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

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REPORTS

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VOL. VIII.

EAST INDIES:—CARNATIC WAR, &c.

1781 & 1782.

1806.

REPORTS

ON THE

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AND OF

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS

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1782. 6th *March.*—SIXTH REPORT from the ſame Committee.

(The Second Maratta War.)

The SUBJECTS of this Report are,

Reference to the Diſputes which exiſted between the Britiſh Governments in India and the Maratta Nation, at the Period when Colonel Upton returned from Poona to Fort William in July 1777, and Examination whether they were compromiſed, and Peace reſtored, with a Likelihood of Permanency between the Company and the Poona Government---Account of the Proceedings of the Supreme Council in regard to the Nature of their latter Interference in the Diſputes between the Preſidency of Bombay and the Maratta Durbar---The great Aſſiſtance of Men and Money afforded the Preſidency of Bombay by the Supreme Council, and Detachment of a Body of Troops from Fort Saint George to ſtrengthen the Army on the Malabar Coaſt---Difficulties and Impediments which the Bengal Detachment met with in the Outſet of their March, and the Contrariety of Orders which the Commander of it received from the Preſident and Council of Bombay, before his Arrival at Chatterpore in the End of June---Opinions and Propoſitions of the ſeveral Members of the Superior Council reſpecting thoſe Incidents---Embaſſy to Berar in conſequence of Intelligence of a Declaration of War by France---, Reſult of the Examination into ſeveral Records of the Preſidency of Bombay, concerning the Conduct and Events of the War---View of the Proceedings under that Government---Reſolutions of the Select Committee in Favour of Ragoba---Calamitous Conſequences ariſing therefrom, and Plan for making the War a Means of retrieving their Affairs---Conſideration of the Meaſures which the Governor General and Council adopted in the Interim, and an Endeavour to inveſtigate the Motives of their Conduct, particularly in regard to the Change which it appeared was made in the Command of the Bengal Detachment, and to the Variety of their Reſolutions and Directions for the Purpoſe of completing the intended Connection with the Berar Rajah---Effect which the News of the

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N° 365. Letter from Bengal (Secret Department) to the Honourable the Court of Directors, &c. dated 30th April 1781, containing a Narrative of their Proceedings with respect to the Berar Government, and the Army of the Berar Rajah, stationed for a long Time in the Province of Orissa, with Correspondence, Letters, and Papers, &c. relative to the same - - pp. 1059 to 1071.

N° 366. Instructions from the Governor General and Council to Colonel Grainger Muir, the 21st April 1781—Also Extract of Bombay Diary, the 12th May 1781, relative to the Route of Scindia's Camp, &c. by Lieutenant Colonel Camac - - - - - pp. 1071 & 1072.

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COPIES of Two NARRATIVES from the GOVERNOR GENERAL to EDWARD WHEELER, Eſquire, relative to the AFFAIR at BENARES and a Copy of a Letter from Bengal in the Secret Department, with Poſtſcript (Auguſt... October 1801) containing Information of the Succeſs of the Company's Arms againſt Hyder Ally - - - - - - - pp. 1099 to 1105.

APPENDIX

TO THE

FIFTH REPORT from the COMMITTEE OF SECRECY, &c.

CONTINUED.

FIRST MARATTA WAR.

APPENDIX, No. 46.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated the 3d March 1775.

Par. 32. HAVING taken into our moſt ſerious Conſideration the Circumſtances which induced our Preſident and Council to ſuſpend payment of Tribute to his Majeſty *Shaw Allum*, we muſt declare, that his own conduct has rendered that Meaſure not only expedient, but abſolutely neceſſary.

33. We have heretofore ſignified our earneſt deſire to have his Majeſty accommodated, if poſſible, with a ſuitable Reſidence within the Limits of *Bengal*, in order to avoid thoſe Evils which we ſoon found would reſult from a continual drain of the circulating Specie of the Provinces; but notwithſtanding we were aſſured, that ſuch Reſidence would have been for the King's real advantage, yet as his Majeſty diſcovered an averſion to the Meaſure, we never abated in our attention to his Perſon, which is fully evinced by the regular Payment of the ſtipulated Tribute. We thought it incumbent on us to lay our Sentiments before his Majeſty, but we took no ſteps whatever which could be conſtrued as intended to reſtrain him from acting on the occaſion as he ſhould think proper. It was however with deep Concern we obſerved the King's views were ſuch, as appeared to us altogether inconſiſtent with his circumſtances. Inſtead of availing himſelf of a ſituation ſo eligible as that, which the Provinces might have afforded him, his Majeſty gave us early Proofs, that nothing leſs than the poſſeſſion of *Delhi* could ſatisfy his deſires; and the Meaſures adopted and purſued by him for that Purpoſe were utterly repugnant to the intereſts of the Company.

34. The junction of his Majeſty with the Marattas, the Defeat of his Army by their Troops, and the ceſſion of the Provinces aſſigned for his Support, were Circumſtances ſo alarming, that it became the indiſpenſable duty of our Preſident and Council, to ſeize the opportunity which then offered for preventing thoſe Provinces from falling into the Hands of the Marattas; who were not only become formidable to our Ally *Sujah ul Dowlah*, but were evidently aſpiring to univerſal Conqueſt.

35. Although the Provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad* were reſerved to the King by the Treaty of 1765, we can by no means allow that his Majeſty acquired by that Treaty a right to reſign them into the hands of our Enemies. As the Vizier of the Empire is the firſt officer under his Majeſty, and as the Territories in queſtion were formerly held by the Vizier, we cannot but be of opinion, that our Servants acted with great propriety, in committing them again to his Management when it became abſolutely impoſſible for his Majeſty to hold them in his own immediate Poſſeſſion. And as the King had not only withdrawn himſelf from our Protection, and abandoned the Countries aſſigned to him, but alſo continued by his preſence to countenance the depredations of the Marattas, we fully approve the Reſolution of our Preſident and Council, under thoſe Circumſtances to ſuſpend payment of Tribute to his Majeſty; as we think the general principles of Self-preſervation warranted them to withhold Reſources, which if ſent, they knew muſt fall into the hands of the Marattas, and which they had every reaſon to believe would be appropriated to the uſe of their Army, and contribute towards enabling them to commit hoſtilities in our own Provinces, or in thoſe of our Allies.

36. For the above reaſons, we, upon the matureſt Deliberation, confirm the Treaty of *Benares*; and we alſo hereby direct, That no further Remittances be made to the King without our expreſs permiſſion firſt obtained for that purpoſe.

37. If the King's Vakeel ſhall voluntarily, or by order of his Majeſty, remain at *Calcutta*, we conſent for the preſent that he be allowed the Sum appointed by our Preſident and Council for his ſupport.

38. And if you ſhall be of opinion, that it may be in the power of *Nudjiff Khan* to render us future Services, and therefore that it will be prudent to pay his Stipend, we direct, that in ſuch caſe it be continued.

49. By Letters received over Land from our Select Committee at *Fort William*, dated the 14th and 19th of May 1774, we are informed of the defeat and death of *Hafez Rhamut Khan*, Chief of the Rohillas, and of the probability of that Country being ſpeedily ſubdued by *Sujah ul Dowlah*; and notwithſtanding the pecuniary advantages which the Company have gained by the event, we are exceedingly concerned to find that our Arms have been employed in the conqueſt of the Rohillas, though we muſt confeſs the conduct of their Chiefs,

APPENDIX, No. 46.

in refuſing to fulfil their ſolemn Stipulations with the Vizier, ſeems to have drawn upon them the calamities they have ſuffered.

50. After noticing the cautionary Terms ſettled with *Sujah ul Dowlah* previous to the march of our Troops, we can have no doubt of his having fulfilled the Conditions of the Agreement by which he became entitled to our Aſſiſtance; and had the object in view been extended no further than to compel Payment of the 40 Lacks of Rupees due to the Vizier and the Company for the protection afforded the Rohillas, we ſhould have had leſs objection to the meaſure; though it would have been much more agreeable to us, if the Rohillas had faithfully complied with their engagements, which were entered into for the immediate and mutual defence of the contracting Parties, and in which alſo the Intereſt of the Company was concerned.

52. The Treaty of *Allahabad* compels us to aſſiſt the Vizier in defending his Dominions in caſe they ſhall at any time hereafter be attacked; but in regard to new Conqueſts, or to any warlike Enterprizes beyond his own Territories, we abſolutely prohibit you from employing our Troops on ſuch Expeditions, on any pretence whatever.

53. We much approve the Alteration made in the ſecond Article of the Treaty of *Allahabad*, reſpecting the Terms upon which our Aſſiſtance is, in caſes of neceſſity, to be granted to *Sujah ul Dowlah*, as thoſe Terms were very inadequate to the Service to be performed, and conſequently very improper.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated the 7th March 1775.

Par. 3. By a Letter from our Select Committee, dated the 24th of Auguſt 1774, we are informed that a Brigade of our Troops, which by former Advices was expected to have been returned within our Provinces, had nevertheleſs, at the ſolicitation of *Sujah ul Dowlah*, penetrated into the centre of the Rohilla Country on the oppoſite ſide of the *Ganges*: The above Advice cannot but alarm us exceedingly; more eſpecially when we attend to the ſituation and circumſtances of the neighbouring Powers, and are informed in the Letter above-mentioned of the ſteps taken by the King, and the probability there is of the Marattas being ſufficiently diſengaged from their inteſtine broils, to turn their Arms againſt our Poſſeſſions, if they ſhall deem it for their intereſt to commit depredations therein.

4. Under the above Circumſtances we could not omit the preſent opportunity of teſtifying our concern on ſending ſo conſiderable a part of our Army at ſuch a diſtance from our Territories, and ſo employed as to render it difficult for them to repair within the Provinces in time to prevent the ravages of an Enemy, in caſe the tranquillity of *Bengal* ſhould be ſuddenly interrupted.

5. We therefore direct, that you on no Account permit our Troops to remain beyond the line of Defence originally ſettled with *Sujah ul Dowlah*; but that you forthwith take meaſures for their recal, in caſe they ſhall not be returned before the Arrival of theſe our Orders.

6. And as the hazard to which our Poſſeſſions are expoſed by undertaking ſuch diſtant Expeditions appears to us very great, and the meaſure ſo very repugnant to every idea of ſound Policy, we hereby abſolutely reſtrict you from all attempts of this nature in future: And we poſitively direct, That you never conſent to employ our Troops beyond the Limits of our own Provinces, or thoſe of our Ally *Sujah ul Dowlah*; including therein ſuch Territories only as we are by Treaty obliged to defend, in caſe his dominions ſhall at any time be actually invaded.

From *Nudjiff Khan*; received 2d January 1776.

I have been honoured with your agreeable Letter, expreſſive of the ſincereſt Friendſhip, which filled me with the greateſt pleaſure.

I perfectly comprehend what you write, that you had applied to the Company for their orders reſpecting the continuation of my Annuity, and received their approbation for that purpoſe, but that the carrying it into execution is delayed till my Anſwer can be received. To the charge of encouraging and entertaining Deſerters from the Company's Service, and Enemies of the Engliſh Nation, and particularly the Aſſaſſin *Sumroo*, I have already written you very fully on this ſubject, and muſt repeat, that after the Conqueſt of *Ackbarabad*, when the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah* determined upon the Expedition to *Rohilcund*, in which he was joined by many Engliſh Gentlemen and a Brigade of Engliſh Forces, he repeatedly wrote to me in the moſt preſſing terms, to join my Forces to his in that Expedition, and to prevail on his Majeſty to give him a meeting on the banks of the *Ganges*. I accordingly got his Majeſty to march from *Shahjikanabad*, but he afterwards went back again. I joined the Nabob's Army, who received me with the greateſt kindneſs, and gave the management of the affairs of the Vizerut into my hands, and returned himſelf to *Fizabad*. I ſet off on my Return to *Sejchanebad*; before my arrival his Majeſty had ſent for that villain *Sumroo*, who had been long in the ſervice of the Jauts, and taken him into his own ſervice, giving him *Paunput* and other Mahals for his ſubſiſtence.

Whilſt I was with the Army of the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*, I viſited an Engliſh Gentleman who was at that time attached to his Army, who told me that his Majeſty having engaged in his ſervice an Enemy of the Engliſh Company, it was my duty to cauſe him to be driven from thence. Accordingly, on my Arrival at the Preſence I applied to his Majeſty for that purpoſe, who was pleaſed to anſwer me, That he and *Sumroo* were inſeparably connected, and that from the conduct of the Engliſh Chiefs he was under no obligation to diſmiſs *Sumroo* at their requeſt. As I was intimately acquainted with the Company, I made uſe of my utmoſt endeavours to effect this point, but his Majeſty would never hear of it. Eight or nine Months paſſed in this manner, of which you muſt have received information from the News-papers. At laſt his Majeſty, by the Advice of *Aboulabaa Khan*, in oppoſition to me, called *Sumroo* to his Preſence. As they were not pleaſed with my having the management of the affairs of the Vizerut, or with the endeavours which my connection with the Engliſh Company led me to make uſe of, for the Expulſion of *Sumroo*, they determined to ſend for him and break with me. I clearly ſaw that the arrival of *Sumroo* would cauſe the greateſt diſturbances; and no other remedy preſented itſelf than that of encouraging *Sumroo*, and detaching him from his Majeſty, as the Engliſh Army was at that time cantoned at *Bereilly* in the Rohilla Country. The apprehenſions entertained by *Sumroo* on account of its vicinity, induced him to quit his Majeſty's Service, and hearken to me. It being my deſign to keep him in continual vagrancy, and prevent him from eſtabliſhing himſelf in any ſettled habitation, I diſpatched him towards *Jeypore*. A number of ſurprizing Events happened at that time. The Gauts and Ragopours, with an Army of 80 or 90,000 Horſe and Foot, excluſive of the Maratta Forces, made an Invaſion into the Country under my authority: this producing the moſt ruinous conſequences, I found it neceſſary to quit *Shahjehanabad*, and march againſt them at the head of my Army, taking with me 3 Battalions of the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*'s Forces which he had left with me before I left *Biſſolie*. I was at this time joined by *Sumroo*, with the detachment which I had ſent forwards to *Jeypore*. The Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah* dying at this period, the new-raiſed Miniſters of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, on the very eve of an Engagement, when the two Armies were

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in ſight, recalled the whole of the Nabob's Forces which were with me. The report of the Diſ-union between me and his Majeſty's Miniſters had already gained ground; and the Recal of the Nabob's Forces giving riſe to an opinion of a Breach between him and me, increaſed the ardour of the Enemy, and ſpread the Flames of War. By the bleſſings of the Almighty, and under the auſpices of your Favour, I chaſtiſed them whenever they appeared in the Field, and obliged them to make a diſgraceful Retreat, and ſhelter themſelves in the Fort of *Deeg*, as they were unable to continue the War, having made trial of their utmoſt ſtrength. The Rajepouts ſeparated themſelves and made their ſubmiſſion, agreeing to the payment of a Tribute. Relying on their oaths, I reſtored to them all the places I had taken from them. Two or three Rohilla Chiefs who were in my ſervice (on account of my joining the allied Armies of the Engliſh and the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah* at *Biſſolie*, in the progreſs of whoſe Arms *Hafiz Rhamut* was ſlain) entertaining an apprehenſion of their own ſafety, quitted the advanced detachment of my Forces before my departure from *Shahjehanabad*, and went over to the Jauts. Theſe Men are now in Arms, at the head of 20,000 Horſe and Foot, under the walls of *Deeg*, and are continually augmenting their Army with great numbers of Rohillas from *Rohilcund*; they have been alſo joined by 7 or 8,000 Maratta Cavalry: This has encouraged the Jauts to perſevere in their obſtinacy. Theſe ſeveral events have obliged me to continue *Sumroo* in my ſervice; were I to diſmiſs him at this time, he would undoubtedly go over to the Jauts (in whoſe ſervice he was from the time of the defeat of the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah* at *Buccar* till his Majeſty ſent for him to the Preſence) and cauſe the utmoſt detriment to affairs. I have already intercepted Letters from him to the Chief of the Jauts and Marattas; but as things are now circumſtanced I have not thought proper to take any notice of it; but have given the ſtricteſt charge to all the Hircarrahs to be vigilant, preventing any correſpondence between him and the Enemy. The Marattas at *Indore* and *Aujene*, who are engaged in a Civil War, have made application for *Sumroo*. I am well acquainted with his villainy, and ſee the impropriety of retaining him in my ſervice, would the ſituation of my Affairs admit of my diſmiſſing him; but this is not a time to take ſuch a ſtep. I am well convinced, that were I to apply to the Company for the aſſiſtance of a Body of their Forces, they would be immediately ſent me, yet I cannot think it adviſable to diſmiſs him at preſent. As ſoon as I am in poſſeſſion of the Fort of *Deeg*, I will give the villain his diſcharge, and will endeavour to diſtreſs and ruin him. With ſuch as look no further than the outſide of things my character will ſuffer for a conduct which neceſſity has impoſed upon me; no other conſideration could have induced me to take into my ſervice an Enemy to the Engliſh Company, and thereby to incur a bad name: That I have done ſo, has been entirely owing to neceſſity. I entertain the ſincereſt attachment and ſubmiſſion to the Company, and will never act contrary thereto: I declare from the bottom of my heart, that I regard all the enemies of the Company as my Enemies, and their Friends as mine. The Friendſhip and Connection eſtabliſhed between the Company and me ſhall never be broken on my part. You may reſt aſſured, that I am amongſt the number of thoſe who pay implicit obedience to the Company. I have faithfully related to you the events that have happened in this quarter. As ſoon as I am relieved from the difficulties of the preſent undertaking, you will ſee whether I mean to encourage him or not, and may then judge of the ſincerity of my profeſſions. Soon after the deceaſe of the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*, the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, with the advice of his new-raiſed Miniſters, diſpatched *Mahomed Elich Khan* to the Preſence, to negociate the affair of the Kellats of the Vizerat Toopeckana, &c. who accordingly applied himſelf to the execution of the truſt repoſed in him. In the mean time the Miniſters inſtilled groundleſs opinions into the mind of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, that *Mahomed Elich Khan* was not approved of by his Majeſty as the Negociator of the affairs of the Killats; that it was therefore neceſſary to ſend ſome other perſon, by whom it might be brought to a ſpeedy concluſion. The Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* immediately recalled *Mahomed Elich Khan*, and ſent another agent to the Preſence; notwithſtanding which, he has not to this day obtained the ends propoſed. *Mahomed Elich Khan* began his journey to the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* by this route, and meeting with my Army, he ſtopped and paid me a viſit. In the mean time the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* deprived *Mahomed Elich Khan* of every one of his poſts, and beſtowed them on *Morteza Khan*. *Mahomed Elich Khan* mentioned to me, that the Miniſter of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* being jealous of him, would never reſt whilſt he was employed by the Nabob: That he was under apprehenſion for his life and honour; and that he could not venture to proceed to the Preſence of the Nabob, except through the means of the Engliſh Chiefs. I wrote to Mr. *Briſtow*, the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, and *Morteza Khan*, on this ſubject, in which I repreſented that *Mahomed Elich Khan* having fallen under the Nabob's diſpleaſure, and being deprived of all poſts without having been guilty of any crime, was under apprehenſions for his life and honour, ſhould he proceed to the Nabob's Preſence; that if a Caulnama under the ſeal of the Engliſh Chiefs was ſent to *Mahomed Khan*, ſtipulating that the accounts ſhould be fairly adjuſted from the papers under the ſignature of the late Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*, and that without ſuch an adjuſtment no Perſon ſhould touch the life, honour, or property of *Mahomed Elich Khan*, he was ready to return and obey all the Nabob's orders: That he had been brought up in the Nabob's Family, and was averſe at the thoughts of quitting it. This was not approved of; but Mr. *Briſtow* wrote *Mahomed Elich Khan* a Letter calculated to encourage him, but did not ſend the Caulnama requeſted by him; neither did the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* ſend him a Caulnama. This created ſuſpicions in his breaſt, and fearing for his honour and life he remained at *Achabarad*, as the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah* had held him in high eſtimation, and raiſed him to the honours; and as he was the channel of the negociations between the Nabob and me, I could not on that account refuſe him an Aſylum. I repeatedly wrote to the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, deſiring that if *Mahomed Elich Khan* ſtood indebted to him, he would ſend an account thereof, and that the ſaid *Khan* would diſcharge whatever appeared by the accounts to be due from him: This propoſal was likewiſe rejected. If the Engliſh Chiefs will even now ſend *Mahomed Elich Khan* a Caulnama, and will give him encouragement, he will immediately proceed to the Preſence of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, where he will either meet with reward or puniſhment, according as he is found to be deſerving of either. The Miniſters of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, of their own Authority, wrote to the Forces ſtationed with *Mahomed Buſhere Khan* in *Rohilcund*, to put their Chiefs in confinement; all the Troops under his command aſſembled accordingly, and coming into the public Durbar, raiſed a diſturbance, and endeavoured to ſeize on his Perſon. By his bravery he eſcaped out of their hands, and proceeded alone, naked and on foot, to the River ſide, where he embarked in a boat, and croſſed over to this ſide of the *Ganges*. He made a viſit to *Mahomed Elich Khan*, and conſidered it as a peculiar piece of good fortune that he had been able to preſerve his life: All his wealth fell into the hands of his Troops. In conſideration of his miſerable ſituation, and of his having been brought up in the family of the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*, I endeavoured to comfort and encourage him. The Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* will probably write reproachfully to you concerning me on this Account. The Affair is as I have repreſented: On this you may depend, *Abdulaed Khan*, who conſiders it as the part of his wiſdom to promote diſſentions, has been frequently heard to ſay, "I have

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no Army at my command, by the fear of which the Sirdars might be led to attend on me; but I will create ſuch diſſentions among them, that they ſhall not have time to eat or drink, by which means they will be reduced to the neceſſity of applying to me." How can I repreſent to you the particulars of the extenſive correſpondence he has held, and ſtill holds with the Jauts and Marattas, and Robillas? But the moſt ſurpriſing of all is, that for theſe four or five months he has been continually writing to *Coſſim Ally Khan*, and inviting him to the Preſence by the promiſe of being favourably received by his Majeſty. The ſaid *Khan* is accordingly arrived, and is encamped without the city. You will learn further particulars from the News-papers.

As you have received the approbation and orders of the Company reſpecting my Annuity, I have no doubt of your complying therewith, and favouring me with the payment thereof. It is well known that I am entirely attached to the Company, and that as long as I have life I ſhall never act otherwiſe than with the moſt implicit obedience to them. Conſidering me as at the diſpoſal of the Company, you will confer favours on me, and regard me as your own; and till I have the happineſs of an interview, will frequently let me have the pleaſure to hear from you.

From *Nejif Khân*; received 6th February 1776.

It is now eight months ſince I arrived in this Country with a deſign to bring to puniſhment the Jauts and Rajeputs, who withdrawing from their duty and allegiance, raiſed diſturbances, and committed depredations in my Territories. In this ſpace of time Lacks of Rupees have been expended in the ſupport of my Army, and other neceſſary charges; and I am indebted Lacks of Rupees to the Bankers. In hopes to bring this Affair to a happy concluſion, I have taken up from the houſe of *Lalljee, Lackery*, &c. Bankers, the ſum of two Lacks of Rupees, and diſburſed it for the ſupport of my Army, &c. As I formerly ſent you by *Mahd Aſkurrie* a Merchant, a Receipt for the Sum of 33,333. 7. in part of the two Lacks ſettled on me per annum by the Company, I now ſend a Receipt for the ſum of Rupees 1,66,666. 9. the Balance of my Annuity of two Lacks, through the channel of the aforeſaid Bankers. I am hopeful that you will give directions for the payment of the ſaid ſum on my ſealed Receipt being preſented to you, by which means the ſaid Bankers will be encouraged to act in my Affairs hereafter. The ſooner you direct the payment of this money to the Bankers, the greater will be my obligation to you. As I am bound by the ties of gratitude to the Company, and have the ſincereſt attachment to you, I look to your friendſhip on every occaſion, with confidence, that it will be exerted in my favour.

Regarding me as your own, I hope you will continually favour me with accounts of your welfare, on which my happineſs depends.

Copy of a Letter from *Nujiff Khan*; received 8th June 1776; dated 25th Rubby-ul-awul, 17th Sun of the King's Reign.

On the 8th of Rubbee-ul-awul I received your Letter of the 17th October. With reſpect to what you mention on the ſubject of the countenance I have given to the Enemies of the Engliſh, and particularly to *Sumroo*, I have before written, and now repeat, &c.

[Here follows a Repetition of his former Letter, received the 2d January.]

After writing that "in caſe he had diſmiſſed *Sumroo* "during the ſiege of *Deig*, *Sumroo* might have yielded "to the impulſe of his bad diſpoſition, and joined the "Jauts, whom he had long ſerved," he proceeds—He (*Sumroo*) wrote ſome Letters once to the Jauts and Marattas, which I diſcovered; but the times were ſuch that I could not take any notice of them; however, I ſtationed Hircarrahs to watch his correſpondence, and by this means it was ſtopped. The Marattas, who are engaged in a civil War in the Decan, have been applying to him for his aſſiſtance. You well know his evil Diſpoſition. I inveſted the Kella of *Deig* four months, the which time was a time of Battle. When I had ſurrounded the Kella with my Army, as with a circle made with a compaſs, I effectually cut off Proviſions from the Kella, and it was with difficulty the beſieged prolonged their lives; but by the bleſſing of God, and your good auſpices, I took the Kella on the 10th of Rubbee-ul-awul, and the Jauts with their Families were deſolate on the plain of Misfortune, whilſt victory and ſucceſs crowned the Arms of the glorious Warriors. By means of Victory and Succeſs I have obtained Poſſeſſion of the Kella of *Deig*, and I offer my thankſgiving at the throne of the Almighty. May the undertakings of you and all my Friends be bleſſed with the ſame proſperity!

Since this arduous War has at length been concluded, I will diſmiſs *Sumroo* from me; but it will offend him. Although the unfortunate juncture of the times, which involved me in ſuch a variety of difficulties, and obliged me to connect myſelf with him ſo long, may prejudice me in the opinion of thoſe who judge only from appearances, yet how could I really have been deſirous of bringing reproach upon my ſelf by [illegible] an Enemy of the Company? It is to be attributed to the neceſſity of the times, and a variety of accidents. I who am in the ſincerity of my heart a well-wiſher of the Company, and obedient to them, will never be guilty of a behaviour inconſiſtent with their will. I know the Company's Enemies are my Enemies, and their Friends my Friends. As I am one of thoſe who are obedient to the Company, by God's bleſſing, I will never deviate from a devotion to their will, and a compliance with their pleaſure. Believe me ſincerely your's, and favour me with the Allowance which I owe to your goodneſs, and for the payment of which you have obtained the leave of the Company, that I may not be left in manifeſt diſtreſs (by diſmiſſing *Sumroo*) as I am remedileſs.

I derive my ſupport from you, and am ſenſible of the obedience due from me to the Company. *Raja Diaram* attends your Preſence: I requeſt that you will conſider him as one regarded in a confidential light by me, and hearken to his repreſentations; and that you will favour him, and pay to him my Allowance, that he may remit it to me.

To *Nejuff Khan*; written 13th June 1776.

I have had the Satisfaction to receive your Letters (vide received 2d January, 6th February, and 8th June) aſſuring me of your attachment to the Company, and your Intention of diſmiſſing *Sumroo*, the ſiege of *Deeg* having been ſucceſsfully terminated by the reduction of that Fortreſs; and informing me of various particulars, all which I very clearly underſtand.

I place the greateſt confidence in theſe declarations and profeſſions, and do not doubt of their being followed by effective proofs of your zealous Attachment to the Company's intereſt.

I rejoice exceedingly to hear that the Fortreſs of *Deeg* has been reduced by your victorious Army. May this event prove fortunate to you and to all your well-wiſhers; and may all your undertakings be crowned with proſperity, and daily add to the reputation that you have already ſo juſtly merited and acquired! I wait with impatience to hear that you have diſmiſſed *Sumroo*; and not only him, but *Maddoc*, and the other Europeans to whom you have given Commands in your Army. If you require European Officers for your ſervice, and will inform me

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of it, I will ſupply you with Men, whoſe birth, education, and knowledge in the Profeſſion, will enable them to be of great ſervice to your Affairs, and a credit to your name; but ſuch Men as *Sumroo* and *Maddoc* are a contagion to every fair and honourable Character, and they are alſo the impediments to the renewal of the connection which formerly ſubſiſted between you and the Company. May that union be reſtored, and endure for ever! This is my earneſt wiſh; and ſuch is the eſteem which the Engliſh have conceived for you, that they will with pleaſure revive and confirm the ties of friendſhip with you. But reflect that a real and laſting friendſhip cannot exiſt between two Parties whoſe views and inclinations are oppoſite. It is for this reaſon, and that nothing may remain to caſt even a ſhadow of doubt between us, that I earneſtly recommend to you to prevail upon *Mirza Saudit Ally* either to return to his obedience, and to the Preſence of his brother *Aſoph ul Dowlah Behadre*, or to accept of the aſylum which has been offered him in the Province of *Bengal*; but on no account let him remain with you; for although thoſe who know you and know him will entertain no ſuſpicion of your intentions, the uninformed part of the world will attribute ſuch appearances to hoſtile deſigns in both, and that Opinion may be in the end productive of real miſunderſtandings.

When you ſhall have complied with theſe terms, there will be no obſtacle remaining to my carrying into execution the Orders of the Company for continuing to grant you the allowance of two Lacks of Rupees per annum, which you formerly received from them.

From *Nudjuff Khan*: Received 22d October 1776.

I have received your Letter of the 13th June, conveying to me your congratulations on the occaſion of my Victories, and the reduction of the Fortreſs of *Deeg*. It has penetrated me with a ſenſe of your kindneſs, which will ever be retained in my mind. I am convinced that I owe this ſucceſs, which has been imperceptibly effected by the aid of the Almighty, and the opening dawn of his Majeſty's illuſtrious name, to the ſtrength which I have derived from the zeal and regard of my Friends. May the event be proſperous to the Engliſh Gentlemen, and all my Friends and well-wiſhers!

The prevailing ſway of hoſtile and miſchievous nations had long involved the Empire of *Hindoſtan* in darkneſs and ruin; and it never ſuggeſted itſelf to man that it could be reſtored to its priſtine ſplendor. But God has diſpenſed his gracious aid, and the clouds have in a very ſhort period been diſperſed, and the diſorders ſuppreſſed; and the bleſſing of God, the happy influence of his Majeſty's name, and the ſupport of your friendſhip, and that of the Engliſh Chiefs, will accompliſh what remains.

You have deſired me to diſmiſs *Sumroo*, Monſieur *Maddoc*, and the other Europeans to whom I have given Commands in my Army, aſſuring me at the ſame time, that if I require European Officers, you will ſupply me with Men whoſe birth, education, and knowledge in the Profeſſion, will enable them to be of great ſervice to my affairs, and a credit to my name. This aſſurance has rejoiced me, as it has imparted to me new ſtrength in the hopes which, by the means of your friendſhip, I repoſe in the Company. May God grant to you health and happineſs to enjoy the virtues which he has implanted in your breaſt! I will in the time of need avail myſelf of this liberty, to trouble you with my requeſts. My Friend! when I took my leave the ſecond time of his Majeſty in order to extirpate the Jauts, I engaged with them in the Field, but the worthleſs Syeks who are more numerous than Ants and Locuſts, at the inſtigation of various men in power, who profeſſed themſelves, and now profeſs themſelves, the pillars and ſupporters of the Empire, but being deſirous of injuring my affairs, have paid no regard to the welfare of the State, have diſturbed the peace of his Majeſty's territories, and poſſeſſed themſelves, and now poſſeſs themſelves of Country dependant on his Majeſty. On one quarter *Runjeet Sing*, who is maſter of fortreſſes ſtronger than *Deeg*, promotes commotions and bloodſhed, and has ſent his own Mother to the aid of the Army to the South, as you muſt have heard. However, I beſtow no thought on theſe difficulties which ſurround me, though they are of a very alarming nature; but the pleaſure of God, whatever it may be, will be manifeſted, Arrears to a very conſiderable amount are due to my troops, and particularly to theſe men of infamous character, in conſequence of the ſucceſſive diſturbances and wars of the Jauts and Rajepoots; and you muſt have heard that they were mutinous; and entering into combinations, they added ſtrength to the Jauts, &c. and diſtreſſed my affairs. You may have alſo been informed that I have been diſappointed in the hope of ſupplies from *Deeg*, as I did not find a tenth part of what I expected, and failed of the means of quelling the diſorders which prevailed in the Army, and regulating the affairs in a proper manner. His Majeſty iſſues to me the moſt poſitive commands to attend his Preſence to ſettle the account of the Treaſure. His Commands are ſuperior to any other rule. I cannot deſcribe the minuteſt part of my ſincere regard for the Company, and zeal for their welfare; and my pen is unequal to the taſk of repreſenting the kindneſs which I experience from you, in a diſtinguiſhed degree, above the other eminent Perſons of *Hindoſtan*. You have always been the protector of my honour from the time when we were firſt united by the chain of friendſhip, and are now the protector of my honour. The ruin of two men of ſuch infamous character (*Sumroo* and *Maddoc*) would at one time have been an inſtance of attention to your pleaſure, and would have increaſed our friendſhip, as well as confirmed the rights to which I am entitled from the Company: But ſince they had been before entertained by the chiefs of *Hindoſtan*, and this was a breach of friendſhip on their part, as you well know, and it is an act which is paſt, now when the ſpark of contention has aſcended towards heaven, to diſmiſs them both immediately would be attended with the moſt dangerous conſequences. I foreſee that they would join the evil-diſpoſed, and the Rajahs of *Hindoſtan*, and *Syeks*, and raiſe a flame. I have however in contemplation a plan by which they will in time be ſo effectually ruined, that neither the name nor any trace of them will remain. I have accordingly effected the foundation of the expulſion of Monſieur *Maddoc* and other Frenchmen, and cauſed them to tread the deſart of diſſatisfaction; and I will effect the expulſion of the others in time. I requeſt that you will not entertain a doubt of what I have written, but communicate the contents of my Letter to the Gentlemen of the Council, that they may weigh the conſequences. Since I entertain ſuch a friendſhip for the Company, that I ſhould without reluctance ſacrifice my life, on what ſhould I beſtow any conſideration? But thoſe infamous men would annihilate the good which it has coſt me years of trouble to effect; and the Country of *Hindoſtan* would relapſe into its former ſtate of confuſion and diſturbance, and be a prey to its enemies. But I am now encouraged by the poſſibility and proſpect of advancing my power and honour in this Country by the means of your friendſhip, even beyond my wiſhes.

You deſire that I will prevail upon *Myrza Saudit Ally*, either to return to his obedience, and to the Preſence of his brother *Aſoph ul Dowlah Behadre*, or to accept of the aſylum which has been offered him in the Province of *Bengal*; but on no account let him remain with me. My Friend! if you ſuſpect that I have invited the Commandants and other Officers from the Battalions of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, and that I had an unfriendly motive in entertaining *Myrza Saudit Ally Khan*, you do an injuſtice to my ſentiments, and to the ſincerity of my heart. It is a law of hoſpitality, which is obſerved

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not only in *Hindoſtan* but in *Europe*, that if any one enters your roof, he is not to be turned out. In compliance therefore with my duty as a friend, and the ſolicitations of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, who wrote to me on the ſubject, I preſerve *Mirza Saudit Ally* from other connections, and give every encouragement which may render his life eaſy to him here. Since his arrival he has exhibited every appearance of attachment, and of a deſire of entering into a Treaty: Should I check him in his intention of returning, this would afford grounds for ſuſpicion; but while he remains with me, he will not be able to raiſe any diſturbance. But ſhould he be apprized of the contents of your repeated letters, and leave me, miſchief might enſue. I hope that after the peruſal of my letter, and the aſſurance of my zeal and ſincerity, you will no longer entertain ſuch groundleſs ſuſpicions; for I have never acted, and never will act, inconſiſtently with my friendſhip.

You have informed me that you have received the orders of the Company for the continuation of my allowance, for which I conſider myſelf indebted to your kindneſs. But if you will befriend me by carrying theſe orders into execution, the appearance will ſtrike a terror into my Enemies, as it will be a token of the Company's favour. I requeſt that you will oblige me with frequent letters, till I ſhall have the pleaſure of an interview.

Minutes and Proceedings of the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors, on *Bengal* Affairs, before the Arrival of the *Anſon*.

At a Court of Directors held on Tueſday the 10th of October 1775.

The Court proceeding to take into conſideration the ſtate of Affairs in *Bengal* under the conduct of the Governor General and Council there, the following Particulars were read; *viz.*

An introductory Letter from General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, dated the 30th November 1774:

Another Letter from thoſe Gentlemen of the ſame date, fully adviſing their Proceedings:

Minute of Mr. *Richard Barwell* of the 23d November:

Mr. *Francis*'s Obſervations on Mr. *Barwell*'s Minute.

The Court then entering particularly into the Conſideration of the 70th Paragraph of the ſecond Letter above-mentioned, it was, on the Queſtion;

Ordered, That it be referred to the Committee of Accounts to conſider the State of the Company's Affairs in *Bengal*, and to report their Opinion thereupon: and that each of the Directors who ſhall think proper to attend the ſaid Committee ſhall have a voice therein.

Letter from the three above-mentioned Gentlemen, dated the 1ſt December 1774, addreſſed to *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire:

Letter from *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, dated the 3d of ſaid December:

Mr. *Haſtings*'s Minute of the 8th of that Month, in Support of the Aſſiſtance given to the Vizier againſt the Rohillas;—were alſo read.

And then the Court poſtponed the reading of the remainder of the Advices relative to the Affairs of *Bengal* until a future day.

At a Court of Directors held on Wedneſday the 18th October 1775.

The Court proceeding in the Conſideration of the ſtate of Affairs in *Bengal* under the conduct of the Governor General and Council there;

The Letter from the Governor General, containing his Remarks, &c. dated January 1775; alſo,

The Minute of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, dated the 11th of ſaid January, to the end of the 53d paragraph;—were read:

And then the Court poſtponed the reading of the remainder of the Advices relative to the Affairs of *Bengal* until a future day.

At a Court of Directors held on Wedneſday the 25th October 1775.

The Court proceeding in the Conſideration of the Advices lately received from the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, part of a Letter from General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, dated the 11th January 1775 (No. 1.) beginning with the 54th and ending with the 75th paragraph, was read.

At a Court of Directors held on Friday the 27th October 1775.

The Court proceeding in the Conſideration of the Advices received this ſeaſon from the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, the following particulars were read; viz.

The Remainder of the Letter from the Governor General, dated the 22d February, beginning after his remark on the 75th paragraph of the Charge in the Minute of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, dated the 11th January 1775 (No. 1.):

Letter from the Governor General, dated the 23d February laſt:

Minutes of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, dated the 25th (No. 2. and 3.):

Minute of General *Clavering*, dated the 18th of ſaid February; and

The Governor General's Reply thereto.

At a Court of Directors held on Tueſday the 21ſt of November 1775.

The Court proceeding to take into Conſideration the ſtate of the Company's Affairs in *Bengal*, according to the Advices received from thence in the courſe of this year; it was thereupon

Ordered, That it be referred to a Committee of the whole Court, to conſider of the ſame, and report their Opinion thereon;

And the Court then reſolved itſelf into the ſaid Committee accordingly.

At a Court of Directors held on Tueſday the 28th of November 1775.

A Report from the Committee of the whole Court, dated the 21ſt inſtant, being now preſented, containing their Proceedings on the reference of this Court of the ſame date, to conſider of the ſtate of the Company's Affairs in *Bengal*, according to the Advices received from thence in the courſe of this year,

The ſaid Report was read; and, after very mature Conſideration thereof, it was

Reſolved, That this Court doth agree with the ſaid Committee in their Opinion, That, it appearing that differences of opinion have ariſen in the Superior Council in *Bengal*, and that debates have been carried to great height, and in many inſtances with great warmth, it is neceſſary for the Court of Directors to give deciſive opinions upon ſubjects ſo material to the intereſts of the Company, that their Councils abroad may have in full view the ground on which they ſhall act.

And an Amendment being propoſed to the Committee's ſecond Reſolution, by ſtriking out the following Words at the cloſe thereof, viz.

"*And were alſo contrary to thoſe general Principles of* "*Juſtice which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported;*"

And after a debate, and the queſtion being put, That the ſaid words do ſtand as part of the ſaid Reſolution;

The

The ſame paſſed in the Affirmative; and it was thereupon

Reſolved, That this Court doth agree with the ſaid Committee in their Opinion, That the Agreement made with *Sujah Dowlah* and the then Governor, for the hire of a part of the Company's Troops for the reduction of the Rohilla Country, and the ſubſequent ſteps taken for carrying on that War, were founded on wrong policy; were contrary to the general Orders of the Company for keeping their Troops within the bounds of the Provinces, and for not extending their conqueſts; and were alſo contrary to thoſe general principles of juſtice which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported.

And then it was further

Reſolved, That this Court doth agree with the ſaid Committee in their Opinion, That the whole Correſpondence between the Governor General and Mr. *Middleton* ſhould have been laid before the Members of the Superior Council, who ought to have received every information reſpecting the tranſactions of the Company's Agent at *Sujah Dowlah*'s Court, in order to regulate their conduct at that critical period.

And it was thereupon, on ſeveral Motions,

Ordered, That a General Court be ſummoned to meet at this Houſe on Wedneſday the 6th of December next, on ſpecial Affairs.

Ordered, That in the Advertiſement for the meeting of the ſaid Court, it be ſignified to the Proprietors, that the Papers relating to the diſputes between the Members of the Superior Council at *Bengal* will lie in the Secretary's office for their peruſal.

At a Court of Directors held on Wedneſday the 29th of November 1775.

A Report from an open Committee of Accounts, dated the 28th inſtant, being read;

Reſolved, That this Court do agree in opinion with the ſaid Committee, that it is neceſſary to wait the arrival of the *Anſon*, or ſome further Advices from *Bengal*, before a preciſe judgment can be formed relative to the future reſources of that Preſidency.

At a Court of Directors held on Friday the 1ſt of December 1775.

The Court now conſidering their Reſolution paſſed the 28th of laſt month, in conſequence of the Report from the Committee of the whole Court of the 21ſt of the ſame month, which Reſolution is as follows; viz.

" Reſolved, That this Court doth agree with the ſaid " Committee in their Opinion, that the Agreement made " with *Sujah Dowlah* and the then Governor, for the hire " of a part of the Company's Troops for the reduction " of the Rohilla Country, and the ſubſequent ſteps taken " for carrying on that War, were founded on wrong " policy, were contrary to the general Orders of the " Company for keeping their Troops within the bounds of " the Provinces, and for not extending their conqueſts, " and were contrary to thoſe general principles of juſ- " tice which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported."

After a debate thereon, a Queſtion was propoſed, Whether the Words [*and the then Governor*] between the Word [*Dowlah*] and the Word [*for*] ſhould ſtand as part of the ſaid Reſolution;

And the Queſtion being accordingly put,

It paſſed in the Negative.

Another Queſton being propoſed, for amending the ſaid Reſolution, by inſerting the words [*frequently repeated*] between the word [*Company*] and the word [*for*];

And the Queſtion being put,

The ſame paſſed in the Affirmative.

And another Queſtion being propoſed, Whether the words [*of juſtice*] between the word [*Principles*] and the word [*which*] ſhould ſtand as part of the ſaid Reſolution;

And the Queſtion being accordingly put,

It paſſed in the Negative;

And thereupon the ſaid Reſolution, as now amended, was agreed to, and ſtands as follows; viz.

Reſolved, That this Court doth agree with the ſaid Committee, that the Agreement made with *Sujah Dowlah*, for the hire of a part of the Company's Troops for the reduction of the Rohilla Country, and the ſubſequent ſteps taken for carrying on that War, were founded on wrong policy; were contrary to the general Orders of the Company, frequently repeated, for keeping their Troops within the bounds of the Provinces, and for not extending their conqueſts; and were alſo contrary to thoſe general principles which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported.

At a Court of Directors held on Tueſday the 5th of December 1775.

Two Reports from the Committee of the whole Court, dated the 29th and 30th November laſt, being preſented and read, containing their further Proceedings on the reference of Court, dated the 21ſt of that month, to conſider of the ſtate of the Company's Affairs, according to the Advices received from thence in the courſe of this year;

It was, on the Queſtion,

Reſolved, That this Court doth agree with the ſaid Committee in their Reports, that the meaſure of recalling the Troops from the Rohilla Expedition, as ſoon as it could be done with propriety, was agreeable to the ſpirit of the Company's general Orders; but, conſidering the ſituation of Affairs at that time between the Company and *Sujah Dowlah*, and other circumſtances, the Court think the recalling them ſo haſtily might have been attended with inconveniencies.

At a Court of Directors held on Wedneſday the 6th of December 1775.

The Reſolutions of this Court of the 28th and 29th November laſt, and the 1ſt and 5th inſtant, relative to the Company's Affairs at *Bengal*, were read.

At a General Court of the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, held at their Houſe in Leadenhall-ſtreet, on Wedneſday the 6th of December 1775, at twelve o'Clock at noon;

PRESENT,

John Roberts, Eſquire, Deputy Chairman,
With moſt of the Directors, and a very numerous appearance of the Generality.

The Deputy Chairman acquainted the Court, That the Court of Directors having taken into conſideration the differences which, according to the Advices received in the courſe of this year, appeared to have ariſen in the Superior Council in *Bengal*, had paſſed ſeveral Reſolutions thereon, which are ready to be ſubmitted to this Court.

And the ſaid Reſolutions being thereupon called for, were read, being as follows; viz.

" Reſolved, That this Court is of Opinion, that the " Agreement made with *Sujah Dowlah*, for the hire of a " part of the Company's Troops for the reduction of " the Rohilla Country, and the ſubſequent ſteps taken " for carrying on that War, were founded on wrong " policy; were contrary to the general Orders of the Com- " pany, frequently repeated, for keeping their Troops " within the bounds of the Provinces, and for not ex- " tending their Territories; and were alſo contrary to " thoſe general principles which the Company wiſh " ſhould be ſupported."

" Reſolved, That this Court is of Opinion, that the " whole Correſpondence between the Governor General " and

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« and Mr. *Middleton* ſhould have been laid before the « Members of the Superior Council, who ought to have « received every information reſpecting the tranſactions of « the Company's Agent at *Sujah Dowlah's Court, in order* « to regulate their conduct at that critical period."

" Reſolved, That this Court is of Opinion, that it is « neceſſary to wait the Arrival of the *Anſon*, or ſome « further Advices from *Bengal*, before a preciſe judg- « ment can be formed relative to the future reſources « of that Preſidency."

" Reſolved, That this Court is of Opinion, that the « meaſure of recalling the Troops from the Rohilla « expedition, as ſoon as it could be done with propriety, « was agreeable to the ſpirit of the Company's general « Orders; but, conſidering the ſituation of Affairs at « that time between the Company and *Sujah Dowlah*, « and other circumſtances, the Court think the recalling « them ſo haſtily might have been attended with in- « conveniencies."

The Court taking the above Reſolutions into conſideration;

An Amendment was propoſed to the firſt Reſolution, by prefixing to it the following words, viz.

That, notwithſtanding this Court hath the higheſt opinion of the ſervices and integrity of Warren Haſtings, *Eſquire, and cannot admit a ſuſpicion of corrupt motives operating on his conduct without proof, yet they are of opinion with their Court of Directors*;

And the Court conſidering of that Amendment;

And the 32d paragraph of the Letter to the Select Committee at *Bengal*, dated the 11th November 1768; alſo the 45th paragraph of the Letter to the Select Committee at *Bengal*, dated the 28th Auguſt 1771; and

The Inſtructions from the Governor and Select Committee at *Bengal* to Sir *Robert Barker*, dated the 30th April 1772, entered on the ſaid Committee's Conſultations of the ſame date;

After a Debate of great length, and the Queſtion being put for the ſaid Amendment,

The ſame paſſed unanimouſly in the Affirmative:

And then the Queſtion being put on the ſaid amended Motion, it was

Reſolved unanimouſly, That notwithſtanding this Court hath the higheſt opinion of the ſervices and Integrity of *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, and cannot admit a ſuſpicion of corrupt motives operating on his conduct without proof, yet they are of opinion with their Court of Directors, that the Agreement made with *Sujah Dowlah* for the hire of a part of the Company's Troops for the reduction of the Rohilla Country, and the ſubſequent ſteps taken for carrying on that War, were founded on wrong policy; were contrary to the general Orders of the Company, frequently repeated, for keeping their Troops within the bounds of the Provinces, and for not extending their Territories; and were alſo contrary to thoſe general principles which the Company with ſhould be ſupported.

The Court then having conſidered the ſecond Reſolution of the Court of Directors, on the Queſtion,

Reſolved unanimouſly, That this Court do agree with the opinion of the Court of Directors, that the whole Correſpondence between the Governor General and Mr. *Middleton* ſhould have been laid before the Members of the Superior Council, who ought to have received every information reſpecting the tranſactions of the Company's Agent at *Sujah Dowlah*'s Court, in order to regulate their conduct at that critical period.

The third Reſolution of the Court of Directors being alſo conſidered, and the Queſtion put, it was

Reſolved, That this Court do agree in opinion with the Court of Directors, that it is neceſſary to wait the Arrival of the *Anſon*, or ſome further Advices from *Bengal*, before a preciſe judgment can be formed relative to the future reſources of that Preſidency.

And then the Court, on conſidering the fourth Reſolution of the Court of Directors, on the Queſtion,

Reſolved, That this Court do agree in opinion with the Court of Directors, that the meaſure of recalling the Troops from the Rohilla expedition, as ſoon as it could be done with propriety, was agreeable to the ſpirit of the Company's general Orders; but, conſidering the ſituation of affairs at that time between the Company and *Sujah Dowlah*, and other circumſtances, the Court think the recalling them ſo haſtily might have been attended with inconveniencies.

A Motion being then made,

" That it is the Opinion of this Court, that the in- « ſinuations thrown out by three Members of the Council « General of *Bengal*; in their late Diſpatches, againſt Mr. « *Haſtings*, (whereby it is inſinuated, " that his motives « for engaging in the Reduction of the Rohillas were not « the oſtenſible motives he has aſſigned, and that he « acted therein contrary to his judgment,") are injurious « to the Character of Mr. *Haſtings*, and ought not to « have been made uſe of, unleſs accompanied with the « grounds and reaſons on which ſuch inſinuations are « founded, whereby the Company might have been « enabled to judge for themſelves on a point of ſo much « importance to it as the character of the Governor « General of *Bengal*."

And it being thereupon moved to adjourn;

The Court, on the Queſtion being put,

Adjourned accordingly.

Extract of Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, dated the 15th of December 1775.

Par. 1. While we were indulging the hope that ſo perfect an harmony would have prevailed amongſt the Members of the new Adminiſtration in *Bengal*, as is neceſſary to give vigour to the acts of Government, as well as dignity to your councils, how great muſt our concern and diſappointment be, on finding that Diſſentions have ariſen ſo early, and operated ſo far as they appear to have done, from the ſeparate Addreſſes of our Governor General and the Majority of the Board, as well as from the Minutes on your public Records! We are far from diſapproving a difference of opinion on any meaſure; on the contrary, we conſider it as the duty of every Member of your Board to expreſs his ſentiments with freedom on every ſubject. Our concern proceeds ſolely from obſerving a warmth of altercation, which threatens to deſtroy that mutual reſpect and confidence we were ſo ſolicitous to promote, when we recommended harmony among yourſelves.

2. As the ſeparate Addreſſes of our Governor General, and of the Majority of Council, to the Court of Directors, and of the latter to our late Chairman and Deputy Chairman, are entered upon your Records, we ſhall conſider them as Proceedings or Minutes of Council, and as ſuch reply to thoſe particulars which require our obſervation, direction, or determination; and herein we ſhall be guided by that equal regard which we bear towards every Member of your Board, expreſſing our approbation of ſuch meaſures as are right, and reprehending thoſe which appear to us deſerving of cenſure: But before we proceed to thoſe particulars, we think it neceſſary to communicate to you the following Reſolutions, agreed to by a General Court of Proprietors, held on the 6th inſtant, relative to ſundry objects on which you have been divided.

" Reſolved unanimouſly, That, notwithſtanding this Court hath the higheſt opinion of the ſervices and integrity of *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, and cannot admit a ſuſpicion of corrupt motives operating on his conduct without proof, yet they are of opinion with their Court of Directors, that the Agreement made with *Sujah Dowlah*, for the hire of a part of the Company's Troops for the reduction of the Rohilla Country, and the ſubſequent ſteps taken for carrying on that War, were founded on wrong policy; were contrary to the general Orders of the Company,

Company, frequently repeated, for keeping their troops within the bounds of the provinces, and for not extending their territories; and were alſo contrary to thoſe general principles which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported.

Reſolved unanimouſly, That this Court do agree with the opinion of the Court of Directors, that the whole correſpondence between the Governor General and Mr. *Middleton* ſhould have been laid before the Members of the Superior Council, who ought to have received every information reſpecting the tranſactions of the Company's Agent at *Sujah Dowlah*'s Court, in order to regulate their conduct at that critical period.

Reſolved, That this Court do agree in opinion with the Court of Directors, that it is neceſſary to wait the arrival of the *Anſon*, or ſome further advices from *Bengal*, before a preciſe judgment can be formed relative to the future reſources of that Preſidency.

Reſolved, That this Court do agree in opinion with the Court of Directors, that the meaſure of recalling the Troops from the Rohilla expedition, as ſoon as it could be done with propriety, was agreeable to the ſpirit of the Company's general orders; but, conſidering the ſituation of affairs at that time between the Company and *Sujah Dowlah*, and other circumſtances, the Court think the recalling them ſo haſtily might have been attended with inconveniencies.

3. Having thus laid before you the ſenſe of the Proprietors at large on the above ſubjects, taken after the moſt candid examination of your Records, we proceed to make ſuch further Obſervations, and to give ſuch orders and inſtructions, as from the nature of your advices, and the ſituation of our affairs in *Bengal*, appear to us neceſſary.

4. We diſapprove all ſuch diſtant expeditions as may eventually carry our forces to any ſituation too remote to admit of their ſafe and ſpeedy return to the protection of our own provinces in caſes of emergency.

5. We alſo utterly diſapprove and condemn offenſive wars; diſtinguiſhing, however, between offenſive meaſures unneceſſarily undertaken, with a view to pecuniary advantages, and thoſe which the preſervation of our Honour, or the protection or ſafety of our Poſſeſſions, may render abſolutely neceſſary.

6. The Attention paid by the majority to the tenor and ſpirit of our orders on this ſubject is highly agreeable to us; and it is our moſt poſitive direction, that no deviation from thoſe orders be permitted but upon the moſt urgent and abſolute neceſſity, as that alone can juſtify a departure from them; for the proſpect of any advantages, however alluring, can in no wiſe be adequate to the pernicious conſequences which muſt reſult from examples of diſobedience to our orders.

7. The ſentiments expreſſed by the majority in the 36th paragraph of their addreſs, coincide exactly with our own. Their determination to endeavour to maintain Peace in India, and vigorouſly to defend our poſſeſſions and Allies, cannot be too much applauded; we therefore ſtrictly enjoin every Member of our Council to concur heartily in ſuch meaſures as may be neceſſary for accompliſhing theſe deſirable purpoſes.

8. We have already, in our Letter of the 3d of March 1775, expreſſed our extreme concern on finding that our arms had been employed in conquering the Rohilla Country for *Sujah Dowlah*, and diſapproved the meaſure; and we have no reaſon to alter our ſentiments reſpecting that tranſaction.

9. We not only condemn the principle which eventually produced the Rohilla War, namely, the including of their country in the line of defence marked out for our Commander in Chief, as being contrary to the ſyſtem we had adopted, and repugnant to the general tenor of our orders, but we alſo totally diſapprove the engagements entered into by our ſervants with *Sujah Dowlah*, when *Hafez Rhamet Khan* had failed in the performance of his ſtipulations.

10. On a ſuppoſition that General *Barker*'s ſanction to the Treaty between *Sujah Dowlah* and the Rohillas gave him a right to call upon us to ſee that Treaty fulfilled, it is nevertheleſs evidently certain, that every principle of policy forbad our ſervants to extend their views beyond the ſtrict accompliſhment thereof, and the obtaining of a proper indemnification for charges to be incurred in calling the Rohillas to a juſt account; and we think there was great probability that thoſe ſalutary meaſures might have been accompliſhed without proceeding to hoſtilities. But in all events, inſtead of entering into an agreement with the Vizier, which left no room for accommodation with the Rohillas, it was certainly the duty of our Preſident and Council to have given an immediate and abſolute refuſal to all requiſitions ſo injurious to the reputation of the Company, and eſpecially for engaging in a diſtant expedition, wherein want of ſucceſs might have been attended with fatal conſequences.

11. It is with great ſatisfaction we find, that although hoſtilities were commenced with an apparent determination to exterminate the Rohillas, a more honourable end has been put to that War, and that a proviſion is made for the Son of *Hafez Rhamet Khan*. This circumſtance is the more agreeable to us, as it ſeems to have been effected by the interpoſition of our Commander in Chief, and will, we hope, tend to efface any unfavourable impreſſions which the part taken by our Servants againſt the Rohillas may have occaſioned amongſt the Natives of *India*.

12. The return of our troops from the Rohilla country is an event highly acceptable to us; and from the general tenor of your advices we are led to hope, that the Money then due from *Sujah Dowlah* has been received; but if, from unforeſeen accidents, payment of any part has been delayed, we direct that you inſiſt upon the diſcharge thereof.

13. We by no means approve the idea of continuing to defend the Subah of *Oude* in the Rohilla country; you are therefore in future ſtrictly to confine yourſelves to the letter and ſpirit of our orders on that ſubject, dated 7th March 1775.

14. It is with equal ſurprize and concern that we obſerve, on your Minutes of Council of 13th February 1775, among ſeveral ideas ſuggeſted on the ſubject of a Treaty to be concluded with the ſucceſſor of *Sujah Dowlah*, that any ſervant of the *Eaſt India* Company ſhould propoſe the relinquiſhing of a conſiderable part of our property, and giving up the Rohilla country to the King, in order to facilitate the obtaining from *Shah Allum* a grant of the Sovereignty of *Bengal* and *Bahar* to the Crown of *Great Britain*.

15. We take it for granted that the impropriety of the Minute alluded to muſt have appeared to you in a light ſo ſtriking, as to have precluded all concurrence therein; we nevertheleſs think it neceſſary to iſſue the moſt ſpeedy and peremptory orders and inſtructions for your future guidance, and therefore direct, that no propoſal of a like tendency be ever made by you to *Shah Allum*, or agreed to if propoſed by him, or by any other perſon, on any account or pretence whatever.

16. Although the death of *Sujah Dowlah* may render it neceſſary to make new arrangements with his Succeſſor, we cannot agree with our Council that our Treaties with the State of *Oude* expired with the death of that Nabob.

17. The keeping of a brigade in the ſervice of the Subah of *Oude* is a meaſure we entirely approve (provided it be done with the free conſent of the Subah, but by no means without it) as it enables us to increaſe the real ſtrength of our Army, without incurring additional charges thereby; but the whole pay and contingent charges muſt be borne by the Subah.

18. The death of the late Vizier affords an opportunity for rendering this meaſure ſtill more ſatisfactory. His Succeſſor cannot but be ſenſible how much depends upon our ſupport, and therefore will, we perſuade ourſelves, readily conſent to defray the whole expence of a brigade, to be employed in the defence of his dominions.

APPENDIX, No. 46. 47.

The neceſſary ſtipulations on your part will be, that our troops ſhall not march beyond the line of thoſe territories which *Sujah Dowlah* poſſeſſed in conſequence of the Treaty of 1765, and the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, which were ceded to him by the Treaty of *Benares*; and that they ſhall be at all times ſubject to your recall, in caſe they ſhall be wanted for our own immediate ſervice. Upon theſe principles we direct you to conclude a Treaty with *Sujah Dowlah*'s Succeſſor, and to aſſure him, that the moſt effectual aſſiſtance ſhall be afforded him by us, in caſe his country ſhall at any time be invaded.

19. We find the brigade lately employed with *Sujah Dowlah*, conſiſted of two battalions of Europeans, ſix battalions of Sepoys, and one company of Artillery; and this object appears to us of ſo great importance in every point of view, that we think a complete brigade ſhould be ſtationed in future with the Nabob of *Oude*, and paid by him, as before directed.

20. And as a good body of Horſe would not only be of great uſe in time of action, but alſo of ſingular ſervice in preventing the incurſions of Indian Enemies, who frequently ravage the country with cavalry, and retire before infantry can come up with them, we ſhould deem it an eſſential ſervice rendered the Company, if you could prevail on the Nabob of *Oude* to keep up a body of Horſe, to be diſciplined and officered by Europeans, and under our command.

21. In negociating a defenſive alliance of this nature and extent, no pains muſt be ſpared to convince the Nabob, that our Views terminate ſolely in the preſervation of his country, and that the troops ſo to be kept for his defence will not occaſion a great additional charge to him, becauſe his own forces may be diminiſhed in proportion to the ſtrength acquired by our Aſſiſtance.

22. The ſafety of ſo large a part of our Army requires the utmoſt attention; you will therefore be particularly careful that the reſpective corps be ſo ſtationed as to admit of a ſpeedy junction in caſes of emergency.

23. Whatever number of troops may be thus entertained by the Subah of *Oude*, we muſt again repeat, that the whole expence muſt be borne by him; but due care muſt be taken that ſuch expence be not increaſed by any unneceſſary charge whatever.

24. As the important fortreſs of *Chunargur* was ceded to the Company by *Sujah Dowlah*, you are by all means to keep poſſeſſion thereof. A proper number of Europeans muſt be ſtationed there, and the command of the garriſon muſt be entruſted to none but able and experienced Officers.

25. We direct that the fort of *Chunargur* be forthwith repaired in ſuch manner as ſhall be neceſſary. It is nevertheleſs our order, that the charge of thoſe repairs be included in the ſum already authorized to be expended on public works, and that the ſtricteſt frugality be obſerved in conducting ſuch repairs.

26. Although the office of Vizier of the Empire was confirmed to *Sujah Dowlah* by our influence, we are uncertain how far the paſt conduct and preſent ſituation of *Shah Allum* may render it prudent for us now to interfere in the Appointment of an officer of ſuch nominal authority in his ſervice; but in caſe, from particular circumſtances, it ſhall appear to you neceſſary to take a part in the recommendation of a perſon to fill that office, or that it may contribute to the preſervation of Peace in the country, we ſhall approve of your acting accordingly.

27. The conduct of our late Council in empowering the Preſident to prepare inſtructions for Mr. *Middleton*, as Agent at the Court of *Sujah Dowlah*, without ordering them to be ſubmitted to the Board for their inſpection and approbation, was very improper; and it is our expreſs direction, that no ſuch independent or ſeparate authority be ever delegated to any Governor or Member of Council, or to any other perſon whatſoever; but that all inſtructions to public Agents be laid before the Council, and ſigned by a majority of the Members, before they be carried into execution.

28. As the Appointment of Mr. *Middleton* was made by our Preſident and Council, his correſpondence ſhould have been addreſſed to them, or ſpeedily and unreſervedly laid before them by the Preſident; and we cannot avoid expreſſing our diſapprobation that any part thereof has been withheld from the peruſal of our Supreme Council.

29. Obſerving that Extracts of Letters have been laid before the Board, we direct, that whenever the Governor General, Commander in Chief, or any of our Council, ſhall introduce to the Board any Letters or Correſpondence wrote to them, or to, or by any of them, or by any perſon whatever, by their or any of their directions or privity, relating to the affairs of the company, the *whole of ſuch Letters and Correſpondence* ſhall be produced to, and laid before the Board.

APPENDIX, No. 47.

Extract of the General Letter to *Bombay*, dated the 18th Mach 1768.

Par. 91. THE intimation you gave to our Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, to uſe their endeavours with the Marattas to obtain a grant of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* to us, we highly approve of; and we now recommend to you in the ſtrongeſt manner to uſe your endeavours, upon every occaſion that may offer, to obtain theſe places, which we ſhould eſteem a valuable acquiſition. We cannot directly point out the mode of doing it, but rather wiſh they could be obtained by purchaſe than War.

Copy of a Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, dated 1ſt April 1772.

The laſt Letter we wrote to you was dated the 12th June 1771; and we now give you our ſentiments and inſtructions on ſome important points, to which we expect you will pay the ſtricteſt attention.

We have attended to the Treaty with *Hyder Ally*, concluded in Auguſt 1770, and obſerve by the 3d Article that the Company was to have the excluſive right of purchaſing all the pepper and ſandal-wood in his dominions; the amount whereof, or ſo much as the Company ſhould think proper, was to be paid in warlike ſtores, and the balance in ready money.

The firſt operation of this Treaty is communicated to us in your Letter per *Northington*, dated 4th February 1771; in which you repreſent that *Hyder Ally*, upon Mr. *Church*'s leaving him, gave a liſt of ſuch Articles as he wanted; and that you were determined, in conſequence thereof, to ſend *Hyder Ally* twenty-ſix pieces of cannon and a quantity of ſmall arms, though you wiſhed to have evaded complying with his requeſt for ſuch articles.

Your Advice per *True Briton* informs us, that our Reſident at *Onore* repreſents the Supply ſent to *Hyder Ally* as by no means affording him ſatisfaction; and that upon his defeat by the Marattas, and his preſſing ſolicitations, you had further ordered the ſaid Reſident to furniſh *Hyder Ally* with all the arms which could be ſpared; and this meaſure you doubt not we ſhall approve, conſidering the readineſs he has ſhewn before and ſince the War, to grant us every advantage of trade in the countries ſubject to him.

We are exceedingly concerned to find in the 3d Article of your Treaty with *Hyder Ally*, a ſtipulation reſpecting warlike ſtores, ſubjecting you to act contrary to our inclination and intereſt, the operation whereof muſt

muſt be dangerous in its conſequences, and the meaſure itſelf by no means warranted by neceſſity. Nor indeed, do events prove that *Hyder Ally* deems himſelf bound on his part by the ſaid ſtipulation.

The advantages ariſing from indulging *Hyder Ally* with warlike ſtores, have hitherto chiefly centred in the emolument of individuals. No ſandal-wood, of which the whole produce of his country was to have been the Company's, has been yet received on the Company's account; but thoſe of your ſervants who concluded the Treaty, and to whom *Hyder* communicated his requeſt for warlike ſtores, have engroſſed the whole.

In this general view we muſt condemn your conduct, both for permitting the inſertion of this article in the Treaty, and alſo for ſuffering the perverſion thereof (after it had been concluded) for the benefit of individuals; and although as the Treaty now ſtands we cannot abſolutely and totally prohibit you from ſupplying *Hyder Ally* with the articles therein enumerated, yet it is our earneſt deſire that you evade it by all means in your power; and we could even conſent to relinquiſh the proſpect of trivial advantages reſpecting Inveſtments, rather than contribute, by a ſupply of warlike ſtores, particularly large cannon, to enable *Hyder Ally* to renew his demand, and peremptorily inſiſt upon receiving ſuch ſupplies from us in future.

Another powerful reaſon againſt our furniſhing *Hyder Ally* with the implements of War is, becauſe it is ſcarcely poſſible ſuch circumſtances ſhould be concealed from *Mhada Row*, with whom we are deſirous, on many accounts, to cultivate a good underſtanding. We wiſh to be uniform; and it is our earneſt deſire, that the ſtricteſt neutrality be obſerved reſpecting *Hyder Ally* and *Mhada Row* at your Preſidency as well as at *Fort St. George*; and we hope this will be practicable, becauſe we ſee no other proſpect of enjoying peace at thoſe ſettlements. Whenever we take part in any quarrels of the powers of *India*, we neceſſarily create enemies; but by a ſteady adherence to a neutral plan, and by keeping up a reſpectable eſtabliſhed force, ready to repel and chaſtiſe invaders, we hope and truſt tranquillity will be maintained.

We write confidentially on this delicate ſubject; our ſentiments thereon are not to be rendered public; but we have communicated them to our Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, who have alſo been inſtructed in general to obſerve a ſimilar conduct towards *Mhada Row* and *Hyder Ally*; and we direct that you adviſe with them on all important tranſactions relative to thoſe powers: And here we cannot ſuppreſs our diſpleaſure at your not waiting for their anſwer to your propoſitions for a Treaty, before you put the finiſhing hand thereto: You could not but ſuppoſe them intereſted in ſome degree in the event, and we have reaſon to believe they would have adviſed you againſt complying with a condition, which appears on the ſlighteſt examination to be repugnant to ſound policy, becauſe it cannot with ſafety be fulfilled.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 48.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bombay*, dated 1ſt April 1772.

Par. 38. IN our advices dated the 7th February laſt, we intimated our intention that Mr. *Moſtyn* ſhould proceed to *Poona*, and reſide there in order to advance our intereſt, and facilitate the accompliſhment of our views with *Mhada Row*. And we ſhall now expreſs ourſelves more fully, both in reſpect to thoſe objects and his reſidence, as the means by which we hope to attain them.

Par. 39. As an introduction to our having a fixed Reſident at the Court of *Mhada Row*, we have judged it adviſable to ſend him a Letter, together with a preſent of a Gold Sword and Cattarah; and therefore, unleſs ſome unexpected event has happened to render it abſolutely neceſſary to defer ſuch meaſure, you are to direct Mr. *Moſtyn* to repair forthwith to *Poona* in the public character of Reſident: and you muſt furniſh him with ſuch inſtructions as you ſhall deem neceſſary for his conduct, and moſt likely to effect the ends we propoſe to ourſelves by ſuch reſidence; which are, to acquire upon ſafe and honourable terms ſuch privileges and poſſeſſions as would not only be beneficial to our commerce, but greatly contribute to the ſecurity of our ſettlements on the coaſt of *Malabar*.

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Par. 40. The advantages which the Company would receive from the poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, *Baſſein*, and *Caranja*, are ſo obvious, that theſe muſt neceſſarily be the principal objects of your attention; and we are the more inclined to hope that *Mhada Row* may be prevailed on to cede to us theſe iſlands, as the tribute he receives from them is not ſo conſiderable but that we may be able to offer in exchange what he may deem an equivalent for ſuch ceſſion.

Par. 41. With reſpect to thoſe points on which you are to inſtruct Mr. *Moſtyn*, we ſhall not attempt to lay down any preciſe plan for your guidance, ſince ſo much will depend on circumſtances and events, that local information and your own judgment muſt govern you therein; and eſpecially as much muſt ſtill be left for our Reſident to effect by a prudent choice of meaſures, and an unremitted attention to the intereſts of the Company: But though from theſe conſiderations we are ſenſible that your inſtructions to Mr. *Moſtyn* can be but general, we ſhall here point out to you ſuch particulars as are eſſentially neceſſary to be noticed to him, viz. That he let no favourable circumſtance eſcape him; that he be careful not to give *Mhada Row* any cauſe of diſguſt by frivolous punctilios, which we are perſuaded he may avoid, and ſtill preſerve the reſpect due to his ſtation in our ſervice; that he be particularly watchful of that Prince's temper, and avail himſelf of every apparent diſpoſition in our favour: and above all, that he endeavour to conciliate the minds of his Miniſters, and cultivate a friendſhip with them.

Par. 42. The inclination which we are informed *Mhada Row* has to *Rajapore*, from its being the birth-place of his family, and to the poſſeſſion of *Fort Victoria*, from a religious regard which the Gentoos pay to the river and to the Pagoda near the Fort, may be uſefully employed on this occaſion. And therefore, in caſe great difficulties ſhould ariſe in obtaining *Salſette*, the Reſident may be inſtructed to ſuggeſt to *Mhada Row*, that in conſideration of our being put in poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, *Baſſein*, and *Caranja*, we ſhall not oppoſe his acquiring *Rajapore* from the Sciddee, nor heſitate to yield to him the poſſeſſion of *Fort Victoria*; and we doubt not, but that in ſuch caſe, every difficulty would be removed.

Par. 43. Having thus marked the outlines of inſtructions to be given to Mr. *Moſtyn*, on his proceeding to *Poona* as our Reſident, we ſhall here only obſerve, that by an exertion of your abilities, and ſteady attachment to our intereſt, in carrying our preſent deſign into execution, you will juſtify that confidence we hereby place in your conduct.

Par. 44. By our ſhip *Marquis of Rockingham* you will receive our Letter to *Mhada Row*; but as we are unacquainted with his titles and complimentary mode of addreſs, we have left a ſpace in our Letter for you to fill up in the cuſtomary manner; and we herewith tranſmit you a copy of our Addreſs, which muſt be accompanied by a proper tranſlation. On Mr. *Moſtyn's* repairing to *Poona*, you will commit our Letter and Preſent to his care, and direct him to deliver the ſame to *Mhada Row*, with ſuch ceremonies and marks of reſpect as are ſuitable to the occaſion. And we ſhall only add, that as by the incloſed copy of our Addreſs to *Mhada Row* you will perceive that we intend no more than to maintain a ſtrict

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ſtrict harmony and alliance with him, you muſt govern yourſelves accordingly in all your negociations.

Copy of a Letter to *Mhada Row*.

After the uſual compliments:

Impreſſed as we are with an ardent deſire to increaſe the intercourſe and ſtrengthen the harmony which has long ſubſiſted between your Government and the Engliſh Company, we could not but receive a ſenſible pleaſure upon finding by your Letter to Mr. *Moſtyn* you entertain the ſame diſpoſition to cultivate a mutual friendſhip, and are equally deſirous that it ſhould be eſtabliſhed on a ſure and laſting Foundation.

The Satisfaction which your kind profeſſions afford us, is however in ſome degree allayed by your ſuppoſing that our Servants at *Bombay* and *Surat* are not ſincerely inclined to further that deſirable end; but as they are fully convinced that we earneſtly wiſh to ſecure your eſteem, and to prove ourſelves worthy your confidence, we truſt they would not do any act which would tend to defeat our hopes of your concurring in the ſame views. We perſuade ourſelves that their conduct muſt have been repreſented to you by ſome malevolent or deſigning perſons who wiſhed to interrupt that concord and cordiality which could not but redound to our reciprocal advantage.

Unwilling therefore that you ſhould remain under the leaſt uncertainty of our diſpoſition to perpetuate our friendſhip, we have directed Mr. *Moſtyn* to repair to *Poona*, and reſide at your Court, that we may have the ready means of manifeſting our ſincere intentions of removing every impediment to that amity, which we hope neither time nor the malice of our Enemies will deſtroy; and we are happy to find that the confidence we have of his good conduct is confirmed by that favourable opinion and kind regard with which you are pleaſed to diſtinguiſh him.

We have ſent to our Preſident and Council a Sword and Cattarah, which Mr. *Moſtyn* will have the honour to preſent to you, and we requeſt your acceptance thereof, as a ſmall token of our reſpect, and a pledge of the ſincerity of our deſire to maintain the ſtricteſt harmony with you and your Government.

We ſhall here only add our warmeſt wiſhes, that your days may be crowned with health and honour, and that your dominions may flouriſh in peace and plenty.

In witneſs whereof we have hereunto affixed our Great Seal in the City of *London*, this 1ſt day of April, in the year of our Lord 1772.

(L. S.) (Signed) *W. Tayler.*

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 26th September 1772.

Copy of Inſtructions to Mr. *Thomas Moſtyn*.

To *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſq.

Sir,

The Honourable Company having been pleaſed to direct that you ſhould reſide at the court of *Mhada Row*, advance their intereſt, and facilitate the accompliſhment of their views, we ſhall now proceed to communicate to you our Honourable Maſters expectations therefrom, and give you ſuch inſtructions as are ſuitable to the occaſion; previouſly acquainting you, that all your letters on the ſubject of your negociations are to be addreſſed to the Select Committee.

As an introduction to our having a fixed Reſident at *Poona*, the Honourable Company have addreſſed a letter to *Mhada Row*, which is now delivered you, together with a preſent from them of a Gold Sword and Cattarah, which are to be given with ſuch ceremonies and marks of reſpect, as are ſuitable to the occaſion; and, in addition to the preſent ſent out by our Employers, we have provided ſundry articles, amounting together to rupees 11,617, as per liſt incloſed, which are to be diſtributed as preſents, in ſuch manner as you may judge moſt likely to remove any difficulties which might ariſe to impede the execution of our intentions, which are to acquire from him, upon ſafe and honourable terms, ſuch privileges and poſſeſſions as will not only be beneficial to our commerce, but contribute to the ſecurity of the Honourable Company's poſſeſſions on this ſide India.

You are alſo to uſe your utmoſt endeavours to penetrate into any deſigns of the Marattas, which may at all affect the Honourable Company's poſſeſſions in *Bengal*, or the *Carnatic*; and ſhould you be able to diſcover any thing important, relative to either of the other Preſidencies, you muſt immediately ſend the neceſſary notice thither, and communicate the ſame to us, that we may furniſh you with ſuch inſtructions as ſhall appear proper; though in the interim, and eſpecially if the occaſion ſhould be very preſſing, we permit you to take ſuch ſteps as your own prudence may dictate.

By the incloſed atteſted copy of the paragraphs of the Honourable Court's commands of the 1ſt of April laſt, you will be fully apprized of the expectations they have from your reſidence at *Poona* of getting poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, *Baſſein*, and *Caranja*, and of the idea they have formed that they may be acquired by the ceſſion of *Fort Victoria* to the Marattas, and a promiſe on our parts not to oppoſe their acquiring poſſeſſion of *Rajapore* from the Sciddee.

It is out of our power to lay down any preciſe plan for your guidance on the occaſion, at leaſt till we may learn from you the light in which theſe poſſeſſions are reſpectively looked upon by *Mhada Row* or his Miniſters; and even then we are ſenſible much muſt be left to a prudent choice of meaſures on your part, and an unremitted attention to the intereſt of your Honourable Employers, inſomuch as to ſuffer no favourable circumſtance at any time to eſcape you, whether reſpecting this or any other part of your negociations; and we direct that you at all times particularly avoid giving any cauſe of diſguſt to *Mhada Row* by frivolous punctilios, which we entirely concur with our Honourable Employers in opinion, may be well avoided, and at the ſame time the reſpect due to them and to your ſtation be preſerved.

Propoſals having been lately made us by *Futty Sing* to enter into an alliance with him, which have been referred to the Honourable Company, we judge it neceſſary you ſhould be acquainted thereof, and accordingly incloſe an atteſted copy of a Letter from that Chief at *Surat*, which contains the offers made us by him; but at the ſame time we muſt obſerve to you, that as the Honourable Company expreſsly declare it to be their intention to maintain a ſtrict harmony and alliance with the Marattas, you muſt therefore govern yourſelf accordingly in all your negociations.

The poſſeſſion of the Maratta ſhare of the Surat revenue has been an object our Honourable Employers have had long in view, and you muſt therefore acquaint us, after due enquiry, how far they may be induced to give it up, and what equivalent they may expect for it.

As it will be highly neceſſary you ſhould be well acquainted of *Mhada Row*'s temper and deſigns, as well as of the intrigues of his Miniſters, that you may avail yourſelf of every apparent diſpoſition in favour of our Honourable Employers, we therefore permit you to diſburſe ſuch ſums of money for theſe purpoſes as may appear to you really neceſſary; and we at all times recommend to you to conciliate the minds of his Miniſters, and to cultivate a friendſhip with them.

We encloſe copies of different Treaties with the Marattas, and of the correſpondence between the Preſident and Council of *Madras* and the King's Miniſter, that you may govern yourſelf accrodingly.

A copy of the ſmall cypher, with the inſtructions to it, is herewith delivered to you, leſt you ſhould judge it neceſſary

neceſſary at any time to make uſe of it; in your correſpondence with the other Preſidencies it may be highly proper.

Mr. *Edmund Veale Lane* is appointed to accompany you as your Aſſiſtant, and the neceſſary number of Sepoys are ordered to attend you.

You are to keep a regular Diary of your proceedings, two copies of which you are annually to tranſmit hither.

The Honourable Company having been pleaſed to allow you the ſum of 5,000 Rupees annually, we permit you to charge the ſame in your Accounts, or it ſhall be paid here as may be moſt acceptable to you.

We ſincerely wiſh you ſucceſs in your Negociations; and are

Your loving Friends.

Extract of the General Letter from *Bombay*; dated 4th December 1772.

Par. 10. Mr. *Moſtyn*, on his arrival from *England*, was admitted to a ſeat at our Board, and ſhortly after the receipt of your commands of the 1ſt of April laſt, he ſet out for *Poona* with ſuitable Inſtructions for accompliſhing the points your Honours have in view by his reſidence at the Maratta Durbar: He has acquainted us that *Mhada Row* and his Miniſters acquieſced in his continuing there as a fixed Reſident, and that in general he had been very well received: He alſo advises us, that he ſhortly expected an anſwer to your Honours letter, which we hoped to have received in time to have ſent in the *Duke of Cumberland* Packet; but *Mhada Row*'s death, which happened on the 18th ultimo, after a lingering illneſs, we ſuppoſe prevented it. He has been ſucceeded by his Brother, *Naroon Row*, and we do not find that any internal diſturbance is likely to happen on this occaſion.

APPENDIX, No 49.

Extract of General Letter from *Bombay*; dated the 12th April 1771.

Par. 12. THE Preſident laid before us in Conſultation the 19th ultimo, a Letter he had received from the Nabob of *Surat*, as alſo his ſentiments on the ſubject of that Letter, and the nature of the *Surat* Government's Demand on that of *Broach*, both of which are tranſmitted in the packet under No. 36, by which it appearing, as alſo from our own knowledge of that affair, that the *Broach* Government was very largely and juſtly indebted to that of *Surat* for the Phoorza of *Broach*, which for upwards of forty years the former had collected owing to the inability of the latter to obtain redreſs; and alſo that the Nabob of *Broach* had, contrary to Treaty with us, collected a duty of 2½ per cent. for near ſeven years, on all goods the property of Merchants under our protection, whereas the ſame had been ſettled at 1½ per cent. which alone amounted to full a lack and a half of Rupees to this time; all which being conſidered, and the advantage which would in all probability accrue to your Honours by our obliging the Nabob of *Broach* to give ample ſatisfaction for both theſe points, and the preſent opportunity, when our Troops were ſo near his territories, being as favourable as could preſent itſelf, we therefore directed your Servants at *Surat* to make a peremptory demand on the Nabob for the difference of the Cuſtoms he had collected, as alſo for the arrears of the Phoorza, and to put the ſame on a proper footing in future; and ſhould he endeavour to retard or evade the ſame, they are to direct Colonel *Gordon* to tranſport the troops under his command towards his territories to compel him to enter into the beſt terms poſſible, which we doubt not will induce him to pay at leaſt ſome ready Money, and ſettle a mode for an annual future payment, as alſo to put the Cuſtoms on the ſame footing as ſettled by Treaty.

Par. 13. The *Broach* Phoorza belonging to the Nabobſhip, and not to the Caſtle of *Surat*, we have directed your Servants previouſly to enter into an agreement with the Nabob to make over the greateſt part, if not the whole, to your Honours, in conſideration of the expence you will thereby incur; and that they likewiſe ſtipulate the largeſt ſhare of what may be in future annually received, ſhould be on your account, which we doubt not he will readily agree to, as he well knows without our interfering he could never expect to recover any part thereof. We hope our expectations herein will not be diſappointed, and that this meaſure will meet with your entire approbation. APPENDIX. No. 48. 49.

Extract of *Bombay* General Conſultations; the 19th March 1771.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,

The W° *Benjamin Jervis*, Eſquire, *David Wedderburn*,
Nathaniel Stackhouſe, *John Watſon*,
Brice Fletcher, *William Taylor*.
William Shaw, indiſpoſed.

The Preſident lays before the Board the Tranſlate of a Letter from the Nabob of *Surat*; as alſo his ſentiments on the ſubject of that letter, and the meaſures moſt eligible to be purſued, both of which are entered hereafter; on conſideration of which, it is reſolved, The Chief and Factors be inſtructed to make ſuitable application to the Nabob of *Broach* for the difference of the Cuſtoms he has collected, as well as for arrears of the Phoorza; and that they endeavour to enter into a Treaty with him, to put the ſame on a proper footing in future, which if he ſhould evade, they muſt be directed as ſoon as the preſent ſervice will permit, to order Col. *Gordon* to tranſport the Troops under his command toward his territories, to compel him to enter into the beſt terms poſſible; which we flatter ourſelves will induce him at leaſt to pay ſome ready Money, and ſettle a mode for the certain payment of an annual ſum in future; as alſo to put the Cuſtoms on the ſame footing as ſettled between the late Nabob and Mr. *Hodges*, when Chief of *Surat*. Preſident lays before the Board a Letter from the Nabob of Surat, with his ſentiments thereon.

As the Phoorza of *Broach* was granted to the Nabobſhip of *Surat*, and not to the Caſtle, it becomes neceſſary the Chief and Council ſhould enter into a private agreement with the Nabob of *Surat* at leaſt to give up the greateſt part of what may be recovered, and hereafter annually received, as well as to pay the expence incurred thereby. Directions in reſpect to the Amount which may be recovered.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Meer Haſſizoodeen Ahamed Cawn Bhadur*, Nabob of *Surat*; dated the 4th, and received the 8th March 1771.

After compliments:

I was very glad to hear that your Honour has got the Government of *Bombay*, on which I take the liberty to congratulate you. Your Honour, I hope, will encourage and favour me, looking on me as your Well-wiſher, and be pleaſed to command my ſervices. Tranſlate of a Letter from the Nabob of Surat.

The Phouſdar of *Broach* was under this Government for a number of years; whereas *Neeknam Cawn* (the Father of *Mazad Cawn*, the preſent Phouſdar of *Broach*) did break that old rule of obeying this Government, and took away the property of the *Surat* Nabobs; and as your Army is lately marched againſt the Coolies and maſtered their country, I hope your Honour will direct the Commanding Officer of that Force to march therewith into the country of *Broach* to ſettle the ſaid diſpute, relating to the Phouſdar as aboveſaid, and to oblige the ſaid *Mazad Cawn* to pay me all the Cuſtoms which he has received for ſo many years, it being my property; and that the ſaid Phouſdar may in future be put into my

APPENDIX No. 49.

The Resident's sentiments on the Nabob of Surat's Letter.

poſſeſſion; doing which I as well as the Honourable Company will have profit.

The *Surat* Government has large and juſt demands on that of *Broach*, and as we have a large and ſufficient force to the Northward, and as I underſtand the Nabob of *Broach* is under great apprehenſions of their being employed againſt him, it is a good time to make demands on him, which his fears may bring him to a compliance. The firſt demand is for the produce of the *Broach* Phoorza, granted about 150 years, by the Mogul unto the *Surat* Government, and poſſeſſed by them till about 40 years, when the *Broach* Nabob finding himſelf ſtrong enough refuſed to pay it, and threw off his dependance; the Phoorza was computed at about R^{s} 70,000 a year, which amount the *Surat* Government uſually recovered from it, and now amounts to twenty-eight lack. The next demand is for a conſiderable difference of Cuſtoms, which, contrary to an expreſs Treaty, the Nabob of *Broach* has collected on all merchandize belonging to thoſe trading under the Company's protection to *Broach*. In the time of Mr. *Hodges*'s Chiefſhip the Nabob of *Broach* (the Father of the preſent one) entered into a Treaty with him for ſettling the duties to be paid at *Broach*, on all goods belonging to thoſe under the Engliſh protection at 1¼ per cent. and according to this agreement the duties were collected two or three years, but afterwards, without any reaſon aſſigned, the Nabob raiſed them to 2½; and this difference, one year with another, has amounted to about R^{s} 25,000, and as about ſix years have elapſed ſince it was impoſed, the demand on this account may be reckoned R^{s} 150,000, ſo that the juſt demand the Government has on that of *Broach*, is about 30 lacks. The *Broach* Phoorza was by Phirmaund granted to the Nabobſhip of *Surat*, and not to the Caſtle; but that, I apprehend, may be eaſily ſettled with the preſent Nabob: as he himſelf can have no hopes of recovering it by his own power, I preſume he will have no objections to transferring his right and title to the Company, who has the means in their hands of conducting them to good purpoſe and advantage, if he is to receive a ſmall part thereof. The demands for theſe arrears, and for the future poſſeſſion of the *Broach* Phoorza Revenue, and the duties on Engliſh goods being collected, as ſettled with Mr. *Hodges*, are in themſelves juſt and proper to be made; and no time can be more convenient than the preſent one, when we have ſo large a force that way, and the Nabob himſelf frightened, and apprehends we have deſigns againſt him. I therefore propoſe, that the Chief and Council ſhould be directed, to demand in the moſt peremptory manner, of the *Broach* Nabob, immediate payment of the arrears due on the Phoorza; alſo the difference of the Cuſtoms collected from the Merchants, and full ſecurity for the annual payment of the produce of the Phoorza in future, and the duties on Engliſh property being collected as ſettled with Mr. *Hodges*, I apprehend the Nabob of *Broach* would be ſo much intimidated on receiving this letter which makes the demand, that he will immediately enter into a Treaty, and conſent to very advantageous terms, without our forces proceeding againſt him; if ſo, a proper Treaty might be concluded with him, and he remain and be ſupported in his Territories.

Extract of the General Letter from *Bombay*; dated the 5th June 1771.

Par. 13. Your Honours have already been fully adviſed of our motives for undertaking an Expedition againſt *Broach*, which we doubt not will prove ſatisfactory to you; and from the directions we gave to your Servants at *Surat*, to embark all the forces employed againſt the Coolies and proceed on board the veſſels up the River of *Broach*, with the utmoſt expedition, we doubted not but that affair would have been ſhortly brought to a ſpeedy and ſucceſsful iſſue.

14. But on the 21ſt of April (when we had reaſon to conclude our forces were before *Broach*, from the orders we had given to your Servants at *Surat*, and which they had previous to that date acquainted us they had directed to be carried into execution) we received a Letter from them, adviſing us that they had given directions for the forces to return to *Surat*, in order to march from that place by land againſt *Broach*; and that they were induced to act thus, in direct oppoſition to our orders, on the Chief having been acquainted by a man who had been long in the ſervice of the *Broach* Nabob, and whoſe relations they acquainted us ſtill ſerved him, that it was in his opinion the moſt likely method of enſuring ſucceſs againſt it.

15. We acquainted them in reply thereto, that the mode of proceeding they had adopted, appeared to us liable to many impediments and delays, all which we pointed out to them; and that we could ſee little proſpect of ſucceſs againſt that place, as the river, which was both broad and rapid, would thus be between the Troops and the town, which would in our opinions unavoidably occaſion at leaſt a great delay in their proceedings; whereas, had the Troops proceeded immediately up the river, they might have landed on the ſide on which the town is ſituated, and attack it with much greater probability of ſucceſs; and as the ſeaſon was ſo far advanced, it behoved them to avoid every unneceſſary delay, as we could by no means permit of the Troops belonging to this garriſon being abſent during the rainy ſeaſon, and therefore at all events they muſt be embarked for their return hither by the 20th of May; at the ſame time we informed them, that ſhould our hopes of ſucceſs be fruſtrated by their deviation from our orders, we ſhould deem them anſwerable for it.

16. The Chief and Council, inſtead of endeavouring to rectify the miſtake they had committed, by liſtening to the advice of a man evidently intereſted to render the Expedition unſucceſsful, ſtill perſiſted in their error, and vindicated their conduct, notwithſtanding our objections reached them time enough to have altered it; and though they themſelves experienced the juſtice of ſome of our remarks on it, by the delay that happened in their ſetting out from *Surat*, owing to the want of Carts and Bullocks for the Artillery, and neceſſaries, which prevented their leaving it ſome days after their arrival there.

17. The troops however at laſt ſet out from thence the 27th of April, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Cay*, who was inſtructed to obſerve all orders he received from Mr. *Gambier*. The Nabob of *Surat* alſo ſent about 700 men on this Expedition, to act in conjunction with our Forces, under the command of the *Buxey*, who likewiſe ſet out at the ſame time.

18. On their march, they were attacked very briſkly by about 2,000 of the Nabob's Forces, but beat them off with a very ſmall loſs on our ſide, though the *Broach* Troops, it is ſaid, ſuffered conſiderably.

19. They arrived on the banks of the river oppoſite *Broach* on the 1ſt of May, and then found that, contrary to the report of the perſon who furniſhed the Chief with his information, the river inſtead of being about 200 yards broad, was in reality 1,400 yards; but that there was an iſland in the middle of it, of which they took poſſeſſion, and from thence attacked the Town. A breach was made which was once judged to be practicable, and intended to be ſtormed; but on the Troops having embarked for that purpoſe, they were by the rapidity of the ſtream carried much below the intended place, and therefore it was at that time laid aſide; and it ſhortly after appeared that the Enemy had eſtocaded the breach quite acroſs with ſtrong timbers, in ſuch a manner as to render it, in the opinion of the Engineer, &c. impracticable. So much time was then elapſed as to put it out of their power to make another, which, together with the loſs of almoſt all their ſhells by the blowing up of a magazine, induced Mr. *Gambier* to apply to the Commanding Officer for his opinion, whether it was poſſible to reduce the place, ſo as to have the Troops embarked by the 20th, agreeable

agreeable to our orders, and he having given it in the negative, orders were given for their return to *Surat*, which they ſhortly reached, and embarked by the time we directed, and ſince returned hither.

20. But in order to obviate the diſgrace which would otherwiſe have been incurred by the Siege being raiſed, Mr. *Gambier*, in conſequence of ſome overtures which had been made him by the Nabob of *Broach*, induced him (previous to the Troops marching from thence) to make his public requeſt that they ſhould be withdrawn; and his Duan and ſome other of his principal people accompanied Mr. *Gambier* to *Surat*, to endeavour to ſettle affairs with the Chief and Council, by which the march of the Troops thither was unmoleſted.

21. As it ſtill appears to us, that had our firſt directions regarding this affair been carried into execution, the iſſue of it would have been very different from what it is at preſent, we therefore propoſe to make a ſtrict Enquiry into the cauſe of the failure of it, for which purpoſe we have already appointed a Committee; and your Honours may depend that wherever it may appear the blame may lay, a ſuitable reſentment ſhall be ſhewn by us for thus trifling with the credit of your Arms.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations; the 27th November 1771.

The Preſident acquaints the Committee, that he calls this Meeting purpoſely to inform them, that he has for ſome days paſt been endeavouring to bring the Nabob of *Broach* (now here) to an accommodation for the Honourable Company's demands upon him, as ſet forth at the time our Forces went againſt him, and for the charges incurred thereby. Tranſlates and Copy of the Papers which have paſſed on this occaſion he now lays before us, which are read as entered hereafter: and the Tranſlate of the laſt Papers from the Nabob are his ultimate propoſals, as the Nabob deſired in caſe they were not accepted, that he might return to *Broach*; and as the propoſals were ſuch in his opinion by no means admiſſible, he immediately acquainted the Nabob of it, and directed the veſſel to be ready for his accommodation.

The Committee entirely concur in opinion with the Preſident in reſpect to the Nabob's propoſals, and unanimouſly approve his proceedings herein.

As the Nabob therefore is now on his return, without any terms being ſettled between the Honourable Company and him, we deem it highly neceſſary to have recourſe to force, as well to obtain ſatisfaction, as to recover our credit, loſt by the laſt expedition, after the Nabob is ſafely returned thither. But *Hyder Ally* may make ſuch offers for our aſſiſtance, in conſequence of our former reſolution, as we may judge for our Honourable Employers advantage to accept; and as that is an object of much greater importance, Reſolved, that we defer coming to a final determination with reſpect to either, until we receive an account of *Hyder*'s Offers for aſſiſtance, which we hope will now ſhortly arrive; and in the interim it is agreed, that every thing neceſſary ſhall be prepared to carry into execution ſuch meaſures as may hereafter appear moſt for our Honourable Employers intereſt, reſpecting which the Preſident will give the neceſſary directions.

The Preſident lays before the Board Tranſlate of a Writing from the Nabob of *Cambay*, binding himſelf not to moleſt the ancient poſſeſſions of the Rajah of *Bonnagur* and *Gopaljee Servia*, as entered hereafter, in conſequence of what was reſolved by the whole Board on the ultimo,

The Preſident lays before the Committee, Tranſlate of two Letters from the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, which are now read as entered hereafter.

Tranſlate of a Letter from the Nabob of *Broach* to the Governor. APPENDIX, No. 49.

I was on my arrival here extremely glad to ſee your Honour, and was, God knows, mightily pleaſed with your friendſhip, goodneſs, and greatneſs. I am much obliged to you for your entertainment and civilities; I have experienced your friendſhip more than what is offered in the Company's agreements; that is to ſay, "That we "may part in ſtronger friendſhip than ever." I have hopes that our friendſhip ſhall be encreaſed more and more in future. Your Honour may believe me to be your true Friend, and look upon the *Broach* and *Bombay* as one, and my Forces as yours. Whenever you ſhall want me I ſhall join you agreeable to this agreement.

A long while ago I have no friend at *Bombay*, nor do I keep friendſhip with any body here; nobody knows me, nor do I know any body at *Bombay*, and have no correſpondence with any body by Letters. I look upon all the Gentlemen here as favourable to me, but there is no mediator between us; for your Honour is every thing to me; I only know you: Whatever friendly offices you will do me, looking upon me as yours, and agreeable to writing, I ſhall take as if you had done them to me from your own generoſity, and will never fail on my part in my friendſhip to you as long as I may live.

If you will think about having the country of *Guzerat* into your hands for the Company, I ſhall, agreeable to your order, be ready with my Forces, being very well acquainted therewith. This affair ſhall be ſettled, ſo that you will be much pleaſed thereby, and it will bring in large income and profit, becauſe all the country is empty (meaning, without proper Forces to guard it). The whole of this country can be conquered within a year: The revenues are more than one crore of Rupees. When you will ſettle about this affair, and reſolve to undertake this enterprize, I ſhall give you all the particulars regarding it, after your Honour's pleaſure.

On my coming here and meeting you, my heart was entirely cleared, inſomuch that nothing is remained there. You have agreed in your Security Paper, "That a friendſhip ſhall on my arrival at *Bombay* be made agreeable to your wiſhes;" ſo that if your Honour will keep your ſight on your ſaid writing, I ſhall be much pleaſed if you will grant me a written Agreement conformable to the copy which I have ready by me; in doing which it ſhall be looked upon as if you have complied with your writing; if not, there is no matter, for I ſubmit to your pleaſure.

Every body knows that you have held my hand, and made me wait upon you, though my Anceſtors who governed *Broach* upwards of 50 years had been no where. It is right your Honour will always protect me in the abovementioned manner.

God knows I can't make you a return for all your favours, civilities, entertainment, &c. for I am empty pocket, all which I doubt not but you muſt have heard from others, I having more expences than income, eſpecially upon account of the Marattas trouble, who had ſurrounded my place till three years, in which I ſpent my ſtock, and am largely indebted to the Merchants and my Troops for their Pay. What can I ſay more?—As I look upon you as my true Friend here, have therefore given you an account of my caſe.

Luttoboy Mazmandar (who has lately opened a correſpondence with your Honour, is neither mine nor the Marattas ſervant) has his ſhops at many places in the Guzerat country, as alſo at *Surat*; and if your Honour will pleaſe to grant him your Purwannah, or Order, under the Honourable Compay's Seal, he will carry on the affair of his ſhops at *Surat* and *Bombay* freely, and I will ſend you a copy thereof if you will grant his requeſt.

Tranſlate

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Tranſlate of the Terms offered by the Nabob of *Broach*, 14th November 1771.

I the Nabob *Imtyazood Dowlah Maazud Cawn Bahadar Dutterjung* may live at the Port of *Broach* freely and contentedly, believing me your Friend for ever; whatſoever diſpute and unpleaſantneſs I had in my heart is now quite cleared, and a firm friendſhip is become with the Honourable Company agreeable to our wiſhes, and more firm than heretofore. Should any enemy proceed againſt *Broach*, we ſhall not fail in ſuch caſe to aſſiſt you on the part of the Honourable Company, and ſhall join you, Sir, with neceſſaries. I ſhall not in future hear the perſons who may be in neceſſity, their Informations againſt you, and ſhall look upon *Broach* as mine, and you may, Sir, look upon *Bombay* as yours. We give you this writing fairly, and with the Honourable Company's word, that we ſhall not fail in our friendſhip to aſſiſt you whenever required; for which purpoſe I have given you this everlaſting Agreement from the Honourable Company, that no manner of difference there will be, either Sir or your Children. You may if you chuſe come to *Bombay* with your Family; for your coming or going, as well as for the performance of all the conditions herein abovementioned, this Agreement will ſerve now and in future. Should any Merchants of *Broach*, or the perſons under your protection, chuſe to trade to this Port, I agree to their doing it freely, paying the uſual Cuſtoms of this place.

The Governor's Anſwer to the above Propoſal.

What is obſerved in the firſt article of the Nabob's Paper, that is to ſay, that we may part in a ſtronger friendſhip than ever, which is my hearty wiſh; and if it ſo happens, it will give me great ſatisfaction and pleaſure, and will be much for the intereſt of both parties: But the Nabob cannot be ignorant of the demands we have on *Broach*, thoſe that he was acquainted with laſt April before our Troops went that way, viz. that of the Phoorza, which has been withheld from the Government of *Surat* for 40 years; the overcharge in the Cuſtoms in the Merchants trading under the Company's protection for near ſix years paſt; and the heavy charge we were at in ſending our Troops that way; all which it is neceſſary the Nabob ſhould take into ſerious conſideration, and what he has to ſay regarding them.

The whole amounts to many Lacks, but notwithſtanding that, if he has or chuſes to make any propoſals for accommodating this matter, I am very ready, and will not be unreaſonable in my demand. Beſides agreeing to pay a certain ſum annually on account of the Phoorza in *Surat*, with proper Security, the Cuſtoms to be paid at *Broach* by thoſe under the Company's protection, as was ſettled with his Father by Mr. *Hodges* when he was Chief at *Surat*. Then will we take into conſideration his propoſals regarding *Guzerat* in his third article, and will ſettle ſuch a ſtrong Alliance with him as cannot eaſily be broken, which I hope he will conſider of, that we may part with the friendſhip of Brothers.

Tranſlate of the Nabob of *Broach* his Anſwer.

Before the Honourable Company's Troops were diſpatched, I wrote your Honour a Letter, in which I have mentioned to you all the particulars; which Letter be pleaſed to take out of the office and peruſe it, what I have therein ſaid regarding your demands.

I have already given in, an anſwer regarding the Phoorza of *Broach*, in my former Letter, which you will pleaſe to re-peruſe.

There are performing the agreements mentioned in the time of Mr. *Hodges*, when Chief of *Surat*; notwithſtanding which, if you want more favours therein, I am ready.

Through the advice of Mr. *Draper* and *Gambier*, the Honourable Company's Troops were ſent; they are therefore anſwerable for the charges thereof, for I did not begin myſelf.

Your Honour ſay, "That I ſhould take all the matters you have above expreſſed into my ſerious conſideration, and what I have to ſay regarding them;" to this I reply, that I have given you anſwers before to all the above matters; after conſidering, therefore, it is too far for your Honour, &c. to talk about theſe things now, for you wrote me about the time of my coming to *Bombay*, that nothing ſhall be talked of, about what was paſſed before.

As you have poſitively wrote to me now, that you will not act unreaſonably with me, therefore it is right that you ſtand to your ſaid writing, as I depend upon your word.

I have already given you an anſwer to your 7th Article, in this Paper, Article 2d, therefore need not to repeat it again.

You wrote me concerning the cuſtoms; to which I reply, that what was ſettled in the time of the deceaſed Nabob, by Mr. *Hodges*, is acceptable to me, and I will charge no more.

What you ſay regarding *Amedavad* is true.

Your Honour gave me fair writing under the Company's Seal, that on my coming to *Bombay* nothing ſhall be talked of about me what was paſſed before, and a firm friendſhip ſhall be made agreeable to my wiſhes, and we may part in a ſtronger friendſhip than ever without difference. You have likewiſe wrote me concerning the Money, that I muſt be thoroughly ſatisfied that there can be no truth in ſuch kind of news, for there is not the leaſt foundation for it; notwithſtanding all which, I was greatly ſurprized at your friendſhip and kindneſs. I hope you will, keeping your ſight upon your writing, order your Munſee to give me a fair writing, conformable to my foul copy which I gave you the 14th inſtant, doing which you will comply with your word, and I ſhall return to *Bombay* and from your Honour well pleaſed.

Tranſlate of what the *Nabob* wrote on the back of the Governor's Anſwer to him.

If you had ſuch an intention on your heart, why did you call me here on your word? This thing is too far from your greatneſs. You will pleaſe to obſerve all the particulars on a ſeparate paper.

The Governor's Reply.

Upon the whole, you ſay you have already given me anſwers to every thing: if ſo, you have nothing more to ſay.

But I wiſh for your own ſake, and it will be for your own intereſt, to adjuſt every thing in ſuch a manner as to make the Company your Friend, which will ſecure you againſt your Enemies; and further, may enable you and them to purſue much greater things hereafter, as pointed out by yourſelf; which will bear no compariſon with your preſent ſituation. I have for all this time been ſilent, in expectation that you would of yourſelf have ſaid ſomething towards an accommodation; but as you have not, and you deſired I will ſign the Paper you cauſed to be ſhewn me, I was obliged to ſend you the Memorandum my people ſhewed you to-day, as it is impoſſible for me to ſign ſuch a Paper, when you have made no offer to ſettle our demands. But if you are determined not to accommodate matters, you may reſt ſecure I ſhall keep my word in replacing you in your own City agreeable to my promiſe, after having given you more Honours than

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than were ever given to any perſon whatſoever at this place; and that you are as ſecure as if you were in your own Houſe, or more ſo; but I muſt ſerve my Maſters.

Tranſlate of a Letter from the Nabob of *Broach*:—received the 24th inſtant.

After Compliments:

I have received your Honour's Letter, and obſerve the contents of the five paragraphs you wrote me therein. I readily believe what you ſay, that you will ſend me to *Broach* ſafe; for I have no manner of doubt with regard to your complying with your word. Now I give you a plain Anſwer to your above five paragraphs, that as you have held my hand, and brought me to *Bombay*, the ſhorteſt way to accommodate matters is, that your Honour ought to write me plain, ſuch as I can afford to accept, agreeable to my inability: You will write me ſo plain, that I may clearly underſtand. The loſſes and ſcarcity of Caſh which I am ſuffering theſe three or four years, is very well known to your Honour; therefore what you order me you will do it, keeping your ſight on my inability, and on the Company's Security Paper you have granted me; that is to ſay, that on my arrival at *Bombay* a friendſhip will be made, agreeable to my wiſhes. I know that every thing can be done by your favour. I agree to what your Honour ſays in your firſt letter to me, regarding the Cuſtoms, and will abate therein as much as you will ſay.

Tranſlate of another Letter from the Nabob:—received the 25th inſtant.

After Compliments:

I have ſent your Honour an Anſwer laſt night, which I doubt not you have received. I have a long hiſtory of my circumſtances to tell you, which I wiſh I could ſpeak to you perſonally; but my tongue does not permit me to do it: I did therefore make *Nanna Bhoy* ſit down with me till two o'clock this morning, and have communicated to him all the particulars. Your Honour will ſend for him; hear all from him, and favour me with your Anſwer to the above letter, and his information.

The Preſident's Account of the Negociation with the *Broach* Nabob.

Having ſignified to the Nabob of *Broach* his having been here ſome time, and had not yet heard any thing from him with reſpect to our demand on him, only that he had delivered me a paper with ſome Propoſals of his own, without any mention towards an accommodation of our demand, I ſent him, wrote in Perſian, what was neceſſary he ſhould ſettle before he returned to *Broach*, as he intends ſetting out ſoon; and that I could not think of ſigning a paper he ſent me a tranſlate of, until he had come to ſome agreement about ſettling that buſineſs; which he attempted to evade by ſaying, that we had ſigned a Security Paper, that every thing ſhould be ſettled agreeable to his deſire, which is, that every thing ſhould be forgot, as he had condeſcended to come to *Bombay*, and delivered his Perſon into our hands on the faith of our writing; and that now he wanted to return back. To which I replied, that he might depend on our complying with; but that I thought it behoved him to think well before he went, and ſettle every thing before he went away; and that I would not be unreaſonable in my demands; on which he ſent me yeſterday a Paper, wherein he deſires I will write him plain, that he may clearly underſtand what we expect.

The following is what we demanded of him in April laſt:

The demand on account of the Phoorza of *Broach* is eſtimated at 70,000 Rupees a year, which having been withheld for 40 years paſt, amounts to 28 lacks; but the Nabob ſays it has not been paid this 50 or 60 years, which increaſes the demand proportionably. This was granted by Phirmaund from the Mogul to the Nabobſhip of *Surat*, about 150 years ſince.

The next is, for what has been collected on account of Cuſtoms from the Merchants trading under the Company's protection for about ſix years paſt, eſtimated at Rupees 25,000 a year, amounts to Rupees 150,000.

Next, the charge of the Expedition laſt May, amounting to between two and three lacks of Rupees, which makes the whole demand on him amount to about 33 lacks; and that he ſettles a certain ſum to be paid in *Surat* annually, in the month of July, on account of the Phoorza; viz. 12, 15, or 20,000 Rupees a year, with proper ſecurity.

If we can get 5 or 6 lacks for our demand, it will be well, or more if poſſible, when I think we may enter into an Alliance with him, and take into conſideration what he has pointed out regarding *Guzerat*.

Propoſals made by the Nabob of *Broach*, as the baſis of a Treaty to be made between the Honourable Company and him.

1ſt. That we ſhall promiſe to get him and his ſubjects paid their juſt Debts, after being proved, from many of their Debtors.—Refuſed.

2d. Upon account of his making a firm friendſhip with us, ſhould the Marattas quarrel with him, or otherwiſe, we ſhall in ſuch caſe join him with our Troops, Balls, and Powder, &c. and he ſhall on his part do the ſame.

3d. At the time of our marching againſt the Nabob, *Futtee Sing* took his Bond for certain ſums of money to be paid him at the opening of the ſeaſon, which he now demands, and we muſt promiſe to get back from him, by writing him letters, or any other means.—Refuſed.

The particular Payment of Two Lacks of Rupees.

1ſt	Payment in the	Month of	Moharam	1186	Rupees	50,000
2d	D°	D°	D°	1187		50,000
3d	D°	D°	D°	1188		50,000
4th	D°	D°	D°	1189		50,000
					Rupees	2,00,000

Pray don't diſcover this to any body.

Tranſlate of a Writing from the Nabob of *Cambay*.

(L. S.)

The Paper of Agreement between the Honourable Engliſh Eaſt India Company, and *Meinam Cawn*, Nabob of *Cambay*.

Agreeable to what I have been requeſted by Mr. *John Torleſſe*, Reſident of *Cambay*, I now do promiſe, that ſhould *Goge* at any time fall again into my hands, and the Honourable Engliſh Company be deſirous of having a Factory there, I will grant it to them: On no account whatſoever ſuffer any other European Nation to ſettle there. Alſo, from the long friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Honourable Engliſh Eaſt India Company and me, I have hearkened to the recommendation they have been pleaſed to give to *Eckarajee* and *Gopaljee Servia*. I will on no pretence whatſoever meddle with or trouble the ancient

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poſſeſſions of *Eckrajee*, the ſon of the late *Bowſting*, nor the Town or Fort of *Bownagur*, no more than what has always been uſual for the poſſeſſor of the Bunder of *Gogo* to take, and what I took when I was in poſſeſſion thereof, and no more will I demand. With reſpect to *Gopaljee Servia* and his Town, I will give neither moleſtation. But I do requeſt, that after this Agreement the Honourable Company will not recommend any more perſons of that country to me, and by the help of God I and my Heirs will ſtand to all Agreements hitherto entered into between us. Written with my own hand this 12th day of the Moon Raijub, year 1185, or 22d October 1771.

(A true Tranſlation.)
John Torleſſe.

(A true Copy.)
Daniel Draper.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations; the 30th November 1771.

The Preſident acquaints the Committee he has deſired this Meeting to inform them, that the Nabob of *Broach* having made ſome further Overtures, he had ſent proper perſons to repreſent to him the impropriety of his going from hence, without coming to terms of accommodation with the Honourable Company for their demands upon him, and the diſadvantage which muſt accrue to himſelf therefrom; in conſequence whereof the Nabob had at length offered to pay to the Honourable Company the ſum of 4 lacks of Rupees, provided it be accepted in full of all demands; and to make over to the Honourable Company his ſhare of the Cuſtoms collected on goods imported at *Broach* by Britiſh Subjects, or others trading under the Engliſh Paſs and Colours. On due deliberation therein, it is agreed to accept thoſe propoſals, provided the Nabob agrees to the payment of the ſtipulated ſum within a conſiſtent time, but we wiſh he could be induced to pay at leaſt a part thereof in ready Money.

The Nabob being immediately acquainted thereof, repreſented his utter inability to pay any part in ready money; but at length offered to pay one-half within ſix months, one lack more within twelve months from the date of the firſt payment, and the remainder within the following year: A Treaty agreeable thereto being drawn up, and the Nabob conſenting to ratify the Articles of it, it is therefore reſolved, that it be laid before the whole Board for their approbation and concurrence.

Adjourned.
Geo. Skipp, Sec^y.

Approved, *Wm Hornby*, *Nathl Stackhouſe*, *David Wedderburn*, *W. Taylor*, *Jno Watſon.*

Articles for a Treaty of Peace and firm Friendſhip between the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Bombay*, in behalf of the Honourable United Engliſh Eaſt India Company, and the Nabob *Imhjazood Dowlah*, *Maazage Cawn*, *Bahawder Ditter Jung*, of *Broach*, &c. &c.

1ſt. Peace and Friendſhip to ſubſiſt uninterrupted in future, between the Honourable Company and the Nabob of *Broach*, his Heirs and Succeſſors.

2d All Britiſh ſubjects or perſons trading under the protection of the Honourable Company's ſealed Paſſes and Colours, ſhall pay no Cuſtoms at *Broach*, &c. places in the Nabob's country, except ſuch as the Honourable the Preſident and Council ſhall impoſe, which ſhall be levied by ſuch perſons as they ſhall appoint on account of the Honourable Company; and the Nabob engages for himſelf and Succeſſors, that no Fees, Dues, or Exactions of any ſort, ſhall be levied on the ſaid trade by himſelf or them, on any pretence whatever.

3d. The Honourable the Preſident and Council ſhall have free liberty to ſettle a Factory wherever they think proper, and a ſuitable portion of ground for building the ſaid Factory on, or a convenient houſe ſhall be allotted for that purpoſe.

4th. The Dutch have already a Factory at *Broach*, but in future no other European Nation ſhall be permitted to ſettle a Factory at *Broach* without the conſent of the Honourable the Preſident and Council.

5th. The Nabob engages never to aſſiſt the Enemies of the Engliſh Nation, but obliges himſelf to aſſiſt the Company in any Wars they may be engaged in with 1,000 private Sepoys and 300 Cavalry, with their Officers; or ſuch larger number as they may want, and he can ſpare, at the following rates; viz.

Each Horſeman, rupees 15 per month;
Each Sepoy, — rupees 7½ per D°;

or at ſuch rates as it ſhall appear they ſtand him in.

6th. The Nabob will not engage in any War with any of his Neighbours without the conſent of the Preſident and Council; but in all Wars which he ſhall engage in with their conſent, or if he ſhall be ſuddenly attacked in his territories, they ſhall give him effectual ſupport and aſſiſtance, he paying the Troops on the following terms;

To each European, rupees 15 per month;
To each Sepoy, - - - 7 D°.

N. B. The Commiſſion Officers of the Company, and the ſuperior Officers of the Nabob, to be paid at the diſcretion of the party aſſiſted, but with the concurrence and approbation of the party aſſiſting.

7th. The Nabob agrees to pay unto the Honourable Company, in conſideration and acquittal of all demands to this day, the ſum of four lacks of Rupees, which the Honourable the Preſident and Council agree to accept in full for their claim on him for the Phoorza, and exactions of Cuſtoms on Britiſh Merchants, on condition he ſhall inviolably adhere to the terms herein contained; and in failure thereof it is hereby declared, that the above ſum of four lacks ſhall be deemed and taken to be for repaying the expence incurred by the Expedition only, and the Honourable the Preſident and Council in ſuch caſe hereby declare themſelves at free liberty to purſue the moſt effectual means for the recovery of any demands which they or their Allies have, or hereafter may have, upon him. The ſaid four lacks of Rupees are to be paid within two years and a half from the date hereof, at the following ſtated periods; viz.

Two lacks within ſix months from the date hereof;
One lack more within twelve months from the firſt payment; and the
One lack remaining in the following year:

For which he will enter into a Bond, binding himſelf and Heirs, and mortgaging his whole territories.

8th. In caſe any Expedition ſhall hereafter be undertaken, and ſucceſs attend it, the Honourable the Preſident and Council will take care that the Nabob of *Broach* ſhall have a recompence adequate to the aſſiſtance he may afford.

9th. In conſideration of the friendſhip eſtabliſhed between the Honourable Company and the Nabob, he ſhall have firm friendſhip with all their Friends and Allies, particularly the Nabobs of *Surat* and *Cambay*, with whom he ſhall enter into Treaty; and ſhall conſider all their enemies as his, and they ſhall conſider all his enemies as theirs. For due performance of this article, we, on the part of the Nabobs of *Surat* and *Cambay*, become ſecurity.

Separate Article entered into with the Nabob of *Broach*.

You the Nabob *Sahib Imhjazood Dowlah*, *Maazul Cawn*, *Bahawder Dillejung*, may live at the Port of *Broach* freely, believing us your Friends for ever. We have given up the demand of Phoorza, its produce for forty years, overcharge in the Cuſtoms on goods belonging to the Merchants under the Honourable Company; and

charge

charge of the Expedition ſent againſt you. Our hearts are quite cleared, and we have made a friendſhip agreeable to your wiſhes. No demands nor anſwer now remain to make with you: we have given you this acquittance in full for all demands as above-mentioned.

We ſhall get paid yours and your ſubjects juſt debts from any perſon or place under our Government, on being proved. We ſhall admit no information againſt you: We look upon *Broach* as ours, and *Bombay* as yours. This Protection Paper is granted to you from the part of the Honourable Company, with their word, as well as our word and honour, that we ſhall not fail in our friendſhip and aſſiſtance of Force and Ammunition upon occaſion, for which purpoſe this everlaſting Protection Paper is given you. All the Counſellors are bound that no difference will be either with you or your Children, and the friendſhip ſhall be daily increaſed more and more. You may, if you chuſe, come to *Bombay* with your Family. For your coming and going, as well as for the performance of all the conditions herein above-mentioned, this Agreement will ſerve you as a voucher which we agree to perform with the Honourable Company's word and honour. Should any Merchants of *Broach*, or the perſons under your protection, chuſe to trade to *Bombay*, we agree to their doing it freely, and paying the uſual Cuſtoms of this place, without hindrance on the part of the Honourable Company.

Tranſlate of the Nabob's Bond to the Honourable Company.

Know all men, that I *Imbjazood Dowlah*, *Mazood Cawn*, *Behawder Dillejung*, Nabob of *Broach*, have this day agreed and acknowledged myſelf indebted unto the Honourable United Engliſh Eaſt India Company; the ſum of four lacks of Rupees, current Money of *Bombay*, for the payment of which to be well and truly made unto the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Bombay*, at the following ſtated periods, I hereby bind myſelf, my Heirs and Succeſſors, and mortgage my whole territories, to be at the diſpoſal of the ſaid Company in caſe of failure; *viz.*

Two lacks within ſix months from the date hereof;
One ditto more within eighteen months D°;
One ditto more within two years and ſix months D°.

In witneſs whereof I have hereunto voluntarily ſet my hand in *Bombay*, this 30th day of November 1771, in the preſence of

My Brother, My Uncle,
My Codjee, My Moreſſee,
My Vackeel; who have alſo ſigned to this Bond, as witneſſes of its being my Act and Deed.

APPENDIX, No. 50.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bombay*; dated 1ſt April 1772.

Par. 34. IN regard to the Expedition againſt the Nabob of *Broach*, in which you appear to have engaged from motives as unjuſtifiable as the former, the ſame was altogether ſo vague and ill conducted, that we are ſurprized you ſhould attempt to exculpate yourſelves from blame, which you ſeem to think due only to want of Succeſs. We ſhall not here point out every circumſtance which has excited our diſpleaſure, but we muſt declare, that you have not only weakened our confidence in your Adminiſtration, by involving us in unneceſſary expence, but brought diſcredit on our Arms by Enterprizes which afforded no probable proſpect of advantage, and the more ſo, as the above Expeditions were wantonly undertaken at a time when you declared yourſelves under the greateſt difficulties to raiſe Supplies for the indiſpenſable occaſions of your Preſidency; and which you urge as a reaſon for deviating from our expreſs commands on another ſubject, namely, for exceeding the rate we had fixed for Bills of Exchange. APPENDIX. No. 50.

35. We obſerve with what earneſtneſs you charge the ill ſucceſs of the *Broach* Expedition to the miſconduct of our Servants at *Surat*, and indeed, we ſee enough to convince us how unfit they were for ſuch an undertaking. Their liſtening to the information of a Man who might have juſtly been ſuſpected of being in the intereſt of the Nabob, and their marching the Forces by Land, when they might with more ſecurity and diſpatch have proceeded on Veſſels immediately to *Broach*, are inſtances of Error and Miſconduct we know not how they will juſtify to us; but as you have directed a ſtrict Enquiry to be made into the cauſes of this Failure, we ſhall ſuſpend our final condemnation of their proceedings until we ſhall be furniſhed with every particular relative thereto, and which we require you to tranſmit by the firſt opportunity.

36. There however appears one cauſe which may have contributed to your diſappointment, which cannot be aſcribed to our Servants at *Surat*; namely, your putting the Expedition under the direction of Civil Servants, who muſt be ſuppoſed ignorant of military operations, and might therefore not deem themſelves concerned in the event; whereas, had the Expedition been left wholly to the conduct of the Military Commander, his Honour would not only have been engaged in its ſucceſs, but he would otherwiſe have been anſwerable for any miſconduct in the progreſs of it.

37. Upon the whole, we are as little ſatisfied with the reaſons you have urged for permitting Expeditions againſt the Coolies and the Nabob of *Broach*, to take place, as with the meaſures you took for carrying them into execution; we therefore deem you reſponſible for all Expences incurred thereby; and direct, that you fail not to tranſmit us a full and particular Account thereof, by the returning Ships of this Seaſon.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bombay*; dated 1ſt April 1772.

Par. 32. The Reaſon aſſigned by you for ſending a Land Force againſt the Coolies is ſo very ſingular, that we cannot find words to expreſs our aſtoniſhment thereat. Having determined to inveſt *Ali Novas Cawn* in the Naibſhip of *Surat*, we obſerve you reſolve to enforce your recommendation of *Ali Novas Cawn* to the Nabob by a very conſiderable Armament; but as the Nabob, upon your pledging the Company's honour for the conduct of *Ali Novas Cawn*, conſented to receive him as *Naib* without drawing the Sword, upon receipt of his Letter you found your Troops ready to embark, but the intended Expedition rendered unneceſſary by the Nabob's compliance; whereupon it occurred to you, that an Expedition againſt the Coolies had been ſubmitted to your conſideration in a former Letter from *Surat*, and you now inſtantly reſolve, that it behoved you to extirpate the ſaid Coolies, and upon this momentary conſideration, you venture to weaken your Garriſon and that of *Surat*, in order to commence and proſecute a War, not, becauſe upon mature conſideration it had been found abſolutely neceſſary (for if ſo, it ought to have been done ſooner) but, becauſe you were determined at all events to employ your Troops.

33. However ſatisfied you may be with the iſſue of this Expedition, we muſt here declare the ends propoſed by it do not appear to us to be completed by the Treaty you have entered into with the Nabob of *Cambay*, and by the ſum he has ſtipulated to pay for your ſurrendering *Toolajee Fort* into his hands; ſo far are we from conſidering this meaſure as likely to anſwer your expectations, that we own ourſelves apprehenſive that greater miſchiefs may enſue from the Fort being in his poſſeſſion than in that of the Coolies; and with reſpect to the ſum of Rupees 75,000, for which you have made this ceſſion, you will not expect us to conſider it as an equivalent for the Charges which muſt have attended a Land Expedition.

Extract

APPENDIX. No. 50.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultation; the 27th November 1771.

Tranſlate of a Writing from the Nabob of *Cambay*.

(L. S.)

The Paper of Agreement between the Honourable Engliſh Eaſt India Company and *Moinan Cawn*, Nabob of *Cambay*.

Tranſlate of a Writing from the Nabob of Cambay.

Agreeable to what I have been requeſted by Mr. *John Torleſſe*, Reſident of *Cambay*, I now do promiſe, that ſhould *Gogo* at any time fall again into my hands, and the Honourable Engliſh Company be deſirous of having a Factory there, I will grant it to them, and on no account whatſoever ſuffer any other European nation to ſettle there; alſo, from the long friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Honourable Engliſh Eaſt India Company and me, I have hearkened to the recommendation they have been pleaſed to give to *Eckarajee* and *Gopaljee Servia*. I will on no pretence whatſoever meddle with, or trouble the ancient poſſeſſions of *Eckrajee*, the Son of the late *Bowſung*; nor the Town or Port of *Morondgur*, no more than what has always been uſual for the poſſeſſor of the Bunder of *Gogo* to take, and what I took when I was in poſſeſſion thereof, and no more will I demand. With reſpect to *Gopaljee Servia* and his Town, I will give neither moleſtation, but I do requeſt, that after this Agreement the Honourable Company will not recommend any more perſons of that Country to me: and, by the help of God, I and my Heirs will ſtand to all Agreements hitherto entered into between us. Written with my own hand this 12th day of the Moon Raijub, Year 1185, or 22d October 1771.

(A true Tranſlation.)
John Torleſſe.
(A true Copy.)
Daniel Draper.

APPENDIX, No. 51.

Extract of the General Letter from *Bombay*; dated the 20th November 1772.

Par. 42. IN the 8th Paragraph of our Addreſs of the 18th June laſt, we informed your Honours of the expectation we were then in of an Anſwer from the Nabob of *Broach*, by which we hoped to be enabled to determine clearly as to his intentions in reſpect of the Treaty which was entered into on the 30th November laſt year.

43. On the 14th July the Preſident laid before us Tranſlate of a Letter the Nabob had addreſſed him on the ſubject, in which he requeſted Mr. *Morley* might be ſent back to *Broach*; but as the Letter was in general vague and inconcluſive, we were of opinion it would be improper to comply with this requeſt till the Nabob might convince us of the ſincerity of his intentions, by remitting the firſt ſtipulated ſum, being two lacks of Rupees, by Bills either on this place or *Surat*, the time for the payment of it being elapſed.

44. The Preſident accordingly acquainted the Nabob of our determination, who in reply addreſſed him another Letter, which was laid before us on the 19th Auguſt, wherein he urges the impoſſibility of ſending Bills, as it was not in his power to procure them to ſo large an amount; but he therein declared, that the Money was actually ready, and deſired a Veſſel with Mr. *Morley* on board, might be ſent for it; and as he at the ſame time mentioned, that he did not even deſire Mr. *Morley* ſhould land till the Money was ſhipped off, we were induced to believe that he really intended to abide by his Agreements; and therefore, in order to do every thing in our power to bring it to an happy iſſue, we determined to ſend a Veſſel with Mr. *Morley* as ſoon as the ſeaſon opened.

45. Mr. *Morley* accordingly arrived there on the 1ſt October, when the Nabob, inſtead of adhering to the Treaty he had ſolemnly entered into, or paying any regard to the repeated promiſes he has ſince made to abide by it, moſt baſely and perfidiouſly evaded the ſame, as your Honours may ſee at large in the ſeveral Letters from Mr. *Morley* and the Nabob, a Copy of all which is tranſmitted under N° 48.

46. On the 21ſt October the Preſident in Conſultation acquainted us, that the Select Committee had taken the whole of this affair under their conſideration; but the voices thereon being equally divided on the Queſtion, Whether immediately to ſend an Armament againſt the Nabob for chaſtiſing him for his baſe and perfidious conduct? or, Whether to wait your determinations on the ſubject? it had been agreed to refer the ſame to our determination. A Copy of the Preſident's Minute is tranſmitted under N° 49.

47. The Brigadier General at the ſame time laid before us a Letter, containing his reaſons for the vote he gave at the Select Committee on this occaſion, as entered in our Diary on the ſame day; a copy of which is alſo tranſmitted in the Packet under N° 50.

48. We deferred till the following day the conſideration of this ſubject, and the whole being then before us, as alſo your Honours ſentiments and opinion on the firſt Expedition againſt the Nabob of *Broach*, contained in your commands of the 1ſt April laſt, the Majority reſolved, after the moſt mature deliberation, immediately to fit out a ſuitable Armament, to procure ample ſatisfaction for the inſults he had dared to offer to your Honours, and for the baſe violation of every Article of the Treaty he had ſolemnly entered into; in purſuance of which the neceſſary Marine and Military Force was ordered to be got in immediate readineſs, becauſe it was deemed inconſiſtent with your honour and real intereſt to admit of any longer delay. By our Minutes of the 22d ultimo, your Honours will pleaſe to obſerve the whole of our proceedings herein; and the Reaſons aſſigned by Meſſrs. *Draper*, *Watſon*, *Stackhouſe*, *Shaw*, and *Garden*, for diſſenting to an Expedition at this juncture.

49. Thoſe Gentlemen addreſſed us a joint Letter on the 30th ultimo, aſſigning their Reaſons at large for their diſſent to the meaſures which were reſolved on, a Copy of which, agreeable to their requeſt, is incloſed in the Packet, under N° 52; and Meſſrs. *Fletcher* and *Taylor* the ſame day laying before us, each a Letter, containing their reaſons for voting for the Expedition being immediately undertaken, we incloſe Copies of them under N° 51, for your Honours information.

50. The Brigadier General and Superintendant having tendered their ſervices to command the reſpective departments, which we accepted, and every thing having been prepared with the utmoſt diſpatch that the ſervice would admit, the Veſſels with the Troops on board ſailed from hence on the 2d inſtant; and as the Fleet had arrived at *Surat* Bar on the 7th, and Mr. *Morley* in his Letters acquainted us, that the Nabob had not above two thouſand Soldiers in his pay, and thoſe as well as the Inhabitants of the town in general much diſaffected, we therefore have very little doubt, but it would become an eaſy conqueſt, and that in the latter part of this Addreſs we ſhall be able to adviſe your Honours, that the diſcredit which your Arms had ſuffered by the failure of the former Expedition has been amply regained, and that they have been reſtored to that credit in the eyes of the Country Powers which they formerly uſed to hold; and we are in hopes that it will be attended with many other conſiderable advantages, and that the expence which will be incurred by it will be but ſmall.

51. Our inſtructions to Meſſrs. *Wedderburn* and *Watſon*, who command the Military and Marine Departments, and whom we appointed for conducting this ſervice, are entered under the 1ſt November, in our outward Letter Book;

Book; and under N° 53. is Copy of the Tranſlate of a Letter the Preſident received from the Nabob, under the 31ſt October, which is couched in the ſame evaſive ſtile as his former ones, and therefore merited no notice.

52. In our Diary is entered, under the 14th July, a Letter from Mr. *Morley* to the *Surat* Chief and Council, containing a better account of the *Broach* Nabob's Forces and Revenues than we have otherwiſe procured; and from this Letter your Honours will obſerve, that the Plea of Inability which the Nabob made uſe of, to evade diſcharging the ſum due by Treaty, muſt have been falſe, and done only with a deſign to amuſe and deceive; we therefore flatter ourſelves you will approve the meaſure we have purſued, more eſpecially as thoſe Gentlemen who diſſented from it were of opinion with us, that ſuch a ſtep would have been really neceſſary, had not the conſtruction they put upon your commands of the 1ſt April laſt, and the other conſiderations ſtated in their Letter, induced them to wiſh to defer it only till what they eſteemed a more proper juncture, and they could have your ſentiments on the whole.

Extract of *Bombay* General Conſultations; the 21ſt October 1772.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire,
Preſident and Governor,
The W° *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, *David Wedderburn*,
Benjamin Jervis, *John Watſon*,
Nathaniel Stackhouſe, *Brice Fletcher*,
William Tayler, *William Shaw*,
Robert Garden.

The conduct to be obſerved towards the Nabob of Broach, referred by the Select Committee to the Board.

The Preſident then acquainted the Board, That ſince the Meeting of the 13th inſtant, the Select Committee had conſidered of the advices which have been received from Mr. *Morley*, containing an Account of the *Broach* Nabob's deceitful and perfidious conduct; and as the voices were therein equally divided, Whether immediately to ſend an Armament againſt him to chaſtiſe him for his behaviour? or, To wait the Honourable Company's Directions? it had been reſolved therein to refer it to the Board for their determination; he therefore propoſes the following to their conſideration:

The Preſident's Queries reſpecting the Nabob of Broach.

Firſt, Whether our ſitting down quiet with the treatment we have received from the Nabob of *Broach*, will be for the intereſt or credit of our Honourable Maſters; and if we do, may we not expect to meet with the like treatment from other Powers?

Secondly, It is true the Honourable Court of Directors have ſignified to us their diſapproval of our having acted hoſtilely againſt him at firſt; but now they are adviſed of the Treaty we made with him, do you not think they will expect that he make the ſame good, or that we oblige him to do it, both for their Honour and Intereſt; and that we ſhall be highly blameable, ſhould we ſuffer ourſelves to be thus trifled with, and not reſent it? I am therefore of opinion, that it is both for the Honour and Intereſt of our Honourable Maſters, that immediate ſatisfaction ſhould be taken for ſuch his behaviour, and which, I make no doubt, will be approved by my Honourable Maſters. It is their credit and intereſt I make my motive for urging it, and a better opportunity cannot well offer than the preſent, when moſt of His Majeſty's Squadron will be laying here.

20th October 1772. *William Hornby.*

Mr. Wedderburn gives his Opinion on the Meaſures purſued with the Nabob of Broach.

The Brigadier General lays before the Board a Letter aſſigning his Reaſons for the Opinion he gave at the Select Committee, on the Meaſures neceſſary to be purſued with the Nabob of *Broach*, as entered after this Conſultation.

The Board deeming the above of too much importance to be directly determined on, do agree to meet To-morrow Evening at ſix o'clock, for this purpoſe; and do therefore now adjourn till that time.

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A Letter from the B. General, containing his Reaſons for the Opinion he gave on the Meaſures neceſſary to be purſued againſt the Nabob of Broach.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

As military Men in India have ſometimes been ſuppoſed to be fond of promoting military Enterprizes, more from a love of Glory, or ſelfiſh views, than from any proper conſideration of the Expences neceſſarily attending ſuch undertakings, or a juſt calculation of the advantages which their Employers may expect to reap from their Conqueſts; and as the Preſident has laid before the Board what paſſed at the Select Committee, I think it incumbent on me to ſtate to this Honourable Board my ideas on the ſubject of the Conſultation of the 13th inſtant, and the Reaſons for the Opinion I have given, that fair and impartial Men may judge of my motives.

I reckon it a very lucky circumſtance that I am not ſingular in my opinion of the meaſures proper and neceſſary to be purſued on the preſent occaſion. The Gentlemen whom I have the Honour to concur with, will I believe, be acquitted of ſuſpicion of intereſted views in an Expedition againſt *Broach*. As to myſelf I declare, I never ſaw, ſince I have been a Soldier, a ſervice that I ſo little deſired as the ſervice againſt *Broach*; and were it not from a ſenſe of the duty I owe to the Honourable Company, I would rather chuſe to decline than to undertake it.

Every Member of this Board is now ſo well acquainted with *Broach*, that if 6 or 800 trained Europeans, and twice as many diſciplined Sepoys, were to atchieve the conqueſt and reduction of the place in 24 hours, they would think it might be done in a ſhorter time: If every thing were to ſucceed in the happieſt manner poſſible, little credit would be acquired by the Troops, or by the commanding Officer; but if they were to fail, if their ſucceſs was by any accident delayed ever ſo little, they would be overwhelmed with diſgrace, perhaps loaded with obloquy.

Every thing moſt precious to a Soldier may be loſt on ſuch an undertaking, and there is nothing to be gained. Every Man of Reflection muſt know, that in ſuch an Enterprize, depending on ſo many combined circumſtances, many untoward accidents may happen which no human prudence could foreſee or prevent, and which may overſet the beſt laid Plans, and render ineffectual the beſt concerted Deſigns.

The commands of the Honourable Court in their Letter to this Preſidency, under date the 1ſt April, are ſtated as the principal grounds on which the Opinions are founded that incline to tamely ſubmitting to the groſs and repeated inſults and violations of Treaty on the part of the Nabob of *Broach*, and to pacific meaſures for the preſent. While I continue in the Honourable Company's ſervice, I will endeavour to be as obedient to the Orders of the Honourable Court as any Gentleman of this Board; but I confeſs, after the moſt attentive peruſal of the Honourable Court's commands of the 1ſt April 1772, I cannot put the ſame conſtruction on them as theſe Gentlemen do, who have voted for pacific meaſures; I cannot perſuade myſelf that the laſt Directors, (who in the whole of this Letter have juſtly laid much ſtreſs on the advantages of local information, and have ſtudiouſly avoided giving ſtrict and poſitive orders in matters of Importance, but have left their Preſident and Council at liberty to purſue ſuch meaſures, as from circumſtances and events, might appear moſt for the Honour and Intereſt of their Conſtituents) could ever intend to iſſue orders in April, which ſhould bind this Board, or influence their conduct in conjunctures which it was impoſſible for them to foreſee, and which have not happened till October.

From the 32d Paragraph to the 38th, I find ſevere cenſure on the paſt conduct of this Board, in the Expeditions againſt the Coolies and *Broach*. I find particularly in the 34th and 37th Paragraphs, that the Honourable Court is diſpleaſed with the motives upon which theſe Expeditions were undertaken, and diſſatisfied with

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the reaſons urged by this Board for permitting them to take place. But I muſt confeſs I cannot conceive that the motives upon which theſe Expeditions were firſt undertaken, and the motives which, in my humble opinion, ſhould now impel this Board to proceed hoſtilely againſt the Nabob of *Broach*, are in any reſpect ſimilar. That the Honourable Court diſapprove and blame reviving old and doubtful Claims upon the Nabob of *Broach*, in order to frame a pretext for attacking him, does by no means imply that they intend, in the ſituation to which the Honourable Company's affairs are now brought at this Preſidency, that the Preſident and Council ſhould in the preſent circumſtances remain inactive, and tamely ſubmit to the groſs and unparalleled indignity which they have ſuffered from the Nabob of *Broach*.

I know that Peace is much more for the intereſt of the Company than War; but I believe it will be found true here, as in all other Governments, that the way to avoid War is to be reſpectable. The Honourable Court have done their duty; they have put ſuch a Force under your directions as might make this Government reſpectable in the eyes of all its Neighbours; but they can do no more; the reſt depends on the Governor and Council.

I need not, I am perſuaded, remind this Honourable Board of the behaviour of the Nabob of *Broach* in April laſt. It cannot be forgotten till it be puniſhed; nor need I make any obſervations on his late conduct; every Gentleman here muſt feel it ſtrongly.

The expences of an Enterprize againſt *Broach* cannot be conſiderable. The ſucceſs is as aſſured as the ſucceſs of any operation of the kind can be. I have deliberately conſidered the Honourable Company's orders—I know the diſtreſſes we are in for Money—I know the Force that may be employed againſt *Broach*; and I do not heſitate to declare it to be my opinion, that in the preſent conjuncture, a ſpeedy, vigorous, and ſpirited effort ſhould be made to chaſtiſe the Nabob of *Broach* for his inſolent, baſe, and perfidious conduct.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Bombay, Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
21ſt October 1772. Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servant,
David Wedderburn.

Extract of *Bombay* General Conſultations; the 30th October 1772.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire,
Preſident and Governor,
The W^e *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, *David Wedderburn*,
John Watſon,
Nathaniel Stackhouſe, *Brice Fletcher*,
William Tayler, *William Shaw*,
Robert Garden.
Mr. *Benjamin Jervis*, indiſpoſed.

Draper, &c. deliver a joint Letter, containing their Reaſons for diſſenting to an Armament being ſent againſt Broach.

Meſſieurs *Draper*, *Watſon*, *Stackhouſe*, *Shaw*, and *Garden*, who diſſented from the Reſolution of the Board in our laſt Conſultation, on the Meaſures then reſolved to be purſued for obtaining redreſs at this juncture from the Nabob of *Broach*, now lay before the Board a Letter, containing their Reaſons for their diſſent.

Ordered, That it be entered after this Conſultation.

Fletcher, and Tayler, aſſign their Reaſons for voting for an Expedition againſt Broach.

Meſſieurs *Fletcher* and *Tayler* each lay before the Board a Letter, aſſigning their Reaſons for voting for an Expedition againſt *Broach* being immediately undertaken, which are alſo ordered to follow this Conſultation.

Letter from Meſſ^rs Draper, Watſon, Stackhouſe, Shaw, and Garden, aſſigning their Reaſons for diſſenting to an Expedition againſt Broach.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

The determination of the Majority laſt Council day, reſpecting an Expedition at this juncture againſt *Broach*, which has been the ſubject matter of deliberation at our two laſt Meetings, being altogether contrary to our ſentiments, we beg leave thus to lay before our Honourable Employers the arguments we there urged againſt the proceeding, and which induced us to diſſent from the other Members on this ſo important an occaſion.

Firſt, Becauſe the Honourable Court of Directors have been pleaſed, in the Paragraphs 34, 35, 36, and 37, of their commands to this Preſidency, dated the firſt of April laſt, not only to declare their total diſapprobation of the motives heretofore aſſigned in the Governor's Minute, and Board's Reſolution, on firſt undertaking the former Expedition againſt *Broach*, but further add, "that we "ſeem to think blame only due to want of ſucceſs;" thus plainly indicating, that they ſhould have equally condemned that meaſure, had our Arms been ſucceſsful.

Secondly, It was urged by the Gentlemen who voted for the Expedition, that our Honourable Employers did not know the ſubſequent Treaty which had been concluded, and the *Broach* Nabob's late inſolence and baſe infringement of it, at the time they gave thoſe poſitive orders. This Argument we acknowledged the juſt weight of, but wiſhed to have the Honourable Court's opinion of that Treaty, before we renew Hoſtilities, as they had ſo peremptorily declared the original cauſe of the War "ſo "very unjuſtifiable;" and we muſt again beg leave to remark (as we did before at the Council Board) that although the Honourable Court have, in their ſaid Letter, very ſeverely reprimanded us for the diſgrace brought on their Arms by the failure of this Expedition (of which they ſeem to have felt the full ſtigma) yet, inſtead of directing us to retrieve their Honour, they content themſelves in condemning our proceedings, and us to pay the Expence, and thus, by an implied acquieſcence, ſeemed inclined to ſit down in the diſgrace, rather than proſecute ſuch a War, after having ſo highly diſapproved the Board's original motives for it.

Thirdly, They blame the Board's undertaking the Cooley and *Broach* Expeditions at a time the Treaſury was ſo low; which cauſe, we are ſorry to obſerve, ſtill ſubſiſts, and if poſſible, renders it to a greater degree injudicious at this juncture, when the Treaſury is not only low, but very much in debt to the Paymaſters for the current Expences of the Settlement, and alſo for the Mocha Supra Cargoe's Bills on us to a large amount; and we are beſides under Engagements to advance three Lacks of Rupees for the *Surat* Inveſtment, and to ſend a large ſum to the Coaſt Settlements, and little proſpect of any immediate Supplies ſo abſolutely neceſſary for thoſe purpoſes.

It muſt be confeſſed, that the inſolence of the *Broach* Nabob has of late been very great, and merits chaſtiſement at a proper time, ſhould our Honourable Employers think fit in future to permit or direct it; but it is the allowed maxim in politics of all Nations, and all Governments, to wait the fitteſt conjunctures in every reſpect to reſent injuries, which however atrocious, however daring the offences, it is not always judged needful or proper to reſent on the inſtant, but await ſuch times and opportunities as beſt coincide with the true Intereſts of the Government aggrieved; nor are inſults forgiven, becauſe they are not immediately retaliated, but reſentment reſerved for a proper time and opportunity.

Thus upon the whole, as our Employers are pleaſed ſo ſeverely to condemn the original motives of this War, and therefore ſeem to acquieſce in the diſgrace brought on their Arms rather than proſecute it, we could not conſent to ſuch a ſtep, when our Treaſury was ſo much in Arrear, and this too at a time when a month or two will moſt probably bring us their ultimate opinion and determination relative to the firſt Expedition as well as the Treaty; when we ſhall doubtleſs have their ſentiments moſt clearly and fully expreſſed in anſwer to the very particular advices of both, ſent home by the Ship *Dutton*; we therefore could not avoid repeatedly urging the Board to defer taking the preſent ſtep, at leaſt till advices were received either by the expected Packet-Boat, or over land; and in this we were the more ſanguine as the number of

voices

voices were ſo equal that the Governor's caſting vote alone decided in favour of an immediate Expedition both in the Select Committee and Council; neither would the countenance of His Majeſty's Squadron, which has been ſo much inſiſted on, be loſt by ſuch delay, nor ſhould we be deprived of this, even were we to wait the Honourable Company's fuller inſtructions on the ſubject for another ſeaſon, as we may again expect it here in a year's time; but this, or any other countenance, ſeems the leſs neceſſary from the certainty of ſucceſs expreſſed, as well in the Governor's Minute as in the General's Letter on this ſubject; nor can we pretend to ſay how much this ſtep may affect Mr. *Moſtyn*'s Negociations with the Marattas, who have an important intereſt in the *Broach* Revenue.

However juſt the Remark made by General *Wedderburn* in his Addreſs above-mentioned, that no intereſted views can be aſcribed to the three Members of the Select Committee who voted for the Expedition; we flatter ourſelves, it will be admitted at leaſt equally ſo, that the diſſentients voting againſt it at this juncture cannot be aſcribed to any other motive but the attention they on all occaſions wiſh to ſhew to the poſitive Commands of their Employers in caſes where they leave us no latitude, no diſcretionary powers, whatever advantages our local ſituation and information might afford us.

But as the Expedition is then reſolved on, we moſt ardently wiſh it may terminate to the Honour of our Arms, and ſhall be equally ſolicitous with the other Members to co-operate in every reſpect that may render it ſucceſsful and advantageous.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Daniel Draper,
John Watſon,
Nathaniel Stackhouſe,
William Shaw,
Robert Garden.

Bombay,
26th October 1772.

Letter from Mr. Fletcher, aſſigning his Reaſons for voting for an Expedition againſt the Nabob of Broach.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Our Honourable Maſters having been pleaſed in their commands of the 1ſt April 1772, to diſapprove of our motives for undertaking the former Expedition againſt *Broach*, I requeſt the following Reaſons may ſtand upon Record for my acquieſcing in the preſent one; and whatever may be the event, I flatter myſelf, they will appear ſufficient to juſtify me for acting in ſeeming contradiction to their Sentiments on the ſubject.

I will not here pretend to enter into a diſcuſſion of the Motives which firſt led this Board to attack the Nabob of *Broach*; the meaſures purſued afterwards ſufficiently evince the deſire this Board had to cultivate his Friendſhip, and to live on peaceable terms with him; in conſequence of which a Treaty was entered into, which on our parts has been ſtrictly adhered to, but on that of the Nabob moſt ſhamefully infringed in every particular. Our Reſident has been treated with the greateſt contempt, and every mark of diſreſpect ſhewn to the Engliſh, inſomuch that it appears to me totally inconſiſtent with the Honour and Intereſt of the Company longer to ſubmit to ſuch repeated inſults, which muſt only tend to leſſen us greatly in the eyes of the neighbouring Powers, but is fraught with many ill conſequences too obvious to need being enumerated. The Honourable Company muſt neceſſarily have that confidence in us, to ſuppoſe we can only have their Intereſt in view in an undertaking of this ſort; and however averſe they may be to hoſtile meaſures, I am firmly of opinion, they never would approve of our tamely bearing the inſults by the Nabob, without ſhewing a ſuitable reſentment, merely becauſe they had expreſſed theſe their ſentiments. Circumſtances may be ſuch, as to render it highly improper to be actuated implicitly thereby, of which we on the ſpot can alone be the proper Judges. This appears to me to be the caſe at preſent, and for that reaſon, I give my voice for the Expedition being immediately ſet on foot.

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I am, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Brice Fletcher.

Bombay.

Letter from Mr. Tayler, aſſigning his Reaſons for voting for an Expedition againſt Broach.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Reſolution for the immediate Chaſtiſement of the Nabob of *Broach*, for his late inſolent and perfidious conduct, having been determined ſolely by the caſting vote of the Honourable the Preſident, I ſhall here beg leave to inſert the Reaſons that urged me to vote, as I did, in favour of it.

In the firſt place, his having broke through every part of the Treaty which he voluntarily came here and entered into, under the 30th November 1771.

Secondly, The Language held by the Honourable Court of Directors, in the 9th paragraph of their commands of the 30th June 1769, ſpeaking of an inſult that had been offered to this Board by *Viſſajee Punt:* The Paragraph is as follows; viz.

" You will ſee by the whole tenor of our Letters to " you and the other Preſidencies, that we are rather jea- " lous of the Maratta Power, yet we have ſought to con- " tinue in peace with them, and to keep up a friendly in- " tercourſe; but if they think fit to take a hoſtile part " againſt us, to ſend you inſulting Meſſages, and to brave " your Port with their Grabs, it is time to take vigorous " meaſures for preſerving that reſpect which we have " hitherto held on your ſide of *India*. When you wrote " your Letter of the 13th December, giving an Account of " the Maratta Fleet cruizing off the Harbour, and of the " inſolent Anſwer of *Viſſajee Punt*, you had Ships in your " Harbour more than ſufficient to have deſtroyed his " Fleet, or brought him to a more becoming and expli- " cit Declaration; and when *Madarao* informed you that " his deſigns were to demand the Chout from the Nabob " of *Arcot*, preſerving at the ſame time towards the " Engliſh, you ſhould have told him that thoſe two " things were incompatible; that the Nabob of *Arcot* " was, as he knew, in firm friendſhip and alliance with the " Engliſh, and that any demand made upon him at the " head of an Army laying waſte his country, would be " anſwered by the Engliſh Forces in all parts of *India*, " who never would ſuffer a People under their protection " to be diſtreſſed and plundered under any pretence what- " ſoever. That Accounts ſhould be ſettled between " their reſpective Agents in the uſual manner, and if any " thing was due from the Nabob of *Arcot*, your good " offices ſhould be employed in bringing the matter to an " amicable concluſion. This ſort of language, with ſome " vigorous preparations at the ſame time by Sea and " Land, would have been more likely to preſerve Peace " with the Marattas, than the ſilent reſpect with which " you ſeem to have received all their inſults."

Our Force was at that time in no ſhape equal to what it is at preſent; if therefore, they then expected we ſhould have ſhewn ſuch reſentment to the moſt formidable Power in *Hindoſtan*, what will they not ſay to the ſilently receiving the inſults of a Nabob of *Broach*, whoſe whole force, by the lateſt advice from Mr. *Morley*, dated the 18th inſtant, does not amount to 2,000 men, and theſe diſaffected to him from his withholding their Pay, as were his Subjects in general from his tyrannical and oppreſſive government?

Notwithſtanding the Honourable Court of Directors, in their commands of the 1ſt April laſt, are pleaſed to diſapprove our motives for this Expedition, they dwell much on the diſcredit brought on their Arms. Their diſapprobation of our motives gives me much concern, but the circumſtance of the Treaty in my opinion totally changes our ſituation; and were we to ſuffer the infringement of it to paſs without immediate chaſtiſement, we ſhould heap diſcredit on diſcredit.

They

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They are further pleaſed to ſay, the Enterprize afforded no probable proſpect of advantage. *Broach* is the Key to the rich Kingdom of *Guzerat*, where moſt of our Europe Inveſtment is provided, and from whence all the beſt Cotton is brought for the Conſumption of *India* and *China*. Behind *Guzerat* lay the extenſive Provinces of *Ajenere* and *Jeſſelmae*, which formerly took off a large quantity of our Woollens and other Europe Commodities. By a Letter from the late Chief of *Surat*, entered on our Diary the 14th May 1771, it appears that the Agents of *Futtee Sing*, whoſe Capital is *Brodar*, about 45 miles diſtant inland from *Broach*, had offered to pay down five Lacks of Rupees, and 125,000 per Annum, provided we would put their Maſter in poſſeſſion of it. By the ſame Letter the Buxey of *Surat* had offered three Lacks down, and R^{s} 50,000 per Annum. The Honourable the Preſident laſt Council-day produced a Letter of a very late date from the preſent Chief of *Surat*, acquainting him that *Anvor Khan* had offered to pay down ſix Lacks. Mr. *Morley*, in his Letter of the April, entered in our Diary under the 14th July laſt, adviſed that the Nabob's ſhare of the Revenues of *Broach* amounted to R^{s} 2,95,000 per Annum. Under the 6th inſtant he had received intelligence from the Banicans he had appointed our Brothers, that in their opinion the leaſt Amount the Nabob had in his Treaſury was 70 Lacks of Rupees.

Our becoming Maſters of *Broach*, ſhould we not keep poſſeſſion of it, may therefore be made a capital advantage of, in obtaining from *Madarao* the territorial poſſeſſions recommended and expected by our Honourable Employers.

As to the Charge of this Expedition, the Proviſions will not exceed Rupees 29,000, the Freight of Boats will amount to Rupees 6,000 per month. The conſumption of Stores will, I firmly believe, be very ſmall. The Troops muſt be paid whether here or at *Broach*, and the ſtate of our Treaſury has enabled us to pay the Sepoys going on the Expedition to the end of this month, and to permit of Rupees 30,000 being embarked for the payment of the Europeans; and though our preſent balance may be but ſmall, there is a certain proſpect of its increaſing very faſt, from the late Sale of Veſſels to the amount of

Rupees		82,935 — —	
Bengal Goods, D^{o}		3,30,000 — —	
The intended ſale of Europe Goods, the 2d of next month, which may be expected to yield, *viz.*			
1,000	Bales of Broad Cloth	3,20,000 — —	
86	D^{o} long Ells	34,400 — —	
1,626	Lead	21,760 — —	
38	Steel	760 — —	
6,582	Copper Plates	5,30,000 — —	
2,439	Copper Fine	2,10,000 — —	
686	Japan Copper	55,000 — —	
			11,71,920 — —
Bills on Europe permitted to be drawn to the Amount of			4,00,000 — —
		Rupees	19,84,855 — —

The Gentlemen at *Bengal* have alſo acquainted us we may take every opportunity of drawing on them, as they will of remitting us, any further Sums we may have occaſion for.——We have been adviſed by Mr. *Broone*, that ſome Money may be expected from the Rannie, in part of her debt.

The Honour and Intereſt of our Employers are inſeparable. From the immediate carrying into execution our intentions againſt *Broach*, I am confident both will be acquired, and I am as confident that the Loſs of both muſt be the conſequence of a delay.

I have the Honour to remain, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
William Tayler.

Bombay,
26th October 1772.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bombay* to the Court of Directors; dated 4th December 1772.

Par. 8. In our Addreſs of the 23d ultimo, we have fully acquainted your Honours with the conduct of the Nabob of *Broach*, in evading a compliance with every Article of the Treaty which he entered into on the 30th of November 1771, and with the motives which induced us to ſend a ſuitable Military and Marine Force againſt *Broach*, commanded by the Brigadier-General and Superintendant, to obtain ſatisfaction for the Nabob's baſe and perfidious conduct; and in the cloſe of the ſame Addreſs we informed you, that the Preſident had juſt received intelligence that your Forces had ſtormed and taken the Town on the 18th ultimo, after the Batteries had been only two days open before the place. We have now the pleaſure to acquaint you that we have ſince received a Confirmation of this fortunate event, and the Town is now actually in our poſſeſſion. The loſs in Killed and Wounded would have been eſteemed inconſiderable on this occaſion, had not Brigadier-General *Wedderburn* been amongſt the number of the former, who was unfortunately killed on the morning of the 14th ultimo, as he was reconnoitring too near the walls of the Town.

9. The Revenues of this place, by the beſt account we are yet able to procure, amount to about ſeven Lacks annually, about one Half of which was collected by the late Nabob, and the remainder by *Futty Sing*, ſon of the late *Damajee*, who has already acquainted the Gentlemen in command there, that he expects to receive his proportion as heretofore, reſpecting which we have yet come to no determination; but we have reſolved to keep the new Conqueſt in our poſſeſſion till we can judge of its exact value, or be able to diſpoſe of it in ſuch manner as may be moſt for your intereſt; in purſuance of which we have ſent orders to your Chief and Council at *Surat* to eſtabliſh a Reſident and Factors there, who are to be ſubject to the orders of the former; and we have directed the Chief to repair thither for ſettling matters upon a proper footing, ordering at the ſame time that Colonel *Gordon* (on whom the command of the Military devolved upon the death of the Brigadier General) and Mr. *Watſon*, ſhould return to their reſpective ſtations here with the Forces under their command, except ſuch part as Mr. *Price* and thoſe Gentlemen may judge requiſite to remain at *Broach* as a ſuitable Garriſon, on due conſideration of every circumſtance which can affect it. For every neceſſary particular relative to our motives for ſetting on foot this Expedition, our Addreſs of the 23d ultimo, with the papers which accompany it, will fully explain, and your Honours will therein be fully acquainted with the Reaſons aſſigned by Meſſrs. *Draper*, *Watſon*, *Stackhouſe*, *Shaw*, and *Garden*, who diſſented from the meaſure, and

were for deferring it till what they eſteemed a more proper juncture by the receipt of your Orders thereon. Succeſs however having attended it, and the diſgrace brought upon your Arms by the failure in the former attempt being wiped off, and as we hope it will turn out very advantageous to your Honours, we therefore doubt not but the undertaking will meet with your approbation. We have directed that the plunder and booty taken ſhall be divided agreeable to your orders, deducting firſt the Expences of the Expedition. Upwards of one Lack of Rupees has been already taken in the Durbar, with other things of value; and as it is generally allowed that the Nabob on his flight when the Troops entered the town carried nothing of value with him, and as his Riches are acknowledged to have been conſiderable, we hope that his Treaſure to a much larger amount will be ſhortly diſcovered.

10. Mr. *Moſtyn*, on his arrival from *England*, was admitted to a ſeat at our Board, and ſhortly after the receipt of your Commands of the 1ſt of April laſt, he ſet out for *Poona*, with ſuitable Inſtructions for accompliſhing the points your Honours have in view, by his Reſidence at the Maratta Durbar. He has acquainted us, that *Mhada Row* and his Miniſters acquieſced in his continuing there as a fixed Reſident, and that in general he had been very well received: He alſo adviſed us that he ſhortly expected an anſwer to your Honours Letter, which we hoped to have received in time to have ſent in the *Duke of Cumberland* Packet; but *Mhada Row*'s death, which happened on the 18th ultimo, after a lingering illneſs, we ſuppoſe prevented it. He has been ſucceeded by his Brother, *Narron Row*, and we do not find that any internal diſturbance is likely to happen on this occaſion.

By the laſt advices from *Bengal* and *Madras* every thing remained in perfect tranquillity at thoſe places.

Extract of the General Letter to *Bombay*; 12th April 1775.

43. There is no part of your conduct more reprehenſible than that of engaging, without abſolute neceſſity, in Military Expeditions. The large Sums which have been expended at *Broach* and on the Cooleys, are an immediate inconvenience to the Company, and the conſequences of your proceedings embarraſſing in the higheſt degree; and after ſucceeding againſt the place, it is mortifying to obſerve, that our affairs are in a much worſe ſituation than they were before thoſe Expeditions were undertaken; as we do not find, that the Charges incurred in conquering the Country, and the Expences of keeping the Conqueſt, are likely to be defrayed from its reſources in a reaſonable time, without oppreſſing the Inhabitants.

44. In your Statement of the Company's Share of the *Broach* Revenues, we find Rupees 68,659, ſaid to be a Tribute paid by Country Powers. This article wants explanation. We wiſh to be informed what Country Powers pay this Tribute, and by what right, or on what pretence it is collected.

45. The whole of our annual Revenue at *Broach*, we obſerve, is ſtated at - - - Rupees 2,42,554
The annual Expence at - - Rupees 2,18,584

And the clear Income - Rupees 23,970

46. The Expence of the firſt Expedition was upwards of four Lacks of Rupees, and of the laſt nearly three Lacks of Rupees

47. Although your firſt Expedition againſt *Broach* was undertaken in 1771, and the place reduced in November 1772, enquiries into that miſmanagement, which claimed your immediate attention, have been prolonged, and your Reſolutions thereon deferred till 1774; and we find, that although a majority of the Council thought proper to appoint a Committee to inveſtigate the Affairs of *Broach*, the meaſure has not been carried into execution.

48. As the materials and particulars before us are unſatisfactory, and as your Proceedings and Reſolutions thereon are far from being unanimous, we therefore direct, APPENDIX, No. 51.

That a Committee of Enquiry, conſiſting of four, viz, *Rawſon Hart Boddam*, *William Tayler*, *Andrew Ramſay*, and *Daniel Crokatt*, be forthwith ſent to *Broach*; and that they be inſtructed to aſcertain, with all poſſible exactneſs, the Produce of the Country, number of Inhabitants, the ſtate of the Manufactures, the fortified Places, the groſs amount of the Revenues, the Company's Share thereof, the Articles from which they ariſe, the mode by which they are collected, the Charges of Collection, the combined Amount or Proportion received by us and *Futty Sing* from the produce of the Pergunnahs, and that which Cuſtom or Uſage has allotted to the Cultivator of Lands as the reward of his labour; and alſo, what ſecurity the Native has for his property, and what are the modes of adminiſtering Juſtice in civil and criminal caſes.

49. Another object of the Committee's particular attention muſt be, to fix upon a proper Military Eſtabliſhment for the defence of *Broach*, till the place ſhall be otherwiſe diſpoſed of; and in doing this, due regard muſt be had to its vicinage to *Surat*, and to the ſuccours which may on Emergencies be afforded from thence, or from the Preſidency, and alſo to the opinion of the Commanding Officer, reſpecting the Force neceſſary for the defence of *Broach*, and for the protection of the country.

50. The general behaviour of our Servants at *Broach* muſt alſo be fully inveſtigated by the Committee; and in the execution of this part of their duty, they muſt review the conduct of our Chief and Factors, from the time the place was taken to the preſent period; and report to you, in the fulleſt manner, their opinion reſpecting the management of affairs under every Adminiſtration, change, or alteration which has happened at *Broach*, and what Regulations may be neceſſary for the collecting of the Revenues, and good government of the place in future, in caſe we ſhould not be able to diſpoſe of our ſhare and intereſt therein for a valuable conſideration in ready Money, or to exchange the ſame for other Territories to our ſatisfaction.

51. It is our pleaſure that the exerciſe of all power and authority, veſted in the Chief and Factors of *Broach*, be ſuſpended immediately upon the arrival of our Committee of Enquiry; which ſuſpenſion muſt continue till that Committee ſhall return to the reſpective ſtations which they may hold under the Preſidency.

52. In fixing our Military Eſtabliſhment for your Preſidency in the former part of this Letter, we have included every Command and Detachment for your Subordinates; but ſo long as *Broach* ſhall be in our poſſeſſion, and yield us an adequate Revenue, we permit you to keep a Garriſon in that place, conſiſting of 1,000 Men, over and above the number ſpecified in our ſaid Eſtabliſhment.

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Extract of *Bombay* Conſultations; the 28th January 1773.

(Seal of Futty Sing.) (Seal of the Honourable Company.)

Agreement between *William Andrew Price*, Eſquire, Chief for Affairs of the Britiſh Nation, in Behalf of the Honourable United *Engliſh Eaſt India* Company, on the one Part, and *Futty Sing Guicawar*, on the other Part.

THE Town of *Broach*, lately belonging to *Mahazuz Cawn*, Nabob, having been conquered by the victorious Arms of the Honourable Company, it is ſtipulated and agreed, That every thing ſhall remain on the footing it was at the time of the ſaid Conqueſt; the Engliſh and

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Futty Sing each receiving their ſhare of the Revenues, in the proportions they then ſtood, both within the town and territory annexed thereto. In this, there is not to be any difference; agreeable to the above, every thing is to continue. This is the Agreement, ſealed by both parties the 12th day of January 1773, or the 18th of Sheruvel in the 1186th Year of *Hegira*.

Extract of *Bombay* Conſultations; the 2d February 1773.

Read the Advices from *Broach*, with the Tranſlate of the Agreement with *Futty Sing*, entered under the 28th January.

This Agreement is ſo looſely drawn up, ſo very inconcluſive, and ſo liable in every reſpect to objection, that we muſt much diſcommend their conduct regarding it. Many diſputes touching the Collection of the Revenues will probably ariſe, none of which have they endeavoured to guard againſt; we muſt however, for the preſent, acquieſce in it.

APPENDIX, No. 53.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations; the 17th September 1773.

AS the preſent conjuncture by the aſſaſſination of *Narron Row*, and the acceſſion of *Ragoba* to the Government of the dominions of the Marattas, appears to us to be favourable for accompliſhing the ſeveral points propoſed by our Honourable Maſters when they fixed a Reſident at the *Maratta* Durbar, Mr. *Moſtyn* muſt therefore be directed diligently to attend to every circumſtance that ſhall happen which may appear likely to render the accompliſhment of theſe points leſs difficult, adviſing us accordingly: And as we deem his reſiding at *Poona*, in the preſent critical ſituation of the affairs of the Marattas, immediately requiſite for promoting the intereſt of our Honourable Employers, he muſt be poſitively ordered not to quit it; which from his Letter before us we fear he intends doing, for we know of no ill conſequence that can reſult to him, even ſhould *Poona* be attacked by a Foreign Power.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* to the Court of Directors; dated the 12th January 1774.

Par. 2. By the Letters from your Reſident at *Poona*, which are entered upon our Diary that we have now the Honour to tranſmit, you will be acquainted with the late Revolution there, and the preſent poſture of the Affairs of the Marattas ſo far as we are adviſed of them.

3. On the acceſſion of *Ragoba* to the Government, whoſe ſituation ſeemed very precarious, we thought it probable that he might make ſome application for the aſſiſtance of the Company's Forces; and as this appeared a more favourable conjuncture for accompliſhing the ſeveral points particularly wiſhed for by you, than any other that may for a long time happen, we gave ſuitable orders to your Reſident on the occaſion; but *Ragoba* quitted *Poona* with his Army without opening himſelf on the ſubject.

4. Notwithſtanding the Reſident has plainly hinted to the Durbar at different times the Terms on which you were willing to acquire poſſeſſion of the places pointed out in your Commands, dated the 1ſt April 1772, and has even given them to underſtand that we might be induced to part with *Broach*, provided ſuitable offers were tendered for it, they have made no Propoſals on the occaſion; and as the acquiſition of *Salſette*, &c. from the Marattas has been the object principally in view for many years paſt, without any Succeſs in every Negociation with them, we are induced to believe that it will never be obtained by that means, more eſpecially as it does not appear that the Durbar are ſo deſirous of obtaining poſſeſſion of *Rajahpore* as you ſeem to underſtand; and with reſpect to *Fort Victoria*, we believe they are perfectly indifferent about it: ſuch being the caſe, and the Reſident adviſing us by a Letter entered in our Diary under the 9th ultimo, that the Affairs of *Ragoba* wore a moſt unfavourable aſpect, and that his Death or Depoſition was almoſt certain, when our Treaties with the preſent Government may be deemed at an end; and as it was moſt probable that on ſuch an event the whole Empire would be thrown into the greateſt confuſion, as there would in all probability be many Competitors for the ſupreme power; he therefore ſubmitted to us the Expediency of obtaining poſſeſſion of thoſe places pointed out by you by Force of Arms, in caſe of the Death or Depoſition of *Ragoba*: And, having taken theſe Advices into our moſt ſerious conſideration under the 10th and 11th ultimo, as your Honours will find by our Minutes of that day, we unanimouſly determined, in caſe of the event above-mentioned, to poſſeſs ourſelves of thoſe places by Force, as a meaſure agreeable to your Intereſts, and conſonant to your wiſhes, provided our particular ſituation with reſpect to our want of Money would admit; and in conſequence thereof we then gave ſuch Directions as were then requiſite. But it ſince appears that the Affairs of *Ragoba* were not in ſo deſperate a ſituation as your Reſident at *Poona* had apprehended; for it is currently reported that he has taken ſuch umbrage at the Proceedings of the Nabob *Mahomed Ally Cawn*, particularly in taking *Tanjore*, that he propoſes either to proceed himſelf, or to ſend his Forces into the *Carnatic*, of which we have adviſed your Servants at *Madras*, not as a thing certain, but only as a report very prevalent here.

APPENDIX, No. 54.

Copy of the 22d Paragraph of the Company's General Letter to *Bombay*; dated 22d March 1771.

THOUGH we are in this inſtance relieved from the fears of an approaching War, we cannot ſuffer ourſelves to be lulled into an improper ſecurity while the French continue to collect ſuch Naval and Land Forces at the Iſlands, as give us reaſon to ſuſpect they are meditating ſome hoſtile deſign againſt our Poſſeſſions in *India*. You muſt therefore by no means abate of your vigilance and attention, but uſe every neceſſary precaution for the ſafety of our Settlements, and the protection of our Trade on the Coaſt of *Malabar*.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bombay*; dated the 12th April 1775.

53. It is with much concern we learn from your Records, that we are not likely to obtain *Salſette* from the Marattas by Negociation. We however diſapprove your Reſolution to take poſſeſſion of that Iſland by force in caſe of the Death or Depoſition of *Ragoba*; and hereby poſitively prohibit you from attempting that meaſure under any circumſtances whatever, without our Permiſſion firſt obtained for that purpoſe.

EXPENCES of the Fortifications at *Bombay*, from 1768-9 to 1770-1.

	Rupees.
From Auguſt 1768 to July 1769	300,686
1769 - - 1770	532,492
1770 - - 1771	662,410

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

East India Houſe,
28th February 1782.

APPENDIX, No. 55.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bombay*; dated 6th April 1770.

Par. 67. THE important point of ſettling our Military Eſtabliſhments in the interval of Peace upon a reſpectable footing, having been under our moſt mature conſideration, we have, with the Advice and Aſſiſtance of Lord *Clive*, Major-General *Lawrence*, Major-General *Coote*, and Colonel *Wedderburn*, thought proper to adopt the following Plan and Regulations for the Military Eſtabliſhment at your Preſidency; which we direct you to carry into execution as ſoon after the receipt hereof as poſſible.

68. That the Infantry do conſiſt of one Regiment, containing two Battalions of Europeans and two Battalions of Sepoys.

69. The two Battalions of Europeans are to conſiſt in the whole, of Commiſſion and non-commiſſion Officers and Private, of 1,562 Men, excluſive of the Field Officers; and the two Battalions of Sepoys, including Commiſſion and non-commiſſion European and Black Officers, 2,042 Men.

70. That each Battalion of Infantry do conſiſt of one Grenadier Company, and eight Battalion Companies.

The Grenadier Company of each Battalion to be formed of

	1	Captain,
	4	Lieutenants.
5		
	6	Serjeants,
	6	Corporals,
	4	Drummers,
	80	Privates.
96		
101		

And each of the eight Battalion Companies of

	1	Captain,
	1	Lieutenant,
	2	Enſigns.
4		
	4	Serjeants,
	4	Corporals,
	3	Drummers and Fifers,
	70	Privates.
81		
85		

That the Field Officers to the ſaid Regiment be

	1	Colonel,
	2	Lieutenant Colonels,
	2	Majors.

71. That each of the two Battalions of Sepoys before mentioned ſhall conſiſt of

	1	Captain,
	5	Lieutenants,
	5	Enſigns.
11		
10	10	Serjeants,
Europeans 21		
	1	Commandant,
	10	Subadars,
	20	Jemidars.
31		
	60	Havildars,
	60	Naigues,
	10	Colourmen,
	10	Tom Toms,
	829	Sepoys.
969		
1,021		

72. Having formed a new Military Eſtabliſhment, as mentioned in the preceding Paragraphs, we require the moſt punctual compliance therewith, which will ſerve as a reply to the 100th Paragraph of your Letter of the 2d of December 1768, reſpecting the Appointment of an additional number of non-commiſſion Officers to the two Battalions of Infantry. APPENDIX. No. 55.

73. As it is very eſſential that the Natives ſhould be kept as ignorant as poſſible, both of the Theory and Practice of the Artillery Branch of the Art of War, we eſteem it a very pernicious practice to employ the People of the country in working the Guns; and if ſuch practice is in uſe with you, we direct that in future you attach European Artillery Men to the ſervice of the Guns which may belong to the Sepoy Corps, and that no Native be truſted with any part of this important ſervice, unleſs abſolute neceſſity ſhould require it.

Extract of General Letter from *Bombay*; dated the 23d November 1772.

Par. 107. We come now to ſpeak to your Honours of our proceedings in regard to your Military Eſtabliſhment, which is a ſubject of ſo much importance, that it engroſſed our moſt ſerious attention, and was firſt brought upon the carpet in conſequence of a Letter the Preſident addreſſed us in Conſultation the 30th of June, pointing out the great increaſe of this branch of your Honours Expences, and propoſing a Plan for its Reduction, as well in Numbers as by curtailing many allowances which had taken their riſe ſince your Orders have been in force for the obſervance of the Regulations which have been ſettled at *Madras* in regard to your Military Eſtabliſhment on the Coaſt of *Coromandel*. You will obſerve by the Preſident's Letter and propoſed Plan, that he deemed your Eſtabliſhment of the 6th of April 1770, in point of numbers, as inadequate of the neceſſary duty of this Place and its Subordinates, and therefore in his Plan he allowed ſuch numbers (but at the leaſt Expence) as he eſteemed ſufficient; his Letter however, with the Papers which accompanied it, will more fully inform you of his ſentiments; a Copy of it is therefore tranſmitted under N° 72, for your Honours information; it is alſo entered after that Day's proceedings, when we determined to concur with the Preſident in every ſuitable reduction; but the ſubject being of ſo much importance, we deferred coming to any Determination till our Meeting on the 8th of July following, on which Day the Brigadier General laid before us a Letter, pointing out the riſe of the Encreaſe in the Pay and Allowances to the Forces ſince the year 1750, and in other branches of Expence in the Military Department; containing alſo his Remarks and Opinion upon the Plan propoſed by the Preſident.

108. At the ſame time Meſſrs. *Shaw* and *Garden* addreſſed us a joint Letter, expreſſing their entire acquieſcence in the Preſident's general Idea, for a Reduction in the Numbers and Expence in the Military Department, but propoſing that it ſhould extend ſtill further, ſo as preciſely to quadrate with your Honours expreſs and reiterated Commands on this head of the 6th of April 1770, which you had often ordered to be ſtrictly adhered to; a Copy of their Letter is encloſed in the Packet, under N° 73, and a Copy of that from the Brigadier General, under N° 74.

109. We the ſame day took the whole of this ſubject into conſideration, and after the moſt mature Deliberation and Diſcuſſion, and ſeveral Queſtions being propoſed, it was reſolved, in conſequence of the previous Queſtions being put at the deſire of Meſſrs *Shaw* and *Garden*, That your Commands of the 6th April 1770, reſpecting your Military Eſtabliſhment, ſhould be carried into execution as ſoon as poſſible; for it was urged that the then ſituation of Affairs with the Nabob of *Broach* rendered it very impolitic to pitch upon that period for a Reduction in the number of your Forces; and it was therefore reſolved, that the Reduction determined on ſhould not take place till we might be able to judge of the part the Nabob

APPENDIX, No. 55.

Nabob propoſed to take, as the Brigadier General then gave it as his opinion, that if the Forces firſt were reduced, we ſhould not have it in our power to obtain ſatisfaction from the Nabob, ſhould it be neceſſary or judged proper to undertake it.

110. This reaſon has hitherto prevented our carrying our Reſolution to reduce your Forces into execution; but your Honours may depend that the Reduction ſhall take place as ſoon as poſſible after the return of your Forces hither; and that we ſhall perſevere in reducing every branch of Expence in your Military Department, as well by curtailing all unneceſſary Allowances as otherwiſe, ſo as to bring them within proper bounds.

111. But as the Majority of the Board were of opinion, on the queſtion being propoſed at the deſire of the Brigadier General, that the number of Troops eſtabliſhed by your commands of the 6th April 1770, is inadequate to the duty and protection of this Preſidency and its Subordinates, we therefore beg leave to ſubmit it to your re-conſideration; and take leave to refer you to our Minutes of Conſultations under the 8th July, for the whole of our proceedings on this ſubject, and for the opinion of Meſſrs. *Shaw* and *Garden* upon this laſt queſtion; but the abſence of the Commanding Officer, Superintendant, and principal Engineer, prevents our ſending you a Statement of the Number of Men now really neceſſary for the detail of duty for this place and its ſubordinates, as it was our intention to do, though your Honours may depend we ſhall not fail to forward it by a future opportunity.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bombay*; dated 12th April 1775.

Par. 25. On your Select Conſultations we find the Garriſon propoſed by one of the Members of the Committee of Defence for *Bombay* in time of War, conſiſt of 14,776 men, beſides Inhabitants, Surgeons, Attendants in the Hoſpitals, &c. which he ſays will render the whole number equal to 20,000: On which we remark, that our whole Force at *Madras* when beſieged by the French was 1,758 Europeans, including Horſe, Infantry, and Artillery, and 2,220 Sepoys, and alſo about 200 Horſe belonging to the Nabob, who were of no uſe to us; and if the Fortifications of *Bombay* have been extended ſo far as to require the number ſet down in the Eſtimate to man the works, we have reaſon to lament that any new works have been undertaken, being fully of opinion, that if the old Walls had been left as they ſtood many years ago, the intereſt of the Money, which has been ſunk in Fortifications ſince that time, would have maintained Troops ſufficient to have rendered the place impregnable to the combined Forces of *Indoſtan*, and to have ſecured it from any attack which the French were capable of making in that quarter.

26. As the Iſland of *Bombay* is ſmall, and the places where landing is practicable, few, and not diſtant from the town; as the diſembarkation of Troops, Stores, and Artillery is tedious, and the advantage of freſh Troops with cannon over Troops juſt landed from a long voyage without cannon, muſt be very conſiderable; and as a retreat under the guns of the Fort is at all events practicable, we perſuade ourſelves that with a good Field Train, the Troops we have at *Bombay* will at all times be able to prevent a regular Siege, unleſs a more formidable Enemy ſhould land upon that Iſland than we have reaſon to believe will ever be ſent againſt it.

27. So long as a Britiſh Fleet remains in the *Eaſt Indies*, we deem it impoſſible for an Enemy, without a ſuperior marine force, to prevent timely ſuccours from being thrown into *Bombay* if ſuch meaſure ſhould become neceſſary; and ſo long as we maintain our ſuperiority at *Bengal* and *Madras*, we ſhall be able to provide thoſe ſuccours on the ſhorteſt warning.

28. It is therefore our order, That our Infantry at *Bombay*, non-commiſſion Officers included, including alſo every Command and Detachment for the Subordinates, be forthwith reduced to 1,200 Europeans:

That the Artillery Corps do conſiſt of 312 Europeans and no more, non-commiſſion Officers, Bombardiers, and Gunners included:

That the Corps of Black Troops be reduced to 3,000 Sepoys:

That all Black Forces (except the above 3,000 Sepoys) ſuch as Topaſſes, Nairs, Tivies, or of any other denomination, be diſbanded:

That no greater number of European Commiſſion Officers be appointed to the ſaid Black Troops than the Eſtabliſhment ſhall of neceſſity require:

That all Officers who ſhall become ſupernumerary by this reform, do continue to receive their Pay; and that they ſucceed to commands as vacancies ſhall happen, according to Seniority, in their reſpective Corps:

That all European non-commiſſion Officers and Private Men, over and above the ſaid Eſtabliſhment, be ſent to *Fort Saint George*, or *Fort William*, according to ſuch Requiſitions as ſhall be made from thoſe Settlements reſpectively, or from either of them, by our Orders.

The Military Force to be ſtationed at *Tillicherry* is to conſiſt of

1—One Serjeant,
12—Twelve European Centinels,
2—Two Matroſſes,
1—One Tindal,
12—Twelve Laſcars,
1—One Corporal,
6—Six Sepoys,

} To be poſted at *Durmapatam* Iſland.

35

And the Military Force to be ſtationed at *Anjengo* is to conſiſt of

1—One Serjeant,
12—Twelve European or Sepoy Sentinels.

13

Par. 52. In fixing our Military Eſtabliſhment for your Preſidency, in the former part of this Letter, we have included every Command and Detachment for your Subordinates; but ſo long as *Broach* ſhall be in our poſſeſſion, and yield us an adequate Revenue, we permit you to keep a Garriſon in that place, conſiſting of 1,000 Men, over and above the number ſpecified in our ſaid Eſtabliſhment.

Extract of *Bombay* General Conſultations, the 30th June 1772.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor;

The W° *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, *David Wedderburn*,
Benjamin Jervis, *John Watſon*,
Nathaniel Stackhouſe, *Brice Fletcher*,
William Tayler, *William Shaw*,
Robert Garden.

To the W° *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, &c.
Members of the Council.

Gentlemen,

Letter from the Preſident, propoſing a Reduction in the Military Eſtabliſhment and Fortifications.

The Expence and annual Loſſes of this Preſidency and its Subordinates, become a ſubject of the moſt ſerious conſequence. The difference againſt our Honourable Employers on cloſe of the books ending 71, was no leſs than Rupees 24,30,329: It behoves therefore to carry into execution every means that can be deviſed for decreaſing the Charges, conſiſtent with the Safety and Defence of the Settlements, and the nature of the Service.

I have

APPENDIX. No. 55.

I have already laid before you a Plan for the reduction of the Marine, and as the ſeaſon is now arrived I deſire it may be taken into conſideration.

I ſhall now give you my ſentiments on ſome other branches of our Expences.

The Honourable Court of Directors in the 68th and 69th Paragraphs of their commands of the 6th April 1770, are pleaſed to direct that the Infantry on this eſtabliſhment do conſiſt of one Regiment, containing two Battalions of Europeans and two Battalions of Sepoys; and that the two Battalions of Europeans are to conſiſt in the whole of Commiſſion, Non-commiſſioned Officers, and Private, of 1,562 Men, excluſive of the Field Officers; and the two Battalions of Sepoys, including Commiſſioned and Non-commiſſioned European and Black Officers, of 2,042 Men. They were not pleaſed in theſe commands to give any directions regarding the Artillery, but in thoſe of the 18th March 1768, they direct it ſhall conſiſt of four Companies, making together 302 Men, including the Field and all other Officers. Theſe numbers make 3,906 Men, excluſive of the General and five Field Officers of Infantry, who added to the above make 3,912 Men.

Our Eſtabliſhment on the Iſland at *Surat*, *Tellicherry*, and *Anjengo*, conſiſts of 7,755 Men, Officers and Private, including 609 Tivees, and 32 Nairs at *Tellicherry*, and 544 Topaſſes here and at *Tellicherry* and *Anjengo*, which together make 1,271. The Infantry, Sepoys, Artillery, and Laſcars, amount to 6,484.

The Honourable Court of Directors in their commands of the 18th March, were pleaſed to declare that the Eſtabliſhment they then ordered was intended for garriſoning the Iſland and ſubordinates; but it is I believe univerſally allowed not to be ſufficient. Our preſent Eſtabliſhment wants no more than 71 of doubling the number ordered by them, and the number actually belonging to the Iſland only being 5,410 Men, exceeds their Eſtabliſhment 1,498. I propoſe therefore to your conſideration, whether a Regiment of Infantry, including the General and all the Field and other Officers, conſiſting of 1,772 men, compoſed of the Europeans, and the Topaſſes doing duty at *Tellicherry* and *Anjengo*; a Corps of Artillery, conſiſting of 517 Men, including all Officers, and 209 Laſcars, three Battalions of Sepoys, conſiſting of 2,632 Men, and the 727 Nairs and Tivees at *Tellicherry*, will not be ſufficient for the ſervice of this whole Preſidency. This Eſtabliſhment will conſiſt of 5,648 Men, whoſe monthly pay will amount to Rupees 57,487. 3. 17. The preſent Eſtabliſhment conſiſts of 7,755 Men, whoſe monthly pay amount to Rupees 77,149. 2. 98. The Eſtabliſhment ordered by the Court of Directors is 3,912 Men, at the next monthly charge of Rupees 47,849. 0. 20. allowing for no Commiſſioned or Non-commiſſioned Officers on the Staff, Surgeons, nor Cadets, whoſe Allowances, Rupees 2,398. 1. 43. added to that ſum, cauſe it to amount to Rupees 52,247. 0. 63. monthly. The Eſtabliſhment I propoſe provides for all thoſe Officers, &c. and 1,736 Men more than that ordered by the Court of Directors, at the additional Expence of Rupees 7,240. 2. 54. per month, it will reduce the preſent Eſtabliſhment 2,107 Men, and decreaſe the monthly pay, Rupees 19,661. 3. 81. many contingent Charges muſt of courſe decreaſe alſo. For your fuller information a Statement is annexed, particularizing the Eſtabliſhment as ordered by the Company. As it now ſtands, and as I propoſe it ſhould be, the annual Amount to the Eſtabliſhment I propoſe, will be Rupees 6,89,852; from whence deducting 2,20,000, the amount of the Pay and Allowances to the Garriſons of *Surat*, *Tellicherry*, and *Anjengo*, as reduced by General *Wedderburn*'s plan, the remaining Charge of Rupees 4,69,844, will fall on the Iſland only, and with Houſe Rent, Oil, and Peon Money, being Rupees 37,370 per annum, will amount to Rupees 5,07,214, for the Pay and Allowances to 3,369 Officers and Private, included under the head of Garriſon Charges.

The Head of Garriſon Charges on Books 60/1 for 3,142 Men on the Iſland, including 381 Peons, and 162 Invalids, amounting to no more than R^{s} 3,03,049. 41.— On Books 70/1, it amounted to R^{s} 8,12,830. 1. 12. for 5,606 Men, including 386 Peons, and 347 Invalids. On cloſe of Books 73, provided my Plan is adopted, it may be expected not to exceed R^{s} 5,60,000 for 4,102, allowing for 386 Peons, and 347 Invalids, in which caſe the difference in our Expences for 1771 and 1773, will be Rupees 2,52,830 per annum; and when it is conſidered that the number of Europeans, Sepoys, and Laſcars, is much greater than it was in the year 1760; that the increaſe of Pay to the Sepoys of every denomination, and addition of Europeans, and augmentation of Black Officers to that Corps, which took place in the year 63 and 69, occaſions the Expence of the numbers now propoſed to be maintained to exceed the Charge, the like number would have been at, till the year 1763, the ſum of R^{s} 70,482 per annum, together with the increaſe occaſioned by Officers of higher Rank, the Staff and additional Pay to Commiſſion Officers of every Rank, which amounts to upwards of R^{s} 88,000 per annum, together with the allowance for Houſe Rent being double what it was in the year 60/1, the Garriſon Charges for the year 72/3 will not exceed (proportionably) what they were in the year 60/1.

I have received certain intelligence that the French have ſent to Europe 3,000 of the Troops they had at *Mauritius*, and that they were at the Cape the 20th March laſt on their return, on five large ſhips. We need not heſitate therefore at making our Reductions on account of the reports we have heard, of their having intended to tranſport that Force to *India*; but to obviate any objection that may be made to diſbanding ſo many diſciplined Troops, I propoſe that the Chief of *Surat* be directed to endeavour to induce the Nabob to take them into his pay under the ſame controul as thoſe in the ſervice of the Nabob of *Arcot*, in lieu of the Irregulars he now has, and if he declines accepting them, that they may be diſcharged.

The monthly Expence of the Fortifications runs very high, I therefore propoſe, that the Labourers employed thereon, ſhould be reduced to 12 or 1,500 Men, and if poſſible, to lower the Artificers and Labourers Pay under what they receive at preſent.

The Charge of the Storekeeper and his Aſſiſtants, the Engineer, Practitioner Engineers, Surveyors, Cadets, Overſeers, &c. amounts as per accompanying account, to upwards of R^{s} 2,400 per month. I conceive a large Reduction therefore may take place. I am of opinion, the Engineer and Aſſiſtant Engineers, and ſix Cadets Overſeers, are ſufficient for every purpoſe.

The Honourable Court of Directors in their Commands of the 4th April 1767, Paragraph 85, object to 60 Rupees per month being allowed Captain *Burr* as Director of the Laboratory if it had not been uſual, ſaying, "They will not admit of ſuch innovations."— In thoſe of the 25th March 1768, Para. 159, they direct, that the Salary of £. 300. per annum ſhall be in full of all Allowances on Account of that ſtation. In their commands of the 31ſt March 69, Paragraph 104, they expect and require, that no Allowances be at any time made to their Military, unleſs warranted by their orders, or the practice of their other Preſidencies; and mention, that on Account of the Gratuities added to the pay of their Military Officers, they hoped we had of our own accord withdrawn every extra allowance whatever.

Under the 6th April 1770, Para. 15, they direct the Marine Eſtabliſhment to be adjuſted on the moſt frugal terms poſſible. I ſhall hereafter lay before you ſuch further Remarks as may occur to me on the Reduction of the Loſſes and Expences in general, both here and at the Subordinates.

I am,
Gentlemen,
your moſt humble Servant,
William Hornby.

Bombay,
30th June 1772.

APPENDIX. No. 55.

STATEMENT.

INFANTRY, as ordered by the C° of Directors, 1770.

1	Brig. General		R^s 830 — —
1	Colonel		300 — —
2	Lt Colonels, at	240 — —	480 — —
2	Majors	180 — —	360 — —
18	Captains	156 — —	2,808 — —
24	Lieutenants	84 — —	2,016 — —
32	Enſigns	60 — —	1,920 — —
76	Serjeants	20 — —	1,520 — —
76	Corporals	14 — —	1,064 — —
56	Drums and Fifes	14 — —	784 — —
1,280	Private	10 — —	12,800 — —
1,568	Men	Rupees	24,882 — —

INFANTRY here and at the Subordinates, as they now ſtand.

1	Brig. General		830 — —
1	Colonel		300 — —
2	Lt Colonels, a.		480 — —
2	Majors		360 — —
18	Captains		2,808 — —
25	Lieutenants		2,100 — —
31	Enſigns		1,860 — —
85	Serjeants		1,700 — —
85	Corporals		1,190 — —
79	Drums and Fifes		1,106 — —
1,397	Europeans		13,970 — —
	Topaſſes, vizt.		
	327 a. R^s 8 p. M°	2,616 — —	
	150 a. 6 D°	900 — —	
	67 a. 5 D°	335 — —	
544			3,851 — —
	Govr Staff.		
2	Aid de Camps		280 — —
	Genl Staff, vizt.		
1	Aid de Camp	140 — —	
1	Major Brig^r	140 — —	
1	Sec^y	120 — —	
			400 — —
2	Q^r Maſt^{rs} for the Reg^t		96 — —
1	Surgeon Major		120 — —
2	Batt^l Surgeons		151 3 70
2	Serj^t Majors, and 2 Q^r Maſt^r Serj^t add. Pay		51 — 80
2	Drum. and 5 Maj^{rs}.		10 2 68
24	Cadets, a. 20 R^s ea.		480 — —
1	Town Major, and 4 Adj^t		360 — —
2,297	Men	Rupees	32,504 3 18

INFANTRY propoſed.

1	B. General		830 — —
1	Colonel		300 — —
2	Lieut. Colonels		480 — —
2	Majors		360 — —
18	Captains		2,808 — —
20	Lieutenants		1,680 — —
16	Enſigns		960 — —
76	Serjeants		1,520 — —
76	Corporals		1,064 — —
54	Drums and Fifes		756 — —
1,280	Private		12,800 — —
2	Drum. and Fife Majors		38 2 68
2	Serj^t Majors		65 2 40
2	Q^r Maſter Serjeants		65 2 40
1	Surgeon Major		120 — —
2	Battalion Surgeons		151 3 70
217	Topaſſes a. diff. Pay at		
1,772	Men, Tellicherry and Anjengo		1,235 — —
2	Adjutants, a. 60 R^s ea.		120 — —
1	Brig^r Major		140 — —
1	Town Major		120 — —
3	Aid de Camps		420 — —
1	Secretary		120 — —
2	Quarter-Maſters		96 — —
		R^s	26,250 3 18

ARTILLERY as ordered.

1	Lieutenant Colonel	240 — —	
1	Major	191 2 —	
2	Captains a. 167 2 — ea.	335 — —	
4	Capt Lieutenants	108 — —	432 — —
4	Firſt Lieutenants	89 3 —	359 — —
4	Second D^{o}	83 — 70	332 2 80
2	Third D^{o}	60 — —	120 — —
12	Lieut. Fireworkers	60 — —	120 — —
12	Serjeants	24 — —	288 — —
12	Corporals	20 — —	240 — —
32	Bombardiers	18 — —	576 — —
48	Gunners	16 — —	768 — —
8	Drummers	14 — —	114 — —
160	Matroſſes	12 — —	1,920 — —
302		R^{s}	6,634 — 80

As it now ſtands.

1	Major	191 2 —	
1	D^{o} Brevet	167 2 —	
2	Captains a. 167 2 —	335 — —	
4	Captain Lieut^{s} 108 — —	432 — —	
4	Firſt Lieutenants 89 3 —	359 — —	
4	Second Ditto 83 — 70	332 2 80	
2	Thirds 60 — —	120 — —	
12	Lieutenant Fireworkers 60 — —	720 — —	
16	Serjeants 24 — —	384 — —	
12	Corporals 20 — —	240 — —	
32	Bombardiers 18 — —	576 — —	
51	Gunners 16 — —	816 — —	
13	Fifes and Drums 14 — —	182 — —	
160	Matroſſes 12 — —	1,920 — —	
1	Adjutant	60 — —	
1	Q^{r} Maſter	48 — —	
1	Serjeant Major a. ^{h} Pay	12 3 20	
1	Q^{r} Maſter Serjeant D^{o}	12 3 20	
1	Surgeon	75 3 85	
1	Purvoe	15 — —	
1	Sirang	16 — —	
3	D^{o} a. 12 R^{s} ea.	36 — —	
13	Tindals a. 8 R^{s} ea.	104 — —	
308	Laſcars a. 5 R^{s} ea.	1,540 — —	
642	Men.	R^{s} 8,887 — —	

Propoſed.

1	Major	191 2 —	
3	Captains	502 2 —	
4	Captain Lieutenants	432 — —	
4	Firſt Lieutenants	359 — —	
4	Second D^{o}	332 2 80	
1	Third D^{o}	60 — —	
12	Lieutenant Fireworkers	720 — —	
12	Serjeants	288 — —	
12	Corporals	240 — —	
32	Bombardiers	576 — —	
48	Gunners	768 — —	
12	Fifes and Drums	168 — —	
160	Matroſſes	1,920 — —	
1	Adjutant	60 — —	
1	Quarter Maſter	48 — —	
1	Serjeant Major	36 3 20	
1	Quarter Maſter Serjeant	36 3 20	
1	Surgeon	75 3 85	
1	Purvoe	15 — —	
2	Serangs a. 12 R^{s} ea.	24 — —	
6	Tindals 8	48 — —	
200	Laſcars 5	1,000 — —	
517	Men	R^{s} 7,902 1 01	

The Laſcars abſolutely neceſſary.

APPENDIX. No. 55.

SEPOYS, as ordered 1770.

2 Captains, at	156 — —		312 — —
10 Lieutenants	84 — —		840 — —
10 Enſigns	60 — —		600 — —
20 Serjeants	33 3 36		667 — 20
2 Commandants	102 1 60		204 3 20
20 Subedars	54 1 60		1,088 — —
40 Jumbledars	16 1 —		650 — —
120 Havaldars	8 — 50		975 — —
120 Naiques	6 2 75		802 2 —
20 Colourmen	6 — —		120 — —
20 Tom Toms	6 — —		120 — —
1,658 Sepoys	6 — —		9,948 — —
2,042 Men		R^s	16,327 1 40

As they now ſtand.

4 Captains	a. 156 — —	624 — —
19 Lieutenants	84 — —	1,596 — —
21 Enſigns	60 — —	1,260 — —
40 Serjeants	33 3 36	1,334 — 40
4 Commandants	102 1 60	409 2 40
41 Subedars	54 1 60	2,221 1 60
88 Jumbledars	16 1 —	1,418 — —
249 Havaldars	8 — 50	2,023 — 50
240 Naiques	6 2 75	1,605 — —
Subneſſes, vizt.		
1 At 15 R^s ea.	15 — —	
4 At 10 R^s ea.	40 — —	
23 At 6. 2 75.	153 3 25	
28 —		208 3 25
9 Trumpeters	6 — —	54 — —
116 Tom Toms	6 — —	696 — —
41 Watermen	6 — —	246 — —
3,181 Sepoys	6 — —	19,086 — —
4 Adjutants	60 — —	240 — —
Tivees, vizt.		
2 Head Moopas	10 — —	20 — —
58 Under D^o	6 — —	348 — —
635 Tivees, Private	4 — —	2,540 — —
Nairs, vizt.		
1 Writer		4 — 60
1 Moopa		10 — —
30 Nairs Private		135 — —
4,812 Men	R^s	36,079 — 75

Propoſed.

3 Captains	a. 156 — —	468 — —
6 Lieutenants	84 — —	504 — —
6 Enſigns	60 — —	360 — —
24 Serjeants	33 3 36	812 — 64
3 Commandants	102 1 60	307 — 80
24 Subedars	54 1 60	1,305 2 40
48 Jumbledars	16 1 —	780 — —
120 Havaldars	8 — 50	975 — —
120 Naiques	6 2 75	802 2 —
6 Trumpeters	6 — —	36 — —
72 Tom Toms	6 — —	436 — —
2,160 Sepoys	6 — —	12,960 — —
3 Adjutants	60 — —	180 — —
13 Subneſſes, 1 at 15, and 12 at	6 2 75	91 — 50
24 Watermen	6 — —	144 — —
Tivees, vizt.		
2 Head Moopas, a. 10 R^s	20 — —	
58 Moopas, 6	348 — —	
635 Private Tivees, 4	2,540 — —	
695 —		2,908 — —
Nairs, vizt.		
2 One Moopa and a Writer	14 — 60	
30 Private Nairs, a. 4½	135 — —	
32 —		149 — 60
3,359 Men	R^s	23,214 2 94

APPENDIX. No. 55.

HOUSE RENT, PEON and OIL MONEY, paid to the Officers, for Twelve Months; viz.

1771.			
May	3,220 — —		345 1 30
June	2,860 — —		305 3 70
July	2,860 — —		307 3 60
Auguſt	2,993 1 33		317 1 50
September	3,000 — —		317 3 —
October	2,944 2 67		302 2 20
November	2,640 — —		289 2 40
December	2,673 1 33		290 3 29
1772.			
January	2,572 — —		277 2 42
February	2,730 2 65		288 3 31
March	2,677 1 33		273 1 20
April	2,611 1 23		270 3 25
	33,782 2 54		3,587 3 17
	3,587 3 17		
R^{s}	37,370 1 71		

An ABSTRACT of Allowances given to the following Gentlemen, employed on the new Fortifications; viz. for March 1772.

1. Captain Lawrence Nilſon, acting as principal Engineer, Conveyance, Palanquin, and Office Rent	70 — —	
2 Sepoys from the Pay-office, at 5 R^{s} ea.	10 — —	
2 D^{o} entered in Liſt of Overſeers, &c. Maſſals, &c. 81 R^{s} per day	12 2 22	
4 D^{o} D^{o} 72 D^{o}	22 1 28	
4 Palanquin Coolies D^{o}	30 2 76	
1 Summerheadboy D^{o}	4 3 53	
		150 1 79
2. Captain Spaeth, Aſſiſtant to the Engineer, his Allowance, at R^{s} 2 per day	62 — —	
1 Servant, at R^{s} 8 per day	8 1 48	
1 D^{o}, at R^{s} 63 per day	4 3 53	
1 Summerheadboy, at R^{s} 54 per day	4 — 74	
		79 1 75
3. Lieutenant James McNail, Aſſiſtant to the Engineer, and Draftſman, at Rupees 4 per day		124 — —
4. Lieutenant John Bellaſis, Practitioner Engineer, his Allowance at Four Shillings per day	49 2 40	
4 Palanquin Coolies 99 Rupees per day	30 2 76	
1 Summerheadboy 54 Ditto	4 — 74	
		84 1 90
5. Mr. Lampard, Practitioner Engineer, his Allowance, at 4 Shillings	49 2 40	
4 Coolies 99 Rupees per day	30 2 76	
1 Summerheadboy 63 Ditto	4 3 53	
		85 — 69
6. Mr. Murray, Practitioner Engineer, his Allowance, at Four Shillings per Day	49 2 40	
4 Coolies	30 2 76	
1 Boy	4 — 74	
		84 1 90
7. Mr. James Valentine, Practitioner Engineer, his Allowance 4 Shillings per day	49 2 40	
4 Coolies	30 2 76	
1 Boy	4 — 74	
		84 1 90

APPENDIX. No. 55.

8. Mr. Wall, Practitioner Engineer, his Allowance	49	2 40	
4 Coolies	30	2 76	
1 Boy	4	— 74	
			84 1 90
9. Mr. Robert Nicholſon, Practitioner Engineer	49	2 40	
4 Coolies	30	2 76	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			83 3 11
10. Mr. Wilkinſon, Practitioner Engineer	49	2 40	
4 Coolies	30	2 76	
1 Boy	4	3 53	
			85 — 69
11. Mr. Royce, Practitioner Engineer	49	2 40	
4 Coolies	30	2 76	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			83 3 11
12. Mr. M'Cullock, Practitioner Engineer	49	2 40	
4 Coolies	30	2 76	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			83 3 11
13. Mr. Grahme, Practitioner Engineer	49	2 40	
4 Coolies	30	2 7[illegible]	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			83 3 11
14. Mr. Williamſon, Practitioner Engineer	49	2 40	
4 Coolies	30	2 76	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			83 3 11
15. Mr. Bloxam, Practitioner Engineer	49	2 40	
4 Coolies	30	2 40	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			83 2 75
16. Mr. Tamber, Practitioner Engineer	49	2 40	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			53 — 35
			1,417 3 53
1. Mr. Will[m] Bedford, Overſeer, his Allowance, at 2 Shillings per day	24	3 20	
1 Boy	4	— 74	
			28 3 94
2. Mr. Alex[r] Maxwell Richardſon, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			28 1 15
3. Mr. Touthcote, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	4	— 74	
			28 3 94
4. Mr. Brown, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			28 1 15
5. Mr. James Smith, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	4	— 74	
			28 3 94
6. Mr. Geo. Louther, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			28 1 15
7. Mr. James Bullock, Overſeer			24 3 20
8. Mr. Tartarious, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	4	— 74	
			28 3 94
9. Mr. Tchoop, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			28 1 15
10. Mr. George Thomas, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			28 1 15
11. Mr. Duffen	24	3 20	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			28 1 15
12. Mr. Rich[d] Noyce, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			28 1 15
13. Mr. Dennoon, Overſeer	24	3 20	
1 Boy	3	1 95	
			28 1 15
Major Dagon, Surveyor, his Allowance, at 2 Rupees per day	62	— —	
Major Burr, - - - - Ditto	62	— —	

Mr.

APPENDIX. No. 55.

Mr. Black, Sub-ſurveyor	31 — —		
1 Boy	3 1 95		
		34 1 95	
Mr. Turner, Sub-ſurveyor	31 — —		
1 Boy	3 1 95		
		34 1 95	
Mr. Torriana, Sub-ſurveyor	31 — —		
1 Boy	3 1 95		
		34 1 95	
Mr. Hollamby, Sub-ſurveyor	31 — —		
1 Boy	3 1 95		
		34 1 95	
Mr. Malet, Accomptant to the Committee		31 — —	
Mr. Page, Storekeeper, his Allowance, and his Aſſiſtants, Purvoes, Sepoys, &c. as per his Liſt		255 — 44	
			548 — 24
		R^{s}	2,428 — 62

Wedderburn, B. G. David, Letter from, on the ſubject of the Military Expences, and containing his remarks on the plan propoſed by the Preſident, for reducing them.

Extract of *Bombay* General Conſultations; the 8th July 1772.

The Brigadier General lays before the Board a Letter as entered hereafter, pointing out the increaſe of the expences of the Military Eſtabliſhment at different periods, and containing his remarks and ſentiments on the plan laid before us by the Preſident in our laſt Conſultation.

Shaw, Eſquire, William, and Garden, Eſquire, Robert, joint Letter from, propoſing the Reduction of the Military be made exactly agreeable to the eſtabliſhment ordered by the Honourable Company.

Meſſrs. *Shaw* and *Garden* at the ſame time laid before us a Letter, expreſſing their entire acquieſcence in the Preſident's general idea for a reduction in the Military Eſtabliſhment at preſent kept up; but propoſing alſo that the reduction ſhall extend farther than the Preſident's plan, ſo that the eſtabliſhment may preciſely quadrate with the Honourable Company's expreſs commands on this head of the 6th April 1770, which they have frequently directed ſhall be ſtrictly adhered to. Their Letter follows this Conſultation.

Committee of Surveys, Letter from, propoſing ſundry Reductions in the expences of the new fortifications.

The Committee of Surveys lays before the Board a Letter which relates to the new works, and encloſing one from the acting Engineer, propoſing the reduction of ſundry Black Officers and Overſeers at preſent employed thereon; pointing out likewiſe the number of Practitioner Engineers, &c. neceſſary in his opinion to be retained to enable him to carry on the works; both which letters are entered hereafter.

Military. The reduction of it conſidered;

The Board then proceed to conſider the Preſident's Letter and plan for the Military Eſtabliſhment, as alſo the Letters above-mentioned; when a debate ariſing on the reduction in the Military department, Meſſrs. *Shaw* and *Garden* deſired the following queſtion might be put: Whether the Honourable Company's reiterated commands reſpecting their Military Eſtabliſhment of the 6th April 1770, ought *not* to be carried into execution as ſoon as poſſible? Which is reſolved in the affirmative.

and Queſtion put on the occaſion, by the deſire of Meſſieurs Shaw and Garden.

The Brigadier General then deſired the Board would give their opinion on the following queſtion:

Wedderburn, B. G. David, popoſing a queſtion reſpecting the reduction of the Military.

Q. Whether the number of Troops eſtabliſhed by the Honourable Company in their commands of the 6th April 1770, conſiſting of 3,912 men, is ſufficient for the duty and protection of this place and its ſubordinates?

The Majority of the Board of opinion, the Eſtabliſhment ordered by the Company inſufficient.

The foregoing queſtion being put, after mature deliberation, the majority are of opinion, that from the repreſentations from the different commanding Officers, that the Honourable Company's laſt Military Eſtabliſhment of the 6th April 1770, is inadequate to the duty and protection of this Preſidency and its ſubordinates.

Meſſieurs Shaw and Garden of opinion the Company's commands reſpecting the Military Eſtabliſhment ſhould be ſtrictly adhered to.

Meſſrs. *Shaw* and *Garden* declare, That they are not competent judges upon this queſtion; but, as the Gentlemen the Honourable Company mention they conſulted upon the occaſion are of allowed military abilities, and as the commanding Officers upon the ſpot, who have the benefit of local information, differ from thoſe Gentlemen, they think it ought to be ſtated to the Honourable Company for their determination; but that until their further directions on this head may be received, their preſent commands ought ſtrictly to be adhered to.

Military. Further reaſons for not immediately reducing it.

It being urged to the Board, that the preſent ſituation of affairs with the *Broach* Nabob, was ſuch as rendered any reduction at preſent taking place very impoſitie, as the Nabob did not appear to have abſolutely yet determined whether he ſhould fly off from, or adhere to, the Treaty he entered into the 30th November laſt; whereas, if he found we were diſbanding any part of our Forces, he would certainly not make good the firſt payment of two lacks of Rupees, concluding that we had no intention of obliging him to do it by force, the terror of which only may induce him to comply; and the Preſident being aſked, Whether he has yet received an anſwer to the Letter he wrote the Nabob? acquaints us, that he has not, though the time in which an anſwer might have been received, is long elapſed;

The following queſtion is therefore deſired to be put on the occaſion:

Whether, in conſideration of our preſent ſituation with the Nabob of *Broach*, it is conſiſtent with the Honourable Company's real intereſt, that the reduction reſolved on ſhall immediately take place, or that we ſhall wait till, by the Nabob's anſwer we can come to a concluſive determination on the meaſures neceſſary to be purſued?

Reſolved, That the reduction in the number of the Military on this eſtabliſhment be not carried into execution till by the *Broach* Nabob's anſwer to the Preſident's Letter, we may be able finally to determine on the meaſures to be purſued with him, as the Brigadier General delivers it as his opinion, that if the forces now on foot are reduced we ſhall not have ſufficient number to obtain ſatisfaction for the inſults the Nabob has been guilty of, if the Board ſhould hereafter reſolve to attempt it.

No more Recruits to be raiſed for the Sepoys.

The General then acquainted the Board, that the battalions of Sepoys want about 140 men of being complete; and deſired its directions whether he was to continue to inliſt.

Reſolved, and ordered, That no more men be inliſted for the Sepoy Corps till further directions.

On conſideration of thoſe parts of the Letter before us which relate to the new works, the following Reſolutions are taken, and directions given:

New fortifications. The number of Practitioner Engineers, and their pay reduced.

As one Aſſiſtant and one Sub-engineer are abſent, to acquieſce in four practitioner Engineers being continued, with a pay of 4 ſhillings per diem each, which is to be in full conſideration of their acting in this capacity; and the allowances hitherto made for Palanquin Coolies and

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Somerade men, muſt be immediately diſcontinued. The four Gentlemen, the acting Engineer recommends as moſt uſeful for this employ are now appointed, and we acquieſce in 12 Cadets being allowed to act as Engineers, with an allowance of two ſhillings per diem on this account, as the acting Engineer mentions it as neceſſary; but no more than this number muſt on any account be retained; and the pay and allowances of all the Practitioner Engineers and Cadets hitherto employed above the number now ſettled, muſt immediately ceaſe.

Sundry Black Overſeers, &c. reduced to the pay of the workmen.

We approve the reduction propoſed by the acting Engineer in his Letter, of ſundry Black Overſeers, Subneſſes, and Officers of Labourers, and direct that it immediately take place; ſo alſo muſt the ſmall reduction he propoſes in the pay of the people, which muſt extend likewiſe to every other office.

Only one Surveyor and three Sub-ſurveyors to be employed in future.

From henceforward there are to be only one Surveyor, and three Sub-ſurveyors, under the Committee of Surveys; and the Preſident appoints Major Burr, Surveyor, as the ſenior Officer.

The number of people employed under the Storekeeper remarked.

Obſerving a conſiderable monthly expence charged in the new Fortification Paymaſter's diſburſements, for a number of people under the Storekeeper of the fortifications, which we are of opinion will admit of great reduction;

Ordered, That the Committee of Surveys make due enquiry, and report their opinion of the reduction which may be made.

The works to be carried on with as much expedition as poſſible.

As our Honourable Employers firſt directed the extenſive fortifications carrying on to be erected, and as they are now in great forwardneſs, we are of opinion it behoves us to cauſe them to be completed with as much expedition as the ſtate of our Treaſury will permit, in order that they may as ſoon as poſſible be eaſed of the heavy expence attendant on carrying them on; it is therefore agreed, that a number of men be employed, not to exceed 3,563, including Officers, Overſeers, Artificers, and Labourers of every ſort, ſex, and denomination; which number the acting Engineer repreſents as neceſſary to carry on the works effectually.

New Fortifications.

Propoſals to be received for making Maſonry, &c. by Contract.

The Committee of Surveys muſt frame a publication, in order that it may be laid before us, for propoſals to be received for contracting for the maſonry of new works, for digging the ditches, and for cutting of ſtone.

Land Paymaſter to prepare an Eſtimate of the Expence of making Sewers.

An Eſtimate of the Expence of making deep arched ſewers for carrying away the filth of the town, muſt be made by the Land Paymaſter, and laid before us.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Letter from the B. General, ſtating the Expences of the Military Eſtabliſhment at certain periods, and analizing the Preſident's propoſed Military Eſtabliſhment.

In order to give you every light in my power upon the very important ſubject of the Honourable the Preſident's Letter of the 30th June, I have the honour to lay before you ſome Statements, ſhewing the progreſs, and the different changes that have been made on the Military Eſtabliſhment at this Preſidency, and ſeparately ſtating many of the moſt conſiderable articles of your Military Expences; that ſeeing where the increaſe is, you may be able to judge where the reform may moſt properly and efficaciouſly be made. To reduce the numbers is the moſt eaſy and the moſt obvious way of reducing the expence, but it does by no means appear to me that it is the moſt advantageous for our Honourable Employers: circumſtanced as the Honourable *Eaſt India* Company is at preſent, it appears to me, that it is their intereſt, and that it ought to be the conſtant ſtudy and endeavour of their Servants at all their ſettlements, to keep up a reſpectable and efficient Military force at the leaſt poſſible expence. Your Honour, &c. will obſerve I have taken the ſtate of the Troops from the year 1750, as that is the loweſt and the leaſt expenſive eſtabliſhment for theſe twenty years paſt.

In the year 1750-51, the amount of the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges for the Preſidency alone, is Rupees 2,43,551, and the total number of the Troops, including Officers and Non-commiſſioned Officers, is

Europeans - - -	403
Sepoys and Topaſſes -	1,577
	1,980

The number of European Officers at the Preſidency in Auguſt 1750, is no more than 15.

At this period the pay of the Sepoys was as follow:

1 Subedar - -	R° 20	—	— per month.
1 Jemedar - - -	13	—	— D°.
1 Havildar - - -	6	2	—
1 Naique - - -	4	2	20
1 Sepoy - - - -	4	—	—
1 Topaſs - - -	4	—	—

In 1753 the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges at the Preſidency increaſe above the charges of 1751, Rupees 82,437.

The Europeans, including Officers and Non-commiſſioned Officers, are - - - - - - -	823
Sepoys and Topaſſes - - - -	1,871
	2,694

The number of European Officers at the Preſidency 35.

The increaſe of the numbers above 1750, is,

Artillery - - -	46
Infantry - - -	374
Topaſſes - - -	224
Sepoys - - - -	70
	714

At this period, the pay of the Topaſſes is raiſed to Rupees, 5 per month.

In 1757 the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges are increaſed above the year 1753, Rupees 39,234; this increaſe is not difficult to be accounted for: The numbers are increaſed this year,

Artillery - - -	42
Infantry - - -	122
Sepoys - - - -	224
	388

Houſe Rent is this year allowed to the Officers, half what is now allowed to the Captains and Subalterns. The European Officers at the Preſidency this year are 51; the Non-commiſſioned Officers of the Europeans, and the Officers and Non-commiſſioned Officers of the Sepoys are increaſed this year.

In 1760 the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges are, Rupees 64,211 leſs at the Preſidency than they were in 1757; but the Troops are decreaſed likewiſe.

Artillery - - -	97
Infantry - - - -	382
Topaſſes - - -	265
Sepoys - - - -	205
	949

The Officers at the Preſidency are fewer than they were in 1757; 15.

But it is worthy the attention of this Honourable Board, that though the number of Officers be decreaſed 15, and the Non-commiſſioned Officers and Private Men 934; yet the Military Paymaſter's charges in ſeveral articles were conſiderably higher than they were in 1757. The decreaſe of Rupees 64,211 is about the amount of the nett pay and allowances of the Officers, Non-commiſſioned Officers, and private Men, decreaſed in 1760.

	1757.	1760.	Increaſe.
Proviſions at the Out-Forts	56,368	77,402	21,034
Stationary	746	1,899	1,153
Candies	2,104	6,243	4,039
Military Storekeeper	135,087	171,151	36,064
Hoſpital Stores	9,721	10,715	994

The pay of the Topaſſes and Sepoys was increaſed

This year	1 Subedar	R$ 5	per month.
	1 Jemedar	3 1	—
	1 Havaldar	1 2	50
	1 Naique	1 —	55
	1 Sepoy	— 3	20
	1 Topaſs	1 —	—

The Caſh received by the Military Paymaſter in 1760, is more than the Caſh received by him in 1757; R$ 119,864.

In 1761, the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges increaſed above the former year 16,906 Rupees, but the Troops increaſe,

Artillery	71
Infantry	58
Sepoys	510
	639

This year the Topaſſes are leſs than the former year, 213.

The eſtabliſhment is for the firſt time ſettled at two Companies of Artillery, one Battalion of Infantry, and one Battalion of Sepoys, and conſiſted of, Europeans, Officers and Non-commiſſioned Officers included 737; Sepoys and Topaſſes 1,739; 2,476.

The European Officers at the Preſidency this year were 48.

In 1762, the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges increaſe R$ 42,258, the Europeans increaſe 130, and the Topaſſes 101. The European Officers at the Preſidency are 64.

In 1763, the Infantry increaſes at the Preſidency 202, the Artillery decreaſes 126, the Topaſſes 141, Sepoys 107. The Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges at the Preſidency increaſe this year R$ 31,957.

In 1764 at the Preſidency the Europeans increaſe 273, the Topaſſes 13, the Sepoys 506. The Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges increaſe more than the preceding year, Rupees 32,221. This year the pay of the Naiques of the Sepoys was raiſed to Rupees 6. 2. 75. per month, and of a Sepoy to Rupees 5. 3. 20. per month.

In 1765 the Europeans at the Preſidency decreaſe 316, the Sepoys 414; yet the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges increaſe this year R$ 29,271: the Hoſpital Charges increaſe R$ 3,223 more than the preceding year. In this year there are 80 European Officers on the Eſtabliſhment.

In 1766, the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges decreaſe at the Preſidency R$ 43,735.

In 1767, the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges at the Preſidency increaſe above the preceding year R$ 46,095; the Houſe Rent, Oil, and Peon money, amounts this year to R$ 4,412. This year the Sepoys pay is raiſed to R$ 6 per month.

In 1768, the Europeans decreaſe 170, the Topaſſes 36; the Sepoys are augmented 376. The eſtabliſhment is ordered by the Honourable the Directors under the 18th March 1768, received here the 29th July following, to conſiſt of nine Field Officers, one Battalion of Artillery, three Battalions of Infantry, and two Battalions of Sepoys; in all, 134 European Officers.

This eſtabliſhment could not be completed till 1769. The Europeans at the Preſidency were then decreaſed 69. The Topaſſes were increaſed 4, and the Sepoys 600 more than 1767. The Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges of this year exceed thoſe of that year R$ 87,906. Houſe Rent, Oil, and Peon money, amounts this year to R$ 12,919; the additional pay allowed to the Officers, to R$ 17,861. The pay of the Topaſs Fifes and Drums was increaſed in September 1768 to R$ 7 per month. In June following, houſe rent was allowed to

Field Officers, at the rate of	R$ 80 per month.
Captains	40
Subalterns	20

A third Battalion of Sepoys was raiſed; four European Subalterns were poſted to each Battalion of Sepoys, inſtead of two (as before); and an additional Enſign was appointed to each Company of Infantry in October. In May the pay of the Subedars was augmented to R$ 54. 1. 60. per month.

In 1770, the Europeans at the Preſidency are increaſed 446, and the Sepoys 1,313 more than in the preceding year; the Topaſſes decreaſe 19. From October 1769 to the latter end of May 1770, the Europeans and a Battalion of Sepoys were in camp. In March 1770, the Sepoys were formed into four Battalions. The Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges of the Preſidency are increaſed R$ 2,07,790 more than in 1769. In September and October the Eſtabliſhment was altered, by order of the Honourable Court of Directors, under the 6th April 1770, to a Battalion of Artillery, two of Infantry, and two of Sepoys; ten Subaltern Officers, ten Serjeants, and an European Adjutant, were appointed to each of the four Battalions of Sepoys. In October an allowance was made, by order of this Honourable Board, of 10 ſhillings per day to each of the Field Officers, in lieu of companies.

In this year, Houſe Rent, Oil, and Peon money, increaſes R$ 14,824 more than the preceding year.

In 1771, the Garriſon and Hoſpital Charges increaſe R$ 163,266. The Europeans increaſe 172, and Topaſſes 57; the Sepoys decreaſe 369. To account for which increaſe in the charges, the alterations mentioned above, ſince July 1770, muſt be taken in, together with the increaſes of Houſe Rent, Oil, and Peon money, R$ 9,077 more than the preceding year.

The charge for Peons is this year conſiderably increaſed, from 1,647 Rupees per month to 2,095.

I was much ſurpriſed to find the charge for Peons ſtill under the head of Garriſon Charges, as your Honour, &c. were pleaſed to direct ſome time ago that this charge ſhould, at *Surat* and *Tellicherry*, not be included under Garriſon Charges, but be defrayed by the Land Paymaſter. The ſame orders here will eaſe the Military eſtabliſhment of about Rupees 25,000 per annum, which in truth belongs not to it.

I will not take up your Honour, &c.'s time, by a detail of the progreſs of the Military charges at the Subordinates; as your orders of 1771, and ſome late regulations, will probably prevent any increaſe of them in future, which may not eaſily be accounted for.

I ſhall now proceed to the conſideration of the Honourable the Preſident's Letter, and his plan for the reduction of the military expences. It gives me ſome ſatisfaction to reflect that the Letters which I have had the honour to lay before this Board, and which ſtand upon your records, will bear witneſs for me, that ever ſince I have been here, I have endeavoured to retrench every thing that appeared an unneceſſary article of expence in that part of the Military department which was at all under my direction. The increaſe of Officers and Europeans, the increaſe of pay and allowances ordered by the Honourable Court of Directors and this Board, with the increaſe of the numbers and pay of the Black Troops, I believe accounts pretty nearly for the increaſe of expence under the heads of Pay and Allowances. The great increaſe under the heads of Hoſpital Charges and Hoſpital Stores, has already been laid before this Board by the Hoſpital Committee, and ſeparately in a Letter from

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me under the 21ſt April; but I am afraid the meaſures taken thereupon by your Honour, &c. will not be found to anſwer the end of reducing them as low as can be done. The large increaſes in many other articles on the Military Paymaſter's books, both here and at the Subordinates, can be accounted for, I ſuppoſe, by the Gentlemen who hold now, or who have held the offices of Military Storekeeper, or Military Paymaſter.

The Honourable the Preſident did me the honour to ſhew me a draft of this Letter ſome days before laſt Council-day; and I took the liberty to ſubmit to his conſideration ſome obſervations that occurred to me on reading it.

I ſuppoſe the ſame reaſons which induced this Board, notwithſtanding the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors of March 1768, to increaſe the Eſtabliſhment, by ordering a third Battalion of Sepoys to be raiſed, ſubſiſt ſtill; and, in my humble opinion, the reaſons for keeping up three Battalions of Sepoys for the ſervice of the Preſidency only, as ſet forth in a Letter from me, under the 7th October 1770, and in a Minute of Conſultation under the 26th of the ſame month, are ſtill in full force.

The following analyſis of the Honourable Preſident's Eſtabliſhment, which I had the honour to lay before him, will enable this Board to decide whether it be adequate to the ſervices required from it or not.

From	- -	5,639 the propoſed eſtabliſhment,
Take	1,076 for *Surat*,	
	1,085 for *Tellicherry*,	
	117 for *Anjengo*.	
		2,278
There will remain		3,361 for the ſervice of the Iſland, the Cruizers, &c.

From 3,361 take, at 600 Men a day for the Guards of the Iſland, at only three Reliefs - - - - - - - - -	1,800
Cruizers - - - - - - - - - -	500
Recruits - - - - - - - - - -	100
Seik - - - - - - - - - -	200
For Perſia, Scindy, and other ſervices - - - - -	200
Officers, Non-commiſſioned Officers, Drummers, Bhaldars, Watermen, Subneſſes, &c. - - - - - - - -	1,045
	3,845
Remains as above - - - - - -	3,361
	484 deficient in the propoſed Plan.

The Minute of Conſultation under the 26th October 1770, which I had the honour to point out to the Preſident, is in theſe words: "We entirely concur with the "General, that the number of Sepoys ordered by our "Honourable Maſters, is by no means ſufficient for the "Eſtabliſhment; on the contrary, it appears evident, "that the ſecurity of the Iſland alone requires three "Battalions; and ſhould the new arrangements which he "propoſes in the Garriſons of *Surat* and *Tellicherry* take "place, a fourth Battalion will be abſolutely neceſſary." Reſolved therefore, &c. The Members now at the Board, who were preſent at this Conſultation, are the Honourable the Preſident, Meſſrs. *Jervis*, *Watſon*, *Stackhouſe*, *Fletcher*, and *Tayler*.

The arrangement that I propoſed in 1770 has actually taken place, and employs one Battalion of regular diſciplined Sepoys inſtead of the Irregulars that have been diſcharged, a reduction therefore, nearly equal to that of a Battalion, has taken place ſince I have been here.

The Honourable the Preſident has not been pleaſed to aſſign the reaſons why his opinion of the number of Troops indiſpenſably neceſſary for the duty of this Iſland and the Subordinates, is now ſo widely different from what it was in October 1770, or in September 1769; he ſays, "That he has received certain intelligence, that the "French have ſent to *Europe* 3,000 of the Troops they "had at the *Mauritius*, and that we need not heſitate to "make our reduction on account of the reports we have "heard of their intending to tranſport that force to "India." This argument would be concluſive for a reduction, if any augmentation on the intelligence of the French having ſent out a force to the *Mauritius*, but on the contrary, at that time the eſtabliſhment was actually lower in numbers than it was in the two or three preceding years.

The eſtabliſhment of 1770, with the reaſons of this Board for keeping up a much larger number of Troops than were ordered by the Honourable Court of Directors in their commands of the 6th April 1770, were ſubmitted to their conſideration in 1770, by the ſhips *Greenwich* and *Admiral Pocock*, and their directions upon them may now be daily expected. This alone, without any other conſideration, would induce me to be of opinion, that any reduction of the Troops ſhould be poſtponed till their orders arrive. I muſt ſuppoſe the Governor and Council, in October 1770, very deliberately weighed and conſidered their ſituation, and the ſervices required of the Troops, and were perfectly convinced of the indiſpenſable neceſſity of the numbers they ordered to be kept up, before they ventured to deviate ſo very widely from the poſitive commands of their Honourable Maſters of the 6th April 1770, reſpecting their Military eſtabliſhment. For my own part, I avow the opinion I gave in October 1770; I have reconſidered it with much attention, and with the advantage of being better acquainted than I was at that time with the duty to be done, and the ſervice required of the Troops, and I do not heſitate to ſay, that I ſee no one reaſon to alter it. I ſhould have been glad that the Honourable the Preſident, in juſtification of this Board for having deviated in October 1770 ſo widely from their Honourable Maſters orders of the 6th April 1770, and for having ſo long continued ſo heavy, and (as he ſeems to think) ſo unneceſſary an expence as their preſent Military Eſtabliſhment, would have been pleaſed to point out any one alteration in the ſituation of the Honourable Company's affairs here or at the Subordinates, that evinces that a ſmaller Military Eſtabliſhment is neceſſary now than was in 1770.

It appears by the Returns, that the total numbers of the eſtabliſhment for the Preſidency and the Subordinates in 1769, were 7,813; of 1770, 8,474; and in 1771 it was reduced to 7,154.

By the late Colonel *Pemble*'s Letter of the 21ſt March 1769, it appears that it is his opinion, "that a body of "Sepoys, not inferior to 3,000 Men, will be at all times "neceſſary for the ſervice of this Garriſon only, but "ſhould we at any time be engaged in a war, a far greater "number will no doubt become neceſſary." In a Letter under the 28th September 1769, he gives further reaſons for augmenting the corps of Sepoys to 3,000 Men for the ſervice of this Garriſon only, and recommends it in very ſtrong terms. The Minute of Conſultation under the 29th September, on that Letter, is, "Read a Letter, "as entered hereafter, from Colonel *Pemble*, which being

"*maturely*

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" *maturely* conſidered, the following Reſolutions are taken " thereon:

" Notwithſtanding we could wiſh in the preſent ſcar- " city of money, to diminiſh inſtead of increaſing our " expences, yet as for the reaſons aſſigned by the Colo- " nel, it appears indiſpenſably proper to keep upon the " Iſland the full number of Sepoys which he recom- " mends, &c."

At this Conſultation there were preſent of the Members of Council now at the Board, the Honourable the Preſident, Meſſrs. *Jervis*, *Stackhouſe*, and *Fletcher*.

I cannot perſuade myſelf that the diſgraces the Honourable Company's arms ſuffered on the Malabar Coaſt, and the being foiled in our late attempt to take *Broach*, have raiſed our military character in the eyes of our neighbours; I have heard that the Country Powers in general, and the Marattas in particular, have loſt the high opinion which they once entertained of the irreſiſtible force of Britiſh arms, to which, more than to numbers, the Honourable Company owe their valuable acquiſitions in *India*. Of this the behaviour of the Marattas laſt year at *Surat*, and the daring violation of Treaty in the Nabob of *Broach*, are, in my humble opinion, ſtrong proofs: But if the Honourable the Preſident, who from his correſpondence with the country Governments muſt know better than any body, will ſay, that he knows the military character of the Britiſh nation is more reſpectable, and in higher eſtimation with the Powers of *Indoſtan* now, than it was four, five, or ten years ago, I ſhall think it one very good reaſon for an immediate and conſiderable reduction of the Military Eſtabliſhment; but if the reverſe ſhall appear on enquiry to be true, you will find by experience that a diminution of that opinion muſt be made up, by an increaſe of numbers, and an improvement of diſcipline.

As to the Honourable the Preſident's propoſal, that the Chief of *Surat* be directed to endeavour to prevail on the Nabob to take the Sepoys you may think proper to reduce into his pay, under the ſame controul as thoſe in the ſervice of the Nabob of *Arcot*, in lieu of the Irregulars he now has, the arguments already uſed againſt a diminution of your military force apply equally ſtrong againſt this propoſal; but ſuppoſing you ſhould reſolve to reduce one entire Battalion of Sepoys, the negociation with the Nabob of *Surat*, and the ſettlements of the conditions upon which this body of Troops is to enter his ſervice, appears to me replete with difficulties. The Sepoys, accuſtomed to regular monthly payments here, will ill brook an arrear of ſeven or eight months in every twelve, which I believe is the mode of payment in the Mogul Governments; they will mutiny or they will deſert; at *Madras* I believe the Governor and Council ſtand guarantees for the payment of the Sepoys in the Nabob's ſervice that were put into it by them; certain diſtricts or certain revenues are appropriated for this purpoſe, which are, as the Sepoys, under their controul. Can ſuch an appropriation be made at *Surat*? Will the Nabob be induced by any means to conſent to it? Will he diſmiſs the Officers and Sepoys, who being paid by him, depend upon him only, and are attached to him? Will he in their room take Sepoys, who being paid by you, depend upon the Company, and are attached to them? Can his revenues afford this charge? Will diſciplined Sepoys preſerve their diſcipline, and do their different duties that the Nabob's Sepoys are now employed upon? But ſuppoſing all theſe difficulties ſolved, is the Nabob of *Surat* at all in ſimilar circumſtances with the Nabob of *Arcot*? The Nabob of *Surat*'s Troops were reduced to barely what ſeemed neceſſary for his perſonal ſecurity and the police of the town, in the chiefſhip of Mr. *Hodges*. I believe the Nabob of *Arcot* is able to ſupport a conſiderable Army. Can your Sepoys ſent to *Surat* be of any uſe to the Preſidency? Can you remove them from hence and employ them elſewhere, without endangering the ſafety or the good government of the town? But there ſeems to me one difficulty ſtill: Have the Governor and Council power to permit Britiſh Officers and Non-commiſſioned Officers to enter into the ſervice of the Nabob of *Surat*, without the previous conſent of the Honourable Company? If upon trial it ſhould be found impracticable to perſuade the Nabob of *Surat* to take what may be deemed the Supernumerary Sepoys into his ſervice, I know nothing elſe that can be done with them but to take the Officers and Non-commiſſioned Officers, and private Men, out of the four Battalions that are the moſt advanced in years and the leaſt fit for active ſervice and to diſcharge them; but it would be incompatible with juſtice and humanity to ſend away people to ſtarve, who had devoted the beſt part of their lives to the Company's ſervice, or had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in it. I ſhould therefore ſuppoſe that your Honour, &c. would think it right to give them penſions equal perhaps to half their preſent pay; this will amount to about 3,000 R' per month, allowing that they ſhould not all be entitled to penſions. Add to this the pay and allowances of the European Officers, and the pay of the European ſerjeants, which by the Honourable the Preſident's plan are to be reduced, but whoſe Pay and Allowances muſt be continued to them, at leaſt till the Honourable Company's pleaſure be known concerning them, which amounts to R' 1,10,363. 1. 12. The Honourable the Preſident's plan for the reduction of the Sepoys will only be a ſaving of about 32,027 Rupees per annum to the Honourable Company; the Sepoys that are kept up will be much worſe, and they will be deprived of the ſervice of one complete Battalion.

That the Sepoys will be much worſe by the reduction which the Honourable the Preſident propoſes, by the European Officers and Non-commiſſioned Officers in each Battalion, I believe, upon the authority of Lord *Clive*, General *Lawrence*, General *Coote*, General *Caillaud*, General *Carnac*, and Colonel *Pemble*, Officers who had conſummate experience of theſe Troops, and who performed much good ſervice to the Honourable Company with them. But the orders of the 6th April 1770, are ſo preciſe and poſitive reſpecting the appointment of European Officers and Non-commiſſioned Officers to each Battalion of Sepoys, that though exigencies of the ſervice might juſtify, and even render praiſe-worthy, a deviation from our Honourable Maſters commands in point of numbers, yet I could not venture, for my own part, to alter an eſtabliſhment which had received the ſanction of the approval and recommendation of theſe Officers. Beſides, I muſt again aſk, why were theſe Officers appointed in 1770? or, why are they leſs neceſſary now, than they were then?

Some time ago I propoſed to this Honourable Board, that four Subneſſes per Battalion ſhould be diſcharged, becauſe I thought a head Subneſs and five others ſufficient for the buſineſs of one Battalion; but I cannot concur with the Honourable the Preſident in thinking one head Subneſs and three others ſufficient, unleſs a better ſort of Purvoes or Portugueze be employed, to whom you muſt of courſe give an advanced pay. The reduction of two Watermen per Battalion, which the Honourable the Preſident propoſes, is ſo very inconſiderable, that I ſhould hardly have troubled your Honour, &c. with a remark upon it; but when Sepoys are ſent upon ſervice, two Watermen per Company are as few as ought to be ſent; and they are of a particular caſt of people very difficult to find here.

In the Honourable the Preſident's State of the Artillery, there is one Captain leſs than the eſtabliſhment; in the reſt there is very little difference except in the reduction of 108 gun-room Laſcars, which perhaps may be done without any great immediate hurt to the Service; but the ſaving to the Honourable Company will be very trifling, only 6,480 R' per annum, and theſe trained Laſcars are exceedingly uſeful upon ſervice, I am informed, and it requires a conſiderable time to render them ſo; but even from this inconſiderable ſum of 6,480 R' ſome deductions will be to be made for penſions, which I ſuppoſe

your

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your Honour, &c. will think it right to grant to ſome of them that have been long in the ſervice.

As for the Honourable the Preſident's propoſal for the reduction of the Infantry, I have only to obſerve, that as it now ſtands, it is exactly conformable to the Eſtabliſhment ſettled by the Honourable Company's orders of the 6th April 1770, excepting 9 Serjeants, 9 Corporals, 23 Drummers, and 59 private Europeans.

The Non-commiſſioned Officers and Drummers are alſo moſtly there, but I do not know that there has been any application for leave to keep more than were ſettled by the laſt Eſtabliſhment for that Garriſon. As to the ſupernumerary Europeans at preſent upon the Eſtabliſhment, they are to be accounted for in no other way that I know of, than that more Recruits have been ſent out in the courſe of laſt ſeaſon than were neceſſary to complete the Eſtabliſhment. As to the Topaſſes at the Preſidency, which the Honourable Preſident by his plan propoſes to reduce, I ſhall only obſerve, that from the firſt time I ſaw them, I thought them very uſeleſs Troops; I was confirmed in this opinion by a Letter from the late Colonel *Pemble*, of the 21ſt February 1769, and mentioned a reduction of them to the late Preſident, who ſtrongly objected to it, and referred me to what was ſaid of them by this Honourable Board in the Conſultation under the 28th March 1769. If the Honourable Preſident had not prevented me, I did intend addreſſing this Honourable Board for leave to diſcharge ſuch of the Topaſſes as could not ſerve for R' 6 per month. But if the whole Topaſſes at the Preſidency ſhould be diſcharged, it would be no great loſs to the Honourable Company's ſervice, though I fear it would add conſiderably to the liſt of Penſioners.

The ſame reaſons which hinder me from concurring with the Honourable the Preſident in his plan for the reduction of the European Officers of Sepoys, appear to me equally good againſt the reduction he propoſes in the Officers of the Infantry.

I am ſorry I cannot concur with the Honourable the Preſident, in his plan for reducing the monthly expence of the new Fortifications, by decreaſing the number of Labourers and Artificers employed thereon; the works are at that point now, that the beſt thing that can be done for the intereſt of our Honourable Employers, as well as for the defence and ſecurity of the place, is to have them finiſhed with the leaſt poſſible loſs of time.

I beg leave to acknowledge to your Honour, &c. that part of the increaſe of the charges of the Overſeers on the new Fortifications was owing to my advice to Colonel *Keating*: I found ſome of the beſt Non-commiſſioned Officers in the Artillery employed as Overſeers on the new works; I adviſed Colonel *Keating* to ſend them back to the Artillery, where their ſervice was much wanted, and to employ Cadets in their room; I likewiſe adviſed him to diſmiſs as many Black Overſeers as there were Cadets, and to employ them in their room. This I did, becauſe I thought young Gentlemen ſent out to ſucceed to Commiſſions, were more to be depended on than any other Overſeers whatever, and becauſe they would be employed; and the addition of their pay as Overſeers, to their pay as Cadets, would enable them to ſupport themſelves like Gentlemen, which on their Cadets pay alone they could hardly do. But the appointment of the Practitioner Engineers took place before I was allowed to interfere in any ſhape with the new works. The principal Engineer uſed from civility to tell me, that the Honourable the Governor had agreed to the appointment of ſo many Practitioner Engineers, and ſhewed me the liſt of thoſe Officers he intended to recommend to him: Of the whole liſt, I do not recollect to have mentioned but two Gentlemen to the principal Engineer ſince the ſuperintendance of the new works was put under the Committee of Surveyors. Mr. *Tayler* aſked me to recommend Enſign *Carpenter* to the Honourable the Governor, in room of Lieutenant *Wall*, who was gone to *Europe*; as there were too many already, I anſwered, it was out of my power, and the Committee of Surveys had reſolved to apply to the Governor to reduce the number. A few days afterwards, Captain *Nelſon* came to inform me, that he had received an order from the Honourable the Governor to employ Enſign *Carpenter* as a Practitioner Engineer.

I cannot but applaud the determination of this Honourable Board on the 29th September 1769, who, though there was then a great ſcarcity of money, yet determined to increaſe the Sepoys to the number they thought neceſſary for the duty and ſecurity of the Garriſon only. I agree with the Honourable the Preſident, that the annual expences and loſſes of the Preſidency and the Subordinates is become a ſubject of the moſt ſerious conſequence, and deſerving the utmoſt attention of this Honourable Board; but I cannot think a reduction of the neceſſary expences (for ſo upon the authority of this Board, and my own I muſt think the pay of the Troops and the Labourers) the firſt point at which a reform ſhould begin.

Your Honour, &c. will obſerve, by an inſpection into the Military Paymaſter's Ledger for ſome years back, that there is a great increaſe in the Money that paſſes through the hands of the Military Storekeeper. In the year 1751, the Military Storekeeper is debited on the Ledger R' 3,759; in the year 1760, R' 1,7',151; in the year 1770, R' 1,95,714; and in the year 1771, R' 2,55,063. From the year 1760, the Hoſpital Charges, excluſive of Hoſpital Stores, increaſe as follows:

1760	-	-	-	R' 10,024
1763	-	-	-	17,104
1765	-	-	-	21,939
1766	-	-	-	25,332
1768	-	-	-	26,019
1769	-	-	-	32,522
1770	-	-	-	42,476
1771	-	-	-	60,951.

The increaſe of the numbers of the Troops will unqueſtionably increaſe the Charges of the Hoſpital; this cauſe, with the extenſion of the works, will increaſe the expences of the Military Storekeeper's office. I have in a former Letter repreſented to your Honour, &c. that I did not think upon enquiry, that the increaſe of Hoſpital Charges could be accounted for by the number of the Troops. As to the Military Storekeeper's Charges, they are ſo blended with the Military Paymaſter's, that it is difficult for any perſon not daily converſant with theſe accounts, and impoſſible for the ſhort time I have had for this Letter, to ſeparate and ſtate the progreſs and cauſes of their increaſe to your Honour, &c. With all ſubmiſſion, I apprehend, that the Military Storekeeper's office is now arrived to ſuch magnitude, that it would be proper it ſhould be ſeparate from the Military Paymaſter's Department; that he ſhould make his own drafts upon the Treaſury, and deliver his accounts to the Board, in the ſame manner as the other Offices do.

The Honourable the Governor promiſes he will hereafter lay before the Board ſuch further remarks as may occur to him on the reduction of the loſſes and expences in general, both here and at the Subordinates. I am perſuaded that this will be attended with the beſt effects to the ſervice and intereſt of his Honourable Employers, and it will much redound to his own honour and credit; and, when he has leiſure to go into a minute and circumſtantial examination of the progreſs of the expences in the different Offices at the Preſidency and Subordinates, I doubt not, from his experience and knowledge of the Company's buſineſs, but he will be able to make ſuch reductions of the expences as will be a conſiderable annual ſaving to the Company, without being driven to the neceſſity of that deſperate ſtroke of almoſt ſtopping the Fortifications

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in their preſent ſtate, and diſbanding the Troops who have been ſo often judged indiſpenſably neceſſary for the ſecurity of the Company's important poſſeſſions here.

I have the honour to be,
with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient, and
moſt humble Servant,
David Wedderburn.

Bombay, 7th July 1772.

Total of the Accounts of the Military Annual Expences.

1751	3,67,639	1	71
1752	2,56,986	3	55
1754	4,23,413	2	02½
1754-5	4,49,130	3	60
1756	5,10,675	2	47
1757	5,06,781	3	22
1759	5,44,267	1	30
1760	5,22,011	3	30
1761	6,91,217	2	92
1762	5,73,407	1	17
1763	7,23,158	1	19
1764	7,00,317	3	87
1765	7,35,363	—	75
1766	5,88,393	—	58
1767	7,54,663	1	10
1768	7,33,676	3	50
1769	8,88,194	1	45
1770	11,37,761	3	01
1771	10,52,137	—	63

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Letter from Meſſrs. Shaw and Garden, propoſing, that the reduction of the Military Eſtabliſhment exactly quadrate with the Honourable Company's expreſs commands.

From the great importance of the plan laid before you laſt Council-day in the Honourable the Preſident's Letter, for reforming our Military Eſtabliſhment, and reducing as much as poſſible our other amazingly increaſed expences, we deem it incumbent on us to ſay, we not only entirely acquieſce in the Governor's general idea on the abſolute neceſſity of ſuch a meaſure, but take the liberty humbly to offer our particular ſentiments on the mode and extent of thoſe reductions, which, with regard to the Troops, we beg leave to propoſe to the Board, be carried ſtill further than the Governor's plan, and ſo as to quadrate preciſely with the expreſs and reiterated commands of our Honourable Employers, reſpecting their Military Eſtabliſhment. And this we are the more ſanguine to ſee carried into execution, as our preſent inevitable current expences we find (from the late Calculate for the year laid before us) ſo exceedingly ſurpaſs our own reſources, that we ſhall be neceſſitated every ſeaſon, whilſt they continue, to make large drafts from the *Bengal* Revenues, which it behoves us to put a ſtop to, as far as may be, by every means in our power; and this reduction of our Forces can certainly never take place at a more favourable juncture than the preſent, when (as the Governor is pleaſed to obſerve) our certain intelligence of the French having ſent home ſo many of their Troops from the Iſland ſufficiently demonſtrate their pacific intentions.

On the moſt accurate examination of all the Honourable Company's late commands on the ſubject of Military arrangements, we find, that many months after the acknowledged receipt of Colonel Campbell's plans of the preſent increaſed works of *Dungaree*, &c. and his (Colonel *Pemble*'s) and the then Engineer's opinion of the Troops requiſite to garriſon the ſame both in Peace and War, they have on due deliberation, and after many Conſultations with a Board of able Officers, adopted the Plan laid down in their commands of the 6th April 1770, for their Eſtabliſhment on this ſide *India*, to which they have enjoined the moſt punctual obedience: and although all thoſe opinions and plans tranſmitted hence had doubtleſs been laid before a Board of Officers, and notwithſtanding Brigadier General *Wedderburn*'s ſubſequent repreſentation in October 1770, and the Governor and Council's approbation of the ſame in their Letter under the 3d December following, had alſo reached the Honourable Court of Directors, yet after this they are pleaſed, under the 3d June 1771, abſolutely to condemn ſuch deviation from their fixed plan, and expreſs their diſapprobation of the ſame in the following terms: "Though the diſregard "you have ſhewn to our orders, and the encroachment "you have made on our authority, would juſtify our "ſevereſt diſpleaſure, yet we ſhall here only expreſs our "condemnation of your conduct herein, but at the ſame "time muſt appriſe you, that any future deviation from "our preciſe and poſitive regulations in reſpect to our "Military Eſtabliſhment, will be attended with the ut"moſt effects of our reſentment:" And to much the ſame purpoſe they write in other paragraphs of thoſe very commands. As we are their Servants therefore, and they are thus expreſs in their orders, and as all apprehenſions from the French ſeem at an end for the preſent, we are of opinion that after ſuch deliberate and reiterated directions, we ſhould not deviate from the rule they have thus been pleaſed to preſcribe, more particularly as on a retroſpect to former times, we find that the duty of the Garriſon and Subordinates was long, and till very lately, carried with much inferior numbers in proportion, even when the increaſed extent of our work is conſidered; and this opinion Mr. *Shaw* expreſſed to the Preſident when he had the honour of converſing with him twice or thrice on this ſubject, previous to the delivery of his Letter and Plan. As we pretend not however to a perfect knowledge of the detail of duty, we beg leave to recommend, that ſhould the Committee of Defence (appointed in caſe of an actual attack) deem this eſtabliſhment inſufficient, they be directed to form one for Peace and another for War, on the moſt accurate and economical plan poſſible (with their reaſons at large, and all the needful detail of duty) to be ſent to the Honourable the Court of Directors by the firſt opportunity, for their further obſervation and inſtructions thereon; but in the mean time it is our opinion, and we move, that their orders be carried into execution as ſoon as poſſible.

In reſpect to the Fortifications (as thoſe extenſive works are intended to be completed) we think the ſooner they are finiſhed the better, for many reaſons: Firſt, the ſame Surveyors, Sub-ſurveyors, Storekeepers, and Aſſiſtants, Practitioner Engineers, Cadets, and Overſeers (whoſe allowances make a capital figure in the expences of the works) however the Board may be pleaſed to reduce them, may ſtill be able to attend to ſuch a number of men on each work, as will be neceſſary to carry it on with all the expedition which the nature of that ſervice, and the ſtate of our Treaſury can admit; and the works completed will thus in caſe of an accident be better capable of being defended, and run leſs to ruin when finiſhed, than if any part of them remains imperfect.

On the late conſiderable reduction of pay to the Labourers which we moved for, we alſo propoſed a further one might take place as ſoon as poſſible, as well regarding them as Artificers in general, which we ſhall be very happy to ſee effectually carried into execution, and equally ſo to reduce the Marine Eſtabliſhment, as we ſhall at all times to concur with the Honourable the Preſident and the Board in every other propoſal that may be offered, tending to the intereſt of our Honourable Employers.

We are, with due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servants,
William Shaw,
Robert Garden.

Bombay, 6th July 1772.

APPENDIX. No. 56.

APPENDIX, No. 56.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 9th October 1775.

TO form a proper judgment of the motives which guided the Government of *Bombay* at this juncture, it will be neceſſary to be acquainted with the views of the Honourable Company in that Settlement.

The ſafety and acceſſableneſs of the Harbour of *Bombay* at all ſeaſons of the year, together with the vicinity of the Marattas, and particularly to one of the paſſes through which the whole of the country above the Gauts might be ſupplied with the articles of *England*, ſeem chiefly to have engaged the attention of the Company in the acquiſition of this Iſland; their ſpeculations were perfectly juſt, as Woollens and the other ſtaples of *England* are diſpoſed of at *Bombay*, and the markets which it ſupplies, to the amount of 14 Lacks annually.

Beſides this, the conveniency of the Harbour has ſecured to the Engliſh, and thoſe who trade under their protection, almoſt the excluſive trade in *Indian* Commodities with the country of the Marattas, as well as in the Cotton with which *Bengal* and *China* is ſupplied; the whole bringing in an annual profit to the Company in Cuſtoms of above 3½ Lacks.

The influence which the Company have in the Government of *Surat*, not only enables them in a great meaſure to give a conſiderable check to the commerce of the European Nations already eſtabliſhed there, but, if well exerted, to prevent any others from interfering; a power more valuable, as *Surat* is, next to *Bombay*, the chief mart for the vend of ſtaples, the entire monopoly of which is their great and leading commercial view in the Weſt of India.

For a conſiderable time Commerce alone engaged the attention of the Company at *Bombay*, but the conſtruction of the Docks, and the excellent Timber, with the number of Artificers readily procurable there, gave it a conſequence in a Military light. Nothing more need be ſaid of this than the teſtimony of Commanders of His Majeſty's Squadrons; and indeed the utter impoſſibility of proper repairs elſewhere ſerve to convince, that, to the Docks at *Bombay*, and the ready aſſiſtance found there, was chiefly owing our ſuperiority at Sea in this quarter of the globe during laſt War.

Senſible of the importance of theſe objects, and of the defenceleſs ſtate in which *Bombay* was, the Honourable the Court of Directors in the year 1768 ſent out Colonel *Campbell* to inſpect the ſtate of the Fortifications, with poſitive orders implicitly to follow his plan; and knowing alſo the inadequacy of our Garriſon to the defence of the place, they very conſiderably enlarged our Military Eſtabliſhment.

Previous to this, the expences of *Bombay* exceeded its Revenues; but this great increaſe they were ſenſible muſt diſtreſs the Government there for means to defray them, and furniſh their inveſtments for *Europe* and *China*: Knowing alone that a territorial acquiſition could alone furniſh a Revenue equal to the neceſſities of that Settlement, they lay down a ſyſtem for the attainment of one; this was the acquiſition of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, with the Maratta ſhare of the Revenues of *Surat*, which they imagined would about complete their views; and this, I muſt again repeat, they urgently and eſpecially enjoined us to embrace every opportunity to attain, and to this alone to direct all our political and military operations, declaring it at the ſame time to be the utmoſt of their wiſhes in the Weſt of *India*.

In the ceſſion ſtipulated for by the Treaty with the Peiſhwah, the views of the Company have been completed beyond their hopes; as, excluſive of the chief conſideration, a Revenue equal to its expence and occaſions, the commercial and military advantages of *Bombay* are moſt permanently ſecured to it.

On *Salſette*, *Caranjah*, and *Baſſein*, *Bombay* may ſafely depend for proviſion of all kinds, and poſſeſſing *Baſſein* and its diſtricts, we inſure to ourſelves a part of the Timber neceſſary for our Marine Yard, the want of which would ſo greatly diſtreſs our works there, that was this place to fall into an Enemy's hands, or any diſputes with the Marattas to ſubſiſt in the time of war with *France*, the Docks, which are now ſo material, would be rendered almoſt uſeleſs for want of this indiſpenſable article.

In the diſtricts ceded in the Guzzarat Country, grows the Cotton for the *Bengal* Market, which ſecures to the Engliſh, and thoſe under their protection, the entire trade in this article; and of courſe to the Company the whole Cuſtoms on it.

Excluſive of theſe actual advantages, we ſhall entirely preclude the Dutch, who have long been ſoliciting a Settlement at *Baſſein*, from all rivalry with the Company in the Trade to the Maratta dominions, beſides preventing the dangerous conſequences that might attend the neighbourhood of ſo active and enterprizing a Nation, who have never been known to let ſlip any opportunity of extending themſelves; and ſhould they at any time embrace an opportunity to get poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, with the means they would have to diſtreſs ours and carry on their own trade, it ſeems very probable but little would be left to the Engliſh at *Bombay*: this acquiſition alſo defeats the known and declared deſigns of the Portugueſe, and the probable views of the French, who, from former ſteps, and their now ſending out ſo many ſhips to the weſt of *India*, ſeem alſo inclined to participate with us in the Commerce there.

The ſtriking advantages of theſe poſſeſſions will, I truſt, be deemed worthy of moſt ſerious regard, when it is conſidered that the maintenance of *Bombay* is neceſſary in the general ſyſtem of the Company's affairs, from an annual loſs of about £. 150,000, a burden on your Government very troubleſome at beſt, but perhaps dangerous in the end by the remittance of ſpecie, and all chiefly for a local advantage, till then uncertain; *Bombay* would become a winning Settlement of near eight Lacks, which will be a difference to the Company of £. 250,000 annually; it would be in a ſtate to afford certain aſſiſtance of all kinds to a Squadron in time of War, ſecure the Commerce of the Weſt of *India* in the Engliſh hands; and above all, to fruſtrate the great Rivals of the Company in their views of participating in our trade with the Maratta dominions, an object alone of great importance, as on this trade depends their chief vend of Woollens and the other ſtaples of our native Country.

APPENDIX, No. 57.

Extract of the General Letter from *Bengal* to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company; dated the 22d Auguſt 1774.

Par. 8. THE Preſidency of *Bombay* have again applied to us for a large ſupply of Money, ſetting forth their diſtreſſes in the ſtrongeſt terms, and requeſting immediate relief. We have anſwered them, that the ſtate of our finances and demands here did not enable us to furniſh them to the extent they required, but that we would cheerfully lend our aſſiſtance in the moſt ſpeedy manner. As far as 15 Lacks, we had engaged to ſupply them within the courſe of the year, could we find out the means of remittance; but that it was not in our power to obtain drafts here to the amount of above 5 Lacks, and that from doubtful hands, and at the exorbitant exchange of 112 Sicca per 100 *Bombay* Rupees; terms which we ſhould not think ourſelves juſtifiable in accepting, not only as it would have proved an immediate and heavy loſs of near 19 per cent. on the remittance, but as it ſerved to introduce and encourage the exportation of our own ſpecie, which we eſteem it our duty to guard againſt by every poſſible means, as fatal to the Commerce and Revenue of theſe Provinces. There has however lately occurred an unexpected event which will afford them means

of taking up Money on their Bills on us: The ſhips returning from the Gulphs with the produce of the trade for three years paſt, detained by the late troubles in thoſe Countries, great part of which they muſt either bring round to *Bengal* in ſpecie, or leave at *Bombay* for drafts on this place; and we have taken care to ſecure the refuſal for that Preſidency from the Owners of ſeveral of theſe veſſels which belong to this port.

The balance in your general Treaſury this day is, current Rupees 7,72,377. 1. 9. In the *Dewanny* Treaſury Sicca Rupees 3,89,143. 1. 17. 2. and in the caſh current Rupees 18,476. 8. 5.

APPENDIX, No. 58.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Committee, the 28th November 1774.

At a Committee;

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
John Watſon, *Daniel Draper*, *William Tayler*.
The W° *Peter Elwin Wrench*, Eſquire, indiſpoſed.

READ, and approved, our proceedings under the 25th inſtant, being our laſt Conſultation.

The Preſident acquaints the Committee, that he has deſired this meeting purpoſely to lay before them a Letter he received yeſterday from Mr. *Robert Henſhaw*, who at preſent reſides at *Goa*, dated the 31ſt ultimo; giving an account of the Military and Marine Force lately arrived at *Goa*, from *Portugal*, and of the intentions of the Portugueſe ſpeedily to attempt the recovery of the dominions they formerly poſſeſſed to the northward of this place, and particularly the Iſland of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*.

This Letter being accordingly read, and taken under mature and deliberate conſideration, it is obſerved, that there appears no doubt of the Portugueſe intentions againſt the Iſland of *Salſette*; and as ſurely as they attempt the conqueſt of that Iſland with their preſent force, ſo ſurely they will gain the poſſeſſion of it; which event will not only put it out of our power ever to acquire the poſſeſſion of it for the Honourable Company, who have ſo frequently expreſſed their ardent wiſhes to obtain it, but will alſo be attended with infinite prejudice to the trade and intereſt of the Honourable Company here, by reducing their Cuſtoms and Revenues in a very great degree, as the Portugueze, by the poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, will become Maſters of the Paſſes inland, and conſequently it will be entirely in their power to obſtruct our trade, and to lay whatever impoſitions they pleaſe upon it, which they were formerly ſo prone on every occaſion to do; and we therefore think it becomes our undoubted duty to endeavour, to the utmoſt of our power, to prevent it if poſſible from falling into their hands without the leaſt delay, by taking it ourſelves; and it is obſerved that a more favourable opportunity than the preſent one, will probably never again offer, as by the diviſions in the Maratta Government there is now no head in that Empire, and it will be out of the power of either party to ſend any effectual force to obſtruct our proceedings.

The Preſident hereupon acquaints the Committee, that, agreeable to their recommendation in the month of March laſt, he has continued to temporize with the people, who made propoſals to him for the delivery of the Iſland into our hands; that they have ſince been frequently very preſſing with him on the ſubject, and that they are now equally deſirous as before of giving up the Iſland to the Honourable Company.

The Committee taking all theſe circumſtances under conſideration, together with the Negociation now depending with *Ragoba*, as well as the ſituation of Mr. *Moſtyn*, at *Poonah*, who is within the power of the Miniſterial Party, are unanimouſly of opinion, it is a duty highly incumbent on them to prevent the Portugueze from attaining poſſeſſion of the Iſland of *Salſette*, by gaining poſſeſſion of it for the Honourable Company: Reſolved, therefore, that we cloſe with the offers made for giving it up with the utmoſt expedition, and that we purſue the ſpeedieſt means in our power for effecting it, by ſending a body of Forces to gain poſſeſſion of it in the manner that may be agreed on between the Preſident and the perſons who have treated with him for that purpoſe.

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The Preſident is accordingly deſired and empowered to cloſe immediately, on the moſt moderate terms he can obtain, with the perſons who have been treating with him for the delivery of *Salſette*; and every other preparation muſt in conſequence be made for effecting this deſirable end.

And, in order that this proceeding may not affect the negociation depending with *Ragoba*, Mr. *Gambier* muſt be apprized of our intentions, and directed to aſſure him, that if he will not be induced to cede the Iſland of *Salſette* to the Company, we will give it up to him (on his granting us what we may deem an equivalent for it, and paying the charges we ſhall incur by it) whenever he may be in full poſſeſſion of the Maratta Empire; our only intention at this time being to prevent it falling into the hands of the Portugueze, which, from the preſent ſituation of the affairs of the Marattas, moſt undoubtedly would ſhortly be the caſe, unleſs we purſue the neceſſary meaſures to prevent it.

Mr. *Moſtyn* muſt alſo be adviſed of our intention, and of the motives that have impelled us to it; and as we hope this ſtep will not be the means of breaking that good underſtanding which has till now ſubſiſted with the miniſtry at *Poonah*, we wiſh him to continue there, and to endeavour at reconciling the Miniſtry to the meaſures we are purſuing, giving them the ſame aſſurances, in caſe they prevail in their conteſt with *Ragoba*, as we have directed Mr. *Gambier* to give to *Ragoba*. But ſhould Mr. *Moſtyn* be convinced, on his being acquainted with our intentions, that he can no longer remain with ſafety to his perſon, we then permit him to come away, though we much hope this will not be the caſe, as we think his continuing at *Poonah* will be the means of reconciling the Miniſtry to the meaſure, and ſerve to convince them of the ſincerity of our profeſſions.

We deem it neceſſary here to remark, that we have not yet heard of the arrival at *Bengal* of ſuch of the Council lately appointed by Act of Parliament as were to proceed from *England*, and conſequently we are not reſtricted by that Act from undertaking this affair; but, even had we heard of their arrival in the form preſcribed by the Act, we muſt think the neceſſity of executing this meaſure without any delay, and it being entirely agreeable to the repeated orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, would fully authorize us for undertaking it without waiting for the permiſſion of the Governor General and Council, agreeable to a clauſe in the ſaid Act, which provides for ſuch a contingency.

As we ſhall probably be in want of ſome additional force at the Preſidency, in caſe the matters now on foot ſhould be executed, it is agreed to embrace this opportunity of reducing the Garriſons of *Tellicherry* and *Anjengo*.

Reſolved, therefore, That the Military Force at the latter place ſhall henceforward conſiſt only of one Subaltern Officer (who for the preſent is to be Lieutenant *Brownrigg*) with three Serjeants, three Corporals, and one Drummer, and thirty-ſix private Topaſſes of Infantry, with one Bombardier, two Gunners, and two Matroſſes of Artillery; the remainder muſt be ſent hither by the firſt opportunity.

The whole Company of Europeans, with their Officers, except ten private, now doing duty at *Tellicherry*, muſt be

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be withdrawn, and ſent here as ſoon as poſſible, and the future Garriſon of that place muſt be conſidered as complete without them.

Letters to the Chiefs at *Tellicherry* and *Anjengo* muſt be prepared, to apprize them of our Reſolution. Letters alſo to Mr. *Gambier* and Mr. *Moſtyn*, muſt be wrote agreeable to our foregoing Minutes; but that to the latter muſt not be forwarded till matters are ſo far advanced, as to put it out of the power of the Miniſtry in any degree to obſtruct our views, in caſe Mr. *Moſtyn* ſhould communicate our intentions to them; but he muſt alſo have time to come away before the affair becomes public, in caſe he ſhould deem it abſolutely neceſſary to do ſo.

Adjourned.

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper.
W. Tayler.

Geo. Skipp, Secry.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c.

Honourable Sir,

I have already publicly adviſed the Board of the arrival of *Don Joze Pedro de Camera*, &c. and the reaſon I have been ſo long ſilent to your Honour on this ſubject, aroſe from a deſire of informing you with ſome degree of certainty, of the force and intentions of the Portugueze. The Capture of the *Saint Anna*, a forty-gun ſhip, by the Marattas, has awakened the Court of *Liſbon*, and ſpirited it up to take ſatisfaction for the inſult committed on the Flag of *Portugal*; for this purpoſe it was that the above Gentleman, a General Officer of approved abilities in his profeſſion, and in whom were united the requiſites neceſſary to inſure ſucceſs in ſuch an important undertaking, was appointed Governor and Captain General of *India*. Since his arrival, very many alterations, and great, have taken place. In the King's Yards they work double tides in preparing the Fleet. Gallivats that have been unemployed theſe ſeven years (a few only excepted, uſed as Luggage Boats) are fitting out with the utmoſt expedition, and a Bomb Veſſel is ordered to be prepared. When ready, their force by ſea conſiſts as follows; viz.

	Guns.		Guns.
Madre de Deos - -	70	*Conceicao* - - -	70
St. Francis Havier -	44	*Cruſario* - - -	36
Penha de Franca -	30	*St. Miguel* - - -	30
St. Antonio Grab -	22	Two Sloops, each -	12

Fifteen Gallivats, mounting each one heavy Prow Gun and from four to ſix ſwivels each.

The *Madre de Deos* and *Cruſario* arrived this ſeaſon from *Portugal*, and are to remain in *India* until ſuch period as ſix Frigates of 20 guns each are built at *Demaun*, which the King has ordered, and whoſe iron of every denomination came from *Portugal* in the *Madre de Deos*, together with cordage, canvas, &c. and cannon complete for the whole. The *Madre de Deos* her lower decks are 24 lbs.

Their Military Force conſiſts of four Regiments quite complete; three whereof are Infantry, and one of Artillery; viz.

	Col.	Lt. Col.	Major.	Capt.	Lieut.	Enſigns.	Privates.	Total.
Regiment of Henriques -	1	1	1	7	7	7	455	479
Regiment of Britto - - -	1	1	1	7	7	7	455	479
Regiment of - - - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	455	479
Regiment of Artillery - -	1	1	1	14	14	14	700	745
	3	3	3	28	28	28	2,065	2,158

I have not inſerted the Officers of the third Regiment, as it is not yet formed, the men arriving only this and the laſt ſeaſon, and no one as yet appointed to the command. The whole is commanded by the above *Henriques*, who is a Brigadier General. Excluſive of the foregoing, the King has ordered a Legion to be formed of Sepoys, to be cloathed as the Engliſh, and to conſiſt of 1,200 private men, excluſive of Officers; to each Company, one European Captain and one Lieutenant. To this Legion is joined the two Troops of European Horſe now here, conſiſting of 75 private men each. The command of this Legion is given by his Majeſty, by ſpecial Commiſſion, to *Don Antonio Joze de Nourontia*, the famous Biſhop of *Halicarnaſſus*, known over *India* by the title the Nizam gave him of Nabob *Delour Jehung Behadur*.

I have given your Honour this detail of their Naval and Military Force, previous to what I have to adviſe your Honour of their intentions, that you may therefrom be enabled to judge of their abilities to execute the ſchemes they have in view.—The recovery of the Province of the *Norte*, or what we call *Salſette*, is their primary object; and the capture of the *Saint Anna*, with the Forts of *Gheriah*, *Sevendroog*, &c. their ſecondary object. My reaſons for ſuppoſing ſuch, ariſe as follows: The Biſhop above named, who, excluſive of the command of the Sepoys, is Conſeiller du Guerre, has, in ſeveral interviews I have had with him, endeavoured to draw from me my opinion on ſeveral queſtions he put to me. Firſt time he ſtated theſe queſtions, he begged my ſentiments of a Union between us and the Portugueze againſt the Marattas. If I judged it feaſible? If *Bombay* could make ſuch a Union, without previouſly obtaining orders from the Governor General at *Bengal*? If I judged a propoſition of this nature would be agreeable to *Bombay*? and in caſe of a Union, did I think that *Bombay* would conſent to the Portugueze having the province of the *Norte*? —To theſe points, I need not adviſe your Honour what reply I made.—In a ſecond interview, he renewed the ſubject; I was ſilent; he then aſked me, If it was true, the report that prevailed here, that *Bombay* was on the eve of joining one of the Parties now contending for the Maratta Government, and that in recompence, ere the aſſiſtance marched, the Iſland of *Salſette* was to be delivered over to us for ever?—I was about to reply, when he proceeded and ſaid, he was well convinced that if ſuch was the caſe, His Majeſty's Troops would join the adverſe party, firſt proteſting againſt the proceedings of *Bombay* (mere Portugueze bombaſt) for that his moſt Faithful Majeſty ſtill deemed *Salſette* part of his dominions, as he did the ſhip *Saint Anna*, a veſſel of his fleet; and that he was determined to reſcue the one and the other from the hands of thoſe who ſo unjuſtly detained them. I have been repeatedly aſked by many here (perſons I am convinced employed to pump me, as the expreſſion is) of the intentions of *Bombay* regarding *Salſette*, &c. and whether I could procure any Charts of that Iſland, or Plan of *Baſſein* and *Tannah* Forts, and if the paſſage round the Iſland was known to us; with numberleſs other queſtions. In ſhort, I find from many, but eſpecially from the Biſhop of *Halicarnaſſus*, that it is determined upon, and that very ſpeedly, the reduction of the province of the *Norte*, unleſs we are beforehand with them, which they much ſuſpect, and in which caſe they will proteſt moſt loudly againſt us; but that is all they have done hitherto, and as much as they will then do, for more they dare not do, without ſpecial and further orders from *Portugal*. The Governor has alſo hinted as much to me, with a view, as I can but think, that it ſhould be made known to you, in the belief that the knowledge of ſuch his moſt Faithful Majeſty's intentions, would pre-

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yent *Bombay* carrying into execution any ſchemes they might entertain againſt the Iſland of *Salſette*. In ſhort, it ſeems here no ſecret the intentions of the Portugueze; and all thoſe who formerly had eſtates on *Salſette* when the property of the Portugueze, are as conſcious to appearance of once more poſſeſſing, as I am certain of my exiſtence.

I remain, with the greateſt eſteem and reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Goa, Your moſt obliged and obedient Servant,
31ſt Oct. 1774. *Robert Henſhaw.*

Liſt of Officers arrived at *Goa* from *Portugal*, 1774.

Artillery, viz.

Colonel.	Theodoſio de S^{a} Raboxa.
Lieutenant Colonel.	Guſtavus Adolphus Hercules de Chermont.
Captains.	João Nunes de Figureido.
	Pedro Paulo de Foneca,
	Jozes Lopez da Souza,
	Ignacio Joquim de Caſtro,
	Antonio Pedro Gallego Sarmanho,
	João Baptiſta Viera Godingho.
Firſt Lieutenants.	Feliciano Antonio Falcao,
	João Baptiſta Dias,
	Theotino Gomez,
	Antonio Fernandez,
	João Joze Baptiſta,
	Cuſtodio Cæſar de Faria,
	Joze Manoel Pinto de Faria.
Second Lieutenants.	Domingo Janeiro Azario,
	Lucas Joãa,
	Joze Coelho de Amoral,
	Manoel Godinho da Mira,
	Bento Alexis de Souza.
Major of the Regiment.	Antonio Joze de Sepulvara.

Legion, viz.
Cavalry, viz.

Lieutenant Colonel.	Antonio de Aſſa Caſtello Branco.
Major.	
Captains.	Antonio Duarte de Fonceca,
	Silverco Manoel.
Lieutenant.	Diogo James Murphy, Iriſh.

Sepoys, viz.

Majors.	Joquin Vincente Godinho de Mira,
	Joze Lewis Pinti de Souza.
Captains.	Franciſco Godinho de Mira,
	Lewis Mendez Tores,
	Antonio Manoel,
	Franciſco Ricardo,
	Franciſco Soanes.
Lieutenants.	Bernardino Joze Contento,
	João Manoel Nogarette,
	Antonio Telli de Menezes,
	Antonio Joze de Olivarez.
Infantry Captains.	John Emanuel Wade, Iriſh,
	Philip Manoel Franco.

Tueſday 29th November 1774. Signed the following Letters to Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poona*, and to Mr. *Gambier* at *Surat*; the latter was directly forwarded, but the former is to be detained ſome days for the reaſons given in our Minutes of yeſterday.

To *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire.

Sir,

We have received undoubted intelligence that the Portugueze are fitting out a very reſpectable Armament at *Goa*, with intention of acquiring, with the utmoſt expedition, the poſſeſſion of the dominions formerly belonging to them, and in particular the Iſland of *Salſette*. Orders from Europe, and a conſiderable Sea and Land Force being ſent from thence, have enabled them to undertake this expedition.

Their being in poſſeſſion of the Iſland of *Salſette*, would be of the utmoſt detriment to the trade and intereſts of the Honourable Company here, by having it in their power to obſtruct the former, as they would become poſſeſſed of the Paſſes Inland, when they would undoubtedly lay whatever impoſitions they pleaſed upon it, as they were formerly ſo prone, on every occaſion, to do. Beſides, on ſuch an event, we could have no hopes of ever acquiring it for the Honourable Company, who, as you well know, have long much wiſhed to become poſſeſſed of it.

In this ſituation we have eſteemed it our undoubted duty to be beforehand with the Portugueze, by acquiring poſſeſſion of it for our Honourable Employers; and have in conſequence determined to embrace ſome Offers which have been made for facilitating this acquiſition.

We have chiefly been impelled to this ſtep by a thorough conviction that it would otherwiſe fall into the hands of the Portugueze; as, from the preſent ſituation of the affairs of the Marattas, it muſt be out of their power to ſend ſuch a force as would be able to oppoſe them.

We ſtill earneſtly wiſh to remain on good terms with the Marattas; and hope this ſtep will not by no means break that good underſtanding which has ſo long ſubſiſted. However, we do not abſolutely direct that you ſhould remain at *Poona* after the receipt of this Letter, if you are convinced the ſafety of your perſon is endangered thereby; but if on the contrary no harm can happen to yourſelf, we then much wiſh you ſhould continue there, and direct that you endeavour to reconcile the Miniſtry to the meaſure we have purſued, by acquainting them with our motives for it; and by aſſuring them, in caſe their party prevails in the preſent conteſt, we ſhall then be ready to give it up (if they will not be induced to cede it to us) on their granting us what we may eſteem an equivalent, and paying the expences we ſhall incur thereby.

In caſe you quit *Poona*, you will of courſe bring your Aſſiſtant with you; but we again tell you, we wiſh you may remain, in order to convince the Miniſtry of the ſincerity of our profeſſions.

We are,
Bombay Caſtle, Your loving Friends.
29 November 1774.

To Mr. *Robert Gambier*, at *Surat*.

Sir,

The Portugueze have this ſeaſon received a very conſiderable ſupply of men from Europe; their Naval Force is alſo put on a reſpectable footing, and we have received undoubted intelligence that they are fitting out an Armament with the utmoſt expedition from *Goa*, with intention of recovering the dominions they formerly poſſeſſed to the Northward of this place, and in particular the Iſland of *Salſette*.

As their being in poſſeſſion of *Salſette* would be of the utmoſt detriment to the trade and intereſt of the Honourable Company in theſe parts, by leaving it in their power to obſtruct our trade, and lay whatever impoſitions they pleaſe upon it, which they were formerly ſo prone, on every occaſion, to do; and as on ſuch an event, we could have no hopes of ever procuring for our Honourable Employers the poſſeſſion of that Iſland, which they have ſo often expreſſed their deſire of attaining, we have therefore reſolved, as our undoubted duty, to acquire poſſeſſion of it for the Honourable Company.

We have in conſequence determined to embrace ſome offers that have been made us for facilitating the acquiſition of it; and a ſuitable Force will accordingly be ſent in a few days to effect it.

It is our wiſh that this ſtep may not impede the negociation at preſent depending with *Ragoba*; and we accordingly direct you to aſſure him, that no other motives

APPENDIX. No. 58.

have impelled us to take this ſtep than to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Portugueze, which it would moſt undoubtedly, as well from the force they propoſe ſending againſt it, as from the preſent ſituation of the affairs of the Marattas, which puts it out of their power to ſend any ſuccours to prevent it.

This you are to explain to *Ragoba*; and to aſſure him that, provided he cannot be induced to cede it to our Honourable Employers, we will give it up to him on his granting what we may eſteem an equivalent for it, and paying the expences that will be incurred thereby, ſo ſoon as he may be in full poſſeſſion of the Maratta Empire.

We are,

Bombay Caſtle, 29 November 1774.

Your loving Friends,

APPENDIX, No. 59.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Committee, the 1ſt December 1774.

OUR Addreſs to the Honourable the Court of Directors, intended to be forwarded by our Honourable Maſters Ship *Thames*, having been conſidered and approved, is this day ſigned as follows:

Honourable Gentlemen,

By our Addreſs of the 10th ultimo, a duplicate of which is incloſed, we informed you of the propoſals that had been made to us by *Ragoba*, through Mr. *Gambier* at *Surat*, for the aſſiſtance of a body of the Company's forces againſt his Enemies, the miniſterial party at *Poona*, in order to re-eſtabliſh him in the Government of the Maratta Empire.

We alſo communicated our reſolution to aſſiſt him, provided ſuch matters were ſettled to our ſatisfaction as we judged neceſſary to ſtipulate with him, in order that, ſhould a Treaty take place, it might turn out truly beneficial to the Honourable Company our Employers.

We have ſince received two Letters from Mr. *Gambier* on the ſubject, entered in our Diary under the 17th and 25th ultimo, the laſt of which was accompanied by the Tranſlate of a Treaty propoſed by *Ragoba*; wherein, though his offers fall far ſhort of our demands, he nevertheleſs propoſed to cede a territory to the Company near *Surat*, that, according to Mr. *Gambier*'s account, would produce an annual revenue of about 8 Lacks of Rupees; which, added to the ſhare of the revenues the Guicawars at preſent receive from the Town and Pergunnahs of *Broach*, being near three Lacks, which he alſo offered, made in the whole about eleven Lacks per annum: he likewiſe propoſed to depoſit ſix Lacks of Rupees in money, and to give ſecurity for the payment of half a Lack monthly, for ſix months, which was to be conſidered as the expence of our Forces for that term, which he propoſed ſhould be reckoned at a Lack and a half of Rupees per month, without further account; and, provided they continued with them longer than ſix months, he then propoſed to make another advance of ſix Lacks, and to continue paying half a Lack monthly as before; but he refuſed to cede the Iſland of *Salſette* or *Baſſein*, which we demanded, amongſt other articles, for the aſſiſtance we were to afford him.

Our remarks on theſe Letters from Mr. *Gambier* are fully ſtated in our Minutes of the 17th and 25th ultimo, and though we have by no means agreed to the terms of the Treaty as propoſed by *Ragoba*, we have nevertheleſs been induced to recede in ſome degree from our firſt demands, as well with reſpect to the ſum to be previouſly depoſited, as in regard to the ceſſion of the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*.

As to the depoſit, our demand was for fifteen Lacks of Rupees, or twenty if poſſible, as Security for the expences of our Forces, and to enſure the Company from any loſs; *Ragoba* has tendered ſix; and as Mr. *Gambier* has repreſented that he believes it to be out of *Ragoba*'s power, in his preſent ſituation, to offer more, and as ample ſecurity muſt be given for the monthly payment for the Lack and a half of Rupees for the expences of your Forces, we have been induced ſo far to reduce our demand in this particular.

Ragoba is alſo very averſe to the ceſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, inſomuch that inſiſting on thoſe places might probably have cauſed an entire ſtop to be put to the depending negociation. In deference to the opinion of your Honours, we much wiſh that he could have been prevailed upon to grant them to the Honourable Company; but we were at the ſame time of opinion, that it was by no means for their intereſt to run the riſk of overſetting the whole on that account, as much more material advantages might be granted elſewhere; and we therefore determined to wave making any further demand for thoſe places till a more favourable opportunity: thoſe are the only points in which we have any ways receded from our firſt demands.

The following are therefore the terms on which we have at preſent offered to afford him the Honourable Company's aſſiſtance:

That the *Poona* ſhare of the revenue formerly annexed to the Government of *Surat*, from 30 Pergunnahs and 4 Cuſbahs, amounting, according to the late Mr. *Price*'s ſtatement entered in our Diary in the month of May 1772, to about twelve Lacks and a half per annum, be given up for ever:

That the Guicawar ſhare of the *Broach* Revenues, with any Revenues collected by the *Poona* Government, from the *Broach* Town and Pergunnah, amounting to about 3 Lacks per annum, be alſo ceded for ever to the Company:

And that the Revenue now poſſeſſed by the *Poona* Government, which belonged to the Caſtle Governor at *Surat*, at the time the Moguls were in the fulneſs of their power, be alſo made over to the Company, amounting to about three Lacks of Rupees.

The whole of the foregoing amounts to about 18 Lacks and a half of Rupees annually, which we have inſiſted ſhall be ceded for ever. There are alſo ſome other articles of our demands, all of which are ſpecified in a ſketch of the Treaty we have drawn up and forwarded to Mr. *Gambier*, as entered under the 26th ultimo, that in caſe *Ragoba* ſhould embrace our offers, no time may be loſt in entering into the neceſſary engagements on that account; and Mr. *Gambier* is accordingly empowered to enter into a Treaty on the terms herein ſet down.

Should we obtain the whole for the Company that is inſerted in this Draft for a Treaty, or even ſhould we be obliged to recede in ſome degree from the largeneſs of our preſent demands, we muſt think we ſhall merit your Honours full approbation of our proceedings, as the advantages that the Company will reap therefrom will be conſiderable and laſting; and we think, that with the body of Forces we propoſe ſending to the aſſiſtance of *Ragoba*, there can be little doubt of his obtaining the full poſſeſſion of the Government of the Maratta Empire.

Thus this matter ſtands at preſent, and we ſhall not fail to embrace the firſt opportunity of adviſing you of the reſult.

We have alſo another affair of equal importance at preſent in agitation, owing to the intelligence we received a few days ago from Mr. *Robert Henſhaw*, one of your Servants, at preſent reſiding at *Goa*, of the deſigns of the Portugueze to attempt the immediate recovery of the Iſland of *Salſette*, and the other places they formerly poſſeſſed to the Northward.

Mr. *Henſhaw*'s Letter is recorded under the 28th ultimo;

ultimo; and being taken under the moſt mature conſideration, we could not entertain a doubt of the deſigns of the Portugueze, and were convinced, if they attempted the conqueſt of *Salſette* in the preſented diſtracted ſituation of the Maratta Government, with the large force they can now command, that they would certainly make a conqueſt of it, which it is our undoubted duty if poſſible to prevent, by gaining immediate poſſeſſion of it for the Company; for, ſhould the Portugueze acquire that Iſland, it would not only put it out of our power ever to gain it for the Company, but would be attended with infinite prejudice to their trade and intereſts at this place; as, by the Portugueze being in poſſeſſion of the adjacent Paſſes to the inland country, they would have it in their power to obſtruct our trade, and to lay what impoſitions they pleaſed upon it, which in former times, upon every occaſion, they were ſo prone to do.

We accordingly reſolved to attempt to gain it for the Honourable Company; and as the people who made propoſals to the Preſident for delivering up the Iſland, as related in our Diary in the month of March laſt, are ſtill equally ready to do ſo now, we have empowered the Preſident to cloſe with their offers on the moſt moderate terms procurable, which he will do as ſoon as poſſible; and in the mean time, every preparation is making with that ſecrecy the affair requires, or will admit of, to prevent a diſappointment, even ſhould the Garriſon at *Tanna*, the principal fort, not be ſo ready to deliver it up as we have reaſon to conclude they will be.

For further particulars reſpecting this affair, permit us to refer you to our Diary, wherein is pointed out the means we have pitched upon to prevent, as much as in our power, the negociation with *Ragoba* from being affected hereby; and as to Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poona*, we ſhall give him timely intelligence of our intentions, ſo that he may repair hither, in caſe he ſhould eſteem his perſon in danger by remaining at *Poona* till our intentions become public.

As we may poſſibly be in want of ſome additional force at the Preſidency, we have embraced this opportunity of reducing the Garriſons at *Tellicherry* and *Anjengo*, and of fixing their Military Eſtabliſhment much lower than before, as you will obſerve by our Minutes of the 28th; and we have alſo ordered, that all the great Guns at *Anjengo*, from 12 lbs. upwards, ſhall be ſent to the Preſidency. By this means, the expences of both theſe places will be annually much reduced; we therefore flatter ourſelves, your Honours will approve of it: And we can aſſure you, that in our proceedings in general, we have no other object in view than what we eſteem the intereſt of our Honourable Employers, we truſt that the whole of our proceedings will meet with your Honours approbation.

We have the honour to be,
with much reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your moſt faithful Servants.

Bombay Caſtle,
1ſt December 1774.

APPENDIX, No. 60.

Extract of *Bombay* General Conſultations; the 12th December 1774.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,

The W° *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, *Robert Gordon*,
Thomas Moſtyn, *Brice Fletcher*,
William Tayler, *Robert Garden*.

BY ten o'clock this morning, that part of the Military Force intended to proceed by land to *Tanna*, marched out of town, commanded by Brigadier General *Robert Gordon*. At ſeven, P. M. the remainder of the Military Force intended to proceed to *Tanna*, embarked on board ſundry boats, and proceeded with the following veſſels and Gallivats to *Tanna*: Terrible Bomb, Adam Sheriff; Triumph Prahm, John Hall; Spy Cutter, Samuel Hardy; Otter Gallivat, Thomas Buncombe; Greyhound Gallivat, Walter Barlau; Lively's Prize Gallivat, Nathaniel Smith; Fly Gallivat, William Auguſtus Skynner; and Wolf Gallivat, Brice Hardy.—John Watſon, Eſquire, Superintendant, embarked on one of the above veſſels, and proceeded as Commander of the Marine Force to *Tanna*, with inſtructions to the Brigadier General and himſelf, to conſult and co operate with each other for the good of the Service.

APPENDIX. No. 60.

At the ſame time ſailed out of Port, the Bombay Grab, George Emptage, to cruize.

Extract from Journal of Brigadier General Robert *Gordon*, on the Siege of *Tanna* and Reduction of the Iſland *Salſette*.

Monday, 12th December 1774.

This day the Armament intended for the reduction of the Iſland of *Salſette* ſet off from *Bombay*, in the following order; viz.

Marched by Land,

The General and his Staff,
Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn.

Firſt Company of Grenadiers, 100 Private, with their Officers.

Second Company of Grenadiers, 100 Private, with their Officers.

The two Grenadier Companies of the Second Battalion of Sepoys of 100 each, with Lieutenant Cadgu and Enſign Richardſon.

Eighty Light Infantry from the ſecond Battalion of Sepoys, commanded by Enſigns Ormiſton and Denſon.

The two Grenadier Companies of the third Battalion of Sepoys, with their Officers, each Company 100 Private.

Two three-pounders, with 50 Laſcars, and the proportion of Artillerymen, under Lieutenant Hallamby.

The Engineers, Captain Nelſon and Mr. Witman.

Twenty Biggarees with ten cheſts of Ammunition.

Two European Carpenters with Broad Axes.

Thirty Bhaldars with Iron Crows, &c.

Thirty Biggarees to carry Arrack.

Quarter Maſter and his Stores.

Troops, &c. by ſea, under Colonel Egerton and Major Henry.

Captain Abington, 1ſt Company, 100 Private.
Lieutenant Henry, } { Acting Enſign, Williams.
Enſign Jones, } { D° D° Riddell.

Second Company 100 Private.
Lieutenant Panton, } Enſign Newgent.
Bennet, }

Firſt Company, 2d Battalion, 100 Private.
Captain Farrer, } { Enſign Symes.
Enſign O'Hara, } { Acting D° Brownrig.

520 Sepoys, with their Officers, under Captain Jackſon.
122 Artillery D°.
150 Laſcars.
70 Bhaldars and Biggarees.

APPENDIX. No. 60.

An Abſtract of the above.

Artillery, Infantry, and Sepoys.			
			Artillery.
		10	By Land.
	132	122	Sea.
			Infantry.
		200	By Land.
	500	300	Sea.
			Sepoys.
		480	By Land.
	1,000	520	Sea.
	1,632		
			Laſcars.
		50	By Land.
	200	150	Sea.
			Bhaldars.
		80	By Land.
	150	70	Sea.
	350		

Extract of *Bombay* Select Committee; the 30th December 1774.

Signed an Addreſs to the Honourable the Court of Directors, and a Letter to the Agent and Council of *Buſſora*, which were diſpatched in duplicate per Dingey bound to *Muſcat*.

Honourable Gentlemen,

By the Honourable Company's Ship *Thames*, which ſailed from hence under the 4th inſtant, to complete her cargo for Europe on the coaſt, we adviſed your Honours from this department of our Reſolution to ſend a ſuitable force to reduce the Iſland of *Salſette*, with the other adjacent Iſles. We alſo then apprized you at large with our motives for ſo doing; and we make no doubt but that they will prove ſufficiently ſatisfactory to your Honours.

A Dingey being now bound to *Muſcat*, affords us an opportunity to tranſmit to your ſervants at *Buſſora* this Addreſs, which is ſolely to convey to you the pleaſing intelligence of the reduction of the fort of *Tanna*, the principal one on *Salſette*, which was taken by your Forces by ſtorm on the 28th inſtant. The fort of *Verſova* was reduced a few days before by Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*; and as there is no other poſt on the Iſland of any importance, the conqueſt of the whole is as good as completed; on which happy event we beg leave to congratulate your Honours, aſſuring you it ſhall be our ſtudy to make it as beneficial to you as poſſible. We ſhall ſhortly write you further by a veſſel we ſhall diſpatch directly to *Buſſora*. In the mean time we have the honour to remain, with much reſpect,

Honourable Gentlemen,

Bombay Caſtle, 30th December 1774.

Your moſt obedient and faithful Servants.

APPENDIX, No. 61.

Extract of *Bombay* General Conſultations, the 20th December 1774.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,

The W^e^ *Daniel Draper*, *Thomas Moſtyn*, *Brice Fletcher*, *William Tayler*, *Robert Garden*, *John Watſon*, Eſquire, at *Tanna*.

Fort William. The Governor General and Council announcing their having aſſumed that Government.

READ a Letter from the Governor General and Council at *Fort William*, ſignifying their having taken upon them the Government of *Bengal*, in virtue of the late Act of Parliament; and deſiring to be furniſhed with the neceſſary intelligence of the Company's political concerns on this ſide *India*.

Ordered, That a proper Letter be drawn out by the Secretary, giving them every information that the ſaid Act directs.

APPENDIX, No. 62.

Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations, March 8th 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,

The Honourable *George Monſon*, *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire,

Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

CONFORMABLE to the Board's Addreſs of this date, we ſhall proceed to communicate to your Honour, &c. our motives for determining at this juncture to endeavour at acquiring poſſeſſion of the Iſland of *Salſette* by force of arms, from the Marattas, the late poſſeſſors of it, of which we particularly adviſed the Honourable the Court of Directors in our Addreſs per *Thames*, ſeveral days before the receipt of your Letter of the 24th of October, wherein we were acquainted of your having taken poſſeſſion of the Government of *Fort William* in virtue of the late Act of Parliament; and we flatter ourſelves our reaſons for this undertaking will appear ſo ſatisfactory and convincing to them as well as to you, that we ſhall be fully juſtified in our proceedings. In the commands of the Honourable Court of Directors to this Preſidency, dated the 31ſt March 1769, an atteſted Copy of which we incloſe for your information, they are pleaſed to direct that we ſhould be ever watchful to obtain the Iſland of *Salſette*, with the other place therein pointed out, which they acquaint us muſt be the conſtant objects we are always to have in view in all our Treaties, Negociations, and Military Operations.

Again, the Honourable Company in their Letter of the 6th April 1772, expreſsly direct, that Mr. *Moſtyn*, one of our Members, ſhould be eſtabliſhed at *Poona*, for endeavouring to acquire that Iſland, with the other places mentioned in their former commands; and they point out what they permit us to give as an exchange.

Mr. *Moſtyn* was accordingly fixed as Reſident at the Maratta Durbar in the year 1772, during the life-time of *Mhadarow*, and about a year before that Government fell into the confuſion it has been in ſince the aſſaſſination of his ſucceſſor, *Narrow Row*; but he found no probability of obtaining the places deſired by the Company, even though he was inſtructed to offer *Broach*, with its territories (which we had juſt then acquired from the Nabob) in addition to the terms pointed out by our Honourable Employers.

Some time after the Maratta ſtate fell into that confuſion which at preſent diſtracts it, when in fact there is no head in that Empire ſtill; we took no ſtep for attaining by force of Arms the poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, notwithſtanding the opportunity was very favourable, and that we have reaſon to conclude *Salſette*, with the ſmaller adjacent Iſles, was ceded to the Crown by the Marriage Contract between King *Charles* the Second and the King of Portugal.

Previous however to the receipt of your Letter to the Board, communicating the intelligence of your Honour, &c. having taken upon you the Government of *Bengal*, we

we received advice from Mr. *Robert Henſhaw* (a Gentleman in the ſervice then reſiding on ſome buſineſs of the Company's at *Goa)* that the Portugueze had this ſeaſon received with their new Captain General, Don *Joze Pedro de Camera*, a very conſiderable reinforcement of men and ſhips from Europe, and that their undoubted deſigns were immediately to attempt at recovering from the Marattas the poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, *Baſſein*, and the other countries they formerly poſſeſſed, ſo far as *Damman*, called by them the Province of the North: an extract of this letter for your information we alſo incloſe.

We could not entertain a doubt, from the diſtracted ſituation of the affairs of the Marattas, that the Portugueze, with the force they commanded, would certainly gain poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, which is their favourite object, and moſt probable of the other parts of their former poſſeſſions.

Had this event taken place, it would not only effectually have prevented us from ever acquiring *Salſette* for the Honourable Company, but the Portugueze would then again have had it in their power to obſtruct our Trade, by being in poſſeſſion of the principal paſſes to the inland country, and to lay whatever impoſitions they pleaſed upon it, which in former times, upon every occaſion, they were ſo prone to do, which of courſe would have been of infinite prejudice to the Trade, Revenues and Intereſt of the Company in theſe parts, inſomuch that we ſhould in a great meaſure have been ſubject to the caprice of the Portugueze.

What then remained for us to do in this emergency? Had we ſat inactive ſpectators of the event, we ſhould in our opinions have betrayed the intereſt of our Honourable Employers; had we wrote to you for inſtructions and advice, your ſentiments and recommendations moſt probably muſt have arrived much too late to have enabled us to prevent the execution of the deſigns of the Portugueze; and though we had not any account at this time of your being eſtabliſhed in your Government of *Fort William*, and conſequently were not reſtricted by law from purſuing ſuch meaſures as we judged moſt for the intereſt of our Honourable Employers, yet, as the matter was in every point of view of an important nature, and we ſhortly expected to hear you were arrived, we ſhould have been very glad to have ſubmitted to your judgment the directions of the meaſures neceſſary to be purſued; but we were obliged either to act at this very juncture, or entirely to give up all thoughts of attempting to avert the evils with which we were threatened; we therefore determined, after the moſt mature deliberation, in order to prevent the miſchiefs which muſt have enſued to the intereſt of the Honourable Company, from the Portugueze being in poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, to attempt obtaining it for our Honourable Employers; and as ſome offers had been made to the Preſident ſome months before by the Killedar of *Sannah*, the principal fort on the Iſland, to deliver it to us for a ſum of money, the Preſident was empowered to cloſe with him on the moſt moderate terms; but the Killedar now excuſed himſelf from proceeding any farther in the buſineſs, alledging that the Miniſtry at *Poona* having obtained intelligence of the deſigns of the Portugueze, had reinforced his garriſon, which put it out of his power to deliver it up in the manner he before wiſhed to do: it therefore only remained for us to ſend ſuch a military and marine force as was judged neceſſary to reduce it; which was accordingly diſpatched under the command of Brigadier General *Gordon*, and Mr. *Watſon*, Superintendant of our marine; and we have the pleaſure to acquaint you that *Sannah*, the principal fort on the Iſland, was taken by ſtorm on the 28th inſtant, after our Army had been fifteen days before the place. *Verſova*, another fort on *Salſette*, was alſo taken by a ſeparate party, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, and in conſequence, the whole Iſland is now in our poſſeſſion.

The Iſland of *Caranja* alſo ſurrendered yeſterday, which completes the conqueſt we had determined to make near this place.

The very day after our forces ſet out againſt *Tanna*, part of the Portugueze fleet appeared off this port, with their trade under its convoy, bound to *Damaun*, a ſettlement they ſtill retain to the Northward of this place; the Commander of which, ſo ſoon as he gained intelligence of our proceedings, delivered a ſmall Proteſt, by the directions, as he ſaid, of the Captain General of *Goa*; which ſhews the neceſſity of the meaſures we have purſued, and evidently corroborates Mr. *Henſhaw*'s account of their intentions; to this Proteſt, we delivered a ſuitable Reply, and thus it reſts between us.

The Revenues of *Salſette* amount to about 3,30,000 rupees, on a moderate calculation, and thoſe of *Caranja* to about 40,000; we ſhall fix a ſuitable Civil Eſtabliſhment at each of theſe places, for their Government and for the collection of the Revenues, with a proper military Force for their protection.

Before we entered upon theſe enterprizes, we judged it very neceſſary to recal Mr. *Moſtyn* from *Poona*. Yet it is the fartheſt from our wiſhes to occaſion a rupture between us and the Marattas, by the ſteps we have been under the neceſſity of purſuing; the Preſident therefore, agreeable to our Reſolution, will explain to the Miniſterial Party at *Poona*, the real motives for our proceedings; and they ſhall be aſſured, that in caſe they gain the advantage in the preſent conteſt, by the overthrow of *Ragoba*, that we ſhall reſign the Iſlands to them ſo ſoon as they are in a condition to defend them from the Portugueze, if they cannot be induced to cede them to us, provided alſo that they will give a ſuitable equivalent or compenſation for them; for your Honour, &c. will obſerve, that we have been impelled to this proceeding at this juncture, and without your concurrence, more from our duty to prevent thoſe places from falling into the hands of the Portugueze, than to retain them in the Company's poſſeſſion, though this laſt is much to be wiſhed, as the Honourable Company is ſo deſirous of them; and therefore, when we accommodate matters with the Marattas, which ſhall be done as ſoon as poſſible, our utmoſt endeavours ſhall be uſed to reconcile them to our keeping them.

The ſame aſſurances as will be given to the Miniſterial Party, will alſo be given to *Ragoba*, ſhould he again obtain the ſupreme power over the Marattas, and we hope he may be eaſily ſatisfied; but it is neceſſary now to adviſe you of the riſe and progreſs of a Negociation at preſent depending with him, which we ſhall accordingly here proceed to do.

Near twelve months ago, ſome overtures were made by an Agent from *Ragoba* to Mr. *Moſtyn*, our Reſident at *Poona*, for the aſſiſtance of Men and Money to re-eſtabliſh his affairs. His demands however were ſo large, eſpecially for Money, which he then much wanted, and it being our fixed reſolution by no means to aſſiſt him with any, but on the contrary, that we ſhould expect a conſiderable ſum from him, if we joined him with our Forces, as well as many grants of Territory for our Employers, that the matter was preſently dropped.

About four months ago, *Ragoba*, by means of an Agent he has reſiding at *Surat*, again made propoſals through the Chief of *Surat*, for the aſſiſtance of a body of Forces againſt his enemies, the Miniſterial Party at *Poona*. As we were of opinion very material advantages might be obtained for our Honourable Employers, by affording him ſome aſſiſtance, we directed the Chief to enter upon a Negociation, and pointed out the terms on which we might be induced to aſſiſt him with a body of European Artillery and Infantry and Sepoys, to the amount of about 2,500 Men; which, in conſideration of the advantages the Company were to reap from the alliance, we judged we might be able to ſpare ſome few months on this ſervice. For this aſſiſtance, we firſt demanded that a depoſit ſhould be previouſly made of fifteen, or if poſſible twenty Lacks of Rupees, to anſwer the expence; and, to inſure the Company from any loſs, that the Iſlands of *Salſette*, *Baſ-*

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ſein, and the other ſmall Iſlands adjacent to this place, ſhould be ceded to the Honourable Company, together with the Maratta ſhare of the Revenues of thoſe Pergunnahs near to *Surat*, which formerly did belong to the Governor of that Town; all of which the Honourable the Court of Directors have repeatedly enjoined us to embrace every opportunity in our power to endeavour at obtaining: we alſo demanded the Share collected by the Guicavars, from the Territories of *Baroche*. We further ordered, that it ſhould be ſtipulated in caſe of a Treaty taking place, that *Ragoba* ſhould confirm all the former Treaties of this Preſidency with the Marattas; that he ſhould engage never to diſturb the tranquillity of the Company's Poſſeſſions in *Bengal* or the *Carnatic*; with ſome other leſs material points which relate to this place alone.

His Agent ſet out from *Surat*, to communicate our demands to his Maſter, but partly owing to his ſickneſs, and to other difficulties which attended his journey, it was a conſiderable time before he returned. At length however, his Maſter's Propoſals were communicated to us, which, as your Honour, &c. may ſuppoſe at firſt fell far ſhort of our demands, and particularly *Ragoba* abſolutely refuſed to cede the Iſlands of *Salſette* or *Baſſein*, and declared it was totally out of his power to depoſit ſo large a ſum as was demanded.

Though we wiſhed to obtain thoſe two places, in deference to the opinion of our Honourable Employers; yet, as more material advantages might be gained by a ceſſion of Territory near to *Surat*, we judged it improper to break off the Negociation on this account, and therefore ordered that it ſhould proceed, and from time to time gave the neceſſary directions reſpecting it. At length, *Ragoba*'s Agent agreed on the part of his Maſter, to cede to the Company certain Pergunnahs near to *Surat*, whoſe annual Revenues amount to eighteen Lacks and twenty-five thouſand (18,25,000) Rupees, in conſideration of our aſſiſting him with the body of Forces we before mentioned. He alſo agreed to depoſit ſix Lacks (6,00,000) Rupees in Money, and to ſecure to the Company the payment of the ſum of one and a half Lack of Rupees per month, for the expence of the Force with which we were to aſſiſt him. The other Articles, ſuch as his engaging never to diſturb the tranquillity of the Company's Poſſeſſions in *Bengal* or the *Carnatic*, he readily conſented to, as well as to confirm the Treaties with us, and the other leſs material points we demanded.

Some matters however remained ſtill to be adjuſted, relative to the time when the Company were to be put in poſſeſſion of the places to be ceded to them; which we inſiſted ſhould be ſo ſoon as the Treaty was executed, as we were determined to proceed on the moſt ſecure grounds, and to run no hazards whatever, without ample ſecurity in hand. Agreeable to which, we inſtructed the Chief of *Surat*, that he might adjuſt the ſame on a proper footing, which we had no doubt he would ſpeedily have done; but the Agent was at this time abſent from the City, collecting the Revenues of certain Diſtricts near to *Surat*, for his Maſter, to enable him to pay the advance of ſix Lacks (he being his Choutai in thoſe parts) and he was alſo taking poſſeſſion of the Pergunnahs that were to be delivered over to the Company; in which buſineſs he was ſeized by a party of the Miniſterial Forces, and is at preſent confined by them. *Ragoba* had drawn near to *Surat* with his Army, which was very conſiderable, in order that our Forces might eaſily join him, as he expected the Treaty would be ſpeedily finiſhed; but ſuſpecting ſome treachery about this time from a part of his Troops, he ſpeedily ſeparated from them with thoſe he could rely on, and for the preſent is actually retreating towards *Delhi*. He has however cauſed the Chief to be aſſured, that he ſhall ſpeedily return, when he deſired this Treaty might be concluded.

At the time we firſt entered upon this Negociation, we had not heard that thoſe Gentlemen of your Board who have arrived from *England* had even left it; we therefore were not at all reſtricted by Law at that time, from entering into any engagements we judged beneficial to our Honourable Employers, to whom we have fully explained ourſelves on the ſubject, and whoſe orders only we were purſuing by the meaſures we had adopted; beſides, if this Treaty takes place, we ſhall obtain ſuch a Revenue for the Honourable Company, as will enable this Preſidency to ſupport itſelf, and conſequently relieve you from the burthen of furniſhing us annually with the large ſum we ſhall otherwiſe indiſpenſably require, and therefore doubt not but it muſt be approved by the Company and you, Gentlemen; for it is moſt probable, ſhould this opportunity eſcape us, that ſuch another will never again offer, and as it would have endangered the whole had we put a ſtop to the Treaty (after we received intelligence of your arrival) till your concurrence was obtained, we therefore flatter ourſelves we ſhall be fully juſtified in your opinions for continuing the Negociation, as well as for concluding it, which we propoſe to take the firſt opportunity in our power of doing.

That *Ragoba* may take no umbrage at the meaſures regarding *Salſette*, our motives for the ſame will be explained to him, as adviſed in the preceding part of this Letter; and the ſame aſſurances will be given him in caſe of his ſucceſs (and with our aſſiſtance, we can have little doubt of his ſucceeding) as will be given to the Miniſterial Party.

As a conſiderable part of our Marine Force is employed at *Buſſora* and in the *Perſian Gulph*, we have at preſent not a ſufficient Marine for the protection of our Trade on the coaſt of *Malabar* from the Maratta Fleet, which it is moſt probable will attempt to make ſome depredations on it. We ſhall therefore immediately addreſs a Letter to the Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Squadron in *India*, who we conclude is now at *Madras*; adviſing him of the ſituation of affairs, and deſiring him, if he cannot repair to the Coaſt with his whole Squadron, that he will ſend two of his ſhips for the protection of the Trade on the Coaſt.

And as our Military Force is not ſufficient to garriſon our new conqueſts, and for the other ſervice for which it may be preſently wanted, we ſhall apply to the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, deſiring they will furniſh us with two Companies of European Infantry, and one complete Battalion of Sepoys, until ſuch time as we may be able to return them by our own levies being completed.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, the 31ſt December 1774. *William Hornby*, &c. Council.

Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations; the 13th March, 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Received from Commodore Sir *Edward Hughes* the following Letter and Incloſure:

Saliſbury, in *Madras Road*, the 21ſt February 1775.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

I arrived here on the 13th of this inſtant; and received a Letter from the Governor and Council of Bombay, dated the 4th ultimo, requeſting me, if it ſhould be too inconvenient for me to go there with the Squadron, to ſend at leaſt two ſhips thereof for the protection of the Trade againſt the Maratta Fleet, which they were apprehenſive would make repriſals, in conſequence of the ſeizing on the Iſland of *Salſette*; which, they ſay, they have judged it expedient to do. The ſeaſon of the year

is coming on when no ſhip can act on the Coaſt of *Malabar*. I have however ordered the Captain of His Majeſty's ſhip the *Sea Horſe*, when he hath landed the Company's Treaſure at *Bombay*, and the Captain of His Majeſty's ſhip the *Swallow*, to act agreeable to the requeſt of the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, and to concert meaſures with them, and occaſionally with the Chiefs of the Company's Settlements on that Coaſt accordingly; but the *Swallow* having met with an accident, it will detain her ſome time longer before ſhe can proceed to the *Malabar* Coaſt.

I ſhould certainly be informed of the motives for the ſeizing the Iſland of *Salſette*, or for any act of Hoſtility committed by the Company's Servants; in conſequence of which I may be required by them to lend the aid of His Majeſty's ſhips under my command.

I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) *Edward Hughes.*

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, Knight, Commodore and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the Eaſt Indies, at *Fort Saint George*.

Sir,

Our Letter of the 16th of September acknowledged the receipt of your favour of the 5th of Auguſt.

The ſituation of affairs here lately, rendered it very expedient for us to obtain poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, and of the ſmaller adjacent Iſlands from the Marattas. In conſequence of which we ſent ſuch a Military and Marine Force as effected the conqueſt of *Salſette*; *Tannah*, the capital Fort, being taken by ſtorm on the 28th ultimo, after our Forces had been 15 days before the place; and the whole Iſland is now in our poſſeſſion, with the other ſmall adjacent Iſlands.

As it is abſolutely neceſſary, till the Marattas may be reconciled to the motives of our proceedings, that the Trade up and down the Coaſt of *Malabar* ſhould be protected by ſtrong convoys, leſt the Maratta Fleet ſhould attempt making reprifals on it; and as a conſiderable part of our Marine Force is at this juncture employed in the Gulph, inſomuch that we have not ſufficient Force for the Services required; we therefore ſtrongly recommend to you, Sir, to proceed to this Coaſt with your Squadron for the protection of the Trade; but ſhould that be inconvenient, we then earneſtly requeſt you will ſend two of the ſhips under your command for that purpoſe, with directions to the Commanders to concert the neceſſary meaſures with us and the Chiefs of our Settlements on the Coaſt, ſo as effectually to anſwer the deſired end of affording the protection it muſt neceſſarily require.

We are, &c.
(Signed) *William Hornby* and C°.

Bombay Caſtle, 4th January 1775.

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Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations, the 16th January 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

READ the following Letter, this inſtant arrived from Mr. *Moſtyn*, Reſident at *Poona*.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Preſident, &c. Member of the Select Committee of *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Having this inſtant received a Letter from the Governor of *Bombay*, directing me immediately on the receipt of it, to withdraw with the utmoſt ſpeed to the Preſidency, this is purpoſely to acquaint you thereof, to prevent your addreſſing any further Letters to me at this place; and incloſe your Honours, &c. duplicate of my laſt.

Poonah, I am, &c.
5th December 1774. (Signed) *T. Moſtyn.*

As the removal of Mr. *Moſtyn* from the Capital of the Maratta State has deprived the Board of the only means of obtaining intelligence in that quarter; and as no advice has been received of the motives which have influenced the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to recal him in ſo ſudden a manner, which may render it unſafe or improper to ſupply his place by any appointment from this Preſidency;

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to *Bombay*, and diſpatched immediately in duplicate, one copy by return of the Shaik gallivat, and the other over Land.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Preſident, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We have juſt received advice from Mr. *Moſtyn*, your Reſident at *Poona*, of your having ſuddenly recalled him from that Capital, with advice to return to your Preſidency with all expedition; but as he does not mention the reaſons, we are altogether to conjecture, and muſt only conclude, that it proceeds from ſome important conſideration, of which we ſhall doubtleſs receive advice. In the mean time we cannot avoid expreſſing our ſurprize at not having already received ſuch advice, and muſt impute the delay to ſome accident. As you were directed to give us regular information of your political proceedings, we repeat our deſire to be duly and punctually informed of every circumſtance in your political Tranſactions and Events, which may any way affect the general ſyſtem of the Company's affairs committed to our eſpecial charge. We are, &c.

Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations, the 30th January 1775.

PRESENT;

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Received the two following Letters from *Fort Saint George*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

On the third inſtant we received a Letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, who, by appointment from the Court of Directors, had reſided for ſome time paſt at *Poona*, adviſing, that on the 5th December, he had received orders from the Governor and Council of *Bombay* to withdraw from thence, and repair to the Preſidency with the utmoſt ſpeed. As he did not communicate to us the reaſon for his ſudden recal, and the Gentlemen at *Bombay* gave us no intimation on the ſubject, we are at a loſs how to account for the ſame.

This morning the Preſident received a Letter from Captain *Cook*, commanding at *Palamcotah*, dated the 3d inſtant, adviſing, that on the preceding evening he received a Letter from a Gentleman at *Anjengo*, dated the 29th December, in which was the following paragraph:

"A Pattamar boat is juſt arrived from the Preſidency, informing us that our Troops have taken the Field againſt the Marattas, and are now before *Tanna*. The Marattas have a large Fleet now looking out for our *China* ſhips; but

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but I make no doubt we ſhall ſoon hear of their being diſperſed, as there is a ſtrong one of ours fitting out at *Tellicherry* to go againſt them."

Although we have not received any advices on this ſubject from the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, neither can we aſſign the reaſon of their engaging in Hoſtilities againſt the Marattas; yet, as the intelligence, if true, is of the utmoſt importance to the Company's affairs, we have thought it proper to give your Honours, &c. the moſt early intelligence for your information, as that we may be favoured with your ſentiments reſpecting the conduct to be obſerved by us, ſhould the Gentlemen at *Bombay* find it expedient to apply to us for aſſiſtance, or to co-operate with them.

It is neceſſary for us to obſerve, that our Revenues and Reſources are very inadequate to our undertaking a War at any rate; and our ſituation with reſpect to the Nabob, on whom we muſt depend for aſſiſtance, in caſe of our being obliged to take up arms, has been fully explained to you in the Letter from the Board in their Military Department of 7 December laſt.

The Nabob has acquainted us, that by the lateſt intelligence he learns that *Ragonut Raw*, jealous of the two *Hindoſtan* Chiefs, on account of the ſame Letter he had intercepted, had ſeparated himſelf from them, and it was thought had arrived on the Banks of the *Norbuddah*, with about ten thouſand Horſes, and was retiring towards the *Malva* Province.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) *A. Wynch,*
Joſeph Smith,
A. M. Stone,
E. Stracey.

Fort Saint George,
10th Jan. 1775.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since diſpatching our Letter of yeſterday, private advice is arrived from *Tellicherry*, which ſay, that our Troops had taken poſſeſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*; but no particulars regarding the capture are mentioned. The ſame advice add, that it ſeems the Portugueze had determined to have poſſeſſed themſelves of thoſe places, if we had not done it before them; that they have this year brought on three Frigates and three Merchantmen, a large quantity of warlike Stores, and are determined to repoſſeſs themſelves of ſome of the Territories they formerly enjoyed, and to put *Goa* on a different footing.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) *A. Wynch,*
Joſeph Smith,
A. M. Stone,
E. Stracey.

Fort Saint George,
11th Jan. 1775.

Reſolved, That a Council be ſummoned to meet to-morrow morning in this Department, purpoſely for taking into conſideration the above two Letters, juſt arrived from *Fort Saint George.*

Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultation, the 31ſt January 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Read, and approved, the Proceedings of the Council held yeſterday.

The Board being met agreeable to the Reſolution of yeſterday, to take into conſideration the Letter then received, and recorded, from the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*:

Ordered, That the Secretary diſpatch a Letter immediately after Captain *Downs*, Commander of the *Shark* galliot, to ſtop his veſſel in the River till further orders.

The above Letter is accordingly ſent to the Maſter Attendant, with directions to diſpatch it as ſpeedily as poſſible after Captain *Downs*, if there is not certain intelligence of his having already left the River.

The Board, after mature conſideration of the ſubjects contained in the Letters from *Fort Saint George*, are of opinion, that the intelligence, though not of public authority, bears too ſtrong appearances of truth for them to entertain any doubts of it; and indeed, the Board have no other way of accounting for the ſudden and abrupt recal of the Agent or Reſident at the Maratta Court, but by attributing it to ſome hoſtile intention formed by the Preſident of *Bombay* againſt that Nation; the Board however forbear to make any remarks on this extraordinary event, until they ſhall receive ſome authentic advice of it from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, or until the Report ſhall obtain confirmation; but they think it neceſſary to addreſs the Preſidency immediately on the ſubject by different conveyances.

Agreed, That a Letter be written to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, to the following purport:

That in the laſt Letter to them, the Board took notice of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s recal from *Poona*. At that time, amongſt various other conjectures, they had ſuſpicions of that Preſidency being engaged in hoſtilities with the Maratttas, for which reaſon it was not thought proper to appoint another perſon from this Eſtabliſhment to reſide at *Poona*; that theſe ſuſpicions have been ſince confirmed by the Letters from *Madras*, which though in conſequence of private advices, are ſo circumſtantial, that the Board might give credit to them, at leaſt to allow them to have ſome foundation, and therefore repeat their expreſſion of ſurprize at the inattention of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to this Government, in not ſending advice of theſe particulars; and peremptorily to require that Preſidency to tranſmit immediate Accounts of the reality of theſe facts, and if true, of their cauſes; and to report conſtantly, by different conveyances, their further intentions and events as they may occur, that this Government may be enabled to fulfil the commands and expectations of the Britiſh Legiſlature, and of the Company, by watching over and taking early meaſures for ſecuring the intereſt of the Company in *India*: that on intelligence of ſo alarming a nature, the Board find themſelves under great uneaſineſs at being obliged to remain inactive, but that they muſt remain ſo till they hear from the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, who muſt be anſwerable for the conſequences of the ſteps they have taken.

Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations, the 3d February 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Incloſed are triplicates of our Letters of the 10th and 11th inſtant.

The Preſident this day received a Letter from Mr. *Boddam* at *Tellicherry*, dated the 31ſt ultimo; an extract of which, as alſo the intelligence which accompanied it,

waits

waits on you herewith, and which it appeared neceſſary to communicate to you with all expedition.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Fort Saint George, 14 January 1775. (Signed) *A. Wynch*, &c. Council.

Extract of a Letter from *Rawſon Hart Boddam*, Eſquire, Chief of *Tellicherry*, dated the 31ſt December 1774, and received the 14th January 1775.

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir,

I have this morning been favoured with your Letter of the 22d November by our returned Putterah; and agreeable to what therein noticed, now ſit down with the greateſt cheerfulneſs to comply with your deſire as far as lay in my power.

The accounts you notice to have received relative to the Force come out this ſeaſon and expected by the Portugueze, is well founded, as you will obſerve by the incloſed extracts of ſome advices ſent me by my correſpondents, which I have long ſince forwarded to Mr. *Hornby*. They ſtill expect another 50 or 60-gun ſhip, which ſailed in company with a merchantman who paſſed this place about ten or fifteen days paſt, and had only 85 men as recruits on board for *Goa*. They have now two frigates laying to the ſouthward of *Cochin* to join this expected ſhip and convey her ſafe to *Goa*. The intentions of this reinforcement was to re-poſſeſs themſelves of the conqueſts made from the Portugueze nation, formerly by the Marattas, particularly *Salſette* and *Baſſein*; but as our Troops are *now* acting againſt thoſe places, which without doubt you have ſome time been adviſed by the Select Committee at *Bombay*, was their intentions, I hope, in a few days to adviſe you that every ſucceſs has attended the expedition; though by a Letter received yeſterday from Mr. *Hornby*, per *Drake* cruizer, dated the 23d inſtant, he acquaints me *Tannah* Fort ſtill held out, though they had deſtroyed all their defences, and were preparing that day to ſtorm, which it was imagined would put the place into our hands. They had ſuſtained the attack of our battery for ſeven days, the Fort being high, and the walls thick and well built by the Portugueze.

By a ſmall veſſel juſt come in, I learn that the Maratta fleet, now cruizing betwixt *Gheriah* and *Puttenah Gheriah*, conſiſts of five ſhips and three ketch grabs, with 30 or 40 gallivats. It is at preſent uncertain if *Dowlal*, the Governor of *Gheriah*, will join *Ragoba*'s party or not; if the contrary, our trade will run ſome riſque of ſuffering, if the men of war do not ſpeedily appear on this Coaſt.

A true Extract.

(Signed) *James Capper*, Aſſiſtant Secretary.

EXTRACTS.

The 21 September arrived at *Goa*, *Don Joze Pedro de Camara*, as Governor and Captain General of *India*, with two ſhips of war, one of 64 guns, the other a large long frigate; both to remain in *India*. The Government will undergo almoſt a total change as well in Religion as in civil matters.

Two Brigadiers and two Lieutenant Colonels, with a ſuitable number of Officers, are come out; the Infantry is to be augmented, and a Regiment of Artillery to be raiſed. Three of the largeſt convents are taken for barracks to accommodate them. The Artillery are to have *Senior D'Cave*. The Inquiſition to be totally aboliſhed; all the poor unhappy wretches ſet at liberty; and the houſe taken for the Viceroy's palace. No Padres to be made for twenty years to come. All the riches of the Churches taken by the King, and only a feaſt allowed to be kept throughout the whole year; the expences of which is to be aſcertained by the Viceroy. The King has alſo taken to himſelf the advantages ariſing by the Tobacco Farm, and the ſale of the annual conſignment of *Portugal* Snuff ſent out by the *Queen*. Officers of Juſtice are come out to take cognizance of all matters that require redreſs. A liberty of conſcience is permitted; and the Aſiatics, of whatever denomination, are permitted to exerciſe their religion and build Pagodas, &c. The Portugueze are going to put their marine on a different footing to what it was. Six frigates of 36 guns each, to be built at *Damaun* with the utmoſt expedition. All the gallivats at *Goa* are repairing. And the two men of war that are arrived, have brought no trade of any kind, being full of implements of every kind for the above ſix frigates, with a very large quantity of Cannon, Shot, Powder, and all kind of Military Stores. They brought, Seamen included, one thouſand effective men. And there is hourly expected another ſhip of *Cunlofer*, commanded by *Coats*, &c. and a freight ſhip; on theſe are coming alſo from 5 to 600 Military and Marines. The biſhop of *Alicarnaſſa* or *Delevar Jung*, has the rank of Brigadier General. It is ſaid they fully intend attacking the Marattas. I think they muſt have ſome intentions of that nature, by increaſing their Military and Marine Forces ſo conſiderably. An Act of Grace has taken place upon the arrival of the new Viceroy; and all delinquents pardoned and ſet at liberty.

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Account of the Portugueze Forces at *Goa*, &c.

Four Regiments of Infantry, conſiſting of ſeven Companies of eighty Men each Company, are - -	2,240
One Regiment of Marines, conſiſting of ten Companies, each eighty Men - - - - - -	800
One Troop European Horſe - - - - - -	200
Three Regiments of Natives, conſiſting together of - - - - - - - - - - - -	2,000
Sepoys - - - - - - - - - - - -	6,000

Two ſhips of ſixty-four and ſeventy guns.
Four ditto of fifty, forty-four, and forty guns.
A Grab-ſhip of thirty-ſix guns.
One Patack, a Frigate of thirty-ſix guns.
Fifty Minchiras and Gallivats, carrying ten or twelve guns each.
Two Bartotes or Fire-ſhips of fourteen guns each.

A true Copy of the Extract.

(Signed) *James Capper.*

APPENDIX, No. 64.

Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations, 3d February 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

THE Governor General recommends, that a Letter be written to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, in reply to theirs now before the Board, in ſubſtance as follows:

To thank them for their diligence in conveying the intelligence to us which they had received concerning the affairs of *Bombay*; and to inform them, that we have no other advice of theſe tranſactions; and therefore, although we cannot doubt of ſome event ſimilar to what is reported having taken place, yet, till we obtain more preciſe and authentic intelligence, we muſt remain undetermined as to the meaſures which it may be neceſſary to adopt on the occaſion; to declare, however, that we cannot apprehend any conſequences from ſuch an event, which is

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likely to affect the Company's intereſt in the *Carnatic*, or require the intervention of that Preſidency; that in this perſuaſion, we can only recommend that they concert with the Nabob ſuch general cautionary meaſures as may tend to the defence of his poſſeſſions whenever they ſhall be liable to an invaſion, but neither to ſend any part of their Forces into the field, or take any other ſtep for his ſervice which may draw the Company into an expence, without a formal requiſition from him, and an engagement to defray the extraordinary charge, taking care that he appropriate a fund for that purpoſe; that this is the plan which occurs to us at preſent as the moſt adviſable; nor do we foreſee a probability of any circumſtances happening which ſhould engage them in more diſtant operations, or draw their attention from their own poſſeſſions, or thoſe of our ally the Nabob; that we recommend to them to keep a watchful eye over the French and *Hyder Ally*, and write to us as often as any freſh occurrences of conſequence ſhall come to their knowledge.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

The Governor further offers the following Obſervations to the conſideration of the Board:

Although the conduct of the Government of Bombay may prove, as it at preſent ſeems to be, precipitate and unwarrantable, and may eventually compel us to adopt a plan of politics dictated by them, from a partial conſideration of their own limitted concerns, inſtead of waiting to receive from us their rule of action, formed on a ſyſtem adapted to the general intereſt of the Company, and of the Britiſh nation in *India*; yet it does not appear likely to produce any conſequences of immediate danger. The preſent intereſting diſtraction of the Maratta State, and its long continuance, muſt have conſiderably exhauſted both their ſtrength and reſources; the miniſterial party which compoſe the actual Government have yet too formidable an opponent in *Ragonaut Row*, the regular Chief, to engage in new conteſts, eſpecially with a power with whom the Marattas have always ſhewn a diſinclination to break even in the height of their proſperity.

By the lateſt advices *Ragonaut Row*, ſupported by *Jacoojee Mulcar* and *Maldajee Cinde*, had retreated to the city of *Ugein*, the capital of the *Malavar* province, it is probable that a ſlight diverſion afforded to his adverſaries would invite him to return, as it would render the conteſt leſs unequal than it has lately proved; neither is it likely that it will reſent an act of the Government of *Bombay*, which can only tend to favour his cauſe by leſſening his credit, and diſconcerting the projects of his enemies.

From theſe reaſons, it appears unlikely that the Marattas will attempt a retaliation of the injury which has been offered to their nation, either on this Government or on that of *Fort Saint George*; the Chiefs attached to the party of *Ragonaut Row*, who have hitherto conducted the affairs of the Marattas on this ſide, have other intereſt to provide for, and the miniſters are too weak (as has been already obſerved) for diſtant enterprizes, or even to act with vigour againſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

The only powers to whom this event may be ſuppoſed to afford a pretext, or an occaſion to create us trouble, are *Hyder Ally* and *Shahabajee Booſla*; the former underſtands his own intereſt too well to quarrel with the Engliſh, from whom he can gain nothing, and with whom he may hazard all he has, and he is already ſufficiently occupied by more rational projects, the eſtabliſhment of his own country, and the annexation of the petty States of his neighbourhood to his own dominion; *Shahabajee Booſla* has for ſome time ſought the alliance of this Government and derives his ſureſt means of independance from the weakneſs of the Government to which he is legally ſubject.

On the grounds thus deſcribed, the Governor has propoſed the above draft of the Letter to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*; and offers it as his further opinion, that it is unneceſſary to take any immediate meaſures for obviating the conſequences of the ſuppoſed injuries offered by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to the Maratta Government.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

The above two Papers having been delivered in by the Governor General, and ſent in circulation to the other Members of the Board, the Draft for a Letter to *Fort Saint George* was not agreed to by General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*: Agreed, therefore, that it lie for conſideration.

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AGREED that the following Letter be now written and diſpatched over land to *Bombay*:

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. and Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 31ſt December, containing as well the general ſtate we required of the political ſituation of affairs of your Preſidency, as the particular accounts of your late operations at *Salſette* and *Baſſein*. The firſt will be taken into conſideration as ſoon as the hurry of other buſineſs will permit us, and directions in conſequence will be tranſmitted to you. As to the laſt, the tardineſs of your Advices almoſt precludes us from ſaying any thing at preſent on the ſubject. Our ſentiments of this inattention will be ſufficiently known to you by our Letter of the 3d February, triplicate of which accompanies this: we muſt however add, that we cannot admit the plea of your being unacquainted with the new Government having taken place here, becauſe we conceive that the operations in which you were going to engage, were too intereſting to the Company's affairs at large, and too likely in their conſequences to affect this ſettlement, not to have become matter of the moſt early intelligence to this Preſidency under the late adminiſtration.

We have received Advices from *Fort Saint George*, of the ſteps they had taken in conſequence of your application to them for aſſiſtance. For the reaſon we have already given, we ſuſpend our opinion on your late meaſures, and the conſequence of it, but can aſſure you that we ſhall be ready to afford you ſuch ſupport in your preſent circumſtances, as may be neceſſary for preventing, as far as may lie in our power, any injury to the Company's affairs.

We are alarmed at the declaration of your intention to join *Ragoba*; we muſt diſapprove of this as inconſiſtent with your negociations with the ruling party at *Poona*, and with the authority of this Government. Your own report of his decline and the power of his opponents, prove it to be a meaſure of danger; it may force us into a rupture with *Shabajee Booſla*, his declared enemy, and our neighbour, with whom we are on terms of friendſhip. We cannot ratify your engagements with *Ragoba*, without ſuch reaſons as we cannot now foreſee; we poſitively direct that you ſuſpend your negociations with him till you receive our further inſtructions. We were diſappointed in not receiving an account of the Forces on your eſtabliſhment, with the general ſtate of your political affairs which you ſent us, more eſpecially as you informed us of your having found it neceſſary to require a reinforcement from *Madras*; we therefore deſire that you tranſmit us ſuch a ſtate by the firſt opportunity.

We alſo deſire that you will prepare and tranſmit to us an accurate ſtate of the whole Revenues of your Preſidency, ſpecifying the groſs Amount, Charges, and nett Produce of each Branch.

Fort William, 8th March, 1775. We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 66.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th May 1775.

PRESENT,

Warren Haſtings, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires,

READ a Letter from Sir *Edward Hughes*, as follows:

To *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

In conſequence of the accident which befel His Majeſty's ſloop the *Swallow*, which I acquainted you with in the Letter I did myſelf the honour of writing to you on the 21ſt February laſt, that ſloop could not proceed, as was intended, for the *Malabar* Coaſt, to join the *Sea Horſe* there for the Protection of the Trade, having been in a great meaſure diſmantled. I have informed the Preſidency of *Bombay* thereof, and of my deſign to repair to that Coaſt myſelf, whenever the ſeaſon will admit. I am now to acquaint you, Gentlemen, that I am going with the *Saliſbury* and *Swallow* to *Trinconomalle*, on the Iſland of *Ceylon*, as well to avoid the petty monſoon, as to inſpect the condition of the ſloop, and to put her into proper order again for ſervice, and that I mean to return to this road about the middle of the next month.

I have heard of the arrival of the *Sea Horſe* on the Coaſt of *Malabar*, and have no doubt but ſhe has long ſince landed the Company's treaſure, and been employed agreeable to the requeſt of the Preſident and Council there.

I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) *Edward Hughes.*

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Madras*.

Honourable Sir,

Under the 7th inſtant I was favoured with your Letter of the 16th January, and am happy that any information my addreſs of the 31ſt December would give you has proved agreeable; you may in future depend, Sir, I will embrace every opportunity of ſending you any Advices that I may judge worthy your notice.

This morning anchored in our road the Honourable Company's cruizers, *Revenge* and *Bombay* Grab, from *Bombay*; they left the Iſland the 26th ultimo, in order to proceed down hither, to give convoy to the

laying here, but falling in a little to the ſouthward of *Rajanoul* with the convoy under the *Calcutta (Thompſon)* which they judged not ſufficiently ſtrong to encounter the Maratta fleet that was cruizing betwixt them and the Reſidency, proceeded up again juſt a little to the ſouthward of the Iſland; ſeeing them clear from any riſk of the Enemy, then made the beſt of their way (the ſhips *Revenge* and *Bombay* Grab) and off *Cape Dobbs* fell in with the Maratta fleet, and luckily deſtroyed their Admiral's ſhip, mounting 40 guns, as ſet forth in the narrative now incloſed for your peruſal, wrote by a paſſenger in the *Bombay* Grab, which I now ſend for your peruſal. I do not hear of any farther acts of hoſtility by the Preſidency of *Bombay*; their Troops, ſince the getting poſſeſſion of *Salſette* and *Caranja*, except the entirely defeating and deſtroying a body of Marattas that had made a deſcent on *Salſette* in order to plunder and ravage the country. The packet from the Preſidency which I now forward to *Anjengo* for your Board, I dare ſay will fully explain to the Gentlemen of *Bombay* their further intentions, to which I beg leave to refer you. The Portugueze I do not hear have made any attempts againſt any of the Maratta ports, they were not prepared; and our acting ſo materially in the very point they had in view, I believe has entirely diſconcerted their plans.

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I beg you will believe me, with great eſteem, &c. &c.
Tellicherry,
9th February 1775. (Signed) *R. H. Boddam.*

APPENDIX, N° 67.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 25th May 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General and Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires,

GENERAL *Clavering* lays before the Board the following Extract of Advices which he has received from Brigadier General *Gordon*, at *Bombay*.

Copy of Brigadier General *Gordon*'s Letter, dated 12th February; offering his ſervices to command the Troops.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

As you have been pleaſed to reſolve that a large part of the Troops ſhall take the field immediately, I beg leave to offer my ſervices to command them. This I hope you will think from my rank here I have a right to.

It is true that I have deſired leave to reſign, when an opportunity, which is agreeable to me, offers for my proceeding to Europe by the way of *China*; but that zeal I have for the Service, added to the reſpect which I owe to thoſe friends who ſo warmly ſupported my appointment in the General Court of Proprietors, makes me wiſh moſt earneſtly to render ſome further ſervices to the Honourable Company. I am therefore to requeſt, that your Honour, &c. will permit me to take the command of the Forces which are immediately to be employed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) *Robert Gordon.*

Copy of the Board's Anſwer, dated 14th February, to the above.

To Brigadier General *Gordon.*

Sir,

I am directed by the Honourable the Preſident and Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter, tendering your ſervices to command the Forces now to be detached from hence; and to obſerve to you in reply, that the Board, with yourſelf, having been of opinion, in conſultation the 11th inſtant, that the object in view could not be accompliſhed by the time you had limited for your ſtay in *India*, you on this account then declined the command; whereupon Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* was then appointed. As this appointment has thus taken place, they do not now think proper to annul it; but they ſhall mention your readineſs for this ſervice, in a ſuitable manner, in their Advices to the Honourable Company.

I am, Sir, &c.
(Signed) *George Skipp*, Secretary.

Copy of Brigadier General *Gordon*'s Letter, claiming the command of the Troops ordered to take the field, dated 15th February 1775.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Yeſterday evening I received three Letters from your Secretary, dated 14th February; in the firſt, the receipt of my Letter, tendering my ſervices to command the Forces to be detached from hence, is acknowledged; and

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it is ſignified to me in reply, that as the Board with myſelf had, on the 11th inſtant, been of opinion, that the object in view could not be accompliſhed by the time I had limited for my ſtay in *India*, that I had on that account declined the command, whereupon Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* was then appointed; and as this appointment had then taken place, you did not think proper to annul it.—The ſecond Letter contains directions to me to order Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, and the Officers who are to proceed on that detachment, to be ready to embark on a moment's warning.—In the third, your commands reſpecting the embarkation, and alſo ordering Captain Lieutenant *Bricket* to *Fort Victoria*, are ſignified to me.

In anſwer to the firſt of theſe Letters, I am to obſerve, that I never declined the preſent ſervice, but repeatedly declared that I was always ready for the executive part, while I remained in *India*; and by my ſubſequent Letter, that I was ready to accept of the command, and to continue in the Service, till the preſent was brought to a concluſion.

I claimed the command as my right, from my rank and appointment by the Court of Proprietors; as well as that of the Court of Directors; and I conceive, the depriving me of it to be an act of injuſtice towards me, to which the ſucceſs which has attended the Company's arms as often as I have had the direction of them in the field, ſhould not have expoſed me; and I believe, this is the firſt inſtance of a Brigadier General, who had been appointed to the command of the Forces at any Preſidency by the vote of a General Court of Proprietors, having been refuſed the command of an Army about to take the field, to make room for a Lieutenant Colonel of Artillery. But admitting that my having ſignified my intentions of returning to Europe was a ſufficient reaſon for depriving me of the command, it ſhould then have been offered to Colonel *Egerton*, who is next to me in ſucceſſion, and who is ready to take it upon him.

The appointment of a Chief Engineer, or Commandant of Artillery as ſuch, to the chief command of a body of Forces, is, I believe, almoſt without example either in the King's or Company's Service. I think Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* is, for many reaſons, a very improper perſon for the appointment which you have given him; I therefore repeat my proteſt againſt the Troops taking the field under his command; nor will I be anſwerable in the ſmalleſt degree for the conſequences which may attend any of the meaſures which you are about to purſue.——I come now to the ſecond Letter: Before I received it, the Governor had put the names of the Officers, who are intended for the expedition in orders, directing therein that they were to be in readineſs to embark at a moment's warning; and he had ſignified it, as his command, to me by the Town Major, that Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* was to chuſe ſuch men as he thought proper from amongſt the Troops here to take with him; which in conſequence he has done. In ordering the Officers for this ſervice, no raſter, no military rule whatever, has been obſerved. By this means much injuſtice is done to many Officers; as, however lightly ſome people may think of it, I know of few greater injuries which can be done to an Officer than depriving him of his tour of duty on actual ſervice. I mention this for the notice of our Honourable Maſters, who, I doubt not, will grant redreſs to Gentlemen who have ſerved them long, honourably, and faithfully.

Reſpecting the third Letter, I was informed by Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, that he had began to prepare his Stores, &c. &c. before I received it. I have therefore only to ſay, that your orders, as far as depends upon me, ſhall be punctually complied with.

I am now to ſubmit to your conſideration the weak ſtate to which all the new Conqueſts and Subordinates will be reduced when the Troops for this ſervice are drawn from them, and the total inability of the Preſidency to afford them relief, ſhould any of them be attacked. In my opinion, theſe points merit your moſt ſerious attention; as, ſhould any accident happen to the Forces who are about to take the field (and every Army, even if ever ſo ably commanded, is liable to untoward chances) I ſay, in ſuch a caſe the Company's ſettlements on this ſide of *India* would be expoſed to the utmoſt danger. I do not think the Troops expected from *Madras* would, if they were arrived, be ſufficient for the purpoſes for which they are wanted. The new Battalions of Sepoys now find great difficulty in getting recruits, as no bounty is given to encourage men to enter into the Service. It is alſo to be conſidered, that as theſe battalions take a great part of the duties of the Garriſon, drilling muſt go on very ſlowly, and it muſt be long before they can be made ſo fit for ſervice as to be depended on in any buſineſs of importance. However, I would recommend the uſing every means to get them completed as faſt as poſſible; and that no time ſhould be loſt in applying to the Supreme Council for aſſiſtance to guard againſt whatever may happen, and to protect thoſe other Territories promiſed to be ceded to us.

I am, &c.

(Signed) *Robert Gordon.*

Ordered, That the Return of *Bombay* Forces, delivered in with the above, be entered after the Conſultation.

It appearing from the foregoing Extract, and other private Advices received from *Bombay*, that the Preſident and Council there had actually ſent a conſiderable Force to the aſſiſtance of *Rogonaut Row*, and had entered into an offenſive Treaty with him to reinſtate him upon the Muſnud at *Poona*, of which they have tranſmitted no authentic intelligence to this Government, by the conveyance that has brought the above news;

Agreed, That the following Letter be written to them in Cypher, and diſpatched in Duplicate; one copy by way of *Benares*, and the other by *Fort Saint George*.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Preſident, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have not been favoured with any Letters from you or your Select Committee, reſpecting the political affairs of your Preſidency, ſince your Letter dated the 31ſt December; nor have we received any authentic Advices of the late occurrences in your parts, but from private Letters and other intelligence, all concurring in the ſame points.

We underſtand that you have entered into an offenſive Treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, and have ſent a conſiderable Force to his aſſiſtance, which has actully taken the field.

This laſt is confirmed by Letters received by the Commander in Chief, with Returns of the Force actually ſent. Embarraſſed and perplexed with theſe reports, the truth of which we cannot doubt, and ignorant of the Force of your Enemies, and of the immediate plan of your operations, we are obliged to remain inactive in circumſtances which may poſſibly require our utmoſt exertion for your ſupport and relief.

In this ſituation your ſilence becomes truly aſtoniſhing; but under the want of preciſe and authentic Information from yourſelves, we are obliged to ſuſpend our final judgment of your proceedings, and in the mean time proteſt againſt all the conſequences of any hoſtile meaſures taken, or offenſive engagements entered into by you without our conſent. We conſider them as directly contradictory to the proviſions made in the Act of Parliament, for uniting the ſeveral Preſidencies under the political ſuperintendance of this Government, and equally contrary to the common principles of prudence and policy; ſince the partial reſolutions and operations of a ſingle Preſidency may eventually involve all the Com-

pany's ſettlements in a general war, without any previous concert, or a general plan for conducting it.

Our Letter of the 3d February laſt contained very explicit orders on theſe heads, and we expect that you will be full and circumſtantial in your anſwer to it, and in explaining the motives for your late conduct.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 63.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 31ſt May 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

RECEIVED the following Letter and Incloſures from the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

In our Addreſs of the 31ſt December laſt, which has been already tranſmitted in triplicate, we acquainted you with every thing needful from this department, as well with regard to the attack of *Salſette*, as to the negociation depending with *Ragoba*, the rightful ſupreme Governor of the Maratta Empire. We have been ſince favoured with your Letter in your ſecret departments of the 16th of January, to which our above-mentioned Addreſs, we flatter ourſelves, will be conſidered by you as a full and ſatisfactory reply.

Shortly after the date of that Addreſs, *Ragoba* with his army arrived at *Bradera*, not very far from *Surat*; the negociation with him was continued through the Chief of *Surat*, in the manner he before acquainted you that we propoſed doing, and at length was brought ſo near to a concluſion, that we had tranſmitted from hence a Treaty on the terms we propoſed, and had every reaſon to believe that it would be directly executed; jewels to the amount of ſix lacks of rupees were depoſited by *Ragoba*, and the neceſſary ſunnuds were delivered for the ſeveral diſtricts and territories the Company were to be entitled to in virtue of the Treaty, and of the aſſiſtance that agreeable to the Treaty we were to afford him.

Our Forces accordingly proceeded from hence to *Surat*, that they might be ready to proceed from thence to join his army as ſoon as the Treaty was actually concluded, and we had great reaſon to hope that the war between *Ragoba* and the Miniſterial Party, through the aſſiſtance of the Company's Forces, would ſpeedily have been brought to an happy and glorious iſſue, by which, when accompliſhed, the Company will become quiet poſſeſſors of ſundry diſtricts and pergunnahs, whoſe annual revenue will amount to near 20 lacks of rupees, and by which we hope this Preſidency may be enabled to maintain itſelf, and relieve you from the burthen of ſending us large annual ſupplies; and to add to our ſatisfaction about this time, ſome material advantages were gained by *Ragoba* over the Enemy's army.

This pleaſing proſpect was however for a ſhort time clouded; the Miniſterial Party, poſſibly learning that *Ragoba* was on the eve of concluding a Treaty with the Company, that would moſt probably overſet their ambitious hopes of ſubduing him, corrupted, as it is ſuppoſed, a part of his forces, moſtly Arabs, on whom he placed conſiderable reliance, and where he himſelf was poſted; they then attacked that quarter with the ſtrength of their army. *Ragoba* ſeeing in the midſt of the battle that the Arabs neglected to do their duty, and then not knowing how far the treachery had ſpread, or whom in this emergency to truſt, precipitately fled from the field, with about one thouſand horſe only, towards *Cambay*.

The Nabob of this place ſeeing his ſituation, and dreading the power of his enemies, refuſed to admit him, he then made the beſt of his way towards *Dowmagur*, where he luckily met with one of our gallivats, embarked on board her, and on the 23d ultimo arrived at *Surat*, where the Chief received and entertained him as a friend and ally to the Company.

Notwithſtanding this alarming ſtep, it ſhortly appeared to us, (*Mr.* Draper *excepted, who has given his reaſons in writing for differing with us in this Opinion, as per Copy incloſed*) that *Ragoba*'s affairs were not nearly in the deſperate ſituation there was at firſt reaſon to fear. Two principal Chiefs, *Couderow* and *Govind Row*, with many of his great Officers, remain firm to his intereſt, and have collected an army to the number of 25,000 men, moſtly horſe, within 40 coſs of *Cambay*; many others are alſo likely ſoon to join him; we therefore eſteem it our indiſpenſable duty, not to give up the great advantages that were to be reaped by the Company from the Treaty, when ſo fair an opportunity offered of retrieving his affairs, by ſending our Forces to *Cambay* to join his army. *Ragoba* earneſtly preſſed us to this ſtep, and we have little doubt when a junction is once effected, but that ſucceſs will attend their operations. Our Forces proceeded accordingly, and arrived at *Cambay* the 17th inſtant.

We have given Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, the commanding Officer of this detachment, proper inſtructions for his conduct; have enjoined him to obſerve the utmoſt prudence of circumſpection, and never to engage in meaſures beyond his own power to retrieve.

On the 6th inſtant, while *Ragoba* was yet at *Surat*, he executed the Treaty to the Company; the Chief alſo executed one to him, which has been ſince ratified and confirmed by us; an atteſted Copy of which we tranſmit your Honour, &c. incloſed, for your full information, and we hope it will meet with your entire approbation.

From the want of a ſufficient Military Force, we were under a neceſſity of ſtipulating, that a leſs number ſhould at firſt proceed than was originally intended, as your Honour, &c. will obſerve by the Treaty; but the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George* having with great readineſs complied with our requeſt for Troops from thence, and two companies of European infantry being actually arrived here, and a battalion of their Sepoys ſhortly expected; we therefore reſolved to complete the detachment of two thouſand five hundred men, the number firſt propoſed; and the remainder accordingly now proceeds to *Surat*, from whence they will embark for *Cambay* to join the former detachment. And as the different perſons that form the Miniſterial Party are reported to be very much divided amongſt themſelves, and that *Madjee Sindy* has actually deſerted their cauſe, and others it is expected will very ſhortly fall from them, we therefore have reaſon to hope that *Ragoba* may in a ſhort time be able to reduce them all to their due obedience to him.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 31ſt March 1775.

(Signed) *William Hornby*, Preſident, &c. Council.

L. S. The Seal of the Company.

Articles of Agreement and Treaty between the Honourable *William Hornby* Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Bombay*, and of all its Dependencies, on the part and behalf of the Honourable United Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, on the one part, and *Ragonath Row Ballajee*, Peſhwa, on the other part. Dated the 6th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1775, on the third day of the month Moherum, and year 1189, Ijay, Mahometan ſtyle, on the day of the month and year 1180, Gentoo ſtyle.

APPENDIX. No. 68.

Article 1ſt. The Treaty concluded between the Government of *Bombay* and *Badjerow Pundit Pardans*, or firſt miniſter of his Serene Highneſs the *Sou Raja*, dated July 1739 or 1140 of the Mahometan ſtyle, and that concluded on the part of this Government with *Ballajee Budjerow Pardan*, dated the 12th October 1756, or of the Mahometan ſtyle 17th of Moherum 1170, are hereby ratified and confirmed in their full extent, according to the true and full intent and meaning of them, in the ſame full and ample manner, and in the ſame light in which they have hitherto been ever underſtood.

Art. 2d. All other Governments ſubſiſting between this Government of *Bombay* and that of the Marattas, are hereby ratified and confirmed, and after the re-eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba* in the government of the Maratta dominions, peace and tranquillity ſhall ſubſiſt uninterrupted between this Government, in behalf of the Honourable Company and the Maratta Government.

Art. 3d. *Ragoba* on his part, and on the part of the Maratta Government, engages from this day forward never on any pretence, or in any manner, to aſſiſt the Enemies of the Honourable Company in any part whatever of their dominions in *India*; and the Honourable the Governor and Council of *Bombay* do in the like manner engage never to aſſiſt the Enemies of *Ragoba*.

Art. 4th. The Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, in behalf of the Honourable Company, and in conſideration of the under-mentioned grants and ceſſions made by *Ragoba* to the Company, do hereby engage and agree, as ſoon as poſſible after theſe Articles of Agreement and Treaty are fully ratified, executed, and confirmed on the part of *Ragoba*, to aſſiſt him with a ſtrong body of Forces, with proper guns and warlike ſtores, as a field train of artillery, which are to join his army, and act in conjunction with his Forces againſt his Enemies, the Miniſterial Party: in the ſaid Forces ſhall be included, no leſs than 700 Europeans, and the whole ſhall not be leſs in number than 2,500 men, but at preſent only 500 Europeans, and one thouſand Sepoys and Laſcars, with a proper and effectual number of guns, will be ſent, and the reſt if wanted afterwards.

Art. 5th. In conſideration of ſuch effectual aſſiſtance on the part of the Honourable Company, *Ragoba*, as Peſhwa and as ſupreme Governor of the whole Maratta Empire, doth hereby engage on his part to cede and make over to the Honourable Company for ever the under-mentioned places and territories, and he doth accordingly by theſe preſents make over the ſame to them in the moſt full and ample and effectual manner, and he doth with theſe preſents deliver the neceſſary ſunnuds; granting, in the fulleſt manner, all the preſent and future full right and title of the Maratta Government to them; and in caſe of the loſs at any time of the ſunnuds now delivered, theſe preſents are at all times to be conſidered as ſuch, and of full equal validity as any ſunnud whatever.

Baſſein, and the whole of its dependencies, in its fulleſt extent, and all Rents and Revenues thereunto belonging, together with the Fort or Forts, and every thing belonging unto the *Poona* Government in it.

Salſette, the whole and entire Iſland, with all the Revenues of the different places annexed to it, as collected by *Anunt Row* and *Ramajee Punt*.

Jambooſeer and *Orpad*, with the whole of their dependencies, in their full extent, together with every thing belonging to the *Poona* Government in thoſe *Pergunnahs*.

The four following Iſlands adjacent to *Bombay*, with every thing belonging to the *Poona* Government therein, viz. *Caranje*, *Canary*, *Elephanta*, and *Hog Iſland*.

Art. 6th. *Ragoba* alſo engages immediately to procure from the Guicawar, a grant to the Honourable Company for ever, with all the neceſſary ſunnuds, of their ſhare in the Revenues collected by the Guicawar in the town and pergunnahs of *Broach*.

Art. 7th. The Honourable Company to be conſidered as the ſole lords and proprietors, from the day of the ſigning of this Treaty, of all and every of the places ceded by the two laſt articles, in the like manner, as the *Poona* Government, or the *Guicawar* Government were before conſidered; and are accordingly, from this day forward, to exerciſe every right and authority in theſe places, and to receive every Revenue which the *Poona* Government, or the *Guicawar* before exerciſed or received.

Art. 8th. *Ragoba* alſo engages faithfully to make good to the Company for ever, the ſum of Seventy-five thouſand Rupees annually, from his ſhare of the revenues of *Jalaſies*; which ſum is to be paid by his Pundit, in two different payments at ſtated periods.

Art. 9th. *Ragoba* engages to pay in full for the charges and expences of the body of forces with which he is to be aſſiſted, conſiſting of two thouſand five hundred men, with guns and ammunition, the ſum of One hundred and fifty thouſand Rupees monthly and every month, which the Honourable Governor and Council agree to accept, without further account, and is to commence the day the forces leave *Bombay*; but as the whole number of forces will not at firſt proceed, he is only to pay a proportionable monthly ſum, till the whole force, if neceſſary, may be ſent to join him. He engages to pay this ſtipend monthly; and as ſecurity for the ſame, till his affairs will enable him to furniſh money, which he promiſes to do as ſoon as poſſible, he aſſigns by theſe preſents the revenues of the following places: viz.

Occaſeer, his remaining ſhare, after dedicating what is before by theſe preſents ceded to the Honourable Company.

Athmood and all its diſtricts,
Hanſoot and all its diſtricts,
Verſaut and all its diſtricts.

But it is hereby declared, that the Revenues of theſe places belong to the Honourable Company no longer than till the amount of the monthly ſtipend that may be due for the expences of the Company's forces is fully diſcharged, when all further demands on theſe four places are to be relinquiſhed; and in this light, the Honourable the Governor and Council declare, they accept theſe four Pergunnahs.

Art. 10th. As it has been mutually agreed during the courſe of this negociation, that the ſum of ſix lacks of rupees ſhould be depoſited by *Ragoba*, with the agent of the Honourable Company, to be accounted for at the expiration of the ſervice intended to be performed againſt his enemies the Miniſterial Party; and *Ragoba* finding it at this time totally impoſſible for him to raiſe the ſum to be depoſited, though ſtill equally willing to do it was it in his power, the contracting parties have mutually agreed to ſettle this point as follows; that *Ragoba* ſhall immediately depoſit with the Company's agent at *Surat*, to the full value of ſix lacks of rupees in jewels, to remain in the Honourable Company's poſſeſſion till redeemed, which muſt be done as ſoon as *Ragoba*'s affairs will poſſibly admit: all this *Ragoba* faithfully and firmly engages to perform, and the Honourable Company to accept.

Art. 11th. In caſe of oppoſition from any perſon or perſons whatever, to the Company taking poſſeſſion of all or any of the places hereby firmly and effectually ceded to them, *Ragoba* doth engage to pay the expence that will be incurred by their gaining poſſeſſion, to uſe effectual means to put them in poſſeſſion, as well as to ſecure them for ever in the quiet poſſeſſion of all the revenues and places now ceded to the Honourable Company.

Art. 12th. Should *Ragoba* make peace with his enemies the miniſters, he firmly and faithfully engages, that the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company ſhall be included in it to their ſatisfaction.

13th. *Ragoba* doth alſo engage, never to moleſt the dominions of the Honourable Company in *Bengal*.

He further engages not to make war, or commit any depredations in the *Carnatic*, ſo long as the laſt treaty ſubſiſting between the two Governments is adhered to by the Nabob.

14th.

14th. In caſe it ſhould happen (which God forbid) that any of the Company's Ships or Veſſels, or the Ships, Veſſels, or Boats of any perſon or perſons trading under their protection, ſhould be ſhipwrecked on any part of the Maratta Coaſt, every aſſiſtance ſhall be given by the Government and Inhabitants to ſave as much as poſſible; and the whole that may be ſaved ſhall be returned, all reaſonable expences being paid by the owners.

15th. All the places ceded for ever to the Company by this Treaty are to be conſidered as their ſole right and property from the day this Treaty is ſigned; and this Treaty from that day to be conſidered in full force, juſt as if the expected ſervices were fully accompliſhed, whether *Ragoba* ſhall make peace with his enemies or not.

16th. Immediately after the ratification of the foregoing articles, and after the jewels to the full amount of ſix lacks of rupees are depoſited, and the ſecurity abovemention given for the payment of the monthly expences of the forces ſo long as they continue with *Ragoba*, and till their return, all in the manner above-mentioned, the Governor and Council engage that the Company's forces, agreeable to what is mentioned in the body of this Treaty, ſhall proceed from *Bombay* to join the army of *Ragoba*; and they truſt, by the bleſſing of the Almighty, that they will quickly overcome his enemies, the Miniſterial Party, and eſtabliſh him at *Poona* in the government of the Maratta Empire.

The foregoing Articles having been agreed to by the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, who have empowered me to accept the ſame in their behalf, I do, in confirmation thereof, affix the Seal of the ſaid Honourable Company, and ſign my own name thereto, in *Surat*, the day and year above-written; and I do engage to procure a ratification of this Treaty under the Seal of the Honourable Company, and under the Hands and Seals of the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, within thirty days from this date.

(Signed) *Robert Gambier.*

We the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* aforeſaid, having empowered Mr. *Robert Gambier* to execute a Treaty with *Ragonaut Row Ballajee*, Peſhwa, in our behalf, on account of the Honourable Company, of the foregoing tenor, which he has accordingly done, of the date abovementioned; and the ſame having been ſigned to, ratified and confirmed by *Ragonaut Row Ballajee Row*; and whereas by the laſt article it is covenanted and agreed that a ratification of the ſaid Treaty ſhall be tranſmitted by us under the Seal of the Honourable Company, and under our proper Hands and Seals, within one month from the above date; theſe therefore are to certify, that we hereby ratify and confirm the foregoing Treaty in all and every part: In teſtimony whereof we have cauſed the Seal of the aforeſaid Honourable Company to be hereunto affixed, and do now ſign the ſame with our Hands, and affix our proper Seals thereto this 16th day of March, in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-five.

(Signed) *William Hornby,*
Daniel Draper,
Thomas Moſtyn,
Brice Fletcher,
Willm Taylor.
L. S.

By order of the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council, of his Majeſty's caſtle and iſland of *Bombay*, and of all forts, factories, territories, forces, and affairs of the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company on the weſtern ſide of *India*, and on the Coaſt of *Perſia* and *Arabia*.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *Chas Skipp*,
Secretary.

APPENDIX. No. 68.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I am concerned, that after concurring with you in the whole progreſs of the negociations with *Ragoba*, and likewiſe in every meaſure relative to the intended expedition for the re-eſtabliſhing him in the government at *Poona*, I ſhould think myſelf under the neceſſity of diſſenting to the reſolution you came to the 7th inſtant, for ordering our troops to proceed on the expedition, in conjunction with *Ragoba* as ſoon as he may have ratified the Treaty, and have given us ſufficient ſatisfaction relative to the payment of the monthly allowance, for defraying the charges of the expedition, agreeable to the minutes of that day. As I conceive that in conſequence of *Ragoba* having ſo lately been routed and fled from his army to *Surat*, attended only by an inconſiderable quantity of followers, that there is a great alteration for the worſe in the ſtate of his affairs, to what it was about the middle of laſt month, on our troops leaving *Bombay*, when, according to the Advices we then had, he was at the head of ſo numerous an army as to have lately engaged the miniſterial troops more than once with ſucceſs; whereas from the intelligence in general we have ſince received from *Surat*, *Broach*, and *Cambay*, the forces of which his army was compoſed are ſtill diſperſed at a conſiderable diſtance from *Cambay*; and in my opinion any large number of them re-aſſembling and acting with the neceſſary ſpirit and firmneſs, is become very doubtful, eſpecially as the Company's credit (as to immediately raiſing caſh) as well as his, is now very unfortunately known to be at a low ebb at *Surat*. I cannot therefore but conſider the reſolution your Honour, &c. came to the 7th inſtant, as premature; and of courſe that it would have been more adviſable to have poſtponed it, if neceſſary, about twenty days; as I cannot but think that by ſo doing we might be qualified to come to a proper determination on ſo very weighty an affair, both to the Honourable Company and *Ragoba*, eſpecially for the following reaſons:

1ſt. Becauſe, that by the above time we may reaſonably hope to have a pretty certain account what number of *Ragoba*'s forces may be able and willing to join him, and whether he may have any tolerable proſpect of paying them, ſo long as our troops may be ſuppoſed to act jointly with him,

2dly. That we may likewiſe, by the above time, hope to be at a certainty about the ſquadron with the expected reinforcement of troops from *Madras*, alſo the expected ſupply of money from *Bengal*; the former of which would enable us to determine, whether it would have been beſt that the preſent ſmall body of the Honourable Company's forces, under Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, conſiſting of about 1,500 men, ſhould or ſhould not proceed with *Ragoba* without waiting for the reinforcement, conſidering the difficulty and riſque of their effecting a junction afterwards. And the ſupply of money would enable us to relieve the Company's preſſing neceſſities at *Surat*, without having recourſe to the pledging of *Ragoba's* jewels, or lowering the preſent very diſadvantageous rate of exchange with *Bengal*, and alſo put the demands of our troops on a certainty of being anſwered; without which, I apprehend very ſerious conſequences may enſue.

3dly. That ſhould *Cambay* then on the whole be thought the moſt eligible place for our and *Ragoba's* troops aſſembling at, the ſeaſon might permit of it; and in the ſame time *Ragoba's* friends, wherever ſituated, could have no doubt from the continuance of our forces with him at or near *Surat*, that they were kept in readineſs to proſecute his cauſe, even though it might then be judged moſt adviſable, in order to be joined by the *Madras* troops, to have deferred proceeding with the expedition till after the rains.

4thly. Becauſe I am of opinion, that with *Ragoba's* concurrence at leaſt, the expedition had better be ſo deferred

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deferred than profecuted at this juncture, without a very reafonable profpect of their being able to carry him to *Poona* before the rains; and in which cafe the troops might remain at or near *Surat*, thereby affording full protection to that fettlement and *Broach*, and be very ferviceable, I conclude, in recovering the revenues of the diftricts to be ceded to the Company, conformable to the 11th article of the Treaty, particularly thofe on account the monthly allowance; and during the rains, I imagine good offers might be made *Ragoba* and us by the Miniferial Party, for accommodating matters, if he and we fhould think proper to attend to them.

Thefe were the principal reafons of my diffenting to your Honour, &c. above-mentioned refolution; but in cafe *Ragoba* and our troops fhould be enabled to fet out from *Surat* agreeable thereto, which in confequence of *Ragoba*'s late defeat appears to be rather improbable, your Honour, &c. have my beft wifhes that your expectations therein may be fully anfwered; being with refpect,

(Signed)

Bombay, 11th March 1775. *Daniel Draper.*

Ordered, That the Letter agreed upon, to be written in Cypher to the Prefident and Council of *Bombay* at the laft conſultation, be now withheld.

The Governor General begs leave to record the following minute upon the fubject of the above Letter.

The intelligence conveyed in thefe difpatches appears of fo great importance to the general intereſts of the Company, that I think it incumbent on me to offer my particular fentiments previous to the deliberation of the Board upon it.

If the meafures adopted by the Prefidency of *Bombay* had been attended with any deciſive effects, I fhould not have judged it neceſſary for this Board to paſs either cenfure or approbation upon them; but on the contrary, I am forry to declare that I fee a tendency in them to a very extenfive and indefinite fcene of troubles in which this Government, and all the connections of the Company in *India*, may be eventually involved. I think therefore it becomes incumbent on us to interfere in fuch a manner as either to put a total ftop to the operations, or to mark the degree of our acquiefcence in them. I muft plainly declare, that I regard their conduct in this inftance as unfeafonable, impolitic, unjuft, and unauthorized.

It is unfeafonable, becaufe the Treaty was formed with *Ragoba* at a time in which he appears to have been totally abandoned by his former adherents.

It was impolitic, becaufe it threw the whole burthen of the war on the Company, without a force at the command of that Prefidency equal to the undertaking, without money or certain refources; and becaufe it was undertaken without any regard to the general intereft of the other fettlements of the Company in *India*.

It was unjuft, becaufe they had received no injury from any part of the Maratta State which could authorize their interfering in their mutual diffentions, nor were under any actual ties to aſſiſt *Ragoba*; on the contrary, it appears from their Letter of the 31ſt December, that they were in actual treaty with thofe very Powers againſt whom they have fince declared war, and had even laid the foundation of it at the time in which they were making them offers of friendfhip. I quote the words of their letter as a proof of this, "Yet it is "the furtheſt from our wiſhes to occaſion a rupture be- "tween us and the Marattas, by the ſteps we have been "under the neceſſity of purſuing. The Preſident there- "fore, agreeable to our reſolution, will explain to the "Miniſterial Party at *Poona* the real motives of our pro- "ceedings, and they ſhall be aſſured, that in caſe they "gain the advantage in the preſent conteſt, by the "overthrow of *Ragoba*, that we ſhall reſign the iſlands "to them ſo ſoon as they are in a condition to defend "them from the Portugueze, if they cannot be induced "to cede them to us; provided alſo that they will give "a ſuitable equivalent or compenſation for them."—And in the paragraph almoſt immediately following, they ſay, "About four months ago *Ragoba*, by means of an "agent he has reſiding at *Surat*, again made propoſals, "through the Chief of *Surat*, for the aſſiſtance of a "body of forces againſt his enemies, the Miniſterial "Party at *Poona*. As we were of opinion very material "advantages might be derived from it to our Honourable "Employers, by affording them ſome aſſiſtance, we di- "rected the Chief to enter upon the negociation; and "pointed out the terms on which we might be induced "to aſſiſt him with a body of Europeans, Artillery, and "Infantry, and Sepoys, to the amount of about 2,500 "men, which, in conſideration of the advantages the "Company were to reap from the alliance, we judge we "might be able to ſpare for ſome few months on this "ſervice."

Theſe oppoſite negociations, which muſt become public to the whole world, cannot fail to deſtroy that confidence which the powers of *India* have hitherto placed in the honour and good faith of the Britiſh Government in *India*.

It is unauthorized, becauſe it is expreſsly contrary to the Act of Parliament, which declares, it ſhall not be lawful for them "to make any orders for commencing "hoſtilities, or declaring or making war againſt any "Indian Princes or Powers, or for negociating or con- "cluding any treaties of peace or other treaty with "any ſuch Indian Princes or Powers, without the conſent "and approbation of the ſaid Governor General and "Council firſt had and obtained, except in ſuch caſes of "imminent neceſſity as would render it dangerous to "poſtpone ſuch hoſtilities or treaties until the orders "from the Governor General and Council might arrive, "and except in ſuch caſes where the ſaid Preſidents and "Councils reſpectively ſhall have received ſpecial orders "from the ſaid united Company; and any Preſident and "Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Fort William*, who ſhall "offend in any of the caſes aforeſaid, ſhall be liable to "be ſuſpended from his or their office by the ſaid "Governor General and Council."—The exceptions above ſpecified will no wiſe apply to the preſent caſe; they were in no actual danger, nor had they even the plea of a favourable criſis, the advantages of which might be loſt by miſſing the inſtant opportunity to ſeize it. I do not therefore heſitate to pronounce, that they have been guilty of a direct infringement of the Act of Parliament, and the authority of this Government founded upon it.

Having thus declared my opinion on the meaſure itſelf, I am compelled to add my equal diſapprobation of the manner in which they have commenced the proſecution of it, by the removal of their forces to ſo great a diſtance, both from the center of their own poſſeſſions, and from the Capital of the Maratta State, which I conceive ought to have been the immediate and principal object of ſuch an enterprize; they have laid the foundation of an indefinite war, depending on a ſeries of unconcerted operations, each liable to be fruſtrated by a variety of probable accidents, againſt which it does not appear that they have made any proviſion.

On the whole, I offer it as my opinion, that we ought to proteſt againſt the Treaty formed by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, as invalid, and againſt the war, as dangerous, impolitic, and unauthorized.

Although I am thus clear in my opinion of what is paſt, I confeſs I have doubts of the part which this Government ought to take with reſpect to the future. It is impoſſible to conjecture *amidſt ſuch a variety of probable contingencies, and under our total ignorance of their plan of operations*, what turn affairs may have taken, or what may be their actual ſtate at the time our orders may arrive. It is certainly to be wiſhed they could be replaced on the ſame footing on which they were before their engagement with *Ragoba*; but this is now impoſſible, and to withdraw abruptly after having entered into poſitive engagements with our party, and offended the

other perhaps beyond the hopes of reconciliation, may be attended with greater danger than proſecuting the original deſign, and even with national diſhonour? I can therefore only venture to propoſe, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* be peremptorily enjoined to cancel the Treaty with Ragoba, and to withdraw the detachment immediately to their own poſſeſſions, by whatever means may be in their power, unleſs any of the following caſes ſhall have occurred; viz.

1ſt. That they ſhall have obtained any deciſive advantages over the enemy.

2d. That the detachment ſhall have proceeded to ſuch a diſtance, or be in ſuch a ſituation as to make it dangerous either to retreat, or not to go on.

3d. That a negociation ſhall have taken place between *Ragoba* and his opponents, in conſequence of the ſupport afforded by this alliance.

Theſe I conceive to be all the caſes of neceſſity which muſt compel them to preſerve, and which I muſt recommend to be made exceptions to the general order; I can form the idea of many others, but I dare not propoſe them; to multiply exceptions, would tend to fruſtrate our intentions, and I allude to theſe only, to ſhew the unfortunate dilemma to which we are reduced, that we muſt either proceed with danger, or retreat with diſgrace, and have no option but that of the leaſt evil.

The Board concurring in the opinion of the Governor General, excepting the articles of reſervation with reſpect to the recall of the Forces from their expedition to *Cambay*.

The queſtion is put, Whether the recall of the Troops ſhall be ordered without any ſpecific exceptions?

Mr. *Francis*—I agree entirely with the Governor General, in diſapproving the conduct of the Government of *Bombay*, and in proteſting againſt all the conſequences which may attend it. I think that their engaging the Company's Troops in diſtant inland expeditions, eſpecially without any determinate object for their operations, or limitation of time for their ſervice, ought not to receive the leaſt countenance or authority from us; and that we ought to inſiſt upon their recalling the Troops, without any conſideration but that of their ſafe retreat.

Mr. *Barwell*—I think not.

Colonel *Monſon*—I think they ſhould, except of the ſingle conſideration of the ſafety of the Troops.

General *Clavering*—Agrees with Mr. *Francis* in the whole of his opinion above entered.

The Governor General—I think not; I ſhould propoſe the exceptions which are contained in the preceding Minute, which I have laid before the Board.

Agreed, That the Troops be ordered to be recalled without any exception, but the ſingle conſideration of their ſafety.

General *Clavering*—I propoſe that a paragraph be inſerted in a Letter to *Bombay*, to acquaint the Government there, that as we have directed them to quit their engagements with *Ragoba*, and to withdraw their Forces from him into their own garriſons; and as it is not lawful for them either to negociate or conclude any Treaty of Peace, or other Treaty, with any Indian Prince or Power, without the conſent of the Governor General and Council; we will endeavour to open a negociation with the governing Maratta Power at *Poona*, for the re-eſtabliſhment of a peace with that State, upon the moſt advantageous terms we can for the Government of *Bombay*, and the other ſettlements of the Company in *India*. But in caſe we are not able to open ſuch negociation with the Maratta States at *Poona*, that we do empower them to do it, in the firſt place to refer the negociation to us; but if that ſhould not be found practicable, then to conclude a Treaty of Peace with the ruling power of the Maratta State at *Poona*, upon the moſt advantageous terms, having always in view the obtaining the Iſlands of *Salſette*, &c. of which they are in actual poſſeſſion for the Company.

Reſolved, That a negociation be accordingly opened with the Regent at *Poona*, that notice thereof be given to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, with directions to encourage and receive any pacific overtures which may be made them; and hold, as the firſt objects, an immediate ceſſation of arms with the Marattas, and the confirmation of the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* to the Company. APPENDIX No. 68.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written in Cypher, and diſpatched in Triplicate, by different conveyances, to *Bombay*.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Preſident, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We have received yours of the 31ſt of March, with the Copy of your Treaty with *Ragoba* incloſed, and the Advices of your ſubſequent operations.

Our duty impoſes upon us the painful neceſſity of declaring that we totally condemn the meaſures which you have adopted; that we hold the Treaty which you have entered into with *Ragoba* invalid; and the War which you have undertaken againſt the Maratta State impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized, and unjuſt. Both are expreſsly contrary to the late Act of Parliament; you have impoſed on yourſelves the charge of conquering the whole Maratta Empire, for a man who appears incapable of affording you any effectual aſſiſtance in it. The plan which you have formed, inſtead of aiming at a deciſive conqueſt, portends an indefinite ſcene of troubles, without an adequate force, without money or certain reſources to extricate you from them; nor have you the plea either of injury ſuſtained from the party which you have made your enemy, or of any prior obligation to defend the man whoſe cauſe you have eſpouſed.

We ſolemnly proteſt againſt you for all the conſequences, and peremptorily require you to withdraw the Company's Forces to your own garriſons in whatſoever ſtate your affairs may be, unleſs their ſafety may be endangered by an inſtant retreat. We leave the means of effecting this to you, but ſhall expect your punctual compliance with our commands.

You have neither informed us for what purpoſe the detachment was ſent to a diſtance ſo remote from the obvious ſcene of its operations as *Cambay*, nor what plan you have concerted for their ſubſequent progreſs. You have not informed us of the ſituation of the places aſſigned you for payment of the ſubſidy, in whoſe poſſeſſion they were, from whom they were to be either peaceably ſurrendered, or taken by force, nor of the amount of the ceded Iſlands; all which points we conceive to be eſſentially neceſſary for our information.

In the dangerous conſequences which we apprehend from the ſtate in which you had placed the Company's affairs in your quarter, we ſcarce advert to any part of your conduct, which reſpects merely the formal line of your duty; yet, as this Government has been charged by a ſolemn Act of Legiſlature itſelf, with the general intereſts of the Company in India, and armed with a controul over the other Preſidencies, we cannot paſs by without notice the entire diſregard which you appear to have ſhewn to our authority.

For the paſt, we content ourſelves with leaving to you the reſponſibility of your own actions; but for the future, in caſes of the like inattention on your part, after the peremptory injunctions which we may have found it neceſſary to preſcribe for your conduct, we ſhall deem ourſelves accountable if we neglect to exerciſe the powers veſted in us by the Act of Parliament, for the ſupport of the authority committed to us.

In order that nothing may be omitted on our part to extricate you from any difficulties to which your immediately relinquiſhing your engagement with *Ragoba* may expoſe you, it is our intention to open a negociation with

APPENDIX. No. 68.

the ruling party of the Maratta State at *Poona*, as ſoon as poſſible. We ſhall adviſe you of the meaſures we take for this purpoſe; in the mean time, we direct you to receive and encourage any pacific overtures that may be propoſed to you, making the inſtant ceſſation of arms, and a confirmation of your poſſeſſion of the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, your firſt objects; but you are not to aim at more expenſive acquiſitions, or conclude any definitive Treaty without our approbation.

We are, &c. &c.

The Governor General—I muſt inform the Board, that the perſon whom the Miniſterial Party at *Poona* have conſtituted the Peiſhwa or Prime Miniſter of the Maratta State in the place of *Ragoba*, is an infant, and that the man, who I underſtand has the chief conduct of their affairs, is *Suckharam Baboo*.

I would recommend to the Board, that a Letter be addreſſed to this perſon, ſignifying to him the ſentiments and intention of the Board previous to the propoſed negociation; which if agreed to, I move that the following draft be written to him to that effect.

To *Suckharam Baboo*.

Underſtanding that the chief adminiſtration of the Maratta State is in your hands, I have judged it expedient to addreſs you upon the ſubject of the tranſactions which have lately paſſed between your Government and that of the Engliſh Company at *Bombay*. I am informed by Letters from the Governor and Council of that place, that they have entered into an offenſive Alliance with *Ragoba*, and ſent a large military Force to ſupport him in his pretenſions to the Peiſhwaſhip of the Maratta State. As this is contrary to the orders of the Company, which expreſsly enjoin the ſtricteſt forbearance of every act which may lead their ſervants to become the aggreſſors in any wars or diſputes with the powers of India, and to the commands of the King of Great Britain my maſter, by which the other governments and ſettlements of the Company are prohibited from forming Treaties, or engaging in Hoſtilities, without the previous concurrence of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, orders have therefore been ſent from myſelf and the Council aforeſaid, to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, to withdraw the Forces which they have detached to the aſſiſtance of *Ragoba*, and to deſiſt from all further acts of hoſtility with any party of the Maratta Nation, unleſs in caſes in which they ſhall be compelled to it in their own defence; and it is my intention to depute a proper and truſty perſon to *Poona*, which, being the ſeat of the Maratta Empire, is alſo contiguous to *Bombay*, to treat with you concerning the points of difference between the Government of *Poona* and that of *Bombay*, and to eſtabliſh the conditions of a future peace and laſting friendſhip between both.

I ſhall wait for your anſwer to this Letter before I give the Deputy his diſpatches, that I may be firſt aſſured it will be agreeable to you to receive him; and in the mean time I hope you will give orders for the ceſſation of all hoſtilities on your part with the forces of the Engliſh Company, that no impediment may remain to the propoſed pacification.

I have written this ſolely with a view to the reſtoration of peace and friendſhip with your Nation, and the preſervation of good order, and conſiſting in the affairs of the Engliſh Company, which are ſubject to my charge. From the report which has been univerſally made to me of your wiſdom, I have the greateſt reliance on your diſpoſition to ſecond with heartineſs my endeavours, that neither you nor I may be blamed, if the event ſhould not prove anſwerable to them.

Sic Orig.

APPENDIX, No. 69.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt June 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

THE Board taking into conſideration the appointment of a perſon on a deputation to the Maratta Court at *Poona*;

The Governor General recommends Lieutenant Colonel *Dow* for that appointment.

From the novelty and delicacy of this commiſſion, he conceives it to require a perſon of known and uncommon abilities to execute it. The well-known character of Colonel *Dow* will juſtify the choice that he has made of him for this truſt. Added to a good underſtanding, and the advantages of a liberal education, he poſſeſſes a very competent knowledge of the country languages, and an intimate acquaintance with the political intereſt of the Company; and the Government believes that he has reſided ſometime at *Bombay*, which may have afforded him an opportunity of informing himſelf of the particular ſtate, exigencies, and means of that Preſidency.

Mr. *Francis*—I agree with the Governor General in his opinion of Colonel *Dow*'s merit. It was that opinion which induced me to give my hearty concurrence to his late appointment of Commiſſary General, for which I have ſince had the greateſt reaſon to think him particularly qualified. I cannot conſent to remove him ſo ſoon from an office in which he has done, and may do, the Company the moſt eſſential ſervice.

Mr. *Barwell* acquieſces in the Governor General's motion.

Colonel *Monſon*—I agree with the Governor General and Mr. *Francis*, in the acknowledged abilities of Colonel *Dow*; but he is now placed in an office in which he has already acquitted himſelf to my full approbation, and I think the ſuddenly removing him from it, may be attended with ſome prejudice to the Company's affairs in that department, I therefore do not conſent to this appointment on the deputation to *Poona*.

General *Clavering*—The ſingular talents, integrity, aſſiduity, and firmneſs which Lieutenant-Colonel *Dow* has ſhewn ſince his appointment to the office of Commiſſary General, has convinced me that it could not be filled ſo ably by any man in the Company's ſervice. I know that he has ſaved the Company ſeveral lacks of rupees; in doing which he has acquired much ill will from the army. I therefore cannot give my conſent to his removal, as this would in effect be, becauſe during his long abſence it would be impoſſible to ſend a deputy who ſhould poſſeſs all thoſe requiſites for that employment which Colonel *Dow* poſſeſſes. If the Governor General ſhall think a military man of Colonel *Dow*'s rank proper for that employment, I would recommend Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to it, as I believe him very capable and intelligent.

The Governor General—I confeſs that in naming a military man, I was guided by the intimate perſuation, that the choice of the Board would be confined to that line. I think the rank of Colonel *Dow* rather an objection than a recommendation; but I regarded only the other qualifications which I believed him to be poſſeſſed of.

Reſolved, That Lieutenant Colonel *Dow* be not appointed.

Mr. *Francis*—I agree to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*'s appointment.

Mr. *Barwell* acquieſces.

Colonel *Monſon* agrees to the motion.

General

General *Clavering* agrees.

The Governor General alſo aſſents.

Agreed, That Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* be appointed to *Poona*; and that he be allowed 1,000 Rupees per annum, beſides the pay and double batta which will be his due as on ſervice out of the provinces.

Ordered, That the Secretary acquaint Colonel *Upton* of his nomination, and direct him to repair immediately to the preſidency.

The Secretary having prepared the inſtructions for the Deputy to *Poona*, conformably to the Orders of the Board, now produces them; and they are approved in the following words:

Sir,

Having thought it neceſſary to depute you to *Poona*, the capital of the Maratta State, with powers to act on behalf of this Government, in ſettling with the Peiſhwa, or acting Miniſter of that nation, the terms for a reſtoration of peace with the Government of *Bombay*; we direct that you proceed thither with all poſſible diſpatch, and attend to the following inſtructions:

1ſt. On your arrival at *Poona* you will deliver the Credentials herewith given you, unto *Suckharam Baboo*, or the Peiſhwa or acting Miniſter for the time being; and take the firſt opportunity of expreſſing to him the regret of this Government for the hoſtile meaſures which have been adopted by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*; in concurrence with *Ragoba*. You will inform him that we entirely diſapprove of the Treaty they have entered into with him, which was done without any authority from us; that our only deſire is to re-eſtabliſh that peace which has been infringed by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and to live in amity and union with the Maratta Nation.

2. You will uſe all your endeavours to obtain a ceſſion of the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* to the Company, with the other conquered Iſlands, viz. *Caringa*, *Canary*, *Elephanta*, and *Hog* Iſland. You will repreſent the intentions of the Portugueze to have ſeized theſe Iſlands, and that a naval force had actually arrived at *Goa* for this purpoſe; that the Government of *Bombay* poſſeſſed themſelves of them as ſoon as they were informed of this intention, without the leaſt degree of enmity to the Maratta Government, but merely to fruſtrate the deſigns of the Portugueze, which have ſince proved evident in this reſpect, they having formerly proteſted againſt our proceedings, and aſſerted an old claim to the poſſeſſion of the above places. It might be further urged, that the Portugueze will continue to keep a watchful eye upon them, but their Court being at peace with the Engliſh Nation, they would not pretend to ſet on foot any expedition againſt them while they remain in our hands; and if they ſhould be given up again to the Marattas, the Portugueze would not fail to take the firſt occaſion of making an attack upon them, and either overpower the garriſons uſually ſtationed for their defence, or make it neceſſary to maintain in them ſuch a force in conſtant pay, as the revenues could by no means afford to ſupport.

3. If there is any foundation for the intelligence which we have lately received, and which we believe to be authentic, of ſome ſignal advantages which have been gained by *Ragonaut Row* over the Miniſterial Army, we apprehend you may be able to obtain the ceſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, with the other conquered Iſlands, without much difficulty; and in this caſe you may alſo have it in your power probably to gain more ſubſtantial advantages to be yielded to the Company. Your next object therefore muſt be to obtain a formal ſurrender of the moiety held by the Marattas of the revenues of the town and pergunnah of *Broach*. But we muſt leave theſe, or any other parts which you may be able to ſecure for the intereſt and advantage of the Company, to your diſcretion; and you will propoſe them, or not, as you ſee occaſion from the ſpirit of the Court, the event of the operations of *Ragoba*, and the inclination of the Miniſterial Party to a pacification. If any offers ſhall have been made before your arrival by the Miniſterial Party to the Government of *Bombay*, it is unneceſſary to recommend to you to inſiſt on them if they ſhould be for the advantage of the Company.

4. Though we do not mean to inſiſt abſolutely upon all theſe conceſſions, if manifeſt advantages ſhould have been gained againſt the Company's arms, yet we are determined on no account to relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*; therefore ſhould the Peiſhwa hold out againſt yielding them to the Company, you are at no rate to agree to reſtore them, declaring to them, if neceſſary, that the matter having been referred to the Honourable the Court of Directors, it is impoſſible to relinquiſh theſe places without their expreſs permiſſion; and you are to adviſe us immediately of what has paſſed.

Although we have thought it neceſſary to diſapprove the meaſure of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in entering into the Treaty with *Ragoba*, and have ordered them to withdraw their aſſiſtance from him, yet we think it conſiſtent with the honour of the nation, and this government, to endeavour to ſtipulate ſome conditions for him with his adverſaries; what theſe ſhould be, muſt depend on the circumſtances in which you may find him on your arrival; we muſt therefore leave this chiefly to your diſcretion, and only direct in general, that in whatever Treaty you may negociate with the Marattas, you will endeavour to include *Ragoba*, and to obtain ſuch terms for him as in his actual ſituation it may appear to you reaſonable to expect, and which may not fruſtrate the immediate objects of your negociations.

We incloſe the tranſlation of a Letter which the Governor General has lately written to *Suckharam Baboo*, on the ſubject of our intention to depute a perſon to the Maratta Court; alſo, Copy of the Treaty entered into by the Preſidency of *Bombay* with *Ragoba*, as they may ſerve for a guide to you in your negociations.

Ordered, That they be copied fair, and delivered to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* on his arrival.

APPENDIX, No. 70.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 26th June 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Moiſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

READ a Letter from the Preſidency at *Bombay*, as follows:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

In our letter of the 31ſt ultimo we acquainted you of the Treaty that had been entered into with *Ragoba*, of his ſituation, and of the ſteps we had purſued for fulfilling our engagements; at the ſame time we incloſed a Copy of the Treaty for your information: A duplicate of that Letter, of the Copy of the Treaty, and of another paper, then incloſed, accompanies this Addreſs.

We have now the ſatisfaction to acquaint your Honour, &c. that our Forces were joined by *Ragoba*'s Army, in number near 40,000 horſe and foot, at a village about two miles from *Cambay*, on the 19th inſtant, as we are juſt informed by advices from the commanding officer of our forces there. The Miniſterial Army by the ſame account is not more than ſix miles diſtant from the place of their encampment, ſo that we ſhortly expect to hear of a deciſive action, which we think can only be prevented by an accommodation taking place between *Ragoba* and the Miniſterial Party; ſome overtures for which have been made, though we are yet unacquainted with the particulars; but it appears to us, that the heads of that party, divided

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divided as we are assured they are amongst themselves, are endeavouring to make some terms of advantage with their master while they yet have it in their power.

We before advised your Honour, &c. that *Madjee Sindy* had deserted the confederate ministers. We are now assured that he has actually entered into engagements for assisting *Ragoba*, and only waits for the first favourable opportunity to do so. *Tookajee Holcar* it is also asserted will never act against him, and *Futty Sing* it is said is entering into engagements with him.

Thus it should seem from the advices of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, that the grand confederacy will be shortly greatly weakened, if not entirely dissolved. He represents, that nothing is wanting to give life to *Ragoba*'s affairs but money, for which he is it seems in very great distress. Colonel *Keating*, and indeed *Ragoba* himself, have urged us to furnish him with a supply of at least five lacks of rupees; which request has been denied, as out of our power to grant him.

Besides, had it been just at that time in our power to furnish that sum, or any other, yet, whatever sum of money we could have lent, though considerable to the Company, would have gone but a little way with so numerous an army, towards retrieving *Ragoba*'s affairs, and he would probably again have been soon in the same distress. We therefore judged it more prudent, especially as we had entirely complied with the terms of the Treaty on our part, to give an absolute denial, that he might at once endeavour to find a pecuniary supply from some other quarter. From this your Honour, &c. will judge that it is not yet in *Ragoba*'s power to bear any part of the expence of our forces, which by Treaty he has engaged to do. The whole expence of our army therefore at present falls on the Company, which by being in the field is of course very considerable; this circumstance, together with many other urgent calls for money, induces us earnestly to request you will send us a large supply in specie or otherwise, as soon as possible; and we hope, that when the matters at present depending are brought to a successful issue, and the Company in consequence in quiet possession of the factories ceded to them, that we shall be enabled from the revenues to carry on our employers affairs, without being any longer a burthen to your Presidency.—The *Revenge* and *Bombay* Grab, two of our cruizers, fell in with the Maratta Fleet some time ago, in their passage to *Tellicherry*, and were attacked by them; the enemy however presently sought their safety by flight; one of their vessels only escaped, which was drove on shore and totally destroyed; it was the Commodore's vessel, and mounted four-and-forty guns.—We have been favoured with your Letter of the 3d of February, and doubt not but our Address of the 31st December would reach you shortly after, when we hope your Honour, &c. would be convinced that we have done what the Legislature required of us, in giving you every information you could desire. We did not write you at the time that Mr. *Mostyn* was ordered to quit *Poona*, as the notice of your having taken on you the government of *Bengal*, in virtue of the late Act of Parliament, had not then reached us, and when it did, it required some days to compile and digest the detail of the Company's affairs at this Presidency, which you desired, as well as to give you a clear idea of the important matters we had then in hand. At that time the siege of *Tannah* was carrying on, which also occasioned our Advices being retarded for a few days, as we were then in daily and even hourly expectation of being in possession of the fort; and we wished, together with the motives of our proceedings, to be able to advise you of the success that had attended them; but it happened that our operations at *Tannah* were protracted much beyond the time we had reason to suppose. It is not therefore at all extraordinary, that private Advices should be received before our Letter reached you; but your Honour, &c. may depend, that we shall always send you ample and timely, and we hope satisfactory accounts of our proceedings.

We are, &c.

Bombay Castle, 30th April 1775. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

APPENDIX, No. 71.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, the 5th July 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Governor General, President,
Lieutenant *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monson*,
Richard Barwell, } Esquires.
Philip Francis, }

RECEIVED the following Advices from Fort *St. George:*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

A Packet under your address, from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, was yesterday received by the *Success* Grab, and forwarded over land.

Although we doubt not but the Gentlemen of *Bombay* have communicated to your Honour, &c. particular intelligence regarding their operations, yet we have thought it necessary to transmit to you Copy of their Letter to us, and of the papers which accompanied it.

The intelligence mentioned in Mr. *Townsend*'s Letter respecting *Hyder Ally*'s designs against the Raja of *Travencore*, we believe to have but little foundation, as the Raja is expressly included in the Treaty entered into between this Government and *Hyder Ally* in 1769; and we can scarce think that *Hyder Ally* will venture to break the Treaty by attacking the Raja.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Fort *Saint George*, 20 June 1775. *A. Wynch*, &c. Council.

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Esquire, President, &c. &c. at Fort *Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

You are advised from the Board, under the 10th April, of the arrival here of the two Companies of European Infantry that you had sent to our assistance. We are now to acquaint your Honour, &c. that the whole of the Battalion of Sepoys under the command of Captain *Kelly* is also safely arrived, except about an hundred men that are on board the ship *Calcutta*, which has been for some days past expected from the Coast.

The two Companies of European Infantry were sent to join our Forces at present engaged in assisting to re-establish *Ragonaut Row*, the Peishwa, in the supreme government of the Marattas. Our Forces, in conjunction with those of the Peishwa, are in full march from *Cambay*, towards *Poona*. In five successive engagements which they have had with the Ministerial Army, they have always been victorious, and without any loss to our Forces (the advantage has always been obtained by them) except in the last, which happened on the 18th ultimo, when the victory was more complete than in any of the former actions, and the number of the enemy killed, and their horse very considerable indeed. Yet, owing to an accident or mistake, a detachment of our Forces sustained considerable loss, being that wherein the *Madras* Infantry was posted; the loss sustained by your Infantry, was two commissioned Officers, and fourteen non-commissioned Officers and Private Men killed; and one Officer and twenty-eight non-commissioned Officers and Privates wounded: The particulars of this affair are related in a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* to us; an extract of which we now inclose for your information.

We have lately learnt by Advices from the Reſident at *Omore*, that an Embaſſy has been ſent by the Dutch at *Cochin* to the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, at *Seringapatam*; and that there is great reaſon to ſuppoſe that a Treaty has been entered into between them, whereby the Dutch, in conſideration of grants for the purchaſe of Pepper and Sandall Wood, have engaged to aſſiſt the Nabob, by ſea and land, in making a conqueſt of the *Travencore* country. A Copy of the Letter containing this intelligence is incloſed, and ſhould it be anyways uſeful, we ſhall be happy in having communicated it to you.

The incloſed Packet, for the Chief at *Anjengo*, we requeſt you will be pleaſed to forward.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 1ſt June 1775. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *Ja. Capper*, Aſſiſtant Secretary.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Thomas Keating*, Commanding Officer of the Forces with *Ragoba*, to the Select Committe at *Bombay*; dated at *Betaſſe* Camp, 19th May 1775.

As ſoon as the Enemy's guns began firing, I rode to the rear, and found Captain *Meyers* moving agreeable to orders; when near enough, our guns and howitzers fired on their army, and at their cannon, until the former fled, and the latter were ſilenced. Captain *Meyers* and ſeveral other Officers then reported to me, the two guns belonging to the Enemy were but a little way from the right of the diviſion engaged, and the Enemy cutting down hedges to make room to carry them off; on this information I ordered the ſecond company of European Grenadiers from the head of the line of march to join Captain *Meyers*'s diviſion, and directed Captain *Meyers* to endeavour to poſſeſs himſelf of the two guns, ordering him to avail himſelf of the ſtrong Milk Buſh incloſures and wood, and move with the utmoſt regularity to cover them; I remained with the Guns, two 12 Pounders, one 6 and one 8 Inch Howitzer. Soon after the diviſion with Captain *Meyers* quitted their ground, I obſerved them to move much too quick: I called to them to ſlacken their pace, which they then did; but I ſince find they were ſoon after ordered to move on rapidly. However, they got well formed near the guns, when the Enemy charged them from the left with a very large body, which I reached with round and caſe ſhot, and with the muſquetry; they were ſoon repulſed. They charged a ſecond time, and were again repulſed. At this time Captains *Meyers* and *Serte* were killed juſt at the moment a very large body of the Enemy with two war elephants got into a lane immediately in the rear of the diviſion, but declared they were *Ragoba*'s party, and this was affirmed by one of his Officers, named *Hurry Punt*, and was heard by many of our people, and ſome of our Scindian horſe, calling to the enemy to advance, adding, "Now is your time, here are the Engliſh without their "guns." Theſe circumſtances, added to the endeavours of the Horſe and Elephants to break in on the Diviſion, obliged them to face to the right about, and give them a general fire, which totally routed them: Thus were the enemy repulſed in front and rear, with great loſs to them, and very little to us, when the firſt company of European Grenadiers were obſerved by the reſt of the Diviſion to go to the right about, and make a running march or retreat from their ground. This occaſioned the Sepoys and *Madras* Infantry to follow their example, but not further than to join the Grenadiers, though they all retreated very quick. It was ſomething regular till they came to the Milk Buſh hedges in their now run-away front, where the openings were very ſmall; there commenced their deſtruction, every man puſhed where he could, without obſerving the leaſt order, though repeatedly called upon by moſt of their Officers. The Enemy obſerving their confuſion, rode amongſt them ſword in hand, and cut a great number of them to pieces. As ſoon as I obſerved our men in this diſorder, I pointed all our fire to cover their retreat, and went to rally them. The firſt I met were the Grenadiers, as flying before about fifty horſe, cutting them down without oppoſition; with great difficulty I got them to the right about, and ordered them to fire; inſtead of which, they anſwered, "Theſe are our friends," "Your friends!" ſaid I, "ſee them cutting down our "Sepoys under puſhed bayonets." This was the caſe; they were not 15 yards diſtant. The moment I aſſured them it was the Enemy, in place of firing they fled ſhamefully, without firing a ſingle muſket, though our cannon were ſcarce 40 yards diſtant from them; nor did they halt for ſome time. Then it was our artillery made amazing ſlaughter, in a few minutes our caſe ſhot covered the field with their dead bodies. But it is a buſineſs I cannot account for, that in ſpite of every annoyance thoſe people always carry off their dead; on this occaſion they loſt immenſe numbers by their attention to it; not more than nine or ten were left behind.

As far as was in our power we advanced upon the enemy, and totally repulſed them, after the above ſhameful retreat, in which we ſuſtained our whole loſs, which I believe is greater than ever was known in *India* out of the ſame number engaged. Of 15 Officers, 6 were killed, Captains *Meyer* and *Serte*, Lieutenants *Morris*, *Stonny*, *Proſſer*, and *Anderſon*; and five badly wounded, Captain *Frith*, Lieutenants *Dawſon* and *Young*, Enſigns *Denſon* and *Turing*. For the reſt of the killed and wounded, I beg leave to refer your Honour, &c. to the accompanying Return.

After remaining on the field of battle to bury our dead, and procure conveyance for our wounded, we marched for this place, which is one coſs from the banks of the river *Mahé*, where we propoſe marching to-morrow, having perſuaded the Peiſhwa not to remain on this ſide during the rains.

The enemy's loſs muſt be very conſiderable indeed, though the numbers, as yet, are not mentioned from any accounts; in general our intelligence is exceeding bad. Three elephants were left dead on the field, and a great number of horſes. At the firſt tank they watered at, I am told upwards of 500 died of their wounds. Two thouſand good horſe would have made it as complete a victory as ever was made in *India*, but two hundred cannot be procured in this army. Indeed, I impute a great deal of their backward behaviour to their having no pay; and ſcarce proviſion to eat.

A true Extract.

A true Copy of the Extract. *Geo. Skipp*, Secretary.

(Signed) *Ja. Capper*, Aſſiſtant Secretary.

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APPENDIX, No. 72.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 10th July 1775.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. &c. *Fort William* Select Committe.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

IN the laſt addreſs from this department to your Honour, &c. we adviſed you of the junction of our forces with the Peiſhwa Army, and of the then ſituation of affairs. A duplicate thereof is now incloſed.

Since then, nothing very deciſive has taken place. Our Forces, in conjunction with the Peiſhwa or *Ragoba*'s Army, are now on their march from *Cambay* towards *Poona*; and by this time, as we have reaſon to ſuppoſe, are near *Broach*. In five ſucceſſive actions with the Miniſterial Army, they have always been victorious without any loſs to our Forces, except in the laſt, which happened on the 18th ult. when, though the victory was much more

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complete than in any of the former actions, and the number of the enemy killed and wounded were very considerable indeed, with a great number of their horſes; yet, owing to ſome accident or miſtake, a detachment of our Forces ſuſtained conſiderable loſs. The particulars of this affair are related in a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* to us, dated the 19th ult. an extract of which is incloſed for your fuller information. Six commiſſioned Officers were killed, and five wounded on this occaſion, with about ſeventy Europeans killed and wounded, and about the like number of Sepoys.

Incloſed we tranſmit to your Honour, &c. Copy of a letter from our Reſident at *Onore*, containing intelligence of the deſigns of *Hyder Ally* and of the Dutch. We have communicated the ſame to the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, and have directed the Chief of *Anjengo* to apprize the Rajah of *Travencore* of the deſigns againſt him.

Your favour of the 8th March came to hand the 12th ultimo, to which we ſhall fully reply by the firſt direct conveyance; but, agreeable to your requeſt, we incloſe a Return of the Forces of this Preſidency, and a State of its Revenues; in the laſt of which you will obſerve, is not included the revenues of any of the places ceded to us by Treaty, *Salſette* and the other Iſlands only excepted.

We return you thanks for your aſſurances of aſſiſtance. At preſent, the moſt material matter we have to deſire, is a ſupply of money, which we requeſt you will ſend us by bills, or in ſpecie, as ſoon as you may be able; and in the mean time the Chief and Council at *Surat* have orders to draw upon your Honour, &c. for ſuch ſums as they can procure; and they have lately ſucceeded in obtaining about two Lacks of Rupees.

We have judged it neceſſary to appoint Mr. *Moſtyn* to proceed to and to reſide at *Ragoba*'s Durbar, in order, amongſt other matters, to relieve the Commanding Officer from all other duties but the command of the Troops. He will accordingly ſet out for *Surat* very ſhortly; from whence we make no doubt but that he may eaſily join the Army.

As, by the Orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, political matters as well as thoſe relative to military operations, are conducted by the Select Committee, we requeſt that your Honour, &c. in your Advices on thoſe ſubjects, will addreſs your Letters accordingly.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 1ſt June 1775. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Reſolved, That the following Anſwer be written in Cypher, and ſent to *Bombay*.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We are favoured with your Diſpatches of the 1ſt ultimo, which contain among other, ſome Advices of the operations of the Army of *Ragoba*, and of your detachment with him.

We find theſe accounts ſo incomplete and ſo unſatisfactory, that we are ſtill at a loſs to form a true idea of the ſtate of theſe affairs from them. The only part of Colonel *Keating*'s Correſpondence, which you have communicated to us, is a broken Extract from a Letter containing a relation of his tranſactions, beginning in the middle of an engagement, from which we are unable to judge of his intentions before the battle, or of the operations he propoſed in conſequence of it. We only learn, that he was arrived near the River *Mage*, and had perſuaded *Ragoba* to croſs it before the rains; which appears to us rather to controvert your information of his being in full march towards *Poona*. It ſhould rather ſeem, that he means to croſs the river in order to put his army in quarters during the rains. We therefore think it neceſſary to require Copies of your Correſpondence with Colonel *Keating* from the beginning of the campaign, and that you continue to furniſh us with Copies of what may paſs between you in future.

We cannot avoid obſerving, that notwithſtanding our Inſtructions of the 8th of March laſt, and the peremptory ſtyle in which we found it neceſſary to convey them, you have ſtill thought it proper to depute Mr. *Moſtyn* as public Miniſter to *Ragoba*'s Court, without informing us of the deſigns or object of his miſſion, or of the meaſures which you may have taken for a compliance with thoſe Inſtructions, although it appears, that ten days had elapſed from the receipt of them till the date of your Letter now before us; neither have you informed us what Supplies you have received or expect from *Ragoba* for maintaining the burthen of the War you have entered into on his behalf. In a word, we are ſtill as much in the dark as we were on the firſt intelligence of your projected Campaign, notwithſtanding our earneſt intreaties to be furniſhed with every information that could enable us to judge what aſſiſtance our duty might make it incumbent upon us to afford you. We now deſire, in addition to the other lights we have required from you, that you ſend us a Copy of your Inſtructions to Mr. *Moſtyn*; and that you give orders to him to tranſmit to us, by every opportunity, ſucceſſive intelligence of the ſtate of affairs in *Ragoba*'s Army while he continues there, and of all other matters relating to his Negociations, and the ſtate of the preſent War with the Marattas, as far as may fall under his notice.

From what we have ſaid, you will perceive that we can in no ſhape approve of your late Inſtructions: it is painful to us to repeat remonſtrances. We ſhall leave you to anſwer for this conduct to the Court of Directors. In the mean time, left in the uncertainty of which we complain, we cannot think ourſelves juſtified in ſending you the Supplies you require. We remain in hopes, that the Letter you promiſe us in anſwer to ours of the 8th of March, will be more explicit, and both enable us to afford you our aid, and point out the objects which are to be obtained by it.

We have already adviſed you of our intention to open a Negociation with the Ruling Party at *Poona*, for the re-eſtabliſhment of Peace with the Marattas. We alſo addreſſed *Suckeram Baboo* at the ſame time on that ſubject, acquainting him of our deſire to depute a perſon to treat with him there. We have ſince appointed Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to this charge, who is now ready to ſet off, and will wait at *Calpee* on the river *Jumna*, for Paſſports from *Suckeram Baboo*. We incloſe a Copy of ſuch parts of his Inſtructions as we think materially neceſſary for your information.

Fort William, 10th July 1775. We are, &c. &c.

APPENDIX, No. 73.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 10th July 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

GENERAL Clavering lays before the Board the following Propoſal, which was delivered to him for that purpoſe by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Memorandums from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, for the peruſal of General *Clavering*, reſpecting the Embaſſage to *Poona*.

Route Colonel *Upton* prefers, by *Allahabad* to *Calpee*, and there wait Letters from *Poona*, and be ſupplied with the neceſſary Paſſes.

Reaſons

Reaſons for giving the preference to this route.

Paſſage by water to *Calpee*, which will be effected as ſoon as the Nana's Letters can reach that place, and ſooner than any veſſel can get out, conſequently all this time gained ſhould the Embaſſage not proceed; the inconvenience ariſing from this journey to the Company or the Colonel, &c. is very immaterial. The road from *Calpee* to *Poona*, a high road, which the Marattas always take when coming into the upper parts of *Indoſtan*. By Letters ſent to the Nabob *Aſſaph ul Dowlah*, as ſoon or ſoon after the departure of Colonel *Upton*, Paſſes will be eaſily obtained, and meet him at *Allahabad* or *Calpee*, from what few independant Rajas may poſſeſs the country that he has to paſs through. However, the country to be paſſed is almoſt entirely in the poſſeſſion of the Marattas, or influenced by them. To ſtrengthen this opinion, ſuppoſe waiting till the middle of Auguſt to go by ſea, the uncertainty of the paſſage (ſuppoſe) to *Maſulipatam*, the waiting for every thing neceſſary there, and then having to go to *Poona* quite as far by land as from *Calpee to Poona*, through a very bad travelling country, which Colonel *Upton* has in part experienced, as well as the very tedious delays always found there in ſupplying the moſt trifling wants; theſe circumſtances put together, ſhew at one view that the time is quite gained from *Calcutta* to *Calpee*.

The occaſion is too obvious almoſt to obſerve the neceſſity of Letters being diſpatched inſtantly to the Nanah, in which the name of the Miniſter ſhould be mentioned.

Letters to the Nabob *Aſſaph ul Dowlah* ſhould alſo be forwarded directly. Letters to *Cheit Sing*, will procure what elephants and cauſſet camels may be wanted.

The Journey from *Calpee* to *Poona*, is about twenty-five days. Our Ally *Aſſaph ul Dowlah* will ſupply the neceſſary guards till met by the Nanahs.

Agreed, That this plan for the route of Colonel *Upton*, be adopted by him in his journey to *Poona*, but that he be directed to wait at *Calpee*, for Paſſports from the Peiſhwa of the Maratta State.

Agreed, That the Governor General be requeſted to write to *Nudjiff Cawn*, deſiring him to furniſh Colonel *Upton* with Paſſes, and to afford him every neceſſary aſſiſtance in his way to *Calpee*, if he ſhould find it requiſite to apply for them; and alſo to write to *Suckeram Baboo*, for Paſſports through the Marattas Dominions, to be forwarded to meet Colonel *Upton* at *Calpee*.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be alſo written to Mr. *Briſtow*.

To Mr. *John Briſtow*.

Sir,

We have received your two Letters of the 20th and 21ſt June. Having ordered Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to proceed on a deputation to *Poona*, to negociate a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta State at that capital; and as it is thought proper that he ſhould take the route of *Allahabad*, and by *Calpee*, we deſire you will obtain from the Nabob the neceſſary Paſſports for his ſafety in travelling through his dominions, together with a guard to conduct him as far as *Calpee*, and to remain with him there until the arrival of Paſſports from the Peiſhwa at *Poona*, at which time we could wiſh that it were at Colonel *Upton*'s direction, either to diſmiſs the guard, or to take it on with him if he ſhould find it neceſſary. You will take care that blanks be left in the Paſſports, for the names of any perſons who may attend Colonel *Upton* in his buſineſs.

Fort William, 10th July 1775. We are, &c.

The following Letter of Diſpatch is ſent with the Inſtructions of the Board to Colonel *Upton*:

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*.

Sir,

The Commander in Chief has communicated to us the route by which you propoſe to perform your journey to *Poona*, and your reaſons for preferring it.

As we approve of your purſuing this route, we have directed Mr. *Briſtow* to procure from the Nabob *Aſſaph ul Dowlah*, Paſſports for you, and a guard to accompany you through his dominions, as far as *Calpee*. *Nudjiff Cawn* has alſo been requeſted to afford his aſſiſtance, if you ſhould find it neceſſary to apply for Paſſes to him; and a Letter has been diſpatched to the Peiſhwa at *Poona*, deſiring him to ſend Paſſports to meet you at *Calpee*, at which place you will wait for them. We wiſh you a ſafe journey; and

Fort William, We are, &c. &c.
10th July 1775.

APPENDIX. No. 73.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 17th July 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Read the following Letter and Incloſures, ſent in by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

To the Honourable Governor General, &c. Council.

Gentlemen,

I was yeſterday honoured with your Letter of the 10th, and am taking every meaſure to haſten my departure, which I imagine may be by the 21ſt, if the Board ſhould find it convenient to give me their ultimate Inſtructions by that time.

I have taken the liberty to incloſe the names of the gentlemen I could wiſh to be permitted to take with me on this Service, and ſhall be happy if they are approved of by the Board, and eſtabliſhed with their fixed ſalaries whilſt employed on this Service.

I have alſo the honour to incloſe memorandums of what guards, eſcorts, camp equipage, boats, &c. &c. appear to me neceſſary, which I hope may meet with your approbation, and order to procure.

I have made a few remarks on my Inſtructions, which you will do me the honor to obſerve upon in my private (or what farther) Inſtructions you may be pleaſed to give.

Fort William, July 14, 1775. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) *J. Upton*.

Remarks ſubmitted to the conſideration of the Honourable the Governor General and Council, by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

1ſt. Farther advantages to be obtained for the Company, &c.—Should this be practicable, of what nature, whether money or territory? If the former, under what head or account? If territory, where?

2d. Stipulation for *Ragoba*.—Is he entitled (or ſhould it be) to poſſeſs country? Should this be guaranteed by the Company? Should he receive any money from the Miniſterial Party, how much ſhould be obtained for him if poſſible, and how ſecured to him?

3d. To endeavour to get the ſurrender of the moiety of the revenues of the town and pergunnah of *Broach*.—It is meant then that *Broach*, with its pergunnah, is (if poſſible) to be entirely the property of the Company, independant of any other power?

4th. What is the name of the preſent Nana, or perſon in chief, ruling the Maratta Empire, and meant to be kept in poſſeſſion thereof?

5th. Upon the Treaty being concluded, are the ſettlements of *Bombay* and *Madras* to be informed thereof by me, and immediately thereupon, or not till after I have heard from the Governor General and Council?

6th.

APPENDIX. No. 73.

6th. Should not I have with me the Seal of the Company? Should it not alſo be affixed to my Inſtructions, as it may have great weight at the Court of *Poona*.

7th. *Suckaram Baboo* has been wrote to twice.—Should not a Letter to him be given to me to uſe in caſe of miſcarriage of theſe Letters, (or as they may tell me, miſlay or loſt) again fully maintaining that he is to treat with me only? Should he have already treated with the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, is he to be adviſed of the neceſſity of a ratification of ſuch Treaty, and this by me, on your parts, or wait till it ſhall be referred to *Bengal*?

8th. Letters to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, (to be made uſe of only on neceſſity); they may alledge, the not fully comprehending their Letters from *Bengal*; that they wait further inſtructions that will determine the buſineſs they may be negociating; in ſhort, they may delay my buſineſs by various pretexts—ſuch Letter will effectually prevent it.

9th. It may be neceſſary to have a letter to the Governor and Council of *Fort St. George* alſo, to make uſe of only upon neceſſity; acquainting them with the nature of my deputation, to prevent my being obſtructed therein, as well as to receive any aſſiſtance from them ſhould it be required.

Gentlemen recommended by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, with their appointments, to the Honourable the Governor General and Council, to proceed with him on his embaſſage to *Poona*.

Captain *Allan Macpherſon*, of the 1ſt Regiment	Interpreter and Perſian Tranſlator.
Lieutenant *James Paterſon* of the 1ſt Regiment.	Secretary.
Sutton Banks, M. D.	Surgeon.
Captain *Benjamin Wroe*, of the 1ſt Regiment	A general charge of all Guards, Camp Equipage, Elephants, Camels, Stores, &c. &c. belonging to the Honourable Company.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 17th July 1775.

Reſolved, That the further Orders and Reſolutions of the Board upon the above, be ſignified to Colonel *Upton* in the following Letters:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

Having conſidered the ſeveral queſtions which you thought it neceſſary, for the elucidation of your inſtructions, to propoſe to us, we ſhall proceed to acquaint you with our reſolutions upon each.

1ſt. The direct purpoſes of your appointment are to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace between the Maratta Government and the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and to obtain a confirmation to that Preſidency of the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* for the Company; theſe points you are to conſider as indiſpenſable.

If, however, from the ſucceſs of *Ragoba*'s Forces againſt the Miniſterial Party, you ſhould find the latter diſpoſed to make further conceſſions for our neutrality, we have mentioned in our former Inſtructions, that a renunciation of the remaining moiety of the revenues of the town and pergunnah of *Broach*, is a point which we wiſh to ſecure; for the reſt, you muſt be guided entirely by your own diſcretion, which will be actuated by the ſtate and objects of the negociation which may have taken place between the Government at *Bombay* and the Miniſtry at *Poona*: but we would not have you prolong the Negociations for a day, in hopes of obtaining any other conditions than thoſe which we have expreſsly mentioned, or required. We cannot point our intentions herein more explicitly, as your conduct muſt depend entirely upon the circumſtances and ſituation of affairs.

2dly. With reſpect to the terms to be obtained from *Ragobá*: this likewiſe is an article on which we cannot give you more particular inſtructions, becauſe, as we have already told you, it muſt reſt wholly upon contingent circumſtances; but whatever may be ſettled for him by the Treaty, if it forms a clauſe in it, it will of courſe be guaranteed to him by the Company.

3dly. The town and pergunnah of *Broach* are already poſſeſſed independant in their government by the Company; our orders were only intended to free the Company from any participation of the revenues of theſe places with the Marattas.

4thly. *Ragonaut Row* is the Peiſhwa or chief ruler of the Maratta State; but he was obliged by the Miniſterial Party at *Poona* to quit that capital, and they have ſince proclaimed in his ſtead the Son of *Narrain Row*, the late Peiſhwa, who is ſtill an infant. We conceive it impoſſible to foreſee what accommodation will take place between the two parties now contending for the Peiſhwaſhip, but it is moſt probable that if the Miniſtry prevail, the elevation of the Son of *Narrain Row* will be confirmed. If the peace is to be effected by a Negociation, the terms of it muſt be left to the parties themſelves, and we ſhall agree to acknowledge whomſoever they ſhall finally reſolve among themſelves to eſtabliſh; but in the preſent ſtate of affairs, as we cannot formally addreſs ourſelves to either of the Competitors, we have referred you to *Suckaram Baboo*, the ruling Miniſter at *Poona*; and in caſe he ſhould not be living at the time of your arrival at *Poona*, you will addreſs yourſelf in like manner to the perſon who may be found in actual poſſeſſion of the chief adminiſtration, delivering to him the Letters addreſſed to *Suckaram Baboo*, together with your Letter of Credence, which will contain full powers for treating with any perſon who ſhall be poſſeſſed of that authority of the ſtate.

5thly. You will adviſe the *Bombay* Preſidency of your arrival at *Poona*, and inform them conſtantly, as well as the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, of all tranſactions which you may think of uſe for them to know.

6thly. We do not think it neceſſary to furniſh you with a Seal. The Company's Seal will be affixed to your Credentials, which will give full and ample validity to any Treaty which you may conclude with the Marattas.

7thly. You have been already directed not to leave *Calpee* till you hear from *Suckaram Baboo*, or obtain Paſſports from him. You will have a Letter for him delivered to you with your Credentials, in which he is informed, that we do not admit the authority of any perſon to conclude a Treaty on behalf of the Company with the Maratta Government but yourſelf; and if any ſhould have taken place with the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, it is to be of no effect until ratified by you.

8thly. The Governor and Council of *Bombay* have already been adviſed of your appointment; a duplicate of that Letter is incloſed, with a further notification of the power veſted in you by the foregoing paragraph. This packet you will ſend to *Bombay* by the firſt ſafe conveyance.

9thly. The *Fort Saint George* Preſidency being informed of your deputation, there can be no neceſſity to furniſh you with any Letter under their addreſs.

We herewith deliver to you a Cypher, which you are to keep in your own poſſeſſion, and make uſe of when you find occaſion in your Advices to us and the other Preſidencies.

Fort William, the 17th July 1775. We are, &c.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

In a ſeparate Letter of this date we have given you our ſentiments of directions upon the particular articles which you referred to our conſideration in your Paper of Remarks. We ſhall now reply to the other Incloſures in your Addreſs of the 14th inſtant.

We approve of your taking with you Captains *Wroe* and *Macpherſon*, Lieutenant *Paterſon*, and Doctor *Banks*: They are to receive the uſual Pay of their reſpective ranks, with full double Batta, as if on command without the Provinces, from the 15th inſtant; that is to ſay, the Military Officers will receive the appointment of their ranks in the Army, and Doctor *Banks* that of a full Surgeon on this eſtabliſhment.

We had previouſly fixed a Salary of 1,000 R^s per Menſem, to be drawn by you, beſides your Pay and double full Batta: Theſe Allowances are to take place from the date of your Inſtructions, that is the 21ſt ultimo.

APPENDIX, No. 74.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 24th July 1775.

AGREED, That the following Letters be conſequently written to *Bombay* and to *Fort Saint George*; and that the former be conveyed by means of Colonel *Upton*.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

In our laſt, of which a Duplicate is incloſed, we informed you of the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, to negociate a Treaty of Peace with the Marattas.

This will be forwarded to you by him; and we think it proper to adviſe you, that in caſe any Treaty may have been formed, or any Conditions ſettled by you with the Miniſterial Party, they muſt be confirmed and ratified by Colonel *Upton*, before we can allow them to be of any effect, as we have given him ample Inſtructions and full Powers to conclude upon ſuch Terms only as he may judge proper.

We have furniſhed him with a Copy of the ſmall Cypher, N° 2, Letter B, framed in March 1755, which we have directed him to make uſe of whenever he may find occaſion for it.

Fort William, 17th July 1775. We are, &c.

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council, at *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

You are already fully apprized of the operations of the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, in conjunction with *Ragoba*, againſt the Miniſterial Party of the Maratta Government at *Poona*. We think it proper however to inform you, that we highly diſapprove of the conduct of that Preſidency in having entered into an offenſive alliance with *Ragoba*, not only as we deemed it repugnant to the intention of the Legiſlature of *Great Britain*, and to the poſitive injunctions of the Company, which recommend a profound Peace with all the Powers of *Hindoſtan*; but alſo becauſe, by the Treaty entered into, they engaged to aſſiſt a Man who had not the means even to ſupport his own Army in an extenſive conqueſt, which muſt naturally lead to an indefinite War, and perhaps to the diſgrace of the Engliſh Arms, beſides throwing the burthen of it upon them. We therefore directed them immediately to withdraw the Company's Troops into their own Garriſons, and to receive any overtures which might be made for a pacification or ceſſation of arms; but to ſuſpend any concluſions upon them until further orders.

That nothing may be wanting on our part to extricate the Preſidency of *Bombay* from the difficulties in which they were likely to be involved, and to reſtore a Peace between the Company and the Maratta Government, we have deputed Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to proceed to *Poona* to conclude a Treaty of Peace with that State, and have furniſhed him with full Powers and Inſtructions for this purpoſe. The Peiſhwa has been adviſed of this Deputation, and deſired to forward Paſſports for Colonel *Upton* to meet him at *Calpee*.

Colonel *Upton* has received orders to communicate to you any tranſactions which he may think material enough to deſerve your notice.

Fort William, the 17th July 1775. We are, &c.

Reſolved, That the following Letter of Credence be written in Perſian, and delivered under the Company's Seal to Colonel *Upton*.

Whereas troubles have ariſen, and hoſtilities actually taken place between the Government of *Bombay* and the Maratta State at *Poona*, which is repugnant to the commands of the Company, and to the wiſhes which they have conſtantly manifeſted to maintain a perpetual Peace and Amity with that Nation; We the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in virtue of the Powers veſted in us by the Legiſlature of Great Britain, and by the ſaid Company, to direct and controul the Company's Settlements in *India*, relying on your fidelity, prudence, and integrity, have deputed you to proceed to *Poona*, and to negociate and conclude with the Chiefs and Rulers of that State, a Treaty of Peace and Friendſhip between them and the Engliſh Company, on ſuch Terms as ſhall be for the mutual benefit, honour, and ſatisfaction of both parties, and remove all the cauſe of enmity which at this time may have taken place between the Marattas and the Government of *Bombay*: And we hereby give you full powers to that effect, declaring that we will ratify and confirm whatever ſhall be ſo concluded by you, in our names, and in our behalf, according to the Inſtructions with which we have furniſhed you for that purpoſe.

Given in *Fort William*, this

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 24th July 1775.

Colonel *Upton*'s Embaſſy to *Poona* affording a favourable opportunity to ſurvey the Peninſula of *India*, and likewiſe to aſcertain the true diſtance of places through which he will paſs, Colonel *Monſon* propoſes, that the Reverend Mr. *Smith* be appointed to attend Colonel *Upton* for this purpoſe—To which the Board agree, and allow Mr. *Smith* to draw the Pay and Allowances of a Captain of Engineers, employed on a ſimilar ſurveying ſervice.

APPENDIX, No. 75.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 24th July 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

READ the following Paper of Intelligence, received by the Governor General, and extracted from his Book of News.

Intelligence from the *Decan*, dated the 27th of Rubbee Aſſanie, or June.

We hear that *Ragonaut Row* with the Engliſh Army having croſſed the *Nurbudder* in the neighbourhood of

APPENDIX. No. 75.

Broche, began his march towards *Surat*. *Hurrajee Purkeah* determined likewiſe to croſs the *Nurbudder* with his Army, and had ſent over his Baggage and Military Stores, there being a ſpace of 10 coſs between him and the Army of *Ragonaut Row*.

In the mean time the Engliſh having embarked in boats, ſuddenly appeared, and falling on the Baggage of *Harrajee Purkeah*, plundered it. They ſlew great numbers of his men, and very many were drowned in the river; *Hurrajee* fled, and took the road to *Gozeraut*; *Focajee*, who had not ſent his Baggage or Stores acroſs the river, returned with them in ſafety, in company with *Hurrajee*.

Ragonaut Row is encamped on the Banks of the *Nurbudder*, and deſigns to purſue his route to the *Decan* during the continuance of the rains.

Suckaram Baboo is very ill, occaſioned by grief for the death of his ſon.

The people of the *Decan* are in the utmoſt conſternation.

Nizam Ally Khan and *Moodajee Booſla* with one conſent have entered into a league with *Ragonaut Row*.

The rains are ſet in very heavily in the *Decan*.

We are in a ſtate of uncertainty as to who is to be ruler of the *Decan*.

It being beyond the reach of conjecture what face the War with the Marattas may bear at the period of Colonel *Upton*'s arrival at *Poona*; and the Governor General conſidering the probability of *Ragoba*'s complete ſucceſs, recommends to the Board that Colonel *Upton* be inſtructed in ſuch caſe to treat with him.

Agreed, That the following directions be given to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* on this head; and that a Letter of Introduction, and implying the Powers veſted in him to treat and conclude a Treaty in behalf of the Company with *Ragoba*, be alſo addreſſed to that Prince, and given in charge to the Colonel.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

It being uncertain how the iſſue of the War now depending between *Ragoba* and the Miniſterial Party may turn out at the time of your arrival at *Poona*, and as it is poſſible that *Ragoba* may have made himſelf maſter of that place, we hereby authorize you in ſuch caſe, or if you ſhall find ſo great a ſuperiority on his ſide as to give you reaſon to expect that the operations will be entirely deciſive in his favour, to negociate and conclude a Treaty with him, inſtead of the preſent Miniſtry; and for this purpoſe, a Letter will be delivered you, addreſſed to *Ragoba*; and as you are furniſhed with a Copy of his Treaty with the *Bombay* Preſidency, by the aſſiſtance of this and your former Inſtructions, you will be able to ſettle it upon ſuch Terms as you may conceive will beſt anſwer our ideas.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
24th July 1775.

To *Ragonaut Row*, ſent by Colonel *Upton*, written the 31ſt July 1775.

It is with great concern that we have heard of the late diſtractions of the Maratta State; but as it has pleaſed God to crown your arms with ſucceſs, we are in hopes that an end will be ſoon put to them. The Preſident and Council of the Company's Settlement at *Bombay* duly informed us of the Treaty of Alliance which they concluded with you and of the effectual aſſiſtance which they afforded to your cauſe. That Service being now performed, we are deſirous of reverting to that ſyſtem of Peace and Tranquillity, which beſt ſuits the commercial views of the Company. For that reaſon, in virtue of the Powers veſted in us by the Legiſlature of Great Britain and the Company, to ſuperintend and controul all the political affairs in *India*, we have deputed Lieutenant Colonel John *Upton* to conclude a new Treaty of Peace and perpetual Friendſhip between the Company and the Maratta Nation. He will apply to you as the ruler of that State, and you will liſten to his Propoſals as if coming from us; and we have no doubt but you will find his Terms moderate and juſt, as we have determined to remove every object of ambition, and to adhere only to ſuch as are neceſſary for the ſecurity and peace of the Company's poſſeſſions.

To *Suckaram Baboo*. Written the 31ſt July 1775.

I have already written you concerning the appointing of Colonel *Upton* to negociate a Treaty of Peace between the Company and the Maratta Nation. He now proceeds to *Poona* with full Powers for that purpoſe; and I requeſt you will cheerfully receive him; and whatever Treaty you may ſettle with the Colonel, will be agreed to by this Government. No perſon but the Colonel is empowered to that purpoſe.

APPENDIX, No. 76.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 10th Auguſt 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires

THE Secretary informs the Board, that the following Letters have been received ſince their laſt meeting, and ſent in circulation; one from the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Our Letter of the 1ſt inſtant (which had been forwarded in Duplicate) acknowledged the receipt of your favour, dated the 8th of March.

In that Letter we communicated to you the progreſs of our Army under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*; we have not ſince received any further Advices from him, nor have we received any Letters from you ſince our laſt; this therefore is chiefly to reply to your Letter of the 8th of March, agreeable to what we promiſed in our Addreſs of the 1ſt inſtant.

We truſt, that the reaſons which have been aſſigned in our Letter of the 30th of April, for not ſending more early intelligence of our deſigns and operations againſt *Salſette*, will prove ſufficiently ſatisfactory, more eſpecially when you conſider that it was, as we well knew, from the diſtracted ſtate of the Maratta Government, totally out of its power to diſturb the tranquillity of the Company's poſſeſſions in *Bengal*, or thoſe of their Allies, on account of our proceedings on this ſide of *India*; and ſo the event has fully proved; and provided our operations in ſupport of *Ragoba* are crowned with that ſucceſs which we hope they will, the Treaty we have entered into fully binds *Ragoba* and his ſucceſſors from ever taking part againſt the Company; and indeed we doubt not but that gratitude will induce him always to be ready to act in their behalf.

Your Honour, &c. obſerve, "That you are alarmed "at the declaration of our intentions of joining *Ragoba*; "which, you add, you muſt diſapprove, as inconſiſtent "with our Negociations with the Ruling Powers at *Poona*; "and that it is a meaſure which may force you into a "rupture with *Sabajee Bouncello*, his declared enemy and "your neighbour, with whom you are on terms of "friendſhip."

We never had any Negociations with the Miniſterial Party, who we ſuppoſe you mean by the Ruling Powers; we only acquainted you on this head, long before we concluded the Treaty with *Ragoba*, and at a time that there was little probability that it ever would be concluded, that in caſe they gained the advantage in the

preſent

preſent conteſt, that we ſhould endeavour to reconcile them, by explaining our motives for attacking *Salſette*. The concluſion of the Treaty, and the part we in conſequence took againſt them, rendered any explanation or negociation on this account quite unneceſſary, and therefore all thoughts of a negociation with them, independant of *Ragoba*, had been long dropped; and though *Ragoba*'s affairs have wore but an unfavourable aſpect, yet we make no doubt but a ſteady perſeverance and proper conduct will enable him, with our aſſiſtance, to overcome his enemies, or elſe to accommodate matters favourably with them; which in the end muſt enſure to the Company on a ſtable footing, the great advantages granted to them by the Treaty, a Copy of which has been long ſince tranſmitted to you.

When your Honour, &c. take this ſubject under your conſideration, we requeſt that you will particularly attend to the following circumſtances:

Firſt. That the part we have taken, is in the ſupport of the rightful ſupreme Governor of the Marattas, and who had been in poſſeſſion of that dignity; and that the Miniſterial Party are his ſubjects, who have rebelled againſt him, and moſt unjuſtly are endeavouring to diſpoſſeſs him of his ſeat.

2dly. That by acting in the manner we have done, we have ſecured to the Company, by the moſt effectual grants (which *Ragoba* was the only perſon who had any right to give) the right of poſſeſſing thoſe places, ſuch as *Salſette*, *Baſſein*, &c. which they have repeatedly and earneſtly enjoined us to procure for them; and even more, which is ſtill further for their benefit, the expences that will be incurred during this War, are to be amply repaid to them, and in the end we doubt not but that ſuch a currency will be given to the affairs of the Company in theſe parts, and to trade in general, as will be attended with ſingular benefit to them, and to individuals trading under their protection; in this light we flatter ourſelves you will view our proceedings when the whole comes before you.

We were and are convinced, that your Honour, &c. may be perfectly free from any apprehenſions of being forced into a Rupture with the *Bruncello*'s on account of our Proceedings, even had *Subajee* been yet alive; for, from the death of *Janojee Boncello*, which happened about three years ago, till *Subajee* was killed, as he lately was by *Moodajee*, that government, commonly known to us by the name of the *Berar* Government, was torn in pieces by the civil diſſentions between *Subajee* and *Moodajee*; but ſince the death of the former it has been reſtored to quiet; and as *Moodajee* (who now governs for his Son that was adopted by the late *Janojee*) is a known friend to *Ragoba*, he will conſequently be rejoiced at the part we have taken, inſtead of being diſguſted at it.

Thus we hope that we have removed your Honour, &c. objections to our entering into the Treaty with *Ragoba*, and that you will concur with us in opinion, that we were and are purſuing the true intereſt of our Employers; for had we not laid hold of the preſent opportunity, which was ſo very favourable, to procure grants of the places that they wiſhed to poſſeſs, it is more than probable that another ſuch would never again have offered.

We beg leave here to remark, that as your Honour, &c. are ſituated ſo very diſtant from this Preſidency, it would be totally impoſſible for us to benefit by circumſtances as they fall out, provided we always wait for your directions: We need produce no other inſtance than the Letter before us, which is dated the 8th March, not being received here till the 21ſt ultimo, and is an anſwer to our Advices of the 31ſt December laſt. Had we waited for your reply to thoſe Advices, *Ragoba* would have been entirely loſt, and the advantages the Company gain by the Treaty gone, moſt probably for ever. The Legiſlature indeed has provided againſt this great inconvenience in the late Act of Parliament, which we make no doubt but you will always conſider; and we aſſure you, that we ſhall take no material ſtep in any political matters without your concurrence, unleſs when it may be dangerous to poſtpone for ſo long a time coming to a determination thereon.

In the preceding part of this Letter, we acquainted you that we had no Advices from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* ſince the date of thoſe noticed in our laſt Addreſs; but private Letters from the Chief of *Surat*, mention that the Army is arrived in the neighbourhood of *Broach*, in its march towards *Poona*; that our Forces have had another engagement with the Miniſterial Army, in which the latter were again worſted; and that the affairs of the confederacy, owing to their want of money and to diſſentions amongſt themſelves, are in a very declining way.

The Marattas lately made an attempt on *Salſette*, by landing about 3,500 Men from *Baſſein*, but they were quickly drove off by a detachment only from the Madras Battalion of Sepoys, with very conſiderable loſs on their ſide, while on ours we had only one Sepoy killed, and two or three wounded.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 24th June 1775. (Signed) *William Hornby*, Preſident, &c. Council.

From *Madajee Booſlah*; received 20 July 1775.

The animoſity and contention which have for theſe three years prevailed in this family, ſince the death of the Rajah of bleſſed memory (*Janojee Booſlah*) the deſtructive flames of which have ſpread from the river the *Kiſtnah* to the *Nurbudda*, are well known, and no doubt have been written to you by the News-writers. After repeated ſtruggles, the hoſtile ranks were at length drawn up in array of battle, on the Plain of *Naugpore*, againſt my younger brother, *Sabajee Booſlah*; when, notwithſtanding the few adherents of my party, and the very inconſiderable number of my Troops, oppoſed to upwards of 20,000 of his, beſides artillery, rocket men, and others, all well armed and accoutred, I obtained a complete and deciſive victory; of this I ſome time ago did myſelf the pleaſure to acquaint you in my anſwer to your Letter After a ſhower of Arrows and Rockets from the lines of the combatants, whoſe lightnings darted through clouds of armour, dealing deſtruction and death around, 5,000 brave fellows were laid dead in the field, and as many wounded; the remainder, actuated with ambition and glory, cloſed in with their elephants, and after ſome time trying the metal of their weapons, victory perched upon my banners, and the tree of enmity was overſet in the ſtorm. This is all evidently owing to the interpoſition of Providence; in gratitude for which I offered up my prayers, and have ſince employed myſelf in regulating the affairs of the country, in conſoling and gaining the hearts of my friends, and rewarding the meritorious and loyal; and alſo intend ſhortly marching with my Army to *Berar*, having appointed *Babojee Anunt* to the Soubadary of *Cuttack*; he has ſent his Son thither with a proper Force, who, on his arrival, will undoubtedly write you, and tranſmit you this Letter. Our friendſhip will now be more firmly eſtabliſhed than ever: And, as it is my deſire to maintain and preſerve every Treaty and Engagement inviolate; ſo I hope you have the ſame deſire on your part, as it will be attended with innumerable advantages to both. After the arrival of *Beney Ram Pundit*, I ſhall write you further particulars.

From *Madajee Booſla*; received the 22d July 1775.

Your Letter, under date the 24th of Salfor, I had the pleaſure to receive at my encampment at *Ellichpore* in the Soubah of *Berar*. Your friendly diſpoſition to maintain and preſerve inviolate the friendſhip and engagements you had entered into with the deceaſed Rajah *Janojee Booſlah*; the joy you expreſſed at the victory which I have by the favour of the Almighty obtained; your wiſh to unite the intereſt and affairs of the Company with thoſe who are endowed with the virtues of ſteadineſs and bravery, and diſtinguiſhed with the favour of the Almighty;

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Almighty; and your referring me for the particulars of all theſe matters to *Benaram Pundit*, have given me infinite joy and ſatisfaction. The ſituation of affairs here is this: Soon after the victory which I obtained in the late engagement with my younger brother, and before my troops had recovered of the wounds which they had received, I had a congreſs with the Nabob *Nizam*, who, at the requiſition of the Miniſters at *Poona*, arrived at *Berhanpore* in the Zelah of *Berrar*, to take a part in the War with *Ragonaut Row*; and although poſſeſſed of no friendly diſpoſition towards me, yet, as he had long been on terms of friendſhip with, and done many acts of favour to, my family, I deemed it inconſiſtent with gratitude to commence any difference with him, and therefore remained pacifically inclined. The confuſed ſtate of affairs in the *Decan*, and the open hoſtilities which have ſome time ſubſiſted between *Ragonaut Row* and the Miniſters at *Poonah*, are now the ſubject of diſcuſſion; and whatever we determine on, I ſhall write for your information, and in the ſpace of a week break up the congreſs. As uniting the ambitious in bonds of cordiality and friendſhip, is not leſs neceſſary for eſtabliſhing the peace and proſperity of the country, than for retrieving affairs which have already ſunk to the brink of ruin; whatever may be the reſult of our deliberations to that end, you will not only be acquainted with from me, but from the Letters of the *Nizam*.—*Beneram Pundit* is not yet arrived; I am hourly expecting him; and as ſoon as I have learnt from him the ſtate of affairs with you, I will again give him his diſpatches. I hope that you will continually keep our friendſhip in view, which will be the means of ſtrengthening and confirming it.

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 10th Auguſt 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Sir, and Gentlemen,

I HAVE the honour to incloſe you a Letter from the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, at the requeſt of his Highneſs; and that of being with great eſteem,

(Signed) *Edwd Hughes.*

From the Nabob of *Arcot*: received 6th Auguſt 1775.

I have from the firſt relied on your friendſhip for the ſucceſs of my affairs, and eſpecially ſince more extenſive powers have been granted you. I have had the moſt ſanguine hopes that every thing would ſucceed to my wiſh. Since the Governor and Council of *Bombay* have eſpouſed the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row*, and aſſiſted him in the War againſt the Miniſters of *Poona*, thoſe Miniſters have repeatedly inſinuated to my Vackeel *Rowjee*, whom I have ſtationed at *Poona*, and have alſo directed him to write me, that I had long made declarations to them concerning my own friendſhip and that of the Engliſh; but that the ſteps lately taken by the Settlement of *Bombay* was in direct contradiction thereto; that I ſhould take upon myſelf the part of a mediator, and accommodate their differences, which would be productive of ſecurity to the *Carnatic*. When the Governor and Council of *Bombay* commenced diſturbances with the Marattas, with a view to ſome new acquiſition in that quarter, I thought it had been a plan of yours, and therefore ſaid nothing upon it; but I have ſince learnt, that you diſapprove of that Preſidency's having entered into the War, and that for the ſake of ſecurity to the country, and promoting the happineſs and eaſe of the people, you are deſirous of accommodating a Peace with the *Poona* Miniſters, and of ſending ſome perſon of truſt thither for that purpoſe. You will therefore have a fine opportunity of ſhewing your attention to the affairs of my country, that is, for ſecuring it in peace, an object much deſired by the King of Great Britain and my friends the Company, and attended with many advantages to the Country, to the Company, and to Trade, ſince it is at *Poona* the peace of this country may eaſily be preſerved; but ſhould it have no ſhare in your negociations, and you only attend to the affairs of *Bombay*, and to the alliance with *Ragonaut Row*, without doubt the Marattas will raiſe diſturbances in this country; and when we are at war on this Coaſt, what will a peace ſignify on the other? Lord *Pigot*, in the Agreement under date the 8th of Zeanda 1173, of the Hejerie, equal to the 23d of June 1760, wrote me in theſe terms; viz.

As you and the Company are now united in the ſame intereſt, all political tranſactions and negociations with the Nabob *Salabat Jung Nizam Ally Cawn*, and other powers, ſhall be conducted with your advice; for your advice I eſteem above all others. And accordingly this rule has been obſerved by all Governors, as they conſidered it beſt for the Company's affairs, and for the ſecurity of this country. I therefore requeſt that you will order the perſon whom you have appointed to go to *Poona*, to take this route, and to viſit me that I may explain my ſentiments to him with reſpect to the ſecurity of the *Carnatic*, and ſend a perſon with him on my own behalf, to co-operate with him in his negociations for fulfilling your inſtructions on the ſubject of the Company's affairs, and alſo for ſecuring tranquillity to the *Carnatic*. But ſhould he have ſet out before you receive this Letter, I requeſt you will immediately tranſmit him inſtructions to make the ſecurity of the *Carnatic* a clauſe in the Treaty of Peace, and write him an order to conſult and act conjointly with the deputy from hence in his negociations with the Marattas; which order tranſmit to me, that I may ſend it by the hands of the Deputy himſelf. By the favour of the Almighty I ſhall then be perfectly at eaſe from any apprehenſions of the Marattas diſturbing the peace of the *Carnatic*, and ſhall think myſelf indebted for it to your friendly endeavours. This tranſaction will give you laſting credit in this country, and do you honour at home with the King and the Company.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 16th Auguſt 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

THE Board now take into conſideration the Letter from the Nabob of *Arcot* to the Governor General, tranſmitted by Sir *Edward Hughes*, and recorded in Conſultation 10th inſtant.

Reſolved, That proper attention be had to the Intereſt of the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, in the Treaty of Peace to be entered into with the Maratta State at *Poona*; and that the following Inſtructions on this head be therefore ſent to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We think it proper to give you the following Inſtructions in addition to your former, and require you to pay all

all due attention to them in entering upon your Negociations at *Poona*.

As the Nabob of *Arcot* is a particular friend and ally of the Engliſh, and as his intereſt may be affected with any Treaty you may conclude with the Maratta Government, we direct that you make the Maratta Chiefs acquainted with the union that ſubſiſts between him and the Company, and inſiſt on including him in the Treaty, in an expreſs Article to the following effect: That the Nabob *Wallah Jah Bahadar*, Nabob of the *Carnatic*, having been for a conſiderable courſe of years united to the Engliſh Company by the ſtrongeſt ties of friendſhip and alliance, and the Company having ever conſidered his enemies as their enemies, and his friends as their friends, it is agreed, that the Mahratta Chiefs likewiſe ſhall hereafter regard him as their friend, and his enemies as their enemies. At the ſame time we are to acquaint you, that we have deſired the Nabob of *Arcot*, if there are any particular Articles which he wiſhes to have ſtipulated for him, to ſtate theſe Articles to us, aſſuring him, that we would take them into conſideration, and give you ſuch further orders reſpecting them as ſhall be compatible with the other objects which we have in view in concluding the Treaty of Peace with the Marattas.

We have further to direct, that whatever Treaty you enter into with the Mahratta State, you require that it be ſigned by all the Chiefs nominally and individually; and that you inſiſt on this as a point from which you cannot depart.

A duplicate of this Letter will be delivered to you by the Nabob of *Arcot*'s Vackeel at *Poona*, with whom you will conſult upon any thing which he may have to propoſe for his maſter's intereſt, and attend to his repreſentations as far as may be conſiſtent with the general tenor of your Inſtructions.

We incloſe for your information Copy of a Treaty which was executed between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and the Maratta Government, on the 12th October 1756.

We are, &c. &c.

Agreed, That the Governor General be requeſted to write an anſwer to the Letter from the Nabob of *Arcot* in the following terms:

To the Nabob of *Arcot*.

I have received the Letter with which your Excellency honoured me through the channel of Sir *Edward Hughes*, acquainting me, that the Miniſters of *Poona* had repeatedly inſinuated to your Vackeel *Roujee*, that the ſteps lately taken by the Settlement of *Bombay* were in direct contradiction to the declarations you had long made to them concerning your own friendſhip, that of the Engliſh; and that they wiſhed you ſhould take upon yourſelf the part of a mediator to accommodate their differences, which would be productive to the ſecurity of the *Carnatic*. You farther acquaint me, that as you have learned that the Board here diſapprove of the proceedings of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and have ſent a perſon of confidence thither to negociate a Treaty of Peace with the Marattas, in which you are deſirous of being included, and requeſt that the perſon thus deputed may take the route of *Madras*, and viſit you, that you might explain your ſentiments to him with reſpect to the ſecurity of the *Carnatic*, and ſend a perſon with him in your behalf, to co-operate in his negociations.

I now have the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that the perſon choſen by the Board for this deputation, is Colonel *John Upton*, and that he took his departure from hence about a month ago, in his way to *Poona*, by the road of *Allahabad* and *Calpee*. When the Board firſt took the determination to ſend a miniſter to *Poona*, they acquainted the Preſident and Council at *Fort St. George* of it, not doubting but they would communicate it to your Excellency, and that you would deliberate upon what might be neceſſary for you to propoſe for your intereſts, jointly with thoſe of the Company in the propoſed Treaty.

We did not judge it proper to inſtruct our Miniſter to take any ſteps on your behalf, knowing that there were Treaties ſubſiſting already betwixt you and the Marattas; to the nature of which we were ſtrangers, and therefore, uncertain whether any propoſals which might come from this Government, would coincide with thoſe Treaties, or your particular views. APPENDIX. No. 78.

But on receipt of your Excellency's Letter, orders were ſent to our Miniſter at *Poona*, a duplicate of which I now tranſmit as you deſire, to be delivered to him by your Vackeel, in which we have conveyed to him the poſitive inſtructions of the Board, to make the Maratta Chiefs acquainted with the relation which has long ſubſiſted between your Excellency and the Company, and inſiſt on a ſeparate Article in the Treaty to this effect, That the Nabob *Wallah Jah Bahadar* has been during a courſe of many years united to the Company by the ſtrongeſt ties of friendſhip and alliance; and as the Company have ever conſidered his enemies as their enemies, and his friends as their friends, it ſhall be agreed, that the Maratta Chiefs alſo ſhall regard him as their friend, and his enemies as their enemies.

We have alſo directed him to conſult with your Vackeel on every thing regarding your intereſt; but as our principal view in the preſent Negociation, is to reſtore Peace to the Preſidency at *Bombay*, we wiſh not to involve that object in any extraneous matter, and therefore, that whatever regards the *Carnatic* be alſo confined merely to its peace and tranquillity. If however your Excellency ſhould have any particulars to propoſe relating to theſe objects, I beg you to communicate them to me, together with a Copy of the Treaties which may now be ſubſiſting between you and the Maratta State, that orders may be iſſued to Colonel *Upton* in conſequence; and further, as the intereſt of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* are ſo cloſely connected with yours, I requeſt, that whatever propoſals you may think fit to tranſmit to me, you will be pleaſed to deliver a Copy to the Preſident and Council there, that this Board may have the advantage of receiving at the ſame time their ſentiments upon them.

As I underſtand that the Names of the principal Maratta Chiefs will be neceſſary to be affixed to the propoſed Treaty, to give it a due ſanction; and as you have had the opportunity of a long intercourſe with that people, to obtain a knowledge of the perſons on whom the adminiſtration of the State depends, I requeſt that you will be pleaſed to tranſmit to me an exact Liſt of their Names, it not being in my power to procure that information here with ſufficient exactneſs.

(Signed) *W. H.*

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 7th September 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

RECEIVED the following Letter from *Bombay* Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The War we are at preſent engaged in for the ſupport of *Ragoba* is of the utmoſt importance to the Honourable Company, as we have already fully repreſented to you, and it therefore calls upon us particularly to purſue every means in our power to bring it to a ſpeedy and

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ſucceſsful iſſue, for on that will depend the great advantages that the Company are to reap by the engagements we have entered into on their behalf; and it is moreover a matter of the utmoſt importance to conclude the War if poſſible in the courſe of the enſuing ſeaſon.

Our Forces, in every engagement with the Enemy, have gained all the advantage that we had reaſon to hope for, ſo far as depended on them; but at the time we ſent the body of men we did to the aſſiſtance of *Ragoba*, it was concluded his own Forces would be of material ſervice in the courſe of the campaign; the contrary however has been found to be the caſe, and it has therefore frequently happened that our Army has been unable to reap every advantage that might have been expected from its victories over the Enemy. The Commanding Officer has therefore requeſted, and *Ragoba* earneſtly ſolicited, that a reinforcement may be ſent againſt the time that they will be able again to take the field, which will be in the beginning of November next; the rainy ſeaſon having obliged the Army to go into quarters at *Dubhoy*, near the banks of the *Nerbuddah*. For this reinforcement, the neceſſity of ſending which we are ſufficiently convinced of, *Ragoba* is to make over additional advantages to the Honourable Company, excluſive of thoſe mentioned in the Treaty.

We ſhall alſo require a Military Force for the protection of *Saſſette*, and the Provinces ceded to the Company, as well as to enſure the collection of the Revenues of them for the enſuing ſeaſon.

We have made the ſame ſtatement to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, of the ſervices for which a large Military Force is required here, as we have now done to your Honour, &c. and we have at the ſame time acquainted thoſe gentlemen, as we beg leave now to do to you, that it will be totally out of our power to furniſh the whole force that will be requiſite, without the aſſiſtance of the other Preſidencies. Being convinced that we could receive a reinforcement from *Madras* (as it may march by land to *Anjengo* and *Tellicherry*) much more early than we could do from you; we have therefore earneſtly requeſted the Governor and Council there to ſend by that rout three hundred European Rank and File, and two complete Battalions of Sepoys, in time for the ſervices that will be required of them.

Should that Preſidency be unable to aſſiſt us with the whole force that is now deſired, we then earneſtly requeſt that your Honour, &c. will furniſh ſuch part as they may be deficient in ſending, or that you will be pleaſed to ſend the whole from your army. Should thoſe Gentlemen be unable to ſend any part of the ſuccours we have now required of them, in ſuch caſe, we require that they may be ſent ſo early that we may be enabled to reap the benefit of their ſervices during the whole courſe of the enſuing fair ſeaſon.

The Gentlemen at *Fort St. George* are deſired to communicate to your Honour, &c. their reſolution in conſequence of what we now write them, that you may be enabled to regulate your determination; and we again repeat it as our earneſt wiſh, that the arrival of the Forces which may be ſent from your Preſidency may, if poſſible, not be later than the enſuing month of November.

We are well aware that we formerly wrote your Honour, &c. that the moſt material aſſiſtance which you could then afford, was in furniſhing us with ample ſupplies of Money; at that time we expected that *Ragoba*'s Forces would do their duty, but the repeated complaints from our Commanding Officer of their miſconduct and miſbehaviour, induces us no longer to have any reliance on them, and therefore will oblige us to make a ſuitable addition to our own Army.

We again repeat our requeſt, that you will ſend us a liberal ſupply of Money, excluſive of the annual one of fifteen Lacks; and ſhould your Forces be ſent to our aſſiſtance inſtead of thoſe from *Fort Saint George*, it will be very convenient to us that their own Military Cheſt ſhould accompany them.

Our laſt Addreſs was dated the 24th ultimo, and has already been forwarded in Duplicate.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 13th July 1775. (Signed) *William Hornby*, Preſident, and Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We addreſſed you on the 13th ultimo in Duplicate, ſince when we have not been favoured with any Letter from you.

The ſituation of our Army in the field is the ſame as we laſt adviſed, the ſeaſon of the year not admitting of their quitting their preſent Cantonments; but we have the pleaſure to acquaint you that *Ragoba* has obtained a very material advantage, by *Futty Sing* having quitted the Miniſterial Party and come over to his; a Treaty has been concluded between them, by which he is to furniſh the Peiſhwa with the ſame body of Forces, and to pay the ſame annual Stipend, as the Guicawars always uſed to do; and he is moreover to pay the Peiſhwa, for making peace with him, the ſum of twenty-ſix lacks of Rupees, within ſixty days after the Treaty was executed, which is about one month ago.

The immediate advantages to the Company from this event are, that *Futty Sing* has made over his right and title for ever, as well as thoſe of his family, to their ſhare in the town and diſtricts of *Broach*, which by our Treaty *Ragoba* has obliged himſelf to obtain; *Futty Sing* has alſo given up two diſtricts to the Company for ever, convenient to *Surat* and *Broach*, for their mediation in this buſineſs, whoſe annual Revenue may be about a Lack and a Half of Rupees.

Bombay Caſtle, 6th Auguſt, 1775. (Signed) We are, &c. *Willm Hornby*, Preſident, and Council.

P. S. The incloſed Packets would have been forwarded ſooner, if the Ships *Stafford* and *Dianna*, by which they were tranſmitted, had not returned into port on account of the badneſs of the weather.

The queſtion is put, Whether we ſhall ſend or authorize the Supplies of Men and Money which the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* have required in their Letter of the 13th July?

Mr. *Francis* delivers the following opinion:

The Preſidency at *Bombay* ſeem now to be alarmed for the conſequence of thoſe unwarrantable meaſures in which their union with *Ragoba* has involved them. It appears to me that they engaged in the preſent War without an Army, without Funds, without a Plan of Operations, or even a determinate Object. I ſay nothing of the right or juſtice of their quarrel, ſince they take no notice of it themſelves. With reſpect to the ſucceſs which they ſay has conſtantly attended Colonel *Keating*'s operations, I confeſs I place little or no dependance on their accounts of them. There have been few actions in *India* between European and black Troops, in which the former have ſuffered more both in loſs of men and loſs of honour, than that of the 18th May, which yet was repreſented to us in the light of a Victory. With the knowledge of this fact before me, I cannot give credit to any general aſſurances they may ſend us of the ſucceſs of our arms; neither am I moved from my firſt opinion of their proceedings, by the expectation of any advantages to be granted us by *Ragoba*. The Lands he pretends to aſſign to us, might have been obtained by our own ſtrength without his aſſiſtance, nor have we any other ſecurity for the poſſeſſion of them. They have given us no exact deſcription of thoſe Lands, but we know with certainty that at preſent they produce nothing towards the ſupport of the War. Whether theſe, or any other expected acquiſitions, can compenſate for the loſſes we have already ſuffered, the expence which we have and muſt ſtill incur, and the hazard to which our Army is expoſed, will not I am perſuaded, be a queſtion in the minds of the Court of Directors. It is well known that the conſequences of

this

this ruinous War have not been confined to the operations of the War itſelf; the diſaſter which the Trade of *Surat* ſuffered by their Fleet being detained there for want of convoy till the Monſoon broke up, can only be attributed to our rupture with the Marattas: This Fleet was chiefly laden with Cotton: The immediate loſs is generally computed at Twenty-five Lacks of Rupees. The importation of Cotton into *Bengal* has failed conſiderably, and the price of that article has riſen in proportion, which cannot happen without the greateſt prejudice to the manufactures of this country. I am alſo aſſured that the Cotton Trade to *China* has, from the ſame cauſe, been almoſt wholly loſt this ſeaſon. The Court of Directors, I doubt not, will ſee with indignation the Trade of *India* ſacrificed by their Servants to the ſpirit of conqueſt, with as little conſideration of the true and natural intereſt of a commercial Company, as of the obvious dictates of policy and juſtice.

In my opinion, we cannot paſs a condemnation too ſolemn or ſevere upon the whole conduct of the Council of *Bombay*, with reſpect to their rupture with the Marattas. They now, in effect, admit that they have little aſſiſtance to expect from their Ally *Ragoba*; his own Troops will not fight, and he has no Money to pay ours. —I am againſt ſending them any reinforcements of Men. We may ſpare them a moderate ſupply of Money, but not on the principle of continuing the War. I think we ſhould repeat and inſiſt upon our former orders, to recal Colonel *Keating*, without any reſpect or conſideration whatſoever, but the ſafety of the Troops under his command. I underſtand that he may effect a retreat from his preſent cantonments to *Broach* without difficulty, from thence I think the Army ſhould be withdrawn as ſoon as poſſible to cover *Bombay*. (Signed) *P. F.*

Mr. *Barwell*.—I think both Men and Money ſhould be ſent to *Bombay*.

The Honourable *George Monſon*.—The Court of Directors, in their firſt inſtructions, require us to fix our attention to the preſervation of peace throughout *India*, and that in all our deliberations and reſolutions we ſhould make the ſafety and proſperity of *Bengal* our principal object. The Preſidency of *Bombay* having made an alliance with a Prince who had neither Men nor Money, and they themſelves without either Men or Money determining upon a War againſt the moſt powerful State in *India*, without any cauſe or pretext whatſoever, appears to me both unwarrantable and impolitic.

That War was not our meaſure, nor are we reſponſible to the Court of Directors and to our Nation for the event of it; but if we ſhould now think proper to aſſiſt the Preſidency of *Bombay* with Men and Money to carry on a War which was not undertaken on principles of policy or intereſt for the Company, I think we make ourſelves reſponſible for all the conſequences of it: I therefore am for enforcing our former orders to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to retract their engagements with *Ragoba*, and to ſecure the Company's Army and preſent poſſeſſions in the beſt manner they ſhall be able; we have already ſent a perſon to *Poona* to conclude a Treaty of Peace with the Miniſterial Party, and I have not the ſmalleſt doubts but he will be able to effect it to the honour of the Nation, and for the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions. As the Preſidency of *Bombay* is in want of Caſh for their immediate demands, I would anſwer their bills to a certain amount, if they could procure them; if not, as there is no alternative, the Specie muſt be ſent from this country.

General *Clavering*.—The principles which the preſent Adminiſtration eſtabliſhed as the object of their conduct, were the preſerving the peace of *India*, as far as it could be done conſiſtently with the ſafety of the Company's poſſeſſions. Agreeable to this principle, we firſt applied ourſelves to put an end to the *Rohilla* War. We then refuſed the offers made to us, through the Government of *Madras*, to the *Nizam*, to aſſiſt him againſt the Marattas, with all the alluring advantages with which the propoſal was accompanied. We no ſooner heard the Government of *Bombay* had commenced hoſtilities againſt the Marattas to take the Iſland of *Salſette*, than we teſtified our diſapprobation of it, and further ſignified to that Government, our commands to deſiſt from their engagements with *Ragoba*, and even at laſt to withdraw the Troops with which they had joined his Army. Theſe have been the principles which have guided our conduct ſince the commencement of our Adminiſtration; our views in the purſuits of this conduct have been not leſs to conform to the poſitive commands of the Court of Directors, directing us to preſerve the peace in *India*, than the declared intentions of the Legiſlature, which inveſted us with powers for that purpoſe; the meaſures we have taken to effect this, and with regard to the preſent Maratta War, are now carrying into execution by the Miſſion of Colonel *Upton* to *Poona*; and we have reaſon to hope that the Marattas ſeeing the juſtice and moderation of this Government, and that our intentions are finally to put a ſtop to that ſpirit of Conqueſt, Encroachment, and Injuſtice, which ſeem hitherto to have prevailed too much in *India*, will liſten to the Propoſals that we have made them, to conclude a firm and laſting Peace with them. Till therefore they refuſe to conclude a Peace, I ſhall object to ſending any more Troops than what have been ſent from the Preſidency of *Madras*, or any Money more than what is ſufficient for the Supplies of their inveſtment. It has been uſual to ſend them annually about fourteen of fifteen Lacks: I would not therefore increaſe that ſum more than to make it up twenty, with the ſpecific condition that it ſhall not be employed but for the purpoſe above-mentioned.

The Governor General.—I am of opinion that the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſhould be furniſhed with Supplies both of Men and Money. The queſtion before us is not, whether the Preſidency of *Bombay* have acted properly, or improperly, in their original engagements with *Ragoba?* nor to ſupport a political ſyſtem. We have condemned the meaſures of the Preſidency of *Bombay*. We have unanimouſly paſſed the ſevereſt cenſure upon it. The effects of that meaſure ſhould not be conſidered as affecting that Preſidency, but the intereſts of the Company, which are involved in it, not only at *Bombay*, but in every part of their Poſſeſſions. The queſtion therefore before us is, by what means it will be moſt expedient to endeavour to extricate the Company's affairs from the danger which has befallen them in a War thus too precipitately undertaken?—All our private Advices concur in repreſenting the Miniſterial Party at *Poona* in a ſtate of diſtraction, and in deciſion they appear not to have any principle of action, nor Leader whoſe pretenſions to the government could enable him to guide their meaſures, or to connect the attachment of their people. The overtures which have been made to the Nabob of *Arcot* by the Government of *Poona*, and their intreaties that he will ſtand forth as their interceſſor to obtain a Peace with the Company, ſtrongly confirm the above reports, and leave every reaſon to believe that the ſtate of the Miniſterial Party is yet worſe than that whoſe cauſe we have eſpouſed. Under ſuch circumſtances, it appears to me that nothing is wanting on the part of this Government but a temporary, though vigorous exertion of its powers to maintain that aſcendant which it has acquired, and by which alone the ſucceſs of the future Negociations can be inſured. If the Detachment now employed in the ſupport of *Ragoba*, ſhould be either defeated for want of Succour, or recalled at ſuch a criſis to *Bombay*, and *Ragoba* abandoned to ruin, I will venture to foretel that Colonel *Upton*'s Negociations will be fruitleſs, and attended with diſgrace. On the other hand, I will with equal confidence riſk my credit with the Company, in foretelling that the iſſue of it will be ſucceſsful and honourable if we maintain our ſuperiority at the time in which it ſhall take place, and ſhew a reſolution to dictate, not receive, the terms of an accommodation. For theſe reaſons,

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reaſons, I am of opinion that the effectual ſupport of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in the War undertaken by them, will prove the ſureſt means of reſtoring the peace of *India*. We have thoſe means in our power, and I therefore think it our duty to employ them.

General *Clavering*.—The opinion which the Governor General has now given, appears to me ſo inconſiſtent with that which he formerly gave, for withdrawing the Company's Troops from the aſſiſtance of *Ragoba*, and for ſending Colonel *Upton* to *Poona*, for negociating a Treaty, that I cannot tell how to reconcile ſuch opinion with the meaſure in which I underſtand he concurred with the other Members of Council. Our Letters to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, which peremptorily require that Preſidency to withdraw their Forces into their garriſons, in whatever ſtate they might be, without endangering their ſafety by an inſtant retreat, muſt have been received and carried into execution before this time, if they mean to obey the orders of this Government: therefore, the adopting a plan for the ſupport of a War which we have not only condemned, but have directed ſhould be finiſhed by the retreat of our Troops, appears to me a meaſure, at preſent both ſuperfluous and incompatible with the meaſures that we have already taken, of ſending to treat with the other Party at *Poona*. It would not only ſhew to the powers of *India*, that we have no ſyſtem of political conduct, but would likewiſe expoſe our Negociations to the other party to contempt and deriſion, and perhaps even the perſons of the gentlemen themſelves who are gone to negociate a Treaty, to the greateſt danger. In our Letter to the Court of Directors of the 5th Auguſt, we have acquainted them how much we had condemned the ridiculous project of the Council at *Bombay*, of undertaking the conqueſt of the Maratta Empire with ſo ſmall a force; we have informed them of our having given peremptory orders for the withdrawing the Troops from the Army; what would they think of our conduct ſhould we, inſtead of purſuing the plan which we adopted, as we thought with ſo much wiſdom and propriety, if we were now to alter that reſolution? To be conſiſtent therefore with the principles which we have eſtabliſhed for the rule of our government, and the meaſures we have already adopted, I muſt adhere to the opinion I have already given, of only ſending a ſuccour of 5 Lacks in addition to the 15 Lacks which has been uſually given to the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

Colonel *Monſon*.—If I can collect any thing from the Governor General's Minute, it is, that to obtain an honourable Peace at *Poona*, and to maintain that ſuperiority which the Britiſh Troops have acquired in *India*, that we ſhould ſupport a Prince whoſe right to the government of *Poona* is controvertible; that we ſhould ſend a reinforcement of Troops and Money to maintain a War, the object of which is not defined, nor the advantages to the Company no way mentioned. If the Governor General is of opinion that an honourable Treaty of Peace with the Marattas is not to be obtained but by reinforcing the preſent Army in the field, and continuing that injudicious War, I beg leave to ſubmit to him, whether the War could not be more deciſive (as War is his object) if the whole force of the Company from the three Preſidencies, ſupported by their allies, were put in motion againſt the Maratta State? I think ſuch a meaſure would be deciſive, and might be advantageous to the Company, but not honourable to the Government. Many actions may be honourable to the arms of a ſtate, that are diſgraceful to the conductors of it; and I think a meaſure of this kind would be highly diſhonourable, as we may be underſtood to be the aggreſſors in the Maratta War. To eſtabliſh a peace of this empire, a ſyſtem, a policy muſt be adopted, diametrically oppoſite to that which has for many years been purſued. The only certain method of introducing tranquillity and ſubordination in their empire, is to ſupport an authority in the perſons who have a legal right to govern; a contrary maxim has been purſued; every kind of protection and ſupport has been withdrawn from the Prince of the empire; his poſſeſſions wreſted from him, though given him under the moſt ſacred Treaties, and ſold to his ſervants and dependants; his ſervants protected and ſupported in ſubduing nations, and extirpating races of people, to feed his ambition, and to gratify the avarice of an ambitious Prince, whoſe object, I firmly believe, from the declarations which I have heard he has made, was to place himſelf with the late adminiſtration on the throne of *Hindoſtan*. This ambitious Prince, whoſe views were ſupported by the late adminiſtration, violated the moſt ſacred Treaties, and refuſed to make over to his ſovereign the countries which he had pledged himſelf to deliver, and which he had conquered with the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh Arms, who he looked upon to be entirely at his command, and to be the inſtruments of his obtaining his ambitious projects. If War is to be the means by which the Company's inveſtment is to be provided, and their civil and military eſtabliſhments maintained, let us wage it with that degree of ſplendour and command which our force would give us; but not to ſcatter away the honour of the Nation, the force or wealth of the Company, by aſſiſting an ill-adviſed undertaking; the ſupporting of which can be the only means of protracting the War, which protraction muſt be attended with every advantage to the Company's commercial concerns, as well as to the revenues.

The Governor General.—In the diſcuſſion of a point ſo important to the ſafety of the Company's and the national intereſt in India, as that now before us, it is of little conſequence whether my opinions which have never had any weight in the political meaſures of the preſent adminiſtration, are ſtrictly conſiſtent with each other, or not; yet it concerns my credit to defend them. If I truly recollect the ſubſtance of the Minute which I originally delivered upon this ſubject, or if I know my own mind, I think nothing will be found in it to which my preſent opinion is contradictory. The beſt part of the conſiſtency of theſe opinions, will be, to ſet them in oppoſition to each other. I will therefore beg leave to ſubjoin ſo much of my former Minute as has relation to the ſubject now before the Board.

" Although I am thus clear in my opinion of what " is paſt, I confeſs I have doubts of the part which this " Government ought to take with reſpect to the future; " it is impoſſible to conjecture, amidſt ſuch a variety of " probable contingencies, and under our total ignorance " of their plan of operations, what turn affairs may have " taken, or what may be their actual ſtate at the time our " orders may arrive. It is certainly to be wiſhed they " could be replaced on the ſame footing on which they " were before their engagement with *Ragoba*; but this " is now impoſſible; and to draw abruptly, after having " entered into poſitive engagements with one party, and " offended the other, perhaps beyond the hopes of recon- " ciliation, may be attended with greater danger than " proſecuting the original deſign, and even with national " diſhonour. I can therefore only venture to propoſe, " that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* be peremp- " torily enjoined to cancel the Treaty with *Ragoba*, and " to withdraw the detachments immediately to their own " poſſeſſions, by whatever means may be in their power, " unleſs any of the following caſes ſhall have occurred; " viz.

" 1ſt. That they ſhall have obtained any deciſive " advantage over the Enemy.

" 2d. That the detachment ſhall have proceeded to " ſuch a diſtance, or to be in ſuch a ſituation, as to make " it dangerous either to retreat, or not to go on.

" 3d. That a Negociation ſhall have taken place " between *Ragoba* and his opponents, in conſequence of " the ſupport afforded by this alliance.

" Theſe I conceive to be all the caſes of neceſſity " which muſt compel them to perſevere, and which I " muſt recommend to be made exceptions to the gene- " ral order."

In this Minute, three caſes were ſubmitted to the Board as exceptions to the orders propoſed for the recal of the Troops. The Board adopted only the ſecond. The firſt

is the ground of my preſent opinion. Our Troops have obtained an advantage over the Enemy, which, added to the ſituation, I conſider as deciſive, provided only ſuch timely ſuccours are ſent them as it is in our power to afford them.

The General has obſerved, that to adopt a plan for the ſupport of a War which we have condemned, would be incompatible with the meaſures that we have taken of ſending to treat with the other party at *Poona*. I apprehend, that to treat in the midſt of a War, is no new practice even with the moſt civilized nations; in the preſent caſe it appears to me unavoidable; Peace is not effected by the retreat of one party, eſpecially if the other ſhall thereby become not only maſters of the field, but enabled by it to take ſuch meaſures at their leiſure as ſhall preclude the other from the poſſibility of renewing the War. In that caſe there is no room for a Negociation, which can only be conducted with a probability of ſucceſs but to that party which has ſome advantages to offer, or ſome dangers to threaten. By precipitately abandoning the War, we give up all, even the dread of retaliation of any injuries which we may ſuſtain by any ſubſequent conduct of our enemies. I do not conceive it to be neceſſary, that any reinforcement which we might ſend ſhould take the field, if they are at hand, and we have it in our power to offer the alternative of Peace on ſuch juſt and honourable conditions as the nature of the cauſe which we are engaged in may allow or require; or of War, in defence of our own rights and ſafety. The ſame end, I think, may be obtained, even though the Forces already employed ſhall have been withdrawn to *Bombay*.

Colonel *Monſon* has aſcribed maxims to me which do not follow from any thing which I have aſſerted, and objects which I do not avow. I have never aſſerted, that to obtain an honourable Peace at *Poona*, and to maintain that ſuperiority which the Britiſh Troops have acquired in *India*, we ſhould ſupport a Prince whoſe right to the Government of *Poona* is controvertible; that we ſhould ſend a reinforcement of Troops and Money to maintain a War, the object of which is not defined. My opinion is, that we ſhould maintain our ſuperiority for the ſake of obtaining an honourable Peace. War is not my object; my object is Peace, which is moſt likely to be obtained by being prepared for War. It does not neceſſarily follow, becauſe I object to one extreme, I muſt therefore have recourſe to the oppoſite; that becauſe I object to an abrupt concluſion of the War, I ſhould therefore put the forces of all the three Preſidencies in motion for the proſecution of it. The principle which I have recommended, is a medium between the two extremes, and ſuch as I think moſt likely to conduce to the end aimed at by the other Members of the Board. I will in this place frankly own, that the opinions which I have formerly given upon this ſubject, were not ſtrictly conformable to my judgment of the meaſures which ought to have been purſued under a different adminiſtration. I knew the general ſenſe of the Board, and I wiſhed, in the opinion I gave at the ſame time, to accommodate it to their ſentiments, and to prevent the extremities to which I feared they would lead. Perhaps if it had been in my power to have guided the meaſures of this government, and I could have depended on the unanimous ſupport of the Members of it in their execution, I might have propoſed a different plan of action. That which appears in my Minute of the 31ſt May, I ſtill think moſt ſuitable to the times, though not to the occaſion, independently conſidered. The reflections thrown out by Colonel *Monſon*, upon the conduct of the late adminiſtration in their tranſaction with the King and the Vizier, the Treaty of *Benares*, and the *Robilla* War, are all foreign from the ſubject of the preſent queſtion. I have repeatedly replied to them, and am weary of dwelling on an exhauſted argument.

Mr. *Francis*.—When the Governor General recommends the ſending a reinforcement of men to the army under Colonel *Keating*, I preſume he means it with an immediate view to a vigorous proſecution of the preſent unjuſt and impolitic War, though ultimately to the eſtabliſhment of a ſafe and honourable Peace. On this principle, the reinforcement muſt of neceſſity be very conſiderable, ſince it is plain that we have little or nothing to expect from the aſſiſtance of *Ragoba*. If, in conformity to the Governor's opinion, ſuch a force as the occaſion would require were to be ſent to the Coaſt of *Malabar*, I ſhould have hoped that he would have come to the Council prepared to inform us from what quarter it could be ſpared; what the general plan of our military operations ſhould be; together with the preciſe object and exact limits of them; in my opinion, ſuch a reinforcement as it would be neceſſary to ſend, if we ſent any, is not to be ſafely ſpared from the two Brigades remaining in thoſe provinces, for the defence of which an eſtabliſhment of three Brigades has been thought neceſſary. We cannot, conſiſtently with our engagements with the Nabob of *Oude*, withdraw the Brigade from his country, and if we did, we know that his ruin would be the conſequence. I preſume it will not be thought adviſable to divide and weaken the Company's force upon the Coaſt; we ſhould thereby leave the *Carnatic* open to the incurſions of the Marattas, and *Madras* itſelf expoſed to inſult from *Hyder Ally*, or perhaps from an European enemy.

Suppoſe Colonel *Keating* to penetrate farther into the country, we ought at leaſt to determine what object we are to propoſe to ourſelves from his ſucceſs; how far he is to carry the Company's Troops from the defence of their poſſeſſions; or how his retreat is to be ſecured in caſe of any unexpected check. Theſe are conſiderations which I think ſhould accompany every propoſal to commence or continue a War. The Governor General's opinion goes ſimply to the continuation of a War which he himſelf has condemned; which, from the diſtance of the ſcene of action, would not be under our guidance; and which, having no determinate plan, object, or limitation, would probably involve the Company's affairs in endleſs difficulties. I adhere therefore to the opinion I have already given, that the War on the *Malabar* Coaſt ought not to be ſupported, and that the ſafeſt and moſt prudent meaſure we can adopt, is, to withdraw our troops from their preſent hazardous ſituation to the defence of our own poſſeſſions. The regard to juſtice and moderation which we have ſhewn in taking the firſt ſtep towards an humble accommodation with the government at *Poona*, will probably make the conſideration of hoſtile meaſures againſt that State unneceſſary.

Reſolved, That the ſum to be ſupplied to the *Bombay* Preſidency in the courſe of this year, commencing from 1ſt May laſt, be extended to twenty lacks of Rupees, including the amount which they have already drawn for ſince that period.

Agreed, That the following Letter be immediately diſpatched for that Preſidency:

Gentlemen,

We have juſt received your Letters of the 13th July and 6th Auguſt; that of the 24th June had before reached us.

The laſt Advices which you acknowledge the receipt of from us, being dated the 8th March, we take this opportunity of tranſmitting you, by the ſea conveyance, Copies of all our Letters to your Preſidency ſince that date.

The ſenſe we entertain of your engagements with *Ragoba*, and the whole of your conduct in reſpect to your tranſactions with him, cannot more fully appear than from the tenor of thoſe Letters.

We are now ſorry to find the truth of our conjectures, as to the conſequence of this engagement; that the whole burthen of the extenſive War, undertaken by you in ſupport of *Ragoba*'s claim to the Peiſhwaſhip, has fallen upon yourſelves, and that no dependence can be placed on the aſſiſtance of his Troops.

We have been ſo particularly enjoined by the Court of Directors to attend to the preſervation of Peace in gene-

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ral with the Country Powers throughout *India*, that we thought it neceſſary, in our Letters of the 31ſt May, to give you poſitive orders to recal your Army from *Ragoba* to your own garriſons, in whatſoever ſtate your affairs might be, unleſs the ſafety of the Troops might be endangered by an inſtant retreat. We hope you have acted with conformity thereto; but if not, we now repeat thoſe directions, judging it more particularly requiſite at this period, as it appears that *Ragoba* is not able to fulfil his part of the Treaty; and we require you to confine your views to the protection of the Company's poſſeſſions, including *Salſette*, and the ſhare in the Revenues of *Broach* given up by *Futty Sing*, in the beſt manner you are able. This laſt we have alſo inſtructed our Miniſter at *Poona* to ſecure, if poſſible, by the Treaty with that State. We cannot conſequently grant our conſent to any further reinforcement of Troops being ſent to join you from this ſide of *India*; I have therefore forbid the Council at *Fort St. George* to comply with your requeſt for 300 Europeans and two Battalions of Sepoys. Another reaſon which has weight with us againſt ſupplying you with Troops is, that having appointed Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to proceed to *Poona*, to negociate a Treaty of Peace with the Miniſterial Party there, he will moſt probably arrive and open the buſineſs of his Miſſion to that Court before any reinforcement of Troops could be brought to co-operate with your Army, even ſuppoſing they ſhould ſtill remain in their quarters at *Dubhoy*; the junction of freſh Troops might be alarming to the Marattas, and appear contrary to good faith at a time when we are treating for Peace.

We have the greateſt reaſon to hope that Colonel *Upton* will find the Miniſtry inclined to liſten to his Propoſals for an Accommodation, eſpecially if they reflect upon the juſtice and moderation of this Government in the part it has taken, and diſcover by this, that it is our wiſh to promote a general pacification. Colonel *Upton* will no doubt under theſe circumſtances effect an honourable Peace for the Britiſh Nation, and upon terms of ſecurity to the Company's poſſeſſions in *India*.

We have agreed to furniſh you to the amount of 20 lacks of Rupees in the courſe of the preſent Year, commencing the 1ſt May laſt, in which we include the Drafts accepted from your Preſidency and *Surat* ſince that date; and we authorize you to continue drawing upon us for ſuch ſums as you may be able to obtain at the moſt reaſonable exchange in your power to that extent.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Setwajee Gonkeſcan*, *Somerbatan*, to Colonel *Thomas Keating*.

After Compliments.

As you have made a friendſhip between me and *Ragonaut Row Punt*, I have therefore from my Sircar ceded for ever to the Company a Pergunnah called *Chickly*; and the friendſhip muſt be continued, without any alteration, according to the agreement dated the ninth of Jonia.

Delout Setwajee Row,
Gorkwar Someubadon.

The Copy of this Sunnud having been received in Cypher, has occaſioned ſome inaccuracies in the ſpelling of the names.

True Copy.
(Signed) *Edward Ravenſcroft*,
Secr.

Tranſlate of the Copy of the Treaty between *Ragonaut Bajarow Pundit Predan*, on one part, and *Futty Sing* and *Seagee Row*, *Shermſhere Bahader*, on the other part.

That *Seagee* and *Futty Sing*, *Shirmſhere Bahadar*, had diſobeyed and joined with the Rebels; but now by the means of Colonel *Thomas Keating*, who for and in behalf of the United Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company have, by promiſing preſents, accommodated matters with *Pundit Predan*, the following are the Articles of the Guicawar propoſals.

Article 1ſt, That *Secajee* and *Futty Sing*, *Guicawar Shermſhere Bahader*, do hereby agree to pay the ſum of eight lacks of Rupees every year to the Circar.

2d, That they are to attend as uſual with a Troop of 3000 good Horſe and Men, which number is not to be leſſened.

3d, In the late *Maderow*'s time they uſed to pay every year three lacks of Rupees to *Govindrow*, *Guicawar Senackeſkel Shumſhere Bahader*; which ſum is ſettled not to be paid him in future, about which *Govinrow* is to make no claim againſt *Secajee* and *Futty Sing*.

4th, *Conderow*, *Guicawar Jumuth Bahader*, is to be continued on the ſame footing, and agreeable to the Agreement made in the time of the late *Damajee*, deceaſed.

5th, That the Government and Revenue of the Pergunnahs of *Broach* have been ceded to the Honourable Company, agreeable to the Agreement made between them and *Sheremuth Punt Pridan*, about which *Secajee* and *Futty Sing* are not to make any diſpute.

6th, The Pergunnahs *Chickly* and *Vercow*, near *Surat*, and *Coral*, near the *Nubadah* river, and about 15 coſs diſtant from *Broach*, which together make three Pergunnahs, the Guicawar have ceded to the Honourable Company for ever, on account of the Peace they have made between the Guicawar and *Sheremuth Punt Predan*.

7th, That in the Court of *Sheremuth Punt Predan*, the Guicawars muſt pay a due attention to every thing that is reaſonable, without having any communication with its enemies.

8th, That for the confirmation and compliance of the above Articles, the Honourable Company ſtand ſecurity; and ſhould the Guicawars appear any way falſe, the Honourable Company is not to protect them; *Ragoba* is alſo to fulfil the above Articles without any difference.

A true Copy.
(Signed) *Edward Ravenſcroft*,
Secr.

APPENDIX, No. 79.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th September 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, Eſquire.
Mr. *Francis*, indiſpoſed.

RECEIVED the following Letter and Incloſures from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George:*

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

We have had the honour to receive your Letter of the 17th July, communicating to us the reaſons which have induced your Honour, &c. to depute Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to *Poona*, as well as your ſentiments on the meaſures adopted by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in acting in conjunction with *Ragoba* againſt the Miniſterial Party of the Maratta Government.

Accompanying, your Honour, &c. will receive Copy of a Letter which the Nabob has lately received from *Savay Maudheveron Pundit Pridhawn*; in conſequence of which we have addreſſed a Letter to the Nabob, wherein we adviſe him in reply to *Maudheveron*, to refer him to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, who on the ſpot can beſt inform him of the favourable intentions of the Engliſh towards his Government. And we have further requeſted that the Nabob will inform us if there is any thing relative to the ſafety or proſperity of the *Carnatic*, which he may think

think may be obtained from the Maratta Government by means of Colonel *Upton's* Deputation, and which he would wiſh us to communicate to your Honour, &c. for that purpoſe.

In a Letter lately received by our Preſident from Mr. *Whitehill*, Chief of *Maſulipatam*, we are given to underſtand that *Allyar Beg*, brother to *Fazel Beg Cawn*, who commands the Soubah's Army, and who has extenſive influence both over his Councils and Government, is ſhortly expected to arrive at *Maſulipatam*, in order to celebrate a feſtival at that place; and on this account we think it adviſable to acquaint your Honour, &c. that we believe ſomething of importance to the Company may be obtained through his means, particularly as *Fazel Beg* has expreſſed himſelf greatly inclined to a more intimate connection than at preſent ſubſiſt between the Engliſh and the Soubah. At all events we think a Negociation with the Soubah might be probably carried on, not only as it might affect our Northern Circars, but as it might be of immediate conſequence to the forwarding the intention of the Deputation which your Honour, &c. have thought proper to ſend to *Poona*. The Soubah has heretofore had great weight with the Miniſterial Party of the Maratta Government, and we therefore are of opinion that advantages from that quarter may be had through his means; in this matter, however, your Honour, &c. will be the beſt enabled to judge. Mr. *Whitehill* has been directed to ſound *Allyar Beg* with reſpect to the Soubah's real intentions towards the Engliſh, and on being adviſed of the reſult of his enquiry, we ſhall not fail to communicate it to your Honour, &c. for your information.

The accompanying Letter from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, addreſſed to your Honour, &c. having been juſt received, we have now the honour of forwarding it to you, together with Copy of a Letter which we have received from them, as well as of our reply; in conſequence whereby you will obſerve, that they requeſt a further reinforcement of Troops from this eſtabliſhment; and that we, in conſequence of your Honour's &c. deſire, have declined ſupplying them with that ſuccour which they required.

We are, &c.

Fort Saint George. (Signed) *A. Wynch*,
26th Auguſt 1775. Preſid^t, and Council.

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council at *Fort Saint George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The War we are at preſent engaged in for the ſupport of *Ragoba*, is of the utmoſt importance to the Honourable Company, and loudly calls upon us to purſue every means in our power that we can think of to bring it to a ſpeedy and ſucceſsful iſſue; for on that will depend the greateſt advantages that the Company are to reap by the engagements we have entered into on their behalf. And it is a matter of the utmoſt importance to them, to conclude the War in the courſe of the enſuing ſeaſon.

Our Forces, in every engagement with the Enemy, have gained every advantage that we have reaſon to expect; but at the time we ſent the body of men we did, it was concluded, that *Ragoba's* own Forces would be of material ſervice during the campaign. The contrary, however, has been found to be the caſe; and it therefore has happened, that our Army has often not been able to reap any advantage that might have been expected from the victories they have gained over the Enemy. The Commanding Officer has in conſequence requeſted, and *Ragoba* earneſtly ſolicited, a reinforcement may be ſent by the time that they will be able again to take the field, which will be in the beginning of the month of November next, the rainy ſeaſon having at preſent obliged the Army to go into winter quarters at *Dubay*, near the banks of the *Nerbedah*. For this reinforcement which *Ragoba* has ſo earneſtly intreated, he is to make over additional advantages to the Honourable Company, excluſive of thoſe mentioned in the Treaty.

We ſhall alſo require a Military Force for the protection of *Salſette*, and of the Provinces already ceded to the Company, as well as to inſure the collection of the Revenues of the enſuing ſeaſon.

We have thus ſtated to your Honour, &c. the ſervices for which a large Military Force is required, and ſhall now proceed to acquaint you, that it is totally out of our power to furniſh from hence the whole that will be requiſite; but ſatisfied as we are how much you have the intereſt of the Honourable Company at heart, and being convinced that we can receive a reinforcement much more early from your Preſidency, than from the Governor General and Council at *Fort William*, who have offered us aſſiſtance, we therefore again take the liberty to apply to you, earneſtly requeſting that you will ſupply us with three hundred Europeans Rank and File, and two complete Battalions of Sepoys, which we may receive in time for the ſervices that will be required of them, by your Honour, &c. ordering them to march by land to *Anjengo*, from whence they will be directed to proceed to *Tellichery*, at which place conveyances ſhall be ready to tranſport them hither; and we can aſſure you that your compliance with this requeſt will be of very material benefit to our Honourable Employers.

The incloſed Packet for the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, communicates to them the ſame intelligence as we have now done to you; and we requeſt that your Honour, &c. will acquaint them with your reſolution and determination on the application we now make to you; for ſhould you be unable to aſſiſt us with the whole Force that is now deſired, we have requeſted thoſe Gentlemen to ſupply the deficiency, or even the whole, ſhould you not be able to ſpare any part; but at the ſame time, we requeſt that you will conſider, that it is more than probable that the ſuccours from *Bengal*, ſhould you leave it to the Governor General and Council to ſupply us, cannot arrive at the ſcene of action ſo early as the beginning of November next, which is the time, as we before ſaid, that our operations muſt begin.

It will be very acceptable, if the ſtate of your finances will enable you to ſupply the Force that you may detach to our aſſiſtance with a Military Cheſt, as we have ſo many calls for Money, that we are apprehenſive our reſources may be inſufficient to ſatisfy all the demands upon us; more eſpecially, as one of our moſt material reſources is almoſt ſhut up, namely, the receipt of Money for the ſales of the Company's Goods; for, owing to the preſent ſituation of the Maratta Country, Trade is at this time almoſt at a ſtand.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *D. Draper*,
13th July 1775. &c. Council.

A true Copy.
(Signed) *R. Sulivan*,
Sec^r.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have been favoured with duplicate of your Letter of 13th ultimo, together with a Letter addreſſed to the Governor General and Council, which ſhall be forwarded to *Bengal* with the utmoſt expedition.

In conſequence of the aid of Troops which, in compliance with your earneſt deſire, we before ſent you, we informed the Governor General and Council of our having done ſo, and of the weighty reaſons which influenced us to ſuch a meaſure; but although they did not diſapprove of our having granted you that reinforcement at your urgent requeſt, yet they deſire that for the future we do not detach any part of our Forces out of our Provinces, unleſs for the ſecurity of our own poſſeſſions, without their previous concurrence. From this, therefore, your Honour, &c. will perceive, that we are not at liberty, even if our Military eſtabliſhment could afford it, to ſend

you

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you that aſſiſtance which you require; but indeed, were we left diſcretionally to act, our incompleete eſtabliſhment of Europeans would not admit of our making the ſmalleſt draft from it, much leſs of ſo conſiderable a one as that requeſted by your Honour, &c. of 300 Rank and File.

Having a few days ago received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, containing an account of the reaſons which have induced them to depute Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to *Poona*, we ſhall here furniſh you with an extract of that part of it which immediately relates to the Embaſſy, and the Powers given to Colonel *Upton*; viz.

We have deputed Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to proceed to *Poona*, to conclude a Treaty of Peace with that State; We have furniſhed him with full Powers and Inſtructions for this purpoſe.—The Peiſhwa has been adviſed of this Deputation, and deſired to forward Paſſports for Colonel *Upton*, to meet him at *Calpee*.

Agreeably to your requeſt, we ſhall immediately inform the Governor General and Council of our determination to decline acquieſcing in the requeſt you have made, in order, if it ſhall appear to them proper, that you be ſupplied with a reinforcement of Military from that eſtabliſhment.

Fort Saint George, 26th Auguſt 1775.

We are, &c.
(Signed) *A. Wynch*,
Preſident, &c. Council.

A true Copy.
(Signed) *R^d Sulivan*,
Sec^y.

Reſolved, That the following Reply to the foregoing Letters be immediately diſpatched to *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 26th Auguſt, by the *Ankerwyke*; alſo that of the 12th Auguſt, with your proceedings, which we ſhall take into conſideration as ſoon as poſſible.

We do not conceive it neceſſary to employ the mediation of the Nizam, in effecting the propoſed Treaty with the Maratta Government; and we think it is not likely that he would willingly engage in it, without ſome view to his own advantage. And as it is not our intention to ſolicit a reconciliation with the Maratta State, but to propoſe it to them as an act of juſtice due from this Government, and as being a duty enjoined us by the inſtructions of the Court of Directors, for the preſervation of Peace throughout *India*, we judge it unneceſſary to enter into any Negociation for this end, either with the Nizam, or any other power, and mean to rely ſolely on our own influence for effecting it.

We think however it would be highly proper for you to direct the Chief at *Maſulipatam* to inform the Nizam's Miniſter, *Fazel Beg*, ſhould he viſit that place, that we entertain the above ſentiments; that we have already declared our entire diſapprobation of the War in which the *Bombay* Preſidency have engaged the Company againſt the Maratta Government at *Poona*, and that we have ſent them orders to diſcontinue it.—He may alſo inform the Miniſter of our deputation of Colonel *Upton* to *Poona*, to ſettle the Terms of a Treaty of Peace with the Ruling Power there.

We think it would be improper to communicate to him any more than theſe circumſtances.

We are, &c.

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From the *Nabob*, dated 12th Auguſt 1775; received 13th D^o D^o.

YESTERDAY, being the 11th Auguſt, at Evening, the Letter from *Savay Maudheverow*, a Copy of which I now incloſe for your peruſal, was brought to me by two poſt camels. You will be pleaſed to inform me what mode you think it adviſable to adopt in replying to it. What ſhall I ſay more?

Copy of a Letter from *Savay Maudheverow Pundit Pridhawn* to the Nabob; received at the *Durbar* 11th Auguſt 1775.

From the firſt eſtabliſhment of the Engliſh Factories on this Coaſt, we have, in reliance on their ſincerity and veracity, afforded them every kind of aſſiſtance that could tend to make their ſettlements flouriſh, and their trade increaſe; and the good underſtanding between us ſeemed firm and proſperous, inſomuch that the late *Iru Mant Maudheverow*, on receiving a Letter from your Highneſs and Mr. *Bourchier*, the then Governor of *Madras*, by the mediation of *Naugoo Row*, on the ſubject of the conqueſt of the *Maiſore* Country and *Reidenoor*, and the chaſtiſement of *Hyder Cawn*, applied himſelf, from a regard to the laws of friendſhip, to ſuccour your Highneſs and the Engliſh, and advanced in perſon repeatedly into the country of *Maiſore* with that intent. He then ſent *Maudeverow Sadaſhevah* to your Highneſs, who ſtaid with you for a conſiderable length of time; and notwithſtanding that no ſigns appeared of your ſending us a Force, and that the dilatory promiſe of Letters from *Europe* was brought up in the matter of the ſuccours we require, yet, after receiving Letters from your Highneſs and Governor *Dupré*, full of friendly expreſſions and declarations of ſteady adherence, he returned from thence; and though your Highneſs's country was cloſe by, did not tranſgreſs the bounds of amity. We had an entire dependance on the continuance of that good will which was expreſſed in your Highneſs's and the ſaid Governor's Letters from firſt to laſt.

Now however the Governor of *Bombay* having got poſſeſſion of *Salſette* by artifice, is acting in concert with my Uncle *Ragonaut Row*, in open hoſtility with the Circar Army. This perhaps you have already heard. Such a proceeding on the part of the Engliſh, contrary to all expectation, is highly injurious; and, conſidering the conduct of my Uncle towards my Father, which muſt appear atrocious to all nations, it is wonderful that the Engliſh, famed as they are for their ſincerity and uprightneſs, and informed as they are of this circumſtance and the nature of my Government, ſhould undertake to aſſiſt him.

Your Highneſs frequently wrote the late *Iru Mant Maudheverow*, and pledged your word to *Maudheverow Sedahevah* that you would be ſecurity for the union ſubſiſting between us and the Engliſh. I therefore deſire of your Highneſs, that you will ſpeak with the Governor of *Madras* that he may write, and that you yourſelf alſo will write, to the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*; and that they ſend directions to the Governor of *Bombay* to deſiſt from ſuccouring my Uncle, and remain in the path of ancient friendſhip, which I ſhall eſteem a favour. For the reſt may your Highneſs's joy be perpetual.

A true Copy.
(Signed) *R^d. Sullivan*,
Secretary.

APPENDIX, No. 81.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 18th September 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

THE Governor General lays before the Board two Letters, this morning received from *Suckaram Baboo* and *Ballajee*

Ballajee Pundit, with the following Letters from the Chief of *Maſulipatam*, and Mr. *Motte*.

Honourable Sir,

I have the honour to tranſmit you herewith, two Letters received this day, the one from *Sukaram Baboo*, and the other from *Nana Pudanvijs*, both addreſſed to you.

Maſulipatam, I am, &c.
2d September 1775. (Signed) *John Whitehill*.

Sir,

I do myſelf the honour to incloſe two Letters received from *Poona* by returned Pattamars, and two received at the ſame time, diſpatched from thence by *Sukaram Baboo* by expreſs Pattamars.

Benares, I have, &c.
9 September 1775. (Signed) *T. Motte*.

From *Sicca Ram Baboo*; dated 29th July; received 18th September.

The many inſtances of your wiſdom, prudence, and abilities, which have come to my knowledge, have long made me deſirous of cultivating your friendſhip; but there is a time fixed for every thing, before which it cannot take place. I thank God that, agreeable to my moſt earneſt wiſhes, I have at this happy time, enjoyed the pleaſure of a Letter from you; and by a peruſal of its contents, am ſatisfied of your friendſhip and regard.

You are therein ſo kind as to inform me that you have written to the Sirdars of *Bombay*, to recal the forces which, contrary to the Orders of the Company, they have ſent to the aſſiſtance of *Ragonaut Row*, and to refrain from any act injurious to the Government of *Surmunt Row*; and you deſire that I will alſo put a ſtop to all hoſtilities againſt them by Troops of this Government. You further inform me, that it is your intention to depute a truſty perſon to me to adjuſt all differences; but that you wait for my anſwer, and a diſcovery of my ſentiments thereon. I perfectly underſtand all theſe particulars.

The circumſtances, my friend, are theſe; formerly the ſtricteſt union ſubſiſted between the family of the Peiſhwa and the *Bombay* Sirdars, which was cemented by a great number of Treaties; but by a ſudden change of fortune, *Narrain Row* being murdered by *Ragonaut Row*, the circumſtances of which are well known, by the favour of God a ſon was born to the deceaſed *Row*, under whoſe ſhadow we are protected; his birth raiſed the hopes of all men, and he was ſeated on the Muſnud of the Peiſhwaſhip.

During the life-time of the late bleſſed *Row*, I and *Ballajee Pundit* had, under him, the management of all affairs of the Government; and out of gratitude to them we ſtill continue to exert ourſelves with the utmoſt aſſiduity for the ſervice of our maſter, and are ſatisfied therein by all the dependants of the Peiſhwa, both great and ſmall. Moreover, the Nabob *Nizam ul Mulk*, adhering ſtrictly to the rights of his ancient friendſhip, ſhews favour and kindneſs to us.

When this affair became public, *Ragonaut Row* went towards *Hindoſtan*, purſued by the Forces of the Decan; and the *Bombay* Sirdars, notwithſtanding there had not been the leaſt appearance of a breach of friendſhip on the part of this Government, in violation of their Treaties, fraudulently ſeized on *Salſette*, belonging to this Government, and entering into an alliance with *Ragonaut Row*, who was wandering about with a very few followers, engaged in hoſtilities with the armies of the Circar. As the moſt ſtrict attention is paid to the performance of Treaties in your country, which the contracting parties preſerve inviolably to the end of their lives, ſuch conduct from the Sirdars of *Bombay*, in violation of their friendſhip, filled me with aſtoniſhment, and they daily enter further into this buſineſs. It therefore becomes neceſſary to oppoſe them; and our Army, ſupplied with all kinds of neceſſaries, has taken the field for that purpoſe.

There has been one or two engagements between them, which you muſt have received Advices of.

I have no other wiſh than to reſtore the affairs of my maſter, to procure eaſe and ſecurity to the people, and to preſerve harmony amongſt the families of the nobles. This is alſo your intention. Agreeable to your promiſe, you will, I doubt not, direct the recal of the Forces from the field; but it is a matter of the higheſt importance that your Orders to the Sirdars at *Bombay* ſhould be conveyed in the moſt poſitive terms. Our mutual intereſt conſiſts in a ſtrict friendſhip being preſerved between us, I have written all theſe particulars for your information, and wait for your Anſwer, and the arrival of a confidential Agent from you. The ſooner an Anſwer arrives the better.

Ballajee Pundit has alſo written to you, to whom it is neceſſary you ſhould return an Anſwer.

On a ſeparate Paper.

Several affairs of importance are delayed for your concurrence. As ſoon as the preſent affair is ſettled, I will inſtruct a perſon therein, and ſend him to you. Let me frequently have the pleaſure to hear from you.

From *Ballajee Pundit*; dated 29th July.

The many inſtances which I have heard of your wiſdom, prudence and abilities, have long made me deſirous of cultivating your friendſhip: but there is a time decreed for every thing, till which it cannot take place. God be thanked, that agreeable to my moſt earneſt wiſhes, *Sicca Ram Pundit* has at this happy time received a Letter from you, which inſpired me with the greateſt pleaſure; by a peruſal of its contents I am ſatisfied of your friendſhip.

Sicca Ram Pundit has written you very fully, by which you will be made acquainted with every particular.

I am in expectation of your Anſwer, and the arrival of a confidential Agent from you; the ſooner they arrive the better. Several affairs of importance are delayed for your concurrence. After the preſent Negociation is brought to a concluſion, I will ſend a perſon to you fully informed on theſe points.

N. B. Duplicates of the ſame date were received with the above Letters, together with triplicates dated 8th of Jummadu Aſſani, or 6th of Auguſt.

Reſolved, That the following Reply be ſent to the foregoing Letters.

To *Sicca Ram Baboo*; dated 20th September 1775.

I have been favoured with your Letter of the 29th of Jummadee ul Awel, together with a duplicate of the ſame date, and triplicate of the 8th of Jummade Aſſani, and was made happy by a peruſal of its contents. You write me, that you are anxious for the arrival of my Anſwer, and of a truſty perſon to accommodate all the cauſes of difference between the Gentlemen at *Bombay* and the Maratta State. My friend Colonel *Upton*, who has been appointed with full powers to treat with you, ſet out from hence about the latter end of Jummadee ul Awel, and will proceed directly to *Poona* by the way of *Calpee*. As I have already expreſſed my firm wiſh to reſtore the bleſſings of peace, and to eſtabliſh a laſting friendſhip between the Company and Maratta Nation, I have nothing elſe to add, but to deſire, that as Colonel *Upton* muſt paſs through your Country, and may meet with obſtructions, you will facilitate his paſſage as much as poſſible, by ordering the Chiefs of the Country through which he is to paſs, to afford him ſuch aſſiſtance as he may require. Conſidering me as your ſincere friend, let me frequently have the pleaſure to hear of your health.

To *Ballajee Pundit*, of the ſame Tenor and Date.

Reſolved, That the above Letters be ſent to Colonel *Upton*, together with Copies of them, and of thoſe juſt received for his information; and that the following Letter be immediately written to him.

APPENDIX. No. 81.

APPENDIX. No. 82.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

The Governor General having received Anſwers from *Sicca Ram Baboo* and *Ballajee Pundit*, the Miniſters of the Maratta Government at *Poona*, to the Letters which he wrote them concerning our intention to depute a perſon to negociate a Treaty of Peace with that State, we incloſe Tranſlations of theſe Papers, together with Copies of the Replies now diſpatched to them, for your information. The original Replies, which we alſo incloſed, we deſire you will forward by a ſpeedy conveyance to *Poona*, with a Letter from yourſelf addreſſed to *Sicca Ram Baboo*, requeſting any aſſiſtance that you may find you may have occaſion for in your route to that Capital.

We think it proper to add, that it appears highly neceſſary you ſhould proceed with all poſſible diſpatch.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 82.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 5th October 1775.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

WE addreſſed you in duplicate under the 6th inſtant: and have ſince received the duplicate of your Letter of the 31ſt May, the contents whereof give us great concern; not only becauſe the intereſt of our Honourable Employers, we apprehend, muſt be very materially affected by the meaſures you have thought proper to adopt for bringing about a general Pacification, and the due weight of this Government affected in a manner we fear fcarcely to be retrieved, by the Letter *Sacram Bappo* at *Poona*, but alſo becauſe your Honour, &c. ſeem to think we have been guilty of a premeditated and intentional diſreſpect to the powers entruſted by the Legiſlature to your Government, which we take this early opportunity to aſſure you was by no means the caſe; but the Negociation for the Treaty with *Rageba* being begun before your adminiſtration commenced, and as we thereby ſecured to the Company the poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, and the right to *Baſſein* and the Pergunnahs near to *Surat*, all of which our Honourable Employers have repeatedly enjoined us to procure for them; and as the Revenues of theſe Pergunnahs can be collected without much trouble or expence, and is ſo conſiderable as to amount, including *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, to near twenty (20) lacks of Rupees per annum, which will be the means of enabling this Preſidency to ſupport itſelf, without being any longer a burthen to yours, of which the late adminiſtration frequently complained; and it was moreover abſolutely requiſite for us to determine, whether we would conclude the Treaty, or abſolutely reject it; for any delay in the then ſituation of *Rageba*'s affairs would, we judged, have been the ſame as if we had determined to remain inactive; we ſay, for all theſe cogent reaſons, we thought that we were not precluded by the late Act of Parliament from purſuing the meaſures we did.

Another weighty conſideration impelled us alſo to this meaſure; we have been induced, from the motives we fully ſtated to your Honour, &c. in our Addreſs of the 31ſt December laſt, to attack and reduce *Salſette*, and we think that the welfare of this Preſidency entirely depended on our preventing that Iſland from again falling into the hands of the Portugueze; in this ſituation we are of opinion policy required that we ſhould ſide with one of the contending parties in the Maratta State, that it might be reconciled to our motives for that attack, and to our continuing in poſſeſſion of that Iſland; this neceſſarily being allowed, juſtice doubtleſs required that we ſhould take part with *Rageba* the Peiſhwa; and in duty to our Employers we made this deciſive ſtep as advantageous to them as poſſible, as we think is evident from the Treaty.

We are induced to hope for theſe reaſons, that your Honour, &c. will not continue to conſider our Treaty as invalid, nor the War which was the conſequence of it, either un-authoriſed, impolitic, or unjuſt; that it was not dangerous, the event of it hitherto has ſhewn; but even had it been ſo in ſome degree, we flatter ourſelves your Honour, &c. will admit ſomething might have been riſked for the great probability we had of acquiring a a revenue of nearly two hundred and fifty thouſand (2,50,000 *l. ſtg.*) Pounds ſterling per annum, for the future neceſſary ſupport of this Preſidency, and this by a means that equity as we conceive, allowing for circumſtances, cannot cenſure; for though we have not the plea of injury ſuſtained by the *Poona* party, yet it muſt be obſerved, that party is compoſed of the traitorous and rebellious ſubjects of *Rageba*, who by his large offers for our aſſiſtance, his juſt pretenſions, and the neceſſity of our taking a part for the reaſons above aſſigned, induced us to eſpouſe his cauſe, and to hope for your Honour, &c. concurrence.

We are convinced, that were you fully acquainted with the equitable and undeniable pretenſions of *Rageba* to the dignity of Peiſhwa, of which he has been near two years in poſſeſſion (as you will pleaſe to obſerve on reference to a Letter from Mr. *Meſſyn*, Reſident at the Durbar, to the late Select Committee of your Preſidency, under date 29th November 1773) and that a large part of the Maratta Empire at preſent acknowledge him ſuch, with the fair proſpect we had of ſhortly fixing him therein, and alſo of the diſtracted ſtate of the affairs of the rebellious confederacy, without an adequate army, or an effectual means to procure one, together with the detriment that muſt accrue to the Company, and the diſgrace to this Preſidency, by the Orders you have given for annulling our Treaty, and in conſequence deſerting *Rageba*; we ſay that had your Honour, &c. been fully apprized reſpecting all theſe points, we cannot but flatter ourſelves that your Orders would have been very different, or at leaſt they would have left us to have carried into execution your reſolution for a general pacification, which we are ſatisfied might have been done with honour and credit, had you not at the ſame time you peremptorily required us to withdraw our Forces, acquainted the Miniſterial Party ſo expreſſly of your having done ſo, and of your condemnation of our conduct.

This intelligence we received from *Poona* in a Letter to the Preſident, as per Copy incloſed, and at the ſame time we received a Copy of one from Governor *Haſtings* to *Sacram Bappo*; both were delivered by an Agent from that party, who had been here ſome time to ſolicit Peace; but the indiſpoſition of this Agent, and of our Preſident afterwards, prevented his propoſals being received till after he had got this Letter; he will now make no other Overtures than, that on condition of delivering up *Rageba* and the Iſland of *Salſette*, and of relinquiſhing our pretenſions to *Baſſein*, and all other places ceded by Treaty, our expences may be defrayed; though we are ſatisfied thoſe he came with were widely different indeed: he alſo aſſures us, as well as the Letter from *Poona*, that Orders are gone to their Army to ceaſe all hoſtilities; which Orders the Agent declares he underſtands extend to *Rageba*, his Officers, and adherents. In obedience to your poſitive injunctions, we have alſo ſent directions to our Commanding Officer to ceaſe from all acts of hoſtility, and as ſoon as the ſeaſon will poſſibly admit, our Forces will be withdrawn into our own garriſons.

But in order more fully than can be done by Letter, at ſo great a diſtance, to repreſent to your Honour, &c. the motives for all our proceedings, and the preſent ſituation of affairs, with the danger and diſcredit that muſt attend our Treaty being annulled, and *Rageba* deſerted; as well as to repreſent to you at large the particular intereſt of this Preſidency; we have deputed to your Honour, &c. Mr. *William Taylor*, who, from being long a Member of our Board and of the Select Committee, is ſufficiently

ently qualified to give your Honour, &c. every requiſite information: and we earneſtly requeſt that you will attend to the repreſentations that he may make you on the ſubject in queſtion, and all others dependent on it; and we hope, that on further conſideration you may be induced to revoke your preſent Orders, to confirm our Treaty, and to permit us to carry *Rageba* to *Poona*, in the manner firſt propoſed, for we can aſſure your Honour, &c. that with your countenance and ſupport we are firmly of opinion no ill conſequences can reſult therefrom, but on the contrary, that great and permanent advantages muſt be ſecured to the Company thereby; we hope alſo that you will do us the juſtice to believe that it is our wiſh and intention at all times to pay the moſt implicit obedience to your authority. We would willingly take upon ourſelves the conſequences of the War, for which your Honour, &c. by your proteſt declare we are reſponſible, provided we have your ſupport, and are allowed to conduct it to its iſſue.

For every other requiſite information, as well with regard to the places ceded for ever by Treaty, as for thoſe granted for the ſubſidy, alſo for the ſituation of the Pergunnahs that have ſince been made over to the Company by *Rageba* and *Futty Sing*, for mediating the reconciliation of the latter with the former, likewiſe for the Company's general intereſt at this Preſidency in its preſent ſituation, permit us to refer your Honour, &c. to Mr. *Tayler*; aſſuring you that we remain, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 23d Auguſt 1775. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, and Council.

To *Madaurao Narrein*.

After Compliments.

By the hands of your ſervant *Biccajee*, I received your Letter, and underſtand its contents. You write, that a Letter has been received from Governor *Haſtings* at *Bengal*, in the name of *Sacaram Bagwant*, of which you have ſent me a Copy, and that you have ſent written Orders to all your Officers, charging them not to fight with or moleſt the Engliſh Forces. This is well. Your ſervant *Biccajee* has aſſured me in your name, that your Orders to your Officers alſo extend to *Rageba*, his Forces, and all his adherents, that is, that they are not to fight with or moleſt him, or them; this alſo is proper, for *Rugonaut Row* Peiſhwa is under our protection. All is to remain juſt in the ſame ſituation as at preſent, as your ſervant aſſures me is your meaning and intention; this alſo is mine, and I have therefore ſent the neceſſary Orders to the Commander of our Forces. Take care, I deſire, that your Orders are not infringed, and then mine will be exactly obeyed, till a Treaty may be concluded.

A true Copy.
(Signed) *Geo. Skipp*, Secretary.

Ordered, That this Letter lie for conſideration.

APPENDIX, No. 83.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

WE have received Advice from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and alſo learnt from Mr. *Tayler*, one of their Council, who has been deputed from them to this Government, that a total ceſſation of Arms, has taken place between the Maratta Army and the Company's Troops, lately employed in ſupport of *Rageba*; both Parties will conſequently remain in this ſtate of ſuſpenſe, until your arrival at *Poona*. It is unneceſſary therefore to ſay, how earneſtly we repeat our directions for your proceeding with all poſſible diſpatch.

Fort William, 5th October 1775. We are, &c.

Reſolved, That Mr. *Tayler* from *Bombay* be requeſted to meet the Board at Ten o'Clock on Monday next, that day being ſet apart for his reception. APPENDIX. No. 83.

Ordered, That notice be ſent him by the Secretary.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 9th October 1775.

Such were the great and leading motives which induced the Government of *Bombay* to engage with Peiſhwah *Ragonath Row*. It ſeems the very criſis wiſhed for by the Company, an opportunity of accompliſhing the objects they had ſo ſtrenuouſly enjoined them ever to keep in view, with honour, with juſtice, and without the hazard of a general War with the whole Maratta Empire, with their eſpecial and repeated Orders on this head before them, unrepealed by every Letter that accompanied the new Act. So far from meaning a diſregard to that Act, or to the power with which it veſts your Honour, &c. the Government of *Bombay* would have deemed themſelves wanting, in their conception of it, to the ſpirit of the Legiſlature expreſſed in the words, "except in ſuch caſes "where the ſaid Preſident and Council reſpectively ſhall "have received ſpecial Orders from the ſaid united Com-"pany," and moſt highly to our Employers, had they ſo ſlumbered over their intereſts, as to let paſs by unregarded this opportunity, perhaps the only one that may offer again, of eſtabliſhing their affairs in the Weſt of *India*, on the footing they have ſo long ſought to place them. To have heſitated cloſing with the Peiſhwah, would in effect have been the ſame as a plain refuſal, for in the ſituation he then was, he muſt certainly have had recourſe to other aſſiſtance; and from the reſpectable footing in which the late increaſe of their military and total change of Government has placed them, it would moſt probable have been to the Portugueze, who would gladly have cheriſhed a ſtroke of fortune ſo unexpectedly co-operating, the execution of the very views to which all their late expences and arrangements have ſolely tended, viz. the recovery of the Provinces of the North, the great object of their intereſt and honour ever ſince the capture of them in 1739, by *Chimnajee Oppa*, and which they would certainly have now obtained, had it not been for an interference equally timely and fortunate to the Honourable Company.

Beſides theſe, other ſtrong inducements were not wanting to take the part they did; the reduction of *Salſette*, without the conſent of either party, rendered it neceſſary to ſide with one, in order to procure a degree of title to the poſſeſſion; and to prevent the diſagreeable alternative of either endangering the welfare of the Settlement, by relinquiſhing this conqueſt, or ſuſtaining at ſome period a general War with the combined Forces of the Marattas, to maintain it.

The due attention to the ſafety and tranquillity of the Company's Poſſeſſions in the Eaſt of *Hindoſtan*, was alſo no ſmall motive in theſe engagements. It was judged, that ſhould the ſucceſs of the confederates at *Poona* end in the total depreſſion of *Rageba*, and once give them leiſure to advert the other objects, the very firſt that would ſtrike their attention, would be to enrich themſelves by the collection of Chout in the name of their circar. In this all parties among the Marattas never fail to concur. I cannot pretend to ſay how far the *Bengal* Provinces might be engaged; but from the vicinity of the *Carnatic*, there ſeems no doubt of their paying it a viſit. They never want a pretence; and the reduction of *Tanjore* had given great jealouſy at *Poona*, particularly to the Maratta Chiefs, as the Rajah of *Tanjore* is related to the Rajah. The ſafety and tranquillity of the Company's Territories in the Eaſt would, for theſe reaſons, be ſecured for a longer time, by not ſuffering the Miniſterial Confederacy to predominate by the Treaty with the Peiſhwa. This great object is for ever accompliſhed as far as ſolemn engagements can bind; and, could circumſtances permit of a general exertion at this period, our ſecurity in this point might be ſtill more perfect.

Indeed, by theſe ſeveral motives, the Government of *Bombay*

APPENDIX. No. 83.

Bombay concluded a Treaty with the Vackeel of *Ragoba*: It was much to be wiſhed that their reſources in Men and Money had been more adequate to this undertaking; but truſting that the ſame ſentiments would generally prevail of the policy and utility of their engagements, the aid of the other Preſidencies was not doubted. Accordingly ſuch Troops as could poſſibly be ſpared were embarked for *Surat*, from whence they were to proceed to form a junction with the Army of *Ragoba*, in the manner that circumſtances on their arrival might point out to be moſt expedient; the firſt ſtep propoſed being to reduce *Brodirah*, the capital of the *Guicawars*, put the Officers of *Govindrow* and *Candahrow* in poſſeſſion of the country, and direct the march towards *Poona*, which could then be done with greater ſafety, as we ſhould have a country in alliance with us in our rear.

Hurry Punt Furkia, a Bramin, one of the Confederates and Commander in Chief of the Army, hearing of *Ragoba*'s intention to ſecure our aid, judged there was no time to be loſt; and therefore determined, if poſſible, to attack him while he had yet the ſuperiority; he accordingly directed his march towards *Broderah*, which obliged *Ragoba* to raiſe the ſiege of it, and retire Northwards of the *Mybie* River, near *Cambay*. *Futty Sing Guicawar* joined the Confederates; and being well acquainted with the country, led their Army, by ſhort routs, through paſſes and defiles, croſſed *Mybie*, came unexpectedly on the Army of *Ragoba*, attacked the center of it, where he was; a ſmart action enſued between the Armies, but a party of Arabs, whom *Ragoba* had got from *Govind Row*, declining to engage, he thought himſelf betrayed, quitted the field, and narrowly eſcaped to *Cambay*, with about 1000 horſe. His General, *Monackjee Phankria*, retreated with the beſt of his Troops and valuable effects to the Fort *Copperwange*, about 50 coſs from *Cambay*, as did *Govind Row* and *Sanda Row*.

From *Cambay* the Peiſhwa made the beſt of his way to *Surat*, where our Army found him. The Treaty agreed on by his Vackeel was here ratified by him; and having received advice from his General and his Allies of their ſafe retreat to *Copperwange*, from whence they acquainted him, that they doubted not of effecting a junction with the Engliſh Troops, could they advance to *Cambay*, it was therefore determined our Army ſhould proceed there, as we could tranſport it by ſea, and were well aſſured of its perfect ſecurity. It accordingly arrived there the 18th March; and though the Miniſterial Army was at firſt between us and our Allies, yet by a concerted motion the Commander in Chief having brought himſelf in a ſecure poſt between the Enemy and the Peiſhwa's Troops, a junction was happily formed with them on the 19th April.

The combined Army then conſiſted of 35,000 Horſe and Foot belonging to *Ragoba* and *Govind Row*, and 2,500 Engliſh Troops. The Army of the Confederates had ſuffered a very material reduction, and of their beſt Troops, by the deſertion of *Madoojee Sindia*, the Jagierdaar of *Ugien*, owing entirely to the impolitic advice of the Bramins, who deeming *Ragoba*'s ruin certain on his late defeat, paid no further attention to their Northern Friends, but ſent Orders to *Hurry Punt Furkia*, to ſeize *Madoojee Sindia*, and ſend him to *Poona* to ſettle his accounts. The Maratta got intelligence of this, and knowing the meaning was to fleece him, he decamped with about 12,000 of the beſt horſe in the Army, under pretence that troubles in his own Jaghier called him there.

As ſoon as poſſible after junction, Colonel *Keating*, the Commander in Chief of our Forces, advanced towards the Enemy in order to bring them to an engagement, but though ſomething ſuperior, they ſtudiouſly avoided it, and fled before us at different times. At the requeſt of the Peiſhwa, for ſome particular reaſons our Army moved towards the North; but *Poona* being our final object, as the Peiſhwa's arrival there would bring matters to a concluſion, Colonel *Keating* was ordered not to be diverted from it by any object ſo remote from his deſtination, but with all expedition poſſible to direct his march Southward.

Diſcouraged by the deſection of ſo conſiderable a partizan as *Sindia*; by the doubts they were in regarding their other Northern Ally, *Hulcar*; by the duplicity of the Nizam's conduct, who notwithſtanding their ceſſions and ſubſidies, had ſtill declined advancing any Troops to their aſſiſtance; by the loſs of their Ally, *Shabajee Bonſola*, cut off by his brother *Moodajee*; by their fears of ſeveral leading men, who not only refuſed to join the Confederacy, but they judged would declare openly for *Ragoba* as he advanced to *Poona*; and knowing the utter impoſſibility they were in to reſiſt, ſhould the engagement of the Engliſh with *Ragoba* become general; from theſe ſeveral motives, the junction at *Poona*, it is ſaid, directed *Hurry Punt Furkia* at all events to riſk an engagement with us at any rate; their proſpects could not be worſe, and a fortunate ſucceſs might give a favourable turn to a Negociation, which *Sacaram Bapoo* and *Nana Furneſſe* were then meditating with the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*.

When the Peiſhwa was compelled to fly on the unfortunate ſurpriſal of his Army, he had brought off with him about ſix lacks of Rupees in Jewels, the reſt of his valuable effects were ſecured in the Fort of *Dhaar* with his family; theſe ſix Lacks were inſiſted on as a pledge for his engagement with the Company. He wanted to make a Loan at *Surat*, but from the ſtate of affairs, the Shroffs did not chuſe to truſt him on his own ſecurity, and the Preſident and Council could not in prudence engage the credit of the Company; from this want of money, infinite diſtreſs ſucceeded, and in action, advantages were loſt by it, as it is well known the hired Troops of *India* can never be brought to engage without ſome proſpect of immediate ſatisfaction; the Miniſters know this, and were therefore more deſirous to come to action before a turn to his affairs relieved him from this diſtreſs, which they were ſenſible would in fact deprive him of any great benefit from his own Troops, whatever their number might be.

Accordingly, on the 18th of May they made diſpoſitions to engage.—Accounts have already been tranſmitted of this action, in which the Confederates were defeated, and though by ſome unfortunate accident on our ſide, and the inaction of the Peiſhwa's Force, it was not ſo complete a victory as might have been hoped for, yet it ſufficed to throw their Troops into utter diſcouragement, and they never could be brought to face us again, but ſuffered us quietly to purſue them through defenſible paſſes and defiles without oppoſition, till on the 7th of June we came up with their rear in croſſing the *Nerbedah*, killed them ſeveral people, obliged them to ſink their Cannon in the river, and many Men, Horſes, and Camels, &c. were afterwards found floating down with the tide; this was the laſt time we could come to action with them, *Hurry Punt Furkia* having fled with the remainder of his Army entirely out of the *Guzerat* Provinces.

The approach of the Monſoon, when it would be impoſſible for our Troops to march, forbad all thoughts of advancing further Southward before the rains; not to loſe any time however, it was determined by the Colonel to avail himſelf of the remaining part of the fair ſeaſon to reduce *Dubboy*, a fortified place, ſituated between *Broach* and *Broderah*, where our Army could winter, and on the opening of the ſeaſon be eaſily joined from *Broach* by ſuch reinforcement and ſupplies as might be ſent from *Bombay*, and from thence march to reduce *Broderah*, ſhould the Negociation then on foot between *Futty Sing* and the Peiſhwa fail to ſecure us a friendly country in our rear, on the march of the Army towards *Poona*. The reduction of *Dubboy* was effected without loſs, and with it concluded all our Military Operations that Campaign.

The engagements of *Futty Sung Guicawar* with the Confederates, ſeems to have been ſolely with the view of preventing the ravage and deſtruction of his country for ever. At the time he joined their Army, he made diſtant

Overtures to *Ragoba*; he knew that the intereſts which the late ceſſions gave to the Engliſh in the welfare of *Guzerat* would preſerve it on their part, and his junction with the Miniſterial Army ſecure it on the other; as ſoon therefore as the retreat of *Hurry Punt Furkia* confirmed his ſafety in that quarter, he began to make ſerious Overtures of Accommodation to *Ragoba*, who from the general face of things he judged muſt prevail, and in that caſe his Government would be for ever loſt to him. As the former appointment of *Govind Row*, and his firm attachment to *Ragoba*, left no doubt of his rival being eſtabliſhed in the *Guicawar* poſſeſſion, the better to inſure ſucceſs he applied for the mediation of the Engliſh, to whom he not only gave the confirmation of the grants engaged by the Peiſhwa to be obtained from the *Guicawar*, but further convenient ceſſions in perpetuity, to the amount of about 1,78,000 Rupees per annum. With *Ragoba* he ſtipulated for the uſual Chout and aid due to the *Poona* Durbar; and what was moſt convenient in his preſent circumſtances, the ſum of twenty-ſix Lacks to be paid in ſixty days, the Peiſhwa having previouſly ſatisfied *Govind Row*; a Treaty of Peace and Alliance was finally concluded in the month of July laſt.

At ſea the Marattas at firſt made a formidable appearance. Induced by the hopes of making ſome rich captures, the Officer at *Gheria* equipped a ſquadron conſiſting of

1 Ship	— 46	guns	2 Gallivats of 9 guns.
1 Ditto	— 38	ditto	8 Ditto from 2 to 4 guns, beſides ſwivels.
1 Ditto	— 32	ditto	
2 Ditto	— 26	ditto	
—5			

This formidable Fleet in appearance was met on the 2d of February by the *Revenge* and *Bombay* grab, under the command of Commodore *John More*; the Commodore immediately ſtood towards them, when their whole Fleet bore away; he however ſingled out the Admiral's ſhip, called the *Shumſhur Jung*, of 46 guns, and directed the grab, being the beſt ſailer, to give her chace. The ſhip ſtood in for the ſhore, with deſign it ſeems to run aground, but the grab came up with her, and began engaging, which giving time to the Commodore to come up, he kept up a very ſmart fire on her for about two hours, when ſhe blew up and was entirely deſtroyed, with the Commander and moſt of her people.

Proper convoys being given to the trade up and down the *Malabar* Coaſt, we met with no loſs whatever at ſea, except of a ſmall pilot ſloop, which was ſurprized by two gallivats, under the colours of the Suddee of *Ragapore*, our friend and ally, not knowing at that time of our being at hoſtilities with the Marattas.

As your Honours, &c. had deſired particular information regarding the ſeveral places ceded to us, I will conclude with it the account of our ſituation at this period.

Ceded for ever by the Treaty with the Peiſhwa,

Salſette, with Caranjee, Elephanta, Hog Iſland, and Canary — —	3,50,000	
Baſſien with its dependencies —	4,00,000	
Orpad — — —	3,50,000	
Jamboſeer — — —	4,00,000	
Baroach the Guicawars Shaw	3,50,000	
To be paid annually from Occlaſeer	75,000	
		19,25,000

Preſented to the Company ſince by Ragonaut Row and Futty Sing, on the concluſion of the Treaty between them; viz.

Corial near Baroach — —	50,000	
Chickley near Surat —	1,00,000	
Veriow near Surat — —	28,000	
Ahmood adjoining to Baroach	1,50,000	
		3,28,000
Ceded to the Company for ever — Rupees		22,53,000

Made over by the Peiſhwa for the payment of the ſubſidy, viz.

Ahmood, ſince entirely given up, and therefore the others remain as a pledge for the payment of the ſubſidy —	1,50,000	
Occlaſeer, the remainder of its revenues — —	1,00,000	
Hanſoot — — —	1,27,000	
Verſal — —	1,00,000	
		4,87,000

From the ſouthenmoſt part of *Baſſien* to the point of *Chaul*, the land forms a deep bay, in which are ſituated the Iſlands of *Salſette*, *Bombay*, *Caranja*, *Hog Iſland*, *Elephanta*, and *Canary*; *Bombay* being ſituated about eight miles from the continent, forms the harbour to which it gives its name.

Salſette lays north of *Bombay*, from which it is divided only by a narrow channel of about half a mile in breadth; it is about twenty miles long, and the ſame breadth on a medium. Its chief produce is Rice; it is capable of much improvement, not being above two-thirds cultivated, and great part of it alſo breached by the ſea. The Fort of *Tamah* commands a fordable channel, dividing *Salſette* from the main, and is about the middle of the eaſtern ſide of the Iſland.

Caranja is a ſmall Iſland on the eaſt of *Bombay*, forming part of the eaſt ſide of the harbour; its chief produce is alſo Rice; it is at preſent worth about 60,000 Rupees per annum, and is capable of improvement.

Elephanta is a ſmall Iſland, valued at about 800 Rupees.

Hog Iſland and *Canary* are little more than barren rocks; the latter is in the mouth of the harbour. Of all theſe, except *Canary*, which is not worth the trouble of reducing, we have poſſeſſion of the regular Sunnuds for them on the Peiſhwa.

Baſſien is a Peninſula formed by a large river on the north, by the ſea on the weſt, and a river which divides it from *Salſette*, and to which it gives its name, on the ſouth; a rivulet which fills makes it an Iſland in the time of the rains. It produces Rice, many Fruits, and particularly fine Sugar Canes: The ſoil is exceedingly fine. An extenſive fort on the ſouth commands the river. The diſtrict of *Baſſien* extends to *Baldapaiby* northward, within eight coſs of *Damaun*, including *Dannoo*, *Terrapore*, *Mahim*, *Kelme*, *Almole*, and ſome other towns ſituated on rivers flowing from the *Gauts*. We have the Sunnuds for *Baſſien* and its diſtricts; but as we had not ſufficient force to reduce them after the departure of our Army to the northward, and as the conducting the Peiſhwa to *Poona* was the great object which would inſure to us the peaceable attainment of theſe places, it was not thought prudent to delay that, or diminiſh our Force by the previous reduction of them; they are not therefore in our poſſeſſion as you imagined, but ſtill in the hands of the Miniſterial Party.

Theſe are all our acquiſitions to the ſouthward of *Surat*, forming a continued chain with *Bombay* of about eighty-ſix miles from north to ſouth. Two additional battalions of Sepoys, I imagine, will be ſufficient for the neceſſary poſts, which being called in on any apprehenſion from the French, will be a conſiderable reinforcement to the ſtanding garriſon of *Bombay*.

From *Baſſien*, *Donnoo*, and the rivers between, comes great part of the Timber indiſpenſably neceſſary for the conſtruction of the ſhips. *Salſette*, &c. with *Baſſien* and its diſtricts, are only eſtimated at 7½ Lacks, but under our Government they will, I doubt not, in a few years produce at leaſt ten.

For all the ceſſions to the north ſtipulated by the Treaty with the Peiſhwa, we have not only the Sunnuds but abſolute poſſeſſion; the Sunnuds for *Corial*, *Chickley*, and *Variow*, were juſt received by the very laſt accounts, and no doubt we had poſſeſſion ſoon after we were in poſſeſſion of *Ahmood* and all the places aſſigned for payments of the ſubſidy.

APPENDIX. No. 83.

Orpad, *Variow*, and *Chickley*, laying contiguous to *Surat*, I ſee no increaſe of expence that will be requiſite on their account, except the neceſſary one for collection.

The ceſſion of the *Guicawar*'s ſhare of the *Baroach* revenue, is only what is Choutiah, collected from the ſame towns we did, ſo that this is all clear profit. *Jambooſeer* is a large commercial town, ſituated on a ſmall river to which it gives its name. Its territory adjoining to that of *Baroach*, very few changes will be requiſite, as the ſame garriſon which defends the territory of the one, will ſerve for the other. *Ahmood* is a large town; its diſtricts, and that of *Corial*, are all contiguous to that of *Baroach* from *Occlaſeer*, where the ſubſidy is paid, we have only to ſend a man to collect annually 75,000 Rupees.

Occlaſeer, the firſt of the Pergunnahs from which we are to reimburſe ourſelves for the ſtipulated ſubſidy, lies betwen *Surat* and *Baroach: Hanſoot* adjoins to our Pergunnah of *Orpad: Verſaul* is about 40 miles to the ſouthward of *Surat*, ſituated on a river, from which a great quantity of Timber is exported. As it is from the nett produce of theſe aſſignments that the Company are to be paid, the neceſſary charges of collection will be on account of the Peiſhwa.

Although theſe ceſſions are not literally the Maratta ſhare of the *Surat* revenues, by which it is to be underſtood thoſe collected by the Peiſhwa; yet, as they generally anſwer the views of the Company, it was preferred accepting them for many reaſons. Different perſons collect in many of the other diſtricts, which might have involved us in diſputes; *Baroach* being reduced ſince the date of their orders, they could have no views or intereſt then in the diſtrict ceded adjoining to it; but another ſtill more forcible reaſon is, that in order to have completed the ſum we had in view, the Peiſhwa muſt have taken from the *Guicawar* dominions; and at that period it was very material to conciliate the affections of that family, who may be made uſeful allies to the Company, ſhould you deem this a fit juncture to form a ſyſtem for counteracting any future deſign of the *Poonah* Durbar.

At the concluſion of the Treaty with *Futty Sing*, the general aſpect of affairs was very flattering to the hopes of *Ragoba*; he had already experienced, that with the greateſt force they could ever hope to collect, the Confederates had never dared to make a bold and determined ſtand againſt our Army as it then was, although for want of pay his own Troops had never been brought to act with any degree of efficacy. This Army would have been increaſed after the rains by Captain *Kelly*'s battalion of Sepoys from *Madras*, which, from the experience given of the activity and conduct of its Commander, the attention of his Officers, and the excellent ſtate of diſcipline the men were in, was judged by the military gentlemen to be little, if any thing, inferior in the field to Europeans; add to this, the junction of *Futty Sing*'s Troops, and the effectual ſervice that might be expected from thoſe of the Peiſhwa, when they found him enabled to ſatisfy their arrears; it was natural to imagine the Confederate Army would not dare to face us; the *Guicawar* country extending far on the road to *Poonah*, ſecured our rear and proviſions to the Army. With this Force alone, it might not be very raſh to pronounce that we ſhould have reached our deſtination during the courſe of the enſuing campaign, had we received the requeſted reinforcement from *Madras*; it ſeems to me there could not have been the leaſt doubt of it.

To increaſe his hopes by the lateſt accounts, *Moodajee*, who by the death of his brother *Shabajee* now enjoyed undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the *Bonſalo* Dominions, was advancing with a very reſpectable Force to his aſſiſtance, as was alſo *Iſhmael Cawn*, at the head of 4,000 good Horſe; *Appajee Gunnis*, then in charge of *Ahmadabab*, was in Treaty for the ſurrender of it to the Peiſhwa, part of whoſe Troops were gone to take poſſeſſion of it, which, when effected, would leave him free from any enemy to the northward of the *Nerbedah*.

But above all, the conduct of the Nizam, at this juncture, moſt fortunately co-operated with other events, to give us a moſt perfect aſſurance, of conducting our engagements with the Peiſhwa to a happy iſſue; it was perfectly of a piece with that policy which had attentively watched every turn in the Maratta affairs, to retrieve what their Government had uſurped from him in its proſperity. On the defeat of their Army, and the bad aſpect of their affairs, when the Peiſhwa repaſſed the *Nerbeda*, the Confederates, who would advance nothing of their own, thought to bribe the Nizam to action, by the ceſſion of the ſtrong and important Fortreſs of *Dowletabad*, with *Buranpore Aſſiry*, and ſome diſtricts formerly conquered by the Marattas: He accordingly entered into a ſolemn engagement with them; they had actually evacuated *Dowletabad*, and were withdrawing their Troops from the other ceſſions. In point of territory, it ſeems he had now got all he wanted; but judging, that if the Engliſh entered generally and heartily into the re-eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba*, his retaining it might be very doubtful, in order to ſecure himſelf more thoroughly, he applied to the Nabob of *Surat*, to ſound whether he could not compaſs his admiſſion into the party of *Ragoba*: His terms were, the confirmation of all that the Miniſters had ceded to him, for which the Engliſh were to become guarantees; for this he offered to act againſt the Miniſters with all his Force, conſiſting of 50,000 Horſe, 15,000 Sepoys, and a Train of Artillery, which were to be further joined by 8,000 good Horſe of *Moodajee Bonſalo*, ſhould the terms be accepted. Should the Nizam be once determined to act againſt them, the Confederates muſt loſe all hopes; and there ſeems no reaſon to doubt that he would, with the guarantee of the Engliſh to ſecure him in the ſtipulated ceſſion, as without it, he could have little hopes of peaceably retaining them any longer than juſt during the continuance of the preſent diviſions.

Excluſive of this application to the Engliſh, the Nizam alſo ſent Vackeels to *Ragoba*, with propoſals for a general accommodation between all parties, on the following plan: That *Ragoba* was to enjoy all the honours, and ſufficient revenue to ſupport the dignity of the Peiſhwa, but the Government to be carried on in the name of his ſon *Imrut Raw*, and the adminiſtration of affairs to be with *Moraba Tourneſe*; as Duan, all places ſtipulated to be ceded by the Miniſterial Party, to be confirmed to him by *Ragoba*, and the Confederates fully pardoned and ſecured in poſſeſſion of their fortunes and effects.—Excluſive of the policy of it, which alone ſuffices to account for the conduct of the Nizam, it is imagined the death of his *Neeziee Ruckna ul Dowla*, who was ſaid to be deeply bribed by the Miniſters, was partly the occaſion of theſe Overtures.

Far different from this flattering ſituation was the ſtate of the Confederacy; they had been deſerted by *Mhadoojee Sindia* and *Tocajee Holkar*, on whom reſted their chief dependence; *Naroo Uppa*, the Governor of *Poonah*, a man well reſpected, was dead; *Morava Tourniſe*, a Miniſter of the firſt conſideration, with ſeveral others, could not be brought to join the Confederacy, and his influence was ſo high, that they dared not moleſt him even in *Poonah*: Already, ſome in their party, by no means inconſiderable, had quitted it; ſuch were *Appajee Gunies*, the Governor of *Ahmadabad*, and *Futty Sing Guicawar*, to whoſe knowledge and influence in the *Guzerat* country, they were ſolely indebted for the ſucceſs they met with, previous to our junction with *Ragoba*: *Shabajee Benſalo*, who had been formerly of great ſervice to them, was dead: Always doubtful of the Nizam, the death of *Ruckna ul Dowla* now defeated all their hopes in that quarter, they knew the utter impoſſibility of reſiſting the united efforts of the Engliſh; add to this the jealouſy entertained of the views and ambitions of the leading members of the Confederacy, made ſeveral dread their ſucceſs, almoſt as much as that of *Ragoba*. Such was the ſtate of politics at *Poonah*.

Their reliance on their Army was nothing better: The Maratta Chiefs who had been brought to engage in the Confederacy, were given to hope for ſupplies of Caſh

from the Miniſters; but here again the *Brahmin* avarice combated the general intereſt; for though they have large ſums of their own, yet no one being perfectly aſſured that any particular benefit would accrue to him by parting with it, conſtantly refuſed every application, and referred to the treaſurers of the Circar, which being only the temporary collections, were ſoon exhauſted in ſubſidies to the Nizam. *Hurry Punt Furkia* foreſeeing the confuſion this want of money would create, abſolutely made pacific Overtures to the Peiſhwa, at the head of his Army, when it was in its moſt flouriſhing condition. However fit the Maratta Troops may be for predatory incurſions, ſtrong reaſons may be aſſigned why they will never willingly be brought to act againſt an army with a well-ſerved artillery; for theſe reaſons, and from the little proſpect they had of plundering, the army of *Hurry Punt Furkia* very ſoon ſhewed ſtrong diſinclinations to ſerve; and having loſt numbers of horſes in the different attacks we had made on them, their men now became clamorous on their leaders for arrears of pay, who again importuned *Hurry Punt Furkia:* by the account of perſons ſent for intelligence, and to watch his motions, the Miniſters had ſent bills for 15 lacks of Rupees, but the Shroffs had refuſed to anſwer them, from whence may injuſtly be inferred, they had not even in this ſituation advanced the amount. *Hurry Punt Furkia* had deſigned to winter to the northward, in order to be at hand to watch our motions on the opening of the campaign, but his Troops had abſolutely refuſed. By the laſt accounts, he was at *Indoor*, in full march towards *Poonah*, with between 20 and 30,000 men, horſe and foot. In his way through *Tookajee Holkar*'s country they had violent diſputes regarding ſome money which *Furkia* demanded, but *Holkar* could not be induced to furniſh; and under pretence that the death of *Siga ul Dowla*, and his third ſon being in arms, might render his preſence abſolutely neceſſary in his own Jaghier, he drew off his Troops from the Confederacy.

Saccaram Bapoo, and *Nonna Furneze*, had ſent two Vackeels to treat of an accommodation; but from the indiſpoſition of one of them, and afterwards of the Preſident, they had not mentioned their offers: and though it was rather wiſhed to ſecure to the Company the late ceſſions by the ways of Peace than of War, yet the precipitancy of diſpenſing with the Preſident's Negociations, was thought might have beſpoke too great an eagerneſs on our part, and an impolitic doubt of ſucceſs in the undertaking we were then engaged in.

Such, Gentlemen, was the ſituation of the Peiſhwa on the receipt of your Letter of 31ſt May laſt; I leave you to judge how different from that deſperate, friendleſs, and forlorn ſtate you ſeemed to apprehend him in. Had you been pleaſed to ſignify to the Government of *Bombay* alone your pacific determination, there is no doubt but a general accommodation might ſoon have been effected with honour and credit to the Company, and all the ceſſions and advantages ſecured to them, which was ſtipulated for in the Treaty with the Peiſhwa. As the terms of that Treaty was never underſtood by either Party to extend further than our aſſiſtance to defeat the Miniſterial Confederacy, and by conducting him to *Poonah*, to reinſtate him in the Peiſhwaſhip, whether this was effected by force or negociation, the Company were equally entitled to the ſeveral benefits which induced them to form theſe engagements.

But much do I fear, that whatever your future reſolves may be in conſequence of theſe my repreſentations, the Letter from the Honourable the Governor General to *Saccaram Bapoo*, and your poſitive Orders to withdraw our Troops from the Peiſhwaſhip, will utterly deſtroy all the fair hopes of ſucceſs which from circumſtances we had a right to conceive. Nothing can give a ſtronger idea of the unfavourable conſequences which may probably enſue, than the triumphant inſolence of the Confederates, as expreſſed in their offers ſubſequent to the receipt of Governor *Haſtings*'s Letter. Inſtead of permitting us to retain *Salſette* and *Baſſein* (the laſt of which I obſerve is not in our poſſeſſion) they demand *Ragoba* to be delivered up to them, *Salſette* and our other acquiſitions to be reſtored; for which they will deign to reimburſe our charges. But a few days before, I may venture ſafely to aſſert, they would have been glad to have compounded for the guarantee of the Engliſh to the ſafety of their perſons and property. It is not in their nature to conceive, that a ſpirit of juſtice dictated this apparent conceſſion; they attribute it to fear, or a conſcious inability of performing our engagements.

As the Miniſters will make every advantage of this circumſtance, and no doubt highly exaggerated, I muſt confeſs myſelf at a loſs to judge with preciſion what conſequences may enſue.

The firſt that ſtrikes me is, that *Futty Sing* will fly off from all his engagements, retain ſuch part of his 26 Lacks as are not paid, and refuſe the Company quiet poſſeſſion of the ſeveral diſtricts he had ceded to them. By this means the Peiſhwa will loſe all the dependance he had in *Guzerat*; for, having been obliged in ſome meaſure to diſappoint *Govind Row* in his expectation on that province, in order more effectually to ſecure ſo important an object as having the whole *Guicawar* family at his devotion, it is not to be doubted but that *Govind Row*, when he finds the Peiſhwa incapable of performing his late promiſe, will accommodate matters with his brother *Futty Sing*, and both decline any further interference.

By our deſertion, that of the *Guicawars*, and probably moſt of his Troops for want of money, the Peiſhwa will really find himſelf for a time that forlorn and abandoned man which you, Gentlemen, imagined him to be. Whatever part he may take, muſt be detrimental to the intereſt of the Honourable Company in the weſt of *India*, and perhaps dangerous to their poſſeſſions in the eaſt.

If he embraces the offer of the Nizam, and is reinſtated by his means, the Company muſt not only forego all hopes and title to further poſſeſſions, but relinquiſh *Salſette*, or encounter all the difficulties and inconveniencies of a *Maratta* War, which are by no means counterbalanced by the revenues of that Iſland. Excluſive of this, we ſhall loſe about 12 Lacks, which will become due for arrears of ſubſidy; and as we ſhall have every thing to expect from the juſt reſentment of *Ragoba*, the commerce of the Honourable Company, and the Engliſh in general, will be impeded, if not totally interrupted, by diſcouragement it will be in his power to give without coming to an open rupture.

The ſame conſequence will enſue ſhould he throw himſelf on the protection of *Hyder*, with the additional diſadvantage of increaſing the power of a man whoſe mortal and declared averſion to the Company and their ally, and his open partiality to and encouragement of their declared rivals, render every acceſſion of country or connection the juſt objects of our jealouſy. *Hyder* has already aſſiſted him of late with money, and it is thought would willingly undertake his cauſe for much ſmaller conceſſions than have been made to us, with 30,000 excellent Horſe, and a body of well diſciplined Infantry, a good Artillery ſerved with about 600 Europeans, and thoſe he lately is ſaid to have agreed for with the Dutch. This force joined to the Allies of *Ragoba* would be irreſiſtible by the Confederates; and then it reſts with you, Gentlemen, to determine with the combined Armies of *Hyder* and the Peiſhwa, in what ſafety would be our poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic*.

His other reſources are in his ancient ally, *Moodajee Bonſalo*, in *Holkar* and *Sindia*, always inclined to his party, and now utterly diſcontented with the Confederates; in *Morabah Fourneze* and his party, and even in *Hurry Punt Furkia*, whoſe treatment by the *Poona Junto*, has led them to make frequent Overtures to *Ragoba*, and lately in an application to the Portugueze; all which equally deprive us of the advantages of the ſtipulated ceſſions, and are pregnant with dangers to the Honourable Company's Settlements.

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But there is another object, Gentlemen, on which I would wish to fix your serious attention; it is the sacred Honour of the English Nation and the Company, and that firm reliance which this hitherto unviolated faith has given all the powers around, on our word and engagements; it is well known among the Princes of *Hindostan*; the violation of the most solemn compacts enters into the common course of business, and therefore they are lightly formed, and little relied on; far different with the English, they have beheld them backward to engage, making no Treaties but with the most deliberate consideration; but then they have ever found them stedfast to their word, and of faith inviolable.

The Marattas have beheld us in the very zenith of their formidable power, with not half our present force, bid defiance to all their threats, and boldly oppose ourselves in aid of an inconsiderable ally: after a two years siege, we hoisted our colours on *Gingerah*, which they were on the point of reducing; they admired our good faith, and respected our resolution, by withdrawing their Troops, though not without murmur and strong discontent.

In what light will they then regard our desertion of *Ragoba*, after the solemn Treaty so publicly entered into with him? for, whatever errors there may be in the conduct of the government of *Bombay*, the application of the Nizam of the *Guicawar*, and the behaviour of all the neighbouring powers, strongly bespeak their idea of the force and solemnity of the engagements of the English; they can hardly be brought to comprehend the nature of the limited and discretional power, the exact explanation of which can alone clear the President and Council of *Bombay*, in their minds, of an unworthy and intended fraud, in forming engagements they must know where invalid. By this and by the public manner in which you have proclaimed their dependance, I am afraid that the respect and opinion of their authority, which are necessary in the common conduct of their affairs, will be totally destroyed; and should they lose their opportunity of accomplishing the view of the Company in the west of *India*, we may for ever bid adieu to all hopes of it, how much soever the Directors may recommend a continuance of our attention to them; for it is only by availing ourselves of such circumstances as must be embraced the moment they present themselves, that I foresee any probability of bringing matters into the happy train they were, previous to the receipt of your Orders of the 31st May. The intention of the Legislature in the clause of exception before quoted, will, I apprehend, be utterly frustrated. Who again will ever apply to us? they must be sensible the whole face of things may be changed before your consent can be obtained.

Exclusive of our breach of faith with the Peishwa, which would be rendered doubly glaring by espousing a man who was the notorious contriver and conductor of the plot against *Naron Row*, with which the Confederates now affect to stigmatize the character of *Ragoba*; exclusive of this, there appear to me many strong objections against acknowledging the administration of *Sacram Bapoo* and the *Poona* junto: *Sacram* has always shewn himself the determined enemy of the Company. Besides that dread and jealousy of their advancement in the west of *India*, common to every Maratta who has a just sense of the interest of their Government, another good reason may be assigned for it; whether it was from the poverty of his parents, or the duties of the menial employ he was brought up in, prevented him from giving the necessary application, but unfortunately he does not possess the requisite advantages of education, scarce being able to read or write. This necessarily, when he came to the charge of great affairs, compelled him to repose a confidence in some person who could: his confidant is one *Vessagee Punt Saler*, a Bramin, who having long been supreme Governor of the *Concan*, in which are *Salsette*, *Bassein*, and its districts; this man knowing the views of the Company, has ever opposed with all his influence the least favourable inclination in the Durbar at *Poona* to comply with them, and has ever fomented disturbances and jealousies between us: being a man of intrigue and ability, he is said to have great sway with *Sacram*; and as he is from interest deeply concerned in preventing our acquisition of these places, I imagine, that should we utterly abandon *Ragoba*, and the Confederates perceive his other resources likely to fail him, whatever they may promise us at first, should they at length have no fears from him, they will never acquiesce in any of the cessions made by the Peishwa; indeed their offers beforementioned sufficiently bespeak their intentions. I leave you, Gentlemen, to judge, what will be the sentiments of our Honourable Employers on this occasion, after such a sacrifice of men, money, honour, and national faith, to become the contempt and ridicule of all the powers in the west of *India*.

Bad and disgraceful as this may be, it appears to me yet trifling to the serious consequences that may ensue to their territories in the east, on the undisturbed possession of which the very existence of the Company depend. I hold it as a political maxim, that all the powers in *India* are interested in the continuance of the Bramin Government. The jealousy which, from various causes, ever subsists between the Maratta Chiefs and the Bramins, will prevent that union of the whole Empire which must be most formidable and dangerous to the rest of *India*. The surprizing rapidity with which they overrun almost the whole dominions of the Mogul, the numerous armies they send forth to all quarters, and the bravery of the Rajepouts under their own Raja, and led forth by Chiefs of their own cast, are sufficient circumstances to make us deprecate their re-union. Should the administration continue in the hands of the confederated Bramins, what with their own disunion, and other circumstances, it seems to me very probable that some of the Maratta Chiefs will expel them from the Government, and either re-establish the Raja, or reign themselves. *Moodajee Bonsalo*, whose bravery, policy, and daring character are well known and dreaded, was suspected of this design: disincumbered from his brother *Shabajee*, he may perhaps turn his thoughts to effecting it. Should such an event take place, and the whole power of the Maratta Empire be collected in one hand, what prospect of a lasting tranquillity can there be to the other States of *India*? The Government of a Peishwa, under proper checks and limitations of power, seems to me the only certain way to avert this evil; and should this object be deemed worthy your attention, I apprehend the present crisis to be the fittest that may ever again offer for effecting it.

I have thus, Gentlemen, as fully and clearly as is in my power, explained to you the rise, progress, and present state of our undertaking with the Peishwa *Ragonaut Row*. On the one hand, you will perceive the interest of the Company and the honour of the English nation deeply concerned in fulfilling our engagements; on the other hand you may judge of the detriment, danger, and dishonour, attending the utter abandoning of them. I am happy to perceive, that the general manner in which the Letter from the Honourable the Governor General to *Sacram Bapoo* is worded, by implying you unacquainted with the nature of our previous acknowledgment of *Ragoba* as Peishwa, on which is founded the equity of our late Treaty, reserves as yet inviolate the honour and good faith of the Company, and leaves you free in the choice of measures. I do therefore most solemnly intreat you, in the name of the Government of *Bombay*, to warrant and assist them to fulfil their engagements with the Peishwa; as in their opinion and in mine, on the most mature consideration, this appears to be the only safe and honourable expedient at this juncture, and is perhaps the only opportunity that may ever offer again of accomplishing the several important objects before explained to you, and establishing the affairs of our Honourable Employers on that system in the west of *India*, which they have so frequently and strenuously recommended.

But

But whatever may be your intention, I muſt earneſtly recommend to you, Gentlemen, inſtantly to revoke your orders for withdrawing our Army from *Ragoba*. This may prevent the effects to which they are immediately liable, by keeping all parties in ſuſpenſe till your final determination is known; and whether you may be led to terminate this affair by Arms or Negociation, it is equally important to your ſucceſs, and pardon me if I add, to our national reputation, not utterly to abandon him; the deſertion of all his allies would be the infallible conſequence of ours, and his death moſt probably of both; which the world, judging only by appearances, would lay to our charge.

In a word, Gentlemen, whatever judgment you may entertain of the original meaſure, this ſeems to me to be no longer the proper object of your conſideration. If we have unneceſſarily engaged in a War to which we had no juſt provocation, yet its continuance is now become neceſſary to our ſafety; for the recal of the Army will not only throw us at the mercy of a perfidious enemy, who will not fail to take the baſeſt advantage of our weakneſs, but it will cut off all our hopes of future reſources by ſo dreadful an example held out to thoſe, whoſe alliances we may hereafter find it neceſſary to ſolicit. If you ſuppoſe that we had violated former engagements, and any neutrality which the Company may have recommended to be maintained with the Maratta State, by the Treaty lately formed with *Ragoba*, permit me to ſay, that we have the plea of thoſe very engagements to juſtify us in the part we have taken with the only legal or known repreſentative of the Maratta Nation, and that having executed a new Treaty with him, in all its forms we have pledged the national faith and honour for the performance of it. The Government of *Bombay* is alone reſponſible, and willingly takes upon itſelf the reſponſibility for the paſt; and for the future, it is our duty to ſet before you the alternative which we know depends on your reſolutions. On the one hand, we are convinced that conqueſt and honour, the acquiſition of revenues, and an influence in the firſt ſtate of *India*, will be the iſſue of the enterprize, which we have happily proſecuted to this time, if we are allowed to carry it to a concluſion: on the other hand, weakneſs, diſgrace, and ruin, will inevitably follow the retreat of our Forces, unleſs an accommodation ſhall have firſt taken place, by which the intereſts of each party ſhall have been ſecured, and their ſafety effectually guarded againſt all future claims and hoſtilities.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Calcutta, (Signed) *William Tayler*.
9th October 1775.

The Governor General begs leave to put the following Queſtions to Mr. *Tayler*:

Q. Is it known whether *Sacaram Bappoo* and his party concerted the plan of the late revolution, and the aſſaſſination of *Narron Row* with *Ragoba*, or was it brought about without his knowledge or intervention?

Mr. *Tayler*—It is not known whether it was or not; but by the beſt accounts we have, it appears that *Ragoba* was very deſirous of ſaving the life of his nephew.

Q. Who had the charge of *Ragoba*'s perſon when he was in confinement?

A. He was confined in the Palace at *Poona*; but I don't know the name of the Officer who had charge of his perſon.

Q. In whoſe ſervice were *Mahomed Eſaph* and *Summer Sing*, the murderers of *Narron Row*?

A. In the immediate ſervice of *Narron Row* himſelf, and belonged to ſome of his Troops called Guardees.

Q. To what family did the ſlave belong, whoſe reſentment is ſaid to be the cauſe of *Narron Row*'s death?

A. He had belonged to *Madhoorow*, and on his death he became the property of *Narron Row*.

Q. Is it certain that *Sacaram Bappoo* directed the aſſaſſination of *Narron Row*, or is this a point of common belief?

A. It was univerſally believed to have been brought about by his means; and Mr. *Moſtyn*, who was reſident there at the time, is as certain of it, as a perſon can be without having ſeen the fact.

Q. On what authority do you learn that orders were given to the Maratta General to ſeize *Madajee Sindia*?

A. It was wrote to the Governor at *Bombay* by the Chief of *Surat*, and other perſons that he employed to gain country intelligence; and the intelligence was confirmed by his immediately quitting the Army of the Miniſterial Party.

Q. What ſymptoms has *Tuckoogee Holkar* given of a defection?

A. He has all along ſhewn himſelf wavering; and it appears from Mr. *Moſtyn*'s Letters, that he did ſo at the beginning: and a few days before I left *Bombay*, a Letter was received from the Chief of *Surat*, dated the 27th of July, with this paragraph:

> Extract of a Letter from Mr. Robert *Gambier* to the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee at *Bombay*; dated *Surat* the 27th of July 1775.
>
> The people I ſent to enquire after *Fenkia* are juſt returned from *Hindoor*, where they left him making the beſt of his way towards *Poonah* with, in all, about twenty to thirty thouſand men, horſe and foot. His Troops are very mutinous for their pay, and highly diſcontented, and in his way through *Holkar*'s country he had ſome violent diſputes with him about ſome money he demanded, and which *Holkar* could by no means be induced to furniſh.
>
> A true Extract from the Copy of a Letter delivered to the Governor General and Council by Mr. *Tayler*.
> *Wm. Bruere*,
> Aſſiſtant Secretary.

And this Advice is confirmed by repeated Letters from Colonel *Keating*.

Q. On what authority do you learn that *Nizam Ally Cawn* had made Overtures to the Nabob of *Surat*, for an accommodation with *Ragoba*?

A. By a Letter from the Nizam to the Nabob of *Surat*, forwarded by him to the Governor of *Bombay*, of which I now preſent you a Perſian Copy. Alſo by the following Letter from the Chief of *Surat* to the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

The following is a Tranſlation.

> Extract of a Letter from the Nabob *Zabit Jung*, commonly called *Dhoſa*, written by order of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn Bahadre*, to his Excellency; received ſome days ago.

After the expulſion of *Ragonath Row*, and his croſſing the *Nirbuddah* and returning to *Burhanpore*, the Nabob *Nizam Ally* entered into a Treaty with the Miniſters of *Mahda Row* and *Narrain Row*, to join their party and canton at *Kojiſtah Bunyead*, on condition of their giving up to him the Fort of *Doulutabad* and other Mahals; and he went into cantonments there accordingly. *Ragonaut Row*, at the end of the rainy ſeaſon, being in the country of *Kandace*, ſent a meſſage to the Nabob, that if he would join him, he would reſign to him the Fort of *Doultabad*, *Aſur*, &c. together with *Burhanpore* and other Mahals in his rear, which he had conquered by an engagement, in which the Nabob *Shokut Jung* loſt his life; and that if he aſſented to his propoſals, to march to *Aſerah*, and immediately conclude the Treaty; but of regard to his engagements with the Miniſters of *Narrain Row* and *Madha Row*, and to the bad character as well as bad faith of *Ragonaut Row*, the Nabob would pay no attention to his propoſals; but ſince the Engliſh have ſided with *Ragonaut Row*, although the Nabob has an Army of 50,000 Cavalry and 15,000 Infantry, and a Train of Artillery conſiſting of 100 pieces of Cannon, with all kinds of Ammunition and neceſſaries of War, and is beſides attended by *Madajee Benſale* at the head of 8,000

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8,000 Horſe, whoſe ſon he has adopted; and though the Miniſters of *Narrain Row* and *Madaba Row* have evacuated the Fort of *Doulutabad*, and are ready to reſign *Aſeer*, *Burumpore*, &c. to him; yet as there is a Treaty ſubſiſting between his Excellency and the Engliſh, that they ſhall not employ their reſpective Forces againſt each other, and he is deſirous that they ſhould daily increaſe; and although *Ragonaut Row* is the ſon of *Mazee Row*, and his Excellency was much his enemy, on account of the inſtability of his diſpoſition, yet if through your means the Governor of *Surat*, or the General of *Bombay*, will cauſe *Ragonaut Row* to engage to give up to his Excellency the Fort and Places afore-mentioned, and will become Guarantee for the performance thereof, his Excellency will be enabled to depend thereon, and will undoubtedly attach himſelf to the party of *Ragonaut Row*, and procure for him the accompliſhment of his views; for the Enemy's Forces are ſo numerous that they will ſurround the European Army, and prevent any proviſions being conveyed to them, in which caſe it will be difficult for them to preſerve *Guzzerat*, much more to reduce *Poonah*: without the aid of the Nabob's Army, *Ragonaut Row* can never obtain poſſeſſion of the Country; it is neceſſary therefore that you ſhould make this propoſal privately to the Engliſh: I will likewiſe give every aid in my power. I conjure you by your grandfather, that you will not communicate this ſecret to any perſon whatever. Let me have your immediate anſwer to this.

Copy of a Letter from the Nabob *Meer Hafiz ul Dein Ahmud Cawn Bahader*, Nabob of *Surat*; dated 22d of Jummadee ul Awul (or July)

It is a long time ſince I have had the pleaſure to receive any account of your welfare: May this have proceeded from no diſagreeable cauſe. I have written concerning ſeveral affairs of conſequence to the truſty *Govind Ram*, my Mutteſedy, who will repreſent them to you. I am hopeful that having paid attention thereto, you will favour me with an immediate anſwer, and with any commiſſions or buſineſs you may have in this part; in the execution of which I ſhall receive great pleaſure. As at this ſeaſon of the year there is no paſſage for boats, and the difficulty of land carriage is well known, it was neceſſary to ſend this Letter with the greateſt care and ſecrecy; I have therefore not incloſed it in a rimcab rarctah, according to cuſtom, which I hope you will be ſo kind as to excuſe. May your proſperity and happineſs daily increaſe.

Extract of a Letter from the Chief of *Surat* to the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

My laſt Addreſs, of which a Duplicate accompanies this, was under date the 15th inſtant, ſince when I have received none of your commands.

This I diſpatch to give cover to a ſmall Packet in Cypher, received the day before yeſterday, via Benares, to your Honours, &c. addreſs from the Governor General, &c. Council at *Bengal*, which agreeable to your orders, I have had opened, and fair tranſcribed.

The 25th I received a Letter from Colonel *Keating*, dated at *Balampore Calicut*, near *Brodeara*, the 13th inſtant; in which he writes, that the Treaty with *Futty Sing* was the preceding night ſigned and ſealed; and that *Futty Sing* had further given the Company the Cuſbah of *Beriow*, with all its diſtricts and revenues; and that he hopes to ſend me a ſunnud for it in a few days. He further writes, that *Futty Sing* had received advices of *Hurry Punt*, with the remains of his Forces, being about 105 coſs off, ſome on the northern and ſome on the ſouthern banks of the *Nerbedah*: That he had received Bills from *Poonah* for 15 lacks of Rupees, with which he had propoſed to remain where he was till the rainy ſeaſon was over; but his Army, one and all, refuſed; and that the Shroffs, on whom his bills were drawn, had refuſed to accept or pay them, which had cauſed a great deal of diſtreſs and confuſion amongſt his people.—This is all the Colonel writes. But I hear from thoſe quarters, that *Ragoba* had detached a ſtrong party of his own Forces to *Ahmudarad*; for the ſurrender of which place the preſent Governor, *Apajee Gunnes*, was in Treaty with him; and this once effected, the country to the northward of the *Nerbedah* will be entirely reduced to obedience to *Ragoba*.

The Nizam's Vackeels have been with *Ragoba*, and are, I underſtand, returned to their Maſter for further orders. If your Honour, &c. approve it, I believe it would be no difficult matter to negociate through the Nizam a general accommodation between all Parties. I am informed, that a propoſal of this nature has been made by the Nizam *Ragoba* on the following plan: That *Ragoba* himſelf is to enjoy all the honours, &c. ſufficient Revenues for the ſupport of his dignity of the Peiſhwaſhip; but the government is to be carried on in the name of his ſon *Amret Row*, and the adminiſtration of affairs put into the hands of *Moraboy* as Duan; and all places ſtipulated to be ceded by the Miniſterial Party to the Nizam, are to be confirmed to him by *Ragoba*, &c. all the Miniſterial Confederacy to be fully pardoned, and left in poſſeſſion of their Fortunes and Eſtates. I do not ſuppoſe that *Ragoba* would eaſily conſent to give up the actual government, though I believe he would face a great deal to ſecure the peaceable poſſeſſion of it to his ſon. And I underſtand that *Morabah*, the propoſed Duan, is in great eſteem with *Ragoba*; and though ſtrongly ſolicited by the Miniſterial Party, has always refuſed to act againſt him. On the whole, I am fully of opinion, that a general Accommodation might be brought about much more ſpeedily and effectually through the mediation of the Nizam *Ally*, than by any other means. And I therefore much wiſh to receive your Honour, &c. Orders, in reſpect to the propoſed Treaty with him, and whether you would chuſe that general Pacification ſhould be made part of it.

I much fear theſe Pattamas will find great difficulty in getting to you, as a gentleman lately come from *Darmun* tells me, that all communication between *Bombay* and that place has been ſtopped for ſome time paſt; for which reaſon I would tranſmit it by a boat, but the weather will not allow.

Surat, 27 July 1775. I am, &c. (Signed) *Robert Gambier*.

Q. Do you know, on any good authority, what Terms the Vackeels of *Saccaram* and *Nanah Funoze* were directed to propoſe to the Government of *Bomboy?*

A. We do not know the direct Terms they meant to propoſe; but from a variety of converſations it was imagined, that they would have agreed to let *Ragoba* conduct the affairs of the Government, provided he agreed to let the Sicca be in the name of the Infant, whoſe Party the Miniſters eſpouſed, and would engage for the ſecurity of their perſons and fortunes.

Q. In what inſtance has *Saccaram* ever ſhewn an enmity to the Company?

A. I have the Minutes of ſome Conferences held by Mr. *Moſtyn* at the *Poona* Durbar, wherein ſome are particularly related; and he has been remarkable in appointing all Negociations which we have had occaſion to make with the Peiſhwa; and after having obtained ſunnuds, his intrigues have operated to prevent their ever being of any uſe.

Q. What reſources have the Miniſters for carrying on the War?

A. I have mentioned in my Letter, that they have hitherto relied on the Revenues of the Circar, and would not employ their own money; beſides which, I believe their principal reliance to have been on Nizam *Ally*, *Tokajee Holkar*, and *Madajee Sindia*.

General *Clavering* begs leave to aſk, if Mr. *Tayler* has got the Court of Directors Letter, 6th April 1772, appointing Mr. *Moſtyn* to *Poonah?*

A. I have the Paragraphs of it that relate to Mr. *Moſtyn*'s appointment.

Read

Read extracts from the following Letters:
18th March 1768.
31ſt Ditto 1769.
1ſt April 1772.

Governor General—I obſerve by theſe Paragraphs, the Company declare that they limit their views on that ſide of *India* to the poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, *Baſſein*, and certain Iſlands and Diſtricts round *Surat*; what was the inducement of your Preſidency for the enterprize againſt *Broach?*

A. The Nabob having voluntarily broke through a Treaty which he made with the Governor and Council on his coming to *Bombay* for that purpoſe.

Queſtion by General *Clavering*—What reaſon had you to conclude, that *Salſette* was ceded by the Crown of *Portugal*, by the Marriage Contract with Charles the Second, to the Crown of *England?*

A. From the names of ſeveral places mentioned in the Marriage Contract, which are in *Salſette*, and not in the Iſland of *Bombay*.

Q. Did *Ragoba*, immediately after execution of the Treaty, put the Preſidency into poſſeſſion of the Lands which he agreed to cede to the Company?

A. He gave us the ſunnuds immediately, and we took poſſeſſion of them accordingly, except *Baſſein*.

Q. Do you know how much has already been received from thoſe Lands?

A. I do not, as the Accounts had not been tranſmitted from *Surat* and *Broach*.

Q. Have you reaſon to believe that the Company was in immediate receipt of the Revenues of thoſe places?

A. I moſt firmly believe it; and have a private Letter from Captain *Abington* to Mr. *Draper*, mentioning, that a part of the Revenue for *Orpad* had been received even in the month of May laſt.

" I am very uneaſy leſt I ſhould be blamed in not " having been more expeditious in collecting the *Grain*; " but I flatter myſelf both the Board of *Surat* as well as " *Bombay*, will make great allowances, when they con- " ſider the ſtate of this Pergunnah. When I arrived, " Overtures by the Marattas, the Inhabitants fled, and the " Grain all buried. Things now bear quite a different " aſpect, though I have often been interrupted by the " detachment of Maratta horſe. However, I have " collected from the villages ſituated near this town, " about 150 candys of Wheat, I have ſent about 30 carts " to *Randeer*, and about one hundred more ready at dif- " ferent villages."

Q. Has the Subſidy been regularly paid agreeably to the Treaty?

A. No, it has not; but I conclude we muſt be entering upon the receipt of it, as we are in poſſeſſion of the places.

Q. Have you the Inſtructions that were given to Colonel *Keating*, when he took the command of the Army?

A. I have them not.

Q. Was Brigadier General *Gordon* conſulted concerning the operations of the campaign?

A. I have Copies of the Minutes that paſſed on the occaſion, which I think imply his having been conſulted.

Read the Proceedings of the Select Committee, 11th February 1775, as follow:

Extract Proceedings of the Select Committee; dated 11th February 1775.

The Brigadier General and Mr. *Halſey* are now made acquainted of the Negociation depending with *Ragoba*; the Letters and Papers relative thereto, with our ſeveral Reſolutions, and the propoſed Treaty, being read to them, and particularly the Select Committee's Letter to the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, of the 31ſt December laſt; they are alſo made acquainted of every other particular in our power to inform them of on this ſubject, as well as of our application to the Preſidency of *Madras*, for a reinforcement of Troops, and of our requeſt to Commodore *Hughes*, to come armed with his Squadron to this Court.

After mature deliberation, the Brigadier General declares, that the object to be gained for his Employers, by the meaſures now purſuing, as far as he is acquainted with it, appears to him ſo conſiderable, and ſo much to the advantage and intereſt of the Honourable Company, that he joins with the Board, in thinking that it ought to be purſued, and brought to the ſpeedieſt concluſion; and in this opinion Mr. *Halſey* alſo concurs.

The reſolution of our yeſterday's conſultation, of accepting Jewels to the amount of ſix lacks of Rupees, in lieu of the depoſit of that ſum in Money, as Money cannot be procured, it is again unanimouſly accorded to, and confirmed for the reaſons then given; and the Treaty muſt be drawn up here as ſoon as poſſible, for being ſent to *Surat*.

The Board then take under conſideration, the Force now to be ſent to *Ragoba*'s aſſiſtance; and it is unanimouſly agreed, that it ſhall conſiſt of the following;

Artillery	—	—	—	80
European Infantry		—	—	350
Sepoys	—	—	—	800
Laſcars	—	—	—	160

Which with their proper Officers, Non-commiſſioned Officers, &c. will complete the number to full 1,500 Men, being the Force that it is reſolved at preſent to ſend; and as the whole cannot be ſpared from hence, it muſt be completed by detachments from the garriſons on *Salſette*, at *Surat*, and *Broach*; and it is agreed, that we leave it to the Preſident with the Brigadier General to determine as to the number to be detached from the ſeveral places; but that part which goes from hence and from *Salſette*, muſt abſolutely ſet out ſome time before the next Spring.

The Brigadier General now offers his ſervice to command this detachment of our Forces, provided the buſineſs could be accompliſhed within the time he propoſes ſtaying in *India*. But the Board, as well as the Brigadier General, concluding that it will take up much longer time than he propoſes for his ſtay, it is therefore conſidered who is the moſt proper Officer for this command; and the Preſident nominates Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* for it; which is agreed to by the Board, Brigadier General *Gordon* only excepted: for it is obſerved, that Colonel *Egerton*, ever ſince his arrival in *India*, has been very unfit for any ſuch command, owing to his ill health; twice only indeed has he ever been ordered on any Service ſince he has been in the Company's pay, now upwards of ſix years; the firſt of which was no more than to take the command of the garriſon of *Broach* on the coming away of Lieutenant Colonel *Brewer*, which he at firſt declined, under the pretence of its not being a command equal to his rank, though the General was of a contrary opinion; and afterwards, on the order being repeated to him, he then urged ill health for his excuſe; the ſecond was on the Expedition to *Fannah*, from whence he returned ſick in ſeven or eight days after he ſet out. For theſe reaſons, we deem Colonel *Egerton* a very unfit Officer for the command; and Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, from the commiſſion he has brought out from the Company, is next in rank on the eſtabliſhment to Colonel *Egerton*, until Lieutenant Colonel *Brewer* may arrive from *England*.

Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* is therefore appointed Commandant of the Forces to be detached to the aſſiſtance of *Ragoba*.

Brigadier General *Gordon* begs leave to aſſign the following reaſons for his diſſent to this appointment:

That it is not common in the courſe of ſervice, that the commanding Officer of Artillery, or Chief Engineer, as Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* is, ſhould command a Body of Infantry in Line:

That

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That the offer of this command ſhould, in his opinion, be made to Colonel *Egerton*, when, if he ſays that his health will not admit of his going, that it then by rotation falls to Lieutenant Colonel *Cay*, and after him to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, who are the ſenior officers in the Infantry.

The Board therefore obſerves, that there have been many inſtances in *India* of Officers in the Artillery commanding Troops in Line, amongſt which are the following, and no ſuch objections were then raiſed as the Board know of: Major *Maitland*, of the King's Artillery, commanded the Expedition to *Surat* in the year 1759; Major *Mare* of the Artillery, and Chief Engineer, came to be Commanding Officer of the Forces of this Preſidency on Sir *James Fowlis*'s going to Europe; and Captain *Pemble*, who was Commandant of the Artillery, commanded the Forces detached to *Bengal* in the year 1763. And beſides, as we are ſatisfied with his (Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*'s) conduct in the reduction of *Verſarva* and *Carnejah*, we think he merits ſuch a mark of our favour as we confer on him in this appointment.

A true Copy.

W. G. Farmer.

Q. It does not appear from thoſe conſultations, that he was conſulted upon the Operations; it appears only that he was conſulted upon the Treaty, and the number of Troops that ſhould be ſent there. I beg leave to aſk of Mr. *Tayler*, if he was afterwards conſulted upon the Operations of the Army at any time?

A. No, I believe not after that day. On the 14th there was another Conſultation, to read a Letter from Brigadier General *Gordon*, an extract of which Conſultation I beg leave to read.

Extract Proceedings of the Select Committee, with Brigadier General *Gordon*'s Letter, dated the 14th February 1775.

Reſolved, by the Majority, after due deliberation, That the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* to the command of the Forces proceeding to the aſſiſtance of *Ragoba*, be adhered to. We have however a juſt ſenſe of the offer the Brigadier General has now made, and ſhall mention the ſame in our next general Addreſs to our Honourable Employers.

Meſſrs. *Halſey*, *Garden*, and *Fletcher*, are of opinion, as Brigadier General *Gordon* has now made a tender of his Services, and to bring the War to a concluſion, that the ſame ſhould be accepted, and that he ought in conſequence to be appointed to the command of the Force going into the field.

The appointment of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* being thus adhered to, the Brigadier General then immediately produced a paper, containing a diſſent thereto, and his reaſon for concurring on Saturday laſt in the meaſure now purſuing: Ordered, as the General deſires it, That the ſame be entered after this Conſultation, for the notice of our Honourable Maſters; though we muſt juſt remark, that the reaſons for his acquieſcing in the plan we are purſuing, appear now very different from what they were on Saturday laſt. The general motives for this difference may be very obvious to all who may peruſe this day's Reſolution.

As the Brigadier General declares in the diſſent that he has now delivered, that Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* is ſo very unfit for the command to which we have appointed him, it is remarked to the General, that it is very extraordinary that he did not make this objection before our appointment took place; and he is now deſired to declare his reaſons for his opinion. To this he replies, that the boaſted ſucceſs at *Perſeva*, was really deſtitute of every military merit but reſolution; for that had the Enemy done their duty with any ſpirit or fidelity, the whole Party under Colonel *Keating*'s command, inſtead of coming off with ſucceſs muſt have abſolutely been all cut to pieces, while they were in confuſion and noiſe under the walls, when in attempting to erect Ladders which they could not effect, as he has been aſſured by Officers who were on that ſervice. But the General adds, that as he never was on ſervice wherein Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* was employed, he knows nothing further of his military capacity.

The General being aſked, whether he had any objection to Colonel *Keating*'s conduct at *Carnajah?* he replies, He has not; that he confines his remarks to his proceedings at *Verſava*.

The neceſſary Orders for the embarkation of the Forces and Stores proceeding to *Surat* under Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, are this day given us, will appear on our public Diary, and the whole will be ready in about three days.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

As you have been pleaſed to reſolve, that a large part of the Troops ſhall take the field immediately, I beg leave to offer my ſervices to command them. This I hope you will think from my rank here I have a right to.

It is true that I have deſired leave to reſign, when an opportunity which is agreeable to me offers for my returning to Europe by the way of *China*; but that real wiſh I have for the Service, added to the reſpect which I owe to thoſe friends who ſo warmly ſupported my appointment in the General Court of Proprietors, makes me wiſh moſt earneſtly to render ſome further ſervice to the Company; I am therefore to requeſt, that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to permit me to take upon me the command of the Forces, which are immediately to be employed.

Bombay, 12th February 1773. I am, &c. (Signed) *Robert Gordon*, Brigadier General.

Brigadier General *Gordon* declares, that nothing would have induced him to give his conſent to the Troops taking the field, or to enter into either Treaties or Wars, without the Orders of the Supreme Council, except this conſideration, namely, That as by the attack of *Salſette* (on the expediency of which meaſure he never was conſulted) Hoſtilities were actually commenced againſt the Marattas, after which it became neceſſary to make the moſt of affairs. On this principle he conſented to entering into the Treaty which was laid before the Board laſt Council day, and recommended as the moſt advantageous that could then be made for the Company's intereſts. He therefore claimed the command of the Troops which are to take the field, as his undoubted right; in the execution of which, his beſt endeavours ſhall be exerted to bring the ſervice to a ſpeedy and honourable iſſue.

The appointment of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* to command the Forces, is undoubtedly contrary to the practice of the Army; either as Chief Engineer, or Commanding Officer of Artillery, he is entirely out of the general line of command. Brigadier General *Gordon* therefore diſſents and proteſts againſt the appointment, and hereby declares he thinks Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* ſo unfit for it, that if it is given to him, the General will in no reſpect whatever deem himſelf reſponſible for any part of the meaſure, either as to entering into the Treaty, the Troops taking the field, or of the conſequences which may ariſe therefrom.

Bombay, 14th February 1773. (Signed) *Robert Gordon*, Brigadier General.

Queſtion. When did the Government of *Bombay* receive public advice of the late Act of Parliament for regulating the affairs of *India?*

Anſwer. In the month of Auguſt 1774.

Queſtion. When did the Government of *Bombay* receive the Letter of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, of the 25th October 1774?

Anſwer. I cannot pretend to charge my memory with the date.

Queſtion.

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Queſtion. Do you remember when you received Mr. *Henſhaw*'s Letter, adviſing you of the hoſtile deſigns of the Portugueze on the Iſland of *Salſette?*

Anſwer. I believe about the latter end of November.

Queſtion. Had you any other information beſides Mr. *Henſhaw*'s Letter, of the deſigns of the Portugueze on *Salſette?*

Anſwer. We had many reports, but no advices ſo authentic as Mr. *Henſhaw*'s Letter; however, not only the Captain of the Fleet, but the Government at *Goa*, proteſted alſo againſt it; and there was a Letter from a Portugueze Prieſt intercepted afterwards, which proved their intentions.

Queſtion by the Governor General. What was the deſtination of the Portugueze Fleet?

Anſwer. They every year ſend out a Convoy to *Surat*.

Queſtion. How many Troops did you employ in the reduction of *Salſette?*

Anſwer. I believe near Two thouſand, but I am not certain.

Queſtion. What reaſon have you to ſuppoſe that the declared Son of *Narron Row* is a ſuppoſititious child?

See Reference Page in printed Report, 27.

Anſwer. From the common report of the Country, and information given to me by Mr. *Moſtyn*.—Mr. *Tayler* then read the information as follows:

Soon after *Narron Row* was cut off, it was induſtriouſly reported that *Gungaboy* was near two months gone with child; and ſhe accordingly, at the end of her ſeven months, went through the accuſtomary ceremony among the Gentoos; this was performed a very few days before the Miniſters carried her to *Poonah*. I will not preſume to ſay *Gungaboy* was not with child, but her being accompanied with five women, all big with child, gave riſe to ſuch a conjecture; however, it might be only to ſecure a boy, in caſe ſhe ſhould have a girl. Be all this as it may; nay, even allowing *Gungaboy* to have brought forth a boy, from the beſt information I could get, and in which I placed much confidence, as it came from the then Governor, *Naroo Appair*'s houſe, that boy certainly died, and *Gungaboy* adopted the ſon of one *Ramchunder*, a Brahmin that officiates at her family Pagoda; and indeed it was much whiſpered about, and many concurring circumſtances perſuaded me it was ſo, and I think there need be no better proof of it, than the Nizam's propoſal to us, through the Nabob of *Surat*; that is, for the Maratta Government, in the name of *Amut Row*, *Ragoba*'s adopted ſon.

General *Clavering*—I have put this queſtion to Mr. *Tayler*, becauſe it appears by Mr. *Moſtyn*'s Letters of the 30th and 31ſt January 1774, entered in the Select Committee Proceedings of the 9th March 1774, that the Widow of *Narron Row* was ſeven months gone with child; and by his Letter, dated in the Proceedings recorded of the Select Committee of the 8th September 1774, he ſays ſhe was actually delivered of a ſon.

The Board adjourn to proceed on this buſineſs again in the evening, and deſire that Mr. *Tayler* will attend at ſeven o'clock.

Monday Evening.

The Board being met according to adjournment, now reſume the buſineſs of Mr. *Tayler*'s deputation.

Queſtion by General *Clavering*—Do you know what inducement the Council at *Bombay* had to proceed in the Negociation with *Ragoba*, when it appears by the Letter that we received from that Council of the 31ſt December, that he was a fugitive, abandoned by his Forces, and actually retreating towards *Delhi*?

Anſwer. He was not altogether abandoned at the time we treated with him, although he had been defeated. Our inducement was the importance of the object to the Company, and in compliance with their repeated injunctions.

Queſtion. With how many followers did he come to *Surat?*

Anſwer. I believe not more than 1000, but that his Army went with *Gobindrow*, and *Conderow*, and other Officers to a place called *Copperwanjee*.

Queſtion. Had Mr. *Gambier* inſtructions from the Council, to ſign the Treaty with him?

Anſwer. The Treaty was ſent up, ſigned by the Council, and interchanged by Mr. *Gambier*, afterwards with *Ragonaut*, he ſigned it officially as interchanged by him.

Queſtion. I underſtand that after the Army landed in *Cambay*, a conſiderable time was loſt in treating with *Futty Sing*; had Colonel *Keating* powers given him for that purpoſe, or to treat with any of the Princes of the Country?

Anſwer. I don't know of any time being loſt in treating with *Futty Sing*; to the beſt of my knowledge, nothing of that kind appears in our Advices; but a junction was made of our Forces with *Ragoba*'s as ſoon as poſſible; the inſtructions to Colonel *Keating* were, to do all he could for the intereſt of *Ragoba*; but he had no expreſs powers to treat.

Queſtion. Did the Council never expreſs any diſpleaſure with Colonel *Keating*, for treating with *Futty Sing?*

Anſwer. They expreſſed their diſpleaſure at the Army's not moving faſter to the ſouthward than it did; and Colonel *Keating* exculpated himſelf, by ſaying it was *Ragoba*'s ardent deſire to take *Ahmadabad*, I don't recollect that the Council expreſſed any particular inſtance of diſpleaſure at his treating with *Futty Sing*.

Queſtion. Was it with an intention of taking *Ahmadabad*, that the Army firſt moved to the northward?

Anſwer. The firſt motion to the northward was to effect a junction with *Ragoba*'s Army; after the junction that was the reaſon aſſigned to us by him.

Queſtion. Did they take the place?

Anſwer. They did not proceed againſt it.

Queſtion. Are Colonel *Keating*'s reaſons known for not proceeding further towards *Ahmadabad?*

Anſwer. The Governor and Council directed that he ſhould not, if he could poſſibly avoid it.

Queſtion. You have mentioned that the territory which has been ceded to the Company is in extent about 86 miles, excluſive of the lands lying contiguous to *Broach* and *Surat*, and that this extenſion of territory might be defended with two battalions; has this information been given to the Council by any military men?

Anſwer. No, it has not; it was only my own opinion which I preſumed to offer; but I meant, that I imagined that number ſufficient to garriſon the Forts, enforce the Collections, and protect the Country, ſuppoſing us to be in peace with the *Poonah* Government.

Queſtion. Are you informed of the loſs the Company has ſuſtained in men during the laſt campaign?

Anſwer. I do not know the exact number; to the beſt of my remembrance of the laſt return that was received before I left *Bombay*, the Army exceeded 2,000 men, but I cannot tell by what number, as it came down in cypher, and there was ſome miſtake in it, which prevented my paying more attention than I otherwiſe ſhould have done.

Queſtion. Were the ſick included in that return?

Anſwer. I believe they were.

General *Clavering* obſerving that his reaſon for aſking this queſtion is, that he heard the men were very ſickly; Mr. *Tayler* adds, that they have been ſickly, but that they were on the recovery, and ſome of them had joined the Army from the Hoſpital at *Broach*.

Mr. *Bartwell* begs leave to put the following Queſtions to Mr. *Tayler*.

Queſtion. What is the object of the War that has been entered into by the Government of *Bombay*; I mean ſo far as relates to the ſervice to be rendered to *Ragoba*, and when the Company will be entitled to the benefit propoſed to them by the Treaty?

Anſwer. The benefit to be rendered to *Ragoba* was to fix him in the Government of the Maratta Empire at *Poonah*; the Company were entitled to the benefits from the date of executing the Treaty, as appears by the 15th and 16th Articles.

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Queſtion. Was it meant, after fixing him in the Government at *Poonah*, to accompany him any further with the Engliſh Troops?

Anſwer. No, it was not by any means; if he had any further occaſion for our ſervices, he muſt have made freſh Overtures.

Queſtion by General *Clavering*—Does it appear upon the Conſultations, that the queſtion was ever agitated, whether or not you could enter into formal engagements, and ſign a Treaty with *Ragoba*, without the conſent of this Government?

Anſwer. The ſubject was agitated, and we conſidered that we could, from the reaſons which have been already repreſented to this Board, which are the ſame as appear upon our Conſultations.

Mr. *Francis* begs leave to aſk Mr. *Tayler* the following Queſtions:

Queſtion. Do you conſider your conducting *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, and putting him in poſſeſſion of that Town, as equivalent to fixing him in the Government of the Maratta Empire?

Anſwer. Yes.

Queſtion. Would it have been inconſiſtent with your engagements with *Ragoba* to have withdrawn our Army after putting him in poſſeſſion of *Poonah*?

Anſwer. No.

Queſtion. You obſerve that the acquiſition of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* was laid down to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, by the Company, as the grand and ſole object of every military or political engagement; that the Company declared theſe to be the utmoſt limits of their views on the weſt of *India*; and that they rather wiſhed they could be obtained by Purchaſe than War—Have the Preſidency of *Bombay* any inſtructions, general or particular, to aim at conqueſts or territorial acquiſitions on the Continent?

Anſwer. They have not other inſtructions; the Company have ſaid in their Letter, the 31ſt March 1769, that *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, with their dependencies, and the Maratta proportion of the *Surat* revenues, are all they ſeek for on the weſtern ſide of *India*; and that theſe are the objects we are to have in view in all our Treaties, Negociations, and Military Operations, and what we muſt be ever watchful to obtain; always attentive to convince the Country Powers, theſe are, and ever will be, the utmoſt limits of their views on that ſide of *India*.

Queſtion by the Governor General—Are the Lands which have been ceded us by the dependencies of *Baſſein*, the ancient territory of the Portugueze Government?

Anſwer. Yes, they were ſo underſtood.

Queſtion by Mr. *Francis*. You obſerve that the conveniency of the Harbour of *Bombay* has ſecured to the Engliſh almoſt the excluſive trade in Indian commodities, with the country of the Marattas, as well as in the Cotton, with which *Bengal* and *China* are ſupplied; as we are already in excluſive poſſeſſion of the above trade, in what ſenſe can the commerce of the Engliſh, or of thoſe who trade under their protection, be improved or benefited by the territorial acquiſitions ſtipulated by the Treaty with *Ragoba*?

Anſwer. We before had the Trade, but we now have the Country, wherein the articles of that Trade are produced.

Queſtion. Have you formerly found any difficulties in procuring Timber from *Baſſein*, or Proviſions from *Salſette*?

Anſwer. We have ſometimes; but it always was in the power of the Maratta Government to prevent our getting them.

Queſtion. Have you lately received any ſupplies of Timber from *Baſſein*?

Anſwer. No, not ſince the commencement of the War.

Queſtion. On the 31ſt December laſt, the Preſidency of *Bombay* were apprized of the commencement of the preſent Government of *Bengal*; they had not then concluded any Treaty with *Ragoba*; on the contrary, they ſay in their Letter of the above date, that they will accommodate matters with the Government of *Poonah* as ſoon as poſſible, and endeavour to reconcile them to our keeping *Salſette*—Was the concluſion of the Offenſive Treaty with *Ragoba* a caſe of ſuch imminent neceſſity as would have rendered it dangerous to poſtpone the Hoſtilities propoſed by that Treaty, until the Orders from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* might arrive? or had you any ſpecial Orders from the Company to engage in the above Treaty?

Anſwer. I am clearly of opinion, that if it had been deferred till the Orders of the Governor General and Council had been received, that the opportunity would have been loſt; we conceived that the Orders of the Court of Directors were ſpecial on this ſubject.

Queſtion. Is it underſtood by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, that the exception made by the Legiſlature of a caſe of imminent neceſſity relates ſolely to the indiſpenſable defence of the Company's poſſeſſions; or that it authorizes them to commence Hoſtilities at their own [illegible] and without provocation, againſt the neighbouring [illegible]

Anſwer. The Preſidency of *Bombay* by no means conſider that the Act authorizes them to commence [illegible] at their own diſcretion, and without provocation [illegible] the neighbouring States; but that having conceived [illegible] be a caſe of imminent neceſſity, to poſſeſs themſelves [illegible] the Iſland of *Salſette*, to prevent it falling into the hands of the Portugueze, they then thought it found [illegible] enter into the Treaty they did with *Ragoba*, for [illegible] it, and obtaining the other acquiſitions.

Queſtion. What provocation had the Preſidency of *Bombay* received againſt the Government of *Poonah*?

Anſwer. None.

Queſtion. Have any part of the ceded Revenues been yet collected by us in ready money, or is the whole to be paid in kind?

Anſwer. It is uſual there to receive the Rents part in money and part in kind. I ſuppoſe that the ſame methods will be obſerved by our Agents as before; but the ſeaſon having prevented any Advices being received from thoſe parts before my departure, I cannot be ſo preciſe as I could wiſh upon this point.

Queſtion. Have any part of *Ragoba*'s Jewels been ſold towards defraying the expences of the War?

Anſwer. Some money had been raiſed upon ſome of them.

Queſtion. If *Ragoba* be the only legal and known repreſentative of the Maratta Nation, why was Mr. *Moſtyn* continued as reſident with the Government at *Poonah*? and why do the Select Committee ſay in their Letter of the 31ſt December laſt, that they will accommodate matters as ſoon as poſſible with that Government?

Anſwer. It did not appear to us to be at all neceſſary to recal Mr. *Moſtyn*, as the Miniſterial Party at *Poonah* offered him no moleſtation: what the Select Committee meant, by ſaying they would accommodate matters with that Government, was, with whichever Party might prevail.

Queſtion. Whether the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, before they ſigned the Treaty with *Ragoba*, had ſeen the inſtructions voted by the Court of Proprietors to this Council, in which we are particularly directed to fix our attention to the preſervation of Peace throughout *India*?

Anſwer. Yes, they had ſeen them.

Queſtion by the Governor General—Had any Overtures been made by the Miniſterial Party to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, before the Treaty was executed with *Ragoba*?

Anſwer. None.

Queſtion. Could an alliance have been formed with the Miniſterial Party, conſiſtently with the engagements actually exiſting between the Government of *Bombay* and the Maratta State?

Anſwer. In my opinion it could not.

Queſtion. Did any Treaty of Friendſhip exiſt between the

the Preſidency of *Bombay* and *Ragoba*, before that concluded with him the 16th March laſt?

Anſwer. Not with *Ragoba* particularly; there was a Treaty formed while he was Regent, during the minority of *Mahdoo Row*.

Queſtion by Colonel *Monſon*—Did *Ragoba* make any Overtures to the *Bombay* Government, till after his defeat by the Miniſterial Party?

Anſwer. Yes.

Queſtion. Of what nature were they?

Anſwer. He then wanted us to aſſiſt him with a large ſum of money, and did not make any propoſals that we could liſten to, of making ceſſions to the Company.

Queſtion. Did he demand that money as Chout, or as a Loan?

Anſwer. As a Loan.

Queſtion by the Governor General.—Were the Terms of the Treaty with *Ragoba* agreed upon before his defeat, or after it?

Anſwer. Before the defeat.

Mr. *Tayler* begs leave to repreſent to the Board, that in conſequence of their poſitive Orders to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, the Army will retreat from *Ragoba* the 15th November, in their way back to *Broach* and *Surat*, in order to proceed to *Bombay*, unleſs Orders are immmediately ſent to prevent them; and that he conceives it to be neceſſary to keep them with *Ragoba*, whatever determination the Board may come to.—Mr. *Tayler* withdraws.

The Queſtion ariſing from the foregoing Minutes, is, whether the Orders ſent to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to recal their Troops to their own garriſons, ſhall be repeated, and their recal for the preſent ſuſpended?

Mr. *Francis*—Every part of the information communicated to us by Mr. *Tayler*, confirms me in my former opinion, that the Company's Troops ſhould be withdrawn to their own garriſons, without any conſideration whatſoever, but the ſafety of their retreat.

Mr. *Barwell*—I think no prejudice can ariſe to the public intereſts, by continuing the Troops in the preſent ſituation; it may prove of great utility to the negociations Colonel *Upton* may enter upon. I am for ſending immediate Orders, directing the Troops not to remain.

The Honourable *George Monſon*—From what has been ſubmitted to the conſideration of the Board by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, this through Mr. *Tayler*, I find no room to alter my former ſentiments on this ſubject, that the Troops ſhould be immediately ordered to withdraw to the Company's garriſons, without any conſideration whatſoever but their immediate ſafety. Their continuing longer in the field will be a conſiderable increaſe of expence to the Company, without any object of advantage to them from it. The Miniſterial Party by this action will be ſenſible of our ſincere intentions to make Peace with them; and I have not the leaſt doubt but they will give due attention to the propoſals made to them by Colonel *Upton*.

General *Clavering*—There does not appear by any of the Anſwers which Mr. *Tayler* has made to the Queſtions which have been put to him, a ſingle reaſon to make me depart from the opinion which I formerly gave, to direct the Preſidency of *Bombay* to withdraw their Troops within their own garriſons. He has indeed urged, that it would be a breach of faith on their part with *Ragoba*; but he has not conſidered that the breach of faith would be much ſtronger on our ſide, were we now to break off from the Overtures that we have made to the reigning Power at *Poonah*, ſhould we admit our Troops again to take the field; and at the ſame time ſhould think proper to order Colonel *Upton* to proceed to *Poonah*. One of the two caſes muſt inevitably happen; either we ſhould expoſe his perſon to the danger of being ſacrificed, or our Negociations would be rendered fruitleſs, by the ſuſpicions that we ſhould create in the minds of the Miniſters at *Poonah*, that we were acting a perfidious part by them. The Intention both of the Legiſlature and of the Court of Directors, is evidently that there ſhould be an union of as well as of arms, between the three Preſidencies. If after the honourable ſteps we have taken we ſhould not ſucceed in our Negociation at *Poonah*, it will be then time enough to order the Troops of the Preſidency of *Bombay* to act conjointly with the other two Preſidencies, to compel the Maratta State to ſubmit to the terms that we ſhall then think it adviſable to give them. At all events, I never would adviſe that the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſhould hold Territories upon the Continent, unleſs it be ſome ſmall Territory about *Surat* or *Broach*, merely to pay the expences of thoſe Garriſons; to hold more would expoſe the Company to eternal Wars, in which nobody would profit but their Servants.

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The Governor General—I am confirmed in my opinion, that our Army ſhould keep the field, that it ſhould be ſtrengthened with Supplies both of Men and of Money, and that a determination ſhould be ſhewn by this Government, both to dictate and maintain the general conditions of the Peace to which we ſhould acquieſce; that a contrary conduct would fruſtrate the deſign of our Negociations, as is too apparent from the haughty tone with which they dictated the terms which were propoſed by their Vackeels to the Government of *Bombay*, after having made advances for Peace, while our Troops were in oppoſition to them. I am convinced, that fear only can operate upon the minds of the Marattas; that if we miſs the advantage of which we are now in poſſeſſion, the adherents of our Ally will abandon him; and that if our Negociation ſhould afterwards fail, we ſhall have no reſource but in our own ſtrength for a future defence.

Reſolved, That the former Orders tranſmitted to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, ſhall remain in force.

The Governor General—As it appears from Mr. *Tayler*'s propoſition, at his taking leave of the Board, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* have miſunderſtood the Order ſent them for withdrawing the Troops into their garriſons, as meant to direct their recal to *Bombay*, I ſubmit to the Board the propriety of explaining the intentions of the Board in this reſpect, which I ſuppoſe leave to the Preſidency of *Bombay* the option of ſuch of the Company's garriſons as they ſhall think moſt proper for the reception of the Troops, whether *Broach*, *Surat*, *Salſette*, or *Bombay*, or to diſtribute them to each.

Agreed, That this be explained to Mr. *Tayler*, and mentioned to the *Bombay* Preſidency.

The following Letters are accordingly written for this purpoſe.

To *William Tayler*, Eſq.

Sir,

After duly conſidering the repreſentation which you have been pleaſed to deliver to us, as well as the ſeveral informations which you have communicated reſpecting the nature, motives, and object of the engagement of the *Bombay* Preſidency with *Ragonaut Row*, and the preſent ſtate of the Maratta Government at *Poonah*; we have for the preſent to acquaint you, that we are confirmed in our opinion of the expediency of the Company's Troops being immediately recalled from the ſervice of *Ragoba* into their own garriſons. Our Orders for this purpoſe will therefore remain in force.

But as you ſeem to underſtand, by the propoſition which you urged at taking leave of the Board this evening, that our directions implied the recal of the Troops to *Bombay*, we think it neceſſary to explain our meaning to have been, that it ſhould remain at the option of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to withdraw them to ſuch of their garriſons, and diſtribute them as they might ſee fit, for the protection of the Company's Poſſeſſions, including *Salſette*.

Fort William, We are, &c.
9th October 1775.

P. S. We have ordered our Secretary to furniſh you with a Copy of the Inſtructions which have been given to

APPENDIX. No. 84.

to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, our Deputy to the Court of *Poonah*; for your information of the Conditions which we have preſcribed for the propoſed Treaty to be formed with that Government.

Bombay. To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, and Council.

Gentlemen,

We now acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 23d Auguſt, delivered to us by Mr. *Tayler*.

It appearing by a repreſentation from Mr. *Tayler*, that he underſtood our Orders to you for withdrawing the Company's Troops from *Ragoba*, to imply the recal of them to *Bombay*; we think it proper, leſt you ſhould put the ſame conſtruction upon them, to take this opportunity of explaining our intention to have been, that it ſhould be leſt at your option to withdraw the Forces to any of the Company's garriſons which you might judge moſt proper for their reception, or to diſtribute them to each; and to confine your operations to the protection of the Territories poſſeſſed by the Company previous to the date of your Treaty with *Ragoba*, including *Salſette*.

We are, &c.

Fort William, 9th October 1775.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
Richd Barwell.

APPENDIX, No. 84.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 18th October 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

READ a Letter from Mr. *Tayler*, as follows:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Agreeably to what you did me the honour to notice to me in your favour of the 9th, I have received a Copy of your Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*. The repreſentations I had made to you, would, I flatter myſelf have conveyed far different ideas from thoſe which dictated theſe Inſtructions; but it reſts with you alone to determine on the propriety of changing your line of politics; convinced as I am of the detriment which muſt befal the preſent proſperous ſituation of the Honourable Company's affairs on the weſtern ſide of *India*, if that line which has been adopted is continued to be purſued, I can only lament my ill ſucceſs: My duty calls upon me to tell you, that the moiety of the Revenues of the Town and Pergunnah of *Broach*, which has been ceded to us by *Futty Sing*, is in his gift alone.

But as your Honour, &c. have been pleaſed to appoint a Deputy from yourſelves immediately to *Saccaram Bapoo*, and exclude the Government of *Bombay* from any ſhare in concluding the Peace, I am directed by the Honourable the Preſident and Council to repreſent to you that ſuch a meaſure will in their opinion be a great indignity to that Preſidency, eſpecially as the Honourable Company had themſelves ordered a Member of their Board to reſide there, and given repeated approbations of his conduct, as will appear more evidently from the accompanying Paragraphs of their Orders, and Copy of their Letter to *Mahada Row*.

Permit me therefore, in juſtice to all the Gentlemen of the Board of *Bombay*, but particularly to thoſe concerned in the Treaty concluded with the Peiſhwa, to remonſtrate to you, that ſituated as they are in the neighbourhood of the Marattas, having frequent communication with them, and conſtant opportunities of becoming acquainted with the views, connections, and intereſts of the different perſons in the *Poonah* Durbar, they certainly muſt be beſt qualified for negociating the ſeveral matters intruſted to Colonel *Upton*, an entire ſtranger to their whole ſyſtem of Government; and I truſt it will appear to your Honour, &c. that at the time it pleaſed the wiſdom of Parliament to arm you with controling powers over the other Preſidencies, it was by no means their intention that they ſhould appear ſo much degraded and contemptible in the eyes of the Country Government, as the Preſidency of *Bombay* muſt do, unleſs you will commit the Treaty of Peace to their management.

Our Honourable Employers and the whole Britiſh Nation may be naturally led to ſuppoſe, that in your opinion the Members of that Government are devoid in every degree of integrity and abilities; which would be the moſt cruel and unjuſt of all imputations; for I dare dare to affirm, not a perſon who concluded that Treaty was actuated by any other motive than their obedience and duty to their Employers, whoſe intereſts appeared to them to be moſt materially benefited by their engagements.

The Members who compoſe the *Bombay* Council have ſerved the Honourable Company from 20 to 35 years. The ſole dependance of ſome of them is ſtill on the ſervice; and they have not yet been taxed with the want of abilities. Mr. *Moſtyn*, who returned from *England* in the year 1772, brought with him the Court of Directors appointment as their Repreſentative to the *Poonah* Durbar.

For theſe ſeveral reaſons, Gentlemen, I earneſtly conjure you to revoke your Orders to Colonel *Upton*, and by committing to the management of the Government of *Bombay* whatever Negociation you may deem it neceſſary to enter into with either party, ſupport the neceſſary reſpect to it, and not ſubject to ſo ſevere a mortification, a ſet of Gentlemen, againſt whom the only faults that can be alledged are their having haſtily carried into execution their zeal for the intereſt of their Employers, and having been ſo unfortunate as to differ in opinion from your Honour, &c. on the neceſſity and authority they had for it. I pledge myſelf to you for their implicit obedience to whatever you may direct; and can only urge further in behalf of this meaſure, the very conſiderable ſaving that will accrue by it to the Honourable Company, as it muſt be unneceſſary to ſtate to you the difference between giving the Marattas a Peace, and becoming ſuitors to them for one.

Calcutta, 12th October, 1775.

I am, &c.
(Signed) *W. Tayler*.

Copy of ſundry Paragraphs of different Letters from the Honourable Court of Directors to the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

Under the 18th March 1768.

Par. 91. The intimation you gave to our Preſident and Council of Fort *St. George*, to uſe their endeavours with the Marattas to obtain a grant of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* to us, we highly approve of; and we now recommend to you in the ſtrongeſt manner, to uſe your endeavours upon every occaſion that may offer to obtain theſe places, which we ſhould eſteem a valuable acquiſition; we cannot directly point out the mode of doing of it, but rather wiſh they could be obtained by Purchaſe than War.

Under 31ſt March 1769.

Par. 41. The opening a Negociation with the Marattas was a very proper meaſure, and Mr. *Moſtyn* acquitted himſelf therein highly to our ſatisfaction.

42. The demands made on them in return for the advantages they were to expect from our ſucceſſes againſt

Hyder Ally, were alſo very proper. *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, with their dependencies, and the Maratta's proportion of the *Surat* Revenues, were all that we ſeek for on that ſide *India*.

43. Theſe are the objects you are to have in view in all your treaties, negociations, and military operations, and that you muſt be ever watchful to obtain; always attentive to convince the Country Powers, theſe are, and ever will be, the utmoſt limits of our views on the weſtern ſide of *India*.

Under the 7th February 1772.

Par. 16. Mr. *Moſtyn* having repreſented to us, that his health is ſo well eſtabliſhed as to enable him to return to his rank and ſtation in our ſervice, he now takes paſſage for your Preſidency on the ſhip Duke of Cumberland.

17. We take this occaſion to apprize you, that it is our intent Mr. *Moſtyn* ſhall ſhortly proceed and reſide at the Court of *Mhada Row*, not only to explain our ſentiments, but to endeavour to cultivate a good underſtanding, and tranſmit ſuch buſineſs with him as the ſituation of affairs may render neceſſary.

18. We are not at preſent prepared to tranſmit to you ſuch Inſtructions for Mr. *Moſtyn* as we may deem neceſſary, but ſhall not fail to do ſo by the latter ſhips of the ſeaſon; mean while it is our pleaſure, and we direct, that on his arrival at your Preſidency, to be immediately appointed to ſuch poſt as he ſhall be intitled to by his rank in your Council, which poſt we alſo permit him to execute by a Deputy during his reſidence at the Court of *Mhada Row*; and we further direct, that Mr. *Moſtyn* be allowed the ſum of rupees 5,000 per annum, as reſident at *Poonah*, to commence from the time of his proceeding thither.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We think it proper to tranſmit you a copy of the Inſtructions which we have given to Colonel *Upton*, that you may be acquainted with the nature and extent of the powers and commiſſion entruſted to him, and the terms which he is ordered to ſecure for the Company in his Negociations with the Maratta Government.

He has been directed to correſpond with you; and as your local knowledge and experience may enable you to furniſh him with uſeful information, we requeſt that you will communicate ſuch to him whenever he may conſult you.

The Guicawar proportion of the Revenues of the Town and Pergunnah of *Broach*, and the Diſtricts of *Corial*, *Chickley*, and *Verio*, having been made over to the Company by *Futty Sing*, who appears to be the perſon poſſeſſed of the right and authority to make theſe grants; and as we underſtand that they may be held without any material increaſe of expence, we deſire you will retain poſſeſſion of them until a Definitive Treaty of Peace ſhall have been concluded with the ruling party at *Poonah*.

Admitting the poſſibility of *Ragoba*'s being reduced by any unforeſeen misfortune to ſeek refuge in ſome of your garriſons, we would not have you underſtand from any directions yet tranſmitted you, that we mean entirely to deſert him; on the contrary, you will find, by a paragraph of the incloſed Inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*, that our intention is to obtain a ſuitable proviſion for him; we therefore deſire that you will afford him a ſanctuary for himſelf and his domeſtics or attendants, in caſe he ſhould ever be neceſſitated to apply for your protection, in order to avoid any perſonal danger.

We are, &c.

Reſolved, That the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* cannot be repealed or changed conſiſtently with the orders of the Board already made public, and the dignity of this Government.

Agreed, That theſe Reſolutions be ſignified to Mr. *Tayler* as follows:

Sir,

We have received your Repreſentation of the 9th inſt.

The Guicawar proportion of the Revenues of the Town and Pergunnah of *Broach*, and the Diſtricts of *Corial*, *Chickly*, and *Verio*, having been made over to the Company by *Futty Sing*, who appeared to have poſſeſſed the right and authority to make this ceſſion, we have inſtructed the Preſidency of *Bombay* to retain poſſeſſion of, until a Definitive Treaty of Peace ſhall have been concluded with the ruling party at *Poonah*, as they may be held without increaſe of expence to the Company.

With reſpect to the other parts of your letter, we are concerned to find you infer ſuch conſequences to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, as you ſeem to apprehend will reſult from the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to *Poonah*; we think it proper therefore to aſſure you, that it is our wiſh to ſupport the reputation and credit of their Government, as far as we can conſiſtently with the due execution of the Powers entruſted to us by the Legiſlature. It ſhall alſo be our endeavour to ſecure the Preſidency of *Bombay* from any ſlight or diſreſpect of their authority. We are ſatisfied of the knowledge and experience of theſe gentlemen in the political views and intereſts of the Maratta Government, nor do we queſtion their ability to conduct a Negociation for a Peace: Yet, however we may be influenced by theſe motives, and by our confidence in their integrity and ſtrict deſire to fulfil our intentions, we do not think we can repeal or alter the appointment of Colonel *Upton* conſiſtently with the orders and reſolutions which we have already made public, and ſignified to the Miniſters at *Poonah*, or with the dignity of this Government, which he has been deputed to repreſent in his character of public Miniſter at the Maratta Court.

As it is poſſible that *Ragonaut Row* may ſeek refuge in ſome of the Company's garriſons on the *Malabar* Coaſt, we have further directed the Preſidency of *Bombay* to afford him an aſylum with his attendants only, in caſe he ſhould find himſelf reduced to ſolicit this mark of their favour.

We are, &c.

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APPENDIX. No. 85.

From the Nabob of *Arcot*; received the 14th October 1775.

AS ſoon as I learnt that you and the Gentlemen of Council were pacifically inclined towards the Miniſters at *Poonah*, and afterwards when I was informed that you had determined to ſend Colonel *Upton* to conclude a Peace with them, I diſpatched ſeveral letters to you, under dates the 16th of Jummadee ul Awal (or July) with a duplicate of the 19th of the ſame month; of the 13th of Jummadee Aſianie (11th Auguſt) with a duplicate thereof; of the 28th of the ſame month; and of the 6th of Rujjub (2d of September); all of which have undoubtedly been peruſed by you and the Gentlemen of Council. I ſent a draft of Coulnâmâh, which in my judgment ſhould be obtained from the Marattas for the tranquillity of the *Carnatic*, and for the Circars, and other poſſeſſions of the Company, to the Governor and Council of *Madras*, to be forwarded to you in a letter from them; and for the greater ſecurity, I now incloſe you another copy of it. By the Bleſſing of God I am an Hereditary Prince, and a firm and ſteady Friend and Ally of the King of *Great Britain*, and am the moſt attached to the *Engliſh* Nation of all the Princes of *India*. My friendſhip and ſincere regard to them has been frequently put to the teſt, both in times of proſperity

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perity and adverſity, and through the ſtrict connection which ſubſiſts between me and the Company, our concerns are the ſame, and my Country is independent of every Sirdar, however powerful, by means of my Alliance with the King of *Great Britain*. By this the Country of *Carnatic Paingaut*, *Tanjore*, and all my other Dominions, are exempted from the payment of Chout, either on account of time paſt or to come, as well as from all other demands which would otherwiſe have been made on it. I therefore ſome time ago requeſted you would ſend inſtructions to Colonel *Upton* to conſult with the Agent whom I ſhould ſend there, and in conjunction with him to exert his endeavours for the eſtabliſhment of Peace with the Miniſters at *Poonah*. The Peace formerly concluded with the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*, by General *Caillaud* and Mr. *Stracey*, was very ſoon broken; that concluded through me with the ſame Nabob, has not yet been ſhaken, though this is the ninth year ſince it was firſt eſtabliſhed; and, by the Bleſſing of God, were a Treaty concluded through my mediation with the Miniſters at *Poonah*, there can be no doubt but I ſhould obtain great advantages for the Company, becauſe I am perfectly well acquainted with the diſpoſitions of the Powers of the Country, and in the method of negociating and forming Treaties with them; and ſhould, by the Bleſſing of God, exert myſelf to the utmoſt to eſtabliſh it on the firmeſt footing. The advancement of the proſperity and intereſts of my friends the *Engliſh*, in *India*, is the firſt wiſh of my heart; and this greatly depend on the preſent Treaty. The *Poona* Miniſters ſome time ago applied to me to take on myſelf the part of a Mediator of Peace between them and the *Engliſh*. I am therefore deſirous, for my own and the Company's intereſts, and to remove all doubts, to borrow Mr. *Chambers* (a good man, and a friend both to me and the Company) from the Governor and Council here, and to ſend him to *Poonah*, accompanied by *Shuſh Row*, whoſe eldeſt brother reſides there on my part. I requeſt that you will be ſo kind as to ſend Orders without delay to Colonel *Upton*, to act in conjunction with theſe Perſons whom I ſhall ſend in the propoſed accommodation. I will tranſmit you a copy of the Orders which I give to Mr. *Chambers* and *Shuſh Row*, as well as of the Tranſactions and Negociations of which I receive intelligence from *Poonah*. In the Treaty with the Marattas, it will not be proper to inſert the names of any countries, except thoſe under the Dominion of the Company, myſelf, and the Succeſſor of *Sujah ul Dowlah*; and it is for the Company's intereſt that no other ſhould be inſerted; for the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah* and *Hyder Ally Khân* are very far from wiſhing the increaſe of the Power and Authority of the *Engliſh*, to whom in their hearts they are not Friends. And *Hyder Ally Khân*, in this neighbourhood, incited thereto by the conſideration of the greatneſs of his Forces, which he is daily augmenting, has gone beyond his limits, of which you have been informed by my former letters. He has lately formed a reſolution of marching from *Serrungpatan*, and annexing the Countries of *Kurpah*, *Kurnole*, the Dominions of *Mararow*, and of the Zemindars dependant on *Adoonie* to his other poſſeſſions. He is prevented carrying theſe deſigns into immediate execution, by the neceſſity of repairing the Fort of *Serrungpatan*, part of the walls of which have been thrown down by an inundation of the River *Kâveerie*; as ſoon as this buſineſs is accompliſhed, he will certainly proceed to the execution of the afore-mentioned plan; and as the Chiefs of theſe Countries are not ſufficiently powerful to make head againſt him, there is no doubt but he will quickly bring them under his dominions. I incloſe for your information ſome papers of intelligence which I have lately received. At a particular ſeaſon of the year, horſes and cloaths were always brought into this Country to *Tripotee*, of which I uſed to make purchaſes, and the People of the Country took off large quantities; but for theſe laſt two years *Hyder Ally Khân*, in conſequence of his intentions on *Kurpah*, has not permitted the dealers in cloth and horſes to come to *Tripotee*, but draws them into his own country, and purchaſes their merchandize himſelf. With the approbation of the Governor and Council here, I raiſed ſeveral troops of cavalry, and by reaſon of the unhealthineſs of this climates to horſes, I have loſt many in each troop, which I cannot replace; and ſhould *Hyder Ally* get poſſeſſion of *Kurpah*, &c. I ſhall not be able to procure a ſingle horſe in *Paingaut*. This being the caſe, it would be greatly for our mutual intereſt that the Taluok of *Guntore*, which is ſituated between my poſſeſſions and the Sirkars, ſhould be under the Company's Authority: and that *Kurpah*, which is from of old a dependancy of the *Carnatic Paingaut* (which is well known) ſhould be put into my hands. If by the Bleſſing of God this is carried into execution, and the Fougedars of *Kurnole*, *Mararow*, and the Zemindars of that quarter, who have altogether about 9 or 10,000 horſe, are under the Company's and my protection, their forces will be ready to join with us whenever we may have occaſion for them. I therefore think it would be proper that you ſhould ſend a public order to *Hyder Ally Khân*, to confine himſelf within his own limits, and not to make any attempt againſt the dominions of others. You are apprehenſive of the *French*: I am ſtill more ſo, from the augmentation of *Hyder Ally*'s forces, who is their ſupporter.

Incloſed in the above:

Draft of the Sunnud.

As the whole Country of the *Carnatic Paingaut* and *Ballagaut*, from the River *Kiſhna* to the boundary of *Mallewar*, together with the Fort and Country of *Tanjour*, and all the Forts, Jaheirdas, Zemindars, Pykars, &c. are under the Government of the Nabob *Wallah Jah*, *Ameer Ul Hind*, *Omdut ul Mulk*, *Aſeph ul Dowlah*, *Anwar ul Dien Khân*, *Bahadre Zuffur Jung*, *Sepah Sallar*, I, by the order of *Mahab Rajah* my maſter, declare upon my faith, and on the oath by *Bael Bhundhâr*, that I renounce all demands of Chout, Serdaſemuckee, &c. on the Countries above ſpecified; and that I have no claim of Chout, &c. on account of times paſt or to come. It is hereby required of my ſons and brothers who may ſucceed me, and of all the officers of the *Mahab Rajah*'s and my Government, and of all Miniſters for Affairs, and Taffildars, that they ſtrictly obſerve the Terms of this Sunnud, reſpecting the renunciation of Chout, &c. from the Nabob *Wallah Jah* and his Poſterity, and never on any account, to the lateſt Generations, give them trouble by a demand of Chout, Serdaſemuckee, Nalbundee, and other Taxes; but that they conſider all the afore-mentioned Duties as abſolutely renounced for ever. On this occaſion, knowing the moſt poſitive injunctions, do not demand a freſh Sunnud every year, and deviate not from the orders contained herein.

Dated

LIST of the Names of Maratta Chiefs, which it will be proper to inſert as Guarantees for the tranquillity of the Countries of the *Carnatic*, the Sirkars, and *Bombay*, and for the obſervance of the Treaty of Peace to be concluded through your means between *Rajah Ram Raje Madho Row Sewae Pundhit Purdhan*, the Son of *Narrain Row*, and the King and Parliament of *Great Britain*, the Company and *Engliſh* nation, and the Nabob of *Arcot*.

Maodhajee Boofilah
Futty Sing Guicawar
Govind Row Guicawar
Holdcar
Sindhia
Siccaram Pundit
Morow Pundit Purnaveeſe
Baboojee Naig
Taroo Sindkar
Anund Row Raſtah

Damun

Damun Row, brother to Gopaul Hurry
Hurry
Nanna Purnaveeſſe
Hurry Pundit Purkeah.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 9th November 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

The Board taking into conſideration the Nabob of *Arcot*'s application for Mr. *Chambers* to go to *Poonah*, agreeable to his Letter received the 14th October, and entered in the Perſian Correſpondence;

Agreed, That Mr. *Chambers* be permitted to proceed to *Poonah*, on the part of the Nabob, to aſſiſt Colonel *Upton* in negociating any points which the Nabob may think neceſſary to recommend to him to be made conditions in the Treaty, but to tranſact his buſineſs only through Colonel *Upton*.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

The Nabob of the *Carnatic* has applied to us for permiſſion to depute Mr. *William Chambers* to *Poonah*, to aſſiſt you in negociating any matters on the part of the Nabob, and to propoſe to you ſuch conditions as he may think neceſſary for the intereſt of the *Carnatic*, to make articles in the Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Government. We have allowed the Nabob to employ Mr. *Chambers* on this ſervice, in caſe the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George* ſhall ſee no objection to it; but we have thought it neceſſary to reſtrict him from tranſacting any buſineſs, except through you: And we deſire that you will conform to his repreſentations, as far as you may be authorized by the tenor of our Inſtructions.

We underſtand that Colonel *Keating* has retired with the troops under his command to the ſouth of *Surat*, and will there remain inactive; but that the reaſons alledged for this movement are, to be in readineſs again to take the Field, or to embark for *Bombay*, as future occaſions may render neceſſary. If Colonel *Keating* ſhould continue in this ſituation until your arrival at *Poonah*, you will explain theſe circumſtances to the Miniſtry, and acquaint them that they may depend on our obſerving moſt rigidly the pacification on our part, and that we conſequently require the ſame good faith from them; but if they ſhould order their troops to be again put in motion, with intention to commence hoſtilities afreſh, we ſhall likewiſe be under the neceſſity of breaking through the peaceful meaſures which we meant to obſerve, and ſhall conſider ourſelves no longer bound to keep any terms of amity with them.

We are, &c.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings*, &c. Council.

Fort William,
9th November 1775.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, 2d November 1775.

Extract of a Letter to *Fort Saint George*.

The Nabob has applied to us for permiſſion to employ Mr. *Chambers*, on a deputation from him to meet Colonel *Upton* at *Poonah*, and to aſſiſt him in negociating any matters on the part of the Nabob; alſo to propoſe ſuch articles as he may wiſh to have inſerted as conditions in the Treaty of Peace with the Maratta State. As we conceive this attention due to the Nabob's requeſt, we have told him that we comply with it, if you ſhall ſee no objection; but that Mr. *Chambers* muſt tranſact his buſineſs only through Colonel *Upton*, who has been ordered to attend to his different repreſentations, and to conform to them, as far as he may be authorized by the tenor of our Inſtructions. Appendix. No. 85.

We are, &c.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings*, &c. Council.

Fort William,
9th November 1775.

FOR THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ASIATIC

APPENDIX, No. 86.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 29th November 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Phillip Francis*, } Eſquires.

THE following Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* was received ſince the laſt meeting of Council, and immediately circulated.

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letters of the 5th inſtant; alſo the letter from the Nizam.

In about five weeks from this date, I expect to be at *Poonah*; ſooner if poſſible.

The Country about here is in the greateſt diſtreſs and confuſion. The Marattas have a ſmall army of about 3,000 men, within 20 coſs of *Calpee*; their free-booters have plundered and laid waſte the Country all around within 5 coſs, and they daily expect the Town to ſhare the ſame fate. The Rajah of *Calpee*; *Hamet Bahader* the Goſſain, (who, with his brother *Omro Gyr*) has the entire command and direction of the *Doaub*, has lately marched with an army of about 15,000 men, to the neighbourhood of *Janſi*, whether to ſecure a ſtrong paſs there, or to beſiege *Janſi*, is not known. The Marattas marched the 3,000 men in conſequence of this motion of *Hamet Bahader*'s, and have got between him and *Calpee*. It is alſo ſaid the Marattas have a large force in motion from *Brampore*, commanded by *Hurry Pundit*. In all appearance, the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* will ſoon have in his Country a conſiderable Maratta army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) *J. Upton*.

Calpee,
26th October 1775.

APPENDIX, No. 87.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th November 1775.

THE following Letter from Mr. *Taylor* to the Board was received ſince laſt council day, and ſent in circulation.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I have learnt that the Peiſhwa *Ragonaut Row*, has addreſſed you concerning his pretenſions from the late Treaty. Although the ſtrict adherence to that Treaty forms the chief object of my deputation; yet the validity of it, and the national obligation incurred by it, have already been ſo amply diſcuſſed, that I will only beg of you to bear in mind, that however unauthorized and invalid

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invalid the engagements of the Government of *Bombay* may appear to you, a different ſentiment will prevail with the ſeveral Powers of *Hindoſtan*; for till the contrary was publicly announced, the ancient Conſtitution of the Company certainly exiſted with reſpect to them; and agreeably to that, *Ragoba* will in their minds have a clear right to every advantage ſtipulated to him by the late Treaty. It muſt alſo be remembered, that the miniſterial confederacy is by no means a general aſſociation of the moſt reſpectable Maratta Chiefs, to expel him from the Government for his crimes or incapacity, but a partial combination of a few individuals, brought into office by his own family, who, to gratify their own ambition and intereſt, firſt releaſed him from impriſonment, raiſed him to the Government of which he became the rightful poſſeſſor; and then from the ſame motives, entered into a rebellious confederacy to expel him from that Government, in order to uſurp it themſelves.

Should theſe conſiderations and other motives induce you to make the concerns of *Ragoba* a more leading object in the intended Negociation at *Poonah*, I think it incumbent on me to ſtate to you my opinion, in what manner this point might be effected, moſt conſiſtently with the ſteps you have already taken, the good faith of the Nation, the intereſts of the Company, and how the preſent differences might eaſily be terminated, ſo as to ſecure a permanent ſettlement.

On no footing whatever have the Miniſters any pretenſions to the Government. If the infant *Mhadoo Row Narrain* is really ſuppoſititious, the title of *Ragoba* ſtands unqueſtioned; if he is the true child of *Narrow Row*, ſurely the guardianſhip of an uncle is more natural and equitable, than that of men who have been abetting to the murder of his father, and the expulſion of that uncle, merely to raiſe themſelves on the ruin of the family, and muſt be deemed by all the Powers of *India*, a juſt ſettlement.

To quiet all parties, I would therefore adviſe, that the acknowledgment of the title of *Mhadoo Row Narrain* be the baſis of any future Treaty: that *Ragoba* poſſeſs the actual government in quality of Regent, in the ſame manner as he did during the minority of *Mhadoo Row*, and *Narrow Row*, the uncle and father of the infant; and that in caſe of the death of the infant and *Ragoba*, the ſucceſſion devolve on *Imrut Row Ragoba*'s adopted ſon. To obviate any objections that may ariſe to the infant being put in the power of *Ragoba*, a battalion of Sepoys, or any certain number of our troops may be ſtationed there, for the ſafeguard of his perſon, under the command of our Reſident, the expence of which muſt be paid by the *Poonah* Government; or any other plan may be purſued, which may be ſettled among themſelves.

That the preſent Confederates be guaranteed by the Company, with reſpect to their lives, fortunes, and offices; and even if required an aſylum offered them in any of the Company's territories, or as is uſual among the Marattas, ſome Forts aſſigned them for the ſecurity of their perſons and property.

That the ceſſions made by *Ragoba* to us be guaranteed all by parties, as well as the ſecurity of the *Carnatic*, and the exemption of *Mahomed Ally*, from every kind of demands from the Marattas.

Whatever may be the event of future deliberation on this point, I muſt again earneſtly take the liberty to recommend that our army be permitted to remain with *Ragoba* till a final pacification is effected. It will prevent him from deſpair, and perhaps from throwing himſelf into other connections; ſuch a ſhew of determination will carry an idea of firmneſs and confidence in this Government very neceſſary to give a weight to Colonel *Upton*'s repreſentations and demands. The late declaration of the Miniſtry indeed renders this but a point of prudence, in order to protect the *Guzerat* country. Our army might remain encamped with that of the Peiſhwa, under the walls of *Broderah*. This would at once retain *Futty Sing* in our party, defend the *Guzerat* country in caſe of the eruption of the miniſterial army, and being at a proper diſtance from them, prevent any diſturbance in collecting the harveſt and revenues from our Pergunnahs. The Miniſters might be acquainted with the orders to do this, and that their threats were the occaſion of it, as well as your determination to continue the army with the Peiſhwa till the final Pacification; ſince it appears ſo little dependance is to be had on their promiſes, and at the ſame time they might be aſſured that was our ſole intention. As to the expence, it could not be conſiderable, and we are beſides in actual collection of the diſtricts aſſigned for payment of our charges, which are rated at more than they amount to.

The arrears from the 17th February laſt would alſo become ſecured.

I have, &c.

(Signed) *W. Tayler.*

Calcutta, 18th Nov. 1775.

The Secretary alſo ſent with the above, a letter to him from the Governor General, containing his opinion upon Mr. *Tayler*'s, and a letter from Mr. *Tayler* to the Governor General, as follows:

Sir,

Be pleaſed to ſend round the accompanying letter from Mr. *Tayler*, with that in which he has lately addreſſed the Board, to the Gentlemen of Council, whoſe opinions upon the propoſition contained in the letter I wiſh to collect in this way, unleſs they ſhall judge it neceſſary to diſcuſs it in a formal meeting.

My own opinion upon it is clear. The articles recommended for the Pacification appear reaſonable, and likely to produce their effect, becauſe they accord with the propoſitions which, as we underſtand from Mr. *Tayler*, were at one time the objects of the Miniſters themſelves, and it is not likely they will now refuſe them, if a determination is ſhewn on our part to inſiſt on them. By Colonel *Upton*'s laſt letter, we may expect him to have accompliſhed his journey near a month before our Orders on this ſubject can reach him; if in that ſpace of time he ſhall not have concluded a Treaty, it may be preſumed that the miniſterial party ſeeing the advantage in procraſtinating the iſſue of it, have purpoſely evaded it; and a power thus granted to Colonel *Upton* to preſcribe the ultimate conditions, will bring his Negociation to a ſure criſis; and whether War or Peace be the reſult, this Government will ſtand equally juſtified in their endeavours to prevent the former, and to eſtabliſh the latter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) *W^m Haſtings.*

Belvidere, 22d Nov. 1775.

(Approved) *R. B.*

Honourable Sir,

As I have been given to underſtand that the letter I did myſelf the honour to addreſs to yourſelf and the Council yeſterday, was deferred, on account of your not being preſent at the Board; I hope you will excuſe my taking the liberty to urge to you the importance of its being ſpeedily decided on, eſpecially if what I have propoſed ſhould meet with the approbation of yourſelf and the Council, that immediate orders may be diſpatched, ſo as to arrive in time to prevent *Rogoba* from purſuing any other meaſures.

I have, &c.

(Signed) *W. Tayler.*

21ſt Nov. 1775.

The following Deſire have been returned by the other Gentlemen of Council, the Secretary begs leave to bring on the above buſineſs.

I deſire

I deſire the Conſideration of Mr. *Tayler*'s letter may be poſtponed to the Firſt Council, when I will give my Opinion upon it.

(Signed) *J. H.*
G. M.
P. F.

APPENDIX, No. 88.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th November 1775.

Mr. *Tayler* now ſends in a letter as follows:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

HAVING yeſterday received a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, dated 29th ultimo, containing advices, which appear to me of the greateſt importance with reſpect to our preſent ſituation with the Marattas, I herewith incloſe for your notice an extract from it. I cannot here forbear remarking that this event confirms the advices and conjectures of the Government of *Bombay*, regarding the ſtate and expectations of the two parties, which I had the honour to communicate to you in my Addreſs of the 9th ultimo.

In the preſent critical conjuncture of Affairs, it is much to be lamented that I was not ſo far ſucceſsful as to induce the revocation of your Orders for withdrawing our army from *Ragoba*. This would have given him ſome room to hope that you did not mean entirely to abandon his concerns; and as I am convinced that he would at any rate prefer a Reſtoration or Settlement under the protection and ſanction of the Company to any other, I think, that notwithſtanding the offers of the perſons at *Poonah* who have formed an Alliance to ſupport his cauſe, he would ſtill have waited the event of his late Addreſs to you, before he withdrew himſelf from us to embrace their protection.

But when I reflect on the time at which Colonel *Keating* repreſents theſe matters to be agitated, viz. the 29th ultimo; and that about the 12th inſtant, your final and abſolute Determinations would arrive, which preclude him from all hopes of reſtoration through our means. It ſeems to me that common policy muſt plainly dictate his reliance on the Junto formed by *Moraba Furneeſe*.

Should he adopt this meaſure, there appears to me juſt grounds of apprehenſion, that what we have moſt of all to fear will happen; I mean the re ſettlement of the Maratta Empire, and the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, without our aſſiſtance, after the abſolute abandoning of him, in direct violation of the Treaty concluded with the Government of *Bombay*. In ſuch caſe, I think you muſt perceive, that Colonel *Upton* can form very little hopes of ſucceſs in any one of the points he is charged to negociate. I do not ſee on what footing of Juſtice or Right he can pretend to any of the ceſſions which form the principal object of his Embaſſy, as they were the ſtipulated price of engagements we have found it convenient to recede from; and as to ſtipulations regarding *Mahomed Aly*, I ſhall only remark, that the *Carnatic* has ever been too favourite an object of Maratta depredations to relinquiſh it but on compulſion.

The only effectual means I can deviſe in this ſituation, is ſtill to endeavour to become the inſtruments of his reſtoration, by acceding to the Treaty entered into with him by the Government of *Bombay*, leaving it to them to explain in the beſt manner they may be able, the cauſe of the impediment on the proſecution of our engagements with him, the miſtruſt that he has of all the Miniſters, the knowledge of their general views, and of that perfidy and treachery; and which, from the leading characteriſtics of his Nation and Caſt, may perhaps yet induce him to wait the event of his late application to you, before he adopts that laſt and dangerous meaſure of confiding his life and Government with ſuch doubtful characters as theſe. Appendix, No. 88.

I have, &c.

(Signed) *W. Tayler.*

Calcutta, 29th Nov. 1775.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, dated the 29th October 1775, and received the 28th November.

Though the odds are greatly againſt this reaching you at *Calcutta*, yet at a venture I ſhall communicate ſome little matters which may be of uſe.

Morabah Furneeſe has lately ſent a man to the Peiſhwa, with aſſurance that he and the following are ſtrongly attached to his intereſt; *Butchabhoy*, *Chintoo Wittel*, *Mallarjee Goparah*, and *Ramchunder Gunneſs*; all powerful men. He adds, that the ſituation of the miniſterial party is nearly as bad as can be; that *Harry Punt Furkia*, now at *Aurungabad*, has ſcarce five thouſand men under his command, and, at the utmoſt, their whole force do not exceed 12,000, and thoſe ſo diſpirited and diſperſed as not to be eaſily aſſembled. *Saccaram Bappoo* and *Nanna Furneeſe* are in *Promder Fort*, and afraid to truſt themſelves out of it: That he, *Maroba*, is collecting a force which, by the time we can aſcend the Gotts, will amount to 10,000 of the beſt horſe lately in the Miniſter's pay; with theſe he will join the Peiſhwa, and carry him to *Poonah* without bloodſhed. Theſe are the accounts he daily receives from the ſouthward. *Beeſi Sing*, the Raja of the Marwar Country, is now within 45 coſs of the City of *Amedabad*, on his way to join the Peiſhwa; his Vackeel arrived here yeſterday, and ſays, his maſter has with him ten thouſand of his troops. We ſhall march to-morrow for our Pergunnah of *Chickley*, and leave the Peiſhwa's Army at *Sangaaz*. I hope in God you are by this time ſucceſsful. Nothing on earth could pleaſe me ſo much as the aſſurance of it.

A true copy.

(Signed) *W. Tayler.*

The following Queſtion is put, upon the firſt of the above Letters from Mr. *Tayler:*

Whether the Propoſitions contained in the ſaid letter, or any part of them, ſhall be agreed to?

Mr. *Francis*—I think that the Reſolution already taken by this Council, and on which our Inſtructions to Colonel *Upton* are founded, are not open to any alteration, until we hear the reſult of his firſt Negociation with the Miniſtry at *Poonah*, or until he informs us in what manner his Propoſitions are received by them, and whether the Negociation committed to him be likely to ſucceed or not.

Colonel *Monſon*—The ſituation of this Government with the Maratta State, and the Inſtructions under which Colonel *Upton* is ſent to treat with the miniſterial party at *Poonah*, will not admit of any preſent alteration. We ſhould wait for the reſult of his Negociations, before any ſuch freſh Propoſitions of a different nature from thoſe which we have already made to the Miniſterial party are ſubmitted to their conſideration. I therefore am of opinion that the Propoſitions contained in Mr. *Tayler*'s letter cannot be admitted.

General *Clavering*—I cannot agree to the adopting at preſent the plan propoſed by Mr. *Tayler* in his letter of the 18th inſtant, becauſe it would oblige us to vary the Syſtem of Pacification that we have propoſed to the Miniſters at *Poonah*. It is neceſſary to wait for the firſt advices from Colonel *Upton* before we alter the meaſures we have already taken for his Negociation; ſhould thoſe fail, and Colonel *Upton* return, our meaſures then muſt be adapted to the circumſtances; but at any rate I think Mr. *Tayler*'s plan, of allowing our army to remain with *Ragoba*, would defeat the preſent Negociation, and may eventually engage the Company in an endleſs War, in

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order to eſtabliſh *Ragoba* in his Peiſhwaſhip. What reaſon Mr. *Tayler* may have for his conjecture that *Mâderow Narrain* is a ſuppoſititious child, I cannot conceive. Mr. *Moſtyn*, in his letter of the 28th April 1774, recorded on the Select Committee Proceedings 15th June, ſpeaks poſitively of his Birth; and again, in his letter of the 20th May following, recorded on the Select Committee Proceedings of the 1ſt September 1774, confirms that account, and the effects that it had had upon *Ragoba*'s party, by his forces having left him on that account. This is the ſtrongeſt evidence that we can obtain of the Legitimacy of his Birth, both in the mind of Mr. *Moſtyn* at that time, and in the opinions that were entertained of it in that Country. As to Mr. *Tayler*'s ſcheme, of keeping a battalion of the Company's Sepoys at *Poonah*, it is too chimerical to require a ſerious anſwer.

The Governor General—I ſtill adhere to my opinion delivered in my Circular Minute of the 22d. The laſt letter which we received from Colonel *Upton*, adviſed us that he was at *Calpee* on the 26th ultimo, and expected to reach *Poonah* in five weeks, which period will have elapſed to-morrow. At all events, any letters which may be diſpatched to him after this day, will not be able to reach him until a long time after his arrival there, when every Negociation ought to be concluded, if he ſhall find in the miniſterial party a ſincere diſpoſition to Peace. Theſe propoſitions, accompanied with a peremptory declaration that they are the ultimate Terms offered to them, I do not conceive would produce their effect, and for that reaſon I have recommended their being adopted. The condition objected to by the General I ſhould equally diſapprove, but that I conclude the alternative joined with it would preclude it from having a moment's conſideration with either party, and that they would both prefer an accommodation of this point between themſelves, to any interpoſition of our force in an occaſion of ſo much delicacy as the immediate guard of the perſon of their actual Sovereign.

Reſolved, That the following Reply be ſent to Mr. *Tayler*:

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 18th inſtant, and of yeſterday.

We are much obliged to you for communicating to us the intelligence incloſed in the latter from Colonel *Keating*. We hope that the ſucceſs of Colonel *Upton*'s Negociation will obviate the neceſſity of making any alteration in the Inſtructions already given him; at any rate, as he muſt be ſo near the end of his journey, we think it abſolutely neceſſary to wait for advices of his firſt interview and Negociations with the Miniſtry before we ſend him any new Inſtructions for his conduct.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis.

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Copy of a Letter from *William Tayler* to the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

BY the Advices from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, you will have been fully apprized of the Treaty entered into with *Ragoonath Ballajee Row*, the Peiſhwa of the Maratta Empire, for our aſſiſtance with a body of your troops to act in concert with his, in order to effect his Re-inſtatement in his Capital of *Poonah*; which he had been obliged to abandon by the violence of certain of his ſubjects, who had entered into a rebellious confederacy to expel him from his Government in order to uſurp it themſelves. The motives which guided the conduct of your ſervants at this critical juncture, the progreſs of their military operations, and the general ſtate of affairs, have alſo, no doubt, been ſo fully ſtated to you by the Calcutta, that a recital of them now would be an unneceſſary intruſion on your time.

With the flattering hopes they had then before them, of ſpeedily accompliſhing their engagements with *Ragoba*, either by arms or negociation, and thereby effecting thoſe objects which had been ſo frequently and ſtrenuouſly enjoined to them, as your ultimate wiſhes in the weſt of *India*, it is not eaſy to conceive the concern and aſtoniſhment of your ſervants on the receipt of the following Letter from the Honourable the Governor General and Council, which arrived at *Bombay* on the 12th Auguſt laſt.

Copy of a Letter from *William Tayler*, to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

From the very general manner in which this Government had expreſſed themſelves regarding the meaſures purſued by your ſervants at *Bombay*, it appeared to them impoſſible to judge with preciſion of the grounds of their diſapproval, which was indiſpenſably neceſſary in order to remove their objections to the Treaty with *Ragoba*; in the ſtrict adherence to which, the good faith of the Nation, and your particular intereſts, were deeply engaged. For the latter purpoſe, as well as to give them every requiſite information regarding your views and intereſt at that Preſidency, ſhould they perſiſt in their determination to conclude a Peace with the Miniſterialiſts, the Governor and Council of *Bombay* deemed it indiſpenſably neceſſary to depute hither a Member of their Board; and, as I appeared to them duly qualified to anſwer their intentions, they did me the honour to ſelect me. Purſuant to their directions I therefore embarked on the Terrible Bomb Ketch, and arrived here the 1ſt ultimo.

As the ideas which appear to have guided the Reſolutions of the Governor General and Council, ſeemed to me to have ariſen from want of knowledge or miſconception of the nature of the Maratta Government, the late factions and diviſions in the *Poonah* Dubar, the ſtate of the different parties, the rank, rights, and connections of *Ragoba*, I thought it neceſſary to ſtate theſe at large, together with your declared views and intereſts in the weſt of *India*, the manner in which they would be accompliſhed by the Treaty with *Ragoba*, and alſo how far the ſecurity and welfare of your territories in the eaſt of *Indoſtan* had been attended to in the concluſion of that Treaty—I therefore addreſſed them the following Letter. *(See Appendix 83.)*

Copy of a Letter from *William Tayler*, to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

Conſidering the alteration of circumſtances, and the different ſentiments which the foregoing Addreſs muſt doubtleſs have conveyed from thoſe, who ſeem to have dictated the letter to the Government of *Bombay* of the 31ſt of May laſt, I flattered myſelf that this Government would be induced to an alteration of meaſures; but it is with regret I muſt acquaint you, that all I had urged was in vain; for under the 9th ultimo they wrote me in anſwer, that after duly conſidering the repreſentations which I had been pleaſed to deliver them, as well as the ſeveral informations I had communicated reſpecting the nature, motives, and objects of the engagements with *Ragoba*, and the preſent ſtate of the Maratta Government at *Poonah*, they had, for the preſent, to acquaint me, they were confirmed in their opinion of the expediency of the Company's Troops being immediately recalled from the ſervice of *Ragoba* into their own garri-

ſons. Their orders for this purpoſe would therefore remain.

The reaſons and motives for the conduct of this Government, are no doubt explained to you at large on their Records. For my part, being totally ignorant of them, I can only here lament the ill ſucceſs of my endeavours, being well convinced that the re-eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba*, and the completion of our engagements with him, is the moſt effectual means to enſure the quiet and permanent poſſeſſion of the ſeveral Diſtricts to be ceded to us.

Having expreſſed ſome doubts regarding their orders for the recall of our Troops from *Ragoba*, they alſo acquainted me in their letter of the 9th ultimo, that, as I ſeemed to underſtand their directions implied the recall of the Troops to *Bombay*, they thought it neceſſary to explain their meaning to have been, that it ſhould remain at the option of the Government of *Bombay* to withdraw them into ſuch of your garriſons, and diſtribute them as they might ſee fit, for the preſervation of your Poſſeſſions, including *Salſette*.

The words—"Company's Poſſeſſions"—appearing to me indefinite, and being unwilling to leave any opening for the Government of *Bombay* to ſuffer the leaſt imputation of diſobedience to the Orders of the Governor-General and Council, I requeſted it might be explained, whether they meant to include by them ſuch of the ſeveral Diſtricts ceded to us by the Peiſhwa and *Futty Sing* Guicawar, as are in our poſſeſſion, or whether they meant to confine them only to *Salſette*, and Territories poſſeſſed by you previous to our engagements with the Peiſhwa: to which they returned me for anſwer, that their meaning by the Company's Poſſeſſions was, the Territories poſſeſſed by the Company previous to the date of the Treaty entered into with *Ragoba*; and that they added including *Salſette*, becauſe the Government of *Bombay* had taken poſſeſſion of it before that period. I have, however, the pleaſure to inform you, that though my Deputation has not been in general ſucceſsful, yet, that I truſt it has not been wholly ineffectual to the advancement of your intereſts; for on further repreſentation from me, and explaining the nature of the tenure, and the particular convenience theſe ceſſions would be of to you, the Governor-General and Council write to me under the 18th ultimo, that the *Guicawar* proportion of the Revenues of the Town and Pergunnah of *Broach*, and the Diſtricts of *Corial*, *Chickley*, and *Veriow*, having been made over to you by *Futty Sing*, who appears to have the right and authority to make this conceſſion, they had inſtructed the Preſidency of *Bombay* to retain poſſeſſion of them until a Definitive Treaty of Peace ſhall have been concluded with the ruling party at *Poona*; from which circumſtance I hope they mean to retain theſe ceſſions, the Revenues of which are valued at ſo conſiderable a ſum as 5,28,000 Rupees.

I was regularly acquainted with the Deputation of Colonel *Upton* to *Poonah*, by a copy of his Inſtructions being ſent me. This meaſure appears to me reflective on your ſervants at *Bombay* in general, who, from their proximity to the Marattas, and the daily opportunities they have of becoming acquainted with the Characters, tranſactions, intereſts, and deſigns of the ſeveral Members of that Durbar, may juſtly be ſuppoſed moſt fit for ſuch a Negociation; but particularly on Mr. *Moſtyn*, whom you have done the honour to appoint your Repreſentative there, and whoſe conduct you have repeatedly approved. It alſo ſeemed to me highly derogatory to them as your Government there, and tending totally to ſubvert every idea of reſpect, power, and authority in the different Powers around, which, in its conſequences, muſt no doubt be attended with difficulties and hindrances in the conduct of your Affairs. The amazing expence of this Embaſſy, in compariſon with the trifle it would coſt you was this Negociation committed to the management of your Servants at *Bombay*, was alſo a capital objection with me. For theſe ſeveral reaſons I thought it my duty to remonſtrate againſt this meaſure, to deſire the recall of Colonel *Upton*, and that they would ſignify their orders and intentions, leaving the execution of them to the Government of *Bombay*, for whoſe ready and implicit obedience I confidently pledged myſelf. But ſorry I am to acquaint you, that my repreſentations on this head had alſo no effect; for they acquaint me in anſwer, that they are concerned to find me infer ſuch conſequences to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, as I ſeemed to apprehend would reſult from the appointment of Colonel *Upton* to *Poonah*: they thought it proper, therefore, to aſſure me, that it was their wiſh to ſupport the Reputation and Credit of their Government as far as they can, conſiſtently with the due execution of the powers intruſted to them by the Legiſlature, that it ſhould alſo be their endeavours to ſecure the Preſidency of *Bombay* from any ſlight, or diſreſpect of their authority. They expreſs themſelves ſatisfied of the knowledge and experience of your Servants, in the political views and intereſts of the Maratta Government; nor did they queſtion their abilities to conduct a Negociation for a Peace; yet, however, they may be influenced by theſe motives, and by their confidence in their integrity, and ſtrict deſire to fulfil their intentions, they did not think they could repeal or alter the appointment of Colonel *Upton*, conſiſtently with the Orders and Reſolutions which they have already made public, and ſignified to the Miniſters at *Poonah*, or with the Dignity of this Government, which he had been deputed to repreſent in his character of Public Miniſter at the Maratta Court. In reply to this I can only remark, that if there is any juſtneſs in the grounds on which I found my objections, which the Governor-General and Council do not pretend to deny, the reaſon they here aſſigned for totally diſregarding them, appears to me but unſatisfactory, as I do not conceive what indignity can poſſibly enſue by their transferring the management of this Negociation from Colonel *Upton*, to a Deputation of your Servants at *Bombay*—their Supremacy in political matters could have been as effectually explained. I can only further lament, that when the mode and terms of accommodation were reſolved on, they did not from the firſt, ſignify their intentions to the Government of *Bombay*, by which means you might long 'ere now, I apprehend, have been at ſome certainty with reſpect to your Affairs on that ſide; whereas by the preſent mode and route, you are left in a very diſagreeable ſuſpenſe, and likely to continue ſo for ſome time; for though Colonel *Upton*, I underſtand, left this place in July laſt, he was on the 27th ultimo got no further on his way to *Poonah* than *Calpee*, and as it is probable the intermediate Country may be infeſted with parties of Horſe, and his journey thereby delayed, it is impoſſible to ſay when he will arrive there.

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With reſpect to the matter and objects of Colonel *Upton*'s Inſtructions, I beg leave to trouble you with the following reflections:—

If we may judge from the tenor of Governor *Haſtings*'s letter to *Sackaram Bapoo*, and from the expreſſions he makes uſe of, "My Employer, the King of *England*," Colonel *Upton* will be eſteemed at *Poonah* the Repreſentative of this ſacred Character; I will therefore firſt proceed to examine how far his actions will be conſiſtent with the dignity of it, and with thoſe ideas of juſtice and moderation, which no doubt this Government will wiſh to convey of itſelf in this firſt inſtance, that is publicly brought forth to action in the face of all the Powers in *India*.

Every circumſtance, if well attended to, ſeems to confirm it beyond a doubt, that, conſiſtent with juſtice and propriety, *Ragoonath Row* is the only perſon whoſe Authority we can regularly acknowledge, with whom we can enter into any Treaty or Agreement relative to Maratta Affairs. On the death of his Nephew, *Raron Row*, being the only male Survivor of the Family of *Badjerow*, he ſucceeded to the Peiſhwaſhip, and was regularly

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regularly inveſted with the Office by every requiſite form, and acknowledged by the very perſons whoſe intereſt and ambition now lead them in arms againſt him. This acquieſcence would by no means be deemed a compulſive one; for at that time, it is well known, he did not poſſeſs the means of compulſion: a priſoner, without money, and without an army, he was ſolely indebted to them for his releaſe, and particularly to the Duan *Sackaram*. From the juſtneſs of his Hereditary Title, and this public acknowledgement of the different Miniſters and Maratta Chiefs, the Government of *Bombay* thought they might alſo with great propriety recognize him. Accordingly the public Envoy of the Company at *Poonah*, who then repreſented the Engliſh Nation, did, in the Name of that Nation, formally acknowledge him, and renewed with him the Treaties and friendſhip entered into with his anceſtors. I conceive that this act was as generally obligatory on the whole Nation, as any other Treaties of Peace and Alliance formed previous to the exiſtence of the Governor General and Council.

Excluſive of our public acknowledgment of him as the ruling Power eſtabliſhed at *Poonah* by the conſent of all parties, it muſt be obſerved, that we had in ſome degree a previous obligation to recognize him alone as rightful Heir of the Family of *Badjerow*. Our agreement with the firſt Peiſhwa, *Badjerow Ballajee*, was rather, on his part, a perſonal than a national one; nothing is mentioned in it of the Maratta Government; it was a friendſhip between him and the Company, eſtabliſhed by a Treaty ſigned in his behalf by his Brother, *Chimnajee Oppah*, which Treaty is the baſis of all our Rights and Pretenſions in the Dominions of the Peiſhwa. This perſonal friendſhip is confirmed by a Minute on the *Bombay* Records, which declares all your Treaties null and invalid in the extinction of the Peiſhwa family. It was on this footing that in the year 1761 *Ragoba*, when Regent before, requeſted our aſſiſtance againſt the Nizam in behalf of the young Peiſhwa, *Mhadoo Row*. Nothing of the Maratta Government was mentioned; he pleaded, that in virtue of our ancient friendſhip with the family, it was incumbent on us to aſſiſt him in that time of diſtreſs. Poſſeſſed with theſe ideas, and deeming the reigning diviſions a fit opportunity to compaſs the Views of the Company, the Government of *Bombay* early directed the Preſident at *Poonah* to ſound whether *Ragoba* would want our aſſiſtance; and at a time when perhaps it might have been done to advantage, they never once thought of treating with his rebellious ſubjects, deeming it totally incompatible with our engagements and friendſhip with the Peiſhwa, and conſequently a groſs and open violation of our faith.

On this footing alone, the *Britiſh* Nation ſeems doubly bound to make the Reſtoration of *Ragoba* the primary object of the intended Negociation. Though our ſolemn acknowledgments of him, and the renewal of friendſhip pledged to his Anceſtors, does not perhaps imply any actual obligation to aſſiſt him; yet, in Honour and Juſtice, we were certainly bound not to acknowledge any other Government at *Poonah*, till he had formally relinquiſhed all title to it; or till his utter depreſſion, by deſtroying all hopes, had authorized our treating with the ruling Powers, in order to prevent a general interruption to our affairs. This virtual obligation was confirmed by a ſolemn Treaty, whereby we not only renew our acknowledgment of his right, but engage to ſupport him in it againſt the Uſurpation of the Confederacy. Much has been already urged reſpecting the validity of our engagements to him by that late Treaty; and it yet remains to be ultimately decided how far that Treaty was legal and warrantable by the Act of the Legiſlature; but be that as it may, whatever may have been the culpability of the Government of *Bombay* in concluding it, if any regard is to be paid to National Faith, *Ragoba* has certainly a right to every advantage ſtipulated by it; for, till the contrary was publicly announced, the ancient Conſtitution of the Company certainly exiſted with reſpect to the Powers of *India*, and the acts and obligations of that Preſidency became the acts and obligations of the Nation.

Theſe words of Colonel *Upton*'s Inſtructions, plainly acknowledge the juſtneſs of *Ragoba*'s title, and clearly define the nature of the two parties; *Ragonath Row* is the Peiſhwa, or Chief Ruler of the Maratta State, but he was obliged by the miniſterial party to quit that Capital. It muſt be remembered, that this party was by no means a general aſſociation of the moſt reſpectable Maratta Chiefs to expel him from the Government for his Crimes or Incapacity, but a partial combination of a few, who, to gratify their ambition and intereſt, firſt releaſed him from impriſonment, raiſed him to the Government, of which he became the rightful poſſeſſor, and then, from the ſame motive, entered into a rebellious confederacy to expel him from that Government, in order to uſurp it themſelves. To theſe worthy characters is the Repreſentative of the King of *England* to apologize for having aſſiſted their lawful Prince, whoſe right to Government his Nation had before in the moſt ſolemn manner recognized, and renewed with him the Treaties and perſonal Engagements before entered into with his anceſtors. This ſacred Character, againſt whom Rebellion is Death, conſents to countenance and acknowledge their uſurpation in open violation at a ſolemn Treaty previouſly entered into by his Nation, in which they engage to aſſiſt the rightful Prince in the recovery of his Dominions from that very uſurpation.

Had the abandoning of *Ragoba* proceeded from a deteſtation of his crime, a pacific diſpoſition, or a ſentiment of the juſtneſs of the Miniſters to govern, the equity of the motives might have apologized for the infidelity of the act; but his actions will effectually contradict every ſuch ſuppoſition, as the price of our neutrality is to inſiſt on part of the very Territories which was the ſtipulated reward of our aſſiſting *Ragoba*, and if this is refuſed, I am at a loſs to conceive what elſe he is to do, but contradict the pacific declarations he ſet out with by a denunciation of hoſtilities; for ſurely he was not deputed in ſo exalted a character, and with ſo much parade and expence, merely to apologize to the Miniſters, and beg of them *Salſette* and *Baſſein*.

But, ſetting Honour and National Faith aſide, I will proceed to the conſideration of the purpoſes intended to be effected by Colonel *Upton*'s Embaſſy.

The words of his inſtructions beſt define them, "to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace between the Maratta Government and the Preſidency of *Bombay*," and "to obtain a Confirmation to the Preſidency of the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*." Theſe points he is to conſider as indiſpenſable. If I may venture to judge further of the deſigns and wiſhes of this Government, it is alſo no inconſiderable object with them ſo to accommodate matters, that after ſecuring to the Company the Territories in queſtion, they may remain totally neutral and unconcerned in any further parties or reſolutions which may ariſe in the *Poonah* Durbar, and not be compelled to draw their ſword in future, but on the juſt grounds of defending their own abſolute and unqueſtioned rights.

If, by the Maratta Government, is meant the miniſterial confederacy, there is no doubt that Colonel *Upton* will ſucceed in being able to conclude a Treaty of Peace with them. Nine men embarked in a rebellious deſign to uſurp a Government from its rightful owner, will, no doubt, in the deſperate ſituation they were reduced to, gladly embrace the proffered friendſhip of the Britiſh Nation; but I cannot conceive how the uſurped Power of theſe nine men, diſavowed and abandoned by the moſt reſpectable Chiefs of the Maratta Empire, can well be deemed the Maratta Government, or a temporary agreement with them, a Treaty of Peace with it.

However pacifically inclined the Miniſters may be for the

the preſent, I much doubt whether they will accede to the Conditions which are to be ſtipulated on the mere footing of a neutrality. Should any of the Maratta Chiefs have joined *Ragoba*, they certainly will inſiſt on effectual aid from us. Should he be deſerted by all, and a Fugitive in one of our garriſons, they will hardly conſent to the ceſſions to be inſiſted on by Colonel *Upton*: judging by themſelves, they will give no credit to his menaces. The precipitate manner in which the apprehenſions of this Government led them to direct the abandoning of *Ragoba*; the excuſes ſent from hence, the apologies to be made to our Ambaſſador, all beſpeak us in their opinion, under the influence of ſome ſecret fear, or conſcious weakneſs. They know that with the Forces of *Bombay* alone, it is impoſſible to attack them with any probability of ſucceſs. They are alſo ſenſible that unleſs we can retain the peaceable and undiſturbed poſſeſſion of them, the Territories we demand will by no means counterbalance the loſſes we ſhall ſuſtain by the ſtoppage of Trade, the ruin of our Merchants, and the depredations it is in their power to commit.

But whatever temporary calm our preſent accommodation may produce, many circumſtances concur to warrant the juſteſt apprehenſions, that we muſt infallibly in the end either cede the Poſſeſſions we may now acquire, or have a much more difficult taſk on our hands, than the re-eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba*. I will ſuppoſe for a moment every thing adjuſted with the Confederates, and *Ragoba* quietly acquieſcing for the preſent in whatever we may chooſe to ſtipulate for him. To make this tranquillity durable, we muſt be aſſured that his reſignation and content will be laſting.—The character of *Ragoba* is rather propitious to ſuch a hope; he is ſomething advanced in years, and the various turns of fortune that he has experienced, has given his mind ſo religious a bent, that it would better ſuit his diſpoſition to be the miniſtering Brahmin of a Pagoda, than Conductor of the Maratta empire. It is not however in Human Nature for him patiently and quietly to ſubmit to the uſurpation of a ſet of men, whoſe only views are to raiſe themſelves on the ruins of his family: Were we free from apprehenſions on his part, the character of his Son *Imrut Row*, muſt preclude all hopes of tranquillity; he is a youth of great natural parts, and of an active, daring, and aſpiring genius; a firm union of the confederacy might perhaps enable them to withſtand their attempts, but it is compoſed of men of ſuch jarring intereſts, that when they are not in arms againſt *Ragoba*, they muſt naturally diſunite. Their common danger, when they had every thing to fear from our junction, could hardly contain their mutual miſtruſts and jealouſies of each other's views, from diſſolving their league. They conſiſt of Rajahpute Chiefs and Brahmin Miniſters; on a ſettlement, the Rajahputes will be demanding Jaghiers; this the Miniſters will be averſe to, as ſuch grants diminiſh the Revenues, which is the principal object of their aims. Excluſive of this, it is well known that a rancorous and deadly hatred has long ſubſiſted between *Sackaram Bapoo*, and *Nanah Furneeze*, who are the two leading Miniſters in the confederacy, and the latter is the man of moſt influence and ability. *Ragoba* is generally eſteemed by all men for his charitable and unoppreſſive character, and if he only quietly waits the diſunion of the Confederates, the wiſhes of all Parties, aided by the influence of thoſe who have ſhown themſelves throughout particularly attached to him, muſt in the end, I think, infallibly reſtore him to the Government. In ſuch caſe, it is eaſy to judge what probability there is of our peaceably retaining the ceſſions of the Miniſters.

A circumſtance occurs to me, in conſidering the plan of Colonel *Upton's* Negociation, which is not unworthy of attention. It moſt unfortunately happens, that every one of the Diſtricts which he is inſtructed to demand, are, from the nature of their tenure, either totally out of the power of the Miniſters to grant, or it would be totally inconſiſtent with common juſtice for us to accept them at their hands. The nature of the *Guicawar* tenure has been ſufficiently explained, not to perceive at one glance that the *Poonah* Durbar cannot grant to us the Moiety of the Revenues of *Broach*, which is the ſole right and property of the *Guicawar*. *Salſette* and *Baſſein* are by no means a part of the Maratta Dominions; they are the Family Property of the Peiſhwa, granted by the Raja *Shaa* to his Predeceſſor *Badjerow Ballajee*; they belong as much to *Ragoba* in quality of heir, as the Diſtricts of *Calcutta* do, to the Company; from him alone can we with juſtice and propriety receive them: or, from the indiſputed Heir of the Peiſhwa Family, admitting from a moment that the infant *Madoo Row Narrain* could be clearly deemed ſo, can we with juſtice accept his Patrimony from the Miniſters, who have been acceſſary to the Murder of his Father, and expelled his Uncle from the Government, merely becauſe they make his name a ſanction to their Uſurpations? Appendix. No. 89.

Such being the reflections which occurred to me on the preſent plan laid down to Colonel *Upton*, as the object of his Negociation, I deemed it incumbent on me, as your Servant, and a Member of the Britiſh Commonwealth, ardently to embrace any opportunity that might offer, to lead back this Government as far into what appeared to me the right road of good policy, as circumſtances would admit: and *Ragoba* having addreſſed them a letter, regarding his claim by the late Treaty concluded with him, I imagined they might again become the ſubject of their deliberations, I therefore under the 18th inſtant, propoſed another plan of accommodation, which you will pleaſe to obſerve is a medium between his conditional re-eſtabliſhment, and the confirmation of the Authority of the Miniſters.

Copy of a Letter from *William Tayler*, to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

Though ſo many days have elapſed ſince the delivery of the above plan, I have not yet been honoured with a reply to it; and begin therefore to be apprehenſive, ſhould it even be approved, leſt any turn of Affairs may have produced an accommodation, and Colonel *Upton* find *Ragoba* in the Government; how in ſuch caſe he could act with propriety, and effect the purpoſes enjoined him, I confeſs myſelf at a loſs to diſcover. The arguments and apologies ſtated in his Inſtructions can, on no account be enforced to *Ragoba*, who on the application for *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, would naturally tell him, That he had been deceived by the Government of *Bombay* into a Treaty for their aſſiſtance, and that depending on our Good Faith, he had preferred our Nation to every other reſource; and that for the firſt time it had been ſported with, as the Government of *Bombay* muſt have well known their ſubordinate ſtate; That, therefore, he had only to expreſs his concern at the delays having forced him into other meaſures, and to form other connections; and appealed to the Equity of our Nation, whether we ought not to reſtore *Salſette*, being his Family Inheritance, and all the Territories he had ceded to us, and aided us to get poſſeſſion of.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and moſt obedient humble Servant,
W. Tayler.

Calcutta, 26th November 1775.

Copy of a Letter from *William Tayler* to the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of *England*, trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

Since cloſing my addreſs to you of the 26th, I have received a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, dated the 29th ultimo, containing ſome Advices, very important in the preſent ſituation of your Affairs with the Marattas. See Append. 88.

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As any delay might render it uncertain whether this would reach the Saliſbury, I take the liberty to incloſe you a copy of my Addreſs of this date to the Governor General and Council on this occaſion, which will fully inform you of the nature of theſe Advices, and of my ſentiments regarding them.

I cannot help here again lamenting the total inefficacy of my late Repreſentations to this Government with reſpect to our Engagements with *Ragoba*; for in the delicate and critical ſituation to which their conduct has brought you, it ſeems to me very probable, that his reeſtabliſhment without our aid may enſue; in which caſe we muſt probably for ever, relinquiſh all hopes of compaſſing your Views in the weſt of *India*.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
Calcutta, and moſt devoted Servant,
29th November 1775. *W^m. Tayler.*

Copy of a Letter from *William Tayler* to the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of *England*, trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

Appendix 88.

I have this inſtant received the accompanying Letter from the Honourable the Governor General and Council, in anſwer to mine of yeſterday; and as their determination on this point muſt be intereſting to you, I ſend it by a boat expreſs, in hopes it may yet overtake the Saliſbury.

The remarks and conjectures contained in my letter to them of yeſterday, are ſufficient comments on their Reſolutions not to alter their conduct with the alteration of circumſtances, as they point out all the evil conſequences that are likely to enſue.

I am with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
Calcutta, and moſt devoted Servant,
30th November 1775. *W. Tayler.*

Copy of a Letter from *William Tayler* to the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of *England*, trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

By the ſhip Hillſborough I now do myſelf the honour to tranſmit you Duplicates of my ſeveral Addreſſes of the 26th, 29th and 30th of November laſt.

I am ſorry it is not in my power to communicate any certain Accounts of the State of your Affairs in the weſt of *India*, for, notwithſtanding that by their Letter to me of the 29th November, the Honourable the Governor General and Council deemed Colonel *Upton* to be near the end of his journey, yet no intelligence has been received of his arrival at *Poonah*. The letter which has been lately ſent from the miniſterial party to this Government, has no doubt been duly forwarded in the public Advices by this ſhip. I underſtand it contains a menace to proceed to hoſtilities, unleſs this government comes to an immediate accommodation of matters, a preliminary ſtep to which, I learn, is to be the reſtoration of *Salſette*, and the other places ceded to us by the Peiſhwa, of which we have poſſeſſion. This I am inclined to think is rather a bravado than their real intentions; for, by advice I received yeſterday from *Gepal Row*, the brother-in-law of *Ragoba*, the Intelligence communicated to me by Colonel *Keating*, as mentioned in my Addreſs to you of the 29th November laſt, is rather confirmed, with the additional circumſtance of the Peiſhwa's Army having given the Miniſterialiſts a ſignal defeat near the Paſs of *Soingur*, which leads from *Guzerat* into the Diſtricts of the *Poonah* Durbar; but of this, though related on ſeeming grounds of authority, I am afraid to ſpeak with certainty, as I have not received Advices of this or any other matter from the Government of *Bombay*; and it ſeems reaſonable to expect, that had this intelligence been well founded, they would doubtleſs have informed me of it.

Upon the whole, I cannot help again lamenting that the Governor-General and Council would neither permit the Government of *Bombay* to proceed in their engagements with *Ragoba*, nor entruſt to them the accommodations they had determined on. In either caſe I can confidently aſſert, that at this hour you would have been in quiet poſſeſſion of an increaſed Revenue of 22 lacks, with all the advantages ſet forth in my firſt addreſs to this Government. Affairs would have been in tranquillity in the weſt of *India*, and your Commercial Concerns proceeding in their uſual channel; inſtead of which you may perceive the uncertainty of your political ſituation there, and the probability there is of being either farther embroiled in military operations, or making conceſſions equally inconſiſtent with your intereſt and honour. I learn by private accounts, that the vend of your Woollens and Staples is totally at a ſtand, as (though contrary to their agreement with the Government of *Bombay*) the Miniſterialiſts do not ſuffer the Merchants to come down to trade: At any rate this ſeaſon bids fair to be a very unfortunate one for the private Merchants, from this cauſe. And ſhould the next produce another ſcene of hoſtilities, as this effect would of courſe continue, I am afraid many new opulent Merchants of *Bombay* and *Surat* would be reduced to infinite diſtreſs, beſides a very conſiderable loſs that muſt enſue to you by the failure of Cuſtoms.

I have the honour to be, with the moſt profound reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and
Calcutta, moſt devoted Servant,
20th January 1776. *W. Tayler.*

Extract of *Bombay* Secret Conſultations, the 17th February 1776.

PRESENT.

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,

The Honourable *Dan. Draper*, Eſquire,
Thomas Moſtyn,
Robert Gordon,
Andrew Ramſay,

Mr. *Fletcher* indiſpoſed, Mr. *Tayler* at *Bengal*.

A country veſſel being bound to *Buſhire*, an Addreſs was prepared to the Honourable Company, to be forwarded over land as follows:

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Gentlemen,

A country veſſel proceeding to *Buſhire* at a very ſhort notice, we can only adviſe your honours of a few intereſting particulars. Colonel *Upton* arrived at *Poonah Dhur* on the 30th December; and we wiſh we were able to give you a more ſatisfactory account of his proceedings; he is very reſerved in his Advices to us, and has only acquainted us at times with what turn his Negociation was likely to take. In the beginning of January he ſeemed to think that the Treaty would be concluded in a few days; and on the 1ſt and 6th of this Month, he adviſed us, that from converſations he had held with the Miniſters, it was very probable the Treaty would not take place at all. Under the 10th he ſays, that appearances are ſtill againſt it, but proceeds to aſk us, what

Privileges

Privileges we would wiſh to have ſtipulated in caſe Factories ſhould be eſtabliſhed at *Baſſein* and *Jamboſeer*, ſuppoſing that the ceſſions in the *Guzerat* Province ſhould not be retained by the Company?

We know not what circumſtances may have occaſioned theſe Reſolutions in Colonel *Upton*'s Negociations, but we begin to be apprehenſive that he will conclude a Treaty upon terms very injurious to the Company. We however immediately repreſented that your Intereſt required he ſhould inſiſt upon the ceſſions made by the Treaty being confirmed: That he could not recede from his demand for *Baſſein* conſiſtently with his Inſtructions; and that a Factory either at that place or *Jamboſeer* would be attended with no manner of benefit to your Honours. If this repreſentation could have no effect, we can only lament that the time when the exiſtence of this Preſidency is at ſtake, we are not at liberty to purſue our own meaſures for its welfare.

It has been our ſtudy ever ſince Colonel *Upton*'s arrival at *Poonah*, to give him all the information in our power, ſo as to enable him to form the moſt competent judgment of your Political and Commercial Intereſts at this Preſidency; for however inconſiſtent we may deem the conduct of the Governor-General and Council, in intruſting this Negociation to a Lieutenant Colonel entirely unacquainted with either, while a Member of our Board is expreſsly appointed by you, reſident at the Maratta Durbar; yet it becomes our Duty to uſe every precaution to prevent your intereſt from ſuffering by this conduct, which we are well ſatisfied it would do, were we, from a falſe punctilio, to with-hold from Colonel *Upton* that uſeful and neceſſary information which our vicinity to *Poonah*, our conſtant intercourſe and frequent Negociations with the Marrattas, enable us to give him; and we cannot doubt when your Honours are fully apprized of our Proceedings upon this occaſion, that you will not only do us the juſtice to teſtify your approbation thereof, but that you will likewiſe favour us with your ſentiments at large upon the conduct of the Governor-General and Council, in wreſting out of our hands the management of a Treaty ſo immediately connected with this Preſidency, and which muſt relate almoſt to its particular intereſts.

Ragoba's Army and our Forces are now encamped near *Surat*. We thought it abſolutely neceſſary to continue them with him until the Treaty is concluded, and Colonel *Upton* is convinced of the good effects of this meaſure. If, however, he ſuffers the Miniſters to amuſe him much longer, we are very apprehenſive *Ragoba*'s diſtreſs for money, which is become very great by this long inaction, may cauſe his friends to deſert him, and his army to diſband for want of pay, which the Miniſters would not fail to take advantage of. We have particularly cautioned Colonel *Upton* on this head, and ſtrongly recommended to him to procure conſiſtent and honourable Terms for *Ragoba*, without which we are aſſured the Peace cannot be permanent.

The Governor General and Council have authorized us to return the Ceſſions made by *Futty Sing*, being the Guicawar Share of the *Broach* Revenues of the Diſtrict of *Coral*, *Vercoo*, and *Chickley*, until a Definitive Treaty may be concluded with the Miniſters; but we have little reaſon to hope they will depart from their original Plan for terminating our differences with the Marattas.

Mr. *Tayler* having addreſſed your Honours very fully by the Salisbury, reſpecting the Negociations at *Calcutta*, it is not neceſſary for us to ſay any thing further on the ſubject.

We remain, with the utmoſt reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient Servants,

Bombay Caſtle, 17th Feb. 1776.

W. Hornby, &c. Council.

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APPENDIX, No. 90.

Extract of Secret Letter from *Bengal*, dated the 5th Auguſt 1775.

Par. 10. SOON after the date of our laſt Diſpatch, we received information on private authority, from various channels, of a Treaty having been concluded between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and *Ragoba*, the Competitor for the Peiſhwaſhip of the Maratta ſtate at *Poonah*; and that in conſequence their Troops had taken the field to his aſſiſtance. So extraordinary a ſtep on their part, without any previous communication with us, could not fail to alarm us; and we were preparing, on the faith of that Intelligence, to write them, teſtifying our general diſapprobation of the meaſures, when we received Advices from them, dated the 31ſt March, which fully confirmed the former reports, and conveyed to us a Copy of the Treaty which they had actually concluded with *Ragoba*.

11. After maturely weighing theſe Advices, we were more confirmed in our former opinion of the danger and impropriety of this Alliance. It appeared to us, that they had undertaken to conquer the whole Maratta Empire for a man who is incapable of affording any effectual aſſiſtance in it. The plan which they had adopted for the execution, ſeemed to aim at no deciſive conqueſt, but to portend an indefinite ſcene of troubles, without an adequate force, without money, or certain reſources for extricating them out of it; nor do we find they have any plea of injuries ſuſtained from the party which they have made their enemy, or of their obligation to defend him whoſe cauſe they have eſpouſed.

12. We therefore ſolemnly proteſted againſt the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, for all the conſequences of this Alliance, and peremptorily required them to withdraw the Company's Forces into their own garriſon, in whatever ſtate their affairs might be, unleſs the ſafety of the Troops ſhould be endangered by an inſtant retreat. We alſo remarked to them the indecency and illegality of their conduct in concluding an offenſive Treaty, and engaging in actual War, without ever conſulting our opinion, or paying the ſmalleſt regard to the Authority veſted in us by a ſolemn Act of the Legiſlature, to ſuperintend and controul the Political Affairs of all *India*. We told them, that for the paſt we would content ourſelves with leaving with them the reſponſibility of their own actions; but for the future, in caſes of the like inattention, we would not fail to exerciſe the Power veſted in us by the Act of Parliament for the ſupport of our Authority.

13. In order to render more effective our Reſolutions on the ſubject of theſe meaſures, we agreed to depute a proper Perſon to *Poonah*, to treat with the Rulers of that State for a laſting Peace between them and us; and that the baſis of this Treaty ſhould be an inſtant ceſſation of arms, and a confirmation to the Company of the poſſeſſion of the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*. The perſon we have choſen for this commiſſion is Lieutenant Colonel *J. Upton*, who is actually ſet out from hence on his way thither, provided with proper Inſtructions and Credentials; he goes by the way of *Allahabad* and *Calpee*, at which laſt place he is ordered to wait for the neceſſary Paſſports from *Suckeram Baboo*, the ruling Miniſter at *Poonah*, who has been written to for that purpoſe, and previouſly acquainted with the motives of his journey. We have duly adviſed the Preſidency of *Bombay* of this appointment.

14. Since the receipt of the firſt advices of the Maratta War, we have had various Accounts of the different operations in it: By the lateſt it would appear that *Ragoba* is in a proſperous way, although he has met ſome checks and diſappointments, particularly in an Engagement with the Enemy on the 18th May laſt, in which a conſiderable detachment of our Troops were ſurrounded and almoſt cut off; they ſuffered a loſs of no fewer than

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ſix killed and five wounded out of fourteen European Officers who ſerved in the detachment. Seeing however a poſſibility of *Ragoba*'s being eſtabliſhed at *Poonah* before Colonel *Upton*'s arrival there, we thought it proper to add to his Inſtructions a power of treating in that caſe with that Chief, on the ſame Terms which we had preſcribed for his Negociation with the oppoſite party.

15. We have kept you regularly adviſed in the other department, of the ſeveral Remittances we have made to the Preſidency of *Bombay*. The Treaſure we ſent by the Seahorſe arrived very opportunely for them; but as the new troublrs in which they have involved themſelves increaſed their wants, they have made freſh demands upon us; we have however refuſed to comply with them, till ſuch time, as we have an anſwer to our late order, and a particular account of their operations in conſequence: we alſo informed them, we were greatly ſurprized at their appointmen of Mr. *Moſtyn*, as a Deputy to attend *Ragoba* in the field, without informing us of the deſign and object of his commiſſion; and we have directed them to tranſmit to us a Copy of his Inſtructions, and roo rder him to ſend to us by every opportunity, ſucceſſive intelligence of the ſtate of *Ragoba's* Affairs. We have further required of them, Copies of their Correſpondence with Colonel *Keating*, the Commanding Officer of the troops in the field.

Extract of Secret Letter from *Bengal*, dated 11th September 1775.

Par. 5. The Preſident and Council at *Bombay* now finding that no dependance can be placed on the Aſſiſtance of *Ragoba's* Forces, and that the whole burthen of that extenſive War is conſequently fallen on the Company, have applied to us and to the *Fort Saint George* Preſidency for a Reinforcement of Men, which they ſay *Ragoba* has earneſtly ſolicited for, promiſing to make over additional advantages to the Company for the ſervices of ſuch extraordinary aſſiſtance. They have alſo requeſted that we would furniſh them with a liberal ſupply of money to carry on their operations.

6. Having before ordered the Council at *Bombay* to withdraw their Army from the ſervice of *Ragoba*, in whatever ſituation their affairs might be, if it could retreat with ſafety; and as Colonel *Upton* will in all probability arrive at *Poona*, and enter upon his Negociations for a Peace with the Maratta State before any Force could be brought to join the *Bombay* Troops, even ſuppoſing them not to have been withdrawn; we directed the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George* not to comply with the requeſt of the *Bombay* Preſidency for a Re-inforcement, and repeated our Orders to the latter to recal their Army immediately to their own Garriſons, and to confine their views to the protection of the Company's Poſſeſſions, including *Salſette* and that moiety of the Revenues of *Broach*, lately held by the *Guicawars*, which *Futty Sing*, who by the lateſt advices from *Bombay* appeared to have gone over to *Ragoba* from the Miniſterial party, had ceded to the Company. For a more particular account of theſe matters, we beg leave to refer you to the Copy of our Conſultation incloſed.

7. We have the greateſt reaſon to hope that Colonel *Upton* will find the Miniſtry at *Poona* inclined to liſten to his propoſals for an accommodation, and that he will be able to effect an honourable and advantageous Peace for the Company, as the Chief of the Maratta State at *Poonah* has written to the Nabob of *Arcot*, to beg his intereceſſion with the *Engliſh* to deſiſt from any further Hoſtilities, or continuing to afford any ſuccour to his Uncle *Ragonaut Row*.

8. You will ſee by our Proceedings, that the Governor-General, who had hitherto concurred with the other Members of the Board in diſapproving the conduct of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and in ordering them to withdraw their Troops, as likewiſe in the meaſure of the Negociation, which we are about to eſtabliſh with the ruling Power at *Poonah*, judged proper on this occaſion to depart from the ſyſtem which he had before purſued, by giving it, as his opinion, that the Requiſition of that Preſidency for troops and money ſhould be complied with. As his reaſon for having adopted theſe ſentiments cannot well be abridged without altering the force of them, we muſt beg leave to refer you to the Conſultations, not only for them, but the opinions of the other Members of the Board in reply to them.

9. We have agreed to extend our ſupply of money to the *Bombay* Preſidency in the courſe of this year, commencing from the 1ſt May laſt, to 20 lacks of rupees, including a ſmall amount for which their bills have been accepted ſince that date, and we have authorized them to continue drawing on us for that ſum at the moſt reaſonable exchange in their power.

Extract of a Secret Letter from *Bengal*, dated 20th November, 1775.

Par. 21. The Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, on the receipt of our letter, which totally diſapproved of their conduct in the part which they had taken in *Ragoba*'s cauſe, deputed Mr. *Tayler*, one of their Members, to this Government, to repreſent, in the fulleſt manner, their motives for what they had done, and to exculpate their actions in our opinion; they adviſed us, at the ſame time, that *Futty Sing*, the Soubadhar of the Province of *Guzerat*, had come over to *Ragoba*'s party, and engaged to ſupply him with the ſeaſonable relief of 26 lacks of Rupees, and that he had alſo made over in perpetuity to the Company, the *Guicawar* ſhare in the Revenues of the Town and Pergunnah of *Broach*, beſides the Diſtricts of *Coriaul*, *Chickley*, and *Veriow*.

22. Mr. *Tayler* on his arrival was introduced to the Board, and delivered a long ſtate of the Maratta Government and Connections, together with the reaſons of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* for having entered into an offenſive Treaty with *Ragoba*, in the fulleſt manner; we alſo put various interrogatories to him reſpecting theſe matters, all which will appear at full length in our Proceedings, referred to in the margin, and will throw a conſiderable light upon the ſubject.

23. We were by no means induced to change the ſentiments we had formed of the precipitancy and impropriety in the conduct of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* in the meaſures they had adopted; we have therefore made no other alterations in our former orders to that Preſidency for recalling their Troops within their own garriſons, and confining their operations to the defence of the Company's Poſſeſſions, including the newly-conquered Iſland of *Salſette*, than to extend that line of defence to the Countries lately ceded by *Futty Sing* to the Company.

24. Mr. *Tayler* conceiving that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* would ſuffer great indignity by being wholly excluded from any ſhare in the Negociation with the Maratta Government, for a Definitive Treaty of Peace; and as from their vicinity and frequent communication with that people, they had better opportunities of becoming acquainted with the views and intereſts of the different perſons in *Poonah* Durbar than Colonel *Upton*, that they would therefore be the moſt proper perſons to conduct and execute the buſineſs entruſted to him. We replied, with aſſurances of our wiſh to ſupport the reputation and credit of their Government; and that, however we might be influenced by a confidence in their integrity, abilities, and ſtrict deſire to fulfil our intentions, we could not, conſiſtently with the Reſolutions and Orders which we had publiſhed and ſignified to the Miniſtry at *Poonah*, or with the dignity of this Government, which muſt be affected by their repeal, alter the appointment of Colonel *Upton*, or recall him from the duty on which he was engaged.

25. As there appeared to us a poſſibility that *Ragoba*, after the *Engliſh* Forces were withdrawn from him, might, by unforeſeen accidents be reduced again to apply for protection to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*,

we thought it right to provide for ſuch an event, and accordingly gave directions that an aſylum might in ſuch caſe be granted to himſelf and attendants.

26. We have heard from Colonel *Upton*, in a letter dated the 26th October at *Calpee*; he then expected to reach *Poonah* in five weeks. The Miniſters at *Poonah* are waiting with great impatience for his arrival, profeſſing themſelves as ſolicitous to forward the Peace on their part as we can deſire; at leaſt it appears ſo from all the letters and declarations of *Succaram Baboo* and *Biſſarjee Pundit*, the Miniſters at *Poonah*, to this Government. A total ceſſation of Arms took place immediately on the knowledge of our ſentiments and intentions. However, as Colonel *Upton* in his letters to us, mentioned a report that a large body of Marattas were in motion from *Brampee* towards *Calpee*, we have directed him to acquaint *Succaram Baboo*, that the Pacification ſhall be rigidly obſerved on our ſide, and that we expect the ſame good faith from him; but that if he ſhould put his Troops in motion to commence hoſtilities anew, we ſhould conſider ourſelves no longer bound to keep upon any terms with him.

27. The Nabob of the *Carnatic* hearing of our intention to depute Colonel *Upton* on this ſervice, wrote to us through the channel of Sir *Edward Hughes*, deſiring, as the particular friend and ally of the Engliſh, to be included in any Treaty which might be formed with the Maratta Government. We accordingly directed Colonel *Upton* to inſiſt on an Article in favour of the Nabob, declaring the long duration of our union with him; that it is ſupported by the ſtrongeſt ties of Friendſhip and Alliance; that the Company had ever conſidered his enemies as their enemies, and his friends as their friends: and we further directed him to require, that all the Mâratta Chiefs ſhould nominally and individually ſign their Names to and execute the Treaty.

28. As the Nabob of the *Carnatic* alſo acquainted us, that he had many Articles to propoſe for the Treaty, wherein the intereſts of his Government were deeply concerned, we requeſted that he would tranſmit them to us, and communicate them at the ſame time to the Preſident and Council at Fort *Saint George*, as the Company's intereſt at that place was ſo cloſely connected with his, that we might alſo have the advantage of receiving the ſentiments of that Preſidency upon them. We have ſince deſired permiſſion to employ Mr. *William Chambers*, the Perſian Interpreter at Fort *Saint George*, to proceed to *Poonah* on his part, and aſſiſt Colonel *Upton* in negociating ſuch Articles as it might be neceſſary to propoſe for his benefit. We have approved of his deputing Mr. *Chambers*, if the Preſident and Council ſhall ſee no objection to it; but we have poſitively forbid him from interfering in any manner in the Negociations of Colonel *Upton*, or from propoſing any thing for the Treaty but through him. Colonel *Upton* has been ordered to attend to his repreſentations, as far as may be conſiſtent with the tenor of our Inſtructions to him.

APPENDIX, No. 91.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th December, 1775.

PRESENT.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

RECEIVED the following Letters and Incloſures from Sir *Edward Hughes*.

Appendix. No. 91.

Coventry, in *Madras Roads*.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

I am honoured with yours of the 16th day of Auguſt, acknowledging the receipt of my letters, dated the 5th, 13th, and 19th days of July, and incloſing one from the Governor General, in anſwer to the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, which, at your requeſt, I returned to his Highneſs; and I believe the incloſed from him, which I tranſmit at his particular deſire, is an acknowledgment of the receipt of that anſwer, and of the perfect ſatisfaction he found in the peruſal thereof.

On the 3d of this inſtant, His Majeſty's ſhip the Coventry joined me here from *Europe*, and on the 11th the Sea Horſe arrived here again from the coaſt of *Malabar*, where Captain *Farmer* (as well as Governor *Hornby*) informs me there was no occaſion for his preſence at the time he left *Bombay*, the latter end of Auguſt. If there ſhould be hereafter any protection requiſite for the Trade, as I mean to ſail from hence on the 15th of the next month for that coaſt, with the Saliſbury, and the two ſhips above-mentioned, where I am to be joined by the Dolphin and Swallow (the former in her way to *England*) in order to refit at *Bombay*; whatever may then be in my power, ſhall be done for the ſervice of the Company, and ſafety of the Trade there; and I ſhall be particularly happy in receiving from you, Sir, and Gentlemen, any commands you may wiſh to honour me with on thoſe heads, or relative to the Treaty now coming forward between your Board, and the miniſterial party of *Poonah*.

I am, &c.
(Signed) *Edward Hughes.*

Madras, the 15th October 1775.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

I beg leave to incloſe you ſome Papers of intelligence copied from what Captain *Farmer* delivered to me on his return from *Bombay*, in His Majeſty's ſhip the Sea Horſe.

I have the honour to be,
Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Warren Haſtings, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council. (Signed) *Edward Hughes.*

Sir,

Purſuant to the Orders I received from you, the following is what I have been able to learn concerning the *Eaſt India* Company's Affairs in the *Culph* of *Perſia*.

About fourteen years ago, Meſſrs. *Shaw* and *Gorden*, the Company's Factors at *Buſſorah*, ſold a quantity of Woollens on truſt to one *Hodjee Eſoof*, a Turkiſh Merchant, who depending on his influence with the Government, conſtantly evaded, and at laſt refuſed payment for them: Whilſt this Debt was depending, the Baſhaw of *Bagdad* came down to *Buſſorah* with an army, in order to attack a certain *Arab* Shaik, called the Chaub, who with his veſſels and forces threatened *Buſſorah*. The Company's Chief there thinking this a good opportunity, applied to the Baſhaw for his interference in procuring the payment of *Hodjee Eſoof*'s Debt, which he promiſed, provided they would aſſiſt him with one of the Company's cruiſers to attack the Chaub's veſſels. The Company had till then appeared merely as Merchants at *Buſſorah*, and the attack of this Shaik was their firſt deviation from that character. The Chaub by their aſſiſtance was driven away, and the Baſhaw returned to *Bagdad*. The Chaub, watching his opportunity in revenge for acting againſt him, ſeized two merchant veſſels: this hoſtility rendered the Trade to *Buſſorah* unſafe, till he was reduced. Expenſive Expeditions were fitted out for this purpoſe, and after various ſucceſs on the Company's ſide, the Chaub threw himſelf on the protection of *Kherim Khan*, the preſent Regent of *Perſia*, who is married to one of the Royal Family; and it is ſaid keeps the right Heir to the Crown of *Perſia* in confinement.

Appendix. No 91.

Kherim Khan, after overcoming his opponents, and quietly eſtabliſhing himſelf at *Sehyraſh*, it ſeems wiſhed as much as was in his power to reſtore the Trade of *Perſia*; and accordingly, in the year 1763 granted the *Engliſh* permiſſion to eſtabliſh a Factory, with certain privileges, at *Buſhire*, a place conveniently ſituated for the inland Trade with *Perſia*. Here they reſided without the leaſt moleſtation or apprehenſion of it till the above period, when an Envoy was ſent to the Khan, to acquaint him that the Chaub was their Enemy, and that they rather hoped he would aſſiſt them than ſhew him any countenance; but his negociations being ineffectual, and from the Khan's conduct the ſafety of the Company's Property at *Buſhire* ſeeming but doubtful, the Factory was withdrawn in 1769; and the Company, tired of the charges attending on ſeveral Expeditions to the Gulf, directed that it ſhould not be reſettled, but that they ſhould limit their views and Settlements in *Perſia* entirely to *Buſſorah*. I could not find that the Company ever were at open hoſtilities with the Khan. But the object of variance between them being long ſince removed by the death of that Chaub, (although there is ſtill a Chaub, who pirates as the former did, and has joined his Forces to *Kherim Khan*'s againſt *Buſſorah*) he has frequently preſſed the Company to return to *Buſhire*, offering every advantage that they could aſk; but the Company's Orders are poſitive againſt it. The Khan conſtantly reſides at *Sehyraſh*, which he has made the Capital of *Perſia*; and from the accounts I have been able to gather from the beſt informed *Armenians*, there is every reaſon to ſuppoſe he would wiſh to be in amity with the Company, as they all agree in allowing, that he ſeems by every meaſure to wiſh the re-eſtabliſhment of Trade in his Dominions. He had however, and openly profeſſed, a perſonal enmity to Mr. *Moore*, the Agent at *Buſſorah*, who was always againſt the Settlement, as it did not anſwer to the Company before, and whoſe intereſt it certainly was not to effect a reconciliation with the Khan, becauſe, if the Factory at *Buſhire* ſhould be reſettled, it might prevent ſhips from going up to *Buſſorah*, to diſpoſe of the cargoes; in every one of which he has a certain profit, by one means or another.

The Khan's officers are in poſſeſſion of the Iſland of *Carrack*, and have a fleet of gallivats, which likewiſe pirate in the Gulf; but whether with or without the Khan's conſent is uncertain. It was part of this fleet that took one of the Company's ſchooners, with two civil Servants on board, in 1773, when the factors were obliged to fly from *Buſſorah*, on account of the plague; they were not at hoſtilities with the Khan, and he diſavowed any Orders proceeding from him for this action, but ſtill retained the two gentlemen at *Sehyraſh*, where he treated them very well. His reaſon for detaining them was, that their releaſe might be a weighty inducement for the Company to ſettle again at *Buſhire*.

Mr. *Garden* was ſent from *Bombay*, to endeavour to get theſe gentlemen clear; upon his application to the Khan, he releaſed them, and promiſed to return the ſchooner they were taken in; which however was not done at our departure.

The Factory was in April laſt once more eſtabliſhed at *Buſhire*, and by what I could learn, it will never pay the expence the Company muſt be at in keeping Servants there, as it appears to be a very poor place, not being able to ſell during our ſtay there but very few of their Woollen Cloths; the reſt came away under our convoy, and which is the only advantage the Company can expect from it: whereas, from *Buſſorah* they diſpoſe of the chief of their Woollens to Merchants, that tranſported them to *Bagdad*, and all that Country which trade with the *Bengal* piece-goods, and all the other parts of *India*, will be entirely loſt ſhould *Buſſorah* fall into the hands of the *Perſians*. The Agent of *Buſſorah* is now upon an amicable footing with *Kherim Khan*, but ſays, that he knows by long experience that the *Perſians* are a people not to be depended upon; for inſtance, their taking one of the Company's veſſels, and detaining two of their Servants at a time of profound Peace; and that the *Turks* never deceived the *Engliſh*.

The *Muſkatters* are the greateſt Maritime Power in the Gulf; they have ſeveral ſquare-rigged veſſels, beſides one large ſhip of 40 guns, and a number of gallivats, with which they generally go to collect the Tribute due to the Prince of *Muſcat*, who is called the Imaum, from certain Countries along the Coaſt to the ſouthward of *Muſcat*. The Company has always been at friendſhip with the Imaums of *Muſcat*, who earneſtly ſeek it for two good reaſons; one, that they repair and build all their veſſels at *Bombay*, and the other, becauſe they know the Company could at any time, as they are bad ſeamen (although the beſt in the Gulph) eaſily deſtroy their veſſels, without which they could not collect their Tribute to the ſouthward. They were fitting out with all the expedition they could, and expected to ſail in five days after our departure, all their fleet, which they ſaid would conſiſt of twenty ſail of ſquare-rigged veſſels, a number of gallivats and armed frankies, amounting in the whole to about one hundred ſail, with twenty thouſand land forces on board them, in order to relieve *Buſſorah*, which in all probability they will accompliſh if it is not taken before they arrive. They have detained one of *Hyder Ally*'s veſſels that was going to aſſiſt the *Perſians* againſt *Buſſorah*; another of them was caſt away on that coaſt.

There is a Shaik at *Ormus*, who I underſtand has ſent ſome gallivats to aſſiſt *Kherim Khan* againſt *Buſſorah*, although he looks upon himſelf as quite independent of him, as does many other petty Shaiks from thence up the Gulph, that have gallivats and armed boats who pirate and ſeize upon all boats or veſſels whenever they can overpower them; thoſe that I have mentioned are the chief of them.

I am, with all due reſpect,
Sir,
your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
(Signed) *George Farmer.*

Sea Horſe, *Bombay*, the 21ſt Auguſt 1775.

Sir *Edward Hughes*, Knt.
Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's ſhips in the *Eaſt Indies*.

Sir,

You mention in one of the letters I am favoured with from you, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* has wrote you relating the War, but very little or nothing concerning its cauſe; give me leave to inform you what I have been able to learn on that ſubject.

The Marattas formerly inhabited the mountainous and interior parts of *India*, and their Miniſters, men much famed for their wiſdom, were Bramins. It was contrary to their Caſt ever to go to War; but whenever they had occaſion to ſend out an army, the operations were planned by them, and the command given to Rajepours or Princes among them of a different Caſt. Theſe men, in proceſs of time, feeling the power they were inveſted with, one of them reſumed the Regal Power from the Bramins, ſtill keeping them as Counſellors of State, and the head of them as a State Priſoner, who was treated with all the outward ſhew of Royalty, and allowed a Revenue ſuitable to his rank. He inveſted this Rajeput with the outward appellation of the Firſt Miniſter of State, when in fact, by being at the head of the army, he had the whole power in himſelf; however, to this day this mock ſhew ſubſiſts.

The *Mogul* Emperors were never able to conquer the Marattas; for when the *Moguls* worſted them in the plains, they immediately retired to the mountains where they could not follow them, and when recruited, poured down their troops of horſe in torrents. At this time the army was raiſed by the Prince, who always commanded them in perſon; the horſes were all his own, of which conſiſted their Armies, and he never ſuffered any Fortifications to be raiſed in his Dominions for fear an

Enemy ſhould get poſſeſſion of them, and by that means maintain a footing in their Country; whereas, if they entered it, as the whole Country was open to their horſe, which was their chief ſtrength, they would harraſs the enemy ſo much on every ſide, that they were glad to get back as ſoon as they could. Upon the downfall of the *Mogul* Empire roſe the Maratta Empire. Upon their diviſions the Marattas poured down their vaſt armies of horſe, by which means they ſoon got poſſeſſion of all the open Country adjoining to them, with ſome few of the fortified places, and penned thoſe up ſo cloſe that ſtill adhered to the *Moguls*, that theſe places were glad to pay them tribute, otherwiſe they would deſtroy every thing within the reach of their guns.

This great extent of dominion obliged them, like all other overgrown States, to ſend Governors to rule over the diſtant Provinces, which Governors by degrees raiſed themſelves to a kind of independence, as had happened to the *Moguls* before, and was the ruin of that State. Theſe Governors farmed the Revenues of the Province at a certain price, and were likewiſe obliged to ſend to the aſſiſtance of the Prince a ſtated number of horſemen fit for the field; ſo that what he could ſqueeze out of the ryots or farmers over and above was his own. Their continual extortion upon theſe poor people ſoon depopulated the Country, and inſtead of their horſe, which formerly belonged to the Prince, they now contract with the chief men of the Country for a certain ſum of Money, to bring ſuch a number of horſemen fit for action into the field. Theſe great men agree with the common men under them, they finding their own horſes, for as much leſs than what is allowed them as they can, ſo that the common men's whole fortunes conſiſt in their horſes and arms, as they are obliged to find another horſe if any thing happens to the one they ride. I leave you to judge, Sir, thus circumſtanced, whether it is not reaſonable to think that they will avoid as much as poſſible coming to action, eſpecially againſt a regular army, and a good train of artillery. Having given you the outlines of what I have been able to get any inſight into concerning this people, I now come to inform you of what is ſaid to be the cauſe of the preſent War between the Company and them.

Ragoba's elder Brother governed thoſe extenſive Territories with great prudence and ſtrictneſs, inſomuch that I was well aſſured that you may leave all your property in the middle of the highway, without any one's daring to meddle with it, let it lay there ever ſo long. To bring them to this, he was obliged to deſtroy whole Diſtricts of banditti, which ſtruck ſuch a terror into others, that it ſtopped all pilfering of that nature, although the great men ſtill kept grinding the ryots as before.

At his death he left two Sons, the eldeſt of which reigned ſome years after him with reputation, and died about the age of twenty-five years. Suſpecting that his Uncle *Ragoba* was entering into ſome cabals againſt him, he ſhut him up a cloſe priſoner, where he was at the time of his death. His Brother was then ſeated on the throne, a young man about ſixteen or ſeventeen. At this juncture *Ragoba*'s party, not thinking themſelves or him well uſed, gathered to a head, and attacked the Prince; he run for protection to the priſon where his uncle was confined, who took him in his arms and promiſed his protection; The rebels followed, and threatened that they would kill them both if he did not immediately let him go, which he did, and they directly put him to death. The nephew left a wife that proved to be with child: *Ragoba*'s party placed him in the ſupreme command; and the Miniſters, who are chiefly Bramins, and ruled every thing in the former reign, fled, and raiſed what troops they could. *Ragoba* ſoon found himſelf ſtraightened for want of money, as the Treaſury was quite empty; however he found means to raiſe an army, and marched after the Miniſters. About this time the Queen, who they had with them, was brought to bed of a ſon, that is now living, which, with the odium he lay under as being thought acceſſary to his Nephew's death, and the want of money to pay his Troops, occaſioned the deſertion of them; ſo that without ever ſtriking any effectual ſtroke againſt the Miniſters, after various incidents which happened to him, he was obliged with only a few followers to make the beſt of his way to *Surat*, from whence he applied to the Government of *Bombay* to aſſiſt him in regaining the poſſeſſion of *Poonah*, the capital of the Maratta Dominions; which, as ſoon as he quitted, the miniſterial army returned to and proclaimed the young Prince, whoſe Mother, an intriguing artful woman, well ſupports the pretenſions of her Son. Appendix No. 91.

Ragoba does not diſpute his right to reign, only alledges that he has the ſole right to be Regent during his minority. What he would do, had he him in his power is hard to ſay.

Juſt at this time the Governor and Council of *Bombay* ſent ſome forces, and took *Salſette* from the Marattas, under pretence that the *Portugueze*, who had a large armament at *Goa*, were going to attack it; and ſhould they ſucceed, it was more than probable they ſhould never have the ſame opportunity of gaining it to *Bombay*, as undoubtedly it is of the greateſt utility to it; but the pretence for taking it cannot be juſtified according to our notion of War and Peace. To ſupport what they had done, conſidering the diviſions among the Marattas, they thought it right to join *Ragoba*, who promiſed them chart blank; and I was told, upon his depoſiting twelve lacks of rupees they promiſed to ſupport him with 1,500 Sepoys and 700 European Troops, until they placed him in poſſeſſion of *Poonah*; he paying to the Company a lack and a half of rupees per month, to defray the expences of theſe Troops, and after the War was over, to give up as much Territory as would bring in to the Company a clear Revenue of twenty lacks of rupees per annum. Upon this Colonel *Keating* was ſent with an army a good deal ſhort of the ſtipulated number to *Cambay*: *Ragoba* went with him from *Surat*. After their arrival at *Cambay*, and ſome movements there, about five thouſand horſe, which was very far ſhort of what *Ragoba* expected, joined *Keating* and him; with this force they marched towards *Brodera*, where they made a Treaty with *Futty Sing*, by which *Ragoba* was to have received twenty ſix lacks of rupees from him for the Nabobſhip of *Guzerat*, and leave to remain in poſſeſſion of *Brodera* (both which had been abſolutely promiſed to *Govindrow* his elder brother, who had ever been a faithful friend of *Ragoba*'s). The conſequence of this Treaty was, that *Govindrow* has withdrawn his forces from them, and refuſes to give them any aſſiſtance; on the contrary he does not ſcruple to ſay, that *Keating* and *Shaw*, (Chief of *Broach*) are infamous liars, and may meet with the juſt reward of their infidelity when they leaſt expect it. On the other hand, *Futty Sing* has paſſed the day of payment with a tender of three and a half lacks only, in conſequence of which, *Keating* has ordered out an eighteen pounder, a ſix, and two howitzers, to attack him in *Brodera* the 11th Auguſt. This advice arrived at *Bombay* the 23d, as the Proclamation for a Ceſſation of Arms between them and the Maratta was reading. The Orders for the Ceſſation came from *Bengal*, together with a very long Chawbuck or Letter.

Mr. *Taylor*, one of the Council and a Member of the Secret Committee, was preparing to ſail for that place, in order to ſolicit leave to proceed in the War, until all and every part of the Treaty with *Ragoba* is fulfilled. This is no more than they owe to themſelves, and indeed to the intereſt of their Maſters; for however raſh and inconſiderate the commencement of this War may have been, they are evidently gone too far to retreat without the greateſt danger of looſing not only *Salſette*, but *Bombay* itſelf. Beſides, their Arms on this ſide *India* would ever after be held in contempt. Only think of their expending ſo many men, for they have loſt a number, without coming to any deciſive actions; ſuch ſums of money,

Appendix. No. 92.

money, and vaſt quantities of ammunition and ſtores, at the diſtance of 500 miles from *Bombay*, whilſt the avowed object of the War is to be in poſſeſſion of *Poonah*, and placing *Ragoba* on the Peiſhwa Mamud. Would a ſtranger to the geography of the Country believe then that *Poonah* is only 70 miles from *Bombay*, and only one paſs of any difficulty between them, which is ill fortified and worſe defended in point of Troops? The real caſe is, by all that I could any way diſcover, that half of Colonel *Keating*'s army could march from *Bombay* to *Poonah* in four days, in ſpite of all that they have in that Country to oppoſe him; ſo that nothing but the expectation of a great body of horſe joining *Ragoba* at *Cambay*, could induce him to take that roundabout way.

I am, &c.

Bombay, 24th Auguſt 1775. (Signed) *George Farmer.*

Sir *Edward Hughes*, Knight, Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the *Eaſt Indies*.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
Richd. Barwel,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 92.

From the Nabob of *Arcot*; received the 10th December.

I SOME time ago ſent you Papers of Intelligence which I had received from the army of the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*, from *Poonah*, &c. and I now incloſe for your peruſal a News Paper from *Poonah*, dated the 29th Shabaun (25th of October.)

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Kiſhen Row*, dated the 29th of Shabaun (25th October) received the 22d of Ramzaun (16th November).

Namah Purnaveeſe is lately arrived at *Poonah*, and having raiſed near five lacks of rupees, will diſpatch it to *Hurry Pundit* in a day or two; *Hurry Pundit* marched from *Berhanpore*, croſſed the *Teetie*, and went to *Turgaon*. Having had an interview with *Sucaram Pundit*, and conſulted with him, he is on his return to the army.

A detachment of 4 or 5000 cavalry, which he ſent into the neighbourhood of *Soonkur*, have reduced *Navabpore* and all the other garriſons of *Gobind Row Kaunkwar* to his obedience; *Amrut Row* and *Gobind Row*, &c. having aſſembled 5 or 6000 Horſe are arrived in the neighbourhood of *Aklaſore*. This lays *Hurry Pundit* under the neceſſity of ſupporting his forces in that part, and prevents his coming to the preſence.

During the ſeaſon of the Duſſarah, ſeveral perſons undertook to ſatisfy the forces here, and they will very ſhortly march from hence.

I formerly wrote you that the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah* was about to conſer the office of Dewan, on *Sumſun ul Dowlah*; the particulars are as follows: The Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah* at firſt ſent a meſſage for that purpoſe; the negociators of this buſineſs are, the Wife of the Nabob *Shaheed*, the Wife of *Nizam ul Dowlah*, *Gulum Sieed Khan*, *Nuſſeeb Yar Khan*, *Zabit Jung*, &c. but the Mother of *Sumſum ul Dowlah*, will not agree or even hear it mentioned.

Kiſhen Row Billal and *Naunajee Pundit* are arrived here. I hear that *Kiſhen Row* has concluded a Treaty on the following terms, with the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*:—"That the remainder of the Jaghire, amounting "to 65 lacks of rupees, which was formerly ſtipulated, "and of which 48 lacks have been already given, ſhall now be completed." A liſt of the places to be given up in conſequence of this agreement, is preparing in the Duftar; they will probably be ſurrendered to the ſaid Nabob. Should he come to the aid of the *Poonah* Miniſters in perſon, there is no doubt of their reſigning the ſaid places to him, but if he only ſends an army, I cannot ſay whether they will be given to him or not. As ſoon as I can gain any certain intelligence on this, I will tranſmit it to you.

APPENDIX, No. 93.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 8th of January, 1776.

READ the following Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

Gentlemen,

I was laſt night favoured with your letter of the 20th of October. The tranſlation of the letter which the Governor General was pleaſed to write to *Succeram Bahoo*, in conſequence of my application, was not incloſed (as you mentioned its being) it is however of no great conſequence. I am greatly obliged by your having wrote to him.

I was prevented going the *Janſi* road by the *Goſſaines* having beſiged that place; and the country between *Janſi* and *Saugur* (the intended route) being all in arms, the Raja and Jummedars againſt each other, and the whole of them trying to make themſelves independent. I wrote to the *Narwar* Raja for permiſſion to travel through his country, which he granted; but the independent Rajas, &c. through whoſe country I am to paſs, made further application neceſſary.

I had permiſſion from them to paſs, but it retarded me much. From *Narwah* I travelled entirely through *Ragoba's* country, obliged always to ſend forward for permiſſion to go on, the country every where either in arms, or ready to be ſo, or the people ſhut up in their forts. I am now in the country of a Patan, Nabob *Fiaz Mahomed Cawn*, who grants me a free paſſage through his country; but his people behave ſturdily. I have not yet received a line from *Poonah*. The Sirdars of the different diſtricts have not been apprized of my travelling through their country, or know any thing of my buſineſs. And I am now within 70 coſs of *Berhanpore*, the head quarters of their army. On the *Eugene* road, which you will obſerve in *Jeffery's* map, and which is about 60 coſs to the weſtward of *Bopall*, they have an army in motion of about fifteen thouſand men, I imagine marching to the relief of *Janſi*. Twenty-five of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah's* horſemen have joined me, theſe I take on to *Poonah*, and have wrote to countermand the reſt of the eſcort provided by the Nabob, which, indeed, I have repeatedly done ſince my having left *Calpee*. It might have appeared that I travelled ſlow, from not recollecting that at *Benares* I had to ſettle the mode of being ſupplied with money to fix my route, and get proper people to attend me, expecting little or no aſſiſtance from *Poonah*. At *Allahabad* I was to receive the Nabob's eſcort and cattle to carry the camp equipage; from thence I was obliged to travel by land (not being able to go up the *Jumna*) and laboured hard to get up the tents, &c. from *Calpee* to *Hemet Behaudre's* encampment, about 30 coſs; the country quite laid waſte, the people every where in arms, and the Maratta Pendaries plundering on all ſides; we were obliged, therefore, to travel very circumſpectly. I am now going on from 20 to 25 miles a day, over a country very mountainous, and filled with rocks and jungles. I have wrote to *Berhanpore* to aſk the Sirdar to lay bearers for me and Captain *M'Pherſon* to *Poonah*. If he complies with my requeſt I ſhall not be long getting there.

To the ſecond paragraph of your letter of the 20th October, I ſhall be very particularly attentive. Trivial

formalities or punctilios ſhall never obſtruct any buſineſs I may have to tranſact.

Bopawl, I am, &c.
25th November, 1775. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

Reſolved, that the following letter be written to Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 25th November, dated at *Bopawl*.

We ſend you copies of letters which we have lately received from *Madoo Row Narrain*, and from *Succeram Baboo*, together with our anſwer to the latter. We earneſtly recommend to you the greateſt diſpatch poſſible in bringing your Negociations to a concluſion.

Fort William, We are, &c.
8th January, 1776.

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Appendix. No. 94.

From *Madho Row*, dated the 28th of Ramazun (22d November) received the 1ſt January, 1776.

ALTHOUGH I have repeatedly written to you, yet a long ſpace of time is paſt without my having had the pleaſure of any letter in anſwer, for which I am very anxious. Several letters addreſſed to my Miniſters, *Siccaram Pundit* and *Bellajee Pundit*, on the ſubject of increaſing the friendſhip between us, have been received, and anſwers returned from this quarter; ſince which, though a long time is elapſed, nothing which I deſired has been carried into execution.

The afore-mentioned Miniſters have the firmeſt reliance on your wiſdom and foreſight, and have inſpired me with the ſame ſentiments. Your negligence in this buſineſs is the ſubject of the greateſt aſtoniſhment. It is the deſire of the ſaid Miniſters to eſtabliſh the ſtricteſt friendſhip and connection between the two States, which appears to them a matter of mutual advantage. You have been informed of all particulars by the letters already written you from this quarter; in conſequence of which I have now to requeſt that you will not give ear to the repreſentations of ſelf-intereſted perſons, but will purſue ſuch meaſures as may conduce to the advancement of our mutual friendſhip, and to the ſettling of the Affairs now before us to our mutual ſatisfaction. As I am the cauſe of what has happened, I will exert my utmoſt endeavours for the eſtabliſhment of peace and unanimity. Let me be ſpeedily favoured with your ſentiments, for, in conſequence of the length of time which has elapſed, the Miniſters are filled with uneaſineſs with regard to the event of this buſineſs, and are very anxious for an anſwer. Any delay will probably prove the means of increaſing the troubles. For the reſt, you are the maſter to act as you think fit.

From *Siccaram Pundit*, of the ſame date, received the 1ſt January, 1776.

I have been favoured with your agreeable letter, under date the 28th of Rajub, or 23d of September, in which you inform me of the departure of Colonel *Upton*, who being inveſted with full power to negociate a Peace between the Two States, will proceed to *Poonah* by the route of *Illahabad* and *Calpee*: and you deſire, that I will give directions to the Foujidars, Gomaſtahs, &c. that no objection be made to his paſſage, with ſuch things as he has with them, and that they will furniſh him with every kind of neceſſary he may ſtand in need of. This letter reached me the 21ſt of Ramzaun (15th of November) and I perfectly underſtood the contents. Agreeable to your deſire, the ſtricteſt orders were diſpatched to the Foujidars, Talookdars, &c.

Four months, my friend, are paſſed ſince any news has been received of Colonel *Upton*, and though daily newſpapers arrive from that quarter, there is no mention of him. This is a matter of great ſurprize. In your firſt letter you informed me, that you had written in expreſs terms to the Governors of *Bombay* and *Surat*, to recall their forces from the alliance of *Ragonaut Row*, and to ceaſe hoſtilities againſt the armies of the Government, which they would doubtleſs comply with; and you deſired, that I would forbid the Troops of this Government to commit any act of hoſtility againſt the *Engliſh*. Placing the utmoſt confidence in what you wrote me, I gave orders accordingly to the Commanders of the Forces for a ceſſation of arms, and informed the ſaid Governors of the ſubject of your letter, to which they returned me an evaſive anſwer; of this I have already written you. They have not to this time recalled their forces from thence, but inſtead thereof have reduced ſeveral Towns in the neighbourhood of *Goujeraut*, although the roads to the ſeveral Ports are ſhut up, yet ſhips are ſent to collect ſtores. This being the caſe, the veſſels of this Government oppoſe and obſtruct them in their paſſage to and fro; this you may have heard from report. The Sirdars of this Government have lacks of men under their command, and are filled with bravery. How long are they to remain idle ſpectators of the greateſt loſſes? They will now ſet about recovering the Towns which have been taken from them. Did the ſaid Governors pay any attention to your orders? They would without heſitation give up all the conquered towns. If they retain them, no blame can be thrown on the Sirdars.

From the fame of the good faith of the *Engliſh* Nation, I make no doubt that the ſaid Governors would comply with your directions; but the contrary appears, as they are every minute committing acts of hoſtility. I had determined from what you wrote me, to ſet about accommodating the diſputes between the Maratta States and the *Engliſh* Nation, who, in violation of former Treaties have commenced hoſtilities; but I am now of opinion, that the ſaid Governors are averſe to an accommodation, and have made intereſted and partial repreſentations to you, with a view to prevent its taking place. The delay in the arrival of your Vakeel, and in putting a ſtop to the flames of War, are reaſons for my belief; I therefore write to requeſt that you will weigh the Repreſentations of ſelf-intereſted People, in the balance of wiſdom, and will apply to the accommodation of all differences, which is the part of true wiſdom. To ſum up all in a few words, the Governors do not recall their Forces from the alliance of *Ragon au Row*, or deliver up the conquered Towns; and although the roads are ſhut up, ſhips paſs backwards and forwards, which inſtances are not conſiſtent with peace and friendſhip, but may be conſidered as the foundation of a quarrel; I therefore think it proper to give you information of ſuch tranſactions.

From *Ballagee Pundit*; of the ſame tenor and date.

N. B. Duplicates of the two laſt Letters of the ſame date were received at the ſame time with the originals.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 8th of January 1776.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Read, Two lettets from *Mado Row Narrain*, and *Succeram Baboo*, received the 1ſt inſtant, and recorded in the Perſian Correſpondence.

Agreed, that the Governor General be requeſted to reply to theſe Letters in the following terms.

Appendix. No. 95.

I have received the Letter which you wrote to me the 22d November.

I have repeatedly written Anſwers to your ſeveral Letters, and diſpatched them to you in duplicate by different roads, to enſure the ſafety of their conveyance. It is with ſurprize I received the information of your having given orders for ſtopping the Ports, and for intercepting our veſſels on the *Malabar* Coaſt, as this meaſure is ſo contrary to your Profeſſions of Peace and Friendſhip. By a Letter received from Colonel *Upton*, written a few days after the date of yours, I learn that he had advanced as far as *Bopaul*, within ſeventy coſs of *Burhampore*, but that his journey had been very much retarded by the obſtacles which he had met with in the way, for want of the Paſſports which you had promiſed to ſupply him.

From a principle of juſtice, and from the ſentiments of moderation which have been earneſtly enjoined us by our Superiors, we have put a ſtop to the Hoſtilities which had taken place between the Government of *Bombay* and your forces; we are in hopes that you have imitated our example, and that by a reciprocal deſire to promote an amicable concluſion to theſe troubles, all differences between us may be happily ſettled, on the moſt equitable and permanent footing: but if you ſhall reſolve to adopt a different conduct, and in violation of your promiſes renew the War againſt us, whilſt our forces remain in peace and in inaction, we ſhall then be remedileſs, and you muſt anſwer for the conſequences. We have given ſtrict orders to the Preſidency of *Bombay* to abſtain from all further hoſtilities, and to withdraw their Forces to their own Poſſeſſions. We are informed that they have literally complied with theſe orders, you can therefore have no excuſe if any act of yours ſhould be the cauſe of reviving the War.

Agreed, That copies of *Mado Row Narrain*'s Letters, and of *Succeram Baboo*, together with the Board's reply, be ſent to Colonel *Upton*.

APPENDIX No. 95.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 18th December 1775.

RECEIVED, the following Letter from *Fort Saint George*, together with a Letter from *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We now incloſe you a Duplicate of our laſt Letter, alſo a Packet which we have received under your Addreſs from the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Fort Saint George,
25th November 1775.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

We had the honour to addreſs you the 4th inſtant, and agreeable to what we then mentioned, we ſhall now proceed to reply more fully to your Letter, dated 18th July.

We are much concerned that you ſhould ſtill think you have reaſon to complain of our not being ſufficiently full and explicit in our Advices reſpecting our Proceedings in conſequence of the Treaty with *Ragoba*, which we cannot but in a great meaſure attribute to your Honour, &c. as not having then received our letter, dated the 30th April, of which you have not acknowledged the receipt, and we flatter ourſelves that all cauſe of complaint on this head will be entirely removed by our ſucceeding letters, and the information Mr. *Tayler* will perſonally give you.

In compliance with your requiſition, we now tranſmit a complete ſeries of our correſpondence with Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, beginning with the inſtructions given him on his firſt proceeding with our troops to join *Ragoba*; and we ſhall not fail regularly to tranſmit copies of all Letters that may in future paſs between us. We alſo incloſe a copy of the inſtructions we had prepared for Mr. *Moſtyn*, by which your Honour, &c. will perceive that the objects of his intended miſſion were only to preſs *Ragoba* to march with all poſſible expedition towards *Poonah*, to haſten the accompliſhment of ſome points of the Treaty, and to relieve the Commanding Officer from all charge of buſineſs with the Durbar, and Negociation with the Country Powers. The Treaty with *Ragoba* had been executed long before our determination for ſending Mr. *Moſtyn* to the army, and we did not conceive the meaſures to be in the leaſt repugnant to the directions contained in your Letter of the 8th March, being ſolely intended to haſten the concluſion of the War which had been already begun. Mr. *Moſtyn*, however, was prevented from proceeding to join the army by the unuſual ſeverity of the monſoon; and this deſign was afterwards entirely dropt, upon the receipt of your letter dated the 31ſt May.

We moſt ſincerely regret the reſolution your Honour, &c. have taken to ſend Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to treat with *Seccaram Bappoo* at *Poonah*, without waiting for further advice from us. We did entertain hopes we ſhould have convinced your Honour, &c. of the Juſtice of *Ragoba*'s pretenſions to the Peiſhwaſhip, and that we ſhould have met with your ſupport and aſſiſtance in the proſecution of the War; when we did not doubt but in the courſe of the next campaign we ſhould have conducted *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, and fulfilled our engagment with him. Theſe hopes we now fear are not only defeated by this meaſure, but the dignity and conſequence of this Preſidency amongſt the neighbouring Powers very ſenſibly injured. We cannot think we were unreaſonable in our expectations, that the Negociation in which the intereſts of this Preſidency were ſo materially concerned, ſhould have been carried on in concert with us, and which indeed we concluded to be your intention from the tenor of the Governor General's Letter to *Saccaram Bappoo*; but when we advert to the extract you have favoured us with from Colonel *Upton*'s Inſtructions, we find him veſted with the moſt extenſive Powers, and not the leaſt reference to be made to us for Advice or information, the want of which is avowed in theſe very Inſtructions, and which from the vicinity of *Bombay* to *Poonah*, we could convey to him in two days. Notwithſtanding this, we thought it our duty to afford Colonel *Upton* every information we could give to aſſiſt him in the execution of his important Commiſſion, being ſatisfied that he would only receive partial accounts from *Poonah*, both of *Ragoba* and Affairs in general; and we at firſt propoſed to ſend a Gentleman fully inſtructed to meet him there, to confer with him reſpecting the Intereſts of this Preſidency ſo far as you have committed them to his charge; but not knowing whether this ſtep might be agreeable to your Honour, &c. we diſpatched a letter to him by different routes, a copy of which is incloſed, wherein we made him this propoſal; or if he preferred information by letter, we offered to give him the moſt full and ſatisfactory advice on every point he might wiſh to be informed of. We have not yet received an anſwer to this Letter, or any advices of the Colonel's arrival at *Poonah*, though we heard ſo long ago as the 9th ultimo, that he was arrived at *Calpe*, on the River *Jumna*.

The letter from Colonel *Keating*, dated 30th Auguſt, will ſhew you in what manner *Ragoba* received the news of your Honours, &c. determination to open a Negociation with the Miniſtry, and of your poſitive orders for withdrawing our forces from his army, and a ceſſation of hoſtilities taking place. This ſubſequent Letter, dated the 2d September, will apprize you of the Peiſhwa's reſolution to wait patiently the reſult of the Negociation; but in the mean time, he demands very pertinently from what ſource he is to ſupply his exigencies, until the concluſion of this important adjuſtment, which muſt neceſſarily take up ſome months; and then makes the

following

following propoſals, which we intend to communicate to Colonel *Upton*, when we hear of his arrival at *Poonah*; and we beg leave ſtrongly to recommend to your Honour, &c. to obtain them for him, as being in our opinion extremely moderate, and ſtrictly conſiſtent with juſtice.

Ragoba firſt propoſes, that half of the Country, the produce of which is reſerved for the maintenance of the reigning Peiſhwa, ſhould be put into his immediate poſſeſſion; or, leſt this propoſal ſhould take up too much time in the diſcuſſion, that a monthly ſtipend be paid him from the Circar of *Poonah*, for the ſupport of himſelf and his adherents, until ſome agreement may be concluded. This ſtipend his agent here propoſed ſhould be lacks of rupees per month.

He next propoſes, and entreats, that before you come to any deciſion reſpecting his pretenſions to the Peiſhwaſhip, you will attend to every evidence that can be produced by either party; when, if it ſhould be proved to your ſatisfaction, that a Son of the late *Narron Row* does exiſt, let ſuch Son be appointed Peiſhwa; but he then, as next of blood, claims the office of Dewan for himſelf, until the Minority of this ſuppoſed Son expires, at which period he will reſt ſatisfied with a proviſion independent of any employment; if, on the contrary, he ſhould prove to your Honour, &c. that this Child, ſaid to be the Son of *Narron Row*, is a ſuppoſititious one, and which he doubts not to make evident, he in ſuch caſe pleads, that as the Son of *Bajerow*, he is juſtly entitled to the Peiſhwaſhip of the Maratta Empire; with which, if he is inveſted, he promiſes to fulfil the whole of his engagements with the Honourable Company.

We have ſent Directions to Colonel *Keating* to retire with our troops into our Pergannahs contiguous to *Surat* or *Broach*, as ſoon as the weather and roads will permit; and as by the agreement for the ceſſation of arms every thing was to remain on the ſame State until a general Pacification might be concluded, we have ordered him to give effectual protection to theſe Pergannahs, and to repel any hoſtile attempts that may be made on them. Mr. *Tayler* will have taken poſſeſſion of moſt of the Pergannahs ceded to us ſo long ago as the month of April laſt.

In the courſe of Colonel *Keating's* correſpondence you will obſerve, that he has at different times obtained grants from *Futty Sing* and *Ragoba*, of ſome other ſmall Diſtricts contiguous to *Surat* and *Broach*. He lately obtained from the former the grant of a Pergannah called *Siner*, producing a Revenue of upwards of a lack of rupees a year; but as it lay out of the line of Territory we wiſhed to poſſeſs, and your Honour, &c. had forbid us to aim at further acquiſitions, we immediately gave directions for its being reſtored.

We beg leave to obſerve, in reply to a remark in your letter dated the 10th July, that we acquainted your Honour, &c. in our letter, dated the 31ſt March, of *Ragoba's* having made a depoſit in jewels, valued at ſix lacks of rupees, as a ſecurity for the expences of the War; and, by the Treaty, it appears that ſeveral Diſtricts were made over to the Company, the Revenues of which were to be particularly aſſigned for the payment of the monthly ſtipend of rupees 1,50,000. *Ragoba* has ſince paid a further ſum of about two lacks of rupees, as mentioned in Colonel *Keating's* letter, dated the 30th Auguſt, and we had every reaſon to expect more conſiderable ſums would have been received from him, in conſequence of the Treaty with *Futty Sing*, who has already paid about ten of the ſtipulated twenty-ſix lacks, and we are perſuaded would have paid the whole, and that *Ragoba* would have found no difficulty in raiſing money as he advanced, had we continued to ſupport him.

Whatever may be your determination with reſpect to the matters at preſent in agitation, we aſſure you we will moſt ſtrictly conform to it; and we requeſt in the moſt earneſt manner, that you will not continue to withhold the neceſſary ſupply of money for our expences, from an apprehenſion that we ſhall apply it to any purpoſes inconſiſtent with your directions; and likewiſe, that you will, if poſſible, aſſiſt us in paying off our Bond Debt, which, unleſs we are confirmed in poſſeſſion of the places ceded to us by the Treaty, we ſee no proſpect of being able to effect ourſelves. Appendix. No. 95.

We ſhould have been more particular in explaining the pretenſions of *Ragoba* to the Peſhwaſhip, had not Mr. *Tayler* been commiſſioned to give you full information on that head; he will alſo be able to acquaint you with many particulars you may want to know reſpecting *Futty Sing* and *Govind Row*, the Sons of *Dormajee*, or, they are commonly termed, the *Guicawars*, the mention of whom ſo frequently occurs in the letters from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*. We ſhall only here obſerve, that this family, till lately, collected a ſhare of ſix tenths of the *Broach* Revenues in participation with us; and that it was their ſhare we wiſhed to obtain, and not the Mogul's, as mentioned in your Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*. The Mogul's ſhare devolved to us when we reduced the Town, and *Futty Sing* having lately given us Phirmaun for the *Guicawar* ſhare, we are now entitled to the whole Revenue of that Diſtrict.

Bombay Caſtle, We have the honour to remain, &c. the 14th October, 1775.

Ordered, That the foregoing letter from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* lie for conſideration until the arrival of the original, the letter now before the Board being a duplicate, and no incloſures having been ſent with it.

APPENDIX, No. 96.

Extract of Secret Letter from *Bengal*, dated the 15th January, 1776.

Par. 38. WE have received a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated 25th November, at *Bepaul*, about 70 coſs north of *Burhanpore*, in which he ſaid, he had met with continual obſtacles in travelling through a Country where the people were all in arms, and not having received any Paſſports from *Poonah*, he had been much delayed.

39. Letters of the 22d November, very lately arrived from the Peiſhwa and Miniſtry at *Poonah*, declare, that orders to ſecure a free paſſage to Colonel *Upton*, had been iſſued to the Fouſdars, &c. but that no accounts of him had reached *Poonah*. Theſe letters are ſo uncommon in their nature, and the ſtyle ſo different from any thing we could have expected, that we take the liberty to refer you to the tranſlations of them. They ſhew little pacific inclinations at firſt profeſſed by this party, but ſeem to be written on the grounds of falſe information, as they accuſe the Preſidency of *Bombay* of inattention to our orders, in ſuffering the army to act offenſively after we had declared ourſelves for Peace; though we are well aſſured both by the Preſidency and by means of Colonel *Keating*, that all operations were immediately ſuſpended, and that the army only waited for the fair ſeaſon to retire. The Miniſtry likewiſe think ill of our ſhips ſailing from Port to Port as in the time of Peace, and tell us that they will be intercepted by the Maratta veſſels on the coaſt, and the Ports ſhut againſt them. They further complain of the ſuſpence they are kept in; and threaten, unleſs the places which we have taken be delivered back immediately, that they will ſet their army in motion for the recovery of them.

40. We cannot reconcile theſe Declarations to the reduced ſtate in which the Miniſters appear, by advices from Colonel *Keating* to Mr. *Tayler*, dated 29th October, which he communicated to us. The contents of theſe are, that *Moraba Furneſee*, one of the principal Perſons in the *Poonah* Durbar, had come over to *Ragoba's* intereſt, with

Appendix. No. 97.

with ſeveral other men of power; that the miniſterial army was reduced to 12,000 men at the utmoſt, and much diſpirited; that the Miniſters had retired to *Poonder Fort*, and were afraid to truſt themſelves out of it, and *Ragoba*'s Party daily gained ground. We believe both theſe relations may be magnified by the ſanguine ideas of either intereſt; but we hope that a general equilibrium will be preſerved until Colonel *Upton*'s arrival at *Poonah*, to give weight to his Negociations. In the mean time, we have repreſented to the Miniſters our motives for putting a ſtop to the late hoſtilities on the *Malabar* ſide of *India*, hoping they would entertain a reciprocal deſire to conclude matters amicably; but if they reſolve to purſue a different conduct, and not to abide by the promiſes they had made, we ſhould be under the neceſſity of oppoſing them, and leave them to anſwer for having drawn the conſequences upon themſelves.

41. We have lately received a letter from the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, containing an account of *Ragoba*'s reception of the intelligence of our having deputed a Perſon to *Poonah*, and Propoſals made by him in conſequence; the firſt of which is, that a Diſtrict or monthly ſtipend be immediately aſſigned him for the ſupport of himſelf and his adherents until the Negociations are concluded. Secondly, That his pretenſions to the Peiſhwaſhip ſhould be diſcuſſed; and in caſe he proves that *Mahda Row Narrain* is only a ſuppoſititious child of the late Peiſhwa, his Title to it as next Heir ſhould be acknowledged, otherwiſe, by the ſame pretenſions, he claims the Regency until the Son of the deceaſed Peiſhwa becomes of age to act for himſelf, at which time he will reſt ſatisfied with a penſion. As the letter which conveyed this information to us is a duplicate, and as none of the original papers referred to in it were incloſed, we have ſuſpended the conſideration of it until we received the original.

APPENDIX, No. 97.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated the 5th February 1776.

PRESENT.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

The Honourable *George Monſon*.
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED an Original Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, dated the 14th of October, duplicate of which letter is recorded in conſultation of the 18th December laſt; but as the papers referred to in it did not arrive with the duplicate,

Ordered, That they be entered after this day's Conſultation.

As the correſpondence with Colonel *Keating* is very voluminous, and as it muſt appear on the Proceedings of the Council at *Bombay*;

Ordered, That only Abſtracts of it be entered on the Proceedings of this Board.

Ordered, That the Incloſures in the above Letter be entered after the Conſultations.

Abſtract of Letters to and from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*.

No. 1. His Inſtructions.

2. Letter from. Arrived with the Troops at *Surat*; 27th February; propoſes marching to *Cambay* at the proper ſeaſon.

3. Letter from, to the Preſident. State of the engagement between *Ragoba* and the miniſterial party; with its conſequences.

4. Letter to. To obſerve the Directions of the Chief and Council at *Surat*; and deliver them a Copy of his Inſtructions.

5. Letter from, dated *Surat* 9th March. Propoſed attack on the miniſterial forces in this neighbourhood, deferred; is determined to proceed to *Cambay* the next ſprings, and carries with him the 18 pounders.

6. Letter from, dated off *Sevally*, 15th March. Is on his way to *Cambay*. requeſts diſcretional Orders; his reaſons for it; delivers his ſentiments on the moſt eligible means for affording *Ragoba* aſſiſtance. *Ragoba* conſents to pay the expence of tranſmitting ſtores and proviſion. Has attacked the Marattas in the neighbourhood of *Surat*, and put them to flight.

7. Letter to, dated 23d March. Inſtructions for his conduct when at *Cambay*. Diſapprove of his having attacked the Marattas near *Surat*. Will ſend a detachment of 150 Europeans to join him in two days.

8. Letter from, dated 21ſt March, near *Cambay*. Arrived and encamped at *Narangzeer* on the 20th. *Ragoba* received advices from his army, under *Conderaw* and *Govindrow*. The ſtate thereof. A party of *Ragoba*'s diſperſed troops join him, and bring account of more expected ſhortly. Has an interview with the Nabob, who aſſures him of every aſſiſtance in his power. Relates Intelligence of the State of the Miniſterial Party. Great confuſion in their Councils.

9. Letter to, dated 31ſt March. Send a Detachment of Sepoys. Require him to effect a junction with *Ragoba*'s army, and proceed to *Poonah* with all poſſible diſpatch.

10. Letter from, to the Preſident, dated 30th March. *Futty Sing* deſires leave of the Nabob to ſend two men to camp; on which account he wrote him to join forces. His reaſon for it. Further letters from *Futty Sing*. His firſt letters intercepted by *Hurry Punt Fuckia*. His Letters anſwered by *Fuckia*; their contents. Expects *Govindrow* and *Candarow* will join him without delay, the Enemy only 14 coſs diſtant. Receives hourly intelligence of their intention to attack him. Is well prepared to receive them. Requeſts more Subaltern Officers; *Luxaman Goſſault* appointed Vackeel to *Dada Saib*. Propoſe 5 lacks to be ſent *Dada Saib*, as the only means of inſuring ſucceſs. Means for Repayment, with the Advantages the Company are to reap from it.

11. Letter from, dated 31ſt March. Requeſt that the time of the ſprings may be fixed on for his departure, ſhould he not be able to effect a junction with *Ragoba*'s army. Nothing but Money wanted to enſure ſucceſs to *Ragoba*'s affairs.

12. Letter to, dated 22d April. Complains of his neglect in not adviſing them of the ſtate, &c. of the army. Are not able to ſupply *Ragoba* with money.

13. Letter from, dated *Gunnich* 18th April. Is joined by a party of *Govindrow*'s troops. Plan propoſed for forming a complete junction. *Futty Sing* determined on entering into a Treaty. *Madajee Scindia* has offered his aſſiſtance, and marches on the 17th to join the army. Repreſents the diſtreſs *Ragoba* is in for want of money, and the terms he offers for obtaining it. *Ragoba* to defray the expence of tranſporting guns, &c.

14. Letter from, dated *Darrah* 19th April. Has joined the whole of the Peiſhwa army. Enforces the immediate neceſſity of ſupplying *Ragoba* with caſh. Has reſolved in aſſiſting him out of the Military Cheſt; and writes to *Surat* for a ſupply.

15. Letter from, dated 20th. Covering triplicate of the above.

16. Letter from, dated 21ſt. Is joined by 10,000 of *Govindrow*'s troops; the baggage, &c. left under care of his Uncle *Condaro*, 60 coſs off.

17. Letter from, to the Governor, dated 23d. The army 50,000 ſtrong. The Treaty with *Futty Sing* under Signature.

18. Letter to, dated 3d May. Diſapprove of his having ſupplied *Ragoba* with money. Poſitively direct

direct him not to advance any more. To tranſmit Copy of the Treaty with *Ragoba*, and a Cypher with which he is to correſpond.

19. Letter from, dated near *Hoſſam*, the 28th April. His reaſons for not writing oftener. Comes to a battle with the confederate Army; Particulars thereof. *Ragoba*'s troops did not engage. Will ſend a more circumſtancial account of it in his next. Again urges the neceſſity of ſupplying *Ragoba* with money. The preſent plan and deſigns of *Ragoba*.

20. Letter from, dated *Mawtrah*, 3d May. Meets the Enemy on his march towards *Kereah*; engages them, and puts them to flight, with the loſs of near 1,200 killed and wounded. Diſadvantage of being incumbered with a large bezar; on which account, intends perſuading the Peiſhwa to change his route, and go towards *Poonah*.

21. Letter from, dated *Neriad*, 10th May. *Seanes Mantrah* on the 5th, and encamped at *Coomleah*; which place he leaves the next morning; and after marching a few miles, is interrupted by the whole of the miniſterial army. Comes to an engagement; Particulars thereof. Left *Hydrabad* on the 7th, for *Neriad*; is ſuddenly attacked at *Dabaun*. Throws the Enemy into diſorder, and obliges them to retreat in the utmoſt confuſion; ſince which, they have not ſhewn themſelves. Encamps at *Neriad* on the 8th; Deſcription of the place. The Peiſhwa intends laying a tax on it. Refers to Mr. *Lovibond*'s letter for the Particulars of the Treaty with *Futty Sing*. Wiſhes much to croſs the *Mybié* before the rains. Urges it to the Peiſhwa, who gives his reaſons againſt it. The Peiſhwa promiſes a donation of 30 lacks to the Army as ſoon as he is in poſſeſſion of *Poonah*. Gives his reaſons for advancing the Peiſhwa money. Has got a depoſit of jewels to the amount advanced.

22. Letter from Mr. *Lovibond* to Colonel *Keating*, relates the treatment he met with, while negociating the Treaty with *Futty Sing*.

23. Letter from, dated *Betaſſee* 19th May. Particular account of their march from *Neriad*, with the ſhameful retreat and loſs ſuſtained in an engagement near *Noppier* on the 18th; imputes the backward behaviour of the Peiſhwa's troops to their want of pay: Loſs on the Enemy's part very great.

24. Letter from, dated *Suban* the 26th May. His march from *Battſee* to the above place. Has not ſeen any thing of the Enemy ſince the engagement on the 18th; imagines the loſs they ſuſtained that day has totally diſperſed them, if not entirely ruined their cauſe. Is drawing near *Broach*; ſupplies will be ready on his arrival there. Is much ſolicited by *Govindrow* to form the ſiege of *Brodua*; declines it. Expects to be on the banks of *Nubedah* in two days. Has not been able to find out the reaſon of the ſhameful conduct of the 2d Company of Grenadiers. On the 18th, a party of the Enemy appear before the Camp, but on firing two or three ſhot, they retired.

25. Letter from, dated *Jaraſeer* 3d June. The want of money has cauſed almoſt a general defection among *Ragoba*'s troops. *Govindrow* refuſes to croſs the *Nubedah*. The *Arabs* refuſe to march without all that is due to them. The moſt eligible ſtep now to be purſued is, to oblige the Enemy to croſs the *Nubedar*. Will be obliged to get a reinforcement at *Broach*. Urges, in the moſt preſſing terms, that *Ragoba* may be ſupplied with five lacks.

26. Letter from. Has been confined by a ſevere illneſs. On the 8th marched from *Jerraſeer*, intending to croſs the *Nerbedah*, but found it impoſſible. On the 9th reached *Seruttah*; there got intelligence of the Enemy's being encamped cloſe to the Paſs of *Bavapoor*. On the 10th, diſcovered the Enemy, who on ſeeing them fled in confuſion. His reaſons for again attempting to march to the ſouthward. *Ragoba* determined on not croſſing the *Derbedah*. Reſolved on going to *Duboy*. On the 12th the Monſoon ſet in very violently, which prevented his reaching *Dubbay* till the 19th. *Govindrow* deſirous of reducing *Brodera*. Is in hopes of obtaining Sunnuds for the Province of *Ahmood*. In conſideration of his acquieſcing in *Ragoba*'s Propoſal at *Rowa Peer*, *Futty Sing* declares his readineſs to join him immediately; offers him a Paſs for himſelf and attendants. Is in hopes of obtaining ſome valuable acquiſition for the Company, on whatever terms *Ragoba* and the *Guicawar* Family may ſettle. Mr. *Shaw* joins him, and makes *Ragoba* a public viſit and preſent. *Ragoba* encamped on the River *Ore*. The miniſterial army gone to the *Inalive* Country, and are much diſaffected. Report of many of them being drowned at the ſetting in of the rains. State of his Army, &c. The Peiſhwa requeſts the Europeans may be completed to the Terms of the Treaty, for which he will pay a further ſum. Appendix. No. 97.

27. Letter to, dated 13th July. Approve his intention of croſſing the *Nerbedah* and *Tappy*; concur in the reduction of *Brodera*; the conditions on which it is to be undertaken. Approve his having held a Court of Enquiry on the Second Company of Grenadiers, and requeſt his opinion on the proceedings. Lament the effects of the irregularity of *Ragoba*'s troops. Do not think proper to alter their Reſolution for not ſupplying *Ragoba* with money. Diſapprove of his having accepted a Phirmaund for a donation to the Army.

28. Letter from, dated 8th July. Subſtance of the Treaty with *Futty Sing*.

29. Copy of the Treaty with *Futty Sing*.

30. Letter to, dated 6th Auguſt. Approve of the Treaty with *Futty Sing*. Deſire him to be urgent for the payment of the arrears of the monthly ſtipend, &c. On *Ragoba*'s receiving the ſum ſtipulated in the Treaty.

From. Treaty between *Ragoba* and *Futty Sing* concluded the 18th inſtant. All the Sunnuds, except for *Verrow* (which he hourly expects) are made over to the Company for ever. Requeſt they will grant him a reinforcement of men and ſtores. July 22d

From. The Peiſhwa's Family, and *Eſſob Cawn*, with 4,000 horſe and foot, are on their way to join the Peiſhwa. *Mhadajee*, and *Mhadajee Bounſella*, are ready to join, provided ſome Country is ceded to them. *Appajee Gunneſs* has ſent Vackeels to treat. The miniſterial party greatly diſtreſſed.

Letter to, 19th Auguſt. Have received letters from the Governor General and Council, diſapproving the meaſures they were then purſuing; in conſequence, poſitively order him to deſiſt from further hoſtilities againſt the miniſterial party, unleſs attacked by them, and to remain in his preſent ſituation until further orders. To aſſure *Ragoba* of their protection and ſupport.

Letter from, 30th July. *Futty Sing* has paid near two lacks of the ſum ſtipulated, as mentioned in his addreſs of the 8th inſtant. From the extraordinary hardſhip of the officers, hopes they may be allowed double batta. Has received the Sunnud for the *Verrow* Pergunnah.

Letter to, 5th September. Direct that he return, with forces under his command, into the *Broach* or *Surat* Pergunnah. To acquaint *Ragoba*, that it is their advice that he continue with him till the embarkation of the troops.

Letter from, 6th Auguſt. The miniſterial army is marched to *Barrampoor*.

—— From, 8th ditto. Has had ſeveral conferences with the Peiſhwa reſpecting *Nizam Ally*. The Peiſhwa is apprehenſive of the *Nizam*'s joining the Miniſters. Is deſirous of receiving aſſiſtance from the *Engliſh* only, and granting territory in lieu. By a compliance with his terms he engages to increaſe the monthly ſtipend. Has deputed Mr. *James Forbes* to proceed to *Bombay*, to ſettle this buſineſs. The Peiſhwa requeſts that the *Madras* Preſidency may be wrote to, to inſiſt on *Nizam Ally*'s remaining neuter, and that the *Nizam* may be wrote to, to the ſame effect. Great pains has been taken to prevent

Appendix. No 97.

Futty Sing from paying the ſum of money to the Peiſhwa, *as per agreement*, *Nothing ſhall divert his attention* from reaching *Poonah* as ſoon as poſſible. His opinion on the behaviour of the 2d Grenadier Company on the 18th May.

Letter from, 9th Auguſt. Has had a particular converſation with *Govind Row*, from which he is convinced of the deceitful conduct of *Futty Sing*; has therefore reſolved on making every preparation for undertaking the ſiege of *Brodera*, is encamped with the Peiſhwa Army, within two miles of *Brodera*, and is in readineſs to inveſt the place.

Letter from, 21ſt ditto. Captain *Scott*'s and Captain *Weſtphall*'s detachments are halted within 1000 yards of *Brodera*; *Futty Sing* has propoſed coming into their camp, on aſſurance of ſafety; has prevailed on him with much importunity to diſcharge his preſent payment of 10 lacks; deſires ſuch villages as *Govindrow* has poſſeſſed himſelf of, may be reſtored to him, for the poſſeſſion of which, will pay five lacks more; to which the Peiſhwa has aſſented.

Letter from, 25th Auguſt. The Peiſhwa has received intelligence of *Saccaram Bapoo* and *Nana Farneſs* having erected their ſtandard in the Field, with a deſign of aboliſhing the title of Peiſhwa; repreſents the neceſſity of a reinforcement to prevent the conſequences. The Peiſhwa appears averſe to receiving payment in jewels, elephants, and piece goods; is apprehenſive of what may follow. The Peiſhwa has detached *Ameen Cawn* with 3000 horſe and 200 foot towards *Amadabad*. Has defeated the troops of *Appajee Guineſs*.

Letter from, 27th Auguſt. The Peiſhwa appears deſirous of going to *Amadabad*. Will not conſent to it till he has granted a Sunnud for a Pergunnah equal to *Ahmeed*. Has received intelligence of *Mamed Eſcobb*'s having defeated a body of 7,000 horſe, under the Command of *Worman Row*, near the banks of the *Nerbeda*.

—— From, 30th Auguſt. Has recommended a reſidence at *Bombay* to the Peiſhwa, until the event of the Treaty is known. Has received *Futty Sing*'s Bond for ſix lacks, payable in two months. The fatal conſequences which may attend leaving the Country to the mercy of the Peiſhwa's Army; how it may be obviated. Has ordered a detachment to take poſſeſſion of *Kurraul*.

Letter from, 2d September. The Peiſhwa much diſtreſſed and perplexed to account for the ſudden reverſe of conduct towards him; his advice to him on the occaſion. The Peiſhwa is determined to wait the Concluſion of the Treaty at the head of his army: his Propoſitions for ſupplying his exigencies in the interim: wiſhes, prior to any deciſion, that the Supreme Council would attend to every evidence which he can produce reſpecting the lawful Son of the late *Narrain Row*: Conditions in conſequence. *Futty Sing* has declared his readineſs to afford Protection to the Country.

Letter to, 19th September. Expreſs their ſurpriſe at the reaſon he aſſigns for not having retained a conſiderable part of the 10 lacks paid by *Futty Sing* to the Peiſhwa. Direct that the forces may be withdrawn, which were ſent to take poſſeſſion of *Sinor*, and that it be reſtored to the perſon from whom he received it. To procure no further grants for ſecuring the debt due from the Peiſhwa, and to enter into no further Negociations. Diſapprove his intentions with reſpect to *Govindrow*: require his reaſons for this part of his conduct.

Letter from, 6th September. The Peiſhwa has infringed the Treaty with *Futting Sing*, not having delivered up to him the whole of his Pergunnahs on the payment of the 10 lacks. The Peiſhwa ſtill continues greatly depreſſed.

—— From, 10th September. The partizans of *Govindrow* are anxious for an accommodation between their Maſter and *Futting Sing*. Tranſmits a Liſt of the killed, deceaſed, and deſerted Sepoys.

—— From, 18th September. *Futty Sing* has agreed to give up to *Govindrow*, one-third of the *Gulcawar* Poſſeſſions, on certain conditions: *Govindrow* not ſatisfied, *but inſiſt* on the Peiſhwa's ceding a conſiderable part of his own Country; which he has refuſed. *Futty Sing* has ceded to the Company a village called *Der Battia*. *Ameen Cawn* has reſiſted one ſally from the beſieged at *Amadabad*, who felt a material loſs. The Peiſhwa has deſired Pattamars may be ſent to *Bengal*, as he intends correſponding with the Supreme Council. *Futty Sing* has ſent him the Sunnud for the village of *Dubattia*.

Letter from, 27th September. *Govindrow* ſtill refuſes the offers made him by *Futty Sing* and the Peiſhwa. The Peiſhwa has given up the Pergunnah of *Hariſhoot* in lieu of one which had been promiſed to the Company. The Peiſhwa has diſcovered a defection in part of his Army; has applied to him for a detachment, which he complied with. *Govindrow* has come down a little in his demands.

Letter from, 1ſt October. Explains that part of his Letter, dated 30th Auguſt, which regarded the Peiſhwa's debt. His Reaſons for a change in his ſentiments with reſpect to *Govindrow*.

—— To, 8th November. Deſire that he will uſe his endeavours with *Futty Sing* to make over *Batta* to the Company inſtead of *Dubattia*.

—— From, 30th October. The Peiſhwa has croſſed the River with his Army. Has received further aſſurances of the attachment of *Moraba Dadda*, alſo Offers of ſervice from *Bejee Sing*, Raja of the *Marawar* Country.

To *Thomas Maſtyn*, Eſquire,

Sir,

In order to attain the cleareſt inſight into *Ragoba*'s affairs, his ſituation, expectations, and deſigns, as well as to give him ſuch forcible and proper advice as will induce him to proceed with all poſſible expedition to *Poonah*, his capital, we have deemed highly neceſſary that a Gentleman of the rank of Council ſhould proceed to him; and having appointed you for theſe purpoſes to proceed to and reſide at *Ragoba*'s Durbar, it is our direction that you embark for *Cambay* as ſoon as poſſible, from whence you are to ſet out to join the Army with as much expedition as the neceſſary attention to your own ſafety will admit. We make no doubt when *Ragoba* is informed of your arrival at *Cambay* (or at any other port from whence it may be moſt convenient to join his Army) that he will readily concert proper meaſures with Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, for ſending an eſcort to conduct you with ſafety to the Camp; or you are otherwiſe to take ſuch proper meaſures as will inſure your arrival there in ſafety.

From the knowledge you have acquired of the country people, it is almoſt unneceſſary for us to remind you that the influence we hope you will acquire over *Ragoba*, and thoſe who are moſt in his eſteem and confidence, will much depend on your endeavouring to conciliate his good opinion, which we accordingly expect you to do.

Senſible as we are that the War can only be terminated by *Ragoba*'s moving ſpeedily towards *Poonah*, you are therefore ſtrenuouſly to urge him to do ſo, by ſetting forth in proper colours the great diſadvantage to his affairs, by his continuing ſo long ſo very far diſtant from his capital, thereby putting it entirely out of his power, either to procure money for his own occaſions, and what ought to be as material to him, it alſo puts it out of his power to provide for the payment of the ſtipend monthly due by Treaty to our Honourable Employers, for the expences of their forces which are now aſſiſting him.

A copy of the Treaty we incloſe, that you may act conformable to it; but there are a few points, to the accompliſhment of which we expect your particular attention.

1ſt. That you endeavour as ſoon as poſſible to procure the payment of the arrears of the monthly ſtipend

of one and a half lack of rupees, and that the ſame be punctually made good to you in time to come.

2dly. That you procure from the Peiſhwa a ſufficient body of horſe to be ſent to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, for putting the Company in effectual poſſeſſion of the Territories by Treaty ceded to them.

3dly. That you procure from the Peiſhwa the Sunnud, that he has bound himſelf to obtain from the *Gutcawars*, for their ſhare of the Revenues of the Town, and in the Pergunnahs of *Broach*.

Theſe points once accompliſhed will be of very material advantage to our Employers, and they are no more than he has bound himſelf to perform. On our part, every thing we engaged for has been fulfilled, and even more; notwithſtanding which, *Ragoba* by letter has preſſed us for a loan of money, and this requeſt has been moſt urgently and frequently repeated by Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, the Commanding Officer of our forces now with *Ragoba*. What makes this matter more extraordinary is, that after we had acquainted Colonel *Keating* of our inability to furniſh this loan, and that we alſo deemed it inconſiſtent with the intereſt of the Company to do ſo, he has again urged us on this head, and adds, that he is afraid to acquaint *Ragoba* of our refuſal.

As we ſhall not ſupply *Ragoba* with money for the reaſons given above, you are to adviſe him accordingly in a proper manner, leaving him no hopes however of any pecuniary aſſiſtance on the part of the Company. If you find that he has received any aſſurances of our aſſiſting him with Money, acquaint us of it, and let *Ragoba* know that they have been given without our knowledge and permiſſion. Urge him to march towards *Poonah* without any further delay, and in doing ſo, he will doubtleſs ſhortly be able to ſupply himſelf with money for his own occaſions, as well as to enable him to fulfil his pecuniary engagements to the Honourable Company.

You are well acquainted how much we have diſapproved of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*'s conduct, by intending to march to *Amadabad*, which is the oppoſite route to *Poonah*. Notwithſtanding we explained our ſentiments hereon in our Letter of the 23d of March, yet, by his laſt advices it appears that he perſiſts in that opinion, and actually intends to proceed thither, you are to make due enquiry of the Peiſhwa, and of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, as to their motives for this proceeding, of which you are to adviſe us.

Although Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* was in nowiſe authorized by us to enter into any Treaty or Negociation of any kind with any Powers or Perſons whatever; yet, from his advices it appears that he has done ſo, and particularly with *Futty Sing*; indeed, he acquaints us that he has been under the neceſſity of making the Company a party in a Treaty between *Ragoba* and *Futty Sing*. How or in what manner the Company were to be parties, he has not yet adviſed; and as he was quite ſilent on the ſubject in the Letters he has wrote us, we do not know whether the Treaty has taken place or not; we therefore deem it neceſſary that you ſhould require the Colonel to acquaint you of every ſtep he took regarding this Treaty, and to lay before you in writing, his proceedings with *Ragoba*, and his correſpondence with all or any of the Country Powers that he may have correſponded with, in order that we may receive the ſame through you with your ſentiments at large thereon. Should any propoſals or applications in future be made to any of the Country Powers, they muſt all be made to you, and not to the Commander of our Forces, and whenever the Company's intereſts may be concerned, they are to be tranſmitted to us with your ſentiments. In theſe matters, the Military Commanding Officer muſt not interfere; but we ſhall rely on you to take care to ſupport his conſequence in every conſiſtent manner, ſenſible as you muſt be, that much will depend on his conduct.

As we direct that you only in future ſhall have intercourſe with *Ragoba*, or that all intercourſe ſhall be through you, ſo it will be neceſſary that the Military Commanding Officer ſhould be under your controul, except in the execution of every military operation; and we accordingly lay down the following rule for your conduct in reſpect to the Military Commanding Officer, to whom inſtructions are accordingly given. Appendix, No. 97.

Whenever it may be reſolved and agreed between *Ragoba* and yourſelf to march, to encamp, or to make any other movement with the Army, you are to ſignify the ſame to the Commanding Officer of our Forces in writing, and he is ordered to obey; but in reſpect to the mode of the march, of the encampment, or the method of carrying any military meaſure into execution, the Military Officer is of courſe the more proper judge how it ſhould be effected, and therein you are not to interfere, nor in the detail of the duty of the Army.

As the expences of our Forces muſt amount to a very conſiderable ſum monthly, we eſteem it very neceſſary that you ſhould ſuperintend and controul your accounts of the Commiſſary and Paymaſter, which we accordingly direct you to do; and thoſe Officers, through Colonel *Keating*, are now ordered to lay their Accounts before you monthly, or oftener if you call for them, and never to make any payments out of the ordinary courſe of the ſervice which you ſhall diſapprove of.

Incloſed is a Copy of our Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* of the 17th February laſt, and of this day, by which you will obſerve that he is directed to render to you an account of his Proceedings in general, and to produce to you the copies of his Letters hitherto, and our replies.

We rely upon you conſtantly and frequently to adviſe us of every particular within your knowledge, as well reſpecting *Ragoba*, his motions, forces, and our general proſpects of ſucceſs by this expedition; in ſhort, from you we now expect every requiſite information, as it is unneceſſary after you arrive at *Ragoba*'s Durbar, that the Commanding Officer ſhould correſpond with us.

Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, on your demanding it, will appoint ſuch a Guard to attend you, as you ſhall think neceſſary.

Returns of the Forces are regularly to be delivered to you, and through you tranſmitted to us.

Mr. *Charles Brome*, Senior Merchant, and Mr. *Francis William Pemberton*, Writer, are appointed to your aſſiſtance; and we direct, that you keep an exact and regular Diary of all your Proceedings, wherein all letters, whether from the Country Powers or others, are to be inſerted, and the motives of the advices noticed in it; two copies of this Diary are to be delivered to us on your return.

Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* is ordered to deliver up to you the Seal of the Company, the Cypher, and the Letter of Inſtructions to the Cypher; and as the communication by ſea will ſhortly be ſhut, your Correſpondence with us muſt be carried on, by truſty and careful Pattamars.

The allowance you enjoyed at *Poonah* will be continued to you as long as you are engaged on this ſervice, and your expences will be defrayed by the company; but we rely on you to obſerve every neceſſary frugality; you are alſo to take care, that no unneceſſary expence be incurred in the Department of Commiſſary and Paymaſter to our Forces.

The ſum of rupees 5,000, has been advanced you here, on account of your expences, for which you are to give due credit in your accounts; and until you receive money from *Ragoba*, as we hope you ſhortly will, in conſequence of what is mentioned in the former part of theſe Inſtructions, you may draw for ſuch further ſums as you ſhall require, on this place, or on *Surat* Factory, or the Paymaſter or the Commiſſary to the Army.

Bombay Caſtle, We are, &c.
May 1775.

Appendix. No. 97.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

In a Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, dated the 10th July, they acquainted us of their having appointed you to proceed to *Poonah*, and of the object of your miſſion; at the ſame time, they tranſmitted an extract of ſuch part of their Inſtructions to you, as they ſaid was neceſſary for our information.

The Governor General and Council, in their letter to us, mention that they are much uninformed as to the then ſituation of Affairs; and it appears by their Inſtructions, that in moſt points they have been able to give you diſcretional orders only; in this caſe we think it becomes a duty we owe to our Honourable Employers, to offer you every Information that you poſſibly want, for enabling you to diſcharge the high Commiſſion with which you are entruſted; and as we learn by ſome of the miniſterial agents now here, of your arrival at *Calpar*, on the River *Jamma*, from whence they ſhortly expect you at *Poonah*; and as we are fully ſatisfied that you will receive very partial accounts from the miniſterial confederacy, of the real ſtate and preſent ſituation of the affairs of *Ragonath Row*, and of the Company, ſo far as they are connected, we will therefore moſt readily give you, on your ſignifying your deſire for it, every Information that you can wiſh for, relative to both, either by a letter, or by deputing a Gentleman to you, from hence to *Poonah*, properly inſtructed and fully acquainted with the whole. Should you prefer the latter, we requeſt that you will procure the neceſſary Paſſports for him, and on your ſending them hither, he ſhall proceed immediately; at any rate, we wiſh you would take no material ſtep in the Buſineſs entruſted to you, relative to this Preſidency, till after we may receive your Reply to this Letter.

In caſe you ſhould prefer our only writing to you on the ſubject above-mentioned, it will be then neceſſary that you ſhould acquaint us, whether you are in poſſeſſion of the Company's large Cypher for your Correſpondence.

We tranſmit this Letter in Quadruplicates, by different routes, in hopes that it may ſafely reach you.

Bombay Caſtle, 11th September 1775. We are, &c.

(Signed) Preſident and Council.

A true Copy

(Signed) *Edward Ravenſcroft*, Secr[y].

Continuation of the Correſpondence between Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* and the *Bombay* Preſidency, abſtracted, incloſed in the Letter from *Bombay* of the 17th November 1775.

Letter to Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, 8th November, acknowledging the receipt of his Letters of the 4th, 8th, and 16th October, deſiring him to uſe his endeavours to procure a grant of *Batta*, inſtead of *Duballia*, taken poſſeſſion of by miſtake.

Letter from, 30th October. He has prevailed on the Peiſhwa to croſs the River, and will endeavour to induce him to proceed without delay to the *Surat* Pergunnahs. The Peiſhwa has received further Aſſurances of *Morabah Dadda*, and of *Beje Sing*'s attachment; the latter has made offers of ſervices, and is encamped within 45 coſs of *Amadabad*, with 10,000 Men, and wiſhes to join the Peiſhwa. The Miniſterial Confederates have violated the ceſſation of hoſtilities; Inſtances given.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have been honoured with your Commands of the 15th inſtant, and in reply thereto, beg leave to acquaint you, that the place I mentioned to the Colonel as a proper Poſſeſſion for the Honourable Company, if any further ceſſions of territory were obtained from the *Guicawars*, was a Village called *Batta*, and not *Duballia*, which he through miſtake applied and obtained *Futty Sing*'s Sunnud for; *Batta* is a large Village or rather Town, with a conſiderable diſtrict belonging to it, which affords an annual Revenue of about 20,000 rupees, ſituated near the banks of the River, on the oppoſite ſide, a little below the Honourable Company's Garden Houſe; it formerly I am told belonged to the *Orpad* Pergunnah, on which it borders; and as that Pergunnah borders on *Henſote*, *Batta* is the only diſtrict which prevents the Honourable Company from enjoying without interruption the whole Territory, for a conſiderable breadth, between the River of *Surat* and *Broach*; and on this account I mentioned it to Colonel *Keating*, when I found he was negociating with the *Guicawars* for territories to be ceded to the Honourable Company, as a place which it would be both convenient and advantageous to be annexed to our other Poſſeſſions. Moſt unluckily, he ſomehow miſtook the name, and accepted Sunnuds for a village called *Duballia*, which is a very trifling farm, ſituated on the banks of our River, on the *Surat* ſide, a little below a well-known place called *Veriow*, now belonging to the Honourable Company, as ceded to them by *Futty Sing*. Not imagining that ſuch a miſtake could ariſe as to the name, immediately as I received advice from the Colonel, that he had procured the Sunnuds, I concluded they were for *Batta*, and ſent to take Poſſeſſion of that place; and not till ſome time afterwards, when I got the Sunnuds tranſlated, did I find out the miſtake, which I then noticed to the Colonel, and begged him to rectify it; and as I imagined, that to effect this, could be no difficult matter, I determined ſtill to keep poſſeſſion of *Batta*; but as he has lately wrote me, that on account of your orders, not to apply for any further grants of territory, and moreover, his being at preſent deeply engaged in negociating an Accommodation between *Futty* and *Govindrow*, he cannot do it, I ſhall be under the neceſſity of withdrawing our people from *Batta*, if the *Guicawars* Agents inſiſt on it; and as to *Duballia*, for which I have ſtill the Sunnuds, I have yet done nothing, as I concluded, that when the miſtake was rectified, and the Sunnuds obtained for *Batta*, of courſe *Dubalia* would be reſtored, and therefore I now requeſt your Orders what I am to do with them. The annual Revenues of this Village amount to about 4,000 Rupees. For the reaſons I have aſſigned, I imagine your Honour, &c. will agree with me, that the poſſeſſion of *Batta* would be convenient and advantageous.

We have begun to collect the Revenues of *Chicoly* and *Verſaul*, which Pergannahs produce batty and early grain, and have already recovered from theſe two places about 35,000 rupees, and more is daily coming in from *Orpad*; we ſhall begin to collect in about a month more, as ſoon as the grain it produces is fit to cut. The Pergannah of *Chicoly* contains 72 Villages, and is ſituated to the eaſtward of *Gundaire* and *Verſaul*, on which Pergannahs it borders. Its annual Revenues amount, from the beſt information I can get, to about a lack of rupees.

It is very neceſſary that all the Lands of the ceded Pergannahs, ſhould be ſurveyed and meaſured before any proper and particular account can be taken of their produce and value; and I therefore beg you will be pleaſed to ſend a proper perſon with the neceſſary inſtruments for this ſervice, when I will endeavour to procure, as ſoon as poſſible, an exact ſtate of all your Poſſeſſions under the Management of *Surat*.

Surat, 30th October, 1775. I have, &c.

(Signed) *Robert Gambier*.

A true Copy.

Edward Ravenſcroft, Sec.

Warren Haſtings,
George Monſon,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 98.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 12th February, 1776.

RECEIVED the following Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*:

Gentlemen,

I have delayed writing a few days as I was deſirous of doing myſelf the honour of addreſſing you, to ſay ſomewhat more than barely that I was arrived at *Poonah*. The journey was conſiderably longer than we before imagined: Mr. *Smith* makes it 948 miles from *Kalpee*, and we were never able to procure a relief of either bearers, collies, or cattle for our camp equipage, and very little aſſiſted in any way. The miſcarriage of Orders from our Miniſters here, and the diſturbed ſtate of the Country, was the occaſion of this.

I was met about eight coſs from *Poonah* by a Vacquil (a man of rank) from *Siccaram Baboo* and *Bellajee Pundit*. He told me the Peiſhwa and Miniſters were at *Poonah* Dhur, a fort about ten coſs from *Poonah*; that it was their requeſt I would ſtay a day or two to refreſh my people, and travel by ſmall ſtages, ſo that I might paſs about four or five days before I reached *Poonah* Dhur, as they were waiting a lucky day for the meeting; which happened the 30th December, the day after my arrival, when I was conducted to the Peiſhwa's Durbah. On the way I was met by *Siccaram Baboo* and *Bellajee Pundit*. On this occaſion a full Durbar was aſſembled. The Profeſſions of Friendſhip from the Governor General and Council, were made on the part of the Company, and returned by *Siccaram Baboo*, and *Balajee Pundit* on the part of the Maratta State.

The next day was appointed for reading the Credentials, when all the Chiefs that could be collected were to be aſſembled in Durbar. This was accordingly done.

In debating with the Miniſters preliminary to the Treaty being entered upon, which muſt neceſſarily be delayed ſome days, as will appear in the ſequel, they urge ſtrong reaſons againſt the Signature of their Chiefs individually to the Treaty. The converſations and the reaſons they give, I incloſe; alſo the riſe and progreſs of the preſent diſſentions and diſturbances in this Country, as related by themſelves.

In my Inſtructions I am directed to inſiſt on the Signature of their Chiefs nominally and individually, which I imagine will be attended with many difficulties, or perhaps not attainable; you will be pleaſed, therefore, to give me further directions reſpecting this article. I am myſelf of opinion it might be diſpenſed with. In concluding the Treaty I ſhall endeavour, and, I hope, with ſucceſs, to keep open ſome ſeparate Articles, in caſe any thing further ſhould occur to you, or for your future approbation of what may, to me.

The Miniſterials have in their hands almoſt all the collections of the Country, conſequently the Intereſt of a great majority of their Chiefs; indeed I hear of very few that are connected with *Ragonath Row*, and theſe of the *Guzerat* Country only; ſo that a Peace in the Country will ſoon be eſtabliſhed, upon the Engliſh withdrawing their protection from *Ragonath Row*.

At the requeſt of the Miniſters I have wrote to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to know if their force is entirely withdrawn from *Ragonath Row*, as they have intelligence here that yet ſome troops remain with or near him, which enables him to commit hoſtilities; and they declare on their part, they have not moved a ſingle horſeman from their Army ſince the receipt of the Governor General's firſt letter, now near ſix months ago.

Incloſed is a letter I received from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*. My reply requeſted every information they could poſſibly give me, and which I expect in four or five days. I have alſo the honour to incloſe the Copy of a Letter I received from the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, by which you will perceive he is ſending an Ambaſſador to negociate at this Court. I ſhall be particularly attentive to the Inſtructions I have received reſpecting the Nabob. I was much diſappointed in not meeting a Vackeel of his at *Poonah*, as the Miniſtry here are very deſirous to conclude the Treaty as expeditiouſly as poſſible, and which my Inſtructions in every part direct me to do. Appendix. No. 98.

The laſt letter I received from the Board, is dated 20th October, 1775. If any orders have been ſent to *Bombay*, or Minutes have paſſed in Council reſpecting the buſineſs of my Deputation, ſince that date, I have not been informed of them.

I hope in a few days to acquaint you with the ſenſe of theſe people regarding the Treaty; at preſent I cannot ſee a ſingle perſon that is not entirely devoted to them.

Much uneaſineſs has been expreſſed at my not having brought ſome Preſent on the part of the Company. They ſay it is not only the Cuſtom of this Country, but they conceive of ours, and all the World on ſuch occaſions; and that it leaves too much room for their people to form miſtaken notions. This was intimated to me by one of their Chiefs appointed to reſide with me, and who is preſent at all our debates at the Peiſhwa's Durbar. He obſerved, that they were afraid their Nation was not conſidered ſo honourably, or of the conſequence they could wiſh it to be. I told them it had not eſcaped the Gentlemen at *Calcutta*, and requeſted he would ſatisfy *Sicca Ram Baboo* and *Bellajee Pundit* of this, but that the buſineſs was too urgent to admit the delay of a fortnight or three weeks to make ſuch preparation; that I had been hurried, as they well knew, with a very long journey before me; that I had been deſired to aſſign theſe reaſons for what they think a neglect, and that I had received directions to ſend to *Bombay*, and provide this cuſtomary compliment. I have accordingly given orders for different articles, to the amount of about fifteen thouſand rupees. I wiſh you may think this right.

I have the honour to incloſe the form in which I mean to draw up the Treaty. You will pleaſe to return it me with your remarks and alterations, ſhould you think any neceſſary.

Poonah Dhur, 5th January, 1776. I have, &c. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

P. S. It is with extreme grief I adviſe of the Death of poor Dr. *Banks*. He had been in a declining way theſe two months paſt, and expired this morning early.

Concluſion of a Debate reſpecting the Maratta Chiefs, individually ſigning the Treaty, 3d January, 1776.

The Colonel aſked, If they had conſidered his propoſal of calling their Chiefs together to ſign the Treaty? They replied, they had; but looked upon it as a requeſt which could not be complied with, without danger to the Tranquillity of the State. That they have now in their poſſeſſion, Treaties between their Peiſhwa and the Kings of *Delhi*, as far back as the Reign of *Aurungzebe*, as well as Treaties with all the other Powers of *Indoſtan*, which they were ready to produce; that the Colonel might ſee the Seals which have been affixed on all ſuch occaſions, and that the ſame will now be uſed; and that they alſo bind themſelves by a moſt ſolemn Oath, which they take at the time of putting their Seals or Names to the Treaty, to abide faithfully by every Article therein contained. I hope the Colonel in his Letter to *Calcutta* will acquaint the Gentlemen with theſe circumſtances. They declared theſe were the invariable rules obſerved in all Treaties that had ever taken place between their State and any other Power: that were they now to deviate from them, the conſequences might be fatal, as it would induce the Chiefs, who

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are now entirely dependant on the Peiſhwa, and liable to be deprived of their Dignity and Country at his Pleaſure, to think themſelves of Conſequence enough to demand a Share in the Government, inſtead of obeying the Orders of their Maſters, and cauſe diſſentions rather than unite them.

That there were three or four Chiefs whom they could not call to the Peiſhwa's Durbar, though they acknowledged in moſt reſpects his ſuperiority, and were obliged to join him with their forces whenever he made War upon any Power adjoining to or near their reſpective Countries. Their Names and Countries as follows:

Madajee Bhonſalo, - - *Durbarow Cattach.*
Guctawar Govendram, and *Futty Sing*, } half *Guzerat.*
Mirarow, - - - - Part of the *Carnatic.*

They further declared, That they wiſhed nothing ſo much as a laſting Peace with the Engliſh, and that the Colonel might depend upon their taking every meaſure in their power conſiſtent with the honour and ſafety of their Country to eſtabliſh ſuch a Peace.

The Colonel obſerved to them, that the preſence of the Chiefs was a circumſtance which the Honourable the Governor General and Council conſidered as indiſpenſable; that if the arguments he had made uſe of, heretofore were not of force ſufficient to bring them to his opinion, he would, as he had already mentioned, write to the Governor General and Council, and receive their further Inſtructions on this article, which he hoped would be more favourable to their wiſhes; in the mean time the Treaty may be carried on, ſo as to enable them to withdraw their Army, and reduce the heavy expence they at preſent complain of.

J. Upton.

His Highneſs the Nabob *Wallajaw Ummur ul Hind, Candath ul Mulk, Bahader ul Dowlah, Anweer ul Deen Cawn, Bahadre Zuffer Jung, Sepah Salaur Subahdar* of the *Carnatic*, to Colonel *John Upton*, Ambaſſador at *Poonah*, from the Governor General and Supreme Council at *Bengal*.

Upon hearing of your Appointment as Ambaſſador, to negociate a Peace with the people at *Poonah*, I wrote to the Governor General, deſiring a Letter from him to you, to keep the tranquillity of the *Carnatic* in view; the Governor General in friendſhip to me has ſent me an Engliſh letter, directed to you, and has informed me, that he ſent you a duplicate thereof, which I hope you have received. I ſend you incloſed, tranſlation of his letter to me; that to you I will ſend by truſty perſons, who are ſoon to ſet out. My friendſhip and regard have been for a long time eſtabliſhed with the King, the Company, and the Engliſh Nation, as have been their favour and regard to me. They conſider me as themſelves, and in their kindneſs to me included me in the 11th Article of the Treaty made at *Paris*, with the other Kings; I am therefore convinced that I am the firſt friend to the Engliſh Nation; and as there is no Prince in *India* ſo firmly attached to them as myſelf, and as the Governor General has wrote to you to negociate jointly with my Ambaſſadors, I requeſt that you will wait a little for their arrival, as they will ſoon ſet out, and by them I will write particularly, after which you will include the peace and tranquillity of the *Carnatic* in the Treaty between the Company, the Engliſh Nation, and the People at *Poonah*, or *Ragonaut Row*, agreeable to a draft I ſhall ſend you; and you'll oblige the Chiefs of the Marattas, not to demand any Chour, Surrdare, Mokee, &c. either for the paſt or the future. I never will forget your friendſhip in this affair, and I will be much obliged to you. What can I ſay more?

Given at *Chepaute*,
8th November, 1775.

TREATY between the Honourable the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and the Maratta State.

Poonah, January 1776.

Whereas Differences have ariſen amongſt the Chiefs of the Maratta State, and the Preſidency of *Bombay* having taken a part therein, by ſending Forces into the Maratta Dominions, which the Honourable the Governor General and Council of *Fort William* diſapprove, we are deſirous of conciliating the Differences, and have determined accordingly to enter ſuch meaſures as may moſt effectually contribute to ſo deſirable an end. The Governor General and Council of *Fort William* for this purpoſe therefore have authorized, deputed, and given full Powers unto Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*, in the ſervice of the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, to conclude a Peace between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and the Maratta State; and the following are the Articles of Convention between the ſaid Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*, on the part of the Honourable the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and the Miniſters and Chiefs reſpectively of the Maratta State, whoſe Names are hereunto ſubſcribed, on the part of the Maratta State. Done *Poonah*, this . . . . Day of 1776.

L. S. The Seal of the Peiſhwa
L. S. *A. B.*
L. S. *C. D.*
L. S. *E. F.* (Signed) *J. U.*

Preſent, when the above was ſigned,
A. M. Per. Int.
J. F. Secr.

Article the 1ſt.
It is agreed, That
Article the 2d.
That
Article 3d.
That, &c. &c.
Signed as before.

Preſent when ſigned, as before.
Separate Articles.

N° 1.
2.
3.
&c. &c.

Signed as before.
Preſent, when ſigned as before.

N. B. In the Preamble to the Articles I have ſaid "to ſettle a Peace between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and the Maratta State, agreeable to the Tenor of my Inſtructions;" you will pleaſe to ſignify if you approve this method, or would prefer its being drawn up only, "a Peace with the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company," as the Maratta Miniſters ſeem very deſirous of ſettling a full and laſting Peace with the Engliſh Nation: and there may be ſome Articles in which the *Bombay* Preſidency may not be conſidered more particularly than either of the other Settlements.

Reſolved, That the following Form of a Preamble to the Treaty with the Marattas, be ſent to Colonel *Upton*.

ARTICLES of a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendſhip between the Maratta State and the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, ſigned, ſealed, and ratified by Rajah *Ramraujee*, *Mahederow Seway*, *Pundit Purdham*, the Son of *Narrain Row*, Peiſhwa, and *Succaram Pundit*, *Maraba Pundit Turnaveſs*, &c. &c. &c. *Babooje Naick Naroo*, *Sucker Amundrow Raſta*, *Darumun Row*, and *Nana Turnaveſs*) for themſelves, and onbehalf of the other Chiefs and People of Maratta State, on the one part; and by Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*, who is inveſted with full Powers by the Governor General

and Council of *Bengal*, on behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, on the other part.

Whereas differences have ariſen between the Chiefs of the Maratta State, and the Governor and Council of *Bombay* have taken a part therein by ſending Forces into the Maratta Dominions; the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, from an earneſt deſire to conciliate the ſaid differences, and to reſtore a firm and laſting Peace between the Chiefs of the ſaid State and all the Governments of the Engliſh Company committed eſpecially to their charge, have deputed Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*, and inveſted him with full Powers from them, and on the behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, to conclude a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendſhip with the Peiſhwa, and other Rulers of the Maratta State; and the following are the Conditions agreed on by both Parties reſpectively; viz.

I.

II. &c.

N. B. The Treaty when executed agreeable to the foregoing form, ſhould be delivered to the Peiſhwa of the Maratta Government. In the duplicate ſigned for the Governor General and Council, the precedency in Rank ſhould be given to the Company.

The Names of the Maratta Miniſters and Chiefs mentioned in this Preamble are only for the ſake of form. Thoſe ſhould be inſerted by whom the Treaty may be ratified.

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RESOLVED, That the following reply be written to Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 5th January from *Poonah*.

Our reaſons for inſiſting on the Signature of all the Maratta Chiefs to the Treaty, were founded on the undivided ſtate of that Government, and the Infancy of the Peiſhwa, who is ſupported by the Regency at *Poonah*. We ſtill think that their concurrence is equally deſirable; but we would not let this point be made any obſtruction to the concluſion of the Treaty, and the diſtance is too great for you to refer to us every difficulty which may occur to you in the courſe of your Negociations, and to wait for our orders. On all ſuch occaſions, you will conform as nearly to the general ſpirit of our orders as circumſtances will admit.

On the preſent ſubject we authorize you to accept of the Ratification of the Treaty by the Peiſhwa, his Miniſters, and the Perſons whoſe Signatures are uſually fixed to the Treaties of that State; and we wiſh alſo to obtain thoſe of all the other Chiefs who are preſent, and are poſſeſſed of ſufficient Power to oppoſe the execution of it. We would ſtill have you require, that the others ſhould be parties, and that their aſſent may be ſignified by writings, or by perſons properly authorized on their behalf; but as we are ſenſible that this may be impracticable with reſpect to all the Chiefs, eſpecially thoſe who eſpouſe the intereſt of the oppoſite party, we only expreſs our deſire that the whole may be included, and leave it to your diſcretion to recede from this requiſition ſuch degrees you ſhall find it unattainable.

We incloſe a proper form of a Preamble to the Treaty which you may conclude with the Peiſhwa.

We are, &c.

General *Clavering*.—When Colonel *Upton*'s Inſtructions were drawn up, he was directed to uſe his endeavours to obtain the ceſſion of *Baſſein*, on the ſuppoſition that the Government of *Bombay* was actually in poſſeſſion of it. From later advices we have been informed, that although the ceſſion of the Iſland of *Baſſein* was made an Article of the Treaty between *Ragoba* and the Government of *Bombay*, the poſſeſſion of it had never been yielded to the Company. Appendix, No. 99.

We have been informed by Mr. *Taylor*, that of all the Poſſeſſions of the Maratta Empire the Miniſters are more tenacious of preſerving the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* than of any other of their Territories; becauſe the conqueſt of thoſe Iſlands being made by the Peiſhwa's Anceſtors from the Portugueze, they conſidered the poſſeſſion of them as an honour which it would be a diſgrace for them to relinquiſh. As I am apprehenſive that if the Terms in Colonel *Upton*'s Inſtructions relative to the Iſland of *Baſſein* remain unrepealed, and that he be not inſtructed to relinquiſh the demand of *Baſſein* in caſe the Miniſters ſhould abſolutely object to cede it to the Company, the Treaty muſt be broken off, and conſequently the deſirable object which we have in view, of obtaining Peace for the Government of *Bombay*, be poſtponed for a conſiderable time; I beg leave to propoſe, that diſcretional orders be now given to him, not to inſiſt on the Iſland of *Baſſein* being granted to the Company in the future Treaty of Peace; unleſs the Miniſters have already conſented to acquieſce to the demand that he has made for it, or that he perceives a diſpoſition in them to yield the poſſeſſion of it to the Company.

Mr. *Francis*.—I underſtood that the object of Colonel *Upton*'s appointment was to ſettle and conclude a definitive Treaty of Peace with the Maratta State, on terms equitable to them, and alſo in ſome degree honourable and advantageous to the Company. We undoubtedly meant to relinquiſh many of the advantages ſtipulated by the Preſidency of *Bombay* with *Ragoba*; but we alſo meant to obtain ſome other beneficial Articles in return for thoſe conceſſions, otherwiſe I ſee no ſubject for a Negociation. A Peace, by which one of the contracting parties yields every thing, might have been obtained without a formal Embaſſy or even without a Treaty. The acquiſition of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* muſt have appeared to us to be an equitable condition, ſince, in our Inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*, we have declared, that "we were determined on no account" to relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of thoſe Iſlands, and that he would "at no rate" agree to reſtore them. It does not appear to me, that the circumſtance of *Baſſein*'s not being actually in our poſſeſſion makes any difference with reſpect to the propriety of our adhering to our firſt plan. Our Right to demand the ceſſion of that Iſland, would not have been improved by our previouſly taking poſſeſſion of it. We are forming a Treaty of Perpetual Peace, in which each of the contracting parties muſt be expected to yield ſomething reciprocally for the public good.

I think that the ceſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* ſhould be inſiſted on; and as Colonel *Upton* has not ſuggeſted to us that he expects to meet with any difficulties on either of thoſe points, I hope they will both be obtained.

Colonel *Monſon*.—When I gave my conſent to the firſt draft of inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*, I underſtood, from the repreſentations of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, that they were in poſſeſſion, in conſequence of the Treaty with *Ragoba*, of *Baſſein* and its dependencies. I have ſince learned, that although that ceſſion was one of the conditions of the Treaty, that *Ragoba* had no power to put the Preſidency of *Bombay* in poſſeſſion of that place; and that if they obtained it, it muſt be by force of Arms. My object in the miſſion of Colonel *Upton* to *Poonah*, was to reſtore Peace on the weſtern ſide of *India*, which I think ſhould be obtained on any terms, as a War carried on there can only be expenſive to the Company, and prejudicial to the general Trade of *Hindoſtan*. I therefore am of opinion, that Colonel *Upton* ſhould have Inſtructions to obtain *Baſſein* and its dependencies, if he can, from the miniſterial party; but not to make it an article on which

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which to break off the Treaty he is now inſtructed to conclude.

Governor General.—The Company have invariably joined *Baſſein* and *Salſette* in all their Inſtructions to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to obtain poſſeſſion of the latter. Of its importance in a commercial light, we have been informed by Mr. *Taylor* in his letter to this Board, recorded in Conſultation 9th October. It appears to be of ſtill greater conſequence as a political acquiſition, from its connection with the Continent, and its contiguity to the Paſſes which lead directly to *Poonah*. We have repeatedly declared to Colonel *Upton*, that we would not depart from our claim to *Baſſein*; nothing has ſince occured to induce the Board to change a declaration ſo peremptorily made, nor do I conceive that Colonel *Upton* will find any difficulty to carry it into execution. The Miniſters have no perſonal intereſt to ſerve, nor family pride to gratify in the detention either of *Salſette* or *Baſſein*.

They were conquered by the Anceſtors of *Ragoba*, who has already conſented to relinquiſh them. The Infant Peiſhwa, who might be ſwayed by the ſame conſiderations, is incapable of forming any opinion upon them; and every argument which can juſtify our retaining the poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, combats equally in favour of our right to *Baſſein*, and of the propriety of aſſerting it. I am therefore of opinion, that no alteration ſhould be made in our original Inſtructions upon this ſubject.

I am againſt the Queſtion.

Reſolved, That no Alteration be made in the Inſtructions already given to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, for requiring the ceſſion of the Iſland of *Baſſein*, as a condition of the Treaty of Peace.

General *Clavering*.—I muſt proteſt againſt this Reſolution of the Board, and all the fatal conſequences that I am afraid will enſue from it. By one act of Injuſtice we have taken the Iſland *Salſette* from the Marattas, and by another we refuſe to make Peace with them, without they relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of an Iſland which we have no right to claim from them, by any equivalent that we can cede to them in return.

General *Clavering* requiring to refer to the Letter from the Court of Directors to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, which arrived this day in the *Grenville* Packet, to enable him to finiſh his Proteſt; the Secretary informs him, that with the approbation of the Board he has juſt ſent it to Mr. *Taylor* for his peruſal. The General therefore defers completing his Minute until he can obtain a reference to it.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on Mr. *Barwell* with the above Debate, and requeſt his opinion upon the Queſtion propoſed by the General.

The Secretary having waited on Mr. *Barwell* with the whole of this Conſultation, agreeably to the orders of the Board, he declared that he acquieſced in the ſentiments expreſſed by the Governor General and Mr. *Francis*.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
P. Francis.

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 14th February 1776.

PRESENT.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
} Eſquires.

GENERAL CLAVERING having referred to the Letter of the Court of Directors to *Bombay*, dated 12th April, now delivers in a continuation of his Minute of the 12th inſtant as follows:

The Letter from the Court of Directors to the Council at *Bombay* of the 12th April, which we have juſt been reading, contains their poſitive commands not to take poſſeſſion of the Iſland of *Salſette* without their permiſſion, but by Negociation. If the Iſland of *Baſſein* can be obtained by the ſame means, I ſhall be glad; but I think it neither conſiſtent with the Orders of the Court of Directors, given ſo particularly in this letter to the Council of *Bombay*, or to us, in their Inſtructions to preſerve the Peace of *India*, to continue a War merely to acquire Territory. On the ſame principles, the propriety of reſtoring *Salſette*, it may be ſaid, might be inferred; beſides that, one injuſtice will not authorize our committing another. I confeſs I wiſh moſt ardently that the Board would even obviate the objection I feel to our inſiſting on keeping *Salſette*, without giving ſome equivalent for it either in Money or in Territory. I believe *Fort Victoria* was once propoſed by the Company themſelves as an equivalent for it; but whatever the Board may think proper to do in this matter, there is certainly a very great difference between relinquiſhing a place of which we are in poſſeſſion, and its inſiſting on obtaining another Iſland of much more value and ſtrength, that we might perhaps have much difficulty to acquire by force. The Board muſt reflect on the conſequence of the Miniſters at *Poonah* refuſing to comply with our demand, that the War muſt be continued, the effects of which are already ſo ſeverely felt by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in its Trade in all its branches. Are we reſolved in what manner the War ſhall be conducted, to compel the Maratta State to ſubmit to our Terms? Are we determined to ſend twenty lacks annually to *Bombay* till Peace is concluded? For theſe and many other urgent reaſons, I think the Board's Reſolution to inſiſt on the ſurrender of *Baſſein* of ſo much importance, that it deſerves to be re-conſidered. I therefore move, that the Orders to Colonel *Upton*, to inſiſt on the ſurrender of *Baſſein*, may be diſcretional, in caſe it can be obtained by Negociation, but not otherwiſe.

Mr. *Francis*.—The ſyſtem on which I have invariably acted, has been hitherto honoured with the concurrence and approbation of General *Clavering* and Colonel *Monſon*. The former Proteſt now made by General *Clavering* againſt a Reſolution of the Board, in which I concurred, cannot therefore fail to bring the conſiſtency of my conduct into queſtion both here and at home. I do not think that I have departed from any one of the principles which I have avowed and ſet my name to. I think that in adhering to the Inſtructions originally given to Colonel *Upton*, I did no more than ſupport the ſame plan, which was approved and confirmed by every Member of the Board. I muſt, however, beg the indulgence of the Board to take a little time to conſider and draw up a defence of my conduct, as I know no period of my future life in which the tranſaction that appears on the Records of Monday laſt may not affect my character. I have the greateſt reaſon to expect this indulgence, as General *Clavering* himſelf has taken two days to conſider and introduce ſome new arguments in his preſent motion, which were not before the Board on Monday. Late in the afternoon of that day I did earneſtly and repeatedly requeſt of the Board to delay the debate and deciſion of the whole queſtion till the next Morning: That propoſal was not agreed to. I did alſo urge, that Mr. *Barwell*'s accidental abſence might not prevent the queſtions being determined by a full Board;

Board; but that his opinion might be taken into the determination of the Board, as has been practiſed upon ſome other occaſion. This conduct ſhews how unwilling I was to hurry the deciſion of a queſtion in which I had the misfortune not to agree with General *Clavering* and Colonel *Monſon*.—No time was allowed me. After a more careful review of the whole ſubject, I muſt declare, that I do not even now ſee any reaſons for adopting General *Clavering*'s firſt motion, which ought not to have weighed with him, and with the Board at the time when he ſigned the following Inſtruction to Colonel *Upton*.

"We are determined on no account to relinquiſh "the poſſeſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, therefore ſhould "the Peiſhwa hold out againſt yielding them to the "Company, you are at no rate to agree to reſtore them."

A circumſtance is now mentioned, which alone is ſuppoſed to juſtify a departure from the ſpirit of this Inſtruction; viz. that when it was given, the Board conceived that *Baſſein* was actually in our poſſeſſion. I myſelf do not think the difference material. But thoſe Members of the Board who think it material, ſhould, as I humbly apprehend, have moved for an alteration of the Inſtructions as ſoon as they diſcovered their miſtake. I believe it was diſcovered ſo long ago as the 9th October, when Mr. *Tayler* was before the Board. From that time to the preſent, no ſtep has been taken to obviate the fatal conſequences which are now foretold of our adhering to the demand of *Baſſein*. No other new matter of any kind reſpecting this queſtion has yet come before us. Colonel *Upton* does not ſuggeſt to us the apprehenſion of any difficulty whatſoever on this point. I cannot therefore, without departing from that conſiſtency of conduct which I have hitherto endeavoured to maintain, conſent to any alteration in Colonel *Upton*'s original Inſtructions; let me add, that I cannot do it without oppoſing my own opinion to the unanimous ſenſe of the Board, deliberately, not haſtily taken, as I find it expreſſed in our letters to Colonel *Upton* of the 21ſt June and 17th July. At the ſame time, however, I am far from oppoſing the preſent Motion for bringing the queſtion again under Conſideration. I am at all times ready to give every Member of this Board an opportunity of reconſidering his opinion on any important queſtion; we owe ſuch compliance mutually to each other; we owe it alſo to the Public Service. Neither am I myſelf ſo obſtinately fixed in my own opinion, as not to be open to hear and yield to argument.

Mr. *Barwell*.—I do not underſtand General *Clavering*'s Motion to be a reconſideration of the Reſolution to inſiſt on the ſurrender of *Baſſein*, but a Propoſition to alter the original Inſtructions given to Colonel *Upton*. I am againſt the Motion.

Colonel *Monſon*.—Mr. *Francis* in his Minute accuſes the Board of having hurried him into a haſty opinion, without being allowed ſufficient time to digeſt his thoughts upon the queſtion then under deliberation. I was preſent at the Board on Monday laſt during the whole time of the Board's ſitting, and do not recollect any Propoſition being made for an Adjournment. I believe it will not appear from the proceedings of that day, that ſuch a propoſition was made. Mr. *Francis*, in order to prove a conſiſtency in his own conduct, charges me with a neglect of mine. It is true, I was acquainted by Mr. *Tayler* ſo early as the 9th of October, that we were not in poſſeſſion of *Baſſein* and its dependencies. It would certainly then have been proper to have ſent Colonel *Upton* Inſtructions not to have inſiſted upon the ceſſion of that place to the Company, as the ultimate Terms of the Treaty. I do not think I can be accuſed from deviating from that ſyſtem of conſiſtency which I have laid down. I declared on Monday laſt, that my object in the miſſion of Colonel *Upton* to Poonah, was to reſtore Peace. My intention in giving diſcretionary power to Colonel Upton, is conſiſtent with that declaration. I think that Colonel *Upton* ſhould endeavour to procure *Baſſein*, but not to make it the final Condition of his Treaty. If he ſhould perceive a diſpoſition in the Miniſtry at *Poonah* to relinquiſh *Baſſein* for an equivalent, or what may be thought ſo, I would recommend even that *Broach* and its dependencies ſhould be ceded for *Baſſein* and its dependencies. Upon the whole, I think it ſo much for the Intereſt of the Company, and ſo conſonant to their Inſtructions to acquire Peace throughout *India*, that I would even conſent, ſhould it be inſiſted on, to reſtore the Iſland of *Salſette*. I ſhould be ſorry to preclude any Gentleman from delivering his ſentiments upon a queſtion which I think, conſidering the critical ſituation of Affairs in *Europe* and this Country, of the utmoſt conſequence to the Company. I therefore am for the motion; not that I have any new matter to offer to the conſideration of the Board, but ſhall be ready to yield to any arguments which may be uſed in ſupport of a contrary opinion to that which I have given. Appendix. No. 100.

Mr. *Francis*—I beg leave to aſſure Colonel *Monſon*, that I never had a thought of bringing a charge of any kind againſt the Board, or againſt himſelf. No man is more ready than I am, to acknowledge and bear teſtimony to the integrity and conſiſtency of his conduct. I have often availed myſelf of his ſuperior judgment: I hope ſtill to be guided by it. With reſpect to the queſtion before the Board, my object is ſimply the acquiſition of *Baſſein* with *Salſette*; I have expreſſed no opinion, I have propoſed no limitation to the conceſſions which it may be proper to make to the Marattas in return for this acquiſition. I think the ſituation of theſe places makes the acquiſition of them ſo eſſential to the ſecurity and beneficial poſſeſſion of *Bombay*, that I am willing to purchaſe it upon the terms propoſed by Colonel *Monſon*; and ſo far forth I yield to his opinion.

With reſpect to what I have ſaid, of my requeſt that the debate of Monday laſt might be poſtponed till the next morning; it is very true, that no formal motion appears on the Proceedings to that effect. That I did make ſuch a requeſt, is a mere matter of fact, for which I can only appeal to the recollection of the other Members of the Board. But I beg it may ſtop here.

General *Clavering*—In deciding on the important queſtion now before us, it ſeems very immaterial, whether the Proteſt I have entered this day on the Conſultations was finiſhed on Monday or not; the reaſon of my deferring it to this day, was to obtain the preciſe words contained in the Letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of *Bombay*, prohibiting them to take *Salſette* by force if they could not obtain it by negociation. I have introduced no new matter into it which would not have appeared at that time, had I recollected the terms in which the Court of Directors Commands were expreſſed. I wiſhed only to be accurate, and not to take up the time of the Board a ſecond day on a buſineſs which I could not but have wiſhed might have been concluded immediately. In regard to the deſire which Mr. *Francis* expreſſes he had to poſtpone the deciſion of my queſtion on Monday, till there was a full Board; it certainly only depended on himſelf and the Governor General to have done it, if they had pleaſed, as they then formed a majority. I mentioned in my Minute on Monday, that the Orders for inſiſting on keeping *Baſſein* as well as *Salſette*, were given in conſequence of the full perſuaſion that we were in, that the Iſland of *Baſſein* had been ceded and relinquiſhed to the Company along with the other poſſeſſions which *Ragoba* had actually ſurrendered to the Government of *Bombay*. It is true that the miſtake was diſcovered ſo early as in October, but neither at that time nor ſince did it ever occur to me, that we had given Orders ſo peremptory to Colonel *Upton*, not to relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*. The Word not to "reſtore," plainly implies our conception of our being in poſſeſſion of it. The firſt duty that we owe both to thoſe who employ us and to ourſelves, is to correct a miſtake as ſoon as we diſcover

Appendix. No. 100.

cover it; it was only on Monday laſt that I obſerved, on reading over the Inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*, the error that we had committed; I no ſooner obſerved it, than I made a Propoſition to the Board to have it rectified, hoping that it would have met with no difficulty from any of the Members, and particularly from one with whom I had hitherto concurred in every ſentiment ſince my arrival at *Bengal*, in the ſtrict obſervance of the Company's Orders, and in the Principles of Public Juſtice. I ſtill hope that both he and the other Members of the Board, on a review of the conſequences (which I cannot help thinking will be very fatal) of the Orders given to Colonel *Upton* unleſs they be reſcinded, will ſtill permit that they be made diſcretional.

The Governor General—I certainly remember that Mr. *Francis* more than once expreſſed a reluctance to decide on the Propoſitions contained in Colonel's *Upton's* Letter at the laſt Meeting of the Board in this Department, and he will do me the juſtice to acknowledge that I declared myſelf equally deſirous of poſtponing it; and had a motion been made to that effect, I ſhould certainly have voted for it, for the purpoſe of affording ſufficient leiſure for every Member of the Board to weigh and deliberate maturely on a point of ſo much importance as that contained in the General's queſtion; but no ſuch motion was made, and for my own part I had no motive to make it, becauſe I was already clearly determined in my own opinion. I have already aſſigned the reaſons which induced me to oppoſe the General's queſtion. I could add many others of equal ſtrength, and could place thoſe which I have already urged in a much ſtronger point of view; but I conclude that the Judgment of the Court of Directors will here this have been made known to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, concerning the propriety of the deſign formed by that Preſidency for poſſeſſing themſelves both of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*. I ſhall be therefore very brief in what I have further to add on this ſubject.

I have always underſtood it to have been an invariable Injunction of the Court of Directors to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to ſeize every favourable occaſion for acquiring poſſeſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, either by Treaty or Arms, and conceive the acquiſition of *Baſſein* to be of equal if not greater conſequence than that of *Salſette*. In the Inſtructions therefore which were given to Colonel *Upton*, I aſſented to the declaration, that the poſſeſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* ſhould on no account be relinquiſhed, regarding the poſſeſſion of both as an inſeparable object both of the Company's intentions and wiſhes; nor do I recollect whether I underſtood *Baſſein* to have been ſtill in the poſſeſſion of the Marattas at the time when theſe Inſtructions were drawn, or in ours; it yet does not appear from the *Bombay* Letters which were received to that date; nor would it have made any change in my opinion of the propriety of inſiſting on the ceſſion both of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*; yet I ſhould with leſs reluctance have yielded, at that time, to any propoſition that had been made for the ſurrender of the latter, as the wiſh of the majority of the Board was to remove every obſtacle to the Reſtoration of Peace, and the conceſſion might have been then made on our part, without any circumſtances of humiliation; but having declared our reſolution in ſuch peremptory and decided terms, having repeated it, in two ſeparate paragraphs in the firſt Inſtructions, and again in the ſecond which were delivered to Colonel *Upton* on the 17th July, I have no doubt that Colonel *Upton* will have made the demand both for *Salſette* and *Baſſein* in terms equally peremptory. I dread therefore the conſequences of relinquiſhing a point on which we have already made the future event of Peace or War to turn. The Marattas will be obviouſly led to conclude, with ſuch a promptneſs to change a reſolution of ſuch conſequence, that we ſhall be equally diſpoſed to yield to any demands which they may make, rather than hazard the renewal of the War. From what has paſſed, I feel myſelf as ſolicitous as the other Gentlemen of the Board may be, to bring Colonel *Upton's* Negociation to a ſpeedy and peaceable concluſion; and from the Character of the People with whom we are in treaty, I believe that we ſhall be more likely to attain that end by an undeviating adherence to the requiſitions and declarations which we have already made, than by conceſſions of any kind, but more eſpecially by ſuch as are ſpontaneouſly made, through the apprehenſion only that they may be in the future courſe of the Negociations exacted from us.

Mr. *Francis* moves, That this Debate be adjourned till To-morrow.

Agreed to.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
P. Francis.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 15th February 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant-General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Reſumed the Debate of Yeſterday.

Mr. *Francis*—I have already expreſſed my willingneſs to make a compenſation to the Marattas for the ceſſion of *Baſſein*, if the poſſeſſion of that place cannot be obtained on any other terms. Colonel *Monſon* has expreſſed an opinion to the ſame effect. I would therefore propoſe, that Colonel *Upton*, in caſe he ſhould find inſurmountable difficulties in obtaining *Baſſein* without a compenſation, may be authorized to propoſe certain conceſſions to the *Poonah* Government in return for their compliance with his firſt demand. I think that a ſurrender of our Right and Intereſt in *Broach* might be made the condition of that compliance; but he ſhould at the ſame time be particularly inſtructed to reſerve this conceſſion until he ſhall find it abſolutely impoſſible to ſucceed without it. In the mean time he may propoſe other compenſations, if any ſhould be demanded, and not come to this, but in the laſt extremity.

Mr. *Barwell*—I adhere to the opinion that I have already given; I cannot conceive that we have it in our power to offer the Marattas any thing beyond the Company's Alliance for the ceſſions demanded from them. The Miniſters of the Maratta State muſt be fully ſenſible of the intereſts we ſacrifice in quitting the party of *Ragoba*, and withdrawing our Forces from his cauſe; any thing beyond this, I apprehend, will ſpeak rather a weakneſs in the Engliſh Government; and I ſhall not be ſurprized if, preſuming on ſuch a principle, they ſhould demand to be paid even for the Expences of the War. The moſt favourable occaſion that could have offered for promoting the intereſts of the Company on the weſtern ſide of *India*, we propoſe to forego for the ſake of Peace, and only inſiſt on ſuch a condition from the Maratta State, as is abſolutely neceſſary to the very being of *Bombay*. I am againſt the motion.

Colonel *Monſon*—When Propoſals of Peace are made to a Nation to which they have it not in their power to accede, it is the ſame thing as a Declaration of War, or a continuation of hoſtilities. This I conceive to be the nature of the propoſal which is to be the final condition on which Colonel *Upton* is to make his Treaty with the Maratta State: the Fort of *Baſſein* I underſtand to be of very conſiderable ſtrength, and in the poſſeſſion of a perſon who neither acknowledges the miniſterial [illegible] or that of *Ragoba*; it is certain, from our [illegible] been put in poſſeſſion of it, that he pays no [illegible]

the Treaty the Preſidency of *Bombay* have made with *Ragoba*, or we ſhould have been in Poſſeſſion of that place many months. My wiſh in giving a certain latitude to Colonel *Upton*'s Inſtructions, is to attain an honourable and laſting Peace; therefore, I could wiſh that the poſitive orders under which he is now to act might be extended; but at the ſame time, that he ſhould be inſtructed to obtain the deſirable object of *Baſſein* and its dependencies, without giving any equivalent for them; but if he finds that is not to be done, then to enter into a Negociation for an exchange of *Broach* and its dependencies for *Baſſein* and its dependencies, but not to cede the former until the Company are put in poſſeſſion of the latter, without any expence or aſſiſtance afforded by the Company; that is, not to receive the right only without the poſſeſſion.

If Peace is not to be obtained from the Marattas but by the ceſſion of *Broach* for *Beſſein*, I think it ſhould be accepted on thoſe conditions. I am therefore for the motion.

Mr. *Francis*—I beg leave to obſerve, that there is no fact or inſtance before the Board, on which I could ground a ſuppoſition that the Commandant of *Baſſein* would not think himſelf bound to comply with the orders of the *Poonah* Government: his not having acquieſced in the Treaty made between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and *Ragoba*, proves only that he is not a Dependant of that Prince, which I never underſtood he was; but it does not follow, that he will not obey the Orders of the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, whom, as I have always underſtood, he acknowledges for his ſuperiors. I undoubtedly meant that the ceſſion of *Broach*, or any other place now held by the Company, ſhould not be made until the Company were put in poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*.

Colonel *Monſon*—I have no right to ſay that the perſon who commands in the Fort of *Baſſein*, will not obey the orders of the miniſterial party, for by doing that, I ſhould declare him a Rebel; but it is my opinion that he will not, as I believe there are few inſtances in this Country where perſons who are in poſſeſſion of ſtrong forts, do give them up by the orders of any perſon, without having firſt made terms for themſelves. I make no doubt, but if the miniſterial party would make over their right to the *Eaſt India* Company, of *Baſſein* and its dependencies, and that the Company's Army was to appear before the place, that the Commandant would deliver it up to the Army, on certain advantages for himſelf; but then the Company muſt be at the expence of the conqueſt; and in this manner, they might take poſſeſſion of any place in this Country.

General *Clavering*—The Propoſal made by Mr *Francis* to exchange *Broach* for *Baſſein*, is perfectly agreeable to the object I had in view, in acquiring the latter by Negociation; but I muſt obſerve, that Mr *Francis* has not explained himſelf, whether he would ſtill perſevere in inſtructing Colonel *Upton* to break off the Treaty with the Miniſters, in caſe they ſhould refuſe to cede that Iſland to us upon theſe Terms.

Mr. *Francis*—I have always conſidered the acquiſition of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* as the fundamental article of our Negociations with the Marattas; conſidering all circumſtances, I do not foreſee a probability of their being refuſed; if, however, Colonel *Upton* ſhould find the Maratta Government inflexibly determined not to yield *Baſſein*, he may in that caſe ſuſpend his Negociations, and wait for further Orders from this Board, but there will be no neceſſity for his entirely breaking them off, or quitting *Poonah*.

Governor General—I object to the queſtion, becauſe *Broach* is already the Company's property, purchaſed at a great expence, and with the loſs of the lives of an Officer of diſtinguiſhed merit and many *Britiſh* ſubjects; becauſe I have doubts whether there be a power in this Board to give up the poſſeſſion of *Broach*, the acquiſition of which has been confirmed by the Court of Directors; becauſe I believe that in the compariſon, the poſſeſſion of *Broach* will be found to be yet more advantageous than even that of *Baſſein*; at leaſt, we know it to be a rich and fruitful Country, abounding in many valuable productions and manufactures, eſpecially in the article of Cotton, with which it ſupplies the greateſt part of the Country in that article from the *Malabar* Coaſt; becauſe it is a much frequented Port of Trade, and the key to the Provinces of *Adjemore*, *Jeſſemore*, and the other weſtern diſtricts of *Hindoſtan*, which it ſupplies with Broad Cloth, bought at the Company's Sales; becauſe our preſent poſſeſſion of it, is known, and viſible to the whole World, and the ſurrender of it will be an implied imputation of a want of power in the Company to retain it; and laſtly, becauſe I am clearly of opinion that the Treaty may be obtained without it, and that even if it could not, we ſhould be juſtified, after the many conceſſions which have been made to the Miniſters, were we to be reduced to the neceſſity of renewing the War, there being every reaſon to believe that the conteſt would be of very ſhort duration. Appendix, No. 100.

Reſolved, That Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, in caſe he ſhould find inſurmountable difficulties in obtaining *Baſſein* without a compenſation, be authorized to propoſe certain Conceſſions to the *Poonah* Government, and that in return for a compliance with his firſt demand, a ſurrender of our Right and Intereſt in *Broach* be the condition of that compliance; but that he be particularly inſtructed to reſerve this Conceſſion until he ſhall find it abſolutely impoſſible to ſucceed without it.

Ordered, That Inſtructions agreeable to the above Reſolution be ſent to Colonel *Upton*.

Mr. *Francis*—I requeſt the ſenſe of the Board, whether it ſhould make a part of the Inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*, that in caſe he ſhould find the Maratta Government inflexibly determined not to yield *Baſſein* at any rate, he ſhould ſuſpend his Negociations, and wait for further Orders from the Board, or whether he ſhould intirely break off the Treaty, and quit *Poonah*? I agree that he ſhould ſuſpend his Negociations, and wait for Orders.

Mr. *Barwell* gone home.

Colonel *Monſon* thinks he ſhould wait for further Orders.

General *Clavering*—I agree to it with reluctance, becauſe I think it will tend to protract the concluſion of the propoſed Treaty.

Governor General—I do not object, although I think that a more firm and decided conduct is more likely to accompliſh the ends which we have all in view.

Agreed in the affirmative, to this additional Propoſal of Mr. *Francis*,

Reſolved that the following Letter be written to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

In addition to our Letter of the 14th, which accompanies this, we think it neceſſary to give you farther Inſtructions, to obviate if poſſible the occaſion of any farther Reference.

If you ſhould find the Miniſters totally averſe to make the ſurrender of *Baſſein* a Condition of the Treaty, after uſing every other means in your power to engage them to it, we authorize you to offer ſome conceſſions to them in return, which you will endeavour to make as moderate as poſſible; and ultimately we empower you to cede the fortreſs and dependencies of *Broach* in return for the actual ceſſion of the Iſland of *Baſſein* and its dependencies, if you ſhall find it unattainable on inferior terms; but you are not to propoſe this final conceſſion until it appears abſolutely impoſſible to ſucceed without it. If this ſhould alſo be rejected, we deſire you will give us immediate information, and not

leave

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leave *Poonah* if you can continue there with ſafety, until you receive our farther Orders.

We are, &c. &c.
Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
G. Monſon,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 101.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 26th February 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings,* Governor General, Preſident,

Lieutenant General *John Clavering,*
The Honourable *George Monſon,*
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

RECEIVED, the following Letters from *Bombay:*

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

We addreſſed you in duplicate by the ſhips *St. Helena* and *Union*, under the 17th ultimo, and have ſince been honoured with your Commands, dated the 25th May, 17th July, and 9th October, all of which arrived on the 28th ultimo, and on the 6th inſtant we received your letter, dated the 7th September, addreſſed to the Select Committee.

The irregularity and delay with which both your and our Advices have been mutually received, have been very perplexing to us; and as the two firſt-mentioned Letters are of ſo very old a date, and your Honour will have ſince received ſuch full information from our late Letters, and from Mr. *Tayler*, it is only neceſſary to obſerve in reply to that date, the 25th May, that we certainly ſhould have addreſſed you by the ſame veſſel which conveyed the Return of our Forces to General *Clavering*, had we not underſtood ſhe was to make a trading voyage, and would probably have a long paſſage to *Bengal*, and we then ſhortly intended to diſpatch the Company's veſſel the *Tannah* ſchooner, directly to your Preſidency, which however was unavoidably detained longer than we expected.

Before we received the explanation of your Orders for recalling the Company's Troops to our own garriſons, we did not underſtand they abſolutely implied their return to *Bombay*, and therefore propoſed letting them remain in the *Surat* or *Broach* Pergunnahs until we were favoured with your final Anſwer to the Repreſentations Mr. *Tayler* was commiſſioned to make you. Our late Letters and Correſpondence with Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, tranſmitted by the *Royal Charlotte*, will likewiſe have apprized you of the advice we gave to *Ragoba*, to accompany our Troops with ſuch part of his Army as he might be able to maintain, being ſenſible that the ſeparation of our Forces from his, at that time, would have expoſed him to immediate deſtruction, entirely defeated the purpoſe for which you had deputed Colonel *Upton* to *Poonah*, and rendered ineffectual the Repreſentations we intended making to your Honour, &c. in his favour.

By our laſt Advices the two Armies were arrived at *Corode*, a place only 15 coſs from *Surat*, belonging to the Nabob. And when our Commanding Officer was preparing to march to the quarters aſſigned for them in *Chicoley*, one of the Pergunnahs ceded to us by *Futty Sing*, the Peiſhwa acquainted him, that he could not quarter in that Pergunnah without certain ruin to his cauſe, and inſiſted on remaining in their preſent ſituation, until he could explain his reaſons to us, and receive our determination.

We beg leave to incloſe a Copy of the Letter *Ragoba* addreſſed our Preſident on the ſubject, and the continuation of our Correſpondence with Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, which will inform your Honour, &c. of his motives for refuſing to quit the encampment at *Corode*; and having conſidered with the moſt deliberate attention what conduct we ſhould obſerve on the occaſion, the following moſt forcible reaſons occurred to us, to induce us to permit of our Troops remaining for the preſent in the encampment they now occupy:

That we hourly expected to receive full and preciſe Orders from your Honour, &c. in anſwer to the Repreſentations made you by Mr. *Tayler*, and we could foreſee no bad conſequences from our Troops remaining in their preſent ſituation until that time, whereas many might be apprehended from their precipitately quitting *Ragoba:*

That the moſt probable conſequence of their taking this ſtep appears to be, that his adherents diſcouraged by your deſerting him, would likewiſe inſtantly forſake him, and the ſeveral Officers who before were inclined to embrace his cauſe, would give up all thoughts of ſupporting him, which would not only make his ſituation deſperate and irretrievable, but alſo have a very bad effect on Colonel *Upton's* Negociation, by encouraging the *Poonah* Government to demand terms very different from thoſe we are clearly of opinion they may now be induced to agree to, as they will certainly either raiſe or lower their demands according to *Ragoba's* ſituation, and this your Honour, &c. ſeem to be aware of, by your Inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*.

That on the other hand, ſhould *Ragoba*, notwithſtanding the ſeparation of our Forces, be ſtill able to keep his Army together, and his friends remain firm to his intereſt, the Honourable Company would loſe all their influence with him, and the Maratta Armies no longer awed by the preſence of the Britiſh Troops, would very probably again commence hoſtilities, whereby your Honour, &c. hopes of effecting a general pacification, would be entirely defeated:

That *Corode*, though not actually the Company's Pergunnah, belonged to our Ally the Nabob of *Surat*, and our Troops would be there equally ready to embark for the Preſidency, or be diſpoſed of as might be neceſſary in conſequence of your Orders, as if they had been at *Chicoly*; and being ſituated on the banks of the River *Tappey*, the Army having the Country open to them, would be plentifully ſupplied with water and proviſions, and the Company's Territories be preſerved from the devaſtations always committed by Maratta Armies.

For the above reaſons we conceived the good of the Service abſolutely required our permitting the Company's Troops to remain with *Ragoba* in their preſent encampment, until we receive the expected letters from your Honour, &c., and we flatter ourſelves you will approve our determination.

Ragoba alſo warmly ſolicited us to permit our Forces to accompany his Army into the Candeiſh Country, to levy contributions; but though we are ſenſible he muſt be much in want of money, no proviſion having been yet made for his ſupport during the adjuſtment of the Treaty, we did not think ourſelves authorized to take ſuch a ſtep, and acquainted him, it was totally out of our power to comply with his requeſt.

From the beſt intelligence we can procure of the ſituation of the Miniſterial Army, we learn, that on the 14th inſtant *Hurry Punt Furkia*, with 13 or 14,000 horſe and foot, five cannon, and three ſwivels mounted on hackeries, with a large buzar, were encamped near the Village *Conquelia*, on the banks of the River *Gojem*, 15 coſs from the Paſs of *Candibana*. [illegible] *Kaſta*, and his Brother *Gopal Raſta*, with about [illegible] horſe, and three pieces of cannon, were encamped at *Sacree*, 10 coſs from the ſaid Paſs; and *Dabaje* [illegible]

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balbar, with about 12 or 1,400 horſe, and two elephants, were at *Boundigom*, one coſs from the Paſs. That the troops ſhewed little ſigns of ſpirits, and kept exceeding watchful guards, ſo that it was with infinite difficulty the Halcarrahs could enter the different camps, even in the diſguiſe of graſs-cutters; and Colonel *Keating*'s letters mentioned, that they were buſily employed in ſinking ſhafts in the paſs, to prevent the paſſage of ſtores or cannon.

The Miniſterial Party have not made any overtures to us for an accommodation, ſince thoſe mentioned in our Letter dated the 23d Auguſt; nor had we any reaſon to expect they would, as your Honour, &c. have ſignified to them your intention of deputing Colonel *Upton* to treat with them at *Poonah*; and the ſeveral acts of hoſtility committed by their Troops, as mentioned in Colonel *Keating*'s letters, give us great reaſon to ſuſpect the ſincerity of their intentions.

The many overtures and offers of aſſiſtance made to *Ragoba* by *Madajee Scindia*, and other moſt conſiderable men of the Confederacy, and the differences ſubſiſting between the Chiefs of that party, have cauſed ſo great an alteration in the poſture of affairs in favour of *Ragoba*, that we beg leave to ſubmit it to you as our deliberate opinion, that a Treaty with him would be more advantageous to the Company, promiſes more ſtability and permanancy, and is more likely to enſure the general Peace of *India*, than one with the Miniſters. The reaſons on which we ground this opinion, are fully ſtated in a letter we have diſpatched to Colonel *Upton*, thinking it very neceſſary he ſhould be apprized of the true ſituation of *Ragoba*'s affairs before he commenced his Negociation. And in this letter, a copy of which is incloſed, we have freely offered our ſentiments to the Colonel; but as he may not, perhaps, think himſelf at liberty to adopt them, we requeſt, if your Honour, &c. coincide with us in opinion, you will ſend him directions accordingly. We have not yet heard from him, but within theſe few days have received certain intelligence of his having been at *Brampore*, on the road to *Poonah*.

The ceſſions of Territory made by *Ragoba* appear to us objects of ſuch importance to the Company, that we are greatly alarmed at your intentions of relinquiſhing them. The Company's right to them is indiſputable, as being derived from valid grants made by the lawful Sovereign of the ceded Countries; and we are convinced that if Colonel *Upton* ſhews a determination not to part with them, it will be no obſtacle to the concluſion of a general Peace, whichever Party he may treat with. The compact and convenient ſituation of the ſeveral Pergunnahs, with reſpect to our Settlements of *Surat* and *Broach*, will enable us to collect the Revenues with little expence; and a very ſmall addition to the garriſons at thoſe places, will be quite ſufficient for their defence. The Revenues will defray the expences, and provide the Inveſtments of this Preſidency; the Company will poſſeſs many valuable Articles of Commerce within their own Territories, and be able greatly to extend the ſale of Woollens and other ſtaples of *Great Britain*. We have been ſome time in peaceable poſſeſſion of all the ceded Territories (except *Baſſein*) the Revenues are collecting without any difficulty, and the Marattas already conſider them as diſmembered from their Empire. Your Honour, &c. muſt before this time be ſo well informed on the ſubject, that it is unneceſſary for us to add more; but we hope ſoon to be able to ſend you an accurate account of their Revenues, and a correct chart. Colonel *Keating* has ſucceeded in obtaining a grant from *Futty Sing* of *Batta*, the Village mentioned in our Addreſs dated the 17th ultimo; and there being four Villages called the *Autgoms*, ſituated in the very centre of the *Broach* Pergunnah, which formerly compoſed a part of it, until they were wreſted from the Moguls by the *Guicawars*, about forty years ago, we conceived that our Sunnud for the Town and Pergunnah, entitled us likewiſe to theſe Villages, or at any rate that it was improper they ſhould be poſſeſſed by any other Power, as they might prove a conſtant ſource of diſputes. We therefore inſtructed Colonel *Keating* to ſtate our pretenſions to them to *Futty Sing*, and to obtain a Sunnud for them, and likewiſe if poſſible for the remaining eight *Autgoms* (there being twelve in all) which border cloſe upon the Pergunnah, and would be a very convenient addition to the Company's Territory. We do not know the amount of the Revenues produced by the *Autgoms*, but we believe it is not very conſiderable.

Colonel *Keating*'s letters contain all the information we poſſeſs reſpecting *Govind Row* and *Futty Sing*; and we have the pleaſure to obſerve, that the diſpute between them is nearly compromiſed, which will be a circumſtance very favorable to *Ragoba*.

We have the Honour, &c.

(Signed) *William Hornby*, *D. Draper*,
J. Moſtyn, *B. Fletcher*,
Bombay Caſtle, *Robert Gardin*, *W. Aſhburner*,
29th December, 1775. *Andrew Ramſay*.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Ragonath Row*, *Bajee Row*, *Pundit Pradan*, to the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Bombay*, dated the 28th November, and received 4th December, 1775.

After Compliments:

Your Honour having ſent Mr. *Tayler* to *Calcutta* this long while ago, I thought that an anſwer would ſoon be received from him: I marched further to receive his anſwer on the way. With this intention I marched from *Nurmada*, and encamped at *Codadah* upon the *Tappee*; but your order is not come as yet. Colonel *Keating* deſired me much on my arrival here, to march, and to go to *Chickley*; but our marching thither will tend to my diſadvantage, as all the Officers and Miniſters who have ſent their propoſals to me (by your Honour's help) promiſing to come and join me, will become hopeleſs; and my Army will, on my going to *Chickly*, ſtarve there; the Country will be ruined, and I ſhall be diſtreſſed for money for my expences. I did, for theſe reaſons, very much deſire Colonel *Keating* to remain at this place; but he refuſes to do ſo without your Honour's Order. There is no danger in complying with my Propoſal, which will not infringe the ceſſation; and I can get money by levying contributions; and it will be much to my advantage to remain near the Paſs of the Gaut, as far as *Bhondgam*, becauſe ſeveral Officers intend coming to me there from the Gaut: but Colonel *Keating* will not do this without your order. I have therefore wrote your Honour this letter, hoping you will ſend him an Order to do any buſineſs (agreeable to maydeſire) that may be for my advantage, and ſuch as can be done without fighting; as alſo to go near the Gaut to prevent the Army (which intend coming to join me on my reaching there) from deſpairing. Your Honour will pleaſe to ſend this Order directly; and as you have taken my buſineſs upon you, you ſhould conſider, that if I return back, what the people will ſay; whether the Officers who have promiſed to come and join me, will or not be hopeleſs? and whether it will or not be difficult to perſuade them to join me again? My enemies are, by your help, entirely broke. On our going as far as *Bhondgam*, the buſineſs will be done without fighting. As you have taken all the burthen of my buſineſs upon you, you ought to act for its advantage. Your Honour will give general orders to your Commanding Officer here, to continue doing ſuch buſineſs as can be done through threatening; as alſo to go to *Caundas*, and as far as *Bhondgam*, near the Country of *Guzerat*, where the Paſs of the Gaut is called *Barey*. Should my army as well as yours be ready there, the revolters will come hopeleſs, not join together, and ſubmit to me; but if we ſhall remain into our Mahall of *Chickly*, they will think that a diſpute has aroſe between our friendſhip,

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by which they will be animated to join together; our marching further is therefore very convenient; the buſineſs is for moſt part done. If the Engliſh Army will march with my Forces to the Gaut, even without fighting, the revolters will be ſeparated through fear, and never be able to ſtand to fight. What I thought I have mentioned to your Honour, and I will act agreeable to your ſentiments. As our going to *Chickly* will hurt our purpoſe, I have therefore taken the liberty to write you all the particulars. Pleaſe to ſend me an anſwer, as alſo one to Colonel *Keating*.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secr.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

On the 11th September laſt, being informed by the Miniſterial Agents at this place, that you were ſhortly expected to arrive at *Poonah*, we diſpatched letters to you by four different routes, one of which at leaſt we ſuppoſe muſt have reached you; and having lately received certain intelligence of your being advanced as far as *Brampore*, we wait with the utmoſt impatience to receive your anſwer to that letter, as we much wiſh to communicate many matters of great importance to this Preſidency, before you bring your Negociation to any concluſion; and for that purpoſe are ready, as we therein acquainted you, either to depute a Gentleman fully inſtructed to confer with you at *Poonah*, or to convey our information by letter, whenever you ſignified to us which method you prefer.

But as your being apprized of the true ſituaton of *Ragoba*'s Affairs before you commence your Negociations, may be of the utmoſt importance, we diſpatch this expreſs, to convey to you the moſt authentic intelligence we poſſeſs reſpecting him; and, in order to give you the more perfect idea of his ſituation, ſhall begin our detail from the time we received the Governor General and Council's prohibition for carrying on the War, and Advice of their having deputed you to treat with the Miniſters for a general Pacification.

Ragoba's Army and our Troops were then cantoned during the rainy ſeaſon at *Duboy*, a place about twenty coſs from *Brodera*, after having carried on a very ſucceſsful campaign againſt the Miniſterial Army, whoſe Forces were ſo broken and diſpirited by repeated defeats, that we are perſuaded their Chiefs would have found the utmoſt difficulty in bringing them again to act againſt us. *Ragoba* likewiſe had lately detached *Futty Sing* from the Miniſterial Party, and concluded a Treaty with him, by which he not only gained a powerful Ally, but ſtipulated for a Subſidy of twenty lacks of rupees; a conſiderable part of which was paid before the receipt of the above-mentioned Letter from the Governor General and Council; and by this reaſonable recruit to his finances, he would have been enabled to have taken the Field the enſuing campaign with great advantage.

Upon receipt of the Governor General and Council's Orders for recalling the Company's Troops into our own garriſons, we gave the neceſſary directions for their marching from *Duboy*, into the Pergunnahs adjacent to *Surat* or *Broach*, whenever the ſeaſon would permit: and at the ſame time adviſed *Ragoba* to accompany and remain with them, with ſuch part of his Forces as he could maintain, until we received an anſwer from the Governor General and Council, to the repreſentations we had deputed Mr. *Tayler*, a Member of our Board, to make to them; for we were ſenſible, had we abruptly withdrawn our Forces from him, his adherents, alarmed and diſcouraged by our deſertion, would have inſtantly forſaken him, and his deſtruction become immediate and inevitable, which would have greatly embarraſſed you in your Negociation, as the Miniſters, relieved from all apprehenſions of *Ragoba*, would have demanded Conditions very different from what we are clearly of opinion they may now be eaſily brought to, ſhould you think it expedient to treat with them.

The event has juſtified our conjectures of the good effects that would attend the appearance only of our Forces continuing in concert with *Ragoba*, during the march from *Duboy* towards *Surat*, he received repeated overtures from many of the Miniſterial Chiefs, who were ready to return to their Allegiance to him. Under the 16th October, Colonel *Keating*, the Commander of our Forces with *Ragoba*, writes us that *Moriba Dada Barjaba*, *Chinto Vittul*, *Ramchundra Gunnis*, and *Mallarjee Gorparah*, all principal men and officers in the Confederacy, and then in the Neighbourhood of *Poonah*, had entered into an aſſociation to ſupport *Ragoba*'s cauſe, which they had ſignified to him, with ſtrong aſſurances of joining him with 25,000 good horſe. *Bejee Sing*, Rajah of the *Marwand* Country, likewiſe ſent a Vackeel to the Peiſhwa on the 28th October, with the warmeſt aſſurances of Friendſhip, and offers of immediately joining him with 10,000 men, then encamped within forty-five coſs from *Ahmedavad*.

Every day almoſt brings favourable accounts to *Ragoba*: differences are continually ariſing amongſt the Chiefs of the Miniſterial Party, and moſt of the principal men in the Maratta Empire, are ready to acknowledge him as Peiſhwa; *Madajee Sindea* has ſent to inform him, that if the Engliſh continue with him, he will immediately join him with a large body of Forces; and if they ſhould abandon him, he then requeſted the Peiſhwa would retire with his Army to *Ugeen*, where they would concert the neceſſary meaſures for the good of his cauſe. *Appajee Madeu*, one of *Ragoba*'s adherents, who had been at *Ugeen*, to negociate with *Mhadjee Scindy*, returned to camp about ten days ago, with a body of two thouſand horſe. The beginning of this month, two Vackeels arrived with *Ragoba*, from *Marabah Furnees*, *Butcheba Proonder*, *Shajee Bonſlo*, *Darah Scinta*, *Apparaw Pattanher*, *Mallarjee Goſparah*, *Veſſejee Punt Benewallah*, *Chintoo Vittule*, *Wittol Sewdew*, and *Ragopunt Row*, men who formerly were attached to the miniſterial intereſt, and who had empowered theſe Vackeels to aſſure *Ragoba* of their determinations to join him with 15,000 good Troops, provided the Engliſh ſupported him.

The Engliſh and Peiſhwa Armies are now encamped at *Carode*, on the ſouthern banks of the River *Tappey*, about fifteen coſs from *Surat*, where we propoſe they ſhall remain, until we receive final orders from the Governor General and Council; or your Negociation is brought to ſome concluſion, for which we have ſtated our reaſons very fully to them.

We think it neceſſary to mention to you, that notwithſtanding the agreement for the Ceſſation of Arms, which has been religiouſly obſerved both on our part and *Ragoba*'s, the Miniſterialiſts have violated it in ſeveral inſtances; veſſels with Engliſh Paſſes and Colours, are daily inſulted by their gallivats, who have even taken three or four of our Merchant Veſſels, and they make no ſcruple of firing from their batteries at *Baſſein*, on our boats in *Salſette* River. They take every method in their power of diſtreſſing this Settlement, by prohibiting all ſupplies of grain, timber, and proviſions, and *Ragoba* has lately complained of their having actually committed hoſtilities againſt two of his partizans, *Mahomed Eſoof* and *Chimman Row*. The firſt they attacked in the *Malwey* Country, totally diſperſed the Forces he commanded, and have ſince cut him off; and *Chimman Row* has given the following account to Colonel *Keating* of the attack made upon him:—

"That he was attacked with about 15,000 men, near
"the Paſs of *Candabarow*, and, knowing of the
"ſation, he was not apprehenſive of any
"contrary to every expectation, he was attac
"night of the 20th October, by about
"communi

" commanded by *Anant Row Reſta*, who had forced a " march of 25 coſs for that purpoſe; and in this action " he had near 500 men killed and wounded, many " taken priſoners, and loſt all his baggage." On the 15th inſtant a body of about 800 horſe, detached by *Hurry Punt Furkia*, again attempted to ſurprize *Chimman Row*, but being timely apprized of their intentions, he retreated to *Sungur*, with very little loſs. Colonel *Keating* likewiſe adviſes, that the Billdars belonging to the miniſterial army are employed in ſinking ſhafts in different parts of the *Candibarra* Paſs, to prevent cannon, carts, &c. from paſſing.

In theſe critical circumſtances, your arrival at *Poonah*, being ſo long protracted, keeps us in a ſtate of the moſt anxious and diſagreeable ſuſpence, and gives the miniſterial party every advantage they could wiſh for, collecting and recruiting their diſperſed and broken Army, and ſhaking the reſolution of thoſe who are inclined to embrace *Ragoba*'s cauſe. We have ventured to defer ſeparating our Forces from *Ragoba* before your Negociation was ſet on foot, being convinced that ſtep would have given ſuch a turn to Affairs, as to render all your efforts ineffectual to bring the Miniſters to any reaſonable terms of accommodation; but we now flatter ourſelves, that from the preſent favourable ſituation of affairs, you will find no difficulty in ſecuring for the Honourable Company, all the advantages ſtipulated for them in our Treaty with *Ragoba*, and ſuch conditions for him as may be perfectly ſatisfactory, ſhould you not think it more eligible to treat with him, inſtead of the miniſterial party; for we do not heſitate in giving our opinion, that a Treaty with him would in every reſpect be moſt advantageous for the Company, not only as it promiſes more ſtability and permanency, and would more effectually ſecure the general tranquillity of *India*; but even ſuppoſing the Infant the Miniſters have ſet up, to be really the Son of *Narron Row*, which we can by no means allow; yet *Ragoba* is in that caſe entitled to the office of Duan, or Regent, during the minority, and therefore the proper perſon to treat with; and there is little room to doubt, but the Miniſters would acquieſce, when they found that you ſupported him; whereas, ſhould *Ragoba* not be ſatisfied with the ſtipulations you may make for him, there is every reaſon to apprehend, that from his numerous adherents, and former conſequence in the Maratta State, he will be conſtantly raiſing diſturbances, and forming intrigues with every Power from whom he can expect any ſupport, which in their conſequences may materially affect the Company's Poſſeſſions.

During this long ceſſation of hoſtilities *Ragoba* has found the utmoſt difficulty in raiſing money to ſupply the exigencies of his Army, no proviſion whatever having been made for his ſupport during the diſcuſſion of the Treaty; and his enemies being in poſſeſſion of *Poonah* and the Circar treaſures, deprives him of all reſources: we therefore earneſtly recommend to you, to inſiſt upon it as a preliminary point, that the Miniſters immediately aſſign him a ſuitable Revenue, which we think at leaſt ſhould be ſeven or eight lacks of rupees per month.

When we receive your anſwer to our letter, dated the 11th September, we ſhall immediately take the neceſſary meaſures for informing you of what we have to offer regarding the intereſts of this Preſidency; and the Advices we have received from *Bengal*, ſince your appointment.

Bombay Caſtle, We are, &c.
29th December 1775. A true Copy.
(Signed) *Edward Ravenſcroft*, Secr'.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Council of *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I take the immediate opportunity of my arrival at this place, of acknowledging the receipt of your Letter of the 11th September, which came ſafe to hand yeſterday. I alſo forwarded a letter which I brought with me from the Governor-General and Council of *Fort William*.

As you requeſt, you may depend upon my not taking any material ſtep in the buſineſs on which I am deputed relative to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, till I am honoured with another letter from your Board, which I am convinced will give me every information I can deſire. Should it hereafter appear neceſſary, I ſhall gladly embrace your kind offer, of a Gentleman's being deputed to *Poonah*, but I ſhould rather wiſh this buſineſs ſhould be done by letter.

As you mention being already informed of the particulars in my Inſtructions that relate to your Preſidency, the repeating them now will be quite unneceſſary.

I have in my poſſeſſion the Company's ſmall Cypher, but there is not the leaſt reaſon to fear an Interruption of any of our letters, as the people here are fully ſatisfied of the neceſſity of my correſponding with your Preſidency, and have given the moſt poſitive orders that our Cauſſits may paſs every where uninterrupted. The ſubject of the letters will, however, determine the manner in which you may chuſe to write.

Poonah Dhur, I have the Honour, &c.
30th December 1775. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

A true Copy,
(Signed) *Edward Ravenſcroft*, Secretary.

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APPENDIX, No. 102.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 6th March 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor-General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

RECEIVED the following Letter from Colonel *Upton*:

Gentlemen,

I take the earlieſt opportunity of acquainting you of what I conceive is the diſpoſition of theſe People regarding the terms of accommodation. The letters they received from *Calcutta* before my arrival, had perſuaded them fully, that I was deputed to treat with them on equal terms, without making any demands whatever: however, at a few meetings I made them ſenſible that they had underſtood theſe letters too literally.

A delay to our buſineſs of ſome days was occaſioned by a death in the family of *Sicca Ram Baboo*, and a marriage in *Ballojee Pundit*'s. The neceſſary information from *Bombay* (to which Correſpondence they readily aſſented) occaſioned a further delay. We were yet ſomewhat getting on with the buſineſs preliminary to the grand Articles of the Treaty, and I had every reaſon to expect that a Peace, both honourable and advantageous for the Company, would take place; but I am now fully convinced they will never agree to our keeping *Salſette*, or to ſurrender *Baſſein*. On theſe Iſlands, they ſay, they have expended many crore of rupees, particularly on *Baſſein*, which they appear determined at all events to keep, and indeed they declare againſt parting with *Salſette* and the four ſmall Iſlands in the Bay, and that they will never grant the Sunnuds for ſuch of them as we have already ſo unfairly taken from them, and will render *Salſette* in a great meaſure uſeleſs to us, by prohibiting all connection with it from the Continent. Theſe have been their Reſolutions at our two or three laſt meetings, and I conceived it owing to their imagining that I muſt treat with them at any rate, and that I had vaſtly exceeded my Inſtructions, by aſking a ſurrender of theſe Iſlands. They aſk me a thouſand

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times, why we make ſuch profeſſions of honour? how diſapprove the War entered into by the *Bombay* Government, when we are ſo deſirous of availing ourſelves of the advantages of it?

They ſay the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta* have deputed me to negociate with them on terms honourable to both nations; yet all advantage and honour is confined to ourſelves.

In ſhort, I find *Salſette* and *Baſſein* are the only impediments to a Treaty's taking place that might otherwiſe be very advantageous; for I am fully convinced that they would readily cede to us ſome Country in the neighbourhood of *Broach* or *Surat* in lieu of them; alſo cede to us their ſhare of collections in the *Broach* Pergunnah, defray the expences of the War, and give up all demands on the Chout in every part of the Company's Poſſeſſions, and all future right and title to ſuch claim.

When my Inſtructions were made out, it was thought we had got *Baſſein*, and I was therein ordered on no account to give it up. But as the Company are not in poſſeſſion of this Iſland, the ſtipulations regarding it muſt take a different turn. I think if they allow the Company to ſettle and maintain a Factory, with certain Privileges in Trade, on *Baſſein*, and totally exclude all foreigners, and give ſome Country near our ſettlements of *Broach* or *Surat* in lieu of it, it would be quite as advantageous, and poſſibly may be effected; and to this purpoſe all my endeavours will be uſed.

I ſhall inſiſt on the Company's keeping poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, agreeable to the orders in my Inſtructions, and of their giving up the four ſmall Iſlands mentioned therein, ſituated in the Bay of *Bombay*. If theſe terms are refuſed, the Treaty muſt of courſe be broke off for the preſent, or perhaps altogether, for they intimate they will wait no further references to *Calcutta*, but again commence hoſtilities within a few days, as the letters they have already received from thence have ſo much miſled them.

I ſee in the *Bombay* Correſpondence an order for that Government to keep poſſeſſion of the ceſſions made in the Guzerat Country. I have had repeated converſations on that ſubject with the Miniſters, who declare that no one in the Country can have any right to give grants of any part thereof; that *Futty Sing* is not the Proprietor of the Country, but was appointed the Sirdar of it on terms ſimilar to all other Sirdarries. They muſt ſay that moſt of the conceſſions have been made ſince the ceſſation of Arms has taken place; that *Futty Sing* adviſed them repeatedly that he ſhould be obliged to comply with the demands of the Engliſh, and *Ragonaut Row*, if he was not aſſiſted with more Troops. This they would not comply with, as they had determined ſtrictly to adhere to their obligation of preventing all hoſtilities, and were aſſured that any places taken or ceded during the ceſſation of Arms would be reſtored.

We therefore have agreed to leave the Guzerat Country quite undetermined on, till your farther pleaſure ſhall be known. I ſhall take the firſt opportunity of forwarding to you the Names of the places ceded in that Country, by whom, and at what time. The Miniſtry are ſatisfied, that if they prove what they aſſert reſpecting it, you will make no demands therein further than what they themſelves may grant in the Treaty.

Should the Treaty be now concluded, a ſeparate Article muſt be kept open for this Buſineſs.

I had the honour to write to you, Gentlemen, on the 5th of laſt Month; I hope my letter has been received. I ſend this by way of *Maſulipatam*, in expectation of its getting ſooner to *Calcutta* than by the other route. In a day or two, as ſoon as I am further informed of the intention of theſe people, I ſhall write again by way of *Benares*, and ſend a duplicate of my letter of the 5th ultimo.

Theſe people, I imagine, are by no means in the deplorable ſituation that had been thought; they have a very numerous Army, and no want of money; they have engaged in an Alliance with the Nizam, who has lately marched a body of twenty-four thouſand Troops, and thirty-five guns, to join *Hurry Punt Tuckia*; by this time the junction muſt be effected, though I imagine the Nizam's Troops will not be eaſily brought into action. The Commandant of theſe Troops, Nabob *Fazil Beg Cawn Dhowſa*, ſent to me to know if our Treaty was likely to take place with the Miniſters, and many queſtions, all of which tended to guide their actions; ſo that they might ſave appearances, yet not be led into the Field againſt the Engliſh. I may miſtake in my conjecture, but I have every reaſon to ſuppoſe not.

If we cannot agree upon Terms of Accommodation, and hoſtilities again commence, I ſhall go to *Bombay*, and wait your Orders either to return immediately to *Bengal*, or execute what further Inſtructions you may have to give.

Poonah Dhur, 2d February 1776.

I have, &c.
(Signed) *J. Upton.*

P. S. They will agree to allow to *Ragonaut Row* a houſhold, conſiſting of one thouſand horſe, to be under his direction, and obey all his legal Orders, two hundred domeſtics to be named by himſelf, and twenty five thouſand rupees a month. He is to live at his former reſidence on the *Ganga*, or name where he rather chuſes to reſide.

I incloſe an account given by the Miniſtry of the Succeſſion of the Guicawars Family to the command in *Guzerat*.

Eſtabliſhment, &c. of the Guicawars, in the Command, &c. of the Guzerat Country.

Fermuck Row Dobarry being a Chief of high rank, under the *Sabou Raja*, he beſtowed on him the *Guzerat* Country; but ſome commotions ariſing between him and *Bajerow* the Peiſhwa, a battle enſued, in which *Fermuck Row* was killed, and his Army diſperſed; he had a Son or two, who made their eſcape, and took refuge with the Moguls.

Damajee Guicawar, who was the principal Chief under *Fermuckrow*, and managed the Guzerat Country in his life-time, promiſed a proper ſubmiſſion to the Peiſhwa immediately after his Maſter's death, which was accepted of, but commenced a rebellion ſoon after againſt *Tara Boi*, Mother to the *Ram Raja*. The Peiſhwa marched againſt him with an Army, and gained a complete victory, and made *Damajee* himſelf priſoner. He had been but a few days in confinement, when he found means to ſooth the Peiſhwa, and prevail upon him to accept of his ſervices, producing a proper ſecurity for his future good behaviour, and paying down fifteen lacks of rupees. The Peiſhwa gave him a grant of half *Guzerat*, on a promiſe of being his vaſſal, paying ſix lacks of rupees a year, and having ten thouſand horſe always ready for his ſervice. *Damajee* died ſome years after. He left three Sons he had by two Wives. *Govinrow* was the Son of the firſt Wife, but younger by ſome years than *Syajee* and *Futty Sing*, who were the Sons of the ſecond Wife. They began to diſpute who ſhould ſucceed the Father in the Chiefſhip, and not being able to ſettle amongſt themſelves, they repaired to *Poonah*, and laid their claims before *Madarow*, then Peiſhwa. He ordered their Law Books to be examined; by which it appeared that the firſt-born (whether of the firſt or ſecond Wife) was to ſucceed to the Father's rank and fortune. *Syajee* was the eldeſt Brother, but being blind, the Sunnuds for half *Guzerat* were given to *Futty Sing*, the next Heir, for which he paid ſeventy lacks immediately, and promiſed obedience to the Peiſhaw.

Govinrow, who had been in expectation of obtaining theſe Sunnuds, remained at *Poonah*, and refuſed a jaghire of ſix lacks a year offered him by *Madarow*.

After the death of *Narrain Row*, *Govinrow* applied to *Raghoba*

Ragoba, for the Chiefſhip of *Guzerat*, which he gave him on receiving twenty-two lacks of rupees.

Govinrow immediately commenced a War againſt his Brother.

After *Ragonaut Row* was ſupported by the Engliſh, he marched towards *Guzerat*, where he was joined by *Govindrow*, and *Futty Sing* with his Forces joined the Miniſterial Army, and continued with them, till in conſequence of the *Calcutta* Letters a Ceſſation of Arms took place, *Futty Sing* returned to his own Country. *Ragoba* and the Engliſh attacked *Futty Sing*. He immediately wrote to *Poonah* for Aſſiſtance, but the Miniſters having ſtopped all acts of hoſtilities in obedience to the *Calcutta* Letters, refuſed to ſend any reinforcement to *Futty Sing*; who being unable to repel the Force of his Enemies, found himſelf under the diſagreeable neceſſity of coming to ſuch terms as they thought proper to demand, particularly with the Engliſh, who engaged to prevent his Country being diſturbed either by *Govinrow* or *Ragoba*.

Govinrow ſeeing this Treaty ſettled with his Brother, had no further hopes, therefore quitted *Ragoba*, and marched acroſs the River *Mahie*, where he eſtabliſhed his own authority, and on this ſide of the *Mahie*, *Futty Sing*'s Country is ſtill diſturbed by *Ragonaut Row*.

N. B. The Guicawars were ſervants of *Debarry*; *Debarry* a ſervant to the Raja; and all the Chiefs under the Rajaſhip have for a long period been ſubordinate to the Peiſhwa, and renewable by his Sunnuds. *Eſwant Row*, the Son of *Debarry*, died amongſt the Moguls, and left behind him one Son, who arrived at *Poonah* three years ago, and applied to the Peiſhwa for his Country, and we are now about giving him part of it.

APPENDIX, No. 103.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 6th March 1776.

READ a Letter from Mr. *Tayler*, as follows:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In a Diſpatch from the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, there are forwarded to me Copies of their ſeveral Addreſſes to you of the 4th, 14th, and 31ſt October, 17th November, and 29th December, and one to Colonel *Upton*, dated the 29th December, which I believe has likewiſe been incloſed in a packet to you.

I beg leave to remark to you, Gentlemen, that theſe Advices confirm the truth of the intelligence I had the honour to communicate to you in my Addreſs of the 29th November laſt, with the additional circumſtance of the Overtures of *Mhadajee Scindea*, and of Brahmin Miniſters, and Rajapute Chiefs. On a ſettlement being made, it ſeems probable that the latter will be demanding either large ſums or a grant of territory in reward for their ſervices; both of which the Miniſters will be equally averſe to grant. It is well known, theſe have already been ſo backward in the performance of their engagements to the Army, that at the time they were in arms againſt the Peiſhwa, great diſſentions prevailed among them. Their leader, *Sacram Bapoo*, whoſe influence and abilities render him the great ſupport of their cauſe, is already advanced in years, and very infirm, and his death it is thought would diſſolve the Confederacy. In either of the above cauſes operating I can foreſee no other conſequences but the Reſtoration of *Ragoba*.

Should you utterly abandon his intereſts, there ſeems to me a great probability of this event taking place, in deſpite of the efforts of the Miniſterialiſts. One great reaſon why he prefers a reſtoration by means of the Company is, becauſe it will be effected by a much ſmaller ſacrifice of his influence and dominions. He well knows that the demands of thoſe who offer their aid would be very exorbitant; but abandoned by you, he will have no other reſource than to ſubmit to theſe demands. You have already been apprized of thoſe who are now in his party; and I am informed that *Holkar* has offered his aſſiſtance on certain conditions. I leave you to judge, Gentlemen, whether it is probable that the Miniſters will be able to cope with the united Force of thoſe he will then have in his party.

Should he effect his Reſtoration, I muſt again repeat, That there ſeems little probability of the Company's quietly retaining the Ceſſions of the Miniſters; at any rate, his efforts will occaſion a ſcene of confuſion in the Maratta Dominions, very deſtructive in the Commerce of the Company and of this Country, which have already ſuffered very conſiderable by it.

Such is the light in which I view the preſent ſtate of affairs, and future proſpects; conſidering therefore the obligations of the Engliſh Nation to him by Treaty, the fairneſs of his conduct hitherto, the juſtice of his propoſals to us, and the general face of things as they appear by the Advices from *Bombay*, together with the idea that muſt be entertained by all the Country Powers of the breach of our engagements with *Ragoba*, I truſt you will deem it equally conſiſtent with equity and ſound policy, at leaſt to adopt ſome plan of accommodation ſatisfactory to him, and immediately inſtruct Colonel *Upton* accordingly, as it may not yet be too late for advices to him to prove effectual.

But whatever may be your determination on this point, I doubt not, Gentlemen, you will agree with me in my opinion, that in the preſent ſtate of affairs it ſeems hardly probable the Confederates will heſitate complying with all the Conditions ſtipulated for, in the Treaty with *Ragoba*, if circumſtances are well availed of. I have already been too explicit on the utility of the ſeveral Ceſſions to the Honourable Company for you not to perceive the importance of them; and I therefore earneſtly conjure you to inſiſt alſo on whomſoever you may treat with confirming and guaranteeing all the Ceſſions made with *Ragoba* and the Guicawars.

Should your Informations, by the Advices of Colonel *Upton*, differ from thoſe tranſmitted by the Government of *Bombay*, I beg leave to obſerve, that he dates from the Fort of *Pronder*, where he is ſurrounded by the Miniſters and their creatures, whoſe intereſt it is to miſinform him with reſpect to their own ſtrength and importance, and to ſecrete from him every circumſtance favourable to *Ragoba* and his Partizans. Their patience, ſkill, and diſſimulation, in conducting political Negociations, are very well known in *India*. It is almoſt uſeleſs to inſiſt on the different credibility that is due to informations collected under thoſe diſadvantages, and thoſe communicated by Gentlemen, in whoſe honour you have a ſecurity from intentional deceit, and whoſe caution is warranted by the dangers they incur, ſhould their ill-grounded intelligence miſlead you into meaſures that might not otherwiſe be deemed expedient.

I have, &c.

5th March 1776.

(Signed) *W. Tayler.*

APPENDIX, No. 104.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 6th March 1776.

GOVERNOR GENERAL—I have waited to hear whether any propoſal upon the ſubject of the Letters now before the Board, ſhould be made by any of the Members who have hitherto had the chief guidance in the meaſures which have been adopted reſpecting the tranſactions of the Government of *Bombay* with the Marattas, for the purpoſe of preſerving a conſiſtency in the Reſolutions of the Board. I have thought it my duty rather to follow than take the lead in this buſineſs in which I may be obviouſly led to follow my original ideas, as every other Member will be as obviouſly inclined to ſuch meaſures as ſhall be conſonant to thoſe to which they

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have already given their aſſent. But as no propoſition has been yet made by any other Gentlemen, and as the Letter from Colonel *Upton* requires a ſpeedy and deciſive anſwer, I ſhall offer my ſentiments upon it, leaving it to the Board to adopt them, if they ſhall find them to correſpond with their own, as much time has already been conſumed in Colonel *Upton*'s Negociation; and we cannot, were we inclined to it, expect that we ſhall be able to protract the concluſion of it ſo long as to admit repeated References from him to this Board, and repeated Inſtructions in return. I am of opinion that whatever Orders are now ſent to him in reply to his letter before us, they ſhould be peremptory and concluſive; that he ſhould be directed to bring the buſineſs of his Negociation to an iſſue, either by an immediate concluſion of the Treaty, or by demanding his diſmiſſion, and retiring to *Bombay*: there he may ſtill remain and wait the Orders of the Board for his future proceeding; but as ſuch an event muſt be certainly followed by the renewal of hoſtilities with that party of the Maratta State with which we are now in treaty, it will next remain to be conſidered, what proviſion ſhall be made for ſuch an event. I ſee no alternative but to withdraw wholly from the War, or renew the former Treaty with *Ragoba*; the latter appears to me unavoidable in the caſe which I have ſuppoſed. In the mean time I would recommend, that Colonel *Upton* be referred to the Inſtructions which he has already received, and directed to conform literally to them. In propoſing this, I own I feel a repugnance to the laſt Order which was ſent to him reſpecting the exchange of *Broach* for *Baſſein*; but as this is a meaſure already reſolved on, I ſhall make no new objection to it; but I think it nevertheleſs my duty to ſtate one objection, which I have already intimated, from recollection only, on grounds which have ſince occurred to me of greater certainty, in the Conſultation 15th February. I expreſſed a doubt whether there was a power in this Board to give up the Poſſeſſion of *Broach*, the acquiſition of which had been confirmed by the Court of Directors. Of this I have no longer any doubt, as I think the following clauſe in the Act of Parliament clearly limits the controlling powers of this Government over the other Preſidencies, to the commencing of Hoſtilities, the declaring of War, the negociating or concluding of Treaties of Peace; but does not authorize this Government to order the Surrender or Exchange of any of the Company's Poſſeſſions dependant on the other Preſidencies, to obey ſuch orders. I beg leave to ſubjoin the words of the Act of Parliament, leaving it to the Board to draw ſuch concluſions from them as they may think neceſſary and applicable to the caſe in queſtion. "And "be it further enacted by the authority aforeſaid, That "the ſaid Governor General and Council, or the major "part of them, ſhall have, and they are hereby autho"rized to have power of ſuperintending and controlling "the Government and Management of the Preſidencies "of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen* reſpectively, ſo far "and in ſo much as that it ſhall not be lawful for any "Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Ben*"*coolen*, for the time being, to make any Orders for "commencing Hoſtilities, or declaring or making War "againſt any *Indian* Princes or Powers, or for negoci"ating or concluding any Treaty of Peace or other "Treaties, with any ſuch *Indian* Princes or Powers, with"out the conſent and approbation of the ſaid Governor "General and Council firſt had and obtained; except in "ſuch caſes of imminent neceſſity as would render it "dangerous to poſtpone ſuch Hoſtilities or Treaties until "the Orders from the Governor General and Council "might arrive, and except in ſuch Caſes where the ſaid "Preſidents and Councils reſpectively ſhall have re"ceived ſpecial Orders from the ſaid United Company: "and any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, "or *Bencoolen*, who ſhall offend in any of the caſes "aforeſaid, ſhall be liable to be ſuſpended from his o"their office, by the Order of the ſaid Governor General "and Council; and every Preſident and Council of "*Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen*, for the time being, "ſhall and they are hereby reſpectively directed and re"quired to pay due obedience to ſuch Orders as they "ſhall receive touching the premiſes, from the ſaid Go"vernor General and Council for the time being; and "conſtantly and diligently to tranſmit to the ſaid Go"vernor General and Council, Advice and Intelligence "of all tranſactions and matters whatſoever that ſhall "come to their knowledge relating to the Government, "Revenues, or Intereſt, of the ſaid United Company."

Mr. *Francis*—I cannot admit the Governor General's conſtruction of that clauſe of the Act of Parliament which he has quoted. A power to make Peace, muſt in its nature include a power to agree to the only terms on which in ſome caſes Peace can be obtained. This, or any other State, may be reduced to extremities, in which it may have no alternative but relinquiſhing a part of its Poſſeſſions or hazarding the whole. With reſpect to the buſineſs before the Board, I obſerve, that Colonel *Upton* informs us in his Letter of the 2d February, that the Miniſtry have intimated to him, that they will wait no further References to *Calcutta*, but again commence hoſtilities within a few days. From this paſſage, and from the general tenor of his letter, I conclude that one of the two events muſt have already taken place, either he has concluded a Treaty of Peace, relinquiſhing our firſt claim to *Baſſein*, but obtaining the other principal objects of his Inſtructions, or he muſt have withdrawn to *Bombay*; in either caſe, a queſtion between Peace on any terms and the Continuance of Hoſtilities, is not entirely open to the preſent deciſion of this Board; if it were, (or in order not to differ with any Member of the Board who may ſtill think it is, ſuppoſing the queſtion entire before us) I ſhould think that, whether to obtain an honourable Peace, or to conduct a War with advantage if that ſhould be unavoidable, it is indiſpenſably neceſſary that we ſhould order Colonel *Upton* to withdraw to *Bombay*. I mean always on the preſumption that the Miniſtry have given a peremptory denial to our keeping *Salſette*, or accepting of the exchange propoſed to them by our laſt letter; it ſeems to me, from the intelligence now before us, that we treat with great diſadvantage, while Colonel *Upton* is at *Poonah*; and I ſay this from a ſuſpicion that they avail themſelves of the circumſtance of having him and his party in their power; otherwiſe it is inconceivable to me, that when we offer to relinquiſh the greateſt part of the advantages ſtipulated with a Prince whoſe title to the Peiſhwaſhip, or at leaſt to the actual Government during the minority of *Mhada Row Narrain*, is in competition with theirs, they ſhould abſolutely refuſe to make us any compenſation for ſo great a ſacrifice to them, at leaſt it is ſuch, whatever we may deem it. This is my general opinion of the line which this Board ought to purſue, but as I have not yet heard the ſentiments of the other Members of the Board, and as ſo great a queſtion as Peace or War is under the deliberation of the Board, I ſhall reſerve my final vote upon this queſtion until I have the advantage of hearing the ſentiments of the other Gentlemen.

Mr. *Barwell*—Though there is not regularly any queſtion before this Board, as Mr. *Francis* has thought it neceſſary to comment ſo largely on the ſentiments expreſſed by the Governor General, it may be expected that I ſhould give my ideas upon the meaſures this Government ought to purſue on the preſent ſtate of the Company's Affairs in the weſtern ſide of *India*. This Council has been very moderate in the Propoſals made to the miniſterial party at *Poonah*, for withdrawing their Forces from the Field, and relinquiſhing the advantages which, under the ſanction of a Solemn Treaty, the Company are entitled to reap. From the letters we have received from Colonel *Upton*, it ſeems not to be left to our option to effect a Pacification, on any other terms than by ſubmitting to ſuch as may be dictated by the

Poonah Durbar. I confeſs I ſhould be concerned to ſee the Company involved in an expenſive War, but when I conſider the diſhonour that muſt ariſe to the Engliſh Arms, by appearing to yield that through fear which we have it in our power to over-rule, we ſacrifice both the intereſts of the Company, and our military reputation, by ſuch tameneſs. We offer to yield to the Maratta Government certain benefits to be derived to us by a certain mode of conduct, and conſequently have a right to expect that ſome ſmall equivalent, however inadequate it may be to our Conceſſions, ſhould be made to us, for deviating from that conduct. I will not enter into the Principles that firſt led the *Bombay* Government to adopt the cauſe of *Ragoba*, but being engaged, I judge we have a right to take advantage of the preſent ſtate of the Maratta Government, to the advantage of the Company. I do not think any part of *Broach* ſhould be yielded up in exchange for *Baſſein*, admitting that the power was unqueſtionably in this Board to cede or transfer the actual Poſſeſſions of the Company. In the preſent ſtate of Colonel *Upton*'s Negociations, I do not ſee any ſteps that this Government can take in it, further than to authorize the Government of *Bombay*, provided his Negociation does not prove ſucceſsful, to purſue ſuch meaſures for their own defence, and the ſupport of this Ally, as they may judge prudent and conſiſtent with the general intereſts of their ſettlement.

Colonel *Monſon*—The Governor General, by the Act to which he alludes, admits a power in this Government to make Peace. The means of doing it muſt therefore be inherent in it, and if it can only be effected by making ceſſions of any of our preſent Poſſeſſions, undoubtedly we have a right to yield them up. Colonel *Upton*'s letters leave no option in this Board in what manner they may continue their future Negociations; he acquaints us, that he ſhall ſtipulate certain terms for the Company on the Iſland of *Baſſein*, to the excluſion of other European Nations, but that he apprehends the *Poonah* Durbar will not be prevailed upon to allow of the ceſſion of *Baſſein* and *Salſette*, in which caſe he purpoſes to retire to *Bombay*. This event muſt have taken place before he can receive any further Inſtructions from us. If his Negociation ſhould not have taken place, on the terms mentioned in his letter, it will then be for the Board to conſider, whether they will continue the War in conjunction with *Ragoba*, or act upon the defenſive? When that becomes a queſtion, I ſhall be ready to give my ſentiments upon it.

General *Clavering*—On the deciſion of the queſtion, whether the Orders which have been already given to Colonel *Upton* ſhall be confirmed or modified? depends the final events of Peace or War with the Maratta State. Our firſt Inſtructions to him were conveyed in terms which breathed a different ſpirit from thoſe which have lately animated this Board; we directed Colonel *Upton* to aſſure the Miniſtry of *Poonah*, of the regret that we felt at the commencemeht of hoſtilities on the part of the Government of *Bombay*; that we diſavowed its Negociations with *Ragoba*, and that we wiſhed for nothing more than to unite with them in friendſhip. On the 7th September we began to change our language, and ſince that time, and ſince Mr. *Tayler*'s arrival, ſome Gentlemen have ſuggeſted, that the Honour of the Engliſh Name was more concerned in procuring and maintaining conqueſts, than in either paying a regard to the Inſtructions of the Court of Directors to preſerve the Peace in *India*, or to ſet an example of juſtice and moderation, by relinquiſhing Poſſeſſions that had been obtained by the infraction of a Treaty of Peace. Thoſe who now perſevere in thoſe meaſures, muſt be reſponſible for the conſequences of them, and ought, when they ſend their final Orders to Colonel *Upton*, to conſider on the means for carrying on the War, and inſtructing the *Bombay* Council accordingly.

Governor General—I meant not my minute as a formal queſtion for the determination of the Board; but as the ſenſe of the individual Members of the Board ſeem to have been delivered in the ſeveral Minutes which have followed mine, and as it is neceſſary that ſome anſwer ſhould be given to Colonel *Upton*, I beg leave to propoſe the following queſtion for the determination of the Board, Whether Colonel *Upton* ſhall be ordered to conclude a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, under the Inſtructions which have been already tranſmitted to him; or, in caſe of their Refuſal to accede to the Treaty, to require his Diſmiſſion, and retire to *Bombay*? Appendix, No. 105.

Mr. *Francis*—I have already given my opinion on that point.

Mr. *Barwell*—I think Colonel *Upton* ſhould be inſtructed conformably to the Queſtion.

Colonel *Monſon*—I think he ſhould, unleſs he has concluded a Treaty before he receives our laſt Inſtructions; in which caſe, if the Conditions of it are not conformable to his laſt Inſtructions, it ſhould not be cancelled; he ſhould make a peremptory demand conformably to his laſt Inſtructions; and if the *Poonah* Durbar will not give him a categorical anſwer, he ſhould demand his Diſmiſſion, and retire to *Bombay* in ſix days after the receipt of the Letter now propoſed to be wrote to him.

General *Clavering*—I agree with Colonel *Monſon*, that whatever Conditions we may have agreed upon, they ſhould not be cancelled by the ſubſequent Orders that Colonel *Upton* has received from us; but if he has not been able to obtain the Iſland of *Baſſein* unconditionally, or in exchange for the Town and Territory of *Broach*, I am of opinion that he ſhould not inſiſt upon it. With regard to the other part of his Inſtructions, I think he ought not to inſiſt abſolutely on any thing more than the Iſland of *Salſette*, and the other Iſlands in the Bay; however, to obtain ſuch other advantages in the neighbourhood of *Surat* or *Broach* as he may find they will readily yield. His retirement to *Bombay* muſt follow of courſe, if the Conditions I have propoſed are not complied with.

Governor General—I agree to the Queſtion, and to the qualification propoſed by Colonel *Monſon*; namely, that if Colonel *Upton* ſhall have concluded a Treaty in the manner which he has adviſed us in his laſt letter he intended, before the receipt of our letter of the 15th February, that Treaty ſhould be confirmed. I likewiſe approve of the limit of time propoſed for his departure.

Mr. *Francis*—This Government will undoubtedly be bound by any Treaty which Colonel *Upton* may conclude; of courſe I preſume it can never be propoſed to cancel or alter it. I think however, that ſuppoſing it concluded before the receipt of our laſt Inſtructions, and that he ſhall have relinquiſhed the demand of *Baſſein*, he might ſtill be inſtructed to propoſe the exchange of *Broach* for that Iſland, if he ſhould find the Miniſtry diſpoſed to comply with ſuch a propoſal.

Agreed, That in caſe Colonel *Upton* ſhall not have already concluded a Treaty, he be ordered to conform to his former Inſtructions; and if the Miniſtry at *Poonah* ſhould not accede to thoſe Conditions, that he require his Diſmiſſion, and retire to *Bombay* within ſix days from the receipt of theſe Orders: but if a Treaty ſhall have been concluded before the arrival of the laſt Inſtructions, without obtaining a Ceſſion of *Baſſein* to the Company, he be ordered to offer them the Terms of exchange therein mentioned.

APPENDIX, No. 105.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 7th March, 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Lieutenant

Appendix. No. 105.

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
} Eſquires.

READ, and approved, the Conſultation of yeſterday:

Received the following Letters from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:—

Gentlemen,

I had the Honour to write you on the 2d inſtant, and herewith forward a Duplicate of that Letter.

By the converſation that paſſed laſt night at the Durbar, which accompanies this, you will perceive that the Negociation is entirely at an end. The Miniſters are determined never to grant the Sunnuds for the Company's keeping *Salſette*, or for their poſſeſſing the four ſmall adjacent Iſlands. They offered in exchange for *Salſette* a Country of three lacks of rupees in the neighbourhood of *Broach*, but would not wait my referring this buſineſs to the Board, as I requeſted; though they were told, and underſtood, that by laying a dauk to *Benares*, they might get a reply as ſoon as the anſwer to our former reference (under date 5th January) could arrive. They could not wait for that either; they ſaid they had already expended immenſe ſums, and had been deceived by the letters from *Calcutta*; that full powers were veſted in me, and from me they expected an anſwer. I obſerved to them, that full powers it was true were veſted in me, provided I did not deviate from the Inſtructions that were given me, and I had all along told them, that *Salſette* could not be given up, and that they might be aſſured I ſhould never abuſe the powers they conceived me poſſeſſed of. That they had yet an opportunity left of aſking this exchange, they replied No, poſitively.

In five or ſix days more I am to leave *Poonah* Dhur, and they will then fix the time for the expiration of the Ceſſation of Arms. I told them I expected a ſufficient time to adviſe all our Settlements before the renewal of the War; however, I ſuſpect them of taking every advantage.

I wrote the laſt week to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, to prepare them for this event; alſo to Colonel *Keating*, that he might guard againſt any ſurprize. His Majeſty's Squadron being here at this time is a fortunate event; and, I think, if the War is to be proſecuted, if three or four companies of Europeans, a ſmall detachment from the corps of artillery, and two or three battalions of Sepoys were embarked from *Bengal* to join the Army from *Bombay*, we might ſoon command Peace on our own Terms, for the Chiefs of this Country are quite at a loſs which ſide to take, and are waiting to ſee what the Engliſh do.

I incloſe a Letter I received two days ago from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, with an Extract of a letter they had received from Colonel *Keating*, and further offers made by *Ragonaut Row*. In three or four days I ſhall write again by way of *Benares*.

Poonah Dhur, 7th February 1776. I have the Honour to be, &c. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

P. S.—I ſhall write to the Governor and Council of *Fort St. George* and the Nabob of *Arcot*, to inform them of the Treaty's being broke off with the miniſterial party.

Debate at the Peiſhwa's Durbar, February 6th, 1776.

Colonel *Upton* went to the Durbar this evening at half paſt ſix o'clock. After the uſual complimentary queſtions, the converſation turned on the time and delay it would occaſion, ſending letters to *Calcutta*, and receiving anſwers, before the Treaty could be concluded; that they had already expended crores of rupees for theſe ſeven months paſt, waiting the Colonel's arrival; and continuing that expence to receive further accounts from *Bengal*, would condemn them in the eyes of the whole World. That the Colonel came to treat with them with full powers, why, therefore, refer to others?

The Colonel obſerved to them, that by the plan he propoſed of laying a dauk from this to *Benares* immediately, anſwers would arrive as quick, if not quicker, than the replies to the letters ſent ſoon after his arrival. Regarding their objections to aſſembling the principal Chiefs to ſign the Treaty, that although he was of opinion the Supreme Council would, after reading his repreſentation, be ſatisfied with the uſual ſignatures as mentioned by the Gentlemen here, yet it was neceſſary for him to receive their letter to that purpoſe, before he would deviate from that Article of his Inſtructions; and that being the caſe, there could be no time loſt in continuing the Ceſſation of Arms for another month, particularly as they might, if they pleaſed, withdraw what part of their Army they thought proper to reduce their expence, and that the Colonel would be anſwerable that the Engliſh Army would ſtrictly attend to the Terms of the Ceſſation; and further, that he propoſes this meaſure of referring to the Supreme Council, becauſe they (the Miniſters) did not ſeem to credit that his demands were in conſequence of his Inſtructions; that he himſelf could not deviate from theſe Inſtructions, but it was very probable the Gentlemen of *Calcutta* would, by their own repreſentations and his, be diſpoſed to comply with their propoſals, or refer them to *England* if they thought neceſſary, by which means the Miniſters would be ſenſible, that he acted with ſtrict Honour from the beginning. That he alſo would engage for the continuance of the Ceſſation of Arms for a month, or more, after the replies arrived from *Calcutta*; if the alternative was to renew the War, to give them full time to aſſemble their Troops.

They declared they had been already ſo much diſappointed by the letters from *Calcutta*, and drawn into ſuch very heavy expence, from a certainty that no claims whatever ſhould be made upon their Country; and that *Salſette*, which had been ſo unjuſtly taken from them, would be again reſtored; that they had no idea or intention of ſuffering the like inconvenience any more. That as the Colonel had come ſo great a diſtance to ſettle a Peace with them, they wiſhed to ſhew a diſpoſition to do every thing in their power to conclude a Peace. That from theſe conſiderations, they would give up the Country mentioned yeſterday, in lieu of *Salſette*; but could not make Peace upon any other Terms. That it reſted with the Colonel to agree or not, as he pleaſed, as he was come with full powers to treat with them.

The Colonel aſſured them, that though he had full powers, he was determined not to abuſe them, and that he was not authorized to give up *Salſette*: that he muſt again obſerve to them, the Supreme Council might, and it was probable they would, agree to their offer; but it was not in his power to part with *Salſette*.

They replied very ſhortly, God will determine as he thinks beſt.

The Colonel aſked their abſolute determination.—They declared, they knew of none but War.

The Colonel ſaid, he was very ſorry he could not act more to their ſatisfaction, for it would give him great pleaſure if he could.

It was then agreed that the Colonel was to ſtay five or ſix days near *Poonah* Dhur, by which time they would aſſemble a Durbar for him to take his leave.

The Colonel obſerved, that from the day he took his leave, it would be neceſſary to fix a certain day, not nearer than a month or twenty days, to give a reaſonable time for all parties being properly informed with the renewal of the War.

They ſaid, when the Colonel came to take his leave, they would fix a day for the Commencement of Hoſtilities.

N. B.—It

N. B.—It was remarked in this evening's Converſation, that finding the Colonel could not (or would not, as they termed it) reſtore *Saljette*, they never opened their lips about any thing elſe.

(Signed) *J. Upton.*

A true Interpretation.
A. Macpherſon, Perſian Interpreter.

From the above advices, which ſupercede the orders of yeſterday, it appears moſt probable, that the Treaty with the Miniſterial Party of the Maratta State has been broke off, and hoſtilities renewed; it is alſo probable that theſe ſudden and abrupt Declarations of the Miniſters, may have been a feint, for the purpoſe of trying what impreſſion it might make on the mind of Colonel *Upton*, and that finding him determined, they may ultimately conſent to an accommodation, upon the Terms which he has propoſed to them; but this the Board can ſtate only as a poſſible event, and it now becomes neceſſary to ſuppoſe the War renewed, and to provide the means of conducting it with the greateſt probability of ſucceſs. From the Returns now laid before the Board by the Commander in Chief, it appears, that the whole Military Force at the Preſidency of *Bombay*, excluſive of the remote Factories, is as follows, including Officers:

	Artillery.	Infantry.	Sepoys.
At Bombay - - - - - -	112	450	1776
Madras detachment at ditto - - - - - -			893
In the Field - - - - - -	114	378	1454
Madras detachment ditto - - -	106		—
At Salſette - - - - - -	75	193	955
At Caranja - - - - - -	1	29	240
	302	1156	5318

The preſence of His Majeſty's Squadron appears a circumſtance moſt favourable to the deſign of reinforcing the detachment in the Field, as the garriſon at *Bombay* will require but very few men to defend it, and the reſt (the Board think) may be conveniently and ſafely ſpared to be ſent into the Field.

APPENDIX, No. 106.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

WE have received your Letter, dated the 24th ultimo.

Immediately on the Ceſſation being proclaimed, we gave Inſtructions to the Commanders of all the Company's Veſſels; not to moleſt any boats or veſſels belonging to the Marattas; and as no act of hoſtility has been committed on our ſide, there is not any occaſion for repeating theſe orders.

We are much pleaſed to find you are convinced of the propriety of the Company's Troops not being entirely withdrawn from *Ragonath Row*'s, before the concluſion of the Treaty, and we are ſenſible you will experience the good effects of this meaſure in your Negociation.

The ſeveral Ceſſions from *Futty Sing* (except *Batta*) were made long before the receipt of the Governor General and Council's Orders for diſcontinuing the War.

The Treaty between him and *Ragoba* was executed on the 18th of July laſt, near *Brodera*, whereas thoſe Orders did not reach *Bombay* until the 12th of Auguſt; and it was ſtipulated in that Treaty, that the Guicawar ſhare of the Broach Revenues, and the Villages of *Cordi*, *Chickley*, and *Periow*, ſhould be ceded to the Honourable Company. *Futty Sing* before this was openly connected with the Miniſterial Party; but when he found *Ragoba* ſupported by the Engliſh he was glad to make his Peace with him, and return to his Allegiance; and theſe Ceſſions were made to the Honourable Company, for the Services rendered him in accommodating matters between him and the Peiſhwa. He has lately made many profeſſions of his attachment to the Company; and in a letter to our Preſident at the time, expreſſed his ſatisfaction at the accommodation effected by Colonel *Keating*. The only Ceſſion obtained ſince the Ceſſation, was the Village of *Batta*, which is ſo connected with our other poſſeſſions, that a grant of it was requeſted from *Futty Sing* in the room of *Sinore*, a place producing a much more conſiderable Revenue, which we voluntarily relinquiſhed becauſe it was not ſo conveniently ſituated. We have alſo lately requeſted him to give up his pretenſions to the *Autgoms*, ſome Villages ſituated in the very center of the Broach Pergunnah, which he does not ſeem to conſider as included in his grant of that diſtrict, but we are not yet apprized of the ſucceſs of this application. We never authorized, nor do we believe any compulſion was ever uſed to obtain theſe grants from *Futty Sing*.

We muſt again ſtrongly urge to you the propriety of your inſiſting upon the Miniſters ſettling an Eſtabliſhment for *Ragoba* immediately, for we may venture to foretel, that if you recede from this point, they will protract and retard the Negociation by every artifice in their power, in the hopes of *Ragoba*'s Army diſbanding for want of Pay, which would entirely fruſtrate the good effect we, with ſo much reaſon expected from our late meaſures, and we are alſo apprehenſive it will be a difficult matter to prevent an Army without Pay in a plentiful country, from committing ſome irregularities, which the Miniſters will be very ready to term an infringement of the Ceſſation.

We have lately received a Letter from Colonel *Keating*, containing ſome Propoſals made by *Ragoba*, of which we think it proper to tranſmit a Copy for your notice, and likewiſe an Extract from another Letter alluded to therein; but the Orders from the Governor General and Council arriving about that time, Mr. *Forbes* did not deliver *Ragoba*'s Propoſals. You have never acknowledged the receipt of our Letter, dated the 29th ultimo.

We hope you will prevail with the Miniſters to give immediate orders for opening the communication; and remain,

Sir, &c.

(Signed) *Wm. Hornby*,
D. Draper,
Rob. Gordon, &c. Council.

Bombay Caſtle,
1ſt February 1776.

A true Copy.

APPENDIX, No. 107.

Appendix. No. 107.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated the 5th September 1775, from *Muckerpere* Camp, three miles from *Brodira*.

I HAD the honour of addreſſing you laſt the 6th inſtant; ſince when, I had ſeveral long Conferences with the Peiſhwa, repecting *Nizam Ally*, who is in Treaty with both him and the Miniſters. The Peiſhwa ſays, that without *Nizam Ally* joins the Miniſters they cannot again make any formidable head againſt him, ſo that him only is he apprehenſive of, being poſſeſſed of a great number of cannon and a large body of good country infantry.

The Nizam would moſt willingly join the Peiſhwa, provided he agrees to his terms, but the latter ſays he wiſhes for no other friends than the Engliſh alone, who have done every thing for him, therefore is deſirous of receiving aſſiſtance from them only, and grant Territory in lieu thereof. Our laſt converſation on this ſubject was on the 6th inſtant; he then requeſted me to appoint a proper perſon to proceed to *Bombay* immediately,

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ately, accompanied by a man of his own to ſettle this buſineſs. His wiſh is to have an augmentation to the number of Forces already ſtipulated for, of at leaſt two hundred Europeans and one thouſand Sepoys, beſides their Officers, alſo four field pieces, two royal howitzers, and ammunition in proportion. Upon your granting him this ſupply, he is ready to engage to increaſe the monthly ſtipend, alſo to grant and make over to the Company for ever, ſuch Country as you ſhall eſteem moſt proper, having an exact affinity to the number of Troops, &c. formerly agreed for, and now required.

In compliance with the Peiſhwa's requeſt, and judging it proper ſo to do, I have appointed Mr. *James Forbes* to proceed to *Bombay* on this buſineſs. He is the bearer of this Letter, and having acted as my Secretary ſince Mr. *Holmes* went to *Bombay*, he is able to give your Honour, &c. every kind of information you may require; and I requeſt he may return to the Army, when this affair is concluded.

The Peiſhwa deſires me to requeſt, that you will be pleaſed to write to the Governor and Council of *Madras* to inſiſt on *Nizam Ally* remaining neutral in the diſpute between him and the rebellious Miniſters: Alſo, that the Governor of *Bombay* will write to the Nizam to the ſame purpoſe, and if neceſſary, ſend a Gentleman to him; but adds, that ſhould the Nizam in defiance of ſuch remonſtrance, perſiſt in taking an active part againſt him, he doubts not, with the Bleſſing of God, and the reinforcement above-mentioned, to be able in the courſe of the enſuing campaign, to reduce the Miniſterial and the Nizam's joint Force, and compel him to make ample reſtitution; in which caſe, he aſſures me, the Company may depend upon reaping conſiderable advantages.

A true Extract,

(Signed) *Edward Ravenſcroft*, Sec^r^.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you laſt the 18th inſtant. Since the diſpatch of the 5th inſtant, by which your Honour, &c. received full powers to treat with the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, in the perſon of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, the Peiſhwa has been conſidering with great attention on the beſt grounds for eſtabliſhing a Treaty with that Council. He frequently mentioned the ſubject to me, ſignifying his intention of extending his deſigns with the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh; and this he declared, not from views entirely confined to himſelf, but alſo with thoſe of enlarging conſiderably the intereſts and advantages of the Honourable Company, to whom he acknowledges himſelf highly indebted. In conſequence of theſe conſiderations, he yeſterday made known to me the grand outlines for the baſis of this new Treaty, deſiring at the ſame time that I would explain the whole to your Honour, &c. ſince he intended the ſame to anſwer to you, as guides in the management of the Treaty. He concluded with obſerving, that he had deſigned and propoſed ſomething ſimilar to the preſent propoſitions the beginning of Auguſt laſt, and which I communicated in part under the 8th of that month, by Mr. *James Forbes*, who was further inſtructed on that occaſion.

The following are the Articles as explained by the Peiſhwa.

1. That he the Peiſhwa doth confirm and guarantee to the Honourable Company, the Treaty of *Surat*, in the moſt full and ample manner.

2. That he *Ragonath Badjirow* ſhall grant, cede, and for ever make over unto the Honourable Company, all that part of the *Cocanny* Country immediately appertaining to the *Poonah* Govenment, except the Port of *Ghiriah*, and a Territory thereunto annexed ſufficient for the uſes of the Port.

3. That the ſaid *Ragonath Badjirow* Peiſhwa ſhall, as ſoon as poſſible, put the Honourable Company's Troops in full and ample poſſeſſion of any one of the gaupts or paſſes that lead from the *Cocanny* into the high part of the Maratta Dominions; and which gaut or paſs ſhall be determined on by the Honourable Company, and ever after conſidered as belonging to the *Eaſt India* Company.

4. That the ſaid *Ragonath Badjirow* Peiſhwa doth agree, that the Honourable Company ſhall receive the ſum of 10 per cent. per annum, out of, and from the groſs produce of every Jaghire that has been, or may hereafter be granted to any perſon whatever, who is or may hereafter be dependant on the Maratta Government; and the ſaid ſum of 10 per cent. per annum ſhall be paid in Caſh, without any deductions whatever, to ſuch perſon or perſons as the Honourable Company, or their proper agents, ſhall appoint; or ſuch Lands and Territories as the ſaid Company may eſteem moſt convenient to be made over to them, within the courſe of one year from the ſigning of the Treaty, in the moſt full and ample manner, by the ſaid *Ragonath Badjirow*, or his Heirs.

5. That the ſaid *Ragonath Badjirow* Peiſhwa doth engage, for himſelf and his Heirs, to take from the Honourable Company to the amount of ten lacks in Woollens annually, paying for the ſame an advance of fifteen per cent. upon the prime coſt.

6. That in conſideration of the above Ceſſions, Grants, and Advantages to the Honorable Company, they on their part ſhall engage to add to the Army now in the Peiſhwa ſervice, ſuch a ſufficient Force, as may be able with God's Bleſſing, to place him in poſſeſſion of the Seat of his Father, the Government of the Maratta Dominions.

7. And that the *Eaſt India* Company do agree to advance him, *Ragonath Badjirow* Peiſhwa, the ſum of ten lacks of rupees, the better to enable him to proſecute and fulfil theſe engagements; and which ten lacks are to be repaid within one year after his reſuming Charge of the Government.

8. And that as it is well known the Family of *Nizam Alli Cawn* are encroachers and uſurpers of the natural rights of the *Hindoos*, as alſo declared friends to the French Nation, the power of the ſaid *Nizam Alli Cawn* ſhall be curtailed, as the contracting Powers may judge proper, for the eaſe and ſafety of the Common Cauſe; and further, that whatever Country it may be neceſſary to diſpoſſeſs him of, one fourth part of its groſs annual Revenues ſhall be paid nett to the Honourable Company, in the manner laid down with reſpect to the 10 per cent. from the Jaghires, or lands and territories granted in lieu thereof: Alſo is provided,

9. That all Troops provided by the Honourable Company for the aſſiſtance of *Ragonath Badjirow*, or his Heirs, for the purpoſe above-mentioned, or any other that may hereafter be neceſſary, ſhall be paid and allowed for in the ſame proportion as is provided for by the Treaty of *Surat*, except the expence of carrying ordnance ſtores and proviſions, which are ever to be eſteemed diſtinct, and allowed as a ſeparate charge.

10. That from the day of ſigning the Treaty upon which theſe Articles depend, the contracting Parties ſhall eſteem themſelves as mutually bound to aſſiſt and ſupport each other in their juſt rights and full poſſeſſions, to the end of time; and the ſaid *Ragonath Badjirow* Peiſhwa doth, of his own free will and accord, further agree, for himſelf and his Heirs for ever, That in caſe the Engliſh Nation were at any time attacked either by a foreign or Indian Power in any part of their Settlements or Poſſeſſions in *India*, that he or his Heirs will and ſhall aſſiſt them with ſix thouſand horſe, free of all expence whatever, and with the whole of his Fleet, that may belong to the Port of *Ghiriah*.

The Peiſhwa deſired me to obſerve to your Honour, &c. that the groſs amount of the Jaghire proceeding from the Maratta's Government, amount at preſent, to about two crore of rupees per annum.

From the certain advantages that will ariſe to the Honourable Company by this propoſed Treaty, the Peiſhwa doubts

doubts not, but the ſame will be readily agreed to; and as a principal part of it was framed ſo long ago as the beginning of laſt Auguſt, and at that time mentioned to your Honour, &c. it cannot be regarded as extraordinary that it is now renewed.

I am, &c.

Camp near *Maudave*, 24th Jan. 1776. *Thomas Keating*, Lieut. Col.

APPENDIX, No. 108.

RESOLVED, That the following Letter be written to Mr. *Briſtow*.

To Mr. *Briſtow*.

Sir,

By a Letter received from Colonel *Upton*, under date the 7th of February, we are informed, that the Miniſters at the *Poonah* Durbar have peremptorily refuſed to accede to the terms of accommodation, which he was inſtructed to propoſe to them. That they poſitively inſiſted on the reſtitution of *Salſette*, and a renunciation of the four ſmall Iſlands adjacent to it; and would not agree to wait the reſult of a reference of this point to us; in ſhort, that they were determined to hear of Peace on no Conditions, that ſhould not be excluſively honourable, and advantageous to themſelves; Colonel *Upton*'s Negociation is therefore entirely broken off; he was to receive his diſmiſſion, and retire to *Bombay* within ſix days from the date of his letter; but the further interval to be allowed before the renewal of hoſtilities was not then determined. The Miniſters having reſolved to ſend their Army again into the Field, we have no alternative left, but a vigorous proſecution of the War againſt them, in conjunction with *Ragonaut Row*, on the preſumption that the reſolution of the Miniſterial Party is final. We have agreed to ſupport the pretenſions of that Prince, and have taken every preparatory ſtep that has occurred to us, for providing means to carry on the War with vigour and ſucceſs.

The immediate march of the brigade from *Owde* to the frontier of the Province of *Corah*, neareſt to *Calpee*, appearing to us a meaſure likely to be attended with good effects, not only from the appearance of reſolution which it will convey to the neighbouring Powers, but alſo for the conveniency of detaching the party hereafter-mentioned, if the ſituation of affairs ſhould abſolutely require it, we deſire you will repreſent to the Nabob the ſtate of our tranſactions with the Marattas, and that we judge it neceſſary, for the ſecurity of his Dominions, to remove the brigade from its preſent cantonments to *Corah*. In this ſtation they will be ready to oppoſe any attempts which *Radajee Scindia*, or any other Maratta Chief, might be encouraged, by the preſent diſpoſition of the Company's Forces, or by other circumſtances, to make againſt his poſſeſſions; and in this light we deſire you will repreſent this propoſed movement of the brigade to the Nabob, as a meaſure calculated for his ſecurity, rather than for any direct purpoſe of our own.

As ſoon as you have obtained his conſent to the motion of the brigade, you will adviſe Colonel *Stibbert*, who is ordered to hold himſelf in readineſs to march.

We have written to all the neighbouring States to engage their aſſiſtance againſt the Miniſters at *Poonah*, or at leaſt to ſecure their neutrality.

Madajee Scindea, and *Touckoojee Holcar*, have been referred to you for particulars. If they have Vackeels at the Nabob's Court, you will ſound them with reſpect to their Maſter's attachment to *Ragoba*'s intereſt, and endeavour to diſcover their real intentions, whether they mean to take any, and what part in the War. You will alſo open a direct correſpondence with their Chiefs; the object of which muſt be to explain to them our late tranſactions with the Miniſtry at *Poonah*. That not having approved of the Proceedings of *Bombay* in their Declaration of War againſt the Miniſterial Party, we had endeavoured, from motives of moderation and of general amity to the Maratta States, to reſtore Peace in that part of *India*. That for this purpoſe we had deputed Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to *Poonah* with ample powers to conclude a Treaty with the Miniſters there, and offering to relinquiſh many important advantages ſtipulated by the Preſidency of *Bombay* in their Treaty with *Ragonaut Row*; but that the Miniſters, notwithſtanding the ſucceſs of our Arms in the laſt campaign, have peremptorily refuſed to liſten to any terms of accommodation, but ſuch as left us without any advantage of any kind, and which we could not accept without diſhonouring ourſelves in the eyes of all *Indoſtan*: That the pacific meaſures we had hitherto purſued had produced no effect, but to demonſtrate to all *Indoſtan* the moderation and juſtice of the principles on which we act. That we are now compelled by the determined obſtinacy of the Miniſters to renew the War: That being reduced to this neceſſity, we have reſolved to ſupport the cauſe of *Ragoba* with the utmoſt vigour, and with a general exertion of the whole Power of the Engliſh Arms in *India*: That our grand Object is Peace; and that we are determined to act in all quarters at once; and by the deciſion and rapidity of our Proceedings, bring the War, if poſſible, to a ſpeedy concluſion: That as we are well aſſured of the fidelity and attachment of *Madjia Sindia*, and *Touckoojee Holcar* to the cauſe of *Ragoba*, we have thought it adviſeable to give them the earlieſt knowledge of the actual ſtate of affairs, and of our future intentions; and that we hope and expect they will not fail to make an immediate and public Declaration in *Ragoba*'s favour. That to encourage them to take this ſtep, we have ordered the Brigade in *Owde* to march towards the frontiers of their country; where it will be ready to give them effectual ſupport, if the events of the War ſhould make it neceſſary; and that you are inſtructed to receive and tranſmit to us any propoſals which they may think fit to offer for the advantage of the common cauſe. Your correſpondence with the Maratta Chiefs will be formed out of theſe materials. That you may not, however, be unprovided with ſpecific Inſtructions to guide you in your Negociations with them, we authorize you to acquieſce in any requiſition made directly by them for the aſſiſtance of our Forces to the extent of three battalions of Sepoys, to join and cooperate with them in ſuch military operations as they may recommend, and be diſpoſed to engage in, for the intereſt of *Ragoba*. At the ſame time we in confidence acquaint you, that this is a meaſure which nothing but the apparent neceſſity of affairs could induce us to adopt. You will therefore take care not to make any propoſals of this kind yourſelf, but merely yield your conſent to it, on their ſolicitation. In that caſe you will give immediate notice to Colonel *Stibbert*, who is furniſhed with directions to act in conformity to the advices he may receive from you,

We are, &c.

Fort William, 7th March 1776. (Signed) *Warren Hoſtings*, &c. Council.

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Mr. *Francis*—I yield my aſſent to the latter part of the propoſed letter to Mr. *Briſtow*, in which he is empowered to bind us to a meaſure which may engage the Company's Arms beyond the line of the Guarantee of the Nabob of *Owde*'s Dominions, ſolely upon the ground of neceſſity.

Colonel *Monſon*—I agree to all the meaſures propoſed by the Governor General, as thinking the War now unavoidable, but moſt ſeriouſly lament the ſituation in which this Country is thrown by the precipitate and ill-adviſed meaſures of the Preſidency of *Bombay*. I can now deviſe no means by which we can extricate ourſelves out of this War, but by a vigorous exertion of all the Company's Force.

General *Clavering*—Since the commencement of hoſtilities between the Government of *Bombay* and the Maratta

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Maratta State, my utmoſt endeavours have been employed to put an end to them by a Peace. But as the Negociation is now broken off with the Maratta State, I think it an indiſpenſable duty in me to give my concurrence to meaſures which ſeem beſt calculated to extricate the Government of *Bombay* out of the difficulties in which they have engaged their own Government, as well as the other Preſidencies. I think it neceſſary to enter this Declaration to obviate any objection that may be made to me againſt my conſenting to carry the Company's Arms beyond the line of defence preſcribed by them. Nothing but the neceſſity of the caſe ſhould have obliged me to it; and to prevent our being dazzled by the lucres which *Ragoba* has thrown out to the Government of *Bombay*, or various ceſſions which he will make to the Company as ſoon as he is in complete poſſeſſion of the Maratta Government, I think that the Government of *Bombay* ſhould be inſtructed to make a renunciation of every ceſſion that he has made, excepting the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* and their dependencies, together with ſo much Territory in the Neighbourhood of *Surat* and *Broach*, as will be juſt ſufficient to pay the expences of thoſe two eſtabliſhments.

The Governor General—The particular appellation which Colonel *Monſon* has made of my name, in the aſſent which he has expreſſed to the preceding reſolutions, makes it neceſſary for me to diſclaim any ſeparate concern in them from the other Members of the Board. I conſider myſelf only as the Inſtrument of the Board in collecting and dictating their concurrent ſentiments. I think it neceſſary to ſay thus much, not only as I look upon the meaſures now propoſed to be adopted, as the joint compoſition of the Board, but as I wiſh moſt heartily that in all caſes which may ariſe that have a relation to the object now before us, we may always proceed with the ſame unanimity; however different our ſentiments have been on the paſt meaſures, chance or cauſes independent of this Board, have at length concentrated both our opinions, views, and wiſhes in the ſame point; and I declare, that as in the late debates I laid it down as a rule to follow rather than take the lead, in the ſupport of meaſures which did not originate from myſelf, or with my participation, in like manner it is my intention to yield up, my own opinion, and to join moſt heartily with the reſt of the Board in the future conduct of the War, excepting in ſuch points only as ſhall very materially affect the intereſts of the Company, or the ſafety of their Poſſeſſions. I think it neceſſary to remark upon Mr. *Francis*'s Minute, that I ſhould give with equal reluctance my aſſent to the diſcretional Order propoſed to be ſent to Colonel *Stibbert* and Mr. *Briſtow*, for the march of a party of our Forces beyond the defenſive line of the Dominions of the Nabob of *Owde*, were not the preſent a caſe which requires the moſt vigorous exertion of every power of this Government, for extricating the Company from the troubles in which they are involved, or were the meaſures which has been propoſed applicable in my ſenſe of it, either to the letter or the evident ſpirit of the Company's Orders, which have invariably forbidden remote expeditions, on the expreſs conſideration of the danger to which their own Poſſeſſions were expoſed by the abſence of the Forces neceſſary for their defence. I think it not likely that the Maratt a Chiefs will require the aid of our Forces; but we have no other condition of our Alliance which we can either offer or aſſent to. Should they make the requiſition, the refuſal would impreſs them with doubts of our ſincerity; our acquieſcence would rivet them to the cauſe, and the report of ſuch a Junction, and of the Britiſh Forces arming in all quarters of *Indoſtan* and *Decan*, would give credit to the party which we have eſpouſed, and influence the other Powers of *Indoſtan*, who are now heſitating to which ſide they ſhall adhere, to unite with us in confidence of our power, and the probability of our future ſucceſs. Such a detachment cannot properly be called a diminution of our military ſtrength, ſince it conſiſts only of the native Troops, whoſe places will be immediately ſupplied with others. I ſhall only add, that every other propoſition reſolved on, in this day's Conſultation, has my entire and hearty concurrence.

Agreed, That Colonel *Stibbert* be adviſed of the Orders ſent to Mr. *Briſtow*, as follows:

To Colonel *Stibbert*, or Officer commanding the Army in the Field.

Sir,

The Miniſters at *Poonah* having refuſed to liſten to the terms of accommodation propoſed to them by us, and having endeavoured to impoſe Conditions on this Government, excluſively honourable and advantageous to themſelves, we take it for granted that Colonel *Upton* has, in conſequence of his refuſal to comply with ſuch Conditions, received his diſmiſſion from their Court, and that hoſtilities are actually renewed; on this preſumption, we have ordered Mr. *Briſtow* to obtain the Nabob's conſent, and to give immediate information of it to you, that you may march with the brigade under your command to the frontier of the Province of *Korah*, neareſt to the Paſs at *Calpee*; you will therefore hold yourſelf in readineſs for this purpoſe.

Mr. *Briſtow* has been further ordered to open a Correſpondence with *Madajee Sindia* and *Tuccajee Holkar*, with a view to engage them to eſpouſe the Intereſt of *Ragoba*; and in caſe of their ſolicitation for the aſſiſtance of a part of our military Force, we have authorized Mr. *Briſtow* to yield to ſuch requiſition, and to give immediate notice of it to you; upon the receipt of which, we deſire that you will detach from the brigade under your command a Force not exceeding three battalions of Sepoys, to join and co-operate with *Madajee Sindia* and *Tuccajee Holkar*, or either of them, as may be agreed on againſt the miniſterial party; and you will ſupply the place of ſuch Force, by raiſing an equal number of freſh battalions, to keep entire the ſtrength of the brigade.

We are, &c.

Fort William, 7th March 1776. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings*, &c. Council.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to *Fort Saint George*:

Gentlemen,

By a Letter received from Colonel *Upton*, under date the 7th February, we are informed, that the Miniſters of the *Poonah* Durbar have peremptorily refuſed to accede to the terms of accommodation which he was inſtructed to propoſe to them; that they poſitively inſiſted on the reſtitution of *Salſette*, and a renunciation of the four ſmall Iſlands adjacent to it; and would not agree to wait the reſult of a reference of this point to us; in ſhort, that they were determined to hear of Peace on no Conditions that ſhould not be excluſively honourable and advantageous to themſelves. Colonel *Upton*'s Negociation is therefore entirely broken off; he was to receive his diſmiſſion and retire to *Bombay* within ſix days from the date of his Letter, but the further interval to be allowed before the renewal of hoſtilities was not then determined. The Miniſters having reſolved to ſend their Army again into the Field, we have no alternative left but a vigorous proſecution of the War againſt them, in conjunction with *Ragonaut Row*, on the preſumption that the Reſolution of the miniſterial party was final: we have agreed to ſupport the pretenſions of that Chief, and have taken every preparatory ſtep that has occurred to us for providing means to carry on the War with vigour and ſucceſs.

We recommend it to you to ſuccour them immediately with a reinforcement of two battalions of Sepoys, or more if you can ſpare them, either by the way of *Anjengo*, if the ſeaſon be not too far advanced, or by

what other route you may think more eligible; and to alleviate any danger which you might apprehend from being deprived of ſo large a body of your military force, you will, if you deem it adviſable, raiſe new Corps to ſupply the place of ſuch as you may ſend on this ſervice, during their abſence; and we are willing to defray any extraordinary charge that you may incur on this account.

We have written to *Nizam Ally Cawn*, *Hyder Ally*, *Morary Row*, *Moodajee Boonela*, *Suckajee Holkar*, and *Madajee Sinda*, with a view of engaging their aſſiſtance in favour of *Ragoba*; or at leaſt to ſecure their neutrality. We requeſt that you will open a correſpondence with the three firſt, and concur in uſing your joint efforts with us to induce them to ſecond our views for the re-eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba* in the Government of *Poonah*.

Our Reſident at *Oude* has been ordered to open a like correſpondence with *Madajee Scindia* and *Suckajee Holkar*; and in order to keep them firm to our party, we have removed the brigade from *Oude* to the frontier of *Corah* neareſt *Calpee*, under the pretence of affording them any aſſiſtance that the exigency of the caſe may require.

While we lament the neceſſity which has compelled us to undertake this War, and which has fruſtrated our endeavours to maintain a general Peace in *India*, ſo ſtrenuouſly recommended by the Company, we rely on your efforts to co-operate heartily and effectually with us in bringing it to a ſpeedy concluſion.

We are, &c.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings*, &c. Council.

Fort William,
7th March 1776.

Reſolved alſo, That Sir *Edward Hughes* be addreſſed as follows:

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, Knight, Commander of His Majeſty's Squadron in *India*.

Sir,

We formerly had the honour to acquaint you of the principles in which the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* entered into an alliance with *Ragonaut Row*, to aſſiſt him with the Company's Troops in ſupport of his pretenſions to the Peiſhwaſhip of the Maratta Government at *Poonah*.

That not having approved the proceedings of that Preſidency in engaging the Company's Arms inhoſtilities againſt the miniſterial party, we had deputed Colonel *Upton* to *Poonah*, with full inſtructions and powers to conclude a Treaty of Peace with that party, on terms reciprocally honourable and advantageous; but by a letter juſt received from Colonel *Upton* of the 7th February, we are informed that the Miniſters would liſten to no conditions but ſuch as they might think fit to impoſe for their own honour and benefit excluſively, and to leave us no alternative but to acquieſce in them with diſhonour to ourſelves, or to renew the War. Colonel *Upton* was to receive his diſmiſſion, and retire from the *Poonah* Durbar, in five or ſix days after the date of his letter; but no period had then been fixed for the renewal of hoſtilities.

On the preſumption that the declared reſolution of the miniſterial party to proſecute the War was final, and that Colonel *Upton* has actually broke his Negociations and retired to *Bombay*, we take the earlieſt opportunity of adviſing you that we have releaſed the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* from the reſtrictions which we had laid upon the operations of their army, and have authorized them to continue the War in conjunction with *Ragoba* againſt the Miniſters.

As this is a meaſure to which we are unavoidably reduced, after having ſought by every honourable means to prevent it, we are determined, by a vigorous exertion of our powers, to bring the War to as ſpeedy a concluſion as poſſible. We have therefore taken every preparatory ſtep that has occurred to us for carrying it on with ſucceſs, by providing ſupplies of men and money, to be immediately ſent to *Bombay*; and by writing to all the Country Powers, to engage their aſſiſtance in the cauſe of *Ragoba*, or at leaſt to ſecure their neutrality. We entertain great hopes that they will not oppoſe him, as we underſtand from repeated informations that moſt of the Chiefs of the Maratta State were wavering in their determination which ſide they ſhould eſpouſe. Appendix No. 108.

We have only to requeſt the favour of you to continue with His Majeſty's ſquadron under your command on that coaſt during the continuance of theſe troubles, and to grant all the aſſiſtance in your power to the operations of the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*.

We are, &c.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings*, &c. Council.

Fort William,
7th March 1776.

Agreed, That the Governor General be requeſted to write to *Nizam Ally Cawn*, *Hyder Ally Cawn*, *Moodajee Boofila*, *Moodajee Sindia*, *Succajee Holkar*, and *Morrary Row*, to engage their aſſiſtance in the cauſe of *Ragoba*, or to induce them to remain neuter.

Agreed alſo, That *Succajee Holkar* and *Moodajee Boofila* be referred to Mr. *Briſtow* for particulars.

And agreed, That a letter be written to *Ragoba*, and forwarded to *Surat*, as follows:

Gentlemen,

If Colonel *Upton* ſhould have been obliged to break off his Negociations with the Miniſters at *Poonah*, and a continuation of the War ſhould in conſequence have been reſolved on, we deſire you will immediately forward the incloſed Letter by a ſafe conveyance to *Ragonaut Row*; but if on the contrary a Treaty of Peace ſhould have been concluded, you will deſtroy it.

We are, &c.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings*, &c. Council.

Fort William,
7th March 1776.

To *Ragonaut Row*.

The peremptory and repeated injunctions which this Government has received from the Company, to maintain the Peace of all their Poſſeſſions in *India*, and eſpecially to avoid every occaſion of difference with the Maratta Nation, compelled myſelf and the Council, on the firſt advices of the engagements which the Governor and Council of *Bombay* had entered into with you, without our knowledge or participation, and of the War which was the conſequence of thoſe engagements, to ſuſpend the continuance of it, until we ſhould have uſed our endeavours by every fair and honourable means, to obtain a peaceable accommodation of all differences; and for this purpoſe Colonel *Upton* was deputed on the part of this Government with full powers to negociate and conclude a Treaty of Peace with the Miniſters at *Poonah*. It was with much reluctance that I found myſelf under the neceſſity of appearing to counteract your views, while the Negociation continued; but I had not been inattentive to your intereſts in the inſtructions which I gave to Colonel *Upton*, who had expreſs directions to ſtipulate ſuch conditions as you ſhould approve, and as might enſure your future ſafety and welfare. By letters lately received from the Gentleman, I am informed by the Miniſters at *Poonah*, either preſuming on our moderation, or relying with as much confidence on their own ſtrength, have rejected his Offers of Peace, and declared their intentions of renewing the War. How much ſoever I have ſought to avoid this brunt, while the orders of my Superiors impelled me to it; yet, as my endeavours have proved unſucceſsful, and as I now deem myſelf freed from all former reſtraints, I feel

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the higheſt ſatisfaction in offering you, in the Name of this Government, the perpetual Friendſhip and Alliance of the Company, and the aſſiſtance of their Arms in all parts of *India*, to replace you with full Authority in the Seat of your Government at *Poonah*; and for that purpoſe letters have been written to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, authorizing them to renew their Negociations with you for a Treaty of Alliance, the ratification of which is to be referred to myſelf and the Council appointed for the ſuperintendance of the Company's Affairs in *India*, that the conditions of it may be equally binding on all their Governments and dependancies; and orders have been given both to that Preſidency, to the Preſidency of *Madras*, and to the Commander of our Forces in the Provinces of *Oude*, to co-operate in the execution of your deſigns, and particularly to form connection with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, *Hyder Ally*, *Morrary Row*, *Moodajee Booſila*, *Succajee Holcar*, and *Madajee Sindia*. I have alſo ſent ſupplies, both of men and money, to *Bombay*, and have neglected no means to enſure you the completeſt ſucceſs; for the next I refer you to the Governor of *Bombay*, of whoſe zeal and attachment you have already received the ſtrongeſt aſſurance and conviction.

We are, &c.

Agreed, That the following Letters be written to *Bombay* and to Colonel *Upton*:—

Gentlemen,

By a letter received from Colonel *Upton*, under date the 7th February, we are informed that the Miniſters at the *Poonah* Durbar have abſolutely and peremptorily refuſed to accede to any terms of accommodation, but ſuch as ſhould be excluſively honourable and advantageous to themſelves; being therefore left without any alternative, he was to receive his diſmiſſion from their Court in five or ſix days, when a further interval would be fixed for the renewal of hoſtilities.

On the preſumption that Colonel *Upton*'s Negociations are entirely broken off, that he has retired to *Bombay*, and that hoſtilities are in conſequence renewed, we think it neſſceary to to take the earlieſt opportunity to releaſe you from the reſtrictions which we formerly laid on your operations, and to provide every means in our power for carrying on the War in conjunction with *Ragoba* with vigour. We therefore authorize you to treat with him, and to give him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of our full aſſiſtance and ſupport, which he has alſo been given to expect in a letter from this Government, whereof we tranſmit you a copy incloſed.

One of the moſt important ſervices you can render to the Company, is to obtain the immediate poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, provided it can be done by Negociation with the Killedar, and by offering him advantageous terms for himſelf; but we do not mean to make this the preſent object of your military operations, which ſhould be directed to one point only, the Reſtoration of *Ragoba*; nor would we have your attention drawn off to any other, till that ſhall be accompliſhed.

We recommend it to you to ſend into the Field all the force you can poſſibly ſpare (and if you deem it neceſſary) to bring a body of freſh Sepoys for the duty and defence of your own garriſons. Although we ſhall leave the detail and immediate conduct of the War entirely to your direction, while the ſcene of its operation lies in your neighbourhood; yet, as we are entruſted with the general controul and ultimate charge of it, as it is likely, from the nature of it, to involve the Company's Poſſeſſions in every part of *India*, and the means of conducting it, muſt principally reſt on the reſources of this Government, we think it incumbent upon us to require and inſiſt that you aſſign the Command of the Army to General *Gordon*, whom alone we deem fit to be intruſted with a charge of ſuch conſequence to the Intereſt, Honour, and Safety of the Company, by whoſe expreſs choice and nomination he was appointed to it; and we alſo recommend that you give him immediate orders to join the Troops with *Ragoba*, and march the combined Forces with all poſſible expedition to *Poonah*, ſuffering no object to divert his attention from this main point, which we hope will put a concluſion to the War. The occaſion is too critical and important to ſuffer us to ſtand on perſonal reſpects. We hereby declare that we ſhall conſider you anſwerable to the Company for the conſequences, if our preſent recommendation of General *Gordon* ſhould not be complied with.

We have written to Sir *Edward Hughes*, to requeſt that he will remain with his ſquadron on your coaſt, and afford you all the aſſiſtance in his power; to this requeſt, you will, of courſe, add your own ſolicitation to him, and we have no doubt of his compliance; we have alſo deſired the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, to ſend you as large a re-inforcement of troops as they may be able to ſpare, and if the ſeaſon will permit, to diſpatch them either by the way of *Anjengo*, or by other roads which they may prefer; you are as well able to judge, as we are, how far it may be prudent to depend on receiving this re-inforcement in time.

We have further written letters to *Nizam Ally Cawn*, *Hyder Ally*, *Moodajee Booſila*, *Moodajee Scindia*, and *Succoojee Holkar*, to engage their aſſiſtance, or at leaſt their neutrality in the preſent War. The two firſt of theſe Chiefs will receive applications to the ſame effect from *Fort Saint George*, and we have ordered our Reſident at the Court of *Oude*, to open a negociation with the two laſt, and if they ſhould concur heartily with us, he is authorized, on their ſolicitation for aſſiſtance from us, to grant them the aid of three battalions of Sepoys, to co-operate in any military operations which they may recommend, and be diſpoſed to engage in, for the ſervice of *Ragoba*. In the mean time, we have ordered the brigade in *Oude*, to march to the frontiers of the Province of *Corah*, neareſt to the *Calpee* Pais, profeſſedly to be in readineſs for this ſervice, if the ſituation of Affairs ſhould abſolutely require it alſo, but with a view to keep them in awe, if they ſhould be inclined to counteract our meaſures.

To ſupply you with funds for carrying on the War, we propoſe to remit to you immediately, either in ſpecie or bills five lacks of rupees, and one to authorize you to draw on us, to the amount of five lacks more, the whole to be ſolely appropriated to the operations of the War. And that we may be ſatisfied that theſe great ſupplies are not only expended with œconomy, but ſtrictly appropriated to the ſervice for which they are given, we expect that you will keep a ſeparate account of the diſpoſition thereof, and of all other ſums which you may hereafter receive from us on this account, and that you do tranſmit the ſame to us; for the reſt we leave it to you, to form new connections, and to induce the ſeveral Chiefs of the Maratta Empire to eſpouſe the cauſe in which we are now unavoidably embarked.

The ſucceſſion of events which have involved the Company in this quarrel, has ſprung from meaſures in which we had no concern, and for which we are not anſwerable; but while we lament the neceſſity to which this Government is reduced, of engaging in War, we are equally ſenſible of the expediency of puſhing it with vigour, and to this object, you may be aſſured our utmoſt efforts ſhall be directed.

We are, &c.

Fort William, 7th March, 1776. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings*, and Council.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 2d and 7th February. From the contents of the latter, we conclude that your Negociation has been entirely broken off

off with the Miniſters; that you are returned to *Bombay*, and that hoſtilities have, in conſequence, unavoidably taken place. We have, therefore, on this preſumption, releaſed the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* from their former reſtraint, authorized them to renew the Treaty of Alliance with *Ragoba*, and to ſupport his pretenſions to the Peiſhwaſhip, with all the Force they can ſend to his aſſiſtance; we have alſo deſired the Governor and Council at *Fort St. George*, to grant them a reinforcement of men, and have taken ſuch meaſures on our own part, as we thought neceſſary to give life and vigour to his cauſe, by writing to the ſeveral Country Powers, and removing the brigade from its ſtation in *Oude*, to the frontier of *Corah*, neareſt *Calpee*.

We wait with impatience the arrival of the further Advices which you promiſed to ſend us, and ſuppoſe they will contain news, either of your having quitted *Poonah*, or that the Miniſters have yielded to your Propoſals, and a Treaty has been concluded with them. On the receipt of this letter, we ſhall write further to you; in the mean time, we ſhall only add, that if this ſhould find you ſtill at *Poonah*, and that no Treaty has yet been finally concluded, you will conform to the Inſtructions which you have already received.

Fort William, 7th March, 1776. (Signed) *W. Haſtings*, &c. Council.

Mr. *Francis*—I would beg leave to recommend it to the Board, that in authorizing the Preſidency of *Bombay* to treat again with *Ragoba*, they may be confined to the agreeing upon preliminary Articles of a Treaty, which Articles they may execute with him; but that the definitive Treaty may be referved to be ſettled and executed with *Ragoba* by this Government, as it is probable that the views of this Council, particularly with regard to Territorial Acquiſitions, may not be ſo extenſive as we have reaſon to think may be propoſed by the *Bombay* Preſidency.

Agreed, That the above Propoſal lie for conſideration till next Council-day.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 109.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th March, 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

READ, and approved, the Conſultation of the 7th inſtant.

The Secretary having read the following Papers and Note from General *Clavering* on Saturday, ſent it, agreeably to his requeſt, in circulation to the other Members of the Board.

General *Clavering* deſires Mr. *Auriel* to circulate to the Governor General, and the other Members of the Council, the incloſed Paper, in order that they may form their opinion on the propoſed meaſure of ſending 30 of the artillery corps, and 50 of the firſt regiment to *Bombay*: the expence, the length of the voyage, and the late ſeaſon at which they can arrive at *Surat*, being taken into conſideration.

He will be able to inform the Board to-morrow, of the quantity of field-pieces and howitzers which are, in ſtore. By the return of the Field *Bombay* Train it appears, that there are

lb.	lb.	lb.	lb.	lb.	lb.
12	6	3	12	6	3

5, 7, 4, of which ſerviceable, 3; in the Field 4 and 4.

It is neceſſary to conſider the pay and batta of the Troops during this voyage, and their eſtabliſhment afterwards. The General recommends to the Governor General and the Members of the Board, to determine what batta ſhould be given to the private men, and what to the officers during the voyage, and after they join the *Bombay* Army, to prevent every occaſion of animoſity on account of the difference in the batta, received by their officers and ours.

The queſtion that ariſes is, Whether, firſt, any ſtoppages ſhould be made from the private, for the proviſions furniſhed to them on board.

2d. Whether any, and what, advance of batta ſhould be made to them to enable them to purchaſe neceſſaries for the voyage.

To enable the Board to decide on the two queſtions, he has procured the beſt information (not having any precedent before him) of what appears to be proper.

That on the ſuppoſition of a voyage of three months, one month's full batta ſhould be paid to the men in advance, and one month after their arrival at *Bombay*, and the third month appropriated towards the payment of their proviſions; afterwards, to conform to the allowances in the *Bombay* ſervice, which he underſtands is the ſame as ours.

With regard to the officers who will be entitled to the full double batta as ſoon as they go on board, it is propoſed that they ſhould have three months paid in advance; and after their arrival at *Bombay*, to be paid only the batta of the officers on that eſtabliſhment, but to have the aſſurance of Government that they will be entitled at their return to the ſame allowances as were given to the detachment which went to the *Decan* in the year 1768.

To whom are the officers to apply for orders when they arrive at *Bombay*? The Preſident and Council, General *Gordon*, or Lieutenant-Colonel *Upton*?

The Board will be pleaſed to decide immediately on theſe points, as the neceſſary orders muſt be given.

I approve entirely of the above propoſals. I think the officers and men of the detachment, ought to be put under the immediate orders of General *Gordon* as ſoon as they join the Army.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings*, *Philip Francis*, *Richd Barwell*.

There are very many inſtances of Troops belonging to one Preſidency ſerving at another. Whatever has been the cuſtom, ſhould be followed as a precedent. The general orders to the Troops while at *Bombay*, muſt, as I conceive, be given by the Governor and Council, and communicated to them by the uſual channel of the Fort Major. The private orders will be given by the ſenior officer of the corps.

(Signed) *Geo. Monſon*.

I approve of the propoſals of ſending a ſmall detachment to *Bombay*, but refer it to the conſideration of the Board, whether it would not be more proper to make the whole detachment to conſiſt of infantry, as there appears, from the return, to be already a number of artillery men at *Bombay*, ſufficient for the ſervice. If the veſſel propoſed to carry the detachment ſhould touch at *Madras*, ſhe will be infallibly detained in her voyage, and obliged to go to the Southern Paſſage, which will prevent her arriving in time to be of real ſervice. The *Indian Queen* being in readineſs to depart immediately, appears the fitteſt veſſel for the purpoſe.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings*, *Richd Barwell*.

I agree

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I agree to the propoſal made by the Commander in Chief, if on farther conſideration he ſhould think the number of artillerymen now at *Bombay* inſufficient.

(Signed) *Philip Francis,*
Geo. Monſon.

Agreed, That two braſs twelve-pounders, two braſs ſix-pounders, with carriages, limbers, tumbrils, and a ſpare elevating ſcrew for each gun, be equally divided on the ſhips *Indian Queen* and *St. Helena.*

Reſolved, That a lieutenant, and a lieutenant fire-worker, with thirty-artillery men, a lieutenant and an enſign, with fifty European infantry, be alſo ſent with the guns on the ſhips above-mentioned—half the number on each ſhip.

Reſolved alſo, That on the arrival of the Troops at *Bombay*, the infantry be put under the command of Captain *Allan M'Pherſon*, who is now with Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*. And

Agreed, That a complete camp equipage be ſent with them.

Agreed alſo, That the quantity of proviſions ſpecified in the above paper, with every thing neceſſary for the voyage, be furniſhed from the reſpective offices, under the direct orders of the Comptroller.

Reſolved, That three months pay and double batta be paid in advance to the officers, from the date of their embarking. That on their arrival at *Bombay*, they ſhall receive the ſame batta as the officers on that eſtabliſhment. And reſolved, That they be aſſured, that on their return they will be entitled to the ſame allowance of batta, as was made to the detachment which went to the *Decan* in 1767.

Agreed, That the officers on their arrival at *Bombay*, ſhall receive their orders from the Preſident and Council, but when in the Field, from the Commander in Chief, if he be preſent, or from the officer commanding on the ſpot.

Agreed, That two months pay and double batta be iſſued to the non-commiſſioned and private of the detachment, one half to be paid to them, the other to remain in the hands of the officer commanding each corps, and to be iſſued on their arrival at *Bombay*, they are afterwards to conform to the allowances in the *Bombay* ſervice.

Mr. *Francis*'s Propoſition in the laſt Conſultation, relative to the limitation of the power to be delegated to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, for negociating a Treaty with *Ragoba*, being now taken into conſideration, is unanimouſly agreed to.

The Board proceed to conſider the Articles propoſed by *Ragoba* in the letter recorded in the laſt conſultation from Colonel *Keating* to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and tranſmitted to this Board by Colonel *Upton*.

Agreed to the Firſt Article.

General *Clavering*—I think the Treaty of *Surat* ſhould be confirmed as far as it relates to *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, and the Iſlands; but I am of opinion that no more territory ſhould be obtained in the neighbourhood of *Broach* or *Surat*, than what will be ſufficient to pay the charges of thoſe two eſtabliſhments. The Country of *Guzzerut*, in which I underſtand is centered a great part of thoſe ceſſions that have been yielded to the Company by *Futty Sing*, is open, and will always require a conſiderable body of troops to defend it. An eſtabliſhment of troops adequate to the protection of ſo large a diſtrict, always expoſed to the incurſions of cavalry, would abſorb the amount of the Revenues that may ariſe from them. This opinion I confeſs, is not conſonant to the Company's Orders, which limited their views on the weſtern ſide of *India* to the Maratta proportion of the *Surat* Revenues, but at that time *Broach* had not been taken, and the ſame reaſons which in the year 1769 influenced the Court of Directors to obtain the Maratta porportion of *Surat*, I cannot doubt would now prevail with them to acquire a ſufficient territory to ſupport the expence of *Broach*, had a Treaty with the Maratta State come under their conſideration ſince that time.

Governor General—I think it will be proper to confirm the Treaty as it ſtands. The Countries yielded by the Territory in the neighbourhood of *Broach* and *Surat*, appear to me of too little importance either to be inſiſted on, or relinquiſhed, unleſs the poſſeſſion of them ſhould be an impediment to the new Treaty.

Mr. *Francis*—As I unite the idea of ſecurity to that of acquiſition, it has been my invariable opinion, which I believe conforms to the declared policy of the Company, that the territorial poſſeſſions on the weſtern ſide of *India* ſhould be confined to *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, and the other ſmall Iſlands near *Bombay*, the entire Revenue of *Broach*, and a territory round *Broach* and *Surat* ſufficient to ſupport the expence of the Company's Eſtabliſhment in thoſe places. If however it ſhould be the opinion of the majority of the Board to accept for the preſent, (and in order to ſupport the immediate expences of the War) of the additional conceſſions propoſed by *Ragoba*; I ſhall not oppoſe it, as it will depend upon this Government, or the Company, to relinquiſh them hereafter.

Mr. *Barwell* agrees to accept this Article.

Colonel *Monſon*—The peremptory and haſty refuſal of the *Poonah* Durbar to the propoſals of this Government for Peace, leaves us no alternative; I therefore am of opinion, that all advantages tendered to the Company for their aſſiſtance in this War ſhould be accepted. I ſhould act on different principles, had we had option as to what conduct we might purſue. There can be no harm in accepting any ceſſation, as the Company may at any time, if they think them improper, relinquiſh them. I agree to accept this Article of the Treaty.

General *Clavering*.—I cannot agree to accept of more territory till the Court of Directors pleaſure be known upon it. At the ſame time I admit, that the acquiſition of the *Concany* Country would be very convenient, both for the ſupport of *Bombay* in time of War, for the ſupply of proviſions, and likewiſe a great protection to *Salſette*, in order that it may become an uſeful conqueſt to the Company, but I think myſelf bound by the peremptory Orders of the Company with regard to the acquiſition of territorial poſſeſſions not to yield my conſent to it.

Governor General—I diſapprove of accepting this ceſſion, as it will extend our poſſeſſions to a diſtance unwarranted by the general ſpirit of the Company's Orders, and diſproportional to our means of defence.

Agreed, That the Second Article be not accepted, as it would extend our poſſeſſions to a diſtance not warranted by the ſpirit of the Company's Orders.

To the Third Article.

The Board having reſolved not to accept the country, the gaut is unneceſſary.

To the 4th Article.

The Governor General obſerves, that this ſhould be totally diſapproved, as it can by no means be enforced but ſuch as would render the Company obnoxious to every perſon of conſequence in the Maratta State, whoſe confidence and attachment it is our intereſt to conciliate, not to alienate them from us by an oppoſition of intereſts and an encroachment on their rights.

Mr. *Francis* objects to it for the ſame reaſon.

Mr. *Barwell*—I would accept of it.

Colonel *Monſon* rejects it, becauſe he thinks it would involve the Company in a conſtant ſcene of War with the Maratta Jaghiredars.

General *Clavering* objects to it.

Agreed, That it be rejected, as it could be enforced by no means, but ſuch as would render the Company obnoxious to every Jaghiredar in the Maratta State, whoſe confidence

confidence and attachment it is the Company's intereſt to conciliate, not alienate by an oppoſition of intereſt, and by encroachments on their rights.

To the 5th Article.

Mr. *Francis*—I ſuppoſe that prime coſt includes all expences to the landing of the cloth in *India*, and I agree to it.

Mr. *Barwell* agrees to it.

Colonel *Monſon*—In conſequence of our relinquiſhing the advantageous offers made in the former Articles, I think the quantity ſhould be increaſed to 15 lacks.

Mr. *Barwell* acquieſces in Colonel *Monſon*'s propoſition.

General *Clavering*—I conſider *Ragoba*'s ſituation to have been ſo deſperate when he made theſe propoſitions, that I am afraid little dependance can be placed on the performance of them. When he is reinſtated, I cannot object to offers which are ſo evidently advantageous both to the Company and to *Great Britain*.

Governor General approves of this, if it can be obtained with the free and unconditional aſſent of *Ragoba*.

Agreed to.

To the 6th Article.

Agreed to, underſtanding the putting *Ragonaut Row* in poſſeſſion of *Poonah* to be the ultimate object of the Treaty, and of all the operations entered into with him.

To the 7th Article.

Rejected. The ſupply of ten lacks of rupees, which the Board have already reſolved to ſend to the Preſidency at *Bombay*, being all they have in their power to ſpare, they expect that it be ſolely appropriated to the military operations of that Preſidency.

Article the 8th not agreed to.

To the 9th Article.

Agreed, that the monthly ſubſidy to be paid for the troops furniſhed by the Company, be fixed at two lacks per month, without reference to the number in the Field; but in conſideration of this, we will aſſiſt him with our Forces in all parts of *Hindoſtan* and the *Decan*, which will produce a much greater expence to the Company.

To the 10th Article.

The Board cannot agree to bind the Company to ſuch extenſive engagements as thoſe ſpecified in this Article; but as the whole is now going home to the Court of Directors, their orders ſhall be requeſted upon this Article.

Agreed, That another letter be written to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, incloſing a copy of the above Articles, with the Reſolutions of the Board upon them, and directing them to conclude a preliminary Treaty with *Ragoba* agreeable thereto.

The letter to *Bombay* having been drawn up by the Secretary, he ſent it in circulation for the approbation of the Board, as follows:

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council, at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

Underſtanding from the returns of your ordnance, which have been laid before us by the Commander in Chief, that you will have occaſion for field pieces to proſecute the War, we have ſent by the *Indian Queen* and *Saint Helena*, two braſs twelve-pounders and two braſs ſix-pounders, with an equal number of carriages, limbers, and tumbrils, alſo a ſpare elevating ſcrew to each gun; we have alſo embarked a lieutenant and a lieutenant fireworker of artillery, with thirty artillery men, a lieutenant and enſign, with fifty European infantry, and a complete ſet of camp equipage. This force is equally divided on each veſſel; and we have appointed Captain *Allan M'Pherſon* to the command of the infantry on their arrival at *Bombay*. We have agreed for their paſſage at 2½ rupees per man per day, and have furniſhed them with proviſions and other neceſſaries for the voyage, agreeable to the incloſed account; if any overplus ſhould remain, you will receive it from the commanders. Appendix. No. 110.

We have received from Colonel *Upton*, and read with attention, the letter which Colonel *Keating* addreſſed you, under date 24th January, containing propoſals from *Ragoba* for a new treaty; but conſidering the circumſtances under which they were drawn up, we wiſh in general to decline accepting them. Our ſentiments are expreſſed upon each ſeparate article, and we tranſmit a copy of them for your information. We authorize you to conclude a preliminary Treaty with *Ragoba*, conformably to the conditions now agreed to, and thoſe contained in the Treaty of *Surat*, and deſire that you will tranſmit the new Treaty ſo concluded to us, as we mean to make it the baſis of a definitive one, which we propoſe to execute with him ourſelves. You will aſſure *Ragoba* at the ſame time, that we do not mean by this mode to exact further conceſſions from him, or to enlarge the conditions; of this our intention he may be convinced, if he conſiders how ready we have been to relinquiſh ſpontaneouſly moſt of the advantageous offers which he made through Colonel *Keating*, but we do it with a view of rendering the engagements more ſolemn, obligatory, and laſting.

We preſume you underſtand of courſe, that the part we take in the preſent War, and the aſſiſtance we mean to afford to *Ragoba*, are founded on the ſuppoſition, that he does not depart from ſuch of the conditions propoſed by himſelf as we have aſſented to.

We are, &c.

(Signed)

Fort William,
11th March 1776.

APPENDIX, No. 110.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th March 1776.

ORDERED, That the Liſt of Stores be entered after the Conſultation.

General *Clavering* having propoſed the following additional paragraph to the above letter, the ſecretary forwarded the ſame to the Governor General, and the other Members of the Board, and received back their ſeparate opinions, as follow the paragraph.

Additional paragraph propoſed by General *Clavering* to the letter to *Bombay*.

" We ſhall direct Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to ſend " the two companies of Sepoys, under the command of " Captain *Wroe*, which he took with him as his eſcort, " to ſtrengthen your army, and to command the " Troops from this Preſidency; and recommend it to " you that he may be appointed ſecond in command " in your army; his military talents may be exerted " uſefully in that ſtation, under Brigadier General *Gor-* " *don*; perhaps he may be able to augment the two " companies at *Surat* to a complete battalion. In that " caſe we doubt not but you will afford him all the aſſiſt- " ance in your power with the Chief at that place."

If this paragraph be approved of, and the meaſure included in the letter to *Bombay*, Colonel *Upton* ought to be made acquainted with the military arrangements that have taken place, and are propoſed from this Preſidency with reſpect to the third battalion to be detached from the brigade in the Province of *Owde*, to join *Madajee Holcar*, &c. and to acquaint him, that we ſhall direct the officer who may be appointed to command thoſe three battalions, to join the *Bombay* Army on the firſt favourable occaſion; under which circumſtances the command of thoſe battalions will of courſe devolve upon

Appendix. No. 110.

upon Colonel *Upton*, as belonging to the Troops from this Presidency.

J. Clavering.

Agreed to. (Signed) *Geo. Monson.*
P. Francis.

I object. (Signed) *Richd Barwell.*

I entirely disapprove of the proposition; and that I may not detain the letter to *Bombay*, I shall deliver my objections in a separate minute, with such other observations as I shall judge it necessary to make on the present draft of the letter to *Bombay*.

(Signed) *Warren Hastings.*

The above paragraph having been approved by a majority of the Board, it was accordingly inserted in the letter to *Bombay*, and the following letter was in consequence thereof written to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We desire that you will send the two companies of Sepoys, which you took as an escort from hence into the field, under the command of Captain *Wroe*, to strengthen the army with *Ragoba*. We have embarked fifty artillery men and fifty European infantry from the Presidency for *Bombay*, and have appointed Captain *M'Pherson* to command the latter, on their arrival. The chief command of all the troops which we may furnish, will of course belong to you; and we have recommended it to the President and Council at *Bombay*, to appoint you second in command of the army with *Ragoba*, under General *Gordon*.

In case you should have it in your power, by recruiting new Sepoys, to augment your two companies to a complete battalion, we think this measure adviseable. We have removed the brigade in *Oude* to the frontier in the Provinces of *Corah*, neareſt *Calpee*, and authorized the commanding officer to detach a force, not exceeding three battalions of Sepoys, to the assistance of *Madajee Scindia*, or *Tuckoojee Holcar*, if they should make a requisition for them in support of the cause of *Ragoba*. In case of such a detachment being sent, we shall order the commanding officer to take the first favourable opportunity of joining the *Bombay* Army, when the command of them also will of course devolve on you.

We are, &c.

Fort William, (Signed)
11th March 1766.

The Governor General having sent the following note to the Secretary, with his dissent to the above appointment, it was circulated, and returned, with the opinions of the different Members as follow the dissent.

To *T. P. Auriol*, Esquire.

Sir,

I send you inclosed my dissent from the paragraph in the letter to *Bombay*, regarding Colonel *Upton*, which I desire may be sent round, and entered on the Consultations to go home by this dispatch.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,

14th March 1776. (Signed) *Warren Hastings.*

I am sorry that so early an occasion should have presented itself, to compel me to object to any measure proposed by the majority of the Board, for the conduct of so important a service, as that in which we are now likely to be engaged; but how studiously soever I may endeavour to avoid an appearance of disagreement in ordinary cases, the present is of a nature and tendency which will not admit of such an acquiescence, without a sacrifice of my duty. I therefore declare my dissent from the resolution of the Board, as it is expressed in the letter to the President and Council of *Bombay*, of the 11th instant, in recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, for the eventual command of the army employed by that Presidency, against the Marattas; for the following reasons:

1st. Because a recommendation from this Government to that of *Bombay*, under the present circumstances of their affairs, and the consequences, both public and personal, which they will have cause to apprehend from a refusal to comply with it, has all the effect of an order.

2dly. Because this Government has no right to order or to prescribe to that of *Bombay*, the appointment to commands on their own service, nor any other measure of detail.

3dly. Because they cannot comply with such an order, without a deviation from the practice of the military service; and a breach of the Company's orders, which ought not especially to receive encouragement from the controlling Government.

4thly. Because Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* is junior in rank to three officers on that establishment, namely, Colonel *Egerton*, Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and Lieutenant Colonel *Hay*, of whose abilities this Board have had no experience, and cannot therefore be the judges.

5thly. Because this board have had no experience, and cannot be the judges of the comparative merits and abilities of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, which ought to have been established by unquestionable proofs, to entitle him to so extraordinary and invidious a preference.

6thly. Because it is contrary to the very principle on which the Board have already censured the President and Council of *Bombay*, for their partial appointment of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* to the command, in prejudice to the rights of General *Gordon*, and contrary to that declared to them on this occasion, in the following words, "The occasion is too critical and important to "suffer us to stand on personal respects," unless it can be clearly demonstrated that personal respects were not the inducement for the recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

7thly. Because it cannot fail to give high disgust not only to those officers who are immediately superseded by Colonel *Upton*, but to every other officer on the establishment, who will naturally look upon it, as a precedent which may operate hereafter to the general prejudice of the service, exclusively of the concern which every military man of spirit must feel for the honour of the corps of which he is a member; and surely this is not a time to give offence to those on whose zeal and attachment to the service, the safety of the Company's interests so essentially depends.

8thly. Because the immediate conduct and responsibility of the War depend wholly on the Presidency of *Bombay*, and the latter more especially, since the solemn Protest and Declaration signified to them in the letter from this Government, of the and 6th instant; but to dictate to them the irregular choice of an officer for the command of their army, is to preclude them from the means, and discharge them from the responsibility, since he will consider himself, and be considered by them, as supported by an authority superior to that under which he immediately acts, and therefore less accountable to them for his conduct, than one of their own nomination.

Lastly. Because the service on which Colonel *Upton* was originally employed, must obviously impress *Ragoba* with prejudices against him, and with suspicions of his attachment; and universal experience has shewn, that nothing has a more fatal tendency to defeat the success of great public measures, than a misunderstanding between those who are immediately charged with their execution. I think it but a justice due to Colonel *Upton*, and to myself, to declare, that though I have strongly objected to the indulgence, which it has proposed to shew

him, I have no perſonal diſlike to him. On the contrary, I hold him in great eſteem, becauſe I know him to be poſſeſſed of the general eſteem of his brother officers, which is the beſt teſt in default of experience, of an officer's real merits.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

The proteſt entered by the Governor General, to the letter written to the Government of *Bombay*, recommending Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to be appointed ſecond in command in their army, is grounded on a fact ſo very erroneous, that one cannot help ſuppoſing that in the hurry of his buſineſs, he has not given it an attentive peruſal.

He is pleaſed to ſay, that Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* is recommended to the eventual command; whereas the words are, that he is recommended to be ſecond in command, that the chief command is of courſe to devolve to him. Any one of the officers whom Mr. *Haſtings* has mentioned, may be ordered, on the death or removal of the chief, to take the command, without deviating from the expreſs ſenſe of the recommendation contained in our letter. As this Government is now ſending troops to join the *Bombay* Army, it is proper that an officer of rank ſhould command them. The two companies when augmented to a battalion, as the ſame letter imports, will, together with the Europeans detached from this Preſidency, form a body equal to a third of the forces in the field; and will be more than equal to them, if the three battalions which it is propoſed ſhould act with *Madagee Sindia* and *Tocojee Holcar*, ſhould ever join them.

But Mr. *Haſtings* now urges that this Government has no right to order or to preſcribe to that of *Bombay* the appointment to command in their own ſervice, or any other meaſures of detail. That this was not Mr. *Haſtings's* ſentiments on the 7th inſtant, the Conſultations will bear witneſs. He dictated the intentions of the Board to remove Colonel *Keating*, and to appoint Brigadier *Gordon*, in terms ſo harſh, that one of the Members objected to them; and on that account they were ſoftened.

Mr. *Haſtings* may plead on this occaſion, as he has done on others, when he has altered his opinion, that he endeavours to adopt the ſenſe of the Board when it is not totally repugnant to his own. This plan of conduct is evidently a ſafe one, becauſe it may accommodate itſelf to every future contingency. A few months hence he may diſapprove the meaſures that we are now taking to ſupport *Ragoba*, as he did thoſe which the Board unanimouſly adopted at firſt to oppoſe him.

Mr. *Haſtings* declares that he has no perſonal diſlike to Colonel *Upton*; but on the contrary, that he eſteems him. The diſlike and eſteem which is here denied and affirmed, may be weighed againſt each other by the words of the context, and credit given to that which ſhall preponderate. In one ſcale may be placed the allegation of inexperience, which to an officer is highly detrimental to his credit; and in the other, Mr. *Haſtings's* profeſſion of eſteem, becauſe he ſays he is poſſeſſed of the general eſteem of his brother officers; whether Mr. *Haſting's* profeſſion of eſteem thus eſtabliſhed, can compenſate the attempt to hurt an officer's reputation, muſt be left to Colonel *Upton* himſelf to determine; he knows his ſervices, and how unjuſtly they are depreciated. To efface, however, any impreſſion which may be made to Colonel *Upton's* diſadvantage during his abſence, by Mr. *Haſtings's* ſuggeſtion, it is ſufficient only to mention, that he was bred up in the King's Army; and on his arrival in *India*, was immediately employed on the expedition to the *Deccan*, under the command of Colonel *Peach*.

(Signed) *J. Clavering.*

The Governor General, in his diſſent to the letter to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, appears to me to have entirely miſunderſtood the recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton's* ſervices to them. The words of the letter are, "We recommend it to you that he (Colonel *Upton*) may be appointed ſecond in command in your army; his military talents may be exerted uſefully in that ſtation, under Brigadier General *Gordon*." This expreſſion by no means gives the eventual command of the army to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*: in combined armies the ranks of officers are according to the dates of their commiſſion. I conſider the forces of the different Preſidencies, when united, to form an army of that nature. I therefore think Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* has a right to the rank derived from the date of his commiſſion at this Preſidency, when he ſhall be ſerving in any army where a part of the troops of this Preſidency are employed.

If Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* were to be ordered away, and the troops of this Preſidency continued on the *Bombay* ſervice, it would be an implied cenſure on him in this Preſidency. The Governor in his fourth objection has miſtated a fact; for Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* is ſenior in rank to two out of the three officers which he has mentioned. Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* has ſerved many years with an unimpeached reputation; and candour obliges me to think him, and I ever ſhall (until his public conduct may give juſt reaſon to alter my opinion) an officer to be truſted with the conduct of any command that his rank may entitle him to.

(Signed) *Geo. Monſon.*

I again object to the additional paragraph propoſed by General *Clavering*; and I think the Governor-General perfectly right in the objections he makes to the Recommendation of Colonel *Upton*.

(Signed) *R. Barwell.*

In military appointments, the recommendation of the Commander in Chief will always have conſiderable weight with me, as I think it ought to have with the Board. I have no knowledge, nor do I pretend to be a judge of Colonel *Upton's* merits as an officer; I therefore yield implicitly to the preſent opinion of General *Clavering*, who is the proper official judge of the neceſſary qualifications for a military command, ſince I have no perſonal knowledge of my own to oppoſe to it. A great part of the Governor's objections to Colonel *Upton*, ſeems to be founded on a miſtake of terms and facts. It is not expreſſed or meant that Colonel *Upton* ſhould command in chief in caſe of the removal of General *Gordon*; and I take for granted that Colonel *Monſon* is not miſtaken when he aſſerts, that he is ſenior in rank to two of the three officers mentioned by the Governor, neither is our recommendation of Colonel *Upton*, in my opinion, equivalent to an abſolute order. At the ſame time I expect it will be complied with, ſince, independent of the ſuperior authority veſted in this Council, it would be highly unreaſonable that, even on the footing of a combined army, the party from which the chief ſupport of the common cauſe is expected, ſhould have no officer in that army on whom they can directly depend. There is no ground for ſuppoſing that Colonel *Upton* will oppoſe or counteract that authority under which he is immediately placed, much leſs that the ſervice on which he was originally employed, muſt impreſs *Ragoba* with prejudices againſt him, and with ſuſpicions of his attachment. After failing in a Negociation for Peace, which he undoubtedly had at heart, it ſeems probable that the obſtinacy of the Miniſters, to which he will attribute his want of ſucceſs, will have filled his mind with diſguſt and reſentment. I have a right to oppoſe one ſuppoſition to another, and on this ground conclude that Colonel *Upton* will be cordially received by *Ragoba*, as a man ſlighted and diſappointed by the other party.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

The Governor General's diſſent having been returned to him agreeable to his deſire, with the ſeveral obſerva-

tions

Appendix. No. 111.

tions of the different Members for his information, he ſent them back, with the following note to the Secretary.

I deſire the Secretary to ſend round my reply to the Minutes concerning the recommendation of Colonel *Upton*, that it may be recorded with them in this place.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

If I have miſunderſtood the intention of the Board in their Recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, the explanations which have been furniſhed me of it have not enabled me to diſcover my miſtake, ſince I ſtill conceive an appointment of ſecond in command to be the ſame in effect as an appointment to the eventual command.

I readily acknowledge the error which has been pointed out to me by Colonel *Monſon*, with reſpect to the ranks of Lieutenant Colonels *Cockburn* and *Hay*. I had been informed, that the dates of thoſe gentlemen's commiſſions were prior to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton's*; but I ſince underſtand the contrary from the ſame authority, on which I can ſafely rely. This removes a part, yet but a ſmall part of my objections. It was for the purpoſe of amending this part of my Minute that I wrote to the Secretary to return it; but I did not receive it back until the other Members had written their replies to it.

I ſhould be ſorry to waſte my own time, or to lay claim to that of the Court of Directors, by a minute refutation of the General's arguments; but I am compelled, in my own juſtification, to reply to a fact aſſerted by him, which is directly contrary to my reſolution of it. He ſays, that I "dictated the intentions of the Board to remove Colonel *Keating*, and to appoint Brigadier General *Gordon*, in terms ſo harſh that one of the Members objected to them, and on that account they were ſoftened."

As I remember this ſubject, and I think I can venture to truſt to my remembrance of it, the propoſal of recommending the removal of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, and the appointment of General *Gordon* to the command, originated with one of the other Members of the Board. I myſelf objected to the terms, in which it was propoſed, as pronouncing a ſevere cenſure on Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, in which we were not warranted by any proofs before us.

The firſt draft of the letter to *Bombay* was not written or dictated by me. In that the paſſage relative to the preſent ſubject ſtood thus:

"As the general conduct of this war, and proviſion of reſources for carrying it on, now remain with us, and the honour and intereſt of the Company are ſo deeply concerned in the operations of the army, we think it proper to inform you, that we cannot place ſo much confidence in the knowledge and ſkill of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, as to truſt the future operations of the war to his charge: we therefore expect, and inſiſt upon it, that you aſſign the command of the army to General *Gordon*, and direct him immediately to join the troops with *Ragoba*," &c.—This paſſage I eraſed entirely when the Secretary brought the draft to me for correction, and ſubſtituted the following in its ſtead: "Although we ſhall leave the detail and immediate conduct of the war entirely to your direction, while the ſcene of its operations lies in your neighbourhood, yet, as we are intruſted with the general controul, and ultimate charge of it, as it is likely from the nature of it, to involve the Company's Poſſeſſions in every part of *India*, and the means of conducting it muſt principally reſt in the reſources of this Government, we think it incumbent upon us, to require and inſiſt that you aſſign the command of the army to General *Gordon*, whom alone we deem fit to be intruſted with a charge of ſuch conſequence to the intereſt, honour, and ſafety of the Company, by whoſe expreſs choice, and nomination, he was appointed to it. We alſo recommend, that you give him immediate orders to join the troops with *Ragoba*," &c.

This Extract is ſufficient to ſhew the principle, on which I joined in the recommendation of General *Gordon*, for the command of the *Bombay* Forces, and to prove that my opinions have been conſiſtent.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

APPENDIX, No. 111.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th March 1776.

MR. *TAYLER* ſends in the following letter:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Members of the Council at *Calcutta*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen.

As the refuſal of the Miniſters, to treat on ſatisfactory terms, has determined you to embrace the cauſe of *Ragoba*, and to commit the entire management of all future tranſactions with him to the Government of *Bombay*, I beg leave to repreſent to you, that before they are entirely terminated, many points of diſcuſſion may ariſe with different perſons, which will require much local knowledge of affairs in the weſt of *India*: as from my long reſidence, and the ſhare I have for ſome years paſt had in the adminiſtration of *Bombay*, I may make bold to ſay, that I poſſeſs this requiſite knowledge. You have done me the honour to make me fully acquainted with your views and ſentiments, and I have alſo been publicly deputed from the Government of *Bombay* to repreſent the Company's particular views and intereſts at that Preſidency; ſhould you, from theſe different circumſtances, deem me fit for the important charge of conducting future Negociations, I beg leave to tender my ſervices on this occaſion, not doubting, from the confidence ſhewn in the particular ſelection of me, and the approbation they have teſtified of my proceedings, the Governor of *Bombay* will readily concur in opinion with you, regarding the propriety of it.

I beg leave to obſerve, that as the future conduct of affairs is to be entruſted with the Governor of *Bombay*, they alone will become reſponſible for events; it ſeems but reaſonable therefore, that they ſhould have perſons on whom they can abſolutely depend, and in ſome ſhape command, employed under them; by your appointment of me, they will be perfectly ſatisfied in this point; and I beg leave further to remark, that as it may ſeem now material to impreſs the Peiſhwa with a confidence in us, my return to him, after having been eſpecially deputed to promote his pretenſions, will go far to effect this end.

Should you think fit, Gentlemen, to accept this offer of my ſervices, beſides the credit I ſhould hope to obtain by it with my honourable employers, the honour you do me in repoſing this confidence, will be a ſtrong additional incitement to exert all the ability and activity I may be poſſeſſed of, to ſettle matters in the weſt of *India* on the moſt permanent footing; and ſo much convinced as I am of your deſire to bring them to a ſpeedy concluſion, I beg leave to aſſure you, that this ſhall be a particular object of my attention, for which purpoſe I will proceed by the moſt expeditious route to join the Peiſhwa.

As by the preſent appearance of things I do not now ſee the neceſſity of my further ſtay here, I purpoſe, if it is agreeable to you, at any rate returning to *Bombay*; and take this opportunity to aſſure you, that I entertain the moſt grateful ſenſe of the many marks of reſpect and civility with which you have publicly and individually honoured and obliged me, during my reſidence here; I return you my thanks for them; and with the ſincereſt wiſhes that ſucceſs may attend all your undertakings,

I remain, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Calcutta, 11th March 1776. Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
W. Tayler.

Agreed, That the following reply be written to *Mr. Tayler*.

To *William Tayler*, Eſquire.

Sir,

We have received the letter which you this day wrote to us.

Having already adviſed the Preſident and Council at *Bombay* very fully of our ſentiments in reſpect to the future Treaty to be entered into with *Ragonaut Row*, we think that it would be improper to charge you with any ſeparate commiſſion from this Government to negociate with him; but we leave it to you to return to *Bombay* in whatever manner you may judge moſt expedient, and to act according to the orders which you may receive from that Preſidency. We wiſh you a ſafe and pleaſant journey, and remain,

Sir,

Fort William, Your moſt obedient Servants,
the 11th March 1776. G'. G'. & C°.

APPENDIX, No. 112.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations,
the 1ſt April 1776.

General *Clavering* having propoſed the two following paragraphs to be added to the general Letter to be diſpatched by the *Talbot*, they were circulated, and returned to the Secretary, with the Minutes which follow them, and inſerted in the letter.

" As it does not ſeem clear to us, that either by the Act of Parliament, or by the Charter, a power is given to the Judges to iſſue a writ of Habeas Corpus, we ſubmit it to your opinion to take the ſentiments of your ſtanding council on this point.

" Some part of the conduct of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* ſeems not to be free from objection. Whilſt they were under the injunctions of our orders, to obſerve the ſuſpenſion of arms, and to withdraw their army into their own garriſons, or at leaſt into the Pergunnahs belonging to them, Colonel *Keating* had furniſhed two eighteen pounders for the ſiege of *Amadabad*, and the Company's Troops remained the whole time encamped with thoſe of *Ragoba*."

I declare, that for my own part, I have no doubt of the powers inherent in the Supreme Court to iſſue writs of Habeas, but I cannot object to the reference propoſed to be made upon this point to the Court of Directors, if any other Member of the Board think that the Court are not poſſeſſed of ſuch a power.

I believe it will appear, that the ſiege of *Amadabad* was begun, and the two pieces of battering cannon lent for the ſervice, before the order arrived with Colonel *Keating* for the ceſſation of arms; that on the receipt of that order, *Ragoba*, at the inſtance of Colonel *Keating*, ſent orders to diſcontinue the ſiege. How thoſe orders were obeyed does not appear.

It is paſt a doubt that our forces did remain with *Ragoba*, becauſe he could not accompany them, nor be ſecure againſt hoſtilities if he had remained behind and they had quitted him. If this paragraph is agreed to I deſire that a copy of the letter from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, dated the 29th December 1775, which contains their reaſons for this meaſure, may be ſent a number in the packet, for the fuller information of the Court of Directors.

(Signed) *W. H.*
R. B.

I have no objection to the queſtion mentioned in the firſt of the two paragraphs propoſed by General *Clavering*, being ſtated as matter of doubt to the Court of Directors, if any Member of the Board has a doubt on the ſubject. For my own part, I cannot ſuppoſe that a Court veſted with ſuch extraordinary powers as thoſe of the Supreme Court of Judicature, ſhould want one ſo material to the liberty of the ſubject, and which, in *England*, is truſted to every Judge of the King's Bench and Common Pleas; I mean always when the perſon in whoſe favour the writ of Habeas Corpus is granted is legally an object of the juriſdiction of the Court. Appendix. No. 112.

I agree to the ſecond paragaph, and to the Governor General's motion thereupon.

(Signed) *P. F.*

If there be any doubts in the mind of any of the Members of the Board, with regard to the right of the power of the Supreme Court, to iſſue writs of Habeas Corpus, the reference may be made as ſtated by the General.

I think the ſecond paragraph ſhould be inſerted in the general letter, and I agree to the Governor General's motion.

(Signed) *G. Monſon.*

The following letter from *Bombay*, with its incloſures, was received ſince laſt Council, and circulated with a propoſal from General *Clavering*, that a letter ſhould be written to *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

On the 21ſt inſtant we were favoured with your letter dated the 20th October.

Colonel *Upton* has not yet imparted to us any intelligence of the progreſs or ſtate of his Negociation, but we have given him every information that we think can prove of ſervice to him in bringing it to a happy concluſion.

We have very ſtrongly urged to the Colonel, the propriety of inſiſting upon the Miniſters confirming our Treaty with *Ragoba* in every article, and ſettling honourable and ſatisfactory terms for him. We cannot more fully explain our reaſoning and ſentiments on this ſubject, than we have in the incloſed copy of our letter to him, to which we therefore beg leave to refer you.

A continuation of our correſpondence with Colonel *Keating* ſince the 29th ultimo, is now incloſed with duplicates of the papers tranſmitted with our addreſs of that date.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *Wm Hornby*,
20th January 1776. Preſident, &c. Council.

Ordered, That the incloſures be abſtracted, and entered after the Conſultation.

The foregoing letter having been returned from circulation to the Secretary, he prepared the draft of a letter to *Bombay*, which he circulated for the approbation of the Board, and received back the minutes which follow it.

Gentlemen,

Since cloſing our letter to you of yeſterday we have received yours of the 28th January.

From your correſpondence with Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, which was incloſed in it, we are concerned to obſerve that the Miniſters at *Poonah* did not complain without reaſon of hoſtilities on the part of *Ragoba*, after the ceſſation of arms had been proclaimed. His perſiſting with any appearance of our concurrence after the period in the ſiege of *Amadabad*, is a circumſtance ſo inconſiſtent with the general aſſurances which have been repeatedly given by us, that we cannot avoid taking notice of it. It further appears by Colonel *Keating*'s letter of the 4th November, that two of the Company's field cannon of 18-pounders, had been employed againſt that fort, which is an additional matter of ſurprize and concern to us, as it muſt at leaſt convey the idea, that the ſiege was carried on with your aid and participation, and that we connived at it. We think, for your honour and ours, that this matter ſhould be cleared up, and that if Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* acted therein without your ſanc-

Appendix. No. 112

tion, he ſhould be made accountable for his deviation from the orders which you had given him to forbear all hoſtilities.

We are ſorry likewiſe to remark that our injunctions were not better obſerved for withdrawing our troops within your own Diſtricts. It is needleſs to urge to you the neceſſity of a compliance at all times with the general orders that we ſend to you, as without it the controlling authority veſted in us would become abſolutely nugatory, and rather tend to embarraſs the Company's affairs than promote them.

We are, &c.

I object to the letter propoſed to be written to *Bombay*, becauſe I am of opinion that the correſpondence between the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, does not afford grounds for charging either *Ragoba* or Colonel *Keating*, with having committed hoſtilities after the ceſſation of arms had been proclaimed, but it is very evident that the miniſterial forces did commit hoſtilities in more than one inſtance.

I cannot ſubſcribe to the cenſure paſt upon the Preſidency of *Bombay*, for ſuffering their army to remain with *Ragoba* after the orders received from this Board, becauſe I think they would have been highly culpable had they abandoned him.

(Signed) *W. H.* *R. B.*

I approve the letter to *Bombay*, as Colonel *Keating*'s correſpondence furniſh the declarations which are made in it.

(Signed) *G. M.*

Extract of the continuation of the Correſpondence with Colonel *Keating*, from the 4th November, 1775, to 25th January, 1776.

Letter from, dated *Kiſnapoor*, 4th November, 1775. — The Peiſhwa ſatisfied with the terms of the Governor General and Council. The attack of *Amadabad* begun previous to the agreement for a ceſſation of hoſtilities. Difference between *Futty Sing* and *Govind Row*, adjuſted.

Letter from, dated *Bowoon*, 13th November - — *Futty Sing* has conſented to give *Pitlad* to *Govind Row*.

Letter from, dated *Wrgaehaw*, 20th November - — Thinks encamping at *Candeiſh* will be preferable to the *Chicolly* Pergunnah.

Letter to, dated 2d December - - - - - - — To obtain from *Futty Sing* the four aſſigooms in the heart of the Pergunnah of *Broach*: alſo to prevail on him to make a ceſſion of the remaining eight in the room of *Sinor*.

Letter from, dated *Corrode*, 26th November - - — The Peiſhwa refuſes marching his army into *Chicolly* Pergunnah.

Letter from, dated 29th November - - - - - — *Buckebah* will join the Peiſhwa with five thouſand good troops on his arrival in the *Candeiſh* Country.

Letter from the Peiſhwa to Colonel *Keating*, 25th November. — His reaſon for not marching the troops into the *Chicolly* Pergunnah.

Letter from Colonel *Keating* to the Peiſhwa, 26th November. — Strenuouſly recommending him to proceed to *Chickley*.

Letter from the Peiſhwa to Colonel *Keating* - - — Is determined not to march to *Chickly*.

Letter to, dated 6th December - - - - - - — Conſents to the troops remaining at *Corrode*, but cannot comply with *Ragoba*'s propoſal for marching them into the *Candeiſh* Country.

Letter from, dated *Corrode*, 8th December - - — The Peiſhwa much dejected.

Letter from, dated 22d December - - - - — Has obtained a ſunnud from *Futty Sing* for the Pergunnah of *Batta*; has great hopes of obtaining the four villages of the Autgom. The miniſterialiſts have violated the ceſſation of arms.

Letter from, dated *Corrode*, 24th December - — A party of the miniſterial forces has advanced within five coſs of their camps, and attacked *Monackjee Sindia* when hunting.

Letter from, dated *Corrode*, 28th December - - — *Monackjee Scindia* has made his eſcape from the miniſterial party—The Nizam wavering in his conduct.

Letter to, dated 8th January, 1776 - - - - — Poſitively forbid committing any acts of hoſtility. Require full information relative to the complaint made by the Miniſters, of ſmall parties being detached for plundering the villages.

Letter from, dated *Corrode*, 5th January - - - — The Peiſhwa delegates his authority to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, to treat with Colonel *Upton*.

Letter from, dated near *Mandavia*, 13th January — Had forwarded the Sunnud obtained from *Futty Sing* for batta to *Surat*.

Ditto, ditto, ditto, 18th January. — Information relative to the complaint mentioned in the letter to him of the 8th inſtant.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, &c. Eſquire, Council, *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Agreeable to your orders, communicated to me by your Secretary, I now proceed to inform your Honour, &c. how the Honourable Company's two iron eighteen pounder cannon came to be employed in the ſiege of *Ahmadabad*, and why the ſiege was continued after the ceſſation of arms took place.

Early in the month of July 1775, and long ere the ceſſation of arms was thought of by me, *Ragonaut Bajerow* acquainted me, "That he had determined on "the reduction of *Bowſett*, a fort then in the poſſeſſion "of the miniſterial party, about twelve coſs from "*Cambay*; that he had appointed *Ameen Khân*, a parti- "zan of note, to command this ſervice, and deſired I "would furniſh him with the two eighteen pounder iron "cannon then at *Cambay*;" as I knew that *Bowſett* might be eaſily reduced, alſo that it was of great conſequence to *Ragonaut Bajerow* to have poſſeſſion thereof, I readily agreed to his requeſt, the more ſo, being ſenſible that the wiſh of your Honour, &c. was to ſupport him to the utmoſt. *Ameen Khân* received the cannon, three

three hundred ſhot, and twenty barrels of powder, by my deſire, from Mr. *Malet*, and proceeded to *Mamadabhad*; there he was ſucceſsful, as I had the honour to acquaint you under 25th Auguſt. Flushed with this ſucceſs, inſtead of purſuing his firſt deſign, *Ameen Khân* marched againſt, and formed the ſiege of *Ahmedabhad*.

As ſoon as the ceſſation of arms was known to me, I requeſted of *Ragonaut Bajerow* to give orders to ceaſe hoſtilities againſt *Ahmedabahad*, and ſend the two eighteen-pounder guns to *Cambay*. This he aſſured me ſhould be done; and I can venture to ſay he kept his word, ſo far as iſſuing his poſitive orders; but it was his misfortune, as it ever happens to unfortunate Aſiatic Princes, to have his mandate little attended to when in diſtreſs, eſpecially by thoſe who were at any diſtance. *Ameen Khân*, ſoon ſenſible of *Ragonaut Bajerow*'s true ſituation, no longer expecting his favours, or dreading his power, ſet up a kind of independence, and, by various excuſes, put off the return of the cannon, or raiſing the ſiege.

On the 25th October, I received a letter from the Honourable the Preſident, wherein he mentioned the two eighteen pounders, and deſired me, by every means, to get them returned to *Cambay*, that no time ſhould be loſt; I immediately wrote the incloſed note, marked No. 1, to my interpreter, then at the Durbar, and the ſame evening inforced the contents to *Ragonaut Badjerow* in perſon; and I can poſitively aſſure the Honourable Board, that no endeavours on my part have been wanting in order to recover the two cannon.

No. 2 is *Ragonaut Badjerow*'s application to me, for the loan of the cannon, &c.; and No. 3 is his obligation to be reſponſible to your Honour, &c. for them. Theſe precautions, I flatter myſelf, will convince your Honour, &c. that I proceeded regularly regarding this buſineſs, and was actuated only by proper motives for the welfare of the cauſe I had the honour to be employed in.

I have the honour to remain,
With all poſſible reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen, &c.

Bombay, 21ſt June, 1776. *Thomas Keating*, Lieut. Col.

Note, marked No. 1, being a Meſſage from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, to the Peiſhwa, through his Interpreter at the Durbar.

Wiſwanath,

Preſent beſt reſpects to the Peiſhwa, and tell him, that I have juſt received letters from *Bombay* and *Broach*; the firſt give an account that *Hurria Punt Furkia* has marched from *Brampore*, and is coming to the northward. In the ſame letter the Governor orders me to bring our two eighteen pounders from *Ameen Cawn* to *Cambay*, and ſend them from thence to *Surat*, to be in readineſs in caſe we want them with this army. I therefore deſire you will give my compliments to the Peiſhwa, and requeſt he will give immediate orders for the two guns to be ſent directly to *Cambay*, otherwiſe the Governor will be very much diſpleaſed. The *Broach* letter is from the Chief, who ſays, that part of the Peiſhwa's people are plundering in the *Occlaſeer* Pergunnah, therefore I requeſt that he will give ſtrong orders that none of his troops do go near any country in our poſſeſſion, and order thoſe at or near *Occlaſeer* to return to the army, and aſſure him that I cannot accompany him in any march that leads us towards any of the Pergunnah in our poſſeſſion; and that, as ſoon as any of his troops begin to plunder them, I muſt withdraw our troops from his to give protection. As ſoon as you have done, come to me, as I want you on particular buſineſs.

Yours, &c.
25th October, 1775. *Thomas Keating.*

No. 2 and 3 were the original letters, with the Peiſhwa's ſeal affixed. Appendix. No. 112.

True Copies.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secretary.
Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
R^d Barwell,
P. Francis.

Extract of *Bombay* Secret Conſultations, the 8th January, 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
The W^e *Daniel Draper*, *Robert Gordon*,
——— *Brice Fletcher*,
——— *Robert Garden*,
William Aſhburner, *Andrew Ramſay.*

N. B.—Mr. *Moſtyn* indiſpoſed—Mr. *Tayler* at *Bengal*.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*.

Sir,

We have duly received your letters dated the 22d, 24th, and 28th ultimo.

We have now received advice from Colonel *Upton*, of his arrival at *Poonah* Dhur, and of his having commenced his Negociation; and therefore think it neceſſary poſitively to direct, that you do not on any account commit any act of hoſtility againſt the miniſterial Forces, unleſs the Company's troops are actually attacked by them, which we are willing to believe will not be the caſe.

Colonel *Upton* has repreſented to us, that the Miniſters have complained to him of *Ragoba*'s having detached a part of his army to beſiege *Ahmedavad*, and that ſmall parties of his forces are plundering and laying waſte ſome villages belonging to the Circar: and though we cannot but think the Miniſters have miſinformed him, eſpecially regarding the attack of *Ahmedavad*, which you acquaint us in your letter, dated the 4th November, the Peiſhwa had upon our remonſtrance promiſed to diſcontinue; we muſt nevertheleſs direct, that you give us without loſs of time, full and explicit information on theſe points; for the Miniſters declare, that on their part they have not detached a ſingle horſeman from the army that oppoſed the Engliſh, and *Ragoba*, ſince the receipt of the Governor General's firſt letter, now near ſix months ago, nor committed any acts of hoſtility againſt *Ragoba*.

We are
Bombay Caſtle, 8th January, 1776. Your loving Friends,
William Hornby,
&c. Council.

Extract of *Bombay* Secret Conſultations, the 22d January, 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor.
The W^e *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, *Rob Gordon*,
Thomas Moſtyn, *Brice Fletcher*,
Robert Garden.
William Aſhburner, *Andrew Ramſay*.
Mr. *Tayler* at *Bengal*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Yeſterday I had the honour to receive your commands of the 8th inſtant, and agreeable thereto, now tranſmit the information you require.

This afternoon I had a conference with the Peiſhwa, reſpecting *Amadavad*, &c. he aſſured me, that agreeable to what I wrote your honour, &c. under the 4th November laſt, he had ſent repeated orders to *Ameen Cawn*, to deſiſt from further acts of hoſtility; that for a long time paſt, little or no moleſtation had been given to that place;

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place; that it is true the army ſtill continues cloſe to it, proceeding from the inſufficiency of authority to recall them, ſince he is not able to diſcharge any part of the large debt due to that army. He at laſt obſerved, that by the ceſſation of arms, his power is dwindled nearly to nothing.

As to giving trouble to the villages under the Circar, he ſaid, that he ſuppoſed the Miniſters allude to his collecting money, &c. for the maintenance of his army, if ſo, they are right; but obſerves, that all he is able to raiſe, falls infinitely ſhort of a mere ſupport, and from Pergunnahs in his poſſeſſion, previous to the ceſſation of hoſtilities. He added, that he could not but obſerve, that the Miniſters holding ſuch language, is highly improper on every account, and particularly with reſpect to himſelf, extremely inſolent, knowing him, as they do, to have a lawful right to act ſo, and themſelves abſolutely his ſervants, uſurping a power they have not the ſmalleſt juſt claim to; and he deſired me to requeſt that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to write to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, not to countenance them in ſuch acts of haughtineſs, otherwiſe they will never be reduced to a proper ſtandard of behaviour, which muſt be very detrimental to the intereſt of the Honourable Company, as well as to him.

The Peiſhwa remarked, that the Miniſter's aſſertion, of never having detached any force againſt his ſince the period alluded to, is uniform with their whole conduct, glaringly erroneous; it being notorious, that two bodies of his troops have been deſtroyed by thoſe of the confederates, one under *Mahomet Eſoff*, in the *Malwa* Country, the other commanded by *Chimman Row*, on this ſide the *Candiharra* Gaut, as adviſed your Honour, &c. in my former addreſſes.

The Peiſhwa requeſts, that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to let him know from time to time the progreſs of the Negociation, and how it is likely to terminate.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your highly obliged,
And moſt devoted ſervant,

Camp, near *Mandavie*, 18th January 1776. *Thomas Keating*, Lieut. Col.

APPENDIX, No. 113.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 1ſt April 1776.

THE Secretary begs leave to record in this place the following letter, received from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* ſince laſt Council.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to write to you on the 7th inſtant, and now take the firſt moment to remove the diſagreeable impreſſions that letter muſt have made. The miniſtry have at length agreed to the conditions mentioned in my letter of the 2d inſtant, but they intend writing to you, Gentlemen, to aſk an exchange for *Salſette*, and the ſmall Iſlands in the Bay, for which they mean to offer three lacks of country near to *Broach* or *Surat*: perhaps they mean alſo to make ſome further references, for they think all the demands made are of my own accord, as they are perſuaded you meant to aſk no country or conceſſions of any kind whatever from them.

I ſhall take care, however, that the Articles of the Treaty be clear, and not admit of equivocation, and this they readily agree to; they ſay, if they are inſiſted on, it muſt be ſo.

As Peace muſt be firmly and fully eſtabliſhed, there is no waiting any reference. As mentioned in my letter of the 2d inſtant, reſpecting the *Guzerat* Province, I ſhall examine all the Sunnuds minutely, and take copies of ſuch as are neceſſary, by which that country was made over to this Government, and alſo thoſe that have been ſince granted to the different Sirdars. When I am fully ſatisfied that *Futty Sing* had no right to make over grants of any parts of that country, I ſhall agree to the reſtoring of all made by him and *Ragonaut Row*, except what is now ſtipulated for, viz. the entire Pergunnah of *Broach*, and a country of the annual amount of three lacks of rupees, near or adjoining to *Broach*.

I am ſo deſirous of ſending this off, that I ſhall at preſent ſay no more, intending to write again in three or four days, by which time I hope to have the articles ready.

Poonah Dhur, 24th February 1776. I have, &c. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

P. S.—The Governor and Council of *Bombay* adviſing that a factory in *Baſſein* would be of no uſe to the Company, I have dropped that demand, but all foreigners are to be for ever excluded a reſidence thereon.

General *Clavering* having directed the Secretary to circulate his opinion, that a letter ſhould be immediately written to Colonel *Upton*, approving the terms of the treaty which he propoſes to conclude with the Miniſters, and to requeſt that the Members of the Board will give their opinions upon this propoſal; it was accordingly circulated, and the opinions of the Board returned as follows:

The approbation of this Board, is not neceſſary to the confirmation of any treaty, which may be concluded by Colonel *Upton*; neither would it be proper or conſiſtent to expreſs an approbation of it, before the terms of it were known; Colonel *Upton* having too imperfectly notified his intentions in this reſpect.

(Signed) *W. H.*

The terms of the treaty which Colonel *Upton* propoſes to conclude with the Miniſters, are, as I underſtand, that the ceſſion of *Salſette* and the Iſlands in the Bay, and the entire Pergunnah of *Broach*, and a country to the amount of three lacks of rupees adjoining to *Broach*, be made to the Company. It is neceſſary that we ſignify to him our ſatisfaction of thoſe terms, otherwiſe, if he ſhould receive our letter, which ordered him to continue to inſiſt on the Iſland of *Baſſein*, or at leaſt in exchange of *Broach* for it, he might be prevented concluding the treaty on the terms which he has adjuſted with the Miniſters.

(Signed) *J. C.*

I ſhall undoubtedly think this Government bound to ratify any treaty that ſhall be concluded by Colonel *Upton*, by which *Salſette* ſhall be ſecured to the Company. But I apprehend that as the treaty is not before us, we cannot now ſafely or regularly give any opinion upon it, and as it was to have been ſigned within three or four days after the 24th of February, the concluſion of it cannot be effected by any inſtructions ſent at this time.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

I agree with the General's propoſition, becauſe I find that our letter of the 15th ultimo, did not notify to Colonel *Upton* the reſolution of the Board, to inſiſt on the ceſſion of *Baſſein*, but propoſed the exchange of it for *Broach*.

There is little probability that the negociation ſhall have been protracted, at the time in which this letter may reach Colonel *Upton*; but in conſideration of the bare poſſibility of it's arriving in time to prevent the loſs of *Broach*, I wiſh to empower him to accept the conditions mentioned in his two laſt letters, and to conclude the treaty upon them; theſe conditions I gather from his letters as follows:

The abſolute ſurrender of the Iſland of *Salſette*, &c. to the Company, with the ceſſion of that portion formerly enjoyed by the Marattas of the revenue of *Broach*, the entire Pergunnah of *Broach*, additional lands adjoining

joining to it yielding a revenue of three lacks of rupees; to indemnify the Company for the expences of the War; to ſtipulate the excluſion of all European foreigners from *Baſſein*, and to obtain a Province for *Ragoba*, not leſs than that ſpecified in Colonel *Upton*'s letter of the 2d of February; to this ſhould be added a ſolemn aſſurance of ſafety to *Ragoba*. An exemption from the Chout is not a proper object for this Government to require, becauſe it implies a right which has never been allowed to the Marattas.

Leſt I ſhould have miſtaken the terms of the General's queſtion, I think it neceſſary to explain my ſenſe of it; viz. that Colonel *Upton* be authorized, in caſe he ſhall not have concluded the Treaty with the Miniſters at *Poonah*, to conclude it on the terms which we underſtand to have owed their aſſent, by his letter now before us, and to pay no regard to our letter of the 15th ult. To this propoſition I agree.

(Signed) *W. Haſtings.*
R. Barwell.

Colonel *Monſon*—I ſhall think myſelf bound by any Treaty which Colonel *Upton* may conclude with the Miniſters; and I ſhall approve of any Treaty that he may make agreeable to the firſt orders which he received. Our ſubſequent orders to him have been to relinquiſh *Baſſein* and its dependencies, for *Broach* and its dependencies. If he ſhould have concluded a Treaty before the receipt of our laſt letter, it will be agreeable to the orders he received from the Board, excepting the ſingle inſtance of his inſiſting upon *Baſſein*; for which, in his letter 2d February, he propoſes to have an equivalent.

In conſequence of the above minutes, the following letter was diſpatched to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 24th of February, which has relieved us from the ſuſpenſe in which we had been left by your former advices of the 7th; and we have in conſequence given orders for diſembarking the troops whom we had directed to proceed to *Bombay*.

If your Negociations ſhould ſtill remain open when this letter reaches you, we authorize you to conclude the Treaty on the terms which, by your letter now arrived, and that of the 2d of February to which it refers, we underſtand to have received the aſſent of the Miniſters, and to pay no attention to our inſtructions of the 15th ultimo.

25th March. We are, &c.

In conſequence of the Treaty of Peace having been concluded, General *Clavering* directed the Secretary to ſend round the following paper to the Members of the Board:

In Circulation.

That no time may be loſt in re-landing the troops who had been embarked for *Bombay*, particularly from the *Indian Queen*, which ſhip had gone down the river, General *Clavering* ſent an order early this morning to the Maſter Attendant for that purpoſe, as well as to return the ſalt proviſions which had been borrowed of Captain *Snow*. He hopes that theſe orders will meet the approbation of the Board.

I alſo requeſt the opinion of the Board, whether the treaſure ſhould be brought back from the ſhips, or ſuffered to proceed to *Bombay*. That Preſidency has been ſupplied this ſeaſon with 27 lacks, inſtead of the twenty which were promiſed. The next ſeaſon will not commence till the 1ſt of May.

(Signed) *J. P. Auriol*, Sec^y.

I refer to my minute ſent in circulation.

(Signed) *W. Haſtings.*

I think the treaſure ſhould be landed.

(Signed) *J. Clavering.*

I think the treaſure ſhould be landed. I have not ſeen the Governor's minute.

Half paſt 5 o'clock. (Signed) *G. Monſon.*

I have ſeen and approved the Governor General's propoſals.

(Signed) *R. Barwell.*

I think the treaſure ſhould be landed.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

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Soon after the above was ſent in circulation, the Secretary received the following propoſal from the Governor General; which he alſo circulated, and received back the opinions as entered after it.

The Governor General ſubmits it to the conſideration of the Board, whether it may not be expedient to diſembark the detachments now on board the *Neptune* and *Indian Queen*, and remand them to the garriſon, as the object of their original deſtination no longer exiſts.

At the ſame time he wiſhes the Board to conſider, whether it may be ſo proper to repeal the deſtination of the treaſure and ſtores. In any probable ſituation of affairs, the former may be of conſiderable ſervice. If there is a Peace, it may be directed from the ſupplies of next year; if War, ſuch a ſupply will be immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary. From the latter conſideration, he inclines to the opinion, that it would be proper to let the guns and ſtores alſo proceed. From the duplicity of conduct which we have already experienced in the Miniſters of *Poonah*, prudence requires that we ſhould guard againſt another reverſe, and ſtill afford ſuch aids to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, as may prove of eſſential uſe to them in the caſe of a ſecond rupture with the *Poonah* Government, and at the ſame time avoid the appearance either of ſuſpicion or deception on our ſide, which might be the conſequence of our ſending the detachments, if the Miniſters ſhould prove firm to their engagements.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

I approve. *R. Barwell.*

I think that the treaſure and guns ſhould be landed, and orders ſent to *Bombay* to withdraw their troops into their garriſons; and this order ſhould be inſiſted on.

(Signed) *J. Clavering.*

The guns, detachments, and treaſure, ſhould be landed. If letters are now written to *Bombay*, they ſhould contain orders to that Preſidency to adhere ſtrictly to the terms of the treaty, ſuppoſing it actually ſigned. It is my opinion, and, if neceſſary, I deſire it may be circulated as a motion from me, that the two ſhips ſhould be detained until we receive the letters by which Colonel *Upton* promiſes to ſend an account of the concluſion of the Treaty in three or four days.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

I agree with Mr. *Francis*, that the detachment, the guns, their carriages, the tumbrils, limbrils, and ſtores, with the treaſure, ſhould be re-landed; and that if letters be now wrote to *Bombay*, that orders ſhould be given to that Preſidency to adhere ſtrictly to the treaty concluded by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

I agree alſo to his motion, provided the owners of the ſhips can be prevailed on to detain them until we ſhall hear again from Colonel *Upton*; but not to lay an embargo on them.

(Signed) *G. Monſon.*

I cannot agree to Mr. *Francis*'s motion. The expence will be great and uſeleſs. If the Preſidency of *Bombay* have not already received orders to conform to any treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, I have no objection to ſuch an order to be now written; although the obligation will not be ſtrengthened by it, ſince they are conſtitutionally bound to obſerve the terms of every treaty made by the Superior Government, and will be criminal if they infringe it.

(Signed) *W. Haſtings.*

Orders having been iſſued to the Maſter Attendant, to diſembark the troops from the *Indian Queen* and *Saint Helena*, the following letter was received from him.

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To *J. P. Auriol*, Eſquire

Sir,

The *Indian Queen*, Captain *Boyle*, having ſailed before the orders for diſembarking the troops, and for taking out the treaſure, could reach her, I tranſmit you incloſed the bill of lading for the treaſure, ſigned by Captain *Boyle*, who kept one bill, ſaying that it was neceſſary to do ſo, as he had not received any orders either for taking the troops on board, or for receiving the treaſure.

The other bill of lading was incloſed in the Governor General and Council's letter to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, received under a flying ſeal for that purpoſe; which letter when cloſed was delivered to Captain *Boyle* by Mr. *Wallis*, a maſter in the pilot's ſervice, ſent by me on that ſervice. The troops on board the *Saint Helena* were diſembarked as ſoon as the orders of the Board were received.

I am, &c.

Calcutta, 27th March 1776. *H. Wedderburn*, Mr Attendant.

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ANOTHER letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* having been received ſince laſt Council, it was circulated, and is now recorded as follows:

Gentlemen,

I am made very happy by ſending the copy of the treaty concluded with the Miniſters.

We waited ſome days for a lucky hour to ſign the articles, and during that period I had every reaſon to believe they wanted to recede from their agreements; they wiſhed and urged, by every little means they could deviſe, to make me refuſe the terms, which however I was not in the leaſt diſpoſed to do, and took care they ſhould not, though they inſiſted on crouding the articles with abundance of repetitions and ſuſpicions. I was attentive to their not being very glaring or too trifling, and then was obliged to admit them. I had drawn out the articles in Engliſh, but here we had many difficulties to ſurmount; they ſo perplexed me with doubts and alterations, that I was forced to give it up. They were made out in Perſian, a language underſtood, they ſaid, by all. The Engliſh is therefore a tranſlation from the Perſian, I could have wiſhed the reverſe.

The ſmall Iſland, *Canary*, I underſtand is not now in our poſſeſſion; in that caſe we do not get it; I find it is of no value. The Miniſters not knowing the Engliſh names of the ſmall iſlands in the Bay of *Bombay*, and my being unacquainted with the Maratta names, prevented our inſerting them nominally in the treaty. I have wrote to *Bombay* to get the Engliſh and Maratta names, and it is then agreed to inſert them: This is abſolutely neceſſary, to prevent any miſunderſtanding hereafter; as ſoon as I have got this information, I will forward the names to the Board.

The Miniſters write to you, Gentlemen, to offer a country of three lacks per annum in exchange for *Salſette* and the ſmall iſlands in the Bay. I told them of the impropriety of propoſing a country of much leſs value than the iſlands; they replied, they truſted entirely to the honour of the Gentlemen of *Calcutta*, who muſt be conſcious of their having no right to theſe Iſlands, and would therefore reſtore them; however they have thought fit to ſend a vackeel, who I ſuppoſe is authorized to make other propoſals; they have had little reaſon from me to hope ſucceſs in this negociation. They made me promiſe to write; and as we act, they ſay, from principles of honour and juſtice, enforce the arguments we have to urge for their being reſtored. I think they will of themſelves let none eſcape them, if I may conclude from what I have experienced of them.

I before wrote the impoſſibility of waiting a reply to my letter of the 5th January. The Miniſters have promiſed to write to procure letters from their principal Surdars, ſignifying their having received the treaty, and promiſing obedience to the articles of it. They ſay this was never done before, or treaties ever ſigned in any other manner than the preſent, and it will hurt them very much with the Peiſhwa's ſubjects.

Baſſein not being, as you imagined, poſſeſſed by us, has made you long ſince I hope give up all thoughts of our obtaining it; they ſay we cannot have the ſmalleſt claim to it, and that nothing but force ſhall ever get it from them. It will be impoſſible by any other means ever to obtain it. I underſtand it is not an iſland, as all along ſuppoſed, but a very conſiderable diſtrict, reaching from *Salſette* almoſt to *Surat*; a nullah at the back part of it, which fills in the rains, has given riſe to its being thought an iſland. The fort is very large, and ſtands on an iſthmus, divided from *Salſette* by a river, the breadth of which ſecures *Salſette* from ever being incommoded by this fort.

I obſerve this, as much pains has been taken to perſuade to the contrary, and the neceſſity of our having *Baſſein* for the ſecurity of *Salſette*.

The ſtipulations for *Ragonaut Row* amount to about ten lacks per annum; but they inſiſt on paying his houſehold troops, &c. as he might otherwiſe collect in a ſhort time money ſufficient to engage them in freſh troubles.

The Miniſters requeſt you will be pleaſed to appoint a gentleman to reſide at *Poonah*, to adjuſt all *Ragonaut Row*'s buſineſs with them, as well as any public buſineſs they may have to tranſact with the Preſidency of *Bombay*, &c.

I incloſe a copy of one of the Sunnuds granted by *Futty Sing*, alſo the treaty concluded by him with *Ragonaut Row*; theſe I received from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*.

I have wrote to *Futty Sing*, to ſend me the copy of a Sunnud, for any diſtrict granted by him in the Guzerat Province to the Engliſh, alſo the copies of the Sunnuds by which he holds half of the Guzerat Country, that I may compare them with thoſe in the Peiſhwa's office. I have requeſted of him alſo to let me know how far he conſidered himſelf as proprietor of any part of that country; and if he ever thought himſelf authorized to alienate from the Maratta Government, any Pergunnah of *Guzerat*. Should this right be veſted in him, he will be careful how he denies it, as it may endanger to him the loſs of his Country altogether. I have deſired that theſe papers may be atteſted by the Caſi.

I have forwarded to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, Extracts from the treaty of ſuch articles as concern that Preſidency, and requeſt that they would depute two gentlemen, to fix with the two perſons ſent from this Government, the boundaries of the Country ceded near or adjoining to *Broach*. The Marattas agree to our taking this diſtrict where we like, ſo that we do not pitch upon jaghire land: I have alſo tranſmitted to the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, ſuch articles of the treaty as concern that Preſidency.

I was much concerned at not being able to inſert the Articles you propoſed for the Nabob of *Arcot*. The Miniſters are afraid it might engage them in ſome diſpute with the Engliſh, and they poſitively refuſed admitting it: they will be careful, however, in their conduct towards him. I incloſe the reaſons they gave at our laſt converſation on this ſubject. They ſay they are ready to treat with the Nabob, and if he will reſtore *Tanjore*, &c. through their mediation, which it ſeems they have propoſed to the Rajah, (a relation of the Ram Rajah's) they will then reſign part of the Chout, &c. I forward alſo another article the Nabob of *Arcot* deſired me to obtain for him.

As the articles of the treaty will be made out at *Calcutta*, to be ſigned by the Board, permit me, Gentlemen, to obſerve, that Ram Rajah's and Peiſhwa's ſeal (in one) is always at the top of all treaties; I mention this, that the Company's ſeal may not by any accident be otherwiſe

wiſe fixed. The Miniſters or ſervants to this Government we never ſuffered to ſign or ſeal on the ſame ſide of the paper with the Peiſhwa. Except the exchange for *Salſette* ſhould take place, may I requeſt you will not alter the words of any of the articles, there are many that want it; but it is inconceivable what jealouſies and ſuſpicions theſe people harbour.

I am honoured with your letter of the 8th January, with the tranſlations of the letter from *Saccaram Baboo*, and *Ballajee Pundit*, and the reply, &c. and the copy of the letter from *Soy Madee Row*; alſo the packet for the Peiſhwa, which was forwarded to him. This is the only letter I have received from the Board ſince the one dated 9th of November 1775, adviſing that Mr. *Chambers* had permiſſion to come to *Poonah*, on the part of the Nabob of *Arcot*. That Gentleman was not deputed: the Nabob's buſineſs was tranſacted through his vackeel here.

This packet goes away by way of *Maſulipatam*; I diſpatched a letter by the ſame route on the 24th ultimo, and herewith ſend a duplicate of it.

In two or three days the Miniſters will forward ſome diſpatches on our camels, by way of *Benares*, when I ſhall have the honour to write again, and ſend duplicates of all letters, &c.

Poonah Dhur, 3d March 1776. I am (Signed) *Upton*.

APPENDIX, No. 115.

From *Siccaram Pundit*: received the 1ſt April 1776.

THE all-wiſe Creator and Protector of the Univerſe formed man ſuperior to all other of his creatures, and endowing him with reaſon, made him lord over all, and by the gift of ſpeech, adorned by the gem of veracity, put into his hands the authority over the whole terreſtrial world; it is conſequently the duty of all Magiſtrates, and thoſe inveſted with authority, to provide for, and protect the people of God intruſted to their charge. As this is not to be effected without making uſe of the apparent means, wiſe men eſtabliſhed the mode of correſponding with each other by letters and meſſengers. It was therefore my earneſt deſire to lay the foundation of ſuch a correſpondence with you, and although certain weak and little minds conſidered this deſign as the effect of timorouſneſs and want of ſpirit, yet in the ſight of wiſdom, it will be regarded as a proof of a great ſoul; and as it is incumbent on the firſt projector of any plan to carry it into practice, I was debating with myſelf on the means of effecting it, when your agreeable letter arrived, informing me that the King of *England* had given orders to all his ſervants in this part of the world, not to engage in hoſtilities, or form treaties, without the approbation of the Governor General of *Bengal*, and to take no ſtep which might be the cauſe of diſputes with any Chief of the Maratta Nation; that you had ſent orders to put a ſtop to the proceedings of the Bombay people, and to recall their troops from the field of battle; that you propoſed to depute ſome one to adjuſt all former cauſes of diſpute, and to negociate a ſtrict friendſhip in future, as ſoon as you learnt, if it would be agreeable to me; and that I, on my part, ſhould give directions to the forces of this Government, to refrain from all acts of hoſtility. The receipt of this letter, in an auſpicious hour, inſpired me with the greateſt joy.

I had afterwards the pleaſure of repeated letters from you, on the ſubject of the eſtabliſhment of a firm and laſting friendſhip, and the conciliation of the diſputes which ſubſiſted between the two ſtates.

Induced thereto by friendſhip, I recalled my Generals into the neighbourhood of *Cundaſe*, and waited ſeven months in expectation of your Deputy's, (viz. Colonel *Upton*) arrival. During this interval, the Engliſh from *Bombay* and *Ragonaut Row*, attacked *Setajee Hankwar*, a Chief in my truſt, and obliged him, being unable to oppoſe them, to enter into written engagements for the delivery of a ſum of money, and a certain territory. They moreover ravaged the whole country of *Goujeraut*, and arbitrarily levied large contributions. My Generals were deſirous of preventing this, but preferring your ſatisfaction to all other conſiderations, and relying on your promiſes, I poſitively forbad any act of hoſtility, and patiently bore the expences of crores of rupees to which the ſupport of the Army amounted. It cauſes me the greateſt ſurprize, that the Engliſh at *Bombay*, notwithſtanding your orders to them, continued in alliance with *Ragonaut Row*, and even increaſed their ravages. After the Colonel's arrival, they plundered *Nowapeorah*. This bad faith and diſobedience of orders, ſo contrary to the character I had heard of the Engliſh, at firſt greatly ſurprized me; but I have now learnt that this is nothing more than a report, which amuſes the vulgar; and that they don't act up to this character. Let what is paſt be forgotten. Appendix. No. 115.

On the 4th of Zekaida, (28th of December) Colonel *John Upton* arrived in the neighbourhood of *Poorunder*: ſome days were paſt in expectation of an anſwer from the Governor of *Bombay*; as ſoon as it was received, the Negociation was commenced. In reſpect to *Ragonaut Row*, the Colonel ſaid, that ſatisfaction muſt be given to him. Reflecting on the viciſſitudes of fortune, and the uncertainty of all human affairs, this requeſt of the Colonel's was agreed to. I incloſe you a copy of the memorandum relative to this affair, by which you will be fully informed of the ſubject. If this is complied with, it's well: but ſhould *Ragonaut Row* refuſe his aſſent, let ſtrict orders be given to all the Engliſh to afford him no manner of aſſiſtance, nor to protect him. Incloſed is the original memorandum of propoſitions made by the Colonel. He has made a requeſt of the iſland of *Salſette*. The circumſtances are theſe, In the firſt place, the ſaid iſland is the inheritance of *Seremunt Sabib*, and was recovered with infinite trouble out of the hands of the Portugueſe. Although the Governors of *Bombay* entered into a treaty, in conſequence of which the trade of all other Europeans was prohibited, and for the ſpace of 100 years their trade has flouriſhed there more than ever, by the encouragement of this Government, and though between the Government and former Chiefs, three ſeveral treaties have been contracted, and the ſincereſt and ſteadieſt friendſhip been ever ſhewed to their ſettlement; yet loſing ſight of all this, and obſerving a breach in this Government, and the Chiefs at the head of their armies engaged in contentions, they took the opportunity to ſeize perfidiouſly on *Salſette*. It is likewiſe ſtipulated in their treaties, that if any ſubject of this Government ſhall fly to them for protection, though it may be ever ſo neceſſary to afford it him, they ſhall nevertheleſs deliver him to the officers of Government. Diſregarding this, notwithſtanding they had been witneſſes of the conduct of *Ragonaut Row* (*Thomas Moſtyn* was preſent, and an eye witneſs of every tranſaction) and letters had been written from the Preſence to the Governor of *Bombay*, on the acceſſion of *Seremunt Row Pundit Purdhan* to the Muſnud, to which a letter of congratulation on this event was received in anſwer; I ſay, diſregarding every conſideration of good faith or friendſhip, they aſſiſted *Ragonaut Row*; they conſidered the poſſeſſion of *Salſette* as ſuperior to every conſideration. This event cauſed me the utmoſt aſtoniſhment. I am convinced that you will not inſiſt on this improper requeſt. By the inſtigation of the Bombay gentlemen, the Colonel is very earneſt on this point. I conſidered the engagements of the Engliſh as inviolable; it was the duty of friendſhip to have made the Bombay people ſuffer for their ill conduct, and to have obliged them to reſtore the Government poſſeſſions, that ſo others might have been deterred in future from breach of faith; and the integrity and juſtice of the Engliſh faith have been deeply implanted in the minds of their friends. This method of conciliation has been ſet aſide. You have moreover expreſſed in your letter of credence, a deſire that the honour and ſatisfaction of both parties ſhould be

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be equally attended to; but loſing ſight of this alſo, you have introduced the above demand. Notwithſtanding the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities whilſt the affair of *Salſette* remains unſettled is highly impolitic; yet, as the protracting of the diſputes till an anſwer could be received from you who are at ſuch a great diſtance, would be very prejudicial to both parties; and as I place entire confidence in you, that you will undoubtedly give orders to the Government of *Bombay* to reſtore the place with all its wealth, thinking it adviſable, and importuned thereto by the Colonel, I have agreed to an expedient, and have referred the affair to your juſtice. The delivery of *Salſette* into the hands of the Government will be the means of a perfect conciliation. The peruſal of the ſecond article gave me infinite ſurprize; I was aſtoniſhed at this new pretenſion, which favours neither of friendſhip nor good faith. After long arguments and negociations on this ſubject, an expedient was found, and I at laſt was obliged in conſideration of your friendſhip and juſtice to agree to this alſo. It is accordingly inſerted in the liſt. Notwithſtanding *Satojee Raukwar* was inveſted with no authority for that purpoſe, he was compelled to execute a written engagement for the ceſſion of the country under him; and the diviſion of *Broach* in that country, which is the property of the Government is now demanded, and by another artifice this has been confirmed. I am aſtoniſhed that the Colonel ſhould propoſe ſuch heavy conditions of friendſhip.

He demands to be reimburſed the charges of the army. Juſtice points out that the perſon who violates his engagements, ſhould be reſponſible for the expences incurred on both ſides. In oppoſition to this rule, to demand it from us, is a new pretenſion introduced from *Europe*. The anſwer given concerning the defraying the expences of my army was, that ſuch demand was inconſiſtent with juſtice and generoſity, and that the Ryots of the Country would compenſate to the Government the charges which it had been put to. Were I to give ſuch an anſwer it would be juſt; but, prompted by ſentiments of generoſity, and out of regard to you, I have agreed to its being inſerted in the Treaty. You will act herein as the duties of friendſhip dictate to you.

He has addreſſed me on the ſubject of the Nabob *Mahomed Ally Khan*. Between us and the ſaid Nabob a ſtrict friendſhip had long ſubſiſted, and in the War with the French we afforded him every neceſſary aſſiſtance of Forces and Firmauns from his Majeſty; notwithſtanding which ſervices, the Chout, Serdaſemukky, &c. which he was from of old liable to, are many years in arrears. Morever he has ſeized on the country of *Tanjore*, *Arnie*, &c. the Raja of *Bhoſilah*, as well as on *Ramnautpory*, our place of worſhip, acts highly inconſiſtent with friendſhip. I am hopeful that you will write to him in effectual forms, to deliver *Tanjore* and the other places, with their Rajahs, into the hands of officers of this Government, and to adjuſt the affair of Chout and Serdaſemukky at *Poonah*. Where is the neceſſity of ſending the troops of this Government to that quarter? For theſe many years I have preſerved my friendſhip for him inviolable; but it is not enough that this ſhould be kept on one ſide only. If he will make payment of what is juſtly due from him, no unfriendly meaſures will be purſued by this Government. be yourſelf the judge of the propoſal relative to *Bengal*, and obſerve that *Bhoofilah* is a Chief over 25,000 cavalry, and the ſupport of our power, and that induced thereto by friendſhip for him, we have given up to him the Bengal tribute. It is incumbent on you not to be wanting in friendſhip to *Bhoofilah*.

To ſum up all in a few words; notwithſtanding the reaſonableneſs of our claims, and the juſtice of our cauſe, merely with a view of putting your profeſſions to the proof, the army was recalled from the field. We have long had an intercourſe of friendſhip with the Engliſh Chiefs, and at laſt, inſtead of receiving advantage therefrom are loſers by it. This has made me wiſh to tranſmit all theſe particulars, with copies of the treaties entered into by the Bombay people, together with your letter and Colonel *Upton*'s propoſitions to the King of *England* and his Council, and to form ſuch an engagement with them, that no ſuch inſtances of breach of faith may occur in future. As you are inveſted with the authority of your Sovereign, and are deſirous of my friendſhip, I have firſt written to you.

In former times the Emperor *Aurungzebe* and other inland Powers, joined by the Portugueſe and other maritime Powers, conceiving evil deſigns againſt this Government, were defeated, and met with the juſt reward of their actions. Their breach of friendſhip was the cauſe of their ſo ſhortly loſing all their conqueſts. The Bombay people ſeeing the weakneſs of *Ragonaut Row*, and the minority of *Seremunt Row Pundit Purdhan*, took this opportunity of effecting their purpoſe. I have referred the remedy to your juſtice. Act in ſuch a manner that friendſhip may take firm root between us. If you ſuffer the affair of *Salſette* to remain unſettled, it will be prejudicial to the eſtabliſhment of friendſhip, and the cauſe of continual quarrels with the deſcendants of the preſent Chief. From the ſincere regard which I bear you, and with the greateſt integrity, I have fully explained my friendly ſentiments to you. I flatter myſelf, that on the peruſal of this letter you will write to the Governor of *Bombay* to reſtore the iſland of *Salſette*. Should you have any doubt of what I have written, my vackeel will ſoon arrive at *Calcutta*, and will explain every particular to you.

You may depend on this, that it is my earneſt deſire to obtain the Engliſh friendſhip.

N. B. In the above was incloſed copy of a letter from the Governor of *Bombay* to *Madoo Row Pundit Purdhan*, acknowledging the receipt of his letter, and congratulating him in the uſual terms on his acceſſion to the Peiſhwaſhip.

Memorandum of Eight Propoſitions made by Colonel *John Upton*.

1ſt *Salſette* and the four ſmall iſlands ſhall be ceded by treaty to the Engliſh. After which *Siccaram* and *Bulojee Pundit*, and the Bombay Gentlemen, ſhall write a full ſtate of the affair of *Salſette* and the four iſlands, to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*. I will alſo write to ſupport your letter. If the Gentlemen of *Calcutta* will give up the iſland of *Salſette*, and the four ſmall iſlands in exchange for ſome other country, it is well, otherwiſe they ſhall remain in the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh. If the Gentlemen of *Calcutta* do not reſtore *Salſette*, &c. the Maratta Sirdars ſhall have no claim on the Engliſh, and ſhall not engage in quarrels with them. *Salſette*, with the other iſlands, ſhall remain in the hands of the Engliſh.

Names of the Iſlands.

Caranja,	*Kennery*,
Elephanta,	*Hog Iſland*.

2d. The Gentlemen of *Calcutta* having heard that the Port of *Liſſey* was fallen into the hands of the Engliſh, directed me, in conſequence, on no account to give it up. This account has proved to be a miſtake, and *Liſſey* is in the poſſeſſion of the Maratta Chiefs. I am therefore deſirous that an Engliſh Factory for the carrying on of trade be eſtabliſhed at *Liſſey*, and a part of that country, yielding a revenue of three lacks of rupees, be given to us. The factory ſhall not be included in this, but ſhall be agreed to ſeparately. No other European Nation ſhall be allowed to have a factory at *Liſſey*.

3d, The expences of the Engliſh army from the day of its joining *Ragonaut Row*, ſhall be paid me agreeable to a ſeparate account under the ſignatures of the paymaſters and officers of the army and the whole Council of *Bombay*.

4th, The Marattas ſhall never claim Chout or any of the countries under the Company's immediate authority.

5th, The affair of *Ragonaut Row* ſhall be ſettled in the manner on which we formerly diſcourſed.

6th,

6th, The Engliſh conquered *Broach* from the Mogul, that part of the Country belonging to the Marattas, and the Pergunnahs ſubordinate to *Broach* ſhall be unconditionally ceded to the Engliſh.

7th, With reſpect to the Nabob *Wallah Jaw*, Sirdar of the *Carnatic*. As he has long been the Ally of the Engliſh Company in every change of their fortune, it is neceſſary that the Marattas alſo conſider him in the ſame light as he is conſidered by the Engliſh.

8th, No claim of Chout or other Tax ſhall be made by the Marattas on any other Country which they ſhall cede to the Company.

From *Ballajee Pundit*; of the ſame tenor and date.

From *Seccaram Pundit*; received 4th July 1776.

Since Colonel *Upton*'s arrival, I have addreſſed to you four letters, which contain a full relation of all particulars; but I am ſurprized that I have not received an anſwer to either. Let there be no delay in your correſpondence.

Being very anxious for the reſtoration of *Salſette* and the ſmall Iſlands, from the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh, I was deſirous of ſending a Vackeel to *Calcutta*. In the mean time, a copy of the Treaty which had been drawn out and tranſmitted to you by Colonel *Upton*, arrived under your Seal. The laſt Article, which has been written differently from our wiſh, I have peruſed. However, as the introduction of ſcruples, and a refuſal to exchange copies of the Treaty, might poſſibly be a vexation to you, and create ſuſpicions of a difference, I have, with a view to the eſtabliſhment of friendſhip, avoided the utterance, and even the admiſſion of a doubt into my breaſt; and accordingly, on the 3d of Rubby-ul-ſani, 1190 Hegira, I delivered one inſtrument of the Treaty, on the part of the Government, to Colonel *Upton*, and accepted for the Government the Inſtrument which was ſent from *Calcutta*. If an Article of the Treaty ſhould have been written in different terms, it is no matter; however, I am aſſured, when I reflect upon the ſincerity of your friendſhip that I ſhall obtain *Salſette* and the ſmall Iſlands, and that you will from your favour deliver them up. The ſettlement which has been made between *Seremunt Row* and the Engliſh, has founded a firm friendſhip, and will tend to the beſt effects. But I am very much ſurprized at two circumſtances which I will now deſcribe. My friend, the Governor of *Bombay* effaced all treaties from his memory; and in a time of Peace, when I had no ſuſpicion of his deſign, availed himſelf of the advantage which our family diſputes afforded, as well as of the infancy of *Seremunt Row*; and before the preſent War, ſeized *Salſette* by artifice. He felt no compunction at the diſgrace which ſuch a meaſure muſt unavoidably reflect upon the good faith of the Engliſh. Beſides which, he connected himſelf with *Ragonaut Row*, and the Engliſh took the field. When the War raged between us, and the flames of contention aſcended, you wrote to me, with a view of putting an end to it; and repeatedly to the Gentlemen of *Bombay*, directing them to withdraw their Army from *Ragonaut Row*. But there was nothing but evaſion on their part, till at length Colonel *Upton* arrived, and became ſenſible of the artifice and deceit of the Governor of *Bombay*. However, inſtead of correcting him, he demanded *Salſette*, the Country of *Seremunt*, ſince the negociation proceeded from you; and Colonel *Upton* inſiſted upon it, an article was inſerted in the treaty, reſpecting *Salſette*; for I thought that you would have ſhewn a reſentment at the infraction of treaties by the Engliſh at *Bombay*, and ordered the reſtoration of *Salſette*. But this has not happened; and you have written a laſt Article in the Treaty, that the Engliſh ſhall poſſeſs *Salſette*, and the Iſlands for ever.

Another circumſtance is this, I have heard that the Chief of *Surat* now entertains *Seremunt Ragonaut Row*, and two hundred dependants in *Surat*. This has the appearance of a great deviation; for it has been ſtipulated in former treaties, and you may have known it, that if any native refugee from the Maratta Government ſhall ſeek an aſylum with the Engliſh, he ſhall not be permitted to ſtay, but be delivered up to the Government's men; and an article in the late treaty expreſſes, that the former treaties which may not have been annulled or varied by the preſent, ſhall be held in full force. What the Colonel writes is not attended to and diſregarded. It is their purpoſe to detain *Ragonaut Row*. How then is the good faith of the Engliſh preſerved? The trade in this country was formerly in the hands of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company; but the Government relying upon the good faith of the Engliſh, ſtopped their commercial dealings with the Dutch, and eſtabliſhed the trade of the Engliſh; and the Government has behaved always, ſo as to merit their friendſhip. I was aſſured, that if any other European nation ſhould attempt to ſeize places belonging to the Government, the Engliſh would afford it their aſſiſtance. But it appears that I was miſtaken, for the Engliſh at *Bombay* have themſelves ſeized places belonging to the Government, forgetful of their former and late engagements, and perſiſting in a reſolution not to reſtore them. Being ſure of unanimity amongſt themſelves, they are encouraged to raiſe diſturbances. You are wiſe, and prudent, and deſirous of my friendſhip; weigh well theſe circumſtances, and bring the Governor of *Bombay* to reaſon.

One of the good qualities for which the Engliſh are celebrated, is that of rigid adherence to what is right. For in the inſtance where *Mahomed Ally Khân* unjuſtly poſſeſſed himſelf of the country of *Tanjour*, and alſo where the Engliſh took the *Robilla* country, in both inſtances when the news reached the Company, they immediately reſtored thoſe countries. I therefore requeſt, that upon underſtanding fully all circumſtances with reſpect to *Salſette*, which is *Seremunt*'s country, you will deliver it up entire, together with the Iſlands, to *Seremunt* the Peiſhwa. A country ſhall be granted in lieu of them in the vicinity of *Broach*, out of which the revenues are received without difficulty, and which will not require an expence of Sebundy or eſtabliſhment of ſervants. I requeſt that you will poſitively forbid the Governor of *Bombay* to permit *Seremunt Ragonaut Row* to remain at *Surat*. A compliance with theſe two requeſts will confer a pleaſure, attended with the beſt of conſequences to our friendſhip, and increaſe it by additional ſincerity and ſtrength.

I feel with pleaſure a regard for the Engliſh, which gains upon me by daily augmentation. What other perſon ſhall dare to breathe a different ſentiment? But you will learn all particulars from my Vackeel, who will arrive within a ſmall period. I requeſt that you will render me happy by frequent letters.

From *Bollajee Jenardun*; a letter of the ſame tenor and date.

APPENDIX, No. 116.

THE following Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, which arrived on the 23d of laſt month, with the Treaty incloſed, was immediately circulated.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to forward a copy of the Treaty of Peace concluded this day with the Marattas.

The conditions of it meeting with your approbation, will make me exceedingly happy.

Poonah Dhur, I have, &c.
1ſt March 1776. *J. Upton.*

Treaty between the Honourable the *Eaſt India* Company, and the Maratta State.

Poorunder, 1ſt day of March 1776.

Whereas differences have ariſen amongſt the Chiefs of the Maratta State, and the Government of *Bombay* having

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having taken a part therein, by ſending forces into the Maratta Dominions, which the Honourable the Governor General and Council of *Fort William* diſapprove; and being deſirous of conciliating theſe differences, have determined accordingly to enter into ſuch meaſures as may moſt effectually contribute to ſo deſirable an end: they have for this purpoſe therefore authorized, deputed, and given full powers unto Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*, in the ſervice of the Honourable the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, to conclude a Peace between the Government of *Bombay* and the Maratta State. And Colonel *Upton* having accordingly arrived at *Poorunder*, has concluded a ſolid and firm Peace, on the part of the Engliſh Company, with the Miniſters *Siccaram Pundit* and *Ballajee Pundit*, on the part of the Peiſhwa *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, and all the Maratta Chiefs; and the following are the Articles of Convention which they have engaged into.

Article 1ſt. Peace ſhall be eſtabliſhed and take place from this day, between the Honourable the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company in general, and the Government of *Bombay* in particular, and *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, and his Miniſters *Siccaram Pundit* and *Ballajee Pundit*, on the part of all the Marattas; and the following Articles are to be obſerved inviolably by both parties.

Article 2d. The Peace is to be forthwith proclaimed between the Honourable Company and the Maratta State, at the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and at all its dependencies, at the head of the Engliſh Troops encamped at *Mandavie*, and in every part of the Guzerat Province where there are Britiſh ſubjects. The Maratta Government will alſo order proclamations to be made throughout all their dominions.

Article 3d. The Peiſhwa *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, and his Miniſters, being deſirous of having *Salſette*, and the ſmall Iſlands, ſubdued by the Engliſh in this War, reſtored to them, do offer to give in exchange, a country of three lacks of rupees, with its Chout, &c. in the neighbourhood of *Broach*. Colonel *Upton* having declared, that he could not reſtore the ſaid Iſlands, it is therefore agreed, that they ſhall remain as they now are; and that they ſhall write to the Honourable the Supreme Council of *Fort William*, and both parties engage to abide by their determination—If the Governor General and Council of *Fort William* do not reſtore them, they ſhall continue in the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh, and the Marattas will then give up all right and title to the ſaid Iſlands; ſhould the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta* reſtore *Salſette* with the ſaid Iſlands, the Engliſh will accordingly deliver them over to the Peiſhwa.

Article 4th. The Marattas do agree to give to the Engliſh Company for ever, all right and title to their entire ſhare of the City and Pergunnah of *Broach*, as full and complete as ever they collected from the Moguls or otherwiſe, without retaining claim of Chout, or any other demand whatever; ſo that the Engliſh Company ſhall poſſeſs it without participation, or claim of any kind.

Article 5th. The Marattas do agree (by way of friendſhip) to give for ever to the Engliſh Company, a country of three complete lacks of rupees, near or adjoining to *Broach*, on which there is to be no claim of Chout, or any other demand whatſoever; two perſons on the part of the Company, and two perſons on the part of *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, to proceed and determine the place and boundaries, when the Peiſhwa will give the Sunnuds.

Article 6th. The Peiſhwa and Miniſters agree to pay to the Company twelve lacks of rupees, in part of the expences of the Engliſh Army, in two payments, viz. ſix lacks within ſix months of the date of this Treaty, and the other ſix lacks within two years of the ſame date.

Article 7th. The Engliſh do agree, that every part of the Guzerat Country, ceded to the Company by *Ragonaut Row*, or taken poſſeſſion of by them, ſhall be forthwith reſtored, with all the forts and towns thereunto belonging, except what is ſettled by this Treaty; the country ceded to the Engliſh by *Seaguor* or *Futty Sing Guicawar*, ſhall alſo be reſtored, when it is proved by their letters and copies of the Sunnuds granted by the former Peiſhwa's, now in their (the *Guicawar*'s) hands, that they do not poſſeſs power or authority to make ſuch ceſſions. The Pergunnahs of *Chickley* and *Coral*, with the town of *Veriow*, three villages of the Pergunnah of *Churraſſey*, and the village of *Batta Gang*, are to continue as pledges in the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh till the Sunnuds for the country of three lacks are made over. All treaties and agreements ſubſiſting between the Engliſh and *Ragonaut Row*, are hereby annulled, and thoſe of *Seajee* and *Futty Sing Guicawars* are to be alſo annulled, when the above-mentioned proofs are produced. And theſe Treaties are to be deſtroyed in the preſence of the Peiſhwa's Miniſters when they come to hand.

Article 8th. The Engliſh do agree, the Troops from the Preſidency of *Bombay* are to be marched immediately into their own garriſons and diſtricts.

Article 9th. It is agreed that *Ragonaut Row* is to diſband his Army within one month of this date; his followers and adherents, except his ſervants about his perſon, are to ſeparate within the ſame time; and proclamation is to be made by the Maratta Government, granting a full pardon to all the adherents and followers, and all ſuch as have been in arms with *Ragonaut Row*, the four following excepted, viz. *Abajee Mahadu*, *Nair Cawn Gardie*, *Toolo Khedmutgar*, and *Kurry Sing Chokydar*, who for crimes and miſdemeanors committed againſt the State, are for ever baniſhed the Maratta Dominions.

Article 10th. If *Ragonaut Row* refuſes to diſband his Army, the Engliſh are to withdraw their forces, and are not to aſſiſt him.

Article 11th. The Conditions of the Ninth Article being complied with, the Peiſhwa and Miniſters then conſent to eſtabliſh a houſhold for *Ragonaut Row*, conſiſting of one thouſand horſe and ſome foot, who are to be paid and relieved at the pleaſure of Government, but to obey all legal orders given them by *Ragonaut Row*; alſo two hundred domeſtics, to be choſen by *Ragonaut Row* and paid by Government. They will alſo cauſe to be paid to *Ragonaut Row*, to defray his other expences, three lacks of rupees, per annum, by monthly payments, at the rate of twenty-five thouſand rupees per month; conditionally, that he reſides at *Cooper Gang*, on the banks of the *Gungha Gudomy*. If at any time he may want to change his place of reſidence, application is to be made to the Peiſhwa, without whoſe permiſſion ſuch a change is not to take place; and he is not to cauſe any diſturbance, or carry on improper correſpondence with any perſon.

Article 12th. It is agreed that no aſſiſtance is to be given by the Engliſh to *Ragonaut Row*, or to any ſubject or ſervant of the Peiſhwa's, that ſhall cauſe diſturbances or rebellion in the Maratta Dominions.

Article 13th. The Peiſhwa *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, and his Miniſters, do declare, that the Chout of *Bengal* and its dependencies has, for time out of mind, been part of the Jaghire of the *Bounſello*, they therefore cannot withdraw it; but if the ſaid *Bounſello*, or any of his deſcendants or ſucceſſors, or any other perſon, cauſe diſturbances, by claiming or demanding the Chout on *Bengal* or its dependencies, they do engage never to aſſiſt them themſelves, or permit any Maratta Chief, dependant on them or the Rajahſhip, to give them any aſſiſtance.

Article 14th. It is agreed, That in caſe of ſhipwreck of any Engliſh ſhips or veſſels, or ſhips or veſſels trading under their protection, on any part of the Maratta coaſt, every aſſiſtance ſhall be given by that Government and the inhabitants to ſave as much as poſſible; and the whole that may be ſaved ſhall be returned, all reaſonable charges being defrayed by the owners. In like manner the Engliſh Company engage their aſſiſtance

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ſhould any Maratta ſhips or veſſels be ſhipwrecked on any of their coaſts.

Article 15th. The Treaties between the Government of *Bombay* and the Marattas, dated July 1739, and 12th October 1756, are to be held and continued in as full force as when they were firſt entered into, unleſs any article or articles of either of them ſhould, in other manner, be provided for by this Treaty; in ſuch caſe, ſuch article or articles are to be rejected, and thoſe of this Treaty abided by.

Article 16th. All other Treaties or Agreements, ſubſiſting between the Government of *Bombay* and the Maratta Government, not having undergone alteration, or otherwiſe provided for by this Treaty, are to be held and continue in as full force as when they were firſt entered upon.

Article 17th. It is agreed, that if *Ragonaut Row* has lodged any jewels belonging to the Peiſhwa *Row Pundit Purabaun* in the hands of the Engliſh they are to be reſtored, on the obligation being complied with for which they were lodged.

Article 18th. The Honourable the Engliſh Company ſhall be conſidered as the ſole Lords and Proprietors of all the places ceded by this Treaty, from the dates of the reſpective Sunnuds or grants, and are therein accordingly to exerciſe their own laws and authorities. And the Marattas are not to cauſe any diſturbance in any of the ceded countries, nor ſhall the Engliſh occaſion any diſturbance in the Maratta Dominions.

Article 19th. In the places hereby ceded to the Honourable Company, and in all the places reſtored to the Maratta Government by the Engliſh, it is agreed that both parties ſhall commence to collect the revenues thereof from the day in which they are delivered, and no demand of collection for any paſt time ſhall be made.

Article 20th. A Copy of this Treaty, under the ſeal of Colonel *Upton*, ſhall remain with the Miniſter of the Maratta Government; and a copy ſhall be ſent to *Calcutta* to be ſigned and ſealed by the Honourable the Governor General and Members of the Supreme Council of *Fort William*, and afterwards given to the Peiſhwa.

A tranſlation. (Signed) *J. Upton.*
(Signed) *A. M'Pherſon.*
Perſian Interpreter

The Signature of *Siccaram Pundit.* The Signature of *Ballajee Punditt.*

Here it is dated.

The Board now proceeds to conſider the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, and recorded above.

To the 3d Article,

Reſolved not to relinquiſh *Salſette* and the other conquered lands.

Agreed, That this be added as a clauſe at the end of the Treaty.

Whereas it is declared by the 3d Article of the foregoing Treaty, that, "the Peiſhwa *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, "and his Miniſters, being deſirous of having *Salſette* "and the ſmall Iſlands ſubdued by the Engliſh in the late "war reſtored to them, do offer to give in exchange a "country of three lacks of rupees, with its Chout, &c. "in the neighbourhood of *Broach*." And further, that "if the Governor General and Council of *Fort* "*William* do not reſtore them, they ſhould continue in "the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh; and the ſaid Peiſhwa "*Row Pundit Purdhaun* and his Miniſters will then give "up all right and title to the ſaid Iſlands:" The ſaid Governor General and Council hereby declare their reſolution not to relinquiſh the ſaid Iſlands of *Salſette*, *Caranja*, *Elephanta*, and *Hog*; or to accept the territory offered in exchange for thoſe Iſlands. And the ſaid Iſlands are accordingly to remain for ever in the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh, by virtue of the preſent Treaty.

Signed { *W. H.* / *H. G. M.* / *P. F. R. B.*

5th Article agreed to; underſtanding they are to put the Company in quiet poſſeſſion of this territory.

7th Article. The firſt condition approved of, with the following reſervations: That our withdrawing our troops and officers from the countries ceded by *Ragoba* or *Futty Sing*, ſhall be deemed as a performance of the Treaty regarding theſe ceſſions: with regard to the laſt condition of this Article; viz. And theſe Treaties are to be deſtroyed "in the preſence of the Peiſhwa's Mi-"niſters when they come to hand."

Mr. *Francis* propoſes that Colonel *Upton* be inſtructed to repreſent to the Miniſters, that as we have declared the former Treaty concluded by the Preſidency of *Bombay* with *Ragoba* void, and as it is in fact annulled by the preſent Treaty, we deem it highly offenſive to us, and totally uſeleſs to them, that we ſhould be required to deſtroy it in their preſence. That as *Ragoba* is in poſſeſſion of a duplicate of his Treaty, our deſtroying one copy of it can anſwer no end whatſoever, and may be liable to an interpretation derogatory to the dignity of this Government; that he ſhould therefore exert his utmoſt efforts to have the words above-mentioned omitted; but that if ultimately he ſhould fail of ſucceſs, we have left a blank ſufficient to inſert them: that in this caſe, and ſuppoſing the Miniſters to adhere inflexibly to the omiſſion of the words in queſtion, he is to declare to them, that we ſhall comply with the Article as it ſtands, when all the other terms of the Treaty are completely executed on their part.

Mr. *Barwell*—From what I have ſeen of the Treaty in general from what Colonel *Upton* mentions in his letter, I conceive there is no option in this Government to make any alteration in the terms of the treaty: in this idea I ſhall ſubſcribe to it. At the ſame time I would recommend from the opinion I entertain, that the Maratta Government, if ſincerely diſpoſed to a pacification, will gladly admit the principal points that it is expected the Engliſh ſhall bind themſelves to. I diſapprove entirely of all the matter introduced of a foreign nature; and think it ſhould be ſpecified, that the Engliſh Government is to reap ſuch ſpecific advantages, upon condition that they withdraw their forces from the aid of *Ragoba*; that articles of a treaty upon this ſimple principle ſhould be drawn out, ſuch as this Board can approve, and tranſmitted to Colonel *Upton*; leaving to him to judge the neceſſity of delivering that which he has ſent for our ratification or withholding it entirely, and inſiſting on their receiving of the one framed by this Government.

Colonel *Monſon*—I approve that the Propoſition made by Mr. *Francis* ſhould ſtand as an Inſtruction to Colonel *Upton*.

General *Clavering*—I agree to the Propoſition made by Mr. *Francis*. I could have wiſhed the exceptionable words had been omitted in the 7th article of this Treaty. If the Miniſters will agree to the omiſſion of theſe words, or to the ſubſtituting ſimply, that we annul treaties made by the Preſidency of *Bombay* with *Ragoba* and *Futty Sing*, my objections to it will be entirely removed; but at all events I had rather agree to the article as it ſtands, than engage in a war, if that is to be the alternative of our accepting or refuſing it.

Governor General—I do not agree to the clauſe in the 7th article, by which it is ſtipulated that the treaties with *Ragoba* and the *Guicawars*, ſhall be torn in the preſence of Peiſhwa's Miniſters; nor do I agree to the propoſition now made, to leave it at the option of Colonel *Upton*, to inſert the clauſe in the Treaty to be executed and ſent from this Government. The Miniſters can gain no real advantage from ſuch a conceſſion; but it would prove a real loſs to this Government, in the indelible diſgrace that it would ſtamp on them, for having conſented to ſuch an indignity. I am therefore of opinion, that the Treaty ſhould be executed without that clauſe; and that Colonel *Upton* ſhould declare to them, in the moſt peremptory terms, that we will not ſubmit to it. If they will go to war for ſuch a trifle, a trifle to them, but

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but of very great conſequence to us, they will go to war with us even in ſpite of the Treaty, which has left many pretences for it.

Agreed, That Colonel *Upton* be written to agreeable to Mr. *Francis*'s Propoſition.

General *Clavering*—I cannot agree with the Governor General in opinion, that ſhould the Miniſters refuſe to comply with the omiſſion of the word "Conſent," or to ſubſtitute the other words, I propoſed, that an indelible diſgrace will be ſtamped on us for having conſented to ſuch an indignity. The Treaty in queſtion was made by the Government, and was of no effect, unleſs it has been confirmed by us. When every other means had failed of engaging the Company in a war with the Maratta State, it was no impolitic ſtep to embarraſs the Negociation with as many difficulties as could be created. It is proper the Court of Directors ſhould know, that the intrigues of the Preſidency of *Bombay* have been employed at this place, from the outſet of the Negociation to this time, ſometimes by diſplaying in the moſt lively colours the force of *Ragoba*, and that of his powerful dependants; at other times by depreciating the power of the Miniſters and their dependants; and laſtly, by poſitive aſſertions, that whatever demands we made of the Miniſters, they certainly would be complied with. The preparations that we were making only a few days ago, to enter upon this war, together with the great extent of the operations propoſed, will prove to the Company how nearly theſe intrigues were ſucceeding, and the immenſe difficulties and expence that we ſhould have been engaged in, if they had had their effect.

Governor General—All that the General has ſaid is ſo totally foreign from the queſtion before us, that I am at a loſs to reply to it; but as it immediately follows my minute, and begins with expreſſing a diſagreement from the ſentiments which I have expreſſed in mine, I cannot underſtand it, but as applying throughout to myſelf. If the General means to charge me with endeavouring to embarraſs the Negociation, it is a charge which he cannot know to be true, and which, from the teſtimony of my own conſcience, I declare to be without foundation; I could bring proofs of this even from the articles of the treaty which have been read; there are many paſſages in it which I diſapprove, and many expreſſions which I think highly injurious to us; yet having given full power to Colonel *Upton* to conclude a Treaty, and being almoſt as anxious at this time perhaps as the General can be, that the Treaty ſhould be concluded, I paſs them over without obſervation. I diſapprove of the clauſe which immediately precedes that to which I now except, becauſe it is a wanton and unneceſſary triumph on the part of the Marattas, and ought not to have been aſſented to by Colonel *Upton*, at leaſt the reaſon ſhould have been aſſigned inſtead of the ſimple expreſſion of the annihilation of an old Treaty being made the condition of a new, but as it expreſſes no more in effect, than we have already declared in our letters to the *Poonah* Miniſtry, I have conſented that it ſhould ſtand. But the clauſe in queſtion appears to me to be fraught both with the moſt diſgraceful and dangerous conſequences: I have hitherto only objected to the indignity of allowing a Treaty, ſolemnly executed by a part of the Britiſh Government, to be torn in the face of a public Durbar; but the conſequences appear to me to extend much farther; it appears evidently to be the deſign of the Miniſters to diſcourage and intimidate, by every artifice, all thoſe who may be hereafter inclined to form engagements with the Engliſh; for this purpoſe they have inſiſted on a declaration to be entered in the Treaty now executed with them, that the former Treaty with *Ragoba*'s, the incompetency of which he could not know, is annulled, and to be publicly torn: the exception of four perſons from the pardon granted to *Ragoba* adherents in the 9th article; the fallacious conceſſions of the 11th, by which *Ragoba* is to become a priſoner at their mercy; and the 17th, by which we are made to give up to his enemies the jewels pledged by him under the faith of Government; are all proofs of the ſame dangerous policy in the Maratta Miniſters. I ſhall make no further reflections in this place on the Treaty as it now ſtands ſubmitted to us; I will agree to confirm it, ſo far as it reſpects conceſſions, which we can in honour grant, or which we have a right to yield. Theſe I do not conceive to be included in the obligation of the full powers granted to Colonel *Upton*. It will reſt with *Ragoba* to be a party if he chuſes in the Treaty; I ſhall therefore think myſelf obliged to confirm that part of the Treaty which reſpects him, but will not agree to the 17th Article, becauſe the pledge is not ours to give; yet as it is made an article in the Treaty, and the refuſal to comply with it, may be quoted as a pretence for breaking off the whole, I do propoſe that an equivalent in money, on a fair appraiſement, be given to the Miniſters in lieu of the jewels depoſited by *Ragoba*, but that they remain his property, to be diſpoſed of according to the original conditions on which they were truſted to our charge. The reſt of the treaty I am content to leave as it ſtands.

General *Clavering*—The Governor General has been pleaſed to apply the words I made uſe of, in my laſt minutes to himſelf. I will not contradict him, but ſhall appeal to thoſe very conſultations to which he has referred, for the full vindication of what I have aſſerted. I will not take up the time of the Board in refuting ſeveral circumſtances that appear in the Governor General's Minute, but ſhall content myſelf with remarking that, it appears to me, that he has totally miſtaken the meaning of the 17th Article, which only expreſſes that the jewels pledged by *Ragoba* are to be reſtored on the obligation being complied with. By the word "reſtore," it evidently can mean to nobody but *Ragoba* himſelf, at leaſt, that is the ſenſe in which I underſtand it. It matters not to whom the jewels belong; the fulfilling the engagement on our part can only be performed with the perſon with whom the engagements were made. It was *Ragoba* who lodged the jewels with the Government, and it is to him that they are to be reſtored, on his paying the money for which they were pledged.

Governor General—I have not miſunderſtood the meaning of the 17th Article; I have compared the Perſian original with the tranſlation, and I find both ſuppoſe a right in the Peiſhwa to the property of the jewels, which the Treaty ſays we are to reſtore. The context ſufficiently ſhews that the property ſhall be reſtored to the Proprietor of it. If in the oppoſite ſenſe, the Article would have run thus, "It is agreed that the jewels which were lodged by *Ragonaut Row* in the hands of the Engliſh, are to be reſtored on the obligation being complied with for which they were lodged."

Mr. *Barwell*—To prevent any interruption in the diſcuſſion of the different Articles of the Treaty, I concur with the Governor General in the objections he makes to the 17th Article, the reſt of the Treaty I ſhall make no objections to.

13th Article.

The Board do not think it adviſable to accept the conceſſions made by this Article, and agree therefore that it be left out in the Treaty: And

Agreed, That Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* be directed to decline any explanation upon it; but if that cannot be avoided, to inform the Miniſter, our reaſons for omitting it are, that we apprehend it may be underſtood to contain an acknowledgement of a right which does not exiſt, and which they themſelves, we conclude, by propoſing the Article, have no thoughts of inſiſting on.

17th Article.

Mr. *Francis*—With reſpect to this Article, I think that Colonel *Upton* ſhould be directed to inform the Miniſters, that theſe jewels were depoſited with the Gover-

nor

nor and Council of *Bombay* by *Ragoba*, and that we conſidered them as his private property; that we cannot therefore in juſtice or honour return them to any body but him; that we conſider it as not an object of importance in any other ſenſe: and if he finds that the Miniſtry inſiſts upon it, that he ſhall give them proper aſſurances, that upon a further reference to us, it ſhall be accommodated to their ſatisfaction.

Agreed to this propoſition, and that the 17th Article be left out in the Treaty.

Ordered, That a Treaty be drawn out in conformity to that now received from Colonel *Upton*, with alterations made by the above reſolutions; and that a letter be accordingly written to Colonel *Upton*, as follows:

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 1ſt and 3d March, with a copy of the Treaty which you have concluded with the Peiſhwa.

As you inform us that the Articles of this Treaty are to be made out here and ſigned by us, we have accordingly drawn them up in the form of a Treaty which we had executed, omitting however the concluding words of the 7th Article, and the 13th and 17th Articles entirely.

With reſpect to the firſt omiſſion, we deſire that you will repreſent to the Miniſters, that as we have declared the former treaty entered into by the Preſidency of *Bombay* with *Ragoba*, void; and as it is in fact annulled by the preſent Treaty, and deem it highly offenſive to us, and totally uſeleſs to them, that we ſhould be required to deſtroy it in their preſence; beſides, as *Ragoba* is in poſſeſſion of a duplicate of this Treaty, our deſtroying one copy of it can anſwer no end whatſoever, and may be liable to interpretations derogatory to the dignity of this Government.

We think this a point of ſo much conſequence to us, that we direct you to exert your utmoſt efforts to have theſe words totally omitted, as they are in the incloſed treaty, but if you ſhould ultimately fail of ſucceſs, we have left a blank ſufficient for inſertion of the words in queſtion. You will declare to them, that we ſhall comply with the other terms of the Treaty when they are completely executed on their part.

As we do not think it adviſable to accept the conceſſion which is propoſed to be made to the Company by the 13th Article, we have cauſed it to be left out of the incloſed treaty, to which we apprehend the Miniſters can have no objection. We wiſh you to decline entering into any explanation with the Miniſters on the reaſons of this omiſſion; but if you cannot avoid it, you may acquaint them, that our motives for it, is the apprehenſion that it might be underſtood to convey the acknowledgment of a right which does not exiſt, and which they themſelves, by propoſing or admitting the article, we conclude have no thoughts of ever inſiſting on.

The cauſe of our not having aſſented to the 17th Article is, that the jewels in queſtion having been depoſited by *Ragoba* with the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, we conſider them as his private property, which we are bound to return to him; we cannot therefore in juſtice or honour part with them to any body elſe. We look upon this as an object of no importance in any other ſenſe, and deſire you will urge our reaſons to the Miniſters, and endeavour to induce them to acquieſce in them; but if you find that they ſtill inſiſt on this Article, you will give them proper aſſurances in our name, that upon a further reference to us, it ſhall be accommodated to their ſatisfaction; and immediately adviſe us.

We have added a declaration at the end of the treaty, importing that we are reſolved not to relinquiſh *Salſette* and the conquered Iſlands, in exchange for the territory offered to us in lieu of them near *Broach*. This clauſe will clear up and fix the point left undecided in the 3d Article.

All the reſt is exactly conformable to the draft which you have ſent us; but we think it neceſſary to obſerve, that we underſtand by the 5th Article the Miniſters are to put the Company in quiet poſſeſſion of territory therein ceded; and by the firſt condition in the 7th Article, that our evacuating and quitting poſſeſſion of the countries thereby ſtipulated to be given up, by withdrawing our troops and officers of all denominations from them, is all that is required on our part for the performance of it. Appendix No. 117.

Colonel *Monſon* having ſent a Minute to the Secretary two days after the above letter to Colonel *Upton* was written, he deſired that it might be entered immediately after the letter, and is as follows:

I ſign this letter with a declaration, that I do, with as much reluctance as the Governor General, give my conſent to an act that would fix indelible diſgrace on this Government.

The latter part of the 17th Article is in my opinion of no manner of conſequence, unleſs we make it ſo by our animadverſions.

The papers in queſtion I diſavow as treaties; they are ſtipulations entered into by perſons not veſted with an authority to make ſolemn engagements. If abrogating an unlicenſed act be conſidered as diſgraceful and diſhonourable to the Britiſh Nation, I am at a loſs to form a judgement of what may de deemed honourable for it.

The deſtroying of theſe papers in public will be ſo far from being a diſgrace to this Government, that it will be an honourable declaration to the Potentates of the Eaſt, that it is determined not to ſanctify any act done but by proper authority.

A doctrine eſtabliſhed on the principles laid down by the Governor General, would be annulling the power of this Government, and ſubverting the intention of the Act of Parliament. I ſhould have ſaid this on Monday, but was unwilling to take up the time of the Board in diſcourſe on points in which I cannot agree with him.

I muſt beg leave to obſerve, that not many days ſince he was as ready to yield up the honour of this Government to the Commandant of *Chandernagore*, as he ſeems in the preſent caſe deſirous to aſſert it.

(Signed) *G. M.*

Reſolved in the mean time, That a copy of the Treaty received from Colonel *Upton* be ſent to the Secretary of the Court of Directors, in a ſhort letter from the Secretary, which he accordingly wrote as follows, and diſpatched by the *Talbot*.

Sir,

By the commands of the Honourable the Governor General and Council, I have the honour to incloſe a copy of the Treaty concluded by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* with the Peiſhwa and Miniſters of the Maratta State at *Poonah*; it arrived late laſt night, and was read this morning in Council. As a counterpart is to be made out here, executed by this Government, and tranſmitted to *Poonah* for the Peiſhwa, the Board have agreed to omit the concluding words of the 7th Article, together with the whole of the 13th and 17th Articles, for obvious reaſons which they have directed Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to explain to the ſatisfaction of the Miniſters; and have further reſolved to add a clauſe to the Treaty, importing that they decline to accept the exchange of territory offered in lieu of *Salſette* and the ſmall iſlands adjacent to it.

I have, &c.

Fort William, the 1ſt April, 1776. (Signed) *P. Auriol*, Sec^r.

APPENDIX, No. 117.

RECEIVED the following Letter from *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Incloſed is a duplicate of the letter we had the honour to addreſs you on the 28th ultimo,

Appendix. No. 117.

We alſo tranſmit in a ſeries, copies of the letters that have paſſed between us and Colonel *Upton* ſince that date, and it gave us much ſatisfaction to obſerve by his letter, dated the 24th ultimo, that the Miniſters were reconciled to our forces continuing with *Ragoba* in their preſent ſituation, and perfectly ſatisfied that the terms of the Governor General's letter to *Sacram Baboo*, had been fully complied with. The Colonel obſerves, that was our army to be withdrawn entirely from *Ragoba*, the Miniſters would not fail to take advantage of it, and that they would, in ſuch caſe, have little occaſion to enter into any treaty.

From what information the Council has given us, it ſeems rather dubious whether any treaty will take place with the Miniſters. In the beginning of January he ſeemed to think the Treaty would be concluded in a few days, but in his ſubſequent letters, dated the 1ſt and 6th inſtant, he gave us to underſtand it was very probable it would not take place at all. In his laſt letter, dated the 10th inſtant, he ſays appearances are ſtill againſt it; though whatever circumſtances may have occaſioned the obſtacle to the concluſion of the Treaty, we begin to be alarmed leaſt it ſhould be ſurmounted by conceſſions very injurious to the Company. The queſtions he has put to us reſpecting *Baſſein*, and the ceſſions in the Guzerat Country, and the privileges neceſſary to be ſtipulated in caſe of factories being eſtabliſhed at that place and *Jambooſeer*, give us reaſon to imagine that he entertains thoughts of relinquiſhing thoſe ceſſions; and we therefore eſteemed it our duty to repreſent to him, that the intereſt of the Company required he ſhould inſiſt on the ceſſions made by the Treaty being confirmed; that he could not recede from his demand of *Baſſein* conſiſtently with your inſtructions, and that factories either at that place or *Jambooſeer* would be attended with no manner of advantage to the Company. No inveſtments can be provided there for *Europe*, and from the vicinity of the former to *Bombay*, and of the latter to our ſettlements of *Surat* and *Broach*, no increaſe of the vend for European commodities can be expected. We have ſufficiently ſet forth to him the importance of the ceſſions made by the Treaty, fully explained the political and commercial intereſts of this Preſidency, and given him likewiſe an ample account of the preſent ſituation of affairs, and we cannot depart from our opinion, that by a reſolute and ſteady conduct the Miniſters might be brought to confirm theſe ceſſions, and to reimburſe us the expence of the War, rather than break off the Negociation, unleſs he ſuffers them to amuſe him and gain time until *Ragoba*'s Army diſbands for want of pay, but, as he recedes, they will advance.

Every argument that can be advanced to ſhew the neceſſity of a revenue being acquired for this Preſidency adequate to its expence, and how effectually this great end, might have been anſwered by our Treaty with *Ragoba*, has been already fully ſtated to your Honour, &c. both by us and Mr. *Tayler*; and it has alſo been fully repreſented to you how much the conſequence and dignity of this Preſidency will ſuffer by your entruſting the management of this Negociation to Colonel *Upton*, when a Member of our Board is expreſsly appointed by the Company reſident at the Marratta Court, and repeated in their late Commands by the *Gatton*. We can only lament that theſe repreſentations have not been attended with better ſucceſs; but we have this pleaſing reflection, that we have diſcharged our duty to the Company as far as we could, by giving Colonel *Upton* every information that our experience and knowledge of their intereſts at this Preſidency could dictate, to aſſiſt him in the execution of his important commiſſion.

During this long interval of inaction, our Preſidency has laboured under every diſadvantage that could have attended a ſtate of actual War with the Marattas. All intercourſe of trade, and correſpondence with their dominions, is more rigorouſly prohibited than during the continuance of the War, to the great detriment of the Company's and private trade, though we have repreſented to Colonel *Upton* the propriety of inſiſting upon the communication being opened. But the inconveniencies to *Ragoba* have been ſtill greater. His enemies being in poſſeſſion of *Poonah* and the Circar Treaſuries, deprive him of all reſources for the maintainance of his army, and his diſtreſs for money has lately aroſe to ſo alarming a height, as deſcribed in Colonel *Keating*'s letter, dated the 6th inſtant, inſerted in the Correſpondence now forwarded, that to prevent the purpoſe being entirely defeated, for which we had ſo long continued our troops with him, we deemed it abſolutely neceſſary to advance him the ſum of eighty thouſand rupees, with which we hope he will be able to appeaſe the clamours of his army, at leaſt for a few days. This ſum we advanced upon the ſecurity of a ſupply of about 24,000 pagodas furniſhed him by the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, and which is ſince arrived upon one of the Company's cruiſers.

It appears to us to be evidently the intention of the Miniſters to protract the Negociation as long as they poſſibly can, in hope's of *Ragoba*'s friends deſerting him, and his army diſbanding for want of pay, by which all their apprehenſions of his reinſtatement will be removed. We have more than once apprized Colonel *Upton of this circumſtance, and enforced to him the neceſſity of making it a preliminary point with them, immediately to aſſign an adequate revenue for his ſupport* during the Negociation, which we cannot think is an unreaſonable demand, as we preſume no treaty will be concluded, without ſtipulating proper terms for him, and it is but equitable that a portion of the revenues ſhould in the mean time be made over to him. The Colonel ſeems rather doubtful of ſucceſs in this point, and if at laſt he ſhould be unable to bring the Miniſters to proper terms, and be reduced to quit *Poonah*, we ſhall very much regret your not having complied with our requeſt for a reinforcement, which we think could not have failed giving a favourable turn to the Negociation, or at any rate would have been in readineſs to proſecute the War without loſing a whole ſeaſon.

We tranſmitted to Colonel *Upton* for his notice, a copy of Colonel *Keating*'s letter, dated the 24th, containing ſome propoſals made by *Ragoba*. What Colonel *Keating* calls full powers from *Ragoba*, to treat with your Honour, &c. in the perſon of Colonel *Upton*, is no more than a letter from him to our Preſident, requeſting we will exert our influence to obtain conſiſtent terms for him; for we ſhould not think ourſelves at liberty to accept any ſuch powers from him.

We ſtill continue to receive complaints from our army, of the acts of hoſtility committed by the miniſterial forces, as you will find particularly mentioned in Colonel *Keating*'s correſpondence.

The revenues are coming in very faſt from the ceded Pergunnahs, and we expect to receive in the courſe of this month, 2,86,000 rupees, from one aſſeſſment made on the diſtricts of *Hanſood*, *Occlaſeer*, and *Jambooſeer*, dependant on *Broach*; and by the end of next month we hope to be at a certainty how much the whole will produce this ſeaſon, which we will not fail to adviſe you of.

We have advices from *Buſhier*, dated the 28th December, when matters at *Baſſora* were ſtill in a very uncertain ſituation. The Turks were very obſtinate in their defence of the town, expecting relief from *Bagdat*, and *Career Cawn* ſeemed as determined to reduce it, declaring his intention of marching againſt it in perſon, rather than raiſe the ſiege.

We have, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 18th February 1776. (Signed) *Willm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Ordered, That the correſpondence with Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* be abſtracted, and that it be entered after this conſultation, together with the correſpondence with Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

APPENDIX, No. 118.

Abſtract of the continuation of Colonel *Keating*'s correſpondence, from the 24th January to 14th February 1776.

LETTER from, dated near *Mandavie*, 24th January. Tranſmits an explanation of the Articles of a new Treaty propoſed by *Ragoba*.

Letter to, dated 31ſt January. *Futty Sing* has kept up a conſtant correſpendence with the Miniſters; deſire he will keep a watchful eye over his conduct.

Letter from, dated *Mandavie*, 6th February. The Peiſhwa's diſtreſſes increaſe daily. The miniſterialiſts ſtill continue to commit ravages.

Letter to, dated 14th February. Determine to advance *Ragoba* 80,000 rupees.

Continuation of the correſpondence between the Select Committee of *Bombay* and Colonel *Upton*, from the 28th January.

To the Honourable the Preſident and Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I have received your letter of the 18th inſtant, with the copy of the memorial, &c. delivered to the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*. I am much obliged by the very full information you have been pleaſed to give me, and ſhall endeavour to make every uſe of it, to the honour and advantage of our Honourable Employers.

From a death in *Siccaram Baboo*'s family, and a marriage in *Ballajee Pundit*'s, a Durbar has not been aſſembled for ſome days paſt. I ſent to deſire they would immediately iſſue an order to the officers of their grabs and gallivats, not to moleſt any veſſels or boats with Engliſh paſſes or colours. The order was to be ſent off laſt night; they requeſt in return, that their veſſels, &c. may paſs unmoleſted.

I have perfectly ſatisfied theſe people of the propriety of our troops remaining where they are, and that the terms of the Governor General's letter have been fully complied with, by withdrawing our troops from *Ragonaut Row*'s, and by your having publicly proclaimed the ceſſation of hoſtilities. Till the terms of the Treaty about to take place were made known, I obſerved to them, were we to withdraw our forces entirely, they would have little occaſion to enter into any Treaty. They were, as I have already ſaid, quite ſatisfied that our troops ſhould remain, obſerving ſtrictly that no hoſtilities were committed; was the army to be withdrawn entirely, they would immediately take the advantage of it. At firſt, they aſked this of me, till they were convinced of the impoſſibility of its being complied with.

I ſhall be much obliged to you, Gentlemen, to inform me, if the ceſſions made by *Futty Sing* were antecedent to your receipt of the Governor General's letter, ordering the troops to diſcontinue hoſtilities. *Futty Sing* has all along, according to the account of the miniſtry, and they offered to produce his letters, correſponded with them; and adviſed, that unleſs more troops could be ſent to him, he muſt give up ſuch places as were demanded: They ſay he was compelled to this, after the ceſſation of arms had taken place.

By my inſtructions you will obſerve, that the power of treating with either party is not veſted in me (except conditionally). I obſerve this, as you mention, "if I "ſtill prefer treating with the Miniſters at *Poonah*," &c.

I am afraid I ſhall not be able to get any eſtabliſhment for *Ragonaut Row* previous to the Treaty's being ſettled; they will have much to urge againſt it.

Poonah Dhur, 24th January 1776. I have, &c. &c. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We have received your letter dated the 24th ultimo.

Immediately on the ceſſation being proclaimed, we gave inſtructions to the commanders of all the Company's veſſels, not to moleſt any boats or veſſels belonging to the Marattas; and as no act of hoſtility has been committed on our ſide, there is not any occaſion to repeat theſe orders.

We are much pleaſed to find you are convinced of the propriety of the Company's troops not being entirely withdrawn from *Ragonaut Row*'s before the concluſion of the Treaty; and we are ſenſible you will experience the good effects of this meaſure in your Negociation.

The ſeveral ceſſions from *Futty Sing* (except *Batta*) were made long before the receipt of the Governor General and Council's orders for diſcontinuing the War. The Treaty between him and *Ragoba* was executed on the 18th of July laſt, near *Brodera*; whereas theſe orders did not reach *Bombay* until the 12th of Auguſt; and it was ſtipulated in that Treaty, that the Guicawar ſhare of the Broach revenues, and the Villages of *Corat*, *Chickley*, and *Veriow*, ſhould be ceded to the Honourable Company. *Futty Sing* was before this openly connected with the miniſterial party; but when he found *Ragoba* ſupported by the Engliſh, he was glad to make his peace with him, and return to his allegiance. And theſe ceſſions were made to the Honourable Company for the ſervices rendered him, in accommodating matters between him and the Peiſhwa. He has lately made many profeſſions of his attachment to the Honourable Company; and in a letter to our Preſident at the time, expreſſed his ſatsfaction at the accommodation effected by Colonel *Keating*. The only ceſſion obtained ſince the ceſſation, was the Villiage of *Batta*, which is ſo connected with our other poſſeſſions, that a grant of it was requeſted from *Futty Sing* in the room of *Sinore*, a place producing a much more conſiderable revenue, which he voluntarily relinquiſhed, becauſe it was not ſo conveniently ſituated. We have alſo lately requeſted him to give up his pretenſions to the *Autgoms*, ſome villages ſituated in the very center of the Broach Pergunnah, which he does not ſeem to conſider as included in his grant of that diſtrict; but we are not yet apprized of the ſucceſs of this application. We never authorized, nor do we believe any compulſion was ever uſed to obtain theſe grants from *Futty Sing*.

We muſt again ſtrongly urge to you, the propriety of your inſiſting upon the Miniſters ſettling an eſtabliſhment for *Ragoba* immediately; for we may venture to foretell, that if you recede from this point, they will protract and retard the Negociation by every artifice in their power, in the hopes of *Ragoba*'s army diſbanding for want of pay, which would intirely fruſtrate the good effects we, with ſo much reaſon, expected from our late meaſures; and we are alſo apprehenſive it will be a difficult matter to prevent an army without pay, in a plentiful country, from committing ſome irregularities, which the Miniſters will be very ready to term an infringement of the ceſſation.

We have lately received a letter from Colonel *Keating*, containing ſome propoſals made by *Ragoba*, of which we think it proper to tranſmit a copy for your notice, and likewiſe an extract from another letter alluded to therein; but the orders from the Governor General and Council arriving about the time, Mr. *Forbes* did not deliver *Ragoba*'s propoſals.

You have never acknowledged the receipt of our letter, dated the 29th ultimo.

We hope you will prevail with the Miniſters, to give immediate orders for opening the communication.

I remain &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 1ſt February, 1776. (Signed) *W. Hornby*, &c. Council.

Appendix. No. 119.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We ſhall now reply to your letter received laſt night.

We were ſtruck with the utmoſt ſurprize by the queſtions you put to us reſpecting *Baſſein*. We never imagined that you could entertain an idea of ſtipulating for our having a factory only at that place, when your inſtructions are ſo peremptory for your inſiſting upon the abſolute ceſſion of it to the Company. A factory there would not be attended with the leaſt benefit or advantage to them; and it is our opinion that the intereſt of the Company requires you ſhould inſiſt upon this ceſſion, and that you cannot, conſiſtently with your inſtructions, act otherwiſe. The papers you have been already furniſhed with, will ſhew you the importance of *Baſſein*, and the deſire the Company have for ſo many years expreſſed to obtain it. *Salſette* will never prove of much advantage, and the inhabitants will never think themſelves in a ſtate of ſecurity, unleſs we get poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, and its dependencies, as deſcribed in Mr. *Tayler*'s memorial, and we think that circumſtance only can effectually exclude other Europeans, from either forming a ſettlement there, or making themſelves maſters of the place. In the treaty concluded with the Maratta State, in October 1756, of which we obſerve you have got a copy, it was expreſsly ſtipulated in the firſt Article, that the Dutch, who was the only European Power we were then apprehenſive of, ſhould not form any ſettlement in their dominions; and we do not think that any treaty that can be formed with the Miniſters, will afford us better ſecurity againſt ſuch an event.

We were equally alarmed and concerned at the ſuppoſition you have made, that the ceſſions in the Guzerat Country ſhould not be retained by the Company. We have ſufficiently explained the importance of theſe acquiſitions in our letter dated the 18th ultimo; and in that letter, and the one dated the firſt inſtant, we particularly mentioned the names of the ceded places, and plainly diſtinguiſhed by whom, and when, ceded. For your full ſatisfaction, we will repeat theſe particulars; premiſing, that what is termed the Guzerat Province commences from the River *Tappy*, or *Surat* River, extending from thence to the northward, and that conſequently ſome of the northern ceſſions are not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, ſituated in that Province.

Ceſſions in the Guzerat Province by the Treaty with *Ragoba*, executed in March 1775.

Orpad.

Jambooſeer.

The Guicawar ſhare of the Broach revenues, and ſince confirmed by *Futty Sing*.

An annual collection from *Occlaſeer* of R^{s} 75,000, preſented by *Ragoba* ſince the concluſion of the Treaty.

Aſhmood, preſented in the month of June laſt.

Hanſood, granted in the month of July, with the proviſo that the Company's right ſhould not commence until the 6th October, it having been farmed out until that time.

Theſe two places, with *Verſault* and the remainder of the *Occlaſeer* revenues, were taken poſſeſſion of in the month of April, being mortgaged by the treaty, for ſecurity of the monthly ſtipend.

Verſault is ſituated to the ſouthward of *Surat*, and therefore is not in the Guzerat Province.

Ceſſions made by *Futty Sing*, agreeable to the ſtipulation in his treaty with the Peiſhwa; executed the 18th July.

Ragoba's grant of the Guicawar ſhare of the Broach Revenues, confirmed as above-mentioned.

Coral, near *Broach*.

Chickley and *Veriow*. } To the ſouthward of *Surat* River.

Ceded by *Futty Sing* in November.

Batta, ſituated between the Pergunnahs of *Orpad* and *Hanſood*, which it connects, and for that reaſon a grant of it was requeſted from *Futty Sing*.

We likewiſe, to prevent diſputes hereafter, ſolicited the grant of ſome villages called the *Autgoms* ſituated in the centre of the Broach Pergunnah, as *Futty Sing* did not ſeem to conſider them as included in the former Sunnud. We are not yet apprized of the ſucceſs of this application, though we think the Company's right to them indiſputable, as they formerly belonged to that province in the time of the Moguls. We before obſerved, that we did not imagine the ceſſions made by *Futty Sing* could be effected by your negociations, and we have forwarded to you a copy of the Governor General and Council's letter to us on that ſubject.

We cannot ſee any poſſible advantage that will ariſe to the Company, from having a factory at *Jambooſeer*. and therefore wiſh not for any privileges there, upon that footing; we might have formed a ſettlement there many years ago, had we thought it eligible.

The revenues of the northern Pergunnahs have been collected by and for the uſe of the Company, ever ſince the month of April laſt, and very conſiderable ſums have lately been received.

We have thus given you very explicit information on our parts; and are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 15th February 1776. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

True Copies.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Sec^{y}.

APPENDIX, No. 119.

Extract of *Bombay* Secret Conſultations, the 11th March 1776.

PRESENT.

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, and Governor,

The Hon. *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire — *Robert Gordon.*

Thomas Moſtyn, —

Robert Garden,

Andrew Ramſey.

N. B. Mr. *Fletcher* indiſpoſed, and Mr. *Tayler*, at *Bengal*.

MET to read the letter received laſt night from Colonel *Upton*, adviſing his having concluded a Treaty of Peace with the Miniſters, and incloſing an extract of ſuch parts of which, as he ſays relate to this Preſidency.

The extract of the Treaty was then read, and conſidered with the utmoſt attention.

It is remarked, as extraordinary, that although the treaty is dated the 1ſt inſtant, it was not received here until the 10th in the evening, and *Ragoba* has only a month allowed him to diſband his army.

The opinion expreſſed in our letters of the 15th and 26th ultimo reſpecting the extent of Colonel *Upton*'s power with regard to the ceſſion of *Baſſein*, was founded upon his written inſtructions tranſmitted to us by the Governor General and Council, and not upon any private or verbal inſtructions he might have received at *Calcutta*, for we never imagined he had any inſtructions whatever reſpecting this Preſidency, which had not been communicated to us. If the Governor General and Council have wrote to him ſince Mr. *Tayler*'s arrival in *Bengal*, we hope he would have had cauſe to have deviated from ſuch verbal inſtructions.

We cannot think that an eſcort of one hundred of the Company's troops, or the reſidence of an Engliſh gentleman at *Poonah*, will prove any ſecurity for the ſafety of *Ragoba*'s perſon at *Cocper Gung*, if he ſhould venture to truſt himſelf in the power of the Miniſters; and their motives for the requeſt, concerning the advice to be given by Colonel *Keating*, *Hurry Punt Furkia*, appear very obvious.

As to the Miniſters ſending a vackeel thither upon the plea aſſigned by Colonel *Upton*, it appears very extraordinary; as we think the Treaty ſhould not be explained by a Maratta Vackeel.

We think the Miniſters might have placed ſo much confidence in us, as to have ordered the communication to be opened without waiting for advice of our troops having returned into garriſon.

Two Gentlemen will ſoon be appointed for the purpoſe mentioned in Colonel *Upton*'s letter, but we apprehend the condition that the diſtrict to be ceded is not to be Jaghire land, will be a great obſtacle to our getting ſuch as may be moſt convenient and advantageous.

Colonel *Upton* muſt be acquainted with the Engliſh and Maratta names of the iſlands in our poſſeſſion.

It is then conſidered what orders are immediately neceſſary to be given in conſequence of the treaty; when the following occur to us:

The Peace muſt be proclaimed to-morrow morning at the head of this garriſon, and orders immediately ſent to the army and ſubordinates for the ſame purpoſe.

Orders muſt likewiſe be immediately ſent to Colonel *Keating* to march our troops into the Company's diſtricts dependant on *Surat*, and to give advice thereof to *Hurry Punt*, and whether *Ragoba* accepts the terms ſtipulated for him. Appendix, No. 119.

Ragoba muſt be apprized of theſe circumſtances and conditions, and acquainted that it is not in our power to continue our forces with him any longer: he muſt alſo be deſired to let us know his reſolutions and future intentions.

The further diſcuſſion and conſideration of the treaty is deferred till our next meeting, when it will be entered, with our ſentiments at large upon each article.

As it yet remains a doubt whether *Salſette* will be retained by the Company, no more money muſt be expended on works or buildings of any kind upon that iſland.

Extract of *Bombay* Secret Conſultations, the 12th March 1776.

The Peace was this day proclaimed at the head of the garriſon.

Extract of *Bombay* Secret Conſultations, the 15th March 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
The Honourable *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, *Robert Gordon*,
Thomas Moſtyn, ———
Robert Gurden, *Andrew Ramſay*.
Mr. *Teyler* at *Bengal*, and Mr. *Fletcher*, deceaſed.

Re-peruſed the Articles of the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton* with the Miniſters at *Poonah*, when the Brigadier General lays before us ſome remarks and obſervations thereon; which are likewiſe read, and at his requeſt ordered to be entered after this Conſultation.

The Board then proceed to make their remarks upon the Treaty, which are ordered to be inſerted in this place, in columns oppoſite to each other.

Extracts from the Treaty concluded between the Honourable Company and Maratta State at *Poorunder*, the 1ſt day of March 1776.

Article 1ſt.

Peace ſhall be eſtabliſhed and take place from this day, between the Honourable the *Eaſt India* Company in general, and the Government of *Bombay* in particular, and *Row Pundit Purdhan*, and his Miniſters, *Siccaram Pundit* and *Ballajee Pundit*, on the part of all the Marattas; and the following articles are to be obſerved inviolably by both parties.

Article 2d.

The Peace is to be forthwith proclaimed between the Honourable Company and the Marratta State at the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and all its dependencies, at the head of the Engliſh Troops encamped at *Mandavie*, and in every part of the Guzerat province where there are Britiſh ſubjects. The Maratta Government will alſo order proclamations to be made throughout all their Dominions.

Article 3d.

The Peiſhwa *Row Pundit Purdhan*, and his Miniſters, being deſirous of having *Salſette* and the ſmall Iſlands ſubdued by the Engliſh in this war, reſtored to them, do offer to give in exchange a country of three lacks of rupees, with its Chout, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, the 15th March 1776.

Remarks made by the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* on the Extracts of the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*.

Remarks on the 1ſt Article.

The name of the Peiſhwa with whom the Treaty is concluded, is not mentioned in this article; the term Row Pundit Purdhan being only titles annexed to that office, and applicable to every Peiſhwa. This appears to us a moſt material omiſſion; and though we ſuppoſe the infant, ſaid to be the Son of *Narron Row*, is the perſon meant, we think if Colonel *Upton* has received ſatisfactory evidence of his legitimacy, there ſhould have been an expreſs article in the treaty acknowledging him Peiſhwa. Colonel *Upton* has been totally ſilent on this part in his correſpondence with us; he alſo ſeems to have departed entirely from the clauſe in his inſtructions, dated the 16th of Auguſt, which directs as an indiſpenſable point, that whatever treaty he may enter into, with the Maratta State ſhall be ſigned nominally and individually by all the Chiefs; and we muſt conclude the treaty is only ſigned by the two perſons mentioned in this article: and this precaution was the more neceſſary in the preſent caſe, as the ſuppoſed Peiſhwa is an infant of two years of age.

Remark on the 2d Article.

This article has already been complied with on our part.

Remarks on the 3d Article.

Colonel *Upton* in this article has again acted in direct breach of his inſtructions, dated the 21ſt June and 17th July, which enjoin him in the moſt poſitive terms to inſiſt upon the ceſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*. Indeed the reference at all upon this point, ſhould not in our opinion have been admitted upon

Appendix. No. 119.

&c. in the neighbourhood of *Broach*. Colonel *Upton* having declared that he could not reſtore the ſaid Iſlands, it is therefore agreed that they ſhall remain as they now are, and that they ſhall write to the Honourable the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, and both parties engage to abide by their determination. If the Governor General and Council of *Fort William* do not reſtore them, they ſhall continue in the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh, and the Marattas will then give up all right and title to the ſaid iſlands. Should the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta* reſtore *Salſette* with the ſaid iſlands, the Engliſh will accordingly deliver them over to the Peiſhwa.

Article 4th.

The Marattas do agree to give to the Engliſh Company for ever, all right and title to their ſhare of the City and Pergunnah of *Broach*, as full and complete as ever they collected from the Moguls, or otherwiſe, without retaining claim of chout, or any other demand whatever; ſo that the Engliſh Company will poſſeſs it without participation or claim of any kind.

Article 5th.

The Marattas do agree (by way of friendſhip) to give for ever to the Engliſh Company, a country of three complete lacks of rupees, near or adjoining to *Broach*, on which there is to be no claim of chout, or any other demand whatever. Two perſons on the part of the Company, and two perſons on the part of *Row Pundit Purdhan*, to proceed and upon any conſideration, though we flatter ourſelves, as the Company have ſo repeatedly recommended to us, to obtain poſſeſſion of *Salſette* and the adjacent iſlands, the Governor General and Council will on no account agree to reſtore them. As for *Baſſein*, we muſt now give up all hopes of obtaining this favourite and deſirable object. Unleſs ſome advantages, unknown to us, are obtained for the other Preſidencies, we cannot think this reference will be agreeable to the Governor General and Council; and the inconveniencies and loſs to the Company at this Preſidency, from the delay occaſioned thereby, will be very great. Whilſt our retaining theſe poſſeſſions remains in doubt, no further ſteps can be taken for their improvement either in cultivation, population, or in ſtocking them with cattle, &c. which they ſtand much in need of; and the time now approaches for leaſing out the farms again, which we cannot expect can be done on any tolerable terms in this ſtate of uncertainty, ſo that at any rate the Company will loſe great part of the revenues for this ſeaſon. The compenſation offered for *Salſette*, &c. is alſo in every reſpect inadequate, as three times the propoſed exchange in the neighbourhood of *Broach*, or any where elſe, would be no equivalent for theſe iſlands, whoſe ſituation gives them advantages we could not meet with in any other territory. In caſe of differences with the Marattas, or a war with *France*, they will, in the former caſe, form an excellent and ſecure barrier to preſerve this iſland from all inſults, and ſupply us with a large quantity of grain; and in the latter, we ſhall have the advantage of keeping our military force more compact, and be able to withdraw a conſiderable number to reinforce this garriſon, which could not be done from a more diſtant poſſeſſion. The improvements made to the fortifications of *Tannah*, by forming a glacis and eſplanade, would alſo prove a powerful argument for not putting this place again into the hands of the Marattas. We muſt further remark, that in caſe we do retain *Salſette*, and the other iſlands, it will be abſolutely neceſſary to aſcertain the royalty of the river between the former and *Baſſein*, otherwiſe there will be a continual ſubject for altercation and diſpute; and, on the other hand, ſhould we relinquiſh this iſland by orders from the Governor General and Council, there ſeems to be a great defect in this article, in not recapitulating, in the latter part, that the Marattas ſhall at the ſame time give us the propoſed territory in exchange.

Remarks on the 4th Article.

This article appears ſpecious at firſt ſight; but when it is conſidered that the Poonah Government have no right or title whatever to any ſhare in the Town or Pergunnah of *Broach*, the value of this ceſſion is entirely deſtroyed. In the partition of the Guzerat country, made in the year 1759, between the Poonah Government and *Damajee*, the Father of *Futty Sing*, and *Govin Row*, the Town and Pergunnah of *Broach* were included in the ſhare allotted to *Damajee*, with whom and his ſucceſſors therefore, the ſovereignty and the power of ceding them only reſted; which was plainly acknowledged by *Ragoba* in the Treaty of *Surat*, as he therein only engaged to procure this ceſſion from the Guicawars for us; and by virtue of their Sunnuds alone, we have for ſome time enjoyed full poſſeſſion thereof. We cannot diſcover in the Treaty of *Broderah*, the ſmalleſt trace of the acknowledgment mentioned by General *Gordon* in his remarks upon this article. The Company do not therefore derive any great benefit from this article, further than a ſecurity againſt any demands the Miniſters might hereafter have made on this territory. If upon examination of the Sunnuds, as mentioned in the 7th article, it ſhould appear the Guicawars have a right to make ceſſions, this gift of the Miniſters will be of no leſs conſequence; and in this caſe, we hope Colonel *Upton* will inſiſt upon a proportionable territory being aſſigned in exchange, and the nearer to *Surat* the better.

Remarks on the 5th Article.

We apprehend much difficulty and trouble in carrying this article into execution; and we think either the places to be ceded, or the method in which the revenue of three lacks is to be aſcertained, ought to have been ſettled. The further clauſe mentioned in Colonel *Upton*'s letter, that the country of three lacks ceded by this article, is not to be Jaghire land, will prove another very great obſtacle to any adjuſtment, or

to

and determine the place and boundaries when the Peiſhwa will give the Sunnuds.

Article 6th.

The Peiſhwa and Miniſters agree to pay to the Company twelve lacks of rupees, in part of the expences of the Engliſh Army, in two payments, viz. ſix lacks within * months of the date of this treaty, and the other ſix lacks within two years of the ſame date.

Article 7th.

The Engliſh do agree that every part of the Guzerat country ceded to the Company by *Ragonath Row*, or taken poſſeſſion of by them, ſhall be forthwith reſtored, with all the forts and towns thereunto belonging, except what is ſettled by this treaty; the country ceded to the Engliſh by *Seajee* or *Futty Sing Guicawar*, ſhall alſo be reſtored when it is proved by their letters and copies of the Sunnuds, granted by the former Peiſhwa's (and now in their Guicawar's hands) that they do not poſſeſs power or authority to make ſuch ceſſions. The Pergunnahs of *Chickly* and *Coral*, with the town of *Veriow*, three villages of the Pergunnahs of *Chureaſſy*, and the village of *Batta Gang*, are to continue as pledges in poſſeſſion of the Engliſh till the Sunnuds for the country of three lacks are made over. All treaties and agreements ſubſiſting between the Engliſh and *Ragonath Row* are hereby annulled, and thoſe of *Seajee* and *Futty Sing Guicawars* are to be alſo annulled, when the above-mentioned proofs are produced, and theſe treaties are to be deſtroyed, in the preſence of the Peiſhwa Miniſters, when they come to hand.

Article 8th.

The Engliſh do agree, that the troops now in the field, from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, are to be marched into their own garriſons and diſtricts.

Article 9th.

to our getting ſuch a diſtrict as may be moſt convenient and advantageous; the beſt lands adjoining to *Broach* being all Jaghire, and moſtly to *Saccaram Bappoo Pundit*, which accounts for this exception. Appendix, No. 119.

Remarks on the 6th Article.

The ſum of twelve lacks is very inadequate to the expences of the war, and the diſtant periods fixed for the payment very exceptionable, and even diſgraceful, as the Miniſters propoſing ſuch terms muſt have proceeded from an opinion that Colonel *Upton* would agree to any thing rather than continue the war. So many events may happen before the end of two years, that our hopes of receiving the ſecond payment are not very ſanguine; and if the Miniſters were not able to pay ſo ſmall a ſum in a much ſhorter time, their power cannot be very formidable. This article is alſo very defective in not ſtipulating where or to whom the money is to be paid.

Remarks on the 7th Article.

By this article the Company are at once deprived of *Jambooſer*, *Hanſood*, *Ahmood*, *Occlaſeer*, *Orpad*, and *Verſaul*, now in our quiet poſſeſſion, and producing a revenue of at leaſt fifteen lacks of rupees a year. We are to remain in uncertain poſſeſſion of *Coral*, *Veriow*, *Chickly*, and *Batta*, ceded by *Seajee* and *Futty Sing*, and to wait the diſcuſſion of a tedious adjuſtment before we receive the country of three lacks, made over to the Company by the 5th Article. But the moſt ſtriking inconſiſtency is, that the pledges aſſigned by the Miniſters to remain in our hands for this ſaid country, are (except the three villages of *Chureaſſy*) the very places juſt before ſtipulated not to be reſtored but in caſe of a certain contingency, and are alone in the gift of Guicawars, by virtue of whoſe Sunnuds they already belong to the Company, which Colonel *Upton* was not ignorant of. This very article ſhews it was a doubt with him, whether the Guicawars had or had not a right to make ceſſions; therefore he ſhould not have accepted ſuch doubtful ſecurity. Beſides, even if it ſhould be proved that the Guicawars have not a right to make ceſſions in the Guzerat country, it does not follow that the Miniſters have, though they will probably derive ſufficient influence from this very treaty to make the Guicawars diſavow their own acts, and produce any proof or voucher they may require, eſpecially as their own intereſt is ſo much concerned. We alſo apprehend it will be found very difficult to judge of the authenticity of letters and Sunnuds, in caſe of any colluſion between them and the Miniſters. Excluſive of the inſtance quoted in our remarks upon the 5th Article, we have other undeniable proofs that the Guicawars poſſeſs an unqueſtioned right to make ceſſions, as we have now in our hands four Sunnuds from *Damajee* Guicawar, by which we have collected revenues from ſo many diſtricts adjoining to *Surat*, ever ſince October 1759, one of which is *Veriow*: and another proof is the conduct of the Durbar, at *Poonah*, at which time we firſt became poſſeſſed of *Broach*, and concluded a treaty with *Futty Sing*, in February 1773, for although Mr. *Moſtyn* was then actually at *Poonah* in quality of Reſident for the Company, that Government did never, as that Gentleman aſſures us, make any objections to our treaty with *Futty Sing*, or call in queſtion his power of making any engagements he thought proper.

The ſtipulations in the latter part of this article, that treaties made by the Preſidency ſhall be deſtroyed in preſence of the Peiſhwa's Miniſters, we conſider it, as highly injurious to the honour of the Nation and the Company; and we cannot but reflect with aſtoniſhment, that Colonel *Upton* ſhould ever liſten, and much leſs agree, to ſo diſgraceful a conceſſion. The evil tendency of this unneceſſary, impolitic, humiliating, and diſhonourable condeſcenſion, is too obvious to need any further comment. However, the execution of it ſeems to reſt with Colonel *Upton*, for we cannot conceive that he will demand the original from us, to be applied to ſuch a purpoſe.

Remark on the 8th Article.

Orders have already been iſſued to carry this Article into execution, but we think the communication ſhould have been opened immediately.

Remarks

* The number of months for the payment of the firſt ſix lacks of rupees, is omitted.

Appendix. No. 119.

Article 9th.

It is agreed, that *Ragonath Row* is to disband his army within one month after this date. His followers and adherents (except the servants about his person) are to separate also within the same time; and proclamation is to be made by the Maratta Government, granting a full pardon to all the adherents and followers, and all such as have been in arms with *Ragonath Row*, the four following excepted, viz. *Abagee Mahadu*, *Noor Cawn Gardie*, *Toola Hudmutgar*, and *Hurrig Sing Chokydar*, who, for crimes and misdemeanors committed against the State, are for ever banished the Maratta dominions.

Article 10th.

If *Ragonath Row* refuses to disband his army, the English are to withdraw their forces, and not to assist him.

Article 11th.

The conditions of the 9th Article being complied with, the Peishwa and Ministers then consent to establish an household for *Ragonath Row*, consisting of 1,000 horse and some foot, who are to be paid and relieved at the pleasure of the Government, but to obey all legal orders given them by *Ragonath Row*, also 200 domestics, to be chosen by *Ragonath Row*, and paid by Government. They will also cause to be paid to *Ragonath Row*, to defray his other expences, three lacks of rupees per annum, by monthly payments, at the rate of twenty-five thousand rupees per month; conditionally, that he resides at *Cooper Gang*, on the banks of the *Gungha Gudowry*. If at any time he may want to change his place of residence, application is to be made to the Peishwa, without whose permission such a change is not to take place; and he is not to cause any disturbance, or carry on improper correspondence with any person.

Article 12th.

It is agreed, That no assistance is to be given by the English to *Ragonath Row*, or to any subject or servant of the Peishwa's, that shall cause disturbance or rebellion in the Maratta dominions.

Article 14th.

It is agreed, That in case of any shipwreck of English ships or vessels, or ships or vessels trading under their protection on any part of the Maratta coast, every assistance shall be given by that Government and the inhabitants, to save as much as possible; and the whole that may be saved shall be returned, all reasonable charges being defrayed by the owners. In like manner, the English Company engage their assistance, should any Maratta ships or vessels be wrecked on any of their coasts.

Article 15th.

All treaties between the Government of *Bombay* and the Marattas, dated July 1739, and the 12th October 1756, are to be held and continued in as full force, as when they were first entered into, unless any article or articles of either of them should in other manner be provided for by this treaty, in such case, such article or articles are to be rejected, and those of this treaty abided by.

Article 16th.

All other treaties or agreements subsisting between the Government of *Bombay*, and the Maratta Government, not having undergone alteration, or otherwise provided for by this treaty, are to be held and continued in as full force as when they were first entered upon.

Article 17th.

It is agreed, that if *Ragonath Row* has lodged his jewels

Remarks on the 9th, 10th, and 11th Articles.

Colonel *Upton*, in the first of these articles, has stipulated for what is out of his or our power to perform; for the disbanding *Ragoba*'s Army must in a great measure depend upon himself, notwithstanding any advice we might give him for that purpose; and ten days of the limited month were expired before we received the treaty. The 10th Article is comprehended in the 8th, and must be complied with.

The provision made for him in the Seventh, is in every respect so inadequate to his rank and station, and so very inconsistent with what he had a right to expect, that we think he will never accept of it. If he does, he never can consider himself but as a State Prisoner, and there is every reason to believe his life would not be of long duration, considering that his household is to judge of the legality of his orders, and to be appointed, paid, and changed, at the pleasure of the very men who rebelled against him, and who must therefore dread the very idea of his ever regaining his former power. Many good consequences would have ensued, and the permanency of the Peace have been rendered much more secure, had the Colonel stipulated that *Ragoba* should have had the option of residing at *Bombay*, which the Ministers could not have objected to, had their intentions been good; and he would have proved a most useful instrument in our hands, to have alarmed their fears, and the best security for their observing the Peace.

However, as it seems very probable *Ragoba* will apply to us for protection, and the Governor General and Council, in their letter of the 20th October, have given us permission to afford him sanctuary, in case he should ever be necessitated to demand it, and as we think, it would reflect the highest disgrace upon the Company, to expose him to the mercy of his enemies, we shall receive him, upon his requesting it, with his family and domestics only; and it must be strongly recommended to Colonel *Upton*, in that case, to get his establishment continued to him here, that the Company may not be at the expence of supporting him. The four persons mentioned in the 9th Article must not be received. We think the whole of the stipulations respecting *Ragoba* particularly inglorious; and that the breach of faith to him will fix the most indelible stain on the honour of the British Nation through *Indostan*.

Remark on the 12th Article.

Must of course be complied with.

Remark on the 14th Article.

This Article is more advantageous for the Company than the stipulations made in former treaties on this head, as before, all wrecks were shared equally between the Marattas and us, and we therefore hope it will be faithfully complied with.

Remarks on the 15th Article.

If there had been any articles in the treaties herein mentioned, which interfered or clashed with the present treaty, it certainly would have been better to have pointed them out, than leave them to the construction of the contracting parties; though, however, it does not appear, that the treaties mentioned in this article do clash with the articles transmitted to us by Colonel *Upton*.

Remarks on the 17th Article.

This leaves open a door for much altercation and endless cavil;

jewels belonging to the Peiſhwa *Row Pundit Purdhan* in the hands of the Engliſh, they are to be reſtored on the obligation being complied with for which they were lodged.

Article 18th.

The Honourable *Eaſt India* Company ſhall be conſidered as the ſole lords and proprietors of all the places ceded by this Treaty, from the dates of the reſpective Sunnuds of grants, and are therein accordingly to exerciſe their own laws and authorities. And the Marattas are not to cauſe any diſturbances in any of the ceded Pergunnahs, nor ſhall the Engliſh occaſion any diſturbance in the Maatta dominions.

Article 19th.

In the places ceded to the Honourable Company, and in all the places reſtored to the Maratta Government by the Engliſh, it is agreed, That both parties ſhall commence to collect the revenues thereof, from the day on which they were delivered, and no demand of collections for any paſt tim eſhall be made.

John Upton,
Alex. Macpherſon,
Perſian Interpreter.

As the extracts of the Treaty ſent us by Colonel *Upton* are only ſigned by him and his Perſian Interpreter, he muſt be deſired to ſend us an authentic copy under the Peiſhwa's ſeal, as we may ſome time find it neceſſary to produce this Treaty.

After the moſt ſerious conſideration of all circumſtances, we are entirely of opinion that the Treaty is inadequate, and highly injurious to the reputation, honour, and intereſt of the Company, particularly in the ſtipulations reſpecting *Ragoba:* and we are afraid that Peace is very far from being ſecured on a permanent footing, even after ſuch mortifying conceſſions. We are ſatisfied the Miniſters, before they heard from *Bengal*, would have given a croreof rupees to have obtained ſuch terms; and even now, had Colonel *Upton* alarmed their fears by threatening to treat with *Ragoba* inſtead of them, we have not a doubt but much more adequate terms might have been obtained, and *Ragoba* admitted to ſome ſhare in the Government, according to his right: however, as the Treaty is concluded, and Colonel *Upton* has ſent us an extract of ſuch Articles as he ſays concern the Preſidency of *Bombay*, it becomes our duty to carry them into execution, as far as may depend upon us, and the neceſſary orders were therefore immediately given for withdrawing our forces from *Ragoba*, and proclaiming the Peace at this place, and the ſubordinate ſettlements.

Mr. *Garden* acquieſces in the propriety of affording an aſylum to *Ragoba*, on his requeſting it: but as he wiſhes the Governor and Council ſhould avoid engaging themſelves further than they can perform, he thinks they ſhould not commit themſelves in this inſtance, before they have communicated their intentions to Colonel *Upton*, as he fears the Miniſters may term this ſtep an infringement of the 12th Article of the Treaty.

The Board remark upon this, that the exigence of the caſe will not admit of their waiting for an anſwer from Colonel *Upton*, as the orders for withdrawing the army cannot be delayed, and the permiſſion for affording *Ragoba* an aſylum muſt accompany theſe orders, or it may arrive too late to be of any ſervice.

Adjourned.

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary.
Andw Ramſay,

Brigadier General *Gordon*'s Remarks and Obſervations on the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton.*

Brigadier General *Gordon* having carefully peruſed the Treaty concluded between the Honourable Company and the Maratta Empire, begs leave to make the following remarks thereon:

That the 1ſt Article, immediately by reſtoring peace, is perfectly conſiſtent with the ſpirit and tenor of Colonel *Upton*'s inſtructions, and the object of his embaſſy, as is the 2d Article, directing the general proclamation thereof.

By the 3d Article, *Salſette*, and all theother iſlands which were conquered during the war, are reſerved for the Company till the pleaſure of the Supreme Council is known. As it is to be ſuppoſed that they are well informed of the Company's ſentiments reſpecting *Salſette*, the poſſeſſion of it, which has been ſo long earneſtly wiſhed, is virtually ſecured by this Article.

The 4th article cedes to the Company the Maratta ſhare of the *Broach* revenues in the ampleſt manner. A conſiderable addition of annual income is thereby ſecured to the Company; all ſubject of contention from interference in collection is removed; and as by the 7th Article, the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters engage to prove, that the Guicawar's family have no right to make ceſſions, that power muſt be veſted in the Maratta Government eſtabliſhed at *Poonah*, which, indeed, ſeems to be acknowledged in plain terms by *Futty Sing*, in the treaty which he concluded with *Ragonath Row* on the 18th July 1775.

In the 5th Article, it is very honourable and advantageous, as the Company thereby gain perpetual poſſeſſion of a tract of country producing three lacks of rupees per annum, with power to chuſe the diſtricts moſt convenient and advantageouſly ſituated for them in the neighbourhood of *Broach.*

By the 6th Article, the Company are to receive from the Peiſhwa twelve lacks of rupees to defray in part the expences of the war. Two years ſeem rather a diſtant period for the payment of the ſecond moiety; but it ought to be attended to, that this war was carried on againſt the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters.

By the 7th Article, the Company agree to reſtore all the ceſſions made to them in the Guzerat Country by *Ragonath Row* and *Futty Sing*, on its being proved that they had no right to make ſuch ceſſions. If ſuch proofs are exhibited, juſtice directs that a reſtitution ſhould be made.

The Company are however in the mean time to retain poſſeſſion, particularly of certain villages and Pergunnahs, as pledges, till the Sunnuds for the country agreed by the 5th Article to be ceded to them for ever, are made over. If it is proved, that *Ragonath Row* and *Futty Sing* had no right to make the treaties which

Appendix, No 119.

Remark on the 18th and 19th Articles.

Theſe Articles ſeem to have ſecured, upon good terms, the ſtipulations therein made; and we can only expreſs our hopes there will be no delay in giving the Sunnuds.

Appendix. No. 119.

they have done, it is reaſonable that they ſhall be declared null and void.

The 8th Article directs the drawing the Engliſh troops into garriſon. As a peace is concluded, that is certainly proper.

By the 9th Article, *Ragonath Row* is required to diſband his army, within a month from the date of the Treaty. This meaſure ſeems neceſſary to enſure Peace; and it is believed the deſperate ſtate of his finances would render it difficult for him to keep them together.

By the 10th Article, the Company engage, that if *Ragoba* ſhould refuſe to diſband his army, they will withdraw their troops, and not aſſiſt him. The expediency and neceſſity of this Article are evident; without it no Peace could take place.

The 11th Article provides an eſtabliſhment for *Ranogath Row*, on his complying with the terms of the 9th Article. On this it is to be remarked, that his guards, being paid and appointed by the Peiſhwa, and his Miniſters, muſt be totally dependant on them. Incenſed as they and he are againſt each other by repeated mutual injuries, he will have much danger to apprehend from being ſo entirely in their power. If therefore his annual allowance, which Colonel *Upton* ſtates to amount to ten lacks, was to be paid to himſelf, with permiſſion, either to retire to the place of abode fixed upon for him by the Treaty, or to any Engliſh ſettlement, it would tend to enſure the ſafety of his perſon; and ſhould he take the latter of theſe ſteps, the Company could always guard againſt his infringement of the Treaty.

The Company engage by the 12th Article, not to aſſiſt *Ragonath Row*, or any perſon in rebellion againſt the Maratta's dominions. This is certainly juſt, proper, and conſiſtent, as long as they adhere to the Treaty; as are alſo the ſtipulations contained in the 14th Article, reſpecting ſhips wrecked on the Engliſh or Maratta coaſts.

The 15th and 16th Articles contain confirmations of former treaties, except in ſuch parts as they are altered by the preſent one; as this is always uſual on ſuch occaſions, no remarks occur upon it.

In the 17th Article it is ſtipulated, that the Peiſhwa ſhall have any jewels belonging to him which have been depoſited as pledges by *Ragonath Row*, on fulfilling the conditions whereon they were lodged. This ſeems reaſonable and juſt, as perhaps they are a part of the regalia.

The 18th Article declares the Engliſh ſole lords and proprietors of the territory ceded to them, and this in the moſt expreſs terms.

The 19th aſcertains the time when each party is to begin to collect the revenues, which is done in the cleareſt manner.

Having thus gone through the Treaty, Article by Article, it remains to be conſidered, whether more advantageous terms ought reaſonably to be expected, when every circumſtance relative to the riſe, progreſs, and management of the war, the reſources for carrying it on, the preſent ſtate of the contending parties, Colonel *Upton*'s inſtructions and the ſentiments of the Company, are attended to.

As to the firſt of theſe; the Brigadier General apprehends, that it will be difficult to defend the attack made on *Salſette*, by which the war was begun, on principles of good faith and juſtice. That on the 16th March 1775, previous to which Brigadier General *Gordon* had entered a diſſent, diſclaiming all ſhare of reſponſibility for the meaſures purſued when the Treaty was concluded and ſigned with *Ragonath Row*, he was by no means in a condition to fulfil his part thereof.

That the views and intentions of the Honourable the Preſident and Council, which it is to be preſumed had only for their object he advantage and intereſt of their employers, were by no means ſeconded by the officer intruſted with the command of the troops employed in ſupport of *Ragonath Row*. On the contrary, that officer, Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, did, by repeated acts of violence and miſconduct, waſte much time and ammunition in wandering, without any object of importance to the ſervice in view, through the Guzerat Province, inſtead of marching towards *Poonah*, to which alone his operations ſhould have been directed; during which the lives of many gallant officers and men were loſt, large ſums of money ſquandered away, and all this without obtaining any one permanent or eſſential advantage. If a judgment therefore may be formed of what would have been done in a ſucceeding campaign by Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, from what happened in his laſt, no great deal ought to be expected.

That the reſources of men and money whereof this Preſidency were poſſeſſed, ſeem not ſufficient for ſo vaſt an undertaking, paying due attention at the ſame time to the ſafety of their different ſettlements. The truth of this remark is plainly evinced by the repeated demands which the Board have been unanimous in making for large ſupplies from the other Preſidencies, to enable them to carry on the war.

That *Ragonath Row*, weakened by the defection of his friends, *Govind Row*, who was diſguſted by the Treaty of *Broderah*, in the utmoſt diſtreſs for money, and without a proſpect of relief in this abſolutely neceſſary article, is ill able to contend with his rich and powerful opponents, whoſe cauſe it is believed the Nizam is ready to eſpouſe with a large army.

The inſtructions given by the Governor General and Council to Colonel *Upton*, mark throughout their intentions immediately to eſtabliſh a peace; indeed it ſeems to be the grand object of his miſſion. That they have been led into a belief that *Baſſein* is actually in poſſeſſion of this Preſidency, is evident from the expreſs words of their inſtructions. This however being a miſtake, Colonel *Upton* is certainly at liberty to exerciſe the diſcretional power given to him reſpecting that place, which never was in the hands of the Company, and conſequently it cannot be reſtored, nor poſſeſſion of it relinquiſhed, by them.

The only reſtriction that Colonel *Upton* ſeems under about a proviſion for *Ragonath Row* and the Broach diſtricts, is, that he is not to prolong the Negociations for a day, for any conditions, except thoſe which are expreſsly mentioned. The only conditions expreſsly mentioned are, the keeping poſſeſſion of the conquered countries, and this is done by the 3d Article of the Treaty.

The pacific intentions of the Court of Directors, are ſufficiently evident from their deciſions reſpecting the *Rohilla* and *Tanjore* wars, and if poſſible ſtill more ſo from their expreſs commands, received by the ſhip *Gatton*, relative to *Salſette*, and to the very war wherein this Preſidency has juſt now been involved.

Brigadier General *Gordon*, from a review of all theſe circumſtances, begs leave to offer it, as his opinion, that the Peace concluded by Colonel *Upton* is, in whatever relates to the Company's intereſts, honourable, advantageous, and expedient. That the alteration which he has propoſed in theſe Articles, which relate to an eſtabliſhment for *Ragonath Row*, ſhould be recommended to Colonel *Upton*'s particular attention, who is however ſufficiently and entirely juſtified by the letter of his inſtructions, for the ſteps which he has taken. And Brigadier General *Gordon* deſires to conclude his opinion on the whole of this buſineſs, by reminding the Board, that the Governor General and Council, charged as they are with the general care, management, and direction, of whatever appertains to the honour and intereſts of the Britiſh Nation throughout *Indoſtan*, may have views for the good of the whole, whereof a part cannot be competent judges.

Bombay, 15th March, 1776. *Robert Gordon.*

APPENDIX No. 120.

To the Honourable the Preſident and Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I HAVE received your letter of the 14th inſtant, and the copy of Colonel *Keating*'s letter to you, dated the 6th inſtant.

Very repeatedly I have deſired of the Miniſters a ſupply of money for the uſe of *Ragoba* during the ceſſation of arms, but have never been able to procure a rupee. To me the requeſt appeared unnatural. I had no argument to enforce what I aſked. What have we to urge when deſiring our enemies to ſupply us with the means of carrying on a war againſt themſelves? It is true, Gentlemen, you have ſaid that it is but reaſonable that a portion of revenues, ſo unjuſtly withheld from *Ragoba*, ſhould be made over to the maintenance of him and his adherents.

The merits of this argument I ſhall not enter into; however good they appear at *Bombay*, I am afraid the force of them would be loſt at *Poonah*. The diſperſing of *Ragoba*'s Army muſt be ſhortly expected: this evinces the neceſſity of concluding the Peace with all poſſible expedition; in two or three days it will either be eſtabliſhed or entirely broke off.

With your letter of the 15th inſtant I am alſo favoured. Permit me, Gentlemen, to refer you in turn to my inſtructions. You will perceive I am directed to act as appears to me beſt (particularly regarding this very Iſland of *Baſſein*) for the honour and benefit of the Company; and this I am determined to do. We have little juſt claim to any thing. If the Peace ſhould take place it will be both honourable and beneficial. You know as well as myſelf the ſenſe of the Governor General and Council regarding this war; you will therefore, Gentlemen, eaſily conclude what it muſt be reſpecting the Treaty they wiſh to have concluded with the Marattas: they are ever mindful of the honour as well as advantage of the Company.

Poonah Dhur, I have the honour to be, &c.
20th February 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

Received the 23d following.

P. S. I have to requeſt the favour of your forwarding to me a copy of one of the grants or ſunnuds by which *Futty Sing* made over to the Company any part of the Guzerat Country, as the Miniſtry maintain no ſuch powers were ever veſted in him, and therefore that ſuch ſunnuds are of no force or value.

APPENDIX, No. 121.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

WE have received your letter dated the 20th inſtant.

As you therein acquaint us that the Treaty will either be eſtabliſhed or entirely broke off in two or three days, we ſhould wave entering further into the diſcuſſion of the queſtion, Whether you have or have not, according to your inſtructions, a diſcretional power to recede from the demand for *Baſſein?* did we not differ ſo widely in the conſtruction of your powers on this head, that we deem it neceſſary, in ſupport of our opinion ſo deciſively given, and to remove all imputation of omiſſion from us hereafter in this important point, to ſhew you upon what grounds it was formed.

According to the copy we poſſeſs of your inſtructions, dated the 21ſt June, the third paragraph, to which we ſuppoſe you mean to refer us, runs as follows: "If there "is any foundation for the intelligence which we have "lately received, and which we believe to be authentic, "of ſome ſignal advantages which have been gained by "*Ragonaut Row* over the miniſterial army, we appre- Appendix. "hend you may be able to obtain the ceſſion of *Salſette* No. 120. "and *Baſſein*, with the other conquered Iſlands, without "much difficulty; and in this caſe you may alſo have it "in your power probably to gain more ſubſtantial ad- "vantages to be yielded to the Company. Your next "object therefore muſt be to obtain a formal ſurrender "of the moiety held by the Marattas of the revenues "of the Town and Pergunnah of *Broach*; but we muſt "leave *theſe*, or any other poinſts which you may be able "to ſecure for the intereſt and advantage of the Com- "pany, to your diſcretion," &c. &c. This is the only paſſage we can diſcover in your inſtructions, in any ſhape tending to give you this diſcretional power with reſpect to *Baſſein*; though in our opinion the word *theſe* evidently relates to the other advantages to be ſecured in addition to *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, and does not include theſe places, the ceſſion of which in the preceding article is made a principal object of your deputation: but whatever conſtruction may be put upon that expreſſion, the intention of the Governor General and Council is clearly explained in the very next paragraph, in which your power of relinquiſhing theſe ceſſions is particularly excepted againſt in the following very explicit terms; viz.

"Though we do not mean abſolutely to inſiſt upon all "theſe conceſſions, if manifeſt advantages ſhould have "been gained againſt the Company's Arms, yet we are "determined *on no account* to relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of "*Salſette* and *Baſſein*; therefore ſhould the Peiſhwa hold "out againſt yielding them, you are at no rate to agree "to reſtore them, declaring to them, if neceſſary, that "the matter having been referred to the Honourable the "Court of Directors, *it is impoſſible to relinquiſh theſe* "*places* without their expreſs permiſſion."

But in the ſecond ſet of your inſtructions, of a much later date, this matter is, if poſſible, placed in a ſtill clearer light, and every poſſibility of a doubt of the Governor General and Council's intentions on this head removed. The copy tranſmitted us by them is dated the 17th July, and the paragraph we mean to allude to runs as follows:

Firſt, "The direct purpoſes of your appointment are "to negociate a Treaty of Peace between the Maratta "Government and the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and to "obtain a confirmation to that preſidency of the Iſlands "of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* to the Company. *Theſe points* "*you are to conſider as indiſpenſable.*" We do not think that the Company's right to *Baſſein*, or the force of your inſtructions reſpecting it, are in the leaſt impaired by the circumſtance of our not having poſſeſſion, though the difficulty of prevailing with the Miniſters to conſent to this ceſſion may be increaſed; and we have already apprized you, how very anxious the Company are to obtain this acquiſition, without which, their views upon this coaſt will remain unaccompliſhed: therefore, upon the moſt thorough conviction, we perſevere in the opinion we before expreſſed, that you cannot agree to any treaty wherein this ceſſion is not included, without acting inconſiſtently with, and we will now add in direct breach of, your inſtruction.

We readily allow that if a treaty is to take place with the Miniſters, it had better be concluded before *Ragoba*'s Army diſperſes, but we do not mean by this acknowledgment, that it is neceſſary a treaty ſhould be concluded at all events; we are far from conſidering *Ragoba*'s cauſe as irretrievable, if the treaty with the Miniſters was off, and the Company to continue to ſupport him.

We will not ſay any thing on the Company's right to the ceſſions made by the Treaty, and that queſtion cannot be decided either by us or you.

We entertain the higheſt opinion of the Governor General and Council's regard for the honour and advantage of the Company; and we flatter ourſelves we poſſeſs the ſame, and are competent judges of both at this Preſidency.

Appendix. No. 122.

We incloſe a copy of the Treaty concluded with *Futty Sing* and *Seeajee Row Shumſheer Bahader*, by which the Guicawar ſhare of *Broach*, and the diſtricts of *Corah*, *Veriore*, and *Chickley*, were ceded to the Company; and alſo a copy of one of the Sunnuds executed by the latter in conſequence of the Treaty.

Sir *Edward Hughes* has acquainted us that His Majeſty's ſhip *Dolphin* will ſail for *England* about the 15th of next month.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 25th February 1776. (Signed) *William Hornby*, &c. Council.

To the Honourable the Preſident and Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letter of the 25th February, and with a copy of the Treaty concluded by *Ragoba* with *Futty Sing*, and *Seagee Row Shumſhaw*; alſo the copy of one of the Sunnuds executed by *Seagee Row*.

I am ſorry we differ ſo widely regarding the ſenſe of my inſtructions; you will permit me to obſerve, that the words "relinquiſh, reſtore, and confirm," imply having poſſeſſion, which never was the caſe; and I am quite clear alſo, that I have acted very conſiſtently with the (private verbal) inſtructions I received, before I left *Calcutta*, and I never had or ſeen cauſe to deviate from them.

The Treaty of Peace between the honourable Company and the Maratta Government was ſigned yeſterday afternoon; ſuch Articles of Convention as concern the Preſidency of *Bombay* I have the honour to forward.

Your influence with *Ragoba*, that he may quietly acquieſce in the conditions ſtipulated for him, will, I am convinced, not be wanting. If he expreſſes any fear or uneaſineſs at going to the reſidence appointed for his reception, with the Maratta Sirdars ſent to eſcort him, they conſent to his being accompanied by an Engliſh gentleman, with an eſcort of one hundred of our troops.

The eſtabliſhment made for *Ragonaut Row* amounts to about ten lacks of rupees per annum. It was impoſſible to procure for him any part in the government of this country. The Miniſters have moſt ſolemnly promiſed to live ever on friendly terms with him, unleſs he ſhould occaſion diſturbances in the country. An Engliſh gentleman being here, will be the ſecurity for their good behaviour towards him. The Miniſters requeſt, when the Engliſh army march into their own garriſons, &c. Colonel *Keating* will adviſe *Hurry Pundit Furkia* of it, and at the ſame time inform him if the conditions obtained for *Ragonaut Row* are accepted of by him, and if he is putting the part depending on himſelf in execution.

A vackeel will be ſent in a day or two from this Government to *Bombay*, to explain any thing that may not be fully comprehended.

Broach is the place appointed for the two Engliſh gentlemen and the two Marattas to meet at, to fix the boundaries of the ceded country, amounting to three lacks per annum. The perſons ſent by this Government will be furniſhed with a letter from me, ſignifying their being the people appointed by them to aſſiſt in carrying the agreement into execution.

As ſoon as advice is arrived at *Poonah*, of the Engliſh Army having marched into their own garriſons, they will order the communication to be opened.

I ſhall be much obliged to you, Gentlemen, to favour me with the Engliſh and Maratta names of the ſmall iſlands in or near the Bay of *Bombay*, now in our poſſeſſion. Not knowing them by each other's names prevents their nominally being inſerted in the Treaty. We are to keep only ſuch as we now poſſeſs.

Poonah Dhur, 2d March 1776. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) *J. Upton*.

Received 10th following, at night.

P. S. You will be pleaſed to appoint two gentlemen to proceed to fix the boundaries of the Pergunnah to be ceded near or adjoining to *Broach*. The Miniſters agree to our taking any diſtrict that is not jaghire lands.

J. Upton.

APPENDIX, No. 122.

SIGNED the following letters to Lieutenant Colonels *Keating* and *Upton*.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*.

Sir,

We are now to acquaint you, that we received advice from Colonel *Upton* late in the evening of the 10th inſtant, that he had concluded a Treaty of Peace between the Honourable Company and the Miniſters at *Poonah*, on the 1ſt.

Incloſed is a copy of an extract from the Treaty, as tranſmitted to us by Colonel *Upton*; and it is neceſſary for us to give you the following orders in conſequence.

The Peace muſt be proclaimed at the head of all the Company's Forces under your command, agreeable to the 2d Article.

You are immediately to march our troops into ſuch quarters as will be aſſigned them by the Chief and Council at *Surat* within the Company's diſtricts. The detachments from *Broach* and *Surat* are to return to thoſe garriſons, and the remainder is to be held in readineſs to embark for the Preſidency, as opportunities offer.

The ſtipulations reſpecting *Ragoba* muſt be communicated to him in a proper manner; and the abſolute neceſſity of our ſeparating the Company's Forces from his, explained to him. The Honourable the Preſident has wrote to him upon this occaſion; and if he expreſſes any fear or uneaſineſs at going to the place appointed for his reception with the Maratta Sirdars ſent to eſcort him, the Miniſters conſent to his being accompanied by an Engliſh gentleman, with an eſcort of one hundred of our troops. Colonel *Upton* tells us, the Miniſters have moſt ſolemnly promiſed to live ever on friendly terms with him, unleſs he ſhould occaſion diſturbances in the country. You will loſe no time in acquainting us with what reſolution *Ragoba* may now take, and with his future intentions.

If *Ragoba* refuſeth to accept the conditions ſtipulated for him, in apprehenſion of danger to his perſon, and in conſequence thereof applies to you to be received into any of the Company's garriſons, you may receive him with his family, and a ſuitable number of domeſtics only; but the four perſons mentioned in the 9th Article muſt on no account be protected.

When our troops march into garriſon you will adviſe *Hurry Punt Furkia* thereof; and at the ſame time inform him, if *Ragoba* accepts of the conditions ſtipulated for him, and if he is putting into execution the part of defending himſelf.

The 13th Article is omitted in the extract ſent us by Colonel *Upton*.

You will acquaint us what part of the ſtipulated twenty-ſix lacks have been paid to *Ragoba*, by *Futty Sing*, and how you have diſpoſed of the goods and jewels you mentioned in your letter, dated the 30th Auguſt, to have retained in your hands on account of *Ragoba*'s debt to the Company. We have received your letters, dated the 31ſt, 16th, and 25th ultimo.

We are your loving friends,

Bombay Caſtle, 15th March 1776. *Wm. Hornby*, &c. Council.

P. S. We have juſt received your letter of the 11th inſtant, to which the above will ſerve as a reply.

To

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

Late in the evening of the 10th inſtant, we received your letter of the 2d, with the incloſed extract of the Treaty you have concluded between the Honourable Company and the Miniſters at *Poonah*.

The 13th Article is omitted in the extract you ſent us; and as all the other Articles follow each other in a regular ſeries, we wiſh to know if this omiſſion is accidental.

The Peace was publicly proclaimed here on the 12th inſtant.

The intention of this letter is principally to incloſe a copy of a letter juſt received from Colonel *Keating*, which juſtified our apprehenſions that *Ragoba* would not accept the terms ſtipulated for him, as he is of opinion his perſon will be endangered by putting himſelf ſo much in the power of his enemies. We ſhall therefore afford him an aſylum with his family and domeſtics in one of the Company's ſettlements, agreeable to his requeſt, and the latitude given us by the Governor General and Council, in their letter dated the 20th October, of which you have a copy, for we think ourſelves bound by every tie of honour and humanity not to deny him the protection he has demanded; but we have given orders that the four perſons mentioned in the 9th Article muſt on no account be received.

We recommend it to you to endeavour to ſtipulate with the Miniſters, that *Ragoba* may have an eſtabliſhment continued to him, to the amount mentioned in your letter, viz. ten lacks of rupees per annum; and you muſt be ſenſible of the advantages that will reſult to the Company from his reſidence with us, as ſo long as he is in our hands the Miniſters will be very cautious in their conduct, though at the ſame time we ſhall not countenance him in fomenting any diſturbances againſt the Maratta State.

The Engliſh and Maratta names of the ſmall Iſlands in the harbour of *Bombay* now in our poſſeſſion are incloſed.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,

Bombay Caſtle, 15th March, 1776. *Wm. Hornby*, &c. Council.

Received the following Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

The 9th inſtant at night I received a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, a copy of which is incloſed.

Yeſterday I had a long conference with the Peiſhwa, who poſitively declares he will never accede to the terms ſtipulated for him by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*. He writes to your Honour, &c. by this conveyance, and deſires me to repreſent to you as follows:

That on the known and long experienced good faith of the Engliſh Nation he had entered into a ſolemn Treaty and Covenant with the Honourable Company, whereby they are bound to puniſh his rebellious ſubjects, and to reſtore to him his juſt and lawful right, the Government of the Maratta Empire.

In reſpect to himſelf, he has agreed to grant certain advantages to the Honourable Company, the particulars of which are too well known to your Honour, &c. to need recapitulating, that nothing on his part has been wanting, or ever will.

By Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*'s letter to him, he finds the ſtipulation alluded to, is neither more or leſs than his receiving from his rebellious Miniſters the paltry ſum of three lacks per annum, in conſideration of his remaining their diſcretional priſoner for the reſt of his life, which he has every reaſon to ſuppoſe would in ſuch caſe be of ſhort duration.

He has a firm reliance on the good faith of the Engliſh Nation, and relies on their fulfiling engagements made in the face of Heaven; but ſhould he by untoward fate be for a time diſappointed by means not in his power to account for, he is ſtill reſolved to reject every other propoſal, and appeal for Juſtice to *England*; in the mean time throws himſelf on the protection of the Britiſh Nation, in full confidence of receiving proper ſupport and maintenance at *Broach*, *Surat*, or *Bombay*, until the determination from *England* can be obtained. Appendix. No. 122.

Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* having mentioned to the Peiſhwa that the Circar of *Poonah* will be at the annual expence of ten lacks of rupees by his whole eſtabliſhment, he wiſhes the Company to receive it towards defraying the expence they may be put to on his account, until a final determination takes place.

He obſerved, as his firm opinion, that the terms agreed to by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* were not voluntary, but compulſively obtained by the Miniſters, in conſequence of having him entirely in their power.

I have received a letter from *Hurry Punt Furkia*, informing me, that in conſequence of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* having agreed to ſurrender to the Maratta Circar all the Pergunnah granted by *Ragonath Row* Peiſhwa to the Honourable Company, he is preparing to come as far as *Sungar*, to receive them from me. I replied, that I ſhall always act in ſtrict conformity to your Honour, &c. orders; and that as yet you have not inſtructed me relating to his expectations.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your greatly obliged,
and moſt devoted Servant,

Mandavie Camp, the 11th March 1776. *Thomas Keating*, Lieut. Colonel.

To the Honourable the Preſident and Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letter of the 15th inſtant, together with the paper containing the Engliſh and Maratta names of the ſmall iſlands in the Bay of *Bombay*, in our poſſeſſion; alſo Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*'s letter to you, dated the 10th inſtant.

I forwarded extracts only of ſuch Articles as concern your Preſidency. The entire Treaty I take for granted will be ſent you by the Governor General and Council.

I am much concerned to hear *Ragoba* will not accept the terms ſtipulated. It was long before I could get the Miniſters to grant theſe; and I have endeavoured all in my power ſince to procure for him a change of abode. It was not likely they would agree to his reſiding in any of our ſettlements after what had paſſed; nor could it be expected that they would increaſe the ſtipend. They muſt always fear his ſtirring up freſh commotions; and they certainly would not themſelves furniſh him with the means. How would he have been provided for, had the army been withdrawn conformably to the original order?

The conditions of the Peace, ſtipulated with the miniſterial party, are "for our neutrality," what was agreed upon for it; *Ragonaut Row*, "if it made one Article in the Treaty, would of courſe be guaranteed by the Company; ſuch terms were to be obtained for him as it might appear to me reaſonable to expect, and which might not fruſtrate the immediate objects to my negociations."

You will excuſe, Gentlemen, my making theſe obſervations: I could not get other or better conditions for *Ragonaut Row*; and it was with the utmoſt difficulty I effected the buſineſs on which I was deputed.

You will of courſe, Gentlemen, uſe every argument to perſuade *Ragonaut Row* to accept the terms ſtipulated for him. The Miniſters make the moſt ſolemn proteſtations, that his perſon ſhall be ſafe, and that he ſhall receive every indulgence he can expect. They ſay *Ragonaut Row* and the world muſt be convinced, that they would not break a treaty ſo ſolemnly entered into with Gentlemen poſſeſſed of ſuch power, rank, and honour, as the Members of the Supreme Council are; and that they

Appendix. No. 123

they aſked to have a Reſident, chiefly to ſee their obligations towards him (*Ragóba*) performed.

I am almoſt convinced the Governor General and Council will not conſent to his reſiding in any of our ſettlements; and am much afraid the Miniſters will withhold his ſtipend, unleſs he agrees to the conditions provided for him by the Treaty. I ſhall continue to exert myſelf in endeavouring to procure terms more agreeable to *Ragoba*, but with little hopes of ſucceſs.

Poonah Dhur, I have the honour to be, &c.
19th March 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

Received the 22d following.

To the Honourable the Preſident and Members of the Seleƈt Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letter of the 17th inſtant, together with the copy of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*'s letter of the 12th inſtant. I ſhall take the earlieſt opportunity of acquainting the Miniſters with *Ragoba*'s determination.

I am writing to the Governor General and Council, and ſhall incloſe your letters for their information reſpecting *Ragoba*.

Poonah Dhur, I have the honour to be, &c.
March 21ſt, 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

Received the 26th following.

APPENDIX, No. 123.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 6th May 1776.

PRESENT.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

READ, and approved, the proceedings of the 2d inſtant.

Received the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to forward a duplicate of the Treaty, alſo duplicates of my letters, &c. of the 3d inſtant.

I received a letter yeſterday from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, alſo a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* to the Seleƈt Committee, *Bombay*, dated the 11th inſtant: Theſe I forward for your peruſal.

It ſhould ſeem by theſe letters, that great terms were expeƈted to be gained for *Ragonaut Row*, rather than that peace was to be concluded between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and the Maratta State for our neutrality.

I was long in getting the conditions now ſtipulated for *Ragonaut Row*; and this will not be matter of ſurprize, when we conſider how often he has been in arms againſt the State, even ſo long ago as in the Peiſhwaſhip of *Madu Row*, uncle to the preſent Peiſhwa: He was then defeated, taken priſoner, and pardoned; he has repeatedly offended and been pardoned; and why it ſhould be ſuppoſed now, when he is ſecured by ſo ſolemn a treaty, that his perſon ſhould be in ſuch danger, I cannot conceive. After what has paſſed they certainly would not let him reſide in any of the Company's ſettlements, nor would they furniſh him with the means of occaſioning freſh troubles to the State.

I incloſe my reply to the Seleƈt Committe of *Bambay*; I hope they will try every means to reconcile *Ragonaut Row* to accept the conditions ſtipulated for him.

I have not ſeen the Miniſters ſince the receipt of this letter. *Ragonaut Row*'s reſiding in any of our ſettlements I am ſure will give great umbrage.

I ſend this packet by way of *Maſulipatam*. The Miniſters will diſpatch leters by may of *Benares* in a few days: I ſhall then adviſe how they receive the report of *Ragonaut Row*'s refuſing the terms ſtipulated. Perhaps they may make ſome favourable alterations in them; but I think they will not. As I have repeatedly and very lately aſked this, they always replied they thought the conditions very proper. His future good behaviour, and nothing elſe, would ever get him any other.

Poonah Dhur, I have the honour to be, &c.
30th March 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

The Engliſh and Maratta names of the ſmall Iſlands in the Bay of *Bombay*, ceded by the Treaty with *Ragoba*, and now in our poſſeſſion.

Engliſh Names.	Maratta Names.
Caranja,	Oran and Seva,
Elephanta,	Gance Purne,
Hog Iſland,	Nauva,

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secry.

Read, the following letter from *Bombay*.

Secret Department.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

We had the honour to addreſs you on the 18th ultimo, and have ſince forwarded a duplicate of our letter under that date.

A continuation of our correſpondence with Colonel *Upton* ſince that time, is now incloſed, and though we imagine the advice from that gentleman of the concluſion of the Treaty, will have reached you before this letter, we incloſe a copy of the extract he tranſmitted to us, which we did not receive till the 10th inſtant.

Colonel *Upton* has differed very much in opinion with us in his interpretation of your inſtructions reſpecting *Baſſein*, from the tenor of which we ever conſidered that the ceſſion of that place was to be an indiſpenſable point in any treaty he might conclude with the Miniſters. Your directions on this head appear to us very clear and expreſs, but Colonel *Upton* argues that they were founded on the ſuppoſition of our being in actual poſſeſſion, which never was our caſe, and from whence we conclude he infers their force is deſtroyed. He added further, that he was quite clear, he had acted very conſiſtently with the (private verbal) inſtruƈtions he received, before he left *Calcutta*.

We have carefully examined our advices to your honourable Board, and are at a loſs to conceive upon what foundation you entertained the idea of our being in poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*; but though you do ſeem to have miſconceived this point, we were of opinion, that had the force of your orders to Colonel *Upton*, for inſiſting upon this circumſtance of our being in poſſeſſion, you had ſufficient time after the arrival of Mr. *Tayler* to have explained or altered his inſtruƈtions; we rather thought the peremptorineſs of your orders proceeded from your attention to the Honourable Company's commands to this Preſidency, dated the 31ſt March 1769 and 1ſt April 1772, reſpecting their views on this ſide of *India*, which will remain unaccompliſhed, until we are confirmed in the poſſeſſion both of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*.

Immediately upon receipt of the extraƈt of the Treaty, we ordered the Peace to be proclaimed at all the Company's ſettlements under this Preſidency, and at the Engliſh camp; and at the ſame time, gave directions for our troops being marched into garriſon agreeable to the 8th Article.

The Maratta vackeel mentioned in Colonel *Upton*'s letter of the 2d inſtant, is not yet arrived.

The ſtipulations made for *Ragoba* were in every reſpect ſo inadequate to his rank and ſtation, and ſo very inconſiſtent with what he had a right to expect, that we never ſuppoſed he would accept of them, and conſent to put his life and liberty entirely in the power of his enemies, who muſt dread the idea of his ever regaining his former

power. Many good conſequences would have enſued, and the permanency of the Peace been rendered much more ſecure, had the Colonel ſtipulated that *Ragoba* ſhould have had the option of reſiding at one of the Company's ſettlements, with a ſuitable appointment. This the Miniſters could not have objected to, had their intentions been good, and he would have proved a moſt uſeful inſtrument in our hands, for alarming their fears, and the beſt ſecurity for their obſerving the peace; however, we thought ourſelves bound by every tie of honour and humanity, and authorized by your letter of the 20th October, to afford him protection in caſe he ſhould apprehend his life in danger, and requeſt it, and in that caſe we ſhould have received him and his family; but though on the firſt intelligence of the conditions ſtipulated for him, he determined to throw himſelf upon our protection, as mentioned in Colonel *Keating*'s letter, dated the 11th inſtant, yet on further conſideration, and after conſulting with his principal Miniſters and Officers, he ſignified the following ſentiments and reſolutions to our commanding officer, which he declared to be final.

That he had the moſt ample dependance upon us for the performance of the Treaty of *Surat*, the more ſo, as we muſt be perfectly convinced that he has punctually fulfilled every part of his promiſe, ſo far as had hitherto depended upon him:

That he is fully determined never to accept of any compromiſe, much leſs ſo inglorious a one as that mentioned to him by Colonel *Upton:*

That ſhould we refuſe to fulfil the Treaty of *Surat*, he then appealed to the Honourable Company for juſtice; and in the mean time was reſolved, as far as poſſible, and with God's aſſiſtance, to defend his juſt rights againſt the evil deſigns of his rebellious ſervants; and waved that part of his former reſolutions of placing himſelf under our protection, until the Company's determination could be obtained.—

Thus are our apprehenſions, that the peace would not be of a long duration, already in ſome meaſure confirmed, and a proſpect of a deſtructive war commencing on the very verge of the Company's poſſeſſions, which it cannot fail materially to affect. We have not yet heard of any ſteps taken by either party in conſequence of *Ragoba*'s determination; but we underſtand it was founded upon his dependance of aſſiſtance from the Nizam and *Hyder Ally*, and the defection of one of the principal miniſterial officers, who has promiſed to join him with a large body of horſe. We leave to your Honour, &c. to judge, what muſt be the ſituation of this Preſidency, ſhould *Ragoba* prove ſucceſsful by the aſſiſtance of theſe powers, incenſed as he muſt be againſt the Engliſh for their breach of faith with him.

The Company by this Treaty will be deprived of *Jamboofeer*, *Ahmood*, *Hanſood Occaſeer*, *Orpad*, and *Verſaul*, producing a revenue, which could be collected with very little difficulty and expence, of at leaſt fifteen lacks of rupees a year. The ceſſions made by the Guicawars are alſo to be reſtored, when it is proved they had no right to make ſuch ceſſions (which we ſuppoſe they will readily allow, when it is ſo much for their intereſt, though we never before heard their right called in queſtion, and have held lands under their Sunnuds ſince the year 1759); theſe are *Chickly*, *Coral*, *Veriow*, and *Batta*, producing a revenue of about 1,98,000 rupees a year; but it is very remarkable, that although the Guicawar ceſſions are not to be reſtored but in caſe of the above contingency, and would of courſe remain in our hands until the doubt of *Futty Sing*'s power was cleared up; yet are there four places with three villages in the Pergunnah of *Churcaſy*, belonging likewiſe we believe to *Futty Sing*, accepted as ſecurity for the performance of engagements entered into by the Miniſters at *Poonah*, and we are immediately to make reſtitution of the territories ceded by *Ragoba*, retaining only in our hands the above doubtful ſecurity for the performance of their part of the Treaty.

After the poſitive manner in which you were pleaſed to enjoin Colonel *Upton*, to inſiſt upon the ceſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, we were ſtruck with the utmoſt ſurprize, when we perceived that our retaining poſſeſſion of the firſt, and *Caranja*, *Elephanta*, and *Hog Iſland*, remains a matter of doubt. Our duty to the Company leads us to expreſs our hopes, in the moſt earneſt manner, that you will on no account agree to reſtore theſe places. The compenſation offered for them is in every reſpect inadequate; and three times the value of the propoſed exchange in the neighbourhood of *Broach*, or indeed elſewhere, would be no equivalent for theſe iſlands, whoſe ſituation gives them advantages we could not meet with in any other territory. *Salſette* is only divided from *Bombay* by a river, not above one hundred yards wide, and *Caranja* lays in our harbour directly oppoſite the caſtle; and in caſe of future differences with the Marattas, they will not only form an excellent and ſecure barrier to preſerve this iſland from all inſults, but we ſhall alſo have reſources of grain and proviſions within our own power; and in caſe of a war with *France*, or any other European power, we ſhall have the grand advantage of keeping our military force more compact, and ſhall be able at the ſhorteſt notice, to withdraw a conſiderable number to reinforce this garriſon, which could not be done from a more diſtant poſſeſſion. We have likewiſe made very conſiderable improvements to the fortifications at *Tannah*, by forming a glacis and eſplanade, which ſhould be a moſt powerful reaſon for not putting this place again in the hands of the Marattas; and we can with great ſafety aſſure your Honour, &c. that theſe iſlands will in a very ſhort time produce an infinitely more conſiderable revenue than the territory propoſed to be given in exchange; for all which reaſons, and the great deſire the Company have expreſſed to obtain theſe iſlands, we repeat our wiſhes, that you will not on no account agree to reſtore them. Appendix. No. 143.

The preſent inconveniency and loſs to the Company occaſioned by this reference will be very great. No further ſteps can yet be taken for the improvement of theſe iſlands, either in cultivation, population, or in ſtocking them with cattle, &c. which they ſtand much in need of; and the time is now approaching for leaſing out the lands again, which we cannot expect will be done on any tolerable terms, in this ſtate of uncertainty; ſo that at any rate, the Company will loſe great part of the revenues for this ſeaſon.

Since writing thus far, we have received another letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, which is added to his correſpondence now forwarded; wherein he acquaints us of his having communicated to *Ragoba* the full contents of the Treaty; and that when he was made ſenſible of his real ſituation, he declared, that from a confidence in the well-known good faith of the Engliſh Nation, he had repeatedly rejected offers of aſſiſtance from *Nizam Ally* and other powerful men, who were capable of reſtoring him to his right; and that he had nothing now left, but a reliance on the juſtice of the nation at large, to whom he ſhould carry his ſolemn appeal; and therefore claimed our protection and ſupport, until their determination was known. He is to proceed to this place as ſoon as proper opportunity offers.

Colonel *Upton* ſeems to think, that your Honour, &c. will not conſent to *Ragoba*'s reſiding in any of the Company's ſettlements; but we beg leave to ſubmit to your ſerious conſideration, the everlaſting ſhame and diſgrace which will be entailed on the nation, if we were to ſurrender him up into the hands of his enemies, after having given him protection, and any accident was to happen to him in conſequence. We cannot conſider the proteſtations of the Miniſters as a proper ſecurity for the ſafety of his perſon, if he was to put himſelf abſolutely in their power, as ſettled by the Treaty.

Our troops were to march into garriſon on the 26th of this month; but the communication with the Maratta dominions ſtill remains ſhut.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 30th March 1776. (Signed) *Wm. Hornby.* &c. Council.

Appendix. No. 124.

APPENDIX, No. 124.

GOVERNOR GENERAL—I cannot help noticing the extraordinary alluſion made by Colonel *Upton* to the private verbal inſtructions which he ſays he received before he left *Calcutta*, which I remark in this place, for the purpoſe of declaring, that he received no private verbal inſtructions from me; and I move, that Colonel *Upton* be aſked to what inſtructions he alludes by this expreſſion, and from whom he received them?

Mr. *Francis*—It appears to me, that Colonel *Upton* does not appeal to any private verbal inſtructions, ſuppoſed to have been received by him, as if they were contradictory to, or inconſiſtent with the public orders of the Board; he could not but know that ſuch inſtructions were of no force, and he could not plead them as authority to act againſt his formal orders. As I underſtand it, he mentions them merely as a confirmation in his mind of the ſame, and conſtruction which he himſelf affixes to his orders. I do not believe that any Member of this Board would have taken upon himſelf to have exceeded thoſe limits; and I think the enquiry uſeleſs.

Mr. *Barwell*—As objections have been ſtarted to the motion, and the information can be of no public utility, any private ſentiments that may have been expreſſed on the tenor of the Board's inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*, are no more than the ſenſe of an individual of the Government which gave thoſe inſtructions: for my part, I have never preſumed to interpret the orders of this Government, nor to diſcuſs with Colonel *Upton* the particular part he ſhould act in carrying them into execution. Indeed I do not recollect I ever held any diſcourſe with the Colonel upon the ſubject of his inſtructions; but, as I have ſaid before, that as objections have been ſtarted to the motion, I am of opinion it ſhould be waved. The enquiry can anſwer no purpoſe.

Colonel *Monſon*—The queſtion propoſed to be put to Colonel *Upton*, can be of no public utility, and is in itſelf of no conſequence, any more than gratifying private curioſity; as the Governor General wiſhes to be informed to what Colonel *Upton* alludes, I have no objection to the queſtion being put to him.

General *Clavering*—The private inſtructions alluded to, refer to the Board's orders to retain poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*. When Colonel *Upton* left this place, it was believed by every Member of the Board that we were then in poſſeſſion of that place; and there was then no difference in opinion amongſt any of the Members on the propriety of the orders for eſtabliſhing a right to a place, of which we thought we were in poſſeſſion. From this circumſtance, I am convinced that Colonel *Upton* cannot mean that he had private orders from any individual Member of the Board, to relinquiſh a place which by his orders he was inſtructed to retain; he can only allude to thoſe general words contained in his inſtructions, that we left theſe or any other points which he might be able to ſecure for the intereſt and advantage of the Company, to his diſcretion. The latitude given to him by thoſe words, may probably have been repeated to him by every Member of the Board, in anſwer to certain doubts which he ſubmitted to the Board for explanation. If it could anſwer any purpoſe whatever, I would readily aſſent to the propoſition; but as I think it cannot, I agree with Mr. *Barwell* and Mr. *Francis*, that the enquiry would be uſeleſs.

The Governor General—I deſire to recall my motion; it was not from my own inclination that I made it.

General *Clavering*—As the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* acquaint us that they have offered *Ragoba* an aſylum in one of the Company's Factories, being authorized ſo to do by our letter to them of the 18th of October, and as his reſidence there may have conſequences either to diſturb the friendſhip lately eſtabliſhed between the *Poonah* Government and the Company, or at leaſt that it may occaſion a certain expence to the Government of *Bombay* for his maintenance, ſeeing that by the 11th Article of the Treaty lately concluded with the *Poonah* Government, he will not be intitled to receive any part of the ſums therein ſtipulated for him, unleſs he ſhall reſide at *Coopergong*, on the banks of the *Gungba Gudowry*, I could wiſh the Board would be pleaſed to conſider what inſtructions it will be neceſſary to give the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, with regard to the two ſubjects above mentioned.

The Governor General—I beg leave to ſtate the propoſitions included in the General's minute, in diſtinct and formal queſtions; and beg the favour of the General to correct me if I err in my conſtruction of them, my meaning being to draw the ſubject into preciſe points, to fix the reſolutions of the Board upon them.

Queſtion 1ſt. Whether, by the following paragraph of our letter, of the 18th October, viz. "Admitting the "poſſibility of *Ragoba*'s being reduced by any unfore-"ſeen misfortune, to ſeek refuge in ſome of your garri-"ſons, we would not have you underſtand, from any "directions yet tranſmitted you, that we mean entirely "to deſert him; on the contrary, you will find, by a "paragraph of the incloſed Inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*, "that our intention is to obtain a ſuitable proviſion for "him; we therefore deſire that you will afford him a "ſanctuary for himſelf and his domeſtics or attendants, "in caſe he ſhould ever be neceſſitated to apply to you "for your protection, in order to avoid any perſonal "danger;" the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* were authorized to grant the protection of their Government to *Ragoba*, under the ſituation of affairs at the time in which his application was made to them for their protection?

2d. Whether the Board ſhall approve of the protection granted to *Ragoba* by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, or whether they ſhall be directed to withdraw it from him?

General *Clavering*—I beg leave to add a third queſtion, which is, that if *Ragoba* be ſuffered to remain at *Bombay*, whether the Council at *Bombay* ſhall be authorized to grant him a penſion for his maintenance at the Company's expence?

Mr. *Francis*—I think that the Preſidency of *Bombay* were unqueſtionably authorized to give *Ragoba* a retreat within the Company's territories; and that there is nothing in the late treaty, which precludes us from granting him an aſylum at preſent; at the ſame time, ſeveral conſiderations induce me to wiſh, that that ſtep could have been avoided: the firſt, and principal one is, that, as long as he continues under our immediate protection, and particularly at *Bombay*, the reconciliation between us and the Maratta State will probably be open to jealouſies and ſuſpicions on their part, which at preſent may prevent a cordial union between us, and eventually be the occaſion of a rupture. If however *Ragoba* be at preſent at *Bombay*, I do not think that we are either obliged by treaty, or that it would be conſiſtent with our honour to diſmiſs him from thence; but as the utmoſt we are then bound to do, is to give him a retreat, it ſhould not be accompanied with any conditions burthenſome to the Company, or which may induce him to continue there. This contains my anſwer to the firſt and ſecond queſtions, and to the third I anſwer, No.

Mr. *Barwell*—To the firſt queſtion I anſwer, that I think the Government of *Bombay* was authorized.

To the ſecond, I am of opinion that this Government ought to approve of the protection offered to *Ragoba*.

To the third, That he ſhould not be allowed any penſion by the Company.

Colonel *Monſon*—To the firſt queſtion, the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* were authorized to give protection to *Ragoba*, under certain limitations, which were expreſſed in our letter of the 18th October; I think *Ragoba* was not in thoſe circumſtances, for he rejected the terms ſtipulated for him by Colonel *Upton*, and was reſolved, "as far as poſſible, with God's aſſiſtance, to defend his

" juſt rights againſt the evil deſigns of his rebellious ſubjects," and waved that part of his former reſolutions of placing himſelf under the protection of the Gentlemen at *Bombay*.

To the ſecond queſtion, I diſapprove of the protection given by the Gentlemen of *Bombay*, as I think it impolitic, and a meaſure by which they may involve the Engliſh Company in diſputes and differences with the Maratta State. A like protection given to a conſiderable perſon at this Preſidency, drew on them the reſentment of the Country Government, and annihilated the Company's eſtabliſhments in this country. The Gentlemen of *Bombay*, with ſuch a precedent before them, might have acted with more caution. I think them very cenſurable for the protection they have given *Ragoba*, as they might very well have avoided it, it having been previouſly refuſed by him. As I ſuppoſe that *Ragoba* is already at *Bombay*, I would adviſe that the Gentlemen of that Preſidency ſhould recommend to him to withdraw himſelf from under the protection of their flag, and on no account grant him any ſums of money for his ſubſiſtence.

General *Clavering*—The Preſident and Council of *Bombay* were certainly authorized by the letter of the 18th of October to afford protection to *Ragoba* during the time of the ſuſpenſion of arms, or until a treaty could be concluded with the Government of *Poonah*. The conditions contained in our letter were not to operate but in caſe of an unforeſeen misfortune happening to him, and they were accompanied with an aſſurance that we did not mean to deſert him, but on the contrary, that our intention was to obtain a ſuitable proviſion for him. This intention has been fulfilled by the ſtipulation contained in the 11th Article; I conclude therefore, that the Government of *Bombay* was not authorized, after the Treaty took place, to grant an aſylum to *Ragoba*; and I think they ſhould be told, that we do not approve of their altering the ſtipulation which has been made in his favour in the 11th Article.

The ſecond queſtion is anſwered in the above; and further, they ſhould be acquainted that we do not underſtand how *Ragoba* can be made a moſt uſeful inſtrument, as they declare in their letter of the 30th March laſt, in their hands, if they do not mean to employ him, to carry on intrigues againſt the Maratta State, and thereby endanger the continuance of the Peace, which we have juſt eſtabliſhed.

To the third queſtion, I am clearly of opinion that the Court of Directors will not approve of any penſion being granted him from the Company's Treaſury.

Governor General—To the firſt queſtion, I reply, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* were generally authorized by our letter of the 18th October, to grant their protection to *Ragoba*.

To the ſecond queſtion, That though I regret the neceſſity which impelled the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to grant their protection to *Ragoba*, I ſtill approve of it, and think this Board ought to approve of it.

The third queſtion does not fall within my conſtruction of the controlling powers veſted in this Government over the other Preſidencies, who require not our authority for the diſpoſal of the Company's treaſure entruſted to their charge.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 9th May 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, and *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Read, and approved, the proceedings of the 6th inſtant.

The Secretary having prepared the draft of a letter to *Bombay*, in conſequence of the Minutes of laſt Council, which was circulated and corrected by the Members of the Board, he now lays it before them for their determination. Appendix No. 124.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We have received the letters which you addreſſed to us under dates of the 18th February and 30th March.

We obſerve with concern that *Ragoba* had reſolved to put himſelf under the protection of your Government, and to retire to *Bombay*. You alledge that you were authorized, by our letter of the 20th October laſt, to grant him an aſylum. We admit the fact, but we cannot allow that this authority could be interpreted to extend beyond the time of the ceſſation of arms, whilſt the negociation was carrying on. The terms of our letter were, " admitting the poſſibility of *Ragoba*'s " being reduced by any unforeſeen misfortune to ſeek " refuge in ſome of your garriſons;" in that caſe " we " deſire you would afford him a ſanctuary for himſelf " and his domeſtics or attendants, if he ſhould ever be " neceſſitated to apply for your protection, in order to " avoid any perſonal danger." The ſenſe of theſe expreſſions is fully explained by the intermediate words, " that our intention was to obtain a ſuitable proviſion " for him." This proviſion has been ſecured by the 11th Article of the Treaty now concluded, and we think that the particular ſtipulation therein made in his favour cannot be conſtrued, but by a perverſion of our meaning, to underſtand an urgent neceſſity on which exigency alone our authority for his going to *Bombay* can be eſtabliſhed. If the uſe you mean to make of him, be as you ſay, to render him an uſeful inſtrument in your hands for alarming the fears of the Miniſters, we are apprehenſive that ſuch an effect being produced in them muſt of courſe expoſe the poſſeſſions of the Company to the danger of being involved in a new war. Can it be ſuppoſed that whilſt you are harbouring a perſon ſo obnoxious to the Miniſters, that they will receive a Miniſter on your part, or ſend one of theirs to your Preſidency?

We hope that theſe arguments will have their weight with you, but at all events we ſhall deem you anſwerable to the Court of Directors and the Britiſh Nation, if the Miniſters ſhould upon hearing of your intention, refuſe to ratify the Treaty, and renew the war in conſequence of it.

In your letter now before us, you maintain the independent right of the Guicawar to make the ceſſions which they had yielded by their treaty with you to the Company; and you ſay, that you never before heard this right called in queſtion; yet in the original plan of your treaty with *Ragoba*, as ſet forth in your letter to us of the 31ſt December 1774, the ſhare collected by the Guicawars from the territories of *Broach* is demanded *of Ragoba* as one of the conditions on which he was to receive the Company's aſſiſtance: and it further appears, by the 5th article of the treaty with *Ragoba* and *Futty Sing*, to which Colonel *Keating* made himſelf a party in behalf of the Company, that the Government and revenues of the Pergunnah of *Broach* were ceded to the Company by the former; which ceſſion *Futty Sing* is expreſsly directed not to diſpute.

If *Ragoba*, whom you then conſidered as Peiſhwa, had authority to make this ceſſion, it follows that *Futty Sing* is a dependant of the Maratta State, and that he can have no power to alienate any part of the territory under his immediate Government, without the authority of the reigning Peiſhwa.

With reſpect to our miſtake, in ſuppoſing that you were in poſſeſſion of *Baſſein* when we drew up the inſtructions given to Colonel *Upton*, as you ſay that, "you " are at a loſs to conceive upon what foundation we

Appendix. No. 124.

" entertained that idea," we muſt acquaint you that it took its riſe from the terms of your letters of 31ſt December, 1774, and 31ſt March 1775. In the former you ſaid that " you had inſiſted on the Company's " being put in poſſeſſion of the places to be ceded by " *Ragoba* as ſoon as the treaty ſhould be executed;" and in the latter, that, " the treaty with *Ragboa* had been " made out in the terms you propoſed, and executed, " and that the neceſſary Sunnuds were delivered for the " ſeveral diſtricts and territories the Company were en- " titled to, in virtue of it." And the information was further confirmed to us by our advices from *Fort Saint George*.

In reply to the reference made to us made by the Miniſters in the 3d Article of the Treaty of *Poonah*; we have already directed Colonel *Upton* to ſignify to them, that we cannot aſſent to the exchange of territory therein propoſed to be ceded in lieu of *Salſette*, and the ſmall Iſlands in the Bay, and we have inſerted an explanatory clauſe to this effect at the end of the Treaty which Colonel *Upton* tranſmitted to us for ſignature.

As we did not approve of ſome other parts of the Treaty, we have ſtruck them out, and enjoined Colonel *Upton* to ſtate our reaſons for ſo doing to the Miniſters, and to uſe his endeavours to obtain their conſent alſo to the omiſſion of them. The parts to which we refer are the concluding words of the 7th clauſe, and the 13th and 17th clauſes entirely. When the Treaty ſhall be executed with theſe alterations, Colonel *Upton* will furniſh you with a regular copy of it.

We are, &c.

Fort William, 6th May, 1776.

General *Clavering*—A doubt having ariſen in the minds of ſome of the Members of the Board on the reſult of the Governor General's firſt queſtion, entered on the conſultation of the 6th inſtant, viz.

Whether by the following paragraph of our letter of the 18th October, viz. " Admitting the poſſibility " of *Ragoba*'s being reduced by any unforeſeen misfor- " tune to ſeek refuge in ſome of our garriſons, we " would not have you underſtand, from any directions yet " tranſmitted you, that we entirely mean to deſert him; " on the contrary, you will find, by a paragraph of the " incloſed inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*, that our inten- " tion is to obtain a ſuitable proviſion for him; we " therefore deſire that you will afford him a ſanc- " tuary for himſelf and his domeſtics or attendants, in " caſe he ſhould ever be neceſſitated to apply for your " protection, in order to avoid any perſonal danger"— the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* were authorized to grant the protection of their Government to *Ragoba*, under the ſituation of affairs at the time in which his application was made to them for their protection?

And as it is neceſſary that the letter to be written to the Government of *Bombay* ſhould be formed on the reſolution which a majority of the Board may take on that queſtion; I muſt beg it may be re-conſidered, and a clear and preciſe opinion given upon it.

Mr. *Francis*—The queſtion does not ſtate what application, nor when, becauſe there were different applications made by *Ragoba* when the terms of the propoſed treaty were firſt communicated to him; and before it was concluded he declared his reſolution of retiring into the Company's territories; which reſolution he afterwards waved. The intended draft of the letter to *Bombay* admits that they were authorized to receive him under the circumſtances mentioned in ours of the 18th October. I meant to condemn in the ſtrongeſt terms their receiving him at all ſince the concluſion of the Treaty, and I aſſign my reaſons for it; if he be at *Bombay* I do not think he can be forced from thence; but I think that we ought to enjoin that Preſidency, in the ſtrongeſt terms, not to give him any encouragement to ſtay there.

Mr. *Barwell*—I have no other opinion to deliver upon a re-conſideration on this ſubject, than which I have already recorded.

Colonel *Monſon*—I adhere to the opinion I gave to this queſtion at the former debate, which I think was clear and preciſe.

General *Clavering*—The permiſſion given in our letter of the 18th October, was reſtricted to the ceſſation of arms only; I am clearly of opinion that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are not authorized by that letter to receive *Ragoba*, after the concluſion of the Treaty with the Maratta Government; their intention in harbouring him there is obvious. If the Miniſters refuſe to ratify the Treaty on that account, the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, who have given their ſanction to his reception there, contrary to the ſpirit and letter of our orders, muſt anſwer for the conſequences. An opinion given by any member of this Board, will not juſtify them to the public.

The Governor General—I adhere to my opinion already given; ſtill I object to the letter, becauſe it is not drawn up conformable to the reſolutions of the Board; but, to avoid a long debate upon this ſubject, I deſire that the general ſenſe of the Board may be taken, whether the draft ſhall paſs as it now ſtands or not?

Mr. *Francis*—As the doubt concerning the ſenſe of the Board, expreſſed in their reſolutions of the 6th, ſtill continues, I was going, in order to obviate all differences in point of form, to propoſe that thoſe reſolutions ſhould be annulled, and that the queſtion ſhould be taken up afreſh; but the Governor's motion ſeems to me to anſwer the ſame purpoſe; I agree that the letter ſhall ſtand.

Mr. *Barwell*—I cannot agree to a draft of any letter that does not conform to a vote of the majority of this Board. The preſent draft is not founded upon the reſolutions of the 6th; and until the reſolutions of the majority are fully and explicitly reſcinded, I ſhall be very cautious how I put my name to any letter that may in any reſpect counteract ſuch reſolutions of the majority.

Colonel *Monſon*—The firſt meaſure of the Board is to reviſe the proceedings of the preceding day, and every Member I conceive to have a right to correct, reviſe, or alter his opinion. The latter as it now ſtands is conſiſtent with a reſolution of the majority; I therefore approve of it.

General *Clavering*—I approve of the draft of the letter.

Governor General.—I object to it in point of form; the reſolutions of laſt Council ſhould be reſcinded, and the opinions contained in the draft of the letter now in queſtion taken as anſwers to the queſtions upon which thoſe reſolutions were formed; but as it is the ſubſtance and not the form to which I object, and as the ſecond reſolution, though not formally is ſubſequently repealed by the concluding part of the Minute delivered this day by Mr. *Francis* upon the firſt queſtion, I underſtand the whole reſolutions of the laſt day to be virtually repealed, and ſhall wave any further objections to it in this place.

Ordered, That the draft of the letter to *Bombay*, recorded in the former part of this conſultation, be written fair, and diſpatched.

APPENDIX, No. 125.

RECEIVED a letter from Colonel *Upton*, as follows:

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letter of the 12th February, and its continuation in cypher, dated the 15th February; alſo the preamble to the Treaty.

I am greatly concerned I was not before informed to how great a degree you was deſirous of poſſeſſing *Baſſein*; I perceive now you wiſh to have it almoſt at any honourable rate, though this knowledge would have perplexed me exceedingly.

No conceſſion on the part of the Company could

have

have got us *Baſſein*; and eight-and-forty hours only were left to determine, whether we choſe to renew the war, or make peace, on the conditions I wrote on the 2d February laſt, which I with the greateſt difficulty had obtained, and thought very honourable and advantageous.

I conceived I fully underſtood the ſenſe you entertained of this war, and your abſolute determination to prevent the Company's being engaged in a general one with the Marattas, by putting an end to it. I thought, and ſtill hope, I underſtood my inſtructions thoroughly. *Salſette* and *Baſſein* were not to be reſtored. Our never poſſeſſing *Baſſein*, put it out of my power to reſtore it; and the Miniſters would not conſent on any terms to ſurrender it. If this was inſiſted on, hoſtilities were immediately to have been commenced; and the Miniſters ſwore, in the moſt ſolemn manner, that they would carry fire and ſword through *Bengal*, though the loſs of their own country ſhould be the certain conſequence; and that they would grant a reſidence to the French, even in *Poonah* itſelf. This might be the effect of paſſion only; but they ſeemed to have been making preparations for the carrying part of this threat into execution.

There was no time for a reference; peace muſt take place, and that without delay; beſides, I thought the conditions, as I have already obſerved, very honourable and advantageous.

Had the letters of the 15th February arrived ſoon enough for me to have propoſed the exchange for *Baſſein*, we ſhould have offered for it more than twice the value.

Broach, with the Marratta collections granted to us, and a country of three lacks per annum ceded (in fact in lieu of *Baſſein*) amount to about nine lacks and an half of rupees, beſides the twelve lacks granted towards defraying the expence of the war, which never would have been given whilſt we were making ſuch offers for *Baſſein*. *Salſette* we poſſeſſed, they could not get it from us: this was not the caſe with *Baſſein*.

Salſette and *Baſſein* are the property of the Peiſhwa by inheritance, independant of the Ram Rajah. This muſt have been a great bar to our ever obtaining them by treaty, while the Brahmins are in poſſeſſion of the Peiſhwaſhip; and was now a principal reaſon for their not ſuffering any propoſals to be made about *Baſſein*.

I yet lament, Gentlemen, not having been better acquainted with your ſentiments before the peace was concluded; though I hope, and am perſuaded, you will approve the meaſures I have taken.

I had the honour to write you on the 21ſt March, adviſing of the final determination of *Ragonaut Row*. Three days ago I received the accompanying letter from the Select Committee, of *Bombay*. You will perceive, Gentlemen, *Ragonaut Row* has again claimed the protection of the Engliſh. I have incloſed my anſwer to the Select Committee, alſo a letter from the Peiſhwa to me on this ſubject, and extracts, the Miniſters have ſent me of former treaties.

Your full directions to the Preſidency of *Bombay* are neceſſary, otherwiſe I fear the Articles of the Peace will with great difficulty be carried into execution.

The Miniſters ſay they cannot withdraw the army; that ſubſiſting this army (including the Nizam's forces) amounts to thirty lacks of rupees per month; that we occaſion this heavy expence to them by protecting or rather taking part in the diſputes between them and *Ragonaut Row*. They declared long ago, and deſired I might inform you, that ſhould it be the fate of *Ragonaut Row* to be taken by them in battle, his perſon ſhould ever be ſafe.

The Sunnuds and letters from *Futty Sing* are not yet arrived, the Miniſters expect them daily.

The Miniſters, Gentlemen, have been for ſome time paſt expreſſing their great deſire to write to His Majeſty; I conceive to prefer a complaint againſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*, for their unjuſt attack on *Salſette*, &c. (though they declare not.) They hear the Nabob of *Arcot* has made a firm friendſhip by this means, and they wiſh to do ſo alſo. I have ſatisfied them that full powers on the part of the King, as well as the Company, were veſted in the Supreme Council; they acknowledge this; but the Peiſhwa wiſhes to pay his reſpects to the Throne. They either have or will write to requeſt your permiſſion and aſſiſtance to their putting this wiſh in execution. Appendix, No. 125.

Commodore Sir *Edward Hughes* ſails with the ſquadron on the 15th inſtant for *Madras*.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Paorunder, (Signed) *J. Upton.*
10th April 1776.

P. S. At the requeſt of the Miniſters who were deſirous of writing to the Honourable the Governor General, I have delayed till this day ſending off my packet.

I forward the copy of another letter from the Peiſhwa, on the ſubject of *Ragonaut Row*'s reſiding at any of the Company's ſettlements.

(Signed) *J. Upton.*
13th April.

Copy of a letter, bearing the ſeal of *Mahdoo Row* Peiſhwa. Received by Colonel *Upton* on the 17th Suffer 1190 Hegira.

I have been informed by Captain *Macpherſon*, that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* have brought *Ragonaut Row* to that port, where they have intentions of detaining him; ſince by an expreſs Article of the Treaty he is excluded from the protection of the Engliſh, unleſs he lives in *Coppercanoon*, and it is ſtipulated, that not one of the Engliſh ſhall afford him aſſiſtance, notwithſtanding what has been written from *Calcutta*, and the powers with which you were inveſted, and the character of the Engliſh for good faith. Such a manner of regarding friendſhip and peace was never before heard of. You are prudent, and inveſted with powers from *Calcutta*, and will therefore attend to the terms of the Treaty agreed to, by yourſelf, and not afford *Ragonaut Row* a place amongſt the Engliſh.

Copy of a Letter, bearing the ſeal of *Madhoo Row*, the Peiſhwa, received by Colonel *Upton*, on the 23d Suffer, 1190 Hegira.

I underſtand that *Ragonaut Row* is accompanying the Engliſh army to *Bombay*, where he will be permitted to live by the Governor and Council. A peace was concluded with the Engliſh for this reaſon, that *Ragonaut Row* might live entirely out of the way of family diſputes, and by no means make himſelf a party therein. What is become of the peace now, if the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, who formerly aſſiſted *Ragonaut Row*, now carry him to *Bombay*? in what manner are the diſputes of our family ſettled, while the cauſe of thoſe diſputes remains with the Engliſh? Since the Governor General and Council have deputed you to this place, inveſted with full powers, the crime of intrigues, of which *Ragonaut* had been guilty, was at your deſire forgiven, and a ſuitable allowance ſettled for him. Whilſt he remains quiet, and fixed in the place aſſigned him, the terms of the Treaty ſhall not be infringed by me. He complains that his life is in danger. When engagements are entered into by men of character, ſhall they not be obſerved? Should he fall into my hands in the field of battle, his life ſhall be ſecure.

In a treaty which was concluded between this Government and the Engliſh of *Bombay*, the Engliſh engage not to protect, or in anywiſe aſſiſt refugees from us, and we engage to do the ſame; and the laſt Treaty, in its 15th and 16th Articles, conforms to all Sunnuds and Treaties which are not annulled or varied thereby, the ſame degree or validity as on the day when they were executed; and the ſpirit of the whole Treaty lately concluded is, that the Engliſh ſhall not ſupport the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row*; that they ſhall be entirely diſunited from him; that they ſhall not afford him a place in any of their

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ports; and that the family diſpute ſhall be left to me. I will write theſe particulars to the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*, who have concluded peace with me. Should the Governor and Council of *Bombay* refuſe at your requiſition to ſeparate *Ragonaut Row* from them, give it under your hands, that they do not regard your words; and the Governor General and Council at *Calcutta*, will not aſſiſt the Engliſh at *Bombay*. What ſhall I write more? I before repreſented to you theſe circumſtances ſummarily, and have now repreſented them fully.

Firſt Treaty concluded in the time of *Serrimunt Pundit*, and in the Government of Mr. *Stephens*, by Cap^n. *Hecherbar*, at *Baſſein*, in the year 1140, *Bachupoory*.

Article the 7th. The Engliſh ſhall not in any ſhape aſſiſt the enemies of the Circar (Maratta Government) not even if they ſhould be their own friends. In the ſame manner, the enemies of the Engliſh ſhall not be aſſiſted by the Circar.

Second Treaty concluded at *Poonah* on the part of the Engliſh, by *John Spencer* and *Thomas Byefield*, Eſquires, in the year 1157, at *Beechipory*.

Article 18th. The engagements which ſubſiſted in former years between the Circar and the Engliſh, ſhall now be in force between the parties.

Third Treaty between the Circar *Row Pundit Purdhan* and *Charles Crommelin*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor General of *Bombay*, concluded in the year 1162.

Article 3d. The dependants of the Circar have been ſtrictly ordered, in caſe any of the ſervants of the Engliſh, whether principal ſervants or inferior, ſhall deſert from the Engliſh and come to them, to confine them, give notice to the General, and deliver them over to the Company's men. In the ſame manner, if any of the ſervants of the Circar, principal or inferior, except Europeans, ſhall ſeek the protection of the Engliſh at *Bombay*, the Engliſh ſhall alſo deliver them over to me. This is agreed between the parties. The Engliſh ſhall give their word to their ſervants, and carry them away.

A true tranſlation.
(Signed) *Henry Vanſittart*,
Act^g Perſ^n Tranſlator.

From *Balajee Jundarun*. Received 17th May 1776.

I hope that by the arrival of my former letter you have been informed of all particulars.

It is ſtipulated in the Treaty, that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* ſhall remove their army from an alliance with *Serumunt Ragonaut Row*, immediately upon the eſtabliſhment of the peace; but more than a month has elapſed, and the troops have not yet withdrawn from his aſſiſtance. *Serrenaut* is on his way to that quarter, and the Engliſh are united with him. What Colonel *Upton* has written for the removal of the army, has had no effect. *Hurry Pundit* ſent a letter, with a view of adding ſtrength to the peace; to which he received an anſwer from Colonel *Keating*, the commanding officer of the troops by *Lait Loll*.

Being guided by wiſdom and judgment, you have written various letters for the eſtabliſhment of a peace, and the ſettlement of difference, and probably ſome to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*; this is therefore ſurprizing. I deſire that you will write in ſuch terms to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, as may conſtrain them to deſiſt from every act which may be inconſiſtent with the friendſhip between us; and direct them to make it their ſtudy to ſtrengthen the union.

Incloſed is Colonel *Keating*'s letter; written on a ſeparate paper.

My friend, *Hurry Pundit* is obliged to retain a war eſtabliſhment, which is an expence to the Government of 30 lacks of rupees per annum: By whom ſhall we be indemnified for this enormous ſum?—The Engliſh have not yet deſiſted from hoſtilities; and collect by ſeverities in the ſeveral diſtricts of Guzerat. Should *Hurry Pundit* eſtabliſh the authority of the Maratta Aumils, it will be ſaid that he is cauſing variances. We have been treated in this manner before our very eyes. You will weigh theſe circumſtances in the balance of wiſdom, and write to the Engliſh at *Bombay*, ordering them to forbear hoſtilities.

Copy of a letter from Colonel *Keating* to *Hurry Pundit*. Received the 2 Saffer, 1190 Hegira.

I received your letter of the 22d and 24th Mohurram, on the 27th and 28th of the ſame month. Since the receipt of the firſt letter, which you wrote me on the occaſion of the late tranſactions, I have written to you theſe letters, which I hope have arrived ſafe.

I have there mentioned what was within the compaſs of my knowledge; but I have not to this time received my orders from *Bombay*, reſpecting the peace; but I very well know that the peace will not be approved by *Serrimunt Pundit Purdhan* Peiſhwa. He performs what it is incumbent on him to do; but what cannot ſeaſonably be done will be ſeen. You write, "Let the palm plantation of friendſhip and union flouriſh:" When the ſeed has not been ſown, how can we reap fruit? It is my wiſh that peace may be eſtabliſhed in the *Zellæ*, in a manner which may be right and proper.

Copy of a letter from Colonel *Keating*, in anſwer to *Hurry Pundit*, dated the 3d Suffer, 1190 Hegira; and received the 6th of the ſame month.

I have this day received orders from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, together with the Treaty; the contents of which ſhall be explained to *Serrimunt* Peiſhwa. You will not march from the place where you now are, until you hear from me, nor croſs the *Cuttil*.

Since, agreeable to the Treaty, no part of the army is to moleſt any part of the other, you will give orders to all your army not to moleſt any of the ſervants who may paſs or repaſs of *Serrimunt* Peiſhwa. Should they meet with any moleſtation, it will be known that you have not acted according to the Treaty.

Written on a ſeparate paper.

Since the cloſe of my letter, *Hurry Pundit* has received a letter from Colonel *Keating*, the contents of which are ſo inconſiſtent with the Treaty that I cannot comprehend them. I am ſurprized, when your ſuperiors have inveſted you with the ſupreme authority over the different poſts, and you have delegated that authority in this inſtance to Colonel *John Upton*, by whoſe negociations a Treaty has been concluded, that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* ſhould diſregard it, and behave in contradiction to the rule of obedience. I therefore conceive it to be evident, that neither orders from *Calcutta*, nor even orders from the King of *England*, would affect them; for Colonel *Keating*, a commanding officer amongſt men ſubject to your orders, notwithſtanding your repeated letters and thoſe of Colonel *Upton*, perſiſts in a diſpoſition of enmity, and would not recede from his purpoſes. I refrained from hoſtilities eight months, five of which have paſſed in negociation, three in concerting peace, and more than a month has elapſed ſince the concluſion of peace. I have ſubmitted to a very heavy expence of my army from a deſire of friendſhip, but am under apprehenſions, if the Governor and Council of *Bombay* will not deſiſt from their meaſures at a time when Colonel *Upton* is here, how will they behave when he leaves me. I requeſt you will order them to obſerve the conditions of the Treaty.

Copy of a letter from Colonel *Keating* to *Hurry Pundit*, dated 8 Suffer 1190 Hegira, and received the 10th.

Agreeable to the orders I have received from *Bombay* I am now to adviſe you, that *Serrimunt Ragonaut Baje Row* Peiſhwa, in no reſpect approves the Treaty which has been concluded between him and Colonel *Upton*, and the Mutſeddies are by no means ſatisfied with it. By Article 9th he is to diſband his army within a month. The Treaty did not arrive till twenty-four days after its

date

date, and *Ragonaut* was not before this time informed of it; ſo that the period remaining for the performance of this condition is very ſhort. He is now diſmiſſing his officers and uſing expedition, but he muſt exceed the time limited by two or three days, more or leſs; I therefore requeſt that you will not preſs him to an inconvenient haſte, nor come over from the other ſide of the *Cuttil*, but remain in your preſent ſituation until you hear from me. In the 9th Article it is written, that after *Serrimunt Ragonaut Row* ſhall have diſbanded his army, he ſhall, without meeting with any moleſtation, travel where he pleaſes, and that no one ſhall diſturb him: I therefore enjoin you to a ſtrict obſervance of this condition, that there may not be the leaſt deviation from it; ſhould there be any, it will be an infringement of the Treaty between you and the Engliſh.

From *Saccarim Pundit*. Received the 20th May 1776.

I have addreſſed to you various letters, the contents of which, you muſt have fully underſtood.

Although the behaviour of the Bombay Gentlemen did not merit the re-eſtabliſhment of friendſhip, yet your letters, the embaſſy of Colonel *Upton*, the aſſurances which he made of your friendſhip, and the conſideration of your dignity and ſuperiority over the other ſettlements, induced me to aſſent to ſome of Colonel *Upton*'s propoſals, and refer others to your juſtice, as I have particularly informed you in the letter which I have before written on this ſubject. Colonel *Upton* wrote in the cuſtomary manner to the Gentlemen of *Bombay*.

The letters received from Colonel *Keating* by *Hurry Pundit*, of which I had before tranſmitted you copies, contain ſubjects of diſpute, and the Gentlemen of *Bombay* continue to ſupport *Surrimunt Ragonaut Row*, and are deſirous of carrying him to *Bombay*. This very much ſurprizes me, for it is not the nature of the Engliſh to be diſobedient to orders. However, they pay no regard either to your orders or Colonel *Upton*'s letters, and perſiſt in their former unfriendly diſpoſition. If we are to judge by their behaviour, what opinion can be entertained of your orders? The rules which uſed to direct the Engliſh no longer exiſt. Conſider thoſe orders. It is neither acting up to the character of great men, nor to the principles of Sirdars; nor is it a cuſtom in *Europe*, that writing ſhould be one thing, and ſpeaking another, concluding a treaty another, and performing the conditions of that treaty different from all.—Under theſe circumſtances peace is impoſſible. My army has been without employment, and occaſioned a loſs to me of three crores of rupees, all which has happened in conſequence of your writing; beſides which the Country of *Guzerat* has ſuſtained much damage, and the Bombay Gentlemen have, in violation of other treaties, been exciting troubles. It very much ſurprizes me, that at a time when your letters have been received, and Colonel *Upton* has written preſſingly on the ſubject of ceaſing to ſupport *Surrimunt Ragonaut Row*, ſtill that this ſhould not have effected the leaſt change in their behaviour, except, indeed, by promoting ſtronger inclination to diſorders. What I have written may be the dictates of reſentment, but Colonel *Upton*, who has been witneſs to all tranſactions, will write to you. I hope, however, for the prevention of ſuch behaviour, that ſome effectual meaſures will be adopted in *Europe*, and by you, that it may never be experienced in future; and that you will poſitively forbid every Engliſhman to ſupport *Serrimunt*, or to have any connections with him, or to interfere in the affairs of our family, or obſtruct the collections of the Chout, which is the right of our Government; that you will order *Saſhty* to be delivered up, and write a favourable anſwer to the other particulars contained in my former letter, and which were referred to your juſtice, and that you will take ſuch meaſures for the eſtabliſhment of the affairs in this quarter as may found a laſting friendſhip and confidence between us.

APPENDIX, No. 126.

Appendix. No. 126.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I HAVE the honour to incloſe the copy of a letter from the Peiſhwa, written to me in conſequence of my having made the Miniſters acquainted with the paragraph in your letter of the 31ſt of laſt month, reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*'s having claimed your protection, and that he intended proceeding to *Bombay*. The Miniſters have alſo ſent extracts of former treaties, which I forward for your peruſal.

You will be pleaſed to obſerve, I had before informed the Miniſters with *Ragonaut Row*'s final determination, of which you adviſe me in your letter of the 17th ult. This, therefore, in a great meaſure becomes a freſh engagement with *Ragonaut Row*, and I cannot help thinking, as I mentioned in my laſt, as an infringement of the Treaty—"We are not to take any part in the "Maratta diſputes"—as few obſtructions as poſſible ſhould be put in the way to prevent carrying into execution the Articles of the Treaty.

In the extract you have been pleaſed to forward me, of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*'s letter, dated 25th March 1776, I cannot help noticing the two following:

Paragraph 1ſt.—"This morning, agreeable to your "orders, peace between the Honourable Company and "the *Poonah* Miniſters was proclaimed at the head of "the Honourable Company's forces, now under my "command."

Is it poſſible Colonel *Keating* could have proclaimed the peace in the manner related by this paragraph? The firſt Article of the Treaty informs, when the peace had taken place, and the names of the Miniſters who acted on the part of the Maratta State. The ſecond Article directs, that peace ſhall be forthwith proclaimed between the Honourable Company and the Maratta State, &c. &c.

If Colonel *Keating* has proclaimed the peace in the manner he writes (between the Honourable Company and the *Poonah* Miniſters) it may be productive of doubts and many inconveniencies; what theſe may be, will occur to you, Gentlemen, without my further remarking.

Paragraph 5th:—"In conſequence of the claim of "*Ragonaut Row*, I made him acquainted that I had re-"ceived your Honour, &c. orders to afford him "protection; he will proceed to *Bombay* as ſoon as "proper opportunity offers. His own elephants, "horſes, &c. he means to ſend into the neighbourhood "of *Broach*, under eſcort of the detachment belong-"ing to that garriſon."

All I ſhall obſerve on this paragraph is, that it will be a fortunate circumſtance if the detachment eſcorting *Ragoba*'s elephants, horſes, &c. is not attaked by *Hurry Punt Furkia*, or ſome detached part of his army; as (if *Ragonaut Row* did not accept the compromiſe) he had orders to be very attentive to his motions. I have not mentioned the latter part of this paragraph to the Miniſters, and wiſh it may have paſſed unnoticed.

I cannot cloſe this letter without obſerving, that I wrote on the firſt of laſt month to *Ragonaut Row*, informing him that peace was that day concluded with the miniſterial party, and acquainted him with the terms ſtipulated for him. To this letter I received his anſwer. Colonel *Keating* wrote to you, Gentlemen, on the 11th and 12th March, adviſing of *Ragonaut Row*'s determination in conſequence of what was agreed upon for him; yet I perceive by the 4th paragraph of the extract of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*'s letter, that *Ragonaut Row*, had ſuppoſed he was to have been ſupported by the Engliſh ſo late as till the 24th March. To what end could Colonel *Keating*'s prior converſations on the ſubject of the peace and ſtipulation have tended?

I underſtand the Miniſters have not ſent a vackeel to *Bombay* as they promiſed, to have explained any difficul-

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ties that might have ariſen, and they now refuſe to ſend one.

Poorunder, I have the honour to be, &c.
8th April 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

APPENDIX, No. 127.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated the 16th May 1776.

PRESENT.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*.
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
And *Philip Francis*, }

THE proceedings of the 15th inſtant read, and approved.

Reſumed the conſideration of the letter from Colonel *Upton*, received and recorded yeſterday.

General *Clavering*—In the letter that was read yeſterday from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* of the 10th April, he acquaints us, that our full inſtructions are neceſſary to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to prevent their receiving *Ragoba*, otherwiſe he fears that the Articles of the Peace will with great difficulty be carried into execution. It is true the Board have already expreſſed their ſentiments on this ſubject in very ſtrong terms to the Gentlemen of *Bombay*: they have ſet before them the conſequences which they apprehend will enſue from their receiving *Ragoba*, and have left it with them to anſwer for the event. Such an admonition would probably ſuffice to enforce a compliance with our directions from the other Preſidencies; but the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, who have preſumed to violate a ſolemn peace in oppoſition to the known intentions of the Court of Directors; who in the face of an Act of Parliament gave orders to commence hoſtilities, who ſigned the Treaty of *Surat*, and gave their ſanction to that of *Brodea*, concluded and guaranteed by Colonel *Keating*: who evaded our orders to withdraw their troops into their garriſons when Colonel *Upton* was deputed to *Poonah*, and ſtill more, who furniſhed their cannon to carry on the ſiege of *Amadabad*, during the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities; I repeat, that after ſuch proof of contempt of all authority, I think it is not merely ſufficient to caution them, we ſhould add our poſitive orders that they ſhould ſend away *Ragoba* from the Company's ſettlements. If it ſhould be objected, that thoſe who have on ſo many occaſions been diſobedient before, will not ſcruple to be ſo again, under pretence of their faith being pledged to *Ragoba*, together with the danger which they affect to entertain for his perſon, it may be anſwered, that we have it particularly in charge to preſerve the peace of *India*, and that we cannot ſuffer the danger of expoſing the Company's poſſeſſions to the uncertain event of a war to ſtand in competition with their ſcruples, if they were even well founded.

They ought to know, that a great Nation is as jealous of its honour, as it is of its rights; that receiving the Pretender by any Potentate in Europe was deemed in *England* to be equivalent to a declaration of war; and that if it were permitted to the dependant parts of any State not to acknowledge the conditions of a treaty, or not to carry them into execution, a peace could never be eſtabliſhed or maintained between one Nation and another.

I ſubmit theſe conſiderations to the wiſdom of the Board, and whether it be not expedient to prohibit expreſsly the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to receive *Ragoba* in any of the Company's poſſeſſions, and in caſe he ſhould be there before this letter reaches them, that they be commanded to ſend him away.

Notwithſtanding Colonel *Upton* has already remarked, in his letter to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, of the 8th April, the impropriety of Colonel *Keating*'s publication of the peace, which he ought to have proclaimed by virtue of the ſecond Article in the name of the Honourable the *Eaſt India* Company and the Maratta State, inſtead of that of the *Poonah* Miniſters; yet, leſt the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſhould not have altered the terms of the proclamation in their orders to their ſeveral ſubordinates, I beg leave to offer it as my opinion, that it would be adviſeable, in order to obviate all doubts and uncertainties concerning the authenticity of the Treaty, that they ſhould be directed to proclaim it expreſsly in the manner of the Maratta State.

I further ſubmit it to the conſideration of the Board, whether it would be likewiſe adviſeable to inform the Miniſters at *Poonah*, through Colonel *Upton*, with the orders we have given to the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

The queſtion contained in the General's Minute being put, the Members of the Board deliver their opinion as follows:

Mr. *Francis*—I have already delivered my opinion of the conduct of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in offering a retreat to *Ragoba*, and of the conſequences which that meaſure may produce. If he be not actually at *Bombay*, I agree that we ſhould give them poſitive injunctions not to receive him; not that I think the terms of the Treaty expreſsly preclude us from ſuffering him to reſide within the Company's territories, but becauſe I deem it impolitic and hazardous. If he be now at *Bombay*, I would not order him to be removed by force; but I would inſiſt upon their not affording him the leaſt ſupport, countenance, or encouragement to remain; and I would declare them anſwerable for all the conſequences of their retarding the ratification of the Treaty. In that caſe I believe there is no likelihood of his remaining long in ſo diſgraceful a ſituation, or that the Preſidency of *Bombay* will venture to keep him. Our intention in this reſpect, and our reſolution never to afford *Ragoba* the leaſt aſſiſtance againſt the Maratta Government, may be fully explained to them by Colonel *Upton*.

I think, if Colonel *Keating* has proclaimed the peace in the terms mentioned by Colonel *Upton*, he is highly blameable, and that proclamation ſhould be again made in the manner propoſed by General *Clavering*.

Mr. *Barwell*—I think it is immaterial, whether *Ragonaut Row* be at this inſtant at *Bombay*, or in the Engliſh camp. He has already put himſelf under the protection of the Engliſh Government, and I think that protection ſhould be continued to him while he chuſes to remain under it. The circumſtances of *Ragonaut Row*, under which he chuſes to decline accepting the eſtabliſhment propoſed for him by the *Poonah* Miniſters, plainly indicate that his acquieſcence is denied ſimply under the apprehenſions he entertains of the acts of his enemies. The choice that is left to him, is to ſubmit himſelf, a ſtate priſoner to the people, whom he ſtiles himſelf his ſubjects, to put his life to the riſk, by unreſervedly placing himſelf in their hands, or to demand an aſylum with thoſe who were lately bound, under a ſolemn engagement, to place him at the head of the Maratta State. He has choſen the latter; and I think it will neither be conſiſtent with the honour or juſtice of this Government, to become either the inſtrument of his impriſonment or his death. If ſuch ſacrifices are expected from the Engliſh Nation, to purchaſe a peace from the ruling faction of the Maratta State, I diſclaim and proteſt againſt them; and I conceive the demand now made for the delivering up *Ragonaut Row*, as well as the continuing the Maratta army in the Field, as obvious marks of the ſpirit of enmity and reſentment that I expect will break out as ſoon as the Maratta Government is ſo eſtabliſhed as to allow the preſent ruling faction to purſue meaſures againſt the Engliſh, with the leaſt probability of ſucceſs. The letters from *Bellajee Pundit* and *Siccaram Baboo*, on the Treaty executed by them, I cannot view in any other light than as a ſtrong proteſt againſt the Treaty itſelf, and a plain, open, and avowed declaration, that they will eſteem the State authorized to

proceed

proceed to hoſtilities, as ſoon as its political intereſts may admit of ſuch a meaſure. I am againſt the general propoſition for diſmiſſing *Ragonaut Row* from *Bombay*, ſhould he be there, or for directing that Preſidency to refuſe to receive him, ſhould he ſeek an aſylum in their ſettlement: at the ſame time I would give the ſtrongeſt aſſurances to the *Poonah* Government, that no aſſiſtance of any kind ſhall be afforded to *Ragoba*, or any pretenſions he may advance abetted by the Engliſh Government; but that they are determined, to the utmoſt of their power, to give ſuch ſecurity as they may be enabled to the perſon of *Ragoba*; and that they cannot, in juſtice or honour, refuſe him a reſidence in *Bombay*, or at any of the other Preſidencies.

I think ſuch a proclamation of the Treaty of Peace, as is recommended by the General, ſhould be directed.

Colonel *Monſon*—I agree to the firſt and ſecond propoſitions made by the General, they being in a great meaſure conſiſtent with an opinion I gave ſome few days ſince; they are the beſt proofs that can be given to the Maratta State, of the intentions of this Government to preſerve inviolate the late Treaty concluded with them. While *Ragonaut* remains in *Bombay*, they will have ſufficient cauſe to miſtruſt our intentions: he muſt have been received there with a view to encourage intrigue, and occaſion jealouſies and ſuſpicions between the Maratta State and the Engliſh Government. I approve of the two laſt propoſitions mentioned by the General.

Governor General—I object to all the terms of the General's propoſition; to the two firſt, namely, to refuſe to *Ragoba* protection if he ſhould require it, and if granted already, to withdraw it from him, becauſe it is contrary to good policy, and not required by the terms of the Treaty. I object generally to all, becauſe, from the very extraordinary declaration made by *Siccaram Baboo*, in his letter received the 1ſt April, read in Conſultation the 17th, and recorded in the Perſian Correſpondence, N° 6, I doubt the validity of the Treaty on the part of the Maratta State, and ſhall never think it binding on the Company while a latitude is avowedly claimed by the oppoſite party to declare it null, whenever the caprice or intereſt of the rulers ſhall excite them to break it.

General *Clavering*—Although the terms of the 10th Article in the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, expreſs no more than that we ſhall not aſſiſt *Ragoba*, yet I agree with the *Poonah* Miniſters, in the letter from the Peiſhwa, in thinking that the ſpirit of the Treaty implies, that he ſhould not be received by us. This Treaty which confirms thoſe, between the Government of *Bombay* and the Marattas, dated in July 1739 and 12th October 1756, which are probably referred to in thoſe Articles which they have ſent to us; the firſt concluded with Mr. *Stevens*; the ſecond with Meſſrs. *Spencer* and *Byfield*; the third, which they have likewiſe referred to us, and which appears to be the ſame that is entered in the Book of Treaties, N°12, expreſsly declares in the third Article, "that whatever "people, Europeans of all nations excepted, who are in "the ſervice of *Maddoo Row*, ſhall be delivered up on "the ſame terms and conditions." If therefore the Gentlemen of *Bombay* thought themſelves bound by the conditions of former treaties, they certainly ſhould not have received him, unleſs they meant to give him up. I ſhould be ſorry to ſee the conditions of theſe treaties enforced ſo far although I cannot feel that reſpect for a man who has been repreſented to the Court of Directors by the late Preſident and Council as the murderer of his nephew. Mr. *Barwell* has ſaid, that he "conceives "the demand now made for the delivering up *Ragoba*, as "well as the continuing the Maratta army in the Field; "as obvious marks of the ſpirit of enmity and reſent- "ment that he expects will break out as ſoon as the Ma- "ratta Government is ſo eſtabliſhed as to allow the "preſent ruling faction to purſue meaſures againſt the "Engliſh with the leaſt probability of ſucceſs." If that ſhould be the ſtate of the caſe, though I cannot admit any deſign of delivering up *Ragoba*, he muſt allow that the Government of *Bombay* has reduced the Company into that diſagreeable dilemma of either not making peace with the Miniſters, or the ſupporting the claim of a man whom the late adminiſtration have declared in their letter to the Court of Directors, dated 17th January 1774, Par. 6, was "the murderer of his nephew;" and in another from the Select Committee, dated 17th March 1774, Par. 6, that "he had obtained the command by "exceptionable means." I leave the argument there, contenting myſelf with having uſed my utmoſt endeavours to eſtabliſh a firm peace with the Maratta State, in oppoſition to the various means that have been employed both at *Bombay* and at this place, to prevent its taking effect. Appendix. No. 127.

Governor General—I ſhall never acknowledge any implied terms by deductions from former treaties, in a Treaty expreſsly concluded between the preſent rulers of the Maratta State and this Government, as applicable to the perſon of *Ragoba*, who was the principal object of it; neither do I allow the conſtruction put on the 3d Article of the Treaty of 14 September 1761, which ſtipulates, "that the ſervants of *Maddoo Row* who deſert to "the Engliſh, ſhall be delivered up to him." *Ragoba*, the competitor of the Peiſhwa, can by no conſtruction be ſaid to be his ſervant. Much ſtreſs has been laid upon an expreſſion in one of the general letters of the late Preſident and Council, in which *Ragoba* is ſtiled the murderer of his nephew; as if it made it criminal in this Government to hold any connection with him: the words alluded to, are as follow: "By theſe advices we learn, "that there prevails great diſtractions among the Ma- "ratta Powers; that *Ragoba*, the murderer of his ne- "phew, has marched with an army of 60,000 men to "attack *Nizam Ally*." Theſe words, which have no immediate relation to their context, were certainly neither meant to convey a formal charge againſt *Ragoba*, nor an acquittal of his accomplices. The fact, as I have always underſtood it, and as it is generally admitted, is, that *Ragoba* obtained the Peiſhwaſhip by the murder of his nephew, perpetrated by the immediate authority of *Siccaram Bappoo* and his partizans; that theſe who were at that time in the poſſeſſion of the offices which they have ever ſince held, were the principal authors; and *Ragoba*, who at that time was a priſoner, was their accomplice; there is therefore at leaſt as ſtrong an objection to any kind of connection to the party of the Miniſters as with that of *Ragoba*; but in truth, I hold the objection to have no great weight on either ſide. The Company would have much to anſwer for indeed, were it neceſſary to adopt all the vices and crimes of thoſe with whom they have at any time been engaged by any political tie or connection; for the reſt, I declare that I do moſt firmly and ſincerely wiſh for a ſure and laſting peace with the Marattas; but I differ from the General and other Members of this Board in my opinion of the means by which it is to be effected; believing in my heart, that every conceſſion beyond the ſtrict letter of right, will eventually prove an acceleration of the breach which it is intended to prevent.

General *Clavering*—I have carefully examined all the records in this council, to aſcertain the fact of the murder of *Narrain Row*. Mr. *Moſtyn*, in his letter, 31 Auguſt 1773, to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, ſays, "That *Ragoba* was upon the ſtairs when his nephew "ran into his arms, and begged of him to ſave his life, "and take the Government." And in his letter, 9th September 1773, to this Government, he declares, "That "two Soubahdars, *Mahomed Eſoof* and *Summer Sing*, had "been brought over to *Ragoba*'s intereſt, who had been "cloſely confined for ſome time paſt by his nephew, "fled to the palace with about 500 men, on pretence of "being muſtered; and after having cut off the guards at "the gates, ruſhed in and killed *Narrain Row*: about "an hour after, *Ragoba* was proclaimed in the town with- "out

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" out bloodſhed." He however adds, " That from " what he can learn, moſt of the Miniſters were con- " cerned in this affair." I perceive likewiſe in a letter from the late Vizier, entered in Conſultation 26 November 1773, that ſpeaking of this murder, ſays, " That the Peiſhwa was aſſaſſinated by order of *Ragonaut Row*." I do not ſuppoſe that the late Preſident and Council meant to convey any charge againſt *Ragoba* when they ſpoke of this fact to the Court of Directors on two ſeparate occaſions; they intended probably to inform the Court of Directors of the facts, as they underſtood them at that time.

Whether the Governor General has formed a different opinion of this buſineſs, I cannot conjecture; he probably can refer to the original correſpondence, which gave him the information.

Governor General—I ſhould be ſorry to loſe more of my own time, or to ſwell the public records with the diſcuſſion of ſo unimportant an argument; I ſhall therefore conclude my part of it by remarking, that I could produce from the Perſian Correſpondence, evidence as good as that of the late Vizier, againſt *Siccaram Bappoo* and his aſſociates; and by declaring, that my opinion of the concern which *Ragoba* had in the aſſaſſination of his nephew, was preciſely the ſame when I firſt heard of that event as now, as it will evidently appear, even in thoſe Minutes in which it is diſputed.

Reſolved, That the following Letters be written to *Bombay*, and to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

To the Honourable *Wm Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

By the letter which we wrote you on the 9th inſtant, you have been fully apprized of the ſentiments we entertain of the protection afforded by your Preſidency to *Ragoba*, and of the conſequences likely to reſult from it.

We have been adviſed by Colonel *Upton*, ſince the date of that letter, of the diſguſt which the news of this meaſure had given to the Miniſters. In the letters to him upon that occaſion, written under the ſeal of the Peiſhwa, they have exclaimed loudly againſt it, as being repugnant to our profeſſions of amity, and contrary to the obvious ſpirit of the Treaty. The diſtruſt and jealouſy which you have raiſed in their minds, cannot fail to work upon them, and to prevent any cordial union between us, and probably to produce more fatal conſequences if the cauſe of them be not removed; we therefore direct, that if this letter ſhould reach you before *Ragoba* has taken refuge in *Bombay*, or any of your ſubordinate ſettlements, that you on no account receive him; and in caſe he ſhould be actually at *Bombay*, or elſewhere within the limits of the Company's territories, when you receive this letter, we inſiſt that you do not afford him the leaſt ſupport, countenance, or encouragement, to continue there; and we muſt at the ſame time repeat, that we ſhall hold you anſwerable for all the conſequences of this imprudent ſtep ſhould it prove the cauſe of retarding the ratification of the Treaty, or be the occaſion of a renewal of the war.

We obſerve a paragraph in Colonel *Upton's* letter to you of the 8th April, expreſſing his ſurprize that Colonel *Keating* ſhould have proclaimed the peace as having been eſtabliſhed between the *Eaſt India* Company and the *Poonah* Miniſters, inſtead of the Maratta State. The impropriety of uſing theſe terms on our part, is ſo obvious, that we can ſcarcely credit Colonel *Keating's* having made uſe of them; but if he did, we direct that a Proclamation of Peace be made, if not already done, in all the Company's poſſeſſions under your controul, expreſsly in the name of the Maratta State.

We requeſt that you will cauſe copies to be made of all the treaties which are now in force between your Preſidency and any of the Country Powers, or which may at any time have been guaranteed by you, and take the firſt opportunity to tranſmit them to us.

Fort William, 16th May 1776. We are, &c.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We have received your letters of 20th and 21ſt March, and 10th April, with a poſtſcript of the 13th.

We incloſe copies of two letters which we have written to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and refer you to them for our ſentiments and directions, reſpecting the protection which they have tendered to *Ragoba*.

We deſire you will inform the Miniſters, that we have given peremptory directions to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, not to receive *Ragoba* under the Company's protection; and in caſe he ſhould be actually at *Bombay*, or at any of their ſubordinate ſettlements, when they receive our letter, we have ordered them not to give him the leaſt ſupport, countenance, or encouragement, to remain there. You will accompany this communication with the moſt ſolemn aſſurances in our name, that we are determined never to give him the leaſt aſſiſtance againſt the Maratta Government.

We are, &c.

Fort William, 16th May 1776.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 2d May 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

READ, and approved, the Conſultation of the 29th ultimo.

Received the following letter from *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the *Swallow* ſloop of war that arrived here yeſterday, we received a letter from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, together with an extract of the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton* with the Maratta Miniſtry at *Poonah*, copies whereof come incloſed.

As this event renders it unneceſſary for us to reinforce that Preſidency as we intended, with two battalions of Sepoys, we ſhall countermand the orders we had given thoſe troops, to hold themſelves in readineſs to march to *Anjengo*.

We have the honour to be, &c. &c.

Fort Saint George, 15th April 1776. (Signed) *George Stratton*, &c. Council.

My Lord and Gentlemen,

The laſt letter we received from your Preſidency was dated the 13th December, and we have not yet heard of the *Grenville's* arrival upon the Malabar Coaſt.

On the 1ſt inſtant Colonel *Upton* concluded a Treaty of Peace between the Honourable Company and the Miniſters at *Poonah*; and for the information of your Lordſhip and Council, we incloſe a copy of the Extract tranſmitted to us by him.

We have given orders for our troops returning into garriſon, and as opportunities offer we ſhall ſend round the detachment of Europeans, and Captain *Kelly's* battalion of Sepoys belonging to your Preſidency.

His

His Majeſty's ſhip *Dolphin*, Captain *Pigot*, ſailed for *England* the 22d of this month.

We are with eſteem, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 24th March 1776. (Signed) *Wm. Hornby*, &c. Council.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 20th May, 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, and *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

READ, and approved, the proceedings of the 16th inſt.

Received the following letter and incloſure from *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have this day received a letter from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*; Copy thereof we have the honour to incloſe for your information.

We are, &c.

Fort Saint George, 2d May 1776. (Signed) *Geo. Stratton*, &c. Council.

To the Right Honourable *George* Lord *Pigot*. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council at *Fort Saint George*.

My Lord, and Gentlemen,

We have lately received a letter from the Governor General and Council, wrote upon a ſuppoſition that Colonel *Upton*'s negociation was broke off, and that hoſtilities were renewed between us and the miniſterial party: In this caſe they have taken off the reſtraint they formerly laid us under, and ſeemed determined to proſecute the war with the utmoſt vigour. It appears they have ſignified their intentions upon this head to your Lordſhip and Council; and they have alſo declared to *Ragoba*, in the moſt expreſs manner, their reſolution to ſupport his cauſe.

Though by the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, ſo contrary to their expectations, the ſtate of affairs is become very different from what it was imagined by the Governor General and Council at the date of theſe letters, we think our ſituation is ſtill rather precarious. Their declarations to *Ragoba* being very unreſerved, lead us to expect applications from him, which we ſhall be embarraſſed how to anſwer; and the overtures they have ordered to be made to *Hyder Ally*, *Nizam Ally*, *Moodajee Bouncello*, *Mahadajee Scindea*, *and Tookajee Holkar*, will naturally alarm the miniſterial party, and give them cauſe to doubt our ſincerity. We do not think the Miniſters ſhew much inclination to perform their part of the late treaty; and indeed we doubt their ability in ſome points. Their grabs have very lately made prize of ſome merchant boats from under convoy of a company's cruizer, and all intercourſe of trade or correſpondence with their dominions is ſtill prohibited. *Ragoba* is ſo largely in arrears to his army, that he will find the utmoſt difficulty in diſbanding them; and he has refuſed to accept the terms ſtipulated for him by Colonel *Upton*. Thinking his life would be endangered by putting himſelf ſo entirely in the power of his enemies, he has claimed our protection, which we eſteemed ourſelves bound, by every tie of honour and humanity, to grant him; and this the Miniſters pretend to term an infringement of the treaty.

There is alſo every appearance of further conſiderable commotions in the Maratta State, owing to a party being formed in favour of *Subida*, a deſcendant of the ancient Peiſhwa family, and next in ſucceſſion to *Ragoba*; with whom, it is ſaid, he means to aſſociate, in oppoſition to the Miniſters.

While affairs are in this uncertain ſituation, we think it highly expedient to maintain a reſpectable force, and to be provided againſt all events; we have therefore determined to defer returning the Madras detachment, as we at firſt intended, until we can judge how far this Preſidency is likely to be affected by any of the above circumſtances. Appendix. No. 129.

We remain with eſteem, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 15th April, 1776, (Signed) *William Hornby*, &c. Council.

A true copy.

(Signed) *D. Baine*, Dy My Sy.

APPENDIX, No. 129.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

WE had the honour to addreſs you on the 30th ultimo, by his Majeſty's ſhip *Sea Horſe*, and have ſince received your letter, dated the 29th January.

We have lately received repeated accounts that *Sudaba*, who has been kept in confinement for many years by the *Poonah* Government, has effected his eſcape from *Rhutna Gheriah*, and is already joined by ſeveral Maratta Chiefs, and a conſiderable body of forces. It is ſaid, that he claims the office of Regent of the Maratta State, either for himſelf ſingly, or jointly with *Ragoba*, during the minority of the young Peiſhwa, in oppoſition to the pretenſions of the Miniſters; but we have yet no further particulars of his proceedings than what are contained in the incloſed copies of two letters from the reſident at *Fort Victoria*. *Sudaba* is the ſon of *Chimmajee Oppah*, the brother of *Bajerow*, who was *Ragoba*'s father, and conſequently next to *Ragoba* is entitled either to the Peiſhwaſhip or Regency of the Maratta Empire. At the famous battle of *Paniput*, in the year 1761, *Sudaba* was ſuppoſed to be killed; but ſome time afterwards a perſon made his appearance at *Poonah*, greatly diſfigured with wounds, who aſſerted that he was *Sudaba*, and of which, it is ſaid, he gave moſt convincing proofs; but the Government did not think proper to acknowledge him, and have kept him in confinement ever ſince. This is the perſon who is ſtarted up in oppoſition to the Miniſters, and we apprehend will occaſion much commotion in the Maratta State.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 10th April 1776. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Incloſed are duplicates of our letters, dated the 30th ultimo, and 10th inſtant.

We have ſince had the honour to receive your letter, dated the 7th March, with the incloſed copy of that to *Ragoba*, and we muſt confeſs we greatly regret, that affairs are not in the ſituation you imagined, becauſe the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton* ſo contrary to your expectations appears to us inglorious and diſhonourable to the Company, and the terms thereof entirely inconſiſtent with your inſtructions to him.

We conceive our duty to the Company now calls upon us to give you our opinion of this Treaty, and it is grounded upon the Articles reſpecting *Ragoba*, the ſtipulation for our treaties being deſtroyed in preſence of the Maratta Miniſters, the valuable reſtitutions to be made, all the conditions on our part to be immediately performed, the diſtant periods aſſigned for the Miniſters performance of their part, the general ſuperiority given them throughout, the entire omiſſion of *Baſſein*, and the reference reſpecting *Salſette*.

The Treaty alſo appears to us to be defective in other eſſential points, which we think may affect its validity; the name of the Peiſhwa is not inſerted in the extract tranſmitted to us, the terms *Row Pundit Purdhan* being only titles annexed to that office, and applicable to every Peiſhwa; neither does it ſeem to us that the Treaty has been

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been ſigned nominally and individually by the Maratta Chiefs, agreeable to your inſtructions, which was particularly neceſſary in the preſent caſe.

We obſerved to Colonel *Upton* in the courſe of our correſpondence, that it was by no means neceſſary a Treaty ſhould be concluded at all events, as we were far from conſidering *Ragoba*'s cauſe as irretrievable if the negociation with the Miniſters was to break off; and we have not a doubt, if the war had been proſecuted upon the vigorous plan you had adopted, it would ſoon have been brought to an honourable concluſion, the Company have ſecured great and ſolid advantages, and a general peace have been eſtabliſhed upon an equitable and permanent footing; which, we are ſorry to ſay, ſeems far from being the caſe at preſent.

We have not yet experienced any good effects from this Treaty. The Miniſters do not permit of any communication or intercourſe with the Maratta dominions; to the great detriment of the Company's, and private trade, and we hear lately, that no perſons dare apply for permiſſion to come to *Bombay* from the neighbouring parts, even with the trifling articles of vegetables and fruit. Within theſe few days, they refuſed permiſſion for Major *Wear*, of your eſtabliſhment, going to the hot wells for his health, which has ever hitherto been freely allowed of. This conduct does not ſhew much diſpoſition in the Miniſters to be upon terms of friendſhip with us, and is, we think very injurious to the credit and reputation of the Company, after the peace has been ſo long concluded; but the proceedings of the Maratta fleet afford ſtill leſs demonſtration of their pacific intentions.

They very lately took ſix merchant botellas, with Engliſh paſſes and colours, in their paſſage from *Goa* to *Bombay*, and carried them into *Gheriah*. Theſe veſſels had been under convoy of the Company's ſhip *Gatton*, which arrived here from the coaſt the 7th inſtant, but had ſeparated from her by ſome accident.

On the 4th inſtant the *Terrible*, in her paſſage from *Bengal*, fell in with their fleet off *Gheriah*. Their ſhips immediately run up on each quarter and under the ſtern of the *Terrible*, while their ſmaller veſſels carried off two merchant boats with Engliſh colours, notwithſtanding the commander acquainted the Maratta commodore they were under his protection. The Maratta commodore alſo demanded that the commander, or one of the officers of the *Terrible*, ſhould come on board his ſhip; which being refuſed, he made an effort to take two other veſſels which were under her convoy. But for your more full information of the whole tranſaction, we beg leave to refer you to the incloſed copy of the report delivered to us by the commander of the *Terrible*.

We have repreſented to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* theſe infringements of the Treaty, and recommended to him to inſiſt upon the immediate reſtitution of the eight veſſels, and full ſatisfaction for the inſult offered to a Company's cruiſer; but we do not yet know what anſwer the Miniſters have returned.

Colonel *Upton* has acquainted us, in his letter dated the 8th inſt. that the Miniſters abſolutely refuſe to ſend a vackeel to *Bombay*, which he before adviſed us in his letter dated the 2d ultimo they intended doing, "to explain any thing that might not be fully comprehended."

Their reaſon for this refuſal proceeds from our having afforded the Company's protection to *Ragoba*, which they term an infringement of the Treaty; and Colonel *Upton* has likewiſe embraced that opinion, and taxed us with forming a new engagement with *Ragoba*, and with interfering in the Maratta diſputes. We flatter ourſelves your Honour, &c. will not view our conduct in this light, and that you will do us the juſtice to acquit us of theſe imputations; for, after the moſt attentive conſideration, we cannot diſcover that we have acted in the leaſt repugnant to any part either of this or former treaties, and we could not have denied *Ragoba* a ſanctuary, with any regard to the honour of the nation, or the principles of juſtice and humanity. We alſo conceived, that your orders of the 18th October were alone a ſufficient warrant to us, and theſe orders we long ago communicated to Colonel *Upton*, which makes us ſurprized at his ſupporting the Miniſters in ſuch a demand; inſtead of which we think they ſhould have ſuggeſted to him the propriety of ſtipulating in the Treaty, that *Ragoba*'s place of reſidence ſhould be left at his own option. *Ragoba* is certainly under no obligation to abide by terms ſo full of danger to his perſon, ſettled for him without his authority or conſent; and the ſolicitude of the Miniſters to get him into their poſſeſſion evinces the juſtice of his apprehenſions: They refuſe giving him a ſingle rupee, unleſs he will accept the terms, and reſide at the place allotted for him. The language they make uſe of in their repreſentation to Colonel *Upton* on the ſubject, is very extraordinary; they deſire a certificate from him of our refuſal to give up *Ragoba* upon his application, and then that your Honour, &c. ſhall not aſſiſt us. This repreſentation is termed a letter from the young Peiſhwa; and if the Miniſters ſhould break with us in conſequence of our protecting *Ragoba*, as this menace ſeems to imply, we hope we ſhall be fully juſtified by your Honour, &c. in reſiſting them.

Excluſive of the other defects in the Treaty before-mentioned, we have further to obſerve, that the Miniſters have engaged for more than they have ability or right to perform. We mean, by ſtipulating to give up the Maratta ſhare of the Broach revenues, which is in the gift of the Guicawars alone, and thus ſwelling the Treaty with an imaginary advantage. In the diviſion of the Guzerat province, made in the year 1759 between the *Poonah* Government and the Guicawar family, the diſtrict of *Broach* was aſſigned to the latter, and we have held ſeveral ſmall places ever ſince by virtue of their Sunnuds, a copy or two of which we incloſe. After the reduction of *Broach*, we concluded a Treaty with *Futty Sing* in February 1773, wherein the proportion of revenues to be collected by each, was ſettled without any reference to the *Poonah* Government; and though Mr. *Moſtyn* was then at that Durbar in quality of Reſident for the Company, no objections were ſtarted againſt the right of the Guicawars to form any engagements they might think proper. *Ragoba* in his Treaty with us would only engage to obtain from the Guicawars a grant of their ſhare, and a vaqueel is lately arrived here from *Futty Sing*, to demand reſtitution of the ceſſions made to the Company by his Treaty with *Ragoba*, as the conditions thereof are not fulfilled, and this man poſitively denies all right of the *Poonah* Government to alienate the Guicawar territories.

Ragoba is now in *Surat*, and ſo greatly in arrears to his troops that he is not able to diſband them; and they are now in the neighbourhood of that city: it is not improbable but the miniſterial army may attack them. And to ſecure the Company's ſettlements from danger and moleſtation in the troubles likely to enſue, we have reſolved to quarter our troops in the garriſons of *Surat* and *Broach*, during the approaching monſoon, inſtead of bringing them to *Bombay* as we at firſt intended. This has obliged us to detain the Madras detachment.

We have not any further accounts of the proceedings of *Sudaba* ſince our laſt of the 10th inſtant. The party formed in his favour ſeems to be very conſiderable, and if this be the real *Sudaba*, which we have great reaſon to believe, he will prove a very dangerous adverſary to the Miniſters in conjunction with *Ragoba*; he was always eſteemed a perſon of uncommon capacity and abilities, and formerly conducted the adminiſtration of the Maratta Government with great reputation. The incloſed letter from the Reſident at *Fort Victoria* contains an account of his eſcape from the battle of *Paniput*, and of the circumſtances that happened to him afterwards, and affords ſome other proofs of his being the real *Sudaba*.

Your offers to *Ragoba* of the Company's alliance and

ſupport

ſupport being very unreſerved, lead us to expect applications from him, which we ſhall be embarraſſed how to anſwer; and the overtures made to *Hyder Ally*, *Nizam Ally*, *Moodagee Bouncello*, *Madajee Scindia*, and *Tookajee Holcar*, will naturally alarm the miniſterial party, and make them doubtful of our ſincerity. When your intention of ſupporting *Ragoba* is publiſhed, it will doubtleſs add great weight to his cauſe, and weaken the influence of the Miniſters, by detaching many Chiefs who were before wavering.

From the above repreſentation we flatter ourſelves it will appear to you, that the preſent Treaty is diſhonourable and inſecure; that it is concluded on terms which your ſubſtitute was not authorized to agree to; that the Miniſters have not inclination or ability to perform their part; that they have even actually infringed it by taking our veſſels; that they themſelves, by taxing us with infringing it, and by their menaces, deem it void; that their Government is far from being univerſally acknowledged by the Marattas, and does not promiſe much ſtability; that there is every appearance of further conſiderable commotions in the Maratta Empire, by which the Company's intereſt muſt ſuffer; and that there is no other method of effecting a general peace but by their interference; we therefore requeſt you will take theſe circumſtances, and our preſent precarious and diſreputable ſituation, into your moſt ſerious conſideration, ſubmitting to you, whether it will not be more eligible and more conſiſtent with the honour and advantage of the Company, not to ratify the Treaty formed by Colonel *Upton*, but to permit us to enter into engagements with *Ragoba* upon the plan laid down in your letter of the 7th ultimo?

We requeſt you will favour us with your immediate and expreſs directions for our conduct; and that theſe advices may be conveyed to you with all poſſible expedition, we diſpatch the *Drake* ſnow with them, and alſo to afford Mr. *Tayler* an opportunity of returning to his ſtation, under whoſe orders we have therefore placed the commander; but ſhould Mr. *Tayler* have left *Calcutta*, we requeſt your Honour, &c. will return the veſſel to us.

A continuation of our correſpondence with Colonel *Upton* is incloſed; and our troops, being now in the *Surat* diſtricts, we have received no further letters from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*.

We have the honour to remain, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 22d April 1776. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since cloſing our addreſs of the 22d inſtant, *Futty Sing*'s vackeel therein mentioned, has delivered us a liſt of the demands he was inſtructed to make by his maſter; to which we ſhall return for anſwer, that we have referred the matter to you, and ſhall wait your determination. We therefore incloſe a copy of this paper, and requeſt to be favoured with your directions upon the ſubject.

Ragoba has alſo acquainted us, that he has received promiſes of aſſiſtance from *Nizam Ally Khan*, upon condition that we will engage not to aſſiſt the miniſterial party, and therefore requeſted we would give him an aſſurance to that effect. A copy of this letter is incloſed; and likewiſe of another received from *Ragoba*, requeſting that the jewels depoſited by him may be reſtored; but we ſhall wait your Honour, &c. directions on the ſubject of both theſe letters.

The great loſs that ariſes to the Company on the remittances made from your Preſidency in ſpecie, when reduced into Bombay currency, occaſioned by the high batta charged on Sicca rupees, and the expence of freight, induces us to requeſt, that in your future conſignments you will ſend us the Patna Sonat rupees, which for the above reaſon turns out a better remittance; and to relieve the Company from the expence of freight, we ſhall, in the month of Auguſt next, ſend round one of our cruizers to receive what treaſure you may have to ſend us on account of next year's ſupply; and in the mean time the *Drake*, as we before mentioned, will ſerve for that purpoſe. Appendix, No. 129.

We have juſt received your letter of the 11th ultimo, and beg leave to obſerve to you, that we diſavowed in the moſt expreſs manner, *Ragoba*'s attack on *Ahmadavad*, and inſiſted upon our two eighteen-pounders being returned, which had been lent him by Colonel *Keating* long before the ceſſation of arms had taken place; this will be evinced by our letter to Colonel *Keating*, dated the 20th October, tranſmitted to you by the *Talbot*: and *Ragoba*, upon our remonſtrances, acquainted us, that he had ſent repeated orders to *Ameen Khan*, his officer before *Ahmadavad*, to diſcontinue the ſiege, and reſtore the guns; but that ſuch orders had not been obeyed, and that he had loſt all authority over that army, owing to their being ſo largely in arrears. We can aſſure you that we have avoided with the utmoſt caution giving the leaſt cauſe for complaint to the Miniſters on our part, and that we ſhall ever pay the utmoſt attention to your orders. The reaſons aſſigned for the deviation in the inſtance mentioned by you, will, we hope, prove ſatisfactory, the neceſſity being ſo obvious, and the good effects thereof acknowledged by Colonel *Upton*.

We have the honour to remain, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 24th April 1776. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Demands made by *Sadeſhew Punt*, vackeel of *Futty Sing* Guicawar. Delivered in, the 2d of April 1776.

Firſt. I beg that your Honour will favour me with your letters to the Nabob of *Surat*; and Mr. *Gambier* to deliver the office of Choutea, relating to *Secajee Row*, Guicawar *Shumſhier Bahadur*, and *Futty Sing Row* Guicawar, to the people who they may ſend to take charge of the ſame on the receipt of your letters, and that they may not be moleſted therein.

Secondly. My maſter has granted you Sunnuds for the Pergunnahs of *Chickly*, *Veriow*, *Batta*, and three villages in the Pergunnah of *Chureaſy*; but as nothing has been ſettled; I deſire you will order them to be returned, and favour me with your written orders to the perſons in whoſe charge the above Pergunnahs are, to return them to the ſaid *Secajee Row* and *Futty Sing* Guicawar.

Thirdly. The amount paid by means of Colonel *Keating*, was in goods, gold, gold rupees, piece goods, caſh, jewels, &c. conditionally, that *Ragoba* ſhould get all my Maſter's Tannahs property ſettled; which was not done; my Maſter's buſineſs is unfiniſhed, and the money loſt, I therefore requeſt that you will either order the aforeſaid money to be returned, or get *Ragoba Dadee* to refund what he has received; you being a mediator will I hope ſee this done.

Fourthly. *Nicorah Tupah* has always been ſeparated, and never under *Broach*; notwithſtanding which, your Gentlemen at that place hinder my Maſter's people there. Your Honour will therefore ſend an order to them for to continue it to the Guicawar in the ſame manner as before.

Fifthly. The cuſtoms of *Kem Cuttodrah*, on the other ſide of the *Tappee*, belongs to my Maſter; whereas, now the Gentlemen of *Surat* and *Broach* have turned out our Chokydeers, and have placed their own there. Your honour will therefore order them not to hinder our Chokydeers, and to take away theirs.

Sixthly. *Rodrajee Deſſoy* of *Chureaſy* has ſeveral accounts to ſettle with my Maſter: he owes a balance, and we want alſo to receive of him ſuch revenues as he has recovered; but he has taken your protection, and become an Aumildar of *Chickly*. This is not right: becauſe my Maſter's credit will not be preſerved: your Honour will therefore write to Mr. *Gambier*, not to employ him in your buſineſs; he is a Zemindar, and muſt go to the Guicawar to ſettle with him.

Appendix. No. 130.

Further demands made by *Sadeshew Punt*, on account of his Master *Futty Sing* Guicawar. Delivered in on the 18th April 1776.

First. The Guicawar's share of the Pergunnah of *Broach* for the last year, remains in the hands of the English, which I beg may be paid to my Master *Futty Sing*.

Secondly. The merchants of *Surat* pay customs in the Phorza of that place, in which my Master has a share; some of them, under your protection, clear their goods without paying what is due to my Master. Your Honour will therefore I hope settle this business.

True copies of the translates.

(Signed) *Edw*^{d} *Ravenscroft*, Sec^{y}.

Translation of a letter from *Ragonath Row*, Bajerow Pundit Pradhum, to the President; dated from *Surat* the 7th April 1776, and received the 22d following.

After compliments:

I am arrived at *Surat*, and am so much distressed for money to pay my people, &c. that I cannot express it to you. I deposited in the hands of Mr. *Gambier*, when at this place before, my jewels to the amount of six lacks and a half of rupees, which I beg you will order to be returned to me, and I will then pawn them to carry on my expences for a few days. As these my said jewels were deposited in trusty hands, I hope that no dispute will be made about returning them no me. *Luxaman Appajee* will give your Honour every information about them.

Translation of another letter from *Ragonath Row*, Bajerow Pundit Pradhum, to the Honourable the President; dated from *Surat* the 9th April 1776, and received the same day as the above.

After compliments:

Jeffarood Dowleet Bahadre, an officer belonging to *Nizam Ally Khan*, corresponds with me; and now informs me, that the said Nabob is willing to come and assist me; but is afraid that you will take the part of the Ministers at *Pronder:* if this is done, the business cannot go on properly; he therefore requests you will give him your assurance, not to assist them on any account, and then my business will be done according to my wishes. I have acquainted him, that I shall request you to give me this assurance; and I have wrote *Luxanam Appajee*, in what manner he is satisfied, which he will tell your Honour. I therefore beg of you to write to the said officer, to Mr. *Gambier*, and to me, upon this business, agreeable to what I have mentioned above; then will my business be done, I shall look upon you as having effected it, and by it your name will be exalted. I hope the above mentioned letters will come soon, and you may depend upon my keeping them a profound secret; which I have no doubt will also be done on your part. I have sent to *Luxanam Appajee* a copy of my letter to *Jaffarood Dowleet Bahadre*, that he may shew it to your Honour. The Nabob of this place refuses to pay the amount of the Chout due to me; he wants a general release from my Camawisdar of my Chout in full, and then he will pay him a fourth part thereof. Although I am in the greatest want of money, I cannot get my just demands paid me; and Mr. *Gambier* does not interfere therein. The Nabob being under your protection, I cannot force him; therefore, request you will write to Mr. *Gambier* and the Nabob about this business.

True copies of the translates.

(Signed) *Edw*^{d} *Ravenscroft*, Sec^{y}.

APPENDIX, No. 130.

Governor General—As it appears to me inconsistent with the character of the Supreme Government, 1st. To continue a series of verbal disputations, much more to descend to its own justification with its inferiors, I submit it to the consideration of the Board, whether it would not be most becoming, as well as regular, to decline a reply to the strictures upon the Treaty which are contained in the letter from the President and Council of *Bombay*, dated 22d April, and merely to inform them, that we shall transmit them, with such remarks as we shall judge necessary, to the Court of Directors. As in many points my opinion agrees with that of the President and Council of *Bombay* upon this subject, I conceive myself not competent to answer their arguments, but shall leave it to such of the Members of the Board as may conceive themselves more immediately affected by the objections urged against the Treaty.

2d. I offer it as my further opinion, that a Peace and Treaty having been concluded with the Maratta State, the President and Council of *Bombay* should be informed, that we are determined to abide by the former, and the conditions of the latter, and that they should be peremptorily enjoined to abstain from every act that may be construed an act of hostility against the Marattas, and that upon the grounds we forbid their giving any protection to *Ragoba*'s army, or to any part of it, or to allow it to encamp within any part of the Company's territories, as this could not fail to be imputed to them as a breach of the 12th Article of the Treaty.

3d. I offer it as my further opinion, that the assurance of our neutrality required by *Ragoba*, in the case of his accepting the offers of assistance made him by *Nizam Ally Cawn*, should be given to him, as it may prove the most likely means of inducing him to relinquish the protection of the British flag; and further, because I see no great cause of apprehension from his alliance with *Nizam Ally*; but the contrary, since it might eventually prove an impediment to his contracting the like engagements with *Hyder Ally*, who appears to have been even to the last the warmest friend of his party.

4th. I offer it as my further opinion, that the President and Council of *Bombay* should be authorized to restore to *Ragoba* the jewels deposited by him as a pledge in the hands of the Chief of *Surat*, as the engagement for which they were pledged has been set aside, and the charges of the war have in effect been transferred by the 6th Article of the Treaty from *Ragoba* to the acknowledged Peishwa.

5th. I offer it further as my opinion, that as this Government supposes the supreme authority of the Maratta State to be united in, and represented by, the Peishwa, and the possessions reclaimed by *Futty Sing* are all stipulated either to be restored to the Maratta State, or to be ceded to the Company, the President and Council of *Bombay* should be directed to reject the pretensions of *Futty Sing*, to the restoration of the Guicawar moiety of the town and Pergunnah of *Broach*, and for the Pergunnah of *Chickley*, *Verion*, *Batta*, and the three villages in the Pergunnah of *Chaneasy*, as inadmissible; the rest of his demands respecting matters independant of the Treaty and depending on circumstances, of which we are furnished with no materials to form any judgment, no instructions are required from us upon these points, the President and Council of *Bombay* will of course settle them in the most equitable manner; these being all points of a political nature, contained in the letters from the President and Council of *Bombay*, I beg leave to state them as distinct propositions for the substance of the letter to be written in reply to them.

Fort William, 20th May 1776.

Mr. *Francis*—The preservation of peace in *India* has at all times been inculcated by the Company's instructions to their servants, and ought to be the constant object of the policy of this Government; to which a controlling power over the political measures of the other Presidencies was given, as I conceive, for this express purpo e. A steady adherenee to the pacific system we have hitherto

Appendix. No. 130.

purſued, ſeems particularly incumbent on us at the preſent ſeaſon, when our advices from *Europe* give us too much reaſon to preſume, that the nation is already in a ſtate of anxiety and alarm, in which every man, who has a juſt ſenſe of duty to his King and Country, muſt take part.

I ſhould depart as widely from the dictates of this general duty, as from the real and immediate intereſts of the Company, if I conſented to any meaſures, which, by hazarding the ſecurity of the Britiſh Empire in *India*, might increaſe thoſe difficulties which now ſurround the Councils of the Nation. If the peace with the Maratta State had been leſs advantageous than it is, I think that every conſideration of juſtice, policy, and expediency, obliges us to carry it ſtrictly into execution. The Preſidency of *Bombay* have thought fit to call it *inglorious and diſhonourable*. The whole ſtate of facts, from the taking of *Salſette* to this time, will enable the Court of Directors to determine, whether this peremptory declaration is founded on ſolid reaſons, or on a partiality to former engagements, and an inclination to continue the war, at all events, in ſupport of *Ragoba*. We are not bound to juſtify our conduct to them; and on this point I agree with the Governor General, that it would ill become the dignity of this Government to deſcend to an altercation with them. But I think they ſhould be told, that, as we are reſolved to adhere ſtrictly to the terms of the peace, and as *we* alone are reſponſible for the conſequences of that reſolution, they on the other hand are anſwerable for nothing but their obedience, which we expect ſhall be inſtant and implicit; and that we are determined not to ſuffer the deciſion of peace or war in *India* to depend on any authority but that to which it is committed by the Legiſlature.

The preceeding opinion agrees with that of the Governor General, ſtated in the ſecond propoſition, ſo far as it goes; but I am further of opinion, that as *Ragoba* has not diſbanded his army, (which until the receipt of the preſent letter I took for granted) we are expreſsly precluded, by the 10th Article of the Treaty, from giving him any aſſiſtance; and that therefore he ſhould be peremptorily required to quit *Surat*, and the Company's territories.

I certainly would not take a voluntary part in any quarrel between *Nizam Ally* and the Maratta State; but I think that our giving the propoſed aſſurances to *Ragoba* might be liable to inconveniencies. Since we are determined to detach ourſelves from all connection with him, I would not take any ſtep that might furniſh the Maratta Government with the leaſt colour for ſuſpecting our good faith.

I think it would be beneath the dignity of this Government to retain *Ragoba*'s jewels on account of the expences of the war; but if any ſums of money have been advanced to him perſonally, thoſe jewels, or a ſufficient portion of them, ſhould be anſwerable for the debt.

I ſee no objection to the remainder of the Governor General's propoſition.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Mr. *Barwell*—I adopt entirely the Propoſitions ſubmitted by the Governor General to the approbation of the Board; they appear to me to have no other object than giving ſecurity to the Company, and inſuring a good underſtanding between the Maratta State and the Engliſh Government. I think the Article that propoſes the reſtoration of the jewels lodged by *Ragoba*, ſhould be qualified; for in caſe the Company have any demands upon *Ragoba* for money advanced him, the jewels are the only ſecurity they hold for the payment of ſuch loans.

Colonel *Monſon*—I agree with the Governor General in his Propoſition, that it would be inconſiſtent with the dignity of this Board, to enter into altercation with the Preſidency of *Bombay*, upon matters which depend entirely upon the authority of this Board; but I am for acquainting them that our ſentiments of the Peace will not be altered by their interpretation of the Treaty; that we ſhall ſtate our opinion of it to the Court of Directors, with our reaſons for the propriety and neceſſity of making it; that we require obedience from them in all matters; and that we ſhall deem them reſponſible to their employers, for an infringement of the late Treaty; and if they ſhould be guilty of a violation of it, that we ſhall be under the neceſſity of exerting the authority veſted in us; that we clearly perceive they are bent on war at all events, and will give a juſtifiable cauſe for the re-commencement of hoſtilities, by giving protection to *Ragoba*, when at the ſame time that they received him, he kept his army embodied within a few miles of *Surat*, on the frivolous pretence that they would not diſband for want of pay; the firſt inſtance I have ever heard given as a reaſon for an army remaining together; the want of it is commonly the cauſe of their diſbanding. Such excuſes will undoubtedly be regarded by the Miniſters as a violation of the Treaty, and they will in conſequence renew hoſtilities, in which meaſure they will be juſtified by the Treaty.

The ſecond propoſition is already anſwered in the foregoing.

To the third propoſition: the ſituation of *Ragoba* does not entitle him to make any ſuch requiſition of us. I think it would be impolitic to make a declaration on this ſubject, as I think it might be conſidered as an inference in his favour, which would be contrary to Treaty.

To the fourth: the jewels ſhould be reſtored to *Ragoba*, on his repaying the money which has been advanced to him on their ſecurity.

I agree to the fifth propoſition.

General *Clavering*—In anſwer to the repreſentation made to us by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, that the Treaty lately concluded by Colonel *Upton* is diſhonourable and inſecure; and in anſwer to the opinion, which they have offered to us, that there is no way of ſecuring a peace that ſhall be at the ſame time honourable and permanent, but by the Company interfering, and ſuffering their Preſidency to contract new engagements with *Ragoba*. I think we ſhould confine our anſwer to the following points:

That we will not enter into a conteſt with them, whether the terms of the Treaty be honourable or not; that we are anſwerable to the Court of Directors for the rectitude and expediency of our meaſures, and only require of them a ſtrict compliance with our orders; and further, that we ſhould obſerve to them that it would be impoſſible for this Government ever to eſtabliſh a peace that can be permanent, if the different Preſidencies under the controul of this Government ſhall think themſelves at liberty to cavil on the propriety of our meaſures, and refuſe directly or indirectly to execute our commands: that the peace with the Maratta Empire, which they violated by the taking of *Salſette*, and their ſubſequent engagements with *Ragoba*, was as permanent as any that we could poſſibly make, were even their wiſhes to be accompliſhed of eſtabliſhing *Ragoba* in the Peiſhwaſhip, without which they ſeem to think that no peace can be permanent; but that on this occaſion, we will not heſitate to declare to them, that the peremptory orders that we now give them, to avoid every thing which may impede the concluſion of the peace with the Maratta State, proceed as much from our adherence to the poſitive injunctions of the Court of Directors, as to the conſideration of the embarraſſments in which the Crown of *Great Britain* is now involved, which renders the Peace of *India* more expedient than ever: that it appears to us that the refuge which they have afforded *Ragoba* and his army at *Surat*, will from their own account be attended with the moſt dangerous conſequences, ſince they think it not improbable that the miniſterial army may attack that of *Ragoba*: that we hope that the regard to good faith, which

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which the miniſters have ſhewn during the ſuſpenſion of arms, will ſtill continue, notwithſtanding the provocation they have received; but that we cannot poſſibly anſwer that they will perſevere to maintain that reſerve, when they perceive that the Preſidency of *Bombay* do not intend to perform the conditions of the Treaty on its part.

The ſecond propoſition is anſwered above.

The third: I cannot agree to this propoſition, becauſe we are engaged by treaty not to interfere in the diſputes of the Maratta Government.

To the fourth: That the jewels ſhould be reſtored to *Ragoba*, upon his paying the money for which they were pledged.

To the fifth: the Treaty concluded at *Poonah* has directed what ſhall be reſtored and what retained; the Government of *Bombay* itſelf has acknowledged the powers of the Peiſhwa over the countries poſſeſſed by the Guicawars, and as I acknowledge no other Peiſhwa than him who is in poſſeſſion of the Government of the Maratta State, my opinion is, that the Government of *Bombay* ſhould literally comply with the terms of the Treaty.

Agreed, That the Reſolutions of the Board be collected from the foregoing opinions, in the following Letter to *Bombay*:

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letters of the 10th, 22d, and 24th ultimo, by the *Drake*.

We think it unneceſſary to enter into any diſcuſſion with you on the terms of the Peace lately concluded with the Maratta State; had they been leſs advantageous than we are aſſured they will appear to the Company, we deem ourſelves bound, by every conſideration of prudence, policy, and juſtice, to adhere ſtrictly to them. The preſervation of peace in *India* has been at all times the object of the Company's policy, and is particularly inculcated in their inſtructions to us. The difficulties with which, as you cannot but know, the Councils of the Nation are now ſurrounded, make it indiſpenſably our duty not to increaſe them at ſo alarming a criſis, by engaging in meaſures which may affect the tranquillity of the Company's poſſeſſions in this part of the world. We alone are anſwerable to the Company for the conſequences of the pacific ſyſtem which we are determined to purſue; you, on the other hand, are anſwerable for nothing but your compliance with our injunctions, which we expect ſhall be inſtant and implicit.

We do therefore hereby expreſsly direct, that you conform ſtrictly to the terms of the Treaty, as far as depends on your Preſidency, and that you carefully avoid any ſtep whatſoever which may give occaſion of diſtruſt or jealouſy to the Maratta Government.

We had no doubt that *Ragoba* would have diſbanded his army before he received protection in *Surat*, until the arrival of your letter of 22d April. The reaſons aſſigned for his not doing it, ſeem to us very unlikely to produce the effect you attribute to them. We have heard of Indian armies diſbanding for want of their pay, but never that an army unpaid had long kept together. At all events, your granting *Ragoba* the Company's protection under ſuch circumſtances, and ſuffering his army to remain encamped within the Company's territories, is directly contrary to the 10th Article of the Treaty, and has but too evident a tendency to diſturb the union which has been formed with the Marattas. Your own words are ſufficient to confirm us in this opinion. You ſay, that "it is not improbable that the miniſterial army "may attack them (*Ragoba*'s army) and that dangers "and moleſtations are likely to enſue to the Compa- "ny's ſettlements." To prevent conſequences ſo hazardous to the intereſts of the Company, we direct that you peremptorily do require him forthwith to quit *Surat*, and to retire out of the Company's poſſeſſions.

Although it is by no means our intention to take any part in the quarrels between the Peiſhwa and *Ragoba*, yet we deem it impolitic and unneceſſary to give *Ragoba* the aſſurances which he has demanded from the ſatisfaction of *Nizam Ally*. Such a declaration would be productive of no good conſequence to us, but might raiſe ſuſpicions in the Maratta Government of our good faith towards them.

With reſpect to the jewels pledged by *Ragoba*, which he has now applied for, we deſire, that after liquidating out of them any advances that may have been made to him from the Company's treaſury, you will order the reſidue to be returned to him.

As we ſuppoſe and admit by the Treaty, that the ſupreme authority of the Maratta State is united in and repreſented by the Peiſhwa, and as the poſſeſſions claimed by *Futty Sing* are all ſtipulated either to be reſtored to the Maratta State, or ceded to the Company, we deſire you will reject the pretenſions of *Futty Sing* to the reſtoration of a moiety in the revenues of the town and Pergunnah of *Broach*, and his demand for the Pergunnahs of *Chickly*, *Veriow*, *Batta*, and the three villages in *Chuneaſy*, as inadmiſſible. The reſt of his demands reſpect matters independant of the Treaty, and reſt on circumſtances of which we are not furniſhed with any materials to form a judgment of; we muſt therefore, leave it to you to ſettle them in the moſt equitable manner.

We have taken care to prevent the conſequences which you apprehend will reſult from the meaſures we had adopted when we wrote to you on the 7th March, by deſiring the Chief and Council of *Surat* to deſtroy the letter written to *Ragoba* in caſe a Treaty ſhould have been concluded, and by ſuſpending the diſpatch of the letters we intended to write to the other Chiefs until we found it unneceſſary to diſpatch them.

We are, &c.

Fort William, 20th May 1776.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Rich. Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 131.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 6th June, 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

RECEIVED the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Gentlemen,

The Peiſhwa has not yet been put in poſſeſſion of any of the Pergunnahs reſtored by the Treaty. It was neceſſary, it ſeems, that our troops ſhould remain in *Guzerat*, for the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions in that province; they are diſpoſed of in *Surat* and *Broach*; the commanding officer at *Surat*, and *Ragonaut Row* with him there, and his troops are encamped all around it.

The Miniſters could not conceive that this was ſeparating from *Ragonaut Row*, or not taking part in the Maratta diſputes; they had authoriſed *Hurria Pundit* (their commandant) to receive the Pergunnahs that were to be made over. He wrote almoſt daily to Colonel *Keating*, to know when he might advance to take poſſeſſion of theſe diſtricts, and was as conſtantly anſwered, that he muſt remain where he was, and on no account advance; if he did, it would be a breach of treaty, and he muſt anſwer the conſequences; or anſwer to ſome ſuch purpoſe.

Thus

Thus foiled, the Miniſters complained heavily; they inſiſted on writing to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, that they might know, at a certainty, if the Articles of the Treaty were to be permitted to be carried directly into execution. The anſwer of that Board was to determine the part the Miniſters meant to take, as well as my longer ſtay at *Poonah*.

The Miniſters had certainly very juſt cauſe of uneaſineſs; they loſt their collections in general—they were obliged to keep up their army—they loſt great part of their collections throughout their whole country, and their influence was every where viſibly on the decline: they began to ſuſpect that we had brought them into this lull, to take the advantage of it. It is very certain the Sirdars in general ſaid the Peace was not a firm one, and that the Miniſters had been impoſed upon.

Their being put in poſſeſſion of their Pergunnahs, which I hope will immediately take place, will reſtore that confidence and ſecurity they have for ſome time paſt been deprived of.

The accompanying letters and papers will inform you, Gentlemen, fully and progreſſively, how the delays have been occaſioned—To theſe permit me to refer you.

I incloſe the ſubſtance of a meſſage in confidence, to be made known to the Supreme Council only. It is a moſt vague, ſcandalous ſcheme, and even their ſincerity in it, greatly to be doubted. The vackeel inſiſted on its being forwarded to the Board. May I requeſt you will pleaſe, Gentlemen, to give me a few lines in anſwer, for the Nabob. The knowledge of this intended enterprize may be of material conſequence.

I am collecting and comparing *Futty Sing*'s Sunnuds, &c. and the letters from the different Sirdars, acknowledging their having received, and their obedience to the Treaty. Theſe I ſhall have ready to ſend off with the Treaty, which I propoſe doing by Lieutenant *Paterſon*, as it will not be ſafe truſting them to Hicarrahs in the rainy ſeaſon, and as Lieutenant *Paterſon*'s ſervices will be very little wanted at that time here.

Since writing the above, I have received the Treaty executed by you, Gentlemen, with a letter, dated 1ſt April. I have no doubt but I ſhall be able to get the Miniſters to aſſent to the alteration you require. A duplicate of this letter of 1ſt April being alſo ſent, makes me conclude ſome other letter was intended, and this duplicate by miſtake put up inſtead of it. I ſhall this day forward the packet for the Governor and Council of *Bombay*.

Poorunder, I am, &c.
6th May 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

Mirza Jan and *Mahomed Afzil Khan* delivered the following Meſſage from the Nabob *Fazil Beg Khaun Daiſſa*, on the part of the Nizam.

29th April 1776.

If the Engliſh are deſirous of placing *Ragoba* in *Poonah* in the courſe of the rains, I will join him with the Nizam's troops. In the mean time *Ragoba*, with the Engliſh army, ſhould proceed to *Bombay*, which is only about 40 coſs from *Poonah*, and prepare their ſtores, &c. On their informing me that they are ready, I will join them with all expedition, and when he is placed in *Poonah*, the Engliſh will have what they deſire, viz. *Salſette*, *Baſſein*, a country of twelve lacks, the Maratta ſhare of *Broach* and its Pergunnah, with a country of ſix lacks in the neigbourhood of it, and keeping poſſeſſion of the country granted by *Futty Sing*; alſo be paid a lack of rupees a month for the army, during the time it may be with *Ragonaut Row*, with the payment of the twelve lacks agreed to, by *Siccaram Bapoo*. *Ragonaut Row* agrees to grant to the Nizam a country of thirty lacks, the fort of *Aſſeer*, the city of *Burhampore*, and the forts of *Shoulapore* and *Mulhere*. The particulars of theſe places are known to *Kain ud Dowlah Bahadar*, Soubadar of *Surat*.

If the Colonel agrees to theſe terms, he will, under pretence of going to ſee the preſent treaty carried into execution, leave *Poonah*, and proceed to *Ragoba* at *Surat*, where every thing will be ſettled through *Kain ud Dowla*. The Colonel is to keep up the appearance of friendſhip with *Sacaram Bapoo*, till the rains come on. *Moribba Pumavier* is joined in the ſcheme of fixing *Ragoba* in *Poonah*—no doubt, he has before mentioned theſe matters. Appendix. No. 131.

The Engliſh muſt protect *Ragonaut Row*, till all theſe circumſtances are ripe for execution.

The Nabob has twelve thouſand horſe and twelve thouſand infantry, with thirty guns, ready to join the Engliſh and *Ragoba* when required, after which *Hurry Pundit* and *Saccaram Bapoo*, &c. will not be able to face us; and, with the Bleſſing of God, we will fix *Ragonaut Row* in *Poonah* without bloodſhed.

After *Ragoba* is ſettled in *Poonah*, the Nabob does promiſe to make him grant to the Engliſh Company Sunnuds for the Cattack Country, and relinquiſh all claims to the Chout.

The Nabob has poſſeſſion of the fort of *Aumeer*, about 20 coſs from *Naugpore*, and if the *Bhonſula* ſhould make any oppoſition, he engages to ſubdue him, with very little trouble to the Engliſh, if they will aſſiſt him with the following troops, viz. Three hundred Europeans, two thouſand Sepoys, and ſix guns from *Maſulipatam*. He will pay theſe troops for the firſt year 30,000 rupees per month; for the ſecond year, rupees 40,000 per month; for the third year 50,000, and for the ſixth year 60,000 rupees per month, until the Cattack country is in ſubjection.

As a ſecurity to the Company for the due performance of all theſe conditions, the Nabob *Dhauſſa* will give his Son as a hoſtage to be in the hands of the Engliſh, lodged in the houſe of *Hauſſin Ally* at *Maſulipatam*, till the whole is fulfilled; and the Company to be ſecurity that *Ragoba will perform his* engagements with the Nizam.

But on the other hand, if the Engliſh are determined to keep firm to the preſent Treaty, and decline joining *Ragonaut Row*, the following conditions are propoſed:

That for theſe two months, till the rains are fairly ſet in, the time is to be taken up in ſettling about *Ragonaut Row* with the *Saccaram Bapoo*, &c.; he *(Ragoba)* is to continue in *Surat* till *Govinrow* (who is alſo well affected to his cauſe) comes near that place, when the Engliſh are to remove him from themſelves, and he will immediately croſs the *Tapty* and *Nurbudda* with *Govinrow*. *Hurry Pundit* will not be able to purſue him acroſs theſe rivers till the rains are over.

After the rains are ſet in; the Engliſh ſhould diſcharge two battalions of Sepoys, which will be entertained by *Ragoba*.

Hulkar and *Sindea* are ſincerely diſaffected to *Sicaram Bapoo* and *Bellajee Pundit*, and have propoſed to canton near *Auringabad* during the rains, and that if I would join *Ragoba* they would.

It is required, that as ſoon as the Nizam my maſter takes *Ragoba* by the hand; the Engliſh will not, in any degree whatever, aſſiſt *Siccaram Bapoo* or *Bellajee Pundit*, or afford them protection, even were they to offer them fifty lacks in money, and a country of fifty lacks of rupees more.

This to be given under the ſignatures and ſeals of the Councils of *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*. When this treaty is cloſed, I will in the end of the rains join *Ragoba* with the Nizam's army, and with the Bleſſing of God fix him in *Poonah*.

But if the Colonel ſhould not agree to ſpin out the time as above, till the rains ſet in, or to *Ragonaut Row*'s remaining in *Surat* until he could join *Govinrow*, or to diſcharging the two battalions of Sepoys, *Ragonaut Row* ſhould be embarked in a ſhip, and ſent to *Maſulipatam*, there to remain until I ſend for him, which I will do as ſoon as the above treaty, ſigned by the *Surat* Councils,

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Councils, arrives to my ſatisfaction, and place him in *Poonah* by the aſſiſtance of the Nizam's army.

If *Sacaram Pundit* and *Bellajee Pundit* ſhould ſay to the Colonel, It is agreed upon between you and us, that if *Ragoba* will not diſband his army, and reſide on the banks of the *Gunga*, the Engliſh are to ſeparate from him, Why don't you act accordingly? The Colonel muſt reply, That *Ragonaut Row* came under our protection, which we cannot refuſe him: but if he raiſes any commotions you muſt chaſtiſe him. The Engliſh will not aſſiſt him.

I ſhould now be able to place *Ragonaut Row* in *Poonah*, and the Miniſters could not prevent it; but the intention is, to ſecure the engagements of the Engliſh againſt aſſiſting or protecting them, as no other power will venture to do either.

After *Ragonaut Row* is ſettled in *Poonah*, I will be anſwerable for his duly fulfilling all the Articles of of the treaty entered into by *Sicaram Bapoo* and *Ballajee Pundit* alſo granting Sunnuds for the Cattack country, and relinquiſhing the Chout.

The Cattack country will be put in poſſeſſion of the Company, on their ſending troops, &c. as already mentioned. My ſon will be given as a hoſtage for the due performance of the conditions of the ſecond propoſal.

In a former treaty, it is agreed between the Engliſh and the Nizam, that the friends and enemies of one, ſhall be the ſame to the other. It is requeſted, that the Engliſh will be attentive to their former engagements, and now confirm them, and not join or aſſiſt any power on which he makes war.

If the Nizam ſhould carry *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, the Engliſh Company are not to give any aſſiſtance to *Sicaram Pundit* and *Bellajee*, or any of *Row Pundit Pardhan*'s officers, nor take any part in the war; were they to offer them fifty lacks of rupees, and a country of fifty lacks of rupees more, no aſſiſtance or protection muſt be given them.

It is requeſted Colonel *Upton* will write to the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, and get a treaty under their ſignatures and ſeals to that purpoſe.

(Signed) *A^n Macpherſon*,
Perſ^n Interpreter.

The ſubſtance of Colonel *Upton*'s reply to the Meſſage ſent by the Nabob *Fazil Beg Cawn Dhauſſa*, 29th April 1776.

If the Nabob had not joined the miniſterial army, and had ſent a vackeel to him on his arrival at *Burhampore*, or immediately after his arrival at *Porrunder*, it might have been productive of much better terms for the Company from the Miniſters, and the Nizam's treaty with them might have been ſecured to him: but the Nabob having joined *Hurry Pundit* with 24,000 men, and 30 guns, after his arrival, made the Miniſters talk high and indifferent to peace or war, conſequently the Colonel found much difficulty in ſettling a peace with them. Their coming now, after the Peace is eſtabliſhed with the Miniſters, to propoſe an alliance ſuch as is now offered, is ſo diſhonourable to the Engliſh, that he muſt decline agreeing with them in any one part of the terms they propoſe. That he would, agreeable to the Nabob's deſire, keep it a ſecret, and write to the Supreme Council; but he would not have the Nabob flatter himſelf with their doing any one thing to the prejudice of the Treaty they had lately entered into; and that he could aſſure him, they would not commit any action that would reflect diſhonour on themſelves or their Country.

(Signed) *A^n Macpherſon*,
Perſ^n Interp^r.

APPENDIX, No. 132.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 20th June, 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant-General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

READ again, the letter and incloſures from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, recorded in Conſultation the 6th inſtant,

Reſolved, that the following letter be written to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:—

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 6th ultimo.

Although we approve of the anſwer which you gave to the propoſal delivered to you on the part of *Fazil Beg Cawn*, yet we wiſh that you had avoided giving ſo much countenance to it as you did, in promiſing to tranſmit it to us; you would have done well if you had peremptorily rejected it. For the future we direct that you hold no kind of communication or correſpondence, either with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, or any agent in his behalf, or, indeed, with any other foreign Prince or Power, during your continuance at *Poonah*, as ſuch an intercourſe would not fail to excite the jealouſy of the Maratta Government. The Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, in a letter dated 24th April, adviſed us of a requiſition made to them by *Ragoba*, which appears to have an intimate relation with the propoſals delivered to you by the emiſſaries of *Fazel Beg*, and was probably an effect of the ſame concealed plan. The words of their letter are—"*Ragoba* has alſo acquainted us, that he has received promiſes of aſſiſtance from *Nizam Ally Cawn*, upon condition that we will engage not to aſſiſt the miniſterial party, and therefore requeſted we would give him an aſſurance to that effect." In reply to this paragraph, we told them, that "although it was by no means our intention to take any part in the quarrel between the Peiſhwa and *Ragoba*, yet we deemed it impolitic and unneceſſary to give *Ragoba* the aſſurances which he had demanded for the ſatisfaction of *Nizam Ally*: ſuch a declaration would be productive of no good conſequence to us, but might raiſe ſuſpicions in the Maratta Government of our good faith towards them."

We have given you the above extract from our letter to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay* in this place, as it may ſerve you for a general rule, to be applied to every ſimilar caſe that may occur during the time of your Negociations. You will receive with this a copy of our letter 20th May, wherein this ſubject is contained.

As *Ragoba* refuſed to be a party in the Treaty, and has declined to accept the conditions ſtipulated for him in it, we have no right to complain of the deſign declared by the Miniſters to diſperſe his army; we hope, however, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* will have taken precautions to obviate an event ſo diſcreditable to their Government as the execution of this meaſure, whilſt *Ragoba*'s troops remain within the Company's poſſeſſions, by formally requiring their removal from thence before any hoſtilities had taken place between the contending parties.

You do not inform us whether the letter you received from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, of which you complained to the Government of *Bombay*, had been written in reply to one from you, or what was the cauſe of it—we ſhould be glad to be informed of this circumſtance.

We are pleaſed to obſerve, in your letter to *Bombay*, dated the 4th May, that you had obtained an order for the reſtitution of the veſſels which had been taken upon the Maratta coaſt, and that the Miniſters diſavowed having given any directions which could have authoriſed the ſeizure of them.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 133.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 6th June 1776.

Extract of a letter from the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members Select Committee at *Bombay*, to Colonel *Upton*; dated 16th April 1776.

WE acted agreeable to the dictates of honour and humanity in affording the Company's protection to *Ragoba*, when he ſolicited it, and apprehended the ſafety of his perſon would be endangered by accepting terms ſtipulated for him without his authority or conſent; and we think the ſolicitude of the Miniſters to get him into their power evince the juſtice of his apprehenſions. His reſiding in one of the Company's ſettlements will be a much better ſecurity againſt his forming intrigues to the prejudice of the Miniſters, than we conceive their proteſtations would prove for the ſafety of his perſon was he to put himſelf in their hands. The letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 20th October, is a ſufficient warrant, and we cannot allow that our merely giving him a ſanctuary is either an infringement of the Treaty, a new engagement with *Ragoba*, or taking any part in the Maratta diſputes.

Ragoba is ſo largely in arrears to his army that he will find the utmoſt difficulty in prevailing upon them to diſband. By our laſt advices the Company's forces were arrived at *Domus*, near *Surat* Bar, for the purpoſe of embarking for the Preſidency, but on account of the numerous bodies of forces in the Neighbourhood of *Surat* and *Broach* we have ſince thought it expedient to give orders for quartering them in thoſe garriſons during the approaching monſoons, to preſerve the Company's territories from moleſtations.

The communication with the Maratta dominions is ſtill kept ſhut, and all intercourſe rigorouſly prohibited, though the Company's forces have been ſome time within their own diſtricts. We do not think this ſhews any diſpoſition in the Miniſters to be upon terms of friendſhip with us, &c.

We have within theſe few days received a letter from the Governor General and Council, wrote upon a ſuppoſition that your negociation had been broken off and hoſtilities renewed. We at the ſame time received copy of a letter they had addreſſed to *Ragoba*, offering the alliance of the Company, and the aſſiſtance of their arms to fix him in the ſeat of his Government at *Poonah*. tranſcripts of both which we think it neceſſary to incloſe for your information.

By theſe letters the Govenor General and Council ſhewed the ſtrongeſt determination to proſecute the War with the utmoſt vigour, in conjunction with *Ragoba*, rather than make a Peace upon terms not honourable and advantageous; and it appears to be evidently their intention that the conditions for *Ragoba* ſhould have been ſuch as he would himſelf approve, and which would have inſured his future ſafety and welfare. We ſhall expect applications from *Ragoba* in conſequence of this letter.

A true extract.

(Signed) *A. M'Pherſon.*

Extract of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee of *Bombay*; dated 22d April 1776.

The Miniſters abſolutely refuſe opening the commution into their country, till the army of *Ragonaut Row* ſhall be diſbanded or ſeparated entirely from the Engliſh.

The letter you have received from the Governor General and Council was in conſequence of my letter to them on the 7th of February. I had previouſly adviſed of the terms I ſhould inſiſt on ſtipulating for the Company. If the Miniſters refuſed theſe, the negociation was entirely to have been broken off. In conſequence of this refuſal the letter of the 7th February was written with my fulleſt remarks. I had no doubts if the Peace had not taken place, that the moſt vigorous meaſures would have been purſued to have ſecured an honourable Peace; there appeared no alternative, it muſt have been made ſword in hand. Appendix. No. 133.

You are already acquainted, Gentlemen, with my ſentiments regarding *Ragoba*'s reſiding in any of our ſettlements. The Miniſters now inform me, that his army is in the neighbourhood of *Surat*. If this is true, it ſtands thus: Our army is in the Guzerat province (to this ſeparately there can be no objection;) the commanding officer, (and I preſume the greateſt part of the army) is in *Surat*; *Ragonaut Row* alſo with him there, and his army under cover of this garriſon.

I hope, and am almoſt perſuaded, there can be no truth in this information. It is expreſsly contrary to the true meaning of the 8th and 10th Articles of the Treaty. As I have repeatedly given my opinion on this ſubject, I ſhall not in future preſume again to oppoſe it to yours; but you will pleaſe to obſerve, that I muſt bear no part of the blame ſhould this mode of carrying theſe two Articles of the Treaty into execution, be attended with any deſtructive conſequences.

The accompanying paper, containing a converſation that paſſed laſt night with a perſon deputed by the Miniſters, will acquaint you better than I can otherwiſe do, with the ſenſe they entertain regarding the carrying into execution the Articles of the Treaty.

A true extract.

(Signed) *A. M'Pherſon.*

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated 26th April 1776.

The Miniſters have requeſted of me to forward to you the copies of two letters received by *Hurria Pundit* from Colonel *Keating*.

The Miniſters have now got beyond complaining; they threaten; and I conclude will not wait many days longer inactive, if the Articles of the Peace are not permitted to be carried into execution. They are not only loſing their collections in the Guzerat province, but their influence throughout their whole country. Were they to attempt taking poſſeſſion of the reſtored Pergunnahs, they ſuppoſe it would occaſion ſome diſturbances between their troops and *Ragonaut Row*'s, who are in the very neighbourhood of theſe Pergunnahs. This they ſay would be of little conſequence; but as the Engliſh troops are alſo near, and *Ragonaut Row* with them, of more fatal conſequences. They wait your reply to my letter of the 22d, and will then come to ſome determination.

The following is an extract of a letter I received yeſterday from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*:

"It ever affords me the utmoſt ſatisfaction to engage in any buſineſs that redounds to my country's honour, and the intereſt of my honourable employers; but for reaſons that muſt be obvious to you, I muſt decline adviſing *Ragonaut Bajerow* to accede to the terms ſtipulated for him.

"Prior to our taking any part in the Maratta diſputes, *Ragonaut Bajerow* oft-times rejected terms preferable to thoſe the Miniſters now offer him. Before we gained any advantage over the confederate army, one of the agents made a propoſal for his being Regent, provided the Engliſh would guarantee their employments and property. This too he poſitively refuſed.

"During the life of *Madow Row* Peiſhwa, *Ragonaut Bajerow* declined a ſettlement of ſixteen lacks of rupees per annum, beſides the poſſeſſion of thirty-two forts, becauſe there was tacked to it a clauſe ſimilar to that of reſiding on the banks of the *Gunga*, which he eſteems as nothing leſs than a priſoner at the devotion of his enemies.

"It is at *Ragonaut Bajerow*'s requeſt I now write you;

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and which I the more readily do, ſince *Huria Punt Furkea*, in one of his late letters to me, wiſhes to be informed which part of the Treaty *Ragonaut Bajerow* objects to, and what he wants. He objects to every part and point of the Treaty, and has appealed to the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, the Honourable Company, and to his Majeſty, for redreſs; but as a long time muſt conſequently elapſe before a deciſion can be known, during which a proviſion for his maintenance is neceſſary, and being deſirous of preſerving the friendſhip of the Engliſh Nation, and avoiding a war ſo deſtructive to the Maratta Empire, and to commerce in all its branches, he is therefore come to this final reſolution, To accept either of the two following conditions, until an ultimate ſettlement takes place: the eſtabliſhment offered him by *Mhadow Row* Peiſhwa, with the difference of reſiding under the Engliſh protection; or the *Poonah* Shaw of the Guzerat province in its ruined ſtate.

"If theſe conditions are agreed to, *Ragonaut Bajerow* is determined to remain in perfect tranquillity, until all matters are regularly ſettled, but if they are refuſed, to ſupport his juſt rights in the beſt manner he is able."

The army being withdrawn, I did not conceive Colonel *Keating* had any further part to take in the buſineſs of my deputation, as I never was informed by you, Gentlemen, that he was appointed to aſſiſt in carrying any part of the Treaty into execution. As this, however unknown to me, muſt have been the caſe, I am greatly ſurprized to find the executing or declining what you may have directed, has been ſo optional to the Colonel as the firſt paragraph of the extract plainly ſhews, the whole of which I cannot well comprehend.

The whole of this extract requires your conſideration, as an immediate war between the contending Maratta parties ſeems inevitable, without the ſpeedy exertion of your Preſidency. I am ſuſpected by the Miniſters of being privy to the deſigns of *Ragonaut Row*; nay, they now ſuſpect the Supreme Council muſt have had views further than to treat with them by all this delay, &c. and they have not the leaſt doubt of *Ragonaut Row*'s receiving from *Bombay* every aſſiſtance.

My arguments, my aſſertions to the contrary, have loſt all their force: The conſtant anſwer is, Why the delay in carrying the Articles into execution? why do our troops all remain in Guzerat, *Ragonaut Row* received into *Surat*, and his troops encamped around it?

As I think myſelf no longer ſafe at *Poonah*, I have to requeſt the favour of your calling a Board and coming to ſome immediate determination reſpecting the making over the country, reſtored by the Treaty to the Peiſhwa in the Guzerat province. I ſhall impatiently wait the reſolutions of your meeting, which will determine my longer continuance or immediate departure from the place.

I have, &c.

Poorunder, (Signed) *J. Upton.*
26th April 1776.

Extract of a letter from the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*, to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated 27th April 1776.

Our troops have been long ago ſeparated from *Ragoba*'s army, and have no connection with it; therefore, according to the promiſe of the Miniſters, we have a right to expect the communication being immediately opened.

We aſſure you, that it is entirely contrary to our inclination or deſire, that *Ragoba*'s army continues ſo near to *Surat*; and we are very anxious to remove them, if we knew how to effect it. Directions will be ſent to the Chief and Council at *Surat*, to repreſent to him in the ſtrongeſt manner the impropriety of his troops remaining in their preſent ſituation, and to inſiſt upon their being removed to a proper diſtance; but from his preſent circumſtances we are apprehenſive little regard will be paid to his orders.

We remain in our opinion, that our giving *Ragoba* and his domeſtics an aſylum, is not contrary to any Article of the Treaty; His army continuing ſo near one of our ſettlements is, as we before ſaid, entirely againſt our inclination, and we will do all in our power to remove them. Any conferences he may have with Colonel *Keating*, can be of no conſequence, as the latter is entirely under the orders of the Chief and Council at *Surat*, and is now ſhortly expected at *Bombay*.

We hope you will not give the ſmalleſt degree of credit to the information of the Miniſters, that *Ragoba* has been ſupplied with guns and military ſtores; as we never gave the leaſt authority to Colonel *Keating* or any other perſon for that purpoſe.

They complain, without reaſon, of the Pergunnahs not being reſtored according to the Treaty; it is entirely their own fault that they have not received them long ago, as we ſent orders on the 16th of laſt month, to the Councils at *Surat* and *Broach* to evacuate them whenever perſons properly authorized on the part of the Miniſters came to receive them. For your ſatisfaction, we incloſe copies of theſe orders, which we know have been received at both ſettlements; and by the beſt advices, dated the 11th inſtant, from *Broach*, and the 20th from *Surat*, no agents had then arrived from the Miniſters for the above purpoſe. Colonel *Keating* had nothing to do with the Perguānahs.

A true copy.
(Signed) *A^r Macpherſon.*

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee at *Bombay*, dated 4th May 1776.

Gentlemen,

I received your letter of the 27th ultimo, two days ago, and acquainted the Miniſters with ſuch parts of it as concerned them; viz. that their not having poſſeſſion of the Pergunnahs reſtored by the Treaty, was owing to their agents, who had not preſented themſelves to receive them: that orders had long ſince been ſent to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, to give theſe Pergunnahs up, whenever they were demanded by perſons properly authorized by the Miniſters to receive them: that it was entirely contrary to your inclination, and without your concurrence, that *Ragoba*'s army continued ſo near to *Surat*.

The incloſed copy of a letter from the Peiſhwa will inform you with their determination reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*'s troops, which is to wait fourteen days, and then order *Hurria Pundit Furkia* to diſperſe them. They wait fourteen days, that yet ſufficiently longer time may be had to diſband them, and that they may avoid incurring the puniſhment they will be liable to, if found in arms after that date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) *J. Upton.*

Extract of a letter from the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*, to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated 1ſt May 1776.

However, to leave the Miniſters without the ſhadow of a plea for complaint, we now incloſe freſh orders for the reſtitution of the Pergunnahs in *Guzerat*, which you will pleaſe to deliver to them; and we have ſent directions to the Chief of *Surat*, to make the ſtrongeſt remonſtrances to *Ragoba*, on the impropriety of his troops remaining in their preſent ſituation, and to inſiſt upon their being removed.

The extract you have inſerted from Colonel *Keating*'s letter appears to be an anſwer from one to you, which we have never ſeen. He never had any inſtructions from us to authorize him to write to you in the manner he has done, or to take any part in the buſineſs of your deputation, as you ſeem to take for granted.

It appears by the incloſed extract of a letter from *Ragoba*, that he has got ſome intimation of the late intentions

tions of the Governor General and Council in his favour, and we conclude the Miniſters muſt have received the ſame intelligence; which, with the motives aſſigned in our laſt letter, will eaſily account for their late conduct.

A true extract.

(Signed) *A^n. Macpherſon.*

Extract of a letter from *Ragonaut Row Badjerow Pundit Pradhan* to the Honourable the Preſident; dated 23d April, and received the 29th following.

It is reported, that you have undertaken my buſineſs again: I therefore think that the rebels will make an attempt to fall upon me; all which you will take into your conſideration, and do what you think proper.

My vackeel at *Calcutta* has forwarded expreſs from thence a packet directed to you, which he informs me is about my buſineſs. I now ſend the ſame to you, and upon receipt you will know the contents. My chief dependence is on you.

A true extract.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſtroft*, Sec^y.

Part of a converſation that paſſed laſt night between Colonel *Upton* and* *Mhaderow Sadaſhew* (on the part of the Miniſters) 22d April 1776.

Mhaderow complained heavily, that the Articles of the Treaty were not carried into execution on the part of the Engliſh; on the contrary, that *Ragonaut Row* was in *Surat*, and his army round the walls; that Colonel *Keating* was daily in conference with *Ragoba*, who was furniſhed with powder and all other military ſtores, even guns; that the Engliſh had not reſtored the Pergunnahs, &c. ceded by *Ragoba*, agreeable to the Treaty; and that all the Guzerat country was deſtroying and burning: that the Miniſters were deſirous of knowing what the Colonel ſaid to all theſe circumſtances, and what was to be done.

The Colonel replied, Some of theſe were circumſtances he was perfectly acquainted with, and that he was very much concerned to ſee them: but what they mentioned relative to military ſtores, &c. muſt be impoſſible; but that he had done every thing which depended upon himſelf, viz. concluding a Treaty of Peace with the Marattas on the part of the Engliſh, and making the repreſentations of the Miniſters as well as his own, of the full ſenſe and meaning of that Treaty, to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*; but that it was the buſineſs of the two Governments to carry the Articles into execution, which he made no doubt would be the caſe on the part of the Engliſh if they would have patience; and that he could aſſure them the peace was very firmly eſtabliſhed; but that he could not be anſwerable for the conduct of other people, which the Miniſters ſeemed to think, and had blamed him accordingly. —Yeſterday he (Colonel *Upton*) ſent to inform them that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* had adviſed him, that they had given *Ragonaut Row* protection in *Surat*; at the ſame time they wrote to him to aſſure the Miniſters that he could not cauſe any commotions in the Marratta State whilſt he remained under the Company's protection, and that they would only admit his family and domeſtics; that his army being round *Surat* was by no means by choice, but they were ſo much in arrears they would not diſband; further, that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* aſſured him that they would carry the Articles of the Treaty into execution without delay. If the Miniſters were not ſatisfied with this, they ſhould write the Colonel a letter that ſuch and ſuch Articles of the Treaty were nor carried into execution, and what they meant to do.

Mhaderow declared they would write no more letters on the ſubject, for they found no advantage from thoſe they had wrote; but that the Miniſters were deſirous of knowing what the Engliſh were determined to do, for their army had been idle at a lack of rupees a day for theſe ten months paſt, owing to the letters from *Calcutta* and the Colonel's arrival; and that now there was a heavy loſs to Government in the revenues of *Guzerat* not being collected; and that the Engliſh muſt not be ſurprized if they made the twelve lacks pay for part.

The Colonel ſaid, he could not help obſerving the Miniſters themſelves were in a great meaſure inſtrumental in many of the delays they urged againſt the Engliſh, by being conſtantly in the fort on the hill; I never giving him an opportunity of conſulting with them on any buſineſs. That it was now about a month ſince he had ſeen either of them, whereas it was his opinion they ſhould ſee one another very frequently till the buſineſs was over, even once a day if it appeared at all neceſſary; and that he would according to their repreſentations write to *Bombay* as often as three times a day if required.

Mhaderow ſaid that they were nowiſe dependant on the Engliſh; that he did not ſee the neceſſity of their meeting ſo often, as they neither expected or aſked any thing from them but to fulfil their engagements; that they were ill-treated by the Engliſh, for the Council of *Bombay* appeared to be preparing to do every thing in their power to take an opportunity of ſeizing upon more of the Maratta dominions: whether the Governor General and Council and the Colonel were concerned they could not pretend to ſay; but if the Supreme Council had not ſufficient authority over the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, ſo as to have their orders through the Colonel obeyed, they ſhould not have interfered, but have left them and the Government of *Bombay* to ſettle their own differences; but on the other hand, if the Colonel had power veſted in him, he ſhould either go to *Bombay* or depute a proper perſon to know the occaſion of delay to carrying the Articles into execution, and afterwards proceed to *Surat*, &c. to ſee them carried into execution; without which he was ſure nothing could be done, for *Hurry Punt Furkia* had wrote twenty letters to Colonel *Keating* about ſeparating from *Ragoba* with the Engliſh army, and to beg to be informed when he marched, that people might be ſent to take poſſeſſion of the country to be reſtored, and that he might be left to ſettle with *Ragoba* if he did not retire to *Cooper Gang* as agreed upon. That the only anſwers he could get to his letters were, deſiring him to continue with his army where he then was; that *Ragoba* was diſcharging his troops, and if he *(Hurry Punt)* marched with his army to diſturb them, it would be breaking the peace with the Engliſh. That theſe were ſuch evaſive anſwers as ſhewed little diſpoſition to amicable terms.

The Colonel declared to him, that he had acted all along upon the ſtricteſt honour with them in every reſpect; and that he again aſſured him that the Peace was firmly eſtabliſhed on the part of the Engliſh, which they would find if they would wait a little, the Articles being carried into execution; that however they might ſuppoſe themſelves ill-treated, he thought it nevertheleſs their buſineſs as well as that of the Engliſh to do every thing in their power to eſtabliſh the Peace, and in the mean time to forget as much as they could their grievances.

The Colonel aſked, When they had received a letter from *Hurry Pundit?* and begged to ſee the laſt. *Mhaderow*

Appendix. No. 133.

* On the firſt arrival of Colonel *Upton* at *Poorunder*, *Mhaderow Sedaſhew* was appointed by the Miniſters to reſide near him, and to tranſact any buſineſs between the Miniſters and the Colonel; and that whatever he ſaid or did was to be looked upon as ſaid or done by the Miniſters, in the fulleſt ſenſe.

Appendix. No. 134.

row replied, They received them daily, and would ſend one of the laſt; but no good effects were expected from letters; they were afraid they would at laſt be reduced to the neceſſity of following the example of *Hyder Ally*, who ſecured his Peace with the Engliſh in a very honourable manner to himſelf.

The Colonel obſerved to him, that ſuch converſation was rather improper. He replied, It might be ſo; but he muſt obſerve to him, that it was the intention of the Miniſters, ſhould the war again take place, to carry fire and ſword throughout the whole of the country poſſeſſed by the Company in *India*, and entirely lay it waſte, be the conſequence ever ſo fatal to themſelves.

(Signed) *Aⁿ Macpherſon*,
Persⁿ Interpreter.

APPENDIX, No. 134.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 3d July 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Philip Francis, Eſquire.
Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.

RECEIVED the following letter from Colonel *Upton*:

To the Honourable the Governor General and Council, *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the honour to write to you laſt on the 6th inſtant.

The Miniſters have conſented to omit the 13th and 17th Articles, and the concluding words of the 7th Article, and have ſigned the Treaty, which will be ſent in a few days by Lieutenant *Paterſon*, as I adviſed in my letter of the 6th.

They requeſted on their part that a few alterations might be made. I informed them, that the Treaty being executed by the Supreme Council, it was impoſſible for me to make or admit of any alterations. They therefore write to you, Gentlemen, requeſting this; but their principal motive is to continue the correſpondence about negociating for an exchange for *Salſette*: this they have much at heart, and I am perſuaded will offer largely to effect. They mean to ſend a vackeel to *Calcutta*, a man of more than uſual conſequence, with full power reſpecting this exchange: they intend he ſhall reſide always at *Calcutta*, as they expreſs a very great deſire of having a firm and laſting friendſhip with the Engliſh. May I be permitted to expreſs my wiſh, that in reply to their letter you will acquaint them their vackeel ſhall be received, and his propoſals heard; for though an exchange ſhould not take place, yet it will have the good effect of knowing how far it might anſwer to the Company, and will keep the door open for further conferences if neceſſary; it will alſo ſoften a number of rather diſagreeable circumſtances that have happened, and reſtore a confidence with *Bombay*, which is much required. I have to beg, Gentlemen, you will excuſe my having on this occaſion expreſſed my wiſhes; they are ſubmitted altogether from obſerving the neceſſity of harmony being reſtored between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and the Marattas.

The alterations the Miniſters wanted ſhould take place in the Treaty (which, as I could not comply with, they inſiſted I ſhould write to aſk might be granted) were in the third Article, the words "ſubdued by the Engliſh in this war," as they declare they were not at war with the Engliſh when theſe iſlands were taken. They want any other words rather than taken in war, or in this war. this had been diſcuſſed a hundred times before, and I had convinced them, that expreſſing it in other terms could not be admitted, more particularly as we did not know the Maratta names of the ſmall iſlands in our poſſeſſion in the Bay of *Bombay*, nor did they know nor would conſent to our inſerting the Engliſh names; that theſe iſlands had certainly been taken in war, and in this war for there was no ſeparating or making two wars of it; and further, to what purpoſe to them could tend the alteration, as they were now, as much as they then could be, at liberty to treat about theſe iſlands.

In the ſixth Article they ſay, the words "in part of "the expences of the Engliſh army" imply that ſome further ſum on that account remains due; this had alſo before been repeatedly matter of debate. I have quite ſatisfied them by ſigning a paper, that the true meaning of the ſixth Article is, that the Peiſhwa will have complied with his obligation reſpecting it when the 12 lacks are paid: in this Article therefore, now, no alteration is required; though a reply to their requeſt reſpecting the third Article may be neceſſary.

The Miniſters are adviſed by *Hurry Pundit*, that the greateſt part of *Ragonath Row*'s troops have joined him: this has made them very happy, as they now expect ſoon to ſee an end to their diſturbances; for they conclude orders will ſoon arrive to forbid *Ragonath Row*'s reſiding at any of the Engliſh ſettlements.

I incloſe extracts of letters from *Hurry Pundit* to the Peiſhwa, received about ſix days ago by which you will perceive they had then much cauſe of uneaſineſs.

The Miniſters required in no other manner to be put in poſſeſſion of the Pergunnahs to be reſtored to them than by our evacuating them, but they were not able ſecurely to take poſſeſſion whilſt our army was in the field, and *Ragonath Row*'s not diſbanded, and remaining with or near the Engliſh troops.

You will pleaſe, Gentlemen, to direct where or to whom the 12 lacks of rupees, towards defraying the expence of the war, are to be paid. It was agreed to receive this money in Putachaule rupees, the current rupee of this country, which is in general here ſomewhat better than the Arcot rupee.

Some further papers are expected from *Futty Sing*; as ſoon as theſe arrive Lieutenant *Paterſon* will receive his diſpatches. I hope to have the pleaſure to acquaint you by him, that the Articles of the Peace have been all (except that of the 12 lacks) carried into execution.

I have juſt received the incloſed note; it is the firſt intimation I have had of *Succaram Baboo*'s intention of retiring: I imagine (as he is old and infirm) he takes this method of letting *Morobah Furnice* ſucceed to his appointments, who has all along declined taking any ſhare in the buſineſs of Government with *Succaram Pundit*. It is evident, therefore, they look on their diſturbances as nearly at an end.—Permit me to requeſt you will forward theſe paſſports and letters as ſoon as convenient; I ſhould ſuppoſe they would not ſet out on their journey till the beginning of November. The name of the late Peiſhwa *Madowrow*'s mother is *Goupkaboy*, and ſhould be inſerted in her paſs.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Poorunder, 27th May 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton*.

Reſolved, that the Board cannot conſent to any alterations at this time in the Treaty, which are in themſelves of no conſequence, and which could not be made without cancelling the Treaty already ratified on both ſides.

Reſolved, that the following Letters be written to Colonel *Upton*, and to *Bombay*.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

Since our letter to you of the 1ſt inſtant, we have received

ceived advices from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated 27th May; and in conſequence of his deſire, that we would determine the mode and place of payment of the 12 lacks of rupees, ſtipulated for the expences of the war, we have directed him before he quits *Poonah*, to ſettle for the payment of it at your Preſidency, at the periods when it ſhall become due; and to prevent any diſputes reſpecting the value of the coins, we think it neceſſary to deſire that you will take whatever money ſhall be offered you on this account, giving a receipt for the ſame, in the ſpecies in which it may be paid; and if you ſhall think that there is any deficiency in the amount, you will be pleaſed to report the ſame to us.

Fort William, the 3d July 1776. We are, &c.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We had written to you on the firſt inſtant; but before the diſpatch of our letter, we received your's of the 27th May.

We cannot now give our conſent to the alterations in the Treaty which the Miniſters have deſired, they are in themſelves of no conſequence, and if agreed to, muſt cancel the Treaty which has been already ratified on both ſides.

As we have already deſired you to inform the Miniſters, that we had reſolved not to accept their propoſition for an exchange of territory, in lieu of *Salſette*, *Caranga*, *Hog*, and *Elephanta*; and a declaration to that effect was added at the foot of the Treaty: we cannot enter into any further negociation with them on that ſubject; but as all our proceedings muſt be referred to the ultimate deciſion of the Honourable Company, they will ſignify their directions in conſequence. However, we ſhould deem ourſelves wanting in candour, to ſuggeſt to the Maratta Government expectations which we do not believe will be realized; we therefore deſire you will intimate to them our opinion, that the Company will never conſent to relinquiſh theſe iſlands.

We are much pleaſed with the intention of the Miniſters to ſend a confidential vackeel to reſide in *Calcutta*, and deſire you to encourage this intention, by the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of our wiſh to maintain the peace eſtabliſhed between us, to cultivate their friendſhip, and to remove every ſubject of doubt or diſtruſt that may ariſe on either part; and we think nothing more likely to contribute to this end, than eſtabliſhing a direct communication between us in the manner which they have propoſed.

Before you leave *Poonah* we direct, that you ſettle the payment of the 12 lacks of rupees to be made at the Preſidency of *Bombay*, as it becomes due.

We have applied to the Nabob Vizier, and to *Rajah Cheyt Sing*, for the paſſports deſired by *Succaram Pundit* for himſelf, and *Goupkaboy* the mother of the late Peiſhwa, which will be forwarded to you by Mr. *Briſtow* and Mr. *Fowke*. We deſire that when you deliver them, you will aſſure both theſe people of our protection, and every mark of attention and reſpect in our power, if they ſhall chuſe to reſide either in the dominions of our ally the Vizier, or in the territories dependant on this Government.

This reſolution of *Succaram Pundit*, to proceed to *Benares*, and to leave the chief direction of the Maratta Government in the hands of *Moraba Furneſs*, a perſon who is generally ſuppoſed to be in the intereſt of *Ragoba*, appears to us ſo ſtrange, that we cannot account for it. We deſire that you will furniſh us with your opinion of this meaſure, of *Succaram*'s motives for it, and of the effects which are likely to be produced by ſuch an event.

We are, &c.
Warren Haſtings,
R. Barwell,
P. Francis.

Fort William, the 3d July 1776.

APPENDIX, No. 135.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations the 24th July 1776.

RECEIVED the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

To the Honourable the Governor General and Council, *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

Lieutenant *Paterſon* will have the honour to deliver the Treaty executed by the Miniſters.

The name of the Peiſhwa having been but once mentioned in the Treaty (in the preamble) and that not appearing in the Engliſh tranſlation, the words "Maratta State" having been ſubſtituted, I thought it neceſſary to inſert it a ſecond time; and, with the conſent of the Miniſters, have accordingly again inſerted it (where he is mentioned) in the laſt line but one of the preamble.

The ſeaſon is too far advanced to delay Lieutenant *Paterſon*'s departure any longer, as intended, in expectation of receiving ſhortly more arreſts from *Futty Sing*, who is ordered to come without delay to *Poonah*; and is to bring with him all the papers that have any relation to the buſineſs yet unſettled in the Guzerat country.

I herewith forward articles of obligation between the Peiſhwa and Guicawar family; alſo a letter, &c. from *Futty Sing*; and letters from *Sundia*, and *Tucogee Hulker*, in reply to the circular letter ſent by the Peiſhwa, on concluding the peace.

The Peiſhwa is in poſſeſſion of all the Pergunnahs ceded by *Ragonaut Row*, that were to be reſtored by the Treaty, except *Jambooſeer*, which we are to remain poſſeſſed of, until the country of three lacks is made over.

My laſt letter to the Board was dated 27th May, but not diſpatched until the 1ſt inſtant, owing to the Peiſhwa's delaying the Cauſſeds.

I have the honour to be, &c.
Poorunder, June 3d, 1776. (Signed) *John Upton*.

Ordered, That the Treaty be depoſited among the records in the Secretary's Office; and that the other Perſian papers be ſent to be tranſlated: and,

Agreed, That the following reply be ſent to Colonel *Upton*.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 3d ultimo, by Lieutenant *Paterſon*, with the Treaty, and the other papers which accompanied it.

In our letter of 1ſt July, we directed you to proceed to *Bombay*, and on your arrival there to uſe your endeavours to complete what ſhould remain to be executed of the Treaty; this done, we ſee no cauſe for your continuing longer at that place, but deſire that you return to this Preſidency by whatever route, whether by land or by water, you may prefer. If you ſhould chuſe to return through *Poonah*, you will not fail to repeat to the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, in our name, the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of our reſolution to maintain the peace concluded with them, and to preſerve every condition on our part inviolate.

It did not occur to us, that, according to the univerſal practice of the Eaſt, a return of preſents would have been tendered to you by the Court of *Poonah*, on your departure from it; nevertheleſs, it may not be yet be too late, to inform you of the conduct which we wiſh you to obſerve on ſuch an occaſion. Although you are precluded by the law from accepting of preſents for your own uſe, yet as preſents have been made on the part of the Company, we ſhall approve of your accepting, in like manner, of any which ſhall be made to you from the Miniſtry at *Poonah*, in the name and on behalf of the Company.

Appendix. No. 136.

We deſire you will make the like aſſurances of friendſhip on our part, to any Chiefs of the Maratta State whoſe dominions you may paſs through, in caſe you ſhould reſolve to return by land.

Fort William, 24th July 1776. We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 136.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 22d July 1776.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Bombay*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Since our laſt of the 10th ultimo, we have received your ſeveral letters, dated the 12th and 26th February, 11th and 16th March, and 16th April, with the conſignment of treaſure by the *Indian Queen*, and the bill incloſed in the laſt-mentioned letter.

This is chiefly to acquaint you, that on the ſhip *Hodges* we now return the detachment of Europeans under the command of Lieutenant *Taylor*, having ſhipped on board forty days proviſions for their uſe, as per incloſed account. We requeſt your Honour, &c. will ſettle with the commander for the paſſage of this detachment.

Ragoba's army is entirely diſbanded, and he is now in *Surat*, with two hundred only of his domeſtics and ſervants. We have ſtrongly urged to Colonel *Upton* to uſe his endeavours to induce the Miniſters to aſſign him a ſuitable eſtabliſhment to relieve the Company from the heavy expence they will otherwiſe incur by his maintenance.

The communication with the Maratta dominions ſtill remains ſhut, notwithſtanding the promiſe of the Miniſters that it ſhould be opened as ſoon as the Company's forces had retired into their own diſtricts.

By our advices from *Surat* and *Broach*, we conclude that the reſtitutions ſtipulated by the Treaty are by this time made.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 10th June 1776. (Signed) *William Hornby*, &c. Council. *Warren Haſtings*. *J. Clavering*, *R. Barwell*, *P. Francis*.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated the 5th Auguſt 1776.

Received the following Letter from *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

We incloſe a duplicate of our laſt letter, dated 10th inſtant, and have ſince had the honour to receive your letter, dated the 21ſt March, incloſing an extract from your Minutes of Council reſpecting the allowances to be made to the *Bengal* detachment.

This detachment we returned by the *Hodges*, as before adviſed, and we found the expence of the Madras battalion ſo great a drain upon our treaſury, and having no certainty of ſpeedy aſſiſtance from your Honour, &c. ſince you have been pleaſed ſo peremptorily to forbid our drawing upon you, that to prevent the inconvenience to which we might otherwiſe be expoſed, we determined to ſend back this battalion likewiſe, and a conſiderable part thereof has been already embarked, and the remainder will very ſhortly proceed.

We incloſe copy of a letter from Colonel *Upton*, received ſince our laſt, and of our reply, and we doubt not your Honour, &c. will concur with us in opinion, that there appears in the whole of this Gentleman's correſpondence, a too great readineſs to liſten to the trifling complaints of the Miniſters, and a want of confidence in our repreſentations.

Sudaba ſtill continues to the ſouthward, being prevented from advancing by the monſoon; he has lately ſent two vackeels here to requeſt the Company will aſſiſt him with a battalion or two of Sepoys, and a ſupply of ſmall arms. He ſays *Ragoba*'s cauſe and his are the ſame, and that his object is to deprive the Miniſters of the power they have ſo unjuſtly uſurped, and to reſtore the family of *Badjerow* to their juſt rights. *Sudaba* is now in poſſeſſion of great part of the Conkan country, and his army is ſaid to conſiſt of about 18,000 men. We ſhall ſhortly write your Honour, &c. more fully on this ſubject.

Shortly after the return of Colonel *Keating*, we thought it incumbent upon us, in conſequence of your letter of the 11th March, to call upon him to explain the attack of *Ahmedavad*, and the circumſtance of two of the Company's cannon being employed upon that ſiege after the ceſſation of arms had taken place. Incloſed is a copy of his reply, which with our letter to him, dated 20th October, formerly tranſmitted, we hope will clear up this affair to your ſatisfaction.

Colonel *Upton*'s letter will inform you, that the Miniſters have at laſt given orders for communication being opened between the Company's ſettlements and the Maratta dominions, but they have ſo long deferred it, that it will be of little advantage to our commerce till the opening of the ſeaſon.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 30th June 1776. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Ordered, That the incloſures be entered after the Conſultations.

Continuation of the correſpondence with Colonel *Upton*, from the 10th June.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letter of the 2d inſtant.

The Miniſters have repeatedly declared, that they will ſtrictly obſerve the obligation they have engaged in reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*, but they will not make or admit of any alteration therein. I am afraid I have not ſufficient influence here to get his ſtipulated allowance, or any part of it paid, unleſs he complies with the conditions on which it was granted; I ſhall however try all in my power to effect this. The Miniſters have conſented, and given orders accordingly, to open the communication on the 18th inſtant, obſerving the ſame cuſtoms and duties as heretofore.

I have this inſtant received a letter from the Miniſters, acquainting me, that they are informed by *Hurria Pundit* that a thouſand cavalry, a thouſand other people with artillery, elephants, camels, horſes, &c. have been received into *Surat* with *Ragonaut Row*. I hope this is no more than report; and have to requeſt, Gentlemen, you will write me, that I may ſatisfy the Miniſters accordingly.

They adviſe me alſo, that a man, who calls himſelf *Sadaſhow Row*, is raiſing diſturbances in the Cokun country. I acquaint you with this to prevent the inconveniencies that might otherwiſe happen on the firſt opening of the communication.

The Miniſters further inform me, that *Hurria Pundit* had a vackeel at *Surat*, who has been ordered to retire. They wiſhed and hoped that the eſtabliſhment of the peace would have been ſucceeded by a full confidence and friendſhip. I have the honour, &c.

Poonah, June 1776. (Signed) *John Upton*.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We have received your letter dated the 13th inſtant.

We ſtill hope you will meet with ſucceſs in your endeavours to obtain the ſtipulated allowance for *Ragoba*.

The Miniſters have ſo long deferred opening the communication, that the Company will not derive any commercial advantages from it this ſeaſon.

The fears of the Miniſters make them very ready to adopt ſuſpicions of our conduct upon every occaſion, and we could wiſh you would not ſhew ſo much attention to their frivolous complaints that reſpect us. We incloſe an extract of a letter from the Chief of *Surat*, which will remove all doubts reſpecting the number of people received into *Surat* with *Ragonaut Row*, but we know nothing of *Hurria Pundit*'s vackeel being ordered to retire from thence. We are ſenſible the Miniſters entertain a belief that the Company approve of our ſupporting *Ragoba*, and that we ſhall renew the war in his favour after the rains; and through this medium do they view all our actions.

Two vackeels arrived here on the 17th inſtant from *Sadaſhew Row*; and we apprize you of this circumſtance, as we ſuppoſe the Miniſter's fears will inſtantly be alarmed; but you may aſſure them, that we ſhall not purſue any meaſures in conſequence that may be repugnant to the late Treaty, and which indeed is the proper anſwer to return to all their complaints.

Bombay Caſtle, We are, &c.
20th June 1776. *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

APPENDIX, No. 137.

Copy of the 48th paragraph of the ſeparate letter to *Bengal*, dated 15th December 1775.

BY this conveyance we tranſmit you copy of advices received from our ſervants at *Bombay*, relative to the capture of *Salſette* and *Caringa*, and to the ſubſequent ceſſion of thoſe places to the Company by *Ragoba* the Maratta Chief; and although the materials before us do not enable us to give you particular inſtructions on every point relative to thoſe important events, we however approve, under every circumſtance, of the keeping of all the territories and poſſeſſions ceded to the Company by the Treaty concluded with *Ragoba*; and direct that you forthwith adopt ſuch meaſures as may be neceſſary for their preſervation and defence.

Extract *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 3 July 1776.

Read again, the 48th and 49th paragraphs of the Company's general letter in the ſecret department, dated 15th December 1775.

The Board having, ſo long ago as the 31ſt May 1775, unanimouſly declared their opinion, That the Treaty formed by the Preſidency of *Bombay* was invalid; and having in conſequence of that reſolution concluded and ratified a Treaty in the name of the Company with the Miniſters of the Maratta State, are no longer at liberty to carry into execution the intentions of the Court of Directors, expreſſed in the 48th paragraph of their letter, by keeping all territories and poſſeſſions ceded to the Company by the treaty concluded with *Ragoba*, ſince many of thoſe territories have been ceded to the Maratta Government by the above Treaty with them, and cannot either be retained or reſumed conſiſtently with the public faith of this Government, except in the caſe of a direct violation of the Treaty on the part of the Marattas.

The Board are further of opinion, That the preſence of Colonel *Upton* at *Poonah* is no longer neceſſary; and that his ſervices may be more effectually employed at *Bombay*, for the accompliſhment of what yet remains to be carried into execution of the Treaty on both ſides, than by a longer reſidence at *Poonah*.

It is therefore reſolved, That the following letter be written to Colonel *Upton*. Appendix. No. 137.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We are of opinion, that your reſidence at *Proondur* is no longer neceſſary; but that your ſervice may be more uſeful at *Bombay*, in promoting the accompliſhment of ſuch Articles of the Treaty as remain ſtill to be carried into execution; we therefore direct, that you demand your immediate diſmiſſion from the Peiſhwa's Court, and proceed to *Bombay* as ſoon as you can with convenience, after the receipt of theſe our orders. You will inform the Miniſters, that we have judged your preſence to be no longer neceſſary at *Proondur*, as your interpoſition may be more effectually employed with the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, in urging them to a ſpeedy compliance with the conditions of the Treaty, which remains to be accompliſhed on their part, and which we are ſorry to ſee have been ſo long delayed. You will alſo formally require of the Miniſters, to put the Government of *Bombay* in poſſeſſion of the territories, which are ſtipulated by the Treaty to be ceded to the Company, and to ſettle a proviſion for the payment of the ſix lacks of rupees, which, by the 6th Article of the Treaty, will become due on the 1ſt September next; but you muſt not expreſs or ſhew any diſtruſt of their intentions, nor ſuffer any thing which they may ſay to you in reply to your requiſitions, to induce you to defer your departure from *Proondur*. On your arrival at *Bombay*, you will exert your endeavours to effect the concluſion of the different Articles required by the Treaty, and remain there till further orders, to carry on, any negociations which may be neceſſary with the Miniſters.

Fort William, We are, &c.
1ſt July 1776.

Reſolved, That a copy of the 48th paragraph of the general letter, and of the above reſolution, be tranſmitted to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* with the following letter:

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter of the 18th May. The Honourable the Court of Directors having ſignified to us by the *Greenwich* their orders in conſequence of the capture of *Salſette*, and of the Treaty which at the date of your advices to them you were negociating with *Ragoba*, we think it proper to incloſe a copy of theſe orders for your information, and of the reſolutions which we have come to, on reading them.

As the Treaty of *Poonah* has not left us at liberty to follow the apparent intentions of the Court of Directors on this occaſion, we leave you to act agreeable to our reſolutions, which will point out the plan we have judged it neceſſary to adopt in conſequence of their directions; to which we muſt add, that if you ſhall not have put the officers of the Peiſhwa in poſſeſſion of the diſtricts ceded to the Maratta State by the 7th Article of the Treaty, before the receipt of this letter, we peremptorily repeat our injunctions, that you cauſe theſe diſtricts to be delivered up immediately, and that you admit of no further delay in this point, or in executing any Article that remains unaccompliſhed on your part, but obſerve with the moſt ſcrupulous fidelity every condition required of you by the Treaty.

Colonel *Upton*, whom we have recalled from *Poonah*, has been ordered before his departure, to require of the Miniſters the punctual execution of the ſtipulations on their part; but if they ſhould evade complying with his demand, or be guilty of any acts of hoſtility, we direct that you take no ſteps of your own authority to retaliate the injuries or affronts which may be received from them or their dependents, except you ſhall be compelled to

Appendix. No. 138.

it in your own immediate defence, but that you give us the earlieſt information, and wait for our inſtructions; contenting yourſelves in the mean time by amicable remonſtrances to the Miniſters to endeavour to obtain a ſuitable redreſs.

We have directed Colonel *Upton* to proceed to, and continue at, *Bombay* till further orders, that he may finiſh any negociations with the Miniſters which remain unſettled at the time of his departure. We recommend him to your attention; and as we have not communicated to him the orders of the Company, and the meaſures we mean to purſue, we requeſt that you will impart them to him on his arrival at your Preſidency.

We are, &c.

Fort William, 1ſt July 1776.

Mr. *Barwell*—I have no particular objection to the Reſolution of the Board, as far as it binds this Government to pacific meaſures: policy in the preſent ſituation of the Company's affairs requires it, and I think our utmoſt endeavours ſhould be uſed to ſecure the advantages expected to reſult from the Treaty concluded with the *Poonah* Miniſters; but I mean not, by ſubſcribing to this reſolution of the Board, to allow that this Government is not at liberty to adopt hoſtile reſolutions, and to ſeize the firſt opportunity that offers to execute the Company's intentions.

Warren Haſtings,
Jn° Clavering,
R^d Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 138.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 8th July, 1776.

READ, a letter from Mr. *Tayler*, as follows:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have received from your Secretary a copy of the 48th paragraph of the Honourable Company's commands of the 15th December laſt, and of your reſolutions in conſequence of them.

With reſpect to the firſt, I can only ſay, that, in my conception, nothing can more forcibly expreſs their ideas of the ſituation in which they wiſhed to ſee their affairs in the weſt of *India*; and it is therefore with infinite concern I lament, that the Treaty concluded by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* with the miniſterial confederacy, leaves them ſo widely diſtant from that ſituation. With the former orders of the Company before them, and this ſtrong confirmation of their ſentiments, I doubt not but the Government of *Bombay* would wiſh to bring them as near to it as ſuch part of the territories ceded by *Ragoba*, that remain in their poſſeſſion, will admit; and if they are deterred from ſo doing, by your declining that aſſiſtance enjoined by the orders of the Company, it is you alone who muſt be anſwerable for the conſequences.

In my own juſtification, I think myſelf bound, in behalf of the Honourable the Court of Directors, and the *Bombay* Preſidency, to remonſtrate and proteſt againſt your non-compliance; eſpecially as the conduct of the Miniſters, ſince the ſigning and concluding of the Treaty on the 1ſt of March, by having in the month of April taken ſeveral veſſels with our paſſes and colours (and ſome of them from under the convoy of the *Terrible* bomb ketch, whoſe captain is now here in command of the *Drake*) by their not having permitted any intercourſe or communication with *Bombay* till the 19th May, the date of my laſt advices, nor having till that time ſent any perſons to deliver the lands to be given in exchange for thoſe ceded to us by *Ragoba*, gives you as fair an opportunity as can be deſired, of placing matters on the reſpectable footing ſo much wiſhed for by our Honourable Maſters, inſtead of the very contrary one they are placed in by the Treaty negociated by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

I muſt here beg leave to recall to your recollection the Treaty concluded by the Government of *Bombay* with *Ragoba*, and approved by you and their ſuperiors, the Honourable the Court of Directors; and contraſt it in a few inſtances with that negociated by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*. By the *Bombay* Treaty, *Ragoba*, the rightful Peiſhwa, makes over to the Company for ever certain appointed diſtricts, the revenues of which amount to rupees 19,25,000, and with the villages of *Corial*, *Chickly*, *Veriow*, and *Arnood*, and the Chout of *Surat*, ſince obtained from him and *Futty Sing*, to about rupees 23,00,000 per annum; all which they were in poſſeſſion of, except *Baſſein*, eſtimated at 4 lacks; Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* obtains from rebels, who you are pleaſed to term the *Poonah* Government, ceſſions, ſome of them very vague, to the amount of rupees 9,50,000. The *Bombay* Treaty ſecures a laſting peace to the *Carnatic* and theſe provinces: Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* leaves them to be plundered and laid waſte, as ſoon as the rebels may find it convenient. The *Bombay* Treaty provides for and ſecures, by actual poſſeſſion of lands aſſigned for the purpoſe, the entire expence of the war in favour of the lawful Prince: Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* is content with the promiſe of 12 lacks, which will be about half the amount, and no ſecurity at all; and to conclude the hiſtory of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*'s Treaty, it is made with a man, (*Saccaram Bappoo*) who is immediately about to reſign his ſhare in the adminiſtration to *Morabah Furneeſe*, a declared partizan of *Ragoba*'s, and retire to *Benares*, to paſs the remainder of his days under your protection.

I have only further, Gentlemen, to urge you to reconſider the groſs indignity you are offering to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, by directing that Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* ſhall reſide there, for the purpoſe of concluding whatever may remain unfiniſhed of the Treaty; and I beg you to recollect, that the Company have appointed a Select Committee there, expreſsly for conducting all political meaſures; and that by their having excluded you, ſince the Act of Parliament took place, from having any interference in reſtoring the King of *Tanjore* to his dominions, it is evidently their intention that you ſhould not interfere in the manner you think yourſelves entitled to do, in the affairs of the other Preſidencies; and from the very great difference in the ſentiments of the Court of Directors and your's, on the Treaty with *Ragoba*, it is alſo evident the *Bombay* Council have acted conformably to their repeated inſtructions and wiſhes, and ought not, if in compliment only to the Court of Directors, to be ſubjected to the diſgrace you are about to attempt to inflict on them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Calcutta, the 5th July 1776. (Signed) *W. Tayler.*

The above letter having been ſent in circulation immediately after its receipt, the following opinions were returned upon it.

In anſwer to Mr. *Tayler*'s letter, wherein he ſays he thinks himſelf bound in behalf of the Honourable Court of Directors, and the *Bombay* Preſidency, to remonſtrate and proteſt againſt our non-compliance with the orders of the Company, my opinion is, That we ought to deſire him to produce the powers with which he is veſted on the part of the Honourable *Eaſt India* Company, to authorize him to proteſt againſt the acts of this Government.

(Signed) *J. Clavering.*

Agreed. (Signed) *P. Francis.*

Mr. *Tayler* ſhall be required to produce the powers and authority to the Board, which entitle him to remonſtrate

ſtrate and proteſt, on behalf of the Honourable the Court of Directors and the *Bombay* Preſidency, againſt the acts of this Government.

(Signed) *Geo. Monſon.*

Mr. *Tayler* has certainly exceeded the authority delegated to him by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and indeed any which they could give; but I think it not unneceſſary to propoſe the queſtion to him which is the ſubſtance of the above minutes, as the Board well know, that he has not the powers alluded to in them; and in my opinion, the dignity of Government would be beſt maintained by a direct cenſure, than by the implication of it.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Mr. *Barwell*—The Preſident and Council of *Bombay* expreſsly deputed Mr. *Tayler*, a Member of their Board and of their Select Committee, to this Government, for the ſole purpoſe of engaging its concurrence to the political meaſures, which were adopted at that Preſidency, to ſecure the proſperity and future welfare of the Company's ſettlements on the weſt ſide of *India*. Mr. *Tayler* has been received as the public Deputy of that Government, in behalf of which he now acts, and in ſupport of a policy, that a majority of this Board totally condemn; how far Mr. *Tayler* may be blameable in his repreſentations, I for my part will not pretend to decide, but leave to the Company to determine on the propriety of this addreſs now under conſideration, and whether it is conſonant to their views. I apprehend the paſſing a cenſure on Mr. *Tayler* by this Government is unwarrantable, and I judge unbecoming in the preſent inſtance, becauſe in ſo doing we vindicate opinions contradicting the ſenſe of the Company, who have approved of the Maratta War—a war that under any other circumſtances than the preſent, we muſt have countenanced and proſecuted; and which I fear will be revived by the Marattas at a period when we ſhall be deprived of that faction in their State, which now favours the Prince with whom we were lately in alliance.

I reluctantly add a ſhort obſervation on the preceding minute, ſolely for the purpoſe of obviating any miſconception of the opinion given in mine. The cenſure which I thought the Board might with propriety paſs on Mr. *Tayler*, was not for any ſentiments expreſſed by him, concerning the late Treaty, or the laſt orders of this Board, but for the tone of authority which he has aſſumed in his addreſs to the Board; in this he is ſurely wrong. Upon the former I did not mean to offer an opinion.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Agreed, that the following letter be written to Mr. *Tayler*:

To Mr. *Tayler*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 5th inſtant. You inform us, that "In your own juſtification you think "yourſelf bound in behalf of the Honourable Court of "Directors, and the *Bombay* Preſidency, to remonſtrate "and proteſt againſt our non-compliance with the orders "of the Company."

We deſire you will be pleaſed to inform us, by what power or authority you deem yourſelf entitled to proteſt in behalf of the Court of Directors and the Preſidency of *Bombay*, againſt any act of this Government; and that, if you are poſſeſſed of ſuch power and authority, you will communicate to us the inſtruments or inſtructions which veſt you therewith.

As ſoon as we receive your anſwer to this enquiry, we ſhall conſider what reply it may be proper for us to make to the remainder of your letter.

Fort William, We are, &c.
the 8th July 1776.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 10th July 1776. Appendix No. 138.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Philip Francis, Eſquire,
Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.

Read the following letter from Mr. *Tayler*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Calcutta*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Yeſterday evening I received your letter of the 8th, and in reply do myſelf the honour to acquaint you, that I have been deputed to this place by the Honourable the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, who are the repreſentatives of the Company on that ſide of *India*, being appointed a Government on their behalf to conduct their affairs there, they cannot be ſuperſeded without altering the form of Government eſtabliſhed by the Company. I conceived the appointed of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to reſide at *Bombay* and to treat publicly, independent of them, to be a direct ſuperceſſion of that Government. In their letter of the 22d Auguſt they acquaint you of their having appointed me to repreſent to you at large the particular intereſts of that Preſidency, and as their Deputy and as a Member of that Government, I could not but be ſenſibly affected at ſuch a meaſure, and thought it my duty to remonſtrate.

As the orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors for maintaining the ceſſions made by *Ragoba* have not probably reached *Bombay* by this time, either by the way of *Aleppo* or *Madras*, and the Governor and Council, who will conceive themſelves fully authorized, will think it their duty to act immediately in obedience to thoſe orders, and muſt have taken meaſures accordingly before the receipt of your late directions for a contrary mode of conduct. I conſidered the embarraſſment they may ſuffer under ſuch circumſtances, and I thought it incumbent on me to urge you in the ſtrongeſt manner to alter your reſolutions; and I can with the greateſt truth aſſure you that I am actuated by no other motives than the zeal I entertain for the honour and intereſt of our employers, and the reputation of that Government of which I have the honour to be a Member; had I neglected to act as I have done I ſhould have expected their ſevereſt cenſure.

I muſt beg leave to add, that I am convinced, from the actions and declarations of *Succeram Baboo*, &c. ſince the Treaty, that it is not their intention to obſerve it longer than may ſuit their own convenience; and that if a proper truſt was repoſed in the Governor of *Bombay*, the Company's views on that ſide might ſtill be obtained with great facility; under the preſent circumſtances they will be obliged to ſubmit to every inſult, except an open attack, in any of the ſettlements for the ſpace of three months, which will be required to receive your determination.

It may be alledged, in favour of continuing the powers veſted in Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, that the Miniſters will be averſe to negociate amicably with the Government of *Bombay*, but as a Treaty is now concluded with them, I cannot deſire a ſtronger proof of their unfriendly diſpoſition.

Calcutta, I have the honour to be, &c.
10th July 1776. (Signed) *William Tayler.*

Read again, the letter from Mr. *Tayler*, recorded in the laſt Conſultation.

Agreed, That the following reply be written to Mr. *Tayler*:

To Mr. *Tayler*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of this day.

Appendix. No. 138.

In your addreſs of the 5th inſtant, you declared yourſelf bound to proteſt and remonſtrate in behalf of the Court of Directors, againſt our non-compliance with their orders. In your preſent letter, you have not only dropped the word *proteſt*, but even ſhifted the object of your remonſtrance. Colonel *Upton*'s continuance in a public character at *Bombay* has no relation to the point on which your proteſt was founded; neither have you produced any powers from the Company for making that or any other declaration in their behalf, againſt an act of this Government. We conclude, that ſuch powers have not been delegated to you, and that in aſſuming them you have acted without authority.

We ſhall avoid entering into an argument with you upon the general ſubject of your proteſt. We cannot, however, paſs unnoticed, the appellation of *rebels*, by which in your letter of the 5th inſtant, you repeatedly deſcribe the Government of *Poonah*. The Members of which that Government is compoſed are the ſame perſons with whom the Preſidency of *Bombay* entertained a Reſident, and whom they acknowledged, even after the recall of Mr. *Moſtyn*, as they informed us in their letter of the 31ſt December 1774, that, "the Preſident, "agreeable to their reſolution, would explain to the "miniſterial party at *Poonah*, the real motives for their "proceedings, and that they ſhould be aſſured in caſe "they gain the advantage in the preſent conteſt, by the "overthrow of *Ragoba*, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* "would reſign the Iſlands to them;" and finally, it is with theſe perſons that this Government hath negociated, concluded, and ratified a Treaty, by which the Preſidency of *Bombay* is bound, and for which we ſhall be anſwerable to the Court of Directors.

We do not underſtand to what order you allude, when you ſay that "ſince the Act of Parliament took place, "the Court of Directors have excluded this Govern"ment from any interference in reſtoring the King of "*Tanjore* to his dominions," nor conſequently can we admit the inference you draw from that order, "that "it muſt be their intention we ſhould not interfere in "the manner we think ourſelves entitled to do in the "affairs of the other Preſidencies." Your deciſion on the Company's intentions with reſpect to the diſpoſition of *Tanjore*, ſeems to us not leſs arbitrary and unauthoriſed than your proteſting without powers in behalf of the Court of Directors, againſt the acts of this Government. We alſo are of opinion, that you have equally miſtaken the inſtructions and wiſhes of the Court of Directors, previous to their directions of the 15th December laſt; and in ſupport of our opinion, we refer you to their letter of the 12th April, 1775, to the *Bombay* Preſidency, in which you will find the following paragraphs:

Par. 43. "There is no part of your conduct more "reprehenſible than that of engaging without abſolute "neceſſity, in military expeditions; the large ſums "which have been expended at *Broach*, and on the "Coolies, are an immediate inconvenience to the Com"pany, and the conſequences of your proceedings em"barraſſing in the higheſt degree; and after ſucceeding "againſt the place, it is mortifying to obſerve that our "affairs are in a much worſe ſituation than they were "before thoſe expeditions were undertaken, as we do "not find that the charges incurred in conquering the "country, and the expences of keeping the conqueſt, "are likely to be defrayed from its reſources in a rea"ſonable time, without oppreſſing the inhabitants."

Par. 53. "It is with much concern we learn from "your records, that we are not likely to obtain "*Salſette* from the Marattas by negociation. We how"ever, diſapprove your reſolution to take poſſeſſion of "that iſland by force, in caſe of the death or depoſition "of *Ragoba*, and hereby poſitively prohibit you from "attempting that meaſure under any circumſtances "whatever, without our permiſſion firſt obtained for "that purpoſe."

Prior to the receipt of a copy of this letter from the Court of Directors, we acted in obedience to their general inſtructions for the preſervation of the peace of *India*; but ſince that period theſe orders have been the more immediate guide of our conduct with reſpect to the object in queſtion.

With regard to the orders tranſmitted to Colonel *Upton*, our declared intention was, that he ſhould remain at *Bombay* to complete any Articles of his negociation with the Government of *Poonah*, which he might leave unſettled at the time of his departure; he is the immediate agent of this Government, and was deputed expreſsly on that ſervice; our employing him to conclude it at *Bombay*, could not be meant, nor ought to be deemed a ſuperceſſion of that Government; and if you conſider the offence which the State of *Poonah* hath juſtly taken at their receiving *Ragoba* with his army within the boundaries of *Surat*, after the concluſion of the Treaty, and the impoſſibility, from this circumſtance, of their deputing any perſon to *Bombay*, to carry into execution the Articles of the Treaty which were to be performed on their part, you cannot but ſeriouſly approve of a meaſure which places a Miniſter from this Government between your Preſidency and them, to effectuate thoſe ends which probably could not be attained by that Preſidency alone, without ſuch an interpoſition.

Fort William, 10th July 1776. We are, &c.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 15th July 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires,
Philip Francis, }

Read, and approved, the proceedings of the 10th inſtant.

Mr. *Tayler* ſends in the following letter:—

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

The 13th inſtant, in the evening, I received your letter of the 10th.

From a due deference to your opinion, it gives me much concern that you ſhould conclude I have acted without authority, in proteſting againſt your not complying with the orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, dated 15th December, 1775, for keeping, under every circumſtance, all territories and poſſeſſions ceded to the Company by the treaty concluded with *Ragoba*, and adopting all ſuch meaſures as might be neceſſary for their preſervation and defence; but as a queſtion, I preſume it ſtill remains to be decided, with reſpect to the propriety of it on my part, by that Government under whoſe authority I immediately act, and ultimately by the Honourable the Court of Directors.

In vindication of my deſcription of the preſent Government at *Poonah*, by the appellation of *rebels*, permit me to refer you to the fourth article of your inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated 17th July 1775, which begins with this paſſage:—"*Ragonath Row* "is the Peiſhwa or Chief Ruler of the Maratta State, "but was obliged, by the miniſterial party at *Poonah*, to "quit that capital, and they have ſince proclaimed in "his ſtead, the ſon of *Narain Row*, the late Peiſhwa, "who is ſtill an infant." Allowing this infant to be the ſon of *Narain Row*, which, when I had the honour of attending you in Council I acquainted you Mr. *Moſtyn* was aſſured he is not, *Ragonath Row*, during the minority of his uncle, *Mhadow Row*, and father, *Narain*

Row, was Regent of the Maratta Empire. At his acceſſion to the Peiſhwaſhip, on the death of *Narain Row*, it reſted with him to continue or remove *Saccaram Bapoo* and *Bellajee Pundit* from their offices: he continued them, and they acted as his Miniſters for ſeveral months, and now withhold the Government from him. Under the ſanction of theſe circumſtances it is that I venture to deſcribe them by the appellation of *rebels*.

The Honourable the Governor and Council of *Bombay* of themſelves and through me, have repeatedly aſſured you, that you might depend on their ſhewing the ſtricteſt obſervance to any directions you ſhould be pleaſed to ſend them, relative to the Treaty which Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* has been employed to negociate. As the Repreſentatives of the Company on that ſide of *India*, I muſt ſtill think that confidence ought to have been placed in them, and am ſure they are on every account entitled to it; and from the miniſterial party having ſued to them for peace, I am fully perſuaded, that had you been pleaſed to repoſe the neceſſary truſt in them, it could have been long ſince ſettled on more reſpectable, advantageous, and permanent terms than it now is.

Calcutta, I have the honour to be, &c.
15th July 1776. (Signed) *W. Tayler.*

APPENDIX, No. 139.

From *Ragonaut Row*, received 14th November 1776.

I HAVE diſpatched to you ſeven or eight ſucceſſive letters, but have not to this time been favoured with an anſwer to either, which ſurprizes me; indeed, from remaining in expectation of an anſwer I have incurred a very conſiderable loſs; and being remedileſs I left *Surat*, and am arrived at the fortreſs of *Dummen*. I have received repeated letters from the Sirdars of *Poonah*, but being unwilling to conſent to any of the propoſitions without advice, I have returned no anſwer. I have been informed by my vackeel at *Bombay*, that the Gentlemen of the Council at *Bombay* and at *Calcutta* have been directed by the Company in *Europe* to ſupport me agreeably to the former engagement; and the Gentlemen of *Bombay* have written to Mr. *Tayler*, deſiring him to obtain the permiſſion of the Council at *Calcutta* for this purpoſe. This has conveyed to me the greateſt ſatisfaction. I remain at the kella of *Dummen* in expectation of an anſwer. It is incumbent on you and the Gentlemen of the Council in *Calcutta*, to afford me ſupport, conformably to the orders of the Company; and ſignify your permiſſion to the Gentlemen of *Bombay* for the continuation of the war, for the rainy ſeaſon is now expiring. You will thence evince the uniformity of the acts of the Nation, and your fraternal connection, and it will add vigour to our friendſhip.

I repeatedly addreſs you on the ſubject of my concerns, but receive no anſwer, at which I am ſurprized. I requeſt that you will be prompted by friendſhip to favour me with a reply.

I have written other particulars to *Wunkut Row*, my vackeel, who will explain them to you. I cheerfully repoſe implicit confidence in you.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 30th September 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident.
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.
General *Clavering* indiſpoſed.

Received the following letters from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:—

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letter of the 16th May, with the copies of the letters to the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* of the 16th and 20th May, and the packet for that Board, which arrived at the ſame time, and was immediately forwarded. Appendix. No. 139.

The Miniſters expreſs great ſatisfaction at the aſſurances you have given them, regarding *Ragonaut Row*, and hope, in conſequence of them, ſoon to ſee their country in perfect tranquillity.

Another competitor for power in this country, has lately ſprung up. The account the Miniſters give of this man is as follows:—That about eight years ago a man was confined for calling himſelf *Sedaſhee Row Bow*, ſon of *Chamagee Ophab*, who was the brother of *Bajee Row*, Peiſhwa, *Ragonaut Row*'s father. He was then led through and about the city of *Poonah* four different times, to ſee if any one could recollect in him *Sedaſhee Row*. As nobody could, he was ordered into confinement.

Sedaſhee Row was ſaid to be killed in the battle of *Paneput* againſt the *Abdallahs* fifteen years ago, but it ſeems his body was never found. This man, who has taken his name, lately found means to perſuade the Killedar of the fort, where he was confined, to releaſe him; the Killedar is alſo in rebellion. *Sedaſhee Row*, as he is called (or more generally the Bow) has collected eight or ten thouſand men, and has poſſeſſed himſelf of part of the Cockun country (which extends from *Salſette* almoſt to *Surat*) and is alſo in poſſeſſion of three or four forts. The Miniſters have ſent an army to diſpoſſeſs him, &c. but they ſay the rains are ſo heavy in that part of the country, that their troops cannot poſſibly act until the rainy ſeaſon is over. They tell me they deputed about a month ago two men who knew *Sedaſhee Row*, to go to this man's camp, and ſee if he was really the perſon he gave himſelf out to be; if ſo, theſe men were authorized to aſſure him of the friendſhip of the Miniſters, and to offer him on their part the ſhare in Government he required: but theſe two men on their arrival in the Bow's camp were immediately confined, and the Miniſters have never been able to get any reply from them.

The Miniſters ſay now, that they are quite eaſy about *Ragonaut Row*, and as their whole country will be fully aſſured of the part the Engliſh have taken, they ſhall ſoon quiet this rebellion: however if it ſhould prove, as this man aſſerts, that he is really the ſon of *Chamagee Ophab*, they declare they will give him the firſt office in the State.

I am able, Gentlemen, in this buſineſs to ſay little more than what the Miniſters have related; I ſee very few people, and theſe are always on their guard when with me; their Government is too abſolute for much freedom reſpecting it. The principal people amongſt them ſeem to think this man an adventurer; the lower claſs are aſſured of his being *Sedaſhee Row*, and wiſh to ſee him fortunate: at all events, ſhould he ſucceed to the governing power of this country, his confirming the late Treaty will be neceſſary, as the Peiſhwa is a minor.

Ballajee Pundit requeſts you will be pleaſed to favour him with paſſes, &c. for himſelf and ſuite, of the ſame kind and extent as *Siccaram Baboo*'s; he intends taking the earlieſt opportunity of going to pray at *Benares*, &c. *Maduro Shedaſhew*, the Miniſter's principal agent in the late negociation, makes the ſame requeſt.

Madurow Sedaſhew has repeatedly requeſted of me to adviſe you, Gentlemen, of a perquiſite always claimed by the heads of particular offices on the concluſion of a Peace, and has related the many inſtances where it has been complied with. I always anſwered, that the Engliſh had no ſuch cuſtoms; but even if we had, as we have given up a great deal more country than we have received, we ſhould claim from them this accuſtomed perquiſite. I told him of the impoſſibility of my making an application of ſuch ſort; he has begged he might be permitted therefore to write to me on the ſubject, and wiſhed I would ſend the letter to the Supreme Council. The incloſed is his letter, and explains his claim better than

Appendix. No. 139.

than I can do. May I entreat you will be kind enough, Gentlemen, to furniſh me with a reply to his requeſt; he will then be ſatisfied.

I am in daily expectation of hearing from *Bombay*, what meaſures they have taken in conſequence of your orders to them regarding *Ragonaut Row*. Lieutenant *Paterſon* ſailed from *Bombay* the 14th laſt month. He had charge of the Treaty, which I hope has been ſafely delivered.

Poonah, 19 July 1776.

I have, &c.
(Signed) *J. Upton.*

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letter of the 20th June. A packet which arrived at the ſame time for the Honourable the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, was immediately forwarded.

The propoſal from the Nabob *Fazil Beg Cawn*, was never intended to be put in execution, unleſs it readily met with my ſanction: in this caſe, the buſineſs preparatory to it was to be forwarding, and the approbation and orders from the Supreme Council were to be waited for. I told the Nabob's vackeel, that the engagements now entered into by the Engliſh, would be moſt inviolably adhered to; that as I had promiſed, ſo his maſter's propoſal ſhould be forwarded to *Calcutta*; but that the Nabob would eaſily conceive how ſuch an attempt on the honour and good faith of the Engliſh Nation would be received. And alſo aſſured the vackeel, that if I heard of any motions being made to forward the preſent ſcheme againſt this Government, during my reſidence at *Poonah*, I would immediately adviſe the Peiſhwa's Miniſters of their danger; but if (as he had moſt ſolemnly promiſed me) the Nabob did not interfere or endeavour to counteract the engagements entered into by the late Treaty, I would never take any further notice about it. He departed, aſſuring me, that the thought would be immediately dropped, on his delivering my anſwer to the Nabob.

I have never correſponded with any foreign Power, but at the requeſt of the Miniſters, ſince my reſidence at *Poonah*. The jealouſies of the Miniſters towards me have been long ſince removed. Untoward circumſtances have been continually happening, but theſe on my part have been ſo candidly accounted for, that the Miniſters are perfectly ſatisfied of the good faith of the Supreme Council; and that my conduct has been ſtrictly honourable.

I ſhall moſt attentively, Gentlemen, obſerve your directions, and neither write, nor otherwiſe correſpond, with any of the Country Powers, ſo as to occaſion the leaſt jealouſy to this Government. At preſent they rather betray fears of our being too well acquainted with the diſtracted ſtate of their country, than jealouſies regarding their contentions with *Ragonaut Row*.

Colonel *Keating*'s letter to me of the 14th April laſt was not in reply to any letter of mine, but as the Colonel obſerves therein at the requeſt of *Ragonaut Bajerow*. I incloſe my anſwer; alſo a copy of the Miniſter's denial of their ever having made ſuch propoſals for *Ragonaut Row* as were ſet forth in that letter; the original (under the ſeal of the Peiſhwa) is with me. I alſo forward a letter from me to the Honourable the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, dated 21ſt May. I hope, Gentlemen, theſe will furniſh every particular you were deſirous of knowing.

There is little or no change in the affairs of *Sedaſhew Row* ſince I had the honour to write laſt (19 July). He ſeems rather to be gaining ground; and the people in general are more perſuaded of his being really the ſon of *Chummagee Oppah*. Neither party can do any thing until the rains are over.

I am daily expecting letters from *Bombay*; when theſe arrive, I hope to be able to adviſe of *Ragonaut Row*'s having left *Surat*. I ſhall wait the receipt of theſe letters, and then cloſe this. The accompanying letters, dated the 13th and 24th July, and 7th Auguſt, will fully acquaint you, Gentlemen, with the meaſures that have been purſued ſince the receipt of your letters; that to me, of the 16th May, and that to the Honourable the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, of the 20th May.

Gentlemen, Auguſt 26, 1776.

I have juſt received the letter from the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, which adviſes of *Ragonaut Row*'s having left *Surat*. The following extract is all therein that relates to *Ragonaut Row*'s departure.

Extract of a letter from the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated 19th Auguſt 1776.

"We ſhall wave any further reply to your letter, as "*Ragoba* has thought proper to retire from *Surat* of his "own accord, which of courſe will remove the jealouſy "the Miniſters had conceived at his reſidence there."

The Miniſters had complained to me two days before I received this information from *Bombay*, that *Ragonaut Row* had been permitted to make his eſcape from *Surat*, after having been covered and protected by the Engliſh for near ſix months (contrary to the true intent and meaning of the late Treaty they had entered into with us) which muſt occaſion to their State further troubles and great expence.

I had been conſtantly requeſting of the Miniſters to agree to a change of abode for *Ragonaut Row*, and to take off the troops allotted for his ſervice, which he looked upon in no other light than as a guard placed over him; and to increaſe his ſtipend, ſo as to enable him to ſupport his rank. The Peiſhwa's conſent had been obtained and ſent to *Bombay* the 22d inſtant, for *Ragonaut Row*'s reſiding at *Benares*, unattended by troops; and an allowance of five lacks of rupees a year, or a jaghire to that amount, fixed upon him in the neighbourhood of *Calpee*.

Should this indulgence of the Peiſhwa's reach *Ragonaut Row*, I am of opinion he will not accept it, as his vackeel, who reſides at *Bombay*, wrote me a few days ago in terms, expecting his former demands were to be complied with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) *J. Upton.*

Gentlemen,

I had juſt cloſed the accompanying letter, when I was honoured with your letters of the 1ſt and 3d July; and about an hour after, the incloſed letter and extract from the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* arrived. You will perceive, Gentlemen, by this letter, the determined part (at all events) the Gentlemen at *Bombay* mean to take. This perplexes me exceedingly; for ſhould I take my immediate departure from this place, and proceed to *Bombay*, no arguments could ever induce the Miniſters to believe otherwiſe than that this determination of the Select Committee of *Bombay* was in conſequence of orders from the Supreme Council, and that I muſt all along have been privy to theſe intentions. I ſhould find it very difficult to perſuade the Miniſters, by letter from *Bombay*, that this matter would be adjuſted, when replies to my letters ſhould arrive from *Calcutta*. As it will neceſſarily be ſome time before either *Jamboojeer*, or the ceſſion made by *Futty Sing*, will be reſtored to the Peiſhwa, there would be little to apprehend, until your poſitive orders ſhould arrive, unleſs the reſolves of the Committee of *Bombay* be made known; and in this caſe I ſhould imagine a Maratta war inevitable, unleſs by my being on the ſpot they were ſatisfied that there muſt be ſome miſtake, and might perhaps be induced to wait its being adjuſted. On the other hand, ſhould the Council of *Bombay* determine to proſecute the war, it would be no longer ſafe for me to remain another hour at *Poonah*, enraged as theſe people

are

are at the oppoſition they have already met with, in carrying into execution the part of the Treaty that relates to *Ragonaut Row*, and its conſequence, the defection of many of their Chiefs, who by the Miniſters' enemies have been made to believe that the war would be renewed when the rains were over.

I ſhall immediately write to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, to keep their reſolves for the preſent profoundly ſecret; but I am afraid it will be impoſſible for me to wait at *Poonah*, in expectation of your further orders to that Preſidency, which I ſhall nevertheleſs endeavour to do, if the riſk does not become too great; for it plainly appears, by the determined manner in which this letter from *Bombay* is worded, that I can be of little ſervice there, in forwarding the conditions of the Treaty. Another letter from them may perhaps ſatisfy me, that they mean to go no greater lengths than thoſe already mentioned; if ſo, I hope all may yet end well.

Mr. *Fowke* has forwarded paſſports from *Cheyte Sing* for *Siccaram Pundit* and *Goupkaboy*; as ſoon as thoſe from Mr. *Briſtow* arrive I will preſent them, and make the profeſſions of friendſhip and protection agreeable to your directions.

I will take the earlieſt opportunity of requeſting the Miniſters to ſettle a proviſion for the payment of the twelve lacks of rupees as it becomes due to the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

When I adviſed, that I imagined *Morabah* would ſucceed to the vacancy that *Sacaram Pundit* might make in the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, it was from a natural inference, as at that time *Ballajee Pundit* was treating with him to engage him to come over to the miniſterial party; and as I underſtand he receives part of the emoluments of *Ballajee Pundit*'s appointments, and it is ſaid nominally to be joined with him in the revenue department, though he has for ſome time declined acting, it never could have happened by the inclination of *Siccaram Pundit*, as there is a hatred between him and *Morabah* amounting to almoſt a mortal enmity. Perhaps the Bhow may be brought in, who, if the real perſon he gives himſelf out to be, has claim to the firſt appointment; and it is ſaid *Siccaram Pundit* is not averſe to it, though he will be ſtrongly oppoſed by *Ballajee Pundit* and *Morabah*. How theſe contending parties will adjuſt their differences time alone can diſcover; they ſtand in great need of ſome one related to the Peiſhwa, or of more exalted rank than the preſent people, at the head of the Miniſtry.

It is currently reported here, that the Bhow means to march to *Poonah* immediately upon the rains breaking up: the Miniſters alſo acquainted me, that they had heard of the Bhow's having ſuch intention; that they much wiſhed he would attempt putting it in execution, as they only wanted to get him out of his ſtrong holds, to be inſured of putting an immediate end to this rebellion. The Miniſters are daily augmenting the force that is acting againſt the Bhow. It is ſaid *Ragonaut Row* is on his march by the ſea ſhore to join the Bhow.

I obſerved, in my letter of the 19th July, that the Cokun country extends from *Salſette* almoſt to *Surat*; I then meant, and ſhould have ſaid, it was the part of the country that was likely to be the ſeat of war; for the entire Cokun country extends from near to *Surat* almoſt to *Myſore*, the capital of *Hyder Ally*'s country, and I now underſtand that *Sedaſhee Row* poſſeſſes the greateſt part of this country.

I ſhould imagine a few days would make the travelling from *Poonah* to *Bombay* impracticable, as the pindarries (free booters) from the two armies are laying the country waſte all round, and making priſoners of all that fall in their way.

I wrote laſt night to *Bombay*, as there was no time to be loſt, and incloſe a copy of this letter. The reply will determine whether I muſt immediately proceed to *Bombay*, or remain ſome time longer at *Poonah*, though I think it very probable I ſhall be obliged to retire to *Maſulipatam*, and there wait your further orders; from whence; if occaſion ſhould require, I can with eaſe, in a journey of about thirty days, reach *Poonah*, and letters paſs in about thirteen or fourteen days (leſs if neceſſary) from *Poonah* to *Maſulipatam*. Appendix No. 140.

I ſhall do myſelf the honour to write again as ſoon as I receive a reply from *Bombay*.

In the preſent uncertainty you will be pleaſed, Gentlemen, to forward my letters by way of *Maſulipatam*. Should I go to *Bombay*, I ſhall adviſe the Chief of that ſettlement, and my letters will be ſafely conveyed to me.

General *Carnac* landed at *Bombay* on the 16th inſtant; his appointment is ſecond in Council, and to ſucceed to the chair.

I am, &c.

Poonah, 28th Auguſt 1775. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

APPENDIX, No. 140.

IN conſequence of the intelligence contained in Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*'s letters; it is reſolved, that the following letter be immediately written to *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have juſt received advices from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated the 28th ultimo, with which he tranſmits us a copy of your letter to him of the 20th Auguſt, and of his reply to it on the 27th.

We have read with great ſurprize, the reſolution declared in your letter to Colonel *Upton*, that "you were "determined at all events to keep poſſeſſion of ſuch of "the late ceſſions as are not yet relinquiſhed:" And we are equally alarmed at the fatal conſequences which may attend ſuch a notorious breach of a public Treaty, and conſequently violation of the national faith. We hope however that the arguments urged to you by Colonel *Upton*, and ſupported by our reſolutions, on receipt of the Company's orders reſpecting the Maratta War, which we communicated to you in a letter of the 1ſt July, will have had ſufficient influence on your conduct to prevent the execution of the meaſure you had reſolved on, or at leaſt to have ſuſpended the iſſue of any orders in conſequence thereof until this may arrive.

We now deſire you will call to mind, that the Treaty with the Maratta State has been executed under the ſanction and by the authority of an Act of Parliament; that therefore it is not only binding on all the Company's ſettlements in *India*, but even on the Company themſelves.

We claim and demand your aid, in ſupporting and maintaining the Treaty which is now in force; declaring at the ſame time that we ſhall hold you reſponſible for all the conſequences which muſt follow a breach of it on your part.

But we ſee no difficulty in reconciling the conditions of the Treaty with the object of the Company's orders, although thoſe orders are manifeſtly framed without any knowledge of the part we had taken. The interchange of *Jambooſeer*, and the other lands ſtipulated to be reſtored to the Marattas for the country adjoining to *Broach*, which is ſpecified in the 5th Article of the Treaty to be ceded on their part to the Company, will leave the Company in poſſeſſion of a territory obtained by peaceable means from the Marattas, equally convenient in point of ſituation, and not much inferior in value to that which the Company have empowered you to keep poſſeſſion of though originally obtained, and ſtill requiring to be preſerved, by force of arms.

If our poſitive injunction ſhould effect no change in the reſolutions you had agreed to, we deſire you will reflect on the means you are poſſeſſed of to carry on a war. You have repreſented to us that the ſtate of your treaſury is very low; yet your ſupplies from this Preſidency have been anticipated to a conſiderable amount. The returns of your troops prove, that the eſtabliſhment of your army is very deficient; and upon the whole we think your

Appendix. No. 141.

actual condition very far from being such as would in prudence justify your exposing the Company's possessions under your Government to the immediate hazards of a war, admitting that no other motives opposed your engaging in it.

We are, &c.

Agreed, That the following reply be written to Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We have now before us your letters of the 19th July and 24th, 26th, and 28th August.

The information contained in the letter respecting the resolution of the President and Council of *Bombay*, has greatly alarmed us; and we may very anxiously wait for the subsequent advices which you have promised to transmit to us; yet we think it necessary to write immediately to *Bombay*, to prevent the execution of a measure, which may prove so fatal in its consequences to the interests of the Company.

We inclose a copy of our letter to that Presidency for your information; and as we cannot foresee the event which it may produce, we can prescribe no line for your conduct in case the Government of *Bombay* should still persist in their determination: but we leave it entirely to your discretion either to remain at *Poonah*, to demand your dismission, or to take any other measures which present circumstances shall point out to your judgment as most conducive to the good of the Company's service, your own safety, and that of the party under your command.

In your letter of the 19th July, you say, "At all "events, should he *(Sedasheé Row)* succeed to the "governing power of this country, his confirming the "late Treaty will be necessary, as the Peishwa is a "minor." We desire to know on what ground or information you have formed this alarming conclusion: we on our parts have always considered the Treaty as formed with, and binding on the Maratta State; without regarding in whose hands the actual power of the Government may now or at any time hereafter be lodged.

We are, &c. &c.

(Signed) *Warren Hastings*,
J. Clavering,
Richd Barwell.
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 141.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, the 14th October 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Governor General, President,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Esquires.
General *Clavering* indisposed.

READ, and approved the proceedings of the 10th instant.

Received the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to address you last on the 28th ultimo.

It is with great pleasure I forward the inclosed letter, which I received last night from the Select Committee of *Bombay*; I wish these Gentlemen had been a little more communicative; though I hope they now mean to do all in their power to facilitate the carrying the few remaining Articles of the Treaty into execution. The Ministers have still their doubts from this quarter; the accompanying letter from the Peishwa, which I received two days ago (and forwarded to *Bombay*) will inform you, Gentlemen, of some recent causes for these doubts; which, added to the prevailing report that assistance will be given by the English to *Ragonath Row* after the rains, must certainly occasion to the Ministers much uneasiness; and this they shewed very strongly, when I desired them to appoint a day for my taking leave. They have assured me, that whatsoever turn the affairs of their country may take, they are and shall be thoroughly convinced of the honourable part the Governor General and Council have taken; and that I may remain at *Poonah* entirely secure of their best opinion and in the utmost safety; I have accordingly consented to stay if (as I told them) it met with your approbation, until the Treaty shall be accomplished, or nearly so, or until a Resident shall be sent from *Bombay*.

I believe all thoughts of my going to *Bombay* must be given up, not only from the jealousy it would occasion here, but from the danger of the attempt: may I be permitted to add, that I think every inconvenience, without a single advantage to the business of the Treaty, might be apprehended, should I leave *Poonah* and go to *Bombay*; as it remains entirely with the Ministers to carry into execution the following stipulations, which are all that are now left unaccomplished, viz. the making over the country of three lacks near *Broach*; the producing the proofs of the Peishwa's right to the Guzerat country entire; and, making a provision for the payment of the twelve lacks. I have frequently represented to the Ministers how much we suffered by the dilatory method of carrying on the correspondence with *Fort William*, and have at last got their promise, that they will immediately lay daawks (I believe to *Benares*) by which means the letters will go from *Poonah* to *Calcutta* in about 17 days; this will give spirit to the business, and I should imagine three months might complete it. *Futty Sing* is expected at *Poonah* shortly: I have told the Ministers that I should refer the matter in dispute respecting his right to making grants of any part of the Guzerat country, and receive your orders concerning it; as I did not conceive, now the Treaty was ratified, the power of determining this business was vested in me. You will please, Gentlemen, to give me your particular instructions regarding this.

You will also, Gentlemen, be pleased to instruct me how to proceed should the Bhow be successful; though I see no great reason to expect this, it is nevertheless necessary to be provided against such an exigency. I hope, and think, I shall be able to remain at *Poonah* till I have the honour to receive a reply to this letter. *Ragonath* will not be able to occasion much disturbance in so short a time, and the Bhow's successes cannot affect me. You may depend, Gentlemen, on my giving the most early advice, should we meet with any future rebuffs in adjusting the conditions of the Treaty, or should this Government undergo any alteration, by change of Ministers, &c.

I acquainted the Ministers in the manner you directed, that the Peishwa's vackeel would be properly received, &c. at *Calcutta*; and they have requested that he may accompany me on my return to *Bengal*. From what I can learn, they have not yet been able to fix upon a man in whose abilities and attachment they can sufficiently confide, otherwise I suppose they would send him away sooner, for they were much pleased to find their desire of having a person reside at *Calcutta* so favourably received.

The passports from the Vizier are not yet arrived for *Goupkaboy* and *Siccaram Pundit*.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Poonah, 9th September 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton*.

P. S. I believe the most favourable reading may be given to the inclosed letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay*. I have again wrote to these Gentlemen for a fuller explanation, and herewith forward a copy of this letter.

Ordered, That the inclosures be entered after the Consultation.

Resolved,

Appendix. No. 141.

Reſolved, That the following reply be written to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton:*

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton.*

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 9th ultimo.

We have already given it as our opinion, that your longer continuance at *Poonah* is unneceſſary; we ſee no grounds to alter that opinion, and cannot therefore conſent to your ſtay. We require you to demand your immediate diſmiſſion from the Maratta Court, if this letter ſhould find you ſtill at *Poonah*. You will, however, take care to do it in terms of the greateſt delicacy, and with ſuch cautions that it may not have an abrupt or unfriendly appearance.

We incloſe a letter from the Governor General to *Siccaram Baboo*, which you will deliver to him, and a copy is herewith tranſmitted for your peruſal.

Notwithſtanding any revolutions that may happen in the Maratta State, we conſider that State as well as ourſelves equally bound to abide by the Treaty, and to maintain the conditions of it, without any regard to the perſons actually in poſſeſſion of the ruling power, for the Government itſelf remains the ſame, whatever change of hands the adminiſtration may fall into.

On theſe principles you will ſee that we deem it totally unneceſſary to open any freſh negociation with *Sudaba*, in caſe that Chief ſhould prevail; nor do we ſee any ſubject which will remain for negociation, unleſs ſome conditions of the Treaty ſhould be unaccompliſhed, and he, diſclaiming the Treaty, refuſe to execute them. Suppoſing the party of *Sudaba*, or any other foreign party, to be eſtabliſhed in the Poonah Government, you will call upon them to execute the Articles of the Treaty remaining to be performed on their part, and you will take their reply as an acknowledgment or diſavowal of the Treaty; but you muſt be cautious to avoid expreſſing any doubt of the validity of the Treaty; or that the force of it can be impaired by any internal changes or revolutions in the Government of *Poonah*.

Fort William, We are, &c.
the 14th October 1776.

Referred to in Appendix No. 139.

Read the following letters from *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your letters, dated the 6th, 16th, and 20th May.

It is with much pleaſure we can aſſert, that none of the bad conſequences have enſued which you apprehended from our receiving *Ragoba* into *Surat*, and on which you ground your directions for requiring him to withdraw from the Company's ſettlements: the Treaty has not only been ratified and exchanged, and orders given by the Miniſters for the communication being opened between the Company's ſettlements and the Maratta dominions; but we are not without hopes that Colonel *Upton* will prevail with them to aſſign an eſtabliſhment for *Ragoba*, as he mentions, in his letter dated the 13th June, that he would continue his endeavours for that purpoſe; and we have ſince again urged this point to him, but have not received his reply. Circumſtances therefore being thus altered, and the above conduct of the Miniſters implying an acquieſcence on their part to *Ragoba* continuing under the Company's protection, we have not ſignified to him the directions you have thought proper to give reſpecting him.

When the Peace was proclaimed at this Preſidency, the whole extract, as tranſmitted by Colonel *Upton*, was read verbatim to the garriſon, and we therefore ſuppoſe any further publication to be unneceſſary.

We have ordered copies to be made of the ſeveral Treaties you deſire, which ſhall be tranſmitted to you when finiſhed. The *Grenville* was diſpatched to *England* on the 27th ultimo, with directions to the commander to touch at *Fort Saint George*. We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *William Hornby*,
7th Auguſt 1776. &c. Council.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Our laſt letter was dated the 7th inſtant, of which a duplicate is incloſed; and we have ſince received your letters, dated the 20th and 27th June.

The veſſels taken by the Maratta fleet have not yet been reſtored, though the owners went down to receive them, with the orders from the Miniſters, which were entirely diſregarded.

The *Aurora*, an Engliſh merchant ſhip, was wrecked in the month of June laſt on the Marratta coaſt near *Rutneah Gherry*. The greateſt part of the cargo was landed; and as it is ſtipulated in the late Treaty, that the whole of what may be ſaved from Engliſh veſſels wrecked on any part of the Maratta coaſt ſhall be reſtored, we have ſent the neceſſary information to Colonel *Upton*, that he may demand full reſtitution; we alſo incloſe for your notice copy of a letter from the ſupercargo, giving a particular account of this accident, and of the treatment he received from the Marattas.

We conſider ourſelves as bound by the late Act of Parliament to tranſmit you every propoſal or political information, which in its conſequence may affect the Company's intereſt, and we were therefore ſurprized at the wiſh you expreſſed in your letter of the 30th June. We had no other concern in *Ragoba*'s propoſal reſpecting the Nizam than merely tranſmitting to your Honour, &c. a copy of the letter we received from him on the ſubject, which had we ſuppreſſed, might have made us liable to your cenſure, and we do not ſee how this tranſaction, of which the Miniſters were totally ignorant, could create in them any jealouſy or diſtruſt.

We have from time to time given you an account of *Sudaba*'s proceedings, as they have come to our knowledge; and as the event of his operations is likely to become of much importance to the Honourable Company, we wiſhed to be aſſured of his true ſituation as well as the identity of his perſon, and for this purpoſe *Abdul Gunny* was ſent down to *Rutna Gurry*, on the pretence of making enquiries reſpecting the *Aurora*'s cargo: this man having been frequently employed on Government buſineſs at *Poonah* while *Sudaba* was in power there, was perfectly acquainted with his perſon; and from his report, and from every other circumſtance, there remains not a doubt with us, that the perſon now in arms in oppoſition to the Miniſters, is the real *Sudaba*; he is encamped for the rains two days march from *Fort Victoria*, with an army of about thirty thouſand men, and expects to be joined by a conſiderable body of horſe from the Rannee. It is thought he will march this way before he proceeds to *Poonah* to take in *Baſſein*, the Killadar of which place was put in by his father, and we hear is ready to admit him.

We incloſe copies of a meſſage from *Sudaba*, brought us by *Abdul Gunny*, and of a letter ſince received, in which he explains his deſigns, and expreſſes a ſtrong deſire of being joined by *Ragoba*.

From the preſent appearance of affairs, there is every reaſon to expect that *Sudaba* will very ſhortly become maſter of *Poonah*, and that the Miniſters will not be able to maintain their Government; and we therefore eſteem it our duty to requeſt your immediate directions for our conduct upon this event: he totally diſallows any right in the Miniſters to conclude a Treaty in behalf of the Maratta State; and we apprehend it is highly neceſſary we ſhould be early furniſhed with powers to enter into a negociation with him or *Ragoba*, or both jointly, which we beg you will furniſh us with. Our affording protection to *Ragoba* may be conſidered as a moſt fortunate circumſtance, as we ſtill hope to be able to ſecure the advantages for the Company ſtipulated in the Treaty of *Surat*, which we ſhould have forfeited all pretenſions to, had we denied him an aſylum in his diſtreſs.

The Preſident has received advice from the Chief of *Surat*, that *Ragoba* on the 9th inſtant had ſuddenly retired from that place entirely of his own accord. The incloſed extract from the Chief's letter will acquaint you with

Appendix. No. 141.

with the apprehenſions which led this unfortunate man to this precipitate ſtep, and we can give you no further information of his future intentions than is therein contained.

We incloſe a continuation of our correſpondence with Colonel *Upton*. The *Latham* arrived here from *Great Britain* on the 17th inſtant, and we now tranſmit an extract from the commands of the Honourable the Court of Directors, received by that ſhip. With theſe ſpecial orders before us, we cannot think of relinquiſhing *Jamboſeer*, or any other of the poſſeſſions which are not yet reſtored; and we have therefore, in obedience thereto, determined at all events to retain them, which we ſhall ſignify to Colonel *Upton*, that he may regulate his conduct accordingly. We have the honour to be, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 20th Auguſt 1776. (Signed) *William Hornby*, &c. Council.

Ordered, That the incloſures be entered after the Conſultation; and

Agreed, That the following letter be written to *Bombay*:

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letters of the 7th and 20th Auguſt; which have been in a great meaſure replied to by our's of the 30th ultimo.

We are pleaſed however to find, by a letter juſt received from Colonel *Upton*, dated the 9th September, that your reſolution to maintain poſſeſſion of the conquered countries on the continent from the Marattas had not been divulged, and that you had thought proper to countermand the orders given on that occaſion. We hope that you will not have taken any ſubſequent meaſures to preclude you from carrying the injunctions contained in our letter of the 30th ultimo implicitly into execution; and we again repeat the ſame, requiring your ſtrict obedience thereto.

We have directed Colonel *Upton*, in caſe the party of *Sudaba*, or any other party, ſhould have prevailed in the Government of *Poonah*, to demand the performance of any conditions of the Treaty which may ſtill remain to be executed on the part of the Marattas, and to receive their anſwer as an acknowledgment or diſavowal of the Treaty; but not to enter into any freſh negociations with them. We conſider the Maratta State to be bound by the Treaty; and that the engagements formed by it continue in force as long as the State itſelf ſubſiſts, notwithſtanding any internal revolutions in the Government, or any change of perſons in the actual adminiſtration.

We have further ordered Colonel *Upton* to demand his immediate diſmiſſion from the Court of *Poonah*, to return to *Bengal*. If he ſhould leave any Articles of the Treaty unaccompliſhed at his departure, as the caſe of carrying it into complete effect will of courſe devolve to you, we recommend for this purpoſe, as well as to maintain a continued amicable intercourſe with the Maratta State, that you appoint an Agent to reſide at *Poonah*; and we requeſt that you will be pleaſed to adviſe us of the perſon whom you may nominate to that ſtation.

Fort William, 14th October 1776. We are, &c.

P. S. We have this inſtant received your letter of the 14th September, with the ſeveral papers incloſed in it. We are very happy to ſee it thus confirmed to us, that you had anticipated our inſtructions of the 30th September, by repealing the orders which you had iſſued on the 20th Auguſt laſt.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 14th October 1776.

INCLOSURES.

To Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We have received your letter dated the 27th ultimo.

The utmoſt ſecreſy has been obſerved, with reſpect to the meaſures we had reſolved to purſue, in conſequence of the Honourable Company's commands, communicated to you in our letter of the 20th; and we have now to acquaint you, that from ſome circumſtances which have ſince happened, we have thought proper to countermand the orders we had given on this occaſion.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 4th September 1776. (Signed) *William Hornby*. *John Carnac*, *Robt Gordon*, *D. Draper*, *Tr Moſtyn*, *N. Stackhouſe*, *Robt Garden*, *Andw Ramſay*.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt October 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, and *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires,

Lieutenant General *John Clavering* indiſpoſed.

Read, a letter from *Bombay* as follows:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Agreeable to what we mentioned in our letter, dated the 24th April, we now diſpatch the *Eagle*, one of the Company's cruizers, commanded by Captain *John Hall*, to receive on board whatever treaſure you may think proper to ſend round in part of the year's ſupply, and likewiſe to afford you an opportunity of conveying to us any ſums of money you may have taken up as loans for this Preſidency in conſequence of our letter dated the 30th of June.

Our laſt addreſs, dated the 20th ultimo, was forwarded in duplicate by the ſhips *Saint Helena* and *Reſolution*, and we have ſince received your letters, dated the 1ſt, 3d and 4th July.

We felt the utmoſt concern upon receiving from you, orders ſo very different in their tenor from thoſe of the Honourable the Court of Directors, in obedience to which we had formed the reſolution communicated to you in our laſt letter. From the high reſpect we entertain for both authorities, and the preſent critical ſituation of affairs, theſe very oppoſite orders occaſioned us much embarraſſment; though we think it incumbent on us to declare to you our opinion, that the orders of the Court of Directors ſhould ſupercede every other, and that we ſhould never heſitate a moment which to prefer, if we are ſo circumſtanced as to have an option, unleſs our obedience might tend to the manifeſt injury and danger of the Company's affairs. With theſe ſentiments, and a ſtrong perſuaſion that the conduct we had adopted would prove favourable to their intereſt, we do yet find ourſelves under a neceſſity of deviating from their orders, and of revoking our firſt reſolution, from an apprehenſion of the bad conſequences which muſt enſue ſhould your Honour, &c. perſiſt in the new alliance and withhold from us all further ſupplies, as from the peremptory manner in which your orders are conveyed we had every reaſon to expect. We have therefore countermanded the orders we had iſſued to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* for retaining *Jamboſeer*, &c. of which we alſo gave immediate advice to Colonel *Upton*.

Mr. *Draper* having differed in opinion from us reſpecting the conſtruction of the Company's orders, and diſſented from our reſolution in conſequence, we at his requeſt tranſmit you a copy of the diſſent he delivered on the occaſion. Brigadier General *Gordon* likewiſe concurred with Mr. *Draper* in both points, and delivered a Minute, of which the incloſed is a copy: and the other members

members thinking it neceſſary to explain their ſentiments on the ſubject, we have the honour to tranſmit copies of the Minutes made by the Preſident, and Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Moſtyn*, *Stackhouſe*, *Garden*, and *Ramſay*. *Ragoba*, after quitting *Surat*, proceeded to the ſouthward, and has already collected two or three thouſand followers: He is now at a fort which ſurrendered to him, a ſmall diſtance from *Damaun*, and we hear is negociating with the Portugueſe for their aſſiſtance. We cannot yet judge what probability there is of an alliance taking place between them; but this leads us again to lament that more attention was not ſhewn to *Ragoba* in the late Treaty. We foreſaw this event, with all its bad conſequences, if ſatisfactory terms were not ſettled for him, and urged this point to Colonel *Upton* in the moſt forcible manner in our letter dated the 18th January. This gentleman has ſince acknowledged, in his letter dated the 7th ultimo, that had *Ragoba* ſent a vackeel to him at *Poonah*, the conditions might perhaps have been made more agreeable to him; and we are ſorry that any ſuppoſed failure of ceremony on the part of *Ragoba* ſhould have had any conſideration in a point wherein the honour and intereſt of the Company were ſo much concerned.

Twelve or thirteen days after *Ragoba* had quitted *Surat*, the Miniſters made Colonel *Upton* the propoſal mentioned in his letter dated the 22d ultimo, reſpecting an increaſe of his ſtipend, and a change of abode. The diſtance between *Surat* and *Poonah* is not ſo conſiderable that they could poſſibly be ignorant of this circumſtance when they made the propoſal, of which we have further inconteſtable proof, by a body of three or four thouſand of their horſe marching ſuddenly from the gauts to within a ſmall diſtance from *Surat*; on the 20th ultimo, with a view, no doubt, to intercept him, whereas the above propoſal was made to Colonel *Upton*, at *Poonah*, on the 21ſt. This ſufficiently evinces the artifice of the Miniſters, and that Colonel *Upton* can receive no intelligence at *Poonah* but ſuch as is agreeable to them.

We obſerved, with the utmoſt ſurprize, your intention of recalling Colonel *Upton* from *Poonah*, to carry on his negociation from this Preſidency. His interference in political matters in the immediate ſeat of our Government, would be contrary to every rule of the ſervice, and would ſenſibly affect that conſequence and importance which is ſo neceſſary to be preſerved to the Members thereof. You will permit us to remark, that your ordering him to *Bombay* upon any ſuch purpoſe, implies a want of confidence in us, which we are not conſcious of having merited, and is not warranted by any neceſſity, as no part of the Treaty remains unaccompliſhed on our ſide.

We have advices from *Broach*, ſo late as the 31ſt ultimo, when the Maratta agents for ſettling the country of three lacks were not arrived, though the Pergunnahs lately ſubject to that Chiefſhip have been relinquiſhed ſo long ago as the 18th June. The Company muſt ſuffer conſiderably by the dilatory manner in which the Miniſters perform their engagements, as the ſeaſon is too far advanced to take the proper meaſures for the improvement of the revenues for this year.

Your Honour, &c. are pleaſed to acquaint us in your letter, dated the 3d July, that you had directed Colonel *Upton* to ſettle for the payment of the 12 lacks at this Preſidency; but though the time fixed for the firſt payment is already conſiderably elapſed, we have not yet received a rupee on this account; and Colonel *Upton* has propoſed to us to ſend a gentleman to *Poonah* for this buſineſs, which does not appear to be agreeable to your intentions.

Sudaba continues moving to the northward, and, as we at firſt underſtood, with an intention of joining *Ragoba*, but we know not as yet what effect the latter's negociation with the Portugueze may have on his conduct. On his paſſing fort *Victoria* he paid a viſit to our Reſident, and with profeſſions of much friendſhip to the Honourable Company, he offered a grant of two villages contiguous to that ſettlement, which we however have directed our Reſident to decline. We are perſuaded you will ſee the propriety and neceſſity of furniſhing us with immediate inſtructions and powers for negociating with *Sudaba*, as recommended in our laſt letter, for upon his becoming poſſeſſed of *Poonah*, which in all human probability will be the caſe in a few months, the Miniſters will not be in a condition to comply with the Treaty made by Colonel *Upton*, nor will the Company have any right to the poſſeſſions ceded by *Ragoba*. Appendix. No. 141.

The incloſed copy of the ſailing orders will apprize you of the inſtructions given to the commander of the *Eagle*.

Since writing thus far, we have received a letter from *Ragonath Row*, as per copy incloſed, which confirms our intelligence of his having commenced a negociation with the Portugueze. He however promiſes to return to us in caſe we will give him aſſurances of effectual aſſiſtance.

We have the honour, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 14th September 1776. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

The above letter having been acknowledged in a poſtſcript to the letter written to *Bombay* on the 14th inſtant; Ordered, that duplicates of that letter be prepared and diſpatched.

Incloſures in the Letter from *Bombay*.

The Preſident's opinion.

The Preſident with much reluctance agrees to countermand the orders ſent under the 20th Auguſt, to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, for keeping poſſeſſion of ſuch of the Pergunnahs, &c. as had not already been delivered to the agents of the Poonah Government, as it is contrary to the expreſs orders of the Court of Directors. For that he has every reaſon to expect no aſſiſtance from the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*, or that they could permit the Governor and Council of *Madras* to do it, who are much better ſituated to aſſiſt us with troops, as they are ſoon got over to this coaſt; at the ſame time it gives him real concern to think, that we are neceſſitated to give up, in a manner all the advantages we had acquired for the Honourable Company (and which they had been long ſo much in want of on this coaſt) and at a time he believes, were we to eſpouſe *Ragoba*'s cauſe, he might be fixed in *Poonah*, without any, or very little, oppoſition: at this time there is the greateſt likelihood, that *Sudaba* will not be many months before he gets thither, when the Treaty that has been made by the preſent Miniſters at *Poonah* will be void and of no value, and of *Rogoba*'s likewiſe; nor are we entitled to any thing from it, if he ſhould be ſeated without our aſſiſtance.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *Edward Ravenſcroft*, Sec^r.

Mr. *Carnac*'s opinion.

Whatever may be my ſentiments as to the propriety of the Treaty with *Ragonauth Row*, or of the meaſures for the requiſition of *Salſette* and its dependencies, it is not my inclination, nor perhaps would it become me, to paſs a retroſpective opinon upon matters for which I have no degree of reſponſibility, and which have been ſubjected to the verdict of the Court of Directors. My duty only calls upon me to give my moſt ſtrenuous aſſiſtance with the other Members of Council, that the preſent views and orders of our Honourable Employers may be complied with to the fulleſt extent that our means and circumſtances will admit of. It is not to be wondered at, that the Court of Directors ſhould have ſo long and ſo earneſtly had at heart the obtaining of *Salſette*, with the adjacent iſlands; being from every local advantage, its vicinity to *Bombay*, it compactneſs, the facility of its being adminiſtered under the immediate eye of the Preſidency, a treaſure for which they can have no equivalent; and that being poſſeſſed of it, and therewith, as they

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they had reaſon to ſuppoſe, of the important fort and diſtricts of *Baſſein*, they ſhould be ſo earneſt for the preſervation of them. Indeed their orders on this head ſeem ſo explicit as to leave no plea or evaſion, unleſs under the conviction of the impoſſibility of their being executed, or that our obedience may tend to the manifeſt injury and danger of the Company's affairs; as for inſtance, the involving ourſelves in a war, which the low ſtate of our finances, and the conſiderable diminution of our European force, render us very ill able to ſupport; and we are got into an unhappy dilemma, from the claſhing of the orders received from home with thoſe received from the Supreme Council; which is to me a matter of the moſt ſerious concern, as I have the higheſt veneration for the authority by which it is conſtituted, and a ſingular reſpect for the Gentlemen who compoſe it; from a perſuaſion that they have the moſt honourable intentions towards the public, and a zealous regard for the intereſts of the Company. Into this dilemma we would not have been brought, had our army proceeded to *Poonah* the laſt campaign, agreeable to the main object of our Treaty with *Ragonauth Row*, and which was pointedly recommended in your inſtructions to the officer commanding that army. Had this been done, it is more than probable that *Ragonauth Row* would have been ſecurely ſeated in the Peiſhwary; that the miniſterial confederacy would have been cruſhed; and that there would have been no competitor, with whom to enter into new engagements. There appeared to be but one opinion at the firſt committee held after the receipt of the general letter per *Latham*; but Mr. *Draper* has ſince entered a diſſent, in which the moſt weighty reaſon offered for deviating from the orders of our Honourable Maſters, ariſes from an apprehenſion, that we may draw upon ourſelves a Maratta war: but it is now become problematical at leaſt, whether an adherence to the former Treaty would not be the moſt likely means of avoiding it; for, if your intelligence of *Sudabah* is to be relied upon, and that he really means, as is ſaid, to cooperate with *Ragonauth Row*, we have cauſe to expect, that ſo ſoon as the ſeaſon for action commences, the face of things in the Maratta Empire will be changed, the Miniſters will be reduced to the ſame deplorable ſtate *Ragonauth Row* has been in, and he in his turn will be triumphant. There is indeed an objection almoſt inſurmountable againſt our continuing firm to *Ragonauth Row*, though but ſlightly touched on by Mr. *Draper*; namely, that if the Gentlemen of the Supreme Council perſiſt in the new alliance, we may and probably ſhall have our reſources from *Bengal* cut off, without which we are in no condition to give him that effectual aſſiſtance as he may think ſufficient to merit the confirmation of the conceſſion ſtipulated in the Treaty of *Surat*.

(Signed) *John Carnac.*

Bombay, Aug. 30th, 1776.

A true copy.
(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Eſquire, Secr^y.

Minute made by Brigadier General *Gordon*.

The Brigadier General continues of the ſame opinion he has ever been, that the conditions of the laſt Treaty with the Maratta Government, ſo ſolemnly ratified and confirmed by the Supreme Council, ſhould be ſtrictly complied with and adhered to on our parts, unleſs it ſhould be broke through by the Maratta Government. The Court of Directors could not know of Peace being concluded, nor the circumſtances that attended it, when their laſt general letter by the *Latham* was wrote. The countries ceded by *Ragoba* were all conditional of his being made Peiſhwa, and of his being re-eſtabliſhed by us in the Government of *Poonah*, which on our part was never done or attempted, as the troops never marched that way, until after the ceſſation of arms was declared. Should this preſent Treaty of Peace, concluded between the Maratta Government and the Supreme Council, be broke through, under pretence of other orders from the Court of Directors, no Country Powers would truſt us in future, as they would then have experienced the Supreme Council having overturned the Treaty made between *Ragoba* and this Preſidency, and now the Court of Directors had overturned the ſucceeding Treaty of Peace, concluded between the Supreme Council and the Maratta Government.

A true copy.
(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secr^y.

To the Honourable *Willm Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council, *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

On recovering from my late indiſpoſition, I obſerved, from the Minutes of Council and correſpondence during that interval, that your Honour, &c. had on the 20th inſtant reſolved that the 38th, 39th and 40th paragraphs of the Honourable the Court of Directors their commands, dated the 5th April laſt, received by the *Latham*, contained ſpecial orders for keeping poſſeſſion of all ſuch territories ceded by *Ragoba*, as were not then relinquiſhed, notwithſtanding the late Treaty of Peace concluded by Colonel *Upton* with the Maratta State; and that you had diſpatched poſitive orders to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, on no account whatever to deliver up *Jambooſeer*, and ſuch other ceſſions as then remained in our hands, and were to be relinquiſhed agreeable to the Treaty: alſo that you had wrote, conformably to the above-mentioned reſolution, to the Governor General and Council, and to Colonel *Upton*. The firſt notice of your Honour, &c. having taken ſuch meaſures, affected me very ſenſibly, as I had peruſed the afore-mentioned commands, without perceiving that they ought to be conſtrued in that manner; and the more I have conſidered the ſubject, the more neceſſary it has appeared to me to differ in opinion with your Honour, &c. for my juſtification with the Honourable the Court of Directors, and the Governor General and Council.

I conclude your Honours, &c. have been influenced in the above reſolution, by knowing that the Court of Directors had received intelligence by the *Northamberland*, that the Governor General and Council had appointed a ceſſation of arms, and that Colonel *Upton* had proceeded from *Calcutta*, with full powers to conclude a peace at *Poorunder*; alſo, that you think a particular ſtreſs ſhould be laid on the words, "under all circumſtances," contained in the 35th paragraph; but it appears to me, that the Honourable Court by no means intended thoſe paragraphs to convey ſpecial orders, to counteract any thing Colonel *Upton* might have done; not chuſing to take it for granted, that he would be able to conclude a peace, as had very near proved the caſe, but rather, according to our advices, to conſider us in a ſtate of war, and enjoin us to attend to the ſecurity and preſervation of the ceſſions we were entitled to by the Treaty with *Ragoba*; the Directors well knowing, that if Colonel *Upton* ſhould conclude a treaty, it would operate according to the late Act of Parliament, till they could be informed of the conditions, and give their definitive orders thereon.

I allow that the above-quoted words, "under every "circumſtance," are very comprehenſive; but I can by no means concur with your honour, &c. that they relate to our preſent peaceable ſituation, I am rather induced to think that they are expreſſive of the Directors' approval of the ſeveral ſtipulations contained in the Treaty with *Ragoba*, and that when they become acquainted with our preſent circumſtances, they will be ſorry to find that your Honour, &c. have conſtrued thoſe words in the manner you have done, and in ſupport of my opinion, that they meant only in a general way to reply to our advices then before them; conſidering us in a ſtate of war, without ſuperſeding and unhinging every thing eſtabliſhed by the Treaty, I beg leave to refer your honour, &c. to the ſeveral expreſſions contained in theſe three paragraphs

graphs relative to the ſecurity and preſervation of the ceſſions made by *Ragoba*, on a ſuppoſition that we enjoyed them by that tenure only, for as above obſerved, they well know that we muſt ſubmit to the controlling power of the Governor General and Council as to war and negociation, till their definitive orders might be received.

The expreſſions alluded to above, for my believing that the Honourable Court choſe to confine their orders, as conſidering us in a ſtate of war inſtead of peace, as is now the caſe, are the laſting ſecurity and preſervation of the poſſeſſions acquired from *Ragoba*, mentioned in the 38th paragraph; their approval of keeping them, and directions to the Governor General and Council, and Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, for adopting meaſures moſt proper for the preſervation of thoſe territories according to exigencies, as comprehended in the 39th paragraph; and requeſting countenance and ſupport from the King's ſhips, for the ſecurity of thoſe poſſeſſions, as noticed in the 40th paragraph, which ſurely are not at all applicable to a ſtate of peace and tranquillity.

Having thus fully ſtated to your Honour, &c. the reaſons which have induced me to differ in opinion with you regarding the Honourable Court's paragraphs, I am now particularly to aſſign the reaſons for my diſſenting to the reſolution you took the 20th inſtant, and all conſequences which may reſult therefrom, viz.

Firſt. Becauſe in my opinion, your honour, &c. reſolution is a direct and manifeſt infringement of the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, as well as of the ſtrict orders lately given by the Governor General and Council, for avoiding every meaſure which might even give the Marattas diſtruſt or jealouſy.

Becauſe, in our ſituation, conſidering the advantages reaped and to be reaped by the Treaty, the reſolution is both unreaſonable and impolitic; unreaſonable conſidering the advantages of the Treaty, and impolitic on the two following accounts.

Becauſe, I take it for granted, we ſhall forfeit the receipt of the 12 lacks of rupees ſtipulated to be paid; ſix lacks of which would have been due the firſt of next month.

Becauſe, the ceſſion of the country of three lacks per annum, contiguous to *Broach*, will of courſe likewiſe be forfeited; the peaceable enjoyment of which would in my opinion be far preferable to the Pergunnah of *Jamboofeer*, the only one we ſhall probably retain in conſequence of the reſolution, though eſtimated at five lacks per annum; as I am of opinion more than the difference will be abſorbed by maintaining it by force of arms; and your Honour, &c. well know that *Jamboofeer* has been continued with us, merely as a ſecurity for the country of three lacks, without being allowed to collect the revenues.

Becauſe, I think we ought religiouſly to have proceeded in the execution of the Treaty, or at leaſt to have temporized till we could hear further from the Court of Directors, or the Governor General and Council, but I ſhould have preferred the former conduct.

Becauſe, we are at this place about 29 lacks of rupees in debt, accumulating at an intereſt of ¾ per cent. per month; alſo becauſe the Governor General and Council furniſhing us with ſufficient ſupplies of money, in caſe of the peace being diſturbed by the above reſolution, I think very uncertain.

Becauſe, on the 31ſt ultimo the Company's remains of Europe goods amounted to about ten lacks, to the amount of three lacks have ſince been received by the *Latham*, and the purchaſers remains under the 31ſt ultimo amounted to nearly eight lacks; the realizing of which I apprehend will be much obſtructed, and that the trade of private merchants will equally ſuffer.

Becauſe, the number of European troops ſince the attack of *Tannah* is reduced from 1996 to 1416.

Becauſe, the ſtate of public affairs at home prevented any number of recruits being ſent this ſeaſon, and the ſame reaſon may unfortunately ſubſiſt the next year. Appendix No. 141.

I beg that a copy of this my diſſent may be tranſmitted to the Governor General and Council by the firſt opportunity; and am very reſpectfully, &c.

(Signed) *Daniel Draper.*

Bombay, 28 Auguſt 1776. A true copy. (Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Sec^y.

Meſſrs. *Moſtyn*, *Stackhouſe*, and *Garden*, join in opinion with Mr. *Draper*, that temporizing meaſures, as far as prudence will admit, ſhould be obſerved, and every means uſed to avoid a war; and were we convinced that the perſons with whom Mr. *Upton* has concluded a treaty could poſſibly ſupport themſelves in the Government, we ſhould be alſo of his opinion in every other point: but we firmly believe the Miniſters will not be able to continue in *Poonah* many months longer, for there remains not a doubt with us but *Sudaba* will, as ſoon as the ſeaſon opens, get poſſeſſion of the Government, more eſpecially as there is a proſpect, that *Ragoba* means to join them by coming to the ſouthward; and ſhould this be the caſe, we apprehend they will not want our aſſiſtance, conſequently we can have no right to the poſſeſſions granted by the Treaty made with *Ragoba*, nor can the Miniſters comply with their's. Thus ſituated, and the Company's expreſs orders by the *Latham* before us, we cannot help thinking the reſolution of the Board laſt Council day the propereſt meaſure we can adopt in the preſent unſettled ſituation of affairs; though, for the reaſons given in the general minute, we are obliged to deviate from the Company's orders.

A true copy.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Sec^y.

Mr. *Ramſay*'s Minute.

If the Maratta Empire was now in the ſame ſettled ſtate it was in before the death of *Narron Row*, and the preſent Government at *Poonah* in a condition to fulfil the Treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, however inadequate in ſome reſpects that Treaty may be, Mr. *Ramſay* would entirely concur with Mr. *Draper*, that the unanimous reſolution of the Board at their laſt meeting, for retaining *Jamboofeer*, and ſuch other territory as has not yet been reſtored to the Marattas in conſequence of that Treaty, would be impolitic and unreaſonable, and the reaſons Mr. *Draper* has brought in ſupport of that opinion, would in that caſe weigh moſt forcibly; but circumſtanced as we now are, Mr. *Ramſay* cannot heſitate a moment in declaring it as his opinion, that we ought to retain every poſſeſſion we poſſibly can, conſiſtent with the orders of our employers, who, though they knew of Colonel *Upton*'s miſſion, and muſt ſuppoſe it probable, from the tenor of his inſtructions, he would conclude ſome deciſive terms with the Poonah Government, are notwithſtanding pleaſed to approve, *under every circumſtance*, of our keeping poſſeſſion of the territories ceded to them by the Treaty with *Ragoba*. A pacific ſyſtem, Mr. *Ramſay* will ever hold to be moſt for the Company's real intereſt, and would therefore wiſh to avoid every meaſure which would tend to involve them in war; but in the preſent ſituation of affairs it ſeems next to a certainty, that the preſent ruling Government at *Poonah* cannot long exiſt. *Subadab* is ſaid to be at the head of a very formidable force, and ready to ſupport our late ally *Ragoba* in his pretenſions to the Peiſhwaſhip: this latter it is further ſaid is negociating with the Portugueſe for aſſiſtance; which ſhould they grant, and he ſucceed in eſtabliſhing himſelf at *Poonah* without our aid, we cannot have the leaſt ſhadow of right to withhold from him the ceſſions made by the Treaty of *Surat*. In ſhort, from the preſent diſtracted ſtate of the Maratta Empire, it can ſcarcely admit of a doubt, that in order to ſecure the poſſeſſions we already hold, as well as to preſerve the Company's influence in theſe parts, we ſhall neceſſarily be obliged

Appendix. No. 142.

obliged to take an active part in the troubles which are likely to enſue; in which caſe the ill conſequences which Mr. *Draper* apprehends from keeping poſſeſſion of *Jambooſeer*, &c. can have no weight. As to our infringing Colonel *Upton*'s Treaty, it is notorious, and will fully appear by our records, that every thing has been done on our part to carry it into execution in the fulleſt extent, while no one ſtep appears to have been taken for that purpoſe on the part of the Poonah Government: on the contrary, our veſſels have been inſulted, the communication ſtill continues ſhut, all intercourſe of trade and correſpondence is ſtill ſtopped, and we ſuffer every inconvenience attending an actual ſtate of war; to which if we add their having made over countries not their own, which may probably hereafter involve us in troubles with the Guicawar family, ſufficient grounds are not wanting to invalidate the Poonah Treaty, without hurting the national faith. If the Governor General and Council ſhould judge it eligible to take advantage of the preſent criſis, thoſe gentlemen have already been fully adviſed of every thing that has paſſed in our neighbourhood, and we may therefore hope ſhortly to receive their orders what conduct we are to purſue; but as the ſeaſon for action is now approaching, and we may be under an indiſpenſable neceſſity of taking ſome ſteps for the Company's intereſt, Mr. *Ramſay* thinks their ſpeedy and expreſs orders ſhould be again requeſted, and a letter in duplicate immediately diſpatched to them for that purpoſe, although he much fears the diſtance is ſo great as to render it impoſſible to give orders with that preciſion which the nature of affairs may require; which makes it much to be wiſhed that the Governor General and Council would have ſufficient confidence in this Board to give us a latitude to act as from circumſtances may be deemed moſt for the Company's intereſt; having regard at the ſame time, as far as the ſituation of affairs will poſſibly admit, to the general views and orders of the Governor General and Council.

A true copy.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Sec^y.

APPENDIX, No. 142.

To *Siccaram Pundit*: written 14th October 1776.

I HAVE received your letter, wherein you adviſe me, that the conſideration of my authority over the other ſettlements had induced you to aſſent to ſome of Colonel *Upton*'s propoſals, and refer others to my juſtice, and deſire that I will forbid every Engliſhman to ſupport *Ragonaut Row*, or to interfere in the concerns of the family, or obſtruct the collection of the Chout; and that I will order *Shaſty* to be delivered up; you alſo adviſe me, that with a view to the preſervation of friendſhip you accepted the copy of the Treaty, which was executed in *Calcutta*, and delivered a counterpart to Colonel *Upton*; and that you are aſſured that you ſhall obtain *Salſette* and the ſmall iſlands: theſe, and all the other particulars I very clearly underſtand.

When a treaty has been agreed to, and executed on both ſides, I am ſurprized that you ſhould ſtill diſpute the points which have been decided by the Treaty. The Engliſh have performed no act, whether in their conduct towards *Ragonaut Row*, or in any other inſtance, which is not ſtrictly conformable to it, nor ſhall it ever in any reſpect be violated on our part; but near a twelvemonth has elapſed ſince Colonel *Upton* has arrived with you, and the Treaty has long ſince been executed by both parties. Nothing now remains but the performance, which will depend on you and the Governor of *Bombay*, who is connected more particularly than the Engliſh in any other ſettlement with the Maratta Government. Strict orders have been written to him on this ſubject, and the authority of this Government has been exerciſed to command a rigid obſervance of every ſtipulation. The preſence therefore of Colonel *Upton* can be no longer neceſſary. Indeed it is improper, as it conveys the appearance of a doubtful friendſhip, and that the object of this negociation is not completed. Conformably therefore to the orders which he has received, I conclude that he will before this time have taken his leave and departed: I have now written to him, that in caſe he ſhall ſtill be with you, he do immediately, having received his diſmiſſion, return to *Bengal*; and I requeſt that there may be no delay in giving him his diſmiſſion, that the mouths of falſe and deſigning men may be ſtopt; and that the world may ſee that every difference which formerly ſubſiſted between your Government and the Engliſh is totally effaced, and a firm friendſhip eſtabliſhed for ever. This is my wiſh, as it is alſo my firm and unalterable reſolution to maintain the Treaty in every article of it inviolate; nor ſhall any change in the affairs of that quarter, of which there are many rumours, influence me to depart from this reſolution: and relying on your honour and friendſhip, and on the good faith of the Maratta Government, I am aſſured that it has received a ſanction which will conſtitute the obſervance a ſacred obligation on you and your nation for ever.

APPENDIX, No. 143.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 9th December 1776.

READ the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

Gentlemen,

I now incloſe what correſpondence I have had with the Select Committee of *Bombay*, ſince I had the honour to write laſt on the 10th September, alſo copies of two letters I received from the Peiſhwa; theſe will inform you regularly of the meaſures that have been taken ſince that time to fulfil the obligations of the late Treaty; and I have added, for further information, remarks on the letter from the Select Committee of the 21ſt September.

I have at laſt the great ſatisfaction to adviſe of my having brought the Treaty nearly to a happy concluſion. The Peiſhwa has conſented to make over the Pergunnahs of *Hanſood*, *Occlaſeer*, and *Deſhora*, for the country of three lacks. His Miniſters ſay the annual amount of the revenues of the diſtricts exceeds three lacks, but a freſh eſtimation is to be made, as ſhall be agreed upon between the commiſſaries on each ſide; and the ſurplus (if any) taken off any parts of theſe diſtricts as our commiſſaries ſhall name. I hope, therefore, this buſineſs will readily be adjuſted, as I cannot myſelf ſee a ſingle difficulty. Objections cannot well be made by the Gentlemen of *Bombay* to theſe Pergunnahs, becauſe they before propoſed receiving thoſe of *Hanſood*, and *Occlaſeer*; and in obſerving the value ſet upon *Deſhora* by our commiſſaries, I made a point with the Miniſters of its being added. It was impoſſible to get either *Ahmood* or *Jambooſeer*, they both belong to *Siccaram Bappoo*, and I am told, ſhould he be diveſted of theſe, he would have very little landed property left; beſides, *Jambooſeer* is worth upwards of four lacks and a half per annum, according to their revenue books.

From the Miniſters declaring, that their late large diſburſements had almoſt exhauſted their treaſury, and deſiring ſome longer time might be allowed for the payment of the firſt ſtipulated ſix lacks, and alſo finding that I might importune long before this money would be paid, I propoſed their making over the collections of *Jambooſeer* for the payment of the whole twelve lacks, and their leaving *Jambooſeer* in our poſſeſſion for the ſecurity until this money ſhould be paid. To this they have conſented, and for the more ſpeedy payment have added their annual collections in and about *Surat*. Upon the ſum of twelve lacks being paid, either by the collections on *Jambooſeer*, &c. or otherwiſe we were immediately to reſtore that Pergunnah. This was agreed upon

until the pleaſure of the Superior Council ſhould be known; and I have accordingly adviſed the Select Committee of *Bombay*, and have alſo informed them of what Pergunnahs the Peiſhwa is willing, and has given his orders to his Commiſſaries, to make over for the country of three lacks.

This letter goes by Coſſids, laid every fifteen or twenty coſs, to *Benares*, and I imagine will reach *Calcutta* in about eighteen days.

I ſhall endeavour to wait for further inſtructions at *Poonah*, but if I find this impracticable, I will ſtay at *Auringabad*, diſtant about ſeventy or eighty coſs, through which place the Coſſids paſs.

The Peiſhwa writes to you, Gentlemen, to aſſiſt him with two battalions of Sepoys, and promiſes in return to ſend at any time, on demand of the Superior Council, a body of cavalry, to act as the Engliſh may require. He has been induced to make this requeſt of two battalions of Sepoys, from the friendly profeſſions you have been pleaſed to make, and becauſe his enemies have been enabled to head againſt him, from *Ragonaut Row*'s having been ſo long ſupported by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, after the Treaty was concluded. The Miniſters ſay if their requeſt is complied with, it will be every where known the part the Engliſh take, and their diſputes ſoon end; this requeſt was intended to have been made two months ago, when *Ragonaut Row* firſt made his eſcape from *Surat*; their reaſons might be ſomewhat ſtronger then for aſking this aid: I obſerved this to the Miniſters, but they inſiſted on ſending their letter, and deſired me to write to endeavour to enforce their requeſt.

Neither vackeel or letter has arrived from *Futty Sing*, except what has been already forwarded. I imagine the man keeps back until he ſees which party will get the better; though the Miniſters will not acknowledge this, they excuſe his delays from his being kept at home, and conſtantly employed defending his country againſt his brother. As before, I have again aſſured the Miniſters, that the proofs reſpecting the Peiſhwa's having the ſole right to the Guzerat country, muſt be found ſatisfactory by you, Gentlemen, before the ceſſations made by *Futty Sing* can be reſtored.

It is now ſix weeks and upwards ſince *Sedaſhew Row* has been in poſſeſſion of almoſt the whole country between *Bombey* and *Poonah*. An advanced party of his was for ſeveral days within five coſs of *Poonah*: *Sedaſhew Row* has never himſelf been nearer than about eighteen coſs. Skirmiſhes are happening daily between the two armies; the Peiſhwa's troops are ſaid in theſe generally to have been victorious. Orders are ſent to the Peiſhwa's army, to march to where the Bhow's grand army is poſted, and make a general aſſault. The Miniſters expect this will take place in three or four days; they are to make ſeveral attack, and to endeavour to cut off a retreat to the Bow. *Sinda* and *Tucojee*, who have been ſome time at *Poorunder*, are to command theſe attacks. *Imrut Row*, *Ragonaut Row*'s adopted ſon, is with the Bhow. *Ragonaut Row* is ſaid to be near the Portugueſe ſettlement of *Daman*.

Moribah left *Poonah*, and went to a fort of his own, about twenty coſs diſtant, fourteen days ago. I cannot learn what his intentions are, though it is generally thought he will either join *Ragonaut Row* or the Bhow; the two latter have not yet met. I ſhould think it impoſſible (having nearly the ſame object in view) that they can act in concert. I had written thus far, when the Miniſters ſent to deſire me to defer writing to *Calcutta* for three or four days, as they would re-conſider the ſubject of their letter, before they ſent it off. I therefore diſpatch this by way of *Maſulipatam*, as, upon a reviſal, I think it the more proper route; beſides, theſe people have already ſo long delayed writing, that it is not impoſſible their letter may not be ready yet theſe ſix or eight days, and I wiſh to adviſe immediately of what has been already done towards carrying the Treaty into execution.

I hope I ſhall receive a reply from *Bombay*, to my letter of the 19th, ſoon enough to ſend off with the Peiſhwa's letter. Appendix, No 144.

The paſſports from the Vizier have arrived for *Goupkaboy* and *Siccaram Bappoo*; and have been preſented, together with thoſe from *Chete Sing*, to *Siccaram Bappoo*, who expreſſed his warmeſt acknowledgements for this favour.

I have been honoured, Gentlemen, with your letter of the 24th July; and am greatly obliged by the indulgence, in permitting me to chuſe my route on my return to *Bengal*, which I ſuppoſe ſhall be by *Hyderabad* and *Maſulipatam*.

Poorunder, I have, &c.
26th October 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

Ordered, That the incloſures be inſerted after the Conſultation.

Agreed, That the following letter be written to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 26th October, with its ſundry incloſures.

We have only to acquaint you, that we have approved the accommodation which you have made with the Miniſters, for the mortgage of the territory of *Jambooſer*, and the Peiſhwa's collections in and about *Surat*, for the payment of the twelve lacks of rupees ſtipulated by the 6th Article of the Treaty, to be paid by the Maratta Government to the Company.

We are, &c.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

Since the date of our laſt letter to you from this department, we have received advices from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated 26th October, wherein he acquaints us, That he had obtained from the Maratta Government a ceſſion of the Pergunnahs of *Hanſood*, *Oclaſeer*, and *Deſbora*, as the territory of three lacks, ſtipulated by the 5th Article of the Treaty, to be yielded to the Company; and that he had made an accommodation with that Government, by which the country of *Jambooſeer*, together with the Maratta collections in and about *Surat*, have been mortgaged for the payment of the twelve lacks of rupees, agreeable to the condition of the 6th Article. We cannot but approve of this mortgage, as it affords a good ſecurity for the diſcharge of the ſum to be paid by the Peiſhwa, and is leſs liable to cauſe diſputes with his Government than any other mode he could have propoſed. As Colonel *Upton* will moſt probably have left *Poonah*, on his return to *Bengal*, before the arrival of this letter, we think it proper to repeat our recommendation, that you will appoint ſome perſon to reſide at the Peiſhwa's Court after his departure, with inſtructions to correſpond with us on any material occurrences which may come to his knowledge.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 144.

Extract *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 23d December, 1776.

Letter from Colonel *Upton*.

Gentlemen,

I HAD the honour of addreſſing you laſt on the 26th October.

The Miniſters have at length got their letter ready; they have declined aſking the aſſiſtance of troops, as now their inteſtine diſturbances are nearly at an end. There is ſome excuſe for the delay of this letter; the information from their different Sirdars in the Cockun country, which are arriving daily, kept them from

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closing it, as they wished to advise fully, and with certainty.

The Peishwa is very desirous of a Resident being sent to *Poonah*.

They now see the reason why the Council of *Bombay* decline sending one. The Ministers desired me to be very particular in making this request.

Sidashu Row was totally defeated on the 27th ultimo, he was taken prisoner by one of their Sirdars, *Ragoojee Angria*, who commands a fort on the sea shore, just as he had put off to have escaped, as is said, to *Bombay*. The inclosed letters will inform so very particularly of every transaction since I had the honour to write last, that little is left for me to say.

I have not yet received an answer from *Bombay*, to my letter of the 19th ultimo, which was sent by way of *Surat*; but that no time might be lost, I dispatched extracts of such parts of this letter as related to the cession of the country of three lacks, and of the manner proposed by the Peishwa for payment of the twelve lacks, by the direct road to *Bombay*. I shall do myself the honour, Gentlemen, to write immediately on the adjustment of these particulars.

As there is every appearance of hostilities soon commencing between the Presidency of *Bombay* and this State, I shall endeavour to convince the Ministers to how little purpose I now remain at *Poonah*, and that my services may be more effectually employed in their behalf at *Calcutta*. That I cannot render them any here, is certain; therefore I imagine they will consent to my departure. I have convinced the Ministers, that the Government of *Bombay* will soon receive such orders as will put an entire stop to all acts of hostility; and that they might be assured, in the mean time, no assistance would be afforded them from any of the other Presidencies.

The Ministers are sensible they can sustain no other injury than that of the immense expence incurred by keeping up a large inactive army, before the orders will arrive; but they observe, as these Gentlemen have thought proper to disobey the orders that have been heretofore sent, and disregard such solemn engagements as the treaties now subsisting between the two Nations, they shall have still every thing to apprehend that can be effected by their intrigues; their arms they seem to disregard.

The Peishwa has ordered *Sadashu Row*, to be brought to *Poonah*. I hear they again intend shewing him to the people.

Ragonaut Row is still in the neighbourhood of the Portuguese settlement, *Daman*. He has wrote to the Ministers lately, and proposed accepting a Jaghire, either in the Candeish country, or near *Jansi*: as the Ministers will agree to this, they expect soon to see him settled. He has at present very few people with him, and is almost surrounded by about fifteen thousand of the Peishwa's troops.

In a few days the Peishwa intends sending an army of forty or fifty thousand men, under *Hurry Pundit* and the Pretinctly, against *Hyder Ally*.

As I expect to leave *Poonah* very shortly, I have to request you will be pleased, Gentlemen, to order my letter to be forwarded by way of *Masulipatam*.

Poonah, 13th November 1776. I have, &c. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

Translation of a letter from *Mhada Row* Peishwa, to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, received 8th November 1776.

A seditious man, who assumed the name of *Sedashu Row*, assembled an army, plundered the whole Cockun country, and brought the war to the very environs of *Poonah*. But *Madajee Sindia* and *Banrow Panue*, two of the officers of the Government's army, after repeated defeats, plundered his army, and pursued him to the sea. He attempted an escape with some of his party in a boat, but *Ragojee Angria*, one of our chief officers, being informed of it, followed, and at length seized him, and was bringing him to the capital. While he was prosecuting this design, he received a letter from the Governor of *Bombay*, in the following terms:—"He "(*Sedashee Row*) was on his way to *Bombay*, and you "have carried him with you. Our charge is now in "your hands. Send him, and give him liberty to see "us."

This circumstance has affected us with the greatest surprize, for it is engaged both in the former treaties, and in the late Treaty concluded between the Maratta Government and the English, that neither of the contracting parties shall harbour or aid the rebels of the other; and that the deserters shall be mutually delivered up. What relation does the Governor of *Bombay* bear to that seditious man, which should incite him to desire to see him—and what does he mean by writing such a letter?

Another matter of complaint is as follows:—About a thousand of his adherents, after the defeat, crossed a branch of the sea near *Salsette*, and placed themselves and the elephants, horses, and baggage of their leader, under the protection of the fort of *Salsette*, when *Bheim Row* arrived in pursuit of them as far as the hithermost shore. Mr. *Halsey*, the chief of *Salsette*, wrote two or three letters to the commanders of our army, one of which I inclose. I request that you will do me the favour to transmit a copy of this letter, with a letter from yourself, containing a circumstantial relation of all these facts to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, that they may deliver up to our officers all the rebels, who are now harboured by the English, either in *Bombay* or *Salsette*, or other places; and forego their desire of seeing the rebel, as well as refrain from every fact which may be inconsistent with the treaties, or injurious to the good understanding which subsists between the two States. By this means the friendship will be established on a firmer basis. Inclosed is a letter which I have written to the Governor of *Bombay*, on the subject of those proceedings. You will forward it to *Bombay*, and desire a compliant answer immediately, for had any deserter from the English entered my country, and you required him, I would have delivered him up. A copy of the letter addressed to the Governor of *Bombay*, is inclosed for your inspection.

Translation of a letter from the Peishwa to the Honourable the Governor of *Bombay*.

The words used in the preceding letter, from the beginning to "one of which I inclose," are repeated here; the first person in what respects the Governor of *Bombay* being substituted for the third. *Brimrow* having charged Mr. *Halsey*, the chief of *Salsette*, with the elephants, horses, and baggage belonging to the rebel, went away to perform other business for the Government. You are required to deliver up the rebels who are harboured by the English in *Bombay*, *Salsette*, &c. to our officers, and refrain from such acts which are inconsistent with the Treaty, and injurious to the good understanding which subsists between the two States, by which means friendship will be established on a firmer basis.

P. S.—Dispatch an answer complying with the contents of this letter speedily, or should you have other intentions, inform me, that I may write accordingly to the Supreme Council in *Calcutta*.

Translation of a letter from *John Halsey*, Esquire, Chief of *Salsette*, to the Commander of the Peishwa's army.

The village of *Calvan* is situated within the range of the *Salsette* guns, I cannot therefore permit you to carry on a war there, but request that you will neither send your men into it, nor attack it with fire-arms; should you do so, we shall be under the necessity of firing

firing from the fort. On this we have reſolved—be it your part to preſerve the friendſhip.

Dated 19th Ranzaun, 1190 Higera.

Letter from the ſame to *Bhuns Row Bhauree*.

I have received two letters from you. I before wrote to deſire that you would not make war, and deſired in the ſame manner of the men who were near *Calvan*, that they would not make war with you; they came of their own accord into our dependancies, and I cannot deliver them to you; ſome of your Chiefs and Bramins, through fear of *Serrimunt Rajeſherry Bhow Sudabah*, came into this place for a ſhort time, we likewiſe gave them protection. Thoſe men were demanded on the part of the Aumildars of *Sudabah*, and we refuſed to give them up to them. What ſhall I write more? Let friendſhip ever ſubſiſt.

Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*'s letter having arrived in time to be forwarded to the Court of Directors by the *Shrewſbury*, a copy of it was ſent a number in that ſhip's packet.

APPENDIX, No. 145.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated 30th December, 1776.

RECEIVED the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Gentlemen,

I trouble you with this, purpoſely to acquaint you that *Ragonath Row* went to and was received at *Bombay*, about twelve days ago, to the very great ſurpriſe and concern of the Peiſhwa's Miniſters, who at the very time thought their domeſtic diſturbances quite at an end by having agreed to fix on *Ragonath Row* the Jaghire he had requeſted.

I have wrote to the Seleƈt Committee of *Bombay*, to know the particulars of this extraordinary event, and am expecting their reply daily, but would not defer adviſing you, Gentlemen, for one day, of ſo material a circumſtance as this, of *Ragonath Row*'s being received into *Bombay*, ſo obviouſly in breach of the late Treaty.

Sida Shu Row is on his way to *Poonah*, eſcorted by *Sindia*: he is permitted to travel with his cuſtomary retinue, as the Miniſters declare he ſhall ſuffer no indignities, till they and the public ſhall be ſatisfied that he is not the perſon he has given himſelf out to be.

The paragraph in my letter of the 19th July, where I mentioned the neceſſity of confirming, &c. was altogether meant on the part of this country, to reſtore peace and tranquillity to it, and to accelerate the accompliſhment of the Treaty. Reſiding as a Miniſter at this Court, when ſuch event ſhould have taken place, I ſhould have conceived it neceſſary and uſual, to have mentioned the treaties ſubſiſting between the two Nations, and the making and receiving the cuſtomary profeſſions of friendſhip.

I have been honoured by the receipt of your letter of the 30th September, with the copy of a letter of the ſame date, to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, my laſt to you, Gentlemen, was dated the 13th November.

This goes by the Peiſhwa's dawk, and I hope will be in *Calcutta* in twenty days at fartheſt.

Poonah, 24th November 1776. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) *J. Upton*.

Read the following letter from *Bombay*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

We have received your letter, dated the 30th December, and the incloſed papers.

The extracts we have now the honour to tranſmit from our Secret Conſultations will place in their proper light the circumſtances mentioned in your letter, of our giving protection to ſome of the defeated adherents of *Sudabah*, our interpoſition with *Ragojee Angria* in his favour, and our receiving into *Bombay* the perſon of *Ragonaut Row*. We are perſuaded, that when you have given theſe extracts a candid peruſal, the impreſſion made on your minds by the repreſentation you have received from *Poonah* on theſe points will be entirely removed, and that you will no longer conſider our preventing a handful of wretched Sepoys from being ſlaughtered under the walls of a Britiſh fortreſs as repugnant to any Treaty, but as an act dictated by humanity, and warranted by the law of nations. We ſent the meſſage mentioned in our Minutes to *Ragojee Angria*, after he had by treachery got *Sudabah* into his poſſeſſion, becauſe the latter had been promiſed our protection, and we eſteemed it our duty to endeavour to ſave him from being murdered, which we concluded would be the caſe if he was ſent to *Poonah*, by the perfidious *Angria*; but we diſclaim any declaration of war in caſe of his refuſal to deliver *Sudabah* up. Appendix No. 145.

We beg leave to obſerve, that we are not anſwerable for any thing the adherents of *Subadah* may have thought proper to write to his confederates.

Without entering into any diſcuſſion of your authority to give us an order to expel *Ragoba* from *Bombay*, and putting out of the queſtion the diſgrace and bad conſequences which would have attended ſuch a meaſure, and every conſideration of honour and humanity by which we eſteemed ourſelves bound to protect him, it appeared to us quite unadviſeable, and warranted by no political neceſſity, to compel him to depart, as Colonel *Upton* had acquainted us, under the 12th December, that the Miniſters ſeemed well pleaſed, and for the preſent ſatisfied with the aſſurances he had made them at our deſire in conſequence of *Ragoba*'s having taking refuge here; and we had reaſon to hope, from the profeſſions they made, that ſatisfactory terms would ſoon be ſettled for him, Mr. *Moſtyn* being then ſhortly to proceed to *Poonah*, to whom this point would be given in eſpecial charge. We therefore have not ſignified your orders to *Ragoba*, and we flatter ourſelves Mr. *Moſtyn* will meet with ſucceſs, and that your intentions will thereby be anſwered, as it is very pleaſing to us whenever we can promote the execution of them. Mr. *Moſtyn* ſet off for *Poonah* the 14th ultimo, and arrived there the 29th: he had not then had an audience from the Peiſhwa, but was to proceed to *Poorunder* in two days for that purpoſe. He adviſes the death of *Ram Rajah* on the 24th ultimo, which may probably occaſion ſome alteration in the *Poonah* Government. We incloſe copy of his inſtructions, which we hope you will approve, and that they will convince you of our diſpoſition to preſerve a good underſtanding with the Maratta State.

Much has paſſed between us and Colonel *Upton* on the ſubject of the evaſive conduct of the Miniſters in complying with the 5th Article of the Treaty. In the beginning of December laſt he adviſed, that he had ſettled with them that the Pergunnahs of *Ahmood*, *Hanſood*, and *Deſbora*, ſhould be made over to the Company, and that if the revenues of theſe places amounted to more than three lacks, the exceſs ſhould be deducted from *Amoor* or *Hanſood*; on the contrary, if there was any deficiency, it was to be made up by grants of villages from the Pergunnah of *Occlaſeer*. This was a very fair, equitable agreement, and we then hoped the buſineſs was entirely concluded in an advantageous manner to the Company; but owing to ſome colluſion between the *Poonah* agents at *Broach* and their principals, the country is not to this hour made over to the Company. That you may have full information of our proceedings, and be better able to judge what meaſures to purſue, we now tranſmit copies of all the papers on this ſubject ſince the ſettlement made by Colonel *Upton*, and the letters from Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Boddam*, and *Ramſay*, now at *Broach*, and hope that our conduct will be ſatisfactory to you.

In the above papers you will obſerve the demand made by the Miniſters for the poſſeſſion of *Jamboſeer*, which is equally oppoſite to the agreement made with Colonel

Appendix. No. 146.

Colonel *Upton*, and if complied with, would leave the Company without any ſecurity for the twelve lacks on the country ceded by the 5th Article.

Since writing the above, we have been honoured with your letter, dated the 27th January.

What we have already wrote, and the extracts above referred to, will in a great meaſure ſerve as a reply to one of them; and we can only further obſerve, that we ever underſtood it to be the cuſtom of all nations, and we think it inconſiſtent with reaſon and common ſenſe, not to permit of hoſtilities being committed within the reach of the guns of a fortification, which induced us to give the orders we did to the Chief and Council at *Tannah*, and not any intention of invading the territorial rights of the Marattas.

By the extracts of our Minutes, it will appear that *Ragonaut Row* eſcaped from the fort of *Tinapore*, where he was beſieged by his enemies on board an Engliſh veſſel, and came in perſon to *Bombay*, to ſolicit our protection, without any encouragement or invitation from us. The fort ſoon afterwards was taken by the *Poonah* forces.

In deference, Gentlemen, to the ſentiments you have been pleaſed to expreſs of the late revolution at *Madras*, we will in future addreſs our letters for that Preſidency "To the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Madras*," inſtead of the addreſs we have hitherto continued, declaring however, that we ſtill retain the opinion of that tranſaction expreſſed in our letter of the 17th November.

Mr. *Draper* having differed from us on this point, we, at his requeſt, tranſmit copy of his diſſent, and acquaint you, that he ſtill continues of the ſame opinion.

The extracts you have requeſted in your letter of the 30th December, being exceedingly long, and having very few aſſiſtants in our public offices, it is out of our power to comply at preſent with your deſire, but we now tranſmit a copy of the treaty now in force between this Preſidency and *Hyder Ally*, the others having been already ſent to you at different times.

We have, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 14th April 1774. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, Preſident and Council.

APPENDIX, No. 146.

Extract *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 30th November 1776.

Reply to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

WE have received your letters of the 13th and 24th ultimo.

It is with much ſurprize we read the information contained in them, reſpecting the conduct of Mr. *Halſey*, Chief of *Salſette*, in threatening to fire on the Peiſhwa's forces, if they ſhould continue their operations againſt *Calvan*; and of the Governor of *Bombay*, in ſending deputies to *Ragojie Angria*, one of the Maratta Chiefs, to demand the perſon of *Sudaba*. Theſe facts are ſo contrary to that repeated injunction to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and to their aſſurances in reply, that we cannot give credit to the reports which have been made to you, until we are furniſhed with the explanation of them, which we have required from the Preſidency.

We have alſo given poſitive orders to the Preſident and Council, to require and compel *Rogoba* to quit *Bombay*, or any of its dependencies that he may be in, at the receipt of our letter.

We muſt obſerve, that the letters written by the Miniſters ſince the concluſion of the Treaty, are filled with reproaches againſt the Government of *Bombay*, for acts committed by them previous to the date of it; all which ought to have been cancelled by the Treaty. They likewiſe put the moſt unfavourable conſtructions on every report which is made to them, concerning the conduct of the Engliſh. Theſe circumſtances mark a diſpoſition to enmity in the Miniſters, which is the more obvious to us, from your aſſertion, that you will endeavour to convince the Miniſters to how little purpoſe you now remain at *Poonah*: "that it is certain, that you cannot "render them any ſervice there, and you therefore imagine they will conſent to your departure;" and from their declaration, "that the reaſon you have not left "*Poonah*, is, that no other perſon has been ſent from "*Bombay* to reſide there." What can we conclude from theſe expreſſions, but that you are detained there by compulſion. We hope this is not the caſe; but on the ſuppoſition that it is, a letter has been written to the Peiſhwa, requiring your immediate diſmiſſion: And we hereby poſitively order and command you, if you ſhall be at *Poonah* on the receipt hereof, to take your leave immediately of the Maratta Court, and return to this Preſidency.

Fort William, 30th December 1776. We are, &c.

Reſolved, That a letter be written to *Bombay*, as follows:

Gentlemen,

We have been informed, by a letter from Colonel *Upton*, dated the 13th November, and by letters from the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, which were received at the ſame time, that Mr. *Halſey*, the Chief of *Salſette*, had threatened to fire on the Peiſhwa's forces, if they attempted to carry on their operations againſt the village of *Calvan*; that he had given ſhelter to about a thouſand of the adherents of *Sudabah* in *Salſette*, whom he refuſed to deliver up, on the requiſition of the Peiſhwa's officers; and that two deputies on the part of your Government had arrived with *Ragojee Angria*, and demanded the perſon of *Sudabah* in his name; making a declaration of war in caſe of refuſal.

By a letter juſt received from Colonel *Upton*, of the 24th November, we are further informed, that *Ragonaut Row* had taken refuge in the iſland of *Bombay*, twelve days previous to that date; and that he had actually been admitted there.

Theſe acts, if they have really paſſed, are ſo repugnant to the repeated injunctions we have given you, to your repeated aſſurances in conſequence of them, to the Treaties of Peace concluded with the Maratta State, and to the powers which are veſted in this Government by Parliament, that we cannot give entire credit to the report of them, however good the authority may appear to be from which they are received; but we conſider theſe ſubjects of too much importance to withhold the immediate communication of them from you: And for your better information, we incloſe copies of the ſeveral papers alluded to; among theſe you will perceive the tranſlation of an intercepted letter, ſaid to have been written from one of the adherents of *Sudaba*, reſiding at *Bombay*, to his confederates, encouraging them with aſſurances of ſupport from your government.

We deſire that you will inform us very minutely of the real circumſtances to which all theſe repreſentations refer; and in the mean time we think it neceſſary to repeat our moſt earneſt and poſitive injunctions, that you abſtain not only from every act of hoſtility againſt the Maratta State, but from every occaſion which may tend to renew the former breach between us, except in the caſe of your being actually attacked by them.

If it be true, that *Ragonaut Row* has received the protection of your Government, and ſhall be at *Bombay*, or in any of its dependencies, when you receive this letter, we peremptorily order and inſiſt, that you immediately require and compel him to depart therefrom. It is our fixed determination, that the Peace which has been eſtabliſhed ſhall not be broken by any act of ours, or our dependants. We expect that you will join heartily, with us in this reſolution, and that your endeavours be united to ours, in preſerving a good underſtanding with the Maratta Government.

We

We requeſt that you will furniſh us with extracts from your Conſultations of all your Minutes, debates, and reſolutions, upon the ſubject of your tranſactions with the Marattas, ſince the commencement of your firſt correſpondence with *Ragoba*; but as we deem it of conſequence, that we ſhould be immediately apprized of the circumſtances which have a relation to the facts alluded to in the beginning of this letter, you will be pleaſed to tranſmit to us, as ſoon as poſſible, exact copies of all your proceedings upon thoſe ſubjects; particularly ſpecifying the names of the Members preſent at each Conſultation, and their ſeveral opinions.

Fort William, 30th December 1776. We are, &c.

To *Siccarom Pundit*: written 6th January 1777.

I have received your letter wherein you inform me that *Salſette* was perfidiouſly ſeized by the Engliſh of *Bombay*, in violation of the Peace which ſubſiſted between two States; that they then gave their aid to *Serrimunt Ragonaut Row*; in conſequence of which diſturbances enſued, and that by means of Colonel *Upton*, whom I had deputed for that purpoſe, a Peace was concluded; that the Engliſh did not obſerve the Treaty in withdrawing themſelves from *Ragonaut Row*, but carried him near the fort of *Surat*, where he remained with his army for three months and twenty days after the concluſion of the Peace; that his army was afterwards diſbanded, but he was ſheltered under the Engliſh protection during the time that your army continued in thoſe parts; and that when the rainy ſeaſon arrived, and that your army was withdrawn, they in conſequence of my peremptory injunctions diſmiſſed *Ragonaut Row*, but gave no intimation of it to you. You add, that this can by no means be conſidered as an act of friendſhip, but on the contrary, that it aſtoniſhed you. You alſo adviſe me, that a victory has been obtained by the Peiſhwa's forces over a ſeditious man, who had aſſumed the name of *Sedaſhew Row*, and created diſturbances in the Cucun country; and that this man after his defeat had been taken priſoner by *Ragojee Angria*, one of your Chiefs; but that about a thouſand of his adherents had taken refuge in *Salſette*, whom Mr. *Halſey*, the Chief of that place, had refuſed to deliver up; and that he had moreover threatened to fire on the Peiſhwa's troops, if they perſiſted in carrying on their operations ſo near as *Calvan*.

You inform me in a poſtſcript of the ſame letter, that *Ragojee Angria* had adviſed you of the arrival of two deputies with him from the Governor of *Bombay*, to demand the perſon of *Sedaſhew Row*, who had declared that the conſequence of not ſending him immediately would be war.

I rejoice to hear of the ſucceſs of the Peiſhwa's arms, and of the reſtoration of Peace to the Maratta dominions; and I congratulate you with pleaſure on both theſe events, but my joy is conſiderably damped by the unexpected reports above-mentioned.

The conduct of Mr. *Halſey* in threatening to fire on your army, and of the Government of *Bombay*, in ſending perſons to demand the perſon of *Sedaſhew Row*, if true, are both acts inconſiſtent with the Treaty, and with the friendſhip which now ſubſiſts between us; but they are ſo contrary to the peremptory injunctions which have been given, and to the repeated aſſurances received from that Government, that I do not know how to give credit to them till I hear from *Bombay*: I have written to the Governor there for an explanation, and as it would be wrong to condemn him unheard; I muſt ſuſpend my determination till I am furniſhed with his reply. In the mean time, you may reſt aſſured that I ſhall ſuffer no real acts of hoſtility or violence to be committed againſt your Government by the Engliſh in any quarter.

At ſuch a time as this, we muſt expect that falſe reports will be made to us, either from motives of ſelf-intereſt, malice, or diſtruſt; and it is the point equally of friendſhip and of prudence to be on our guard, that we do not ſuffer ſuch repreſentations to make any impreſſion on our minds, unleſs they are ſupported by undoubted authority. Appendix, No. 146.

This I have laid down as a rule for myſelf, being in my heart determined to maintain the Peace which has been eſtabliſhed between us. It is with this view that I muſt expreſs to you my regret in obſerving ſymptoms of a very different diſpoſition in you. It is one of the duties of friendſhip, and a principle of good policy, when peace is concluded, to give the cauſes of war to oblivion, becauſe the remembrance of them cannot exiſt without a deſire of revenge; yet every letter that I have received from you ſince the ratification of the Treaty, has been filled with epithets of reproach, and exaggerated enumerations of injuries, which if received, that Treaty ought to have cancelled for ever. Not content with this, you raiſe up new pretenſions, which are equally oppoſite to good faith and to juſtice.

I too could recriminate, and on better grounds, but I forbear, becauſe my eyes look only to peace, and the confirmation of it: I have repeatedly deſired that you would grant Colonel *Upton* his diſmiſſion, you now declare that the reaſon of his ſtay is, that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* may ſend a deputy to *Poonah* to ſatisfy you that Colonel *Upton* afterwards ſhall receive his diſmiſſion, otherwiſe the Council of *Bombay* will ſoon break the engagements ſubſiſting between the Maratta State and the Engliſh.

What am I to underſtand by this, but that Colonel *Upton* is detained by compulſion, and that under the ſpecious appellation of a Reſident, you require a hoſtage from *Bombay* in his room? That I may not injure you by ſuch a concluſion, however juſtified by your own declaration and too ſtrong appearances, I have now given peremptory orders to Colonel *Upton* to return, and rely on your honour that no impediment or objection will be made to it on your part, but I have hopes that he will already have received his diſmiſſion from you, and that what I have written on the ſubject is unneceſſary.

I have taken notice of your raiſing up new pretences, the inſtance which I ſhall allude to is this, you deſire to be furniſhed with a letter to the Governor and Council of *Madras*, ordering them in poſitive terms, to ſee that Raja *Tulkajee* be firmly eſtabliſhed in his Rajaſhip, and that *Raminautpore* be reſtored to him. Raja *Tulkajee* is a ſubject of the *Carnatic*; the Company, out of tenderneſs to him, were induced to give particular orders for his being reſtored to the poſſeſſions which he now holds —he has been accordingly reſtored to them. In all the time of our correſpondence and negociations, the name of *Tulkagee* has not been mentioned. On what grounds or what purpoſe is this ſubject now introduced? Though I do not hold myſelf accountable to any power but the King of *Great Britain*, or the Company, whoſe ſervant I immediately am, for any conduct that may be obſerved to the Raja of *Tanjore*, either by the Soubah of the *Carnatic*, or by our Government, yet I make no ſcruple to aſſure you, that I ſhall ever conform to the faith of Treaties, and to the dictates of juſtice in all my dealings with the Raja, as well as in my tranſactions with any other Powers; nor has he any cauſe to complain of the want of either.

To *Balajee Pundit*.

Of the ſame tenor and date.

Extract of the Secret Letter from *Bengal*; dated 6th January 1777.

Par. 4. You will obſerve by the letter from Colonel *Upton*, dated 13th November, which arrived juſt in time to be tranſmitted to you by the *Shrewſbury*, that the Miniſters at *Poonah* have charged the Chief of *Salſette* with threatening to fire at the Peiſhwa's troops, if they perſiſted in carrying on their operations ſo near as the village of *Calvan*, which, though lying on the Continent, appears

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appears to be within cannon ſhot of the fort: and with granting protection to about a thouſand of *Sudaba's* adherents, who had fled to *Salſette* after his defeat; and that they alſo accuſe the Governor of *Bombay* of having ſent two deputies to demand the perſon of *Sudaba* from *Ragojee Angria*, one of the Maratta Chiefs, who had taken him priſoner, with a menace of war in caſe of refuſal. By a letter ſince received from Colonel *Upton*, under date the 24th November, we underſtand that *Ragonaut Row* had gone to *Bombay*, and actually been received into that iſland.

5. Theſe facts in general, but particularly that reſpecting the deputies, appear too extraordinary to gain any credit from us; however we thought them of ſo much conſequence as to make an immediate communication of them to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, from whom we have required a full explanation of the circumſtances to which they allude, and extracts of all their proceedings upon the ſubject, ſpecifying particularly the names of the Members preſent each Conſultation, and their ſeveral opinions.

6. Whatever grounds may have been afforded to the Miniſters for complaint in theſe inſtances, we cannot but remark ſtrong ſymptoms of indiſpoſition on their part, in the continual and exaggerated repetition of former injuries, the remembrance of which ought to have been obliterated by the Treaty, in the exceptions made by them to the conditions of the Treaty itſelf, in the introduction of new pretenſions, under colour of a family connection with the Rajah of *Tanjore*, and in the too ſtrong reaſons they have given us to ſuſpect them of taking advantage of our confidence in their good faith, to detain Colonel *Upton* by compulſion, and under frivolous pretences, notwithſtanding our peremptory orders for his return. This laſt concluſion we ground on the following paſſages in the letters laſt received from the Peiſhwa and Colonel *Upton*, which we cannot give any other conſtruction; viz.

Extract from the Peiſhwa's letter.

" You have deſired that I will give Colonel *Upton* " his diſmiſſion; the reaſon of his ſtay is, that the Go- " vernor and Council of *Bombay* may ſend a deputy " here, perſonally, to ſatisfy us; Colonel *Upton* ſhall " afterwards receive his diſmiſſion, otherwiſe the Coun- " cil of *Bombay* will ſoon break the engagements ſub- " ſiſting between the Maratta State and the Engliſh."

Extract from Colonel *Upton's* letter; dated 15th November.

" As there is every appearance of hoſtilities ſoon com- " mencing between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and this " State, I ſhall endeavour to convince the Miniſters to " how little purpoſe I now remain at *Poonah*, and that " my ſervices may be more effectually employed in their " behalf at *Calcutta*; that I cannot render them any " here is certain, therefore I imagine they will conſent " to my departure."

A letter has been diſpatched to the Peiſhwa, requiring the immediate diſmiſſion of Colonel *Upton*; and another to Colonel *Upton*, ordering him to take his leave of the Maratta Court without further delay. To both theſe we beg leave to refer you.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 13th January 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

General *Clavering* having objected to the ſixth paragraph of the general letter prepared for the *Triton*, the Secretary received the following letter and Minute from him on that occaſion, and copy of the Minute was ſent a number in the packet.

To Mr. *Auriol*.

Sir,

I ſend you my proteſt to the ſixth paragraph in the letter to the Court of Directors, written in the Secret Department, and deſire it may make a number in the packet. I am, &c.

(Signed) *J. Clavering.*

I proteſt againſt the ſixth paragraph of the letter going from the Secret Department to the Court of Directors by this diſpatch, becauſe I conceive the Board is not warranted by any act of the Government of *Poonah*, or declaration of their Miniſters, to draw the concluſions, that are inferred, and even expreſſed in this paragraph, that " we have reaſon to ſuſpect they mean to take ad- " vantage of our confidence in their good faith, to " detain Colonel *Upton* by compulſion."

If we conſider the two letters referred to, there is nothing that can imply the conſtruction that is given to them: the word " diſmiſs" in the Peiſhwa's letter, and " conſent" in Colonel *Upton's*, import the ſame meaning, which is no more than expreſſing the uſual ceremony in *Indoſtan*, of granting diſmiſſion or leave to go away to inferiors by ſuperiors. If we refer to the public conduct of the Maratta State, we have no reaſon to complain of their violation of treaties or their breach of good faith: they ſtrictly obſerved the ſuſpenſion of arms, though it was not maintained on the part of the Preſidency of *Bombay*: they have endeavoured to fulfil the Treaty concluded with Colonel *Upton*, though it has been all along evaded by the Government of *Bombay*; firſt, by giving refuge to *Ragoba* at *Surat*; then ſecretly negociating with *Sudabah*, and protecting his followers; and laſtly, by affording an aſylum to *Ragoba* himſelf in *Bombay*. If after the ſacrifice of *Salſette*, the territory near *Broach*, and what was ſtill more degrading to them, the offer to pay the expences of the war, by giving up certain territories till they were liquidated, nobody can blame the Peiſhwa for uttering complaints, that he made all theſe ſacrifices without obtaining what he had a right to expect, Peace. The concluſions therefore drawn from any expreſſions of complaint in the Peiſhwa's letters are ungenerous, and rather imply an intention to quarrel with him than he with us.

(Signed) *J. C.*

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 27th January 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

READ, the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letter of the 14th October; the letter that accompanied it from the Governor General for *Siccaram Bappoo*, was received by that Miniſter, with warm expreſſions of ſatisfaction—You forgot, Gentlemen, to write to *Ballajee Pundit*; I made ſuch neceſſary obſervations as occurred on the occaſion, and left him very well pleaſed.—The Miniſters reſiding generally ten coſs diſtant from each other, in ſome meaſure makes it neceſſary to write to them ſeparately, but it is more particularly ſo from their eſteeming themſelves

equal in office, to avoid a jealouſy that a ſeeming preference given to either would cauſe.

I wrote laſt on the 24th ultimo, purpoſely to adviſe of *Ragonath Row*'s being at *Bombay*; and I have received one letter only ſince that time from thoſe Gentlemen, dated the 20th November.

The following is all therein, that relates to *Ragonaut Row*: "*Ragoba* has put himſelf under our protection, "and he now reſides at *Bombay*."—I have now the honour to incloſe what letters have paſſed ſince my letter of the 13th November—theſe contain the meaſures that have been purſued towards the completion of the 5th Article of the Treaty, &c. &c.

The Miniſters promiſe I ſhall take my departure immediately on the receipt of replies to my letters to *Bombay*, of the 17th and 19th November—The laſt contained the Peiſhwa's repreſentations of the active part taken by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in the contentions of their country, and requiring their reaſons for ſuch conduct.—I am expecting theſe replies daily, and ſhall be ready to depart immediately after having acquainted the Miniſters with the ſentiments and intentions of the Government of *Bombay* towards them.

I hope it has not been forgot to name a Reſident for *Poonah*; the Council of *Bombay* decline ſending one, without an order from the Superior Council, and the buſineſs of the two Governments cannot well be tranſacted without one.

I am convinced the Miniſters will have as little connection as poſſible with *Bombay*, until their preſent jealouſies and prejudices are removed; to effect this, will be full employ for a Reſident, I fear for many months.

The reply from the Governor of *Bombay* to the Peiſhwa's letter has diſguſted exceedingly; the Miniſters think the language very free for a public letter between nations at peace with each other, and expreſs the greateſt ſurprize that the Council of *Bombay* ſhould aſſume to themſelves the right of arbitration in the diſputes between the Peiſhwa and his ſubjects; they ſay they ſee no end to the diſaffected ſubjects of the Peiſhwa flying to *Bombay*, and receiving countenance and protection.

Sedaſhee Row arrived at *Poonah* a few days ago—the Miniſters intend enquiring into the identity of his perſon in a very public manner, in two or three days.

Since writing the above, I have received a letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated the 30th November, a copy of which I have the honour to incloſe.—I have again requeſted the Miniſters to fix an early day for my departure, and I expect to be on my journey in five or ſix days from this date. I have &c.

Poonah (Signed) *J. Upton.*
5th December 1776.

Ordered, That the incloſures in the above letter be entered after the Conſultation.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

By a letter dated 5th December from Colonel *Upton*, we have, to our great regret, received a confirmation of the reports which he formerly communicated to us, and which we in conſequence intimated to you in our letter of the 30th ultimo. Colonel *Upton* having now tranſmitted to us copies of the correſpondence which paſſed between you and him, and between your Preſidency and the Maratta Government, we think theſe documents too well authenticated to admit of our entertaining any doubts of the facts as they were before repreſented. We incloſe a tranſlation of the letter from Mr. *Hornby* to the Peiſhwa; but as we apprehend that the ſenſe of it may have ſuffered ſome variation from the repeated tranſlations into different languages which it has undergone, we requeſt that you will furniſh us with a copy of the original draft as it was written in the Engliſh.

In your letter to Colonel *Upton* of the 20th November, we obſerve the following paſſages:

1ſt. "*Sudaba*'s people having fled for protection im- Appendix
"mediately under the guns of *Tanna* Fort, you, as a No. 147.
"military man, muſt very well know it would have
"been totally inconſiſtent to have permitted them to be
"attacked in that ſtation."

2dly. "*Ragoba* has put himſelf under our protection,
"and he now reſides in *Bombay*."

As the aſſertion contained in the firſt of the above quotations ſeems to imply a claim which may produce future diſputes with the Maratta Government ſimilar to that which has lately happened, we requeſt that you will inform us on what principles you found ſuch a claim, as it appears to us to be an invaſion of their territorial rights.

Our duty requiring us to foreſee, and to prevent as much as lies in our power, every occaſion of difference between your Preſidency and the Maratta State, we think it incumbent on us to demand this information from you, that we may be able to lay down a certain rule for your guidance, by which the peace of *India* may not be broken.

As the propriety of your receiving *Ragoba* depends ſolely on the neceſſity of the circumſtances which gave occaſion firſt, we deſire that you will communicate to us, in the moſt explicit manner, all the tranſactions which led to this meaſure, particularly whether protection was granted to him at his own ſolicitation, and in conſequence of his appearing in perſon to claim it, or if he was encouraged or invited to come to *Bombay* by any act of your Government.

INCLOSURES.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Sir,

We received your letters, dated the 19th and 20th ultimo; the former did not reach us till the 6th inſtant.

We incloſe for your notice a liſt of the ſeveral diſtricts contiguous to *Broach*, with their computed annual revenue. This liſt was tranſmitted to us by our Commiſſioners, who have therein ranked the diſtricts agreeable to the priority of choice they give to each. The revenue aſſigned to each of theſe places is founded upon experience of their real value, whereas the eſtimation formerly ſent you was framed merely from the information of *Ragoba*'s agents, before we were put in poſſeſſion, and accordingly, as you will obſerve, much exceeds what we have ſince found they will produce. However, we are willing to accept the places offered, if the Miniſters will make up the deficiency by an aſſignment of ſome other convenient territory; and if, contrary to our expectation, the annual revenues of *Oulaſeer*, *Hanſood* and *Deſharah* ſhould exceed three lacks, we will in like manner conſent to reſtore the difference. We have accordingly given the proper inſtructions to our commiſſioners.

The method propoſed by the Miniſters for diſcharging the twelve lacks of rupees, is ſatisfactory to us, and we ſhall give the neceſſary orders for an exact account being kept, of all receipts from *Jambooſeer* and the *Surat* Chowkies.

We ſhall make enquiry reſpecting the circumſtances complained of by the Miniſters, when we ſhall give you our anſwer; but the laſt article immediately relating to ourſelves is without foundation.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *Willm. Hornby*,
7th November, 1776. Preſident, &c. Council.

Liſt of diſtricts in the neighbourhood of *Broach*, with their computed annual value.

	Rupees.
The eight villages diſmembered from the Broach Pergunnah by the Guicawars, and now in poſſeſſion of *Futty Sing*, computed together at	40,000
Deſborah	30,000
Ahmood	1,00,000

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	Rupees.
Coral	35,000
Sinore	80,000
Hanfood, excluſive of its preſent aſſignments and tributes to *Surat* and *Broach*	70,000
Oulaſeer, - D° - D°	75,000
Dubpay	1,30,000

N. B. *Verſeawaw* is mentioned in the map, but ſhould not on any account be accepted, as its ſituation is bad, the villages in the worſt condition, and the whole diſtrict poor and bare of inhabitants; and it is moreover liable to continual depredations from the *Bhills*, and diſputes with the *Gracias* and Rajah *Pipliahs*.

(Signed) *R^t Gambier*,
Geo. Perrot,
J^n Cheape.

N. B. The above is a copy of the liſt of diſtricts mentioned in the letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay* to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated 7th November 1776.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your letter of the 7th inſtant, and have acquainted the Peiſhwa's Miniſters, that "you are willing to accept the places offered, pro- "vided the Miniſters will make up the deficiency "by an aſſignment of ſome other convenient territory; "and if the annual revenues of *Oulaſeer*, *Hanſood*, and "*Deſborah*, ſhould exceed three lacks, you will in like "manner conſent to reſtore the difference."—The Peiſhwa conſents to this, and inſtructions are accordingly ſent to the agents at *Broach*.

In the liſt of diſtricts that accompanied your letter, *Hanſood* and *Oulaſeer* are eſtimated at one hundred and forty-five thouſand rupees per annum, excluſive of their preſent aſſignments and tributes to *Surat* and *Broach*. Not knowing on what account there were aſſignments or tributes on theſe places, I aſked information from the Miniſters, and to what amount aſſignments, &c. on them were made? But they knew as little of this matter as myſelf; however they have promiſed very particularly to examine revenue books; in the mean time I have to requeſt, Gentlemen, you will be pleaſed to favour me with ſuch particulars as have come to your knowledge concerning theſe aſſignments and tributes.

Hanſood and *Oulaſeer* are now valued at little more than half their former eſtimation, which you ſent me on the 18th January, and then you had been in poſſeſſion of theſe places (from the preceding month of April) nine months or upwards. The Miniſters, as well as myſelf, ſuppoſe this ſo very ſhort valuation, muſt be owing (for they eſtimate thoſe places to the full as high as in your liſt of the 18th January) to the decreaſe of inhabitants, or to other cauſes incidental on war. They ſay the inhabitants will of courſe ſoon return, and the country as ſoon recover itſelf, when peace and tranquillity ſhall be reſtored to theſe Pergunnahs. They farther obſerve, and with great juſtice, that were the Pergunnahs they cede, to be eſtimated by the collections that were made there, during the late war, or even now in their ruined ſtate, they might give diſtricts to the real value of eight or ten lacks of rupees, inſtead of three lacks, as ſtipulated. You will pleaſe to favour me, Gentlemen, with your opinion on this ſubject, that I may endeavour to form that of the Miniſters to it, or acquaint you in what they differ, that proper directions may accordingly be ſent to the commiſſioners. The Miniſters in this buſineſs are very ready to meet half way; I think we ſhould not be backward in giving them the meeting, as the advantages are all on our ſide. A report prevails here that *Ragonaut Row* is at *Bombay*; I am convinced of the almoſt impoſſibility of its being true. The Miniſters told me two days ago, that they had agreed to fix on *Ragonaut Row* a jaghire in the Canduh country, or near to *Janſi*, that would be quite ſatisfactory to him; and that they expected this would be ſettled in eight or ten days.

I now forward two packets that arrived laſt night from *Fort William*. The Governor General and Council have ſent for my peruſal a copy of their letter to you of the 30th September. The very powerful arguments they make uſe of, are now I hope no longer required; nevertheleſs I have taken the liberty, in addition to them, to acquaint you, Gentlemen, that the commiſſion by virtue of which I had the honour to negociate with the Maratta Government, is given by the Superior Council, the ſeal of the Company affixed thereto, and in it is inſerted expreſsly; "We the Governor General and Council of "*Bengal*, in virtue of the powers veſted in us by the "Legiſlature of *Great Britain*, &c. &c. have deputed, "you," &c. &c.

I have to requeſt, Gentlemen, you will honour me with a reply to this letter as ſoon as you can conveniently. I am, &c.

Poonah, (Signed) *J. Upton*.
17th November 1776.

To the Honourable the Preſident &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

In my letter of the 17th inſtant, I acquainted you that a report prevailed here that *Ragonaut Row* was then at *Bombay*. I am exceedingly concerned to find this report confirmed by a letter I have juſt now received from the Peiſhwa. He deſires you may be made acquainted with the contents of this letter, and that your anſwer may be immediately procured; for theſe purpoſes therefore, I have incloſed a copy of the Peiſhwa's letter, and have to requeſt, Gentlemen, you will favour me, as expeditiouſly as poſſible, with the reply to the Peiſhwa's accuſations; ſome of which are, admitting the truth of them, but too obvious, in my opinion, infringements of the Treaty. The Peiſhwa's Miniſters think them highly ſo, both of late and former treaties, and complain accordingly.

Poonah, I have, &c.
19th November 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton*.

Tranſlation of a letter from the Peiſhwa *Mhaderow* to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*; received the 19th November 1776.

I have juſt now heard that *Ragonaut Row* arrived at the port of *Bombay* on the 28th of Ramzaun, and the Governor of that place gave him an aſylum in the ſaid port. He alſo before gave protection in the above port and *Salſette*, to the followers of the ſeditious, with elephants, horſes, and baggage, belonging to Sircar.

Theſe actions are very foreign to the meaning of the Treaty under the Company's ſeal, concluded by you between the Sircar and all the Engliſh.

Prior to this I received letters from the Superior Council of *Calcutta*, that "we will not give *Ragonaut* "*Row* a reſidence in any of the Company's ſettlements; "and all the Councils of the Engliſh ports will act ac- "cording to treaty."

It is entered in the preſent and former treaties, that the rebels of each ſide ſhall be delivered up to one another.

Notwithſtanding theſe Treaties, which are exiſting and preſent with the Sircar, the above meaſure by the Governor of *Bombay* is cauſe for aſtoniſhment. What can be the meaning of giving habitations to the enemies of the Sircar; cauſing the ruin of the Sircar's dominions; conſtantly raiſing new ſeditions, and throwing my buſineſs into diſorder? and what connection has the Governor and Council of *Bombay* with this buſineſs?

In order to remove the diſturbances which were between the Sircar and the Council of *Bombay*, you brought

brought a credential letter from the Superior Council of *Calcutta*; we placed an entire dependence on it, and peace and friendſhip was eſtabliſhed between the Sircar and all the Engliſh. Notwithſtanding this, the Governor and Council of *Bombay* are repeatedly acting in this inconſiſtent manner—then how can the writings or engagements of the Engliſh be depended upon?

You ſhould in friendſhip write diſtinctly the purport of this to *Bombay*, and procure a clear anſwer immediately, that meaſures may be taken accordingly.

It has happened well, that during your preſence, breaking the engagements appeared on the part of the Engliſh of *Bombay*. To this moment, on the part of the Sircar, no deviation from the Treaty has occurred; never was ſuch improper conduct as this heard or ſeen in Chiefs of high rank.

Prior to this the Council of *Bombay* broke the engagements of former Governors, took poſſeſſion of *Salſette*; &c. ruined the Guzerat country and other places belonging to the Sircar, and in conſequence of the aſſiſtance they gave to *Ragonaut Row*, we ſuſtained the expence of crores, but for the ſatisfaction of the Superior Council of *Calcutta*, it was dropped. Now the Council of *Bombay* are again in the ſame manner beginning miſchief. If they will not immediately withdraw their hands from all actions that are contrary to treaties, what advantage is there in making a treaty with the Engliſh?

Meaſures ſatisfactory to *Ragonaut Row*, had nearly been concluded, and it was hoped that all the family diſturbances would have been at an end, when *Ragonaut Row*, without notice or cauſe, took the road to *Bombay*: it is moſt extraordinary!

We took ſo much pains that he might be ſettled comfortably and ſatisfactorily—had we wiſhed otherwiſe our army was round him. Probably the Sircar's enemies will ſay he went to *Bombay*, his life being in danger, but this was never the caſe, and if any perſon thinks ſo, it is without foundation.

An anſwer to this letter is neceſſary. What more is to be wrote?

(Signed) *All*ⁿ *Macpherſon*,
Perſⁿ Interpret'.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*

Sir,

We received your letter, dated the 8th inſtant, with the incloſed papers.

Sudabah's people having fled for protection immediately under the guns of *Tannah* fort, you, as a military man, muſt very well know it would have been totally inconſiſtent to have permitted them to be attacked in that ſituation, or to ſuffer any hoſtilities to be committed on either ſide, and therefore on the miniſterial forces drawing up near to *Sudaba*'s, and preparing to attack them, the Chief of *Salſette* ſent their officer the letter you forwarded us. The river between *Tannah* fort and the Maratta ſhore, which is ſtiled in the Peiſhwa's letter a branch of the ſea, is little more than piſtol-ſhot over, and the miniſterial forces, as we have been aſſured by a Gentleman on the ſpot, were drawn up within cannon ſhot from the fort. We were induced by humanity alone to receive the people of *Sudabah* into *Salſette*, to preſerve their lives from the ſwords of their enemies, and ſhould have acted in like manner to the *Poonah* forces, had they been reduced to the ſame ſituation.

On the 30th ultimo *Sudabah*, after his defeat at *Razimatahee*, arrived in this harbour from *Bellapore*, and requeſted protection; which was promiſed, but the Preſident being then abſent at *Salſette*, he declined coming on ſhore, and went to *Mandrem*, a place at a ſmall diſtance from hence, intending to wait there till the Preſident returned. Here he was invited on ſhore to refreſh himſelf by *Ragojee Angria*, with profeſſions of the utmoſt friendſhip and regard, and, as we are aſſured, under the moſt ſacred obligation not to moleſt him, which *Ragojee Angria* moſt treacherouſly violated when he got him in his power, and after ſtripping him of jewels to a great amount, impriſoned him in his fort of *Colabba*. Immediately on receiving this intelligence, a meſſage was ſent to *Ragojee Angria* to demand his releaſe, as we were certainly bound in honour to do, *Sudabah* being at that time under the Engliſh protection, which he had ſolicited, and we had promiſed him. Our meſſage, however, was not attended with ſucceſs, and we conclude *Ragojee* will ſell his priſoner to the Miniſters.—*Ragoba* has put himſelf under our protection, and now reſides at *Bombay*.

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Bombay Caſtle, 20th November 1776.

We are, &c.
Wᵐ. Hornby,
Preſidᵗ &c. Council.

Tranſlation of a letter from the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Governor of *Bombay*, to the Peiſhwa—Received 13th Shewal 1190.

After the uſual compliments:

The letter which you ſent is received. You write, that an exciter of commotions had taken the name of *Sedaſhee Bowe*: if you do not know that he is *Sedaſhee Bowe*, I now make it appear, that he is the true *Sudaba*, regarding which I am perfectly ſatisfied, and this is ſufficient for me. You alſo write that *Ragojee Angria* ſeized upon the Bowe in his retreat. This is a miſtake, from this reaſon, that he came to the port of *Bombay* merely to meet me, but I was not at that time in *Bombay*: on this account he was going to ſtay at *Undery* till I ſhould come to the Iſland of *Bombay*. On the way to *Undery*, *Ragojee Angria* agreed to ſome friendly propoſals, and requeſted that he ſhould come on ſhore, after which *Angria* acted in a treacherous manner; it is therefore reaſonable that the above *Angria* ſhould be reprimanded and puniſhed. The ſaid Bowe came to meet me, he was prevented by him. On receiving this intelligence, I wrote to *Angria* that "I am expecting him, and give him leave to come to me," but the ſaid *Angria* did not permit him to come, therefore the remembrance of this ill behaviour from the above *Angria*, will be kept engraved upon my mind.

I did not conſider the Bowe as a ſeditious man, I even knew him as a friend to the Sircar, and he has met with very unmerciful treatment from the Sircar. You further write that protection has been given to ſome of the Bowe's people in *Salſette*. This that you ſay is true; and this is alſo true, that the people of your Sircar ran away from the Bowe, came, and protection was given to them. Mr. *John Halſey* acquainted me, that he wrote letters under his own ſignature to the Sircar's Chief, one according to that you ſent, and two others. Humanity always gives the Great a deſire that perſons who come in affliction ſhould meet with protection. I have acted accordingly, and will alſo act in future. This is all to be ſaid to you. You may write whatever you ſee beſt, and wherever you pleaſe. What more is to be wrote? &c.

This letter diſpatched the 10th Shewal.

N. B.—The Governor's letter to the Peiſhwa is wrote in the Maratta language, a Perſian tranſlation of it was ſent by the Miniſtry to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

(Signed) *Allen Macpherſon*,
Perſian Interpreter.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

Since the receipt of your letter of the 7th ultimo, I have been continually urging to the Miniſters the neceſſity of their naming ſome other Pergunnah, leaſt it ſhould be found on a freſh eſtimation, that the Pergunnahs already allotted for the country of three lacks, ſhould not yield ſufficient revenue.

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Ahmood I requeſted particularly might be the additional Pergunnah. I obſerved, that our motive for aſking this preferably, was its contiguity to *Broach*, and that I thought they ſhould be equally deſirous that our diſtricts ſhould intermix as little as poſſible. The Miniſters therefore at my repeated ſolicitations have conſented that *Deſborah*, *Ahmood*, and *Hanſood*, ſhall be the ceded Pergunnahs; with this reſerve, that ſhould the revenue of theſe three Pergunnahs exceed three lacks, villages to the amount of the ſurplus will be withheld by the Sircar; on the other hand, ſhould there be a deficiency of revenue in theſe Pergunnahs, the Peiſhwa conſents to make over villages from the Pergunnah of *Occlaſeer* to complete the ſum of three lacks.

I incloſe the copy of the Peiſhwa's inſtructions on this occaſion to his agents at *Broach*; alſo an account of the aſſignments or tributes (as received from the Miniſters) on *Hanſood* and *Occlaſeer*, in which is included the yearly revenue of the Pergunnahs of *Deſborah*, *Ahmood*, *Hanſood*, and *Occlaſeer*, as collected by the Maratta Government.

I now hope, Gentlemen, every obſtacle to the completion of the 5th Article of the late Treaty is removed, and that the ceded country of three lacks will be immediately made over to the Honourable Company.

My continuance at *Poonah* will be no longer than till I am honoured with your replies to my letters of the 17th and 19th of laſt month, and an acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter, which I have to entreat you will favour me with as ſoon as poſſible.

Poonah, December 1ſt, 1776. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

An Account of the Yearly Revenues of the following Pergunnahs, as collected by the Maratta Government, and the Mogul of *Surat*, ſent by the Peiſhwa's Miniſters from their Revenue Office to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, 1ſt December 1776.

PERGUNNAHS.	By the Maratta Government.	By the Mogul of *Surat*.	TOTAL.
	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
Debegebareh, belonging entire to the Sircar - -	40,000	- - -	40,000
Ahmood, - - Ditto - - Ditto - - -	1,63,791	- - -	1,63,791
Hanſood - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,19,159	8,000	1,27,809
Occlaſeer - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,67,401	12,600	1,80,001
Total Rupees - - - - - - - -	4,90,351	21,250	5,11,601

(Signed) *An Macpherſon*, Perſian Interpreter.

Tranſlation of inſtructions from the Peiſhwa *Madeurow* to the Maratta agents at *Broach*, for making over the country of three lacks.

You were formerly diſpatched to give the Engliſh Company a country of three lacks of rupees; I now write that the Pergunnahs of *Ahmood*, *Hanſood*, and *Debegebareh*, are ſettled with Colonel *John Upton* to be given to the Engliſh Company. An account of the full revenues of them in former years, is taken from the Sircar's office, and ſent you. In conjunction with the Engliſh agents, the Zemindars and Kanugows of the ſaid Pergunnahs are to be called, and the above account ſhewn; and you will alſo enquire particularly into their full revenues in former years, according to their papers.

If the full revenues of the ſaid Pergunnahs ſhould exceed three lacks, you will retain villages to that, *Ahmood* or *Hanſood* for the Sircar. If the full revenues of the three Pergunnahs ſhould happen to be ſomething leſs, villages to that amount are to be given from the Pergunnah of *Occlaſeer*.

If the Engliſh ſhould wiſh to fix the revenues according to the preſent year, whereas thoſe Pergunnahs were laid waſte by the march of the armies of *Ragonath Row*, the Sircar and the Engliſh, the preſent collections are not equal to the revenues of former years, but their collections will hereafter become as before.

It is entered in the Treaty, that Pergunnahs of a complete revenue of three lacks, ſhall be given to the Engliſh.

Colonel *Upton* has wrote to the Council of *Bombay* concerning this, and the Council of *Bombay* will write accordingly to the Chief of *Broach*.

You are, agreeable to the above, to deliver to the Engliſh of *Broach*, a country of a complete revenue of three lacks of rupees, and take their receipt in the name of the Sircar, and come away.

(Signed) *An Macpherſon*, Perſian Interpreter.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.—Secret department.

Sir,

We have already very fully explained our motives for firſt affording protection to *Raganath Row*, and theſe ſtill continuing to operate upon us with equal force, we could not deny him an aſylum when he again ſolicited it.

We cannot ſuppoſe any perſon who has been in the leaſt converſant with the natives of *Aſia*, can be ſo totally unacquainted with their genius and diſpoſition, as not to allow, that treachery and perfidy are the peculiar characteriſtics, and moſt particularly ſo of the Marattas, who are the moſt treacherous and perfidious of all Aſiatics. No one poſſeſſed of this knowledge can ſuppoſe for a moment that *Ragoba*'s life would not be in danger, were he to truſt himſelf in the power of the Miniſters, his profeſſed enemies, who muſt dread even the poſſibility of his future elevation, and ſurrounded as he would be, by perſons entirely at their devotion. Convinced by experience of the truth of theſe ſentiments, we could not heſitate in receiving a perſon to whom we had once pledged the faith of the Company, and who abſolutely came himſelf to implore our protection. We only mean to extend this protection to his ſecurity from perſonal danger, until the Miniſters can ſettle ſome terms that are ſatisfactory to him; for you muſt be ſenſible it is far from our deſire that he ſhould reſide here, and we ſhall be very glad whenever he can be removed from the Company's ſettlements with ſafety to himſelf.

If therefore the Miniſters will ſettle any terms agreeable

ble to *Ragoba*, it will afford us real ſatisfaction, and we will with great readineſs not only communicate to him, but uſe our influence to perſuade him to accept any conſiſtent offers they may make him.

And as we are very deſirous to give all poſſible ſatisfaction to the Poonah Government, and to remove, as far as we can, all doubts the Miniſters may entertain in conſequence of *Ragoba*'s reſidence at *Bombay*, we requeſt you will aſſure them in our name, that *Ragoba* only reſides here as a private perſon for the ſecurity of his perſon, and that we will not in any ſhape countenance or promote any ſchemes or deſigns to their prejudice, or in the leaſt infringe the late Treaty; of which, as we have before ſaid, we cannot allow our affording him mere perſonal protection to be any breach.

We will ſend you an accurate account of all the aſſignments or tribute paid from *Hanſood* and *Occlaſeer* to *Surat* and *Broach*, as ſoon as we receive the neceſſary information from theſe places.

We eſteem it worthy of remark and even of ridicule, that the letters you receive from the Poonah Government are ſtiled the Peiſhwa's letters, conſidering that the perſon meant is only an infant not three years of age. Artful as the Miniſters are, they may hereafter think it convenient to diſavow theſe letters, and it appears to us to be more proper and agreeable to the form obſerved by all Governments, that letters from the State ſhould be wrote in the name of the Regent, or the perſons who conduct the adminiſtration during the minority.

Bombay Caſtle, 30th November 1776. We are, &c. (Signed) *Willm Hornby*, and Council.

P. S.—We have juſt received your letter of the 27th inſtant.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 26th February 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Received a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, as follows:

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you laſt on the 5th December 1776.

I have the great pleaſure to acquaint you, Gentlemen, that I have taken my public leave of this Court; but at the very repeated entreaties of the Miniſters, I am under the neceſſity of waiting the arrival here of Mr. *Moſtyn*, who is appointed from *Bombay*, Reſident at the Maratta Durbar. I expect he will be at *Poorunder* within eight days. I ſhall have the honour to attend him once or twice to the Peiſhwa's Durbar, and then ſet out on my return to *Bengal*.

You will perceive, Gentlemen, by the correſpondence I have had with the Select Committee of *Bombay*, how very fully I have been employed in reconciling the differences ſubſiſting between that Preſidency and the Maratta Government, very particularly regarding the reception of Mr. *Moſtyn*, as Reſident on the part of the Honourable Company at this Durbar. The Peiſhwa's Miniſters, however reluctantly, have at laſt conſented to receive this Gentleman, being determined to convince that every part of their conduct ſhall tend to the re-eſtabliſhment of that peace and good friendſhip which heretofore ſubſiſted between their State and the Preſidency of *Bombay*. The Miniſters ſay Mr. *Moſtyn*'s continuance in a public character at their Durbar, muſt depend on the mode in which he conducts himſelf towards their State. As they have conſented to receive him, and reſted it in this manner, I have no doubt of his reconciling what little jealouſies or differences there may be, which I hope are chiefly imaginary.

The perſon who was called *Sidaſhew Row* underwent a public examination of five or ſix days, and was ſentenced to loſe his life, which was put in execution on the 17th of laſt month, and little more is now ſaid of him here than had no ſuch perſon ever exiſted. As it may be ſatisfactory to you, Gentlemen, to know the accuſations brought againſt this man, and what he had to urge in vindication of himſelf, I incloſe the firſt day's examination, as related by an intelligent hircarrah, who was ſent to obſerve in what manner the proceedings were conducted.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient ſervant,
J. Upton.

Poorunder, the 22d January 1777.

Ordered, That the Incloſures in the above letter be entered after the Conſultation.

Agreed, That Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*'s letter lie for conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

INCLOSURES.

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*,

Sir,

We have juſt received your letter, dated the firſt inſtant, and ſhall immediately ſend the neceſſary directions to our commiſſioners at *Broach*. We hope with you, that no further obſtacle will now ariſe to the entire completion of the 5th Article of the Treaty.

We are, &c.
Bombay Caſtle (Signed) *W. Hornby*,
the 6th December 1776. &c. Council.

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*.

Sir,

We have before repeatedly repreſented to you the little effect that has attended the orders the Miniſters tell you they have iſſued, for reſtoring a free communication of trade and intercourſe with the Maratta dominions; the entire ſtoppage of which, notwithſtanding theſe orders, has been ſeverely felt by the Honourable Company, and threatens ruin to many individuals. The principal European and country merchants of this ſettlement have repreſented to us, in the moſt ſtrong terms, the melancholly ſtate to which the trade of this iſland is reduced, owing to the total obſtruction of our trade with the Maratta country; and we think it highly neceſſary to incloſe for your notice, a copy of the memorial they have delivered us on the ſubject, in which we aſſure you the facts are not in the leaſt exaggerated; and our regard for the intereſt of the Company calls upon us to recommend to you, in the warmeſt manner, to inſiſt upon the Poonah Government giving the moſt ſpeedy and effectual orders, without any prevarication, for opening the communication with the Maratta country in the ſame manner as before the war commenced; and we muſt obſerve, that this conduct is totally inconſiſtent with the profeſſions the Miniſters ſo frequently make of amity and good inclination toward the Engliſh, and contrary to the ſpirit and meaning of the late Treaty.

We likewiſe incloſe a letter this day delivered to us by the agents for the concerned in the ſhip *Aurora*, before mentioned to you. By the defeat of *Sudaba*, the Miniſters are deprived of the plea they before made for evading reſtitution; and we think the honour of the Company is engaged to procure full ſatisfaction for the ſufferers, agreeable to the expreſs tenor of the treaty concluded by you; and we therefore think it highly proper

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proper you ſhould exert your moſt ſtrenuous efforts in their behalf. The liſt of the *Aurora*'s cargo was before forwarded to you.

The Chief and Council at *Broach* acquaint us, under the 29th ultimo, that the Maratta agents had not then received any orders from *Poonah*, in reſpect to the ceſſion of the Pergunnahs mentioned by you in your letter, of the 19th October; and the Gentlemen at *Surat* likewiſe acquaint us in a letter dated the 5th inſtant, that the Maratta Amuldar had refuſed paying him the collections from their Chowkies in that city, alledging, that he had received no orders from the principals. This is evaſive, trifling conduct; and we would adviſe you to require the Miniſters to deliver to you the proper orders for their officers, and either to forward them yourſelf or tranſmit them to us, for we are inclined to believe the Miniſters have deceived you, and have never iſſued the orders in queſtion, as the Maratta Pundits are urging with all poſſible expedition the recovery of the revenue for this ſeaſon from the Pergunnahs intended to be ceded to the Company.

We hope the Miniſters will make you ſome propoſals reſpecting *Ragonath Row*, that may be ſatisfactory to him. What can be their objections to his reſiding in one of the Company's ſettlements, and aſſigning to him a ſuitable ſtipend there? If you would gain this point, we think it would be rendering a moſt eſſential ſervice to the Honourable Company.

Bombay Caſtle, 11th December 1776. We are, &c. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your letter of the 30th ultimo. I have given, Gentlemen, in your own words, the profeſſions you wiſhed ſhould be made to the Peiſhwa's Miniſters, regarding *Ragonath Row*: with theſe they ſeem well pleaſed, and for the preſent ſatisfied.

The Peiſhwa's Miniſters will order the vackeel, now reſiding at *Bombay* on the part of the Sircar, to lay before the Honourable the Preſident and Council, terms of reconciliation between the Maratta Government and *Ragonath Row*. They will offer ſuch conditions as (they ſay) heretofore appeared acceptable to him, and to make them the more ſo, they now conſent to his reſiding at *Benares*, and enjoying there the jaghire, as full as they had lately propoſed fixing on him, had he reſided in the Maratta dominions. The Miniſters profeſs themſelves much obliged, Gentlemen, by the offer you have made of uſing your influence with *Ragonath Row* to accept ſuitable conditions towards an accommodation. They hope theſe now given in commiſſion to the vackeel, will prove ſatisfactory to him, and wiſh to be favoured with your reply regarding them, as ſoon as convenient.

The Miniſters wiſh and requeſt, before I leave *Poonah* that I would fix with you, Gentlemen, the method of correſpondence between your Preſidency and this Government, in order that the late treaty may be fully and expeditiouſly carried into execution; and they now requeſt a letter, either to the Peiſhwa or his Miniſters, to ſatisfy them that there will be no delay in the accompliſhment of it, and expreſſive of your friendly intentions towards this Government. The letter from the Honourable the Preſident to the Peiſhwa, dated the 10th of the month Shewel (the 23d November) has occaſioned a good deal of uneaſineſs, which they much wiſh ſhould be removed before my departure. I have therefore to entreat, Gentlemen, you will ſignify to the Peiſhwa or his Miniſters, your intentions of adhering ſtrictly to the treaty lately entered into with the Maratta State; and that you will propoſe to them, that a friendly correſpondence may be immediately opened for this purpoſe. As I am very particularly requeſted by the Miniſters to ſtay here until your letter to them ſhall be received, I ſhall eſteem myſelf much obliged by its being diſpatched with all poſſible expedition, and could wiſh to have it incloſed in the reply to this letter.

Mabadagel Ram Chunder is the perſon appointed agent on the part of the Circar, to reſide at *Jamboſeer*. The Miniſters requeſt receipts may from time to time be given to him, of ſuch collections as may be made by the Honourable Company upon *Jamboſeer*; alſo for the payments he may make from the Choukies in and about *Surat*.

I have the honour to be,

Poonah, the 12th December 1776. (Signed) *J. Upton*.

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*,

Sir,

We have received your letter dated the 12th inſtant.

The Maratta vackeel has not yet laid before us any propoſals for an accommodation between the Poonah Government and *Ragonath Row*; when he does, we ſhall uſe our influence with him to accede thereto, if we think them reaſonable, and that he can accept them conſiſtent with his perſonal ſafety. *Benares* appears to be a very eligible place for his reſidence, if a method can be ſettled for conducting him thither in ſafety. He will be very apprehenſive of undertaking the journey over land, and being a Brahmin, his religious ſcruples will make him very averſe to proceeding to *Bengal* by ſea.

It is our wiſh and deſire to maintain the moſt friendly intercourſe and correſpondence with the Maratta State, of which the Preſident now aſſures the Miniſters, in a letter, which agreeble to your deſire is incloſed to you; and we ſhall expect the like friendly conduct on their part.

As a proof of the ſincerity of our intentions, we are ready to depute a gentleman to reſide at *Poonah*, as heretofore, the moment the Miniſters expreſs a deſire that we ſhould, and provided they will give us aſſurances that they will receive and treat him in a manner ſuitable to the character he will be inveſted with, of Repreſentative for the Honourable Company.

We ſhall iſſue the neceſſary orders for receipts being given for all collections received from *Jamboſeer* and the Surat Chowkies.

Bombay Caſtle, 18th December, 1776. We are, &c. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your letters of the 11th and 18th inſtant. My letter of the 12th nearly replies to theſe, and I make no doubt, on the arrival of a Reſident every thing relative to the intercourſe and trade between the two Governments, (which only remains unreplied to) will be adjuſted to the ſatisfaction of each; I promiſe, no endeavours of mine ſhall be wanting during my ſtay here, to put theſe objects in a train of eaſy adjuſtment to the gentleman who may be appointed to this reſidence on the part of the Honourable Company.

The Miniſters, to convince of their friendly intentions towards your Preſidency, readily accept the offer made, of deputing a gentleman to reſide at *Poonah* as heretofore; and now write on the part of the Circar, expreſſing their deſire that he ſhould depart inſtantly, and that they will receive and treat him in a manner ſuitable to the character he will be inveſted with, of Repreſentative for the Honourable Company.

If this gentleman takes his departure from *Bombay* agreeable to this requeſt and your promiſe, I ſhall have the honour to ſee him at *Poorunder*, as I have conſented to continue here ſome days longer for this purpoſe, thinking, and indeed being perſuaded, that may be of mutual advantage to the two Governments; very particularly ſo, I hope, to our own.

I have to intreat, Gentlemen, you will be kind

enough to meet immediately, if poſſible, on the receipt of this letter, to give the Reſident his diſpatches, that I may not be deprived the pleaſure of giving him every aſſiſtance in my power on his arrival at *Poonah*.

The Miniſters have given orders for bearers being laid from *Panwelly* to *Poonah*, for the greater eaſe and diſpatch of the journey.

Poorunder, I have, &c.
29th December 1776. (Signed) *Jno Upton.*

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*.
Secret Department.

Sir,

This is purpoſely to incloſe a copy of a letter we have juſt received from the Engliſh Commiſſioners at *Broach*.

We ſhall wave remarking on the manifeſt duplicity in the conduct of the Miniſters, at a time when they are making ſuch profeſſions of the moſt ſtrong deſire to have every Article of the Treaty fully accompliſhed. We think it however proper to repeat the recommendation in our letter of the 11th inſtant, to procure the proper orders from the Miniſters, and to forward them to us, that they may be tranſmitted to *Broach* by a ſea conveyance, to prevent any chance of their being intercepted, which might be the caſe if ſent over land. The proper ſunnuds ſhould be likewiſe ſent us for the ceded countries.

We requeſt you will inform us, from what term the collections of the country of three lacks are to be conſidered the property of the Honourable Company.

We are, &c.
Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *Wm Hornby*,
31ſt December 1776. &c. Council.

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your letter of the 29th ultimo, and we at the ſame time received a letter from the Poonah Government, requeſting that a gentleman might be ſent to reſide there as heretofore.

The Miniſters have in their letter expreſſed a deſire that Mr. *Moſtyn*, our former Reſident, might not be the perſon appointed for this charge. We are rather at a loſs to diſcover what objections they can have to this gentleman; but we are inclined to believe their repugnance to him proceeds from a ſuſpicion that he was privy to the attack on *Salſette*, or that it was concerted at his inſtigation. This idea, if entertained by them, is totally without foundation. We do aſſure you, that this ſcheme was not ſuggeſted by any advices from him; that it was determined upon previous to his leaving *Poonah*, by a reſolution of Council, to which he was an entire ſtranger; and that he was only ordered from thence a few days before the attack commenced, without even any intimation being given him of the reaſon for his recall. Theſe circumſtances we requeſt you will ſtate to the Miniſters, and we are perſuaded they will entirely remove their objections to Mr. *Moſtyn*; and as the Honourable Company's nomination, and his knowledge and experience of the Maratta politics, point him out as the proper perſon to reſide at *Poonah*, we have reſolved to depute him thither, as Reſident for the Honourable Company at the Maratta Durbar.

Even allowing the Miniſters had cauſe for ſuſpicion of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s propoſing ſchemes to the prejudice of their Government, all former animoſities ought to be removed by the treaty that has lately taken place, and we cannot allow them to preſcribe who we are to employ upon any commiſſion to the Poonah Durbar.

Our motive for the attack upon *Salſette* was founded upon ſome intelligence we had received from *Goa*, that the Portugueſe were actually preparing an armament to reduced it; and as we were then in expectation of procuring the ceſſion of it by treaty from *Ragonaut Row*, we took that ſtep to ſecure the poſſeſſion of it for the Honourable Company, which you may communicate to the Miniſters, if you think neceſſary.

Mr. *Moſtyn* will ſet out for *Poonah* with all convenient expedition after the proper paſſports are received for him and his attendants, which we requeſt you will expedite. He will bring with him a company of Sepoys. Appendix. No. 147.

We are, &c.
Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *Wm Hornby*,
3d January 1777. &c. Council.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with the receipt of your letters of the 31ſt December and 3d inſtant.

I acquainted the Peiſhwa's Miniſters with the contents of the commiſſioner's letter: they aſſure me that the poſitive orders they ſent to their agents for immediately making over the Pergunnahs, (as adviſed in my letter of the 1ſt December) are carrying with all poſſible expedition into execution; and they have been informed by the Suba of *Guzerat*, of the receipt of theſe orders by him, and that they ſhall be immediately complied with.

On the arrival of the Reſident at *Poonah*, the Miniſters will fix from what time the ceded diſtricts are to be conſidered the property of the Honourable Company; they never meant any collections ſhould be made by the Circar after the ratification of the treaty, on the diſtricts that were to be ceded, and declare their ignorance of any having been made ſince that time.

I have acquainted the Miniſters, Gentlemen, with your arguments in favour of Mr. *Moſtyn* being received as Reſident on the part of the Honourable Company at the Maratta Durbar, and urged every thing that occurred to me in ſupport of them. I am ſorry to be obliged to inform you with the abſolute refuſal of the Miniſters to receive this gentleman. I incloſe the copy of a letter I received from the Peiſhwa laſt night, by which you will obſerve how deſirous they are of receiving any gentleman as reſident except Mr. *Moſtyn*. I alſo incloſe a proper paſſport for the gentleman (and his attendants, &c.) who may be deputed.

I diſpatch this letter with all poſſible expedition, and have to requeſt you will favour me with an immediate reply, as the Miniſters are deſirous of knowing who is to come Reſident, and when his departure from *Bombay* is to take place, before I leave *Poonah*, which is fixed for the 18th inſtant.

Permit me, Gentlemen, to return many thanks for the repeated informations and aſſiſtance you have honoured me with, during my negociations at this Court. I have to beg you will be perſuaded, that the utmoſt deference and attention has been paid by me to every advice and recommendation you were pleaſed from time to time to favour me with ſince my arrival at *Poonah*, and that I have ſuffered greatly whenever I was unable to effect your wiſhes with the Maratta Government.

I make no doubt, and moſt ſincerely wiſh, that on the arrival of a Reſident at this Durbar from your Preſidency, the free intercourſe and harmony which heretofore ſubſiſted between the two Governments, may be again reſtored.

Poorunder, I have, &c.
9th January 1777. (Signed) *John Upton.*

Tranſlation of a letter from the Peiſhwa *Maderow* to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.—Received 8th January 1777.

All the particulars of the letter from the Council of *Bombay*, in regard to ſending Mr. *Moſtyn*, and his recommendations for the Circar's Durbar, are fully underſtood from you.

The Governor of *Bombay* has been wrote to by the Circar, not to ſend him. Let them ſend a truſty perſon here on the part of the Company; we do not fix upon him by name; but, excluſive of Mr. *Moſtyn*, every truſty perſon that the Council of *Bombay* ſhall ſend here,

Appendix. No. 147.

will be treated as heretofore by the Circar, only Mr. *Thomas Moſtyn* muſt never be ſent, as he is not acceptable to the Circar. If the Council of *Bombay* are attentive to the friendſhip of both ſides, they will, according to the above, diſpatch another truſty perſon immediately this way.

A letter is received from the Suba of *Guzerat* regarding the country of three lacks, that "agreeable to the "Circar's orders, I am now delivering the Pergunnahs "of three lacks to the Chief of *Broach*." This is wrote for your information. What more is to be wrote?

A true tranſlation.

(Signed) *Aⁿ Macpherſon*,
Perſian Interpreter.

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*.
Secret Department.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 9th inſtant.

The Honourable Company's eſpecial appointment of Mr. *Moſtyn* to reſide at the Maratta Durbar; the knowledge and experience he has acquired of their views and intereſts during a long intercourſe with that Government; his perſonal acquaintance with the Miniſters and every other perſon of conſequence in the Durbar, and with their characters and diſpoſitions; are ſuch forcible reaſons for ſupporting our appointment of that gentleman, that we cannot conſent to ſet him aſide from an appointment which he has ſo long filled with reputation to himſelf, and with the approbation of our honourable Maſters and this Preſidency, even to the ſatisfaction of the former Poonah Government, ment, upon ſo trivial a foundation as the letter to you from the infant Peiſhwa, which only contains an objection in general terms to Mr. *Moſtyn*, without a ſingle reaſon from what cauſe it is derived. In the preſent ſituation of affairs it is particularly requiſite that the Company's Reſident at *Poonah* ſhould poſſeſs the moſt complete knowledge of the genius and diſpoſition of the perſons he has to negociate with; and we apprehend Mr. *Moſtyn*'s qualifications for this ſtation, which induces us o appoint him to it, are very principal reaſons with the Miniſters for objecting to him. We have reſolved herefore to abide by our appointment; and we ſhould not think ourſelves juſtified to our honourable Maſters, were we to depute any other perſon to *Poonah*, unleſs ſome ſpecific objections are made to him, that we can deem admiſſible. We alſo conſider this conduct of the Miniſters, in refuſing to receive a Member of our adminiſtration, and pretending to make a merit of not objecting to any other perſon, as very unprecedented, and inconſiſtent with that harmony they profeſs themſelves ſo deſirous ſhould ſubſiſt between the two Governments.

We wiſh you a moſt ſafe and pleaſant journey to *Bengal*; and remain, Sir, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *Wᵐ Hornby*,
13th January 1777. &c. Council.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations,
dated the 7th April 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Read the following letter from *Bombay*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have been honoured with your letters, dated the 30th September, 14th October, and 9th December.

The ſudden depreſſion of *Sudaba*'s party, and his ſubſequent death, of which Colonel *Upton* would be enabled to adviſe you with more certainty than you could have done, have added much ſtability to the preſent Poonah Government, and removed the expectations we conceived from *Sudaba*'s rapid progreſs of a ſpeedy revolution taking place therein.

Colonel *Upton* having intimated to us his intention of quitting *Poonah* and the Miniſters expreſſed a deſire that we ſhould depute a gentleman to reſide there, we accordingly, in conformity to your recommendation, reſolved again to fix a Reſident, at the Maratta Court, and appointed Mr. *Moſtyn*, our former Reſident, for this ſervice, of which we gave immediate advice to Colonel *Upton*. We were not a little ſurprized at receiving ſoon afterwards letters from the Poonah Government, objecting in general terms to Mr. *Moſtyn* being the perſon ſent thither, but without aſſigning the ſmalleſt reaſon for their repugnance to receiving this Gentleman; we therefore thought we could not with propriety ſet him aſide from an employment to which he was expreſsly appointed by the Honourable Company, and had long filled to their approbation and with reputation to himſelf, unleſs the Miniſters could point out ſome ſpecific objections to him, that we could deem admiſſible; neither could we with credit permit the Miniſters to refuſe in ſo unprecedented a manner, to receive a Member of our adminiſtration without aſſigning ſome ſufficient cauſe. And judging that the knowledge Mr. *Moſtyn* acquired in his former reſidence, which ſo peculiarly qualified him for this commiſſion, was a principal reaſon with the Miniſters to wiſh ſome other perſon might be deputed, we reſolved to adhere to our appointment; and we have now the pleaſure to adviſe that they have conſented to receive him, and he will ſoon proceed, furniſhed with proper inſtructions for his conduct, of which we ſhall tranſmit you a copy; and he will be particularly directed to correſpond punctually with your Preſidency.

We ſhall likewiſe direct Mr. *Moſtyn* to do all in his power to promote the moſt friendly correſpondence with the Poonah Government; and we hope a ſuitable and permanent accommodation will be effected between that State and *Ragonaut Row*, who ſtill reſides at *Bombay*, whereby all future jealouſies will be removed and the Honourable Company relieved from the expence incurred by his reſidence. We are, &c.

Bombay, 1ſt February 1777. (Signed) *Wᵐ Hornby*, Preſident, and Council.

Read the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your letters of the 9th and 30th December.

By the papers that accompanied my letters of the 5th December and 22d January, you will have been ſatisfied, Gentlemen, of the truth of the reports that were heretofore made to me regarding the demanding by the Governor of *Bombay* the perſon of *Sadaſhee Row* from *Raggujee Angria*, and the part taken by the Chief of *Salſette* in the Maratta diſputes.

I much fear the order you have been pleaſed to ſend to the Preſidency of *Bombay* reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*, has not been received, as the Council have as yet been ſilent on this head. To prevent any bad impreſſion this may make on the Miniſters, I ſhall this day forward to *Bombay* the paragraph of your letter of the 30th December, that regards *Ragonaut Row*.

On the receipt, Gentlemen, of your laſt letter, I obſerved to the Miniſters, as I had repeatedly done before, the impropriety of their cenſures on the Government of *Bombay*, for acts committed before the peace was concluded, all of which were of courſe cancelled by the Treaty. They acknowledge the impropriety of this, and ſay they ſhould not have been ſo frequent in their reproaches, had not the part taken by theſe gentlemen, ſince the concluſion of the peace, been ſo very active againſt their Government: their anger, they add, might have led them too far, but they hope there will be no occaſion to repeat their grievances. This, Gentlemen, is the purport of their anſwer to me now, and was ever the ſame, when I before obſerved on the unfitneſs of ſuch upbraidings.

I wiſh

wiſh it may appear by my correſpondence with the Select Committee of *Bombay* (ſince my laſt letter of the 22d January) that ſome advantages have been derived to the Honourable Company, by my continuance at *Poonah*. A complete lack is gained by the period fixed for commencing our collections upon the ceded country of three lacks; and in this a matter is adjuſted that might have been attended with ſome difficulty.

I leave *Poorunder* to-morrow, on my return to *Bengal*. Had I done this ſooner it muſt have been without the conſent of this Government, which I conceive, Gentlemen, could not have met with your approbation.

I am requeſted by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, to forward the accompanying packet.

Poorunder, I have, &c.
6th March 1777. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton.*

Sir,

Concluding you have not yet left *Poonah*, we think it neceſſary to tranſmit to you a copy of a letter received by your Preſident from the Peiſhwa, under the 19th inſtant.

This letter having been conveyed to us in a manner ſo different from the former ones from the Poonah Government, and the purport thereof being directly contrary to the advices from you, which mention that the Pergunnah of *Jambooſeer* is to remain in our poſſeſſion until the payment of the twelve lacks, we ſhall therefore pay no attention to it, until we hear again from you.

We have, &c.
Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *W. Hornby*, Preſident,
22d January 1777. and Council.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay.*

Gentlemen,

My deſire of being at *Poorunder* on the arrival of the Reſident from *Bombay*, has till now detained me, and afforded me the opportunity of receiving your favour of the 22d of laſt month.

I have the honour to incloſe a letter from the Peiſhwa to the Honourable the Preſident, which aſſures, that the Maratta Government mean ſtrictly to abide by the agreement made regarding *Jambooſeer* continuing in our poſſeſſion until the twelve lacks ſhall be paid, as expreſſed in the Peiſhwa's letter to me, received the 18th of October laſt; a copy of which accompanied my letter of the 19th October.

It ſeems the Miniſters were apprehenſive that the collections of *Jambooſeer* might fall ſhort from a concluſion that their Zemindars would take advantage of the Engliſh Chiefs being unacquainted with the former ſums they were accuſtomed to pay, and take that opportunity of reducing the annual revenues of their reſpective diſtricts: to avoid this inconvenience the Peiſhwa now writes, propoſing two methods for making the collections upon *Jambooſeer*, and wiſhes, Gentlemen, to know to which you give the preference.

In the accompanying letter from the Peiſhwa to the Honourable the Preſident, he agrees that we commence our collections on the ceded country of three lacks, from the firſt of the preſent year, and that we are to account for no collections made upon *Jambooſeer* prior to that date which I conceive muſt be found very ſatisfactory.

I have received a letter from the Honourable the Governor General and Council in which they ſignify their approbation of the manner in which the twelve lacks are to be paid by the Maratta Government to the Honourable Company.

We have yet no intelligence of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s being on his journey; at this, ſome ſurprize is expreſſed by the Miniſters: I purpoſe ſtaying here two days, or three if neceſſary, after this gentleman's arrival.

Poorunder, I have, &c.
5th February, 1777. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton.*

Sir,

The Peiſhwa in his letter to the Preſident having requeſted that a duplicate of our orders to the Chief at *Broach*, reſpecting the country of three lacks and the Pergunnah of *Jambooſeer*, might be ſent to him, we have complied with his deſire; and incloſe likewiſe for your notice, a copy of the orders we have given on the occaſion to Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Boddam*, and *Ramſey*, who have now the ſole adminiſtration of the Honourable Company's affairs at *Broach* and its dependencies.

We are &c.
Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, Preſident,
13th February 1777. and Council.

Gentlemen,

I have been favoured with your letters of the 12th and 13th inſtant with their ſeveral incloſures.

I have the honour to forward, under the ſeals of this Government, a copy of further orders which the Peiſhwa is now ſending to his agents at *Broach*; theſe I hope will remove every difficulty: the Peiſhwa's Miniſters declare they have no other wiſh, than that the ceded country of three lacks ſhould be made over in the moſt equitable manner: for which purpoſe theſe further orders will be diſpatched to their agents as expeditiouſly as poſſible.

You forgot, Gentlemen, to forward to the Peiſhwa a duplicate of your orders to *Broach*; I have however ſupplied the omiſſion, by giving a copy of thoſe you ſent for my information, and have wrote a few lines myſelf to Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Boddam*, and *Ramſey*, to be ſent therewith.

I am greatly concerned to hear Mr. *Moſtyn* has been ſo much indiſpoſed as to diſable him from travelling; it is pity that the expediency of ſending Mr. *Moſtyn*'s deputy to *Poonah* with proper powers, till Mr. *Moſtyn* might have been in condition to have come himſelf, ſhould never have occurred. From the ſtrong repreſentations you ſo repeatedly made of the neceſſity of a free intercourſe between your Preſidency and *Poonah*, the removal of jealouſies, and the re-eſtabliſhment of commerce with the Maratta dominions, I ſhould have conceived you would have readily embraced the firſt opportunity that offered, to carry ſuch very deſirable meaſures into execution; but you are, Gentlemen, certainly the beſt judges how to act in the immediate concerns of your own Preſidency.

Much has been expected, and many things have been recommended to me during the correſpondence I have had the honour to hold with your Board, permit me now to recommend, that ſome gentleman be deputed to *Poonah* as ſoon as poſſible, until Mr. *Moſtyn* can make the journey himſelf; and I am convinced the good effects of ſuch meaſure would be immediately felt. Whatever jealouſies there now may be, between the two Governments, would ſoon diſappear. So long a time having elapſed, and no Reſident ſent, occaſions ſtrange ſurmiſes amongſt the Maratta Chiefs.

I ſhall wait at *Poorunder* to be honoured, Gentlemen, with your acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter in which I have to entreat there may be no delay; and you will be pleaſed to carry on your correſpondence in future as has been ſettled, either with the Peiſhwa or his Miniſters, as my ſhort ſtay here will prevent my tranſacting any further public buſineſs.

Poorunder, I have, &c.
19th February 1777. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 19th inſtant, and as you have expreſſed your deſire that the receipt thereof may be immediately acknowledged, we diſpatch this Pattamar for no other purpoſe not having yet had time to take your letter into conſideration.

We repeat our wiſhes that you have a pleaſant and ſafe journey to *Bengal*; and are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, Preſident,
25th February 1777. and Council.

Appendix. No. 148.

Sir

The incloſed packet being of importance, we requeſt you will forward it in the moſt expeditious manner to the Governor General and Council. Mr. *Moſtyn* is ſo far recovered from his indiſpoſition, that he will be able to ſet off for *Poonah* in a few days.

We are &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 26th February 1777 (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, Preſident, and Council.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated the 12th May 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Read, and approved, the proceedings of the 5th inſtant

Received the following letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, at *Poonah*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Agreeably to my inſtructions from my ſuperiors at *Bombay*, I diſpatch this purpoſely to inform you of my arrival near *Proondur* yeſterday, and that I ſhall have my firſt audience this evening.

Incloſed I have the honour to tranſmit you copy of a letter from the Committee at *Broach*, directed to Colonel *Upton*, or the Engliſh Reſident at *Proondur*. You may depend on my utmoſt endeavours being exerted for the ſettling this buſineſs, as well as with reſpect to the diſtrict of *Jambooſeer*, depoſited with us for the payment of twelve lacks of rupees, conformable to what the Peiſhwa wrote to Colonel *Upton* under the 18th October laſt.

From what intelligence I could get on the road, I do not find that there is any alteration in the ſtate of affairs at this Durbar ſince Colonel *Upton* left it, which was on the 7th ultimo. I ſhall conſtantly keep you adviſed of all material occurrences; and remain with reſpect, &c.

Curreet, near *Proonder*, the 4th April 1777. (Signed) *T^s Moſtyn.*

P. S. Should I have occaſion to addreſs your Honour, &c. in cypher, I ſhall make uſe of the Honourable Company's great cypher N° 1. letter A.

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*, or to the Engliſh Reſident for the time being at *Poorunder.*

Sir,

We have received your favour of the 18th ultimo, incloſing copy of a letter from *Bombay* Preſidency to our addreſs, the original whereof reached us ſome time before.

In obedience to their orders, we have repeatedly aſſured the Maratta agents that we are ready to conform to the tenor of the inſtructions communicated to them from the Peiſhwa, agreeable to the copy tranſmitted by you to the Governor and Council, the 1ſt December laſt, viz. To accept the propoſed diſtricts of *Ahmood*, *Hanſoot*, and *Deſoorah*, and give and receive according as they may exceed or fall ſhort of the ſtipulated amount of three lacks, which we propoſed to have aſcertained by the average produce of the three enſuing years; but the agents inſiſt on our abiding by their eſtimate of R^s 3,33,000, and that there muſt be a deduction from *Ahmood*, for the ſurplus of R^s 33,000, and they will admit of no alternative, although our Commiſſioners here, who have accurately inſpected the revenues for a ſeries of years paſt, maintain they will not exceed R^s 2,10,000.

We are ſorry to obſerve, there muſt be ſome colluſion on the part of the Miniſters, as the inſtructions conveyed directly to the agents differ widely from the copy tranſmitted by you, and ſeem to authorize their ſervants in their obſtinate refuſal to accede to our reaſonable propoſals. We have the honour to be, &c.

Broach, the 12th March 1777. (Signed) *John Carnac*, *R. H. Boddam*, *And^w Ramſey.*

APPENDIX, No. 148.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 20th January 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

RECEIVED the following letter from *Fort Saint George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have the honour to incloſe you intelligence received in a letter from the Nabob, which, after giving an account of the ſituation of affairs at *Poonah*, repreſents *Hyder Ally Cawn* to be raiſing troops and preparing for war, and that the Poligars and Zemindars were ordered to attend at the paſſes towards the Panyinghaut: this however, is in a great degree weakened by advices we have received through another channel, copy of which we incloſe you, which repreſents *Hyder*'s preparations to be in conſeqnence of apprehenſions of the Marattas.

We alſo ſend you copy of a letter, our Preſident has received from the Rajah of *Travencore*, together with a copy of his anſwer. He is included in the treaty with *Hyder*, as being dependant on the *Carnatic.*

We underſtand that the French have received at the iſlands, troops and ſtores from *France*, and that barracks are building at *Pondicherry*. They moſt probably look forward to diſpute with us the Government of this country, and conſidering their views with thoſe of *Hyder Ally*, who has reduced many of the petty Princes around him, we ought to prepare ourſelves againſt the deſigns of either. Were we able, when neceſſity ſhould require to take the field, with a well regulated and well paid army, with good conduct, we might hope one vigorous campaign would reſtore peace to the country. We are ſenſible of the neceſſity of peace, and every endeavour ſhall be uſed towards a continuance of it.

We have reſolved on the increaſe of the number of our battalions, by reducing the preſent eſtabliſhment of a thouſand men in each to ſeven hundred, which will enable us to garriſon the forts of the Nabob under our charge, and to take the field at a ſhort notice with two battalions of Europeans, three companies of artillery, and nine battalions of Sepoys; and theſe joined by the Nabob's cavalry, would, we think, be ſufficient againſt any forces that could be brought againſt us—but troops cannot be maintained, military operations cannot be conducted without money, and herein we fear we ſhall fail. The balances due from the Nabob, the Rajah and our revenues, until September 1777, with the amount of bills to be drawn on the Company, amount to 28,34,000 pagodas, and our diſburſements, in caſe of peace with the amount of our inveſtment, would leave a balance in our hands not inconſiderable were the whole to be received; but the very great ſcarcity of ſpecie, from the conſiderable exports which have been made to *China* and *Europe*, fills us with apprehenſion that our receipts from the Nabob and from the Company's lands will fall ſhort of the eſtimated ſums.

The very report of a force of 1,500 Europeans and 12,000 black troops aſſembled, with the means of payment, in our treaſury, would command reſpect from all, and would be likely to deter any from attempting to diſ-

turb the *Carnatic*, the neceſſity of ſuch a fund has long appeared, and in our letter of the 29th March laſt we had the honour to write to you, how ſerviceable to us ſuch aſſiſtance might prove. We beg leave to repeat the ſame repreſentation to you, and if the ſtate of your treaſury can admit of your ſupplying us, we ſhall reſerve it for the ſupport of an army, in caſe we ſhould be obliged to take the field.

When we reflect on the Company's ſituation here, we confeſs it is hard upon them to be at the riſque, and then to advance for the defence of the *Carnatic*; but no alternative occurs, for the Nabob's reſources being in his lands when troubles enſue, nothing conſiderable can be obtained from him, as we have often experienced. We have recommended to him the reduction of every unneceſſary expence; he has diſmiſſed part of his Sepoys, and we underſtand he is making other arrangements, which will greatly relieve his preſent difficulties.

We ſhall only add, that had we not ſupplied *Bombay* and *Bencoolen* with the ſum of nearly four lacks of pagodas during the years 1774 and 1775, we ſhould at this time have had a conſiderable ſum in our treaſury.

Since writing the above, ſome intelligence has come in, which we have now the honour to incloſe,

Fort St. George, We are, &c. &c.
4th December 1776.

Ordered, That the Incloſures in the above letter be entered after the Conſultation.

INCLOSURES.

From his Highneſs the Nabob to Governor *Stratton*.

2d November 1776.

I have ſent you incloſed a copy of the news received from *Seringapatam*, by which you will diſcover the intentions of *Hyder Ally Khan*.

What can I write more?

Copy of the news of *Seringapatam*.

News is arrived from *Poonah* that *Sukharam Bapoo*, *Nana*, *Phaar Nueſo*, and other Chiefs, are in the forts of *Peorundhar* and *Poonah*. As yet no preparations are made; they have raiſed a few troops, but have not money to pay them. *Ragonaut Row* has quitted the Engliſh at *Surat*, and intends coming here.

Sedaree Row has collected a numerous force, and has taken the country of *Hookum*, with all the forts, &c. and is arrived near *Poonah*. Tranquillity is therefore fled from that quarter. From *Madras* we hear that the former Governor, Lord *Pigot*, is in confinement, and is at variance with the Nabob and the Engliſh, and alſo that the Nabob is greatly harraſſed by his creditors, and his army, for their money, which has very much rejoiced the Chief here, he is raiſing cavalry and infantry, and collected a large quantity of ammunition and ſtores, and has ſent orders to all his people on the borders, and at the paſſes of the Payinghaut, to hold themſelves in readineſs. After the Duwallee they are determined to march. An expreſs on a camel was ſent with letters to the chiefs of *Cudapa*, *Chittaldorook* and *Sanoor* and all the Zemindars and Poligars, to deſire they would come immediately with all their troops, ammunition, ſtores, &c. I am very certain their deſigns are againſt the *Carnatic*; but time will diſcover. They are here ſo particularly ſevere with the news-writers, that if it was known, any one wrote ever ſo little, he would certainly ſuffer death. Notwithſtanding this I have wrote theſe particulars: and if in future another opportunity ſhall preſent itſelf, I will embrace, otherwiſe you will conſider theſe circumſtances as true and be upon your guard.

A true Copy.
(Signed) *D. Baine*,
D^y M^r S^y.

Intelligence received from *Hyder's* country, brought by hircarrahs who left *Seringapatam* 17th October, and arrived at *Madras* 4th November 1776.

Hyder Ally and *Teepoo Saib* are at *Seringapatam*.

When *Hyder Ally* was at *Bunkaporam*, he had news that his brother-in-law, named *Small Cawn Saib*, *Motarow*, and *Hurtur* (formerly the head of the Myſore country) having conſidered with each other; upon that *Hyder Ally* left about 5,000 horſe at *Bunkaporum*, and *Darvady* with 4,000 horſe, and 8,000 Sepoys at *Paraguddy*, which he gave to the command of a Moorman. *Hyder Ally* then went to *Seringapatam*, and on his arrival there, people ſay he killed the ſaid *Small Cawn Saib* with his own hands. This man was Killedar of *Seringapatam* fort. On a certain day, when *Hyder Ally* went to *Hurtur*'s as was his uſual cuſtom, *Kurtur* aſked him, Why do you keep me always in confinement? if you will carry me along with you to camp, I ſhall have an opportunity of walking? Upon hearing this *Hyder Ally* told him, very well; but after that *Kurtur* died in about 15 days, whereupon *Hyder Ally* appointed a boy of eight years of age (a couſin of *Kurtur*'s) in *Kurtur*'s room; and lately being a Doſſarah feaſt (uſually given to boys) *Hyder Ally* ſent for the boy (now the head or maſter) and ſhewed him much reſpect and civility, after which he ſent him to his houſe with great pomp. Appendix. No. 149.

The particulars of the force that ſerves in *Hyder Ally*'s camp, are as follows, viz.

Horſe - - - -	15,000
Sepoys - - -	20,000
Portugueſe, - - -	500
French Soldiers, - -	150

The above force is ſtationed in the following places:

6000 horſe in *Gungapellah* on the eaſt ſide of *Seringapatam*,
4000 horſe about the villages,
8000 Sepoys at *Seringapatam*,
5000 Poligar Peons, D°

And the reſt of the force in the Pavaguddy and Marwaddie. The whole of the Poligar's army that ſerve him, will be about 20,000 Peons.

In this year the ſtrong current of the Cavarce river carried away the bridge of the ſmall fort of *Seringapatam*, and they are now repairing it.

Hyder Ally has given orders to the head Conicoplys of every village, and the managers, to ſettle all the Pergunnahs accounts, and to collect all the balances due from the inhabitants of his Circar; which they are now doing; beſides this, *Hyder Ally* has wrote to the different Polligars to pay him the following ſums due to him, or more properly that he obliges them to pay annually,

	Pags.
The Chittracuttoo Polligar, -	200,000
The Roya Durgum D° -	100,000
The Jemindar of *Ponganoer*, -	23,000

He has alſo wrote to ſeveral other Polligars in the ſame manner. He is making ready his camp: the people ſay, that about 20,000 Maratta horſe had marched as far as the river *Kiſtna*, and which and *Hyder Ally* is making there preparations, for it is ſaid the Marattas will ſoon be in theſe parts, that is the *Seringapatam* country.

Note, *Pavaguddy* and *Marwadne* are diſtant about 120 miles north of *Seringapatam*.

A true copy from the tranſlation,
(Signed) *D. Baine*,
Dep^y M^r S^y.

APPENDIX, No. 149.

Copy of an extract from an Arzdaſht of *Mahomed Bahadre*, Naib of the fort of *Mullebharry*; dated the 19th of Zekaida (31ſt December) and received the laſt of the ſame month: forwarded to Mr. *Stratton* in a letter under date the 12th of January 1777.

A PERSON of credit in the Talook of *Mullebharry* lately ſent ſome people of his own, accompanied by two hircarrahs on my part, towards *Ballagaut*, to learn the real ſtate of *Hyder Ally*'s affairs, and I alſo wrote a letter

Appendix No. 150.

ter for the same purpose to *Cunkunny Durkwalah*. From his answer and the accounts given by the agents sent on this business, I learn that *Shasram*, the brother of *Murrar Row* at the head of 80,000 Maratta horse, had entered *Hyder Ally*'s country by the village of *Adelly*, situated on the confines. In this village *Hyder Ally* had a garrison of 3000 horse under the command of *Kishen Row* the son of *Ramajee Pundit*: the Maratta army surprized him in the night and got possession of the villages, together with *Binkapore* and *Mullery*.

Besides the 30,000 men above-mentioned, another army of 60,000 cavalry have entered the country on the side of *Culkey*.

As soon as *Hyder* received this intelligence, he sent his numerous army under the command of his Son *Tuppoo* and his brother-in-law *Mukdoom Khan*, to engage the Marattas, and is himself at *Seringapatam* to defend that fort. This is undoubtedly fact.

By the blessing of God and your Highness's auspicious fortune, the troubles which are now fallen on *Hyder Allan Khan* must put a stop to the evil designs he has formed.

Whatever further I am able to learn I shall transmit your Highness.

Extract of a letter from Mr. *Robert Adams* to the Resident at *Onore*; dated *Seringapatam* 20th September 1775, and received at *Onore* the 30th, per *Anchers*.

The Nabob yesterday told *Badjee Row* in the Durbar, that his and his brother's wits were gone for taking assistance from the English, a good for nothing deceitful people, who do not mind breaking any firm agreement, and that their assistance was of no value; on which *Badjee Row* and *Pursing Punt* told him, their wits were not gone, unless it was because they had eaten the rice and drank the water of this country, and that the English assisted *Ragoba* when he was deserted by his people, and no one else would assist in either men or money, but that the English had done both, and collected for him 50,000 horse, and he hoped they would in a short time be in *Poonah*, and if he chose to march he might, if not, they, *Badjee Row* and his brother, would go without him, on which the Nabob was silent, and promised he would march with them after the Dussora.

There is great reason to suspect the Nabob is tampering with the ministerial party and the Nizam to our prejudice; he has lately wrote to the latter, observing to him how the English took *Bengal*, *Arcot*, &c. therefore should they be suffered to place *Ragobah* in *Poonah*, the riches of that town must fall into their hands; all the powers and countries from *Calcutta* to *Cape Comorin* must be subject to the English, therefore *now* is the time to frustrate them; and that he may depend they will be on both the Nizam and himself in a short time.

A true copy.
(Signed) *Edwd Ravenscroft*, Secr^y.

APPENDIX, No. 150.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, the 22d April 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Governor General, President,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monson*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*. } Esquires.

From Lord *Pigot* to the King of Tanjore.

THE English *East India* Company disapproving of the late conduct of their servants with respect to *Tanjore*, have thought proper to direct me to replace you upon the throne of your ancestors, upon certain terms and conditions to be agreed upon for the mutual benefit of yourself and the English *East India* Company, without infringing the rights of *Mahomed Ally Khan*, Nabob of the *Carnatic*.

I have in consequence of these orders from my masters concerted measures with the Nabob, so as to carry them properly into effect; and Colonel *Harper*, who will deliver you this, when he has relieved the Nabob's troops, will appoint for your protection such guards as may be thought necessary.

I request of you to allow me a few days after hearing that the English are in possession of *Tanjore* before I say more to you, than to assure you I will study to do every thing that is for the mutual benefit of you and my employers, and I hope you will permit the Nabob's officers to continue in the management of affairs, until I have again the honour to write to you.

Fort St. George, 2d February 1776. A true copy. (Signed) *R. J. Sulivan*, Secr^y.

To the Right Honourable Lord *Pigot*, President, and Governor, &c. &c.

My Lord,

The letter which your Lordship has honoured me with, and which was delivered me by Colonel *Harper*, has given me a joy which no tongue is able to express—overwhelmed with the transport of joy, I am as one who is raised from the dead. When I seemed to be cut off from all the cheering hopes of seeing better days, then it was that God by his over-ruling Providence turned my sorrow into joy. Your Lordship has been the happy instrument Providence, has made use of to restore me to my former dignity and the throne of my ancestors. I shall therefore from henceforth look upon you as my father, and venerate you under that most amiable character as long as I have a being.

Convinced that whatever your Lordship shall think proper to determine or regulate will be to my real advantage, I shall cheerfully resign my concerns to your kind hands, and willingly acquiesce in your determination.

As by your generous regard for my happiness, your honourable name must and will be had in the most grateful remembrance by me and my family; so I hope it will be celebrated over the world.

I remain, &c.

Tanjore, 13th February 1776. (Signed) ತುಳಜಾ ಜಿ

A true copy.
(Signed) *R. J. Sulivan*, Secr^y.

Letter to the Honourable the Court of Directors for affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *East Indies*.

Honourable, Military Department.

1. We paid our respects to you by the *Ankerwyke* and *Hillsborough*, under date the 14th February, and then acquainted you that the Nabob had admitted your troops into the garrison of *Tanjore* the 9th of that month.

2. No persuasions however could induce him to concur in restoring the Rajah. He said he would not oppose the execution of your orders, but would never consent to give up the Tanjore country. So circumstanced, we determined, in consequence of the orders you had been pleased to send us by the *Grenville*, to restore the Rajah by your authority; and we thought proper to entrust the execution of those orders to our President. He set out the 30th March, and returned from *Tanjore* the 5th May; and we have now the pleasure to tell you that the Rajah is put into possession of the whole country his father held in 1762, when the treaty was concluded with the Nabob.

3. His fort is not only garrisoned by your troops, but his country protected by them also: he has on this ac-

count

count engaged to pay into your caſh 400,000 pagodas annually, and will keep no other troops himſelf but what are neceſſary for his guards, the number not to exceed 500. We have the greater ſatisfaction in informing you of this, as every meaſure we have taken has been at his requeſt.

4. And the incloſed copy of the Rajah's letter will, we flatter ourſelves, give your Honours perfect ſatisfaction. We did not think it right to accept any additional country near *Devy Cotah*. We have complied with the Rajah's requeſts in all other reſpects; and our Preſident begs leave to aſſure you, that he cannot expreſs how grateful the Rajah is for the juſtice you have done him, nor how much he merits your countenance and protection.

Fort St. George,
14th May 1776.

APPENDIX, No. 151.

Country Correſpondence 1776.—Extract of Intelligence from the *Decan* received 30 July 1775.

THE deſign of the Decan Sirdars now is, after croſſing the *Nurbudder*, to collect together all the armies of the *Decan*, and being joined by *Nizam Ally Khân* to make one powerful effort by a general engagement with the European army; and that the ſtruggle for the Chiefſhip of the *Decan* may at once be decided in favour of him to whom the Almighty giveth the victory.

Madhajee Sindha has reſolved to join whatever party finally prevails.

Ragonaut Row has laid ſiege to *Burrooda* near *Goujeraut*, which *Futty Sing Guickwar*, who is in the place, is prepared to defend. After the rains he propoſes to proceed into the *Decan*. *Nizam Ally Khân* is encamped near *Ellichpore*, and has put to death *Iſhmael Khân* the Chief of that place, as well as *Rukkun-ul-Dowlah*, his own Dewan. *Madhajee Booſila* having viſited *Nizam Ally Khân* entered into a friendſhip with him, which has been ſince broken, and their former enmity renewed, by *Nizam Ally*'s having aſſaſſinated *Uſeph Gardee*, the murderer of *Narrain Row*, who was an aſſociate of *Madhajee Booſila*. *Nizam Ally Khân* is now inclined to aſſiſt the Sirdars of the *Decan*, but is kept in ſuſpence through fear of the power of the Europeans.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 17th July 1777.

PRESENT,

Secret Department, Thurſday.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General Sir *John Clavering*, K. B.
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

The Proceedings of the 14th inſtant read, and approved.

Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* attending, according to the order of the laſt Council Day, is called in, and delivers to the Board the following paper:

Information, and requeſts of the Nizam to the Honourable the Governor General and Council of the Superior Council, as delivered by himſelf to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, dated 13th April 1777.

The following circumſtances will ſhew our ſteady attachment to the Engliſh.

Treaties of the ſtrongeſt nature were in force between us and the Peiſhwa *Maderow* and *Narrain Row*. When the latter was murdered *Ragonaut Row* wrote twice, acquainting us of what had happened, and declared in the moſt poſitive manner, his intentions were to abide ſtrictly by the above treaties; being therefore under no apprehenſion from that quarter, we ſent our army to ſettle ſome diſturbances in *Berar*, and remained at *Hyderabad* with the neceſſary guards only, but what was our ſurprize when we were informed that *Ragonaut Row* was on his march towards *Buder* with a large army. We were conſequently under the neceſſity of withdrawing the forces from *Berar*, and marching with all expedition to *Buder*. On our arrival there we ſent a vackeel to *Ragonaut Row*, to know the cauſe of ſuch an extraordinary meaſure after his letter to us, and to aſk him if he was ſure he had left all quiet at *Poonah*, after what had happened ſo lately there? however if this ſudden attack was in expectation of finding us unprepared for war, he had better ſend a perſon on whom he could fully depend, to look at our troops and artillery, by which he would be convinced that we were ready for the field. He complied, and a Peace was concluded agreeable to the former treaties; we returned to *Hyderabad*, and he marched towards the *Kiſtna*: but the very day we parted he began to burn and lay waſte the country on this ſide the river, after which he croſſed it, and had a meeting with our brother, whom he endeavoured to perſuade to join him in arms againſt us. Our brother aſked him what he could mean by making ſuch ſtrange propoſals to him, when he had but juſt concluded a Peace with the Circar? and anſwered him in every reſpect becoming our brother. The Maratta Miniſters, *Succaram Pundit* and *Ballajee Pundit*, wrote us at the ſame time of his extraordinary conduct, and that they were determined to return to *Poonah*, and wait with patience till the widow of *Narrain Row*, who was pregnant, ſhould be delivered, and if the child ſhould prove a boy, they begged for our aſſiſtance to ſupport him in preſerving his birthright. Seeing there was no dependance to be placed on *Ragonaut Row*, as well as our deſire of placing the ſon of *Narrain Row* on the Muſnud, we ſent an army to join them, and *Ragonaut Row* was drove acroſs *the Ninbunda*; however, he returned, and was again forced back, and his followers diſperſed, except the *Guicowars*, who found means to carry him to *Surat*, where a treaty of alliance was concluded between him and the Engliſh, promiſing their aſſiſtance to carry him to *Poonah*.

Soon after this we received an addreſs from the French, requeſting that we would, as in former times, accept of their ſervices. We ſent no written reply to this addreſs, but deſired the vaqueel who brought it, to acquaint them, that there was a treaty ſubſiſting between us and the Engliſh, declaring our enemies their enemies, their enemies ours.

They anſwered, that the Engliſh had in ſome degree infringed that treaty, by joining *Ragonaut Row*, againſt whom the Circar had an army in the field; but we declared that we would take no ſteps which ſhould appear contrary to the treaty with the Engliſh, and particularly as we were about this time informed that there was a Council ſuperior to all the others arrived at *Calcutta*, whom we were perſuaded would not deviate from former treaties; we therefore determined to wait till we ſhould fully learn their intentions; at which the French were greatly diſappointed.

Some time after we were informed, that propoſals of Peace were made between the Engliſh at *Surat* and *Hurry Pundit*; and we received a letter from *Ragonaut Row*, requeſting we would ſend an army to aſſiſt him, and that he would give us in return a country of fifty lacks, and ſeveral forts. We replied, we would ſend no army to join him, but if he choſe it, we would uſe our influence with the Miniſters of the young Peiſhwa, to get a jaghire ſettled upon him.

We ordered *Ziffer ul Dowlah* the Dhouſu, with an army, to join *Hurry Pundit*, with ſtrict orders to prevent as much as poſſible, any battles or ſkirmiſhes between the Engliſh and Maratta armies, till we ſhould fully underſtand the diſpoſition of the Superior Council, and upon no account to join in the war without further orders from us.

When

Appendix. No. 151.

Appendix. No. 152.

When we were informed that the Superior Council had deputed a Sirdar of high rank to *Poonah*, to negociate a Peace with the Miniſters of the young Peiſhwa, we were convinced of the juſtneſs of our former conjectures, that they would not approve of the treaty of *Surat* with *Ragonaut Row*; and ſent orders to *Ziffir ul Dowlah* to return with the army under his command.

After the treaty was concluded, *Ragonaut Row* being received into *Surat* gave the Miniſters great uneaſineſs, from which they were ſoon relieved by the orders from *Calcutta*, and his having quitted that place; but when he was received into *Bombay*, they began to think there was no end to their troubles; and from the two following motives, ſent to invite the French to enter into an alliance with them; the firſt, that they might prepare againſt any future attempts which the Engliſh of *Bombay* might make to aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*; the ſecond, to join them in recovering what they conſidered their ancient right, the chout, from the Nabob of *Arcot*.

The French being diſappointed in their expectations from the Cirear, promiſed to enter into an alliance with the Marattas, particularly againſt the Nabob of *Arcot*, and conſequently the Engliſh, provided they would act as follows, viz. That the Marattas ſhould march an army into the *Carnatic*, from which a large detachment ſhould be ſent to the neighbourhood of *Pondicherry*, which is to alarm the French, and they are immediately to ſend to the officer commanding the Maratta army, to know his demands; he will reply, that he inſiſts upon the French joining the Marattas againſt the Nabob of *Arcot*, to recover their chout; the French will give out that they had nothing left but to comply, and will under this pretence of neceſſity ſend an army to join the Marattas.

We have alſo been informed, that a ſhip with five French officers of rank arrived lately at a Maratta iſland. The inhabitants required their immediate departure; but the French aſſured them that they had particular buſineſs with the Peiſhwa's Miniſters at *Poonah*, and deſired notice might be ſent with all expedition of their arrival; which the Chief of the iſland did; and we have intelligence that elephants, camels, &c. are now ſent to the ſea ſhore neareſt the above iſland, to carry the French officers to *Poonah*.

Our attachment to the Engliſh has made us think of the following plan to prevent the Marattas from attacking the *Carnatic*; viz. That *Ragonaut Row* ſhall be continued at *Bombay*, until the Poonah Miniſters agree to ſettle a reaſonable jaghire upon him, in the *Kandee* country, which will be ſo near our dominions that we can threaten to join *Ragonaut Row* with an army the moment they ſhew any intention to march againſt the Nabob of *Arcot*, which will prevent their ſending their army from home.

Another very material circumſtance which we ſuppoſe the Engliſh are not acquainted with, is, that *Moodaje Bonſla*, who claims a right to the choute of *Bengal*, is wiſhing for an opportunity to march a large army into that province, which muſt greatly injure the Engliſh. However our real deſire of being upon the moſt friendly terms with the Engliſh nation has induced us to fall upon a plan which will enable us to thwart *Moodajee*'s intentions on *Bengal*, viz. *Suckojee Boonſla*, the ſon of *Rajajee Boonſla*, claims a prior right to the Chiefſhip of *Napore*, &c. This young man was ſome time ago under our protection; but having concluded a Treaty of Peace with *Moodajee* we ſent him to *Poonah*, to prevent jealouſies while the other continues quiet; but the moment he attempts to diſtruſt the Engliſh we will acquaint him that our intention is to place *Suckojee* on the Muſnud, which will thoroughly prevent his deſigns on *Bengal*, &c.

It is imagined the French are in alliance with *Hyder Ally* to attack the Nabob of *Arcot*, and the Engliſh of *Madras*, and ſhould *Ragonaut Row* be turned out of *Bombay* before the Miniſters have made a proper proviſion for him, he will certainly join *Hyder Ally*.

It is our particular deſire to tranſact all buſineſs concerning the Circar immediately with the Supreme Council, and that no other ſhall interfere.

In order to ſtrengthen the friendſhip ſubſiſting between us and the Engliſh, we ſhould be glad to have the following Article inſerted in the Treaty if agreeable to the Superior Council, viz.

Should the Circar have any ſervice to perform in the *Decan*, the Engliſh are to join and aſſiſt the Circar's army, except againſt the Marattas, and ſhould the Company have any ſervice in the Decan towards *Arcot*, the Circar's army will join to aſſiſt the Engliſh army, except againſt the Marattas.

APPENDIX, No. 152.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 17th October 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires,

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*, indiſpoſed.

READ, and approved, the proceedings of the 14th inſt.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Minute:

Many ſhips have been wrecked on the coaſt of *Oriſſa*, near point *Palmiras*, which from the ſhoals and the currents at certain times of the year, joined by the violence and artifices of the inhabitants, is the moſt dangerous part of the navigation of the whole coaſt: ſeveral inſtances of theſe diſaſters come within our knowledge, and as the fact is notorious, I think it unneceſſary at preſent to accompany the propoſal which I am going to make, with a liſt of the ſhips that have thus unfortunately ſuffered, but will endeavour afterwards to furniſh it.

I now ſubmit to the conſideration of the Board, the propriety of ſoliciting the Rajah of *Berar* to grant a portion of land adjoining to that part of the ſea coaſt, in property to the Company, for the eſtabliſhment of a ſmall fort and garriſon for the protection of ſhipping, and for the preſervation of the lives of the ſeamen, and the cargoes of the veſſels that may be wrecked upon it.

If the Board concur in opinion with me, I think no time ſhould be loſt in making the application, in order to render it uſeful before the next rains. The preſent juncture alſo ſeems favourable; the Rajah of *Berar* has now a vackeel here, and he himſelf is ſolicitous to cultivate the friendſhip of this Government. Should he comply with our requeſt, the advantages to trade are obvious; ſhould he refuſe it, which I think is not unlikely, I ſhall never propoſe to make an eſtabliſhment in his dominions, without his conſent; but it will, I am convinced, at leaſt make him ſeek to palliate the refuſal by forming ſome eſtabliſhment of his own, to protect and prove an aſylum to our ſhipping, which is the only object I have in view.

I cannot pretend to aſcertain exactly the military eſtabliſhment which it may be neceſſary to keep up for the protection of this grant, in the event of its being made to us; this will depend upon many local circumſtances which cannot be at this time foreſeen.

For the better information of the Board I deliver in a map of the coaſt in the neighbourhood of Point *Palmiras*.

To *Madhajee Bhoofela*.

Many ſhips have been caſt away upon the coaſt of *Cannice* and *Boojing*, their cargoes plundered, and the ſeamen and paſſengers impriſoned and ill-treated by the Zemindars of thoſe parts, who appear to be a lawleſs and ſavage race, neither acknowledging any Government, though nominally ſubject to your authority, nor obſerving any rule but the gratification of their own rapacity. Many inſtances have happened within my knowledge,

ledge, of ſhipwrecked perſons who have ſuffered cruel treatment and impriſonment from the Zemindars of *Cannice* and *Boojing*, and in particular of one captain of a veſſel, named *Rogers*, who with many of his people were baſely murdered by the Rajah of *Boojing*, as appeared by the teſtimony of the few ſeamen who eſcaped, and who left the ſaid *Rogers* and their ſhipmates in confinement, and who have never ſince been heard of.

Theſe are actions which are a diſgrace to every civilized Government, and inconſiſtent with the juſtice and humanity which diſtinguiſh your character; at the ſame time I am convinced that it is not in your power to apply the effectual remedy to them, your reſidence being too remote and the country uncultivated, and almoſt inacceſſible but by ſea; I ſhould long ſince have puniſhed the authors of theſe atrocious crimes, but they call themſelves your ſubjects, and this conſideration has reſtrained me; beſides, it is not vengeance for the paſt that I want, but a prevention of the like evils for the future. For this purpoſe I requeſt that you will permit me to erect a proper building for the ſafeguard of the coaſt, for the directions of the veſſels in their paſſage, and for the protection of the lives and cargoes of ſuch as may be wrecked in that neighbourhood, and that you will grant to the Company a Sunnud for the perpetual poſſeſſion and property of the land which lies between the river of *Banka* and the *Mahanudee*, running in a line with the ſea coaſt above and below it. For this I will conſent to pay you the ſame rent which you now receive from the preſent occupiers of it, or any other rent or equivalent which you ſhall judge reaſonable; my wiſh being to make you the partaker with me of an act of extenſive humanity and hoſpitality, in which you may ſuffer no loſs, and in which I cannot derive any other gain than in the benefits of the commerce, to protect which is the object of this propoſal, as the rude ſtate of the country itſelf will render it totally uſeleſs and unprofitable, either as a fund of revenue or internal traffic.

On this ſubject *Beneram Pundit* will alſo addreſs you, and can inform you of other particulars from his own knowledge and enquiry.

The Board agree to the Governor General's propoſal.

From *Moodhajee Bhooſila*; received 28th March, 1777.

What you write on the ſubject of inſuring the ſecurity, ſafety, and protection of merchants and traders, from the dangers of the voyage, and from the calamities of pillage; and that the Zemindars of *Coojung* and *Runka* have ſeized and appropriated the cargoes of ſuch ſhips as have been wrecked on the ſea coaſt, and ill-treated and impriſoned the crews and paſſengers; that the puniſhment of this race of people, and affording redreſs to the unfortunate ſufferers, has been delayed by reaſon of the difficult acceſs of the country, the authority they have eſtabliſhed in thoſe parts, and the remoteneſs of my reſidence is, through the ſincere friendſhip and attachment you bear me, expreſſed in ſo delicate a manner, and with ſo much attention to the honour and rights of my government, as is highly pleaſing and agreeable to me. Such conduct is incumbent at all times on the Ornaments* of the Muſnud of Government.

As I delight in juſtice, and am a friend to the whole race of mankind, the happineſs and proſperity of the people, and ſecurity and protection of the human race in general, whether travellers or fixed reſidents, are the objects of my moſt earneſt deſire and attention. By the happy influence of this good diſpoſition, notwithſtanding the ſmall number of my allies, and the great number of my enemies, victory accompanies me every where, and peace and friendſhip court me on every ſide.

When weighed in the balance againſt the heroes and conquerors of the *Decan*, whoſe horſes make no more of a journey of 1,000 coſs, than if it were a party of pleaſure of 100, what power have the Zemindars of *Coojung* and *Runka* to breathe forth ſentiments of enmity, to take any baſe or improper ſtep, or to plunder and murder any one? Appendix. No. 152.

Once before that evil-diſpoſed Zemindar cloathed himſelf in rebellion, and refuſed to ſubmit his neck to the yoke of obedience; but at laſt, by the terror of the avenging army, he was ſubdued and rooted out. Having found a favourable opportunity, he again eſtabliſhed himſelf there, and entered the paths of ill, which he ſtill treads in.

On the firſt intelligence of this, and on the peruſal of your friendly letter, I diſpatched the moſt expreſs orders to *Madajee Hurry*, Subadar of *Oriſſa*, to proceed without a moment's delay, at the head of a powerful army, to extirpate that fooliſh rebel, the author of all the evil, and to afford protection and ſecurity to all merchants and traders, whether caſt on ſhore by ſhipwreck, or paſſing backwards and forwards, and on no account whatever to ſuffer them to be troubled or moleſted, but ſo to act as to give ſatisfaction to them. The ſaid Subadar has lately written to me, that conformable to my orders he is ſet out to chaſtiſe and extirpate him; and that he ſhall very ſoon reduce him to obedience, or ſhall entirely extirpate him. Probably this news has alſo been tranſmitted from thoſe parts to you; if not, it will be. You will ſet your mind at perfect reſt on account of the merchants and traders, as the Subadar will exert himſelf with the utmoſt induſtry.

As I am conſtantly deſirous of the agreeable news of your health and welfare, the receipt of your friendly letters will relieve me from anxiety, and afford me the greateſt pleaſure.

From *Moodhajee Bhooſila*; received 28th March, 1777.

Your very agreeable letter, every character of which conveyed to my mind a pleaſing ſenſe, and refreſhed the flower-garden of friendſhip and union, the copiouſneſs which the trueſt friendſhip induced you to give to it; your congratulations on the marriage of the illuſtrious youth, and on the ſucceſs of my arms; your hearty acceptance of my preſents, agreeable to the liſt which accompanied them; and after learning the particulars entruſted to *Beneram Pundit*, aſſuring me under your hand, that the conviction of the ſincerity of my friendſhip is firmly engraved on the tablet of your heart; and that you have therefore no other view but to cultivate and ſtrengthen the root of friendſhip which has been planted, and that with reſpect to the money, I ſhall receive an anſwer through *Beneram Pundit*. This letter, filled with ſuch expreſſions of regard, arrived at a happy period, and cauſed my heart to overflow with pleaſure, encreaſing my friendſhip an hundred fold. At the time of its arrival I was diligently engaged, in conſequence of intimation from *Madhoo Row Pundit Purdhaun*, in levying forces, and preparing ſtore of arms and artillery for the purpoſe of ſettling the affairs of *Mundellah*, the Rajah of which is lately dead without children, and has left no legitimate heir, either on the father's or mother's ſide, nor any one fit to be placed on the Muſnud. I have now raiſed near 15,000 expert cavalry, and have diſpatched an advanced detachment, which I ſhall follow in perſon in three or four days. It has been alſo determined to ſend the auſpicious youth, *Ragojee Bhooſila*, with 5,000 horſe to *Poonah*, to pay a viſit to *Madhoo Row Pundit Purdhaun*, a meaſure which our long and ſteady friendſhip renders abſolutely neceſſary. He is already ſet off, and is advanced twenty coſs on his journey, and will proceed there by long marches.

The purport of a precept which adds luſtre to the

* Meaning, Rulers of a State.

Appendix. No. 154.

principle of friendſhip is this, "Give preſents, and thereby encreaſe friendſhip." This we have mutually performed, and it is known to the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah* and to *Madhoo Row Pundit Purdhaun*, the two moſt powerful Princes of the *Decan*, that ſuch an intercourſe ſubſiſts; that preſents, ſuch as elephants, jewels, cloths, and cheetas mutually paſs between us, and that our friendſhip and engagements are firmly eſtabliſhed: and the ſaid Nabob, when we ſat together in diſcourſe, dwelt very long on this ſubject. He obſerved the excellent diſpoſition of the Engliſh chiefs is highly pleaſing and praiſe-worthy, in that, with whomſoever they form friendſhip, or enter into engagements—ſhould the whole courſe of Nature be changed, they would faithfully adhere to them.

In a word, as our friendſhip is arrived to ſuch a degree of perfection, and the fame of it, is ſpread to all ranks of people, it is equally neceſſary to us both, as well as for our mutual intereſt, to preſerve it inviolate. I am ſteadily fixed on every occaſion in this path, and your good faith, your candour, and uprightneſs, have been by the contents of your letter deeply engraved on my mind, as on a ſtone; our friendſhip will daily take deeper root. I am in expectation of an anſwer from the auguſt King of *England* to a letter expreſſed in terms of friendſhip, which was formerly diſpatched—He will certainly ſend one, which will afford me the higheſt degree of pleaſure.

APPENDIX, No. 153.

Extract of a Paper of Intelligence, dated the 21ſt of *Mohurrum*; received the 28th March 1777.

THE *Poonah* Sirdars are at *Poorunder*. It is ſaid that *Byſagee* and *Peetul Sahib**, and *Tocojee Holdcar*, are appointed for the invaſion of *Hindoſtan*.

* Scindia.

APPENDIX, No. 154.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council in *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company, dated the 24th February 1775.

Par. 2. WE then informed you of the declining ſtate of the Vizier's health, according to the intelligence we received from Mr. *Middleton*, and that in his opinion he could not ſurvive long. On the 6th inſtant, by letters from Colonel *Galliez*, we were informed he was actually dead. The Colonel had previouſly apprized us of the imminent danger in which the Vizier lay, and we had diſpatched inſtructions to him to ſupport the pretenſions of *Mirza Amanny*, the Nabob's eldeſt and only legitimate ſon in the ſucceſſion in caſe of his father's death, and immediately to move the brigade down to *Fyzabad* to prevent any diſturbance in the city on the occaſion; we at the ſame time ordered the third brigade to march up from *Barrampore* to *Dinapore*, that it might be nearer to the frontier in caſe any ſervice ſhould be required.

Conf. 3d Feby.

3. We confirmed theſe inſtructions after the news of that event having actually taken place, and further directed Colonel *Galliez* to continue his negociations for the payment of the money due by the late Vizier; and alſo on this occaſion to keep a watchful eye over the foreigners who had been entertained in his ſervice, and to endeavour to engage the new Nabob to diſmiſs them totally; we have further enjoined him to diſcourage the offer of any preſent from the Nabob to the army or to individuals.

Conf. 6th Feby.

4. Juſt before the Vizier's death, he wrote a letter to the Governor General, which was afterwards tranſmitted to its addreſs by *Mahomed Elich Khan*, his Miniſter and favourite ſervant, accompanied by one from himſelf. By theſe letters it appears that *Mirza Amanny*, otherwiſe called *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, had his father's poſitive nomination to the ſucceſſion; and though by all accounts he poſſeſſes neither the qualities of the heart or head, equal to the ſtation to which he is thus called, we have not as yet any reaſon to think that his right will be diſputed.

Ditto Ditto

5. In conformity to thoſe aſſurances which we gave in our laſt letter to your Honourable Court, we have had in deliberation the line which on this important event it may be moſt proper for us to purſue for drawing from it the greateſt poſſible benefit to the Company's affairs. We have already determined that the ſpecific conditions of our former alliances with the Vizier, expired with him; and that although we owe friendſhip to the preſent Nabob, as heir to his father, we are not bound to any ſpecial ſervices to him. In this eſſential point it is neceſſary to mention, that the ſentiments of the Board were not unanimous, as will appear upon the proceedings. Our preſent engagement goes no farther than to a ſimple acknowledgment of his title, and therefore ſhould he apply to us for aſſiſtance and effective ſupport, we mean to afford it only on ſuch terms and ſtipulations as to us ſhall appear moſt advantageous to the Company, and honourable to the Britiſh name. As this is a ſubject of great magnitude and importance, we have choſen to enter upon it in Council, with all the deliberation which it requires. The ideas of the different Members will appear in the Conſultation referred to in the margin; they are not given in as concluſive opinions, but as ſentiments ſubject to be canvaſſed, modified, and corrected, and tending only to throw lights on the ſubject, before the final determination of the Board—when that determination takes place, you ſhall be duly adviſed.

Conf. 23th February.

14th February

6. Mr. *Briſtow*, who has ſet out for his Reſidency at the Court of the new Nabob, will be furniſhed with ample inſtructions on theſe heads; in the mean time we have charged him particularly with the buſineſs of ſettling the payments of the different ſums due by the late Vizier, and given him ſuch further directions for his general conduct at the Nabob's Court as we thought neceſſary. We alſo furniſhed him with copy of a report from Mr. *Middleton*, of the characters, views, and intereſts of the principal perſons there, which cannot fail of being uſeful to him on his firſt arrival. Mr. *Middleton* arrived at the Preſidency in the end of laſt month, with the 15 lacks of rupees, which we have formerly adviſed you he had received from the Vizier; this money is in part payment of the 40 lacks ſtipulated for our aſſiſtance in the Rohilla war.

3d February

6th February

31ſt January

7. We have alſo advice, that the aſſignment of five lacks of rupees, granted by the Vizier on Raja *Cheit Sing*, has been received on the Company's account at *Benares*, and is on the way down to the Preſidency.

Ditto

8. Colonel *Galliez* adviſes us of his having received three lacks of rupees from the late Vizier, in further acquittal of his engagements on account of our aſſiſtance in the late war.

3d January

9. Some time before the Vizier's death, he applied to Colonel *Galliez* to know whether we would permit a battalion or two of Sepoys, or any body of the Company's troops to return into the Rohilla country, ſhould he have occaſion to make ſuch a requiſition.

31ſt Ditto

11. Notwithſtanding our orders to Colonel *Galliez* were very preciſe to keep the brigade together, we were ſorry to find that he had, without leave from us, or even any previous intimation of his deſign, detached two battalions of Sepoys to *Cawnpore*, for the purpoſe of aiding the Nabob to reduce the rebellious Zemindars in the province of *Corah*; a ſervice we diſapproved of much; and had alſo marched one battalion to *Fayzabad*, and detained it there without any apparent purpoſe. We thought this diſregard of our orders worthy of our particular reprehenſion, and we wrote him accordingly, giving him at the ſame time a caution to avoid ſuch detachments for the future, as by thus dividing his ſtrength he might endanger the ſafety of the whole troops under his command.

9th February

11th February

APPENDIX, No. 155.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 6th June 1775.

Tranſlation of the propoſed Articles of the Treaty with the Nabob *Aſuf ut Dowlah.*

THE Nabob *Aſuff ut Dowlah, Ieayaa Cawn Behadre, Hozeblus Jung*, on the one part; and the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, and the Members of the Supreme Council of *Fort William*, for and in the Name of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, on the other part, agreeable to the following Articles:

Firſt. That univerſal peace, firm friendſhip, and perfect union, ſhall for ever be eſtabliſhed between the Nabob *Aſuf ut Dowlah* and the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company; the contracting Powers, with a view of maintaining a reciprocal friendſhip in the future, ſhall not for any cauſe, or under any pretence, encourage the Reiats and the Inhabitants of their Soubahs in committing hoſtilities and diſturbances, and every thing ſhall be avoided by the ſaid Powers which might occaſion them. Their friends and enemies are mutual; and any perſon who ſhall run away and take refuge in the country of one of the ſaid parties ſhall be given up to the other, and no aſſiſtance afforded him.

Second. The aforeſaid Nabob engages never to entertain or receive in his dominions *Coſſim Ally Cawn*, the former Soubahdar of *Bengal*, and *Sumroo*, the murderer of the Engliſh; even in caſe of his getting them into his hands, he will out of friendſhip make them priſoners, and deliver them up to the Engliſh Company. He alſo engages, not for any cauſe or under any pretence, to entertain Europeans of any nation in his ſervice, without the conſent of the Engliſh Company: that he will prevent, oppoſe, and ſend back ſuch as offer to come in, to paſs through, or remain, or ſhall now be in his dominions without the perwannah of the Engliſh Company. The Europeans of every nation in the ſervice of the ſaid Nabob are hereby diſmiſſed; and now and in the future he engages never to entertain the ſaid Europeans; and to deliver up to the Engliſh Company ſuch of their ſervants who have deſerted or may deſert, in caſe of his apprehending them.

Third. If the King ſhould write any thing relative to the affairs of the Nabob *Aſuff ut Dowlah* to the Engliſh Serdars, they will attend to the ſatisfaction, advantage, and inclination of the ſaid Nabob, and not conſent to what the King may ſay or write. In like manner, if the King ſhould write to the Nabob *Aſuf ut Dowlah*, relative to the affairs of the Engliſh Serdars, he will attend to their ſatisfaction, advantage, and inclination, and not conſent to what he may ſay or write.

Fourth. The countries of *Corah* and *Allahabad* ſhall always and for ever remain in the poſſeſſion of the Nabob *Aſuf ut Dowlah*, on the ſame footing as the Subah of *Owde*; and they ſhall on no account in the future be diſturbed by the Engliſh; nor will they ever requeſt a dam or derrum, or any thing from the ſaid countries. The Engliſh Serdars engage to defend the Soubah of *Owde* at all times, and *Corah* and *Allahabad* until the pleaſure of the Court of Directors ſhall be known.

Fifth. The ſaid Nabob, for the defence of his country, as above ſpecified, declares that he has given up of his own free will and accord, unto the Engliſh Company, all the diſtricts dependant on Rajah *Chyte Sing*, together with the land and water duties, and the ſovereignty of the ſaid diſtricts in perpetuity. That the Engliſh Company ſhall, after one month and a half from the date of this treaty, take upon them the ſovereignty and poſſeſſion of the diſtricts under Rajah *Cheyte Sing*, as hereunder ſpecified, viz.

Sircar *Benares*,	The diſtricts of *Juanpore*,
Sircar *Chumar*,	*Bighpore Bahdore*,
Sukteſſgun,	*Mullbooz Kawſs*,

The Sircar *Gawzypore*,
The Pergunnahs of *Seckunderpore, Jeride, Shaay, Abad, Toppa, Surchebur*, &c. as formerly.
The Mint and Cutwally of *Benares*.

Sixth. The Nabob *Auſuf ut Dowlah*, for the aid and aſſiſtance of the Engliſh troops when ſtationed with him, ſhall pay monthly from the date of this treaty, for the charges of a brigade, the ſum of two lacks ſixty thouſand Owde ſicca rupees, of the 16th year, agreeable to the preſent currency. If in future this currency ſhould be aboliſhed, the decreaſe or increaſe of batta ſhall be mutually given and received by the parties. The particulars of a brigade are, viz. Appendix. No. 155.

Two battalions or one regiment of Europeans,
One company of artillery, and
Six battalions of Sepoys.

The aforeſaid Nabob ſhall, whenever the Engliſh troops paſs the boundaries of the Company's provinces, at his requeſt pay the ſtipulated ſum monthly, from that time until their return to the aboveſaid boundaries.

Seventh. If the aforeſaid Nabob ſhall ever require the aid and aſſiſtance of the Engliſh Company, for the defence of any other of his countries, beſides thoſe above ſpecified, he will fix ſomething for the Company proportioned to the ſervice.

The Engliſh Company and all the Engliſh Serdars engage to perform whatever Articles are now mutually ſettled, and in the future, during the life of the Nabob *Auſſuf ut Dowlah*, they will never vary or depart from them. They will not, in any reſpects or manner, make requeſts of any thing now contrary to the tenor of this treaty.

The parties mutually ſwear according to their reſpective faiths, to abide by theſe engagements. Dated the 20th of Rubby-ut-Euril, 1189 of the Hegira, or the 21ſt of May 1775.

A true tranſlation.
(Signed) *John Briſtow*,
Reſt at the Court of the Nabob of *Owd.*

Compared with an atteſted copy ſent down by Mr. *Briſtow*, and found to be an exact tranſlation, except that the word *Bahdoer*, in the liſt of diſtricts, was omitted, which I have inſerted.

J. H. D'Oyley,
Actg. Perſn Tr.

Tranſlation of an Agreement under the ſeal of his Excellency the Nabob *Auſuf-ut-Dowlah.*

In caſe of any perſons having demands, or having received tuncaws on Rajah *Chyte Sing*, or on the diſtricts under him, agreeable to my orders, ſuch demands or tuncaws do not depend on the ſaid Rajah or on the diſtricts, but are due from myſelf.

The poſſeſſion and ſovereignty in perpetuity of the ſaid diſtricts, under the ſaid Rajah, without incumbrances, delay, dues, debts, tuncaws, &c. I wholly give up to the Engliſh Company, at the expiration of one month and a half.

Dated the 20th of Rubby-ut-Ewut, 1189 of the Hegira, or the 21ſt of May 1775.

A true tranſlation.
(Signed) *John Briſtow*,
Reſt at the Court of the Nabob of *Owd.*

Compared with an atteſted copy ſent down by Mr. *Briſtow*, and found to be an exact tranſlation.

(Signed) *J. H. D'Oyley*,
Pn. Tr.

Tranſlation of an Agreement under the ſeal of his Excellency the Nabob *Auſſuf-ut-Dowlah.*

The balance due to the Engliſh Company on account of the countries of *Corah* and *Allahabad, Rohilcund*, and the tuncawn for the troops, according to the engagements of the late Nabob *Sujah-ut-Dowlah*, ſhall be paid to them as it becomes due without any diſpute.

Dated the 20th of Rubby-ut-Ewut, 1189 of the Hegira, or the 21ſt of May 1775.

A true tranſlation.
John Briſtow,
Reſdt at the Court of the Nabob of *Owd.*

Compared

Appendix. No. 156.

Compared with an atteſted copy ſent down by Mr. *Briſtow*, and found to be an exact tranſlation:

(Signed) *J. H. D'Oyley*, Actg. Pr. Tr.

Treaties concluded.

Conſidered the propoſed Articles for a Treaty of Alliance with the Nabob *Auſſuph-ul-Dowlah*.

Approved the 1ſt article,
D° the 2d,
D° the 3d,
D° the 4th,
D° the 5th,
D° the 6th,
D° the 7th.

Ordered, That the Treaty be compared with the Perſian copy, and if it be found exact, that two fair copies be engroſſed in form, for the ſeal of the Company and ſignature of this Board, to be forwarded to Mr. *Briſtow*, that he may obtain the ſame teſtimonies on the part of the Nabob, and return one of them.

APPENDIX, No. 156.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated 7th December 1775.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

General Clavering, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, alſo deliver in their ſeparate addreſs to the Court of Directors, per *Saliſbury*, as follows:

Minute from General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*.

Fort William, 21 November 1775.

Since our arrival in this country, it has been one of our principal objects to give the Honourable Court of Directors an inſight into the real ſtate of their affairs in every branch and department: we muſt now requeſt their attention to a ſhort and general review of our conduct, the effects it has produced, the difficulties in which this Government is involved, and the ſtate of the country.

Notwithſtanding the conſtant oppoſition we have met with from the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell*, we believe it will appear that our labours have not been uſeleſs to the Company: ſome ſalutary meaſures have been carried into execution—ſome abuſes have been checked, or corrected—ſome important advantages have been obtained—much more might undoubtedly have been done, if the ſyſtem of Government in which we found Mr. *Haſtings* involved, had permitted him to co-operate heartily with our endeavours for the public ſervice.

We are ſenſible that in the regular courſe of Government the meaſures of the Council ſhould originate with the Governor; and that it is the duty of his colleagues to adviſe and aſſiſt him.

We came into this country filled with the moſt favourable impreſſions of his conduct, and determined to ſupport his adminiſtration: the records of the laſt twelve months will we hope juſtify our departing from this reſolution, and taking that lead in the conduct of buſineſs, which naturally belongs to his ſtation. The repreſentations ſent home will give the Company but a faint idea of the accumulated difficulties with which we have been perplexed or oppoſed; we therefore hope that in reviewing our meaſures, large allowance will be made for the diſadvantages under which we have acted.

1ſt. We began with recalling the Company's troops from a ſervice equally unjuſt, impolitic, and diſhonourable. In this inſtance the approbation of our conduct is anticipated, in terms as ſtrong and preciſe as we ourſelves could have dictated, by the general letter of the 7th of March laſt: no condemnation can be more ſevere than that which the Court of Directors have paſſed on the Rohilla war, and on the conduct of the late adminiſtration, even on their own ſtate of the facts: what judgment will the Company form of the meaſure, and of the perſons who planned it, when they ſee our repreſentation of it?

2d. As ſoon as it was poſſible for us to obtain ſufficient lights into the nature and inſtitution of the Bank, we reſolved to aboliſh it. In addition to the arguments ſuggeſted to us by the Court of Directors, we ſoon ſaw reaſons for taking that ſtep, which probably were not ſuſpected at home.

3d. We put an immediate ſtop to an arbitrary inquiſition into the titles by which the inhabitants of *Dacca* held their lands in the city. We have reaſon to believe that this inquiſition, which in fact was undertaken by the ſole authority of Mr. *Barwell*, and without the ſanction of the late Preſident and Council, would have depopulated *Dacca*, and ſpread a general alarm, productive of the ſame effect, through all the provinces.

4th. In order to relieve the Company from the burthen of their bonded debt, we ſet out with a plan of reducing the intereſt upon the whole debt, from eight to five per cent. a conſiderable portion of the capital has alſo been diſcharged. Unleſs our expected reſources fail us, and ſetting aſide the caſe of a foreign war, which it ſhall be our ſtudy to avoid, or of a domeſtic calamity which we cannot foreſee or prevent, we have great hopes of being able to congratulate the Company in the courſe of the enſuing year, on the total annihilation of their bonds, or at leaſt on the acquittance of ſo conſiderable a part of them, as to leave a debt too trifling to deſerve their attention.

5th. We have enquired with unwearied diligence into the frauds and corruptions almoſt univerſally practiſed, and connived at under the late adminiſtration. In this branch of duty the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell* were able to have given us the ſureſt lights, and the moſt effectual aſſiſtance; in this branch of duty they have moſt ſtrenuouſly thwarted and oppoſed us: we lament the ſucceſs of our enquiries, they are invidious in their nature, and cannot fail to load us with the enmity of individuals. If the importance of a ſervice were to be meaſured by the labour and anxiety of the perſons who perform it, we ſhould not ſcruple to ſay, that our efforts in this line of duty particularly entitle us to the ſupport and approbation of the Company.

6th. The Board of Ordnance planned and recommended by the Commander in Chief will, we believe, be found a beneficial inſtitution. Where conſiderable ſavings are the object, regularity is the firſt ſtep to œconomy; the operation of a year or two muſt be allowed to prove the advantages of this eſtabliſhment; in the mean time the expence incurred by it, is trifling.

We are happy to obſerve that our opinion of the impropriety of employing the Commiſſary General to furniſh contingent ſupplies to the army, is confirmed by the ſtrong diſapprobation which the Court of Directors have expreſſed of this meaſure in the caſe of Colonel *Macleane*: we have anticipated their orders on this head, by the regulations under which the above ſupplies are now furniſhed.

7th. The principles on which we have condemned the war in which the Preſidency of *Bombay* have engaged themſelves with the Marattas, and the ſteps we have taken to obtain a ſecure and honourable peace, will we doubt not be honoured with the entire approbation of the Court of Directors: they were founded on the knowledge we had of their pacific ſyſtem of policy, and in effect we have the happineſs to ſee them implicitly confirmed by the ſentence paſſed on the Rohilla war. On the ſame principle we refuſed the alluring offers made

to us by the Subah of the Decan, to relinquiſh the Peiſhcuſh paid to him by the Preſidency of *Madras*, and to give the Company his aid for the conqueſt of *Cuttac*.

8th. The motives on which we have reſtored *Mahomed Reza Cawn* to the office of Naib Subah, have been clearly explained. To recover the country Government from the ſtate of feebleneſs and inſignificance to which it was Mr. *Haſtings*'s avowed policy to reduce it, was no eaſy taſk. According to the Governor General's plan, we ſhould have confined the only man perhaps of real abilities and extenſive knowledge in the country, to the important office of ſteward to the Nabob's houſhold, at a time when a Miniſter of the Government was wanted, and when the adminiſtration of criminal juſtice through the country was at a ſtand. The meaſure ſeems to us indiſpenſably neceſſary, and promiſes ſucceſs. In recommending *Mahomed Reza Cawn* to his preſent poſt, we preſume to think that we have rendered an eſſential ſervice to the Company.

9th. The permanent advantages ſecured to the Company by our treaty with the preſent Subahdar of *Oude*, are equally conſpicuous and important; they have extorted an acknowledgment from the Governor General, with which he has not been accuſtomed to honour any meaſures but his own. In return for an acquiſition of twenty-two lacks a year for ever, with an increaſe of fifty thouſand rupees to the monthly ſubſidy of the brigade, beſides many other advantages and honourable ſtipulations, hardly any thing is granted on our part, but a perſonal guarantee of the ſame countries to the ſon, which we were before bound to guarantee to the father. The frontier country of *Ghazipore* muſt at any rate have been defended by our arms, in caſe of an invaſion, whether the revenues of it had been ceded to the Company or not. Theſe revenues are in effect a clear gain to the Company, and a ſeaſonable relief to the declining circulation of *Bengal*. The meaſure is ſtrictly and excluſively our's: the original plan was oppoſed in every ſtep by the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell*. It gives us the higheſt ſatisfaction to obſerve, that by the terms of the treaty, the guarantee of the Nabob's dominions, and the ſervice of the Company's troops, were exactly confined within the ſame limits which the Court of Directors, in their laſt letter, have thought fit to preſcribe to us, in our engagements with the Vizier.

In ſpite of numberleſs diſcouragements, our endeavours to ſerve the Company have not entirely miſcarried: if more ſhall be expected from us, the power and the means muſt be proportioned to the end. Conſidering the reſiſtance and oppoſition we meet with from every quarter, we are in truth unable to determine whether any and what powers are left to this Government. If by our authority as Duan, confirmed to us by Parliament, a farmer be confined for arrears of rent, the Supreme Court of Judicature take the cauſe out of our hands, decide upon the merits, and diſcharge the priſoner: if we diſmiſs the Judge Advocate, he applies to the Supreme Court for a Mandamus to reinſtate him in his office: if we diſmiſs the Secretary of our own Board, we ſee him encouraged to bring an action for his ſalary againſt his ſucceſſor: if we order a Britiſh ſubject to repair to the Preſidency, he pleads the protection of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and declines or refuſes to obey us: if, for reaſons of the moſt ſerious political importance, we endeavour to ſupport the authority of the country Government, and the ſovereignty of the Soubah, we have not only the foreign factories, but the Supreme Court of Judicature to contend with: they publicly deny the exiſtence of ſuch a Government; and affectedly hold out the perſon and authority of the Prince to the contempt of the world.

According to the doctrines maintained by the judges, there is ſcarce any act of Government, however neceſſary or expedient, which, if it tends to controul the actions or to thwart the intereſt of individuals, may not expoſe the Members of the Council to actions in the Supreme Court. We even doubt whether we are authoriſed to prevent any perſons from quitting the provinces and going up the country, though we ſhould be certain of their intention to enter into the ſervice of a foreign Power; in theſe circumſtances many uſeful and obvious regulations for the benefit of the country muſt neceſſarily be left unattempted. A general re-coinage has been repeatedly recommended to us by the Court of Directors: ſuch a meaſure is without doubt indiſpenſably neceſſary; but it is of a nature too delicate and important, and likely to be attended with too many difficulties in the execution, to be undertaken with ſafety by a divided Government, with a hoſtile Court of Judicature. Appendix, No. 157.

We could point out a number of other objects, which would deſerve our attention, and of abuſes which call upon us for redreſs; but this is not a ſeaſon for a mere majority of a Council to undertake any meaſure for the public ſervice, in which the learned in the laws of *England* can diſcover any thing to cavil at.

While a ſtandard is publicly hoiſted againſt our authority, and every individual in the country invited to repair to it; while protection is given to every man who denies or reſiſts the authority of Government; and while the Governor General takes a willing and decided part in every meaſure that tends to degrade the Council, and to diſarm us of our lawful powers, we are not ſanguine enough to expect that any efforts of our's ſhould be equal to the execution of the truſt repoſed in us; we cannot anſwer for the collection of the revenues; we cannot anſwer for the internal government of the country, nor for the ſafety of the ſtate. Our utmoſt endeavours ſhall ſtill be exerted to preſerve the peace, and to promote the welfare of the country, until the neceſſity or expediency of a new arrangement ſhall be determined at home. But, diveſted as we are of all power, we owe it to our ſafety and character to diſcharge ourſelves in the moſt ſolemn manner from all reſponſibility.

(Signed) *J. Clavering,*
Geo. Monſon,
P. Francis.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
George Monſon,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 157.

Extract *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 29th February 1776.

THE Governor General delivers in his Minutes ſent to the Honourable the Court of Directors, by the *Hillſborough*.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors, &c.

Honourable Sirs,

Incloſed I have the honour to ſend ſeparate obſervations on three Minutes of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*; one belonging to the General, and two to the Revenue Department; and all bearing date the 21ſt November 1775.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
faithful humble ſervant,
(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Fort William, the 20th January 1776.

Obſervations on the Minute of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, dated the 21ſt November 1775.

Hitherto the letters and Minutes of the Gentlemen of the Majority addreſſed to the Court of Directors have been

Appendix. No. 157.

been confined to one unvaried theme, the condemnation of my conduct, and of the meaſures of the laſt adminiſtration. They have now changed the ſubject to the enumeration of their own ſervices; but even in this they have not loſt ſight of their original object; as the ſum of their merits on which they lay claim to the applauſe of the Court of Directors, amounts to little more than a diſavowal of the principles, and a ſubverſion of the meaſures of the late Government.

They begin with aſſerting generally, that "ſome ſalutary meaſures have been carried into execution; ſome "abuſes have been checked or corrected; ſome important advantages have been obtained." Theſe general poſitions are afterwards particularized in the following inſtances:

1ſt. The recall of the troops from the Rohilla war.

2d. The abolition of the bank.

3d. The ſtop put to the inquiſition into the titles by which the inhabitants of *Dacca* held their lands in that city.

4th. The reduction of the intereſt on the bonded debt, from 8 to 5 per cent. and the payment of part of the capital.

5th. The inquiſition into the frauds and corruptions, almoſt univerſally practiſed and connived at under the late adminiſtration.

6th. The board of ordnance.

7th. The condemnation of the war in which the Preſidency of *Bombay* had engaged with the Marattas.

8th. The appointment of *Mahomed Reza Cawn* to the office of Naib Subah, and the reſtoration of the powers of the Nizamut.

9th. The Treaty with the Nabob of *Oude*.

When this liſt ſhall be read by thoſe whoſe wiſdom planned the ſyſtem eſtabliſhed by Parliament for the controlling Government of *India*, and compared with the expectations which they muſt have naturally formed from ſo great and extenſive a deſign, they may be led to think very differently from the Gentlemen of the Majority, of ſuch ſervices; and be diſappointed to find, that inſtead of converting the great powers granted to the Governor General and Council to the confirmation of the Britiſh dominion, and the improvement of the Britiſh property in *India*, their time and attention, in a long period of thirteen months, have been occupied on no greater objects than negative meaſures; the temporary adjuſtment of the right of property in a heap of old ruins; the ſubſtitution of a new treaty, in violation of former engagements; and attempts to uſurp or depreciate the merits of their predeceſſors.

To ſhew that theſe are the amount of the ſervices which have been ſo pompouſly diſplayed, I ſhall take the liberty to examine them in their order.

1ſt. The Majority improperly claim a merit in having withdrawn the troops which were employed in the Rohilla war, before that ſervice was accompliſhed. It was imprudent in every ſenſe; it was highly prejudicial to the Company's intereſts, if that ſervice was undertaken on expedient and allowable grounds. It was unjuſt if that Government was bound by previous engagements to proſecute it to a concluſion; and yet more unjuſt if it has ſince exacted the ſum ſtipulated as a part of theſe engagements.

I cannot admit either the juſtice or decency of binding the Court of Directors to the interpretation which the Majority have been pleaſed to force on their orders. I underſtand the paragraph of the general letter of the 3d March, to be an approbation of the Rohilla war. I underſtand the diſapprobation expreſſed in their letter of the 7th of March, to apply to a ſubject totally different from it, to a ſuppoſition that the troops which were employed in the Rohilla war had quitted the country which was the ſeat of it, and had croſſed the *Ganges*, to engage in an indefinite ſervice beyond the preſcribed line of their operations. Theſe cenſures aroſe from a miſinformation, or from a miſconception of the words of a letter from the late Select Committee; and I preſume, that the explanation given them in my letter of the 25th November, which went by the laſt ſhip, will have totally removed all their diſpleaſure upon this head.

2d. The Anſwer from the Provincial Councils to the Queries ſtated to them, proved that ſome advantages had been produced from the inſtitution of the Bank; and that it was not attended with any inconveniencies to juſtify the Majority's haſty abolition of it.

3d. This hardly merits a comment: The Council at *Dacca* had ordered an enquiry to be made into the titles by which the inhabitants of the city of *Dacca* held the lands occupied by them. Mr. *Francis* warmly eſpouſed the cauſe of the occupants. The Board ordered the enquiry to be ſuſpended, and this very important act of the Governor General and Council, which probably was never heard of ten miles from the ſpot which was the object of it, is blown up into magnitude, and is held up as a meaſure which, by the critical interpoſition of the firſt powers of Government, reſcued the city of *Dacca*, and all the provinces, from depopulation.

4th. This is an uſurpation of the merits of the late adminiſtration. The reduction of the intereſt of the bonded debt was unneceſſary. The payment of the principal was effected by the treaty of *Benares*; by the Rohilla war; by the ſavings made by the former board of inſpection in the civil and military expences; by the reduction of the Nabob's ſtipend; by the ſuſpenſion of the King's tribute; and by the other œconomical regulations of the late Preſident and Council. I again defy the Gentlemen of the Majority to produce a ſingle inſtance in all their meaſures by which a rupee was gained to the Company, or a rupee ſaved to them. I beg leave to refer to the Conſultations of the 10th of February, 3d of March, and 26th of July 1774, which ſucceſſively ordered, that the bonds of 1769, 1770, and 1771, including all of prior dates, amounting altogether to 38,16,933. 10. 9. ſhould be diſcharged; and to my minute, which was entered in Conſultation of the 26th January 1775, recommending the diſcharge of the whole, by means which the different balances of the treaſuries ſince the date have proved to have been effective. But my recommendation was rejected, and the propoſal of General *Clavering*, which was delivered to the Board on the ſame day, for paying off part of the debt by new loans of a reduced intereſt of 5 inſtead of 8 per cent. was adopted. In the proſecution of this plan, the debt, on the 31ſt December laſt, was reduced to 62,51,280. 0. 3. bearing 5 per cent. intereſt; and it is certain, that had mine been followed none would have remained, ſince the balance of caſh in all the treaſuries on that day amounted to rupees 97,97,199. 8. 17. 2.

My propoſition for liquidating the bonded debt was founded on an eſtimate of receipts and diſburſements drawn out by the accomptants general, which ſtated the probable balances in the Company's treaſuries, on the 31ſt December laſt, at rupees 18,71,365. 5. 11. after cancelling the debt, and providing for every expence. Many flaws in the eſtimate were pointed out; and the Company were warned againſt giving credit to the flattering account of their affairs which I had laid before them. I endeavoured to ſupport the probability of the eſtimate by arguments; and the Gentlemen of the Majority to controvert the principles upon which it was formed. What was then a ſubject of debate may now be preciſely aſcertained; and the Court of Directors will pleaſe to obſerve, by the accompanying ſtate No. 1, that although the Salt and ſeveral other branches of revenue failed in yielding thoſe funds which were expected, the eſtimate was formed with ſo much moderation that the ſurplus balances in the Company's treaſuries on the 31ſt December turned out actually to be near fifteen lacks of rupees more favourable to the Company than what I had ſuppoſed it. While I congratulate

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the Company upon this proſperous ſituation of their affairs, I have only to regret, that they ſhould have continued ſo long to be burthened with a debt at intereſt, which the ſtate of their finances could long ere now have cancelled.

5th. I cannot but allow that the labours of the Majority to obtain accuſations againſt the former Agents of the Company, have been carried on with unremitted attention. For this grand object the management of the current buſineſs, and the adminiſtration of juſtice throughout the provinces, have been neglected.

I do not admit that "the importance of a ſervice is "to be meaſured by the labour and anxiety of the per-"ſons who performed it," but by the utility which may be derived from it. Let it be ſhewn by what obligation, either of office or neceſſity, the Gentlemen of the Majority were preſſed into ſo regretted a ſervice; let it be ſhewn how it has operated either in its immediate effect on the preſent intereſts of the Company, or tends to influence the future; and that the ſame zeal which has animated them in their ſearch of paſt abuſes, hath equally incited them to attend to the diſcharge of the truſts which have been directly committed to them; that the revenue has been improved; that new ſources of profit have been diſcovered; that inordinate expences have been reduced; that the diſpatch of current buſineſs has been promoted; that juſtice has been adminiſtered; that the diſcipline of the army has been attended to; in a word, that any one important object of government has been vigorouſly purſued; but if theſe duties are neglected by the rulers of a country, it will avail them little to plead in excuſe, that buſied in arraigning the conduct of their predeceſſors, they were unable to attend to their own.

6th. I ſhould be ſorry to object to any meaſure of the Gentlemen of the Majority that appears to have œconomy or real buſineſs for its object. I ſhall not now offer any judgment of the utility of this inſtitution; this can only be proved from the ſavings which it may produce; and as the operation of a year or two is required for this effect, I am diffident in forming conjectures at ſo diſtant a period, when I reflect with regret on the many plans from which I myſelf expected to have derived credit, but which have been blaſted while I was rearing them to maturity.

The remarks repeated under this head, upon the impropriety of employing the Commiſſary General to furniſh contingent ſupplies to the army, appear to me as much out of place as unluckily applied to an encomium on the Board of Ordnance, which is liable to the very ſame objection, as the members who compoſe it, excepting thoſe of the ſuperior council, conſiſt of the heads of thoſe offices which are placed under its immediate controul and ſuperintendancy.

I ſhall avail myſelf however of this occaſion to vindicate both the late Preſident and Council and Colonel *Macleane*, from the cenſures to which this appointment has given occaſion, by requeſting that the Honourable Court of Directors will be pleaſed to read the letter of Colonel *Dow* upon this ſubject, addreſſed to the Board of Inſpection on the 23d May laſt, of which I have annexed an Extract, N° 2. and I will venture hardily to pronounce upon the ſtrength of it, that whatever reductions may hereafter take effect in this hitherto unbounded ſtream of military expence, they will derive their origin from the grant of the contingent ſupplies to Colonel *Macleane*, and to his integrity in the proviſion of them, notwithſtanding the ſeverity with which the conduct of the board in this inſtance has been condemned. Appendix, No. 157.

7th. The Honourable Court of Directors will be the beſt judges of the merits of the Gentlemen of the Majority, in the ſteps they have taken to degrade the Preſidency of *Bombay* in the eyes of the Marattas, and to deprive the Company of the advantages which might have been ſecured to them, even with an honourable peace, which there is every reaſon to believe might have been much ſooner obtained by more vigorous meaſures.

8th. I do not think that the uncontrolled adminiſtration of criminal juſtice ought to be entruſted to any native; if it ſhould *Mahomed Reza Cawn* may be as fit for it as any other. As to the country government, it muſt ever, in my opinion, continue feeble and inſignificant while the real power is in our hands, and the nominal authority is veſted in a perſon who receives his ſalary from us, and is removeable at our pleaſure.

9th. The new Treaty with *Aſof ul Dowla* is certainly advantageous to the Company, if the conditions of it can be fulfilled; but of this I ever did, and do ſtill, entertain a doubt, notwithſtanding the acknowledgments which it is ſaid to have extorted from me, but which I do not remember to have expreſſed, and now diſclaim; for I cannot deem it honourable to have extorted from the Nabob, conceſſions inconſiſtent with our former treaties, to which the neceſſity of his ſituation alone obliged him, however unwillingly, to ſubmit. The faireſt opinion which I could now give of thoſe conceſſions, would be to repeat the ſubſtance of my minutes, entered on our proceedings of the 13th of February and 3d of March. To thoſe I refer as prophetic (if I may ſo expreſs myſelf) of the effects which have been ſince experienced from the conditions of that treaty.

The remainder of the Minute to which this is a reply, conſiſts of little more than a repetition of the complaints which have been before repeatedly made againſt the Supreme Court of Judicature; yet I may not paſs them without reply; but I ſhall make it as brief as poſſible, placing it in oppoſite columns to the caſes which are ſtated in the Minute.

If by our authority as Duan, confirmed to us by Parliament, a farmer be confined for arrears of rent, the Supreme Court of Judicature take the cauſe out of our hands, decide upon the merits, and diſcharge the priſoner.

This I ſuppoſe alludes to the caſe of *Comaul o Dean Cawn*. He appealed to the Court againſt an act of oppreſſion, and was a proper object of their juriſdiction.

If we diſmiſs the Judge Advocate, he applies to the Supreme Court for a Mandamus, to reinſtate him in his office.

Which the Court refuſed to grant.

If we diſmiſs the Secretary of our own board, we ſee him encouraged to bring an action for his ſalary againſt his ſucceſſor.

I know not who encouraged Mr. *Stewart*. His friends I believe have attempted to diſſuade him from bringing his action into the court, thinking it imprudent and likely to prove hurtful to his intereſt. But it was not in the power of the court to prevent it.

If we order a Britiſh ſubject to repair to the Preſidency, he pleads the protection of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and declines or refuſes to obey us.

Not knowing to whom or to what fact this ſentence alludes, I cannot reply to it.

If for reaſons of the moſt ſerious political importance, we endeavour to ſupport the authority of the country government and the ſovereignty of the

The perſon and authority of the Nabob (I know not who made him a prince) ought to be held out of the contempt of the world, if theſe are employed like a ſanctuary to protect debtors

Appendix. No. 158.

the Soubah, we have not only the foreign factories, but the Supreme Court of Judicature to contend with. They publicly deny the exiſtence of ſuch a government, and affectedly hold out the perſon and authority of the prince to the contempt of the world.

According to the doctrines maintained by the Judges, there is ſcarce any act of government, however neceſſary and expedient, which, if it tends to controul the actions or to thwart the intereſt of individuals, may not expoſe the members of the council to actions in the Supreme Court.

We even doubt whether we are authorized to prevent any perſons from quitting the provinces and going up the country, though we ſhould be certain of their intention to enter into the ſervice of a foreign power.

In theſe circumſtances many uſeful and obvious regulations for the benefit of the country, neceſſarily muſt be left unattempted.

A general re-coinage has been repeatedly recommended to us by the Court of Directors. Such a meaſure is without doubt indiſpenſably neceſſary; but it is of a nature too declicate and important, and likely to be attended with too many difficulties in the execution, to be undertaken with ſafety by a divided Government, with a hoſtile Court of Judicature.

debtors from their creditors, and criminals from the purſuits of juſtice. I know no other uſes which the Nabob's name and authority can be applied to.

I do not believe that any doctrines have been delivered in the Supreme Court to warrant this concluſion of the Majority, nor do I apprehend that the members of the board are liable to any ill conſequences from the decrees of the court upon any ſuch of their acts as, although not ſtrictly legal, ſhall have ariſen merely from error in judgment, and do not evidently tend to purpoſes of oppreſſion, ſince there is always an appeal to a ſuperior tribunal.

The right of preventing Europeans from paſſing through theſe provinces to enter into the ſervice of any foreign powers, has not been yet before the court, but I do not conceive it to be a matter of difficulty. The opinion of the Chief Juſtice, delivered in the caſe of *Paveſey*, applies only to the right of our government to expel unlicenſed vagabond foreigners from the country. I cannot let this occaſion paſs without remarking, that the conduct of the judges, in the caſe juſt referred to, manifeſts in the moſt ſtriking manner the candour and temper with which they examine the acts of this government, and their endeavours to ſupport its authority.

This will appear from the Attorney's report entered in the Conſultation of the 23d December, in the Secret Department.

It will require leiſure and attention to carry into execution the orders of the Court of Directors for the improvement of the coinage of this country; but no doubt with reſpect to the probable interference of the Court in the execution of ſuch a meaſure either has proved, or can prove an impediment to it.

The remainder of their minute is pure declamation, and of a kind which I find it difficult to anſwer, in the want of determined facts, which might ſerve as a colour for their alluſions; where is a ſtandard hoiſted againſt their authority? and by whom have the people been invited to repair to it? Who affords protection to perſons denying or reſiſting the authority of Government? What are the proofs that the Governor General has taken "a willing and decided part in every meaſure that "tends to degrade the Council, and to diſarm them of "their lawful power?"

They form an invariable and decided majority at the board, and arrogate to themſelves the whole authority of the ſtate, to the utter excluſion of Mr. *Barwell* and myſelf. The collection of the revenues; the internal government of the country; and every political arrangement, are at their abſolute diſpoſal; and every meaſure they have adopted has operated in its fulleſt extent. It will avail them but little with their employers and the public, to declare that they diſcharge themſelves from all reſponſibility, when it is as manifeſt as the light of the ſun, that they act as they pleaſe, without any preſent power to controul or oppoſe them.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

APPENDIX, No. 158.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 19th February 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Honourable Sirs,

I THINK it my duty to inform you, that the intelligence which I have received for ſome days paſt, from *Delhi*, *Akburabad*, *Dige*, &c. ſeems to confirm a report, that the Marattas are aſſembling in large bodies to the ſouthward, with an intention of moving towards theſe parts. It is ſaid that a body of 25,000 horſe have already arrived at *Jainnigur*, under the command of *Beher Jee Sydeah*, ſon-in-law to *Maddo Jee Sydeah*, and that they have exacted large contributions from *Pretta Sing*, the Rajah of that diſtrict: another body is ſaid to be advanced on this ſide of *Jainnigur*, within twenty or thirty coſs of *Dige*; that theſe bodies have been invited by *Ringut Sing*, the Chief of the Jauts, beſieged in the fort of *Dige* by *Nijif Cawn*, to come to his relief, and that their deſign is to give the army of *Nijif Cawn* battle. Several bodies are likewiſe reported to be advancing towards *Jaane*; that ſome ſmall parties are arrived in that neighbourhood, and at *Calpee*; and that they are become very troubleſome to the Nabob's troops under the command of the Goſſaine Rajah, *Himmit Behader* now lying before *Jaanſee*. It is alſo ſaid that vackeels are arrived in the Nabob's camp at *Etawa*, demanding the chout for the provinces of *Korah*, and the *Doab*, &c. But as Mr. *Briſtow* is on the ſpot, and in the way of more information than what I am, I muſt beg leave to refer you to his correſpondence for this particular, as well as for ſuch other private matters relative to theſe advices, which at this diſtance may not have come to my knowledge.

I have, &c.

Camp near *Belgram*, 3d February 1776. (Signed) *G. Stibbert.*

Reſolved, That the following reply be written to Colonel *Stibbert*.

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 14th ultimo and 3d inſtant. We approve of your having complied with the requiſition of Mr. *Briſtow*, for two companies of Sepoys to be detached to *Pertagur*, to aſſiſt the Aumil of that place in ſecuring the receipt of the collections, to enable him to diſcharge the Nabob's Tuncaws in favour of the Company; and we leave it to your diſcretion to grant aid to Mr. *Briſtow* on all future occaſions

... of a ſimilar nature, ſo far as it may be conſiſtent ... the ſafety of the troops under your command. ... is the more neceſſary as it is to obtain the pay of the troops from the lands aſſigned for that purpoſe.

We are, &c. &c.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 26th February 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Read, and approved, the Conſultation of the 19th inſtant.

Received the following letter from Colonel *Stibbert*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The following is the continuance of the Maratta intelligence which I had the honour to tranſmit to your Honourable Board, in my letter of the 3d inſtant.

They have made no great advances this way ſince their arrival at *Sainagur*, and which I before had the honour of acquainting you with. Their deſign ſeems to be to give aſſiſtance to *Rigeet Sing*, beſieged by *Nizzif Khan* in *Dege*, and to relieve the fort of *Jaanſee*, belonging to them, beſieged by the troops of the Nabob, under the command of the Guſſain Rajah. In an aſſault made by *Nizzif Khan* on the out-works of the fort at *Dege*, he effected a lodgement near the Kumehir gate, and took four pieces of cannon from the Jauts; but in a ſally which was ſoon after made by *Ringeet Sing*, at the head of a body of his garriſon, *Nizzif Khan*'s troops were repulſed, and the out-works retaken, notwithſtanding his coming up with a freſh body to their aſſiſtance, when an obſtinate engagement enſued, with an immediate loſs to *Nizzif Khan* of five hundred men and upwards, and near one thouſand of *Ringeet Sing*'s. *Juſwant Sing* is the only Maratta Chief, by theſe accounts, who has as yet joined the Jauts; but on the arrival and joining of the other Chiefs moving towards *Dege*, I think it is moſt likely that *Nizzif Khan* will be obliged to raiſe the ſiege. With reſpect to the fort of *Jaanſee*, I do not yet hear of any conſiderable bodies being arrived in that diſtrict, but ſhould the force which it is ſaid is moving towards its relief join, I think it is probable the Nabob's troops will be under a neceſſity to retire. This, Sirs, is the whole intelligence worthy your peruſal, which has come to hand ſince I had the honour to addreſs you laſt.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp, near *Belgram*, February 11th, 1776. (Signed) *G. Stibbert.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In my addreſs of the 26th ultimo, I mentioned *Nudjif Cawn*'s having returned to the ſiege of *Dike*, the ſucceſs of which is at preſent doubtful, as the Jauts make a brave defence. The incloſed copy of a letter of intelligence will, I hope, give the Honourable Board an idea of the ſpirit with which it is conducted on both ſides.

By this day's news I underſtand a mine has been ſprung by *Nudjif Cawn* to little effect. He purpoſes to work another, and the Jauts to countermine it. *Myrza Hellyle* is again returned to this camp, with a requeſt to the Nabob for aſſiſtance; but he has as yet had only a complimentary audience, in which no buſineſs has been canvaſs'd. It is very ſurprizing that the war between *Nudjif Cawn* and the Jauts is ſupported thus long, as both are exceedingly diſtreſſed for money, and hardly ever have any ſupplies beyond the day. *Nudjif Cawn* has above thirty-five thouſand horſe and foot before *Dike*; the Jauts near thirty thouſand to defend it; and the fort is ſo extenſive that proviſions are introduced without the leaſt difficulty. *Nudjif Cawn* points his artillery chiefly againſt *Gopall Gur*, which is ſituated on an eminence, and when once taken he thinks he ſhall eaſily command the reſt of the works. Appendix. No. 158.

Sabiter Cawn is treating with the Sikes for the ceſſion of part of his country, upon the condition of their entering into an alliance with him. He has lately quarrelled with *Abdul Ahul Cawn*, in conſequence of which he has ſolicited a reconciliation with *Nudjif Cawn*, and wants to induce him and the Sikes to join him to invade *Rohilcund*, in the hope of recovering the dominions taken from him by the late Vizier; but I fancy his negociations will avail little.

The Nabob, although I have repeatedly urged him upon the ſubject of *Bolow Row*'s letter to me, a copy of which I forwarded in my addreſs of the 26th ultimo, yet he has hitherto come to no determination. I humbly conceive his Excellency cannot have a better opportunity to make an honourable peace than the preſent, that the Marattas themſelves ſolicit for it.

I have however not neglected my negociation with *Bolow Row*, but requeſted him to point out the terms on which he wiſhes for peace: his anſwer I hourly expect.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) *John Briſtow*,
Reſident at the Court of *Oude*.

Read the following letter from Mr. *Briſtow*.

Camp near *Etawa*, Feb. 25, 1776.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſq. Governor General, and the Members of the Honourable Supreme Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed the Honourable Board on the 19th inſtant, and am ſorry to mention a diſagreeable event which occurred yeſterday.

The Nabob had diſmiſſed *Meer Afzul*'s corps, which had been ſtationed on the other ſide the Jumna for ſome time paſt with the Goſſanes. There were five months arrears of pay due to them, which his Excellency engaged they ſhould have in fifteen days; the men conſidered this delay an artifice to deprive them of their right, refuſed to admit of it, and four thouſand of them marched from their ſtation to within ſix coſs of our camp. The day after their arrival, the Nabob went in perſon amongſt them, and thought he had ſettled the whole affair for only a part of the pay, on the receipt of which they were to give up their cannon and arms, and to diſperſe. The perſons employed by his Excellency in conducting the negociation, had carried falſe meſſages; and when the Nabob found the next day that the matchlock-men would not give up their arms, he reſolved on cutting them all to pieces. I heard of this by chance, at ten o'clock at night, and immediately waited on him to diſſuade him from it, as it was an act that could not do him any credit. He urged their diſobedience of orders, in leaving their ſtations contrary to his injunctions; and that if after he had ſettled the matter once, and they refuſed to abide by what they had agreed to, and he ſuffered their conduct to paſs unnoticed, his army would be conſtantly in actual mutiny. I anſwered, he muſt expect it, unleſs he paid them; and repreſented, in the ſtrongeſt terms I could, that his cutting them to pieces would diſaffect his troops in general, and that I thought it probable they would not fight in ſuch a cauſe, as they might naturally ſay, the ſame would be their ſituation another time. I obſerved on theſe occaſions there were a few who ſpirited the reſt; and recommended to his Excellency to pick out thoſe men and puniſh them, but to pay and diſmiſs all thoſe who had no other hand in the mutiny than being led into it by perſuaſion, and ignorance of the conſequences. I ſat with his Excellency till one o'clock in the morning, without being able to diſſuade him from his reſolution; he therefore ordered the Miniſter to march againſt them early the next morning, with about 15,000 men, with directions, that if they gave up their arms and accepted

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of about twenty thouſand rupees, he would ſuffer them to go away unmoleſted, otherwiſe there ſhould not be a man of them left alive. The matchlock-men would gladly have compounded for a part of their pay; but when about two lacks were due to them, and they even doubted their obtaining the ſmall ſum that was offered after they had once grounded their arms, they were therefore rendered deſperate; all treating was at an end, and they reſolved on meeting their fate. Out of four thouſand fifteen hundred refuſed to fight, and left the camp; ſo that the engagement was ſupported by two thouſand five hundred, who did every thing that men in their deplorable ſtate could. They had been for ſome days paſt reduced to the greateſt diſtreſs for the neceſſaries of life, were weak, and terrified by the numbers they had to oppoſe.

Notwithſtanding all the diſadvantages they laboured under, the Nabob got the victory by a chance. He was repeatedly repulſed, ſome guns were even taken from him, and his army put to the route; when a tumbril blew up, and threw the matchlock-men into confuſion, upon which his Excellency's troops broke in upon them and carried the day.

The Nabob had about three hundred men killed; of the matchlock-men there were ſix hundred, many wounded, 800 were taken priſoners, and releaſed to-day, the reſt eſcaped; as his Excellency's troops fought with ill-will, and ſuffered them to get away, otherwiſe a man could not have been ſaved.

The eleven old battalions, that is, thoſe under *Jaoo Lall* and *Buſſant*, who are formed into two brigades, were not in the engagament, but drew out when the news of the Nabob's troops having given way reached them. The men in general declared it was not to attack the matchlock-men, they only meant to defend the camp. Upon the whole, this act, as might be expected, has given great diſcontent amongſt the troops, and it is the general cry, that they are never to expect their pay, but when they can exact it. It is well known I adviſed the Nabob againſt the meaſure, and I flatter myſelf the credit of the Britiſh nation was never at a higher pitch in this country than now. The Nabob's behaviour at *Mindijaut* is a ſtriking contraſt to that on the preſent occaſion.

On my return from the Nabob the night before the affair, a deputation of five of the matchlock-men preſented me a petition juſt as I entered my tents, which I refuſed to receive; but underſtood from them that it contained a requeſt for me to get them their pay. After what had paſſed I could not interfere further. I told them they were the Nabob's ſervants, and that the Company had nothing to do with them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

John Briſtow,
Reſident at the Court of the Nabob of *Oude*.

APPENDIX, No. 159.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 8th January 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I ADDRESSED the Honourable Board on the 6th inſtant.

In my letter of the 11th October I particularly explained the ſtate of foreign affairs at this juncture; the attention of the diſaffected perſons to the Nabob's Government and the neighbouring Powers is much raiſed, owing to our march. *Nudjif Cawn* has principally, from this cauſe, diſcontinued his attacks againſt *Dike*, and arrived at *Santruſh* fort, ten coſs diſtance from it: on hearing of the Nabob's intentions to march to *Cole*, he diſpatched a vackeel to him, a perſon much in his confidence, to enquire what he purpoſed by it, as he had to expect no foreign enemy in that or any other part; that his own Aumils were, if any perſons, ill-diſpoſed towards him; but they were to be found in other quarters of his dominions: he expreſſed his deſire of preſerving his friendſhip with him, but ſhould the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowla* break through it, he was ready to do the ſame, and meet him in the field. His Excellency has not returned any anſwer, though I believe he does not now intend to march to *Cole*, at leaſt he may avoid doing it, without any reflection on his character, by its being ſaid that he is terrified into the meaſure by *Nudjif Cawn*. It ſeems *Coſſim Ally Cawn* is come to *Delhi*, at his Majeſty's ſummons, by the inſtigation of *Abdul Abut Cawn*. His Excellency conſidering his ſtrict alliance with the Company, thought it inconſiſtent to have an interview with the King, whilſt *Coſſim Ally Khan* followed the Court; he therefore gave it as a reaſon for his purpoſing to march to *Etawa*, and alſo for countermanding *Nyaz Ally Cawn*, who he has directed to join him: his preſence in that part of the country will tend much more to eſtabliſh his affairs, than the effecting of an interview with the King at *Cole*, which would be his deſign, as well as to lay plans of poſſeſſing himſelf of part of *Nudjif Cawn*'s country in that neighbourhood. *Abdul Abut Cawn* might apparently agree in any propoſal of the Nabob's, but it would be with a deſign of ingratiating himſelf into his favour, in order to obtain the management of his affairs; he is artful and inſinuating, and an interview with the King, when this man is to conduct it, will always be productive of much intrigue.

The Nabob, by marching to *Etawa*, will ſubſide the jealouſy of *Nudjif Cawn*, with whom he may accommodate all differences, and have the opportunity of reſtoring his authority in the *Doab*: whereas though *Nudjif Cawn* may want money, yet his reputation, and the conſtant war his troops have been engaged in, will, when joined with the rebels, give at leaſt an equality, if not a ſuperiority againſt the Nabob. I believe that *Nudjif Cawn* himſelf would be glad of the opportunity to ſettle his own country; but *Abdul Abut Cawn* has conſtantly correſponded with the Nabob and *Murtezzah Cawn*, and I am apt to think he has encreaſed their jealouſy of *Nudjif Cawn*, by inſinuating he entertained deſigns, which have never once occurred to him. It is certain the granting refuge to *Elich Cawn* and *Baſheer Cawn*, and his correſponding with the Goſſeines, might have given ſome grounds. The Nabob has nevertheleſs on his ſide acted the ſame part in receiving many of *Nudjif Cawn*'s diſaffected ſervants.

In regard to *Coſſim Ally Cawn*, I imagine he will not be of much ſervice to any party, for by the beſt intelligence I can obtain, he muſt have very little money left. It is true he has offered his Majeſty twenty lacks in jewels, which I rather conſider a boaſt to ſerve a temporary purpoſe, than what he will be able to ſupply. I herewith incloſe copies of letters which have paſſed between his Excellency and the King relative to him. They ought to have been forwarded ſome days ago, but were neglected to be given me by the Nabob's moonſhy. I thought it unneceſſary to trouble the Honourable Board with *Murtezza Cawn*'s correſpondence, which is juſt in the ſame ſtyle.

By marching immediately to *Etawa*, the Nabob will awe the Goſſeines, and in caſe *Syndea* has really intentions of joining them, he will at leaſt ſecure the rents of the lands on this ſide the *Jumna*. The Goſſeines wiſh it to be believed that *Sindea* will invade the country, and have even proceeded ſo far as to have their

vackeel propoſe to the Nabob to put him in poſſeſſion of the diſtricts of *Kalpy*, upon the pretences of attaching him to his Excellency's intereſt, and that he is entitled to them, from the three Maratta Chiefs, *Tocojy Holker*, *Byſagg*, and the ſaid *Sindea*, having divided them amongſt themſelves on their invaſion of *Hindoſtan*. Admitting that the Nabob was to equal his moſt ſanguine expectations, and at preſent obtain the peaceable poſſeſſion of the countries on the other ſide the *Jumna*; the having extended his dominions to that diſtance, will prove an inducement to him to involve himſelf in ſchemes of conqueſt, in which it is probable, unleſs ſupported by the Engliſh, that he will fail of ſucceſs. The Honourable Board will be better able to judge of this matter on recurring to events ſince his Excellency's ſucceſſion; for although the example at *Myady Gaut* had every effect that could be wiſhed, to ſubject his troops, yet he himſelf neglects the opportunity he now has of putting them under ſome kind of diſcipline, which makes it that they have no confidence in him, and the people whom he will have to deal with well know it. It alſo happens to be his Excellency's misfortune, that in camp there is not a man capable of commanding the army. *Buſſaunt Ally Cawn* appears to be the fitteſt perſon, but by the opinion of moſt military gentlemen with whom I have converſed, he can hardly have ſufficient experience for ſuch a truſt.

The ſtate of the country on the other ſide the *Jumna*, is as follows: the Goſſeines have made an acquiſition of what yielded the Marattas twenty-five lacks of rupees a year, and taken *Moat*, an exceeding ſtrong fort, their birth place, and was poſſeſſed by *Ender Gyr*, the man who adopted them as his ſons: they are laying in a ſtore of proviſions and ammunition in it; and though they have offered to attend on the Nabob, yet their conduct is as independent as ever: they were much preſſed by the Marattas at the beginning of the campaign, but they have latterly defeated ſeveral parties. *Anoop Gyr* is now at *Moat*, and *Amrow Gyr* is gone towards *Shahabad*, on the frontiers of *Nudjif Cawn*'s dominions, upon the pretence of making the ſettlement of that country. *Mahood Ally Cawn*, the Nabob of *Corah*, is ſuſpected by many people to be diſaffected to the Nabob; his Excellency himſelf and the Miniſter ſay they can depend upon his attachment; but he entertains a conſtant correſpondence with the Goſſeines, and *Bundlecund* Rajah talks of croſſing the river inſtead of meeting the Nabob, and is fortifying a place in his diſtrict, ſtrong by ſituation, called *Behaadeh*. His troops are attached to him, and know in a mutiny that happened at *Rajgyr* gaut, that he underhand encouraged the ringleaders, and was indirectly acceſſary to the entrance of the pay of the matchlock-men.

The poſſeſſions of the Rajah's of *Bundlecund* are to the ſouthward of the diſtricts of *Kalpy*. The anceſtor of the preſent incumbents was Rajah *Chutter Saul*, who had two ſons named *Kyrdaſaw*, who held ſixty lacks of the country, and *Puggut* Rajah, who held fifty D°.

Lacks 110

Mahomed Cawn Bunguſh, the father of *Ahmud Cawn Bunguſh*, the Nabob of *Ferokabad*, attacked theſe Rajahs, who called upon the Marattas to aſſiſt them, which they did, and overcame him, but they ſeized a third part of the country, and then there remained nearly as follows:

To *Kyrdaſaw* - - - - - - -	42 Lacks
Juggut Rajah - - - - - - -	32 D°
	74 Lacks.

Hindoput is the grandſon of *Kyrdaſaw*, and had two brothers, one named *Aumaun Sing*; he killed the other: *Keit Sing* is now in confinement. *Hindoput*'s reſidence is at *Punna*, and in his dominions is the famous fortreſs of *Callinger*: he at firſt held per annum, - Lacks 42 Appendix. No. 159.

He has ſince poſſeſſed himſelf of part of the countries of the under-mentioned Rajahs, *Gomaun Sing* and *Comaun Sing*, and of the Rajah of *Dattya* - 18

Gomaun Sing poſſeſſes *Bander* and *Ajihgur*, per annum, lacks - - - - - - 12 — Theſe two Rajahs are the ſons of *Kyrut Sing* by different mothers, and grandſons of *Juggut* Rajah.

Comaun Sing poſſeſſes *Chicarry* fort and diſtricts, amounting to lacks per annum - - 10

Gudji Sing poſſeſſes *Jyteporé* - - - 6 — The ſons of *Peher Sing*, the brother of *Kyrut Sing*.

Maun Sing Collipehar - - - - 3

Lacks per annum 91

The above Rajahs entertain an enmity to one another, and are all equally ſolicitous of obtaining the Nabob's countenance and protection. The Ranna of *Goad* poſſeſſes the ſame ſentiments; he now holds a country of about ſeven lacks of rupees a year; he had more formerly, as well as a large ſum of ready money, both of which he has loſt and ſpent.

The above circumſtances, together with the facts I have ſtated in my former addreſſes, will I hope fully explain the Nabob's ſituation. The Miniſter, on mature conſideration, is I believe fully convinced his Excellency would do better to ſettle his affairs by negociation, than by himſelf taking the field againſt an enemy. This reaſon has principally induced him to form the following plan:

To place the country on the other ſide the *Jumna*, in the hands of the Ranna of *Goad*, or of one of the *Bundlecund* Rajahs, upon a leaſe for life, of a fixed rent per annum; whatever ſurplus may accrue, to be his emolument, and all charges to reſt with him; the Nabob to take upon him the guarantee of the country againſt a foreign enemy. If upon the whole, the rent pays the expence of the troops kept to defend it, it is all that can be wiſhed; and I do not deſpair (if this plan be executed) of ſeeing it one time or other ſave his Excellency's country from being the ſeat of war. The determination regarding the propereſt perſon, is to be deferred until the Nabob ſhall reach *Etawa*; the only propoſal yet made is twelve lacks a year, by *Gomaun Sing*.

With *Nudjif Cawn* the Miniſter purpoſes to adviſe his Excellency to preſerve a good underſtanding, which he may very eaſily do; in reſpect to other Powers there is apparently little to be apprehended from their intentions.

The intelligence of an invaſion by *Timur Shaw* is premature; and it is unlikely the Sykes will not attack the Nabob.

His Excellency's ſtay at this place will I expect be very ſhort. I have the honour, &c. &c.

(Signed) *John Briſtow*,
Reſident at the Court of the N° of *Oude*.

Camp, near *Ferokabad*,
December 13th, 1775.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In my addreſs of yeſterday's date, I informed the Honourable Board of the embaſſy *Nudjif Cawn* had ſent to the Nabob; the concluſions of his negociations will in a great meaſure depend on the ſentiments of the Honourable Board, and I ſhall therefore ſubmit what has paſſed to their conſideration.

Myrza Hellile, the ambaſſador, was charged with powers to ſettle an interview between the Nabob and *Nudjif Cawn*, but as theſe two Princes entertained great doubts of each other, they would not either of them venture into the dominions of the other, without a poſitive aſſurance of perſonal ſafety. Unleſs the Company ſhould be the guarantees of any engagements to be entered into on this head, it appeared impoſſible to come into terms. *Myrza Hellile* therefore expreſſed his maſter's commands, to apply to me for this aſſurance, and yeſterday night waited upon me in form. The Nabob, accompanied by his Miniſter, did me the honour to meet him;

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him; when he explained his master's readiness to set aside the jealousy and distrust which for some time appeared to have lost him the friendship of the Nabob *Asoph ul Dowla*. Although variances might occur on trifling matters, yet in any thing material he wished to preserve a good understanding: he assured it to be both his master's and his Excellency's interest, for that the Marattas, from whom we might expect an invasion whenever their affairs would admit, were their mutual enemies.

Myrza Hellile afterwards addressed me; said, his master was the well-wisher of the English, to whom he considered himself much obliged; to be sure his Jaghire had been withheld from him, and there was a coolness in the treatment his master had met with, which he thought he did not deserve by his conduct, and that if e failed in any point it was unintentional, as he entertained the highest respect for the English.

The Nabob took upon him to answer *Myrza Hellile*: he urged, in regard to his own connection with *Nudjif Cawn*, that he was really injured by him in receiving his rebellious subjects, particularly *Basheer Cawn* and *Elich Cawn*, who had embezzled large sums, and whom he had placed so high in his confidence as to grant to the latter the Government of *Pydeabad*, and to the former that of *Rotuck*, &c. He then expressed himself in very warm terms of his alliance with the English, whom he supposed were offended with *Nudjif Cawn*, because he had treated him ill. *Mirza Hellile*, and the Nabob, after this entered very warmly into the argument, when his Excellency abruptly took his leave, desiring me to write a letter of assurance of personal safety to *Nudjif Cawn*, and that he would agree to the Company's being the guarantees; for although he had a reason sufficient to complain of *Nudjif Cawn*, yet he still wished to be upon good terms with him; other particulars, such as the place of holding their interview, and the mode, he left to be decided by himself, *Mirza Hellile*, and *Murtezza Cawn*.

After his Excellency left us, we entered more coolly into the discussion of the subject. For my part I acknowledge the strict alliance that the Company had formed with the Nabob, which exceeded the limits it had borne with the late Vizier; still I said this alliance was no bar to their friendship for other Princes to whom they entertained favourable sentiments, so long as no cause was given to alter them.

In regard to the particular business with which *Mirza Hellile* was entrusted, the English were ready to enter into any measure that might tend to *Nudjif Cawn*'s or the Nabob's advantage, or the peace of *Hindostan* in general; but I could not upon any verbal message write a letter of assurance of personal safety to the Nabob *Nudjif Cawn*, unless the terms of the interview were previously requested of me directly from him, as well as concluded and assented to in writing. I desired him to observe I did not say this with a view of offending him, for though he had brought no letter of introduction to me, yet I could have no doubt of his character, and weight and consequence with *Nudjif Cawn*, at least the Nabob *Asoph ul Dowla*'s acknowledging him, as his ambassador was alone sufficient to me, for paying him every attention; I therefore recommended it to him to express my sentiments in these terms to his master.

I further proposed to *Murtezza Cawn*, and *Mirza Hellile* to have *Etawa* fixed upon for the place for the interview, and that the latter should set off as this morning, there being no time to lose, especially as the Nabob had many affairs to settle, and the sooner they were commenced upon, the better.

My proposals were agreed to without any objection, and the rest of the conversation passed upon general subjects. *Mirza Hellile* set off as had been settled.

I beg to be favoured with the commands of the Honourable Board, regarding my conduct between the Nabob and *Nudjif Cawn*. Possibly they may apply to the Company to be the guarantees of any treaty of alliance they may enter into together; but I will avoid it if I can; and in case I should consent to such a proposal, it shall be only conditional until the pleasure of the Honourable Board be known.

The assurance of personal safety, should it take place, will I hope be approved of; at least the Nabob could hardily acquiesce in the Company's being the guarantees, unless he means strictly to abide by any promise he may make on this head.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

(Signed) *John Bristow*,

Camp near *Ferokabad*, the 14th December 1775.

Resid^{t} at the Court of the N^{b} of *Oude*.

P. S. Should *Nudjif Cawn* come to *Etawa* under the sanction of the English, he will have a very few attendants; in such case I humbly submit it to the consideration of the Honourable Board, whether he ought to have a guard for his person from the brigade.

(Signed) *John Bristow*.

Ordered, That the inclosures in the letter dated the 6th of December, be entered after the Consultation.

Agreed, That the following reply be sent to Mr. *Bristow*.

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 6th, 13th, and 14th ultimo; and shall now give you directions with respect to the case stated in the latter, which we desire you will consider as a general rule for your conduct on all such occasions.

We approve of your being present at the meeting of the Nabob and *Nudjif Cawn*; and we desire you will interpose all the good offices in your power, to create as good understanding and friendship between them; but we forbid your engaging the Company in any new treaty whatsoever with foreign Powers, or in the guarantee of any treaty which they may enter into among themselves, without obtaining the express orders of the Board for that purpose.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, the 8th April 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Governor General, President.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monson*,
Richard Barwell, } Esquires.
Philip Francis, }

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I wrote last on the 11th instant. I have to acknowledge the Honourable Board's letter of the 26th ultimo. I hope to be very shortly able to transmit a statement of the Nabob's revenues.

Mirza Hillile, *Nudjif Cawn*'s Ambassador, continues to urge me very strongly to obtain the Company's guarantee to a treaty of alliance between his master and the Nabob *Asup ul Dowlah*, which I have constantly declined in terms to avoid disgusting him as much as possible.

He now openly avows his master's want of confidence in the Nabob, on whom he lays no sort of dependance in any engagements he may enter into.

The Minister seems at present to think that it is good policy to support *Nudjif Cawn*, in order to attach him to the Nabob's interest. The reason on which he grounds this opinion is, that he is, by late intelligence, likely to take *Dike*, as the Jauts have had some convoys of provisions intercepted, and the soldiers desert the garrison in great numbers. As to the impression made on the fort by the mine *Nudjif Cawn* was conducting, or by his artillery, all attempts by these means have failed; by what I understand the event is still doubtful; but appearances are more favourable to him than to the Jauts.

In my address of the 1st instant, I informed the Honourable Board of the junction of *Sabiter Cawn* and the

Sikes, and that *Abdul Coſſim*, *Abdul Abut Cawn*'s brother, had marched to oppoſe them. The event has been very fatal to the King. The account of the battle which has happened is ſo fully expreſſed in the incloſed paper of intelligence, N° 1, that I refer the Honourable Board to it for particulars; I muſt obſerve, in regard to the Nabob, that prior to this event he had ordered *Lettafut* to march to *Delhy*, in hopes of obtaining the *Vizarut*, and to comply with the King's ſolicitation to ſend him a body of troops. I did not know of the ſtep until it had taken place, otherwiſe I could have perſuaded his Excellency againſt it, or adviſed him to aſſiſt *Abdul Coſſim*; for he has now, by not co-operating heartily with the King, ſuffered the worſt conſequences to enſue. I think it not improbable that *Sabiter* may be tempted to invade *Rohilchund*. His fortune is deſperate, and the recovery of his loſt dominions an object he has much at heart; beſides, he ſeems to think that the Nabob has taken part againſt him, and therefore he ſhall be juſtified in commencing hoſtilities: whenever he does it, probably a number of the Rohillas will join him. I before informed the Honourable Board, that in conſequence of the breach between *Abdul Abut Cawn* and *Sabiter Cawn*, the latter was reconciled to *Nudjif Cawn*. Now the Nabob is apprehenſive, that in caſe *Dike* ſhall be taken, *Nudjif Cawn* will be able to attend to enterprizes againſt him, and perhaps join *Sabiter Cawn*. The ſending of *Lettafut* to *Delhy* is in fact in ſupport of *Abdul Abut Cawn*'s meaſures, and therefore diſguſting to *Nudjif Cawn*; but there appears in the Nabob's conduct, in this whole affair, an obſcurity which I cannot underſtand; and I ſuſpect there was ſome other motive for it than the avowed one. There is a great contradiction I know in the obſervations on it on both ſides. *Mirza Hillile* mentions it as a ſtep highly detrimental to his maſter, as giving aſſiſtance to his declared enemy; and that he ſolicited the Nabob to ſend *Lettafut* to *Dike*. His Excellency on the contrary ſays, *Nudjif Cawn* wrote to him to let him go to *Delhi*; whichever may be true I ſhall not pretend to decide, but the duplicity of their conduct diſcovers the great jealouſy ſubſiſting between them, in which I ſhall not interfere further than to prevent them from coming to hoſtilities. Upon conſidering the march of *Lettafut*, in my humble opinion it was in every reſpect an injudicious ſtep.

The reconciliation of *Nudjif Cawn* with *Sabiter Cawn*, and the probability there is of his ſucceeding againſt *Dike*, alarm the Nabob, and he himſelf now wiſhes the Company would become guarantees of the treaty betwixt them. The Miniſter requeſted of me to promiſe it, but I declined, ſaying it was a matter of that importance, that I muſt have inſtructions previouſly from the Honourable Board. I further obſerved it was a moſt delicate point for the Company to be the guarantee of a treaty between two of the greateſt Princes in *Hindoſtan*, and ſhould not be haſtily entered into before the parties were firmly reſolved on conforming to it. Upon the whole, the negociation is in ſuch a ſituation, that if the Honourable Board are ſtill reſolved on not interfering, I believe, from the preſent ſtate of affairs, that I can evade doing it without any great detriment to the Nabob.

I have the pleaſure to incloſe a paper of intelligence relative to the Marattas, N° 2. The Chief, *Jeſſwent Row*, whoſe troops plunder about *Joynagur*, is the ſame perſon who was unitedwith the Rajepoots againſt *Nudjif Cawn*. *Jeſſwent Row* pretends that he has no command over his men; but it is ſuſpected they have his ſecret inſtructions to act in this manner in order to exact money; he himſelf is with *Haſhhally Ram Bohra*, the Rajpoot General.

I incloſed the copy of a letter I this day wrote Colonel *Stibbert* on the arrival of the brigade, or a detachment at *Putahgur*, as Colonel *Stibbert* ſhall judge neceſſary. I hope the rebels will ſoon be diſperſed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) *John Briſtow*,
Reſid^t at *Owde*.

Camp, near *Etawa*,
19th March 1776.

Appendix. No. 159.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the pleaſure to inform the Honourable Board, that the rebels at *Pertabgen* are diſperſed without the march of the brigade, and that his Excellency has in conſequence deſired of the Commanding Officer to countermand it. I have, &c.

Camp, near *Etawa*, (Signed) *John Briſtow*.
21ſt March 1776.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 15th April 1776.

Received the following letter from Mr. *Briſtow*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the pleaſure to addreſs the Honourable Board on the 21ſt ultimo, ſince when the Nabob reſolved on immediately putting under the command of Britiſh Officers altogether ſeven of his eſtabliſhed battalions of Sepoys. In conſequence of this reſolution, Captain *Erſkine* yeſterday had his corps completely delivered over to him, and Captain *Hoggan* received one battalion; the other he will have in *Rohilchund*, where it is now ſtationed, to which country both he and Captain *Erſkine* will march, as a force of at leaſt two regiments is neceſſary to awe the Sikes and *Sabiter Cawn* from attempting an invaſion.

The very large funds which will be required to raiſe and ſupport ſo conſiderable a body of cavalry as ſix regiments, are much beyond the Nabob's ability to undertake at the preſent juncture. He has therefore directed only two regiments to be immediately formed, and whenever his finances will admit of it, he propoſes to raiſe additional ones. In the interim, that the ſervices of the Britiſh officers may not be loſt, the Miniſter wiſhes to have battalions of Sepoys put under the command of the ſupernumeraries, and to effect this point recommended it to the Nabob to have them all recalled from the recruiting ſtations to head quarters; a meaſure that I hope will meet with the approbation of the Honourable Board, as I humbly conceive, if theſe officers are employed to effect the Nabob's ſervice, it matters little whether in the cavalry or infantry; the introducing of them into the latter is hardly any additional expence, at the ſame time that it eſtabliſhes the diſcipline of his Excellency's army, and ſtrengthens his Government; ſome of the cavalry officers alſo expreſs an inclination to change into the infantry, in whoſe room his Excellency may, whenever it will be neceſſary, apply for others. The Honourable Board having offered to lend him other officers on applying for them, I thought myſelf authorized to aſſure the Miniſter they would be granted.

The eſtabliſhment of the artillery corps on the moſt formidable footing, being of the greateſt conſequence, Captain *Hill* was conſulted on the plan: I have the pleaſure herewith to incloſe it, his Excellency having ſigned and approved of it; I humbly ſubmit it to the conſideration of the Honourable Board; the Golunder Company being to ſupply the place of Europeans, I hope the pay allotted them upon the footing of Sepoys will be admitted. The Subahdar is thought a neceſſary officer, becauſe a very conſiderable charge will always reſt with him, and in time of actual ſervice, as there is only one European officer, his being of ſome weight and conſequence in the corps will be abſolutely neceſſary. This eſtabliſhment is founded nearly upon a proportion with that of the brigades; one of the Nabob's companies of artillery being about a third of one of our's.

The men put under the command of the officers ſeem ſo well ſatisfied that I have little doubt of their being very obedient. I am apprehenſive of the bad ſtate of the arms of the Nabob's battalions, excepting thoſe taken from the mutineers at *Mindy Gaut*, which are alſo old and nearly unſerviceable; the whole were made at the late Vizier's foundry at *Fuzabad*, when the Frenchmen who had the charge of it, either from the want of proper artificers, or the impoſſibility of preparing the metals properly, never did bring them to any perfection. The

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country-made muſkets, I am told, hardly ever laſt any time, and the metal is ſo bad that the greater part burſt if fired a number of times ſucceſſively: a ſurvey is not yet completed of the arms of the battalions delivered over to Captains *Erſkine* and *Huggan*, but I fear they muſt be detained a few days to have them repaired and exchanged, ſo as to be ſerviceable. His Excellency has ordered all his muſkets from *Fyzabad* (about four thouſand) to be immediately ſent him, though I do not ſuppoſe there will be much above two thouſand ſtand out of them good for any thing. The artillery attached to theſe two regiments will go away complete as to the number of guns, and I hope it will be poſſible to get the weight of metal, agreeable to the eſtabliſhment. I expect to have to write to the Honourable Board more fully on theſe heads in a ſhort time; I have ſecured a tuncaw of R' 2,60,000 on the Naib of *Rohilehund*, which will ſuffice for the detachment to that province, for I hope at leaſt five months, eſpecially as the battalion ſtationed there, which is to be put under Captain *Huggan*, has already aſſignments made for it.

The firſt battalion delivered over to Captain *Webber* has been ſince put under Lieutenant *Connellan* for the body guard, which makes now altogether five battalions with Britiſh officers. I have, &c.

Camp, near *Etawa*, 2d April 1776. (Signed) *John Briſtow*, Reſident at *Owde*.

Agreed, That Mr. *Briſtow* be replied to as follows:

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 2d inſtant.

Having already written to you fully on the ſubject of the eſtabliſhments propoſed for the Nabob's troops, we ſhall not take notice of the ſtatement you have tranſmitted to us.

We acquieſce in the Nabob's intention to employ a part of the cavalry officers in the command of his infantry, until it may ſuit him to furniſh them with horſe, provided he adopts the plan for appointing them, which we have already laid down for thoſe recommended to Sepoy commands; and as you have promiſed that when he ſhall raiſe the cavalry he may have other officers to command it, in lieu of ſuch as may prefer to remain in the infantry, we aſſent to this alſo.

We are very deſirous to ſee a ſtate of the Nabob's account with the Company, and we therefore deſire you will immediately prepare and tranſmit it to us, adjuſted to the lateſt period; we further direct that you forward to us as ſoon as poſſible, a complete account of the ſubſidy; that you continue regularly to furniſh us with monthly accounts of the ſame, and in future every quarter, with a regular account current.

We are, &c. &c.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 13th May 1776.

Extract of a Letter to Mr. *Briſtow*.

With reſpect to the Negociation you have entered into on behalf of the Vizier with the Marattas, we can give you no particular inſtructions, as we are yet unacquainted with the objects of contention, and the nature of the tranſactions which have hitherto paſſed between them: but we adviſe you on the whole, to endeavour to accommodate matters between them on the moſt ſecure and honourable terms that you may be able to obtain for the Vizier, without engaging the Company in any guarantee, or riſking an interruption of the peace lately concluded at *Poonah*. We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis.

Fort William, 13th May, 1776.

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Shajehanabad; dated the 24th of Rubbee ul Aweel (25th of May); received 15th June 1775.

RAM NARAIN, the vackeel of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, who reſides at *Shajehanabad*, is negociating with the Nabob *Abdul Aid Khan*, to procure the Vizarut for his maſter, offering to pay down a ſum of money as Peiſcuſh: his Majeſty has in conſequence ſent a Shukka Khas to the Nabob *Nizam Ally*, deſiring him either to attend perſonally at court, or to ſend ſome Sirdar on his part there, that being thus made acquainted with his views, he may negociate this affair with him. There has been a battle between the Nabob *Nijiff Khan* and *Nole Sing*, in which the latter was defeated, and fled.

Extract of Intelligence, dated 1ſt of Rubbee Aſſance, or June; received 21ſt June 1775.

Neaz Ally Khan who is arrived at the preſence on the part of *Murtezzur Khan*, to negociate the terms of Khellats of inveſtiture of the Vizarut, &c. has propoſed to pay one lack of rupees Peiſcuſh immediately, and nine lacks in future payments. His Majeſty expreſſed his diſpleaſure at this propoſal, ſaying, that *Mahomed Ellich Khan* had agreed to the immediate payment of 10 lacks, and that he would treat with him. His Majeſty wrote to the Nabob *Bhigum*, deſiring that all affairs might be negociated through *Mahomed Ellich Khan*, by whom they would be ſettled in the moſt ſatisfactory manner, and not through *Meer Murtezar Khan*.

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 29th April 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſiden.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Philip Francis, Eſquire,
Mr. Barwell indiſpoſed.

READ, and approved, the Conſultation of the 25th inſtant.

Received the following letter from Mr. *Briſtow*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed the Honourable Board on the 9th inſtant: and this day had the pleaſure to attend his Excellency three miles out of camp, to meet the Kelaat of the Vizarut, with which he was cloathed on the ſpot, in a tent pitched for that purpoſe. The Vizier expreſſed more ſatisfaction on the occaſion than ever I yet ſaw him. He had the ceremony conducted with great ſtate, and on receiving the Kelaat fired a royal ſalute.

In my laſt addreſs I mentioned the plan intended to be purſued for the defence of this country, and the proſecution of the war with the Marattas, in caſe they would not liſten to the Vizier's propoſals for peace. On maturely conſidering the force to be put under Britiſh officers, four battalions of infantry were deemed inadequate to the ſervice, for which reaſon ſeven more of thoſe under *Buſſant* were recommended by the Miniſter to be delivered over to their charge, and it has been accordingly done, including the body guard; there are now altogether twelve battalions under Britiſh officers.

The Marattas expreſs an inclination for peace; it is however judged neceſſary to guard againſt the worſt, and therefore *Muhboob* has been ordered to march to *Kalpy*, there to remain till further orders; and for the defence of *Cora*, as was before planned, the Nabob has requeſted of Colonel *Stibbert* to order two battalions to that province. The principal reaſon for urging the Vizier to act with vigour and ſpirit at the preſent juncture, is the approach of the rains, at which ſeaſon the Marattas cannot act, and it is probable they will be glad to conclude a peace.

The diſpoſition of the officers is not yet completely made by the Vizier, ſo that it is impoſſible for the Adjutant-

jutant-General to furniſh a general return. No time will be loſt in doing this, but I believe I may inform the Honourable Board, that there will not remain above two or three of the officers unprovided for.

I have, &c.

Camp, near *Etawa*, 16th April 1776. (Signed) *John Briſtow*, Reſident at *Oude*.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. *Briſtow* to the Governor General and Council; dated Camp, near *Etawah*, 9th April 1776.

The King's affairs are reduced to the loweſt ebb; for beſides the near proſpect of loſing the ſmall extent of country which he poſſeſſed, he will have every thing to fear from his diſcontented troops, who have now ſix months arrears due to them, which his Majeſty has no apparent means of being able to diſcharge. The only ſecurity he has left for the ſafety of his perſon and the city, is the preſence of *Lettaupick* with him, which may prove a check to the mutinous ſpirit of his troops, and prevent it from breaking out into any open acts of violence. The rage of the ſoldiery is ſuppoſed to be chiefly directed againſt *Abdulabad Cawn*, as to him they impute the ill, unprovided ſtate, in which they were ſent againſt the enemy, and conſequently conſider him as the author of their late diſgrace. The withholding of their pay they likewiſe ſuppoſe to be owing to the ſame perſon. The Sikes and *Sabiter Cawn* have already ſent agents into ſome of the King's and *Nudjiff Cawn*'s diſtricts, adjacent to where the body of their army at preſent is; an Aumil on the part of *Sabiter Cawn*, and a Mutuſuddee on that part of the Sikes, act jointly in each diſtrict, but the ſhares to accrue to the ſeveral parties have not yet been finally ſettled between them. At one time it was agreed to by the parties, that *Sabiter Cawn*'s ſhare ſhould be ten ſixteenths, and that of the Sikes the remaining ſix. The latter, however, whoſe numbers are increaſed within theſe few days, now refuſe to abide by that diviſion, ſo that the matter remains undetermined, and it appears not improbable may occaſion ſuch a miſunderſtanding as may terminate in an abſolute rupture of the two allied Powers. This point *Abdulahed Cawn* is labouring with all his might to bring about, and exerting every artifice to excite and foment mutual jealouſies, to that end; it is ſaid that his artifices have had their effect with the Sikes already. Of this people there may be now collected together about ten thouſand, and more it is reported will join them ſhortly: they are all irregular cavalry, but the beſt mounted of any troops in *Hindoſtan*. *Sabiter Cawn* may have about twenty thouſand foot and horſe, ill accoutred, worſe diſciplined, ill provided with arms and ammunition, and many months in arrears. The defeat of the King's troops does not appear to have been in any reſpect owing to their want of conduct or courage, but to their being ill provided, and alſo overpowered by numbers. The body of the united army of the Sikes and *Sabiter Cawn* is marching towards *Sarranpore*, a part of the king's territories, diſtant about eighteen coſs from the Nabob *Auſuf ul Dowla*'s frontiers; ſmall parties of them have even come on this ſide. One in particular plundered a village near *Sutulgur*, whereupon one of the battalions which Captain *Hoggan* is to command, and a body of horſe, were detached by *Soorut Sing* to defend that part of the country. I underſtand the enemy have ſince withdrawn theſe detachments, and I hope the force under Captain *Erſkine* will put an effectual ſtop to any further attempts. *Mulla Reim Daad Cawn* has collected near twenty thouſand of his countrymen, and is ſeizing *Hauſey Haſſar*, a diſtrict belonging to *Nudjif Cawn*, to the ſouth weſt of *Delhi*. *Buſhen Cawn* being totally unable to ſtand his ground, has joined *Nudjif Cawn*. The apprehenſions the King himſelf entertains from his ſituation, the Honourable Board will be apprized of from the incloſed papers, viz.

N° 1. Copy of three of His Majeſty's Shokas, to the Nabob and *Moktar ul Dowla*.

2. Copy of a Shoka to the Reſident, with the Nabob *Aſuf al Dowla*; as alſo a letter from *Abelulahed Cawn* to the ſame.

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N. B. Theſe papers are not to be found.

The grant of the Vizerat upon the terms ſpecified in one of the above Shokas, was by no means his Majeſty's free gift, but entirely owing to his diſtreſſed ſituation. He entertains great hopes of aſſiſtance from the Nabob, which it appears to me his Excellency can hardly, with prudence and ſafety to himſelf, afford his Majeſty; a conſiderable part of his troops having been reformed, his country being ſtill in an unſettled ſtate, and his finances low. The defence of his own dominions will indubitably be the firſt conſideration; and in *Rohilchund*, excluſive of the force under Captain *Erſkine*, he will ſcarcely have twelve thouſand men to collect the revenues and defend the province.

APPENDIX, No. 162.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 2d May 1776.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Stibbert*.

SINCE I had the pleaſure of addreſſing you laſt, on the ſubject of Maratta intelligence, &c. nothing has occurred ſo particular as to cauſe the immediate attention of the Honourable Board. The internal diviſions ſeem to prevent thoſe bodies that were moving this way, from making further advances. *Biher Jee* with about 25,000 men, is ſaid to be encamped at *Todah*, which is about 40 coſs from *Dege*.

Reingate Sing continues to importune them to come to his aſſiſtance at *Dege*, which *Muzzif Khan* ſtill lies before with his army; and it is reported that the garriſon is greatly diſtreſſed for proviſions. With reſpect to *Jamee*, beſieged by the Goſſaines, a large body of Marattas are ſaid to be advanced within ſome few coſs of it, which is the laſt intelligence I received from thence.

The chaſtiſement given by the Nabob to the *Nuzzif Pultan*, which you have been fully acquainted of, from Mr. *Briſtow*, has been productive of circumſtances favourable to the plan of his receiving our officers, and alſo towards reſtoring order and regularity among his troops. Every thing in his camp ſince that time has been perfectly quiet.

I have the honour to be with profound reſpect, &c.

(Signed) *Giles Stibbert*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed the Honourable Board the 17th inſtant, and incloſed them the copy of a letter I had received from the Nabob, on the ſubject of a detachment which he requeſted might be made from the army for the defence of the *Cora* province, together with a tranſlation thereof, and my anſwer accompanying. I do myſelf the honour of tranſmitting you the copies of two letters I received yeſterday from Mr. *Briſtow*, the one in the morning, dated the 16th inſtant, incloſing to me a ſecond letter from the Nabob during the march of the above detachment; the other of the 17th, by an expreſs dawk at 11 o'clock at night, informing me of the aſſaſſination of *Muſtar ul Dowlah*, his Excellency's Miniſter.

By the private intelligence which I have received this morning, he had been invited to an entertainment at the houſe of *Buſſunt Ally Khan*, the 17th inſtant, in the morning, when intending to depart after the repaſt at noon, *Buſſunt* and his friends prevailed upon him to repoſe himſelf in his Tiah Connah (a room built under ground to retire to, in the heat of the day), when he and ſome others ſoon after followed him, who immediately plunged their daggers into his belly, and killed him on the

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the ſpot. *Buſſunt*, after the murder had been committed, about three o'clock went to the Nabob, who had juſt before been informed of the aſſaſſination of his Miniſter, who aſked him how he dared to come into his preſence? and ordered his attendants to draw their ſwords, and put him to death, which was immediately executed. About this time intelligence was received, that the battalions of Sepoys were in motion, and advancing, upon which his Excellency ſet out immediately to meet them; and on enquiring from the commandants the occaſion of their being under arms, they replied, for his ſafety; which, after having aſſured them was unneceſſary, he ordered to return to their encampment, which they without heſitation complied with; his Excellency on his return, ſent for *Saidit Ally*, his next brother, whom he was informed had fled to *Fayzabad:* on which he diſpatched a party of horſe to bring him back, but whether they overtook him or not is not mentioned; neither is it ſaid what were his motives for taking this ſtep, but I ſhould rather apprehend it was from a fear of his perſon in the general confuſion.

In conſequence of theſe tumults, and not knowing what further deſigns might be intended, I ſhall not think it prudent to ſend off from the army, the afore-mentioned detachment required by the Nabob, till I am aſſured of every thing being reſtored to its former tranquillity; in the mean time I have wrote Mr. *Briſtow*, adviſing him, in caſe of his Excellency being under any apprehenſions for his own ſafety, to recommend to him to retire to this camp, from whence I ſhall take care to ſend a ſufficient eſcort to meet and conduct him here, on his acquainting me of ſuch his intentions.

I have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf, with the utmoſt reſpect, &c.

Camp, *Belgram*, April 19, 1776. (Signed) *Giles Stibbert.*

Reſolved, that the following reply be written to Colonel *Stibbert:*

To Colonel *Giles Stibbert*, commanding in the field.

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 6th March and 19th ult°, but that of the 17th, to which you refer in the laſt, is not come to hand.

We do not approve of detachments of more than 500 men being ſent from the Camp on any occaſion, except it may be found neceſſary for the protection of the camp itſelf, or to provide ſubſiſtence for the army. We therefore poſitively forbid your granting any detachments for other ſervices. On the preſent occaſion we believe it would be totally unneceſſary, as we have directed that the whole brigade ſhould march, if the Nabob has no objection, to *Allahabad*, which place is contiguous to the province of *Corah*, where he wanted to ſtation the two battalions, for which he had applied to you.

Fort William, 2d May, 1776. We are, &c.

Received the following letter from Mr. *Briſtow.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I did myſelf the pleaſure to addreſs the Honourable Board on the 17th inſtant; ſince that I have made the ſtricteſt enquiry into every circumſtance of the aſſaſſination of *Muctar ul Dowlah*, in order if poſſible to aſcertain the authors and motives of it, as well as the extent it was meant to be carried to. So uncertain, however, muſt be the reſult of all enquiries in affairs of this dark nature, where the ſecret could have been entruſted but to a few, who would be afraid to divulge, nay, would certainly attempt to miſrepreſent, and where reports alſo might be ſpread, by the deſigns or idle ſuſpicions of others, which might be divulged as authentic facts. I ſhall not therefore preſume to decide, but ſubmit the whole to the judgment of the Honourable Board. The following previous circumſtances come within my own knowledge.

On *Javo Loll's* diſgrace, *Buſſunt* having obtained his offices, became a formidable opponent of the Miniſters, and they mutually endeavoured to overſet each other. *Buſſunt* joined himſelf with *Tipper Chund*, the treaſurer *Amro Gyr*, and the *Telinga Rajas*. Theſe people uſed every argument they could think of with the Vizier, to induce him to diſgrace the Miniſter; particularly they urged to him, that inſtead of having eſtabliſhed his Government upon a permanent footing, *Muctar ul Dowlah* had embroiled him with all the old and confidential ſervants of his late father, and that relying on his connection with the Engliſh, and the ſecurity he might derive therefrom, his views of influence, and independence of his maſter, knew no bounds. The Vizier was ſo much affected by theſe ſuggeſtions, that he reſolved on diſplacing the Miniſter, but firſt did me the honour of aſking my advice as to the propriety of the ſtep; I replied, that if the Miniſter had failed in his duty, the meaſure would certainly be right. I obſerved, that he had had many difficulties to contend with, particularly the ſuggeſtions of ill-affected people about his Excellency's perſon, who were continually counteracting every advice and meaſure he recommended. I particularly quoted the inſtance of the Goſſayne, whom he had continued a long time in office, to the great loſs of his Excellency in his revenue, and probably might prove the cauſe of ſome difficulty and trouble in ſettling matters with the Marattas, from whom, by prudent meaſures, he might ere this have had it in his power to have exacted a peace on his own terms. I aſked his Excellency what particular offences his Miniſter had been guilty of? To this he replied, None; but that he was diſguſted with, and determined on removing him. I took the liberty to obſerve, in a reſpectful manner, that I had always found *Muctar ul Dowlah* ready in forwarding the Company's buſineſs, and hoped that as his Excellency did not alledge his having committed any crime, he would aſſure me, his life at leaſt ſhould be ſafe, and, if poſſible, an honourable proviſion made for his ſubſiſtence: that otherwiſe, perſons who could not know the real motives for his Excellency's conduct, might impute his Miniſter's diſgrace to his attachment to the Engliſh. Both the Vizier and the Miniſter entered into a very warm diſpute before me, and I with very much difficulty effected a reconciliation. All this happened a very few days before the aſſaſſination. During the altercation, *Muctar ul Dowlah* repeatedly mentioned his apprehenſions of loſing his life by *Buſſunt*, who he ſaid had offered to break into his houſe with two companies of Sepoys, and kill him, and that whenever he had lately gone out, he always feared to be taken off. The Vizier told him, he was totally ignorant of any offer of the kind, and that it muſt be all falſe, and inſiſted on his being reconciled with *Buſſunt*, which was apparently effected, for *Buſſunt* afterwards ſpent three or four hours every day at his houſe.

The Miniſter nevertheleſs reſolved on having *Buſſunt* diſmiſſed from all his offices, as, after what had happened, he could not think himſelf ſafe with ſuch a perſon about the Vizier; *Buſſunt*, apprized of his intentions, determined to take the firſt ſtroke, and perpetrated the aſſaſſination.

From the late rupture between his Excellency and the Miniſter, I own I was led to conclude that the former muſt at leaſt have intimated to *Buſſunt*, that his aſſaſſination would be agreeable to him, and that without ſuch an intimation, and even aſſurances of his pardon and favour, he would not have dared to attempt it; but I own I am at preſent at a loſs what to think, and the more I reflect on the circumſtances following the murder, the more I find the matter involved in obſcurity.

Immediately on the fact being committed, it is certain that *Buſſunt* went to the Nabob's, came out immediately after having ſeen him, and got the artillery and

troops under his command in readineſs. It is ſaid that when in the Nabob's preſence, the Nabob abuſed him for the crime he had committed, and diſmiſſed him in the moſt opprobrious manner *Buſſunt* alledged to him, that others and not himſelf had committed the murder. After getting the troops ready, *Buſſunt* returned to the Nabob with his uncle and five or ſix of his companions, entering the preſence with a naked ſword in his hand. The Nabob then aſked him, if he intended to murder him too? to which he replied, No; and gave away his ſword to his uncle ſtanding by him. The Nabob immediately ordered his people in waiting to put *Buſſunt* to inſtant death, which was not executed without one of the Nabob's people being wounded in the ſcuffle by *Buſſunt's* uncle and his comrades, who were ſuffered to eſcape. I ſhould have mentioned, that previous to *Buſſunt's* entering a ſecond time into the preſence, and immediately on his going out, the Nabob gave orders for his guards to be at their ſeveral poſts, and in readineſs.

Mirza Saadat Ally, as he himſelf writes me, went, on the firſt news of *Mucktar ul Dowlah* being killed, to the Nabob's, and being refuſed admittance, turned back.

The Nabob himſelf aſſerts, that he was not refuſed admittance, and that he ſent a very urgent meſſage to him to come. It was told me as a fact by ſome people, that he did not hear of *Buſſunt's* death until he had entered the court-yard, and that this news occaſioned his returning; however, he inſtantly fled, and though the Nabob in an hour or two afterwards deſired me to write to him, perſuading his return, with aſſurances of kind treatment, and alſo to ſend Mr. *Grant* to eſcort him, no intelligence could poſſibly be got of his route till late laſt night, when I received a letter from him, informing me of his arrival at *Gaulior*, a place in the poſſeſſion of the Marattas, about thirty-four coſs from hence. Another circumſtance I have heard was, that the aſſaſſins of *Mucktar ul Dowlah*, immediately after having committed the act, went to *Saadat Ally*. Some ſay, as they mounted their horſes, which had been previouſly ſaddled, they talked "of having the buſineſs of two or three other people to do," but this I cannot poſitively aſſert to be a fact.

The opinions as to the authors and abettors of the late aſſaſſination, have been various, but the principal ones are the three following, namely, that the Nabob himſelf either gave the orders to *Buſſunt*, or intimated that it would not be diſagreeable to him; led to this ſtep by the evil ſuggeſtions of ſome near his perſon, by the quarrel he had lately had with the Miniſter, and the latter's haughty conduct. Another opinion given is, that *Mirza Saadat Ally* was the author of the whole, and made uſe of *Buſſunt* to cut off *Mucktar ul Dowlah* only, as a previous ſtep to the taking off the Nabob himſelf. To ſupport this, they alledge that *Buſſunt*, the night before the fact was committed, went in the dreſs of a knotch girl to *Saadat Ally's* houſe, and that there had been a cloſe, though moſt private correſpondence between them for ſome time; they alſo inſiſt on his flight, which they aſſert was on hearing of *Buſſunt's* death, as a ſtrong proof of his guilt; laſtly, there are ſome who ſuppoſe that both the Nabob and *Saadat Ally* were concerned; that the Nabob, urged by reſentment againſt the Miniſter, and fear of *Buſſunt*, ordered the murder; that *Buſſunt* thinking himſelf ſecure ſo far from all inſtant ill-conſequences, had betrayed the deſign to *Saadat Ally*, with whom he had concerted alſo to take off the Nabob when he ſhould have got the troops ready, which he imagined the Nabob would not hinder his doing, under pretence of preventing diſturbances from *Mucktar ul Dowlah's* ſoldiery. There are ſcarcely any that ſuppoſe *Buſſunt* was led ſolely by motives of revenge, for the mortifications and diſgraces he had ſuffered from *Mucktar ul Dowlah*. Perhaps the prevalence of this opinion may be partly owing to the bad conſtructions the ill-natured part of the world are apt to put on all tranſactions which cannot be clearly aſcertained, but are of this dark nature, and therefore ſuppoſe plots and machinations, much deeper than ever really exiſted. Appendix. No. 162.

His Excellency did me the honour to conſult me, on the meaſures to be taken after *Mucktar ul Dowlah's* death. I ſuggeſted to him the propriety of dividing the conſequential offices amongſt different people, and not ſuffering ſo uncontrollable a power as the late Miniſter's to be lodged in the hands of any one man; I alſo adviſed the Nabob not to give the command of his battalions to one man, but to keep them under his different commandants. I am in great hopes that the battalions put under Engliſh officers, will ſoon be accuſtomed to their command, and prove obedient troops. This I think will take place with very little difficulty, as I recommended to his Excellency to put the pay of the native officers on the ſame footing with the Company's, as they before received leſs; his Excellency has accordingly conſented, and it is a meaſure that will attach the troops much to our officers for their ſubſiſtence. Aſſignments have been granted me on the Douaul country, where they will be ſtationed.

Letters, the evening of the aſſaſſination, were ſent to the different Aumils, confirming them in their offices. This country, and the army, are at preſent in peace and quietneſs.

The Vizier conſulted me on the conduct he ſhould obſerve to *Saadut Ally*; he made two propoſals, either for him to reſide at *Fyzabad*, in which caſe he ſhould inſiſt on his being confined to his houſe, or to retire into the Company's territories. It was obſerved, that after what had happened, his being about the Vizier's perſon would be the occaſion of eternal jealouſies; and his Excellency very candidly confeſſed to me, that he could not be at eaſe in his mind, if he ſhould remain with him. I thought for *Saadat Ally* to be at *Fyzabad* would be equally dangerous, as there are always a numerous body of troops, and many of the principal people of the country at that place; circumſtances which would open a channel for intrigues and ſuſpicions; it was therefore determined to make him the offer of retiring into the Company's territory, and I am authorized by the Vizier to propoſe it to him, and tell him a jaghire of one lack of rupees a year, and his travelling charges to his intended place of reſidence, will be allowed him. I hope this arrangement will meet the approbation of the Honourable Board; I humbly conceive it a political one, that will for ever ſecure the Vizier's alliance to the Company. I ſhall to-day write to *Saadut Ally*; and beg to know what place in the provinces the Honourable Board deem fitteſt for his reſidence, in caſe of his returning at my inſtance.

The Vizier having attended to my advice, has in all offices diſpoſed of, ſince the death of his Miniſter, diſtributed them amongſt his late father's adherents. For inſtance, the Duan Khana, a principal office, from the head of it attending conſtantly about him, has been given to *Huſſun Reza Cawn*. By what I could ever ſee of this man, he bears the appearance of attachment to the family, and even uniformity in his conduct. The late Miniſter, on his firſt admiſſion into office, uſed every means to induce this man to join his party, by the dread of his power, or the hopes of emolument to himſelf. He poſitively refuſed, but has throughout conducted himſelf with reſpect to the Vizier, and not intrigued, as others have done, to overſet his government.

The artillery remains in the hands of a ſeparate Daroga; and *Tipperchund*, the Treaſurer and Paymaſter, having loſt his places for his intrigues againſt the Miniſter, is put in again.

Theſe meaſures ſeem all to have a good tendency, and the Vizier has himſelf attended to buſineſs ſince the Miniſter's death. But I know well his diſpoſition, that this can be conſidered only a temporary effort; and unleſs there are one or two capable men about him, affairs will

Appendix. No. 162.

will revert to their late ſtate of anarchy and confuſion. *Huſſun Reza Cawn* will find ſufficient employment in his attendance on the Vizier; and I conceive it out of his line to regulate the finance and military departments; the latter, *Tipper Chund* has been long accuſtomed to, and is very capable of conducting; but for the finance it will be a very difficult point to fix it on a regular ſyſtem. The *Duan Surat Sing*, in the late Vizier's time, had much authority in this branch; having the controul of all accounts, and being well verſed in all the uſages from long experience, he was exceedingly uſeful. But this man having acquitted himſelf well in the Government of *Rohilchund* to withdraw him from thence would in my humble opinion, eſpecially at this ſeaſon of the collections, be an unadviſable meaſure; I think the more ſo, as his place may be ſupplied by his ſon-in-law, who has been educated under him in office, and equally capable with *Soorut Sing*.

There are no Adawlects in this country, but the execution of juſtice reſts with the Aumil and Cutwal. There is generally a Cutwal in each town, or any village of conſequence; he is totally ſubordinate to the Aumil, and I am ſorry to ſay, in the execution of juſtice, there is hardly any deciſion made, but what is biaſſed by money.

Upon a review of the offices through which the buſineſs was tranſacted at the preſence in the late Vizier's time, the principal ones were the Dewanny and Treaſury, but a check upon theſe being neceſſary, the Vizier did think proper, before I left him, to eſtabliſh the office of Amanut: the duties of which will be to ſee that no innovations are made in the fixed eſtabliſhment, either military or civil; and that no final adjuſtments of accounts ſhould be conſidered legal, without the Superintendant's ſignature.

I humbly conceive it to be in every reſpect the plan to ſupport the heads of office in their ſeveral departments, and to keep every man ſolely in his own line, not to ſuffer him to interfere in buſineſs in general, as has been too much the caſe, and one cauſe of the confuſion that reigned. As a mode of obviating any inconvenience from the want of proper perſons for the executive part of the buſineſs, there ought to be one or two able men about the Nabob's perſon, without any oſtenſible offices; to receive and preſent petitions, ſettle all contracts, conclude all agreements for farms, judge of the proper perſons for Aumils, and other departments of government; to ſee that the buſineſs of each office is regularly conducted, and report the ſtate of them, are duties it would be impoſſible for the heads of offices themſelves to do, as taking up too much of their time, which ſhould be uſefully employed in the minutiæ of their own departments. I think it would be improper, for whoever were about the Vizier in theſe capacities, to have a deciſive authority, which was the great evil in *Mucktar ul Dowlah*'s adminiſtration. They ſhould poſitively not have the adjuſting of a ſingle point, without the Nabob's ſanction. The great labour in all buſineſs is to collect materials, which, when once done, it is eaſy to decide on; and I ſhould imagine this would not be an undertaking beyond the reach of his Excellency's induſtry or inclinations. The late Vizier obſerved this plan in his conduct, and the perſons whom he entruſted were *Elich Cawn* and *Baſheer Cawn*. The day after the death of the Miniſter, when the fitteſt perſon to tranſact the executive part of the Government was conſidered upon, nobody was thought ſo capable as *Elijé Cawn*; he is the likelieſt man to reconcile the parties at Court; a man of unwearied application, and well known. Beſides this, it might be further expected by his means to effect a reconciliation with the Begum, a very material object, and I believe what his Excellency has much at heart. *Mucktar ul Dowlah* being out of the way, it was generally ſuppoſed he would return; he was in conſequence wrote to by his agent, and has conſented; but I look upon it to be a doubtful matter. In regard to the part I ought to take in this negociation in the name of the Honourable Board, I am much at a loſs, as *Elijé Cawn* paid great inattention to the protection before granted him; but in this caſe there is great allowance to be made for circumſtances, particularly the Nabob's inclinations, and the advantages to be reaped by the public.——I hope to meet with excuſe for the freedom with which I have expreſſed my ſentiments; but I conſider the Company's intereſt ſo cloſely connected with this Government, that I could not avoid being thus particular on ſo material a point.

Mr. *Chandler* has attended the Vizier, and the intent of the Nabob's leaving me here, is to mediate the peace with the Marattas; the only nation from which I think the Nabob has now reaſon to apprehend any attacks. From theſe I think there can be no real danger, as the very formidable force of eight battalions of Sepoys, under Britiſh officers, with a proportionable artillery, is ſurely ſufficient to defend this country. Relative to military matters I ſhall write the Honourable Board very fully before I leave this, as it has been an object of my ſtay, to ſettle the accounts, and have the neceſſary arrangements to take place.

Whilſt I ſhall remain here his Excellency has thought proper to direct all orders from me to be obeyed by the army.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, humble ſervant,
Camp, near *Etawa*, (Signed) *John Briſtow*,
24th April, 1776. Reſident at the Court of the Vizier.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated 15th May, 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
The Honourable *George Monſon*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Read the following letters from Colonel *Stibbert*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In conſequence of the defection of the Gaſſeins, the march of *Hemet Bahadar*, with his troops towards *Agra*, who has ſince joined *Nudjiff Cawn* at *Deg*, and their abandoning to the Marattas the diſtricts on the other ſide the *Jumna*, that were entruſted by the Nabob to their Government; and alſo on account of freſh bodies of Marattas arriving from the ſouthward, I beg leave to inform you that I have been applied to by his Excellency for two or three battalions of Sepoys, to march into the Corah province for the protection and defence thereof, whilſt he is employing his own troops in oppoſing the enemy, and recovering his authority in the aforeſaid diſtricts; a copy of which application I herewith do myſelf the honour of tranſmitting to the Honourable Board, together with a tranſlation thereof, and my anſwer; which I hope will meet with their approbation.

Propoſals of peace having however been ſince offered, and a negociation ſet on foot between his Excellency and the Maratta Chiefs, he has on this account deſired that the movement of the above detachment may be deferred, till he makes his further requeſt for their ſo doing. What thoſe propoſals are, the Honourable Board will learn from Mr. *Briſtow*. The plan propoſed by his Excellency for proſecuting the war, ſhould a peace be not brought about, is ſo fully explained in his Excellency's letter, that I ſhall not trouble the Honourable Board concerning it. In this caſe, I beg leave to aſſure them, that I ſhall take the moſt particular care, that no infringement or violation may be made of the peace lately concluded between the Company and the Maratta Power,

and

and that their troops are no further employed than in defence of the guaranteed provinces.

I have the honour to be, with great reſpect, &c.

Camp at *Belgram*, (Signed) *G. Stibbert.*
April 17, 1776.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing the Supreme Board, on the 19th inſtant, informing them of the aſſaſſination of the Vizier's Miniſter, and the diſturbances which have lately happened at the Durbar. I then acquainted them, that every thing at that time had the appearance of being reſtored to tranquillity, which I now have to confirm, from the accompanying letters received this day from the Nabob and the Reſident, as well as from my own private intelligence.

In conſequence of which I have ordered the detachment of two battalions of Sepoys, which his Excellency has requeſted for the defence of the Korah province, to march the day after to-morrow, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Parker*, to whom I have given the accompanying Inſtructions, which I hope will meet with your approbation.

I have had no further intelligence concerning the treaty on foot with the Marattas, than what Mr. *Briſtow* has informed me in his incloſed letter. My intelligence from *Calpee* and *Jahauſe* ſay, they are daily eſtabliſhing themſelves in the diſtricts on the ſide the *Jumna*, and that a ſmart action has lately happened between the *Deteah Reja* and *Luckman Row Pundit*, in which many men were killed on both ſides. His Excellency marched with part of his army for his capital at *Lucknow*, the 23d inſtant, and has ordered boats to be got ready for his croſſing the *Ganges* at *Manamow*, abour eight coſs from hence, where I am informed he propoſes making ſome little ſtay. *Sadit Ally*, whom you have been acquainted of, went off on the report of the Miniſter's death; I have received an account this morning arrived the 20th inſtant at *Futtybad*, within ſeven coſs from *Agra*, and that *Elize Cawn*, on hearing of it, ſent tents and people out to meet him; but whether he miſtruſted *Elize Cawn*, or for what cauſe, it is ſaid he took another route, and it is ſuppoſed has proceeded on to *Nezib Khan* at *Dege*.

Camp near *Belgram*, I have the honour to be, &c.
April 25th, 1776. (Signed) *G. Stibbert.*

Reſolved, That the following reply be written to Colonel *Stibbert*.

To Colonel *Stibbert*, commanding the forces in the field.

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 18th and 25th April. By the laſt we perceive that you have ordered the two battalions of Sepoys to march to *Korah*, in conſequence of the Nabob's deſire. This ſtep being directly contrary to our poſitive orders, notified originally to Colonel *Galliez*, under date the 10th February, 1775, and delivered over to you with the general inſtructions which you received from your predeceſſor in that command, we cannot refrain from teſtifying our diſpleaſure, and cenſuring your conduct for this diſobedience. We muſt inform you, that whenever our orders are peremptory, we expect they ſhall be implicitly obeyed. We are the more ſurprized at your conduct on this occaſion, becauſe it appears by your letter of the 14th January, that you were thoroughly apprized of the full force of theſe orders. We hope that the battalions which have marched, did not go without the boundaries of the guaranteed provinces in their way acroſs the country from *Belgram* to *Corah*, and deſire you will acquaint us with the route they took. We are, &c.

Tranſlation of a Letter from his Excellency the Narval *Aſoph ul Dowlah*.

You are well acquainted with the account of the Marattas having come to the other ſide of the *Jumna* in conſequence of the ingratitude of the Guſain. If now we ſhould be negligent, they will gain opportunity and leiſure, and collect together a conſiderable force. Now is the time to repulſe and expel them, when the pleaſure of God to oppoſe and chaſtiſe them is no difficult taſk; the plan that I have been conſidering on I will here communicate to you. To detach from hence four battalions, together with a proper train of artillery, to the other ſide of the *Jumna*, and to ſend alſo four more battalions and 1000 horſe from *Korah*, which are under the command of *Mehboob Ali Khan*; beſides which, having an intention of reſigning the country on the other ſide of the *Jumna*, to the Rana Zemindar of *Gohud*, with whom I am on friendly terms, he will be preſent and ready with ſome thouſands of horſe, and if it be neceſſary I myſelf will alſo march. Appendix. No. 162.

The fighting army of the Marattas amounts to 5 or 7000, beſides ten or twelve thouſand Pindarahs, in the whole about 17 or 18,000 men, ſo that I am on no account apprehenſive of their coming. *Mihbo'b Ali Khan* brings 4 battalions from *Korah*, and leaves only one there; there will not remain an army ſufficient for the defence of that place. On this account therefore do I trouble you to deſire that you will ſend two or three battalions from the Engliſh camp, for the protection of *Korah*, I myſelf at preſent not having any other troops which to replace *Mihboob Ali Khan*'s battalions, the march of which is abſolutely, ſince otherwiſe my affairs muſt go to ruin; and God forbid that the Marattas conquering in that quarter, they ſhould afterwards (as certainly would be the caſe) form the deſign of invading this country alſo, and ſpreading wide trouble and diſturbance, in the end ſeizing upon the Soubahs.

Tranſlation of a Letter to his Excellency the Nawab *Aſoph ul Dowlah*.

Your favour, intimating the ingratitude and treachery of the Guſſain Unoap Gir *(Rajah Himut Behadur)* and the diſturbances created on the other ſide the *Jumna* by the Marattas, as alſo your deſign of ſending an army from your camp, and *Mihboob Ali Khan* with four battalions and ſome horſe from *Korah*, ſhewed its face in the midſt of expectation.

Learning of the troubles excited by the Marattas, I was much affected; I ever implore the Almighty for *your* ſafety and the deſtruction of *your* enemies; and God forbid that any diſturbance be in the Subahs; I ſhould be unmindful of the friendſhip that ſubſiſts between you and the Engliſh nation; in conſequence therefore of your demanding two battalions to march to *Korah*, in order to maintain peace and order in that quarter, I ſhall direct the required force to be in readineſs to repair thither; and I am in all reſpects the obeyer of your noble pleaſure, &c.

Tranſlation of a Letter from his Excellency the Nawab *Aſoph ul Dowla Wuzier ul Mamalik*.

I fully comprehend what you ſay, with reſpect to your having before this put two battalions in orders to proceed to *Korah*, agreeable to my deſire; for the protection of that place, but that hearing of the martyrdom of *Moacker ul Dowlah*, which much troubled and afflicted you, you have delayed their march, and wait for a letter from me on the ſubject. The detaching of the battalions is extremely neceſſary and adviſable, for as much as I have poſitively ordered *Mihboob Alli Khân* to march with expedition to *Calpee*, and I have furthermore empowered Mr. *Briſtow*, who for this purpoſe remains behind me, to treat the Marattas either with peace or war, as he ſhall think proper. Hence it is not fitting that the march of the battalions be any longer deferred.

I eſteem your deſiring me to reſide in the Engliſh camp till all diſturbances be quelled, as the reſult of hearty kindneſs and friendſhip. Through the favour of God no troubles now ſubſiſt. Whatever was decreed has happened; the reſt is happineſs and welfare.

I have

Appendix. No. 162.

I have now (April 23) marched from *Etawa* towards *Lucknow*, in order to ſettle all my affairs and properly regulate my Subahs. I have left behind me in the *Doab*, &c. a conſiderable force, and expect, through the favour of God, that every thing will turn out well.

To Colonel *Stibbert*, commanding the army in the field.

Sir,

I have been favoured with your letter of the 19th inſtant, and have the pleaſure to inform you, that appearances at preſent, both in the Nabob's troops and thoſe under the Engliſh officers, promiſe the utmoſt tranquillity. His Excellency wiſhes you to diſpatch the two battalions to *Corah* as ſoon as poſſible; he ſets off for *Lucknow* by the Manairon road to-morrow morning, and has promiſed to write to you before he ſets out, in anſwer to your letter which I delivered. There is as yet no certain intelligence arrived where *Saadit Alli* is fled to. The preſent tranquil appearances render it (I ſhould ſuppoſe) unneceſſary to ſend any force as an eſcort to his Excellency. I ſhall ſtay here for ſome days, in order if poſſible to adjuſt matters with the Marattas. Mr. *Chandler* has been directed to attend the Nabob on his journey; if therefore you ſhould have any buſineſs relative to my department, to tranſact with his Excellency, be kind enough to make Mr. *Chandler* acquainted therewith, who has my directions to expedite every matter of that kind to the utmoſt of his power.

I am, &c.

Camp, near *Etawa*, April 22d, 1776.

(Signed) *John Briſtow*, Reſident at the Court of the Nabob of *Oude*.

Lieutenant Colonel *Parker*.

Sir, Camp, *Belgram*, April 25th, 1776.

You will pleaſe to proceed with the 15th and 16th battalions of Sepoys, directed to march, and croſs the *Ganges* the 27th inſtant in the morning, under your command, to *Korah*, where on your arrival you will encamp your detachments in any of the topes you may find moſt commodious and convenient for this purpoſe, adjacent to, or within two or three coſs of that town.

His Excellency the Vizier having ordered his troops from *Korah* under the command of *Mahoob Alli Khan*, to march to *Calpee*, and attack the Marattas on that ſide, who have lately ſeized upon the diſtricts belonging to his Excellency on the other ſide the *Jumna*, while a detachment of his army marches againſt them from *Etawa*, in conjunction with the Rana of *Gohud*; in caſe a peace ſhould not be concluded between them, (a treaty being now on foot for adjuſting matters between the Vizier and them) the ſervice to be performed by your detachment is to be an awe upon, and to prevent any inſurrections ariſing among the Zemindars in the Korah province, and alſo defend the ſame ſhould it be attacked by any enemy during the abſence of *Phouzdar Mahamed Aly Khan* and his forces.

You are on no account what ever to croſs yourſelf, or ſuffer any parties from your detachment to croſs the *Jumna*, or march out of the Korah provinces, and to avoid as much as poſſible dividing your force; ſhould it at any time be neceſſary ſo to do, you are immediately to inform me thereof, alſo by a regular correſpondence of all occurrences that may from time to time fall out and happen during your command. I am to recommend to you in the ſtrongeſt manner, to pay the ſtricteſt attention to the diſcipline and conduct of your men, and that no irregularities or oppreſſions are committed by them, or ſubjects of complaint of any ſort given to the inhabitants or country people.

I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient, and humble ſervant,

(Signed) *Giles Stibbert*, Colonel, Commanding the Army.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated the 12th Auguſt 1776.

Read the following letter from Mr. *John Briſtow*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Vizier's real reſources (if properly managed) are ſo much ſuperior to thoſe of any foreign Power, that I entertain little doubt of his withſtanding any attacks that might be made on him; notwithſtanding which, the preſent reduced ſtate of his army gives an opening which may never happen again, and if it were ſeized, might be productive of much loſs and trouble to him, both in *Rohilcund* and the *Doab*; the forces now ſtationed there are inadequate to their defence, and the rains alone, I believe, prevent his Excellency's enemies from invading thoſe provinces. To ſome of *Nudjif Cawn*'s troops, ſix, to others eleven, months arrears were due, only a ſmall portion of which he has been able to pay; and as for theſe three months to come he cannot poſſibly expect any conſiderable collections, I humbly conceive it to be very poſſible, that, rendered deſperate by diſtreſſes, he might be induced to undertake operations againſt the Vizier. His troops though mutinous, laying at *Dike* as they now are, without even the proſpect of a ſubſiſtence, would in all likelihood follow his ſtandard with alacrity, on any new enterprize, in hopes of plunder. Their ſituation cannot be well worſe than it is, and it appears to me, that it muſt be indifferent both to them and to *Nudjif Cawn* himſelf, what ſervice they undertake, ſo that it even only has the ſhadow of ſucceſs. *Runjut Sing* has been ſoliciting at *Onpine* for aſſiſtance, and it is ſaid, *Mahajy Syndea* promiſes him twenty-five thouſand men, and that they are really marched, with an intention to come ſtraight to *Dike*. I remember on many former occaſions the Jauts have propagated reports of expected ſuccours from the Marattas, when they were never really meant to be ſent, ſuch I conceive to be the preſent caſe. The Marattas rarely move without ſome proſpect of the payment of their troops; the Jauts have abſolutely no money for them, and at this ſeaſon of the year for the Marattas to march to their aſſiſtance, in hopes of drawing their ſubſiſtence from the country, (which has been a long time the ſeat of war) it is very improbable they would think of doing it. Theſe reaſons, and the diviſions which I underſtand ſubſiſt in the adminiſtration at *Poonah* make me rather diſcredit the reports of *Mehajy Sindea*'s ſuccours. If though there be any truth in his march, I think there muſt be more intended than the avowed cauſe of aſſiſtance to the Jauts, from whom he cannot expect any advantages adequate to the expence of the enterprize. I look upon it, that this muſt be a cloak to his invading the Vizier's territories, by which he might gain his ends, and revenge the diſgrace thrown on the arms of the Marattas, by the loſs of the *Doab*. I know they ill brook this, and whatever willingneſs they may profeſs to conclude a treaty of amity with his Excellency, I believe they are in this only awed by his alliance with the Company.

Admitting *Nudjif Cawn* to be free from danger from other quarters, there are people about him perſonally inveterate againſt the Vizier, whoſe fortunes are deſperate, and will loſe no opportunity of raiſing his jealouſy. The *Goſſayne Baſheer Cawn*, and all the Vizier's ſubjects who have left his ſervice in diſguſt, may be reckoned amongſt this number; and if he be deprived of all hopes of a proviſion from this quarter, I look upon it *Saadit Ally* might from his rank and abilities become really formidable; he at preſent is greatly diſtreſſed, and I am convinced would be happy to return. His agent has repeatedly urged me to remit him fifty thouſand rupees, to bear his expences to the Company's territories; I have not yet been able to obtain any honourable terms for him from the Vizier, but his remaining with *Nudjif Cawn*, with whom his only object can be to interrupt the peace of his brother's Government, is a matter of that great

conſequence, that I humbly ſubmit it to the conſideration of the Honourable Board. I am convinced in my own mind *Nudjiff Cawn* would be glad to be at variance with the Vizier, as he has given a very ſtrong proof of it, in the late negociation of the Niabut of the *Vizarut*. His Ambaſſador *Mirza Hellyle*, ſolicited for this appointment in the moſt urgent ſtyle, whilſt we were at *Etawa*. The Vizier for ſome time refuſed it him, until the King's approbation was previouſly obtained; but *Mirza Hellyle* got over this difficulty, and received the Kelaat the day before his Excellency left that place. The mutiny in the army a ſhort time after broke out in the *Doab*, and the Vizier's affairs had an unfavourable appearance, upon which *Nudjif Cawn* refuſed to put it on, nor did he do it until very lately.

His Majeſty, according to his laſt year's plan, has fixed on a day to take the field the 14th of the lunar month. It is ſaid the Sikes are collecting a numerous army, with which they have agreed to join him; that they had previouſly refuſed to attack *Nudjif Cawn*, but offered readily to undertake any enterprize againſt the Vizier. *Fyzulla Cawn* has for ſome time been treating with them, and is ſuſpected of having encouraged them with hopes of entering into their views of invading *Rohilcund*; and in order to cloak his raiſing a large body of troops, he does not himſelf entertain above the number of five thouſand, ſtipulated by the treaty with *Sujah ul Dowlah*, but he authorizes his Zemindars and ſervants to do it in their names. It is further ſaid that *Sabitar Cawn* is invited to join in the confederacy; what dependance is to be laid on this intelligence, I cannot ſay, but it appears to me abſolutely neceſſary that the Vizier ſhould loſe no time in putting his army, eſpecially that part, under Britiſh officers, on the moſt reſpectable footing, for in leſs than two months, the rains will ſubſide, and the country be open to the attacks of his enemies.

Lucknow, I have the honour, &c.
July 29th, 1776.

APPENDIX, No. 163.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 28th Auguſt 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }
Colonel *Monſon*, indiſpoſed.

READ, and approved, the proceedings of the 26th inſtant.

Received the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that from accounts received of the junction of a body of Seiks, with *Zabta Chawn*'s army, and of their united forces having moved to *Sucker Taal*, on the banks of the *Ganges*, there is reaſon to apprehend he is meditating an attempt to invade *Rohilcund*, and it is reported he has already ſeized upon a great number of boats, for the purpoſe of croſſing his army: I do not however think he will carry his deſigns into execution till after the rains, a paſſage being at this ſeaſon extremely hazardous, and indeed almoſt impracticable.

His Excellency the Vizier has in conſequence of the above intelligence directed me to proceed to *Daranagur* with the body-guard under the command of Lieutenant *Connellan*, and Lieutenant *Clarke*'s battalion of Sepoys, which is all the force I can at preſent poſſibly collect, the five new-raiſed battalions ſtill continuing under the command of Colonel *Stibbert*: I am hopeful the Board will ſee the expediency of ordering that part of the Vizier's army to be delivered over to me, particularly as there is a proſpect of their ſervices being ſoon required, and I could wiſh to accuſtom them early to that mode of diſcipline and ſubordination I intend they ſhall hereafter continue to practiſe. I need not urge any thing further on this ſubject, as I flatter myſelf the Board will have acquieſced with my former addreſs concerning it. Appendix, No. 163.

I expect the two battalions above-mentioned will reach *Furruckabad* about the 20th inſtant, by which time I ſhall be able to judge with more preciſion of the deſigns of *Zabta Chawn*, and ſhall endeavour to inform myſelf of every material circumſtance, which ſhall be faithfully tranſmitted to you. From the preſent appearance of affairs, I am firmly of opinion his intentions are fixed on recovering the former poſſeſſions of his nation from the Vizier, and from every account I am inclined to believe *Fyzoolah Cawn* will join him in the attempt. Should that really be the caſe, with the addition of Captain *Erſkine*'s regiment now at *Danaragur*, and Captain *Hoggan*'s, alſo ſtationed in that quarter, joined to the two battalions already with me, I ſhall be of force ſufficient not only to prevent their effecting a paſſage over the *Ganges*, but to oppoſe them fairly in the field.

I beg leave to inform you, that in obedience to your inſtructions, I have done all in my power to controul the enormous expences of the army, and ſhall continue to pay the ſtricteſt attention to that taſk, and your future directions reſpecting it.

I take the liberty to ſubmit to your conſideration, how far it would be concluſive to the ſettlement and regularity of the troops, after their late diſtracted and diſperſed ſtate, the aſſembling them in one place for the preſent; and having modelled and diſciplined them, I would propoſe that the infantry might be divided into two bodies, one to be ſtationed for the protection of *Rohilcund*, and the other in the *Doab*, where they would be ſeparately powerful enough to repel any invaſion; or ſhould occaſion require, might eaſily move to the aſſiſtance of each other.

I take the liberty to point out to you, the immenſe expence ariſing from the number of ſtaff appointments in the army, and to ſubmit to your deciſion, how much it would contribute to diminiſh the expence, the annulling the poſt of Adjutant and Quarter Maſters to each battalion of infantry; a meaſure which will not, I am convinced, be attended with any injury to the diſcipline of the troops, and muſt be of manifeſt advantage, by curtailing the very heavy charges now incurred on account of their great allowances and contingencies.

I alſo beg leave to repreſent to you, the ſervice it would be of, to the artillery, to have an officer of approved ſkill and experience, appointed to command that corps. As it is a body on which the chief dependance is to be placed, and which may be ſaid to conſtitute our greateſt ſuperiority over the country arms, I am exceedingly anxious for its improvement, and conceive the enlarging that eſtabliſhment, and augmenting the number of artillery officers, would be a meaſure highly beneficial to the ſervice.

Belgram, I have the honour, &c.
Auguſt 12th, 1776. (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

Reſolved, That the following reply be written to Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 12th inſtant. In our's of the 29th ultimo, we informed you of the orders we had given to Colonel *Stibbert*, to deliver over the new-raiſed battalions to your charge and command; though we have no doubt that theſe orders would arrive in due time, yet to guard againſt the poſſibility of any accident, we now incloſe a duplicate of our letter to you, and have alſo ſent a duplicate of that to Colonel *Stibbert*.

Appendix. No. 164.

We very much commend the attention you have ſhewn already to controul the contingent expences of the Nabob's army under your command, and you may reſt aſſured of our firmeſt ſupport in the proſecution of ſo neceſſary a ſervice.

The offices of Adjutant and Quarter Maſter, are conſidered in every well-regulated army ſo eſſential to the diſcipline and accommodation of the men, and to the preſervation and arrangement of the ſtores, that we cannot judge of the propriety of aboliſhing them on the ſole ground of œconomy, but we rely entirely on your prudence and diſcretion in forming and regulating the Vizier's diſciplined troops; we therefore leave it to you to reduce thoſe appointments, if upon more mature deliberation you ſhall think it adviſeable.

We cannot poſſibly ſpare more artillery officers at this time from our own ſervice; you will therefore uſe your diſcretion, in diſtributing commands in the Nabob's artillery in ſuch manner as may beſt ſupply the want of a commandant, or a greater number of ſubaltern officers, until it may be in our power, ſhould it hereafter be deemed neceſſary, to increaſe their number.

By Colonel *Stibbert's* return, tranſmitted to the Commander in Chief, we are ſorry to obſerve the ſlow progreſs made in raiſing the recruits of the new regiments, eſpecially of that under the command of Captain *Home*, which is deficient 1011 men. We need not mention the neceſſity to recommend to you the greateſt diligence and expedition in completing theſe corps, as ſo little time will be left to diſcipline them before it is likely they may be wanted for ſervice.

As we think it probable that many of the officers of the battalions lately diſbanded, may apply to be admitted into the ſervice of the new eſtabliſhment, we recommend it to you to be particularly attentive to the characters of the officers whom you may appoint to commands in them; and if you ſhall find that any perſons who have received commiſſions had formerly diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the late ſeditions, you will remove them immediately, diſmiſs them from the ſervice, leſt their example and influence ſhould introduce the ſame ſpirit of mutiny among the ſepoys under your command, which has been carried to ſuch lengths in the Nabob's army, and which has too frequently been experienced in his diſciplined corps, even during the government of the late Vizier.

Fort William, 28th Auguſt, 1776.

We are, &c.
(Signed)

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

From the repeated accounts which have been received of a combination formed by the King, the Marattas, the Seiks, and the Rohillas, to invade the dominions of the Vizier after the concluſion of the rains, and from the too great notoriety of his inability to oppoſe an invaſion by any force of his own, the probability of ſuch a deſign is at leaſt ſo apparent as to merit the attention of this Board to the means of guarding againſt it; for this purpoſe I ſubmit to their conſideration the expediency of engaging the Nabob *Nudjif Cawn* in the intereſts of the Company and of the Vizier, and of concerting with him a plan for our common benefit and ſafety. The firſt ſtep to this object would be obviouſly the confirmation of his penſion, and the payment of the arrears which are due of it, both as the means of fixing his attachment and enable him to make it ſerviceable to the common cauſe; but I think it would be improper to make further advances on this point until his anſwer ſhall be received to the letter which was written to him on the 13th June laſt. As there is no time to be loſt, and as the accompliſhment of any alliance with *Nudjif Cawn* which can be converted to purpoſes of ſolid utility, muſt depend upon the previous arrangement of many points, which can only be ſettled in a perſonal negociation with him, I recommend that a perſon be deputed for this purpoſe to *Nudjif Cawn*, who may learn and report to the Board his ſituation and views, and thoſe of the other Powers in his neighbourhood, and who may treat with him upon the conditions of his alliance, and the meaſures to be adopted in conſequence of it; I do not think it neceſſary or proper to appoint a public commiſſion for this buſineſs, but recommend that it be privately entruſted to ſome English gentleman in the ſervice of the Company, who may be previouſly known to *Nudjif Cawn*, and with whom he may treat with confidence.—I will take the liberty to remark, that I ſhould have conſidered it as falling within the ordinary powers and duties of my ſtation, to have formed all the preparatory lines of a meaſure of this nature, by my own authority, for the ſake of ſecrecy and diſpatch, and to have reported my proceedings to the Board, with all the materials which I had collected, when they were ripe for execution; but in the preſent conſtitution of this Government ſuch a power may be deemed improper, I therefore only recommend the meaſure for the approbation of the Board, and will name the perſon whom I would wiſh to propoſe for the ſervice, when I know whether the meaſure itſelf ſhall be approved.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Ordered, That the above Minute lie for conſideration until to-morrow.

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Rich. Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 164.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 29th Auguſt 1776.

RE-CONSIDERED the Governor General's minute delivered into the Board yeſterday.

Mr. *Francis*—By a reſolution of this Board, in which I did not concur, it has been already determined to reſtore *Nudjiff Cawn's* penſion, on the condition of his diſmiſſing from his ſervice certain perſons juſtly obnoxious to this Government. I ſtill think that this alone is not ſufficient to entitle him to ſuch a mark of our favour, and that further meaſures will be neceſſary to ſecure the attachment of a man of his qualifications, and to make him really ſerviceable to us and our ally, the Nabob of *Oude*. I do not therefore object to the propoſed deputation in itſelf, but reſerve any further opinion of it until I underſtand on what plan, and under what inſtructions, the perſon deputed is to act; I cannot aſſent to any which may have a tendency to engage the Company's troops beyond the line of our preſent guarantee.

Mr. *Barwell*—I approve of the Governor's propoſal, to depute an Engliſh Gentleman to learn and report *Nudjiff Cawn's* views and ſituation, and to treat with him on the condition of his alliance, and the meaſures to be adopted in conſequence of it. In this I do no more than adopt the ſentiments of the Company, who have particularly directed this Government to uſe its endeavours to benefit the general cauſe by the abilities of *Nudjiff Cawn*. I concur with the Governor General, that we cannot order the payment of the arrears of *Nudjiff Cawn's* ſalary, nor proceed a ſtep further in that particular, before we receive his anſwer to our letter of the 13th June.

General *Clavering*—The combinations which the Governor General mentions to be forming by the King, the Marattas, the Seicks, and the Rohillas, to invade the dominions of the Vizier after the concluſion of the rains, I do not find to be yet ſo well eſtabliſhed as to be admitted as a truth on which we can depend. In a letter, which I beg leave to deliver in, from Colonel *Stibbert* to Colonel *Goddard*, the invaſion of the Vizier's dominions is treated as very problematical. Whether the intention

Appendix. No. 164.

of invading the country be real or not, I do not think we can place any dependance on the attachment of *Nudjiff Cawn*, whilſt he entertains two ſuch implacable enemies of this Government near his perſon, as *Sumroo* the aſſaſſin, and *Mador* the deſerter; till he ſhall therefore have performed his promiſe of diſmiſſing from his confidence thoſe two perſons, I cannot agree to maintain any intercourſe whatever with him.

The Governor General—I have always underſtood, and I believe it to be certain, that *Nudjiff Cawn* has been compelled, by an unavoidable neceſſity, to retain *Sumroo* in his ſervice. That the firſt motive of his receiving him, was to prevent his enemy *Abdul Abed Cawn*, who was then in treaty with *Sumroo*, from employing him in his ſervice, of which *Nudjiff Cawn* apprehended that his death or ruin were the ſole objects; and that the long war in which he has ſince been engaged with the Jauts, and his own internal weakneſs from the want of money, have put it out of his power to comply with the urgent requiſitions which this Government has made to him for the diſmiſſion of *Sumroo*, who has been principally, if not, as I am informed, always employed in remote ſervices, and now maintains himſelf in a degree of independancy, but never poſſeſſed any ſhare in his maſter's confidence, nor even the public appearance of it; but I agree nevertheleſs with the other Members of the Board, in requiring this as a preliminary and indiſpenſable condition of our further alliance with him. The ſpecific advantages which I expect may be derived from the propoſed deputation, will beſt appear in the following rough draft of the inſtructions which I have prepared for the purpoſe. I muſt add in this place, that although I cannot expect the Board ſhould place implicit confidence in the reports which I have mentioned, of the junction of the King, the Marattas, the Seicks, and the Rohillas, yet I have received reports through various channels, in confirmation of this intelligence, contained in the letter from Colonel *Goddard*, recorded yeſterday, which leave me without a doubt of the formation of ſuch a confederacy.

Read, the rough draft of the inſtructions propoſed by the Governor General.

Ordered, That they be copied fair, and ſent round for the further conſideration of the Board. And,

Agreed, That an Engliſh Gentleman be deputed to treat with *Nudjiff Cawn*, on the ſeveral points expreſſed in the Governor General's minute of yeſterday.

Governor General—I beg leave to recommend Major *Hannay* for this ſervice, as a perſon well-informed of the political ſtate of affairs in that part of *India*, perſonally known to *Nudjiff Cawn*, and in every reſpect well qualified to anſwer the purpoſes of ſuch a commiſſion.

Mr. *Francis*—I have no objection to Major *Hannay*.

Mr. *Barwell*—I acquieſce in the Governor's nomination.

General *Clavering*—I ſhould have no objection to Major *Hannay*'s going there, or any where elſe, where it might be thought his ſervices could be uſefully employed, if it was not for the reaſon I have already given, for holding any communication with *Nudjif Cawn* whilſt *Sumroo* is his chief confidant. Under theſe circumſtances, I think it an indignity to the Company to depute an officer to *Nudjif Cawn*, and a degradation of the officer himſelf, to be admitted into *Nudjif Cawn*'s preſence, under the auſpices of an aſſaſſin.

Reſolved, That Major *Hannay* be appointed to proceed on the deputation above-mentioned.

Mr. *Francis*—I underſtood the previous diſmiſſion of *Sumroo* and *Mador* to be the baſis of the propoſition; without which I could certainly have no thoughts of treating with *Nudjif Cawn*.

Governor General—The General's objection ſuppoſes me to have propoſed, what is the moſt foreign from my intentions. I ſhould hold it, equally with him, a diſgrace to this Government, and an indignity to its repreſentative, to employ any officer, or other ſervant of the Company, in a perſonal negociation with *Nudjif Cawn*, were *Sumroo* at the ſame time admitted into his preſence; but to put this point beyond a doubt, I would propoſe that the diſmiſſion of *Sumroo* be formally required by Major *Hannay*, before he paſs the boundaries of our own dominions, and that in default of his compliance, Major *Hannay* be forbidden to proceed. I cannot extend this propoſition to *Mador*, and the other Europeans in the ſervice of *Nudjif Cawn*, becauſe I doubt whether it may be in his power to diſmiſs them until he ſhall have acquired that addition of ſtrength and authority which may be expected from the renewal of his connection with the Engliſh, and from the credit which it will give him with the other powers of *Hindoſtan*.

The Governor General's motion is agreed by Mr. *Francis* and Mr. *Barwell*.

General *Clavering*—I object to it, becauſe I think the ſame end may be anſwered, by writing from hence, without expoſing the honour of this Government to be affected by the return of a deputation which all *Hindoſtan* will know was expreſsly ſent to invite *Nudjif Cawn* to an alliance, on conditions which he would not accept.

Governor General—I had already propoſed, that this commiſſion ſhould not be of a public nature; and however the exiſtence or object of it may be ſuſpected, it can never injure the credit of this Government, that an individual, not charged with any declared authority, ſhall have proceeded to the frontier of our own dominions, for purpoſes which the world cannot be informed of, even though he ſhould be obliged to return from thence, without having accompliſhed the real end of his miſſion. Were there time for it, I ſhould be equally inclined to write to *Nudjif Cawn*, and to wait for his anſwer to the propoſition of receiving a Miniſter from this Government, and to the preliminary condition of any future treaty which may take place between us; but ſuch a delay would fruſtrate the deſign of the meaſure; nor have I the leaſt apprehenſion that *Nudjif Cawn* will not thankfully agree to receive Major *Hannay*, or that he will refuſe to diſmiſs *Sumroo* ſo ſoon as it ſhall be required of him as the conditions of their meeting.

Reſolved, That the diſmiſſion of *Sumroo* be formally required by Major *Hannay*, before he paſs the boundaries of the Company's dominions, and that in default of *Nudjif Cawn*'s compliance with this requiſition, that Major *Hannay* be forbidden to proceed any further.

General *Clavering*—If ſo public a meaſure as the appointment the Board is now making, could be conſidered even in *Calcutta*, the letter which Major *Hannay* is directed to write to *Nudjif Cawn*, and which as uſual will be read in his public durbar, muſt infallibly pronounce the intentions of this Government, and muſt expoſe it to the contempt of all *India*, in caſe *Nudjif Cawn* ſhould refuſe to ſend away both *Sumroo* and *Mador*, as he himſelf engaged to do by his former letter; beſides, I foreſee that the King, whoſe ſervant *Nudjif Cawn* is, will be juſtly incenſed at ſo partial a diſtinction in favour of him, whilſt he himſelf is entirely neglected by us. I ſtill conſider the King as much the natural head of the empire of *Hindoſtan*, as the Emperor of *Germany* is of the German empire; Princes who are more potent than him, may neglect his orders, but all of them ſeek, on one occaſion or another, to obtain his favour, and the honour which he has to beſtow.

Governor General—I am far from expecting that Major *Hannay*'s deputation ſhall be concealed in abſolute ſecrecy; and upon this occaſion I cannot help lamenting the unhappy ſtate of this Government, which binds the hands of the firſt and executive Member of it from employing ſuch preparatory means for the advancement of its intereſts or its immediate ſecurity, as in the nature of them require to be conducted with the ſtricteſt ſecrecy; but in my opinion it will be ſufficient that Major *Hannay*'s deputation be not publicly made known before it ſhall

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have taken effect; neither will it be neceſſary for Major *Hannay*, in notifying his approach to *Nudjif Cawn*, to ſay that he comes with a public commiſſion; this will be ſufficient to guard it againſt any diſgrace on the failure of it. I for my own part will never join in any act which ſhall give juſt cauſe of offence to the King *Shaw Allum*; and while I perſiſt in thoſe ſentiments, I ſhall little regard the impotent reſentment of a man to whom I owe no allegiance, and ſhall be always ready to ſupport the engagements of the Company, even with thoſe whom he may call his ſubjects, and even againſt his perſon, if by an oppoſition to theſe engagements, he ſhall oblige this Government perſonally to oppoſe him. I ſhould be loſt in ſo wide a field as I ſhould be led into, by the diſcuſſion of the King's rights, and the obligations of this Government to maintain them; but with reſpect to the different treatment which is due from us to him and *Nudjif Cawn*, a very few words will ſuffice. The King ſeparated himſelf from his connections with the Engliſh, in oppoſition to the ſtrongeſt remonſtrances which were made to him on their part; *Nudjif Cawn* refuſed even to accompany the King, or to ſeparate himſelf from the Engliſh, until urged by them to both, as a meaſure which the King's ſafety, under the circumſtances of ſuch a reſolution, rendered indiſpenſably neceſſary, and which their intereſts did not oppoſe. I move that a letter be written to Mr. *Briſtow*, to inform him of the deſign of Major *Hannay*'s commiſſion, ſo far as it reſpects the Nabob of *Oude*, and to direct him to correſpond with Major *Hannay*, and to concert with him the means of rendering it effectual, but to conceal the contents of this information until it ſhall be neceſſary to reveal them.

Mr. *Francis* and Mr. *Barwell* agree to the Governor General's motion.

General *Clavering* diſapproves of every ſtep that may be taken in conſequence of the appointment that has been made this day.

Agreed, That the following letter be written to Mr. *Briſtow*, for the purpoſe mentioned in the above motion

Sir,

Having thought proper to appoint Major *Alexander Hannay*, to proceed on a deputation to the Nabob *Nudjif Cawn*, in order to treat with him on ſundry matters, we direct that you correſpond with Major *Hannay*, and uſe your endeavours to concert means to render his negociation effectual. For this end, we tranſmit you a copy of his inſtructions, as far as they relate to the Nabob of *Oude:* but we deſire you will conceal the contents of this information, and the nature of Major *Hannay*'s appointment, until it be found neceſſary to reveal them, or at leaſt until he ſhall arrive at the court of *Nudjif Cawn*.

We are, &c. &c.

The inſtructions propoſed for Major *Hannay* having been circulated agreeable to the orders of the Board, after the breaking up of this day's Council, they were received back, with the remarks hereafter entered; and being agreed to by a majority of the Board, were written fair, and delivered to Major *Hannay*.

Sir,

The Board having nominated you their Deputy to the Nabob *Nudjif Cawn*, you will wait upon the Governor General for your credentials, and repair with all poſſible expedition to the Court of that Prince.

We recommend your ſtricteſt attention, and the utmoſt exertion of your zeal and abilities, to obtain the following points, the objects of your deputation:

1ſt. You will give the Nabob the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, in the name of this Government, of their earneſt deſire to renew the friendſhip and alliance which formerly ſubſiſted between him and the Company, and of cementing and increaſing both, on conditions of mutual ſupport and advantage.

2d. You will require of him to diſband all his European forces, and particularly to diſmiſs from his ſervice the aſſaſſin *Sumroo*; you will acquaint the Nabob that we conſider his compliance with theſe two requiſitions, as preliminary and indiſpenſable to any treaty which may hereafter be concluded with him, ſince no degree of good faith can ſubſiſt between us, whilſt he employs the ſubjects of nations at enmity with the Engliſh, and gives protection to a man, whoſe name is held in ſuch juſt and univerſal deteſtation by them.

With reſpect to *Sumroo*, we cannot conſent even to your proceeding on the propoſed negociation, whilſt that man is retained in his ſervice. We therefore direct that you previouſly direct a letter to the Nabob, informing him of your intention to viſit him, without formally notifying the authority with which you are inveſted; but to acquaint him, that you are precluded by the poſitive orders of this Government, from entering his territories, until he ſhall have firſt diſmiſſed *Sumroo* from his ſervice. And you will wait until you receive his reply, and an aſſurance of his having complied with your requiſition.

3d. You will repreſent to the Nabob, that we have obſerved with much concern a coolneſs and diſtruſt prevail between him and the Government of *Oude*, ſince the period of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*'s ſucceſſion; and as nothing can ſo effectually contribute to the ſecurity and advantage of his own and the Vizier's dominions, as a cloſe union and unreſerved confidence, and a mutual participation of benefits, you will tender your good offices for accompliſhing ſo deſirable an end, either by offering our mediation, or by concerting with our Reſident at the court of the Vizier, the means of effecting an immediate reconciliation; and for this end you will make exact and regular communications with our Reſident at that court, of all your proceedings upon ſuch points as have a tendency to eſtabliſh a coalition, which we ſo ardently wiſh to effect, between the Vizier and *Nudjif Cawn*.

4th. You will obtain from *Nudjif Cawn*, as early as poſſible, the ultimate conditions on which he is willing to form a laſting alliance with the Company. As he may previouſly demand the confirmation and arrears of his penſion, you will acquaint him, that our determination thereon, by the inſtructions of the Court of Directors, neceſſarily depends on his anſwer to the laſt letter written to him by the Governor General; and you will obſerve to him, that as treaties of alliance between different States can have no other ſolid baſis nor ſecurity for becoming permanent, than that of mutual advantage, we ſhall expect, in return for the pecuniary benefits he may derive from the Company, the moſt effectual ſupport he can afford to the ſecurity of their dominions, on which, in fact, that of his own muſt eſſentially depend, by contributing with his whole force, where it may be practicable, to repel the hoſtile deſigns of the Marattas, or any other Power who may riſe in arms againſt them.

5th. You will concert with the Nabob *Nudjif Cawn*, the beſt probable plan of defenſive operations for oppoſing any invaſion of the Marattas or other Powers in the enſuing campaign, but you muſt guard againſt his entertaining any expectation of actual aid from us, by informing him that we are not permitted on any account whatever to carry the arms of the Company beyond the limits of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*'s dominions of *Oude*, *Corah*, and *Allahabad*.

6th. You will uſe your utmoſt endeavours to gain and tranſmit to us from time to time, the moſt exact information of the natural ſtrength, ſituation, forces, and revenues, and the characters, intereſts, connections, and deſigns, of the princes who reſpectively govern the countries in the neighbourhood of *Nudjif Cawn*, and particularly of ſuch whoſe immediate vicinity, or other circumſtances, may involve them in the tranſactions of his Government.

The

The following paragraph is added in conſequence of Mr. *Francis*'s minute, and the aſſents thereto hereafter entered.

The intent of your deputation being merely to concert meaſures of a defenſive nature with *Nudjif Cawn*, we poſitively reſtrain you from liſtening to any propoſals which may be made to you of a different tendency.

We are, &c. &c.

Mr. *Francis*—I conſider the propoſed deputation to have no object but *defenſive* meaſures only; I ſhall never *concur* in any other; I think that an article ſhould be inſerted in theſe inſtructions, poſitively reſtraining Major *Hannay* from liſtening to any propoſals whatſoever of a different nature.

(Signed) *P. F.* *R. B.*

I readily agree to the clauſe propoſed by Mr. *Francis*, although I think the ſubſtance is clearly and fully expreſſed in the concluding ſentence of the 5th article of the inſtructions.

(Signed) *W. H.*

I have already entered my objections ſo fully to the meaſures to be purſued in conſequence of theſe inſtructions, that it remains only to me to repeat my diſſent and proteſt to any new treaty with *Nudjif Cawn*; the object and extent of ſuch new engagements having not yet been communicated to us. *Nudjif Cawn* is an adventurer who has made his fortune on the ruin of the Jauts, a people like the Rohillas, who have never given us any offence, whoſe ſtate was a barrier to *Bengal*, but whoſe total ruin ſeems to be determined in order to form a large eſtabliſhment for *Nudjif Cawn*.

(Signed) *J. C.*

Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 23d September 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis,* } Eſquires,

General *Clavering*, indiſpoſed.

The general letter in this department having been reviſed and approved by the Members preſent, it was ordered to be ſent to General *Clavering*; and having been communicated to him, he declared his diſſent to the 13th, 14th, and 15th paragraphs reſpecting *Nudjif Cawn*; and afterwards delivered in the following Minute, a copy of which was ſent a number in the packet with the general letter.

I object to the 13th, 14th, and 15th paragraphs of the letter in the Secret Department to the Court of Directors. My objection to the firſt is, that it is not conformable to the reſolutions of the Board: to the ſecond, that it contains facts not authenticated: to the third, that it ſeems calculated to induce the Court of Directors to believe that *Bengal* requires the alliance of *Nudjif Cawn*, to protect it againſt the Marattas, or ſome other Power which may riſe up againſt it.

Explanation 1ſt. On the 10th June it was reſolved to reſtore *Nudjif Cawn* his penſion, on two conditions: the firſt, That he ſhould ſend away all the Europeans who are ſo offenſive to the Engliſh: the ſecond, That he ſhould diſmiſs *Saudit Ally Cawn* from his camp: although the 13th paragraph refers to the conſultation of the 10th June, the laſt condition is totally omitted. It has been in like manner excluded from the inſtructions to Major *Hannay*.

Explanation 2d. The confederacy ſaid to be in agitation againſt the Nabob's dominions, has been mentioned by Mr. *Briſtow* and Colonel *Goddard*, but it has been as much ſlighted by Colonel *Stibbert*. It conſiſts, according to the Governor General's Minute, entered on conſultations of the 29th Auguſt, of the King, the Marattas, the Seiks, and the Rohillas. After having ſeen on ſo many occaſions, the King's power and authority vilified by the late adminiſtration, I was not a little ſurprized to ſee his name mentioned as a dangerous Power in this formidable alliance. I as little expected to ſee the name of the Marattas introduced, becauſe we have lately concluded a treaty with them; and according to all appearances, they are more deſirous of our friendſhip than we can be of theirs. The Seiks are ſo far from wiſhing to quarrel with us, that they are diſpoſed to court our alliance; and with regard to the remains of the Rohillas, although they have no reaſon to reſpect our good faith, or to admire our juſtice, yet I believe they are not ſo formidable as to become the objects of an embaſſy and a public treaty.

Explanation 3d. If I have well comprehended the inſtructions, the treaty which is to be made with *Nudjif Cawn*, is to be formed on the baſis of mutual intereſts; namely, that we are to give him money, and he is to give us his aſſiſtance in caſe *Bengal* be attacked by the Marattas, or any other Power who may riſe up in arms againſt us. Whether the money we are to pay him is to be limited to two lacks, or to be increaſed, is not expreſsly ſaid; but I ſhould conjecture, from the tenor of the firſt and fourth articles, that the latter is intended; and indeed when one conſiders that by the treaty of *Illahabad*, in the year 1765, he was already entitled to receive the ſum of two lacks, and that this ſum had been repeatedly offered to him, no other inference can be drawn but that more is intended to be given him by the new treaty. The words I refer to in the firſt article, are, "the cementing and increaſing the friendſhip and "alliance which formerly ſubſiſted between the Com-"pany and him, on conditions of mutual ſupport and "advantage." The fourth article is more explanatory, and therefore it ſhall be inſerted entire.

Explanation 4th. "You will obtain from *Nudjif* "*Cawn*, as early as poſſible, the ultimate conditions "on which he is willing to form a laſting alliance with "the Company. As he may previouſly demand the "confirmation and arrears of his penſion, you will ac-"quaint him that our determination thereon, by the "inſtructions of the Court of Directors, neceſſarily de-"pends on his anſwer to the laſt letter written to him "by the Governor General; and you will obſerve to "him, that as treaties of alliance between different "States can have no other ſolid baſis nor ſecurity for "becoming permanent than thoſe of mutual advantage, "we ſhall expect, in return for the pecuniary benefits he "may derive from the Company, the moſt effectual "ſupport he can afford to the ſecurity of their domi-"nions, on which in fact that of his own muſt eſſen-"tially depend, by contributing with his whole force, "where it may be practicable, to repel the hoſtile de-"ſigns of the Marattas, or any other Power who may "riſe in arms againſt them."

Underſtanding therefore that by the new treaty, he is to have an additional ſubſidy, and in return he is to give us the aſſiſtance of his whole force, when required, for the defence of theſe provinces, it ſeems to me natural to ſuppoſe, that the Gentlemen who formed and agreed to theſe inſtructions, do ſuppoſe that the formidable confederacy which is to be counteracted by this treaty, is rather directed againſt the Province of *Bengal* than againſt our Ally the Vizier; who is only held forth as the object of it in the Governor General's Minute, entered in Conſultations the 29th Auguſt.

Theſe are the reaſons on which I have objected to the three paragraphs in the general letter.

With reſpect to the propriety of making even a defenſive treaty with *Nudjiff Cawn*; as a public meaſure, it cannot avoid being condemned; it does not appear

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prudent to confide on the fidelity of a man who openly appeared in arms againſt the Engliſh camp in the year 1772, who ſtill detains in his army *Sumroo*, the aſſaſſin of the Engliſh at *Patna*, together with *Mader* and the other Engliſh deſerters. Would his diſmiſſing them now be any proof of his attachment to us? Could it be thought ſafe to bring into theſe provinces for their protection, an army of banditti, who are daily mutinying for their pay, and living by rapine? If there was a neceſſity of introducing foreign troops into theſe provinces, every reaſon requires that we ſhould give a preference to thoſe commanded by Britiſh officers in the ſervice of our ally the Vizier; they could give us *no* umbrage. Our being able to avail ourſelves of their aſſiſtance, in caſe of an exigency, was not one of the leaſt of the advantages which we ourſelves propoſed in forming thoſe corps, and which have ſo happily coincided with the views of the Court of Directors, in their orders to us received in this ſeaſon, directing us to "recommend to "the Nabob of *Oude*, to permit ſome part of his "cavalry to be commanded by officers of the Com-"pany."

Hitherto, I have only conſidered the intended treaty as a meaſure burtheniome to the Company, but eventually dangerous, on a ſuppoſition that *Nudjif Cawn*'s troops were permitted to enter into *Bengal*. I will now take a review of it as it may affect the Company, indeed more remotely, but ſtill not with leſs danger.

In the year 1773, *Nudjif Cawn* was yet no more than an adventurer, not poſſeſſing a ſpot of land. At the fatal Congreſs at *Benares* was laid the foundation of his power, on the ruin of the Jauts; as was likewiſe that of the Vizier by the deſtruction of the Rohillas. In the year 1774, while the Engliſh troops were marching to extirpate one nation, *Nudjif Cawn*'s army beſieged and took the ſtrong fort of *Agra*, belonging to the Jauts, aided by ſome troops of the Vizier, and aſſiſted by Major *Polier*, with the approbation of the Governor General.

In the following ſeaſon he purſued his advantage, and took from the Jauts another ſtrong fort called *Deig*. It ought not to appear ſurprizing, that thoſe people who were formerly conſidered as the allies of the Engliſh, but now abandoned by them, ſhould, as the laſt reſort of deſpair, apply to the Marattas for their aſſiſtance.

That very different ſentiments from thoſe which have been lately adopted in *Bengal*, were entertained formerly by Lord *Clive*, who I believe underſtood the politics of *India* better than any Engliſhman who has ever been in the country, will appear by a letter from the Select Committee to the Court of Directors, dated 8th September 1768.

During Lord *Clive*'s reſidence in the *Bahar* Province, "a Congreſs was held at *Chapra*, at which his Lord-"ſhip, General *Carnac*, *Suja Dowlah*, and the King's "Miniſters, aſſiſted. Here was laid the foundation of "a Treaty between the Company, the Vizier, and the "Jaut, and Rohilla Chiefs, for their mutual defence "and ſecurity againſt all attempts of the Marattas to "invade their ſeveral dominions; but his Lordſhip and "General *Carnac*, from conſideration of the little ad-"vantage the Company would deduce from ſuch diſtant "allies in caſe of an invaſion, choſe to leave this matter "unfiniſhed, and to entruſt *Sujah Dowlah* with the ma-"nagement of ſuch treaties as he might think conve-"nient for his own and the Company's welfare; but he "is not to conclude any thing, nor to enter into any "abſolute engagements, without having previouſly ac-"quainted the Preſident of every propoſal, and obtained "his approbation."

Lord *Clive*'s views are clear: he wiſhed to preſerve the independant nations of the Jauts and Rohillas, as allies of the Engliſh, and to put them under their protection, but avoided making any ſpecific treaty with them, becauſe he knew, that from their great diſtance, they never could be of uſe for the protection of *Bengal*. After having raiſed the power of *Nudjif Cawn* to an height as to become formidable both to the Vizier and to ourſelves, it is at laſt judged adviſable to make the moſt indecent advances to him; I call them indecent becauſe he has not made any reply to the letter that was written to him on the 10th of June; becauſe we are ſtill uninformed whether he will ſend away *Sumroo*, *Mader*, and the other Europeans, or diſmiſs *Saudit Ally Cawn* from his Durbar; and becauſe *Nudjif Cawn*, though now an independant Chief, is ſtill in the ſervice of the King, by whom it will be conſidered as the higheſt indignity to ſee an officer of high rank deputed to his ſervant, while he himſelf is neglected; the King will naturally ſay, "What has *Nudjif Cawn* done for the Company? He "did not grant the Dewannee of *Bengal* to them, or "give them Sunnuds for the five Circars."

To the objection of *Sumroo* and *Mader* remaining with *Nudjif Cawn*, the Gentlemen who have planned this deputation will reply, that they have provided againſt the diſgrace and diſhonour that would enſue from an Engliſh officer being introduced to that Chief in the preſence of thoſe perſons, by directing that Major *Hannay* ſhall not proceed further than *Chunar* until he hears of their diſmiſſion.

At all events we have committed our honour into the hands of *Nudjif Cawn*, and it now remains with him now to diſgrace us, and to give *Sumroo* the triumph of ſetting our power at defiance.

Whatever oſtenſible motives have been aſſigned for this embaſſy in the Governor General's Minute of the 29th Auguſt, and have been introduced in the general letter to prepare the Court of Directors for it, I cannot help ſuſpecting, that much more is intended than what has been diſcovered either to them or to us.

I form my conjectures from two circumſtances: firſt, from the precipitation with which the deſign of this embaſſy was opened and carried into execution: the ſecond, by the omiſſion of *Saudit Ally Cawn*'s name in the inſtructions. On the 28th Auguſt, the Governor General ſhewed me his Minute, which was to introduce this buſineſs, and told me he intended to bring it before the Board the next day; accordingly it no ſooner appeared, than the propoſal contained in it was agreed to by one reſolve, the nomination of Major *Hannay* by a ſecond, and the inſtructions by a third.

I could do no more than proteſt againſt them all ſeverally. I had already repreſented to the Governor General, that he was rejecting a former reſolution of a full Board during the abſence of Colonel *Monſon*, which was not to enter into any further correſpondence with *Nudjif Cawn* till he had complied with two conditions ſtipulated on the Conſultations of the 10th June, namely, his ſending away the obnoxious Europeans, and diſmiſſing *Saudit Ali* from his Durbar. As the gaining this laſt point from *Nudjif Cawn*, had been the chief inducement of the Board to make him any propoſals whatever on the 10th June, it muſt appear to every one very remarkable, that this particular condition ſhould be omitted in the inſtructions.

When the terms of the letter which was written to *Nudjif Cawn* on that occaſion by the Governor General, are examined, my ſuſpicions that ſomething more is intended by permitting *Saudit Alli* to remain with *Nudjif* than what we have been allowed to know, will not appear ill-founded.

"It is for this reaſon that nothing may remain to caſt "even a ſhadow of doubt between us, that I earneſtly "recommend to you to prevail upon *Mirza Saudit Ally* "*Cawn*, either to return to his obedience, and to the "preſence of his brother *Aſoph ul Dowlah Bebader*, or "to accept of the aſylum which has been offered him in "the province of *Bengal*, but on no account let him re-"main with you, for although thoſe who know you and "knew him, will entertain no ſuſpicions of your inten-"tions, the uninformed part of the world will attribute "ſuch appearances to hoſtile deſigns in both, and that

"opinion

" opinion may be in the end productive of real miſun-
" derſtandings."

I will now leave the Court of Directors to draw their own concluſions, whether my ſuſpicions on the above circumſtances be well or ill founded.

The 16th September 1776. (Signed) *J. Clavering.*

APPENDIX, No. 165.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 23d September 1776.

RECEIVED the following letters from Mr. *Briſtow*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed the Honourable Board the 9th, 10th, and 11th inſtant, and am now to acknowledge their letter of the 22d ultimo.

In going to *Fyzabad* to procure an interview with the Begum, I had no intention to interfere between her and the Vizier; I only went to be preſent when any ſettlement might take place, without which the Begum never would have been ſatisfied, as ſhe looked upon the guarantee of the Company as her ſecurity. My rule of conduct at *Fyzabad* not having exceeded this line, and as the five lacks were on the Company's account, I hope the Honourable Board will for theſe reaſons approve the event of this negociation.

The King has diſmiſſed the two battalions which were formerly under the command of Captains *Brooke* and *Stuart*, and given the two Commandants recommendatory letters to the Vizier, to whom I introduced them. They urged that General *Barker* promiſed, that (ſhould they behave well) they ſhould be re-admitted into the Company's ſervice whenever they chole to leave his Majeſty's, and Colonel *Goddard* had already addreſſed the Honourable Board on this ſubject; but as the Vizier deſired on my introducing them, he has written to the Governor General for permiſſion to entertain them. I do not well ſee how his Excellency can raiſe any battalions, as I believe he will find ſome difficulty in paying the army he has already on foot.

I have, &c. &c.

Lucknow, 18th Auguſt 1776. (Signed) *John Briſtow*, Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to write on the 18th inſtant.

In my letter of the April laſt, I informed the Honourable Board of the flight of *Hemmut Bahadre* with his troops to *Agra*, and as he had placed Aumils of his own in the Vizier's conquered countries to the ſouth-weſt of the *Jumna*, the Government on that event fell into diſorder; the Vizier wiſhed to have retained the country, but his army was at that time ſo mutinous, and the principal perſons of his Court diſaffected, that he really had not, though there were above thirty thouſand men upon the ſpot, a force that he could entruſt the undertaking to. The Marattas benefited themſelves by this; they in the courſe of twenty days retook the fort of *Moat*, and all that had been conquered on the other ſide of the *Jumna*, excepting a ſmall diſtrict adjacent to *Etawa*, which they were prevented doing, wholly from its peculiar ſituation, ſurrounded and defended by creeks and nullas which fall into the *Jumna*; the Vizier can hardly be ſaid to govern it; he has, 'tis true, an Aumil in the diſtrict, to whom the Zemindars pay no rents, and in defiance of his authority retain two forts, called *Cammele* and *Saſſaon*: it was to reduce theſe forts that Captain *Stuart* croſſed the *Jumna*.

The Vizier's loſs of the conquered countries, and the ceſſation of arms entered into with the Marattas, ſet aſide the ſcheme planned with the Rana of *Goad*. The Rana however conſiders himſelf a dependant of the Vizier's, and in caſe of the Marattas attempting to invade theſe countries he might be made a very uſeful ally.

I have, ſince I laſt wrote the Honourable Board relative to the negociations of Rajah *Punſhbar Pundit*, the Maratta vackeel, had repeated converſation with him on the ſubject of a treaty with the Vizier, on the terms of which I cannot bring him to any reaſonable determination. He always enlarges upon the friendſhip which the Peiſhwa wiſhes to preſerve with this Court, and his willingneſs to enter into a treaty with amity, but he cannot think of entering into one, ceding the province of the *Doab*. He ſays, it is a ſmall extent of country, and no object for the Vizier to retain, and thereby diſguſt a nation which can bring into the field an army of one hundred thouſand men; I urged to him, an examination into paſt proceedings is not the way for him to eſtabliſh a friendſhip between the Vizier and his maſter, as both would be equally ſolicitous to ſhew the good grounds on which they had intended to act; that for my part I was perſuaded the Engliſh were anxious to ſee their differences ended to their mutual ſatisfaction; the beſt way to do which, in my opinion, was to look to what appeared adviſable at the preſent juncture. His maſter could hardly expect that *Aſuph ul Dowlah* ſhould cede countries he was in actual poſſeſſion of, whilſt he had a force to defend them; and that he had done a great deal in giving up all thoughts of the country, on the other ſide the *Jumna*, which I recommend as the boundary to both their dominions. The diſtricts in which the forts of *Cammaté* and *Saſſoon* are, I particularly excepted, and ſtipulated to be the Vizier's, being in his poſſeſſion.

This paſſed in a converſation I had with him yeſterday; and he obſerved upon it, that he had received his inſtructions, and if theſe were intended to be the terms for the treaty, he begged permiſſion to return to *Poonah*, from whence every article might be ſettled; but he had not powers to do it. In my ſeveral interviews with him, he has often propoſed for the Engliſh and the Marattas to act in conjunction, and make joint conqueſts up to *Lahore*. It appears to me, that the Marattas do not wiſh to make any treaty with the Vizier, but to leave the matters in diſpute between them in the preſent ſtate, until ſuch time as their own affairs will admit of their making a vigorous attack. By the general purport of the intelligence we got from the Decan, I can hardly think any thing of the kind is likely to happen this year. The moſt the Marattas have hitherto done, was to promiſe the Jauts the aſſiſtance of fifteen thouſand men, who were magnified to twenty-five thouſand, and ſaid to have marched from *Ougywe*, whereas, I do not really underſtand, if any have marched, that their numbers exceed four or five thouſand. At any rate at preſent it is only *Mehajy Sindea* who has entered into this undertaking. In regard to the inſinuations of the Maratta vackeel, who would have it be thought that his maſter would go any lengths ſooner than give up the *Doab*, I ſincerely believe, that if the Vizier was unconnected with the Company, their Aumil *Below Rore* would at this time ſend detachments into that province. But the awe in which foreign Powers are held by our troops, is the ſole cauſe of the Vizier's ſecurity, otherwiſe there is a general league already formed againſt him, and the execution of it would be at a ſhort period. The copy of the treaty propoſed by *Punſhun Pundit*, I do myſelf the pleaſure to incloſe.

Nudjif Cawn is at *Dike* endeavouring to ſatisfy his troops, without effect. I believe as he has not yet met with any treaſures in the fort, he declares his intention of going ſhortly to *Delhi*, accompanied by *Saudat Aly*, to pay his reſpects to the King. It is the common converſation at his Durbar, that the intent of this journey is, in conjunction with *Zabita Cawn*, to form a plan of operations againſt the Vizier's dominions. Appearances are preſerved with *Nudjif Cawn* at this Court, but *Zabita Cawn* threw off the maſk in conſequence of a negociation that had been for a long time carrying on with him through *Littipat*, to conclude a treaty of amity, which he poſitively refuſes, unleſs *Nudjif Abad* ſhall be given up to him. He has diſpatched a vackeel, to offer

three

Appendix. No. 165.

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three lacks to the Sikes, on their joining him; but it is not thought that he will ſucceed in getting any conſiderable body, as they have diviſions amongſt themſelves. *Fyzo'la Cawn* was wrote to by *Somet Sing*, and charged with entering into the views of *Zabita Cawn*; he was likewiſe made acquainted, that Captain *Eryſkine* had ſtopt a Hircarrah, who took upon him his name, was entruſted with letters from one of his dependants to the Sike Chiefs, and that he himſelf had directed this Hircarrah to aſſure them verbally of his friendſhip: in anſwer to this, he aſſerts that he does not ever correſpond with any body but the Vizier and the Engliſh; however, he ſent a particular juſtification of his conduct through his vackeel at this Court; to the incloſed copy of which, N° 2, I beg leave to refer the Honourable Board. I likewiſe incloſe copies of *Lattafut's* letters to the Vizier, incloſing one from *Zabita Cawn*, which amounts to little leſs than a declaration of war. I ſuppoſe *Zabita Cawn* may be able to collect thirty thouſand men, but they are not ſubject to any ſubordination, ill armed and ill provided with ammunition; and he himſelf is eſteemed a man of leſs military genius than any Prince of *Hindoſtan*; but his uncle who is with him is a very able officer.

Upon a review of the ſituations of the Vizier's enemies, I cannot entertain the leaſt apprehenſions of any real danger to his dominions, particularly as there is now no doubt but that ſubordination and diſcipline will be introduced amongſt the troops under the command of the Britiſh officers. They are every where put upon the ſame footing with regard to pay, as in the Company's ſervice; their ſubmitting to the reduction of it, is, I think, a ſtrong inſtance that the ſpirit of mutiny is entirely broke through. The troops being thus brought into a ſtate to be ſerviceable to the Vizier, he wiſhes much to collect a formidable force in the *Doab* and *Robilcund*. His enemies are numerous, and if their declarations are to be credited, inclined to attack him; and if thoſe provinces ſhould long remain in their preſent defenceleſs ſtate, it will be a temptation to them to make attempts; whereas by a judicious diſpoſition at this early period, every bad conſequence may be avoided. The plan approved by the Vizier, is to form two regular brigades, conſiſting of a park of artillery, ſix battalions of Sepoys, and one regiment of cavalry, in each of the frontier provinces, to be commanded by the Britiſh officers; but the raiſing of five battalions having been given over by the Honourable Board's advice to Colonel *Stibbert*, the Vizier cannot diſpoſe of them until they be delivered up to him by Colonel *Stibbert*, for which he is very anxious, and wrote ſome days ago to the Governor General on the ſubject. By his own deſire, I alſo trouble the Honourable Board with a repetition of his requeſt; and further, that he hopes orders may be ſent to Colonel *Stibbert* to deliver them over.

I have, &c.

Lucknow, 22d Auguſt 1776. (Signed) *John Briſtow*, Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

P. S. I forgot to mention to the Honourable Board, that in conſequence of *Zabita Cawn's* declarations, and the inclination all foreign Powers ſhew to attack the Vizier, he has been pleaſed to authorize Colonel *Goddard* to aſſemble and diſpoſe of his troops in *Robilcund*, as well thoſe under Britiſh officers as not, in caſe of an invaſion being attempted.

(Signed) *J. Briſtow.*

APPENDIX, No. 166.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 24th October 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

General *John Clavering* indiſpoſed.

READ a letter from the Nabob *Nudjif Cawn*, received the 22d inſtant, and recorded N° 242, in the book of Perſian correſpondence.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Minute:

Although I have been ſome time ſince informed of the circumſtance mentioned in *Nudjif Cawn's* letter, reſpecting the requeſt made by the Nabob *Uſoph al Dowla* to him, for the protection of *Saadut Ally*; and the Members of the Board will probably recollect my having verbally intimated the ſame; yet as the Nabob *Aſoph al Dowla* has ſince repreſented *Saadut Ally* as an object of jealouſy, and complained of the protection granted to him by *Nudjif Cawn*, I move that a letter be written to Major *Hannay*, containing an additional inſtruction to him, to urge *Nudjif Cawn* to uſe every means to prevail upon *Saadut Ally* to leave his Court and withdraw from his dominions, offering him an aſylum in ours, if he ſhall have any objection to return to thoſe of his brother; but that Major *Hannay* be cautioned not to ſee *Saadut Ally*, or to hold any private or direct communication or correſpondence with him; alſo that a letter be written to the ſame effect to *Nudjif Cawn*.

Agreed to the Governor General's propoſal.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to Major *Hannay*, and that the Governor General be requeſted to write to *Nudjif Cawn*.

To Major *Alexander Hannay*.

Sir,

In addition to the inſtructions we have given you for conducting the negociation with which you are entruſted; we direct that you urge *Nudjif Cawn*, by every means that may occur to you, to uſe his endeavours to prevail on *Mirza Saadut Ally* to withdraw from his dominions, and return to the Court of his brother the Nabob of *Oude*; authorizing him, if *Saadut Ally* ſhould, from any apprehenſion of danger to his perſon, object to truſt himſelf within his brother's territories, to offer him an aſylum within the Company's poſſeſſions: but we deſire that you will neither ſee *Saadut Ally*, nor hold any communication or correſpondence with him directly or indirectly.

We are, &c.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 30th October 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

General *Clavering* indiſpoſed.

General *Clavering* ſends in the following Minute relative to *Nudjif Cawn:*

General *Clavering*—The letter which has been lately received from *Nudjif Cawn*, and read the 24th inſtant, is an anſwer to the letter written to him on the 10th June laſt, in which the Board offered him his penſion on two conditions, namely, the ſending away the offenſive Europeans, and the diſmiſſion of *Saudit Ally* from his Court. In his anſwer he has poſitively refuſed complying with either of the conditions. The offer of thoſe conditions was the reſult of an unanimous reſolution of the Board, Colonel *Monſon* being then preſent; which reſolution not having yet been reſcinded by any other reſolution, the orders now given for treating with *Nudjif Cawn*, before he has complied with them, are not only informal with reſpect to the propriety of the Board's proceedings, but are more, a high indignity to the Government itſelf. It appears to me, that the formal manner of proceeding ſhould have been to have moved the Board, that notwithſtanding the direct refuſal

that *Nudjiff Cawn* had given to the two conditions which had been propoſed to him on the 10th June laſt. Major *Hannay* ſhould ſtill purſue his negociation with *Nudjiff Cawn*; this method of proceeding would have brought the matter fairly before the Board, to have learnt from the Governor General his reaſons for proſecuting a negociation ſo apparently derogatory to the dignity of the Government. The public reaſons aſſigned by the Governor General in his Minute of the 28th Auguſt, are founded on the apprehenſions which he then entertained of formidable alliances, that were contracting by the Seiks, by *Zabita Cawn* and the King, againſt the dominions of our ally *Aſoph ul Dowlah*; although I myſelf was convinced at the time, from the correſpondence of Colonel *Stillers*, that no danger was to be apprehended from the neighbouring Powers, to diſturb the peace of *Aſoph ul Dowlah*'s dominions, yet I was very much pleaſed to find that opinion confirmed by the laſt letter received from Colonel *Goddard*, and read on the 24th October laſt, wherein he mentions, that the Nabob has ſo little to apprehend an attack from any of his neighbours, that he recommends to this Government that the Nabob ſhould be adviſed to lend his aſſiſtance to the Ranna of *Geud*, now attacked by the Marattas. If this be the real ſituation of affairs in that country, and that the Maratta Empire be ſo diſtracted with inteſtine diviſions as to be incapable of invading *Bengal*, I confeſs I cannot perceive what public reaſons can be offered for perſevering in a deſign of forming an alliance with a man who ſo openly ſet our friendſhip at defiance, by entertaining in his ſervice every enemy to this Government, and to procure whoſe aſſiſtance, in caſe of an invaſion of *Bengal* by the Marattas, is the object of the treaty propoſed to be formed with him. If nothing more however is meant than to procure a lucrative commiſſion for Major *Hannay*, I ſhould imagine that other means might be deviſed for that purpoſe without ſacrificing the honour and reputation of this Government. To that end, as doubts are entertained that the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* has himſelf authorized *Nudjiff Cawn* to afford his brother *Saudit Ally* his protection, I beg leave to recommend that a letter be written to Mr. *Briſtow*, to communicate to him the ſuggeſtions of *Nudjiff Cawn*, and to know whether in fact the Nabob has authorized him to grant his protection to his brother; becauſe were that to be the caſe, I ſhould no longer be ſo ſtrenuous as I am for his removal from *Nudjiff Cawn*'s camp; in my own opinion he only remains there in order to be near at hand, to foment diviſions in the Government of *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, and perhaps to attempt ſomething more, ſhould a favourable occaſion offer.

Governor General—I object to the propoſals made by the General, to communicate to the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* the aſſertion made by *Nudjiff Cawn*, that the protection granted by him to *Saudit Ally* was at the Nabob's own inſtance, becauſe it can ſerve no purpoſe but to create an animoſity between them; but I ſhall approve of Mr. *Briſtow*'s being directed to enquire into the truth of the aſſertion, as he may obtain it by other means, and if he can, to obtain and ſend us a copy of the letter alluded to by *Nudjiff Cawn*, if any ſuch was ever written.

Agreed, That the following letter be written to Mr. *Briſtow*.

To Mr. *Briſtow*.

Sir,

In a letter which we have lately received from *Nudjiff Cawn*, he informs us that the protection which he ſtill continues to afford to *Mirza Saudit Ally*, is in compliance with the ſolicitations of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, who has written to him on this ſubject, and deſired him to keep *Saudit Ally* from forming other connections. As this is a circumſtance with which we could wiſh to be more particularly acquainted, we deſire you will enquire into the truth of it; and endeavour to obtain and tranſmit to us, without making any direct application to the Nabob himſelf, a copy of the letter alluded to by *Nudjiff Cawn*, if any ſuch was ever written. Appendix. No. 166.

We are, &c.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 30th December 1776.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Agreeable to the orders contained in the Honourable Board's letter of the 30th ultimo, I have enquired into the truth of *Nudjiff Cawn*'s having been ſolicited by the Vizier to grant his protection to *Sadut Ally*, and prevent him from forming other connections; and I find it to be very true, that his Excellency did write in this ſtile to *Nudjiff Cawn*. In my humble opinion the view he had in it was merely to keep up appearances, for in caſe he had requeſted that *Sadut Ally* might either have been delivered up or not received by *Nudjiff Cawn*, he was convinced his requeſt would not have been complied with. When the Goſſagne and Duſhein Cawn fled, *Nudjiff Cawn* pretended to receive them out of regard to the Vizier; and the Vizier on his part again has in ſome inſtances received *Nudjiff Cawn*'s rebellious ſubjects in the ſame way. They both of them in their correſpondence acknowledge theſe acts as reciprocal favours, but they have nevertheleſs been the cauſe of increaſing their jealouſy and diſtruſt of each other. For the information of the Honourable Board relative to *Sardat Ally*'s reception by *Nudjiff Cawn*, I have procured copies of the following letters, which I do myſelf the honour to incloſe, viz.

One from *Nudjiff Cawn* to the Vizier.
From *Mirza Khalyle* ditto.
The Vizier's anſwer to the above.

In procuring the copies of theſe letters, I have uſed the neceſſary precautions to prevent his Excellency from being informed of it.

I have the honour to be,

Lucknow, 18th Nov. (Signed) *John Briſtow*, Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I am happy to inform the Honourable Board, that on a review of the ſtate of foreign affairs there is a great proſpect of ſecurity to his Excellency; but as many circumſtances have occurred of which it may be neceſſary to give particular information, I ſhall endeavour to explain the Vizier's preſent ſituation in the fulleſt manner.

Notwithſtanding the appearances kept up between his Excellency and *Nudjiff Cawn*, I have great reaſon to think they ſtill entertain the ſame jealouſy of each other as formerly. In regard to the Vizier, I do not ſee any cauſe that he has to be apprehenſive of *Nudjiff Cawn*, as he ſtill continues in great diſtreſs for money, and has been compelled to give up a certain extent of country to the Sikes, to prevent their joining *Zabiter Cawn*; the circumſtances relative to which are as follow:

In the month of Auguſt laſt I informed the Honourable Board of the conduct obſerved by *Zabiter Cawn* in reſpect to the Vizier. He did certainly endeavour to form alliances with the view of invading *Rohilcund*; but the awe with which the name of the Britiſh officers commanding ſo conſiderable a body of his Excellency's troops ſtruck all foreign Powers, together with the low ſtate of *Zabiter Cawn*'s own affairs, entirely overſet it. Upon this his old enmity to *Nudjiff Cawn* revived, and he exerted his utmoſt abilities to attach the Sikes to him, in order to invade and diſpoſſeſs *Nudjiff Cawn* of his dominions. *Abdul Abud Cawn* increaſes their animoſities all in his power, by writing inflammatory letters againſt *Nudjiff Cawn*, both to the Sikes and *Zabiter Cawn*. The ſcheme ſeemed to have ſucceeded, for the Sikes, in conjunction with *Zabiter Cawn*, entered *Hanſy*, *Nudjiff Cawn* diſpatched *Nudjiff Cooley Cawn* from *Dike* (where he himſelf then was) with a conſiderable part of his army to oppoſe them.

The league appeared ſo formidable, that *Nudjiff Cawn*

Appendix. No. 166.

even propoſed to march in perſon, and had really moved his encampment three coſs out of *Dike* with this intent, when he received intelligence that *Nudjiff Caolly Cawn* had concluded a peace with the Sikes on the 18th inſtant, granting *Gohana* and *Hanſay* diſtricts, yielding about eleven lacks revenue, as jaghires to their two principal chiefs, *Gudge Sing* and *Hummer Sing*, in conſequence of which they had renounced their alliance with *Zabiter Cawn*.

I ſhould imagine *Zabiter Cawn* will hardly be able to extricate himſelf from his preſent difficulties, for *Abdul Abud Cawn* has it not in his power to aſſiſt him, and his own army is very unequal to *Nudjiff Cawn*'s; it is however impoſſible to ſpeak with preciſion of the turn affairs are likely to take, from the little dependance to be placed on the Sikes, who, ſhould they find it their advantage, would in all probability re-unite with *Zabiter Cawn*, eſpecially as I underſtand their negociations with *Nudjiff Cawn* are not finally adjuſted. Beſides *Gohana* and *Hanſy* as jaghires, they are in treaty for *Hiſſar* and *Rotue*, as farms; a compliance with this may perhaps determine them to abide by the Peace. *Nudjiff Cawn* has for ſome time declared his intentions of going to *Delhi* to pay his reſpects to the King; at which *Abdul Abud Cawn* expreſſes great apprehenſions, leſt it ſhould be with a deſign againſt his life, or to diſplace him from about his Majeſty's perſon. I am however of opinion, that he will not go, at leaſt for the preſent, as the unſettled ſtate of his country, and the war with *Zabiter Cawn*, require his preſence elſewhere.

The Sikes, on concluding the Peace, ſent *Nudjiff Cawn* all the original letters which they had received againſt him from *Obeul Abud Cawn*, and thus increaſed the breach between them.

Saudut Ally ſtill continues with *Nudjiff Cawn*, but is extremely diſſatisfied with his ſituation. Some ſhort time after his arrival, he obtained for his own ſupport and that of the two battalions which deſerted to him from *Etaya*, the diſtrict of *Ryana*, yielding a nominal revenue of nine lacks of rupees a year. *Nudjiff Cawn* now wants him to give it up, and promiſes him *Meeret* in lieu of it, as a jaghire. The fact is, that he wiſhes to be rid of him, for *Meeret* is a diſtrict in *Zabiter Cawn*'s poſſeſſion, which muſt be conquered before it can be diſpoſed of to him. I have every reaſon to believe that he would be happy to return, but am ſorry to obſerve that the Vizier is ſtill as much averſe to it as ever.

On this ſubject however I mean to make an ultimate and full repreſentation to his Excellency, and then forward his reaſons at large for refuſing to conſent.

The low ſtate of *Nudjiff Cawn*'s treaſury has compelled him to reduce his army very conſiderably indeed; a great number of his people have deſerted him, in particular *Madoc*, who is now in the ſervice of the Rhana of *Ghode*.

In regard to the Sikes, they make profeſſions to the Vizier, of preferring his alliance to that of all other Princes, and propoſed a treaty with him, in which he did not acquieſce; he approved of their profeſſions of attachment, and ſaid, he ever wiſhed to continue upon the beſt underſtanding with them, and ſo long as they did not interrupt the peace of his dominions, he ſhould not form any deſigns againſt them. *Soorut Sing* conducted this negociation, and it was particularly given him as a reaſon for rejecting a treaty that it was unbecoming the dignity of the Vizier, the whole body of the Sikes hardly amounting to ſeven thouſand men, their Chiefs numerous, and none of them of the leaſt conſequence.

It is aſſerted, and the Vizier himſelf gives credit to it, that *Fyzulla Cawn* entertains a correſpondence with all foreign Powers, in order to form an alliance againſt him: in my humble opinion it appears to want foundation. *Fyzulla Cawn* is certainly in a better ſituation than he ever was before the war with *Sujah ul Dowlah*, and I cannot ſee what inducement he can have for defection. Before the war, he had I underſtand a country of about ſix lacks, laſt year he collected from his preſent dominions above ſixteen lacks; and this year he has laid an increaſe of two annas in the rupee, which I am informed he will be able to realize without diſtreſſing the country. He is eſteemed a man of great abilities as a financier, and he does not ſeem to want them in any other branch of government; it is therefore impoſſible he ſhould be ſo weak as to forfeit the Vizier's friendſhip, on which his exiſtence depends. He has however been made to believe, that the Vizier wiſhes to deprive him of his territories; and it is by ſome imagined, that conſidering this as a fact, he is ſeeking alliance to guard againſt it.

In the intelligence of *Timur Shah*, he is ſaid to have ſent an Ambaſſador to that Court with a particular commiſſion, inviting him to invade *Indoſtan*, and offering to join and pay him a lack of rupees a day after he ſhall have reached *Lahore*. But admitting *Timur Shah* to be ever ſo well inclined to this expedition, the Sicks would oppoſe his paſſage through their country; *Timur Shah* is himſelf now in *Cabul*.

I am very happy to inform the Honourable Board, that there is not any appearance of the Marattas being this year able to create the leaſt diſturbances to the Vizier, as the preſent diviſions in their own government will employ their whole attention; the Rhana of *Ghode* laid ſiege to the fort of *Goalier*, which is in their poſſeſſion, and was obliged by *Baboo Holcar* to raiſe it; but after *Madoc* joined him, became too ſtrong for *Baboo Holcar*, whom he compelled to retreat, and in a ſkirmiſh he had with him, the Rhana took five guns and two elephants and ſome horſes; a negociation was afterwards propoſed for a treaty of peace, to ſettle the terms of which the Rhana deputed a perſon of his confidence to the Maratta Camp: but by this day's intelligence I learn that they treacherouſly way-laid him, and I ſuppoſe the war will now be continued. The Rhana has made repeated applications to the Vizier for the aſſiſtance of two battalions of ſepoys, which his Excellency refuſed to grant; his principal reaſons were the lowneſs of his treaſury, and the very weak ſtate of his own government in all parts, but in the *Daub* particularly, owing to the refractory behaviour of the Zemindars, who, under the protection of their forts, have hitherto kept that country in a conſtant ſtate of warfare againſt the Aumil. The Rhana profeſſes a very ſtrong attachment to the Vizier; whoſe intereſt it might be to ſupport him in caſe his own affairs would admit of it; but no poſitive engagements had been made to him to give him reaſon to expect aſſiſtance. As the Vizier aſked my advice on this ſubject, I perfectly agreed with him in regard to making the ſettlement of his own government the firſt object of his attention, and I thought it the more adviſeable to confirm him in his reſolution, as the Honourable Board had directed me to recommend it to his Excellency, not to employ the troops under Britiſh officers on any ſervice but the defence of his own dominions, and he had no other to ſend upon this expedition. I did not know likewiſe whether a Britiſh officer commanding a detachment againſt the Marattas might not be conſidered as improper, after the treaty concluded at *Poonah*.

From the above relation of facts, the Honourable Board will, I hope, be ſatisfied of the little cauſe the Vizier has to fear the attacks of any foreign enemies. The ſituation of his own court is much the ſame as it was, for his favourites have ſo much influence in the government, that the ſame abuſes ſtill exiſt, and it will be extremely difficult to convince him of the inconveniencies and loſs which reſult from them. The meaſures of the Miniſters perpetually claſh with the intereſts of the favourites, who oppoſe every thing they propoſe to the Vizier. I ſhall in a few days write the Honourable Board fully on the ſtate of this Government, and have for that purpoſe procured a complete ſtatement of the receipts and diſburſements which I am tranſcribing into Engliſh, and to which I muſt refer for particulars.

It is with much concern I obſerve the want of diſcipline, which ſtill reigns in that part of the Vizier's army, not under Britiſh officers; two battalions marched a ſhort time ago from their ſtations to this place, and demanded their pay, which, if they were not granted, they threatened to plunder the town. The Vizier was obliged to comply with their demands, and when he wanted to diſmiſs them for their mutinous behaviour, they refuſed to give up their arms, unleſs his Excellency would promiſe through me not to uſe any violence towards them. The night of the mutiny I was ſent for at ten o'clock by the Vizier, to be the arbitrator between him and the mutineers; which office I however unwilling took upon me, in order to prevent a diſturbance at *Fyzabad*; the troops have gone to great extremities, and compelled the Begum to pay them a conſiderable ſum of money. The particulars of this diſturbance the Honourable Board will underſtand from her letter to me on this ſubject, copies of which I have herewith the honour to incloſe N° 1. The Vizier, the night before laſt, received intelligence, that after the mutineers diſperſed, the Begum had thought proper to put her own people into all the offices in the town, and diſplaced his: that ſhe had confined a Soubadar and ſome Sepoys, who were guards in the ſtore houſes, ſeized the gates, and publiſhed to the world, that ſhe had bought the town for the money the troops had exacted from her. The Vizier was extremely mortified at this intelligence, and ſent at paſt eleven o'clock at night to let me know that he had ſome very particular buſineſs to ſpeak to me about, and before I could return him an anſwer to his meſſage, he did me the honour to call on me. He complained heavily of the Begum's behaviour, and declared, that if it was not for the treaty he had made with her through the Engliſh, he would immediately order her two principal Eunuchs to be capitally puniſhed; he at firſt determined to ſend the body guard to *Fyzabad*, and retake poſſeſſion of the town, but changed his mind on my aſking him, whether there was a probability of any further diſturbance; he anſwered there was not the leaſt, as the troops concerned in the mutiny were all diſperſed, and another battalion had been ordered to *Fyzabad*, which would be arrived there by that time. After many propoſitions, he at laſt reſolved on ſending the Miniſter *Huſſein Reza Cawn*, to which I adviſed him, knowing the Begum was well affected towards him, and that he would act with moderation. The Vizier inſiſted on my immediately writing her a letter, that *Huſſein Reza Cawn* might ſet off with it before day-break. I incloſe a copy of it, N° 2. I am inclined to think the Begum's conduct has been exaggerated in order to cauſe ill-will between her and his Excellency; but I hope the Honourable Board will approve the part I was obliged to take to moderate matters.

I have the honour, &c.

Lucknow, (Signed) *John Briſtow*,
25th November 1776. Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

APPENDIX, No. 167.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 4th November 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Lieutenant General *John Clavering*, indiſpoſed.

READ the following letter from Major *Hannay*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I beg leave to acquaint you, that I arrived here laſt night, and that by this morning's dawk I received the Nawab *Nudjif Khan*'s reply to my addreſs of the 1ſt ultimo; a copy of which I have the honour to incloſe for your peruſal. It is ſo fully deſcriptive of his ſituation, the difficulties with which he is ſurrounded, and how he is circumſtanced with regard to *Sumroo*, that it requires no comment. His ready compliance with the pleaſure of the Board, in the diſmiſſion of *Maddox*, and the French in his ſervice, I humbly apprehend to be a favourable indication of his diſpoſition to conform to that mode of political conduct which adminiſtration may be pleaſed to recommend as moſt agreeable to the intereſts of the Company; and I do not entertain a doubt but he will fulfil his promiſes with reſpect to the fate of *Sumroo* as ſoon as the neceſſity of his affairs will admit. *Nudjif Kooly Khan*, who is his principal military officer, is now detached againſt a numerous army of the Seiks who are aſſembled in the neighbourhood of *Delhi*; and *Sumroo*'s troops compoſe a very conſiderable part of the corps which is under his orders. *Sumroo* is in perſon preſent with his troops; and under theſe circumſtances, I beg leave to ſubmit to your wiſdom, how far it is in *Nidjif Khan*'s power at this juncture, which has every appearance of being ſo very critical to his fortunes, and even exiſtence, to diſmiſs *Sumroo*, or bring him to the juſt puniſhment of his enormities. Appendix. No. 167.

I have acknowledged the receipt of *Nidjif Khan*'s letter, and acquainted him with my having tranſmitted a copy of it to your Honourable Board, but that the obedience I owe your poſitive commands precludes my proceeding further.

I ſhall remain here until I have the honour to receive your further orders, and if they are not to proceed, I beg leave to offer my moſt earneſt aſſurances that my utmoſt zeal and abilities ſhall be exerted to bring the buſineſs of my commiſſion to a happy iſſue.

Chunargur, I have the honour to be, &c.
October 19th, 1776. (Signed) *Alex. Hannay.*

Copy of a letter from the Nabob *Nudjif Khan* to Major *Hannay*; dated 22d Shawbaun, 18th year of the King's reign.

I have received your letter, adviſing me that you have taken leave of the Gentlemen of the Council, having their permiſſion to pay me a viſit; and that you will ſet out in two or three days. You have written that the entertainment of *Sumroo* is a breach of friendſhip with the Engliſh, and that while he remains with me you cannot carry into execution your deſign of paying me a viſit. You well know that the entertainment of *Sumroo* was a breach of friendſhip in the ruling Powers of *Hindoſtan*; (here follows an exact copy of extract from the letter to the Governor General, entered in Perſian correſpondence N° 242, from "whence I took my leave," &c. to "unſatisfactory ſervice.") I will alſo expel *Sumroo* in time, but he is not at preſent in my army. Proceed therefore on your journey, and afford the ſatisfaction of an interview. Impart to me your ſentiments and purpoſes, and obſerve the true ſtate of affairs here; and having ſatisfied yourſelf beyond all doubt, inform the Gentlemen of the Council whether I am ſincere, or whether you diſcover an appearance of deceit. I am faithful and true in my friendſhip and attachment: But ſhould I immediately break with thoſe men, the good which I have effected by my efforts and labour in a courſe of years, would at once be annihilated; and my enemies who are now in ambuſh, would excite more trouble than before. It is therefore neceſſary that I ſhould conſult experience, by preventing the flames from blazing and the miſchief from enſuing. I have already accompliſhed one object, and will in time accompliſh the ſecond, be aſſured of it: and until I have the pleaſure of ſeeing you, favour me with your kind letters.

The Secretary lays before the Board the following Note and Minute from General *Clavering*:

Sir,

Appendix. No. 167.

Sir,

The ſtate of my health not permitting me to come to the Board as I intended to-day. I deſire you will lay the incloſed Minute before the Governor General and Council, for their conſideration.

Calcutta, Nov. 4th, 1776.

I am, &c.
(Signed) *J. Clavering.*

The diſapprobation that I have on all occaſions ſhewn to the meaſures of deputing an officer of high rank to *Nudjif Cawn*, before an anſwer could be received from him whether he would accept the conditions propoſed to him in conſequence of an unanimous reſolution of the Board on the 10th of June laſt, ſo fully evinces the propriety of my oppoſition to the reſolution taken by the Board to ſend Major *Hannay* on that commiſſion, that I need not add any further arguments to juſtify it. The anſwer received from *Nudjif Cawn*, addreſſed to the Governor General and Major *Hannay*, are preciſely what I expected, that he would not diſmiſs either *Sumroo* the aſſaſſin, or *Madoc*, or *Saadut Ally Cawn*; I muſt therefore beg leave to propoſe that a queſtion be ſubmitted to the determination of the Board, whether the unanimous reſolution taken on the 10th June ſhall be reſcinded, or not?

The Board muſt remember, that the only reaſon aſſigned by the Governor General in his Minute of Auguſt, for propoſing that a treaty ſhould be entered into with *Nudjif Cawn*, was a ſuppoſed league forming by the King, the Seiks, and the Rohillas, to attack the dominions of our ally the Vizier. If the Board will take the trouble of reading the laſt letter received from Colonel *Goddard*, they will ſee, that ſo far is he from apprehending any danger to the Vizier's dominions from any of the neighbouring Powers, that he has propoſed that the Board would adviſe the Vizier to march his army to the aſſiſtance of the Rana of *Goad*, attacked by the Marattas. He is beſides confident that the troops commanded by Britiſh officers in the Vizier's ſervice, are fully ſufficient to ſecure the tranquillity of the Nabob's country againſt the ambition of any of his neighbours.

In this ſtate of affairs therefore, the expediency of a ſubſidiary treaty with *Nudjif Cawn* ſeems to be entirely unneceſſary, either for the protection of the Nabob's dominions or thoſe of the Company, the object of the propoſed treaty.

If the Board ſhould be of opinion, that the reſolution of the 10th June ſhould be reſcinded, and that Major *Hannay* ſhould proceed to the preſence of *Nudjif Cawn*; I beg leave to recommend that they would fix his appointments, in order that the Court of Directors may know by the firſt ſhip the expence of this deputation, as well as the new grounds on which the treaty is to be formed.

(Signed) *J. Clavering.*

The Governor General—I object to reſcinding the reſolution, becauſe it remains as it originally ſtood, unchanged by the objects of Major *Hannay*'s appointment. The letter from *Nudjif Cawn* is by no means a proof either of his diſaffection to us, or of his diſinclination to comply with our requiſitions. It appears from the words of his letter, that he has actually diſmiſſed *Madoc* and the other Frenchmen who were in his ſervice: I am informed by other channels, that he has diſmiſſed them; and I knew and foreſaw that the removal of *Sumroo* could not be effected without much difficulty and danger, yet I ſhall not propoſe any deviation from Major *Hannay*'s original inſtructions, nor ſhall I recommend or conſent that he proceed to the Court of *Nudjif Cawn* while *Sumroo* remains in his ſervice. As the General has deſired that Major *Hannay*'s allowances may be fixed, I recommend that his preſent allowances be confined to the eſtabliſhed batta of his rank, and rupees 100 for a Moonſhy; and from the time of his paſſing the boundary of the Company's poſſeſſions, that his allowances be fixed by thoſe allowed to Colonel *Upton*, in the proportion of their reſpective ranks; I would further recommend, as it appears that the account of Major *Hannay*'s expences is to be referred to the Court of Directors, that the Paymaſter General be directed to draw out an account of the expences incurred by Colonel *Upton*'s deputation from the day of his departure, that they may be the better enabled to judge of the propriety of the expence incurred by Major *Hannay*, by a compariſon with thoſe.

Agreed, That the Reſolution of the 29th Auguſt be not reſcinded.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to Major *Hannay*.

To Major *Alexander Hannay*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 19th October, incloſing a copy of *Nudjif Cawn*'s reply to your firſt addreſs.

We are ſtill of opinion, that it would be highly improper for you to proceed to the Court of *Nudjif Cawn* whilſt *Sumroo* remains in his ſervice; we do not think fit therefore to make any alteration in your original inſtructions.

As long as you continue on your preſent ſervice at *Chunar*, you will only draw the eſtabliſhed pay and allowances of your rank, and 100 rupees for a Moonſhy, but we ſhall augment them from the time of your paſſing the *Carumnaſſa*, if future circumſtances ſhould admit of your proceeding to *Nudjif Cawn*, in proportion to thoſe which were fixed for Colonel *Upton*.

We are, &c.

4th November 1776.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 2d December 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
General *Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, } and *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Read, and approved, the proceedings of the 11th ultimo.

General *Clavering* having ſent in the following Minute before the diſpatch of the *Naſſau*, a copy of it is ſent a number in the packet by that ſhip.

General *Clavering*'s Minute in anſwer to the Governor General's of November 4th inſtant.

The Governor General objects to the reſcinding the reſolution of the 10th June "becauſe, (he ſays) it remains as it originally ſtood, unchanged by Major *Hannay*'s appointment," viz. That till the perſons who are ſo obnoxious to the Engliſh, namely, *Sumroo* and *Madoc*, as alſo *Syded Ally Khan*, were removed from *Nudjiff Khan*, no treaty of alliance ſhould be entered into with him. The Governor General muſt excuſe me if I take the liberty of contradicting him, and declaring, that by the omiſſion of *Syded Ally* in the inſtructions to Major *Hannay*, the reſolution does not now remain as it originally ſtood, and therefore it ought either to be reſcinded or enforced; if reſcinded, then the exception in Major *Hannay*'s inſtructions would only include *Sumroo* and *Madoc*, and not *Syded Ally*; if enforced, the latter would be included in the exception with the former. The Governor General further ſays, that *Nudjif Cawn*'s letter is by no means a proof of diſaffection to the Company, or his diſinclination to comply with our requiſitions;

tions; I cannot conceive what idea the Governor General can form of affection or complying with our requiſitions, when he will not allow that *Nudjiff Cawn* entertaining *Sumroo* in his ſervice, a man who was a murderer of the Engliſh at *Patna*, is not diſaffection, or his evading to ſend him away is not a refuſal of our requiſition. In regard to *Madoc* and the other Frenchmen in his ſervice, I think the words of *Nudjiff Cawn*'s letter are very equivocal; but I have written to Colonel *Stibbert* to be informed preciſely of the fact, whether they be ſent away or not.

If the Governor General foreſaw, as he declares, the difficulty of removing *Sumroo* from *Nudjiff Cawn*, why, it may be aſked, was he in ſuch a hurry to ſend the deputation to him, particularly as he does not mean to recommend or to conſent that Major *Hannay* ſhall proceed to the Court of *Nudjiff Cawn* whilſt *Sumroo* remains there? Had he thought proper to have retarded the Major's departure till that information could have been received, he would at leaſt have ſaved the difference between half and double full batta of a Major, which is 22 and 10 rupees per day, that Major *Hannay* will draw more at *Chunagur* than if he had remained at the Preſidency; the Governor General may think ſuch a ſum trifling, as 8,000 or 9,000 rupees per annum, but it was inattention to theſe and ſmaller ſums that occaſioned the immoderate expence of the military eſtabliſhment before.

The deſign of giving Major *Hannay* the ſame appointments when he paſſes the Company's territories that Colonel *Upton* has, is certainly juſt, as the Governor General muſt deem the journey to *Agra* equal in length and difficulty to that to *Poonah*, and the Majeſty of *Nudjiff Cawn* equivalent to that of the Maratta State. But ſuppoſing even that *Sumroo* and every other impediment were actually removed to the Major's acceſs to this powerful Prince, it is proper that the Company ſhould have the ſatisfaction of knowing what the new motive for the treaty is to be.

When the Governor General introduced to the Board, the propoſition of ſending the deputation to *Nudjiff Cawn*, the formidable alliance of the Seiks, of the King, and of the Rohillas, were alledged as the motive. Whilſt the rains laſt, ſuch a bugbear might be held out, as it could not be contradicted; but at preſent, that we know from *Nudjiff Cawn* himſelf, that he is marching againſt the Seikes, to exterminate them as he had done before the Jauts, and that we are informed from Colonel *Goddard*, that the Nabob's dominions are likely to remain in profound peace, ſome other motive ſhould be aſſigned for the propoſed treaty, inſtead of the reaſon which was given two months ago: I call thereſore on the Governor General once more, before the departure of the ſhip under diſpatch, to declare his public reaſons for wiſhing to purſue this treaty; a treaty, if it is ever to have any effect, it muſt be by affording *Nudjiff Cawn* the means, with the Company's money, of oppreſſing his neighbours, or of invading *Bengal* with his banditti, under the pretence of defending it.

This is the only light I can ſee it in; but if the Governor General has better reaſons to aſſign, it is proper that he ſhould declare them, in order that the Company may judge on the fulleſt information, whether they will chuſe to ratify it or not. I have been all along ſingular in my opinion in the Council on this buſineſs; but the full conviction I have of the rectitude and propriety of it, perſuades me, that the Company will not diſapprove the different ſteps I have taken to avert the pernicious effects this treaty muſt p oduce.

I deſire that this Minute may be ſent a number in the packet, accompanied with any anſwer that the Governor General may pleaſe to give to it.

(Signed) *J. Clavering.*

The Secretary having waited on General *Clavering* with a draft of the general letter for his approval, was deſired by him to add the following information, in the paragraph which treats of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*; viz. Appendix. No. 167.

"Indeed Colonel *Goddard* informs us, that the Seiks "have not come to any agreement with *Zabiter Cawn*, "and that he now apprehends no danger from that quar- "ter; he therefore the more ſtrongly recommends, that "the Nabob be adviſed to grant aſſiſtance to the Rhana "of *Gohud*, who has been attacked by the Marattas."

Which having done, the Secretary again ſhewed the letter to the Governor General, who made a further addition to the ſame paragraph; viz.

"Although the diſtracted condition of the Vizier's "Government, the reduced ſtate of the finances, and "his extreme and known weakneſs of mind, will ſtill "afford too much encouragement for the attempt."

The paragraph, as above corrected, was circulated for the approbation of the other Members of the Board, and the following Minutes were received upon it.

General *Clavering*—I object to the part introduced by the Governor General, as it ſeems only introduced to deceive the Court of Directors, without any authority from Mr. *Briſtow*'s letters, in order to juſtify the propoſed treaty with *Nudjiff Cawn*.

(Signed) *J. Clavering.*

Mr. *Barwell*—I acquieſce to the Governor General's addition. (Signed) *R. Barwell.*

Mr. *Francis*—I am by no means ſatisfied that the dominions of the Nabob of *Oude* are in a ſtate of ſecurity, or that *Nudjiff Cawn* might not be uſefully engaged in the ſervice of our ally. If he will not previouſly diſmiſs *Madoc* and *Sumroo*, of courſe there can be no negociation of any kind with him. If he complies with the preliminary demand, I then think that we ought to avail ourſelves, in ſome ſhape or the other, of the renewal of his penſion, (againſt which I ſtood ſingular in Council) and not give it him for nothing.—This was the ground of my aſſent to Major *Hannay*'s appointment; and I adhere to my opinion.

Approved (Signed) *P. Francis.*
(Signed) *R. Barwell.*

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations,
2d December 1776.

The Governor General delivered to the Secretary the following Minute, with directions that it ſhould make a number in the *Naſſau*'s packet; which, after having been circulated for the information of the other Members of the Board, was accordingly done.

Governor General—I hope it will not be expected from me, that I ſhould give up my time to a minute diſcuſſion of all the arguments, or to refute all the perſonal inſinuations which occur in the numerous minutes, diſſents, and proteſts of General *Clavering*, which have been entered in the Conſultations of the public, ſecret, and revenue departments, in the courſe of the laſt two months.

Though the meaſures of the Board have been chiefly confined in that period to the diſpatch of current buſineſs, yet in the daily progreſs of it they have been oppoſed by the General with a vehemency, ſuitable only to meaſures in which the vital intereſts of the Company were at their laſt hazard.

The appointment of Major *Hannay* to negociate the terms of an alliance with *Nudjiff Cawn*, though the inevitable conſequence of my own recommendations made to the Court of Directors ſo long ago as the year 1773, and approved by them, is aſcribed to the deſign of procuring a lucrative commiſſion for Major *Hannay*. To this end I am charged with ſacrificing the honour and reputation of this Government; of loading the Company with an unprofitable expence, and devoting nations to deſtruction; to thoſe reflections I ſhall not reply. While I remain in charge of the Company's intereſts, I ſhall endeavour to ſecure them by the cloſeſt engagements

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that can be formed with *Nudjif Cawn*, as the only reſource, beſides our own army in that quarter, which can guard our ally the Nabob of *Oude*, where alliance is become both an embarraſſment, and a danger to us; and eventually the political intereſts of the Company, which are unfortunately connected with him. I regret that it is not in my power to complete the political barrier to this country: my influence and authority are too circumſcribed.

Whether a zeal for the intereſts of the Company, or a deſire to obſtruct and embarraſs thoſe operations of Government which he can no longer direct, is the motive which actuates the General in his oppoſition to every meaſure which has been adopted ſince his abſence from the Council, I leave to the judgment of my ſuperiors.

The death of Colonel *Monſon*, whoſe memory I reſpect for the military talents which he poſſeſſed, and the ſervices which he formerly rendered to the Company, and whoſe good will amidſt the unfortunate diſagreements which ſubſiſted between us, I ſtudiouſly endeavoured to conciliate, having placed the ſuperior weight of authority in that ſcale which ſhould conſtitutionally preponderate, but clogged with ſuch diſadvantages of inſtability and oppoſition as to render the reſponſibility annexed to it peculiarly difficult and hazardous. I had determined to avoid all kind of innovation, and to confine the influence which had thus unexpectedly devolved upon me, to the current and ordinary occurrences of Government, and to ſuch extraneous objects as might eventually ariſe and occupy our deliberations. I flattered myſelf, that the only inſtance in which I ſhould be obliged to depart from this reſolution was in the revenue, which the approaching period for forming the new ſettlement, and the time required for the neceſſary preparations of it, made unavoidable; and as a deciſion muſt ariſe before this can be effected, and the meaſures dependant on it carried into execution, no poſſible ill conſequences can be apprehended from it. But the ſtudied and vehement oppoſition of the General upon every occaſion, as it increaſes the reſponſibility with which I am charged, muſt force me in many inſtances to purſue a more deciſive conduct, and to act where I might otherwiſe only deliberate. Drawn into this ſituation, I ſhall no longer think myſelf bound to obſerve that regular attention which I have hitherto paid to every minute of controverſy, but reſerving to myſelf the privilege of replying only to ſuch as I may judge important enough to merit it, I ſhall paſs the reſt in ſilence.

I expect to meet with oppoſition and obſtruction in every ſtep that I take. It will therefore be the more incumbent on me to ſhun every occaſion which may divert me from my immediate duty, by a waſte of time in uſeleſs diſputation.

It is now the third year that I have endured a ſtate of the moſt mortifying and unmerited humiliation; my conduct arraigned, my character aſperſed, and my authority annihilated.

Impreſſed with the deepeſt ſenſe of obligation to the Company whom I have progreſſively ſerved during a ſeries of 26 years, in the moſt important ſtations: to the Parliament which inveſted me with the diſtinguiſhed office which had been aſſigned me, and to my Sovereign who nominated me to it, I reſolved, though with inexpreſſible reluctance, to ſacrifice my repoſe, and expoſe myſelf to that perſecution and unavailing toil which I ſaw prepared for me, and which has continued without the ſmalleſt remiſſion from the arrival of my colleagues in adminiſtration till the preſent hour; perſuading myſelf that the firſt reference of diſputes of ſo alarming a nature, would produce a final deciſion, and if not determine the victory in my favour, at leaſt relieve me from a ſituation equally painful and degrading. The diſappointment of this hope has been deeply aggravated by the harſhneſs of the cenſures which have been conveyed through the general letters of the Court of Directors, in terms of ſeverity, greatly exceeding thoſe which have been experienced by any, even the moſt obnoxious of my predeceſſors; how merited, it does not become me to ſay, nor will the reſpect and ſubmiſſion which I owe to their decrees, permit me either to examine the facts or principles upon which their reproaches are founded.

I can ſafely aver, that I have proſecuted the Company's intereſts with the moſt ardent and diſintereſted zeal, and with an unremitted labour. If this be profeſſion, let my adminiſtration be judged by its effects. In what period of the Company's exiſtence have they experienced a ſtate of proſperity, I will not ſay ſuperior, but equal to that in which I had their affairs in charge?

Notwithſtanding the diſcouragements I labour under, and the difficulties I muſt ſtill expect to encounter, I will adhere to my former declaration, of remaining in the Government, *until I ſhall be removed from it by authority*, which I confeſs I ſhall regard as a more deſirable event than to continue under the preſent circumſtances of a feeble and diſputed influence.

With the aſſiſtance of Mr. *Barwell*, on whoſe ſupport I moſt confidentially rely, and I will hope for that of Mr. *Francis*, I ſhall endeavour to diſcharge the reſponſibility ſo pointedly thrown upon me, ſo as to promote the neceſſary diſpatch of current buſineſs, and leaſt to embarraſs thoſe into whoſe hands the adminiſtration may be hereafter committed; wholly regardleſs of perſonal conſequences, and aſſured of leaving this country, whenever I leave it, with the good wiſhes of its inhabitants, and meeting the juſt applauſe of my conſtituents, and of every diſcerning and impartial man in the whole country.

Fort William,
25th November 1776.

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 3d February 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident.
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.
General *Clavering* indiſpoſed.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

IN my addreſs of the 25th of November laſt, I expreſſed my opinion of the ſecurity of his Excellency's dominions from foreign attacks, and I really thought, that however well inclined *Nudjif Cawn* might be to come to a breach with the Vizier, the diſtreſſed ſtate of his affairs, and the conviction of the inferiority of his troops to the Vizier's, would deter him from ſuch an attempt. There is, however, no poſitively ſpeaking on a point of this nature, as *Nudjiff Cawn*'s people did, within theſe few days, commit depredations on the Vizier's territories. The circumſtances were, that *Nudjif Cawn* had beſieged the fort of *Marſaan*, the poſſeſſor of which made his eſcape, and ſome Marattas in *Nudjif Cawn*'s ſervice purſued him to *Saſſy*, which is in the Vizier's dominions, and they plundered the country; but Colonel *Goddard*, through whom the information of the circumſtances came, imputes this to the licentiouſneſs of the troops, and not to *Nudjif Cawn* himſelf. The Colonel has wrote to *Nudjif Cawn* that he was convinced the depredations were committed without his knowledge, and therefore requeſted reſtitution, and the offenders to be puniſhed. A copy of the inſtructions his Excellency was pleaſed to iſſue on this occaſion to Colonel *Goddard*, I have herewith the honour to incloſe.

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In my addreſs of the 25th of November, I mentioned to the Honourable Board my opinion of the probability, that the Sikes would not abide by the peace they had made with *Nudjif Cawn*; but I now underſtand it is moſt likely to laſt, as the chiefs, *Gadjeput Sing* and *Ummer Sing*, deſpair of any reinforcements from their own countrymen, and they conſider *Nudjiff Cawn*'s force ſuperior to their own and *Sabiter Cawn*'s united. *Nudjiff Cawn* ſtill declares his intention of proceeding to the preſence, and afterwards to bring his whole force againſt *Sabiter Cawn*. He purpoſes to ſolicit his Majeſty to diſpoſſeſs *Sabiter Cawn* of the office of Myr Buxſhy, and grant it to *Saadit Ally*, to whom he now profeſſes the ſtrongeſt attachment. In lieu of wanting him to give up *Byaana*, he has promiſed to grant him *Futty-Abad*, and the diſtricts aſſigned to *Sumroo*, for the ſupport of his party; but this only appears a pretence, for it is a doubtful caſe if he will be able to diſpoſſeſs *Sumroo*.

In regard to *Saadit Ally*'s return, the Vizier is ſtill extremely averſe to it, and I am afraid my hopes of getting the better of his Excellency's objections, will not be accompliſhed; however, I ſhall refer Mr. *Middleton* to the inſtructions the Honourable Board were pleaſed to give me on this head. His Excellency excuſes himſelf principally on account of his inability to grant a jaghire ſuitable to *Saadit Ally*'s rank, and that from the ſituation of affairs, he has nothing to apprehend from any foreign enemies. His arguments may in ſome meaſure be juſt; he however might with greater propriety beſtow a jaghire on *Saadit Ally* than many others who poſſeſs them; and although there is nothing to apprehend at preſent, ſtill this tranquillity may not laſt; and whenever it ſhould be interrupted *Saadit Ally* will always be a tool in the hands of the Vizier's enemies. In my humble opinion, both for *Saadit Ally*'s own ſecurity, and the intereſts of the Company, he could not be better ſituated than to reſide under the protection of the Engliſh, where, in caſe of accidents, the Government would alſo without difficulty be able to conclude their own terms with him, and he be convinced of the propriety of them; but in the preſent ſituation of affairs, the ſucceſſion not being poſitively determined, and *Saadit Ally* conſidering himſelf independant, it might coſt ſome trouble to induce him to comply with the Company's intereſts in the manner he ought. I doubt if now *Saadit Ally* would wiſh to return without at leaſt a jaghire of three lacks of rupees; however, I have endeavoured to aſcertain this point by getting his vackeel to write to know his real ſentiments upon it.

The power of the Jauts appears now to be on the eve of being entirely extirpated, as *Runjeet Sing* remains in the poſſeſſion of the fort of *Commone* alone, and he cannot make the leaſt head againſt *Mahomed Beg Hammedany*, *Nudjiff Cawn*'s officer in that part of the country; and it ſeems he alſo deſpairs of obtaining any aſſiſtance from the Marattas. The Rana of *Ghode* is likewiſe in a very bad ſituation: he had but a ſhort triumph; for the Marattas have at length fallen upon the moſt effectual means for ruining him. They have carefully avoided coming to action, turning all their views to plundering the country and cutting off his ſupplies, in which they have ſucceeded ſo well, that a few days ago they carried off from two conſiderable towns, money and effects to the amount of three lacks of rupees, and flour ſells in his camp for two ſeers a rupee.

Rajah *Hindooput* having died ſome time ſince, his eldeſt ſon *Sumud Sing* ſucceeded to nine lacks of his dominions, and his ſecond ſon *Umrud Sing*, to the remainder, without any diſturbance or material occurrence.

Lucknow, I have the honour, &c.
January 19th, 1777. (Signed) *John Briſtow.*

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated the 21ſt April 1777.

PRESENT.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since I laſt addreſſed the Honourable Board, I have received intelligence, the authenticity of which there is no reaſon to doubt, that *Seadut Allee*, who was beſieging *Beeb*, in the Beaunah province, with an army of about three thouſand men, having attempted to ſtorm the place, was repulſed with great loſs, and after his repulſe ſurrounded by a party of Marattas, brought by the Rana *Kiſhoorey* to the aſſiſtance of the Jauts, and a detachment of *Pertaut Sing*'s troops. After a ſhort and moſt unequal conflict, *Saadut Allee*'s forces were totally defeated, and he, with his people, obliged to retreat precipitately towards *Deig*, leaving moſt if not all his artillery, ammunition, and baggage behind him; he has reached a place called *Candoo*, a few coſs diſtant from *Deig*, where it appears he means to wait until he receives a reinforcement from *Nudjif Cawn*'s army.

By the public accounts it appears, that *Saadut Ally* has loſt upwards of a thouſand men in the repulſe at *Beeb* and ſubſequent attack, in which are numbered many of his Sirdars and principal officers, but as the intelligence was ſent off immediately after the action it may in this particular be defective.

I ſhall do myſelf the pleaſure to addreſs the Honourable Board to-morrow, on the ſubject of my negociations with *Zyne ul ab deen Cawn*.

I am, &c.
Lucknow, (Signed) *Nath. Middleton*,
20th March 1777. Reſident Vizier's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I acquainted the Honourable Board, in my letter of the 20th inſtant, of the arrival of *Zyne-ul-ab deen Cawn*, Naib of the *Doab*; and I was in hopes I ſhould have been able long before this, to have informed them, that ſome ſatisfactory adjuſtment had been effected with him, by which I might hope to relieve the large balance due from him, and ſecure the punctual payment of his future kiſts; to this end I propoſed to him the raiſing a ſum of money on loan among the merchants of this place, at a moderate intereſt, and making over a certain proportion of his revenue, to be appropriated in monthly kiſts, to the liquidation of this debt; to which he was very willing to conſent. But his credit among the merchants and men of property was ſo low, that even with the ſecurity offered them none would liſten to his propoſals, unleſs I would become a party in the agreement, and pledge the faith of the Honourable Company for the ultimate ſecurity of the debt; this was an expedient I could by no means agree to, for beſides the riſk there might be in taking any degree of reſponſibility on myſelf, and the impropriety of engaging the Honourable Company in any private engagements of this nature, it might poſſibly be ſuppoſed to invalidate their claim upon the Vizier, to whom, as the tuncaws he has given I preſume can only be conſidered as collateral ſecurity, we muſt ultimately reſort for any balances ariſing upon them. Upon the failure of the expedient I propoſed, I could think of no better method of guarding againſt the fatal conſequences of *Zyne-ul-ab deen Cawn*'s miſmanagement, than endeavouring to get from him jaydaards to the amount of the balance now due upon my tuncaw, and obliging him to enter into an obligation with me, that the revenue of the diſtricts thus aſſigned over ſhall be ſolely and entirely appropriated to the payment of my tuncaw; which he, after much altercation, conſented to; and I have the pleaſure to incloſe the Honourable Board a copy of his written obligation to that effect, marked

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marked N° 1. In order that I may have a ſufficient check upon him to prevent any deviation on his part, from the terms of the obligation he has entered into, I have appointed a Sezanwul over each of the Naibs on whom the aſſignments are given, who, with the conſent of *Zyne-ul-ab deen Cawn*, is inveſted with authority to call upon the Naib for an account Waſil Bakee of his diſtrict, to require regular information of the daily receipts of revenue from every Pergunnah, and to take effectual care that no part of it is appropriated to other uſes. For the more particular information of the Honourable Board, I beg leave to incloſe a copy of my inſtructions to the Sezanwuls, N° 2, which I flatter myſelf will evince to them that I have omitted no precaution whatever, which could tend to the ſecurity of the very heavy demand I have upon *Zyne-ul-ab deen Cawn*. The people I have ſent in the capacity of Sezanwuls are all men of credit and ability, and as they will by their ſtations gain a local knowledge of the preſent ſtate and capacity of the Doab, I apprehend they will be the propereſt men to ſucceed *Zyne-ul-ab deen Cawn*, ſhould it hereafter be found neceſſary to diſmiſs him his aumildary, which I am of opinion muſt be the caſe, as he appears to poſſeſs neither integrity nor ability equal to ſo important a charge, nor has he been able to account in any ſatisfactory manner for the appropriation of the money he appears to have collected; but an inveſtigation into this matter would have taken up many days, and have kept him from his buſineſs at a moſt critical period, and whatever proofs of delinquency might appear againſt him in the courſe of ſuch an inveſtigation, it would ſtill be impoſſible to diſmiſs him from his office, without riſking the moſt miſchievous conſequences, for at this ſeaſon of the year no men of credit or reſponſibility would take the country but upon the moſt advantageous terms to Government; I therefore thought it moſt prudent to appear ſatisfied myſelf, and to adviſe the Miniſters to content themſelves with taking every means in their power for the ſecurity of the future collections, ſuſpending an enquiry into *Zyne-ul-ab deen Cawn*'s paſt conduct until a more favourable opportunity. I beg leave to incloſe the Honourable Board a liſt of the diſtricts which have been aſſigned over to me in *Jaydaad*, N° 3.—I have to remark that I have made choice of thoſe Pergunnahs which have been repreſented to me as the moſt flouriſhing and the moſt likely to yield the revenue at which they are eſtimated; but until the Sezanwuls arrive in the diſtricts I cannot poſitively aſcertain how far my hopes may be realized, as I have little more than *Zyne-ul-ab deen Cawn*'s own report to form my judgment upon. If however upon a local inveſtigation it ſhould appear that theſe diſtricts have been over-rated, I will inſiſt on their being exchanged, or having the revenue of others aſſigned over to me to make good the deficiency. As the mode of taking ſeparate jaydaards ſeems beſt calculated to obviate large balances upon my tuncaws, I have adopted it in every diſtrict where I thought it likely the collections would fall ſhort, which I am ſorry to ſay comprehends almoſt every one upon which I have any demand, and the deſcription, with a very few exceptions, might juſtly be extended to every diſtrict in the Vizier's dominions. It is with concern I exhibit to the Honourable Board ſo unfavourable a picture of his Excellency's affairs, but I ſhould ill acquit myſelf of the duty I owe my employers, were I to conceal my ſentiments upon a matter which appears of ſuch ſerious conſequence to this Government. By the accounts and ſtatements which Mr. *Briſtow* tranſmitted the Honourable Board a few days after my arrival, they would perceive that the Nabob's diſburſements, at the rate he is now going on, exceed his annual income many lacks; but if thoſe ſtatements are juſt, which from the beſt information I have been able to obtain, I have no reaſon to doubt, the deficiency will be far more conſiderable than Mr. *Briſtow* has ſuppoſed, he having formed his eſtimate upon the jummabundy of the country, without making any allowance for balances, which I believe I may venture to affirm will, at the cloſe of the year, be little ſhort of one fifth of the whole eſtimated revenue at the time; as I have already obſerved, there is ſcarcely a diſtrict throughout the Nabob's dominions that is not conſiderably in balance. In this and the enſuing month, 'tis true large collections will be made, and the arrears to that time probably nearly paid up; but it is alſo equally true, that after that period the collections will bear no proportion to the kiſts. In this ſituation I ſubmit it to the conſideration of the Honourable Board, how far it may be proper to interfere in preſſing the Nabob to regulate his expences, either by a reform in his military eſtabliſhment, or a retrenchment in his civil diſburſements, ſo as to bring them more upon a footing with the probable income.

I have, &c.

Lucknow, 21ſt March 1777. (Signed) *Nath' Middleton*, Reſident Vizier's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Accompanying I have the honour to tranſmit you my caſh account for the month of February laſt. I have not yet received from Mr. *Herbert* his receipts for the two ſums ſpecified to be paid him on account of the troops in the field, but have wrote to that gentleman for, and ſhall forward them as ſoon as they come to hand.

I am, &c.

Lucknow, 20th March 1777. (Signed) *Nath' Middleton*, Reſident Vizier's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Incloſed I have the honour to ſerward you the Paymaſter of the 3d brigade's receipts for the two laſt remittances made him, as charged in my caſh account for February, tranſmitted the Honourable Board with my addreſs, under date 20th inſtant.

I am, &c.

Lucknow, 24th March 1777. (Signed) *Nath' Middleton*, Reſident Vizier's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have juſt received intelligence through an authentic channel, that the Jauts under *Runjeet Sing*, reinforced by the body of Marattas which lately defeated *Saadut Ally*'s party, have purſued their conqueſt to the walls of *Deek*, and were actually preparing to beſiege that place. *Nudjiff Cawn* ſome days ago detached *Mahommed Beg Amdany* with three battalions and ſome irregulars, to ſuccour *Saadut Allee*, but this force is by no means equal to the united army of the Jauts and Marattas now aſſembled at *Deek*; and it is ſuppoſed, that he himſelf will be obliged to march immediately with the greateſt part of his army, to maintain his poſſeſſions in that quarter.

Nudjiff Cawn is uſing all his influence to perſuade the King to accompany him to *Deek*, but his endeavours have hitherto proved ineffectual, and all accounts ſeem to agree his Majeſty will ſhortly return to his reſidence in the capital, being wearied with fruitleſs negociations, and more diſtreſſed than ever by the cabals and oppoſite intereſts and views of his Miniſters and *Nudjiff Cawn*. His Majeſty's expectations were raiſed to the higheſt pitch by the flattring aſſurances of *Nudjiff Cawn* on his arrival at court; and the extremity of his diſtreſſes would probably have induced him to ſacrifice the cauſe of his favourite Miniſter to any means of immediate relief, but he ſoon diſcovered that *Nudjiff Cawn* had not the power, nor, as he ſuſpected, the inclination to afford him effectual ſupport, and being taught to ſuppoſe, that his views were directed to an arbitrary and independant controul over every department, he choſe rather to confide in the attachment of his old Miniſter, than to throw himſelf at once into the hands of one who he ſuſpected would aſſume the entire reins of government, and leave him not even the ſhadow of Majeſty.

Theſe

Theſe are the principles on which the King profeſſes to have ſuppoſed the influence of the *Nudjiff Cawn*, but I apprehend he has ſuffered his ſuſpicions to counteract what would appear to be his true intereſt, for however *Nudjiff Cawn* may in his preſent ſituation be unable to aſſiſt his Majeſty, he is certainly the only perſon he can ultimately look to for ſupport. I have, &c.

Lucknow, 29th March 1777. (Signed) *Nath. Middleton*, Reſident Vizier's Court.

Extract of the Secret Letter from *Bengal*, dated 25th November 1776.

2. At the period we wrote that letter, we had received news of the death of *Elich Cawn*, the Nabob of *Oude*'s chief Miniſter. *Sirut Sing*, the Naib of *Rohilcund*, was the perſon deſigned by the Nabob to ſucceed to the vacant appointment, but he declined that truſt, and it has ſince been conferred upon *Huſſen Reza Cawn*, a man who Mr. *Briſtow* aſſures us is well inclined to promote the intereſts of the Company, and to cement the friendſhip which ſubſiſts between them and the Nabob's government.

3. The regulation of the Nabob's domeſtic affairs appears to be the chief object at preſent which requires the attention of the new Miniſter, as the late apprehenſions of danger ſuggeſted to us from that quarter, on account of combinations ſaid to be forming between the different Powers whoſe territories lie adjacent to thoſe of the Nabob's, have not been mentioned in the letters we have received from thence ſince the concluſion of the rains. The low ſituation of the Nabob's treaſury, the diſſentions in his army, the ſubſequent reduction of his forces, and the animoſities which at that time ſubſiſted in his Court, no doubt combined to raiſe the expectations of the enemies of his Government, and to cauſe in ſome meaſure his own alarms on the ſmalleſt appearance of warlike preparations, or ſecret negociations among the States in his neighbourhood.

Conſ. 24th October.

4. The fair ſeaſon being advanced without any attack on the Nabob's dominions, or any immediate probability of ſuch an event, we hope it will not happen; indeed Colonel *Goddard* informs us, that the Seiks have not come to any agreement with *Zabita Cawn*, and that he now apprehends no danger from that quarter; he therefore the more ſtrongly recommends, that the Nabob ſhould be adviſed to grant aſſiſtance to the Rana of *Gohud*, who has been attacked by the Marattas. Colonel *Goddard*'s attention is taken up with training the Nabob's army under his command to military diſcipline, and eſtabliſhing the different corps after the plan of the Company's ſervice, which will ſoon give them conſequence in the eyes of the country Powers, and conſequently make an attack on his territories the more difficult, although the diſtracted condition of the Vizier's Government, the reduced ſtate of his finances, and his extreme and known weakneſs of mind, will ſtill afford too much encouragement for the attempt.

5. We have recommended to Colonel *Goddard* to be particularly careful that the pay of the troops under his command be regularly iſſued and paid to them without any ſtoppages or deductions. We have alſo forbid the officers in the Nabob's ſervice from taking any concern in the collections of his revenues, under colour of the Nabob's tuncaws or otherwiſe, from lending money to any of the Nabob's ſubjects, and from dealing in any pecuniary or mercantile tranſaction with them.

6. Colonel *Goddard* has made an application to us for an officer to be appointed to the chief command of the Nabob's artillery; but the eſtabliſhment of our own corps of artillery being too ſmall to admit of our ſparing any more officers from it to the Nabob's ſervice, we were under the neceſſity of refuſing our compliance. The Nabob alſo deſired an officer to hold the poſt of Quarter-maſter General to his troops; and Colonel *Goddard* having mentioned this application in one of his letters, the Commander in Chief propoſed Captain *Primroſe Thomſon*, whom you had recommended to his notice, for the appointment; but as we are not yet convinced of the neceſſity of ſuch an appointment in the Nabob's ſervice, Colonel *Goddard* not having recommended it, and the Nabob who applied for it not being, in our opinion, a competent judge of the propriety of it, we have for the preſent agreed that his requeſt ſhall remain ſuſpended for further conſideration. Appendix. No. 169.

8. Major *Hannay*, who is now at *Chunar*, and has written to *Nudjiff Cawn* from that place on the preliminary conditions of his propoſed deputation to him, will wait there till he obtains a final anſwer reſpecting the diſmiſſion of *Sumroo*. We have alſo directed Major *Hannay* to urge to *Nudjiff Cawn*, in the ſtrongeſt terms, the neceſſity of his prevailing on *Saudit Ally* to quit his court.

10. The Perſian correſpondence ſent home by the *Syren*, will have furniſhed you with copies of an extraordinary and peremptory requiſition from *Shaw Allum*, for the amount of his tribute on the Dewanny lands. Our reply, which firſt imparted to him your ſentiments on this ſubject, was founded on your letter of the 3d April 1775, directing the ſuſpenſion of all payments on this account till further orders. *Mudjeed o'Dowla*, the King's Prime Miniſter, has lately renewed his application in a letter to the Governor General, in which he alſo deſires an interview at *Benares*, promiſes that he will perform the journey himſelf, to accompliſh it, on the condition of our remitting 15 lacks of rupees in part, to the preſence; and he endeavours to make this propoſal as ſpecious as poſſible, by aſſurances that "if we will attend to his councils for the ſpace of one year, the affairs of all *Hindoſtan* ſhall be diſpoſed of ſo properly, that the Company will reap two-fold the advantages they now receive."

APPENDIX, No. 169.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*.

Gentlemen,

IN a former letter I had the honour to addreſs you, I mentioned the ſituation of the Ranna of *Gohud*, and how much he appeared to me an object worthy the attention of this Government. I again requeſt to recommend this matter to your conſideration: the Marattas have entered his country, and threaten to make themſelves maſters of it, which they will eaſily be able to effect if the Ranna is left to himſelf. He has implored aſſiſtance from the Vizier, and as his country is ſo ſituated as to form a barrier betwixt the Marattas and the Nawab's dominions, it muſt ſurely be policy to aſſiſt a man whoſe intereſt will always prompt him to be faithful to the Power that ſupports him.

The intelligence from *Delhi* mentioned, that the King, diſappointed in his wiſhes of protection and countenance from the Engliſh, propoſes throwing himſelf into the arms of the *Seiks*, who have never yet come into any actual agreement with *Zabita Cawn*, as he cannot comply with their demands of a ſum of money, the payment of which they inſiſt upon as a preliminary article. Indeed, there now appears no grounds to apprehend the Vizier's dominions will be attacked from that quarter; and I am led to mention this as a further inducement why protection ſhould be given to the *Gohud* Ranna, in which his Excellency will only act as an auxiliary, and by a timely interpoſition muſt probably prevent his becoming a principal on ſome future occaſion, when the Marattas having conquered *Gohud*, ſhall find themſelves powerful enough to make incurſions into the Vizier's dominions.

I alſo beg leave to repreſent to you the preſent ſtate of the Nawab's troops, which I can with ſatisfaction affirm, from their ſubordination and obedience to their officers, as well as the degree of diſcipline they have obtained, to be capable of executing every ſervice that may be required from them with ſpirit and fidelity. That part of

Appendix. No. 169.

of the army in *Robilcund* was the laſt which ſubmitted properly to authority, nor was it till after the diſmiſſion of one of Captain *Hoggan*'s battalions, that the remainder ſtationed in that quarter, intimidated by ſuch an example, made thoſe profeſſions of attachment and ſubmiſſion mentioned in Captain *Erſkine*'s letter to the Commander in Chief; and it is even ſince that period, that they have conſented to receive their pay by the calendar month, to a reduction of it, to ſtoppages for cloathing, &c. and to ſome other regulations I thought it neceſſary to make on my firſt arrival, putting them upon a level with the Sepoys in the Company's ſervice.

Camp at *Ferochabad*, *Thomas Goddard.*
October 8, 1776.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated the 5th May 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Read the following letter from Mr. *Middleton*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By intelligence juſt received from the weſtward, I underſtand that the Rana of *Goad* has concluded a peace with the Marattas; in conſequence of which he has reſtored to them all the countries, elephants, guns, &c. which he had taken from them in the courſe of the campaign. It does not appear from the accounts tranſmitted me, what are the conditions of the peace, or whether any compenſations have been made the Rana for the advantage he has relinquiſhed; it is certain, however, although he has ſupported himſelf with great credit and ſucceſs againſt the Marattas, during the whole campaign, he has long wiſhed for peace, and probably was glad to purchaſe it on any terms, more eſpecially as a detachment of ten thouſand men with twelve guns were on their way from the *Decan* to reinforce *Baboo Hulcar*, at the time the peace was concluded, and have ſince actually joined him. This army will now probably be turned againſt *Nudjiff Cawn* in the *Jaut* country, with which view it is ſuppoſed the peace was ſo haſtily concluded with the Rana of *Goad*. *Mahomed Beg Amdarny*, who was ſome time ſince ſent with a detachment againſt the Jauts and Marattas, in the neighbourhood of *Dieg*, has had ſeveral ſkirmiſhes with different bodies of them, and been tolerably ſucceſsful; but two other of *Nudjiff Cawn*'s battalions, which were employed ſeparately upon the ſame ſervice, have been defeated, with a conſiderable loſs of blood and the whole of their cannon, which they were obliged to leave behind them in their precipitate retreat.

In my addreſs to the Honourable Board of the 6th inſtant, I mentioned the improbability of *Zabita Cawn*'s obeying the King's ſummons; but it ſeems likely that he will ſoon make his appearance at court; a deputation having been appointed by the King to meet and eſcort him to the preſence. *Lettafut Ally Cawn*, from whom I derive my information, is one of the deputies.

I have, &c.

Lucknow, (Signed) *Nath*^{l} *Middleton*,
16th April 1777. Reſident Vizier's Court.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

1. Our laſt Addreſs from this department, under date the 27th March, was diſpatched to you by the *Aſhburnham*; we have now an opportunity of forwarding a duplicate of it by the *Hotter* from *Madras*.

2. We had juſt received the news of Colonel *Goddard*'s having ſubdued the fort of *Minpory* in time to communicate this event to you by our laſt diſpatch. Although the Nabob's troops had hitherto been ſucceſsful in their operations againſt the refractory Jemindars in the *Doab*, yet it was not without loſs on both ſides; and we conſidered that ſuch violent meaſures might tend to alienate the affections of the Nabob's new ſubjects from his government, and at the ſame time affect the credit of the Engliſh name; we therefore recommended it to him to try the effects of more lenient and conciliatory proceedings. We have however the pleaſure to obſerve, that the reduction of the above-mentioned fortreſs has put an end to the campaign, and that all the remaining Zemindars have come to an amicable adjuſtment with the Nabob's Aumils.

3. We are informed that a peace has been concluded between the Rhana of *Goad* and the Marattas, by which the former has engaged to reſtore all the countries which he has taken from the Marattas, ſince the commencement of their late differences. Mr. *Middleton* ſuppoſes, in conſequence of this pacification, that the Marattas will turn their arms againſt *Nudjiff Cawn* in ſupport of the Jauts, who had renewed the war with him, and gained ſome advantages over a part of his army in the neighbourhood of *Deig*.

4. The laſt advices which we received from Major *Hannay* were dated at *Lucknow*, to which place he had gone for the ſake of a more ready communication with *Nudjiff Cawn* on the preliminary articles of his deputation; and becauſe *Mirza Kaleel*, a perſon high in the confidence of that Chief, reſided there in the capacity of his vackeel at the Vizier's Court, and might be uſeful in promoting the ſucceſs of the negociation. On receipt of this information we debated on the propriety of Major *Hannay*'s conduct in quitting *Chunar*, and we beg leave to tranſmit you a copy of our minutes on this occaſion.

5. The Governor General has laid before us a plan for the regulation of the Nabob's troops commanded by Britiſh officers, which is now under our conſideration; we beg leave to ſend a copy of it for your information.

6. Mr. *Briſtow* having brought down to the Preſidency a parcel of jewels, invoiced at 2,35,451 rupees, which remained of a quantity received of the Nabob on account of the Company, we have ordered them to be ſold at public auction on the 15th inſtant, and ſhould give the Nabob credit for the amount of their produce, according to an agreement made by Mr. *Briſtow* with him for that purpoſe.

7. We underſtand from private advices, that Colonel *Upton* left *Poonah* on the 7th March, on his way back to *Bengal*, and that he was at *Hydrabad* on the 5th ultimo.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Fort William, *J. Clavering*,
the 9th May 1777. *Rich*^{d} *Barwell.*

END OF THE FIFTH REPORT.

SIXTH REPORT

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF SECRECY,

APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE

CARNATIC,

AND OF

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THOSE PARTS.

Reported by the LORD ADVOCATE *of* SCOTLAND (HENRY DUNDAS, Esq.)
6th March, 1782.

SIXTH REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF SECRECY, &c.

6th March 1782.

The Second Maratta War.

The COMMITTEE of SECRECY, appointed to enquire into the Cauſes of the War that now ſubſiſts in the *Carnatic*, and of the preſent Condition of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts, and to report the ſame to the Houſe, with their Obſervations thereupon, and who were inſtructed to enquire into the Riſe, Progreſs, Conduct, and preſent State of the Maratta War, and all other Hoſtilities in which the Preſidency of *Bengal* now are, or have been, engaged, in the Support of that War; and of the Effects which the ſaid War and Hoſtilities may have produced in *Bengal*, and the other Settlements and Poſſeſſions of the *Eaſt-India* Company;

HAVING in their preceding Report upon this ſubject, taken a curſory view of the general ſtate of politics, and probable diſpoſition of the ſeveral Powers in any degree intereſted in the diſputes between the Britiſh Governments in *India* and the Maratta Nation, at the period when Colonel *Upton* returned from *Poonah* to *Fort William*, in July 1777, deſire now to carry back the attention of the Houſe, to examine whether thoſe differences were effectually compromiſed and peace reſtored with a likelihood of permanency, between the Company and the *Poonah* Government.

It appears that a vackeel from the Maratta Court accompanied Colonel *Upton* on his return to *Calcutta*; and it will be remembered, that the Miniſters had expreſſed an earneſt deſire to prepare for him a welcome reception by the Governor General and Council, in the view of thereby forming a ſtronger cement to the reconciliation of the two governments. But we have diſcovered very early proofs that the final ſettlement of all differences was not yet accompliſhed. This is very ſtrongly manifeſted by letters and papers of mutual complaint interchanged between Mr. *Moſtyn* and the Poonah Durbar, ſoon after his arrival there, and by accounts from the agents who had been ſent to *Broach*, in order to agree upon the allotment of a country of three lacks. And we have further obſerved, that the Maratta Miniſter, *Siccaram Baboo*, after recapitulating many ſubjects of complaint, in a letter to Colonel *Upton*, deſired at the ſame time to inform the Supreme Council of the arrival of ſome gentlemen on the part of the King of *France*, in one of their Maratta ports, and of the real motives which had induced the Miniſters to permit their approach to the preſence, and to explain the ſubject of their miſſion, being aware, "that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* would repreſent that "matter to them in an injurious light."

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 26 May 1777.
Appx. No. 1. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 16 June and 17 July 1777.
Appx No. 2. Letter from Broach, dated 12 March 1777, to the Reſident at Poona.
Appx. No. 3. Letter from Siccaram Baboo, tranſmitted by Colonel Upton, 31 May, on Ben. Sec. Conſ. 16 June 1777.
Appx. No. 4.

And your Committee have indeed found that the accounts tranſmitted by the *Bombay* Government, and alſo by Mr. *Moſtyn* from *Poonah*, of the welcome reception given to the French agents and of their ſuppoſed deſigns, convey a very different idea of the miniſterial views in this tranſaction. It appears by theſe letters, that the principal perſon of the embaſſy called himſelf the Chevalier de *St. Laub*, and that their viſit was in conſequence of an application from the Maratta Governor to the French Chief at *Surat* during the late troubles: that they came in a large frigate to *Choul*, and it was ſaid with a commiſſion independent of the Government of *Pondicherry*: that the real object of their deputation was not known, but was ſuſpected to aim at the ſettling a factory in *Poonah*, and obtaining a ſea port in ſome part of the Malabar Coaſt under the Maratta dominions. And though Mr. *Moſtyn*, in anſwer to his remonſtrances to the Durbar, was aſſured that nothing was intended to the prejudice of the Company, the Preſidency of *Bombay* were apprehenſive of very bad conſequences to their trade, and of a dangerous influence to their diſadvantage in caſe of a national war, ſhould the French ſucceed in obtaining ſuch conceſſions from the Maratta Government; and they had therefore inſtructed Mr. *Moſtyn*, that he ſhould endeavour "to excite their jealouſy, by repre- "ſenting the ambitious views and encroaching diſpoſi- "tion of that nation, and their attachment to *Hyder Ally*, "and

Appx. No. 5. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 16 June 1777. Letter from Mr. Moſtyn to the Governor General, &c. dated 30 April. Letter from D°. to Bombay, dated 2d May. Letter from Bombay, dated 10th May 1777.
Appx. No. 6. Letter from Fort St. George, dated 15 May 1777.

" and at the ſame time to make it his ſtudy himſelf to " preſerve the moſt amicable correſpondence with the " Durbar." The Chevalier, who had obtained an early permiſſion to lay up his ſhip for the bad ſeaſon at *Choul*, and to land a conſiderable quantity of artillery and military ſtores, appears to have had his audience of the Peiſhwa on the 8th of May, and to have then delivered a letter, purporting to be from the French King, and another from his Miniſter; on which occaſion Mr. *Moſtyn* renewed his repreſentations and remonſtrances, and ſeems not to have been fully ſatisfied with the anſwer returned to him; but obſerving ſoon afterwards a change of behaviour in the Miniſters towards the Chevalier (whom he now found to be Monſieur de *St. Lubin*) he imputed it to a ſuſpicion which had ariſen, through the Nabob of *Arcot*'s vackeel, of his having acted without authority, and having preſented fictitious letters to the Peiſhwa.

Appx. No. 7. Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, dated 21 May 1777. Bomb. Sec. Conſ. 23 May 1777. Appx. No. 8. Letter dated 15 June 1777. No. 8.

Your Committee find that the Governor General and Council had ſuſpended their conſideration and judgment upon all theſe matters till Colonel *Upton*'s return; though General *Clavering* appears to have previouſly declared, that as all the acts of the *Bombay* Preſidency had been ſo manifeſtly hoſtile to the Maratta State, he was not ſurpriſed at their endeavour to form connections with the French, to protect themſelves againſt ſuch unfriendly and unjuſtifiable proceedings; and he wiſhed to induce the Court of Directors to enforce a change of conduct by their authority. Upon Colonel *Upton*'s arrival, the Board ordered all letters and incloſures which they had received from *Bombay* and from *Poonah*, to be delivered to him; and deſired his opinion as well upon the difficulties which ſtill retarded the execution of the treaty, as upon the probability of ſucceſs to the intrigues of *St. Lubin*. The anſwer of Colonel *Upton* to theſe references, which will be found in the Appendix, N° 11, is very full, aſcribing to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, almoſt in every inſtance, the blame of wilful delay, and other unwarrantable obſtructions to the concluſion of the treaty; and declaring a firm opinion, that when all the conditions of it ſhould be carried into execution, the French intrigues at the Maratta Durbar would no longer give any alarm, and that if a Miniſter from the Superior Council was ſent to reſide there, which the Peiſhwa and the Miniſters had ever requeſted, the intereſt of the Company with the Poonah Government would be ſecured againſt every attempt to ſupplant it.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 16 June 1777. D° 14 July. Appx. No. 9.

Appx. No. 10. See Appx. in the Fifth Rept. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 17 July 1777. D° 11 Aug. 1777. Appx. No. 11.

Theſe remarks, together with an abſtract, prepared by order of the Board, of ſuch other particulars as had not been decided upon by them, became the ſubject of their conſideration on the 14th Auguſt; and their letter of the 18th to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, contains their general ſentiments on thoſe ſubjects; to which, in conſequence of another letter then received from that Preſidency, communicating freſh advices in regard to the adjuſtment of mutual ſtipulations, particularly in the province of the Guzerat, they added, in reply, additional obſervations and inſtructions.

Appx. No. 12. Bom. Sec. Conſ. 11 and 18 Aug. 1777. Letter from Bomb. dated 21 June 1777. No. 12. Letter to Bomb. 18 Aug. 1777. No. 12.

It ſhould be here obſerved, that a letter was afterwards received by Colonel *Upton*, from *Futty Sing*, in which he declared that he had found himſelf compelled, by the circumſtances of his ſituation, to make the alienations, which he was at the ſame time conſcious he had not a right to do, of the diſtricts in the Guzerat Province.

27 Oct. 1777. Appx. No. 13.

Your Committee have obſerved, that many reports, in addition to thoſe ariſing from the projects of *St. Lubin*, of the inimical deſigns of the French, had for ſome time paſt been brought from different parts to the Supreme Council; and the Governor General had himſelf ſuggeſted ſome ſuſpicions of them, although he did not think ſufficiently ſtrong to cauſe any immediate alarm for the provinces of *Bengal*, or the neceſſity of removing ſome battalions of the brigades from their ſtation in the Vizier's country, which General *Clavering* had propoſed. But he afterwards adviſed that a letter ſhould be ſent to the Preſidencies of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay*, requeſting them to tranſmit a return of the actual ſtate of their forces, together with their ſentiments upon the beſt preparatory ſteps to be taken for reſiſtance, in caſe of invaſion on any of the Company's ſettlements.

Appx. No. 14. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 28 July 1777. Letters from Mr. Middleton. Mr. Francis's Minute 16 June. Minutes of Mr. Francis, the Governor General, and Gen. Clavering, 14 July 1777. See App. No. 9. 22 Sept. 1777. Appx. No. 15.

With regard to the progreſs of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*'s negociations, our Committee have found, that the Supreme Council, in a letter to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, complained of the want of information from them on this ſubject, though it had appeared by a paper, which had accidentally fallen into Mr. *Moſtyn*'s hands, written by *St. Lubin*'s Secretary, that he was certainly charged with a commiſſion from *France*, and that his ſucceſs muſt of courſe be attended with conſequences very detrimental to the intereſts of the Company. This complaint was afterwards ſtill more ſeriouſly repeated, upon account of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s ſudden return to *Bombay*, and the delay of the Preſident and Council in communicating the propoſals which he brought from the Maratta Government. But by other accounts tranſmitted from *Poonah* in Mr. *Moſtyn*'s abſence, we perceive that not only Monſieur de *St. Lubin* appeared to have a greater influence than ever with the Miniſters, but that his intereſt prevailed ſo far as to procure encouragement alſo for the agent of another foreign Power, who was lately arrived, and who was likely to be allowed to fix an Auſtrian ſettlement on the Maratta Coaſt, by the particular favour of *Nanna Furneſe*. At the ſame time, a quarrel which happened between Monſieur de *St. Lubin* and ſome perſons of his ſuite, opened a ſource of further information relative to the origin and advancement of his ſcheme. Theſe perſons, it ſeems, pretending an alarm at the reſentment of their principal, had ſought an aſylum under the protection of Mr. *Lewis* (the Aſſiſtant Reſident) which he readily afforded them. The Government of *Bombay*, when informed of the circumſtances, aſſured him of their approbation, and directed that he ſhould ſend the two gentlemen to the Preſidency. The Miniſter however *(Nanna Furneſe)* refuſed the Duſtuck to paſs them out of the Maratta territories, which Mr. *Lewis* attributed to the influence of *St. Lubin*. It appears to your Committee, that the Governor General and Council highly condemned this whole tranſaction, as a probable cauſe of new diſſentions with the Miniſters; intimating alſo their ſtrong ſuſpicion of impoſture and ſtratagem in colluſion with *St. Lubin*, for the purpoſe of fomenting diſunion between the Engliſh and that Government.

Appx. No. 16. See Gov. General's Minute, 20 Oct. 1777. Letter in Conſequence. Appx. No. 17. Letter from Bomb. dated 24 Aug. 1777, incloſing a paper received from the Reſident at Poonah. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 6 Nov. 1777. Appx. No. 18. Appx. No. 19. Letter from Bombay, dated 19th Sept. 1777, incloſing one from Mr. Moſtyn at Poonah, 23 Aug. Letter from Mr. Lewis, dated 29 Nov. 1777, with the Incloſures. Appx. No. 20.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 29 Dec. 1777. Appx. No. 21.

But your Committee have found further accounts of theſe proceedings in a letter from Mr. *Farmer*, who happened to be then at *Poonah*, to the Bombay Government, which the Preſident and Council incloſed on the 7th of December in a long Diſpatch to the Calcutta Board; and tranſmitting alſo therein the propoſals which had been delivered to Mr. *Moſtyn*, by the Maratta Miniſters, they declared, that if *Ragoba* ſhould not chuſe to accept the conditions proffered to him, which were certainly more ſpecious than ſolid, they could not prevail on themſelves to remove him by force from their ſettlements, eſpecially " as the Honourable Company, " in a letter dated 16th April 1777, juſt received, con- " ſidered the perſonal ſafety of *Ragoba* of ſo much im- " portance, as to make it one of the conditions of their " acquieſcing in the late treaty." The plain tenor and drift of this Addreſs to the Superior Council, enforced by a copy of the general letter (both of which we have placed at length in the Appendix, No. 23, for the particular attention of the Houſe) was calculated to inſpire a diſtruſt of artifice and duplicity in the Maratta Miniſters, and of their combination with the French to invade the Britiſh ſettlements. It diſcovers alſo the further deſign of perſuading the Superior Council to an anticipation of theſe hoſtile machinations, by a prior attack on the projectors; and endeavours to evince the certainty of ſucceſs againſt a divided Government and a weak, ill-paid army, hard preſſed by *Hyder Ally*; concluding with a repreſentation of the limited powers and unprovided reſources of their own Preſidency, which left

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 26 Jan. 1778. Appx. No. 22. Mr. Farmer's Letter.

Appx. No. 23.

them unauthorized and unequal to the undertaking, without the advice and ſupport of the ſuperintending Government, to whom they had done their duty in ſubmitting theſe neceſſary recommendations.

Your Committee indeed obſerve, from the contents of the General Letter of the 16th April, referred to above, that the Court of Directors, though they gave their ſanction to the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, were not entirely ſatisfied with the terms of it, as it had not procured the ſurrender of *Beſſein* to the Company; and alſo that they did not approve of the mode of interference by the Superior Council in ſending an Ambaſſador to *Poonah*, but plainly pointed out a more limited ſenſe, in which they ſhould expect the ſuperintending power to be for the future regarded; amounting to little more than a reſervation of the right of final approval and ratification of treaties, which the other Preſidencies, in matters affecting their dependencies, ſhould be authorized to negotiate. And your Committee have further obſerved, that the Court very ſtrongly intimated the preference which they ſhould have given to an alliance with *Ragoba*, and eſpecially in the following directions: "If "the Conditions of the Treaty of *Poonah* have not been "ſtrictly fulfilled on the part of the Marattas, and if "from any circumſtances our Governor General and "Council ſhall deem it expedient, we have no objection "to an alliance with *Ragoba*, on the terms agreed upon "between him and you."

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 26 Jan. 1778. Appex. No. 24. No. 24. Extract of General Letter to Bengal, 5 Feb. 1777.

Your Committee find, that on the 26th January the Governor General delivered in a Minute to the Board, which having been prepared before the arrival of the advices juſt mentioned from *Bombay*, was not deſigned as an anſwer or aſſent to them, though turning upon the ſame ſubject, it will of courſe be found in many reſpects applicable to them. And we ſhould not indeed omit to remark, that a letter from the Court of Directors, under date 5th February 1777, to *Bengal*, was received in the month of November following; and as it contains obſervations and directions ſimilar to thoſe addreſſed to *Bombay* in the Diſpatch of the 16th of April, the Governor General was of courſe aware of the Company's ſentiments at the time he drew up this Minute for the conſideration of the Board, and he evidently formed his general plan in obſervance of the Company's orders.

It contains a ſtrong recommendation to adopt deciſive meaſures, either for the purpoſe of final pacification or open hoſtility, between which alternatives it was become neceſſary to determine upon a poſitive choice or offer; that mutual infractions (real or ſuppoſed) of the treaty of *Poorunder*, and the certainty of engagements having been entered into between the Maratta Miniſters and the French Agent, made it incumbent upon the Company's ſervants to be at leaſt prepared for either event, and induced him to propoſe a plan for accommodation, which ſhould be held concluſive.

Your Committee obſerve in this plan material alterations and amendments of the treaty of *Poorunder*; the principal objects of it appear to be a ſtipulation of more advantageous conditions in favour of *Ragoba*, and the eventual or immediate acquiſition of *Beſſein* to the Company, providing againſt the further effects of the French intrigues at the Court of *Poonah*, and propoſing to detach a ſtrong reinforcement of troops to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, with the ſupport of which they might the more confidently inſiſt upon the propoſed terms of accommodation, or make the beſt advantage of any change of government in *Poonah*; but that above all, they might be enabled to reſiſt any attempts which the French ſhould make to the prejudice of the Company's intereſts on that ſide of *India*.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 29th January 1778. Appx. No. 25. See Letter from Bombay, dated 12th December 1777.

But your Committee find, that a few days after the delivery of theſe propoſitions, and before the opinions of the ſeveral Members of the Council had been given upon them, advices were received by the Board from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, containing intelligence of new events, and an alteration of circumſtances, which ſuperſeded the further conſideration of them. It appears, as well by the records of the ſecret proceedings of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, on the 10th and 12th December 1777, as by their letter to *Bengal* of that date, that overtures had been made to Mr. *Lewis*, Deputy Reſident at *Poonah*, on the part of *Siccaram Baboo*, *Moraba Furneſe*, *Burcheba Pronder*, and *Tookajee Holkar*, for the Company's aſſiſtance, to bring *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, and that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* had unanimouſly agreed to encourage the plan, in caſe *Siccaram Baboo* and the other Chiefs would make the application under their own Siccas and hand writing: that they had commiſſioned Mr. *Lewis* to communicate their reſolutions with all poſſible ſecrecy and expedition to the confederates; and that they had requeſted the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* to order 200 European infantry, half a company of artillery, with their officers, and a battalion of Sepoys, to be held in readineſs to march to *Anjengo* on receipt of further advices from *Bombay*; and that they hoped the Governor General and Council would give their hearty concurrence and ſupport to the meaſures which muſt be adopted in conſequence of their reſolutions.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 10 and 12 December. Appx. No. 26

The conſultations and debates which aroſe in the Supreme Council from a conſideration of this ſubject, are placed together in the Appendix, N° 27, and entirely merit the attention of the Houſe. By theſe it will be found, that although much oppoſition was made to propoſals of approbation and encouragement to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, on account of their deſigns in favour of *Ragoba*, it was reſolved by the majority of the Board (which the caſting voice of the Governor General decided) as follows:

Sec. Conſ. 29 January and 2 February 1778. Appx. No. 27. See alſo the Minutes referred to in Appendix, No. 29.

"Reſolved, 1ſt, That it is the opinion of the Board, "that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are warranted, by the Treaty of *Poorunder*, to join in a plan "for conducting *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*, on the application of the ruling part of the adminiſtration of "the Maratta State.

"2d. Reſolved, That it is the opinion of the Board, "that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are warranted, by the orders of the Court of Directors, to "give their ſupport to the pretenſions of *Ragonaut* "*Row*, if they can afford it without a violation of the "Treaty.

"3d. Reſolved, That the plan which the Preſident "and Council of *Bombay* have agreed to form with the "Maratta Government, as explained in their proceedings of the 10th December, and in their letter of the "12th December 1777, be approved.

"4th. Reſolved, That the ſanction of this Government be given to the plan, which the Preſident and "Council have agreed to form with the Maratta Government, as above expreſſed; and that they be authorized to carry the ſame into execution by ſuch means "as they ſhall judge moſt adviſable, provided theſe be "conſiſtent with the treaty, and the orders of the Court "of Directors.

"5th. Reſolved, That the Company not being bound "by the Treaty of *Poorunder* to take part in the diſputes "of the Maratta Government, are therefore entitled to "any further advantages that may be obtained by negociation, as a compenſation for the hazard and expence of their interpoſition and aſſiſtance.

"6th. Reſolved, That it is the opinion of this Board, "that the following are proper objects to be required as "a compenſation for the interpoſition of the Company, "and that it be recommended to the Preſident and "Council of *Bombay*, to obtain them accordingly; "viz.

"1ſt. That ſuch reaſonable and practicable ſecu"rity be obtained for the perſonal ſafety of *Ra*"*gonaut Row*, as he ſhall require.

"2d. That a ſpecific ſum be required to reimburſe "the Company for the military charges which "may be incurred by their interpoſition.

"3d. That

" 3d. That the fort and diſtrict of *Baſſein* be ceded " in perpetuity to the Company.

" 4th. That an additional grant of territory be " made to the Company, adjacent to *Baſſein* or " to *Bombay*, in exchange for *Broach*, and the " lands ceded to the Company by *Futty Sing*, " *Guicawar*, and for the Pergunnahs of *Hanſood*, " *Ahmood*, and *Deſhorah*.

" 5th. That no European ſettlements ſhall be al- " lowed on any of the maritime coaſts of the " Maratta dominions, without the conſent of " the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* " previouſly obtained.

" 7th. Reſolved, That a ſupply of money, to the " amount of ten lacks of rupees, be immediately " granted to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, for " the ſupport of their engagements above-mentioned, " independent of the ordinary annual ſupply to that " Preſidency.

" 8th. Reſolved, That military aſſiſtance be ſent to " the Preſidency of *Bombay*.—In explanation of the " grounds of the 3d Reſolution, the Board think it ne- " ceſſary to remark, that they underſtand the plan of " the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to be confined " merely to the objects of ſecurity to the Engliſh poſ- " ſeſſions in *India*, and to the excluſion of the natural " enemies of the Britiſh Government, from any influence " or connection with the Marattas."

Appx. No. 28. Letter to Bombay, 2 Feb. 1778.

And it appears by the letter, which in conſequence of theſe reſolutions, was then written to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, that the ſanction of the Superior Council was given to their plan, upon the ſuppoſition that the Chief Miniſter of the Maratta State had particularly ſolicited their interference to compoſe the inteſtine diviſions of that empire; and that the object of their own policy was to prevent the growth " of an influence " dangerous to the Company's intereſt, to defeat the " intentions of a party adverſe to the Company, and to " promote the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions." And it ſhould be remarked, that the Governor General propoſed, that the reſolution in regard to ſending reinforcements to *Bombay*, ſhould not be carried into execution until the Board received further advices from thence, which would be neceſſary to warrant it: and he further deſired to lay before them, ſtronger evidence than had yet been recorded of the extent and danger of the French intrigues at *Poonah*, becauſe " they formed the " principal grounds for the ſuppoſed reſolutions of the " Preſident and Council of *Bombay*." To theſe letters and papers, which we have put in the Appendix, N° 29, we deſire to refer the Houſe, and would only further obſerve, that the Governor General added a declaration of his real opinion, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* were in a ſtate of ſufficient force to enter upon the meaſure they had propoſed, under all the preſent circumſtances and diſpoſitions of the Maratta armies; but that, however, he thought it neceſſary to appriſe and warn them, " that the Superior Council deemed them ſolely reſpon- " ſible to the Company and the nation for all the con- " ſequences of the meaſures they had taken, or might " take on that occaſion, without their conſent and ap- " probation."

Appx. No. 29. See ſeveral Letters on this ſubject, particularly one from Mr. Elliot. N. B. No date to Mr. Elliot's Letter.

Your Committee find, that the Governor General and Council tranſmitted an account of all theſe circumſtances to the Court of Directors, in their ſecret letter dated 4th February; in which they added, that the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* having declined to comply with the requeſt of the *Bombay* Government for a ſupply of troops, they had expreſſed their deſire, that they would not continue to refuſe it. And it appears by another ſecret letter, dated 16th February, from the Governor General and Council, that the death of the Ram Rajah, which happened in the beginning of December 1777, was expected to occaſion ſome difficulty and diſorder in the nomination and eſtabliſhment of a ſucceſſor; and that the defeat of the Maratta troops by *Hyder Ally*, would alſo prove to be an event very favourable in its conſequ to the Company's tranſactions with that Governme

Sec Sec. Letter to Court of Directors, dated 4th Feb. 1778. Appex No. 30

Secret Letter, 16 Feb. 1778. Appx. No. 31.

Your Committee find, that on the 11th January, Mr. *Moſtyn*, who had returned to *Poonah*, wrote from thence to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, informing them of his apprehenſions, that though *Siccaram Baboo* would privately aſſiſt the furtherance of their plan, he would not yet be induced to give it under his hand. Whereupon the *Bombay* Board appear to have made the following reſolution, " That nothing further can be done in " the buſineſs, unleſs *Siccaram Baboo* joins in making " application to us for the aſſiſtance of the Company to " reinſtate *Ragoba*; as we cannot think of acting in any " manner contrary to the late treaty, unleſs by expreſs " deſire of the principal perſons with whom it was con- " cluded."—But the Preſident having on the 19th laid before the Board a paper of information, tranſmitted to him by *Ragoba*, wherein it was aſſerted, that an actual agreement in writing had taken place for giving up of *Row Dauda* or *Choul* to the French, though the ſunnuds had not yet been iſſued, they immediately recorded an unanimous opinion, " that nothing but a change in " the preſent Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, could ſecure " the Company from the danger and bad conſequences " of an alliance between the French and the Marattas, " and that there was no method to avert the impending " evil, but by the Company's immediately taking a " deciſive part." And in further confirmation of theſe ſentiments, they communicated their reſolutions to the Governor General and Council, by a letter dated the 20th January, in which alſo they deſired to receive a direction for their conduct, in caſe the French ſhould attempt to take poſſeſſion of the ſea port which was ſaid to have been ceded to them.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 14 Jan. 1778. Appx. No. 32.

19 Jan. 1778.

Bom. Sec. Conſ. 19 Jan. 1778. Appx. No. 33.

Bom. Sec. Conſ. 20 January 1778. Appx. No. 34.

This letter appears to have been taken into conſideration by the Calcutta Board, in their ſecret department, on the 23d February, at the ſame time with diſpatches from Mr. *Moſtyn*, dated the 19th and 24th January, in which he mentions his having been informed by good authority, that no agreement had yet taken place between the French and the Maratta Durbar. In conſequence of theſe advices, and of the application for inſtructions from *Bombay*, the Governor General propoſed an immediate reply, in which they ſhould acquaint the Preſident and Council of their reſolution to ſend a ſtrong military force to act under the direction of that Government, which would aſſemble at *Calpee*, and march by the moſt practicable route to *Bombay*, as ſoon as all neceſſary preparations could be expedited, and before their progreſs ſhould be retarded by the coming on of the rainy ſeaſon. Your Committee obſerve, that this propoſition was ſtrongly oppoſed, as will be ſeen by the ſeveral Minutes of the Board, placed in the Appendix N° 35, whereby the Houſe will be fully informed of the arguments uſed in objection to, and in ſupport of, the meaſure. It was at laſt reſolved to ſend the anſwer, recommended by the Governor General, with an additional paragraph, in the following words: " As we " have no property, or pretenſions to property, in the " port of *Choul*, we cannot authorize you to uſe any overt " meaſures for preventing the French from forming an " eſtabliſhment at that place, however dangerous their " neighbourhood may be to your Preſidency. This " muſt be effected by other means, that is, by an appeal " to that power which alone can give them the right " of poſſeſſion. We think it neceſſary alſo to add the " following injunction, that you do not on any pretence " become the aggreſſors, by commencing hoſtilities againſt " the French directly, nor againſt the Maratta State, " but that you continue to adhere, as you aſſure us you " will do, to the ſtrict letter of the treaty ſubſiſting be- " tween the Company and the preſent adminiſtration of " the Maratta State."

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 23d Feb. 1778. Appx. No. 35.

Appx. No. 36.

Your Committee find, that the Board having thus reſolved to detach a reinforcement to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, went into a conſideration, in their military department,

Ben. Mil. Conſ. 23 Feb. 1778. Appx. No. 37.

partment of the number and quality of the troops they ſhould ſend, and of other neceſſary ſteps to be taken relative to the ſubſtitution of a force, which might be judged ſufficient for the defence of their own immediate dependencies, in the abſence of ſo conſiderable a detachment. The opinion of General *Stibbert*, who had been conſulted on this ſubject, and to whom ſeveral papers of information had been referred on the 2d of this month, was on this occaſion laid before the Board by the Governor General.

And your Committee obſerve, That he (the Commander in Chief) diſapproved of the plan ſuggeſted for increaſing the Sepoy battalions to 1,000 men each, and recommended that four battalions ſhould be formed by drafts from the four brigades, which with two field pieces attached to each, he thought to be full as great a force of diſciplined troops as could be well ſpared from their eſtabliſhment for the ſervice of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and that no Europeans, either of artillery or infantry, could be added to them; that as this detachment muſt go by land, it would be expedient to ſecure the friendly aſſiſtance of the different Powers through whoſe territories they muſt neceſſarily paſs; and that among theſe, the permiſſion and favour of *Tookajee Holkar* and *Madhajee Scindia*, would be of the greateſt conſequence, and remove every material difficulty.—But we perceive that the Governor General was of opinion that this method of drafting would take up too much time, and therefore ſubmi ted the following propoſitions to the conſideration of the Board.

" Firſt, That a detachment be formed of ſix battali-
" ons of Sepoys from the firſt brigade, with their ord-
" nance; one company of native artillery, with its com-
" plement of ordnance, to be furniſhed from the field
" train of the firſt brigade at *Allahabad*, and two how-
" itzers to be ſupplied from the ſame ſtation.

" Second, That the troops which are to compoſe this
" detachment, be directed to aſſemble at *Korah*, or in
" the neighbourhood of *Calpee*.

" Third, That the ſtores of this detachment be fur-
" niſhed from the magazines neareſt to the place of
" rendezvous; and that the commanding officer be fur-
" niſhed with unlimited authority to indent for ſuch
" ſtores and in ſuch quantity as he may deem neceſſary
" for the ſervice to be performed.

" Fourth, That Colonel *Leſlie* be appointed to com-
" mand this detachment, with one field officer from the
" firſt brigade, and one from the temporary brigade;
" and that Major *Baillie* be nominated to the charge of
" the artillery, with two additional ſubaltern officers
" of that corps to join the company ordered upon this
" ſervice.

" Fifth, That Colonel *Leſlie* be directed to make
" the neceſſary preparations to conduct the detachment
" by the moſt practicable route to *Bombay*, or to ſuch
" other place in that neighbourhood as he ſhall be guided
" to by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*; and that
" it be particularly recommended to him to provide the
" moſt effectual means of anſwering a ſufficient ſupply
" of proviſions during the courſe of the march."

Theſe propoſitions appear to have been agreed upon by the majority of the Board—Mr. *Francis* however proteſting againſt the march of the propoſed detachment to the Malabar coaſt, from an opinion, that ſo great a force could not be ſpared conſiſtently with the defence of the Bengal provinces, and of the dominions of their ally the Nabob of *Oude*; and that a reinforcement, if neceſſary, might be ſpared with more ſafety, and proceed with greater expedition, from *Fort Saint George*.

Mil. Conſ. 9 March 1778. N° 37. And we obſerve, that other leſſer arrangements relative to this expedition, being propoſed by the Governor General on the 9th March, were aſſented to by the Board; Meſſrs. *Wheler* and *Francis* declaring, that having objected in vain to the general meaſure, they would not interfere with details.

Your Committee however find, that a packet having arrived on the 12th from the Court of Directors, containing alſo a copy of their diſpatches, dated 4th July 1777, to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* on that occaſion renewed their inſtances of diſlike to the expedition, and addreſſed a letter to the Governor General on the ſubject; in which, adverting to the reſolutions of the Court, and their directions to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, they declared, that, conſidering all meaſures taken by them, in conjunction with *Ragoba*, againſt the ruling power of *Poonah*, to ſtand in direct violation of the Company's inſtructions, they deſired to ſubmit an opinion, that all orders already iſſued for the march of the intended detachment to *Bombay*, ſhould be immediately countermanded. The Minutes of the Governor General and other Members of the Board, at a meeting in their ſecret department, in conſequence of this addreſs from Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, are placed in the Appendix No. 38, together with an extract from the Company's general letter: on the contents of which, and the proper acceptation of them, aroſe the debate in queſtion, and which terminated in a negative given by the majority to the propoſition made by Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*.

Appx. No. 38.

Appx. No. 38.

Your Committee find, that on the 23d March the Governor General propoſed a draft of a letter to *Bombay*, which purported to be an explanation of the ſentiments of the Superior Council on the laſt paragraph of the Company's general letter above-mentioned to that Preſidency; and to give ſuch inſtructions and authority for their guidance, as appeared neceſſary, on a ſuppoſition that the ſame adminiſtration remained at *Poonah*, and that the treaty continued on the ſame footing as that on which it had ſtood for two years paſt. The great objects pointed out in this letter to the attention of the Bombay Board, appear to be, that they ſhould principally endeavour to defeat the ſecret or open machinations of the French with the Maratta Government; ſhould inſiſt upon the definitive execution of the treaty by the ruling Powers of that State; and ſhould take advantage of every change in its adminiſtration to negociate beneficial conceſſions to the Company.—With regard to their conduct towards *Ragoba*, we obſerve the following explicit direction: " But if the preſent or future Members of the " Adminiſtration ſhall either directly infringe the treaty, " or permit it to be infringed by perſons acting under " their authority, or ſhall refuſe to fulfil the conditions " of it, we, as authorized by the Company, do inveſt " you with authority to form a new alliance with *Ragoba*, " and to engage with him in any ſcheme you ſhall deem " expedient and ſafe for retrieving his affairs." In the ſame letter however they informed the Preſident and Council that they had written to deſire the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters would allow a free paſſage to the troops with which they intended to reinforce the Bombay eſtabliſhment, and they directed them to make the ſame application immediately from themſelves. But your Committee think it proper here again to refer the Houſe to the Appendix N° 41, for an inſpection of the inſtructions at large, and for the general reaſonings of the Board upon them, and the objections of the minority, with the ſubſequent reply of the Governor General in defence of them, recorded on the Secret Conſultations of the 6th April; and alſo a further Minute of the Governor General's, recorded in the proceedings of the 15th of the ſame month; and Mr. *Francis*'s Minute, recorded on Conſultations 27th April, in reply and in confirmation of his objections; being all particularly directed to invalidate or ſubſtantiate the evidence of the dangerous tendency of the French deſigns in conjunction with the Maratta Government, and the neceſſity or propriety of the meaſures adviſed for counteracting them.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 23d Mar. 1778. Appx. No. 39.

See alſo Letter to the Peiſhwa, dated 23 March. Appx. No. 40. Ben. Sec. Conn. Corr. No. 6. Letter written at the ſame time to other Powers, particularly to Moodajee Bouſla, are placed in the ſame Appx. Appx. No. 41.

Your Committee having moreover obſerved, that the inſtructions propoſed by the Governor General on the 6th April to be ſent to Colonel *Leſlie*, and a letter in conſequence of them to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, were

Appx. No. 42.

not resolved upon by the Board without opposition, have put the proceedings upon that occasion also in the Appendix N° 42, and only take a cursory notice in this place of the general purport of those orders; by which it appears that Colonel *Leslie* was directed to proceed to *Bombay*, taking his route preferably through the province of *Berar*, on account of the friendly disposition of the Rajah, unless any unforeseen prevention should arise: that if after endeavouring to gain the consent of the chief of any district through which he might wish to pass, he should meet with a refusal from him, he was to pursue his march nevertheless in opposition to any such impediment, paying regard however to certain prescribed restrictions: that in advancing through the different countries, he should be attentive to the state and interests of the several petty Chiefs; that he should be careful in preventing any mischief to the inhabitants; and that he should not suffer himself to be diverted from the steady prosecution of his march, by any new object, however plausible, excepting only for the safety or subsistence of his troops: that he was to consider himself to be under the command of the Presidency of *Bombay* from the time of beginning his march, which he should do as soon as he could be fully provided for it.

And your Committee observe, that the Governor General and Council transmitted accounts of these proceedings to the Court of Directors, on the 20th March and the 23d April; and we have subjoined the extracts from their secret letters of those dates in the Appendix N° 43.

Appx. No. 43. See extracts of letters from Ben. 20 March and 23d April 1778. Appx. No. 44. Letter from Bombay.

And it appears to your Committee, that on the 11th May, Mr *Francis* took occasion, in consequence of a letter from *Bombay*, dated 5th April, to repeat his attempts to put a stop to the expedition under Colonel *Leslie*, as no longer necessary even on the principles on which it was undertaken. Your Committee observe, that the President and Council of *Bombay* informed the Superior Board of a change in the administration of the Government at *Poonah*, by which the supposed friends of *Ragoba* had displaced *Nanna Furnese*, the decided enemy to his interests, though a compromise was since likely to be effected between that Minister and his opponents. They made an inference of regret from this event, that while they had, for want of powers, been unable to take a part, *Ragoba*'s friends had found their own strength sufficient to procure them success without their assistance; and any favourable stipulations for the Company must of course be more difficult to be obtained. They seemed however to feel a consolation in another probable consequence of the revolution, that the designs of the French would be absolutely defeated. Yet they at the same time mentioned the appearance of Monsieur *Bellecombe*, the new Governor of *Pondicherry*, upon their coast, and the report of his having landed 300 Europeans at *Mahe:* that Sir *Edward Vernon* however had sailed with a superior force to attend his movements up the coast; and that they had ordered all the force which they could detach from their Presidency, to be ready to march at a moment's warning, and take advantage of any call for their interposition.

See the proceedings of the Governor General and Council, in their Secret Department, 11th May 1778. Appx. No. 45.

In consequence of these informations, and the probable effects of a change in the Poonah politics, Messrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* argued on the inutility and inexpediency of continuing the design adopted of detaching a considerable body of their troops, and moved, that immediate orders should be sent to suspend their march; but the Governor General deduced from the same grounds of reasoning an entire contrary conclusion, and sought to convince the Board of the necessity of prosecuting with vigour the measures which they had begun, until the designs of them should be fully accomplished. Mr. *Barwell* did not think the reasons assigned by Mr. *Francis* would warrant his assent to the proposition, and it was of course resolved in the negative, by the majority of the Board.

Your Committee find, that the same subject occasioned new debates on the 21st, in which there appeared a like disparity of sentiments, from the same premises. Mr. *Francis*, taking notice of letters received that day from *Fort Saint George*, and from Mr. *Mostyn*, expressed his opinion, that the Board must judge it wise to suspend the march of the detachment; that having no great idea of apprehension from the supposed influence of the French at *Poonah*, and the last accounts from *Europe* shewing no probability of a French war, he thought the measure, against which he was remonstrating, to be most likely in its tendency to cause a rupture with that Power. The Governor General, on the contrary, declared it to be his persuasion, that the whole tenor of the letters proved the necessity of confirming their former resolutions, as he was not convinced that any complete effects had followed from the resolution at *Poonah*, or that there was any diminution in the influence of the French, or of their desisting from their hostile designs.

And we perceive, that in a subsequent Minute, recorded on the Secret Consultations 1st June, upon this subject, the Governor General used the following argument: "I think it proper to observe, that an alliance "with *Ragoba* is not the object of the measures which "have been lately undertaken by this Government for "the support of the Presidency of *Bombay*; their de- "clared object is to give security and permanency to "the peace of that settlement. It fortunately happened, "that while we were in pursuit of this object, *Rogoba* "was offered to us as an instrument. The Company "have warranted us to accept him as such, and he is "the most likely to prove effectual of any that we could "have chosen; we have accepted him, and while his "agency shall be necessary to the above end, and can "be employed with a sacred observance of every other "engagement, I hope we shall continue to employ it." The observations made by Mr. *Francis* in reply to this Minute, and others which followed upon the same subject, are put together in the Appendix. Appx. No. 47.

No. 47. Dated 29 April 1778. See *Appx.* 46.

Your Committee find, in the letter above mentioned from *Fort Saint George*, the following reasons assigned for their granting assistance of troops to the Presidency of *Bombay:* "In consequence of your letter to us of the "4th of February, we ordered the number of troops re- "quested by the gentlemen at *Bombay* to be in readi- "ness to march, if it should be thought necessary on a "further application from them." And it appears that in their letter of the same date to the President and Council of *Bombay*, copy of which they also transmitted to the Superior Council, they informed them, at the same time, of their motives for having at first declined a compliance with their requisition, and of the reasons which had since induced them to grant it, and which they explained as follows:

"We assure you, Gentlemen, that we paid every at- "tention to your request, and should have been happy if "the situation of affairs here had permitted us to comply "with it, in the extent you wished; but circumstanced "as we then were, the measure appeared too unsafe and "imprudent to be adopted: however, upon hearing "from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, "that their sanction and assistance would be given to "your proceedings, and upon their opening and recom- "mending the design more fully to us, we then deter- "mined, notwithstanding the incomplete state of "our establishment, to order the troops you had before "requested, to hold themselves in readiness to march. "They are now under these orders; but as the season is "too far advanced to send them to *Anjengo*, we shall "keep them in readiness to proceed to your assistance "the first opportunity that offers, if your absolute want "of them should continue, and no material change shall "happen here in the mean time. But we must observe "to you, that the number of our Europeans fit for duty "is so small and disproportionate, that we deem it unsafe, "even in the most favourable times, to detach any part "of them upon so distant a service; and we wish there-

fore that Sepoys only may be required, as we can with much leſs difficulty replace their loſs."

Your Committee find, that the Governor General directed the Secretary to prepare the draft of a letter in anſwer to that from the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, and which he laid before the Board for their approbation. This letter contains reflections and information ſo cloſely relating to every ſubject of the enquiry committed to our inveſtigation, and throws ſo much light on the general ſituation of the Company's ſettlements, as well as on the particular object of their actual attention, that your Committee have thought proper to inſert it here at length, in the body of their report:

" Gentlemen,

" We have received your letter of the 29th April, " incloſing copy of one addreſſed to you by the Preſi- " dent and Council of *Bombay*, with your reply to it:

" We deſire to make our acknowledgments to you, " for the very uſeful informations which are contained " in your letter of the 16th January laſt, reſpecting the " ſtate, exigencies, and reſources of your Preſidency. " To the repreſentations therein repeated, of the neceſſity " of your being provided with a fund of money, which " may enable you to anſwer any extraordinary calls in a " time of war, or other public diſtreſs, we can only return " the ſame anſwer that we made in our letter of the 19th " January, to a ſimilar requiſition contained in your's " of the 30th December. We conſider the aid of the " Company's reſources, whereſoever they may exiſt, as " due to the exigencies of all their ſettlements: on this " principle we ſhall always be ready to contribute every " means in our power to the relief of your's, whenever " they ſhall indiſpenſably require it, and we can afford " it without ſubjecting the intereſt of our common em- " ployers to a greater inconvenience in one place, than " that which we ſhould attempt to avert in another. " The diſtance between the two Preſidencies is not ſo " great, nor will the means of remittance, we hope, be " ſo difficult in any ſeaſon of emergency, as to pre- " vent our ſupplying you with money, when there ſhall " be an abſolute call for it. On the contrary, we are " of opinion, that if ever the *Carnatic* ſhould be threat- " ened with a war, it will be the intereſt of every wealthy " individual at *Madras*, to tranſfer his property to " *Bengal*, through the channel of your treaſury; and the " merchants of *Bengal*, who have property at *Fort* " *Saint George*, will certainly be glad to avail them- " ſelves of the ſame means to withdraw it, on ſuch an " occaſion. At preſent no ſuch neceſſity exiſts, to re- " quire an extraordinary aid from us; nor is the proſpect " ſo alarming, as to juſtify us in providing againſt it " in future; for whenever we grant you pecuniary ſup- " plies from *Bengal*, it muſt be attended with one bad " effect, which, under any circumſtances, will afford us " regret; namely, it will tend to impoveriſh this country, " by draining it of the ſpecie neceſſary for circulation.

" To theſe conſiderations we muſt add, that we ſhall " not think ourſelves warranted, even under the moſt " preſſing ſituation of your affairs, to offer our relief, if " it ſhall appear to us that you have the means of it " left in your own hands unapplied. The protection " of the *Carnatic*, while it depends on the Company, " requires that no private claims ought to be ſuffered to " interfere with their right to the ſhare of its revenues, " which may be indiſpenſably neceſſary for its ſafety and " defence.

" We are ſorry that you ſhould have thought it ne- " ceſſary, on the ſlight grounds of private information, " to intimate to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, " that the detachment ordered by us was to winter at " *Corah*, and afterwards proceed on their march. Such " an information from you, however qualified, muſt " have the effect of authority; and we ſee great reaſon " to apprehend, that it will tend to diſcourage their " adherents, and to retard, if not diſcredit, their ope- " rations, by throwing a damp upon their undertakings. " To this end their diſappointment in the hope of aſſiſt- " ance from your Preſidency, though latterly unavoid- " able, will naturally have contributed. We now " think it proper to inform you, that the detachment " which we have formed for the ſervice of the Preſi- " dency of *Bombay*, began its march from *Corah* to " *Calpee* on the 4th inſtant; and unleſs the future ad- " vices which we may receive from *Bombay*, ſhall aſſure " us that its aſſiſtance will not be wanted, it is our in- " tention to proſecute the undertaking without any " delay or intermiſſion. This force conſiſts of ſix bat- " talions of Sepoys, one company of native artillery, " and a ſmall body of cavalry. The command of it " has been aſſigned to Colonel *Leſlie*, an active and ex- " prienced officer; its route to *Bombay* will be through " *Bundlecund* and the dominions of *Moodajee Booſla*, by " his permiſſion, which has been obtained, with a pro- " miſe of ſupplies and proviſions, and every other " aſſiſtance that may be required in the courſe of its " march.

" We rely upon your promiſe to co-operate with us on " this important occaſion, ſhould the ſtate of affairs on " the other ſide of *India* require it at the ſeaſon of the " year, when you will be able to ſend the Preſident and " Council of *Bombay* the reinforcement of men in- " tended for their ſervice; and from the lateſt advices " we have received, we apprehend that their preſence " there may be eſſential.

" We requeſt that you will attend the motions of " *Hyder Ally*, and the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and " adviſe us if they ſhall take any ſteps which may affect " our concerns with the Maratta State."

" *Fort William*, " We are, &c."

" 19th May 1778."

Your Committee obſerve, that this letter was much diſapproved of by Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, particularly on the ground of refuſal to grant a ſupply of money, " conſidering (to uſe their expreſſion) the un- " exampled profuſion with which we have ſupplied " *Bombay*." And when the Governor General afterwards propoſed the following additional paragtaph to the letter—— Appx. No. 48.

" If you ſee a proſpect of the continuance of troubles " at *Poonah*, we beg leave to recommend that you cauſe " a part of your forces to be aſſembled near the northern " frontier of the *Carnatic*, for the purpoſe of affording " either direct aſſiſtance to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, " or a diverſion in their favour, in any way that you " may judge moſt adviſable"—

——It appears that thoſe gentlemen enforced their remonſtrances againſt it with ſtill greater energy:— Their Minutes upon this occaſion, with the replies of the Governor General, are placed in the Appendix, No. 48, and recommended to the notice of the Houſe. No. 48.

But your Committee think proper to obſerve, that the Governor General, in juſtification of his motives for the refuſal of a preſent ſupply of money to the Preſidency of *Madras*, for the purpoſes aſſigned by them, prepared and laid before the Board an exact account of the ſtate of their own treaſury; by which he made it appear " that they could not at that time command a larger ſum " than three and a half lacks of rupees, were they diſ- " poſed to comply with the application from the Pre- " ſidency of *Fort Saint George*, unleſs they ſhould break " in upon the fund which they had appropriated for " their own extraordinary occaſions." Yet when Mr. *Francis*, in conſequence of this account, expreſſed his apprehenſion that they might be deficient in the means of ſupporting their ordinary expences, and he would therefore be againſt ſending ſupplies of money either to *Madras* or *Bombay*, the Governor General would not allow that he meant to repreſent the Company's reſources as exhauſted, ſince thoſe could be only ſeen in the collective ſum of all the treaſuries, and in the eſtimate of their growing reſources and diſburſements, and he alluded only to their two principal treaſuries. See this account and the Minutes which followed it. Appx. No. 49.

But

Ben. Sec. Conf. 21 May 1778. Appx. No. 50. Dated Lucknow, 8 May 1778, and Letters from Col. Leslie, 28 and 29 April.

But your Committee find, that the Governor General and Council were at this time made acquainted, by a letter from Mr. *Middleton*, Resident at the Vizier's Court, inclosing a copy of Colonel *Leslie*'s estimates for the service of this expedition, that very considerable disbursements would be necessary on that account, and that he had already forwarded to him the sum of 12 lacks upon his pressing requisition, though not strictly conformable to the orders he had received. The extract from Colonel *Leslie*'s letter to Mr. *Middleton* upon this subject is as follows: "My estimate for the current expences of one "month amounts to one lack 70,000 rupees; therefore "I suppose that no less than 30,000 will be necessary "for contingencies, or that two lacks will be barely sufficient, exclusive of the first expence of supply. As "the Government have thought that six months ought to "be provided, 12 lacks will be necessary, which I hope "will be sent away as soon as possible."

Appx No. 51. It appears by the answer which the Board upon this occasion sent to Mr. *Middleton*, that they admitted the extraordinary charge on account of the cavalry, which was not provided for in the first estimate of the expence; disapproving however of his having taken upon himself to exceed his original orders.

See Ben. Mil. Conf. 27 March 1778. Appx. No. 52. It may be proper to observe, with regard to the cavalry here alluded to, that the Governor General and Council, in their military department on the 27th of March, had agreed to a requisition made to them by Colonel *Leslie*, for a corps of cavalry to attend his detachment; though it will be seen, by referring to the proceedings on that occasion, placed in the Appendix, No. 52, that the opinions of the Board were not unanimous, and that the Commander in Chief had signified to the Governor General his disapprobation of the measure.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 8th June 1778. Appx. No. 53. Your Committee find, by a letter from Colonel *Leslie*, dated in Camp near *Calpee*, 20th May, that notwithstanding his professions of amity to the Chiefs, and protection to the country through which he was marching, he had met with much opposition, and some instances of

Appx. No. 54. declared hostility from the Marattas, by which, after much forbearance, he had been obliged to make some use of force, and had taken possession of the fort of *Calpee*, which he found evacuated. And your Committee further observe, that the Governor General proposed a draft

No. 54. of an answer to Colonel *Leslie*, in which the Board should approve of his conduct, recommending however a continuance of the utmost caution, and directing him to advise Mr. *Mostyn* at *Poonah*, of any occurrence which might require explanation to the Maratta Government, or the interposition of its authority, to prevent further interruptions to his march. It appears, that Messrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* considered the intelligence transmitted by Colonel *Leslie* as a fit ground for the repetition of their instances against the prosecution of the plan; and that the Governor General complained, with some degree of resentment, against their perpetual opposition to the execution of measures already resolved upon, and declared his unalterable determination to prosecute the expedition, to the utmost of his power, to its conclusion. The several minutes upon this occasion, containing much information of the general situation of those countries, and the supposed connections or dependencies of the several Chiefs with each other, or upon the Poonah Government, are therefore placed in the Appendix, No. 54, and recommended to the attention of the House. It is necessary only to add, that the letter proposed by the Governor General was agreed to by the majority of the Board, who also unanimously consented to his proposition, of informing the Peishwa and Mr. *Mostyn* of these occurrences, and desiring the former to give orders for securing an unmolested passage to their troops through the several districts through which their march lay, as the Board had given the strictest injunctions to their Commander to observe, on his part, the most friendly conduct and regular discipline.

Letter to the Peishwa. Appx. No. 55.

Your Committee find, that on the 11th of June, a letter was received at *Calcutta* from the President and Council of *Bombay*, dated 2d May, which informed them that affairs remained still in a state of uncertainty, from the long and mysterious silence of the new Durbar at *Poonah*; that the dismission of the French was yet in promise only, and that they had therefore "out of their "desire to save the Honourable Company from the "heavy expences, and their troops from the danger "and difficulties of a march from the provinces of *Bengal* "to their side of *India*, been led to send an order to "the officer in command of the forces, not to advance "any further until he should again hear from them." That at the time they came to that resolution, they had expectation of a reinforcement from *Madras*: that two Members of their Board did not concur with them in their resolution: That Monsr. *Bellecombe* was returned to *Pondicherry*, after having landed at *Mungalore* several artillery officers, two hundred men, and a large quantity of military stores for the service of the Nabob *Hyder Ally*; but that the *Sartine* was ordered from the river off *Goa* up to *Choul*. And it also appears to your Committee, that the Board received on the same day a letter from Mr. *Mostyn*, dated 12th May, filled with complaints against the equivocation of the Durbar, both before and since *Moraba Furnese* had the executive authority, in regard to the dismission of *St. Lubin*, and to the Dustucks which he had demanded for the passage of the *Bengal* detachment, in both which points he much doubted of success.

Appx. No. 57. See Mr. Lewis's Journal of his Deputation to the Maratta Camp near Currect. No. 58.

Your Committee observe, that the Governor General hereupon proposed that the order from the President and Council of *Bombay* to Colonel *Leslie*, should be confirmed by an order from their Board, but that they should at the same time direct that officer to complete the preparations which he had been making, and hold himself in readiness to march on immediate warning. Messrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* made objections to this proposition, and considered the order from *Bombay* as a rebuff upon the whole expedition, and the proceedings of Monsieur *Bellecombe* as a proof of the fallacy of supposing that the French were forming plans of hostility in conjunction with the Marattas, and therefore declared their opinion, that the troops should be brought back from the other side of the *Jumna*, and remain in cantonments till the season would permit them to be reconducted into their own territories. The Governor General, in support of his proposition, urged, among others, the following arguments:

Appx. No. 59.

"I am in possession of materials, received through "channels too remote for the possibility of their having "been suggested by the knowledge of what has happened on the other side of *India*, by which I learn that "the destination of the troops which were landed from "the *Brilliante* at *Mangalore*, were for *Chouls*. The "additional sentence of the *Bombay* letter which Mr. "*Barwell* has desired to be inserted, may serve in part "to explain the apparent inconsistency of troops intended "for the service of the Marattas, being converted to "that of the enemies; nor will it be difficult to comprehend the cause of so sudden a change in the conduct of Monsieur *Bellecombe* on the difficulties presented to him, if we suppose him to have been reluctantly compelled into the support of a system formed "independent of his authority, and that his own inclinations led him to prefer another alliance, which I "have reason to believe was the case."—Your Committee think it proper here to remark, that by subsequent information from *Tellicherry* it was discovered that the number of men landed at *Mangalore*, were only 12 artillery, 12 infantry, and one officer, instead of two hundred men, as had been reported.

Letter from Bomb. 31 May, on Ben. Sec. Conf. 11 July. Appx. No. 60.

Three letters appeared to have been written in the terms of the Governor General's proposition, to Colonel *Leslie*, to *Bombay*, and to Mr. *Mostyn*, which will be found in the Appendix, No. 61.

Appx. No. 61.

And

Bomb. Sec. Conſ. 15 June 1778. Appx. No. 62.

And your Committee find, that on the 15th of June the Board received a letter from Colonel *Leſlie*, dated 30th of May, communicating the particulars of an agreement which he had entered into with the Maratta Chiefs, for the ſafe paſſage of the detachment under his command through their country; but that having received orders from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, poſitively forbidding his advance, as unneceſſary in the preſent ſtate of affairs at *Poonah*, and directing him to wait their further orders, he had taken a ſtation on the banks of the *Bettowar* river, as moſt convenient for putting in execution any ſubſequent directions he might receive. And we obſerve that the Board ſignified to him their approbation of his conduct.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 22 June 1778. Appx. No. 63. Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, dated 11 May.—Letter from Bomb. dated 4 May.—Letter from Col. Leſlie, dated 5 June 1778.

But it appears to your Committee, that he had before this time received freſh diſpatches from *Bombay* and from Mr. *Moſtyn*, by which he was required to proſecute his march towards that Preſidency in countermand of their former orders; and that in conſequence of them, he intended immediately to ſet forward, under ſome doubt however of the ſincerity of the Maratta Chiefs in their late engagements with him; upon which ſubject it is to be obſerved, that Mr. *Moſtyn* in his letter had thus expreſſed himſelf: "It will be neceſſary to be ſtrictly on "your guard, and to avoid as much as lays in your "power the giving any cauſe of complaint, though from "the diſtracted ſtate of this Government, and the diſ"ſentions amongſt the heads, I do not believe they will "dare to oppoſe your march."

And your Committee find, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* informed alſo the Superior Board of their having taken off the reſtraint they had laid on the march of the troops from *Calpee*, and directed them to advance "agreeable to the orders of the Governor Ge"neral and Council," acknowledging at the ſame time the receipt of the Bengal letter dated 23d March, and promiſing future information of their reſolutions in conſequence of it. And it appears that Mr. *Francis* took occaſion hereupon to preſent freſh remonſtrances againſt the march of the detachment upon new grounds, inſiſting that the Government of *Bombay* having in this inſtance acted ſo capriciouſly, and without reaſon aſſigned, common prudence dictated to them the impropriety of leaving the army under ſuch directions, eſpecially as the Preſident and Council, by their conduct and expreſſions, endeavoured to fix the reſponſibility upon them. He preſſed alſo a further argument, drawn from the complication of the national engagements and the dangerous deſigns of *France* and *Spain*, which ſhould induce them to have regard to their own defence, and not to weaken or divide their force. It further appears, that the Governor General perſevered in recommending the proſecution of the expedition; and that, allowing the original meaſure and the reſponſibility to be theirs, he declared his opinion that all their reſolutions concerning it ſhould proceed from their own knowledge of the circumſtances which had any relation to it.

Appx. No. 64. Sec. Conſ. 22 June 1778.

See the Debate at large on this day, 22 June 1778. No. 64.

On the 29th June a letter was received from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, which your Committee find to contain the reaſons for their contradictory orders to Colonel *Leſlie*; which aroſe from their firſt expectation, that by the revolution at *Poonah*, the French influence would have been deſtroyed, and from their diſappointment in finding that the new adminiſtration ſeemed inclined to tread in the footſteps of their predeceſſors, as well with regard to the Chevalier de *St. Lubin*, as to *Ragoba*, and the execution of ſeveral articles of the treaty of *Poorunder*. That theſe reflections had determined them not to wait any longer in expectation of propoſals from *Poonah*, but to direct Mr. *Moſtyn* to make a categorical demand on the Durbar, agreeable to the directions received from the Superior Council, in their letter of 23d March; and they deſired to have timely information of the meaſures which, in the ſuppoſed caſes of aſſent or refuſal from the Poonah Court, the Governor General and Council meant to purſue; ſuggeſting at the ſame time, that if it ſhould be found expedient to ſend any further reinforcement of troops to them, the eaſieſt and beſt method would be to order them directly from *Madras*, and to replace them, if neceſſary, from their eſtabliſhment.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 29 June 1778. Letter from Bombay, dated 20 May. Appx. No. 65.

Appx. No. 39.

See Mr. Francis's Minute in Appx. 76.

By a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, dated 29th of May, and recorded on this Conſultation, it appears, that, doubting of the proſpect of obtaining paſſports from the Durbar, he had applied immediately to *Madojee Scindia* and *Tookajee Holkar* for a free paſſage to the detachment, in caſe their march ſhould lead through the dominions of theſe chiefs; and having obtained the conſent of the former, he had diſpatched information of it to Colonel *Leſlie*. He added, that although Monſ. de *St. Lubin* had received an oſtenſible diſmiſſion from the Miniſters at *Poonah*, he had many reaſons (which he communicated) for believing that the Chevalier would not depart, or that if he did, it would be only with the intention of an early return with the ſuccours of troops and ſtores, which he had engaged to procure; and he ſuppoſed that merely in order to gain time for this purpoſe, and to amuſe the Company's ſervants till the rains ſhould ſet in, by which time, (if ever) *St. Lubin* could perform his promiſe, the Miniſters had lately renewed their pretended deſign of ſending an ambaſſador to *Bombay*.

Appx. No. 66. See alſo Inclo-ſure in that letter.

It muſt be obſerved, that the Governor General, on account of this intelligence, fearing leſt Colonel *Leſlie* might in conſequence of a paſſport from *Scindia*, be induced to prefer a route through his and *Holkar*'s territories, propoſed on the 6th of July a letter of poſitive inſtructions to him, that he ſhould march through the province of *Berar*, "as that Chief might be more ſafely "truſted than any other Power between that and the "other ſide of *India*, on account of the long and friendly "intercourſe which had ſubſiſted between his family and "their Government; and becauſe they had no connec"tion with *Madajee Scindia*, who was always repre"ſented as a partizan of *Nanna Furneſe*, which might "render his offers ſuſpicious."

Ben. Sec. Conf 6 July 1778. Appendix, No 67

But it appears, that before the diſpatch of the propoſed letter, information of an event was received at *Calcutta*, which occaſioned the Board to have regard to a convenient ſtation for the return of the troops, if it ſhould appear expedient to recall them for the defence of the provinces. The following letters were therefore written to Colonel *Leſlie*, and immediately diſpatched.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 7th July, No. 67.

"Sir,

"We have received intelligence by the way of *Suez*, "that war was declared by the Court of *France* againſt "*England* on the 30th March laſt; we think it neceſ"ſary, therefore, to give you peremptory orders to "proceed with the detachment under your command, "by eaſy marches on the road to *Berar*, but not to paſs "beyond that province until you ſhall receive further "inſtructions from us, notwithſtanding any orders to "the contrary which may be ſent to you from the Pre"ſident and Council of *Bombay*.

"*Fort William*, "We are, &c."
7th July 1778.

"Sir,

"As it is of the greateſt importance that the con"tents of the incloſed letter ſhould be kept a profound "ſecret, we think it neceſſary to incloſe it in this cover, "and to direct that you ſuffer no perſon whatever to "peruſe it, nor to know the purport of it through your "means.

"*Fort William*, "We are, &c."
7th July 1778.

Your Committee find, that the Governor General, ſtating the war with France as a fact of undoubted certainty, introduced a very long Minute upon that ſubject, with the following obſervations, which, as they ſhortly ſtate his idea of the condition and reſources of the different preſidencies, and the probable deſigns of the enemy

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 9 July 1778. Appx. No. 68.

enemy at such an interesting period, we have thought proper to insert in the body of this Report.

" It is the part of this Government to consider in what " manner it is likely to affect the British possessions in " *India*, and to provide accordingly for their security. " This must comprise and limit all our operations. In " the view of this opening scene, the relative conditions " of the parties engaged in it, will merit our first atten- " tion, and cannot fail to engage it by the striking con- " trast which appears between them; and I mention it " because I think it an essential point in the considera- " tion of our first and perhaps our future measures.

" Great as the power is, which the British Nation has " acquired in *India* compared with that of its rival, " its general line of action is and must be purely de- " fensive. It can gain, the French lose nothing. Even " the capture of *Pondicherry*, and of the other possessions " of the French, will yield no positive advantage to the " English, although it will deprive the French of their " instruments of attack, and thereby effect our own " safety.

" From this point, therefore, all our conclusions " must originate, and all our measures be so laid as to " obviate or to oppose the probable designs of our ene- " mies. Their first attempts will be against *Bombay* " or *Fort St. George*. *Bengal* will be their last—at least " their distant object.

" The Presidency of *Fort St. George* possesses in it- " self the complete means of defence. We can add " nothing to them but in the effects of our political ar- " rangements. We have already yielded it a large sup- " ply of treasure—it requires no other present aid.

" *Bombay* requires every thing. Weak in itself, and " entangled rather than strengthened by its dissipated " possessions on the Continent, it can only defend itself " against a direct invasion, and to that it is perhaps " equal, if it has to contend with the French alone. " But this is unlikely. The last advices from *Poonah* " contain such evidence, as the event itself must soon " refute or realize, of an engagement actually made by " the French Minister there to bring a large military " force to *Poonah*, professedly designed to act with that " Government against *Ragoba*, who at that time resided " at *Bombay* under the English protection.

" In effect, this is the obvious policy which the " French ought to adopt, if they seek to regain their " influence in *India*; and it is no longer to be doubted " that they have adopted it. They have, besides, an an- " cient claim to the alliance of *Nizam Ally*, which is in- " sured by their accidental union in a common cause, " the defence of the ruling administration at *Poonah*, of " which his letters to Mr. *Rumbold* and the Nabob of " *Arcot*, afforded an undoubted proof."

But the great objects which the Governor General appears to have had in view, and on which he dwelt in the bulk of his Minute with much historical and political reasoning, was, in the first place, to point out the immediate necessity of forming an alliance with some great country Power, to counterbalance the supposed confederacy between the French and the Marattas, and then to recommend a deputation to the Court of *Berar* as the most confidential and powerful ally with whom they should wish to enter into the closest bonds of league and amity. That in order to accomplish this end, they had to propose two advantageous inducements to the Rajah; the first being the support of his pretensions to the sovereign power over the Maratta State; the second, the recovery of the capture made on his dominions by *Nizam Ally*; while on their parts they should, by such connection, possess a powerful barrier to their frontiers. The Governor General at the same time offered several other proposals, which were agreed to by the Board, conducive to the augmentation of their military force, and the preparatory defence of their Presidency, among which, one particularly relating to the present subject of our enquiry, was as follows:—" That the Commander " in Chief be requested to furnish the Board with such " a general plan of defence as he shall judge necessary, " in addition to the present disposition of our army, " and in the supposition that the detachment now em- " ployed under Colonel *Leslie*, may not return for a " length of time into the provinces."

Your Committee find, that at the next meeting of the Board Mr. *Francis* delivered his sentiments upon the arguments and proposals contained in the Governor General's Minute of the 9th, and strongly declared his unalterable opinion, that the safety of *Bengal*, which they had been always directed to make the first object of their attention, required the recall of Colonel *Leslie*'s detachment, though however it might be advisable to send a reinforcement of 2 or 3 battalions of Sepoys to *Bombay*, which should proceed from *Madras*, and be replaced, if necessary, from *Bengal*; that the Presidency of *Bombay* should be instructed to make concessions to the ministerial party at *Poonah*, as the most effectual course for defeating the designs of the French, and most agreeable to the plan of defence to which he thought they should confine their views; and on which principle they had also given orders to the Presidency of *Fort St. George* to cultivate the friendship of *Hyder Ally*. That therefore he should have no objection to a treaty of peace and alliance with *Moodajee Boosla* on usual terms, but was afraid of the proposed engagements with him, because " he did not know whither such engage- " ments might lead the Company's arms, or how long " they might implicate them in the political contests of " the Country Powers," which they were taught to avoid. Ben. Sec. Cons. 11 July 1778. Appendix, No. 69.

The Governor General declaring that the measure which he had proposed was formed on grounds purely defensive, and that the present question was only whether a negociation should be entered into, the conditions of which would be proper subject for future debate, it appears that the majority of the Board assented to that proposition; and also that his recommendation of Mr. *Elliot* to be employed on that commission, was unanimously agreed to.

On the 18th July the Governor General laid before the Board the instructions which he proposed to be given to Mr. *Elliot* for the management of his embassy to the Court of *Berar*. Your Committee have placed them, and the arguments of the several Members of the Board, both in objection and support of them, in the Appendix, No. 70, to which we desire particularly to direct the attention of the House for a full examination of them; it will therefore be necessary in this place merely to observe, that the proposition of the Governor General was resolved in the affirmative, and that the instructions to Mr. *Elliot*, and the Minutes thereon, were sealed up and deposited in the Secretary's office; and that in consequence of a second proposition made by the Governor General, it was agreed to inform the President and Council of *Bombay*, Mr. *Mostyn*, and Colonel *Leslie*, of Mr. *Elliot*'s deputation, and to request them to give him their assistance by advice and intelligence of every occurrence or circumstance which might advance the success of his negociation, adding to the Presidency of *Bombay* this special direction—" The " success of the measures we have entrusted to Mr. " *Elliot*, must depend in a great measure upon their " present secrecy. He will, however, notify to you " such articles as he may agree to with the Rajah. In " the mean time, to prevent any steps of a contrary " tendency on your part, we request that you will re- " frain from forming any engagements of a nature hos- " tile to the actual administration at *Poonah*, excepting " such as may appear absolutely necessary for the de- " fence of your own possessions." And to Colonel *Leslie* as follows:—" You will conform to such articles " and engagements as he (Mr. *Elliot*) may conclude on " behalf Appx. No. 70. Appx. No. 71.

" behalf of this Government with *Moodajee Booſla*, as " far as they may reſpect the forces under your com- " mand."

It appears that on the 20th of July, the Governor General moved for the notification of Mr. *Elliot*'s appointment to the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, and that they ſhould be requeſted " to inform him of any " events relating to peace or war, but particularly of " any changes in their political ſituation with the " Nizam." Several matters of arrangement, in regard to allowance of ſalary and attendants, being then ſettled, your Committee find, that the Board agreed to Mr. *Elliot*'s credentials, by which he was intruſted with full powers, and a declaration on the part of the Superior Council, that they would ratify and confirm whatever ſhould be concluded by him in their names, and on their behalf, according to the inſtructions with which they had furniſhed him for that purpoſe.

Appx. No. 72. Secret Letter, 17th Auguſt 1778.

And your Committee further obſerve, that the Governor General and Council communicated to the Court of Directors, in their ſecret letter dated 17th Auguſt, an account of all theſe proceedings, as well in regard to the ſituation of the detachment under Colonel *Leſlie*, and to their own deſign of forming an offenſive treaty with *Moodajee Booſla*, as to the advice " which they had " given to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, to " open a negociation with the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, who " had lately made repeated applications, ſoliciting an " alliance with the Company."

With regard to the ſituation of affairs at this important period in other quarters, connected in any degree with thoſe we have conſidered, your Committee have obſerved, that *Moodajee Booſla*, whoſe alliance appears to have been conſidered as of ſuch importance to the Company's intereſt, had, by his letters, expreſſed in general terms the aſſurances of friendſhip and attachment; and had in particular promiſed to furniſh every kind of ſupply neceſſary for the convenience of the detachment which was to paſs through a part of his dominions. It appears, moreover, that he had addreſſed ſome enquiries to the Government of *Poonah*, relative to the nature of their correſpondence with the French, and had communicated the anſwer he received, which will be found in the Appendix, to the Governor General, but did not add any opinion upon it.

Appx. No. 73. No. 10. See Perſ. Corr. received 20th May 1778.

No. 21 *and* 22. Received 4th July 1778. See alſo other letters.

It has been remarked, that in notifying to the Preſidency of *Fort St. George* the intended deputation to the Court of *Berar*, the Governor General and Council had particularly requeſted them to communicate to Mr. *Elliot* any changes in their political ſituation with the Nizam; and it appeared, from the letters referred to in the Governor General's Minute of the 9th July, that the ſupport of the Poonah Adminiſtration was an undoubted object of the *Soubah*'s policy; and alſo, that his enmity againſt *Ragoba* was as determined. In his letter to Governor *Rumbold*, received 21ſt June, he concluded with theſe words: " If the Gentlemen of *Bengal*, in ſupport- " ing *Ragonaut Row*, are determined to make war with " *Pundit Purdhaun Madharow*, I ſhall be obliged, in " conſideration of the treaty ſubſiſting between him and " me, to give him every poſſible aſſiſtance on my part. " You, Sir, will be pleaſed to communicate theſe par- " ticulars to the Government of *Bengal*, and acquaint " me with the reſult of it."

Appx. No. 74.

Letter from the Nizam to Governor Rumbold, received 21 June 1778.

Your Committee have further obſerved, that in the following month a letter was received at *Calcutta* from *Nizam Ally* himſelf; in which he very explicitly declared his ſentiments and intentions concerning the diſputes with the Marattas, and the probability of his interfering in them.

Appx. No. 74. Letter received 23 July 1778.

This ſeemed wholly to depend on the nature of the ſupport which the Britiſh Government might give to the pretenſions of *Ragonaut Row*; againſt " whoſe bad faith " and invincible villainy," he expreſſed a moſt ſettled reſentment; and adverting to the treaty formed between himſelf and the Preſidency of *Madras*, by which the Company engaged not to protect the enemies of his Government, he ſaid he had formerly aſked Colonel *Upton*, " Whilſt ſuch a treaty ſubſiſts, what is the motive of " giving refuge to *Ragonaut Row*, the inveterate enemy " of my Government, and labouring at his eſtabliſh- " ment?"

Being ſtill ſuſpicious of the ſame deſign, he now aſked the Governor General, if he was ignorant of that treaty, or if, being made by the Company at *Madras*, it was not binding on the Company at *Bombay*? But that his meaning might not be miſtaken, he thus recapitulated it:

" If you have any quarrel with *Pundit Purdhaun* on " any other account than that of *Ragonaut Row*, it " matters not to me, I have nothing to do with it; but " if you engage in hoſtilities with *Pundit Purdhaun* on " account of *Ragonaut Row*, as I am inviolable in my " engagements, and am bound by a firm treaty to " *Pundit Purdhaun* in caſe *Ragonaut Row* makes war on " him, it becomes my indiſpenſable duty, in conſe- " quence of ſuch engagement, to give my aſſiſtance to " *Row Pundit Purdhaun*. You will in ſuch caſe refer " to the treaty I have before alluded to. It was neceſ- " ſary to intimate theſe particulars to you, and I have " accordingly done ſo."

In concluſion, he aſſured the Governor General he needed entertain no ſuſpicions or apprehenſions on account of *St. Lubin*, for whoſe diſmiſſion from *Poonah* he had himſelf importuned, and did not doubt but he was already ſet off.

And it appears, that the Governor General, in his anſwer written the following day, ſtrongly inſiſted on the certainty of an alliance formed between the French and the Marattas, " the fore-knowledge of which (he ob- " ſerved) has induced me to prepare a force to be ſent " to *Bombay*, not for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, to " whom this Government is under no engagements, " nor to make war with the Miniſters with whom we are " in friendſhip, but in conformity to the duties incum- " bent on this Government, charged with the care and " protection of all the Engliſh poſſeſſions in *India*, for " the purpoſe of ſecuring the Preſidency of *Bombay*, " which is now expoſed to a war with our declared ene- " mies the French, and may be alſo involved in one " with the Marattas, for ſuch are their apparent deſigns. " We are the friends of the Peiſhwa and of the Mini- " ſters, and ſhall continue ſo whilſt they are our friends. " We ſhall be their enemies, if they compel us to be " ſuch."

See Perſ. Corr. ſent 24 July 1778. Appx. No. 75.

Having given this explanation of his conduct, he did not doubt of the continuance of the Nizam's friendſhip.

With this anſwer the Nizam, as far as may be judged by his own expreſſions, was apparently well ſatisfied. " The good faith I have found in the Company, exceeds " what I have experienced from any other Power. With " reſpect to what you write of *Ragonaut Row*, the con- " duct you have purſued is ſuch as the faith of treaty " required. I formerly, in the ſtrongeſt terms, deſired " the Poonah Miniſters not to give encouragement to " the French vackeel. They are now aſhamed of their " conduct, and have not the leaſt idea of connecting " themſelves with the French. But ſhould the leaſt " ſymptoms of ſuch a deſign be proved on them, I will " give immediate information to you, and withdraw " myſelf from my engagements with them."

Received at Calcutta January 1779. Appx. No. 76.

It ſhould ſeem indeed, by a ſuppoſed letter from *Ballajee Janaurdon* to the Nizam, copy of which Mr. *Moſtyn* tranſmitted to *Calcutta*, that the Miniſters applied for his aſſiſtance againſt the Engliſh ſo early as June 1778, and at the ſame time avowed the treaty which they had made with the French vackeel in the month of May preceding.

No. 42. Received 21ſt July 1778. Appx. No. 77.

Hyder Ally, however, in this interval had been making ſome ſucceſsful inroads upon the Maratta dominions, and reduced ſeveral of their forts. It has been ſtated in a former Report, that the Governor General ſolicited the aſſiſtance

See Appx. No. 58.

Appx No. 78.

assistance of *Hyder Ally* to expedite the march and the success of the Bengal detachment; but *Hyder* declined engaging in that expedition, because his operations against the Marattas required the exertion of his whole force; so that from these informations, he appears at this period to have been earnestly bent upon hostilities against the Marattas, and apparently desirous of the English friendship, though strongly suspected of a closer attachment to the French.

Appx. No. 79. 11th July 1778, to Chite Sing. N. B. His answer. Appx. No. 80. Letter to Chite Sing, 17 Aug. 1778.

With regard to the lesser Powers in the neighbourhood of *Bengal*, your Committee find, that in consequence of the rupture with *France*, orders were given, upon the resolution of the Supreme Board, to General *Stibbert*, Commander in Chief, to cause three battalions of Sepoys to be immediately raised and maintained at the expence of *Chite Sing*; which the Governor General informed that Rajah, would amount to five lacks per annum; a sum which he, not without earnest representation of his poverty, agreed to pay.

Appx. No. 81. Letter from Lucknow, 10 April 1778. Sec. Letter, 17 August. Letter from Nudjif Cawn, Sec. Corr. Appx. No. 82. See Appx. No. 72, par. 34. See paper of intelligence from Delhi.

A renewal of the treaty between the Vizier and *Fizoola Cawn* had been made under the guarantee of the Company.

Nudjif Cawn having made peace with the Seiks, had expressed his desire of receiving Major *Hannay* as an agent from the Government of *Bengal*; and the Governor General and Council had in consequence directed the Major, who appears to have then had the command of the Vizier body guard, to visit *Nudjif Cawn* with the Vizier's consent, and to report to them any proposals which he might have to offer.

The Vizier was intent on the defence of his own frontiers, and had consented to a plan proposed by Captain *Osborn*, for raising a battalion of Sepoys for the protection of the *Douab*, which the Governor General and Council had recommended to him. Appx. No. 72.

Colonel *Leslie* was arrived at *Chattapore*, where he was obliged to halt for the purpose of repairing his artillery carriages; and from whence he had thought it necessary to direct an attack upon the principal station of the Maratta Chief, *Ballajee Punt*, who had given him much trouble on his march, and who, having assembled his men on the banks of the river *Kane*, still threatened to oppose the progress of the troops. Appx. No. 84. Ben. Sec. Conf. 31 Aug. 1778.

By the last accounts from *Poonah*, a second revolution had taken place in the administration of that Government, at the head of which *Nanna Furnese* was again replaced, by the powerful intervention of *Madajee Scindia*. But the Government of *Bombay* had resolved to close with the proposals of the opposite party, and to pursue the most practicable way of placing *Ragoba* in the Regency, by means of their own forces, aided by Colonel *Leslie*'s detachment, and supported by the troops of that party. See Sec. Letter to Court of Directors, 17 August 1778. Appx. No. 72.

And it appears that the Governor General and Council had taken into consideration these advices from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, and had approved of and given a sanction to their resolutions under certain provisoes. Letter to Bombay, 17 August 1778. Appx. No. 85.

The annexed Charts will shew the state of the revenues, and the state and distribution of the military forces, at this period, under the Presidency of *Bengal*.

An ACCOUNT of the Territorial and other Revenues of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Orissa*, the Expences of collecting the same, the Tribute and Stipends paid, from May 1777 to April 1778.

		Gross Collections.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.	
		CR^s.	CR^s.	CR^s.	£. sts.
Ceded Lands. Land Revenues		59,00,377			
Charges of Collection			2,10,143		
Jaghire to Lord Clive			2,58,631		
Nett Revenues				54,31,603	611,055
	CR^s.				
Bengal Province. Land Revenues	128,95,483				
Board of Customs collected	6,05,040				
Duties on Salt collected	10,48,821				
		145,49,284			
Charges of Collection			9,79,074		
Stipends and Allowances paid			22,97,642		
Nett Revenues				112,72,588	1,268,164
Bahar Province. Land Revenues		39,99,324			
Charges of Collection			2,50,833		
Allowances and Pensions paid			1,76,958		
Nett Revenues				35,71,533	401,797
Duties on Coinage		707		707	80
Customs collected at Calcutta		3,31,823			
Charges of Collection			38,175		
Nett Revenues				2,93,648	33,055
Rajah Cheit Sing		26,32,905		26,32,905	296,202
	CR^s	274,14,420	42,11,456	232,02,964	2,610,333
Commission on the Revenues			3,81,166	3,81,166	42,881
	CR^s		45,92,622	228,21,166	2,567,452

An

An ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at *Fort William*, and Subordinates, from 1777 to 1778.

Civil.	Marine.	Military.			Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges defrayed by the Company.
		Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Nett Amount defrayed by the Company.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
401,183	76,110	1,184,708	366,769	817,939	93,746	1,388,978

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted.
John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

An ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company in *Bengal*, from May 1777 to April 1778; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	CRs.	CRs.
Balances in the Treaſuries - -	203,31,277	
Money borrowed at Intereſt - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		3,69,672
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - - - - - -		1,57,643
Bills of Exchange unaccounted for - - - - - - - - - - - -		6,153
Contract with Country Government for Materials, &c. for Building - - - - -		2,47,451
Account Depoſits - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		8,09,978
Unclaimed Goods - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		11,822
Tuncan Account - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		54,914
Military Fund - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		11,50,720
Sundry Old Debts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		6,265
Debts at Dacca - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		231
Debts at Coſſimbuzar - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		99,760
Debts at Patna - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		58,917
Money refunded on Account of General Coote's Commiſſion - - - - - -		39,050
His Majeſty Shah Allum, Balance of his Stipend - - - - - - - - -		49,50,216
Nudjeef Cawn, Balance of his Allowance - - - - - - - - - - -		12,76,000
Ahteram ul Dowlah, D° - D° - - - - - - - - - - -		1,22,646
Oudy Poory Gouſſaine, D° - D° - - - - - - - - - - -		27,187
Fund for the Diſcharge of old Salt Balances - - - - - - - - - -		7,84,952
Cur[t] Rupees - - -		101,73,577

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted.
John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

ABSTRACT GENERAL RETURN of the TROOPS

		European Commissioned Officers.										European Non-commissioned and Private.					
		Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Ensigns.	Total.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matrosses.	Infantry Rank and File.	Total.
European	Artillery, One Regiment	-	1	2	7	1	18	21	-	50	7	44	22	40	414	- -	520
	Corps of Engineers	-	2	-	3	-	5	-	5	15	1	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	Infantry, 3 Regiments	3	3	4	33	-	42	-	83	168	26	127	77	-	- -	1,798	2,002
	Invalids — Artillery	-	-	-	1	-	- -	1	-	11	-	13	1	13	41	- -	290
	Invalids — Infantry	-	-	1	3	-	3	-	2			43	8	-	- -	171	
Hindoſtan	Troop of Body Guard	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	2	-	4	- -	-	- -	- -	4
	Cavalry, 3 Regiments	-	1	1	3	-	16	-	2	23	-	10	- -	-	- -	- -	10
	Corps of Golundaaze	-	-	1	4	-	25	6	-	36	-	- -	- -	-	- -	- -	- -
	Infantry, 41 Batt[s] and 5 Comp[s]	-	5	5	40	-	224	-	-	274	-	246	408	-	- -	- -	654
	Militia and Invalids	-	-	-	3	-	6	-	-	9	-	16	2	-	- -	- -	18
TOTAL	Present Strength	3	12	14	98	1	340	28	92	588	34	503	518	53	455	1,969	3,498
	Supernumeraries	-	-	1	3	-	27	3	59	93	-	- -	1	-	- -	- -	1
	Wanting to complete	-	2	3	2	6	64	-	-	77	-	77	9	2	181	1,328	1,597
	Eſtabliſhment	3	14	16	97	7	377	25	33	572	-	580	526	55	636	3,297	5,094

		Native Officers and Sepoys, &c.									Native Staff.									
		Subadars.	Reſſaladars.	Jemautdars.	Duffidars.	Tom Toms and Trumpeters.	Drummers.	Private Troopers.	Havildars, Naicks, and Golundaaze.	Havildars, Naicks, and Sepoys.	Total.	Commandants.	Adjutants.	Duffidars Major.	Havildars Major.	Sircars.	Doctors.	Armourers.	Watermen.	Farriers.	Munſeddies.	Moonſheys.
Hindoſtan	Troop of Body Guard	- -	1	- -	6	2	-	100	- -	- -	109	-	-	-	-	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	-	-
	Cavalry, 3 Regiments	- -	6	36	72	18	-	1,349	- -	- -	1,481	-	-	6	-	- -	6	12	- -	6	6	3
	Corps of Golundaaze	7	-	50	-	- -	48	- -	2,468	- -	2,573	3	3	-	3	26	10	12	24	-	-	-
	Infantry, 41 Batt[s] and 5 Comp[s]	409	-	814	-	686	-	- -	- -	31,472	33,381	41	43	-	-	408	125	165	417	-	-	-
	Militia and Invalid Sepoys	82	-	118	-	59	-	- -	- -	6,826	7,085	5	9	-	-	20	20	28	56	-	-	-
TOTAL	Present Strength	498	7	1,018	78	765	48	1,449	2,468	38,298	44,629	49	55	6	3	454	161	217	497	6	6	3
	Supernumeraries	4	-	5	-	- -	-	- -	- -	- -	9	-	-	-	-	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	-	-
	Wanting to complete	12	-	35	-	1	-	91	415	456	1,010	-	-	-	-	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	-	-
	Eſtabliſhment	506	7	1,048	78	766	48	1,540	2,883	38,754	45,630	49	55	6	3	454	161	217	497	6	6	3

under *Fort William* Preſidency, 31ſt December 1778.

European Staff, &c.																										Supernumeraries.						Wanting to Complete.					
Adjutants.	Adjutants and Quarter Maſters.	Quarter Maſters.	Inſpector General of Stores.	Aſſiſtant to D°.	Aſſiſtants D°.	Quarter Maſter General.	Aſſiſtants D°.	Majors of Brigade.	Aids de Camp.	Military Secretaries.	Aſſiſtants D°.	Perſian Interpreters.	Town Major.	Barrack Maſters.	Dep. Judge Advocate General.	Surgeon General.	Surgeous Major.	Surgeons.	Surgeon's Aſſiſtants.	Paymaſters.	Deputy Paymaſters.	Chaplains.	Superintendant Powder Works.	Fort Adjutant.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Enſigns.	Non-commiſſioned and Private.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Non-commiſſioned and Private.
3	-	3	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	6	11	183
3	-	3	-	-	1	1	3	3	7	3	-	2	1	2	3	1	3	5	7	3	3	3	1	1	-	-	3	-	1	-	59	-	1	2	-	-	1	1,328
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	—
6	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	-	-	1	1	1	2	-	46	-	77
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
16	2	12	1	1	1	3	5	9	3	1	2	1	2	3	1	4	20	13	4	3	3	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	*	27	3	59	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	2	6	64	1,597
16	2	12	1	1	1	3	5	9	3	1	2	1	2	3	1	4	20	13	4	3	3	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—

Supernumeraries.					Wanting to Complete.				
Subadars.	Jemautdars.	Trumpeters.	Rank and File.		Subadars.	Jemaudars.	Trumpeters.	Troopers.	Rank and File.
-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-		-	1	-	91	415
2	-	-	-		8	32	1	-	368
2	5	-	-		4	2	-	-	88
-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-
4	5	-	-		-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-		12	35	1	91	871
-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-

DISPOSITION of the foregoing Troops.

Cavalry	1 Regiment	With the Bombay Detachment.
	2 D°	At Futty Ghurr.
Artillery	5 Companies of Europeans	At Fort William.
	1 D°	Cawnpore.
	1 D°	Futty Ghurr.
	1 D° European Invalids	Chunar and Fort William.
	2 Battalions of Golundaaze	Fort William.
	1 D° D°	Cawnpore and Futty Ghurr.
Firſt Brigade	Firſt Regiment	At Cawnpore.
	6 Battalions of Sepoys	D°.
	1 D° D°	Chunar Ghurr.
	1 D° D°	Dinapore.
Second Brigade	2d Regiment	At Berhampore.
	4 Battalions of Sepoys	D°.
	4 D°	Preſidency.
Third Brigade	3d Regiment	At Fort William.
	5 Battalions of Sepoys	Preſidency.
	2 D°	Midnapore.
	1 D°	Chandernagore.
Temporary Brigade	6 Battalions of Sepoys	At Futty Ghurr.
	2 D°	Daranagur } Rohilcund.
	1 D°	Moradabad }
Independent Corps	6 Battalions of Sepoys	At Bhopaul } Bombay
	1 Company of Golundaaze	D°. } Detachment.
	1 Battalion of Sepoys	Chittagong.
	1 D° Light Infantry	Rajemahl Diſtrict.
	5 Companies of D°	Ramgur.
Militia	12 Companies of Sepoys	At the Preſidency.
	10 D°	Moorſhedabad.
	10 D°	Patna.
	10 D°	Dacca.
	4 D°	Dinagepore.
	4 D°	Burdwan.
	3 D°	Boglepore.
	3 D°	Buxar.

Your Committee have thus endeavoured ſhortly to ſtate an account of the proceedings of the Supreme Council, in regard to the nature of their latter interference in the diſputes between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and the Maratta Durbar. We have referred the Houſe to very ample documents and authorities in the ſeveral Appendixes, for fuller information of the declared principles and reaſons of their conduct upon that ſubject. We have made it appear, that they had not only ſent very conſiderable aſſiſtance of men and money from their own Preſidency to that of *Bombay*, but had alſo prevailed upon the Government of *Fort Saint George* to give their aid, by detaching a body of troops from their eſtabliſhment to ſtrengthen the army on the Malabar coaſt, and had ſince applied to them for a preparation of further eventual reinforcements for the ſame ſervice. We have alſo ſhewn the difficulties and impediments which the Bengal detachment met with in the outſet of their march, and the contrariety of orders which the Commander of it received from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, before his arrival at *Chatterpore* in the end of June. To theſe we have added the opinions and propoſitions of the ſeveral Members of the Superior Council in conſequence of thoſe incidents; till, on the receipt of apparently authentic intelligence of a rupture with *France*, that Board directed their attention to a new object, by deputing an Embaſſy to the Court of *Berar*, which they expected to produce in its ultimate conſequences an effect ſeemingly inconſiſtent with the purſuit of their former views and deſigns upon the ſubject; though it is to be obſerved, that the Governor General intimated in his Minute, that he had already "employed the Agency of *Moodajee Booſla*'s vackeel to "excite the ambition of his maſter to aſpire to the "Sovereign authority of the Maratta Empire upon the "death of the *Ram Rajah*." We have explained the tenor of the inſtructions which they ſent to *Bombay*, when they communicated to that Government their intention of forming an alliance with the *Berar Rajah*; and we have finally reported their laſt reſolutions of approbation and concurrence with the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in a meaſure which, being in ſupport of *Ragoba*, appears moſt calculated to claſh with and to counteract the accompliſhment of their deſigns in favour of *Moodajee Booſla*. It is at the ſame time however to be remembered, that the advancement of the pretenſions of *Ragonaut Row* was expreſsly denied to be the object of the detachment under Colonel *Leſlie*, or that it would prove the cauſe of any diſpute with the Poonah Government.

Your Committee therefore find it neceſſary to proceed in queſt of information which may tend to explain or reconcile theſe appearances of political contradiction; but we ſhall firſt lay before the Houſe, the reſult of our examination into ſeveral records of the Preſidency of *Bombay* concerning theſe matters, that it may be ſeen what ſteps they, who were upon the ſpot, and moſt immediately intereſted in theſe tranſactions, took in this interval, to make the beſt exertion of their own faculties of power or policy, to bring them to a termination beneficial or honourable to their employers; but particularly, that it may be explained what were the circumſtances which led to, and what was the purport of thoſe propoſals of *Moraba*, and thoſe ſubſequent anſwers of *Nanna*, which occaſioned the reſolutions taken by the Select Committee of *Bombay*, and the confirmation of thoſe reſolutions by the Superior Council.

Your Committee, however, in the firſt place, deſire to refer the Houſe to an inſpection of the papers hereunto immediately annexed, that they may ſee and examine the ſtate of the revenues, and of the military force under that Preſidency, at the period in queſtion.

An ACCOUNT of the Revenues of Bombay and its Dependencies, from May 1777 to April 1778.

		Groſs.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.		
		R°.	R°.	R°.		£. st.
Bombay.						
Land Revenues	R°. 39,752					
Cuſtoms and Duties	3,59,728					
Farms	97,408					
		4,96,883				
Charges and Deductions			19,976			
Nett Revenues				4,76,912	-	59,614
Tellicherry.						
Land Revenues	R°. 30,192					
Cuſtoms and Duties	10,256					
		40,448				
Charges and Deductions			7,160			
Nett Revenues				33,288	-	4,161
Surat.						
Land Revenues	R°. 1,98,880					
Cuſtoms and Duties	1,48,200					
		3,47,080				
Charges and Deductions			48,920			
Nett Revenues				2,98,160	-	37,270
Anjengo.						
Farms		832		832	-	104
Fort Victoria.						
Land Revenues	R°. 7,368					
Cuſtoms and Duties	1,712					
Farms	376					
		9,456				
Charges and Deductions			776			
Nett Revenues				8,680	-	1,085

(Continued)

(Continued)

		R'	R'	R'	£. st.
Broach.					
Land Revenues	R' 5,26,120				
Cuſtoms and Duties	54,288				
		5,80,408			
Charges and Deductions			32,832		
Nett Revenues				5,47,576	68,447
Tannah.					
Land Revenues	R' 1,99,296				
Cuſtoms and Duties	22,056				
		2,21,352			
Charges and Deductions			15,392		
Nett Revenues				2,05,960	25,745
Carranjah.					
Land Revenues	R' 31,744				
Cuſtoms and Duties	25,488				
Farms	1,296				
		58,528			
Charges and Deductions			1,032		
Nett Revenues				57,496	7,187
Jambooſier.					
Land Revenues	R' 3,43,256				
Cuſtoms and Duties	33,192				
		3,76,448			
Charges and Deductions			18,992		
Nett Revenues				3,57,456	44,682
Vingorla.					
Land Revenues		12,496		12,496	1,562
Rup'.		21,43,936	1,45,080	19,98,856 £. st.	249,857

An ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Bombay and its Dependencies, from May 1777 to April 1778.

	Civil.	Marine.	Military.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges.
	£. st.	£. st.	£. st.	£. st.	£. st.
East India Houſe, 26th February 1782.	70,996	61,258	219,619	12,500	364,373

Errors excepted. *John Annis,* Auditor of Indian Accounts.

An ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the East India Company at Bombay, from May 1777 to April 1778; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Balances in the Treaſuries	21,04,442	
Debt at Intereſt		31,17,405
Due Account Depoſits		39,286
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court		33,599
East India Houſe, 26th February 1782.	Rupees	31,90,090

Errors excepted. *John Annis,* Auditor of Indian Accounts.

An ACCOUNT of the Aids received at Bombay from Bengal, from 1777 to 1778.

	Rupees.
Bullion	
Bills	17,52,806
Goods	
Rup'.	17,52,806
East India Houſe, 26th February 1782.	£. ſtg. 219,101

Errors excepted. *John Annis,* Auditor of Indian Accounts.

GENERAL RETURN of the Honourable Company's Troops.

| | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | INFANTRY. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

under the Preſidency of Bombay, 31ſt March 1778.

SEPOYS.																IRREGULARS.										INVALIDS.					
																	Tivey.							Nairs.								
Field Officers.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Adjutants.	Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subahſies.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.	Topaſſes.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Adjutant.	Serjeants.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Private.	Moopas.	Private.	Captain.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Private.
-	4	16	14	4	4	36	74	35	217	208	23	5	85	34	2,925	70	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	10	9	1	113
-	-	-	1	-	-	1	3	1	6	8	-	-	1	1	118	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	5	5	1	1	10	20	10	58	60	6	2	20	10	764	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	5	5	1	1	10	21	10	63	61	5	2	21	10	785	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	5	5	1	1	10	20	10	59	57	4	2	24	9	820	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	66	-	-	1	2	2	22	234	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	28
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	7	31	30	7	7	67	138	66	400	394	38	11	151	64	5,412	136	-	-	1	2	2	22	234	-	-	1	-	12	11	2	141
-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	3	8	14	5	3	-	4	308	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	7	31	30	7	7	68	143	69	408	408	43	14	144	68	5,720	-	-	-	1	2	2	22	234	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—

	IRREGULAR SEPOYS.									
	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeant.	Havildar.	Naigues.	Subahſies.	Colour Bearers.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Waterſmen.	Sepoys.
Baroche	4	8	1	20	20	4	4	2	9	4	402
Surat	2	4	-	10	10	2	2	2	6	2	326
Angengo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
TOTAL	6	12	1	30	30	6	6	4	15	6	736

	Since laſt Return.						
	Dead.	Deſerted.	Diſcharged.	Invalided.	Tranſferred.	Received.	Entertained.
Artillery	9	5	-	-	2	5	2
Infantry	30	18	4	-	11	8	9
Sepoys	58	197	61	2	2	11	485
TOTAL	97	220	65	2	15	24	496

N. B. What is here put down as the Infantry Eſtabliſhment, is only the Number of which the European Battalion conſiſted when new modelled, the 25th February, and is not the proper Eſtabliſhment for this Preſidency.

(Signed) *Ch^s Egerton,*
Col^o. Command^t.

Sec. Letter from Bombay, 14 March 1778. Appx. No. 86.

Your Committee will next proceed to point out the following extract of a secret letter, dated 14th March 1778, from the President and Council of *Bombay* to the Court of Directors, which appears to have been written a few days after the receipt of the Governor General and Council's letter of 2d February: "We have had the "satisfaction of receiving the most complete sanction "and approbation of the Governor General and Coun- "cil to the plan and principle upon which we are de- "termined to proceed. The failure of this promising "scheme may in a great measure be ascribed to the dis- "trust entertained by *Ragoba*'s friends, of our want of "power to fulfil our engagements. *Moraba*'s words to "Mr. *Lewis* were, 'If we enter into business, let us "go through it heartily; let there be no excuse on the "part of the Governor and Council afterwards, that "they have received orders to make a peace, *as they* "*did before.*'

N. B. The overtures made by Moraba through Mr. Lewis.

"The necessity of taking some measures to anticipate "the designs of the French, and to counteract the party "in the Poonah Government inimical to the Company, "appears every day more eminent. The Governor "General and Council's approbation is too much con- "fined to the particular plan proposed to them, with- "out giving us any more general latitude to act as cir- "cumstances might require, which we had very strongly "pressed them to do; so that at last we may be obliged "either to hazard the consequences of acting without "authority from them, or passively behold the very "existence of the Company endangered, without "making an effort to preserve it."

Bom. Sec. Conf. 29 March 1778. Appx. No. 87.

But your Committee observe, that when Mr. *Mostyn*, in his letter dated 27th March, to the President of *Bombay*, gave an account of the revolution (which he had long expected), whereby *Moraba*, who made use of the name of *Ragonaut Row*, became vested with the Sirpaw of *Duan* by *Pertwetta Boy*, to whose care the person of the young Peishwa had been entrusted, he (Mr. *Mostyn*) applied at the same time for advice and direction; suggesting however the following doubts: "Should "*Nanna* condescend to make up matters with his op- "ponents, it may induce the party not to comply "wholly with *Ragoba's* treaty, and should *Ragoba* re- "fuse to accept of their invitation on any other terms, "*Moraba* and his party might look upon themselves as "absolved from the oath they gave to *Ragoba*, which is "the reason of their having made this effort, and think "no more of them. Our consideration seems now to "be, whether it would not be more advantageous to the "Company to recede something, and thereby fix *Ra-* "*goba* in the Government with a body of our troops, "and remain in strict friendship with the Maratta State, "and consequently entirely shut out our natural enemies "the French, and all other Europeans, than, by per- "sisting in a full compliance with the treaty, have *Ra-* "*goba* thrown upon our hands, without any further "prospect, at variance with the Government, leave all "hopes of any further advantage from them, even by "the present treaty, than what we are in absolute pos- "session of, and give them an opening to admit the "French, or any other Power they please?"

Bom. Sec. Conf. 6 April 1778 Appx. No. 88.

And your Committee find, that these doubts were further confirmed by another letter from Mr. *Mostyn*, in which he expressed much mortification at the probability of a reconciliation between *Nanna* and the opposite party; who being expected at *Poonah* in a few days, would then probably make proposals respecting an agreement with the Company and *Ragoba*. The President and Council of *Bombay* resolved thereupon to instruct Mr. *Mostyn* not to recede from any article of the treaty of *Surat*; adding, "that it would be time enough to "relax in their demands hereafter, if they should find "it necessary." And we observe, that the Board having at the same time considered the contents of the letter received the day before from *Bengal*, dated 26th of February, complained of being confined by it from taking the more active measures they had recommended; and therefore acquitting themselves, they declared the responsibility to rest upon the Superior Council, should the French succeed in getting an establishment at *Choule*.

Your Committee find, in several of Mr. *Mostyn's* letters recorded on the Secret Consultations of the *Bombay* Board, repeated intelligence of the probable designs of the French, of the promises made by the new Durbar to dismiss *Saint Lubin*, of their subsequent evasions on that subject, and also in regard to any certain proposals for an agreement with the Company and *Ragoba*. On the 14th of April he wrote that *Tambucker* was to be dispatched with full powers to treat with the Presidency and *Ragoba*. On the 18th he informed the Board, that at the Durbar, where he found assembled *Butcheba*, *Proonder*, *Morabah*, *Chintoo Wittall*, *Tookajee Holkar*, and others, *Morabah* assured him that they all confirmed the agreement formerly made with *Ragoba*; but their arrangements with the Company would be best settled after *Dada Sahib*'s arrival at *Poonah*, which delay Mr. *Mostyn* was disposed to approve of, thinking that *Ragoba* would consider the treaty of *Surat* as the only legal one.

See letter from Mr. Mostyn, dated 10 April, on Bom. Sec. Conf. 11th April 1778. Appx. No. 89.

Bom. Sec. Conf. 16th April 1778. Appx. No. 90. Ibid. 20 April 1778.

It appears, however, that the President and Council of *Bombay* did not think it proper that Mr. *Mostyn* should come with any proposals whatever from the Ministers, unless they would first deliver to him in writing the particular stipulations which they were willing to agree to. And your Committee observe, that it was at this time that the majority of the Board being of opinion, that from the present situation of affairs, there was no prospect of having any occasion for the Bengal troops that season, and in order to avoid the heavy expence by their marching forward, agreed to write to the Commanding Officer at *Calpee*, to remain there till further orders; and upon this occasion Messrs. *Draper* and *Stackhouse* dissenting from the rest of the gentlemen, declared that they did not think their situation so much altered, either with respect to the Marattas, the probable designs of the French upon *Choule*, or their own military resources, as to justify the countermanding the march of the troops. Whereupon the majority thought it necessary to observe, in their vindication, that the difficulties of the march from *Calpee* to *Bombay* were so great, as to make the attempt next to impracticable; that they would not upon any account expose the Company's troops to such dangers, without the most absolute and imminent necessity; that they were assured, by later accounts from *Europe* than the Governor General and Council could have had, that there was no probability of a rupture with *France*.

Bom. Sec. Conf. 22 April 1778. See the proceedings on this Consultation, Appx. No. 91. *See Appx. No. 56.*

It has been seen how soon these resolutions were altered, and what reasons of absolute and imminent necessity were assigned for commanding the advance of the detachment. To those letters, which are referred to above, your Committee have added, in the Appendix, No. 92, a secret letter from the President and Council to the Court of Directors, dated 26th April, by which will be discovered the idea they then entertained of the situation of those affairs; and wherein we find an observation, which proves that *Ragoba* did not well brook any delay, and that it had been necessary to hold a conference with him, to moderate his impatience. And it appears, that on that occasion he particularly insisted on his alarm, lest delay should weaken the resolution of the party in his favour; to which he added the further stimulative of an earnest profession of his hope to gain an earlier opportunity of putting the Company in possession of *Bassein*.

See Letters from Bombay, dated 4 and 20 May. *See Appx. No. 64 and 65.*

Appx. No. 92. See extract of Secret Letter, dated 26th April 1778 No. 92.

See report of the conference, Bom. Sel. Cont. 22 April. Appx. No. 93.

Your Committee find, that Mr. *Mostyn* communicated to the President and Council of *Bombay*, in his letters of the 25th and 28th May, several pieces of information which he had gained, in further proof of the favourable attention still paid to the French agent by the new Durbar, and of their endeavours to prevent the advance of the

Letter from Mr. Mostyn to Bombay, 25 and 28 May 1778. Appx. No. 94.

the detachment under Colonel *Leſlie*, for which purpoſe it was ſaid that they had written to *Moodajee Boojla*, deſiring him to ſtop their march either by friendly intervention or by force, in which latter caſe he ſhould be ſupported with aſſiſtance from them, if he ſhould require it. And Mr. *Moſtyn* appears to have openly declared to perſons deputed to him from the Durbar, that he conſidered all the pretences of ſending propoſals to *Bombay* as mere fineſſe, calculated only to gain time, and to check the progreſs of the troops from *Bengal*. And your Committee obſerve, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* expreſſed on the 3d June the ſame opinion in theſe words: " Any offers the Durbar may now " make to *Ragoba*, can only be intended to gain more " time, and the more important object we have in view " cannot be put to the hazard upon the mere hopes of " advantage to him."

Letter from Bombay to Bengal, dated 5 June 1778. Appx. No. 95.

It appears, that on the 16th May the Preſident and Council apprized Colonel *Leſlie* that the rainy ſeaſon on their coaſt might be expected to ſet in about the 10th or 15th of June: that on the 5th of June they ſent inſtructions to him to direct his march to *Surat*, unleſs he ſhould think it more expedient to proceed to *Broach*. And we perceive, that on the 19th June, having received information of the commencement of hoſtilities between *Great Britain* and *France*, they repeated their directions to him to purſue his march with the utmoſt diligence on that account. And it appears, that on the 22d of the ſame month, Mr. *Moſtyn* forwarded to him Duſtucks which he had received from *Moraba* and *Butcheba*, for the free paſſage of his corps through the Maratta dominions.

Appx. No. 96.

See Ben. Conſ. 23 July.

But your Committee find by Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letters, and by the Secret Conſultations of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and by their ſecret letters of the 17th June and 8th of July, that Mr. *Moſtyn* had preſented on the 4th of June to the Miniſters a formal paper of demands with the Company's ſeal annexed, in obedience to the directions which, as has been before taken notice of, he had received from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*: that he had deſired an immediate and explicit anſwer likewiſe in writing, allowing only a delay of fourteen days; that he had not however been able for a conſiderable time to obtain any reply to thoſe requiſitions, till by the aſſiſtance of *Scindia* and *Holkar*, *Nanna Furneſe* again appeared in formidable competition with *Moraba* and his party, and ſoon after regained the aſcendancy of miniſterial power; during which ſtruggle it appears that *Moraba* and his friends at laſt delivered to Mr. *Moſtyn* every neceſſary paper and credential for ſettling the demands of the Company upon that ſtate, and bringing *Ragoba* again into the Government; that with theſe, at their particular requeſt, and not having received any anſwer from the new adminiſtration, he determined to proceed to the Preſidency, in order to lay them before the Board; which he accordingly did on the 13th day of July: and on the 21ſt the Select Committee took them into conſideration.

See letters from Mr. Moſtyn, to Bengal, 10 and 30 June; Letters from Bombay to Bengal, dated 12 and 18 June; Letter from Mr. Moſtyn to Bombay, dated 21 June. Do. 27 June.

Appx. No. 97. *See Appx. No.* 65.

Letter from Mr. Moſtyn to Bombay, 3d July. Appx. No. 98.

Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, dated 13th July, with the Inclo-ſures. Appx. No. 99. Letter of 27 June from Mr. Moſtyn. Appx. No. 100.

It is however to be remarked, that Mr. *Moſtyn*, in his letter of the 27th of June to the Board, expreſsly mentioned that *Nanna* had more than once ſent *Maderow Jaderow* to deſire to ſee him, which he had declined to comply with, having aſſigned as a reaſon, that the articles did not require explanation, and if there was any other propoſition to make, it ſhould be delivered in writing; to which *Maderow* had replied, " That the " buſineſs *Nanna* wanted him for, was to talk on the " articles and the increaſe of their friendſhip." Hereupon Mr. *Moſtyn* makes the following reflection in explanation of his reaſons for having ſtill perſiſted to avoid a meeting with *Nanna*:

" This more fully points out their view in ſending for " me to be nothing more than to delay time, and to " evade giving an anſwer to the paper in writing. And " as, from the exceſs of time, your honour, &c. may " judge it a refuſal, I have thought it moſt prudent to " evade going, and from experience I am convinced it " is the only method of drawing any thing from them " in writing."

And your Committee find, that a few hours after Mr. *Moſtyn* had quitted *Poonah*, a reply, very different indeed from that delivered by *Moraba* and his party, was ſent in writing to Mr. *Lewis* by the Durbar, and by him tranſmitted to the Board; whoſe ſentiments upon it will be taken notice of, as having been the principle of thoſe reſolutions, which were proviſionally approved and confirmed by the Superior Council.

See Mr. Lewis's letter, dated 20 July 1778. Appx. No. 101. This appears to be a miſtake; the letter from Mr. Lewis is dated 17th July, but is found on Bom. Sel. Con. 20 July 1778. *See Appx. No.* 85. Appx. No. 102.

But your Committee obſerve, that previous to the meeting of the Select Committee upon this ſubject, they received advice from *Poonah* of ſome violent proceedings againſt *Moraba* and his party by *Nanna*, in conjunction with *Madajee Scindia*, who had employed a body of horſe in ſeizing and confining the perſons of *Moraba* and *Butcheba*; had obliged *Holkar* to give up his Duan, and accept one of their appointment, and were ſuſpected of deſigns againſt the liberty of *Siccaram Baboo*, who had not been conſulted in any of theſe meaſures.

On the 21ſt July the Select Committee of *Bombay*, which your Committee find to have conſiſted of Governor *Hornby*, Mr. *Carnac*, Colonel *Egerton*, and Mr. *Draper*, aſſembled to take into conſideration the ſituation of affairs with the Marattas; and having conſidered the Durbar's anſwer to the requiſitions preſented by Mr. *Moſtyn* on the 4th of June, they judged it neceſſary to conſult him on ſeveral points before they took their reſolutions on the papers before them; which will be found together in the Appendix No. 104.

Appx. No. 103. Appointment of a Sel. Com. 10 April 1778.

Appx. No. 104.

And your Committee further find, that Mr. *Moſtyn* attending accordingly, delivered his ſentiments; in which, after inſiſting upon the danger of *Nanna*'s inimical intrigues with the French, and on the ſtate of the different parties at *Poonah*, he declared it to be impoſſible in his judgment to chuſe any other alternative than that of taking part with *Moraba*, and that it ſhould be done without the ſmalleſt delay, conſidering the actual ſituation of affairs with *France*. And on his further examination by the Select Committee on theſe matters, he gave them every encouragement to make a vigorous attempt from a conſideration of the ſtate and diſpoſition of the Maratta armies, from the aſſiſtance to be expected by acting in concert with the confederate Chiefs, and from the little difficulty there would be in ſecuring all the paſſes between the Preſidency and *Poonah*.

And it appears that the Select Committee thereupon proceeded to conſider the Durbar's anſwer tranſmitted by Mr. *Lewis*, ſince *Nanna Furneſe* had reſumed his place in the adminiſtration; and they came thereupon to the following unanimous reſolutions:

Appx. No. 105.

" That the anſwers are in the higheſt degree vague, " evaſive, and unſatisfactory, and amount to a refuſal.

" That we are authorized by the Governor General " and Council's letter of 23d March, to declare the " Durbar's anſwers a violation of the treaty of *Poorunder*, " and conſequently that we are free from all obligation " laid on us by that treaty, and at full liberty to take " meaſures for ſubverting that party in the Poonah Go- " vernment which is connected with the French in " ſchemes hoſtile to the Engliſh Company; and for " eſtabliſhing an Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, with which " we can maintain a permanent alliance.

" That the ſituation of public affairs in *Europe*, and " *Nanna*'s reſtoration to the executive power at *Poonah*, " render it indiſpenſably neceſſary to effect thoſe two " points with all poſſible expedition.

" That for accompliſhing thoſe purpoſes, the moſt " practicable meaſures be purſued for placing *Ragoba* " in the regency at *Poonah*, with this ſpecial proviſo, " that the Government and Sicca be conducted in the " Peiſhwa's name during his minority, and ſurrendered " to him on his obtaining legal age."

The plan of future meaſures appears to have been the

next ſubject of conſideration; which terminated in other unanimous reſolutions (the particulars of which Appx. No. 106. are placed in the Appendix, No. 106) to engage with *Moraba* and his party, and to make neceſſary preparations (without imparting their intentions to *Ragoba*) againſt the ſeaſon of action, before which time they might expect to receive advices from *Europe*, and obtain the ſentiments of the Governor General and Council.

Letter, dated 21 July 1778. Appx. No 107. And we perceive, that in order to ſecure the co-operation of Colonel *Leſlie*'s detachments, they ſent new directions for the courſe of his march; and that, with a view of engaging the neutrality at leaſt, if not the aſſiſtance of *Moodajee Booſla* and the *Nizam*, they recommended it to the Governments of *Bengal* and *Madras* to prefer demands of that tendency upon thoſe Powers.

See the letters to Bengal and Madras on this occaſion. Appx. No. 108

And your Committee find, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* tranſmitted an account of theſe circumſtances and proceedings to the Court of Directors, in their ſecret letter dated 31ſt of July, which concludes with the following paſſage:

"*Moraba* and his party have engaged to join *Ragoba* with all their forces as ſoon as he paſſed the Ghauts, but we cannot place much dependance upon them, at leaſt for any immediate aſſiſtance, as *Nanna Furneſe*, upon ſuſpicion of their deſigns, has ſeized and confined moſt of this party, and even ſecured the perſons of *Moraba* and *Butcheba* themſelves. Yet ſo much is the Poonah Government weakened by the inteſtine diviſions which have ſo long ſubſiſted, that we hope we ſhall be able to effect our point without much difficulty, even if *Moraba* ſhould not be able to join us; and we doubt not, when it is ſeen that we openly eſpouſe *Ragoba*'s cauſe, but many principal Maratta officers will declare for him, as his claim and family are in general favoured by them, and *Nanna*'s oppreſſive Government deteſted.

"In the terms to be made with *Ragoba* for the Company, we propoſe to look for nothing further than the performance of the Treaty of *Surat*, the total excluſion of the French, and payment of our expences."

Your Committee think it proper in this place to remark to the Houſe, that we have found, among the various records and documents which we had called for, in order to gain all proper materials for the proſecution of our enquiry, a report of the Committee of Correſpondence of the Eaſt India Company; which appears to have been appointed by the Court of Directors to examine into the affairs of *Bombay*, and particularly the circumſtances previous to and during this expedition undertaken in favour of *Ragoba*. And your Committee intend to place an extract of the moſt material parts of this Report in an Appendix, from which the Houſe will derive much information; and as we muſt neceſſarily, in the courſe of our Report, conſider many of the ſame points which have been the objects of their attention, we ſhall occaſionally annex to our obſervations any deciſive opinion which the Committee of Correſpondence appear to have ſubmitted to the Court of Directors upon each of ſuch points. And in obſervance of this deſign, your Committee will here inſert the opinion, which was given upon the reſolution of the Select Committee above-mentioned, of the 21ſt July;

Comm. of Cor. March 1780. "And the Committee having duly attended to the whole of the proceedings previous to the expedition under conſideration, are of opinion, that the reſolution of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, of the 21ſt of July, for placing *Ragoba* in the regency at *Poonah*, was not improper, under the favourable circumſtances ſet forth in their proceedings at that period."

Bom. Sel. Conſ. 12 Oct. 1778. Your Committee have not found in the records of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, any proceedings which tended to a further proſecution of theſe meaſures, till the 12th of October, when the Select Committee, compoſed of the ſame Members, reſumed their conſideration of Maratta affairs. But it will be proper to obſerve, that previous to this meeting of the Committee, a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated 17th Auguſt, had been received, containing their approbation of the reſolutions of the Select Committee of the 21ſt of July, on the following expreſs proviſions:

Received 29 Sept. 1778. See Appx. No. 85.

"Firſt—That it do not interfere with any engagements formed with *Moodajee Bouncello* by Mr *Elliot*, and previous notice to you by him.

"Second—That your lateſt advices from *Europe* ſhall be equal to an aſſurance, that the force required for this ſervice may be ſpared, without endangering the ſafety of *Bombay*, in the event of a French invaſion.

"Third.—That the engagement you may form with *Ragoba* himſelf, or *Moraba* and his aſſociates, be not contrary to thoſe concluded with *Moodajee* by Mr. *Elliot*, and noticed to you, nor of any hoſtile tendency to the Government of *Berar*."

Appx. No. 109. See alſo Appx. No. 111, 112, 113. And it appears, that there was much difference of opinion in the members of the *Bombay* Board, upon the exact interpretation of the Governor General and Council's meaning, in the reſtrictive proviſion relative to the engagements with *Moodajee Bouncello*, whether they ſhould not conſider it as an inſtruction to delay execution of their reſolutions, till they might be informed by Mr. *Elliot* of the particular articles of the alliance entered into with that Power, which in effect would amount to a virtual prohibition of their intended enterprize.

Your Committee having obſerved that the Committee of Correſpondence delivered an opinion upon theſe inſtructions from the Governor General and Council, here inſerted it as follows:

"The Committee find, that when the Governor General and Council approved the reſolution of the 21ſt of July, they could not have been informed of the confinement of thoſe Maratta Chiefs, who were ſuppoſed to be well inclined to *Ragoba*, and capable of affording him the aſſiſtance above-mentioned."

And it further appears, by the advices tranſmitted in this interval by Mr. *Lewis* from *Poonah*, that *Moraba Furnuſe* and *Butcheba Proonder* had been transferred from the cuſtody of *Madajee Scindia* to that of *Nanna Furneſe*, who kept them in cloſe confinement. That "the Durbar had been conſulting how they ſhould oppoſe Colonel *Leſlie*'s march, but were much puzzled what Appx. No. 110. officer to ſend, as *Siccaram* and *Nanna*, being mutually afraid of each other, would not conſent to *Scindia*'s going, as they conſidered him as the umpire between them; that *Hurry Punt* had declared his reſolution of not ſtirring without the Miniſters, who were afraid to truſt *Holkar* with the command: that *Purſeram Bhow* muſt return to *Meritz*, *Hyder*'s army being in camp on the other ſide of the *Kiſtna*, with a determined reſolution of attacking it as ſoon as the ſeaſon opened." That they had therefore contented themſelves with having privately written to the different Rajahs and officers through whoſe diſtricts the Colonel muſt neceſſarily paſs, to uſe every endeavour to prevent his advancing; but that in caſe their efforts ſhould prove ineffectual, they were directed to deny having received any orders from Government.

And it is to be obſerved, that by the laſt accounts received at *Bombay*, of Colonel *Leſlie*'s ſituation, he had not advanced much beyond *Chatterpore*.

Bom. Sel. Conſ. 12 Oct. 1778. Appx. No. 112. And your Committee find on the Select Conſultations of 12th October, a minute of Mr. *Carnac*, in which he lamented, that not a ſingle ſtep had yet been taken in proſecution of their reſolutions of the 21ſt of July, or to avail themſelves of the opportunity offered by the diſtractions in the Brahmin miniſtry to exclude *Nanna* from any ſhare in the Government; that moſt ſerious evils might enſue to the Company by any longer delay; that they were not neceſſarily retarded by any circumſtances ariſing from the reſtrictions contained in the Governor General and Council's letter of approbation; that the party of *Moraba* was not ſo depreſſed as to be incapable

of

of rendering very material ſervice; and that their conduct muſt be liable to a charge of inconſiſtency by their honourable employers, ſhould they remain inactive after having received a full latitude from the controlling Preſidency to act with vigour and effect.—And we perceive that Mr. *Moſtyn*, whoſe opinion was again conſulted upon this occaſion, repeated every encouraging aſſurance of the certainty of ſucceſs, and of the preſent criſis being the moſt favourable that could offer for the execution of their deſigns. And in ſupport of this opinion he offered ſeveral reaſons, which will be found in the Appendix, No. 111. It appears that at the cloſe of the debate, the majority of the Committee, Mr. *Draper* only diſſenting, reſolved to carry into immediate execution the plan agreed to under 21ſt of July.

Bom. Sel. Conſ. 19th Oct. 1778. Appx. No. 112.

Your Committee find, that Mr. *Draper* delivered in his minute of diſſent to the foregoing reſolution on the 19th of October; in which he aſcribed to the difference of circumſtances the reaſon of his changing his opinion ſince the 21ſt of July, and of his objecting to the proſecution of thoſe meaſures at the preſent juncture; to which he added the following inducements:

" Firſt, Becauſe of the expreſs conditions contained in " the Governor General and Council's letter of 17 " Auguſt.

" Secondly, Becauſe of the reſtraint *Moraba* and " *Butcheba*, and their adherents, ſeem to be under.

" Thirdly, Becauſe of the very great deficiency in " our European force to the laſt eſtabliſhment ordered by " the Honourable Company."

On theſe heads he enlarged in long explanatory arguments, which are placed in the Appendix, No. 112, and are judged well deſerving the attention of the Houſe. But in concluſion he declared his concurrence of opinion in the neceſſity of removing *Nanna* from the adminiſtration of affairs, and of reinſtating *Ragonaut Row* in quality of Regent, for the welfare of the Preſidency, though he thought it adviſable to delay the attempt for a few months.

Bom. Sel. Conſ. 26 Oct. 1778. Appx. No. 113.

On the 26th of October your Committee obſerve, that the other Members of the Select Board declared, in anſwer to Mr. *Draper*'s objections, that they conſidered the ſucceſs of the intended expedition to depend entirely upon its being immediately undertaken to prevent a junction between the French and the Maratta forces; and that it was in no way likely " the degree of ſupport they " meant to give *Ragonaut Row* could be at all affected " by a negociation with *Moodajee Boonſla*, even ſuppoſing " it ſhould have been recommended to him to aſſert his " pretenſions to the Rajahſhip of *Sattarah*." The majority of the Committee having thus confirmed their firſt opinion, an immediate expedition to *Poonah*, in ſupport of *Ragoba*, was reſolved upon.

Upon this reſolution, and the ſubſequent execution of it, the Court of Directors, in conformation of the report made to them by the Committee of Correſpondence, conveyed their opinion to the Select Committee in the following words:

" Your reſolution of the 21ſt of July was not im- " proper, under the favourable circumſtances ſtated by " you at that period: but the change which happened " ſoon afterwards in the ſituation of *Ragoba*'s friends, and " the lapſe of time from the 21ſt of July to the 22d of " November, rendered it extremely imprudent to un- " dertake the expedition at that time."

Bombay, 26 Oct. 1778. Appx. No. 114.

And your Committee find, that the firſt preparatory meaſure which the Select Committee took toward the accompliſhing of their deſigns, was to order a letter to be drawn up in the name of *Ragoba*, to the principal Maratta officers, with a view, when he ſhould have approved it, to cauſe it to be circulated on his landing on the Continent. And it appears, that on the 4th of November it was reſolved to appoint a Committee, as a method the beſt ſuited for the purpoſe of carrying their plans into execution; and upon the Preſident's propoſal, Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and *Moſtyn* were appointed accordingly, and immediately directed to conſider the further arrangements neceſſary for the intended ſervice; and to wait upon *Ragoba* to communicate their intentions and the conditions to be previouſly ſtipulated with him; in which they ſhould enjoin *him* to obſerve the utmoſt ſecrecy. But we perceive, that on the 7th of the ſame month Colonel *Egerton* declaring that he had, through miſapprehenſion, aſſented to the appointment of a Committee, which he ſince accidentally found was intended to accompany the army to *Poonah*, deſired to withdraw his aſſent, and to ſubſtitute his proteſt againſt it, for reaſons then delivered by him in writing, the principal of which appears to be, becauſe he deemed it diametrically oppoſite to the intentions of the Company, and becauſe he doubted whether in the abſence of the Commander in Chief, the power of the Select Committee could exiſt without the preſence of the other three Members. Whereupon the Preſident put the following queſtion, in which Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* declined voting:

Appx. No. 116. Bom. Sel. Conſ. 7 Nov. 1778.

" Whether two Members of the Committee can be " detached from the Preſidency at the ſame time upon " any temporary ſervice, and whether the two remaining " Members are, in their abſence, competent to form a " Committee?"—We perceive that Mr. *Draper* thought himſelf obliged, from his idea of the Company's meaning to vote in the negative; but the Preſident being of opinion, that in caſes of great contingency, even his own preſence might be diſpenſed with, the queſtion was decided in the affirmative, by his caſting voice.

But your Committee obſerve, that Mr. *Carnac* afterwards explained his ſentiments on that point, according with thoſe of the *Preſident*; and that on a ſubſequent day, he was replied to by Colonel *Egerton*, who repeated his objections to the Committee, as interfering with the military command, and as being a deviation from the Company's orders.

Bom. Sel. Conſ. 11 Nov. 1778. Appx. No. 117. Do. 18th Nov. Do.

The animadverſion of the Court of Directors on this meaſure, is in theſe words:

" Your appointment of a Member of the Select " Committee to accompany the Commander in Chief to " *Poonah*, was highly improper. By the departure of " the Commander in Chief and Mr. *Carnac*, the Gover- " nor having a caſting vote, became poſſeſſed in fact of " abſolute authority for tranſacting all political, military, " and naval affairs, and ſuch as require ſecrecy, at " *Bombay*; and as this tranſaction militated againſt the " letter and ſpirit of the Court's orders of the 10th of " April 1778, the appointment of a Member of the " Select Committee at *Bombay* to accompany the Com- " mander in Chief to *Poonah*, muſt have our diſappro- " bation, and we declare the majority of the ſaid Com- " mittee very reprehenſible for their conduct in that re- " ſpect. We find the Commander in Chief proteſted " againſt the meaſure; and we exempt Mr. *Draper* " from this cenſure, becauſe, juſtly ſuppoſing it to be " the intent of the Company, that none of the civil " members of the Committee ſhould be detached from " the Preſidency, if the Commander in Chief was to be " abſent alſo, Mr. *Draper* very properly delivered his " opinion in the Select Committee accordingly."

And your Committee find that *Ragoba* made ſeveral objections to the terms of the circular letter above-mentioned, particularly to the clauſe reſpecting his carrying on the Government as Regent only during the minority; and that his behaviour in this inſtance was not without ſymptoms of evaſive diſſimulation, in firſt pretending compliance, and afterwards attempting to obtrude ſeveral very material alterations, which the Committee held to be inadmiſſible, and therefore reſolved (in conſideration alſo of the dangers of delay) to make a very explicit declaration to him, that on his compliance muſt depend the continuance of their ſupport. This appears to have had its effect; by inducing him to ſign the original letter on the 16th of November, having previouſly obtained a promiſe from the Committee to inform the Court of Directors of his ſolemn allegation

Bom. Sel. Conſ. 11 Nov. 1778. Appx. No. 118.

See his amended copy of the letter, Appx. No. 119.

Bom. Sel. Conſ. 16 Nov. 1778. Appx. No. 120.

and

and engagement to prove the young Peiſhwa to be a ſuppoſititious child, and that moreover, if he failed in that proof, he was nevertheleſs ſtill entitled, according to the Gentoo law, to an equal partition of the Government and country. And we perceive, that the Select Committee at the ſame time reſolved to gratify him in his requeſt for a ſupply of arms and ammunition, and for a loan of 3 lacks of rupees " which (they obſerved) " the ſtate of their treaſury at *Bombay* and *Surat* would " enable them very conveniently to grant." But they would not admit the validity of his pretended engagements with Mr. *Shaw*, relative to the ceſſion of *Ahmood*, nor conſent to accept that place as well as *Hanſood*, but as a free gift from him. Yet they afterwards allowed that plea to prevail ſo far as to induce them to add another lack to the loan, which they promiſed to make him.

See extract of Sel. Conf. 23 Nov. See Appx. No. 123.

Report of Com. of Corr.

Your Committee think it proper here to ſtate, that the amount due from *Ragoba* to the Company the 30th day of April 1777, was rupees 24,72,775; that in November 1778, the Governor and Select Committee paid to the executor of Mr. *William Shaw* 80,000 R^s^ on account of *Ragoba*, and lent beſides 15,000 to two of his ſervants, which, with the four lacks mentioned above, amounted in the whole to 4,95,000 rupees; and that the Committee of Correſpondence reported it to be their clear opinion that theſe loans were unjuſtifiable; and that the Court of Directors announced to the Select Committee their ſentiments and reſolutions on this point to be as follows:

" Your payment of 80,000 rupees to Mr. *Shaw's* ex- " ecutors, and your loan of four lacks to *Ragoba*, and " 15,000 rupees to his ſervants, beſides arms and mi- " litary ſtores furniſhed for his uſe, were unjuſtifiable " meaſures, more eſpecially as ſo large a ſum as 1,50,000 " was ſent with the troops, and as authority was alſo " granted to the commiſſary and paymaſter to paſs " drafts on the Select Committee for their neceſſary " diſburſements during the expedition; and we find " that bills have actually been accepted on that account, " to the amount of rupees 2,28,529: unleſs therefore " you ſhall be able to produce better reaſons for having " made the above loans and payment, amounting to " 4,95,000 rupees, than appear to us at preſent, you " muſt expect to be made reſponſible to the Company " for the ſaid amount."

Appx. No. 121.

On the Select Conſultations of the 18th of November, your Committee find recorded the draft of the propoſed treaty with *Ragoba*, which had been approved of by the Committee; but it is proper to remark, that the Preſident on the next day ſignified to the ſeveral members his opinion, that the 16th article appearing to him to be a greater conceſſion than the Gentlemen at *Bengal* were by law entitled to, and not only unneceſſary but a dangerous precedent, he had ordered it to be new modelled.

No. 121.

The article in queſtion ſtood as follows:

16th Article—" When the contracting parties have " mutually interchanged this treaty, it will be ſent to " *Bengal* for the ratification of the Governor General " and Council."

The amended article we find to ſtand as follows:

" If any article of the preſent treaty ſhould interfere " with any engagements formed by the Governor " General and Council not yet known to the Select " Committee of *Bombay*, ſuch article may be altered or " amended as may be neceſſary."

It appears that Mr. *Draper* returned an anſwer in diſapprobation of the amendment, becauſe he conceived the Act of Parliament obliged them to ſubmit the propoſed treaty to the controul of the Governor General and Council; but Mr. *Carnac* thinking that the queſtion ſhould be fairly debated in the Committee, it was accordingly conſidered there on the 21ſt; when Mr. *Draper* appears to have been abſent, and the reſt of the Board agreed, that as they had obtained the conſent and approbation of the Superior Council, and expreſsly mentioned that circumſtance in the firſt article of the treaty, it would be ſuperfluous and humiliating to the dignity of their Government if they ſhould declare that they had no authority to conclude a final engagement.

Bom. Sel. Conf. 21 Nov. 1778. Appx. No. 122.

But your Committee find, that the proceedings of the Select Committee were preſſed forward to a concluſion of theſe preparatory agreements, upon ſudden intelligence that the Miniſters had got intimation of their intentions, and were making preparations to receive them. Whereupon it was determined to ſend off one diviſion of the troops immediately, and that the remainder of the forces ſhould proceed afterwards with all expedition. Yet it appears to your Committee, that another unexpected interruption aroſe from *Ragoba*, who objected to ſeveral parts of the treaty, particularly thoſe regarding the ſecurity of the young Peiſhwa's perſon, and the promiſe of future protection and favour to *Moraba* and the other Chiefs of his party; and he refuſed to ſign the circular letters (though wanted for immediate uſe) till he had executed the treaty, which he was at laſt, after a conference of ſeven hours, hardly prevailed upon to agree to, though he was indulged in his earneſt deſire to make ſome ſmall alterations in it. And we perceive, that in conſequence of this apparent accommodation of all the remaining differences, Colonel *Egerton* ſet off the ſame day to *Bellapore* to put himſelf at the head of the forces; and the other Members of the Select Board being aſſembled in the Preſident's chamber, executed the treaty and ſent it that evening by Mr. *Moſtyn* to *Ragoba*, who, however, notwithſtanding his promiſe, again refuſed to ratify it, unleſs ſome addition was made to the clauſe regarding the cuſtody of the child, and the ceſſion of the Autguns depending upon *Salſette*. And we perceive, that in order to remove all doubts, the Board agreed to make ſome explanatory conceſſions in thoſe inſtances, adding however a reſolution, in conſequence " of their having experienced ſo much evaſion and delay " on his part," to ſend a threatening meſſage to him, that if he ſhould not agree to the treaty with the above additions " they would drop all connection with him, " and take poſſeſſion of the Government at *Poonah* in " the name of the Peiſhwa, and carry it on in his name " until they ſhould receive orders from *Bengal* whom to " appoint Regent."

Ibid. 23 Nov. No. 123.

Appx No. 124.

Still however your Committee obſerve, that the deſire of having a negative in the appointment of Guardians to whom the care of the Child's perſon ſhould be entruſted, encouraged *Ragoba* to expreſs a further diſſatisfaction; and that the Select Board thereupon made yet a further conceſſion to him, " as they were very anxious " to have the Treaty concluded, and unwilling it ſhould " be known at *Poonah* that any diſagreement ſubſiſted " between them;" to all which they added a formal exculpation of his pertinacity, as ſuppoſing it " not to pro- " ceed from any evil deſign againſt the infant, but to " be occaſioned entirely by his fears that they ſhould " place it under the charge of *Moraba* or ſome of the " Chief Officers, which would give them great aſcen- " dancy." And it appears that theſe apprehenſions were not yet ſubdued; for though the Committee, in hopes of accommodating matters without delivering the meſſage agreed upon, approved of Mr. *Moſtyn's* conduct in having ſuppreſſed it, *Ragoba* lingered out his arguments and objections till the 27th, and in the evening of that day at laſt reluctantly put his hand and ſeal to the treaty in the Appendix No. 126.

Bom. Sel. Conf. 26 Nov. 1778. Appx. No. 125.

Appx. No. 126.

And your Committee find, that *Ragoba* left *Bombay* very ſoon after this; and having landed upon the Continent, followed the army with very little expedition, attended by a detachment of the Company's troops and a ſmall body of his own: That on the 7th, Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn* ſet out to join the army, carrying with them their commiſſion and inſtructions for concerting and conducting, in conjunction with Colonel *Egerton*, all the neceſſary operations, political and military, of the

Appx. No. 127.

Bom. Sel. Conf. 21 Nov. 1778. Appx. No. 122.

the expedition, and alſo circular letters which were diſperſed as a manifeſto, being addreſſed to the Mutſeddes, Sirdars, Jaghierdars, and ſubjects of the Maratta State. Theſe papers are dated 5th of December 1778, and placed in the Appendix, No. 127.

Appx. No. 128. On the 29th of December, a ſecret letter was diſpatched from *Bombay* to the Court of Directors, which your Committee find to contain a brief account of theſe meaſures, and alſo congratulations on the proſpect of retrieving the valuable acquiſitions loſt by the treaty of *Poorunder*; ſtating the force detached on the expedition to conſiſt of

Artillery - - -	172
European Infantry - -	549
Artillery Laſcars - -	500
Sepoys - - -	2,689

making in all a body of - - 3,910 men, all officers included; with which force they truſted (all circumſtances conſidered) to bring the buſineſs to a happy concluſion, relying with ſanguine hopes on a general diſpoſition among the Maratta officers and people in favour of *Ragoba* and of his pretenſions, on the advancement of the Bengal detachment, and on the damp thrown, by the fall of *Pondicherry*, upon the expectations of *Nanna Furneſe*, of aſſiſtance from the French.

See Appx. 112. It will have been obſerved, that Mr. *Draper*, in his Minute of the 19th of October, in the Select Committee, reſted much of his argument of objection againſt the immediate execution of their deſigns in favour of *Ragoba*, upon the deficiency of their European force, which he called a lamentable one, compared with the laſt eſtabliſhment ordered by the Company in April 1775, of 312 artillery and 1,200 infantry, and that it could not be better deſcribed than in their own letter of

Appx. No. 129. the 8th of September, to Sir *Edward Vernon*; in which your Committee find it repreſented, "That they had "no other reſources for defence than their own garriſon, "with the further diſadvantageous circumſtance, that "their force conſiſted almoſt wholly of Sepoys, though "they had drained every European they poſſibly could "from their ſubordinate ſettlements." And it is further to be obſerved, that the body of European artillery and infantry, with a battalion of ſepoys, which the Preſidency of *Fort St. George* had held in readineſs to aſſiſt the Bombay operations, were not arrived, and that no other reinforcement of Europeans had been received but thoſe which were recalled from the ſubordinates. And

No. 129. it ſhould not be omitted, that in addition to the force as ſtated above to have been at firſt detached on the expedition, upwards of 400 rank and file, with officers in proportion, appear to have been afterwards ordered on that ſervice, and that a conſiderable part of the additional force conſiſted of Europeans.

Report of Com. of Correſ. And your Committee find, that the Court of Directors thus expreſſed their diſapprobation of the conduct of the Select Committee, in riſking ſuch an enterprize under theſe circumſtances of their military force.

"The ſtate of your garriſon, as repreſented by your- "ſelves to Sir *Edward Vernon*, in your letter of the 8th "of September 1778, could not warrant your ſending "ſo large a force on foreign ſervice at the commence- "ment of an European war; more eſpecially when ſpeedy "ſuccour was rendered precarious, and conſequently "ſucceſs very doubtful, by the very diſagreeable alteration "which had happened in the ſituation of *Ragoba*'s "friends. Under the above circumſtances, the under- "taking was evidently become hazardous, and not to "be juſtified; the reaſons urged by Mr. *Draper* againſt "it were ſolid and judicious; and you ought certainly "to have waited the arrival or near approach of the "Bengal detachment, before you attempted to reinſtate "*Ragoba* at *Poonah*."

But your Committee obſerve, that after having thus paſſed a declaration of cenſure on ſeveral diſtinct parts of the conduct of the Select Committee, the Court of Directors adopted alſo the opinion of the Committee of Correſpondence, upon ſumming up the whole, and tempered their final rebuke with ſome qualification in reſpect of the intention.

"Although this Committee cannot concur in the "reaſons offered by the Select Committee of *Bombay* ſo "far as to approve their conduct, they are nevertheleſs "of opinion that the ſaid Select Committee appear to "have acted according to the beſt of their judgment in "undertaking to place *Ragoba* in the Regency at *Poonah* "in November 1778."

And the Court of Directors, in their letter to the Select Committee, made uſe of nearly the ſame ſtyle of reprehenſion. "Although we are willing to hope, for "the reaſons offered by the majority in anſwer to Mr. "*Draper*'s diſſent, that you acted according to the beſt "of your judgment in undertaking to place *Ragoba* in "the Regency at *Poonah* in November 1778; we never- "theleſs conſider you as having proceeded with great "indiſcretion on that occaſion."

It is to be remembered, that theſe cenſures were paſſed upon the previous reſolutions which ſet forward the undertaking of that expedition, and that this was the puniſhment inflicted upon the adviſers of them, viz. the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*.—Your Committee find, that a failure in the ſucceſsful execution of the plan met with rougher cenſure and more ſenſible puniſhment.

In what manner the accompliſhment of the ſanguine expectations formed by the Governor and Select Committee was fruſtrated, and changed into a ſad reverſe of difficulty and diſtreſs, and by what ſteps, and under what circumſtances the Bombay army was led on towards *Poonah*, till it was obliged to ſubmit to an acceptance of the enemy's permiſſion for its return to the Preſidency, under the ſtipulations of a diſgraceful Convention at *Worgham* on the 17th day of January 1779, will be fully explained to the Houſe by a peruſal of the Poonah diary, Appx. No. 130. which your Committee have thought it proper to point out in the Appendix No. 196; to which we have ſubjoined an extract of a letter, dated 27 March 1779, from No. 130. the Select Committee to the Court of Directors, wherein a fuller account is given of theſe events, accompanied with their obſervations, and a detail of their proceedings No. 130. thereupon. To theſe your Committee have added, the material parts of the Reports of the Committee of Cor- No. 130. reſpondence, from which we have already made ſome extracts, and wherein moſt of the eſſential papers tranſmitted from *Bombay* are referred to, and made uſe of as evidence, for the direction of their opinion on the matters ſubmitted to their inveſtigation; and, in order to complete the weight and authority of the relations and remarks which we have met with on this ſubject, we think it proper to anticipate our regular return to the conſideration of Bengal proceedings, and place in the Appendix, No. 130, the opinion of Sir *Eyre Coote*, which Ben. Sec. Conſ. 24 May 1779. indeed appears to relate chiefly to the military conduct Sir Eyre Coote's Minute. upon that occaſion, and preſents an exculpation of the No. 130. ſoldiery from the ſlur thrown upon them by Mr. *Carnac*, whom, as the Preſident of the Field Deputies, he conſidered the moſt reſponſible and moſt guilty perſon of all who were concerned in the Council, or conduct of theſe tranſactions.

And as your Committee have found that Sir *Eyre Coote*, before he was informed of the event of this expedition, had expreſſed his ſentiments upon the undertaking, and at the ſame time upon the political conduct of the two Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Bombay*, in regard to their differences with the Marattas; we ſhall here lay before the Houſe an extract of his letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Committee of Correſpondence, wherein he Dated 18 Jan. 1779. communicated thoſe opinions.

After giving a very ſatisfactory account of the ſtate in which he found the Company's affairs at his arrival at *Madras*, and which he aſcribed to the great exertions of the Preſident and Council, he wrote as follows:

" I wiſh I could give as favourable an opinion upon " the proceedings of the Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Bom-* " *bay*; but it appears to me, that they ought, at this " critical time, to have united againſt the national " enemy, and given due aſſiſtance to this ſettlement, " which has hitherto borne the whole burthen of the " war: inſtead of which, a large army is ſent from " *Bengal*, at an immenſe expence, into the heart of the " country, where, if I can judge from the information " I have received, they can produce nothing but diſ- " treſs to the Company, not to ſay diſhonour to the " nation, whether ſucceſsful or otherwiſe. And *Bom-* " *bay* is left defenceleſs by ſending their whole force " upon a Maratta expedition, which, beſides the danger " to which the is expoſed, brings upon us the inconve- " nience of tranſporting troops from hence to *Mahi*, " the attack upon which ought naturally to have fallen " upon the ſettlement ſo nearly in its neighbourhood. " Indeed I may ſay the ſending troops upon this expedi- " tion, is rather calculated for the ſecurity of *Bombay*, " in its preſent weak ſtate, than any great proſpect of " ſucceſs we have againſt *Mahi*; as I am apt to ſuppoſe " *Hyder Ally* will interfere in defending that place againſt " any attempts we may make upon it; however, it is " determined that no improper riſk ſhall be run, as they " are to wait at *Anjengo*, in readineſs either to purſue the " plan againſt *Mahi*, if adviſeable, or to embark for " the defence of *Bombay*, if neceſſary."

It will be remembered, that your Committee, in their Firſt Report, took notice of the opinions on this ſubject, which appear on the Select Conſultations of the Madras Preſidency in the month of February 1779.

Your Committee will, in this place, confine themſelves to a few obſervations, and a curſory recital of the moſt material incidents of the expedition, for the ſake of the narrative.

See Appx. 127. It is to be remarked, that when Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn* arrived in the Camp on the 15th of December, and required the publication of their Commiſſion by the Commander in Chief in general orders, Colonel *Egerton* abſolutely proteſted againſt it, making objections both to the tenor and terms of the commiſſion itſelf, and to the competency of two Members (Mr. *Moſtyn* being abſent from indiſpoſition) to do any act of authority. And we obſerve, that the Select Committee of *Bombay*, (which it is to be remembered conſiſted only at that time of the Preſident and Mr. *Draper*) in anſwer to a reference which had been made to them for a deciſion of this diſ- pute, expreſſed their ſurprize to find an idea could be entertained that the powers of the Committee were ſuſ- pended by the ſickneſs or accidental abſence of one of the Members. It is proper therefore to add a further remark, that Mr. *Moſtyn*, who died ſoon after, never once attended any meeting of the Poonah Committee. On the 20th of December Mr. *Carnac* appears to have remonſtrated with the Commander in Chief upon the ſlow progreſs which the army made in its advance; and repreſented, in ſtrong terms, the neceſſity of haſtening their march with all poſſible expedition; and that Co- lonel *Egerton* declined making any anſwer at that time to theſe complaints. Your Committee have found, that the enemy gave at firſt no oppoſition to the march of the troops till the 22d of December; and from that 1779. 4 Jan. time till the 4th of January their cannonading was diſtant and ineffectual, except that two good officers were ac- cidentally killed by it. That on the 5th Colonel *Eger-* 5th January. *ton* ſignified by letter to the Preſident, his deſign of attempting to ſurprize the enemy next morning in their encampment, which however he did not carry into exe- cution; but indeed, on account of his ill ſtate of health, reſigned on that day the command of the army, to which Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* ſucceeded.

And your Committee obſerve, that the Court of Directors expreſſed the ſevereſt diſpleaſure at the con- duct of Colonel *Egerton* in theſe particulars: " The firſt " object that ſtrikes us, is the ſlow progreſs of the army; " this we deem an irreparable injury to the ſervice; and " in this reſpect the conduct of the Commander in Chief " appears extremely defective. The conſequence was " obvious; the enemy had full opportunity to collect " their ſtrength. The friends of *Ragoba*, inſtead of " being encouraged by the ſpirited exertion of our force " to join his ſtandard, muſt, as we conceive, have been " deterred from declaring in his favour by the languor " of our military proceedings." It appears, however, January 6. that Colonel *Egerton*, not being able, becauſe of the number of the enemy's horſe in the Conkan, to effect his return to *Bombay*, continued with the camp, and acted throughout as a Member of the Committee; in which capacity he ſigned, together with Mr. *Carnac*, a letter to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, containing a deſpon- dent repreſentation of their diſappointment in not meeting with any appearances of aſſiſtance or ſupport from the Maratta Chiefs, upon whoſe co-operation with them they had been taught, both by Mr. *Moſtyn* and by *Ragoba*, to reſt their principal reliance: that every thing indeed gave proof of a general determination to oppoſe the eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba* in that degree of authority which January 7. the Select Board had, from falſe aſſurances, been led to engage for:—that they (the Poonah Committee) had on that account explicitly announced to him " the too great " reaſon they had to believe, that there ſubſiſted a total " want of confidence on the part of the Maratta Chiefs, " in his promiſes and aſſurances; and that no nego- " ciations would ever be ſet on foot with them, unleſs " commenced by the Committee, who therefore found " themſelves under the neceſſity of taking ſuch mea- " ſures as appeared moſt eligible to them, without fur- " ther dependence upon him." Your Committee have indeed found, that the conduct of *Ragonaut Row* had given too much ground for theſe intimations, as there were ſtrong reaſons to ſuſpect that, truſting to ſubdue every one by force of arms, he had not only neglected to conciliate the reſpectable Chiefs to his cauſe, but was even ſuſpected of having given orders to the Killedar of *Ah-* *medanagur* not to releaſe *Moraba* himſelf till he got fur- ther poſitive orders from him on his arrival at *Poonah*. And by his own repreſentation of the real circumſtances of affairs, he acknowledged himſelf to have been de- ceived, and gave no encouragement to hope for better ſucceſs as they ſhould advance, either from the junction of powerful adherents, or reſources of proviſions, unleſs they ſhould defeat the forces of the enemy. And we find, that the leaders of the Maratta army gave no op- portunity for that event, by ſtrictly obſerving the plan, which, according to early report, they had reſolved upon, of avoiding any regular action, and of burning the towns, and laying waſte the country, in order to deſtroy the means of ſupply to the Britiſh forces. That theſe having advanced on the 10th of January as far as *Tullegaun*, about 16 miles from *Poonah*, and found that large and populous town in aſhes, and all the grain carried off or deſtroyed, it was thought imprudent and hazardous to attempt any further advancement; and upon a report of the ſtate of proviſions, and upon Colonel *Cockburn*'s declaration, that without a ſupply of horſe, he could not engage to protect the baggage, the Committee reſolved to order preparations for a retreat, which was begun on the night of the 11th.

Your Committee obſerve, that the Court of Directors Com. of Corref. appear to have felt much indignation at this retreat—" When the army was ſo far advanced, and the troops " full of ſpirits and intrepidity; when *Moraba*'s horſe " were reported to be in the Conkan, to act in favour of " *Ragoba*; when 18 days proviſion were in ſtore, and " *Ragoba* had promiſed a further ſupply"—It is how- ever proper to remark on this promiſe, that Mr. *Holmes* See Diary. the Commiſſary had, by his own inſpection, ſeen that *Ragoba* could not perform it. They complained, " that " no Council of War was called at *Tullegaun*, to take " the ſenſe of the officers of the army, on the neceſſity " of retreating; that although the order for the retreat

" of

" of the army on the 11th of January was the joint act " of Mr. *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton*, yet as Mr. *Carnac* " had a caſting voice in the Poonah Committee, and poſ- " ſeſſed in fact ſupreme authority in Camp at the time, " he was particularly reſponſible for that meaſure."

It appears, that the enemy having intelligence of their deſign, attacked them before day-break, cut off part of their baggage, and killed a good many men. On the 13th the Committee finding their ſituation become more alarming (the army having not ventured upon any fur- ther movement from *Worgam*, where they had halted the day before) deputed Mr. *Farmer* to the Maratta camp to negociate for their peaceable return; directing him to repreſent to the Miniſters, that having been de- ceived by confident aſſurances of the general deſire among the Chiefs of the Maratta State, for the re-eſta- bliſhment of *Ragoba* in the Regency, they had been induced to accompany him with a detachment of their troops, for the purpoſe of replacing him in that rank of government; but finding by experience that they had acted under the miſguidance of falſe information, they had determined to deſiſt from that attempt, and were deſirous of returning to *Bombay*, under agreement of a mutual ceſſation from hoſtilities:—That the Durbar, in anſwer to this application, appear to have inſiſted upon the delivery of the perſon of *Ragoba* into their hands, as the only terms on which any accommodation ſhould take place; and that the Committee at once reſolved not to make his ſafety an impediment to their quiet return, eſpecially as he had already declared his intentions of Diary, 10 Jan. giving himſelf up to *Madajee Scindia*. And it is ob- ſervable, that in the overtures which he had made to that Chief upon this occaſion, he endeavoured to per- ſuade him to a belief, that his motives for addreſſing him did not ariſe from any ſenſe of inability to accom- pliſh his aim by the aid of the Europeans alone, but becauſe "thoſe Europeans, in taking part in his quarrels, " ſought only their own aggrandizement, and to obtain " the Country; which neither ſuited his views nor " *Scindia*'s." And as ſome explanation was hereupon neceſſary to ſatisfy the doubts of thoſe Europeans, he told Mr. *Sibbald*, "that his ſcheme in this was, by a " total compliance with the demands of *Scindia*, to " gain him over for the preſent, and afterwards he " would do as he pleaſed."

But we perceive, that when the compliance of the Committee was communicated the next day by Mr. *Farmer* to the Durbar, in which *Madajee Scindia* pre- ſided, and evidently took the lead, he (*Scindia*) received the offer of that conceſſion with marked indifference; and, reproaching the Company's ſervants with a breach of Colonel *Upton*'s treaty, he inſiſted upon the conclu- ſion of a new agreement while the army remained on that very ſpot. This new demand being tranſmitted to the Committee, they conſulted Colonel *Cockburn* upon Diary, 15 Jan. the practicability of making a ſucceſsful retreat; and on his report of the impoſſibility of effecting it, they ac- quieſced in his opinion; though it is proper to remark, that Mr. *Carnac* declared his real ſentiments to be in favour of an attempt to force their way; and that the Committee of Correſpondence, after examining every evidence relative to that queſtion, highly condemned the contrary reſolution.

"It is aſſerted by the Select Committee, that Cap- " tain *Hartley* declared he could rely upon the men he " commanded, and urged every argument in favour of " forcing a retreat, and even formed and preſented " Colonel *Cockburn* the neceſſary diſpoſition for con- " ducting it. It cannot be doubted that Mr. *Carnac* " continued in poſſeſſion of authority without controul, " except to make treaties. He was confident, if the " officers and men did their duty, that the army was " ſufficiently numerous, and ſo well provided with " artillery, as to be able to force their way back againſt " all oppoſition; he had no doubt, that the attempt " ought to be made."

In conſequence, however, of a reſolution to return by ſufferance only, the Committee directed Mr. *Farmer* to inform the Durbar, that having no power to negociate or agree to any treaty without the ſanction of the Supe- rior Council, they ſhould only deceive the Maratta Go- vernment in pretending to ſubmit to their demands; and that by giving up the cauſe and perſon of *Ragonaut Row*, they acted to the utmoſt of their power, and that thereby all diſputes would effectually be put an end to. But we perceive, that this repreſentation drew the fol- lowing pertinent remark from *Madajee Scindia*:—"If " you had not powers to make new treaties, I wiſh to " ſee by what power you broke that made by Colonel " *Upton*, by the aid given to *Ragoba*; and deſire an " explicit anſwer, whether or not it was by virtue of " any direct authority from the Governor General and " Council; if it was, I deſire to ſee that authority, " in order that I may look to them about it." And he aſſured Mr. *Farmer*, that till a new treaty was made be- tween the Engliſh and the Maratta State, the army muſt remain where it was, whatever might be the conſe- quence.

It appears, however, that previous to the receipt of this determination, the Committee had diſpatched an- other Gentleman, "with full powers to ſettle with the " Durbar for the peaceable return of the army, upon " ſuch conditions as he might be able to obtain, ſince " it was the opinion of the Commander in Chief, that " a retreat was impracticable." And your Committee will conclude this account with the report of Mr. *Holmes* (the Gentleman laſt deputed to the Durbar) and the obſervations of the Committee thereupon, in their own words.

" This night, about 10 o'clock, Mr. *Holmes* returned 15 January. " from the Maratta Camp, and adviſed us, that he has " ſettled matters with *Madajee Scindia*, and the reſt of " the Durbar, for the peaceable return of the army to " *Bombay*, on the only conditions they would hear of, " and which are ſuch as cannot fail to fill us with the " deepeſt concern, being humiliating in the higheſt de- " gree, and which nothing but the avowed opinion and " declaration of the principal officers, as to the im- " practicability of effecting our retreat, could juſtify " our acceding to. We muſt, however, obſerve, that " *Madajee Scindia* and the whole Durbar cannot plead " ignorance of our want of powers to conclude ſuch a " treaty as they have now preſcribed to us, they having " demanded both a true explanation and tranſlation of " our letter of yeſterday to Mr. *Farmer*, wherein we " expreſsly direct him to acquaint them, that we have " no powers to enter into any treaty whatever; that " were we to pretend ſuch powers, we ſhould be only " deceiving them;—ſo they have evidently compelled " us to enter into a treaty they were appriſed we had no " power to agree to."

Your Committee find, that the Court of Directors inveighed againſt this Convention, and againſt all the circumſtances attending it, with particular indignation; and herein ſeem to have directed their chief reſentment againſt Mr. *Carnac*. His words are, "At all events, " rather than ſubmit to the terms preſcribed by the " enemy." Yet, under all circumſtances, rather than preſs a retreat, he ventured to pledge the Engliſh faith, in the moſt ſolemn and ſacred manner, for the obſervance of treaties, of which he owns he did not at the time ex- pect a confirmation. He ſtipulated to obtain the Go- vernor's duſtuck for delivering up the Company's poſ- ſeſſions to the Marattas, and gave hoſtages for the due performance of extraordinary agreements, under mental reſervations, and pre-conceived ideas that they were of no validity, and would never be ratified by his ſuperiors.

Your Committee have thought it proper to place theſe extracts thus immediately in the eye of the Houſe, that they might at the ſame time, in ſome of the moſt ſtriking points, ſee and conſider the conduct of the

Company's ſervants, and the judgment of their employers. But we muſt nevertheleſs deſire to refer the Houſe to the Appendix, No. 130, from which they will receive much more ample information, by conſulting theſe documents at large; and we ſhall therefore here ſimply mention the fact of the further cenſures and puniſhments which the Court inflicted on thoſe whom they eſteemed delinquents.

Your Committee obſerve, that they commended the charge which was brought by Governor *Hornby* againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Colonel *Cockburn*; and, upon the moſt impartial review of their conduct, they diſmiſſed thoſe officers from their ſervice. In regard to Mr. *Carnac*, upon whom, they obſerved, no cenſure had been paſſed, nor any enquiry made by the Select Committee, into his conduct and behaviour during the late expedition, which, however, they found not leſs exceptionable than that of Colonel *Egerton*, they, after duly conſidering all the circumſtances relative thereto, reſolved to diſmiſs him from his office as one of the Council and Select Committee of *Bombay*.

Your Committee having thus taken notice of the diſapprobation which the Court of Directors expreſſed of the reſolutions taken by the Select Committee, and remarked, that all their ſeverer marks of diſpleaſure were fixed upon thoſe who failed in the execution of theſe reſolutions, it remains only to obſerve, that the Court beſtowed alſo ſome tokens of their approbation and ſome rewards for the meritorious conduct of others of their ſervants; though it would be premature in this place to mention any but one, which regards Mr. *Draper*, whom they named to be ſecond of Council, and of the Select Committee, upon the removal of Mr. *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton*; and "as a further teſti-
" mony of their approbation of his conduct, they ap-
" pointed him to ſucceed to the office of Preſident and
" Governor of *Bombay* upon the death, removal, or
" reſignation of Governor *Hornby*;" it ought, perhaps, to be obſerved, that the Select Committee of *Bombay*, had raiſed Captain *Hartley*, who, as has been ſeen, diſtinguiſhed himſelf greatly in the expedition, and endeavoured to perſuade an attempt of forcing a retreat, to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, which gave umbrage to ſeveral officers over whoſe heads he was thus lifted; and that the Court of Directors corrected this hardſhip, joining however in high approbation of the conduct of Captain *Hartley*, by directing that he ſhould receive only Captain's pay, till the officers who had been his ſeniors ſhould riſe regularly to the ſame advanced rank, and again take their places above him.

Your Committee find, that Mr. *Farmer* returned to
Jan. 17, 1779. the camp on the 17th, with the papers of agreement executed on the part of the Durbar; by the one of which, all the Company's acquiſitions in thoſe parts, made ſince the treaty with the late Peiſhwa *Maderow*, in 1756, were to be given up; and by the other (being a private article of advantage to *Madajee Scindia*) that Chief was to be put in complete poſſeſſion of *Broach*, as it was held by the Moguls, *Ragoba* was ſurrendered into his cuſtody, and Mr. *Farmer* and Lieutenant *Stewart* were alſo to remain with him as hoſtages for the full performance of the ſtipulation in his favour;—a circumſtance which the Court of Directors mention with great concern and anxiety for their ſafety.

And it appears, that the army on the 20th moved down the Ghauts on its return to *Bombay*, and Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* received that evening at *Campoly* a letter, dated 11th January, from *Bombay*, addreſſed to them as the Poonah Committee; in which they were exhorted to preſs forward with vigour and expedition towards *Poonah*, "as the likelieſt and moſt effectual way
" to improve their ſituation, and to induce *Ragoba*'s
" friends to declare openly in his favour." It is ſcarce neceſſary to remark, that their real ſituation was not known to the Preſident and Select Committee when they wrote that letter of encouragement, which certainly arrived in a moſt unlucky moment. It muſt however be obſerved, that there was deſtined to the Select Committee alſo a ſhock not leſs mortifying in the circumſtances which enſued; for, at the moment of the return of the diſcomfited army, Colonel *Capper* arrived, and App. No. 131. brought with him a letter from the Committee of Secrecy of the Eaſt India Company, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778; acknowledging the receipt of thoſe from the Preſident and Council of 25th of January and 14th of March, and Poſtſcript of the 15th, 1778, and copy of their proceedings of the 10th of December 1777, and of the letters and reſolutions of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, dated 2d of February 1778, and containing the following directions of encouragement to their projects:

" Your vigilance reſpecting the French hath our fulleſt
" approbation.—In regard to *Ragoba*, it would have af-
" forded us much ſatisfaction if the overtures you expected
" from *Sicearam Baboo*, the prime Miniſter, and other
" Maratta Chiefs, had actually taken place, and in con-
" ſequence thereof *Ragoba* had, under proper condi-
" tions, been eſtabliſhed in the Government of *Poonah*;
" and as you attribute the failure of this ſcheme to a
" diſtruſt entertained by *Ragoba*'s friends of your ability
" to fulfil your engagements, we authorize you to de-
" clare in our name, that we will not only ratify and
" confirm the meaſure, if carried into execution at the
" requeſt and with the aſſiſtance of the Maratta Chiefs,
" but alſo to aſſure them that we will uſe all means in
" our power to effect it, though refuſed the concurrence
" of thoſe perſons who have lately manifeſted an atten-
" tion to the French, inconſiſtent with the friendſhip
" ſubſiſting between the Maratta State and the *Eaſt*
" *India* Company.

" The neceſſity of counteracting the views of the
" French at *Poonah*, and of taking immediate and de-
" ciſive meaſures to prevent their eſtabliſhment at
" *Choul*, appears to us ſo very ſtriking, that we not only
" direct you to fruſtrate their deſigns of obtaining a
" grant of the port of *Choul*, but alſo to oppoſe, by
" force of arms if neceſſary, their forming a ſettlement
" at that or any other place which may render them
" dangerous neighbours to *Bombay*.

" As the reſtoration of *Ragoba* to the Peiſhwaſhip is a
" meaſure upon which we are determined, and as the
" evaſions of the Maratta Chiefs reſpecting the treaty of
" *Poonah*, juſtify any departure therefrom on our part,
" we therefore direct, that if, on the receipt of this
" letter, you ſhall be able to obtain aſſiſtance from the
" friends of *Ragoba*, and with ſuch aſſiſtance find your-
" ſelves in force ſufficient to effect his reſtoration with-
" out dangerouſly weakening your garriſon, and thereby
" riſking the ſafety of our poſſeſſions under your Go-
" vernment, you forthwith undertake the [illegible] and
" we further direct, that in ſettling the [illegible] of com-
" penſation to be made to the Company for their ſervices
" on ſuch account, you conform [illegible]
" to the propoſitions laid [illegible]
" General and Council, in their letter of the [illegible]
" February 1778.

" As the co-operation of your other ſettlements will be
" neceſſary to enſure ſucceſs [illegible] important enter-
" prize, we have communicated the contents of this
" letter to our Governor General and Council, and to
" our Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and en-
" joined them to afford you ſuch immediate aid as may
" be required to enable you to re-eſtabliſh *Ragoba*, pro-
" vided it can be done without affecting the inſtructions
" iſſued by the Committee of Secrecy, in their letters
" of the 15th of April 1778, of which they are forthwith
" to give you information.

" We think it however abſolutely neceſſary to inform
" you, that no order in this letter is to operate further
" than is conſiſtent with the ſafety of the iſland of *Bombay*;
" and that in all your proceedings, you are to conſider
" a rupture between *Great Britain* and *France* as inevit-
" able,

" able, although war has not yet been formally declared
" between the two Crowns.

" Having given you this cautionary inſtruction, it is
" proper for us to add, that you may depend upon your
" having your European military eſtabliſhment fully
" completed by the ſhips this ſeaſon, and in your deci-
" ſion on this important ſubject you muſt govern your-
" ſelves accordingly.

Appx. No 131. * No. 1. " Incloſed you will receive copies of our preſent
" * inſtructions to the Governor General and Council
" of *Fort William*, and to the Preſident and Select
" Committee at *Fort St. George*, and alſo of our
† No. 2. " † orders, dated 15th April 1778. The former muſt
" be ſent to their addreſs immediately."

Your Committee have thought it proper to inſert the above letter at length, and to add the incloſures in the Appendix, No. 131, becauſe it contains information of the ſentiments of the Court of Directors, not only on the circumſtances of the Maratta diſputes, but of other political matters, which marked this as a very intereſting period of the ſtate of India affairs.

No 131. We ſhould not omit in this place to obſerve, that while the unfortunate expedition to *Poonah* was in proſecution, ſeveral letters arrived concerning the ſituation and deſigns of the Bengal detachment, both from the Commander of it, and from the Governor General and Council, to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and alſo to the Poonah Committee; to which anſwers were returned, containing a variety of information and change of directions in conſequence of the different turn of affairs during the progreſs and the return of the Bombay army, and therefore properly to be taken notice of at the cloſe of the relation which has been made of the events of that expedition.

1778. Appx. No. 132. Your Committee find, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* received, on the 18th of December, a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated 15th October, by which they were informed of the death of Mr. *Elliot*, and that no ſucceſſor would be appointed to him for the purpoſe of carrying on the intended negociation with the Rajah of *Berar*, till it could be ſeen whether *Moodajee* himſelf, who had expreſſed much ſatisfaction at the overtures made to him, would not on this event make ſome advances for a renewal of that plan. They were alſo informed of the removal of Colonel *Leſſie* from the command of the Bengal detachment, and the appointment of Colonel *Goddard* in his place, with the orders given to him to make application to the Rajah, on his entering the province of *Berar*, for a conjunction of forces, and leaving him a diſcretionary power to ſuſpend his proceedings in caſe of inattention or refuſal from that Chief.

In regard to his co-operation with the Preſidency of *Bombay*, the following inſtructions were ſignified to them: " If the plan which you had reſolved to adopt
" and to carry into execution in September, for the re-
" ſtoration of *Rugoba*, and which you notified to us in
" your letter of the 25th of July, ſtill ſubſiſts; or if
" you ſhall have formed any other for the ſame, and
" conſiſtently with the terms preſcribed for our aſſent
" to that meaſure; or if you ſhall judge a ſtrong rein-
" forcement immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary to
" enſure the ſafety of *Bombay* againſt a French invaſion;
" and ſhall deem it requiſite or adviſable, in either of
" theſe caſes, to command the detachment at all hazards
" to proceed further towards *Bombay*, even without the
" junction of the troops of any Power in alliance with
" us; you will in ſuch caſes, and ſuch only, require
" Colonel *Goddard* to advance with it; but in all other
" caſes you will give him notice of your intentions, and
" leave him to act under our directions."

See Diary. Appx. No. 130. And your Committee find, that the Select Committee diſpatched a letter the next day to Colonel *Goddard*, which they incloſed in a packet to the Poonah Committee, and left it open that they might be made acquainted, by its contents, of their having taken advantage of the Governor General and Council's permiſſion, to require him to advance (according to their former orders of the 15th November and 6th inſtant) even without the junction of any allied troops, in hopes that mutual advantages might ariſe to both detachments from the progreſs of each.

See Diary. On the 26th December, a letter from Colonel *Goddard*, dated 6th of December, addreſſed to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, was read by the Poonah Committee, and found to contain an account of his arrival on the South ſide of the *Nerbuddah*, where he meant to halt for a few days, in order to ſound the inclinations of *Moodajee Boonſla*, before he determined on his future route, which would alſo depend on information from *Bombay*; he had not received any letter from thence of a later date than the 21ſt of July, and by a confuſion of cyphers, could not read the letters ſent by Mr. *Lewis* from *Poonah*, ſo that he was at a loſs for proper intelligence, which became the more neceſſary, as the Marattas began to collect forces in oppoſition to his march, and he was apprehenſive they would be ſtrengthened by thoſe of the Nizam. With a view to counteract them, he ſuggeſted an attempt to influence, if poſſible, the motions of *Hyder Ally*, and to make them co-operate with theirs.

See the Diary. Your Committee do not find that the Poonah Committee wrote to Colonel *Goddard* before the 10th of January 1779, when they were juſt about to fall back from *Tullegaun*, and they then appear to have intimated their doubts of his being able to ſecure proviſions, or to repel the continual and harraſſing attacks of the enemy (to which he would certainly be liable in his march), deſiring him, however, if he thought himſelf ſecure of force and ſupplies, to proceed towards *Broach* and *Surat*, but to halt on the frontiers of *Berar* or elſewhere, if he was apprehenſive of imminent hazard in the attempt to advance under thoſe circumſtances.

But when the convention took place at *Worgam*, your Committee obſerve, that the return of the Bengal detachment was one of the ſtipulations to which the Poonah Committee conſented, and were in conſequence obliged to write a letter to Colonel *Goddard* on the 15th January, with poſitive directions to march back to *Bengal* with the army under his command. Yet here again we perceive they diſcovered an advantage in having no authority, and that they made uſe of it on the 19th, as will appear by the following letter:

" To Colonel *Goddard*.

" Sir,

" We diſpatched you on the 16th a letter containing
" orders, which, upon recollection, we do not think our-
" ſelves authorized to give you—you are therefore to pay
" no regard thereto. We are, Sir,

" Your obedient ſervants,

" *John Carnac*,

" *Charles Egerton*."

Your Committee indeed remark, that they had more authority to write this letter than they were aware of at the time they ſent it; for in the diſpatch before mentioned, which they received on the 20th of January from the Select Committee, there was mentioned the receipt of a letter from the Governor General and Council, and the following account given of its contents:

At Campely. See Diary.

" The contents in ſhort are, that they have given
" Colonel *Goddard* full powers to conclude a treaty with
" *Moodajee Bouncello*, for which reaſon they think it
" neceſſary to revoke the controul they had given us over
" that detachment, though they obſerve their intention is
" not to withdraw the ſources of the detachment entirely
" from the ſupport of any meaſures we might have form-
" ed in reliance of ſuch ſupport, if thoſe meaſures ſhall
" not prove incompatible with the inſtructions given to
" Colonel *Goddard*, and with the engagements he may
" form in conſequence. We ſhall, however, immedi-

This letter itſelf is placed in the Appendix, dated 23 Nov 1778, received 10 January 1779, at Bombay. Appx. No 133.

" ately describe our present situation to Colonel *Goddard*, " who, on the 12th ultimo, was still at *Huffingabad*, and " press him to march towards *Poonah*."

Bom. Sel. Cons. 19 Feb. 1779. Appx. No. 134.

Your Committee find, that after the disgraceful return of the army from the late unfortunate expedition, the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* did not immediately take any material step in regard to the situation of their affairs, except by the removal of Colonel *Egerton* and Colonel *Cockburn* from the command of the forces, and by making some promotions of other officers in order to distinguish those whose merit was acknowledged to have been most conspicuous on the late service; that on the 19th of February, however, the President laid before the Select Board a Minute, containing a review of Maratta affairs, and several resolutions proposed by him in consequence. These your Committee perceive to have for their principal object, the necessity of preparations for a defensive war with the Marattas, who were assembling troops in the neighbourhood of *Caranja* and *Salsette*, and were said to be determined on an immediate invasion of those islands, if they were not peaceably yielded up to them, together with all the cessions stipulated for in the convention of *Worgam*. The President observed, he had already taken care to apprise the Durbar, that the convention was not valid, and that he had informed the superior Board of the circumstances of it, and would do nothing further in it without their orders; that however he did not think it would be fair and consistent conduct towards the Governor General and Council themselves, who had certainly furnished them, in their letters of the 23d March and 17th August, with ample powers for the war they had begun, if they failed of making an exertion towards extricating their own affairs from their present embarrassments, which, though humiliating, had not reduced them wholly into contempt: That Colonel *Goddard* being arrived, on the 29th of January, at *Berampore*, was there probably secure from all hostile attempts; but he thought it advisable, that in their directions to him they should leave it to himself to take his own opportunity for coming on to *Surat* and *Broach*, informing him at the same time of the urgent occasion the Presidency had for his army, and how much they thought their safety might depend on its safe and speedy arrival.—But it appears that the President's chief design in this Minute, was to recommend an endeavour to engage *Madajee Scindia* in their interests, explaining the reasons why he thought such an attempt would prove successful, and insisting particularly on his known aversion to the French, and partiality to the English, to which they were much indebted for the more favourable terms of the convention at *Worgam*; " as it was owing " to him that the point of detaining the whole army as " hostages, which *Nanna* had required, was given up, " and by that means they had it in their power to disavow " the convention; and that in regard to the private " article stipulated with him for his own advantage, he " could not but well know, that the performance of this " article could be no ways effectually secured by him, " but by the very means he rejected, the detention of " their army as hostages." That to these inducements for an application to *Scindia*, there might be added the considerations of his power, and the objects of his policy; that in respect of the first, an alliance with him might be preferable even to that, which appeared to be a favourite of the Governor General and Council, with *Moodajee Boosla*, because *Scindia* was in effect in possession of the Peishwa's domains and the person of *Ragoba*, and entirely guided *Nanna*, the Duan, as his mere instrument: with regard to the second, an alliance with the Company might be useful to him as a protection to his own territories against the designs of the King, who had already began to take advantage of his absence, and to make attacks upon him; that for these and other reasons (which will be found in this Minute, placed in the Appendix) he proposed to write to *Scindia*, and even desire him to send 1,000 horse to meet their army, and accompany them to *Surat*, as a witness of the friendship that should subsist between them; and he also recommended, that a connection with the *Guicawars* should not be neglected, because it offered another resource to them in the present posture of their affairs.—The several propositions then made by Governor *Hornby*, and the subsequent observations upon them by Mr. *Draper*, will be found together in the Appendix, No. 134, in which it will be also seen, that the most of them were agreed to by the majority of the Committee; and that Mr. *Horsley* was appointed to go immediately with their advices to *Bengal*, " in order to supply the Governor General and Council " with such information and detail of local knowledge as " they might require, or the support of their present " plan might render necessary."

No. 134.

Bom. Sel. Cons. 23d Feb. 1779. Appx. No. 134.

And your Committee find, that Governor *Hornby* sent, together with the dispatches from the Select Committee, a letter from himself, addressed to the Committee of Secrecy of the Court of Directors, wherein he inclosed a paper containing his sentiments, as well on the actual posture of affairs, as on the prospect before them, between the time of his writing and the end of the following October, being the form in which he had prepared to bring the matter before the Select Committee as soon as their dispatches were sent off. Your Committee having placed this letter, and the inclosed paper in the Appendix, No. 135, desire to refer the House to them, and will therefore in this place make only a very few observations. It appears by these papers, that no resolution had yet been taken with regard to the necessary measures for their conduct at that juncture; that previous to this date, the Governor and Select Committee had received a copy of the instructions given to Mr. *Elliot* by the Superior Council, for the management of his intended embassy to *Berar*; that they had been made acquainted with the subsequent powers deputed to Colonel *Goddard*, for completing the treaty with *Moodajee Boosla*; that Colonel *Goddard* had informed them of the Rajah's declining to proceed any further in the negociation, after he knew of the Bombay troops being in the field in favour of *Ragoba*, and of his own determination to march forward without waiting to hear further from them; and that he was actually arrived at *Surat*: from a knowledge of which circumstances, Governor *Hornby* observed there was a very material change made in their affairs, and as there was no reason to doubt of the determination of the Governor General and Council to proceed in their design of alliance with *Moodajee Boosla*, they must look to that as the leading circumstance in their political transactions with the Marattas in future.—It appears further, that no answer had yet been received from *Madajee Scindia* to the letter which the Governor, in consequence of the resolutions of the Committee, had written to him, though he had, in the name of the Poona Durbar, on the 2d and 6th of March, [illegible] several cessions stipulated [illegible] gam, and his agent had taken leave without [illegible] self as to the particular [illegible] steps he was suspected of [illegible] a more advantageous [illegible] mittee observe, that the [illegible] Governor *Hornby*, of [illegible] and resources, with [illegible] should require for a [illegible] was truly distressful, especially as he seemed apprehensive of a deficiency in those of *Bengal*, from the immense expence of Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, and the drafts which would probably be made upon them by the Presidency of *Madras*, whose distress for money was said to have been the cause of their delaying so long to carry into execution the projected expedition against *Mahé*. Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, he argued, that as the defence of their settlements absolutely required that they should find means of keeping up their present force, it was become necessary to take immediate measures for that purpose, which could only be effected

28. Mar. 1779. Appx. No. 135.

by ſecuring ſuch revenue under their own collection as might be nearly anſwerable to their expences. With this view he propoſed the plan which will be found in the Appendix, No. 135, for obtaining a determinate knowledge of *Moodajee Booſla*'s reſolutions, to which they ſhould pay their firſt attention, and for temporizing in the mean time with *Scindia* and the Maratta Chiefs; while Colonel *Goddard*, with the command of the forces to the northward, ſhould ſeize upon the ſhare of the rich diſtricts about the *Mahé* and the *Tappy* rivers, and endeavour to eſtabliſh an agreement with the Guicawar brothers under the guarantee of the Company, and to conciliate the other Northern Chiefs. Nor did he deſpair of their being able, with the remaining force of their garriſon, to make a ſucceſsful attempt upon *Baſſein* itſelf, and afterwards effectually to thwart the French deſigns, by taking ſudden poſſeſſion of *Choul*. Theſe he recommended as preparatory ſteps to their defence againſt a French invaſion, or in furtherance of the plan to be concerted with *Moodajee Booſla*; ſtating the improbability of any material oppoſition to their ſucceſs, and urging the danger of their inaction, as an argument againſt any objections which might be made to their proceeding without freſh authority and ſanction from the Supreme Council.

Your Committee have thus taken a view of proceedings under the Government of *Bombay*, and pointed out the reſolutions of the Select Committee in favour of *Rugoba*, the iſſue of which proved ſo very calamitous, as by his captivity to have apparently extinguiſhed his cauſe, and by the terms of the convention to have reduced the Company's power within a very narrow line of defence; but it has alſo been ſhewn, that the barrier of the convention was immediately puſhed down, almoſt before it was attempted to be ſet up; that the fate of *Rugoba* was conſidered only as a perſonal loſs, for which the Committee firſt ſought a ſubſtitute in *Madajee Scindia*, and afterwards in adopting the Governor General and Council's plan in favour of *Moodajee Booſla*; and that the arrival of Colonel *Goddard* with the Bengal detachment at *Surat*, revived even the hope of acquiring a territory ſufficient for the expences of a war, which the decided enmity of *Nanna*, and the undoubted projects of the French, were ſuppoſed to render abſolutely unavoidable. The plan which was conceived by the Preſident, for making the war a means of retrieving their affairs, has been alſo laid before the Houſe, and it has appeared that it was deſigned to wait for the opinion and direction of the Superior Council, before every part of the plan ſhould be carried into execution.

The annexed papers, to which we deſire to refer the Houſe, preſent an account of the general ſtate of the revenues, and of the military eſtabliſhment under the Preſidency of *Bombay*, at the period in which the Preſident appears to have formed the plan of meaſures which your Committee have ſhortly explained.

AN ACCOUNT of the Revenues of Bombay and its Dependencies, from May 1778 to April 1779.

		Gmſs.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.		
		R°.	R°.	R°.		£. s.
Bombay						
Land Revenues	R°. 41,480					
Cuſtoms and Duties	2,52,321					
Farms	1,15,567					
		4,09,368				
Charges and Deductions			26,640			
Nett Revenues				3,82,728	-	47,841
Tellicherry.						
Eſtimated as laſt Year		40,448	7,160	33,288	-	4,161
Surat.						
Land Revenues	R°. 2,05,712					
Cuſtoms and Duties	1,28,196					
		3,33,908				
Charges and Deductions			51,322			
Nett Revenues				2,82,586	-	35,323
Anjengo.						
Eſtimated as laſt Year		832		832	-	104
Fort Victoria.						
Land Revenues	R°. 6,820					
Cuſtoms and Duties	1,807					
Farms	223					
		8,850		8,850	-	1,106
Broach.						
Land Revenues	R°. 5,32,232					
Cuſtoms and Duties	68,122					
		6,00,354				
Charges and Deductions			49,640			
Nett Revenues				5,59,714	-	68,839
Tannah.						
Land Revenues	R°. 1,92,079					
Cuſtoms and Duties	26,365					
		2,18,444				
Charges and Deductions			18,459			
Nett Revenues				1,99,985	-	24,998
Carranjah.						
Land Revenues	R°. 32,572					
Cuſtoms and Duties	15,235					
Farms	5,688					
		53,495				
Charges and Deductions			3,115			
Nett Revenues				50,380	-	6,298
Jamboofier.						
Land Revenues	R°. 2,96,565					
Cuſtoms and Duties	29,409					
		3,25,974				
Charges and Deductions			17,955			
Nett Revenues				3,08,019	-	38,502
Buſſora and Buſhire.						
Cuſtoms and Duties		2,213		2,213	-	277
Vingorla.						
———		16,870		16,870	-	2,109
	R°.	20,10,756	1,74,291	18,36,465	£.	229,558

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Bombay and its Dependencies, from May 1778 to April 1779.

Civil.	Marine.	Military.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges.
£.st.	£.st.	£.st.	£.st.	£.st.
109,357	57,988	272,037	71,509	510,891

East India House,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

GENERAL RETURN of the Honourable Company's

	ARTILLERY.															INFANTRY.																				
							Staff.																Staff.													
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Adjutant.	Quarter Masters.	Surgeon.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Fifes and Drums.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Brigadier General, &c.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Major of Brigade.	Town Major.	Aids de Camp.	Secretaries.	Surgeon Major.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Surgeons.	Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Fifes and Drums.	Private Europeans.
Bombay	1	1	4	1	6	12	1	1	1	12	8	18	11	22	199	-	1	2	1	13	12	21	1	1	2	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Carranja	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Salsette	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	1	7	29	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Baroche	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	4	2	12	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Surat	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	2	3	-	8	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Tellicherry	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	2	8	-	-	-	-	1	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Angenjo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	-	-	1	-	-	4
TOTAL	1	1	4	4	10	12	1	1	1	18	14	29	14	51	270	-	1	2	1	14	15	25	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	57	79	76	38	715
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	14	1	-	-	1	4	9	9	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	15	18	18	565
Supernumeraries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	-	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ESTABLISHMENT	1	1	4	4	10	12	1	1	1	12	12	32	12	48	284	1	-	2	2	18	24	32	1	1	3	1	1	2	2	1	-	94	94	56	1,280

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company at Bombay, from May 1778 to April 1779; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	Rupees	
Balances in the Treaſuries	8,74,366	
Debt and Intereſt		35,22,874
Due Account Depoſits		39,106
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court		30,073
Rupees		35,91,453

Eaſt India Houſe, 26th February 1782.

Errors excepted.
John Annis, Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Aids received at Bombay from Bengal, from 1778 to 1779.

	Rupees.	
Bullion	—	
Bills	14,51,680	
Goods	—	
Rupees	14,51,680	
L. ſtg.	18,1460	

Eaſt India Houſe, 26th February 1782.

Errors excepted.
John Annis, Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Troops under the Preſidency of BOMBAY, 31ſt March 1779.

SEPOYS.																IRREGULARS.										INVALIDS.					
																	Tivey's.							Nair's.								
Field Officers.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Adjutants.	Commiſſaries.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subaltiſſes.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.	Topaſſes.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Adjutant.	Serjeants.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Privates.	Moopas.	Private.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.
-	3	14	12	3	3	29	61	31	179	176	10	5	79	29	2,460	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	10	8	1	111
-	-	1	1	-	-	2	5	2	12	14	-	-	3	2	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	8	6	2	2	15	30	15	86	89	6	4	34	15	1,158	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	5	5	1	1	10	21	9	60	60	3	2	20	10	820	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	5	5	1	1	10	21	10	57	61	3	2	22	10	1,001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	2	1	1	-	3	6	3	12	18	1	1	6	2	238	66	-	-	1	2	2	22	233	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	32
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	7	35	30	8	7	69	144	70	412	418	23	14	164	68	5,877	102	-	-	1	2	2	22	233	-	-	1	-	12	9	2	143
-	1	-	1	-	-	2	5	2	14	8	-	-	-	3	89	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	8	33	31	8	7	71	149	72	426	426	22	14	150	71	5,966	-	-	-	1	2	2	22	233	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—

Continued.

(Continued.)

ENGINEER CORPS.

	Lieutenant Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Cadets.	Sirangs.	Tindals.	Subahdars.	Lafcars.
Bombay -	1	-	1	1	3	2	1	4	1	100
Salfette -	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	—
Surat - -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
Tellicherry	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	—
TOTAL	1	1	3	2	4	2	1	4	1	100

NATIVE PORTUGUESE.

	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Adjutant.	Commandant.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Fifes and Drums.	Private.
Bombay -	1	5	1	-	2	3	5	10	12	15	157
TOTAL	1	5	1	-	2	3	5	10	12	15	157

LASCARS.

	Sirangs.	Tindals.	Private.
Bombay - -	6	21	500
Carranja - -	-	-	3
Salfette - -	1	4	101
Baroche - -	1	3	70
Surat - -	1	1	30
Tellicherry -	1	3	40
TOTAL -	10	32	744
Wanting to complete	-	-	—
Supernumeraries	5	12	244
ESTABLISHMENT	5	20	500

N. B. At preſent, for want of Europeans, the eſtabliſhment conſiſts of four companies of Artillery, one battalion of European Infantry, ſix battalions of Sepoys, with one of Marines, a native Portugueſe Corps, and an Independent Sepoy Corps, for the ſervice of Tellicherry.

Sixty-ſeven Artificers, belonging to the Sepoy Corps, not included in the above.

Captain Hopkins is a Major by Brevet.
Lieutenant Lendrum, } Captains by Do.
- - - - Bowles, }
- - - - Peche, }
- - - - Dawſon, }
- - - - Rettray, }

Your Committee will now return to a conſideration of the meaſures which the Governor General and Council may be found to have adopted in this interim, and will endeavour to inveſtigate the motives of their conduct, particularly in regard to the change which it has appeared was made in the command of the Bengal detachment, and to the variety of their reſolutions and directions for the purpoſe of completing the intended connection with the *Berar* Rajah. And we ſhall afterwards in regular order attend to the effect which the news of the unfortunate events on the Malabar coaſt had upon their councils and proceedings. Your Committee will, however, in the firſt place, deſire the Houſe to recollect the account given in the former Reports, of the ſituation and management of the Company's affairs in other parts at this very important period, by which means they will be better able to judge of the wiſdom and expediency of the meaſures at preſent in queſtion, as conſidered on the larger ſcale of regard to the general intereſt and welfare of the whole. And it ſhould not be omitted to point out the concluding part of the letter from the Select Committee, dated 27th March, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, as it contains material information relative to the expedition againſt *Mahé*, and the ſuſpicions then entertained, and communicated by the Government of *Bombay*, of the hoſtile diſpoſition of *Hyder Ally* towards the Company, and of his open attachment to the French.

And your Committee find, that the Select Committee of *Bombay*, in the letter juſt mentioned of the 27th March, adverted to the ſlowneſs with which the Bengal detachment had at firſt advanced, and to the conſequent uncertainty of its arrival on the Malabar coaſt, as a reaſon, in exculpation of their own conduct, for having undertaken the Poonah expedition without waiting for a more immediate co-operation with it.

It has been ſhewn, that on the receipt of news in June 1778, of a rupture with France, the Preſident and Council had written to Colonel *Leſlie*, in terms of much anxiety, to preſs forward his detachment; and that on the 21ſt of July, when the Select Committee came to their firſt reſolution of undertaking effectually the ſupport of *Ragoba*, they had again addreſſed him in ſimilar terms, and gave him particular directions for his route. And it appears that Colonel *Leſlie*, in his letter to *Bengal* of 25th of July, acknowledged the receipt of the firſt order, and declared his intention of immediately obeying it in the following words: "You may depend on my "utmoſt attention to the wiſhes expreſſed in the Preſi- "dency of *Bombay*'s letter, in uſing all expedition; and "every faculty of mine ſhall be exerted to effect as "ſpeedy an advance as can be made through a tract of "country yet but little known, and the delays I muſt "expect to encounter at this ſeaſon of the year, by the "ſwelling of the many nullahs and rivers which the "country abounds with."

Ben. Sec. Cons. 31 Aug. 1778. 3 e. Orig. Let.

But your Committee find, that the Su[illegible] were not ſatisfied with his long delay at *Ch*[illegible] wrote a letter to him on the 31ſt of Aug[illegible] him to ſtate the cauſe of his continuance [illegible] dered him to purſue his march to *Berar* wi[illegible] nient expedition, agreeable to their comma[illegible] on the 2d of September 1778, the Governor General laid before the Board ſome letters from Colonel *Leſlie*; by which it appeared that he was ſtill at *Chatterpore* on the 14th of Auguſt, and was engaged in negociations with the Rajahs of the *Bundlecund* country; but he thought no diſadvantage or delay had attended his halt there, from which however he reſolved immediately to purſue his march by way of *Rajegur*; and we perceive that the Governor General expreſſed his own confidence, and hoped the Board would be ſatisfied, "that no con- "ſideration would have induced Colonel *Leſlie* to enter "into engagements of a nature to retard his progreſs, "or to divert the ſervices of the troops under his "command a moment from their deſtined courſe or "preſcribed objects."—The further diſcuſſion of this ſubject, in Minutes between the Governor General and Mr.

Ben. Sec. Cons. 1 Sept. 1778. Appx. No. 137.

	Irregular Sepoys.												
	Lieutenant.	Commandant.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subnisses.	Colour Bearers.	Trumpeters.	Fifes and Drums.	Watermen.	Sepoys.
Baroche -	1	1	5	12	1	30	30	3	-	2	12	6	590
Surat - -	-	-	4	8	-	20	20	4	4	4	12	4	409
Anjengo -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Total	1	1	9	20	1	50	50	7	4	6	24	10	1007

	Since last Return.						
	Dead.	Deserted.	Discharged.	Invalided.	Transferred.	Received.	Entertained.
Artillery -	29	6	7	1	2	148	22
Infantry -	112	43	25	4	72	265	42
Sepoys -	245	1,617	239	6	33	192	2,470
Total	348	1,666	271	11	107	605	2,534

(Signed) *Ld Nilson,*

Lt Col^l Command^t.

Appx. No. 138. Mr. *Francis*, will be found in the Appendix, No. 138; by which it appears, that the Governor General acknowledged, that if Colonel *Leslie* had delayed his march in order to interfere in any unnecessary negociations with the country Chiefs, he would be unworthy of any further trust; and he repeated his observations, that the Colonel ought not to have been retarded by the rains, as that season was certainly the most favourable for the prosecution of his march.

Ben. Sec. Cons. 28 Sep. 1778. Appx. No. 139. And your Committee find, that Colonel *Leslie* arrived at *Rajigur* the 17th August, and found the enemy prepared to dispute the passage of the river *Kane*; that he had previously received advice from Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*, not to put too much confidence in *Madajee Scindia*'s passport, as he was the most deceitful of all the Maratta Chiefs; that on the 22d of August he received the orders from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, to march by way of *Berampore* and *Juneer*, through the *Buglana* country, instead of his former destination to *Surat* or *Broach*; that on the 4th of September, he wrote from *Rajigur* to the Governor General and Council, assuring them that he had with the utmost caution avoided interfering with the Bundella Chiefs, either in their private or public disputes, except in the instance of *Surnaut Sing*, in which he hoped for the approbation of the Board, as he acted from motives of advantage to his detachment and to the expedition; that his troops were healthy; and that the moment the rains would admit, he would continue his route.—It appears that he wrote again from the same place on the 7th of September, inclosing a satisfactory letter from *Moodajee Boosla*, who was pleased at the intended embassy to his Durbar; and complaining of the weather as the principal obstruction to his immediate progress, as he had completed an interchange of friendly engagements with the Rajahs *Gomaun* and *Comaun Sing* and himself, on account of the Company.

Ben. Sec. Cons. 5 Oct. 1778. Appx. No. 140.

Appx. No. [illegible]

Appx. No. 1[illegible]. And your Committee find, that on this occasion, Mr. *Francis* delivered a Minute, in which he expressed much doubt and dissatisfaction in regard to the conduct of Colonel *Leslie*, fearing that the objects of the expedition might be defeated, while he delayed his march to make treaties with the Princes of the country; and he therefore moved for an enquiry upon that subject. And we perceive, that the Governor General was also disposed to condemn his conduct, remarking on the slow advance of 120 miles in the space of 4 months, and at an expence of 12,00,000 rupees; but wishing not to enter precipitately into a measure of such importance, he recommended a delay till they should be furnished with every proper material, and be able to form their resolutions upon direct proof of misconduct. The Board appear to have acquiesced in his reasoning.

But your Committee find, that the Board at this time received information of the death of Mr. *Elliot*, which event appears to have been regretted as a heavy misfortune, and especially in respect to the embassy with which he was charged, as on his personal qualifications the confidence of the Government was particularly reposed. And we observe, that the Governor General immediately proposed that a person should be appointed to repair to the court of the Rajah of *Berar*, and furnished with the same instructions as were delivered to Mr. *Elliot*, for concluding a treaty with that Government; but on account of Mr. *Barwell*'s absence, he desired to suspend for a day such propositions as might be necessary for the further prosecution of the subject.

Ben. Sec. Cons. 5 Oct. 1778. Appx. No. 143.

No. 143.

And it appears to your Committee, that at the next meeting of the Board, the Governor General declared, that having more thoroughly considered the subject of the proposed commission, he was induced, for many reasons which he then assigned (particularly from the hope of receiving advances from *Moodajee Boosla* himself) to request the permission of the Board to withdraw his motion; which was accordingly agreed to: but a considerable debate arose, as will be seen in the Appendix, No. 144, about the declaration of their future views in the further advance of the detachment, either for

Ben. Sec. Cons. 7 Oct. 1778. Appx. No. 144.

No. 144.

for the purpoſe of alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*, or of promoting the deſigns of the Council of *Bombay* for the reinſtatement of *Ragoba*; which, however, they all believed to be a project now entirely relinquiſhed by that Preſidency. Nothing explicit ſeems to have been declared by the Board upon this occaſion; the Governor General, who was particularly called upon, only profeſſing in general terms, that the reinſtatement of *Ragoba* had never been the object of their Government, and that he entirely looked up to *Moodajee Booſla*. In regard to the detachment, he confined himſelf to the following argument: "Whether the detachment ſhall be required "to act in the proſecution of any engagements with "*Moodajee*, or for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, or in direct "oppoſition to the French, or even ſhould it be found "neceſſary or expedient to recal it at a future period, "ſtill the preſent continuance of its march is proper, "until the criſis ſhall arrive which ſhall call upon us "to make our option of its ultimate deſtination. Its "ſituation in *Berar* will be central to all our ſettlements "in *India*: it will be a check on the Poonah Govern- "vernment, if it only meditates deſigns againſt us: it "will be at hand to oppoſe them, if they ſhall be actually "formed; and that ſuch deſigns are formed, I am mo- "rally certain."

Letter from Governor General to Moodajee dated 11 Oct. No. 62. Ben. Sec. Perf. Corr. 1778. Appx. No. 145.

And it appears, that at the concluſion of the debate, the Governor General offered propoſals to the conſideration of the Board, for forming ſuch orders as ſhould be given Colonel *Leſlie* for the future march of the detachment, and for ſettling what information or inſtructions ſhould be written to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*; upon which we obſerve, the ſeveral Members of the Board delivered in very intereſting Minutes on the 12th and 15th. And we therefore wiſh the Houſe to conſider them at large in the Appendix, No. 146, in which they are placed, and wherein they will ſee the reaſonings of Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* in objection to the further march of the detachment, on every ground which the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell* had taken for recommending the proſecution of the expedition. And it is proper to remark, that the Board were unanimous in their reſolution of not any longer intruſting the command of thoſe forces to Colonel *Leſlie*, whoſe conduct they deemed a direct violation of his orders; and he was therefore directed to return to the Preſidency with all expedition, after giving up the care of his command to Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*, who was the next ſenior officer. The Board alſo thought it proper to diſavow the treaty which he had taken upon himſelf to conclude with the two Rajahs, and alſo to appriſe him, that they ſhould conſider any other engagements to be invalid which he ſhould have ſince entered into, contrary to the tenor of his inſtructions. At the ſame time, a letter appears to have been written to Colonel *Goddard*, containing orders to him to receive the charge of the forces from Colonel *Leſlie*, and immediately to direct his march into the province of *Berar*; adding other inſtructions, which have already been explained to the Houſe, when your Committee before took notice of the letter diſpatched in conſequence of the Governor General's propoſals on the 15th of October, to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and which was received by them on the 18th of December.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 12th and 15th Oct. 1778. Appx. No. 146.

Appx. No. 147. Letter to Col. Leſlie, 15 Oct.

Letter to Col. Goddard. Appx. No. 147.

Appx. No. 152.

But your Committee find, that the account of this diſgrace did not reach Colonel *Leſlie*, for the Board on the 19th received a letter from his Secretary, incloſing one from the Colonel, dated the 28th of September, but not ſigned by him, as he had been prevented by an attack of a fever, which in a few days after put an end to his life. This event appears to have been communicated by Colonel *Goddard*, on the 3d of October, who at the ſame time obſerving, that the command of the detachment had devolved upon him, promiſed to execute the inſtructions tranſmitted to his predeceſſor with the moſt implicit attention and expedition. We perceive by another diſpatch from him, dated the 11th of October, that he had kept his word, and was already advanced to *Chowkey*, and hoped ſoon to reach the *Nurbuddah* river; and in a private letter to the Governor General, of the ſame date, we find the following obſervations: "I have "the ſatisfaction to think that I have fairly bid adieu to "the regions of *Bundlecund*, at leaſt for the preſent, "and to the tempting prize which the diviſions and "family conteſts of poſſeſſors offer to an invader. I "have left them profeſſing amity to each other, "and reſpect and friendſhip to the Engliſh nation, "whoſe power and proweſs they have at leaſt learnt to "dread. The whole country now wears a face of "tranquil peace, and the army is plentifully ſupplied "with every neceſſary for its ſupport and conveni- "ence."

Sec. Conſ. 22 Oct. 1778. Appx. No. 149.

Sec. Conſ. 2 Nov. 1778. Appx. No. 150.

Your Committee obſerve, that the Governor General, on the 16th of November, propoſed, in order to complete the conſultations for the approaching diſpatches, to record the inſtructions which had been given to Mr. *Elliot*, and the Minutes of the Board upon that occaſion, all which your Committee, for obvious reaſons, had anticipated, and have already laid before the Houſe.

Sec. Conſ. 16 Nov. 1778. Appx. No. 151.

It appears to your Committee, that a letter, dated the 22d of October, was received from Colonel *Goddard*, giving an account of his progreſs towards the *Nerbuddar*, and at the ſame time letters arrived from *Moodajee Booſla* and his Dewan, in which they lamented the death of Mr. *Elliot*, but hoped that unfortunate event would not prove the means of diſcontinuing the plan for a negociation of alliance between the two Governments; the ſame of which had gone forth and alarmed the fears of the Peiſhwa and the *Nizam*, to whom *Moodajee* had avowed, that the "ties of connection between him and "the Engliſh, by reaſon of the Bengal tribute, and the "vicinity of their territories, were ſo firmly bound, that "no circumſtances had or ſhould looſe them;" and indeed, in proof of it, he had cauſed *M. Chevalier* to be intercepted in the *Cuttack*, and delivered up to Mr. *Elliot*. The Governor General ordered theſe letters to be circulated among the Members of the Board, with propoſitions on his part in conſequence of them. Theſe your Committee find to contain a motion, which was agreed to by the majority of the Board, for the appointment of Colonel *Goddard* to carry into execution thoſe deſigns which had been the object of Mr. *Elliot*'s embaſſy; that they ſhould adviſe the Preſidencies of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay* of this commiſſion, and require their conformity to it. It is however to be remarked, that many forcible objections, which will be ſeen by turning to the Appendix, No. 153, were urged againſt this reſolution, both on account of the impolicy of the alliance, as amounting to a declaration of war with the Nizam, very dangerous to the *Carnatic*, and in reſpect of perſonal and profeſſional impropriety in the [illegible] intended negociator, and alſo from a [illegible] uncertainty in which the Superior C[illegible] the deſigns of the Bombay Governme[illegible] goba, and of the orders they might [illegible] occaſion much embarraſſment and [illegible] Goddard, from a poſſibility of his re[illegible] tory directions. And we perceive, that on this occaſion a copy of Mr. *Elliot*'s inſtructions were incloſed in the diſpatch to *Bombay*, which however it has been obſerved did not reach that Preſidency by this conveyance, but was firſt communicated to them by Colonel *Goddard* on his arrival.

See No. 73, 74, 75, 76, Ben. Sec. Depart. Perf. Corr. 1778. No. 152.

Appx. No. 153. See Letter to Moodajee on this ſubject, 23d Nov. 1778. No. 73, on Ben. Sec. Perf. Corr. No. 69, 72, and 73, on Ben. Sec. Perf. Corr. No. 153.

Your Committee find, that ſtrong evidence of a connection, hoſtile to the Company, between the Maratta adminiſtration and the French power in *India*, was at this time tranſmitted by Mr. *Lewis* from *Poonah*, in copies of letters from the Governor of *Pondicherry*, who therein engaged to co-operate with them on the Malabar coaſt, as ſoon as the Britiſh troops ſhould be defeated before *Pondicherry*. It appears however alſo by theſe accounts,

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 30th Nov. 1778. See however alſo Sec. Letter from Governor General and Council, dated 30 Nov. to the Court of Directors. Appx. No. 154.

accounts, that *Hyder Ally* was likely to draw off a chief part of the Maratta troops to oppoſe him in the *Carnatic*.

No. 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, Ben. Sec. Conſ. Corr. Appx. No. 155

Your Committee have indeed found letters, however, from the Peiſhwa and the Miniſters, immediately addreſſed to the Bengal Government, which convey unqueſtionable proof of their uneaſineſs and reſentment, charging the Bombay Preſidency with having purpoſely thwarted every plan of reconciliation, and complaining of the Superior Council for ſuffering it, and ſending a detachment of troops to their aſſiſtance.

The following paragraph concludes one of theſe letters:—"From the commencement of the authority "of the family of the Peiſhwa, they have entered into "treaties with many of the Chiefs both of the Eaſt and "Weſt, and have never before experienced ſuch a "want of faith from any one; nor even to the preſent "time deviated in their engagement, or been wanting "in their duties of friendſhip and alliance. The blame "reſts with you."

Your Committee have further obſerved, that they carried their complaints to foreign Courts, and eſpecially endeavoured to move *Moodajee Booſla* with them, but in vain, as appears by a letter from *Beneram Pundit*, who at the ſame time having received the news of the capture of *Pondicherry*, declared his conviction, that the influence of the Engliſh fortune would at all times effect the ruin of their enemies; and he thereupon added an aſſurance to the Governor General, that the Rajah waited impatiently for the arrival of a ſucceſſor to Mr. *Elliot*.

No 90, Ben. Sec. Conſ. received 16 Dec. 1778. Appx. No. 156.

And it appears to your Committee, that the Governor General turning his principal attention to that quarter, and conceiving the original plan upon which aſſiſtance was deſtined to *Bombay*, to have been defeated by the ſecond revolution at *Poonah*, now propoſed that the detachment ſhould no longer act under the orders of that Preſidency, leſt they might eventually counteract the ends of the negociation lately given in charge to Colonel *Goddard*. And he ſubmitted to the Board, drafts of letters to *Bombay* and to Colonel *Goddard*, ſignifying their revocation of the powers delegated to the Preſident and Select Committee, and the returning to themſelves the direction of that corps, not, however, ſo entirely as to prohibit its co-operation in the deſigns of *Bombay*, under certain proviſions of compatibility with any engagements formed at the Court of *Berar*. Theſe letters being agreed to by the majority, appear to have been then diſpatched; and your Committee have before had occaſion to mention one of them, which arrived at *Bombay* on the 10th of January following. It was not, however, we perceive, without much animadverſion on the inconſiſtency of this change of reſolution, that theſe propoſals were carried, and it was particularly remarked, that the plan in favour of *Ragoba* being ſet aſide (though no advices of the fact were received) did not put an end "to the caſe of an invaſion of *Bombay* by the "French," which had been ſo much inſiſted upon by the Governor General, as the ground of giving powers to that Preſidency to direct the motions of the detachment. And it ſhould not, perhaps, be here omitted to remark, that previous to this reſolution, a letter from Mr. *Lewis*, dated 27th of October, had been received, in which he informed the Board that he was in hourly expectation of being recalled, as the Governor of *Bombay* wrote to him, that the Select Committee had determined to act againſt the Poonah Durbar.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 7th Dec. 1778. Appx. No. 157.

No. 157.

See letter from Bengal to the Court of Directors, 30th Nov. No. 164.—Alſo letter to Rogonaut Row, No. 84. Appx. No. [illegible]

But your Committee find, that the Rajah of *Berar* had on the 23d of November written a letter to Colonel *Goddard*, in which, though he repeated his profeſſions of friendſhip, and promiſes of ſupplies to the detachment, he did not manifeſt the ſame degree of impatience as he had done to conclude engagements, which ſhould require the immediate junction of his troops. And having communicated to the Colonel a paper of intelligence received from *Poonah*, wherein intimation was given of the advance of a conſiderable force under *Scindia* and *Holkar* to oppoſe the proſecution of his march, he betrayed ſymptoms of alarm from the approaching parties of the Maratta troops, and thoſe of the Decan; which, he obſerved, had been, by Colonel *Leſlie*'s unneceſſary delays, ſuffered to collect themſelves at the Paſſes; and he reſolved himſelf to wait for freſh advices from *Calcutta*, in anſwer to his letters, before he would enter into any overtures of negociation; recommending it alſo to Colonel *Goddard*, to halt upon the banks of the *Nurbuddar* in the like expectation, and in the mean time ſeek to conciliate the diſpoſition of the Peiſhwa by written aſſurances, which he would forward with an addreſs from himſelf, of the pacific purpoſes of the expedition. Attention will certainly be given to the entire contents of this letter, which is placed in the Appendix, 159, and by that means it may be judged, how far Mr. *Francis* was well grounded in propoſing the following queſtion, to which Mr. *Wheler* only appears to have joined him in giving an affirmative anſwer:

No. 2.—See Pol. Corr. Appx. No. 160.

"Whether it does not appear to the Board, from the "whole tenor of this letter, that *Moodajee Booſla* is not "inclined to join Colonel *Goddard*, or to co-operate in "any enterpriſe againſt the Poonah Government?—"Secondly, whether it does not at this time appear to "be the opinion of *Moodajee Booſla*, that Colonel *God*-"*dard*'s proceeding on his march will expoſe the de-"tachment to the greateſt difficulties and dangers?"

The negative given by the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell*, were accompanied with reaſons, which will be found in the Appendix, No. 161, and which, turned chiefly upon the impropriety of the diſcuſſion, till they could receive the comment of Colonel *Goddard* upon the ſubject, and the leading circumſtances to it; the Governor General, however, ſeeming to allow that there might be danger in the march of the detachment, if unſupported by the Berar forces; and that, indeed, there would not otherwiſe be an adequate object to warrant ſuch a riſk. It may be proper here to remark, that in a letter to *Moodajee*, dated 29th December, the Governor General exhorted him to be ſteady in his friendſhip and diſpoſition to firm alliance with the Company; and ſeemed to think it neceſſary to preſs upon him, for that purpoſe, the force of his own expreſſions, which he had uſed immediately upon Mr. *Elliot*'s death, and which his later language appeared to contradict.

Appx. No. 161.

Appx. No. 162.

And it appears, that a few days after the debate above-mentioned, the Governor General recommended it to the Board, that in conſideration of the probable diminution which the detachment muſt have ſuffered in its ſtrength, from the unexpected and unneceſſary delays before the death of Colonel *Leſlie*, and becauſe of the like contingencies which would naturally increaſe with the length of the march, they ſhould provide a proper reinforcement; and for that purpoſe ſhould detach, under the command of Major *Camac*, an additional corps, conſiſting of two battalions of Sepoys, amounting to 1,632 men, which might proceed immediately without their artillery, to the extremity of the weſtern frontier, and there wait the directions of Colonel *Goddard*, either to form a junction with the chief detachment, or to preſerve the communication with the provinces. And we perceive, that this propoſal was agreed to by the majority of the Board, though not without oppoſition, on the ground of a deficiency of information by which the fact of the diminution might be eſtabliſhed, and becauſe the point of expediency appeared more urgent for the recall of thoſe troops which had already been ſent out of their province, than for a further weakening of their eſtabliſhment, in order to increaſe Colonel *Goddard*'s corps, and for other reaſons, which, as well as the arguments adduced in ſupport of the propoſition, may be conſulted in the Appendix, No. 163; wherein alſo will be found the inſtructions given to Major *Camac*, on the 14th of January; and a letter to *Beneram Pundit*, in which the Governor General communicated

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 28 Dec. 1778. Appx. No. 163.

No. 163

See letter from Col. Goddard, 26 Nov. 1778, and Paper of Intelligence.

*No. 165. Sec. Pers. Corr. 30 Dec. 1778.

the reſolution of ſending the reinforcement, and aſſigned, as a motive for ſo doing, that it might obviate every poſſible inconvenience apprehended by the *Maha Rajah*, in the proſecution of the march of their joint troops.

7 Jan. 1779. Ben. Sec. Conſ. Appx. No. 164.

Your Committee find by ſeveral letters from Colonel *Goddard*, that he had ſucceſsfully preſſed forward his march to the banks of the *Nerbuddar*, and croſſed that river in the beginning of December, which being ſooner than he was expected by the agents from *Berar*, he propoſed halting there for ſome days, as well to wait the receipt of advices from the Rajah, as to refreſh his troops. It appears, that his progreſs had been frequently interrupted by the harraſſing attacks from the troops of *Ballajee*, and other Chiefs in the intereſt of the actual adminiſtration at *Poonah*, who had alſo threatened vengeance to the Nawal of *Bhopal*, for acting in contradiction to the Peiſhwa's orders, of preventing, if poſſible, the march of the detachment acroſs the *Nerbuddar*.—From this Chief, Colonel *Goddard* appears to have had very friendly aſſiſtance, and alſo to have paſſed through a diſtrict of *Madajee Scindia*'s country without oppoſition.

Appx. No. 165.

But your Committee obſerve, that though Colonel *Goddard* was thus ſafely arrived on the borders of the Berar dominions, he was not likely to have immediate ſucceſs in accompliſhing the intended plan of alliance with the Rajah; for we perceive by a letter from *Moodajee* himſelf to the Governor General, received at *Calcutta* on the 2d of January 1779, that he conſidered all their deſigns to have fallen to the ground by the death of Mr. *Elliot*; and that the negociation muſt be ſuſpended till another opportunity, and a further knowledge of the ſentiments of the Government General. He declared it to have been the object of his own views to have removed, if poſſible, the mutual ſuſpicions and apprehenſions of the Engliſh on the one part, leſt the French were to be aſſiſted by the Poonah Government in hoſtilities againſt them; and of the Peiſhwa and the Nizam on the other, leſt *Ragonaut Row* was to be ſupported by the Company's forces in his pretenſions to the Regency of the Maratta State; and he lamented, that although the Durbar had repeatedly denied all idea of ſuch connection with the French as might in any way juſtify the complaints of the Engliſh; and notwithſtanding the Governor General had himſelf formally aſſured the Berar vackeel there was not, or ever had been, any intention of giving ſupport to *Ragonaut Row*, thoſe jealouſies ſtill remained; and he added, that in order to put an end to them, he had written to Colonel *Goddard* to remain in a ſtation near *Huſſungabad* till freſh advices and information ſhould be received from *Calcutta*, and from the Poonah Durbar. No progreſs, he foreſaw, could be made through the territories of the Peiſhwa without fighting, and a junction of a body of his forces with thoſe under Colonel *Goddard* would avail nothing in the face of ſuch large armies of the Marattas, but would only involve himſelf in the greateſt loſſes. In the concluſion of his letter *Moodajee* thus expreſſes himſelf:—

"As he (the Peiſhwa) pleads a prohibition in the treaty "to the march of forces overland, and likewiſe com- "plains reſpecting the money that Colonel *Leſſie* col- "lected in his territories, what anſwer can be made "thereto?

"As the times require that a conciliation take place "with the Poonah Miniſters, you will conſider and de- "termine what reply ſhall be given to theſe two points, "of which they complain, and by what means they "may be ſatisfied, and communicate your reſolution to "me, that I may write conformable thereto, and re- "move all doubts."

See Sec. Sec. Pers. Corr. 1779. No. 123, 3, to 5. Appx. No. 165. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 11 Jan. 1779. Appx. No. 160.

It appears that this letter, and others received at the ſame time, from the Berar Miniſters, and which are all placed in the Appendix, No. 165, became the ſubject of a Minute delivered by Mr. *Francis*, in which your Committee find, that he expreſſed great apprehenſion of duplicity and ill deſign in the affected delays of the Rajah, and that his alarm for the ſafety of the Bengal detachment, which he thought incapable of ſurmounting the dangers and difficulties of a further progreſs towards *Bombay*, made him ſolicitous for its return to the Preſidency with all expedition, notwithſtanding the avowed diſcredit which would thereby fall upon the wiſdom of their Councils, and the power of their arms; and he recommended, that for this purpoſe letters ſhould be written to the Peiſhwa, to inform him of that alteration, and to deſire permiſſion for the army to return without moleſtation, inſiſting, that at all events, ſome clear and deciſive orders ſhould be immediately diſpatched to Colonel *Goddard*. In theſe repreſentations and advices, Mr. *Wheler* appears to have ſupported Mr. *Francis*; and though the Governor General declined bearing any part in the debate, as there was no queſtion propoſed in the Minutes of the other members, your Committee obſerve, that at a ſubſequent meeting of the Board he delivered in a Minute, in which, though the direct object of it ſeems to be an addreſs to Mr. *Barwell*, to prevail upon him to alter his reſolution of returning to *Europe*, and thereby abandoning his ſhare in the ſupport and reſponſibility of the meaſures, which the majority had hitherto purſued, he took occaſion to advert to Mr. *Francis*'s minute, with ſome degree of indignation at his advice about the ſafe retreat of their army from *Berar* to their own confines. It is to be obſerved, that Mr. *Barwell* ſuffered himſelf to be perſuaded, by the arguments of the Governor General, to make a declaration of his reſolution to continue at the Preſidency as long as his ſupport might be neceſſary towards effecting the execution of the Governor General's plan of public meaſures. And that Mr. *Francis*, in part of his reply to the Governor General's obſervations, ſtrove to enforce his former remarks on the ſtudied tardineſs of *Moodajee Booſla*, by pointing out expreſſions in a ſubſequent letter from him, when he had been fully informed by Colonel *Goddard* of all the particular objects of the proffered alliance.

No. 166.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 23 Jan. 1779. Appx. No. 167.

No. 167.

No. 167.

To the entire contents of the ſeveral Minutes delivered upon this occaſion, your Committee deſire to refer the Houſe, wherein they will find alſo ſome alluſions to the probable deſign of the powers at home, in regard to a change or continuance of the preſent adminiſtration, at the expiration of their natural exiſtence in the month of the following October; and ſomething, alſo, of the probable effect which the arrival of Sir *Eyre Coote*, then daily expected, might have on the future complexion of their proceedings.

See No. 13, 14, and 15 Sec. Pers. Corr. 1779.—Received 22 Jan. Appx. No. 168.

But your Committee find, that on the firſt of February, diſpatches were received, both from *Bombay* and Colonel *Goddard*, which made a material change in the immediate objects to which the Board were to direct their attention. By the advices from *Bombay*, which were dated 12th of December, the reſolutions of the Governor and Select Committee on the [illegible] October, and on the ſubſequent [illegible] your Committee have already repre[illegible] were communicated to the Superior [illegible] treaty formed with *Rageba* in conſequence of [illegible] incloſed. By Colonel *Goddard*'s letter [illegible] January, the Board were informed of the [illegible] he had taken to obey their commands, in endeavouring to form a treaty of alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*; and alſo of the diſpoſition in which he had found that Chief towards a deciſive agreement; obſerving, that in the preſent ſituation of affairs in the Decan, that Court found excuſes for delay, by which they were determined to be influenced. And though he was convinced that they did not mean to give up the advancement of their own ſchemes hereafter in concert with the Engliſh, and had reſolved to ſend *Baneram Pundit* back to *Calcutta* with a freſh commiſſion, they ſtarted many obſtacles againſt the immediate commencement of any active operations, and principally from the part taken by the Council of *Bombay* in favour of *Ragonaut Row*; that

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 1 Feb. 1779. Appx. No. 169.

Letter [illegible]

Correſpondence [illegible] with Mr. Wheler [illegible] his deputation to Poonah. No. 170.

that diſappointed in his views with the Rajah of *Berar*, he had thought it proper (conſiſtently alſo with the ſpirit of his inſtructions) to turn his attention to the requiſitions received from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, and to march towards *Poonah* without further heſitation.

Letter from Bombay to Col. Goddard, 6th Dec. 1778. No. 170.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 9 Feb. 1779. Appx. No. 171.

Your Committee find, that a few days after the receipt of theſe advices, the Governor General delivered in a very long Minute, in which he examined the conduct of the Bombay Committee, with a reference to the inſtructions they had received from the Superior Council, and to the ſubſequent circumſtances under which they had at laſt reſolved upon the execution of their plan; and though he ſeemed to think them warranted by the letter of their inſtructions, he was not inclined to hold them free from blame, in that, after ſo long a delay of proceeding to action, and ſuch entire neglect of timely notification, they had not continued to wait for the reſult of the depending meaſures which the Superior Government had reſolved to purſue as an indemnification for the ſuppoſed diſappointment in accompliſhing their original plan. In regard to a remedy for this confuſion of meaſures, he preſumed it to be clearly within their power; that their duty required them to apply it; that their own plan having been rendered impracticable by that which the Bombay Committee had reſumed, they could find no option left, but muſt give the latter the aid that could be effectually beſtowed on it; in doing which, they ſhould ſtill however have regard to the ſuperiority and indemnification of their Government, by aſſerting the independency of the command given to Colonel *Goddard*, and by ſecuring a proviſion for the reimburſement of their expences. The ſeveral propoſitions into which the Governor General then reduced and arranged the ſubſtance of his reaſonings, will be found in the Appendix, No. 171, wherein are alſo placed the different opinions of the Board expreſſed in their Minutes upon them, and the letters ſent to the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and to Colonel *Goddard*, incloſing his credentials as Miniſter to the Poonah Government, in conſequence of the affirmative reſolutions of the majority; all which are pointedly recommended to the Houſe.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 8 and 15 Feb. 1779.

Appx. No. 171.

No. 171.

Intelligence of theſe events and proceedings appear to have been tranſmitted to the Court of Directers, in diſpatches from the Board of 31ſt and 11th of February.

Appx. No. 172.

And your Committee obſerve, that on the 9th of February the Governor General wrote to *Moodajee Booſſa* in terms of concern and regret bordering upon complaint, at his preſent reluctance to act up to his former profeſſions and invitation, aſſuring him, that had he accepted of the terms offered him through Colonel *Goddard*, and concluded a treaty thereupon, the obligation of it would have been held ſuperior to that of any engagements formed by the Government of *Bombay*. With reſpect however to the future, the Governor General ſtill ſignified his aſſurances, that his diſpoſition and wiſhes would remain the ſame, and that nothing was yet loſt, although the proſpect might be removed to a greater diſtance.

Ben. Sec. Per. Correſ. No. 7. 9th Feb. 1779. Appx. No. 173.

Your Committee will in this place deſire to direct the attention of the Houſe to two Minutes, which we have placed in the Appendix, No. 174; the one delivered by Mr. *Francis*, being a cloſe examination of the conduct of the Governor General, and direct charge againſt him, for the inconſiſtency of his meaſures and arguments relative to the different plans and terms of alliance with *Ragonaut Row* and *Moodajee Booſſa*; the other being the Governor General's defence of his conduct in theſe particulars; on which we ſhall only remark, that the Governor General pointed out two ſeparate and unconnected ſchemes of alliance, which it had been the object of their Government to form with the Rajah of *Berar*, for different purpoſes, and at different periods; the one defenſive, for the mutual and perpetual ſupport of their reſpective territories immediately bordering upon each other; the other offenſive, for other purpoſes; that the deſign of the firſt had exiſted ever ſince the year 1773, and that a fair opportunity preſented itſelf of accompliſhing it, when the Preſidency of *Bombay* called their attention to another object. He ſought, however, to reconcile the offenſive plan in favour of *Moodajee*, with the ſteps taken in ſupport of *Ragoba*, by the following obſervations: "The profeſſed object of "the alliance with *Moodajee*, was to put him in poſſeſſion of the ſovereignty of the Maratta State, to which he had fair and legal pretenſion, and which he might have certainly held without prejudice to the rights of *Ragonaut Row*, as Peiſhwa; and *Ragonaut Row* might as conſiſtently have exerciſed the office of Peiſhwa under his authority, as his predeceſſors in the ſame office did before the uſurpation of *Ballajee* in 1740; which has been ſupported under all the forms and avowed rights of the Conſtitution: therefore the two plans, viz. that formed at *Bombay* for the reſtoration of *Ragoba* to the office of Peiſhwa, and that projected by us for the advancement of *Moodajee Booſſa* to the ſovereign authority of the Maratta Empire, are compatable in their nature, and may really exiſt together."

See the preceding Report.

Your Committee find, that letters from *Bombay*, dated 13th January, which appear to have reached *Calcutta* on the 25th February, brought advice of the ſlow progreſs which their troops had made in the expedition towards *Poonah*, and of the backwardneſs of *Ragoba*'s friends in declaring themſelves in his favour; that they (the Preſident and Select Committee) had in theſe circumſtances, notwithſtanding the receipt of the Governor General and Council's letter of 23d November, ventured to preſs and enjoin Colonel *Goddard* (to whom they had ſent a copy of their treatry with *Ragonaut Row*) to march directly to *Poonch* without a moment's loſs of time, as they thought the aid of his detachment, on which they had always depended, was neceſſary to enſure ſucceſs. The news, however, which your Committee obſerve was on the ſame day laid before the Board by the Governor General, entirely took away all hopes from that proſpect, and convinced them of the diſaſtrous failure of that expedition, and of the captivity of *Ragonaut Row*. It is to be remarked, that the Nabob of *Arcot*, from whom alſo intelligence of this event was then received, concludes his letter in theſe words: "I have "taken every opportunity of pointing out to my friends "ſuch meaſures as appeared to me to be proper. I in- "cloſe you a copy of a letter containing my advice, in "conſequence of information which I have ſome time "ago received from *Poonah*, addreſſed to the Governor "and Council of *Madras*, under date 3d December "1778, and alſo of one I wrote them with the intelli- "gence received from *Poonah*. Had they purſued my "plan, the affairs there had been well ſettled. Will "you, my friend, who are endowed with wiſdom, even "now take ſuch meaſures as ſhall be moſt adviſable?" And it is further obſervable that in a paper containing the like intelligence from the Durbar of the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*, it is mentioned, that when his Highneſs received from the Maratta vackeel an account of this event, he ſaid to him, "It is well, the right has "prevailed, in that your enemies have of their own ac- "cord delivered themſelves into your hands. But the "Naig has reduced the fort of *Chittledurk* to great extre- "mity. If you now take meaſures to raiſe the ſiege, it "is well; otherwiſe you will loſe it in a month or two. "From the poſſeſſion of the ſingle fort of *Cottee* the "Naig made himſelf ſo powerful; ſhould he be ſuffered "to reduce the fort of *Chittledurk*, it will be attended "with the worſt conſequences."

Bom. Sec. Conſ. 25 Feb. 1779. —Letters from Bombay to Ben. and to Col. Goddard. Appx. No. 175.

Appx. No. 176. Letter from Nabob of Arcot.

No. 176.

Your Committee find, that the Governor General did not think it adviſable upon this occaſion to propoſe any immediate meaſure, till accounts ſhould be received from Colonel *Goddard* of his movements, upon being informed of the calamity in queſtion. But we perceive that Mr. *Francis* ſuggeſted the expediency of providing againſt any conſequential danger upon the weſtern fron-

Appx. No. 179. 25 Feb. 1779.

tiers, by ſending orders to General *Stibbert* to be upon his guard. This propoſition appears to have cauſed a debate, the particulars of which will be found in the Appendix, No. 177; and we ſhall only here remark, that it turned in great meaſure upon the probable effect which this event might have upon the neighbouring country Powers, and upon the neceſſary precautions to be taken againſt their deſigns, and eſpecially of thoſe of *Nudjif Cawn*, who was reported to have entered into a treaty with the Marattas; which however did not ſeem to be allowed in its full extent by all the Members of the Board; though the Governor General declared, that he did not mean to hold forth *Nudjif Cawn* as the friend of the Bengal Government, as he conſidered all the Powers around them to be their friends or enemies merely as their intereſts impelled them. It appears that the reſolutions of the Board, in the terms of Mr. *Francis*'s motion, with an additional amendment propoſed by Mr. *Barwell*, occaſioned a letter to be written to General *Stibbert*, which will be found at the end of the Appendix, No. 177.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 1ſt March 1779. Appx. No. 178.

But your Committee think it proper to inſert here in the body of this Report, the letter from the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, among whom Sir *Eyre Coote* will be obſerved to have ſigned his name, which incloſed the papers of intelligence above-mentioned; becauſe, though it has been taken notice of before in a former Report, it ſeems adviſable to place it immediately before the attention of the Houſe, while they are conſidering the connection between the circumſtances of the Maratta war and the enſuing misfortunes in the *Carnatic*.

See alſo Sir Eyre Coote's letter to the Com. of Correſ. 18 Jan. 1779. *Vide Supra.*

Dated 7 Feb. 1779.

"Incloſed we have the honour of tranſmitting to you "a paper of intelligence, received by the Nabob from "his agent at *Poonah*. Its authenticity is too ſtrongly "marked to leave any doubts on our minds concerning "the particulars; and we have now only to hope, that "the effect of ſo conſiderable a check on the progreſs of "the Company's arms may not create ſome immediate "attempts to diſturb our poſſeſſions on this ſide of "*India*, or to fruſtrate the expectations we had formed "of putting a final and ſpeedy period to the power of "the French.

"The ſubject indeed is of ſuch a nature, as to awaken "all our reflections; and we ſhall beg leave here to ſtate "to you briefly what occurs to us, from a review of our "ſituation with reſpect to the Powers around us, and a "conſideration of the probable effects that may have "been cauſed by the unfortunate enterpriſe in ſupport "of *Ragonaut Roto*.

"It will admit of no doubt, that *Hyder Ally* at "preſent bears no favourable inclination towards the "Company, and that he is very ſtrongly in the intereſts "of the French. Had we not commenced the war in "this country with ſo great a ſuperiority, *Hyder* would "moſt likely have appeared, and taken an active part "againſt us in the beginning. The ſucceſs of our arms "againſt *Pondicherry*, probably determined him to per"ſevere in the line of neutrality he had adopted; and we "have every reaſon to think we might have purſued our "operations to the point at which we aimed, without "any moleſtation whatever from him, had not the miſ"fortune of the Bombay troops cauſed ſo material a "change in the face of affairs. *Hyder* now perceiving "ſo glaring an inſtance of weakneſs and diſgrace, may "be encouraged openly to reſiſt our propoſed attempt "on *Mahé*; which he conſiders, in ſome ſort, as under "his protection.

See Appx. No. 74.

"With reſpect to the Nizam, his avowed attachment "to the Poonah Miniſters, and the warmth with which "he remonſtrated to your Board and to this Government "againſt the deſigns which he underſtood had been form"ed in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, ſufficiently ſhew how "he muſt have received the news of our diſaſter, and "how materially this misfortune will contribute to "ſtrengthen the inclinations he will naturally have re"ceived to our prejudice.

"The diſpoſitions of the Peiſhwa and the Miniſters "at *Poonah* upon this event, may be eaſily conceived. "The effects of this reſentment may be ſuſpended for "a time, but we can never ſuppoſe they will reſt ſatiſ"fied with the advantage they have acquired; much "leſs can we expect they will unite in friendſhip or in "meaſures with thoſe who have attempted ſuch danger"ous deſigns againſt them.

"Thus, by one ill-timed and unfortunate enterpriſe, "the reputation of our arms is ſullied, and the friend"ſhip of the principal Indian ſtates hazarded or loſt for "ever, and that too at a period when we are engaged "in a war which calls for the exertion of all our force, "and the good-will of every ſtate in alliance with us.

"In the midſt of theſe unpleaſing reflections, we feel "no ſmall degree of ſatisfaction at the ſucceſsful mea"ſures which have been purſued againſt the French. By "removing them from our neighbourhood, we are at "liberty to act with much greater ſpirit and ſecurity; "and we yet flatter ourſelves, that it is within the power "of the two Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Madras*, by "prudent and vigorous meaſures, to repair the miſchiefs "that have been occaſioned by the miſcarriage of the "Bombay troops, to wipe away the diſcredit that has "fallen on the Company's arms, and to keep in awe "thoſe Powers who may be diſpoſed to take advantage "of our ill ſucceſs on that ſide of *India*.

"On receipt of intelligence from *Poonah*, it became "a queſtion with us, whether it would be ſafe or pru"dent to purſue the expedition we had ſet on foot againſt "*Mahé*. We ſaw the additional riſk to which it was "expoſed, and the inconvenience of ſending ſuch a body "of troops at this time out of the *Carnatic*; but we per"ceived alſo the particular advantage that would reſult "from the ſucceſsful execution of our meaſures. We "ſaw that this was the only opportunity that might "offer for removing the diſadvantageous impreſſions "which have been occaſioned every where by the late "defeat; that the appearance of diffidence or timidity on "this occaſion would ſtrengthen and confirm theſe "impreſſions, and probably operate more to our pre"judice than any failure that could happen from the "proſecution of the enterprize; and laſtly, that the with"drawing our troops will be inevitably followed by the "capture of *Tellicherry*, which though perhaps not im"portant in itſelf, would in the eyes of the country "Powers be conſidered as a victory of no ſmall conſe"quence to the French, and perhaps induce thoſe who "are now wavering, to declare openly in their favour. "Upon the whole, our concluſion was, that the expe"dition ſhould be proſecuted; and we came [illegible] that reſo"lution accordingly.

"We have ſome hopes that *Hyder Ally* [illegible] "favoured and wiſhed well to the cauſe of [illegible] "ſeeing the danger to which he may [illegible] "the reſentment of the Maratta State, [illegible] "avail himſelf of our ſupport; in that caſe we [illegible] "able to detach him entirely from the intereſt [illegible] "French, and render him a uſeful [illegible] "Indeed we are ſo convinced of the [illegible] "uniting cloſely with *Hyder* in a defenſive [illegible] "we ſhall embrace every opportunity [illegible] "have lately appointed one of the Company's ſervants "to proceed to his Durbar, and have written to him "for the neceſſary paſſports, which we [illegible]

"Your northern Circars lay ſo open to [illegible] "the dominion of *Nizam Ally*, and as there is [illegible] "much reaſon to doubt the ſincerity of his friend[illegible] "for the Company, we think it highly expedient at this "juncture to have the beſt intelligence of his deſigns, "and to be timely informed of any motions he may "make towards theſe provinces. For this purpoſe, as "well as to ſettle every thing that may be neceſſary for "obtaining the Guntoor Circar for the Company, and "procuring the diſmiſſion of the French from the ſervice "of *Bazalet Jung*, we have appointed one of the Com-

" pany's ſervants to proceed to the Court of *Nizam Ally*
" in quality of Reſident; he will have inſtructions to cor-
" reſpond with your Board, and to communicate every
" information you may require from that quarter.

" The northern Circars being too extenſive to be
" properly defended by the ordinary force maintained
" there; and the protection of the *Carnatic* and *Tanjore* re-
" quiring all the troops that are ſtationed for their ſecu-
" rity, we are apprehenſive, were any ſudden attack
" made upon our poſſeſſions to the northward at this
" juncture (while we have ſo large a detachment em-
" ployed in the expedition to *Mahé*) we might not be
" able to collect a ſufficient force in time to repel it.
" Conſidering the value and importance of thoſe poſſeſ-
" ſions to the Company, we think it our duty to attend
" particularly to their ſafety; and with that view we beg
" leave to communicate a thought which has occurred
" to us, and which may poſſibly be improved by you to
" ſome uſeful purpoſe.

" We underſtand that Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment,
" by the laſt advices, was ſituated near the confines of the
" Berar Province; ſhould it be found neceſſary to with-
" draw that detachment from the object to which it was
" deſtined, we would propoſe to your conſideration,
" whether it would not be an eligible meaſure to march
" it towards the coaſt of *Oriſſa*, ſomewhere about the
" Chicacole Circar. How far it might be practicable
" to direct the progreſs through the countries dependant
" on the Rajah of *Berar*, we cannot determine, but we
" are of opinion, if that could be done without much dif-
" ficulty, the plan may be deſerving your attention.
" The march of the detachment by that route will be the
" moſt effectual means of checking any hoſtile deſigns
" of the *Seuhah* upon the Circars, or of repelling any
" actual invaſion that may be attempted on our poſſeſ-
" ſions there; and we think it poſſible too, that by march-
" ing your troops towards the coaſt they might reach
" *Bengal* nearly as ſoon, if not ſooner, than by any other
" route."

Fort St. George, 7 Feb. 1779.

Your Committee find, that Colonel *Goddard*, ſtill ig-
norant of the fatal diſaſter which had befallen the Bombay
army, had however received a letter from the Poonah
Committee, which gave him ſome uneaſineſs, as he was
thereby no longer invited to advance towards *Poonah*;
and in being directed to turn his march to *Surat* or *Broach*,
he was at the ſame time warned of great difficulties which
would probably obſtruct him in his endeavours to effect
it. He appears alſo to have been in great diſtreſs for a
ſupply of treaſure, and the Governor General thereupon
made a motion to ſupply him with ſix lacks of rupees,
which the Board appeared willing to agree to, though
ſome of the Members expreſſed great doubts about the
means of tranſporting them to him: It was however re-
ſolved, that ſuch a remittance ſhould be made, and bills
obtained for that purpoſe on the moſt advantageous terms.
And we perceive, that the Governor General followed
this with another motion upon the ſubject of eſtabliſhing
a mode of defence for the countries immediately depen-
dant upon their Government, and with this view, ſub-
mitted to the conſideration of the Board, " the expediency
" of ordering General *Stibbert* to cauſe the firſt brigade
" to croſs the *Jumna*, and to encamp in the moſt con-
" venient ſtation in the neighbourhood of *Allahabad*, and
" of the high road leading from thence to *Berar*, and to
" the ſouthern parts of *Hindoſtan*."

Ben. Sec. Conf. 2d March 1779. Appx. No. 181.

The conſideration of this propoſal appears to have
been deferred till the next day, at the deſire of Mr. *Francis*,
at which time the Governor General renewed his propo-
ſal with this alteration, that he now recommended an
encampment on the Bengal ſide of the *Jumna*, in a
ſtation the moſt convenient for paſſing that river; aſſign-
ing, among others, the following reaſon: " As we may
" hope ſoon to be aided by the preſence of Sir *Eyre Coote*,
" I ſhall be better pleaſed to wait his arrival, than to
" propoſe any decided operations for which there is not
" any very urgent cauſe." And it appears that a letter
was agreed to be written to General *Stibbert*, in the terms
of this corrected motion, though we find recorded on the
ſame conſultation, and have placed in the ſame Appendix,
No. 181, a joint Minute of Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*,
containing their reaſons for refuſing their aſſent to it.

See Col. Goddard's letter, No. 179.

Appx. No. 180.

No. 180.

And your Committee find, that Mr. *Francis* thought
it proper to offer ſome remarks on Colonel *Goddard*'s
probable ſituation, and to ſubmit a propoſal relative to
his future deſtination, as the Governor General had not,
in conſequence of the late intelligence, recommended
any orders or conditional inſtructions to be ſent to him.
The motion was as follows:

Appx. No. 182.

" That if at the time when Colonel *Goddard* ſhall re-
" ceive the preſent orders, he ſhall not have arrived at
" *Surat*, *Broach*, or *Bombay*, or if he ſhall have been
" obliged to halt at *Barampore*, or at any other ſtation
" in the Maratta dominions, he do immediately retire
" to *Berar*, and demand a paſſage from the Rajah
" through his country, towards the coaſt of *Oriſſa*; or
" if he ſhall have been already obliged to retire into
" *Berar*, that he continue his march towards the coaſt
" of *Oriſſa*, and the Chicacole Circar."

Ben. Sec. Conf. 4 March 1779. No. 182.

And your Committee obſerve, that Mr. *Francis* de-
clared, that in the terms of this motion he intended to
adopt the meaſures recommended by the Preſidency of
Fort Saint George, and probably there propoſed by Sir
Eyre Coote. And it appears to your Committee, that the
Governor General, among the objections which he ex-
hibited againſt the propoſition, contended, that they had
not yet received ſuch authentic information of all the cir-
cumſtances of the late diſaſtrous event, as might warrant
their taking any active part with ſafety; that the aid re-
quired by the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, was not
neceſſarily to be furniſhed by Colonel *Goddard*; that the
ſtep adviſed might tend to render abortive any negociation
which Colonel *Goddard* might poſſibly have returned with
Moodajee Boolla; and that " the propoſed route of the
" detachment would be through a conſiderable part of
" the dominions of *Nizam Ally Cawn*; and it was not
" to be expected, from the known and avowed diſpo-
" ſition of that Prince, that he would conſent to their
" paſſage; nor was it a time to furniſh him with a pre-
" text for open hoſtilities againſt them." It appears that
much debate afterwards enſued; when Mr. *Francis* pro-
poſed to leave out the latter part of his motion, and to
retain ſo much of it only as might occaſion the retreat of
the detachment from a ſituation of danger into the country
of a friend. But this too we perceive to have been over-
ruled by the majority, after much diſcuſſion of the force
and purport of the orders Colonel *Goddard* had already
received, and of the probable motives which had induced
him to proſecute his march towards the other ſide of
India. It ſhould however be remarked, that Mr. *Francis*
argued upon a ſuppoſition that the Bombay army had
ſurrendered at diſcretion, and were therefore hoſtages in
the hands of the enemy, whoſe treatment of them might
be much influenced by the advance or recall of Colonel
Goddard's detachment. But it is alſo to be obſerved,
that at a ſubſequent meeting of the Board, he delivered
in another Minute upon the ſame ſubject, in anſwer to
the Governor General's obſervations on the uncertainty
of the real ſtate of affairs under the Bombay Government;
and reflected upon the weakneſs of thoſe arguments,
when adduced as objections " to conditional orders,
" expreſſing clearly the ſeveral caſes in which they were
" or were not to operate."

No. 182.

No. 182.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 8 March 1779. Appx. No. 182.

But your Committee having placed all theſe docu-
ments in length in the Appendix, No. 182, deſire, in
juſtice to their ſeveral authors, to recommend to the
Houſe an attentive peruſal of them; for which we acknow-
ledge and adopt an additional motive, in the following
reaſons urged by Mr. *Francis* on the introduction of the
preſent Minute:—" But ſince I am convinced, that the
" late political meaſures of this Government, and of
" the Preſidency of *Bombay*, will ere long be the ſubject
" of a parliamentary enquiry, and that every part of our

" proceedings, which has occaſioned or led to the late " diſaſter, will be ſubmitted to the judgment of the " public, it highly concerns my reputation, if not my " ſafety, that my conduct through the whole of the " tranſaction ſhould be fairly repreſented, and in no " inſtance miſunderſtood."

Dated 27 Jan. 1st and 5th of Feb. 1779. Appx. No. 183. Bom. Sec. Conſ. 22 March 1779. No. 183.

But your Committee find, that Colonel *Goddard*, in ſeveral letters, informed the Governor General and Council of his advanced march beyond *Berampore* into the Maratta dominions, without having received any certain intelligence from *Bombay*, or from the Army Committee, by which he might deciſively regulate his judgment on the preferable expediency of any particular object for the direction of his detachment, though ſeveral reports of an unfavourable nature had reached him; that deeming it however neceſſary to make an early and determined choice, he had, on full deliberation, and for reaſons which he aſſigned, reſolved to haſten forward with all expedition to *Surat*, and he had been confirmed in this reſolution by a ſubſequent, though ſtill inexplicit letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay*.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 15th Mar. 1779. Appx. No. 184.

And it appears, that on the 15th of March, when no accounts immediately from that Preſidency had yet reached *Calcutta*, Mr. *Francis* took occaſion to make ſome jealous remarks on their ſilence, conceiving it, as well as this letter of the 22d January to Colonel *Goddard*, to be ominous of an intention, ſhould he reach *Bombay*, to break their laſt engagement with the Poonah Government, and to renew the war at all events; and under that impreſſion he moved, " that a letter ſhould be im- " mediately written to the Preſident and Select Com- " mittee, to expreſs concern and ſurpriſe at their pro- " found ſilence on the late operations and defeat of their " army, and to prohibit them in the moſt preciſe and " poſitive terms, and as they would anſwer the contrary " at their peril, from commencing or renewing hoſtilities " againſt the Marattas, or any other Indian Prince or " Power, except in their own immediate defence, with- " out our conſent and approbation firſt had and obtain- " ed."

No. 184.

This motion however was objected to and negatived by the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell*, on the ground of its being only a repetition of orders already ſent under the 4th of February, and premature, becauſe in all probability more authentic and circumſtantial accounts would arrive in a few days.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 18 Mar. 1779. Appx. No. 185.

And your Committee find, that on the 18th advices were at laſt received from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated 3d February, giving a ſhort relation previous to a more ample diſpatch promiſed by an expreſs veſſel, of the mere fact of the convention, with an attendant remark on the invalidity of the ſtipulations agreed to; and giving notice, that they ſhould endeavour to treat with the Marattas on another footing; and had directed Colonel *Goddard* to march to *Surat*.

Appx. No. 186.

And we obſerve, that Mr. *Francis* hereupon renewed his motion made on the 15th, alleging, that from the terms of this letter, he found himſelf confirmed in his idea that the Select Government of *Bombay* " had " it in contemplation to renew hoſtilities with the Ma- " rattas, and it was for that purpoſe they had ordered " Colonel *Goddard* to proceed to *Surat*." But the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell* would not allow that this reſolution was to be deduced from the letter, or any thing more than a diſavowal of the treaty, as far as regarded the ſurrender of their poſſeſſions, which might indeed draw on into a renewal of hoſtilities, but of the propriety or juſtice of which the Superior Council were as yet incompetent to judge, till they ſhould ſee the treaty and the written declaration of the Military Committee—They therefore put a negative on the motion. And your Committee obſerve, that the Governor General at this time propoſed a draft of a letter to Colonel *Goddard*, which the Board acquieſced in (with an expreſs reſervation of former opinions) and in which they aſſured

Appx. No. 187.

him of their approbation of his conduct in proceeding to *Surat*; and gave him a diſcretionary power of employing his detachment in the ſervice and protection of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, with a caution not to involve himſelf or their Government in the reſponſibility of the acts of that Preſidency, entirely independent of which he was to conſider the authority of his command.

Appx. No. 188.

And it appears by a letter from Colonel *Goddard*, dated February 9th, and received a few days after the preceding diſpatch was ſent to him, that he gave reaſons for a perſeverance in his reſolution of marching forward, notwithſtanding he had received from the Peiſhwa's vackeel the inſtructions of the Military Committee for his return to *Calcutta*, thinking himſelf releaſed from the obligation of obedience to them by their letter of a ſubſequent date, before received; and thereby alſo relieved from any alarm on account of the perſonal ſafety of the Gentlemen left as hoſtages.—That he was anxious for a knowledge of the meaſures which the Superior Council might decide upon, in conſequence of the late unfortunate event, as the ſteps to be purſued would reſt ſolely upon them in the probable inability of the Bombay Government to form at preſent any plan of military operations. It is proper here to obſerve, that Mr. *Wheler* at this time delivered in a Minute, in which he enforced a repreſentation of the neceſſity of adopting pacific meaſures, by a melancholy picture of the general poſture of the Company's affairs in *India*; and he particularly dwelt on the alarming ſituation of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, to which he thought this Government could not in ſafety or prudence refuſe a ſupply of money, though it would be proper to recommend the ſtricteſt economy to them, accompanied by an aſſurance that there was no probability of being able to continue ſuch ſupplies in future; and that they muſt exert their own efforts, and regulate their expences accordingly. And it appears, that a promiſe of 15 lacks was made to the Preſidency by the Governor General and Council, though your Committee find that five of them were afterwards witheld, in conſequence of the reduced ſtate of the Bengal treaſury by the loſs of the *Stafford*, on board of which was ſent 10 lacks for the uſe of that Preſidency.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 23 March 1779. Appx. No. 189.

See Ben. Sec. Pref. Corr. No. 43, received 28 Mar. 1779.

See General Letter to the Court of Directors, 14 Jan. 1782. No. 189.

An account of the reſolutions and proceedings of the Board upon the partial information which they had hitherto received from *Bombay*, appears to have been tranſmitted to the Court of Directors in a ſecret letter, dated 29th of March 1779. But your Committee find, that in the beginning of the enſuing month, when Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* had taken his place in Council, the Governor General thought it neceſſary, on account of the advanced ſeaſon of the year, to wait no longer for more circumſtantial intelligence before they proceeded to conſider of ſuch meaſures as might be preſent ſituation of their affairs, it might [illegible] upon; and with that intent he laid [illegible] the 5th of April, a long Minute [illegible] conſideration of the ſubject. It ſhould [illegible] Governor General had previouſly [illegible] certain intelligence, that Colo[illegible] troops under his command, had [illegible] at *Surat* towards the end of [illegible] propoſitions were the reſult of [illegible]

Appx. No. 190.

" That we inveſt Colonel [illegible] " as the Miniſter of this Gover[illegible] " Peſhwa and Miniſters of the [illegible] " renewal or confirmation of [illegible] " provided they will recede from the [illegible] " they have acquired by their late engagements with " Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*; and that they will engage " never to admit any French forces into their domi- " nions, nor allow them to form any eſtabliſhments on " the Maratta coaſt; and that theſe conditions be made " the alternative of peace or war.

See Draft of his Inſtructions.

" 2dly, That the firſt brigade, which has already " been ordered to march to a ſtation convenient for

" croſſing

" croſſing the river *Jumna*, be completely ſupplied with
" ordnance, ammunition, and ſtores, fit for any ſervice
" on which a body, or a force equal to it, may be deſ-
" tined.

" I make this diſtinction, becauſe it will officially reſt
" with the Commander in Chief to recommend both the
" ſtrength of this corps, and the parts of which it ſhould
" be compoſed; expreſſing my own hope, that it may
" not be found neceſſary at any time to employ
" either our European infantry or artillery, but for the
" defence of our own provinces, and the preſcribed
" limits of the dominions of the Nabob of *Oude*.

See Letters to and from Major Camac.

" 3dly, That Major *Camac* be ordered to return to
" *Kernuber*, or to any other ſtation as convenient, near
" and within our own borders, and to remain there until
" further orders; and that he be ſupplied with ammu-
" nition, guns, and ſtores, for complete batta-
" lions.

" 4thly, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted
" to iſſue the neceſſary orders for carrying the reſolutions
" of the Board into execution in the two foregoing
" propoſitions.

See theſe Letters.

" 5thly, That a letter be written to the Peiſhwa and
" his Miniſters, with the ſame ſubſtance as Colonel
" *Goddard's* inſtructions, according to the accompanying
" draft.

See this Letter.

" 6thly, That a letter be written to *Moodajee Booſla*,
" according to the annexed draft.

See this Letter.

" 7thly, That a letter be written to the Preſident and
" Select Committee of *Bombay*, adviſing them of Co-
" lonel *Goddard's* inſtructions, and requiring them to
" conform to them, and in the mean time to be pre-
" pared, either for repelling any hoſtile attempts of the
" Marattas, or for any other ſervice which may hereafter
" be judged neceſſary, but to undertake nothing offen-
" ſively without explicit and poſitive orders from us.

See this Letter.

" 8thly, That a letter be written to the Preſidency of
" *Fort Saint George*, to inform them of this deſign, and
" in the event of their ſucceſs againſt *Mahé* to order all
" the troops which are now employed in that expedition
" to remain there, or otherwiſe at *Tellichery*, and to be
" prepared to move, on the receipt of any orders for
" their junction with our forces on that ſide of *India*."

See Ben. Sec. Perf. Corr. 20 Feb. 1779, No. 28—26th, 29—5 March, 30—Do. 31—8th, 32—Do. 33—Do. 34. Letter from Moodajee to Benaram Pundit, No. 35—18 March, 37—Do. 38—28th, 42: Being a tranſlation of a paper delivered by Benaram Pundit on the part of Moodajee Booſla.

And it appears, that theſe propoſitions were agreed to by the Board, and that letters were accordingly writ-ten; all which will be found in the Appendix, No. 191. And your Committee have thought it proper to inſert therein, for the obſervation of the Houſe, the letters previouſly received from *Moodajee Booſla* and his Mi-niſters, upon the ſubject of the propoſed alliance with him, and upon the event of the Poonah expedition, as alſo a letter received from *Siccaram Baboo*, on the 28th March 1779.

Ben. Sec. Perf. Corr. No. 40. Appx. No. 191.

And as it appears to your Committee, that in conſe-quence of theſe reſolutions of the Board, letters were written to the Maratta Durbar, and to *Madajee Scindia*, in diſavowal of the Convention Treaty, aſſuring them however of a diſpoſition to accommodation on the part of the Bengal Government, if they would give it on theirs a proper encouragement, by relinquiſhing any claims ariſing from the late ineffectual engagements, and by a promiſe of ſeparating themſelves from the French, either for traffic or otherwiſe; we have placed theſe letters in the Appendix, No. 192, to which we refer the Houſe for further examination of their particular con-tents. And as it alſo appaers that the Berar Rajah and the Nizam of the Decan were alſo informed, by letters from the Governor General, of the ſentiments and reſo-lutions of the Superior Council, in regard to the late tranſactions between the Marattas and the Preſidency of *Bombay*, your Committee have thought it proper to put them too in the Appendix, No. 192, for the inſpec-tion of the Houſe.

Appx. No. 192. See Ben. Sec. Perf. Corr. dated 6 April 1779, No. 15, 16—April 28th, 18—May 7th, 19—6 April, 14—12 May, 21—3 June 23, 1779.

Your Committee find, that on the 12th of April a letter was received from *Bombay*, accompanied with a copy of the proceedings promiſed in their former letters of the 12th and 13th of January. Of theſe we having before taken notice, it will be neceſſary in this place only to make a reference to them in the former Ap-pendix, No. 130, &c. And your Committee further obſerve, by ſeveral letters received from Colonel *God-dard*, that he arrived at *Surat* on the 25th February, and had encamped his troops, whoſe good behaviour he highly recommended, upon a convenient and healthy ſpot of ground, two miles above the city, upon the banks of the river: that having afterwards received a letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, expreſſing their deſire to ſee him, he ſet out for that Preſidency, and arrived there on the 15th of March, when he informed the Select Board of ſuch matters as might explain to them the nature of the intended connection with *Moodajee Booſla*: that in the beginning of April he received his credentials, appointing him Miniſter to the Court of *Poonah*, but had deferred appriſing the Durbar of the powers with which he was inveſted, till the receipt of further orders from the Superior Board; in expectation of which, in conſequence of their repreſentations tranſ-mitted by Mr. *Horſley*, the Select Committee of *Bombay* alſo had ſuſpended all operations: that during the receſs from public buſineſs, he propoſed joining the troops at *Surat*, in order to put them in a ſtate of readineſs for employment in ſuch ſervice as he hoped might be ſoon required of them.

Ben Sec. Conſ. 3 May 1779. Letters dated 26 Feb. 1779. 3d and 22 March, 4 April, 1779. Appx. No. 193.

And your Committee find, that the Governor General, on 3d of May, notified to the Board the arrival of Mr. *Horſely*, who, it has been before obſerved, was deputed from the Bombay Preſidency to give the Superior Board an exact information of the late tranſactions and events of their Government. And it appears that he brought with him a letter from the Select Committee, dated 4 April, in which they referred the Board to a variety of documents contained in their diſpatches, and alſo to Mr. *Horſely* himſelf, for more complete and circum-ſtantial information, and by which the Board might be enabled to decide on the conduct of their Government, which they declared had been guided " by the beſt of " their judgments, according to the ſituation of affairs " and the powers given to them."

Appx. No. 194. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 3 May 1779.

No. 194.

It further appears, that they laviſhed the higheſt en-comiums on the judicious and deciſive behaviour of Co-lonel *Goddard*, whom they had admitted to have a de-liberative voice in their councils; and being happy to find his conduct had alſo met with the approbation of the Superior Government, they begged to ſolicit for him from them ſome diſtinguiſhed mark of their mutual ſenſe of his ſervices.

Your Committee obſerve, that the Board employed ſeveral days in reading all the papers ſubmitted to their conſideration by the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*; and ſuch of them as have not been already placed in a former Appendix, No. 130, to which we refer, are put in another, and will conſequently attract the notice of the Houſe.

Appx No. 195.

Your Committee find, that on the 24th of May, the Governor General laid before the Board an arrangement of the ſeveral queſtions, which they might propoſe to themſelves, as ſubjects of diſcuſſion, and which he had taken the pains to extract and put in order from the contents of the voluminous diſpatches lately received from the Government of *Bombay*; and that he proceeded afterwards to make his obſervations on the principal circumſtances of the various matters in queſtion, as in-troductory to the deciſion and directions which they were to pronounce upon them. Among theſe we find prin-cipally, that he thought their diſavowal of the Treaty of Convention to be ſtrictly juſtifiable in every particular, except the ſeparate article of ſtipulation in favour of *Madajee Scindia*, which he found himſelf compelled in conſcience and in duty to declare ought to be ratified by them, unleſs *Madajee Scindia* ſhould have forfeited his right by any ſubſequent act. The remaining hope therefore was, that he might be prevailed upon to depart

Appx. No. 196. Ben. Sec. Conſ. May 24, 1779.

from the letter of his ſtipulation, and to accept of what he might deem an equivalent for it: that the ſeaſon and circumſtances of affairs ſhould prohibit them from loading the paſt conduct of the Preſident and Select Committee with any harſh and unoperating reproaches, but ſhould rather induce them to excite their zeal to exert themſelves for the retrieving of their paſt misfortunes; and to arm them with means adequate to that end, reſtricting their powers where the object was determinate, and permitting a more liberal extenſion of them in caſes too variable and uncertain for poſitive injunctions. And in the draft of the letter which, we obſerve, he then propoſed to convey their inſtructions to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, he ſuggeſted a general caution, to which their ſtricteſt attention ſhould be required; "that their engagements ſhould be offenſive only for the objects of "their immediate operations, and in all other reſpects "purely defenſive." The whole diſcuſſion of a ſubject ſo important as this is, will of courſe be attentively examined by the Houſe. And your Committee having therefore thought it proper to place this Minute, and propoſition of the Governor General, in the Appendix, No. 196, together with the ſeveral Minutes and propoſitions of the other Members of the Board, will confine ourſelves in the body of the Report to a very conciſe ſtatement of the moſt ſtriking points. With this view, we ſhall here only take notice of the principal objects recommended to the obſervance of the Select Committee in the very words of the Governor General's recapitulation: "To ſum up what we have written; our firſt "deſire is to obtain peace on the terms propoſed by our "inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard* on the 5th of April, "and it is only in the event of the failure of this deſign, "that we have formed the ſubſequent inſtructions, or "will allow of their operations. In theſe, the plan of "military operations recommended by your Preſident, "is to have the firſt place, with its dependant engage"ments with the Guicawars; the next in order is the "negociation with *Moodajee Boofla*; and the laſt, the "propoſed engagement with *Madajee Scindia*."

The execution of the projected treaty of peace with the Poonah Miniſtry, and the negociation of alliance with *Moodajee Boofla*, were to be left to the ſole management of Colonel *Goddard*; whom it was recommended to the Preſident and Select Committee to conſult upon all proper occaſions, as the Superior Council would be glad, by inveſting him with the chief command of the *Bombay* eſtabliſhment, whenever that office ſhould be vacant, to give him an effective voice in the Councils of that Government.

Appx. No. 196. Your Committee obſerve, that Sir *Eyre Coote* delivered in a Minute upon this occaſion; the principal part of which we have already adverted to, and ſhall therefore here ſimply remark, that he beſtowed the higheſt commendations upon Colonel *Goddard*, whom however he did not think it in their power to appoint to the chief command of the Bombay eſtabliſhment, though he could wiſh to have him conſulted upon all military and political points. He declared himſelf averſe from ever concurring in the meaſure of deſtroying the Bramin uſurpation, by reſtoring the original Ram Rajah Government in the perſon of *Moodajee Boofla*, conceiving the real intereſts of the Company to be concerned in keeping up diviſions among the Maratta Powers. He remarked, that the natural diminution of Colonel *Goddard's* force, and ſome ſymptoms of diſaffection among the Sepoys, made it neceſſary to loſe no time in exerting their utmoſt vigour to ſupport their military reputation; and he pointedly recommended an alliance with the Country Powers, eſpecially with *Hyder Ally*, whoſe more particular intereſt it was to join them in any hoſtile attempts againſt the Maratta State. In regard to the plan of military operations, he thought that the Commander in Chief, who was principally reſponſible, ſhould have a diſcretionary power to adopt, or not, Governor *Hornby's* plan, as he might think moſt adviſable. And on the queſtion of ſupply of treaſure, he was willing to make ample grants, if proper reſtrictions were provided for the particular uſe of it.

Your Committee find, that Mr. *Francis* alſo gave in a Minute, which appears, as he profeſſed it, to be an examination and opinion upon the reſolutions and tranſactions of the Bombay Government, both in the Council and in the field, relative to the Poonah expedition; and he ſeems therein to agree materially with the ſentiments of Sir *Eyre Coote*. But your Committee further obſerve, that Mr. *Francis* alſo preſented ſome propoſitions to the conſideration of the Board, which he recommended to be made part of their letter to *Bombay*. Theſe, which are placed with the other papers in the Appendix, No. 196, regard only the circumſtance of reference from the Select Committee of *Bombay* to the Superior Council, on the military conduct of Colonel *Egerton* and Colonel *Cockburn*; and convey opinions of condemnation on the proceedings of the Committee in reſpect to the treatment of thoſe Gentlemen.

It appears on the contrary, that Mr. *Barwell* avoided any diſcuſſion of the queſtion on the demerits of individuals, and meant to confine himſelf to the important ſubjects of peace or war; on which he delivered an opinion correſponding chiefly with that of the Governor General, except that he ſeemed, in the point of alliance with *Moodajee Boofla*, to incline more to an agreement with Sir *Eyre Coote*, with whom alſo he concurred in adviſing the Brevet of Brigadier General to be given to Colonel *Goddard*.

Your Committee find recorded upon the Conſultations of the 31ſt of May, 7th and 10th of June, ſeveral Minutes and propoſitions on this important ſubject, introduced by the different Members of the Board; in referring to which the Houſe will perceive what alterations and amendments the Governor General was induced to offer, in order to qualify and accommodate the different opinions which had been formed on the original draft of the letter to *Bombay*: they will obſerve the nature and the reaſons, the terms and the extent, of the oppoſition or approbation given to them; they will ſee and conſider the arguments of Mr. *Francis* upon the neceſſity of pacific meaſures, from an expoſition of the charges attending a war eſtabliſhment, and the avowed ſtate of poverty of the Company's treaſuries. *Appx. No. 197. Ben. Sec. Cons. 31 May, 7 and 10 June, 1779.*

From a further examination of theſe Conſultations, the Houſe will have an opportunity of regarding the draft of a letter to *Bombay*, propoſed by Mr. *Francis*, and rejected by the majority; and they may review the ſcrutiny and deciſion which the ſeveral Members of the Board paſſed upon each paragraph of the amended letter drawn up by the Governor General, till on the 14th, the further corrected copy was entered in the form herein under tranſcribed, and being approved by the majority, was ordered to be diſpatched to the Preſidency of *Bombay*. *Ben. Sec. Cons. 14 June 1779.*

"Gentlemen,

"We have received your letter of the [illegible] "with its enclоſures, by the hands of [illegible]

"We do not think it neceſſary to enter [illegible] "of your proceedings, but [illegible] "enquiries to the choice of [illegible] "conduce to retrieve their unhappy [illegible] "ing the paſt to the ſcrutiny of a [illegible] "effectual authority.

"Having given full powers to [illegible] *Goddard* to "negociate and conclude a treaty of peace with the "Maratta Government, and having no cauſe to alter "the terms which we have preſcribed in our inſtructions "for that purpoſe, we have only to repeat that we look "to the iſſue of that commiſſion as our primary object, "and the termination of all our political views on your "ſide of *India*, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful.

"But if the Miniſters ſhall reject the propoſals which "we have ordered to be made to them, and ſhall reduce "us to the neceſſity of defending the rights and intereſts

" of the Company by an open war, we leave a latitude of " action to Colonel *Goddard*, under your inſtructions, to " avail himſelf of the ſituation which fortune may " preſent to him; and if a war ſhould be indiſpenſably " continued, it muſt alſo reſt with him, who is reſpon- " ſible to us for his conduct, to adopt any part or the " whole of Mr. *Hornby*'s plan laid down in his Minutes " of the 30th of March, or not at all, as he may think " moſt adviſable for promoting the diſtreſs of the enemy. " Should this plan be carried into execution, we require " your ſtricteſt attention to the following cautions: that " your engagements ſhall be offenſive only for the ob- " jects of your immediate operations, and in all other " reſpects purely defenſive; that your engagements with " the Guicawar family ſhall be made with the head of it, " and with him excluſively; that you ſhall not aſſume " a mediation between the brothers, or take any part " whatever in their domeſtic diſputes, further than to " ſupport the party in alliance with the Company, and " his poſſeſſions againſt foreign invaſion; and that you " do not commit the dignity of the Company, or pledge " the national faith, in formal treaties with perſons of " rank or power unſuitable to ſuch a diſtinction.

" We are ſenſible of the attention which you have " ſhewn to our views with the Government of *Berar*, " concerning the overtures lately made to *Moodajee* " *Boofla* by Colonel *Goddard*, and in your reſolutions to " avoid whatever might again interfere with this nego- " ciation. We confeſs, we at this time entertain little " hope of his concurring with our deſigns; he will wait " for proofs of our ſuperiority before he will hazard the " conſequences of a decided connection with us; and " every offer made to him while he is under the in- " fluence of ſuch a policy, will but ſerve to increaſe his " reſerve, as he will naturally conſtrue it to proceed " from the conſciouſneſs of our own inability to ſupport " ourſelves without foreign aſſiſtance; and that it is " an additional motive for our preferring a ſcheme of " military operations, practicable by our own forces, " unincumbered with the weight of a timid ally. If " notwithſtanding *Moodajee Boofla* ſhall have anſwered " the letters which have been written to him, by a " willingneſs to accept of the proffered alliance, we " ſhall leave it to be concluded under the inſtructions " already given in charge to Colonel *Goddard*. If on " the contrary, as we expect, he ſhall directly refuſe, " or heſitate, or make new references to us, we have in " ſuch caſe ordered Colonel *Goddard* to break off the " negociation.

" We think ourſelves ſtrictly juſtifiable in refuſing to " ratify even the ſmalleſt tittle of the treaty or conven- " tion of *Worgam*; and we have already intimated our " ſentiments on this head to Colonel *Goddard*, and given " him our final inſtructions upon it; but, as we had " not at that time before us the ſeparate ſecret engage- " ments entered into with *Madajee Scindia*, we could " not take it into our conſideration, nor judge of the " obligation we were under to expreſs our ſenſe of his " ſervices at the inſtant we diſclaimed the acts of the " Committee. Though we abſolutely deny any vali- " dity to the acts of the Committee, and will not admit " of any pretenſions founded on thoſe acts, yet they " cannot cancel any rights, which have their baſis in " eſſential and intrinſic benefits reaped by our nation. " This right we muſt acknowledge to be poſſeſſed by " *Madajee Scindia*, and muſt therefore declare, that, " unleſs he ſhould have forfeited it by any ſubſequent " act, he his entitled to a full compenſation for any " diſappointment he may ſuffer by our denial of the " acts of the Committee.

" We have therefore inſtructed Colonel *Goddard* " to expreſs the ſenſe in which this Government is " pleaſed to regard the ſervices of *Madajee Scindia* at " *Worgaum*, by offering him ſuch a gratification as may " be afforded him by your Government, or from means " which he may poſſeſs from the operations of war, in " caſe peace is not concluded upon the inſtructions he is " already furniſhed with.

" In the event of a war, if *Madajee Scindia* ſhall be " diſpoſed to take part with us, we have authorized " Colonel *Goddard* to enter into ſuch engagements with " him as ſhall not be contrary to any before concluded, " and which he may judge moſt adviſable; making " our future ſecurity, peace, and an adequate revenue, " his chief and indiſpenſable objects, and the grounds of " our engagements with him.

" To ſum up what we have written; the firſt deſire " is to obtain peace on the terms propoſed by our in- " ſtructions to Colonel *Goddard* of the 5th of April, and " it is only in the event of the failure of this deſign, that " we have formed the ſubſequent inſtructions, or will " allow of their operation.

" The execution of the projected treaty of peace with " the Poonah Miniſters, we leave to the ſole charge of " Colonel *Goddard*, according to the inſtructions which " we have already given him.

" The ſeparate negociation with *Madajee Scindia* bears " ſuch a connection with the foregoing, that we have " therefore thought it neceſſary to leave this alſo to his " charge. The negociation and treaty of alliance with " *Moodajee Boofla* we alſo leave to the ſole management " of Colonel *Goddard*, in the authority of his inſtruc- " tions of the 16th of November, until the period of " their ſuſpenſion, by the refuſal, or ſuch heſitation of " *Moodajee Boofla* as he ſhall deem ſufficient to warrant " his declaring the negociation ſuſpended. The future " renewal of this negociation we reſerve to be deter- " mined by our expreſs orders, but without revoking " the credentials and inſtructions already granted to " Colonel *Goddard* reſpecting it. In all other nego- " ciations, treaties, and plans of military operations, it " is our wiſh ſo to blend the powers of your Govern- " ment with our own, in the direction of them, and in " every formal or occaſional inſtrument which they may " require for their ratification, as to preſerve the credit " and diſtinct reſponſibility of both, and to make both " the pledges for the faithful obſervance of them. For " this purpoſe we need not recommend that Colonel " *Goddard* be conſulted, when his preſence or the nature " of the ſubjects will admit of it, on all meaſures which " have a relation to our preſent inſtructions, as you " have been already pleaſed to allow him a deliberate " voice in your Councils; and we are happy to find that " you are ſo well ſatisfied with his conduct, and his " ready diſpoſition to aſſiſt in the execution of your de- " ſigns, as to leave us little occaſion to lay down a clearer " line for the employment of the forces under his com- " mand, than that we have already deſcribed.

" We have directed Colonel *Goddard* to execute what- " ever you ſhall think practicable, and which ſhall not " be contrary to our inſtructions, or to any exiſting en- " gagements; a caution which we hope will be unneceſ- " ſary, but with which we do not conſider ourſelves at " liberty to diſpenſe, while the principal reſponſibility " reſts with us; and for the ſame reaſon we require, " that all treaties which ſhall be concluded by you in " virtue of theſe inſtructions, be referred to this Go- " vernment, for its final ſanction and formal ratification " of them; and that a clauſe be inſerted in every treaty " you conclude, to that effect.

" We ſhall heartily join with you, in recommending " Colonel *Goddard* to the Court of Directors, for the " appointment of Commander in Chief at your Pre- " ſidency on the firſt vacancy; and in the intermediate " time we think it abſolutely neceſſary, in the preſent " diſtreſſed ſituation that the military upon your eſta- " bliſhment are reduced to, that he ſhould have the rank " given him of Brigadier, in order to enable him to " carry on the public ſervice with more weight and dig- " nity; for which purpoſe we have granted him a Brevet " Commiſſion of Brigadier General for the ſervice on " which he is now employed."

See Report of Committee of Correſpondence.

It may be proper here to remark, that the recommendation of Colonel *Goddard* to the Court of Directors had its effect, and procured him the appointment ſolicited for, and a confirmation of advanced rank.

Your Committee obſerve, that all objections and oppoſition to this letter did not then ceaſe; for, beſides a very earneſt proteſt from Mr. *Francis*, grounded on a variety of reaſons, which may be conſidered in the Appendix, No. 198, and which drew from Mr. *Barwell* an immediate explanation of a paſſage in his former Minute, and from Sir *Eyre Coote* a reply on a ſubſequent day, to which Mr. *Francis* then gave an anſwer, we perceive that Mr. *Horſley*, who had applied before to the Board for permiſſion of general acceſs to the records of the Governor General and Council reſpecting *Bombay*, and ſeems not to have been well ſatisfied with the refuſal of his demand in its full extent, tranſmitted a letter on the 14th June to the Board, wherein he aſſured them, that though the Bombay Government were unanimous in wiſhing to have the line of their conduct reſolved on for them by the Superior Council, laid down as clearly as poſſible, and were determined to give it every aſſiſtance in their power, yet he thought it neceſſary to interfere with his repreſentations, that the reſolutions of the Board, in continuing or extending the powers conferred on Colonel *Goddard*, might not be inconſiſtent with thoſe reſerved to the Government of *Bombay* by Act of Parliament, and eſpecially entruſted to the Select Committee by the Court of Directors; and he entreated to be heard whenever thoſe points might come under conſideration. And it appears, that having been admitted to peruſe the letter addreſſed to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and being indulged with a further permiſſion on his requeſt to carry a draft of it home with him, he returned it on the 18th, with a long paper of remarks, expreſſive of much diſſatisfaction and complaint, and even of indignation, at the reſolutions and inſtructions contained in it, conſidering them as direct encroachments upon the powers of that Government. And it further appears, that the Governor General hereupon thought it proper to take ſome notice in diſapprobation of Mr. *Horſley*'s arguments, as well as of the manner in which they were conveyed, and propoſed a reſolution to the Board, which they confirmed, that the Secretary ſhould be deſired to inform Mr. *Horſley*, "that they did "not require his animadverſions upon their meaſures, "although they ſhould have been pleaſed to have re- "ceived any lights from him which he could have af- "forded them, and for which they were referred to him "by the Preſident and Select Committee, upon the ſub- "ject of affairs at *Bombay*."

Appx. No. 198.

Beng. Sec. Con. 28 June, 1779. No. 198.

Appx. No. 199.

Beng. Sec. Conſ. 31 May 1779 and 7 June, No. 199.

Sec. Conſ. 21 June 1779. Appx. No. 200.

Appx. No. 201.

To this rebuke was added a notification, that their records would no longer be open to him, and that he was at liberty to return to *Bombay* "whenever he had "fulfilled the terms or objects of his miſſion."

It ſhould be obſerved, that a letter of inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard*, propoſed by the Governor General, was acquieſced in by the Board, on the ſuppoſition that they correſponded with the contents of the letter to *Bombay*, which they will be found to do.

Having thus explained to the Houſe the ultimate reſolutions and orders of the Superior Government, on which were to depend the re-eſtabliſhment of peace, or re-commencement of war with the Ruling Powers of the Maratta Empire, your Committee think it proper to introduce in this place, a view of the ſtate of their revenues, and of the military force on their eſtabliſhment, at that intereſting period.

AN ACCOUNT of the Territorial and other Revenues of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, the Expences of collecting the ſame, the Tribute and Stipends paid, from May 1778 to April 1779.

		Groſs Collections.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.	
		CR°.	CR°.	CR°.	£. ſter.
Ceded Lands. Land Revenues		57,38,610			
Charges of Collection		- -	3,00,698		
Jaghire to Lord Clive		- -	2,58,631		
Nett Revenues		- -	- -	51,79,281	582,669
	CR°.				
Bengal Province. Land Revenues	137,40,790				
Board of Cuſtoms collected	5,57,069				
Duties on Salt collected	5,66,109				
		148,63,961			
Charges of Collection		- -	7,08,988		
Stipends and Allowances paid		- -	28,94,505		
Nett Revenues		- -	- -	112,60,468	1,266,802
Bahar Province. Land Revenues		48,56,801			
Charges of Collection		- -	2,55,231		
Allowances and Penſions paid		- -	2,07,909		
Nett Revenues		- -	- -	43,93,661	494,287
Cuſtoms collected at Calcutta		2,74,208	- -	2,74,208	30,848
Rajah Cheit Sing		31,66,935	- -	31,66,935	356,280
	CR°	289,00,515	46,25,962	242,74,553	2,730,886
Commiſſion on the Revenues		- -	3,84,254	3,84,254	43,229
	CR°		50,10,216	238,90,299	2,687,657

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at *Fort William* and Subordinates, from 1778 to 1779.

Civil.	Marine.	Military.			Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges defrayed by the Company.
		Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Nett Amount defrayed by the Company.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
401,348	152,462	1,846,237	855,575	990,662	152,150	1,696,622

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the East India Company in *Bengal,* from May 1778 to April 1779; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	CR°.	CR°.
Balances in the Treaſuries - - -	162,54,351	
Money borrowed at Intereſt - - - - - -		2,30,542
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - -		1,51,392
Bills of Exchange unaccounted for - - - - -		6,153
Contract with Country Government for Materials, &c. for Building - -		2,47,451
Account Depoſits - - - - - - -		12,66,831
Unclaimed Goods - - - - - - -		11,822
Tuncan Account - - - - - - -		54,914
Military Fund - - - - - - - -		11,50,720
Sundry old Debts - - - - - - -		6,265
Debts at Dacca - - - - - - - -		231
Debts at Coſſimbuzar - - - - - - -		7,978
Debts at Patna - - - - - - -		52,716
Money refunded on account of General Coote's Commiſſion - - -		39,050
His Majeſty Shah Allum, the balance of his ſtipend - - -		48,96,360
Nudjeef Cawn, the balance of his allowance - - - -		15,08,000
Ahteram ul Dowlah, D° D° - - - - -		1,22,646
Oudy Pooty Gouſſaine, D° D° - - - - -		27,187
Fund for the Diſcharge of old Salt Balances - - - -		7,84,952
Cur' Rupees - -		105,65,210

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Acco".

ABSTRACT RETURN of the TROOPS

		European Commissioned Officers.												European Non-commissioned and Private.					
		Brigadier General.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fire-workers.	Cornets.	Ensigns.	TOTAL.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matrosses.	Drums and Fifes.	Privates.	TOTAL.
European	Artillery, 1 Regiment	-	-	1	3	6	-	17	29	-	-	56	-	43	40	392	23	-	498
	Engineers, Corps of	-	-	1	1	3	-	5	-	-	6	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Infantry, 3 Regiments	1	2	2	4	30	-	44	-	-	40	123	23	133	-	-	74	1,718	1,925
	Chasseurs, 1 Company	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	3	-	5	-	-	5	75	85
	Invalids	-	-	1	-	3	-	3	1	-	2	10	-	55	11	49	10	167	292
Hindostan	Cavalry { Body Guard, 1 Troop	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	3	-	-	-	-	3
	Cavalry { 3 Regiments	-	-	1	1	3	-	14	-	4	-	23	5	7	-	-	-	-	7
	Infantry, 42 Battalions and Militia	-	-	6	5	43	-	131	-	-	131	316	5	275	-	-	-	-	275
	Artillery	-	-	-	1	3	-	19	6	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Invalids	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total present Strength		1	2	12	15	93	-	235	36	4	180	578	33	521	51	441	112	1,960	3,085
Supernumeraries		-	-	-	1	1	-	6	14	-	16	38	5	1	-	-	-	-	1
Wanting to complete		-	-	1	2	3	7	25	2	2	6	48	-	70	2	203	-	1,399	1,674
ESTABLISHMENT		1	2	13	16	95	7	254	24	6	170	588	28	590	53	644	112	3,359	4,758

		Native Officers and Sepoys.													
		Subadars.	Sirdar Jemautdars.	Jemautdars.	Rissoldars.	Duffidars.	Naggers.	Subrisses.	Drummers.	Tom Toms and Trumpeters.	Private Troopers.	Puckallys.	Havildars, Naicks, and Golandaaze.	D°, D°, and Sepoys.	TOTAL.
Hindostan	Cavalry { Body Guard, 1 Troop	-	-	-	1	6	-	-	-	2	100	-	-	-	109
	Cavalry { 3 Regiments	-	5	30	-	72	18	-	-	-	1,254	-	-	-	1,379
	Infantry, 42 Battalions and Militia	526	-	894	-	-	-	-	480	474	-	-	-	38,459	40,833
	Artillery	6	-	51	-	-	-	-	48	-	-	-	2,600	-	2,705
	Invalids	49	-	76	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	626	755
Total present Strength		581	5	1,051	1	78	18	-	529	479	1,354	-	2,600	39,085	45,781
Supernumeraries		3	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	172	180
Wanting to complete		5	-	8	-	-	-	-	9	-	186	-	-	-	208
ESTABLISHMENT		583	5	1,058	1	78	18	-	534	479	1,540	-	2,600	38,913	45,809

N. B. The Bombay Detachment under Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*, consisting of One Regiment of Cavalry, One Company of Golandaaze, and Six Battalions of Sepoys, are included in the above returns.

under *Fort William* Preſidency, May 1779.

European Staff, &c.												Supernumeraries.									Wanting to complete.										
Brigade Majors.	Aids de Camp.	Chaplains.	Adjutants.	Quarter Maſters.	Paymaſters.	Deputy D°.	Quarter Maſters Serjeants.	Serjeant Majors.	Surgeons D°	Surgeons.	Aſſiſtant D°.	Major.	Captain.	Lieutenant.	Enſign.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Surgeons.	Private.	Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Cornets.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Surgeons.	Aſſiſtant D°.	Rank and File.
1	1	-	3	3	2	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	8	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	7	12	- - -	-	-	2	-	-	Matroſſes, &c. 203
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- - -	-	-	-	-	-	—
3	2	3	3	3	3	3	-	-	3	4	5	-	-	2	16	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	-	-	-	- - -	-	-	-	1	5	1,399
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- - -	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	3	2	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	-	1	4	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- - -	2	13	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	7	6	-	-	-	-	-	9	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	6	Enſigns. 6	-	57	-	1	3	—
-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	- - -	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- - -	-	-	-	-	-	—
4	3	3	17	15	5	3	2	2	4	19	14	1	1	6	16	14	5	1	-	1	-	1	2	3	7	25	8	2	70	2	2	8	1,602
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- - -	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- - -	-	-	-	-	-	—
4	3	3	17	15	5	3	2	2	4	20	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- - -	-	-	-	-	-	—

Native Staff, &c.														Supernumeraries.				Wanting to complete.			
Commandants.	Adjutants.	Writers.	Sircars.	Doctors.	Munſhees Maj.	Munſhees D°.	Duffadars, D°.	Hawildars, D°.	Muſtoddies.	Farriers.	Armourers, &c.	Chucklers.	Watermen.	Subadars.	Jemautdars.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Subadars.	Jemautdars.	Drummers.	Private Troopers.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	6	3	6	-	6	6	18	12	48	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	186
4½	49	38	444	148	-	-	-	-	-	198	16	540	3	1	4	172	4	7	9	—
3	3	-	24	9	-	-	-	3	-	-	12	4	24	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	—
3	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
50	53	38	469	163	3	6	3	6	6	228	32	614	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	4	172	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	8	9	186
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—

Memorandum. No Diſtribution of the above Troops was received.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 28th June 1779. Appx. No. 202.

It appears to your Committee, that Colonel *Goddard* wrote to the Governor General and Council from *Surat*, on the 20th of May, and that his letter reached them on the 21ſt of June; and that he therein informed them of his own ſituation while attending the arrival of their inſtructions before he entered upon any active meaſures, and the diſſentions which, by confirmed advices from *Poonah*, he was convinced ſubſiſted among the principal leaders of the Maratta ſtate, whereby a favourable opportunity might perhaps be opened to them for a ſucceſsful interference in the affairs of that empire, conducive to the reeſtabliſhment of their own; that without looking to ſchemes of conqueſt ſo extenſive as the ſettling the adminiſtration, or diſpoſing of the chief authority of the Maratta empire, many advantages might be taken of its confuſion, and particularly in the quarter near which he was ſtationed, namely, the Guzerat province, whoſe ſituation and preſent ſtate of divided government expoſed it an eaſy prey to an invader.

Letter dated 2 June 1779, on Ben. Sec. Conf. 2 Auguſt 1779. Appx. No. 203. Letter to the Peiſhwa, &c. Appx. No. 204

And it appears, that on the receipt of the inſtructions from the Governor General and Council, incloſed in their letter of the 5th of April, the Colonel immediately addreſſed the Peiſhwa and *Nanna Furneſe* on the ſubject of his appointment to negociate with them; but he at the ſame time obſerved to the Board, that he apprehended much difficulty in ſettling the diſpoſal of *Ragoba*, whom it could not be expected the Miniſters would ever conſent to reſtore into their hands, and without which however he could not foreſee any ſure proviſion for his perſonal ſafety.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 8 July 1779. Appx. No. 205.

But your Committee find by another letter from him, dated the 6th of June, and received at *Calcutta* the 8th of July, that a moſt unexpected event had fallen out, which was likely, by removing this obſtacle, to cooperate with the other circumſtances above-mentioned in favour of the Company's affairs in that quarter, and to lead to a more advantageous accommodation with the ruling powers of the Poonah Government. And we perceive that with obſervations of this nature, Colonel *Goddard* accompanied the intelligence of *Ragonaut Row*'s eſcape from the cuſtody of *Madajee Scindia*, and of his application to him for an aſylum and protection, which he had thought himſelf authorized, in good policy and from the ſpirit of the Board's inſtructions of the 5th of April, to afford him, and to promiſe that he would write to the Governor General and Council for further orders how to act upon this occaſion. And your Committee obſerve, that this immediate anſwer was returned to Colonel *Goddard* by the Board: "We entirely ap- "prove of the offer you have made to *Ragonaut Row*, and "direct that you continue to afford him the protection "of your camp, provided he ſhall not forfeit his right "to it by any act of infidelity, or attempt to defeat the "effects of your negociations, to which you will give "your entire attention without regard to any other con- "ſideration. For the reſt, we leave you to act under "our inſtructions of the 5th of April, in which we ſee "no cauſe to make any alterations on account of this "event."

Letter 12th June 1779. Appx. No. 206.

Information of theſe occurrences appears alſo to have been tranſmitted by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*; who at the ſame time acquainted the Board, that in order to avoid any obſtruction to the negociations which the Superior Government had been pleaſed to commit to General *Goddard*, they had ſent directions to the Chief of *Surat* to deſire *Ragoba* to ſeek an aſylum in ſome other place, unleſs the General ſhould think proper to receive him, and be reſponſible for the conſequences. And we obſerve, that the Board returned an anſwer to the Preſident and Select Committee in ſimilar terms to thoſe which they had made uſe of to General *Goddard*.

No. 206.

See Ben. Sec. Conf. 2 Auguſt 1779. Appx. No. 207.

It appears, that more particular accounts of *Ragoba*'s eſcape, and more minute obſervations on certain advantageous points, which the poſſeſſion of his perſon would put in their power to inſiſt upon in addition to thoſe preſcribed by the inſtructions of the Superior Board, were communicated by General *Goddard* on the 12th of June, before which time *Ragoba* was arrived at *Surat*, and had paid a viſit to the General, bringing with him his adopted ſon, *Amrut Row*, and a child of four years old, born to him ſince the adoption of the other.

The conduct of *Madajee Scindia* in taking ſo little precaution for ſecuring the perſon of *Ragoba*, ſeems to have been a ſubject of aſtoniſhment to General *Goddard*; who obſerved, that by accounts from *Poonah*, the Maratta Chiefs were greatly incenſed with him, and declared they ſhould conſider him as reſponſible for that loſs. And we perceive, that General *Goddard* thought it properupon this occaſion to write again to the Peiſhwa, informing him and his Miniſters of this event, and of his deſire to have a confidential perſon ſent from *Poonah*, with whom he might adjuſt all matters of difference, as well with regard to the perſonal intereſts of *Ragoba*, as to the more immediate concerns of the Company.

Letter, dated 12th June. Appx. No. 208.

It is obſervable, that the General, after giving an account to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, of the circumſtances of *Ragoba*'s eſcape and retreat till he came under the protection of his camp, preferred a complaint againſt the Chief of *Broach* for having received him in that city, and thereby preſumed to encroach upon the reſerved powers of the Supreme Council, and to offer an affront to them in his diſrepect ſhewn to their Miniſter. And your Committee have remarked, that Mr. *Gambier* had taken ſome pains to perſuade *Ragoba* not to advance to *Surat*, till inſtructions could be received from the Preſident and Select Committee; and obſerved in his letter to them, that he believed *Ragoba* would himſelf, if he thought his buſineſs could be effectually done by them, without throwing himſelf into the hands of General *Goddard*, prefer much the putting the management of his affairs under their directions.

Appx. No. 209.

Letter from Mr. Gambier, dated 6 and 9 June. Appx. No. 209.

And your Committee find, that General *Goddard* addreſſed another letter upon this ſubject to the Superior Board on the 18th June, incloſing one from *Ragonaut Row* to the Governor General, and giving an account of the information he had derived, from a conference with him, of the ſtate of parties in the Maratta Government, of his reaſons for delivering himſelf up to *Scindia*, of his having diſcovered the perfidious intentions of that Chief, and of certain overtures which had been made to him by the Nizam, as an encouragement to attempt his eſcape. And we obſerve, that General *Goddard* added ſome remarks of his own on this circumſtance, by which he ſought to reconcile it with the probable line of intereſted policy which the Nizam might be ſuppoſed inclinable to purſue; and he further took notice of another ſource of hope in the enmity which *Hyder Ally* bore to the ruling adminiſtration of the Maratta empire, and in the marks of attachment and favour which he had ſhewn to the perſon and the cauſe of *Ragoba*. He enforced this obſervation by an account of the late proceedings of the Peiſhwa and *Madajee Scindia*, who had written to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and apprized them of their intentions to march againſt *Hyder*, and to puniſh him for his inroads upon their country, ſignifying at the ſame time their deſire of ſettling all differences with the Britiſh Government.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 2 Aug. 1779. Appx. No. 210. Do.

And your Committee find, that at this time ſome alarms of a French invaſion were ſtarted by Sir *Eyre Coote*, from the information he had received of their force and preparatory armaments at the iſlands, which were probably deſigned for an attack upon *Bombay*; and he thereupon propoſed that the Governments of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay* ſhould be recommended to reinforce General *Goddard*'s army with the following troops:

Ben. Sec. Conf. 2 Aug. 1779. Appx. No. 211.

From *Madras*, One Battalion of Europeans,
3 Ditto Sepoys,
50 Artillery.
From *Bombay*, 300 Europeans,
2 Battalions of Sepoys,
100 Artillery.

And

And upon this ſubject he appears to have added the following advice and remarks: "As the works of *Pondicherry* are now deſtroyed, the quota from *Madras* may the more eaſily be ſpared. The troops they have at *Mahé*; 1,100 ſepoys, one company of grenadiers, and 50 artillery, may immediately embark to join General *Goddard*; the reſt may be completed from the ſouthern ſtations, and will certainly be with him before any operations of the enemy can be commenced.

"The forces of *Madras* and of this eſtabliſhment are, in my opinion, fully ſufficient to protect our poſſeſſions on this ſide of *India*; moreover, we are in daily expectation of great addition to our ſtrength from *Europe*. I therefore alſo recommend that drafts be ſent from hence to complete the original number of General *Goddard*'s detachment."—The debate which enſued hereupon, and the ſeveral Minutes of the Members of Council, as well upon this point as upon a following propoſal made by the Governor General for a letter of inſtructions to General *Goddard*, on account of the intended reinforcement to him, are all placed in the Appendix, No. 211. And your Committee think it proper to expreſs their particular recommendation to the Houſe, to give them an attentive peruſal, as they ſo very directly treat upon that ſubject, which we eſteem to be the moſt immediate aim and ſcope of our enquiry. It will be therein ſeen how far the opinion of the Commander in Chief was declared to have influenced the judgment of ſome of the other Members to an acquieſcence in his propoſals, and in what terms of explanation the Governor General defined his own intentions, and thoſe of the Board, in *recommending* to General *Goddard* (without *enjoining* him) to acquire the addition of any other advantageous articles beſides thoſe which by his inſtructions of the 5th of April he had been directed to inſiſt upon. The letters of the Superior Council diſpatched in conſequence of theſe reſolutions to the two other Preſidencies, and to General *Goddard*, are ſubjoined to the other records in the ſame Appendix, and will of courſe be conſidered with them by the Houſe.

No. 211.

No. 211.

And as your Committee obſerve that Mr. *Francis* delivered a ſubſequent Minute of his diſapprobation to ſome part of the letter to General *Goddard* and a partial debate afterwards aroſe upon the mode in which the recruits ſhould be ſent from *Bengal* to join the army at *Surat*, we have annexed thoſe alſo to the reſt of theſe documents.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 16th Aug. 1779 Appx. No. 211.

In regard to the advancement of the negotiations with the Marattas, your Committee have found, that on the 13th September the Governor General ſuggeſted the poſſibility, that the Miniſters might have wiſhed and have found means to protract them, and that thereby General *Goddard* might ſtill remain in a ſtate of ſuſpence; to put an end to which he recommended an immediate direction to him to repeat their offers to the Peiſhwa and Miniſters, and to demand their final determination upon them in the ſpace of twenty-four hours from the time of their being preſented, declaring that their refuſal, or the delay of their anſwer beyond that time, would be conſidered as a declaration of war.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 13 Sept. 1779. Appx. No. 212.

Inſtructions conformable to the terms of this propoſal appear to have been ſent to General *Goddard*, and at the ſame time the Select Committee of *Bombay* were adviſed of them, and deſired to grant them every aid in their power, if he ſhould be reduced to the extremity of engaging in hoſtilities. And by a letter from General *Goddard*, dated the 15th July, which reached *Calcutta* a few days after the diſpatch of theſe inſtructions, your Committee obſerve, that he alſo expected to meet with delays in the buſineſs of accommodation, although the language of the Poonah Miniſters, in anſwer to his addreſs, breathed throughout a manifeſt inclination for peace, and in further teſtimony of which they had immediately conſented to ſend a confidential vackeel to him for that purpoſe. He explained many reaſons however why he was diſpoſed to doubt the ſincerity of theſe profeſſions, from the information he had received of *Nanna*'s preparations for war, and his ſolicitude to engage the aſſiſtance of the neighbouring Powers, particularly the Nizam, from whom he had recently received a very favourable anſwer. He declared himſelf therefore particularly anxious for preciſe inſtructions how far, upon a conviction of the duplicity and deceit of the Poonah Government, he ſhould make known a juſt reſentment of their behaviour, the hoſtile part he was authorized to take, and the particular meaſures he was to purſue in conſequence of the political advantages that might ſuggeſt themſelves from the ſituation of affairs already ſubmitted to the conſideration of the Board.

No. 212.

No. 212.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 16th Sept. 1779. Appx. No. 213.

See Letter to Gen. Goddard from the Poonah Durbar. No. 213.

In the reply which the Governor General and Council immediately returned to General *Goddard*, your Committee perceive, that they referred him to the contents of their letter of the 13th inſtant, and to the tenor of their former inſtructions; but that he might not be at a loſs with reſpect to the plan of his future conduct, they added the following directions: "That you conform literally to thoſe orders in all caſes where they are expreſs; and that in any other, where no proviſion is made, or an option left you to uſe your own diſcretion, you adhere as nearly as poſſible to the ſpirit of them, without waiting the reſult of further references to us."

Appx. No. 214.

In the mean time however the negociations in queſtion appear to have been retarded even beyond expectation, as the agents from *Poonah* did not arrive at *Surat* before the middle of Auguſt, when a long converſation enſued on the points of difference between the two Governments. The particulars of this, as tranſmitted by the General to the Superior Board, your Committee have placed in the Appendix, No. 215, to which we deſire to refer the Houſe. We perceive, that the Miniſter's perfect diſpoſition to make peace with the Engliſh was not doubted by the General, though he ſuſpected that the late ſucceſs againſt the Bombay troops had given them hopes of better terms than he had offered to them: doubting therefore whether ſome more conceſſions, and even the perſon of *Ragoba*, would not be demanded, he had declined conferring upon that head till two preliminary articles, upon the acceptance or refuſal of which the future negociation would depend, were fully adjuſted. The reaſons which induced General *Goddard* to ſuppoſe that the Maratta Miniſtry was at this time ſolicitous for peace, your Committee find to reſt chiefly upon their avowed or pretended wiſh to be at liberty to check the progreſs of *Hyder Ally*, and upon the diſſentions ſubſiſting between *Nanna* and *Madajee Scindia*, who was become, by the ſupport of the other military officers of the Government, ſince the confinement of *Siccaram* and *Marabah*, the only bar to the abſolute power of that Miniſter.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 25 Oct. 1779. See letter from Gen. Goddard, dated 16th Aug. 1779.

Appx. No. 215.

It appears that the General expected to receive anſwers to the letters then diſpatched to *Poonah* in eight or twelve days, when the reſult of the negociation would be certainly known. But your Committee find, by another letter from him, dated the 12th of September, that being diſappointed of receiving any reply, he thought it expedient to obviate the inconveniencies of further delay, by diſpatching *Lalla Nehaul Chund*, one of the Maratta agents, expreſs to his maſter, at his own ſolicitation, and on his promiſe to return in twenty days at fartheſt. The opinion which he had formed of *Nanna*'s inclination to make a peace, was not altered, but on the contrary he declared his perſuaſion, that whatever obſtacle might be thrown in their way, would originate from *Madajee Scindia*, whom, notwithſtanding the ſentiments of the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, he conſidered as their moſt inveterate foe. And he had thought it moſt conſiſtent with the object of the Board's inſtructions, not to commence any excluſive intercourſe with that Chief, unleſs the anſwers which might arrive from *Poonah* ſhould point it out for the intereſt of their affairs to do ſo.

Sec. Conſ. 28 October 1779. Appx. No. 216.

Ben. Sec. Com. 29th Nov. 1779. Appx. No. 227.

On the 4th of October, General *Goddard* appears to have written again to the Governor General and Council, informing them, that though he had received no direct answer from the Durbar, intelligence had been communicated to him from *Poonah*, which he had reason to consider most authentic, that the expected reply would in all probability be such as to preclude him from the opportunity of renewing the old, or making any fresh demands; that the event of the rivalship and dissention between *Madajee Scindia* and *Nanna*, had taken a different turn from what was foreseen, and that they were both then in concert making every preparation for hostilities, and settling the plan for an ensuing campaign; which coalition on the part of *Nanna* he attributed to the prospect of assistance from the French: He had, consequently, thought it necessary to be himself in readiness for the alternative of war, and had appointed the rendezvous of the troops, which were destined to make an accession to his force from the Presidencies of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay*, to be at *Surat*, which he thought the most convenient situation on many accounts, but particularly in the view of being an effectual check upon the Guicawars.

Appx. No. 218.

On the 20th October, having received the Governor General and Council's instructions of the 13th September, the General in his answer to them observed, that he had then waited twice the stipulated time for advices from *Poonah*, from which delay he augured more unfavourably than ever of the real designs of that Court, especially as the Maratta agent remaining with him had received in the interval repeated dispatches from thence. That on this account he had judged it expedient to make this final notification to that agent, "That I would "wait only fifteen days more: in which time he said a "letter might arrive in reply to one he would dispatch "that instant, at the expiration of which, if *Nebilchund* "did not arrive, or a satisfactory answer to the proposals "I had transmitted by him in the name of my Govern-"ment, I should consider this delay as a declaration of "war, and act accordingly."

This point, of such material importance to the affairs of the Company in those parts, being thus on the eve of decision, and, as appears from the representations of General *Goddard*, likely to terminate in an open rupture with the Maratta nation, your Committee think it proper here to consider the condition and dispositions of the parties immediately concerned (in which are included *Ragoba* and the two other Presidencies) as far as from the materials before us we are enabled to discover them, and also to take a short view of the state of the Country Powers, and of the probable effect which this event might have upon their political conduct.

No. 67, Ben. Sec. Perf. Com. Sec. Appx. No. 210

Your Committee have already taken notice of an address from *Ragonaut Row* to the Governor General, soon after his escape to the English camp at *Surat*; and we find, that on the 19th of August, the Governor wrote to him, informing him of their disavowal of the

Appx. No. 219.

Convention of *Worgam*, and their refusal "to abide by "a tittle of the terms contained therein;" adding however, "that it was the invaried practice of the Rulers "of the English Government, to adhere most rigidly "to the faith of public treaties;" and concluding with expressions of satisfaction at his escape, and of approbation of the protection which General *Goddard* had afforded him. It has been shewn, that the Superior Board, in their instructions to General *Goddard*, had not thought it necessary to make any alterations in them on account of *Ragoba*'s return under their protection; and it appears that the General, in his conversation with the Maratta agent deputed from *Poonah* to negociate with him, had been so far explicit on this point, as to declare, "that the English would never consent to "any restraint being used towards the person of *Ragoba*; "that he must be permitted to reside wherever he might "chuse, with a sufficient allowance from the Maratta "State; and on those conditions he should not be "suffered to carry on any improper correspondence, "raise any commotions in their dominions, or if he did, "he should forfeit the allowance from them, and the "friendship of the English." But we perceive, that from apprehension of the interpretations which might be put on the disorders of *Ragoba*'s necessitous partizans, at so critical a juncture as the moment of negociation with the opposite party, the General having ventured, in order to obviate this evil, to advance him, since his arrival in June, 50,000 rupees per month, for the quiet of his people and the supply of his family, he incurred thereby the disapprobation of the Superior Council, who desired it to be understood, that their orders concerning *Ragoba* were merely confined to protection; and added the following signification of their sentiments and intentions on this head: "If *Ragoba*'s influence is so far sunk, "that he cannot procure for himself the necessaries, we "cannot consent to supply him with the superfluities of "life; nor can we see how the Company's affairs will "be benefited by an intimate connection with a man, "from whose influence no advantages can be derived; "and we already find so many difficulties in answering "the demands made upon our treasury, for the "necessary and unavoidable expences of your detach-"ment, that we cannot agree to authorize any unne-"cessary disbursements."

Letter to Gen. Goddard, 29 Nov. 1779. Appx. No. 220.

In regard to the opinion and interference of the Bombay Government, on the subject of protection granted to *Ragoba*, your Committee have already noticed their conduct, by which they evidently wished to throw the responsibility of that measure upon General *Goddard*. It appears that they were not well pleased with the powers and rank granted by the Governor General and Council to him, considering them as infringements of the rights immediately inherent in themselves; that they also disapproved of the instructions given him for the line of his military operations, and especially of the rendezvous at *Surat*, as an ill-judged measure for the professed purpose of the defence of *Bombay* against a French invasion, of which however they did not seem very apprehensive. But it is proper to remark, that notwithstanding such symptoms of dissatisfaction in these particulars, they determined, first making due reservation of their rights, not to oppose the execution of those orders, but on the contrary to unite with the General with the same confidence and cordiality as before, in promoting the success of whatever measures circumstances might render it necessary to adopt; adding, that they would hold their quota of forces in readiness to join the army upon the earliest occasion or demand; and that they had dispatched vessels to *Mahé*, to bring up the reinforcement of troops and stores from that quarter also; having only further requested him to proceed to *Bombay*, to concert with them on the final measures proper to be resolved upon in case of war.

See Appx. 206.

See letter from Bombay to Gen. Goddard, dated 17 Sept. 1779, and General's answer, dated 29 Sept. 1779. See also letter from Bombay to Bengal, dated 6 Sept. Appx. No. 221.

In regard to the sentiments and proceedings of the Presidency of *Fort Saint George* on these matters, your Committee have already laid before the House, a letter from the Governor and Select Committee, in which they made a full communication to the Superior Council of their political state, and the state of their finances; and we have also shewn the requisition made upon them by the Superior Board, on the motion of the Commander in Chief for a reinforcement of troops to be sent from their establishment in addition to the detachments on service at *Mahé*, to strengthen General *Goddard*'s army. But indeed the circumstances relative to these points have been so fully expatiated upon in our former reports, that your Committee hold it more than useless to add any thing to a reference, which we make to them, except by a few necessary observations. It will be remembered that the Government of *Madras* agreed to the transportation of the detachment under Colonel *Braithwaite* at *Mahé*, to join General *Goddard* at *Surat*, but they apprehended, that their situation would not admit of affording any further assistance. It will not be forgotten

N. B. Letter from Fort St. George to Gen. Oct. 30, 1779, and Do. dated 10 Nov. Appx. No. 222.

See letter to Gen. Goddard, 16 Aug. before referred to. *See Appx. No. 215.*

gotten, what ſuſpicions they expreſſed of the purpoſe for which theſe reinforcements were demanded, while the apprehenſions of a French invaſion were the only oſtenſible motives, and how ſtrongly they enforced their earneſt wiſh to contribute any thing in their power to bring about an accommodation with the Marattas, as one of the ſureſt means to prevent the execution of *Hyder Ally*'s hoſtile deſigns againſt the *Carnatic*, and that they generally accompanied theſe repreſentations with a repetition of their diſtreſs for want of money to anſwer the extraordinary demands of their Government. The Houſe will alſo recollect the degree of concern which the Bengal Council expreſſed at the diſappointment of not being furniſhed with the whole of the military aſſiſtance they had required from them, and alſo the complaints which they urged in very ſtrong terms againſt the gentlemen of *Fort Saint George*, for detaining the recruits from *Europe*, the loſs of which they ſaid they had ſenſibly felt, and would continue to do ſo, for the ſupport of their part in the war with *France* and the Maratta State, which they now regarded as inevitable.

Letter from Bengal to Madras, 29 Nov. 1779. No. 222.

The negociations with *Moodajee Booſla* had been now for ſome time diſcontinued; and your Committee have referred the Houſe to the letters from the Governor General to that Chief, wherein he expreſsly declared, that he relinquiſhed all future thoughts of accompliſhing a treaty with him, retaining ſtill a laſting remembrance of his kindneſs. And it appears, that on this ſubject General *Goddard* wrote as follows on the 12th of September: "The anſwers I have received to all my letters "written to *Moodajee Booſla* ſince my arrival at *Surat*, "and particularly to one, informing him of the com- "miſſion you had been pleaſed to entruſt me with at the "Court of *Poonah*, as they contain nothing but general "expreſſions of friendſhip, and earneſt wiſhes for an "accompliſhment of a peace with the Marattas, ſeem "to warrant my conſidering the negociation at *Naigpore* "ſuſpended, until ſuch time as you ſhall honour me "with your inſtructions for its revival."

It is very evident, that *Moodajee*'s politics were much influenced by the misfortune which had attended the efforts of the Bombay Government againſt the Marattas, whoſe power and atchievements he thereupon repreſented in very elevated terms, in a letter to the Governor General; and he added the following obſervation, on the propoſed union between him and the Bengal Government:

Sec. Perf. Corr. No. 88, 1779. Appx. No. 223.

"Yet notwithſtanding all this, the Engliſh propoſe, "without having made preparations, or collected the "neceſſaries of war, to overcome them by a trifling "effort, and to reduce them to obedience. This is "really ſurpriſing. You write me, that one line was "ſufficient to have given an anſwer to the propoſed "deſigns, and that there was no neceſſity to have written "voluminouſly; that is to ſay, 'your forces are ar- "rived at *Huſſingabad*; my troops ſhall join them, and "ſhall ſettle the buſineſs.' This cauſes me real ſur- "priſe, and the end of it would have proved a parallel "to that of the plan of the Engliſh at *Bombay*. To "oppoſe a mountain, a mountain is requiſite. What "effect would be produced by throwing pebbles at it? "By the bleſſing of God, you are known to have "great experience in buſineſs. Regard what I have "above written, as dictated ſolely by warm friend- "ſhip; and on conſidering maturely, you will approve "thereof."

Ben. Perf. Corr. No. 69, 7 July 1779.—No. 88. Letter from Moodajee Booſla, received 5 Oct. 1779. Appx. No. 223.

See letter No. 88, received 31 Oct. 1779. Letter from Dewagur Pundit to Ram Bhadra Pundit. No. 223.

And your Committee obſerve, that the Rajah had, during theſe tranſactions, repeated his recommendation of an agreement with the Marattas, and offered his mediation and guarantee. It is alſo to be obſerved, that he had ſent his own Dewan, *Dewagur Pundit*, in embaſſy to *Poonah*, at the deſire indeed (as he informed the Governor General) of the Miniſters, and that he had been there received with marks of great diſtinction. And we gain from *Dewagur*'s own account to the Berar vackeel at *Surat*, the following information of his proceedings:

"It having been judged adviſable that I ſhould come to "*Poonah*, I have had ſeveral interviews with *Row* "*Pundit Purdhaun* and *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, and long "converſations with them on the ſubject of the Engliſh "Chiefs. *Nanna* is ſteadily fixed in friendſhip to- "wards the Engliſh, and I have therefore written to Co- "lonel *Goddard*, very fully, my ſentiments on what is "moſt adviſable and conſiſtent with the ties of friend- "ſhip. As I have the moſt warm and hearty friendſhip "for the Engliſh Chiefs, I have expreſſed my ſenti- "ments with that warmth and zeal which my regard to "them dictated, which you will further explain. It "is highly proper that Mr. *Weatherſtone* ſhould repair "to *Poonah*; this you will declare. I have diſpatched a "pair of Sirkar Coſſids to you, to obtain anſwers from "General *Goddard* and Mr. *Weatherſtone* as ſoon as "poſſible, and forward them hither. They are earneſtly "expected."

It is however to be obſerved, that your Committee have found a different repreſentation of his real views in the conferences he held at that time with *Nanna Furneſe*, over whom he ſeemed to have much influence. "The Engliſh nation (he was reported to have ſaid) is "a thorn in our ſide, which it is neceſſary to get rid of." *Nanna* replied, "I am not inattentive thereto, and ſhall "leave no means untried for that purpoſe." It was moreover remarked that *Moodajee Booſla* had a vackeel with *Pateel Sahib* *, with whom he kept up a conſtant correſpondence. And it appears by a letter from *Dewagur Pundit* to the Governor General, that he repreſented, in rather a pointed ſtile, the infringements of treaty of which the Government of *Bombay* were accuſed by *Nanna Furneſe*, whom he at the ſame time extolled as a pattern of wiſdom and ſincerity; and he concluded his letter in theſe words: "Notwithſtanding their† repeated "breaches of treaty, I am ready to accommodate mat- "ters through General *Goddard*, and will never, as long "as attention is ſhewn to the honour and dignity of this "family, relinquiſh my hold of their friendſhip. From "all that I have heard from the Poonah Miniſters, it "appears they are inclined to peace. It is therefore in- "cumbent on you to accommodate matters in an ami- "cable manner."

No. 91. See Perf. Corr. Letter from Lalla Fakir Doſs, received 22 Oct. 1779. Appx. No. 224.

* Madajee Scindia.

No. 93, received 31 Oct. 1779. Appx. No. 225.

(† Government of Bombay.)

He appears to have written in much the ſame ſtile to General *Goddard*, declaring that his coming to *Poonah* was ſolely from friendſhip to the Nabob ‡ *Amaud ul Dowlah*, and regard for the General, and to remove all miſunderſtandings; but offered his excuſes for not waiting at *Poonah* till the accompliſhment of the pacification, as he was obliged to ſet off to *Naigpore* for the obſervance of the Duſſarah ‖.

No. 98. N. B. dated Nov. Appx. No. 226.

‡ Gov. Haſtings.

‖ Religious ceremonies in the month of Oct.

Your Committee will here take notice of the ſentiments of the Court of Directors on the ſubject of an alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, expreſſed in their letter of 14th of May, to the Governor General and Council. "At preſent we ſhall only remark, that the undertaking "appears to us contrary to the Company's former policy "to our engagements with *Ragoba* and *Nizam Ally*, "and doubtful reſpecting any reaſonable proſpect of "advantage to ariſe therefrom." And in a letter on the ſame ſubject, dated 27th of May 1779, to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, having then heard of Mr *Elliot*'s death, and that no other perſon was to be immediately appointed to ſucceed him; and having been alſo informed of the intended expedition to *Poonah*, in favour of *Ragoba*, they obſerved, "We "earneſtly hope, that upon your negociation and treaty "with *Ragoba* being communicated to our Governor "General and Council, they would concur with you "in giving full effect thereto, and deſiſt from entering "into any new connections which may ſet aſide or "counteract your recent agreements with *Ragoba*." It has already been ſhewn what opinion the Court delivered at a ſubſequent period, upon the failure in the execution of that plan.

Appx. No. 227. General letter from Court of Directors, 14 May 1779.

Appx. No. 228.

The connection of the Nizam with the miniſterial

party at *Poonah*, and tokens of his preſent animoſity againſt *Ragoba*, have been frequently noticed in this and our former Reports. The Nabob of *Arcot* in particular, in his advice of accommodation with the Marattas, has been found frequently to have given intimations of that connection; and that any marks of ſupport ſhewn to *Ragonaut Row*, would increaſe the *Soubah*'s diſinclination to the Engliſh. It appears alſo, that *Moodajee Boofla* ſuggeſted apprehenſions of the ſame nature, by apprizing the Governor General, "that the Nabob Nizam, and "others alſo, who were all alarmed at the incroach- "ments of the Engliſh into the Decan, were waiting a "favourable opportunity to repel them." And we have ſeen, in the letter from the Nizam himſelf to *Nanna Furneſe*, the moſt explicit declaration of theſe facts; "I have therefore determined, as ſoon as the rains are at "an end, I will ſend a diſtinguiſhing Chief, with a re- "ſolute army and good train of artillery; or, if I find "it poſſible, I will repair in perſon to you, and rouze "that bad race from the dream of ſecurity, and over- "throw all their ambitious deſigns. You will therefore "depend on my friendſhip for *Pundit Purdhaun*, which "is univerſally known." But of the Nizam's diſpoſition in theſe reſpects, there can be no ſtronger evidence than what your Committee find in his letter to the Governor General, written during General *Goddard*'s negociations with the Poonah Miniſtry. In this he upbraids the Engliſh with breach of treaty and good faith to him, by ſupporting *Ragonaut Row*, who was known to be his enemy: that he had nevertheleſs, truſting to their declarations, withheld his aſſiſtance from *Row Pundit Purdhaun* againſt all ſolicitation, though bound by the laws of friendſhip to have afforded it to him: that he had effected the diſmiſſion of the French ambaſſador from *Poonah*, nor would give any countenance to the advances they had likewiſe made to himſelf: but he now found that new deſigns were formed for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, and that General *Goddard* was come to *Surat* from *Calcutta*, and joined with the Bombayer in the ſame plan.—To theſe complaints he added others, relative to the conduct of the Madras Government towards him in regard to the Peſcuſh; and on that head he uſed theſe expreſſions: "I have anſwered Mr. *Hollond*, that ſuch "propoſitions are inconteſtable proofs of a hoſtile diſ- "poſition; that if it is determined to break the treaty, "it matters not to me; I am prepared for all events that "may happen, and thank God that the breach of treaty "falls on them." The moſt material points indeed relative to this part of the ſubject, having been fully made known in our former Reports, need not here be repeated; and are only alluded to with a view of reminding the Houſe that there exiſted at the ſame time ſeveral conjunctive cauſes of the Nizam's diſſatisfaction with the Engliſh.

Of *Hyder Ally* and his hoſtile deſigns againſt the Company's poſſeſſions at this time, your Committee have already reported ſufficient proofs. But we have alſo diſcovered, that during theſe negociations under the management of General *Goddard*, the Nabob of *Arcot* communicated the following information relative to his further projects: "I have received certain advice, that "*Hyder Ally Khan* has ſent an agent to *Poonah* to ſolicit "the Maratta friendſhip, who preſſes the Poonah Mi- "niſters to keep up their enmity to the Engliſh, and "proffers his maſter's zealous aſſiſtance, and offers the "payment of forty lacks of rupees, to ſettle his former "accounts, and an annual peſhicuſh of eleven lacks of "rupees, and to reſtore the country on the other ſide "of the *Barmadder*, which he wreſted from them. "The Marattas have not yet agreed to the terms, nor "have they refuſed. They wait, meaning, if a firm "peace is concluded with the Engliſh, in conjunction "with them, to chaſtiſe the ſaid *Khan*; or, if the En- "gliſh ſhould not chuſe to enter into that ſcheme, to exe- "cute it in conjunction with *Nizam ul Dowlah*; but, if peace ſhould not take place, then they will, through "neceſſity, agree to the terms propoſed by *Hyder* "*Ally*."

Your Committee have alſo found, that reports of this nature had reached General *Goddard* from *Poonah*, and that he communicated them, as in his opinion authentic, in a letter dated 30th September, to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*. It does not appear that he at the ſame time gave intimation of them to the Superior Council. "The particulars of it are, that the Mini- "ſters and *Scindia*, in conjunction with *Hyder*, *Nizam* "*Ally*, and *Moodajee Boofla*, mean to make a general "attack upon the Engliſh at their ſeveral ſettlements, "and have entered into and ſealed written agreements "for that purpoſe." The *Bombay* Committee ſeem to have given little credit to the account of this combination, and regarded it as an artifice of Maratta politics. It is obſervable, that no mention is made of the French in this confederacy; yet we have remarked, that the deſign of a coalition of all theſe Powers againſt the Engliſh, was the object of the French intrigues at the end of the year 1777. The Nabob of *Arcot*, in a letter to the Governor General, obſerved, "that the French "had vackeels with the Nizam and with *Hyder*, as well "as with the Marattas, and by means of their con- "nection with theſe ſeveral Powers, were employing "every act to bring them into an entire compliance "with their views." And it may be proper to add upon this ſubject, a further remark; that ſuch an union was diſcovered in the end of the year 1778, to be among the projects of Mr. *Bolts*, the Auſtrian agent; and that in a letter to *St. Lubin*, he ſtrongly recommended to him to preſs *Nanna Furneſe* on that head, promiſing himſelf to effect it with the utmoſt ſecrecy. And it appears that Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn* took ſo much notice of it at the time, as to warn the Select Committee of *Bombay* againſt receiving ſo dangerous a perſon within that Preſidency.

With reſpect to the other Powers neighbouring on *Bengal*, not hitherto engaged in the great ſcene of the war, but liable to be affected by predatory conflicts with the Marattas on the frontiers, your Committee have intimated the ſuſpicions entertained of *Nudjif Cawn*, and we may add, that ſome doubts appear to have been conceived about the King.

It has been ſeen, that the Government of *Bengal* had, in the year 1778, obliged the Rajah *Cheit Sing* to contribute a ſubſidy of five lacks of rupees towards the expences of the war; and your Committee find, that the ſame demand being made upon him for the preſent year, he had repeatedly urged, in hopes of being exempted from that payment, a plea of inability; which the Governor General, in his letter to him, dated the 25th of September, treated as futile, and threatened, in caſe of further refuſal, to force him to compliance, by ſummoning two battalions of ſepoys to *Benares*. And it appears that this menace had its effect, and produced the reluctant diſcharge of that incumbrance.

But your Committee find, that a difficulty of this kind aroſe in an adjoining quarter, of more material conſequence, and not ſo eaſily to be accommodated. Mr. *Purling*, in a letter from *Lucknow*, dated the 19th November 1779, informed the Board, that the Vizier had abſolutely refuſed, upon a plea of inability, to grant any tunkars for the ſufficient ſupplies of the preſent year; and notwithſtanding every repreſentation to him, perſiſted in the refuſal, and in his intention of diſmiſſing part of the troops under Britiſh officers, attributing the failure of his revenues to the drought which had deſtroyed the harveſt of his country, and which Mr. *Purling* acknowledged to have been very fatal:—"While he had the "means (he ſaid) of providing for the demands of the "Company, he had never refuſed it, and he did not "believe the Council meant to ſeize the expences of his "table and houſehold, which was all that was now left "him."—The whole amount, as it appears, required for the expences of the year, were, rupees 1,36,12,188.12.

and

See No. 85, Appx. No. 229.

No. 88, written in July, received October 1779. Appx. No. 223. Appx. No. 213.

No. 102, received 3d Dec. 1779. Appx. No. 230.

See Perſ. Corr. No. 85, received 21 Sept. 1779. Appx. No. 231.

Appx. No. 232.

No. 2324

Sec. Perſ. Corr. 1777, received 17 Oct. No. 187, with Inclaſures. Appx. No. 233.

See the Poonah Diary, No. 130.

See intercepted Letters 1778, No. 6, 7.—Ben. Sec. Perſ. Corr. 1779, No. 59. Appx. No. 234.

Appx. No. 235. No. 27, 25 Sept. 1779

Ben. Pub. Perſ. Corr. received 23 Sept. and 19 Dec. 1779. No. 124 and 134. No. 235.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 9 Dec. 1779. Appx. No. 236, No. 238.

and the amount granted rupees 68,82,000. And Mr. *Purling* ſtrongly repreſented the neceſſity of ſome immediate directions, "as upon the preſent principle, "no bill from the Preſidency could poſſibly be anſwered; "ſince the demands on the treaſury upon the preſent "eſtabliſhment exceeded the expected incom, and the "laſt drafts of the Board, and their order for the pay- "ment of two lacks and a half to Captain *Popham*, "which had been complied with, had ſo effectually "drained the treaſury, that he had not been able to pay "the firſt brigade for October;" and upon the eſtimate of the preſent year, there was a great exceſs on that of the laſt for the payment of troops. The Vizier, in his letter upon this ſubject to the Governor General, appears to have complained heavily of harſh treatment in the mode of negociating with him, and earneſtly ſolicited to have the particular directions of the Government thereupon. And we obſerve, that the Governor General, in his anſwer to him, remonſtrated with him on the ill conſequences of his behaviour, concluding with the following peremptory warning: "At all events, the de- "fence of your country is the firſt object to be attended "to, and the regular payment of a well-diſciplined body "of troops is indiſpenſably neceſſary for this end: add "to this, that your engagements with the Company "are of ſuch a nature, as to oblige me to require and "inſiſt on your granting tuncars for the full amount of "their demands upon you for the current year, and on "your reſerving funds ſufficient to anſwer them, even "ſhould the deficiency of your revenues compel you to "leave your own troops unprovided for, or to diſband a "part of them to enable you to effect it."

No. 236.

No. 35, dated 25 Dec. 1779. No. 230.

Your Committee think it proper however to add to this, an obſervation of Sir *Eyre Coote*, who was at this time viſiting the military ſtations in thoſe parts. After mentioning an interchange of viſits between him and the Vizier, and the profeſſions of his attachment to the Engliſh, he adds, "It is to be wiſhed we had employed the in- "fluence which ſuch favourable ſentiments muſt have "given us, more to the benefit of the country and our- "ſelves. But I fear the diſtreſſes which evidently ap- "pear on the face of the one, and the failure of revenues "to the other, are not to be wholly aſcribed to the "Vizier's miſmanagement."

Appx. No. 237. Dated Camp, near Allahabad, 21 Dec. 1779.

It is proper that your Committee ſhould take notice in this place of a negociation (the object of it being pointed particularly againſt the Marattas) between the Government of *Bengal* and the Ranna of *Gohud*, which appears to have been propoſed by the Governor General on the 12th of November, when he laid before the Board an account of the overtures made by the Ranna, and the draft of a treaty of alliance, offenſive and defenſive, which he had arranged in conformity to them. The further conſideration of this affair was however deferred till the 2d of December, when the Governor General preſented an amended draft of the treaty; which your Committee find to have been agreed to by the majority of the Board, after much diſcuſſion, and ſeveral Minutes of oppoſition, and others in ſupport of it, which are placed together in the Appendix, No. 239, and wherein it will be ſeen, that many remarks were made upon the inſignificance and obſcurity of the Chief, with whom the Company's Government were to enter into alliance for a ſcheme of conqueſt beyond the Jumna, thereby tranſgreſſing the line of preſcribed policy;—that theſe motives and reflections were on the other hand contradicted, and it was aſſerted that the treaty ſecured the ſupport and aſſiſtance of a powerful Prince, whoſe dominions adjoined to their frontiers, and lay in one of the principal roads through which the Marattas muſt paſs to invade them; and that the objects propoſed by the alliance were ſuch as were moſt likely to weaken the Maratta State, by depriving it of its reſources, and dividing its attention; for which purpoſe, however, Mr. *Francis* thought, that an offenſive union with *Hyder Ally*, or the Nizam, or even with the Rajah of *Berar*, if he could be ſeparated from his countrymen, might, on the principles of the preſent war, be of more importance to its ſucceſs.—Your Committee, in order to place in one view all the opinions delivered on this treaty, have ſubjoined to the Minutes of the Members who were preſent on this occaſion, the proteſt of Sir *Eyre Coote*, which he afterwards tranſmitted to the Board, and we have added the anſwer returned by them to him on the irregularity of his remonſtrance. And it appears to have been further reſolved on, a ſubſequent day, after much difference of opinion, that a perſon ſhould be deputed, on the part of the Bengal Government, to the Ranna of *Gohud*, for the purpoſe of ſeeing the treaty executed, and for exchanging the ratifications. And we obſerve, that Captain *Palmer*, Military Secretary to the Governor General, was afterwards appointed to that deputation, and permitted to draw the ſame allowance as Mr. *Elliot* had on his embaſſy to *Berar*.

No. 68, received 7 June 1779.—No. 39, written 5 July 1779. No. 86, 87, received 23 Sept. 1779. Ben. Sec. Conſ. Nov. 12, 1779. Appx. No. 238.

Appx. No. 239. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 2 Dec. 1779.

See Ben. Sec. Conſ. Feb. 14 and 17, 1780. No. 239. Sec. Conſ. 5 Dec. 1779. Appx. No. 240. Do. 9 and 23 Dec. No. 240.

Your Committee have indeed obſerved, that theſe applications on the part of the Ranna, ſubmitted to the Board by the Governor General, were not the firſt he had received from him. In the beginning of the year 1776, the fears of the Ranna for the probable attacks of the Marattas, occaſioned a requeſt from him, that he might be ſupported with an army, for which he was ready to agree to ſuch terms as ſhould be intimated to him. He had ſome time before received a royal firmaund, and alſo a ſunnud from the Vizier of the empire, for the poſſeſſion of the fort of *Gualier*.

No. 65. Sec. Perf. Corr. 1776. Appx. No. 241.

The Governor General informed him, that it was not at that time in his power to grant him any aſſiſtance, but recommended him to cultivate the friendſhip of the Vizier. The Ranna's vackeel remained at *Calcutta*, and theſe ſolicitations appear to have been afterwards frequently repeated. Colonel *Goddard*, we have ſeen, pointed out the advantages of an alliance with him; and we perceive, that in the beginning of the year 1779, the Ranna wrote to *Mobareck ul Dowla*, the Subadar of *Bengal*, and deſired his interceſſion in his favour, acquainting him, that the Governor General had promiſed him aſſiſtance whenever he ſhould require it.

No. 57, dated 16 May 1776. Appx. No. 242.

Immediately after the reſolution of the Board, by which the propoſed treaty was aſſented to, and while the arrangement of ſeveral collateral points was yet incomplete, the Governor General laid before the Board intelligence conveyed in a letter from Sir *Eyre Coote*, dated 20th November, of an irruption into the territories of *Gohud* by a party of Marattas, who had taken one fort, and were likely to poſſeſs themſelves of the whole country, as the Ranna's troops were few, diſpirited, and mutinous for want of pay: that the Governor General thereupon remarking that this was probably the prelude of a general plan of attack on the Company's poſſeſſions, of which he had lately received good information, propoſed to tranſmit immediately a copy of the treaty to the Commander in Chief, with inſtructions to comply with any immediate requiſitions which the Ranna might make for a detachment of the Company's forces, proportioned to the exigency of the ſervice required by it, of which he would be the judge.

6 Dec. 1779. Appx. No. 243.

This motion alſo met with the like oppoſition, but was carried by the ſame majority, and a letter was in conſequence of it, diſpatched to Sir *Eyre Coote*; who, however, before he could have received it, had written to inform the Board, that Captain *Popham*'s detachment was ready, and would be joined by the reſt of the Vizier's Candahar horſe, which he had, on the application of the Governor General to him, very readily conſented to lend; and that final orders reſpecting their movement were then waited for. But we perceive that Sir *Eyre Coote* at the ſame time expreſſed a wiſh to receive previous advices from General *Goddard*, as at that late ſeaſon, and when the deſign was now too well known, it might be neceſſary to advance great part of the troops

See Letter to Sir Eyre Coote in conſequence. No. 243. See General Letter, 14 Jan. 1780. Appx. No. 244. Letter, Camp at Poppa Maw, near Allahabad, dated 11 Dec. 1779. No. 244.

from

from the camp on the *Jumna*, to ſecure the junction, they meditated with him; and upon this ſubject he concluded in theſe words:

Sec. Conf. Dec. 23d 1779. Appx. No. 245.

" Indeed, if war is to be continued with the Ma-
" rattas, other and more conſequential ſteps muſt be
" taken, than merely the ſupplying General *Goddard*'s
" army from hence, and I ſhould hope the Gentlemen
" of Madras have taken into conſideration, before this
" time, the letter we addreſſed to them on that ſubject."

Your Committee find, that on the day on which this letter was read by the Calcutta Board, accounts were brought from *Europe*, by way of the Porte, of a rupture with *Spain*; and what was perhaps more intereſting to them, intelligence from Colonel *Goddard*, that the Maratta agent having " in plain and direct terms de-
" clared, in the name of his maſter, that he would not
" accede to the propoſals made to him, or conclude a
" peace with the Engliſh, unleſs *Ragonaut Row* was de-
" livered up to him, and *Salſette* reſtored to the Ma-
" ratta Government;" he had broken off the negociation, as not being able, conſiſtently with his inſtructions, to agree to either of thoſe points; and that he ſhould ſet out immediately for *Bombay*, in order to concert with the Committee a plan of future operations. He alſo obſerved to the Board, that finding *Madajee Scindia* to be the moſt hoſtile of any of the Maratta Chiefs, he thought it a very unfavourable moment to addreſs any overtures to him, and ſhould therefore defer it till he received further inſtructions on that head. It appears, that the Board immediately ordered a copy of General *Goddard*'s diſpatches to be ſent to the Commander in Chief; and with reſpect to the expediency of ſending Captain *Popham*'s detachment to reinforce the army on the Malabar coaſt, they deſired him to give ſuch orders for its march or detention, as he might judge neceſſary.

See this Letter in the Appx. No. 246. See Ben. Sec. Conf. 17 Jan. 1780. Appx. No. 247.

On the 14th January, a general letter was ſigned and diſpatched to the Court of Directors; but your Committee obſerve, that previouſly to an agreement on the draft of it, ſome diſſentient minutes paſſed between the Members of the Board on certain articles of information which ſhould be inſerted in it, and particularly, that the Governor General differed with Mr. *Francis* on the propriety of acquainting the Court with the intelligence received of *Hyder*'s accommodation with the Marattas; to which Mr. *Francis* gave credit, and the Governor General did not ſeem to deny, though " he was con-
" vinced from the whole tenor of *Hyder Ally*'s conduct
" and diſpoſition, that he would never moleſt the Eng-
" liſh, while they endeavoured to preſerve a good un-
" derſtanding with him."

Appx. No. 248.

The intelligence indeed, which appears to have been at this time tranſmitted from the Decan, and laid before the Board by Mr. *Francis*, was particular, not only in this reſpect, but in regard to the motions of other country Powers, and eſpecially of *Moodajee Boofla*, whoſe Dewan, *Dewagur Pundit*, was reported to have made an engagement with *Nanna*, before his departure from *Poonah*, that in ſix weeks he would march towards *Bengal*, and lay waſte the whole country. And it is obſervable, that the cauſe herein aſſigned for the unſucceſsful concluſion of the negociation between General *Goddard* and the Poonah Durbar was on account of a demand of money, which the General was ſaid to have inſiſted upon as an indiſpenſable preliminary to the treaty. And we find, that the Governor General and Council imparted to General *Goddard* the circumſtance of this pretended charge, deſiring his anſwer to it, which he returned with an abſolute and indignant denial of the fact.

See Letter to General Goddard, 24 January 1780, and his anſwer to this point, on Conſultations 25 July 1780. Appx. No. 249. Letter from him, Jan. 6th 1780. Appx. No. 250. A.

Your Committee find, that Sir *Eyre Coote* took no immediate ſtep in regard to Captain *Popham*'s detachment, upon receipt of the letter 23d of December, from the Governor General and Council, which incloſed a copy of General *Goddard*'s diſpatch, but complained of the impoſſibility of making any attempt for want of information reſpecting the reſolutions of the Board in conſequence of the tranſactions with the Marattas, and the recommencement of hoſtilities. He incloſed a paper, intituled, " Strength of the Army under Brigadier General
" *Goddard*," upon a ſuppoſition that the detachment from *Mahé* had joined him. It appears, however, that the junction of that corps had not taken place, of which the Board informed the Commander in Chief in their anſwer to his letter on the 24th January; at the ſame time conveying their opinion, that the ſeaſon was too far advanced to make the march of Captain *Popham*'s detachment to the other ſide of *India* an adviſable meaſure, though the corps might be kept embodied, and perhaps be advantageouſly employed on the weſtern frontier of the Vizier's dominions, either to repel an invaſion from the Marattas, if they ſhould attempt it in that quarter, or to proceed againſt them on the weſtern ſide of the *Jumna*.

Appx. No. 251. A.

Appx. No. 252. A.

In regard to the proceedings of General *Goddard* and the Select Committee of *Bombay*, after the abrupt termination of the conference with the Maratta agents till the General's return to *Surat* in the beginning of December, your Committee have found, that the Select Board very readily furniſhed the reinforcements which they could prudently ſuffer to quit the iſland, though not in number equal to the proportion directed by the Superior Council. They conſiſted of 200 European infantry (including two grenadier companies), 100 artillery, one battalion of ſepoys, and eight companies of grenadier ſepoys, ſelected from the different battalions, to be increaſed to ten companies when the opportunity ſhould permit; a force with which the General ſeems to have been well ſatisfied, and to have eſteemed ſufficient for the firſt plan of conqueſt, even without the aſſiſtance of the Madras troops, either from *Mahé* or the Preſidency, of whoſe arrival he had not any early expectations. The ſeveral propoſals, with the reaſonings upon them, which paſſed between the General and the Committee on this occaſion, for the arrangement of their whole ſcheme of proceedings, are put together in the Appendix, No. 253, to which your Committee deſire to direct the attention of the Houſe. It will therein be found, that the Committee was at firſt reluctant to ſtep forward into active operations, from an apprehenſion of their inability to raiſe a fund adequate to the expences of a war; and it will be ſeen by what arguments the General endeavoured to overcome their backwardneſs and alarms, till it was agreed to make it the firſt object of action to ſecure an immediate territorial revenue, both to reimburſe them for paſt expences, and to ſupport the future exigencies of the ſervice, as well as to eſtabliſh a certain fund of ſolid and ſubſtantial benefit to the Company hereafter. The mode of proceeding upon theſe deſigns being reſolved on, they furniſhed him with powers and inſtructions to treat with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, on which buſineſs he meant immediately to enter; foreſeeing however the neceſſity of much art and addreſs to compaſs the acquieſcence of *Ragoba* in the line marked out for him on a diviſion of the ſpoils, and placing, in the meanwhile, a confident reliance on the ſupport of the Superior Government, till by ſucceſs they could acquire the means within their own reach of command. *Ragoba* had already applied to General *Goddard* for an increaſe of his monthly ſtipend, which was not granted to him; but it appeared to be of ſo much importance to have him dependant on the Company, that the General thought it proper to feed him with a proſpect of future favour and aſſiſtance, eſpecially as *Hyder Ally* had lately made ſome ſecret overtures to him, notwithſtanding the new connection he was himſelf believed to have formed with the miniſterial party, and which the General however ſuſpected to be deceitful.

Bombay Sel. Conf. Appx. No. 253. A.

General Goddard's Letters to Sel. Com. 3 and 15th Nov. —Committee's Letter of 2d Dec.—See Ben. Sec. Conf. 24 Feb. 1782.

On the 2d of January, General *Goddard* addreſſed a letter to the Governor General and Council from the North Banks of the *Tappee*, which he had that day been induced to croſs with a view of ſtimulating the reſolu-

Appx. No. 254. A.

tions

tions of *Futty Sing* to an acceptance of the terms of alliance proffered him, for which he had before been rather backward in ſhewing a due acknowledgment. At the ſame time, the deſigns of reducing the fortreſs of *Dubhoy*, which was within twelve or thirteen coſs of *Brodera*, furniſhed a good reaſon to ſatisfy *Futty Sing* on account of that advance.

This was the only principal diſtrict South of the *Mahé*, belonging to the Poonah Government, which was not already taken poſſeſſion of in the name of the *Eaſt India* Company, and delivered over to the Chiefs of the *Surat* or *Broach* to be collected. The difficulty of humbling the lofty ideas which *Ragoba* had entertained from the entrance upon active operations, and of quieting his ſolicitations for money, or for a ceſſion of ſome of the conquered diſtricts, made the General very anxious for inſtructions how far it was the intention of the Superior Council, in any event, to aſſiſt his fortune or claim of power, and what degree of ſupport ſhould in the mean time be given to him and his troops. And the diſtreſs for caſh to pay his own forces, made him alſo very ſolicitous for an effectual mode of ſpeedy and regular ſupply. No reinforcement from *Madras* or *Mahé* had joined the army; and indeed there was no proſpect of early aſſiſtance from the detachment under Colonel *Braithwaite*, which he had been obliged to re-land at *Tellicherry*, for the ſafeguard of that ſettlement.

See the Firſt Report.

Letter from Fort St. George to Bengal, 31 Dec. 1779. See Ben. Sec. Conſ. 14 Feb. 1780. Appx. No. 255. A.

It will, however, be remembered, that much has before been reported by your Committee of the military aſſiſtance given by the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* to ſtrengthen Colonel *Goddard*'s army; and that when the accounts reached them of the detention of the troops at *Tellicherry*, they came to a reſolution of ſending at all events a reſpectable reinforcement; and therefore, in the cloſe of the year 1779, they ordered a complete battalion of Europeans, a company of artillery, and a battalion of ſepoys, to be embarked and to ſail immediately for *Surat*, and held another battalion of ſepoys in readineſs to the Southward to embark from *Anjengo*; declaring at the ſame time, that by this exertion they reduced themſelves to the neceſſity of a mere defence in caſe of a powerful invaſion of the *Carnatic*.

The Bombay Government, it has been obſerved, had promiſed a zealous ſupport in the vigorous proſecution of the war, but they could ſupply nothing towards the expences, and diſclaimed all ſhare in the reſponſibility of it.—In their letter, dated 2d of January 1780, to the Governor General and Council, which we have placed in the Appendix, No. 256, will be found a ſtriking picture of their zeal and their poverty.

Appx. No. 256. A.

The letter which they diſpatched on the 31ſt of December preceding, to the Select Committee of the Court of Directors, contains a ſhort ſtate of proceedings; on which, however, they obſerve, that "to give an idea of "their political ſituation with reſpect to the Marattas, "they muſt principally take their accounts from General "*Goddard*'s letters, as no degree of agency being left "to them, they could give no direct account from "themſelves." And upon the agreed plan of operations, they further remark, that, having diſclaimed all further reſponſibility, "what they might have to offer "to General *Goddard* in the courſe of the ſervice, could "only amount to advice or recommendation; neither "were they warranted by the Governor General and "Council to give him direct orders for his conduct."

See this Letter in the Appx. Appx. No. 257. A.

In regard indeed to the expences of the war, it has clearly appeared from the avowed ſtate of the treaſuries under the other Preſidencies, that they were to fall altogether upon the Superior Government, and were likely to prove a heavy drain upon that treaſury alſo. In the general letter from the Governor General and Council to the Court of Directors, the 14th January 1780, they ſtated the ſums which General *Goddard* had drawn for ſince his arrival at *Surat*, beſides what they had remitted in bullion; which mode of ſupply they intended for the future to purſue, on account of the diſadvantage ſuffered by the Company in the low rate of exchange.

Appx. No. 252. A.

And your Committee find, that the Governor General and Council very openly took upon themſelves the reſponſibility of the war, ſince the recommencement of it by the breaking off the conferences at *Surat*; and in their directions to General *Goddard*, of 24th January, very directly avowed, that they conſidered *Ragenaut Row* himſelf as a mere inſtrument, whom alſo they could not ſuffer to become a chargeable one. On this ſubject having remarked, that they had found no probability of acceſſion of force or influence from him, they clearly declared the motives and rules of their conduct as follows: "We are determined to ſtand forth as the prin-"cipals in the war, and to maintain that character "through the whole courſe of it; as the miniſters, by "rejecting the terms of accommodation which we pro-"poſed to them, have in effect made us ſo. For this "reaſon we think it neceſſary further to direct, that "you do not ſuffer *Ragoba* to become of too much "importance in your preſent operations, and to caution "you againſt entering into any ſpecific engagements "which may entitle him to a participation in your "ſucceſs, unleſs he is able, contrary to our expectations, "to afford you ſuch effectual and actual ſupport, as ſhall "juſtify his admiſſion to ſuch benefits." And it appears that they communicated the ſame ſentiments and reſolutions to the Court of Directors in their Secret Letter of 3d March, in which they alſo gave ſome account of the ſtate of the war.

Appx. No. 250. E.

Your Committee do not find at this period, that the effects of the ſuppoſed combination between the Marattas and the great Country Powers, had began to appear by any open act of hoſtility againſt the Company's poſſeſſions, though indiſputable proofs of its exiſtence had been tranſmitted to the Superior Council from various quarters, and eſpecially in letters from the Nizam, from *Moodajee Boeſla*, and his Miniſter. It is obſervable that each of theſe Chiefs endeavoured to convince the Governor General, that the other was the firſt inſtigator of this confederacy; which however both of them avowed, though they accompanied that intimation with profeſſions of friendſhip to the Engliſh, and of their deſire for a general pacification. It appears indeed, that the Rajah of *Berar* had already marched out his troops under the command of his ſon *Chimnajee*, with orders to remain at the ghaut of *Andary* till anſwers to his letters ſhould arrive from *Calcutta* and *Fort Saint George*. But as your Committee have put together extracts of the principal parts of theſe letters in the Appendix, No. 251, we deſire to refer the Houſe to them for more complete information on the ſubject.

Appx. No. 251. B. See laſt para. of letter from Fort St. George, dated 31ſt Dec. 1779, and the incloſed paper of intelligence, on Ben. Sec. Correſ. 24 Jan. 1780. See Ben. Sec. Perf. Correſ. 1780. No. 2, received 19 Jan. No. 3, received 29 Jan.—No. 4, received 19 Jan. No. 15, received 24 Feb.—No. 18, received 24 Feb. 1780.

In regard to *Hyder Ally*, the accounts of his menaces and his hoſtile preparations at this time have been fully ſtated in a former Report; and therefore your Committee will only here obſerve, that the Governor General addreſſed a letter to him on the 17th of February, touching in part on his ſuppoſed combination with the Rulers of the Maratta State at *Poonah*, and other Powers, againſt the Engliſh Government; and declaring, that he wrote on purpoſe to remove all falſe conceptions which might diſturb the good underſtanding which he believed it to be their mutual deſire to perpetuate between them; and he added further overtures towards improving the connection by nearer ties.

Ben. Sec. Perf. Corr. ſent 17 Feb. 1780. No. 4. Appx. No. 252. B.

Your Committee find, that in the mean time the operations of General *Goddard* in the field, and by negociation, had been carried on with great vigour and ſucceſs;—that on the 19th January the army appeared before *Dubhoy*, which was evacuated the next day by the enemy, when that fortreſs and the whole diſtrict, yielding an eſtimated value of two lacks of rupees, were taken poſſeſſion of in the name of the Company; —that on the 26th January *Futty Sing* was at laſt brought with ſome difficulty to an agreement, in a treaty of alliance

Appx. No. 253. B. Bom. Sec. Conſ. 25 Jan. 1780. Letters from Gen. Goddard, dated 6 and 19 Jan.—Do. 28 Jan. Letter from Gen. Goddard, dated 20 Jan. 1780.—31 Jan. Letter to the Governor General and Council.—5th Feb. Letter from Gen. Goddard

alliance upon the general grounds before explained; the complete particulars of which, with the propoſed diſtribution of the Country between the Company and *Futty Sing*, to the entire excluſion of the Poonah Government, will be found in the Appendix, No. 253; wherein alſo may be ſeen very exact eſtimates of the revenues ariſing from the ſeveral diſtricts in the Guzerat.

inclosing copy of a treaty.—9th Feb. letter to Gen. Goddard: alſo letter from Gen. Goddard 24th Feb. letter to Gen. Goddard, 1780.

No. 253. B. Bom. Sel. Conſ. 14 March; Letter from Gen. Goddard, dated 7th March 1780.

It appears, that after the concluſion of this treaty with *Futty Sing*, General *Goddard* being joined by the cavalry of that Chief, moved forward to the attack of *Ahmadabad*, the capital city of the province; before which he arrived on the 10th of February, and carried it by ſtorm on the 15th of the ſame month, with ſome ſmall loſs on his ſide. On the 28th he put *Futty Sing* in poſſeſſion of the city and its collections, and received from him grants for the ſeveral Pergunnahs ceded by him to the Company.

Appx. No. 254. B. Bom. Sel. Conſ. 25 Feb. Letters from Gen. Goddard, dated 15 and 18.—Letter to Gen. Goddard dated 26th, 1780.

Your Committee have obſerved, that General *Goddard* recommended a delay in the final ſettlement of the province, till all the great objects of the war ſhould be ſecured, leſt any diſputed claims might excite jealouſy and apprehenſion in *Futty Sing*, for whoſe ſervices they had preſent occaſion, and who had juſt granted them for the Company the privilege of having a factory at *Ahmadabad*; for the eſtabliſhment of which, however, no immediate meaſures were taken by the Preſident and Select Committee, nor did they deem it neceſſary to have a fixed reſident at the Guicawar Court. And we perceive, that in their letter to the Governor General and Council, dated 7th of March, in which they gave an account of theſe tranſactions, and tranſmitted copies of the treaty concluded with *Futty Sing* for their confirmation, they made ſeveral remarks on the diſproportionate ſhares of the province allotted to the Company, and thought it neceſſary, from a knowledge of *Futty Sing*'s character, to ſuggeſt an advice, that the Board would not give a haſty and definitive ratification to it without a guarded reſerve, that a new and equitable ſettlement might be provided for hereafter according to the 5th article. And we further obſerve, that when General *Goddard* ſome time after this applied to the Select Board for a loan of five or ſix lacks of rupees for *Futty Sing*, on the ſecurity of aſſignments on his Pergunnahs, and recommended a compliance with his requeſt on grounds of political benefit, the Committee declared it to be a meaſure utterly impoſſible, from the ſtate of their finances, and from the ſmall reſources which their northern acquiſitions would as yet afford them.

Appx. No. 255. B. 10 March, letter from Gen. Goddard, dated 1 March 1780.

Appx. No. 256. B. See Sel. Conſ. 4th April.—Bom. Sel. Conſ. 8th March 1780.

Appx. No. 257. B. 4th and 6th April 1780.

Your Committee obſerve, that General *Goddard*, in his letter of the 1ſt of March to the Select Committee, informed them of the arrival of *Scindia* and *Holkar* in thoſe parts with an army of 40,000 men, and that they were advancing their march towards *Surat*, and that he intended immediately to proceed with the forces under his command, in the hope of intercepting them, after leaving a body of ſepoys for the defence of *Ahmadabad*. And it appears, that by the rapidity of his movements he reached the neighbourhood of their encampment near *Brodera* on the 8th of March, and had intended to attack them in the night, but was prevented by a letter from Mr. *Farmer* (who it will be remembered was left with Captain *Stewart* as hoſtages with *Scindia* for the performance of the ſtipulations in the Convention Treaty of *Worgam*), containing information of the profeſſions which thoſe Chiefs made of their wiſh to be on amicable terms with the Engliſh; and of which they gave a favourable preſage next day, by reſtoring Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Stewart* to their liberty. They ſent them to the General's camp, accompanied by a vackeel, who aſſured him, that *Scindia* declared his enmity to *Nanna Furneſe* to be equal to that which the Engliſh bore him, and that he was only anxious to know what deſigns were formed againſt the Peiſhwa and himſelf: wiſhing to receive propoſals from the General, for an accommodation

See Appx. No. 255. B.

Appx. No. 259. Bom. Sel. Conſ. dated 14 and 16 March 1780. Letter from Gen. Goddard, dated 10 March.

on ſuch terms as might be conducive to the views and intereſts of both parties. This the General thought it proper to decline, but ſignified his deſire of being made acquainted with the ſentiments of *Scindia*, who was the beſt judge in what manner a new ſettlement of the Government at *Poonah* might be effected with moſt eaſe and advantage. After ſome inexplicit letters of friendly profeſſion, *Scindia* at laſt commiſſioned his vackeel to explain his propoſitions; which being evidently calculated to get *Ragoba* and his ſon into his own power, and thereby to aggrandize himſelf in the State, without any regard to the intereſts of the Engliſh, were immediately rejected by the General, who diſmiſſed the vackeel, with an aſſurance that the Engliſh would put no reſtraint upon *Ragoba*, or riſk the ſafety of his ſon; and before they put the power of the State into his maſter's hands, would expect ſome conditions in their own favour, though they were entirely diſpoſed to a fair accommodation. Your Committee however obſerve, that at this time the General had reaſon to ſuſpect the intentions of *Scindia* to be more than dilatory, as he had ſecretly made overtures of aſſiſtance to *Govind Row*, the diſaffected brother of *Futty Sing*, and actually received him in his camp. That being afterwards ſtill more convinced of his duplicity, the General ſought an opportunity, but in vain, of attacking him, as he conſtantly retreated upon his advance, and was guarded againſt all ſurprize.

Appx. No. 260. Bom. Sel. Conſ. 24 March 1780. Letter from Gen. Goddard, 13, 15, and 17 March 1780.

Appx. No. 261. Sel. Conſ. 3 April 1780.—Letters from Gen. Goddard, 24 and 27 Mar. 1780.

But it appears that General *Goddard* at laſt ſucceeded, on the 3d of April, in bringing their whole army to an action with a part of his, in which he totally defeated and drove them off the field with a very conſiderable loſs. This advantage ſeems to have given great ſatisfaction to the Select Committee; who, however, from the advancement of the ſeaſon, began to be anxious for the return of their detachment ſerving under General *Goddard*, as neceſſary for the defence of *Bombay*: and therefore, in conſequence of an unanimous opinion upon this head, they wrote to the General, requiring him to ſend back that corps, ſhould he not determine himſelf to come to the ſouthward before the ſetting in of the rains; and they expreſſed ſome concern to find that their hopes of an attack upon *Baſſein*, which they had earneſtly recommended, would hardly now be gratified in the courſe of the preſent campaign.

Appx. No. 262. Bom. Sel. Conſ. 8th April 1780. 24 April 1780. Appx. No. 263.

Letter to Gen. Goddard, dated 30 April 1780. Appx. No. 264.

Your Committee have found, that in addition to theſe ſucceſſes under the immediate conduct of General *Goddard*, ſome operations directed by the Select Committee, were attended with fortunate events. On the 8th of April, the Committee reſolved to take poſſeſſion of the village of *Culwa*, and the fort of *Bellapore*, with a view of commanding an extent of ſhore on the Continent, and thereby obtaining a means for better ſupply of grain and proviſions. On the 13th of the ſame month, an account was received at the Preſidency, that this deſign had been accompliſhed, and that a detachment under the command of Captain *Campbell* had poſſeſſed themſelves of *Parſeck Fort*, which was deſcribed to be very advantageouſly ſituated for defence; and it appears to have been afterwards reſolved to repair and ſtrengthen it. An attempt upon *Bellapore* and *Panwell* was alſo ſucceſsful on the 12th and 13th of April, and by this means the Preſidency conſiderably extended their command along the Coaſt, and towards the paſſes of the hills in the way to *Poonah*.

Appx. No. 265.

Appx. No. 266. Dated 13 April 1780.

No. 266.

Your Committee do not find, that during all theſe tranſactions, the enemy made any very material attempt upon the poſſeſſions of the Company on the Malabar coaſt, except thoſe (which we have taken notice of) by the forces of *Scindia* and *Holkar*. It appears indeed, that a conſiderable body of their troops aſſembled in the neighbourhood of *Fort Victoria*; and that ſome of their veſſels of war appeared off the port, without however making any attack. And a ſtraggling party under *Gunni Punt* committed frequent ravages in the neighbourhood of *Surat*, and

Appx. No. 267. Bom. Sel. Conſ. 22 Feb. 1780, 29th Feb. 17th March.

and gave ſome little alarms to that garriſon, and to
No. 267. *Broach*, preventing them from taking poſſeſſion of, and collecting a part of the ceded Pergunnahs.

In regard to the Madras detachment, your Committee find, that on the 24th of February, Colonel *Browne* arrived at *Surat* with a reinforcement from *Madras* of ſix companies of European infantry and a company of artillery, and encamped there to wait the General's
Appx. No. 268. orders; in obedience to which, he afterwards joined him
6 April, 23 Do. on the 16th of April; and on the 18th April, five com-
Beng. Sec. Conſ. panies of ſepoys arrived in the *Beſborough* at *Surat*. The
14th June 1780. *See appx.* additional reinforcement of a company of infantry and
No. 274. artillery was ſtill detained at *Tellicherry*, where much
Appx. No. 269. diſſention ſeems to have prevailed between the Commander and the Chief and Council of the Factory, while it continued to be inſulted by the attacks of the Nairs, and others of the Country marauders, at the inſtigation it was ſuppoſed of *Hyder Ally*. And it ſhould be ob-
No. 269 ſerved, that the Select Committee of *Bombay*, for the reaſons which they aſſigned, approved of the conduct of the factory in oppoſing their departure, though
No. 269. Colonel *Browne* wrote in very preſſing terms to deſire, that in conformity to the orders of the Madras Committee, and becauſe of the inconveniencies ariſing to the other part of the detachment under his command from their abſence, they might be ordered up immediately to
No. 269. join him. And we perceive that the Select Committee wrote on the 5th of April to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, deſiring them to revoke their orders for the junction of their detachment at that place with General *Goddard*, and to put it under the orders of their
Appx. No. 270. Government. But it appears, that ſhortly after this a
Bom. Sel. Conſ. letter was received from the Preſidency of *Fort Saint*
23 April 1780. *George*, in which they complained of the Chief and Factors, ſuppoſing them to have given provocations to *Hyder*; and on this ſubject they added theſe further remarks: "*Hyder's* conduct at preſent depends very "much on the tranſactions with the Marattas. A peace "with them would have kept him in awe, and delivered "this Preſidency of every idea of trouble from that "quarter; but it will be difficult to ſay what line he "will purſue, now that the negociation is at an end, "and hoſtilities commenced; for we ſuppoſe it muſt "be known to you, that a treaty has been concluded "between the Marattas and him, with a view of increaſ-"ing our difficulties, and that the Nizam has been from "the beginning of theſe diſputes directed ſolely by the "influence of the preſent Powers at *Poonah*." The reſt of this letter, with the anſwer of the Select Committee, will be found in the Appendix, No. 270.

It ſhould not be here omitted to obſerve, that ſeveral new regulations, reſpecting the European corps, and the augmentation of the ſepoy eſtabliſhment, were ſuggeſted by General *Goddard*, and conſidered by the Select Committee; and it appears, that the reſt of the Board agreeing with the Preſident in the opinion which Appx. No. 271. he delivered on the 29th April, reſolved to carry into Sel. Conſ. 29 April 1780. execution at that time no more of General *Goddard's* plans than what related to the raiſing ſeven new battalions, in order to complete the eſtabliſhment to fifteen battalions of ſepoys. The plan itſelf, and the ſentiments of the Board upon them, are placed in the Ap- No. 271. pendix.

Theſe are the principal circumſtances which your Committee have found recorded in the conſultations of the Bombay Preſidency, relative to the conduct and events of the war during that campaign; the remaining materials, from which we ſhall endeavour to extract a brief account of the ſubſequent tranſactions, conſiſt chiefly in detached papers and diſpatches from the ſeveral Preſidencies.

A view of the ſtate of the revenues, and of the number and diſtribution of the forces, which your Committee find made up to this period, will be here properly preſented to the Houſe; and we have accordingly annexed it in the following papers.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company at Bombay, from May 1779 to April 1780; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Balances in the Treaſuries - - -	11,72,715	
Debt at Intereſt - - - - - - - -		52,19,352
Due Account Depoſits - - - - - - -		36,253
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - -		23,556
Rupees -		52,79,161

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Aids received at Bombay from Bengal, from 1779 to 1780.

	Rupees.
Bullion - - - - - - - - - -	8,88,731
Bills - - - - - - - - - -	12,99,647
Goods - - - - - - - - - -	
Rup^{s}. -	21,88,373
£. *ſtg.* -	273,547

Memo^{m}.

No Bombay Books are received ſince 1778-9; this year is extracted from the Bengal Accounts; but the amount of Goods ſent to Bombay in this time cannot be aſcertained.

Errors excepted.

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

GENERAL RETURN of the Honourable Company's TROOPS

	ARTILLERY.															INFANTRY.																										
							Staff.															Staff.																					
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Adjutant.	Quarter Master.	Surgeon.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardier.	Fifes and Drums.	Gunners.	Matroſſes.	Brigadier General, &c.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Major of Brigade.	Town Major.	Aids du Camp.	Secretaries.	Surgeon Major.	Adjutants.	Quarter Maſters.	Surgeons.	Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Fifes and Drums.	Private Europeans.
Bombay	1	-	3	-	3	6	1	1	-	8	8	17	9	31	82	1	-	1	1	7	4	15	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	1	43	39	37	17	417
With Genl Goddard	-	-	1	1	2	3	-	-	1	7	6	12	4	21	57	-	-	1	1	4	12	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	25	24	14	184
Caranja	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Salſette	-	1	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	3	3	3	1	8	41	-	-	-	-	2	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	12	5	80
Baroche	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	2	4	2	12	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Surat	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	2	4	1	9	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Tellicherry	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	-	2	7	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	5	2	20
Anjengo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	4
TOTAL	1	1	4	4	11	11	1	1	1	25	23	42	17	85	231	1	-	2	2	14	18	27	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	2	44	86	78	38	705
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	6	5	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	8	16	18	575
Supernumeraries	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ESTABLISHMENT	1	1	4	4	10	12	1	1	1	24	24	40	16	80	232	1	-	2	2	18	24	32	1	1	3	1	1	2	2	2	-	94	94	56	1,280

	ENGINEER CORPS.									
	Lieut. Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Sub Engineers.	Practitioners D°.	Cadet.	Sirangs.	Tindals.	Subaulics.	Laſcars.
Bombay	1	-	2	1	4	1	1	4	1	100
Salſette	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	—
Surat	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
Tellicherry	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	—
TOTAL	1	-	3	2	5	1	1	4	1	100

	NATIVE PORTUGUESE CORPS.										
	Captain Commandt.	Lieutenant.	Enſigns.	Adjutant.	P. Commandant.	D° Captains.	D° Lieutenants.	D° Enſigns.	D° Serjeants.	D° Corporals.	D° Fifes and Drums.	D° Private.
Bombay	1	1	1	1	-	1	3	3	12	11	16	311
Salſette	-		1	-	-	1	-	2	4	4	4	59
TOTAL	1	1	2	1	-	2	3	5	16	15	20	370

	LASCARS.		
	Sirangs.	Tindals.	Laſcars.
Bombay	5	19	447
Caranja	1	2	53
Salſette	1	6	151
Baroche	1	4	100
Surat	2	2	60
Tellicherry	1	4	76
TOTAL	11	37	887
Wanting to complete	-	-	—
Supernumeraries	6	17	387
ESTABLISHMENT	5	20	500

N. B.—At preſent, for want of Europeans, the Eſtabliſhment conſiſts of four Companies of Artillery, One Battalion of European Infantry, Seven Battalions of Sepoys with One of Marines, a Native Portuguese Corps, and an independant Sepoy Corps, for the ſervice of Tellicherry.

Seventy-ſix Artificers, belonging to the Sepoys Corps, not included above.

under the Presidency of *Bombay*, 30th *April* 1780.

SEPOYS.																IRREGULARS.										INVALIDS.					
																	Tiveys.							Nairs.							
Field Officers.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subnisses.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.	Topasses.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Adjutant.	Serjeants.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Private.	Moopas.	Private.	Captain.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Private.
-	1	7	6	2	2	19	47	19	138	144	8	4	54	19	2,342	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	8	10	1	121
-	2	15	10	2	2	20	39	21	119	119	4	5	48	19	1,356	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	-	2	-	-	2	4	2	12	11	-	-	4	2	158	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	2	7	7	2	2	18	38	16	105	106	6	2	41	16	1,437	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	5	4	1	1	10	21	10	60	60	3	2	22	9	824	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	5	4	1	1	10	21	9	55	59	3	2	21	10	781	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	1	6	1	1	-	3	6	3	22	29	1	1	12	3	350	66	-	-	1	2	2	22	295	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	27
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	8	45	34	9	8	82	176	80	511	528	25	16	202	78	7,248	80	-	-	1	2	2	22	295	-	-	1	1	10	11	2	148
-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	-	7	-	-	-	1	6	-	9	26	-		22	-	462	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
-	9	38	36	9	8	81	170	82	502	502	25	17	180	81	6,786	-	-	-	1	2	2	22	295	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—

	IRREGULAR SEPOYS.												
	Lieutenants.	Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subnisses.	Colour Bearers.	Trumpeters.	Fifes and Drums.	Watermen.	Sepoys.
Bombay -	1	1	9	19	2	44	50	3	-	2	17	9	965
Surat - -	1	-	9	15	1	40	40	4	4	2	15	8	810
Anjengo -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
TOTAL -	2	1	18	34	3	84	90	7	4	4	32	17	1,783

	Since last Return.						
	Dead.	Deserted.	Discharged.	Invalided.	Transferred.	Received.	Entertained.
Artillery -	21	42	2	-	30	112	10
Infantry -	92	89	22	2	95	239	56
Sepoys -	206	1,279	329	38	21	570	3,006
TOTAL -	319	1,410	353	40	146	921	3,072

(Signed) *Lt Nilson,*

Lt Col^n in Command.

Sel. Letter dated 30th April 1780. Appx. No. 272.

In a letter dated 30th April, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, which was diſpatched with the records above referred to, the Select Committee gave an abridged account of theſe proceedings; and in concluſion obſerved upon the ultimate objects of their own wiſhes from ſucceſs in the war (not pretending to judge to what extent the GovernorGeneral and Council carried their views) "that after eſtabliſhing themſelves "in *Baſſein*, and the Company's ſhare of *Guzerat*, "which would afford a revenue equal to their expences "on that ſide of *India*, their views ſhould be merely "defenſive." And your Committee find, that in a

Appx. No. 273.

ſubſequent letter to the Select Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 25th of July, they repeated the ſame ſentiments, and again lamented the want of communication from the Governor General and Council with their Government on thoſe objects. They at the

Appx. No. 274. See Ben. Sec. Conſ. 12 June 1780. Letter from General Goddard, dated 21 April.—Alſo Ben. Sec. Conſ. 24th Auguſt.—Letter from Do. dated 20 June 1780.

ſame time informed the Court, that by ſome late ſucceſſes in the neighbourhood of *Surat* over the army of the Marattas, and by the reduction of ſome forts of importance, they had got clear poſſeſſion of the Country to the very border of the Portugueſe diſtricts, which alone now ſeparated the frontier of the Surat province from the diſtrict of *Baſſein*; and *Baſſein* itſelf was to be the firſt object of attack at the opening of the enſuing campaign. General *Goddard* had aſſured them, that *Scindia* and *Holkar* had certainly retired into their own territories; to detain them in which he had ſuggeſted to the Governor General the expediency of cauſing a powerful diverſion to be made on both the ſides of *Malwa*; that having put his troops into cantonments, he had ſent back the Bombay detachment to their own garriſon, from which a ſmall party under Captain *Campbell* had lately taken the town of *Callian*, where the Committee afterwards ſtationed a reſpectable force, hoping that it would prove a beneficial acquiſition.

Appx. No. 275. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 24 July 1780.

And your Committee have obſerved, that the Select Committee of *Bombay*, before they communicated to the Court of Directors the obſervations which we have remarked above, on the doubtful intentions of the Superior Government in regard to the extent and objects of the war, had written in ſimilar terms to that Preſidency, and intimated a ſuppoſition that their views might depend, perhaps, upon the efforts which the French might make in *India*. They explained the limits of their own ambition, and the ſteps they were taking to put their army on ſuch a footing as would render their ſchemes for future defence practicable, independantly of ſupport, either in men or money, from the other Preſidencies.

In regard to the oſtenſible views, at leaſt, of the Governor General and Council in the proſecution of the war, as far as may be collected from their own declaration and proceedings, your Committee have already laid before the Houſe the overtures which they had directed to be made for an accommodation with the Marattas, after they knew of *Ragoba*'s eſcape, and of his arrival at *Surat*. And we have alſo referred to their letter

See Appx. No. 205. Appx. No. 249.

of the 24th of January to General *Goddard*, wherein they declared their intentions in reſpect of *Ragonaut Row*, and their approbation of every other part of the plan agreed upon between the Select Committee of *Bombay* and the General.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 24 July 1780. Appx. No. 276.

And it appears that General *Goddard*, in his anſwer to the Governor General and Council's letter of 24th January, after ſtating the detail of his military obſervations, obſerved to them, "that knowing the earneſt "wiſh they had to bring the war to a ſpeedy concluſion, "he ſhould readily liſten to, and encourage every over-"ture the Maratta Government might make for that "deſirable end;" but he was afraid, that notwithſtanding the uniform ſucceſs of the Britiſh army during the campaign, the enemy was not yet ſufficiently humbled

Appx. No. 278. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 23 March 1780.

to grant it upon terms ſo honourable and advantageous as they had a right to expect. And your Committee find, that on the 23d of March the Governor General and Council again ſignified their approbation of the plan adopted for conducting his operations in the Guzerat Country, directing him to do all in his power to ſecure the quiet poſſeſſion of thoſe countries in perpetuity to the Company, and repeating their commands to him againſt entering into any engagement whatever with *Ragoba*, in regard to whom the General explained the motives of his conduct (in a letter dated 17th of February) on the ground of compaſſion and policy. And we perceive, that when the Board wrote on the 20th April to the General, in commendation of his good conduct at *Ahmadabad*, they concluded their letter with expreſſions of hope, "that by the decided ſuperiority of their arms, "he might be able to accompliſh the object which they "had invariably in view—an honourable and advanta-"geous peace; which ſervice they ſhould eſteem of "more importance, nor leſs honourable to him, than "the moſt ſplendid operations in the field. They "authorized him to accept any propoſals which might "be conſonant to their former inſtructions, and war-"ranted by the preſent ſtate of the war, and even to "make overtures for peace on ſuch conditions, if he "ſhould have any reaſonable ground to believe that "they would be immediately accepted, and not em-"ployed to amuſe and deceive. In the mean time, they "relied on his activity for the proſecution and improve-"ment of the advantages with which his campaign had "been ſo happily begun." Your Committee find recorded on the conſultations of that day, a Minute of the Board, introductory to a letter to Sir *Eyre Coote*, requeſting to be favoured with his preſence and aſſiſtance in the deliberations on that ſubject, which they ſhould ſuſpend till his arrival.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 20 April 1780. Appx. No. 279. See alſo letter from Ragoba, No. 45. Sec. Perſ. Corr. received 20 April 1780. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 20 April 1780. Appx. No. 282.

D°. Appx. No. 281.

But it appears to your Committee, that a letter dated the 5th of May, from Sir *Eyre Coote*, was received at *Calcutta* on the 29th of the ſame month; wherein, after repeating his propoſals of ſome vigorous meaſures being taken from thoſe quarters where he then was, as ſoon as the ſeaſon would admit, he obſerved, that he found, ſince he left the Board, they were become principals in the war; that the preſent plan promiſed nothing but an endleſs and ruinous expence; and he deſired to repeat, that in recommending the moſt vigorous "exertions, "it was only with a view to accelerate a peace, which, "in the preſent ſtate of politics at home, would be, in "his opinion, the happieſt event that could happen to "them." And in a letter dated a few days after the laſt, he ſignified his intention of waiting the commencement of the rains before he took his departure for the Preſidency; but he ſtated fully his opinion with regard to the proſecution or termination of the Maratta war, for the particulars of which, together with the Board's orders thereupon, your Committee deſire to refer the Houſe to the Appendix, No. 282, and to No. 286.

Appx. No. 282. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 29 May 1780.

Your Committee obſerving that Sir *Eyre Coote* being at that time in the upper ſtations in the Vizier's country, had from thence recommended an alteration in the mode of carrying on the war, have examined the records of the Preſidency, in order to diſcover what had theretofore been the conduct and event of tranſactions in thoſe parts more immediately under his eye. And your Committee find, that in obedience to the inſtructions of the Board, the Commander in Chief had in the beginning of February directed Captain *Popham* to march and join the Rana of *Ghode*; and that the Board afterwards ordered him to demand from the Rana, the regular and punctual payment of the ſubſidy. On the 21ſt of April Sir *Eyre Coote* wrote to the Board, giving ſome account of military operations, and the force of the enemy in the country of *Ghode*, which he had received from Captain *Popham*; and taking occaſion at the ſame time to explain his ſenſe of the diſgraceful dangers and difficulties with which he foreſaw the buſineſs of *Ghode* to be beſet. That the obſtacles which the detachment had

Appx. No. 283. See Ben. Sec. Conſ. 20 April 1780.

See Ben. Sec. Conſ. 15 May 1780. Appx. No. 284.

met

met with before the mud fort of *Lahar*, were convincing arguments of the folly, under the preſent circumſtances, of attacking *Guallier*. From the whole of this letter, which is placed in the Appendix, No. 284, together with the Board's reply, the Houſe will perceive how very diſſatisfied the Commander in Chief was with the plan of action, as unequal to the critical ſituation of affairs, and the dignity of that character which the Britiſh arms had ſupported in *India*: how ſenſibly he ſeemed to feel the want of information and of authority from the Supreme Council to execute what might appear to him proper at the time of exigency; and with what reluctance he paid obedience to their commands. It appears, however, that in the beginning of May, he had an opportunity of tranſmitting to the Board ſome more favourable accounts from Captain *Popham*, who had ſucceeded in an attack by ſtorm on the fort of *Lahar*, and whoſe conduct upon that occaſion he extolled in the higheſt terms, and recommended him and his deſerving attachment to the countenance and notice of the Board. And we perceive that they immediately teſtified their warm approbation of the ſpirited behaviour of the officers and men, to whom they deſired Captain *Popham* to communicate their thanks; and they at the ſame time wrote to Sir *Eyre Coote*, requeſting that he would ſupply the Captain with ſome artillery and ſtores, "whenever "he ſhould receive advice from him, that he was re- "quired by the Rana to perform any ſervice which "ſhould render them neceſſary." In regard to the fort itſelf, they directed it to be delivered over to the Rana.

Appx. No. 285. Letter dated 3 May 1780.

No. 285.

In conſequence of repeated repreſentations made by the Commander in Chief, of the inequality of Captain *Popham's* force to anſwer all the purpoſes required of it; and in conformity to his frequent advices for more vigorous efforts in that quarter, and particularly againſt the territories of *Tookajee* and *Scindia*, with a view of making an uſeful diverſion to favour General *Goddard's* operations in the *Guzerat*, your Committee find, that the Governor General propoſed ſeveral plans for the change, the augmentation, and direction of the force employed in the territories of *Ghode*, or upon its frontiers. Theſe, with the reaſonings and reſolutions of the Board upon them, are placed in the Appendix, No. 286, and we ſhall here only ſtate very briefly the principal heads of each propoſal, and the deciſion of the Council upon them. On the 29th May, the Governor General moved for the relief of Captain *Popham's* detachment, by three battalions, with their guns, under the command of Major *Camac*, and a battalion of light infantry under Captain *Browne*. To this propoſition the Board aſſented, and orders were ſent accordingly to the Commander in Chief. On the 12th June, having previouſly recommended ſome ſteps towards a peace with the Marattas under the mediation of the Rajah of *Berar*, and at the ſame time however ſuggeſted the neceſſity of improving their pretenſions to better terms by an interval of ſucceſsful exertion in the war, the Governor General adviſed the reduction of Captain *Popham's* corps into three regular battalions, and that they ſhould be added to thoſe under the command of Major *Camac*, for the purpoſe of an invaſion on the territories of *Madajee Scindia*; and as the ſubſidies from the Rana of *Ghode* would of courſe be diſcontinued by that ſcheme of operations, he ſuggeſted the expedient of appropriating the annual contribution of *Cheit Sing*, amounting to five lacks, as a military fund for the payment of the detachment. And he concluded his propoſals on this occaſion with an earneſt entreaty addreſſed to the Board for their ſupport in a meaſure, upon the conſequences of which he would venture his life. But it appears that Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* objected to the expence of this force, as well as to the diſtance at which it was to be employed, the diſcretionary latitude of action given by the intended inſtructions to the Commander of it, and the danger of any pretence for invading the diſtricts of *Bundecund*; obſerving, moreover, that they believed it "to be an "evil inſeparable from the diſtant military operations "in that country, that the charge of them could neither "be limited or controlled." The oppoſition to theſe meaſures propoſed by the Governor General, was not leſſened by his offer of taking upon himſelf the expence of the contingencies, which he ſuppoſed to be the only one that could reaſonably be charged to the expedition, and which he rated far below two lacks of rupees. The inſtructions to Major *Camac* were drawn up agreeably to the Minutes of the majority, and recorded on the conſultations of the 13th of July. A change, however, in theſe took place a few days after, when, Mr. *Francis* being indiſpoſed, Mr. *Wheler* acceded to the regulations propoſed by the Governor General relative to Captain *Popham's* corps; and though he oppoſed the inſtructions to Major *Camac*, the voice of the Governor was then double, and decided the queſtion.

Appx. No. 286.

See Appx. No. 300.

See Cons. 20 July.

On Sir *Eyre Coote's* return to the Preſidency, theſe reſolutions underwent ſome alterations, but the principal ſcheme of action by the united detachments under *Camac* and *Popham*, againſt the territories of *Scindia* and *Holkar*, was confirmed; the different aſpect of affairs, however, after the certain knowledge of *Hyder Ally's* deſigns, and the probable attempts of the Marattas on the Bengal provinces, gave riſe to a more large and general plan of prevention from the Commander in Chief, which met with the approbation of the Board; and when it was found neceſſary to ſend a large reinforcement to the coaſt, he recommended the recal of Major *Camac's* detachment—which was alſo agreed to by the Board. The points of controverſy and diſſention at the Board, eſpecially between the Governor General and Mr. *Francis*, appear to your Committee to have daily increaſed, and at laſt to have riſen to a very great exceſs; in the courſe of which the Governor accuſed Mr. *Francis* of having ſeduced him, by falſe promiſes of acquieſcence in his meaſures, to part with the ſure means of eſtabliſhing them by the ſupport of Mr. *Barwell*, who left *Calcutta* in the month of March on his return to *Europe*. But your Committee recommend to the Houſe a peruſal of all theſe diſcordant Minutes, which we have placed in the Appendix, No. 288, chiefly becauſe there may be collected from them a great body of remarks and information on the general poſture of affairs, comprehending opinions and arguments, not only on the view of political and military ſituations and incidents, but on the ſtate of ability, particularly in pecuniary reſources, on which the Preſidency might be ſuppoſed to rely for the execution and ſucceſs of their complicated ſyſtem of operations.

Appx. No. 287. Sec. Cons. 7 Sept. 1780.

15 Sept. 1780. See Appx. No. 304.

Ben. Sec. Cons. 13 Nov. 1780. See Appx. No. 286.

See Appx. 304. See Appx. 310, 26th Sept. 1780.

Appx. No. 288.

The means by which the happy accompliſhment of theſe deſigns might be attained, were at leaſt the oſtenſible cauſe of the difference of ſentiments and the diſtractions of their Councils, till the news of misfortunes in the *Carnatic* induced ſome ſort of union into their proceedings, as the object at which they were to aim became more certain, and other accidental circumſtances weakened or broke the ſprings of oppoſition.

But before we conſider the tranſactions of that exact period, your Committee muſt relate to the Houſe ſome military events which happened, and ſome overtures of negociation which were ſet on foot previouſly thereto.

Captain *Popham*, who, upon firſt receiving the orders of the Board to retire to *Cawnpore* with his detachment, ſeemed apprehenſive of the conſequences of retreating in the face of a Maratta army, was afterwards however relieved from this alarm, and appears to have exerted an unuſual degree of vigilance and activity in order to gain advantages over the enemy. By theſe means he was enabled to conceive and to compaſs a plan for the ſurpriſe of the fort of *Gualier*, which had been pronounced by the Princes of *Indoſtan* to be impregnable. The enterprize appears to have been attended with ſuch difficulty and hazard, as to render the ſucceſs uncommonly brilliant. The Board came to the immediate reſolution,

Appx. No. 289. Letter from Capt. Popham, 4th July, and 5th Aug. 1780, and Sec. Pers. Corr. No. 69.

Appx. No. 290. General Letter from Bengal, 26th Aug. 1780. Appx. No. 291. Perf. Corr. 1780.—See alſo Ben. Sec. Conſ. 9 Oct. 1780.

Appx. No. 292.

Appx. No. 293. Ben. Sec. Conſ. Sept. 11, 1780.

Letter from Dewagur Pundit to Beneram Pundit, on Sel. Conf. 4 Sept. 1780. Appx. No. 304.

Appx. No. 255. Sec. Perf. Corr. 1780, received 24 Feb. No. 15.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 15 May 1780. Appx. No. 296.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 12 June 1780. Appx. No. 297.

Appx. No. 298.

Appx. No. 299. See Conf. 12 June.

Appx. No. 300. See alſo Appx. No. 286. Governor General's Minute. Do. to Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler, 19th June. Appx. No. 301. Letters from Moodajee and Dewagur Pundit, received 15 and 21 Sept. 1780.

Governor General's Minute, 4th Sept. with two Letters incloſed. Appx. No. 304.

Minute 19 June 1780. Appx. No. 286.

ſolution of keeping poſſeſſion of the place by their own troops, as, during the continuance of the war, the ſafety of this acquiſition might be hazarded if it were left to be protected by the Rana; to whom they wrote on the occaſion, and aſſured him, that as ſoon as peace ſhould take place, the fort ſhould be delivered up to him. And as a reward for the ſervice of the deſerving Commander, he was promoted to the rank of Major, and recommended to the notice and favour of the Court of Directors, who confirmed his appointment. The conſequence of this atchievement was the retreat of the Marattas from the whole circumjacent country, and the alarm ſeems even to have reached *Scindia* in his capital, to which he was retired from the *Guzerat*.

This Chief ſeems to have been repreſented at this time to be full of animoſity againſt the Engliſh, and that the Poonah Miniſter himſelf was leſs inimical to them. The reſentment of the Nizam appears, during the courſe of this year, to have been more inflamed by the proceedings of the Madras Government, in regard to the Guntoor Circar and the Peſcuſh, than by any immediate alluſion to the Maratta war, except in his letter received 24th February, wherein he again ſtates the cauſe of his diſpleaſure on account of *Ragonaut Row*. The Governor General and Council thought it neceſſary to endeavour to appeaſe him, yet were apprehenſive of appearing to form any confidential connection with him, leſt it might tend to alienate from them the Court of *Berar*; "which "the Board obſerved, by a natural oppoſition of intereſts, "was and ever muſt continue in a ſtate of variance with "that of *Hyderabad*." It was however afterwards found expedient to appoint Mr. *Hollond* to be their Reſident there, and they thereupon declared their opinion, "That "he had been the means of preventing the breach of "the alliance ſubſiſting between the Company and the "Nizam." But your Committee have in a former Report explained the ſteps taken by the Governor General and Council, to conciliate the mind of the Nizam: and it has appeared by a letter from Mr. *Hollond*, under date 12th Auguſt, that although he avowed his connections with the Courts of *Poonah* and *Berar*, and declared his having formed the intention of making an attack in conjunction with them on the Company's poſſeſſions, directing his own force againſt the Chicacole Circar, yet Mr. *Hollond* nevertheleſs believed him to be, upon the whole, inclined to remain on pacific terms with the Company, provided that ſome ſatisfaction was given to him on the ſubject of the Peſcuſh and the Guntoor Circar. Yet it muſt be obſerved, that the Dewan of the Rajah of *Berar* ſeemed at that time to conſider the Nizam as the great obſtacle in the way of peace.

The Rajah himſelf and his Miniſters, by their letters, received on the 12th of June, were found to be ſtill forward in offering their mediation, and in explaining the motives of their conduct. The Governor General propoſed to the Board, in conſequence of theſe advances, that the offer ſhould be accepted, and that *Dewagur Pundit* ſhould be invited to a conference at *Calcutta*, in order to expedite the means of accommodation; and the Board gave a ready aſſent to the propoſition. This return of acknowledgment and acceptance ſeemed to have been received with much ſatisfaction by *Moodajee* and his Duan; who thereupon ſuggeſted certain articles of agreement, to which it would be proper for the Engliſh to conſent, recommending in the mean time poſitive orders for a ceſſation of hoſtilities on the part of General *Goddard* and the Government of *Bombay*.—In further explanation of the Rajah's conduct and deſigns in ſending an army into the *Cuttack*, the Dewan aſſured the Governor General, that this was done merely to keep up appearances with the Nizam and the Poonah Durbar; that the march of their troops had been purpoſely protracted, till the ſeaſon for action was over; and that they were ſince directed to abſtain from all offenſive meaſures. The plauſibility at leaſt of this pretext was admitted by Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, who ſeemed alſo to think, that the Rajah's deſire of peace might be ſincere, as it appeared to be founded in the conſideration of his own intereſt, and conformable to the language he had uniformly held: But it was thought adviſeable not to ſuffer the appearance of perfect confidence in his good faith to carry them ſo far as to neglect the proper precautions which their ſituation dictated.

Sir *Eyre Coote* indeed ſeemed to entertain doubts of their deſigns, and was at all events of opinion, that the Maratta army on the confines of *Cuttack* muſt have a bad effect on the ſtate of the Company's affairs. He was earneſt therefore for their removal, and propoſed, that an immediate application ſhould be made to them, to retire, as their remaining where they were, diſturbed the peace of the Provinces. But he was prevailed upon by the repreſentations and arguments of the Governor General to wait further intelligence reſpecting the intentions of the Government of *Berar*, before any appearance of ſuſpicion ſhould be manifeſted; and the only ſtep of that ſort which appears to have been taken, was the appointment of Captain *Macpherſon* to watch the motions of the *Berar* army with a ſmall detachment under his command.

Your Committee have indeed obſerved, that the *Bengal* adminiſtration thought it proper alſo to aſſent to an application from *Chimnajee Booſla*, who commanded the army in *Cuttack*, for a ſupply of proviſion, of which they were in great want; and it was indeed remembered by the Board as an inducement for their aſſiſtance in this particular, that the hoſpitality which the Rajah afforded to their army under General *Goddard*, for many months, had been of eſſential ſervice to them.

But it appears that the Dewan, after he had been informed of the ſupplies of grain with which the Calcutta Board had furniſhed the Berar troops, in a letter of acknowledgment upon that ſubject to *Beneram Pundit*, made an obſervation, that "there was no money with "the army, and that as by the loweſt calculation four "lacks per month was the leaſt which could defray their "exigencies, it was adviſeable that ſixteen lacks ſhould be "ſent for their aſſiſtance, twelve of them ſecretly;" and in order to remove all heſitation about compliance, he added, "Let not the Governor apprehend that this money "will thereby be thrown away, for the Bhooſila and "Engliſh intereſt will then be but one, and much benefit "muſt flow from this. To bring this about is neceſſary, "extremely neceſſary. I do not write for myſelf. This "is the advice to be followed moſt certainly, certainly; "or the army will be no longer governable. If the "army remains till Poos and Maug, the fear of the "Engliſh will be upon all, and therefore this ought to "be effected."

By the terms of a letter from the Governor General to *Chimnajee Baboo*, dated the 13th October, it was to be ſuppoſed, that he ſent him by the bearer, *Biſſembeer Pundit*, the brother of *Beneram Pundit*, ſome pecuniary aid, the amount of which however did not at that time appear. But a letter from the Governor General to the Court of Directors, dated 29th November, has explained the matter to your Committee, and ſhewn that the Governor General, for reaſons which he aſſigned, had privately, without the knowledge of the Council, given three lacks of rupees to the Rajah's vackeel, two-thirds of which was raiſed by his own credit, and to be charged in his official accounts; and he intimated ſome ground of expectations to *Chimnajee* "of the remainder of the "amount required for the arrears of his army, proportionate to the extent to which he might put it in his "power to propoſe it, as a public gratuity, by effectual "orders for the recal of the troops, or for their junction "with thoſe of the Company."

In reſpect to *Hyder Ally*, your Committee find that the Governor General received a letter from him on the 14th of July, in which he complained of the breach of treaty by the Madras Government; obſerving, that he was before well convinced that the treaties and engagements of the Engliſh were inviolable, but he had found

Appx. No. 304.

No. 304.

10 Aug. 1780. No. 304.

Appx. No. 305. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 22 June.—Do. 27 July 1780.

No. 74. See Perf. Corr. received 21 Sept. 1780. Appx. No. 306.

No. 76. Appx. No. 307.

Appx. No. 308.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 27 July 1780. Appx. No. 309.

that whenever a new Governor arrived he would not conform to the agreements of the Council, but acted as he pleaſed, making many innovations in the eſtabliſhed friendſhips. In concluſion he uſed the following expreſſion: "what dependance therefore can be placed on "the engagements and treaties of the Chiefs of the Com- "pany? Do you however act as ſhall ſeem beſt to you."

Hyder does not appear to have given at that time any further explanation of his intentions with reſpect to the Company. But his actions almoſt immediately after fully interpreted them by an invaſion of the *Carnatic*.

Appx. No. 310. The proceedings of the Superior Council upon receipt of the unfortunate news from the coaſt of *Coromandel*, have been already taken notice of by your Committee in our former Reports; by a reference to which, the Houſe will perceive that immediate overtures for a peace with the Marattas were among their firſt reſolutions, and that they were encouraged by the vackeel of *Moodajee Booſla* to hope, that they ſhould meet with effectual aſſiſtance from his maſter's friendly mediation and guarantee. The articles for this pacification propoſed by the Governor General on the 25th September, and afterwards amended by him, were unanimouſly agreed to by the Board on the 2d of October; and meaſures were immediately taken to forward the accompliſhment of this deſign, by tranſmitting a copy of the projected treaty, with powers of mediation, to the Rajah of *Berar*.

Appx. No. 310. Letters were at the ſame time written to the Nizam, to the Peiſhwa, to *Madajee Scindia*, and to the Miniſter at *Poonah*, containing the propoſals which were offered, with additional aſſurances of zeal to put a ſtop to all hoſtilities. And a few days afterwards other letters were diſpatched under the ſame addreſſes, informing the ſeveral Powers of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s embarkation for the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, and deſiring them to communicate to him any circumſtances of a progreſs towards pacification, as they ſhould ariſe.

13th and 15th Oct. 1780. Appx. No. 311

Previous however to his departure, your Committee find that Sir *Eyre Coote* gave in to the Board a ſtate of the forces, and the diſtribution which he recommended of them, according to the ſituation of affairs, and the requiſite plan of operations. Theſe are to be found in the Appendix; and your Committee will only add to them a remark, that the Vizier was upon this occaſion deſired to require from *Fizoolla Cawn* the quota of troops ſtipulated by treaty to be furniſhed for his ſervice, being 5000 horſe, to be put under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel *Muir*, commanding the detachment of *Futty Gur*. And at the ſame time the Rajah *Cheit Sing* was required to furniſh ſuch part of his cavalry as he could ſpare for the ſervice of the Britiſh Government, and to inform the Governor General what number he could ſupply.

See Appx. No. 310. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 2 Nov. 1780. Appx. No. 313.

No. 313.

Appx. No. 314. 30th Oct. 1780.

Your Committee have indeed found, that complaints had been made, that *Fizoolla Cawn* did not fulfil his engagements to the Company, when required to give aſſiſtance in the defence of the *Rohilcund* againſt the Seiks and other borderers who were infeſting it; and there appeared great reaſon to believe, that *Nudjif Cawn* had been tampering with thoſe people, and he was certainly making preparations for war.

Sir Eyre Coote's Minute, 4 Sept. 1780. See Appx. No. 304.

It is to be obſerved, that the Commander in Chief did not apprehend any danger to the dominions of the Vizier, as the troops ſtationed in thoſe parts, when properly arranged, would, he thought, excluſive of cavalry, be more than ſufficient to prevent the Marattas from entering them. He however judged it neceſſary, that it ſhould be ſtrongly recommended to the Vizier, to be attentive to the keeping up a reſpectable body of horſe, and that the Reſident ſhould be directed to urge the neceſſity of their being regularly and punctually paid.

Joint Minute, 29 June 1780. See Appx. No. 286.

Of this indeed, if the deſcription which Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* ſome time before gave of his country was allowed to be juſt, there might much doubt be entertained. "The condition to which we have reduced the "Vizier's country, makes the connection rather a bur- "then than an advantage to this State. We have now "to defend the extended frontier of a ruined country, "which at preſent barely pays the troops that defend it, "and which, according to all appearance, will not do "even that much longer."

It has indeed appeared to your Committee, that before the diſtreſſing news of *Hyder*'s ſucceſsful progreſs in the *Carnatic* had made an accommodation with the Marattas the object of their greateſt and moſt immediate attention, the burthens of the war were acknowledged by the Superior Government to have become intolerable. Early in the courſe of this year, they had expreſſed their ſenſe of them in the moſt pointed language.—In a letter to General *Goddard*, under date 20 April, they wrote as follows: "Our reſources are no longer equal to the "payment of your army, without draining *Bengal* of "its ſpecie; nor can any acquiſition on the other ſide "of *India* compenſate for the diſtreſs which a con- "tinuance of war at the preſent expence would bring "upon the Company. We therefore earneſtly recom- "mend to you, to obſerve the ſtricteſt œconomy in your "future diſburſements."

See Appx. No. 280.

Among the ſavings which the Board then pointed out to the General, was the reduction of the firſt regiment of cavalry, which they did not think had or would in future compenſate by any ſervice for the expence of keeping it up.

But your Committee find, that General *Goddard* afterwards earneſtly interceded for the maintenance of that corps, as he attributed the ſucceſs of one very advantageous action entirely to its exertions; and it appears, that the Board afterwards, in conſequence of this repreſentation, revoked their order for reducing it.

Sec. Conſ. 24th Aug. 1780. Appx. No. 318. Do. 9 Oct. No. 318.

They alſo directed him to call upon *Futty Sing* to fix a ſubſidy for the full expence of any troops left in garriſon at *Ahmedabad*, or employed in the defence of the countries ceded to him, independent of the general plan of the campaign. On this head indeed the General explained the motives of his not having anticipated theſe orders, as he was afraid of unfavourable conſequences from it, before the affections and diſpoſitions of the allies had been fully put to the teſt.

See Appx. No. 274.

The neceſſity of acquiring ſome certain fund for the ſupport of the war, ſeems to have influenced the reaſonings and reſolutions of the Board, relative to the articles of the treaty with *Futty Sing*, and the appropriation of the revenues ariſing from thoſe diſtricts of which their army had taken poſſeſſion in the *Guzerat*. And in a letter to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* on that ſubject, under date the 15th May, they warned them againſt any reliance on continued ſupply from *Bengal*, as they feared "that neither their reſources, nor the currency "of the Provinces, would in any degree endure a con- "tinuance of the vaſt drains which had been made from "it in remittances to that Preſidency, to *Fort Saint* "*George*, and to *China*, ſince the time at which they "came into the Company's poſſeſſion."

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 15 May 1780, fol. 160. See alſo Conſ. 5 June. Alſo 26 June 1780. Appx. No. 320.

See alſo Letter to General Goddard. No. 320.

It has indeed appeared to your Committee, that General *Goddard*, who had recommended the appro tion of the revenues of the conquered countries to the expences of his detachment, did not approve of any alteration in the articles of the treaty; giving it as his opinion, "that the exchange of territory with *Futty* "*Sing* was equitable, and proportioned to the claims of "each party, and calculated to promote the true in- "tereſts of the Company." But we obſerve, that the Calcutta Board were not induced by his reaſonings to make any change in their former orders reſpecting the demand on *Futty Sing*; and although in regard to *Ragoba*, they at laſt hardly conſented to ſuffer the General to allow him 10,000 rupees per month, which was repreſented to be neceſſary for the bare ſubſiſtence of himſelf and family, they accompanied this indulgence with a ſevere reprimand for the deviation from their directions about ſuch allowances.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 2 Oct. 1780. Appx. No. 318.

Appx. No. 318. See alſo Appx. No. 318. 2 Oct. and 9 Oct. 1780.

But we perceive, that even the acquiſitions made in the rich country of the Guzerat were not univerſally eſteemed in the clear and undiſputed light of benefit and reſource. Upon this point Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* wrote as follows in their Minute of 29th June: "An "open country has been conquered, which at ſome "future day, if the promiſed collections from it ſhould "be made, is to return 30 lacks a year to the Com- "pany. Againſt this acquiſition the permanent expence "of an increaſe of eſtabliſhment to regulate and defend "it muſt be placed: and the value of the remainder "compared with the charge of the expedition. The "Company will then know at what price they have "acquired a new territory on the Malabar coaſt. At "the end of February laſt, the ſums remitted to this "detachment alone, amounted to almoſt ſeventy-ſix "lacks of current rupees; and we are convinced, that we "are much within bounds in computing that a crore "of rupees will not clear it to the end of October."

Minute of Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler, 15 June—and Gov. General, 25 June—and alſo Meſſrs. F. and W. on Major Camac's Firſt Expedition, 29 June. 1782. See Appx. No. 286.

The charge of the other detachments, which had been or were ſtill in actual ſervice, were at various times ſtated by different Members of the Council to have amounted to a great and inconvenient addition of expence, in caſe of which alſo it did not appear that the Ranna of *Ghode* had diſcharged any part of the ſubſidy ſtipulated by the treaty.

And your Committee find, that in the month of Auguſt, when the calamities of war had ſpread themſelves ſtill wider and with greater ruin over the Company's poſſeſſions, it became expedient to propoſe the taking up money at intereſt to ſupply the increaſing neceſſities of Government. The Governor General introduced that propoſition with the following unpleaſing compariſon of times paſt and preſent: "When I "took charge of this Government under the former "ſyſtem of it, I found it loaded with a bonded debt of "one crore and one lack of rupees, which amount "in a very ſhort time after grew to one crore and "twenty-five lacks. It was my good fortune and happineſs to ſee this enormous debt wholly reduced, "and a ſum accumulated in our treaſuries, which, as "I recollect, amounted at one time to two crore and "twenty-one lacks of rupees. Since that time our expences have been increaſing, our means declining "(I will not in this place enumerate the cauſes of both), "and it is now my hard lot, and a painful duty impoſed "upon me by the neceſſity of the times, to propoſe, that "we ſhould again have recourſe to the means of ſupplying "our growing wants, and provide againſt the multiplying "exigencies not of this State only, but of the other preſidencies, whoſe exiſtence muſt depend upon our "care of them, by taking up money at intereſt. The "ſum I do not propoſe, becauſe I think it ſhould not "be limited."

Gov. General's Minute, 28 Aug. 1780. Appx. No. 324. See alſo Appx. No. 304, and 310.

It is needleſs here to repeat the obſervations made upon the Maratta war by the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, and their frequent remonſtrances againſt the continuance of it. In the beginning of this year Sir *Thomas Rumbold* drew up a large body of remarks on the actual ſyſtem and ſtate of politics in *India*, in which, as the copy of it in the Appendix No. 325 will ſhew, he made very ſevere animadverſions on the conduct of the Bengal Government in that reſpect, by an examination and cenſure of every proceeding relative to the Maratta war; and he further charged them with the acculation of a wilful continuance of it by their exceſſive demands, and by neglect of the proper opportunities for accommodation. The Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, in their letter of the 3d April, ſeem to have held very nearly the ſame language.

Appx. No. 325

Appx. No. 326

It will be remembered how earneſtly ſolicitous the Nabob of *Arcot* declared himſelf about this time for a pacification with the Marattas, and what were the conceſſions he recommended to be offered to them; but it will alſo be remembered how great were his alarms on account of *Hyder Ally*.

The opinions of Sir *Eyre Coote* while abſent from the Board have been alſo referred to, and have ſhewn how ſtrongly he inforced the neceſſity of pacification, at the ſame time that he recommended a more vigorous proſecution of the war; and your Committee obſerve, in his letter of the 11th May upon this ſubject, ſome ſtriking marks of the ſenſe he then entertained of the danger, as alſo of the value of the Company's poſſeſſions: "The "utmoſt of my ambition is to co-operate with you in "every meaſure of public benefit, and to be enabled by "that means ſucceſsfully to ſupport the honour and in- "tereſt of the nation in this part of the world, at a time "when the event of affairs at home may render theſe "poſſeſſions of ſtill more eſſential conſequence to us "than we have yet had occaſion, valuable as they really "are, to eſtimate them at."

See Appx. No. 282 and 286.

The arguments and reaſonings of the Superior Government, and of the ſeveral Members of it, on the origin and proſecution of the Maratta war, have been laid before the Houſe in ſufficient detail. But your Committee have alſo found, that at the cloſe of this year, when the ſteps we have related had been taken for the more ſpeedy termination of it, and while they were waiting in expectation of an anſwer from the Court of *Berar*, for the approbation of the terms of the treaty which *Moodajee* was to mediate and to guarantee, the Governor General took occaſion to expreſs his ſentiments of it to the Secret Committee of the India Company; and he appears to have been induced to do ſo by the provocation of a charge upon himſelf, as being the author of it; to contradict which, he obſerved, the Court of Directors were in poſſeſſion of the fulleſt evidence: and "that the occaſion of the war was planned "and executed without the knowledge or previous con- "currence of the Bengal Government, which had no "other participation in it, than in providing, by an ex- "traordinary exertion, for the ſupport of the meaſures "undertaken by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, if they ſuc- "ceeded; and for its preſervation, if they failed." And he remarked, how ſeaſonably their detachment had arrived for the laſt of thoſe objects, and the redemption of the national honour, which had been without it irretrievably loſt. He had flattered himſelf, that the war would have been ſoon terminated in ſuch advantages as would have amply atoned for the paſt calamities which had attended it. The ſubject was now reduced to an argument of unavailing ſpeculation, "in which every "perſon was at liberty to form his own opinion."

Letter dated 24 Dec. 1780. Appx. No. 328.

The war, at leaſt in the *Carnatic*, which was the preſent object of their anxiety and exertion, could not, he ſuppoſed, be imputed to the Government of *Bengal*. For the occaſion of that event he accounted by the following explanation: "If the extorted and palliated con- "feſſion of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* may be credited, "and we have the evidence of the moſt public notoriety "to confirm it, it was the ſole effect of a confederacy "formed at his inſtigation, and dictated by his reſent- "ment of the infringements made by the Select Com- "mittee of *Fort Saint George*, on his rights obtained by "the treaty ſubſiſting between him and the Company, "and his natural apprehenſion of hoſtilities intended by "that Government againſt him. Whatever be the "cauſe, ſuch have been the effects; and it is our duty "to do all that may be in our power to avert them."

Your Committee indeed find, that the effects of this extenſive ſcene of warfare were at this time moſt ſeverely felt; and that, in addition to the neceſſity of borrowing money at intereſt, by which the ſum of R^{s} 64,44,601. 1. 6. had been raiſed, the alarming expedient of making a large reduction, or poſſibly a total ſuſpenſion of the Company's inveſtment for the enſuing year, ſeemed to be inevitable. Of this probable event the Governor General gave notice to the Court of Directors in the letter referred to; but at the ſame time he endeavoured to leſſen the ſhock, by aſſurances of the care which had been taken, in conjunction with the

Board of Trade, to prevent the inconveniencies to which the buſineſs of inveſtment might be liable on its renewal; and by the further encouragement of hope, that the mediation of the Court of *Berar* would be entirely conſonant to his own wiſhes; and that the example of that Government would contribute to turn the ſcale, in which the Poonah Adminiſtration might be ſuppoſed to balance their determination in favour of the Engliſh;—to that quarter, indeed, he appears to have looked with peculiar intereſtedneſs and anxiety. "With the aid, or "even neutrality of this Power, I have no doubt of "being able to make the reſources of this Government "equal to every ſervice which may be exacted from "them, both for the maintenance of the actual peace of "theſe Provinces, and the reſtoration of your affairs in "the *Carnatic*, however deſperate they may now appear, "if they continue under the conduct of your preſent "Commander in Chief."

Your Committee obſerve theſe to be the outlines of the picture drawn by ſome of the principal actors in the great ſcene of troubles, which marked this as perhaps the moſt awful and intereſting period that has yet been preſented of the political ſtate of the Company's affairs in *India*; eſpecially when it is recollected that Sir *Edward Hughes*, at that time upon the Coaſt of *Coromandel*, had received accounts of a very powerful French ſquadron, which was naturally imagined to have for its object an attack upon ſome of the Britiſh ſettlements in thoſe parts. See First Report.

To render this repreſentation of their political circumſtances, and particularly under the Preſidency of *Bengal*, more complete, your Committee have made up ſuch accounts of the revenues and military force as the defective return of the materials would allow, in the papers hereunto annexed.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company in *Bengal*, from May 1779 to October 1780; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	CR^s.	CR^s.
Balances in the Treaſuries - -	39,74,109	
Money borrowed at Intereſt - - - - - - - - - - - - -		43,14,472
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - - - - - -		1,36,358
Bills of Exchange unaccounted for - - - - - - - - - - -		6,153
Contract with Country Government for Materials, &c. for building - - - - -		2,47,451
Account Depoſits - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		12,99,988
Unclaimed Goods - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		11,822
Tuncan Account - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		54,915
Military Fund - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		11,50,720
Sundry Old Debts - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		6,265
Money refunded on Account of General Coote's Commiſſion - - - - - -		39,050
Cur^t Rupees - - -		72,67,193

Mem^r. No accounts are received of what is due for ſtipends, &c. in this period.

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted,
John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

ABSTRACT GENERAL RETURN of the TROOPS

		European Commissioned Officers.												European Non-commissioned and Private.						
		Brigadier General.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Cornets.	Ensigns.	Total.	Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matrosses.	Rank and File.	Total.
European.	Artillery, 1 Regiment	-	-	1 Com.t. 1	2	11	10	30	37	-	-	92	43	58	60	28	767	- -	913
	Engineers Corps	-	-	1	1	4	-	5	-	-	7	18	-	-	-	-	-	- -	- -
	Infantry, 3 Regiments	1	2	6	6	52	-	99	-	-	43	209	-	189	-	108	-	1,627	1,924
	Foreign Rangers, 1 Company	-	-	- -	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	3	-	5	-	3	-	103	111
	Invalids	-	-	1	-	3	-	1	-	-	1	6	-	67	10	7	40	177	301
Hindoſtan.	Cavalry, Governor's Body Guard, 1 Troop	-	-	- -	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	- -	3
	Cavalry, 3 Regiments	-	-	- -	3	3	-	17	-	18	-	41	-	11	-	-	-	- -	11
	Infantry, 45 Battalions	-	-	3	7	44	-	229	-	-	87	370	-	-	-	-	-	- -	- -
	Militia and Invalid Sepoys	-	-	- -	-	5	-	2	-	-	6	13	-	16	-	-	-	- -	16
	TOTAL preſent Strength	1	2	13	19	124	10	386	37	18	145	755	43	349	70	146	807	1,907	3,279
	Supernumeraries	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	7	-	1	10	-	15	-	-	-	- -	15
	Wanting to complete	-	-	- -	-	3	-	23	-	-	138	164	-	2	-	2	83	1,376	1,463
	ESTABLISHMENT	1	2	12	19	126	10	409	30	18	282	909	-	336	70	148	890	3,283	4,727

		Native Officers, &c.										NATIVE							
		Subadars.	Sirdar Jemautdars.	Jemautdars.	Rifaldars.	Duffadars.	Naggers.	Tom Toms and Trumpeters.	Havildars, Naicks, and Sepoys.	Troopers.	Total.	Commandants.	Aſſiſtants.	Havildars Maj.	Munſhee D.o	Duffadar D.o	Sircars.	Doctors.	
Hindoſtan	Cavalry, Governor Body's Guard, 1 Troop	-	-	- -	1	6	-	2	- -	110	119	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-	
	Cavalry, 3 Regiments	-	6	39	-	79	20	Drum.ts 802 Tom. T. 229	- -	1,245	1,389	-	-	-	4	Duf. 7 Mutſuddies 15	-	7	
	Infantry, 45 Battalions	452	-	877	-	-	-		35,177	- -	37,537	45	46	34	-	- -	435	137	
	Laſcars attached to different Corps	-	-	- -	-	-	-	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	-	-	-	- -	9	18	
	Militia and Invalid Sepoys	87	-	108	-	-	-	Drum.ts 54 T. Toms. 58	7,165	- -	7,472	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-	
	TOTAL preſent Strength	539	6	1,024	1	85	20	Dr. 856	T. T. 289	42,342	1,355	46,517	45	46	34	4	7 15	444	162
	Supernumeraries	18	-	333	-	7	2	-	-	- -	- -	360	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
	Wanting to complete	-	-	- -	-	-	-	10	-	429	213	652	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
	ESTABLISHMENT	521	6	691	1	78	18	866	289	42,771	1,568	46,809	45	46	34	4	7 15	444	162

under *Fort William* Preſidency, September 1780.

European Staff, &c.																					Supernumeraries.					Wanting to complete.										
Aſſiſtant Quarter Maſter General.	Brigade Majors.	Aids de Camp.	Adjutants.	Quarter Maſters.	Chaplains.	Deputy J. Advocates.	Paymaſters.	Deputy D°.	Surgeons Major.	Surgeons.	D° Aſſiſtants.	Drill Serjeants.	D° Corporals.	Pay Serjeants.	Camp Colour Men.	Serjeant Majors.	Quarter Maſter Serjeants.	Drum and Fife Majors.	Lieutenant Colonel.	Captain.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Enſigns.	Serjeants.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Adjutants.	Surgeons.	Aſſiſtant D°.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matroſſes.	Rank and File.	
-	1	1	5	5	-	-	1	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	83	-	
3	3	4	6	6	3	3	3	3	3	1	11	2	2	18	18	6	6	12	-	-	-	1	15	2	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,376	
-	1	-	3	2	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	48	5	-	-	-	-	-	7	7	45	-	-	-	45	48	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	138	2	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	
3	5	5	63	18	3	3	5	5	4	12	21	47	2	18	18	54	55	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	7	1	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	23	138	2	1	3	2	2	83	1,376	
3	5	5	65	18	3	3	5	5	4	13	24	47	2	18	18	54	55	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

Staff, &c.							Lascars.						Supernumeraries.						Wanting to complete.							
Writers.	Farriers.	Armourers, &c.	Head Chacklers.	Inferior D°.	Watermen.	Pioneers.	Serangs.	Commandant.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Coſſobs.	Lascars.	Total.	Subadars.	Jemaudars.	Duffadars.	Naggers.	Seraugs.	Tindals.	Lascars.	Jemaudars.	Drummers.	Sepoys.	Troopers.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Coſſobs.	Lascars.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	7	22	4	11	44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	213	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	455	345	-	2	58	69	940	1,069		18	329	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	429	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	54	-	10	74	184	136	4,337	4,741		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	5	2	153
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	7	22	4	11	553	345	10	76	242	205	5,277	5,810		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		18	333	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	5	2	153	164		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	429	213	4	5	2	153
2	7	22	4	11	553	345	10	80	247	207	5,430	5,974		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

DISPOSITION of the *Bengal* TROOPS, 1ſt October 1780.

CORPS.	DIVISIONS.	Where ſtationed.
Artillery	3 Companies and a Half	At the Preſidency.
	½ a Company	— Midnapore.
	2 D°	Under Orders for embarkation for Madras.
	1 D°	Berhampore.
	1 D° and a Half	In the Field, Cawnpore.
	1 D°	D° Futty Ghur.
	1 D°	D° at and near Gwalior.
	With a Battalion of Laſcars, ſtrength 330, attached to each Company, with Brigadier General Goddard's Golandaazes, 1 Company.	
1ſt Brigade	Firſt Regiment of Cavalry	With General Goddard.
	1 Regiment of European Infantry, 2 Battalions	1ſt Battalion at the Preſidency.
		2d D° under orders for Madras.
	5 Battalions of Sepoys	Preſidency.
	4 D° D°	Midnapore, and that neighbourhood to the Southward.
	1 D° D°	Chandernagore.
	1 D° D°	Dinapore.
2d Brigade	2d Regiment of Cavalry	Futty Ghur.
	2d D° D° of European Infantry, 2 Battalions	Cawnpore.
	7 Battalions of Sepoys	D°.
	3 D° - D°	Marched towards Gwalior.
	1 D° - D°	Chunar Ghur.
3d Brigade	3d Regiment of Cavalry	Futty Ghur.
	3d D° of European Infantry, 2 Battalions	Berhampore.
	4 Battalions of Sepoys	D°.
	1 D° - D°	Boggah.
	4 D° - D°	Futty Ghur.
	2 D° - D°	Daranaghur.
	6 Battalions of Sepoys	With Brigadier General Goddard.
	3 D° - D°, Drafts	At and near Gwalior.
Independent Corps	Governor General's Troop of Moguls	Preſidency.
	European Company of Foreign Rangers	Gwalior.
	1 Battalion of Sepoys	Chittagong.
	1 D° Light Infantry	Gwalior.
	1 D° - D°	Ramghur.
	European Invalids	At the Preſidency, Budge Budge, and Chunar Ghur.
	Militia Sepoys, 58 Companies, and Invalids D°, ſtationed at	Preſidency.
		Moorſhedabad.
		Patna.
		Dacca.
		Dinagepore.
		Burdwan.
		Boglepore.
		Buxar, and Chunar Ghur.

We ſhall now properly carry our attention from this view to ſee and examine the circumſtances and condition of things on the other coaſt, which was the chief theatre of action. And your Committee find, that while theſe ſteps were taking by the Superior Council, to put an end to hoſtilities with the Maratta Government, General *Goddard*, who had cantoned his army during the rainy ſeaſon, after taking effectual poſſeſſion of the Guzerat Province, was making preparations for an enſuing campaign. By the orders of the Court of Directors, under date of the 12th April 1780, which were received at *Bombay* on the 1ſt day of October following, and were immediately tranſmitted to General *Goddard*, he found himſelf confirmed in the local rank of Brigadier General, appointed Commander in Chief of the forces under the Government of *Bombay*, and to a ſeat as third in the Council and Select Committee of that Preſidency.

Appx. No. 329.

But your Committee deſire to refer the Houſe to the Appendix, No. 330, wherein we have placed General *Goddard*'s Letter to the Governor General and Council, under date 6th September, which incloſed ſeveral papers, containing a full deſcription of the poſture of affairs under that Preſidency, and of the plan of operations propoſed for the campaign. And it appears, that the deſign of an attack upon the important fortreſs of *Baſſein* was impatiently preſſed forward by the Select Committee of *Bombay*; who, about the middle of September, received intelligence from their Reſident at *Goa*, of the ſecret intrigues of the Portugueſe Government with the Court of *Poonah*; and that they had actually received orders from thence to the Governor of *Baſſein*, for admitting

Ben. Sec. Conſ. Nov. 1780. See alſo Conſ. 3d Oct.—Governor Hornby's Minute, &c.

Appx. No. 330.

Extract of a Letter from Bombay to Bengal, dated 23d Sep 1780.

Appx. No. 331.

mitting a Portugueſe garriſon therein, and were making haſty preparations to be before-hand with the Engliſh in getting poſſeſſion of it.

Appx. No. 332. See Letter from General Goddard to the Governor General and Council, 15 Oct. 1780.

It alſo appears that General *Goddard*, after his return from *Bombay* to *Surat*, had been delayed in commencing the ſiege of that place, merely by the badneſs of the roads, which had continued impaſſable longer than was expected; that however, on the 15th October, he wrote to the Governor General and Council, informing them that he ſhould move forward the next day directly to proſecute that object, and that he had taken all neceſſary precautions for the protection of the *Guzerat*, which was likely to yield a very large acceſſion of revenue in the courſe of that ſeaſon: that he had no apprehenſions of any formidable oppoſition in that quarter, except from the united forces of *Scindia* and *Holkar*, from which alſo he hoped to be relieved by their neceſſary attention to the defence of their own northern poſſeſſions againſt another detachment of troops reported to have been ſent from *Bengal* into the territories of *Gohud*. Your Committee do not find that the deſigns of the Portugueſe went beyond report; and indeed we have obſerved, that the Governor General and Council at once regarded it as a vain and imaginary alarm. The General appears to have arrived before *Baſſein*, on the 13th November, and finding the place very ſtrong, and defended by a numerous garriſon, he determined to carry on his operations with regularity and precaution. But the account of his proceedings, during the proſecution of the ſiege, till it ſurrendered at diſcretion on the 11th December, will be found in the letter to which we refer in the Appendix, No. 334, with other particulars of the advantages derived from this acquiſition, which had been ſo long the favourite object of ambition to the Company, and to their ſervants in *India*.

Appx. No. 333. Extract of a Letter from Bengal to the Court of Directors, 15th Jan. 1781.

Extract of Letter from Select Committee of Bombay to Court of Directors, 11th Jan. 1781. Appx. No. 334.

See Appx. No. 329.

Your Committee find, that in conſequence of orders from the Court of Directors, dated 12th April 1780, received the 1ſt October, the diſmiſſion of Mr. *Carnac* from the Council and Select Committee of *Bombay* took place immediately, and Mr. *Stackhouſe* ſucceeded to the youngeſt ſeat in the Committee; General *Goddard*, as has before been obſerved, being appointed to a conſtant ſeat as third. And we perceive, that immediately after the reduction of *Baſſein*, the General repaired to *Bombay*, to conſult with the Board reſpecting the further operations of the army. But that a very material change had then taken place in the political ſituation of the Company's affairs, as an account had been ſome time before received from *Fort Saint George*, of the irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*; and the Admiral, Sir *Edward Hughes*, on his arrival with the fleet on the 19th December, brought a confirmation of the diſaſter which had befallen a part of the Madras army under the command of Colonel *Baillie*, and at the ſame time a letter from Sir *Eyre Coote* to General *Goddard*, adviſing an attack upon *Hyder*'s poſſeſſions on the Malabar coaſt, which the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* had on the firſt notice of *Hyder*'s invaſion before recommended to the Bombay Government, and hoped they would be in a ſituation to act with vigour in it. With theſe alarming accounts, however, from the coaſt of *Coromandel*, it appears that the Select Committee of *Bombay* received advices, dated the 9th of October, from the Governor General and Council, communicating their determination to offer peace to the Marattas on certain conditions, a copy of which was incloſed; containing alſo directions to the Committee to ſuſpend all hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, on receipt of a requiſition in writing from the Miniſter to that effect, and a notification that the like order had been given on his part to the officers commanding the Peiſhwa's armies; and recommending it however to them, and to General *Goddard*, that until the receipt of ſuch requiſition and notification, they ſhould make a vigorous proſecution of the war againſt them.

Appx. No. 335. N° 9, 10, and 11, in Sir Edward Hughes's Packet, dated 2d Jan. 1781.

See Gen. Sec. Conf. 9th Oct. 1780. Appx. No. 336.

And your Committee find, that a body of *Hyder*'s troops, in concert with the Maratta Powers, had made a joint attack on the ſettlement of *Tellicherry* immediately after *Hyder*'s open declaration of hoſtilities; and that the Government of *Bombay*, thinking themſelves bound to give their principal attention and exertions to the Marratta war, found it expedient to abandon *Tellicherry* altogether; that this reſolution, however, had been ſuſpended till the receipt of the opinion of the Madras Preſidency, for which they had applied, declaring themſelves unequal to the maintenance of the place by any further contribution of either men, money, or ſtores. It appears however, that the Admiral, in his paſſage round to *Bombay*, had touched at *Tellicherry*, and had prevailed upon the Chief and Council, with the Commandant of the garriſon, to come to an unanimous reſolution of defending it, and had provided them with a reinforcement of men, and ſupplies of ammunition and military ſtores, proviſions, and money; and in his account of theſe proceedings, which will be found in the Appendix, No. 338, he inſinuated ſome complaint againſt the Committee of *Bombay*, perceiving by their letters, that notwithſtanding the known diſtreſs of the Company's "affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, and "of their own ſettlement of *Tellicherry*, the Maratta "war was ſtill uppermoſt in their minds." Your Committee obſerve, that in the letter alluded to, the Gentlemen of *Bombay* expreſſed great anxiety for ſucceſs in the operations againſt *Baſſein*, which were at that time on the eve of commencing: and we further obſerve, that the Select Committee, in their account of the Admiral's proceedings at *Tellicherry*, remarked, that he was then in poſſeſſion of the Governor General and Council's intentions of offering peace to the Marattas.

Appx. No. 337. See Appx. No. 334.

No. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, in Sir Edward Hughes's Packet. Appx. No. 338.

Letter from Bombay to Sir Edward Hughes, dated 13 Nov. 1780. No. 338.

Such appears to have been the information which the Select Committee of *Bombay* were poſſeſſed of relative to the ſtate of political affairs, when, on the 23d of December, they held a meeting, at which the Admiral aſſiſted, (General *Goddard* being alſo in his place) to conſult on the proper meaſures which would be taken at that juncture: and the reſult of their deliberations appears to have been, that although the Admiral at firſt pointed out the great neceſſity of aiding the operations of the Madras Government, by a powerful diverſion againſt *Hyder*'s territories on the Malabar Coaſt, and urged the expediency of an immediate peace with the Marattas, for the more effectual purpoſe of diſtreſſing the invader of the *Carnatic*; he at laſt concurred, that a vigorous proſecution of the Maratta war, as recommended by the Governor General and Council, promiſed to promote a ſpeedy accommodation, which they all wiſhed for, ſooner than any other plan of conduct. But they, however, at the ſame time reſolved to maintain the ſettlement of *Tellicherry*, as the only place of ſtrength they poſſeſſed in *Hyder*'s dominions, and the attack whereof occupied a part of his force. And we perceive, that on the 24th, the Select Committee applied to the Admiral for the aſſiſtance of two of His Majeſty's ſhips, on an expedition againſt the Maratta town and fort of *Arnaul*, ſituate on a ſmall iſland at the entrance of a river of that name, which formed the northern boundary of *Baſſein*; and that he, in conſequence of this application, ordered the *Worceſter* and *Coventry* upon that ſervice. The meaſure which your Committee find was principally recommended by General *Goddard*, and which the Select Committee, out of reſpect to the Governor General (with whoſe authority he was inveſted) did not oppoſe, though they had at firſt ſuggeſted a different plan, was to ſecure the paſſes of the Ghauts, and to carry the terror of their arms as near the enemy's capital as poſſible, without riſking too far the ſafety of the troops, or endangering their return.—And it appears to your Committee, by a letter from *Bombay* to the Court of Directors, dated 31ſt March, that the expedition againſt *Arnaul* was attended with

See Bombay Sel. Conf. 12 Dec. 1780.

Appx. No. 339. No. 12, in Sir Edward Hughes's Packet.

Appx. No. 340. Letter dated 23 Dec. 1780.

See alſo Appx. No. 339.

Appx. No. 342. Bomb. Sel. Conf. Feb. 8th 1781.

No. 342.

with complete ſucceſs, and that the General forced the enemy's poſts on the hills, and gained poſſeſſion of the paſs of *Bhore Ghaut*.

Appx. No. 342. Letter from General Goddard to Bombay, dated 13 Feb. 1781.

And we perceive, that while the army was encamped in that ſituation, a Maratta Agent came to the General, though without any formal credentials of deputation, and pretending ignorance of any overtures which had been made to the Court of *Poonah*, deſired to know the terms which the Engliſh would expect in any plan of pacification. The General, with the advice of the Select Committee, tranſmitted a copy of the articles in a letter to the Miniſters, containing the moſt friendly profeſſions; and received in reply, a poſitive refuſal to accede to them, with an intimation, that they had been diſapproved of by the Rajah of *Berar*, who had for that reaſon ſent them back to the Governor General and Council. In conſequence of this aſſurance, that hoſtilities were not to be terminated, and having accompliſhed every object which they propoſed to acquire in the courſe of the war, the Select Committee, in concert with General *Goddard*, reſolved to direct their future attentions to a mere ſyſtem of defence, in the protection of their preſent acquiſitions, and the reduction of their great military expences, in which view they made preparations to ſend back all the Madras troops ſerving on that coaſt. And the paſs of *Bhore Ghaut*, where the General had at firſt propoſed to fix a fortified poſt, being upon more mature reflection abandoned by him in the beginning of April, he effected his retreat, though not without loſs, to *Panwell*, and from thence to the neighbourhood of *Callian*, which, as a centrical ſituation, was held the moſt optionable for the cantonment of the troops during the rainy ſeaſon. The Europeans and Bombay troops only were to be brought into their own garriſon.

See also Bombay Sel. Conf. 7 and 24 March 1781.

Appx. No. 343. Select Letter from Bombay, 30 April 1781, and 27 May Do.

In the article of finances, your Committee have obſerved the great and diſtreſſing deficiencies of which the Government of *Bombay* had conſtantly complained, from the low ſtate of their treaſury, and the want of reſources of any kind for a ſupply. We have found that they had been deſirous to procraſtinate the recommencement of hoſtilities with the Marattas, and complained of the ſmall aſſiſtance they had received or were promiſed from the Superior Government. They had forbidden General *Goddard* to draw any more money from the Surat Treaſury, whence he had taken 4 lacks of rupees, becauſe of their own diſtreſſes; and repreſented the advance of 6 lacks to him, between September 1779 and January 1780, as a moſt heavy deduction from their limited income; and that upon his preſſing ſolicitations, they had been obliged to make the remittance of two lacks of that ſum out of a loan of 5 to 6 lacks, which they had raiſed for their own immediate expences, by the negociation of their Chief at *Surat*. It has appeared, that from the ſame ground of neceſſity, they had refuſed to give countenance to a loan for the uſe of *Futty Sing*, and had expreſsly announced to the Government of *Bengal*, that not only the reſponſibility, but the expences of the war muſt reſt upon them. And we perceive, that the ſcarcity of grain which was much apprehended at *Bombay*, in the beginning of the year 1780, became a more alarming evil, from this circumſtance, that the Company's treaſury was not able to furniſh money for the purchaſe of any.

Sec. Letter from Bombay to Court of Directors, 31 Dec. 1779.

See Appx. No. 257.

Ibid.

See Letter from Bombay to Bengal, 2 Jan. 1780.—Bombay Sel. Conſ. 31 Dec. 1779.—Letter from Surat.—See Letter from Bombay to the Court of Directors, 30 April 1780.—Bombay Sel. Conſ. 18 Jan. 1780. See Letter from Bombay to General Goddard, 28 Jan. 1780. Appx. No. 344. See Appx. No. 256. A. and 257. B. 4 April 1780. No. 344.

It is proper to obſerve, that the expences of the Bombay troops ſerving under General *Goddard*, were increaſed beyond the uſual allowance of that eſtabliſhment, the Select Committee having unanimouſly agreed with the General, that it would be expedient to raiſe their pay to an equality to that of the Bengal forces, while they ſhould ſerve together, explaining however to the army, that this indulgence was not to be conſidered as a precedent; and at the ſame time the Paymaſter and Commiſſary were directed to make their drafts on General *Goddard*, for the expence of the Bombay detachment.

See Appx. No. 253. A. Bombay Sel. Conſ. 16 Nov. 1779.—See alſo Mr. Hornby's Minute, 1 Aug. 1780. Par. 6. *See Appx. No. 330.*

It will be remembered, that when they found the war to be inevitable, the principal object of the plan which they recommended for the conduct of it, was to ſecure a territorial poſſeſſion, yielding a ſufficient revenue not only to anſwer the preſent, but alſo the paſt and future expences of their Government. But your Committee find, that an alarm of a diſappointment to their hopes in this reſpect, by a letter from the Governor General and Council, upon the appropriation of the revenues ariſing from the conquered countries, was very ſtrikingly marked in the following paragraph of their letter, dated 25th July 1780, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

"We have the moſt alarming apprehenſions of the "difficulties we ſhall experience the enſuing ſeaſon for "want of money; having lately received a letter from "the Governor General and Council, acquainting us, "that their own diſtreſs will put it out of their power "to make additional remittances equal to the ſupport "of this Preſidency, and the pay of the large army "under General *Goddard*; and therefore, deſiring that "every acceſſion of income which may ariſe to the "Company from the ſucceſs of that army, may be ſet "aſide, and appropriated excluſively to that; and thus "cutting off the principal reſource we had dependence "on for our immediate exigencies, we have only the "hope, that when they receive our propoſal for the "reduction of theſe intolerable military charges, and "ſee the ſtrong meaſure we have actually taken to "make it practicable, which of courſe will require an "extraordinary proviſion for the preſent, they will at "leaſt leave us in poſſeſſion of our own reſources; and, "encouraged by the proſpect of ſome end to ſuch "heavy drains, that they will make a vigorous effort to "give ſucceſs to our plan, and exonerate us from the "charge of maintaining ſuch ruinous auxiliaries."

Your Committee have however obſerved, that General *Goddard* had himſelf, in a letter dated 28th of March 1780, to the Governor General and Council, ſuggeſted and recommended this mode of ſupply for his army, by the appropriation of the acquired revenues to it.

Appx. No. 3[illegible] Ben. Sec. Conſ. 15 May 1780.

It appears, indeed, that the Select Committee received, the end of July, a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated 10th of May, who therein requeſted them "to tranſmit, as ſoon as poſſible, "an eſtimate of their probable receipts and diſburſe-"ments for the enſuing year, included between the "30th April 1780 and 1ſt of May 1781, with an ac-"count of the actual receipts and diſburſements of their "Government for the preceding year; alſo a ſeparate "eſtimate of the groſs revenue and charges of collection "of the pergunnahs or diſtricts ceded to the Company "by the treaties of *Poorunder*, and that lately concluded "with *Futty Sing*; likewiſe an account of their bonded "debt, with the amount of intereſt due thereon, up to "the lateſt period."

Appx. 347.

The Select Committee, in anſwer, promiſed that they would ſend a more full reply to their letter; but in the mean time, returning to the plan they had formed for the reduction of military expences, and to the ſupport neceſſary for its firſt eſtabliſhment, they expreſſed their earneſt hope in theſe words: "that you will exert your "extenſive reſources to the utmoſt, to ſend round the "neceſſary ſupplies this ſeaſon, to give full efficacy to "your plan, and put an end to ſuch inſupportable "drains from your treaſury in future."

No. 347.

The return made to the general account above demanded, appears to have been received at *Calcutta* on the 3d October, accompanied with a letter of ſolicitation for ample and ſpeedy ſupplies, as they (the Bombay Government) were then in the utmoſt diſtreſs for money to defray even their ordinary expences.

Appx. No. 348.

See alſo Appx. No. 330.

Your Committee, in the proſecution of their enquiry on this part of the ſubject, have been much ſtruck with the

See alſo Letter from General Goddard to Bengal, dated 6 Sep. 1780. Appx. No. 349.

the ſympathetic tale of diſtreſs which they found in the following extract of a letter from General *Goddard* to the Select Committee, dated 24th Auguſt 1780. "I "obſerve with real concern and diſappointment the diſ- "treſs for money which you ſtrongly repreſent, becauſe "my own cannot be inferior; and the Honourable Go- "vernor General and Council have depended upon the "reſource of the new acquired revenue, for the greateſt "part of my ſupply. I have been compelled for ſome "time paſt, to draw bills upon them at a conſiderable "loſs (which nothing but the moſt urgent and extreme "neceſſity could juſtify) to provide for the mere ſub- "ſiſtence of the troops; but even this reſource has pro- "ved inadequate, and the army is greatly in arrear. It "is now no longer to be depended on."

Sel. Letter, 22 Jan. 1781. Appx. No. 344.

But your Committee obſerve, that at the beginning of the next year, the ſituation of the Preſidency became ſtill more indigent and intolerable, and this appears with additional weight from the introductory obſervation on the undiſturbed tranquillity in which their poſſeſſions to the northward had remained, and from which they expected to receive a conſiderable revenue the enſuing ſeaſon.—"This however (they added) will be far from equal "to our neceſſities, now preſſing to a degree never be- "fore experienced, as we are obliged to appropriate a "part for the expences of the Bengal army."

Your Committee have already obſerved, that the Government of *Bombay* found a ſerious addition to their expences in the defence of *Tellicherry*, firſt againſt the native Powers of the Malabar Coaſt, and afterwards againſt the united forces of *Hyder Ally* and the Marattas. It appears, that early in the year 1780, the Select Committee had been obliged to direct the Chief and factory to reſerve the whole balance of the treaſure in their hands for defraying the charges of the garriſon, and to lay out none of it in the purchaſe of pepper, as it would be impoſſible for the Preſidency to ſupply them with any further aſſiſtance of money. It has been remarked above, that various reſolutions had been taken and changed, at one time for abandoning and at another for defending that ſettlement; and it was mentioned in a former Report, that after the misfortunes in the *Carnatic*, the Preſidency of *Madras* had reſolved to withdraw all the troops from thence, and entirely to relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of it. The increaſed difficulties of the Bombay Government to furniſh ſufficient ſupport of money or grain, obliged them finally to agree in a like determination; the time was fixed, and within two days of completion for the departure of the fleet, in order to bring off the troops and ſtores, when the receipt of a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 7th January (which ought to have reached *Bombay* ſix or ſeven weeks ſooner) gave to the Committee an aſſurance of a preſent ſupply of five lacks of rupees, and a permiſſion to draw upon them for ſuch further ſums as they might ſtand in need of; a large quantity of rice was alſo promiſed, and part of it arrived. The knowledge of theſe reſources appears to have had the immediate effect of reviving the reluctance they had ſhewn to quit the poſſeſſion of that place, and made them once more alter their reſolution, and take immediate meaſures for preſerving it, by ſupplying the garriſon with a reinforcement of troops and ſtores; the Admiral, who was ſtill upon the coaſt, cheerfully complying with their requeſt to aſſiſt in the execution of this deciſive meaſure; and it appears by a letter from him to the Earl of *Hillſborough*, dated 15th May 1781, that on the 8th of that month, having arrived the day before at *Tellicherry*, and found it cloſely inveſted by the enemy under the command of *Sadur Cawn*, an officer of rank in *Hyder Ally*'s ſervice, he diſembarked from on board his ſquadron the Bombay reinforcement, conſiſting of 40 European artillery and 60 European infantry, and 1,160 Sepoys, with 40 artillery laſcars; and that 500 men in addition to that number arrived on the 10th; he alſo delivered to the garriſon a conſiderable ſupply of proviſions and ſtores, and having afterwards embarked the detachment of *Madras* under Major *Cotgrave*, amounting to 1,180 men, Europeans and Sepoys, he intended immediately to proceed to ſea, and make the beſt of his way to the Coromandel coaſt.

Select Conſ. 6 March 1780. Appx. No. 350.

See Appx. No. 269.

See Appx. Nos. 341 and 342.

Sel. Letter, 31 March. *See Appx. No. 341.*

Letter received the 18 April 1781. Appx. No. 351.

Sec. Sel. Letter, 30 April 1781. *See Appx. No. 343.*

Appx. No. 352.

It may not be improper here to remind the Houſe, that the Bombay Government had, long before their knowledge of the unfortunate events which had happened in the *Carnatic*, being very deſirous of ſending back both the Bengal and Madras detachment, in order (to give their reaſons in their own words, contained in their letter dated 6th June, to *Bengal*) "to relieve the Com- "pany from the moſt heavy expence which muſt be "incurred by their ſervice on this coaſt, but which "cannot be done until we put ourſelves in a condition "to defend our own poſſeſſions, without their aſſiſtance." See Appx. No. 273.

But your Committee obſerve, that in the ſame letter, purſuing their remarks on the intended plan for the augmentation of their own force, and ſtarting a difficulty which would ariſe from the deficiency in their European Corps, they expreſſed a hope of remedy even for that, in the following ſuggeſtion: "We hope the reinforce- "ments received this ſeaſon at *Bengal* and *Madras*, will "enable you to ſupply even this deficiency; the moſt "ready method of doing which will be to transfer the "privates and non-commiſſioned officers of the Madras "detachment now with General *Goddard* to this eſtab- "liſhment, which we hope that Government will be now "in a condition to ſpare."

It muſt however be remarked, that the Governor General and Council had, ſo early as the 20th April 1780, (which was a few days after the Europeans from *Madras* had really joined General *Goddard*, and before the ſepoys had reached him) expreſſed their wiſh, in a letter to him of that date, that he would return the whole or a part of the Fort Saint George detachment as ſoon as the ſeaſon would permit, and he could diſpenſe with their ſervices. But in his anſwer under date the 20th of June, being then at *Surat*, and about to canton his troops for the rainy ſeaſon, the General aſſured them, "that as far "as poſſible he would comply with their wiſhes reſpect- "ing the Fort Saint George detachment;" adding however this remark, "the reinforcements that have at this "time joined me from that Preſidency, conſiſt only of "one company of European artillery, ſeven of infantry, "and one battalion of Sepoys." See Appx. No. 280. See Appx. No. 274.

It does not appear that on the irruption of *Hyder Ally*, the Preſidency of *Madras*, or afterwards Sir *Eyre Coote*, on his arrival, demanded the return of their troops from the Malabar Coaſt; but rather, as has been obſerved, recommended a diverſion againſt *Hyder*'s territories in thoſe parts: and the Commander in Chief, in his letter to General *Goddard*, dated the 12th November 1780, ſtrongly enforced this advice, conſidering the ſituation of affairs with the Marattas as a very ſecondary buſineſs; and expreſſed a hope, that if an attack on any principal place belonging to *Hyder Ally* could be ſucceſsfully undertaken in concert with the Admiral, ſo as to oblige him to ſend ſome part of his vaſt force from the *Carnatic* to the defence of his own country, he ſhould think he might be able, even with the force he then had, to drive him out of the *Carnatic*. See Appx. 335.

Your Committee have explained the reſult of a conſultation on this ſubject at *Bombay*, on the 23d of December, and the ſubſequent tranſactions of the army under General *Goddard*. It appears, that Sir *Eyre Coote* incloſed in his own letter to General *Goddard*, another alſo addreſſed to him from the Governor General and Council, wherein they ſignified their commands for placing his detachment under Sir *Eyre Coote*'s orders; and it will be remembered what directions and authority they had given relative to the proſecution of the Maratta war, which Sir *Edward Hughes* remarked, "they (the "Select Committee of *Bombay*) appear to me more "diſpoſed to do, than to march the army under General "*Goddard* into the dominions of *Hyder Ally*, to make "the diverſion Sir *Eyre Coote* thought ſo neceſſary for the *See Appx.* 339. No. 353.

" the preſervation of the *Carnatic* againſt him, and " which indeed they cannot do till a reconciliation with " the Marattas takes place."

On the 31ſt of March however, your Committee find the Bombay Government " having then loſt all imme- " diate proſpect of a peace with the Marattas," and every object thay had propoſed to acquire in the courſe of the war being accompliſhed, informed the Court of Directors, " that they had taken meaſures in concert " with General *Goddard*, to yield what aſſiſtance they " could to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, and were " preparing to ſend back all the Fort Saint George " troops ſerving on that coaſt, by which their own " military charges would be greatly reduced, and the " army under General *Coote* ſtrengthened with a very " conſiderable reinforcement."

See letters from and to Gen. Goddard, Appx. 356. *See Appx. No.* 343.

The alterations which the reſolution of defending *Tellicherry*, and other circumſtances after the deſcent from the Ghauts, occaſioned in theſe meaſures, are explained in a letter from the Preſident and Select Committee to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, under date 27th May 1781; and it appears, that the Admiral carried with him in the middle of that month to the Coromandel Coaſt, only the detachment under Major *Cotgrave* from *Tellicherry*. Yet it is to be obſerved, that the *Ponſborne* was detained at *Bombay* till the Committee ſhould come to ſome final determination reſpecting the European Corps under Colonel *Brown*; and though no mention is made of its being embarked on board that ſhip, or on two others, which at laſt ſailed from thence on the 11th of July for *Madras*, yet there is ſome reaſon to believe it was then really ſent in them.

Letter dated 28 July.

Your Committee ſhould not have omitted to obſerve, that Sir *Edward Hughes*, in his way round to *Bombay*, in the months of November and December 1780, made two ſucceſsful attacks on *Hyder*'s naval force at *Calicut* and *Mangalore*, where he deſtroyed and took ſeveral ſhips, though one of his own frigates (the *Sartine*) had the misfortune to run upon the rocks at the former place, and was entirely loſt.

Letter from Sir Edw. Hughes, 2 Jan. 1781. See Appx. No. 318.

24 Nov. 1780.

2 Dec. Do.

After the departure of Sir *Edward Hughes* from that coaſt, and the reduction of their military force by the arrangements above-mentioned, the ſyſtem of defence, which the Government of *Bombay* had reſolved upon, became apparently yet more adviſeable; and your Committee perceive, by a letter from the Select Board to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, under date 28th July 1781, that they perſevered in the ſame intentions, not having received or offered any new overtures for accommodation with the Marattas. But it appears, that this plan did not ſeem to be agreeable to the ſentiments of the Governor General and Council, who had informed the Select Committee in a late diſpatch, that the unwillingneſs of the Miniſters to accept the offer of a treaty, did not diſappoint, but on the contrary, had rather pleaſed them, as it left them at liberty to ſecure to the Company the important poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, and the other advantages acquired at the time the propoſed treaty was written. Under this impreſſion, they intimated their wiſhes for a vigorous proſecution of the war, and that the utmoſt aid might be offered to General *Goddard*'s operations, the plan however of which had not yet been conſidered and ſettled.

Appx. No. 358. See alſo Appx. No. 351. Sec. Letter, dated 10 May, 1781.

The Bombay Committee appear alſo in this letter to urge many arguments in their defence againſt the imputation the Governor General and Council had brought againſt them, of a ſudden alteration of ſentiment with reſpect to the mode of proſecuting the war, which however they aſcribed to the failure of their expectations of bringing it to a happy termination, by the utmoſt exertion of their force during the interval allowed for the determinate anſwer of the Marattas to the propoſals for a pacification: and in ſupport of this explanation, they refer to their former reſolutions and proceedings. It ſeems indeed that the Superior Government had alſo communicated to the Bombay Committee, another motive of objection againſt any freſh advances to accommodation with the Poonah Durbar, becauſe " they had " formed a connection with the Berar Government, " which (they obſerved) they had every reaſonable hope " would be attended with a very eſſential change in their " political influence."

Advice of the rupture with *Holland* having been received at *Bombay*, your Committee find that orders were given to diſpoſſeſs the Dutch of their Factories at *Broach* and *Surat*. The latter ſervice had been executed, and there was reaſon to believe, that a conſiderable property would be found belonging to the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company, which would be ſecured for the benefit of the Engliſh Company.

This appears to be the amount of information which the laſt diſpatch brought from the Preſidency of *Bombay*. The papers immediately annexed will ſhew the ſtate and diſtribution of the forces on the Bombay eſtabliſhment, and exhibit ſome repreſentation of the ſtate of Revenue, as far as can be judged from the condition of the treaſuries and the amount of the Debt of that Preſidency. Your Committee have placed a more complete Account in an Appendix.

Appx. No. 357.

Appx. No. 364.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company, at *Bombay*, from May 1780 to May 1781; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Balances in the Treaſuries - - - -	7,45,529	
Debt at Intereſt - - - - - - - -		84,02,222
Due on Account Depoſits - - - - - - -		44,419
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - -		24,136
Rupees		84,70,777

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted,

John Annis,

Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Aids received at *Bombay* from *Bengal*, from 1780 to 1781.

	Rupees.
Bullin - - - - - - - - - -	4,71,587
Bills - - - - - - - - - -	4,22,315
Goods - - - - - - - - - -	—
Rup^{s}.	8,93,902
£. *st.*	111,738

Memo^{m}. No Bombay books are received ſince 1778-9; this year is extracted from the Bengal accounts, but the amount of goods ſent to *Bombay* cannot be aſcertained.

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted,

John Annis,

Auditor of Indian Account.

GENERAL RETURN of the Honourable Company's Troops

| | ARTILLERY. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | INFANTRY. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

under the Preſidency of *Bombay*, 14th May 1781.

SEPOYS.																				IRREGULARS.						INVALIDS.					
																					Tivеys.										
Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Adjutants.	Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Dolays.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subnaiks.	Trumpeters.	Fifes and Drums.	Watermen.	Bhaldars.	Waſhermen.	Barbers.	Artificers.	Sepoys.	Topaſſes.	Adjutant.	Serjeants.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Private.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Fifes and Drums.	Private.
3	18	-	3	3	23	43	20	3	126	125	9	5	55	20	24	22	9	24	1,171	10	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	8	10	1	100
1	17	-	2	2	18	36	11	2	95	104	5	3	44	14	19	16	8	15	1,029	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	27	-	3	3	33	59	16	3	174	179	9	6	62	30	28	29	26	22	2,043	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	18	-	2	2	22	38	11	2	116	117	6	4	44	19	16	3	4	18	1,351	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	1	-	-	-	2	4	2	-	12	12	-	1	4	4	-	-	-	-	163	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	9	-	1	1	9	18	5	1	59	60	3	2	22	11	9	8	3	9	651	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	13	1	2	2	15	24	7	2	67	82	5	3	34	10	13	11	7	9	866	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	6	-	-	-	6	8	3	-	26	31	1	1	9	3	7	2	2	9	476	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	4	-	-	-	4	7	3	-	22	20	-	1	8	2	1	3	3	-	192	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	1	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	6	6	-	-	2	1	1	1	1	-	82	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	22	4	3	2	28	48	14	3	134	137	8	-	59	17	20	15	5	22	1,578	55	-	2	1	24	239	-	-	-	1	-	21
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	4	7	3	-	37	34	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	529	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	136	5	16	15	165	294	96	16	814	907	46	26	353	131	138	110	68	128	10,131	67	-	2	1	24	239	2	1	8	11	1	134
-	1	-	-	1	8	23	77	-	90	57	2	6	-	27	20	48	-	16	869	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	137	-	16	16	173	317	173	16	964	964	48	32	348	158	158	158	-	144	11,000	-	1	2	1	24	239	-	-	-	-	-	-

Irregular Sepoys.	
	Sepoys.
Anjengo - -	8
Total - -	8

N. B. The Forces now conſiſt of Four Companies of Artillery, One Battalion of European Infantry, only Fifteen Battalions of Sepoys, with one of Marines, alſo a Native Portugueſe Corps.

	Since laſt Return.						
	Dead.	Deſerted.	Diſcharged.	Invalided.	Tranſferred.	Received.	Entertained.
Artillery - - -	67	44	5	-	5	97	7
Infantry - - -	109	89	27	1	177	120	22
Sepoys - - -	466	2,769	478	53	308	4,061	4,627
Native Portugueſe Corps	2	4	1	-	2	1	8
Total - -	644	2,906	511	54	492	4,279	4,664

(Signed) *L. Nilſon*,
Lieut. Colonel in Command of the Army.

Your Committee will now proceed to trace the ſource of ſome of the material incidents, of which we have yet made only a ſlight mention, under the adminiſtration of *Bengal*, beginning with the courſe of events that may appear to have immediately attended the offer of pacific propoſals, which (it has been obſerved) were ſent to the Court of *Berar*, as the moſt promiſing channel for the acceptance of them by the Government at *Poonah*.

Ben. Sec. Letter, dated 7 Jan. 1781. Appx. No. 360.

But as it has appeared to your Committee, that before the receipt of any anſwer from *Moodajee Booſla*, the Superior Council thought it neceſſary to conſider of other means alſo, by which they might poſſibly acquire an acceſſion of ſtrength to repel the attacks of the enemy, particularly in the *Carnatic*, we ſhall very briefly ſtate the meaſures which were the immediate conſequence of this policy. In addition to the ſupply of treaſure for the military expences of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, which they had remitted at the time of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s embarkation, they, in the opening of the year 1781, ordered to them the further ſum of CR[r] 4,23,672. 10. 3. and had taken ſteps to continue to that Preſidency ſupplies of grain and other articles of which they were in need; but as it was not in their power to furniſh them with a military force which appeared to be ſufficient for the immediate expulſion of the enemy, they were induced to propoſe a treaty of alliance with the Dutch, whoſe poſſeſſions at and adjacent to *Cochin* had lately been invaded by *Hyder Ally*. This negociation ſeems to have been formed under the advice of the Director and Governor of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company's ſettlements in *Bengal:* and the object of it was to obtain the aſſiſtance of a body of troops from the Government of *Cochin:* but as neither the Governors of *Colombo* nor *Cochin* could engage their aſſent without great perſonal reſponſibility, they having no regular powers to bind their Company in ſuch an act without the ſanction of the Superior Government of *Batavia*, for which there was no time to wait, the offer of ſome additional conceſſions appeared neceſſary, both to indemnify them and to win the concurrence of their ſuperiors. Urged by theſe conſiderations, the Governor General and Council propoſed the ceſſion of the Tinivelly country to the Dutch, which, for reaſons aſſigned, they thought might, without great loſs or danger, be ſeparated from the Government of the *Carnatic*; and they were alſo perſuaded that they had a right to expect ſuch a ſacrifice from the Nabob *Walaw Jaw* of part of his dominions, for the ſhare they took in the preſervation of the whole. The draft of the treaty, and the conſequences reſulting from it, and particularly the reception which the whole ſcheme met with at *Madras*, have been laid before the Houſe in the Supplement to the Firſt Report.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 4 Jan. 1781. Appx. No. 360.

And your Committee find, that the Superior Government was alſo at this time attentive to ſome proceedings of a ſimilar nature, by which they ſought to give ſupport to their affairs on the Malabar coaſt. We have already obſerved, that the ſuppoſed deſigns of the Portugueſe upon *Salſette* and *Baſſein* were not thought worthy of their ſerious attention, becauſe, indeed, whatever connection might ſubſiſt between the Portugueſe and the Marattas, its effect could not, from the condition of the party, become important, nor be ſuppoſed to weigh againſt the ſtrong conſideration of the alliance which had long ſubſiſted between the Engliſh and them; but as the hoſtilities and ambition of *Hyder Ally*, as well as thoſe of the Marattas, required now the full exertions of oppoſition and controul, and as *Hyder* had repeatedly offered inſults to the Portugueſe ſettlements, the Governor General and Council took occaſion upon that ground to make overtures to the Government at *Goa*, for an union with them in diſtreſſing that Prince by ſending a body of forces into his country. For this purpoſe a deputation was given to Mr. *Auriol*, with inſtructions, which will be found in the Appendix, No. 361; but it appears that the expectations of ſucceſs from

Appx. No. 361.

theſe propoſals were not very ſanguine, though the adminiſtration declared themſelves not willing to neglect even the remote chance of ſuch an advantage.

It will be remembered, that a reſolution had been taken by the Governor General and Council, when they ſent the reinforcements to *Madras* under Sir *Eyre Coote*, to detach alſo over-land a conſiderable body of Sepoys with their guns, and a company of European Artillery, the command of which was given to Lieutenant Colonel *Pearce*. This force, to which was afterwards added a company of *Golandaaze* and a troop of horſe, was collected near *Naraingbur* in *Midnapore*, but the movement of it from thence was delayed, till the anſwers from *Naigpore* ſhould arrive, leſt by a precipitate march into the *Cuttack*, before ſome terms of agreement were ſettled, that corps and the *Berar* troops might be expoſed to mutual hoſtilities. It has indeed appeared, that one great object of the application made to *Moodajee Booſla*, was not only to remove all alarm or impediment ariſing from the ſituation and number of his cavalry in the province of *Oriſſa*, but alſo to profit in ſome meaſure by that circumſtance, and to bring about a junction of a part of them, with the detachment of *Bengal*, in the expedition to the *Carnatic*, and an attack upon *Hyder Ally*. By this means, if accompliſhed, an immediate acceſſion of military ſtrength would not be the ſingle advantage to the Company's affairs, but the great confederacy between the Country Powers againſt the Engliſh might thereby be broken, and this the moſt formidable member of it be obliged afterwards to unite himſelf more cloſely with the new ally.

Appx. No. 362. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 3d Oct. 1780. Do 26 October. See Do. 2 Nov. 1780.

Ben. Sec. Letter, 27 April 1781.---Par. 19, 20.

See Appx. No. 364.

See alſo Letter and Narrative, dated 30th April.—Vide. infra.

But your Committee find, that on the 9th January 1781, the expected anſwers from *Nagpore* were received, and ſeem to have greatly diſappointed the hopes of the Board, as they contained ſo many objections to the propoſed treaty, that little room was left to hope for an immediate accommodation with the Government of *Poonah*; and it indeed further appears, that they contained a variety of claims and propoſitions aſſerted by *Moodajee* on his own account, "which, though they "were not wholly new (to uſe the expreſſion of the "Board) were recapitulated in a ſtyle that impreſſed us "with doubts regarding the ſincerity of *Moodajee*'s "former profeſſions and aſſurances."

See theſe Letters in Book of Appendix, accompanying the Letter of 30th April, marked No. 1, 2, 3, 4. Appx. No. 363.

Theſe replies, which in another letter the Board termed a total rejection of their propoſals, they ſuppoſed to be founded on an opinion, that their affairs were reduced to ſo deſperate a ſtate, as might render it too hazardous for the Berar Government to take a decided part in their favour, and afforded no hope of ſucceſs in the mediation required.

Sec. Letter, 27 April 1781. Appx. No. 364.

Your Committee, however, find, that the Governor General and Council thought it yet more incumbent upon them to proſecute the deſign of ſending Colonel *Pearce*'s detachment into the *Carnatic*, againſt every oppoſition it might meet with, though at the ſame time they took meaſures to provide for its unmoleſted march, "and to mark that attention which was due to the rela-"tion in which they had till that time ſtood with the "Government of *Berar*," by deputing to Rajah *Chimnajee Booſla*, a confidential perſon, who ſhould endeavour to prevail upon him, at leaſt to remove his troops from the road of Colonel *Pearce*'s paſſage, if he would not be induced to take a more friendly part, and ſend a body of cavalry to accompany the Colonel, and act under his command.

This reſolution led to a ſeries of negociations with Rajah *Chimnajee*, and alſo with Rajah *Ram Pundit*, the Naib of *Cuttack*, the particular detail of which was conveyed to the Court of Directors in a detached narrative, accompanied with a collection of letters. The moſt material parts of them we have placed in the Appendix, No. 365, and entirely recommended them to the attentive peruſal of the Houſe, as they contain the fulleſt information on theſe points, and many curious and inſtructive remarks on the general poſture of affairs,

Appx. No. 365.

and

and the ſituation of other Powers, by which the Court of *Berar* might be probably influenced in its preſent conduct towards the Engliſh. The ſchemes of policy by which the Governor General ſeems to have dictated the inſtructions he gave to Mr. *Anderſon* (the Gentleman deputed) will alſo appear in the document, as well reſpecting the particular ſucceſſion to the Rauje, as alſo the mode of accommodating the demand of Chout, the eſtabliſhment of which was apparently the great aim of *Moodajee*'s political manœuvres, while the Governor General's wiſh to defeat it was avowedly more intent on the removal of a nominal diſgrace, than on the anxiety or reſolution to be freed from an expenſive if an unavoidable incumbrance. The effect of theſe tranſactions appears to have been, that Mr. *Anderſon* returned to *Calcutta*, bringing with him Rajah *Ram Pundit*; when an engagement was formally concluded on the 29th of March, in the name of his maſter Rajah *Chimnajee*; by which it was ſtipulated, that a body of 2,000 effective horſe ſhould be detached from the army at *Cuttack*, and placed under Colonel *Pearce*'s command; their pay to be iſſued by the Engliſh pay-maſter, at the rate of one lack of rupees per month; that a party of the Company's forces ſhould aſſiſt the Government of *Berar* in aſſerting its pretenſions to the diſtricts of *Gurra Mundela*, a ſmall territory lying on the banks of the *Nerbudda*, and under the actual poſſeſſion of the Peiſhwa. We perceive that Major *Popham* was accordingly ordered to command a detachment of the Company's troops upon that ſervice.

It was at the ſame time reſolved, that a gratuity "of "13 lacks of rupees, being the remainder of a ſum "of 16 lacks propoſed as a contribution for the relief "of the forces in the province of *Cuttack*, in the event "of the acquieſcence of the Government of *Berar* in "the propoſals which were tranſmitted in October laſt "to them, ſhould be granted, and delivered to Rajah "*Ram Pundit* on the behalf of *Chimnajee*, for the re"lief of the army, repreſented to be in the greateſt "diſtreſs, and as an acknowledgment for the paſt, and "ſeaſonable inſtances afforded of the friendſhip of that "Government. A loan of 10 lacks, requeſted for the "ſame purpoſe, was alſo granted to *Chimnajee*, on the "part of the Government of *Berar*, on the ſecurity of "Rajah *Ram Pundit* for payment."

The narrative to which your Committee have referred the Houſe, will ſhew them how far the extreme diſtreſs of his ſituation for want of money to ſatisfy his troops, might be ſuppoſed to operate as an inducement with *Chimnajee* to make theſe agreements; and how far alſo ſuch a ſum was likely to quiet the murmurs of thoſe to whom it was ſaid five times as much was due; and who were repreſented to be with difficulty reſtrained from depredation and plunder on the provinces of the Company. It is alſo to be remarked, that this tranſaction was concluded without the knowledge and concurrence of *Moodajee Booſla*, or his Duan, who had before refuſed to allow of any agreement on thoſe terms. But it appears by the following obſervation of the Governor General and Council, that they nevertheleſs reckoned upon the moſt confirmed effect of it:—"We have "laboured, and we think with a ſucceſs now decided, "to detach the moſt powerful member of the Maratta "State, and in its relation to *Bengal* the moſt capable "of any in *India* to do it either ſervice or hurt, from "the general confederacy which has been formed againſt "us, and have converted it, oſtenſibly at leaſt, into a "party to our cauſe. The event will ſhortly prove the "truth of our concluſions."

Of this, indeed, your Committee do not find that any other aſſurance had yet been indicated, than the ſafe and unmoleſted paſſage of Colonel *Pearce*'s detachment, which Rajah *Chimnajee* himſelf attended to the borders of the *Cuttack*, and ſhewed much attention to the commander. It further indeed appears, that the Rajah had ſeverely puniſhed the only inſtance of any hoſtile attempt, which a party of his troops had made by an incurſion upon the frontiers of *Midnapore*.

It was aſſerted towards the end of April, that he was then on his return to the capital of *Berar*. The laſt letters from thence appear to have been received at *Calcutta* on the 8th March, and in them your Committee perceive no encouragement to the Superior Council, to hope for ſpeedy aſſiſtance of any kind from that quarter. The treaty had not been forwarded to *Poonah*: profeſſions of friendſhip indeed were made, but they were attended by an expreſs declaration, "that there "were other treaties and engagements which circum"ſcribed them; that the Maha Rajah was connected by "treaties with *Pundit Purdhaun*; and that the family of "*Booſla* never did or would vary a hair's breadth from "any engagements."

Your Committee find, that Colonel *Pearce*'s detachment reached *Ganjam* at the end of March, but was long prevented from much further advance, by the violence of an infectious diſorder, which, added to a great deſertion among the Sepoys, much weakened the force of the battalions. No certain account ſeems to have been received of its arrival at *Madras*, or of its junction with Sir *Eyre Coote*'s army. Another detachment under the command of Colonel *Camac*, the ſcene of whoſe operations lay on the weſtern ſide of the *Jumna*, ſeems for a time to have been expoſed to great hazard and diſtreſs, being ſurrounded by the forces of *Madajee Scindia*; but before any ſuccours could reach it, Colonel *Camac* worked his own relief, by a bold and ſucceſsful attack on the enemy's camp, the whole plunder of which, with the guns, ammunition, and ſtores, fell into his hands.

A third corps, under the conduct of Colonel *Morgan*, was ſent againſt *Calpee*. The firſt profeſſed object of this plan, was to protect the rear of Colonel *Camac*'s detachment, and to be a check upon *Nudjiff Cawn*; but the commander of it was alſo inſtructed to uſe his efforts to gain ſuch command over the adjacent country, as to be able to collect thoſe revenues which had before been paid to the Maratta Government. The fort appears to have been abandoned on his approach, and he of courſe took an eaſy poſſeſſion of it; but the chief who held the diſtrict not having appeared ſo ready to obey a requiſition for the transfer of his tribute, the Board approved of Colonel *Morgan*'s deſign of placing an aumil over it, in the hope of drawing a conſiderable revenue therefrom.

Theſe are the principal military tranſactions, of which your Committee have found information in the lateſt diſpatches from *Bengal*. Yet, although theſe were attended with ſucceſs, there was intelligence of other matters from thoſe parts, which did not bear ſo favourable an appearance. The diſtreſſes of the Vizier had increaſed to ſo great a degree, that they would not permit him to make complete payment of the Company's claim upon him, and it became therefore neceſſary to be content with a great part of it in aſſignments, which, however, by Mr. *Middleton*'s calculation, exceeded the demands for the ſervices of the year by above ſix lacks. A proſpect of troubles alſo aroſe from the conduct of *Fizoola Cawn*, who continued to refuſe the ſtipulated number of troops, and the Bengal Government had, as guarantees of the treaty, ſent a formal requiſition to him, inſiſting upon the performance of his engagements.

The troops which compoſed the garriſon of *Guallier*, your Committee have obſerved, were ordered to march under the command of Major *Popham*, and to aſſiſt in the reduction of the Gurra Mundela country; and he was inſtructed by the Governor General and Council, to deliver up to the Rana of *Ghode* the fort itſelf; their motives for which they declared to be, that the Rana had repeatedly urged his claim to it, that he had given great proof of his fidelity and attachment to the Company; to which they added, that, "they thought it pe"culiarly

Letter 29 April No. 21. Appendix, 363.

See Letter, 27 April 1781. Par. 28, 29, and 30. *No.* 364.

Ibid. Par. 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39. *Ibid.* See Col. Muir's Inſtructions—and Bom. Sel. Conſ. 12 May 1781.—Letter from Colonel Caurac. Appx. No. 366.

Par. 41, 42, and Poſtſcript, 15 May 1781. *No.* 364.

27 April, Par. 47. *No.* 364.

" culiarly neceſſary at a time when they were endea-
" vouring to form new alliances of the firſt conſequence
" to their intereſt, to remove every circumſtance that
" might tend to throw doubt upon the Company's fide-
" lity to their public treaties."

15 May. In regard to thoſe alliances, which they were deſirous of forming with the two European Powers, the Dutch and Portugueſe, your Committee find, that neither of them terminated agreeable to the firſt wiſh and intention of the Board, though it is obſervable that they expreſſed a pleaſure in the rejection of the former by the Madras Government, ſince the plan itſelf, founded on the deſperate neceſſity of the affairs on the coaſt, was one of the great and numerous exertions which the Government of *Bengal* had made for their relief, but was rendered unneceſſary by the change to a more proſperous ſtate.

See Appx. No. 379. Letter dated 29 April 1780. It ſhould, indeed, be obſerved, that previous to the date of the letter here referred to, the Governor General and Council had received accounts from home of ſome ſteps which tended to a rupture between *Great Britain* and the republic of *Holland*.

27 April, Par. 10. It appears, however, that the Governor General and Council thought a ſupply of European ſtrength of ſo much importance to the ſucceſs of the war in the *Carnatic*, that they wrote, on the 22d January, to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort *Marlborough*, to deſire that they would ſpare the European force at that Preſidency, conſiſting of 400 men; and they ſeemed to think, that this requiſition might be properly complied with, becauſe the remaining force, conſiſting of Coffrees and Malays, would be ſufficient for the defence of that place againſt the enemies of the country, and the ſmall force in Europeans was at all events unequal to its protection againſt an European enemy.

Par. 44. Dated 15 May. See alſo Letter from Mr. Auriol to the Governor General dated 20 March 1781. Appx. No. 367. With reſpect to the overtures intended to be made to the Portugueſe Government at *Goa*, the Governor General and Council, in their letter of the 27th April, manifeſted their indifference about the further proſecution of them; but it appears by the poſtſcript to that letter, that the enemy had been beforehand with them, and that a treaty offenſive and defenſive was formed between *Hyder Ally* and the Captain General of *Goa*, ſo long before as the month of September, eight or ten days after the unfortunate defeat of Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, and that there was great reaſon to ſuppoſe that the troops which the Captain General had engaged to ſupply, were actually on the road towards the place of rendezvous.

See Sec. Letter, 3 Feb. 1781. Appx. No. 368. And ſee alſo Appx. No. 365. The line of conduct which the Nizam appears to have purſued, was hitherto neutral. The *Guntoor* Circar which had been delivered up by the Madras Government, he retained in his own poſſeſſion; and the *Calcutta* Board do not ſeem to have been diſpleaſed at it. Your Committee indeed perceive, that ſome hopes were entertained of being able to draw him to the Engliſh party, from the circumſtances of his known jealouſy of *Hyder*'s ſucceſs and aggrandizement, and more particularly when he ſhould be informed of what the Governor General believed to be true, that *Hyder Ally* had obtained from the King a grant of his dominions. And we have indeed perceived, that according to the information of Mr. *Hollond*, the Nizam had ſome time before expreſſed his readineſs to join the Engliſh againſt *Hyder* on certain conditions, the firſt of which was ſaid to be that the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row* ſhould be for ever abandoned; and the Board directed Mr. *Hollond* to aſſure his Highneſs, that *Ragoba* was not ſupported by them in any claim upon the Government at *Poonah*, and that indeed they were not by any alliance connected with him, though they ſhould think it diſhonourable to deliver him up into the hands of his enemies.

Appx. No. 368. Letter from the Governor General and Council to Mr. Hollond, dated 22 Jan. 1781. Your Committee have remarked, that one of the principal objections which *Meodajee Booſla* and his Duan made to the articles propoſed for an accommodation with the Poonah Government, was in regard to the future diſpoſal of *Ragoba*, whoſe place of reſidence, as well as his ſtipend and number of attendants, they expected ſhould be fixed at the diſcretion of the Maratta Miniſtry; and it does not appear that the Governor General and Council declared any other motives for their interference in his favour, than the ſafety of his perſon, which they thought required a free choice as to the place of his reſidence.

15 May 1781. The proſpect of peace, through the mediation of the Court of *Berar*, between the Britiſh Governments in *India* and the Maratta Empire, appears to have been repreſented under this ſtate of ſuſpence which your Committee have explained, when the laſt official diſpatches were tranſmitted from *Bengal*. It is indeed to be obſerved, that the Governor General and Council very plainly declared their ſatisfaction in the unwillingneſs of the Miniſter to accept the offer of a treaty, ſince it left them at liberty to ſecure to the Company the important poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, and the other advantages acquired by their troops in the Weſt of *India*.

Extract of Sel. Letter from Fort St. George, 17 Feb. 1781. Appx. No. 369. N. B. The two Letters from the Peiſhwa, referred to as inclofures, are not to be found. Par. 33, Sec. Letter, 27 April. Some greater hopes indeed of pacification ſeem to have been entertained by the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, as the Nabob *Walaw Jaw*, who alſo was employed, at the deſire of the Governor General, in a mediation with the Poonah Durbar, had received advices from them, by which it was ſuppoſed they diſcovered a ready diſpoſition to ſettle proper terms of agreement; and it further appears, that a letter had been written to Sir *Eyre Coote* by the Miniſter, and the purport of it was a declaration, that the Peiſhwa would willingly agree to any plan for accommodation, the advantages of which ſhould not be entirely on the ſide of the Engliſh.

The Government of *Bengal* however, who acknowledged their curioſity to have been raiſed to a knowledge of the terms by which the peaceable intentions of the Poonah Government were to be proved, expreſſed their ſurprize when they found the following to be the conditions recommended:—" That they ſhould deliver
" up to the Marattas the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*,
" the fort of *Gualtier*, the forts in *Guzerat*, and all the
" countries taken from them in *Concan*, &c. and fur-
" render to their pleaſure the perſon of *Ragonaut Row*."
—And the Governor General and Council thereupon obſerved, that although they wiſhed for peace with the Maratta State, they would not make peace on terms diſhonourable to themſelves, or diſgrace the Engliſh name by ſubmitting to conditions which could not be complied with without a ſacrifice of the honour and intereſt of the Company. In their laſt letter, under date 15th May, they further declared their fixed reſolution in theſe words:—" Reſpecting other conditions, (being de-
" termined not to part with the valuable acquiſition of
" *Baſſein*) on which we might be willing to accede to a
" peace, the ill ſucceſs with which our advances have been
" hitherto attended, and the preſumption which they
" ſeem to have given birth to, in the arrogant conduct
" of the Miniſter, diſcourage us in looking to any fa-
" vourable determination of the war, but as we have
" adviſed you in our laſt addreſs, by the moſt vigorous
" and ſucceſsful proſecution of it."

And in the ſame letter they again take notice, with ſome chagrin, of the ſyſtem of defence adopted and recommended by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, expreſſing however a hope, that the remonſtrance which had been made againſt it, " would have the good effect they in-
" tended, in altering a plan of conduct as oppoſite to
" their late opinions, as they deemed it hoſtile to the
" attainment of that object, which both of them pro-
" feſſed to aim at; an honourable and advantageous
" peace."

With theſe accounts of the preſent political ſituation of the Britiſh Governments in *India*, reſpecting thoſe Powers immediately or more remotely intereſted in the war, which has been the ſubject of our enquiry, your Committee had nearly concluded their narrative and obſervations; having only reſerved ſome remarks on the

orders which the Company have lately ſent to their adminiſtrations in thoſe parts, for the more regular and complete termination of them. We have thought it proper, for reaſons which appeared to us moſt juſt and forcible, to draw from no other ſource than the records of the Company, or the official diſpatches of the Miniſters, thoſe materials which we have endeavoured faithfully, though perhaps without ſufficient method and perſpicuity, to digeſt and arrange for the information of the Houſe. The laſt regular advices from *Bengal* which were received by the *Bellmont*, contained thoſe papers already taken notice of; and your Committee upon enquiry found, that the *Neptune*, on board of which the only copies of conſultations and other proceedings were ſuppoſed to be ſent, had been obliged, by having ſprung a leak, to put back, ſo that we looked for the beſt remaining authority in the letters from the Governor General and Council of the 27th April and 15th May, wherein the Houſe will have ſeen what was the apparent proſpect of pacification at that time, and what little encouragement for hope of tranquillity, aroſe from the mediation of the Court of *Berar*. No mention of freſher advices from *Nagpere* has been found therein, than thoſe which were received on the 8th March. The letter from the Superior Council to *Bombay*, which ſtimulated only the ſpirit of offenſive war, was dated on the 10th May, and the language of it appears corroborated by that of the 15th to the Court of Directors.—But it has been ſince ſtated to your Committee, that by the ſame conveyance which brought this diſpatch of the 15th May, Major *Scott*, who appears to have been appointed by the Governor General his agent at home, for managing his political intereſts, received a private packet, wherein were incloſed ſeveral revenue papers which had not been tranſmitted in that ſhip to the Court of Directors; and alſo a letter from the Duan of *Moodajee Booſla* to the Governor General, which was dated 5th April, and received by him on the 10th May 1781. The exiſtence of this letter appears to have been accidentally made known to the Court on the 26th February laſt, when it was immediately called for by them; and on the firſt of March, they communicated a copy of it to your Committee, which we lay before the Houſe, in the Appendix No. 372. The Houſe will judge what alteration this letter may be ſuppoſed to make in the proſpect of accommodation, as far as that object may depend upon the earneſt interference of the Court of *Berar*. The force of the reaſons aſſigned, why, amidſt the ferment of war and paſſion, the treaty proffered by the Government of *Bengal* had hitherto remained in ſuſpence, will be duly conſidered, as will alſo the manner in which the articles relative to *Ragonaut Row*, the ſort of *Gualier*, and *Futty Sing*, are now alone mentioned as grounds of objection. Attention will be paid to the probable motives and ſincerity of that apparent warmth with which the Duan urges his new invitation to the re-eſtabliſhment of peace, after making remarks on the various events of the war; whereby he obſerves, "That as full "revenge had been taken for the diſgrace of the Bombay "detachment, and the Engliſh name was a hundred "times greater than before, and the dread and reſpect "of the Engliſh ſo eſtabliſhed over all, that if any one "ſhould hereafter be at enmity with them, the ſame conſequence would be expected to follow; they therefore "ſhould be thankful that ſo ſmall a force had been able "to prevail againſt ſuch numerous hoſts in every part, "and ſhould by all means open the door to peace and "friendſhip, and uſe their utmoſt power to root out the "French and *Hyder Naig*."—Upon this point of reconciliation with the Maratta State, and the moſt efficacious means of accompliſhing it, the Duan will be found to write in more explicit terms, as follows: "What is "paſt is paſt. At this time, in which I am writing, the "ſcale of ſtrength between the forces of both parties "hangs equal. No time can be better than the preſent, "for the work of peace. You ſhould look upon this as "propitious, and not let it ſlip; ſince the wiſe never "let opportunity paſs, for it is impoſſible to be re-"called. Therefore you ſhould begin a negociation "through the mediation of the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*, "who is one of the moſt principal Chiefs of the *Decan*. "He will repreſent here whatever you ſhall think pro-"per to write to him, without diminution or exaggera-"tion; and in return by the ſame channel, whatever is "to be written, will be written; and let the Nabob "*Mobarig ul Mulk* be applied to in reſpect of this nego-"ciation, who is the firm pillar of the fortune, and "greatneſs of the Aſoſean race, and to whom you have "heretofore written; ſo that the Raja, the Nabob *Ma-"boriz ul Mulk*, and the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*, may "join in a mediation, and obtain from *Pundit Purdhaun* "ſuch a treaty as may prevent any diſputes in future, "and a plan be laid for the extirpating the power of "*Hyder* and the French."

And he concludes his letter in theſe words: "From "the emotions of my heart therefore, and the impulſe "of friendſhip, which attracts me towards you, I have "been induced to write ſo fully. I have not omitted a "ſingle point in this letter, that could contribute to "ſet matters in the fulleſt light, either in weighing the "preſent circumſtances, or looking forward to future "conſequences. I have the ſtrongeſt hope, that you "will examine the whole by yourſelf, word by word, "and approve of all that I have ſaid. And after the "foundation of peace is thus laid, and I am relieved a "little from my diſorder, I will certainly do myſelf the "honour of having one time an interview with you."

It is remarkable, that no mention whatever is made of *Chimnajee Booſla*, or of the troops in the Cuttack, of whoſe forbearance under great diſtreſſes for money, the former letters had been filled with very pointed repreſentations.

It may indeed be proper to obſerve, upon the general tenor of this letter, as well as upon ſome particular paſſages in it, that they certainly diſcover the ſtrong effect which change of circumſtances had upon the diſpoſition and language of the Berar miniſter. The conqueſts of General *Goddard* in the Guzerat and the Conkan, and his ſuppoſed eſtabliſhment on the top of the Ghauts; the unexpected reverſe in favour of Colonel *Camac*, againſt the very ſuperior forces of *Madajee Scindia*; the reviving credit of the Britiſh arms in the *Carnatic*, under Sir *Eyre Coote*, to which however ſhould be added a mixture of dread and jealouſy of *Hyder*'s ambition, fomented and ſupported by the French, have apparently contributed to turn the balance of political doubt, ſo far at leaſt on the ſide of the Engliſh, as to have removed ſome of the difficulties before ſtarted in the way of pacification. There will not eſcape the attention of the Houſe, the lead which is given to the Nizam, in the propoſed renewal of a mediation for peace, and the recommendation of ſoliciting the interference of *Nudjif Cown*, of whoſe preparations and deſigns we have noticed the jealouſy of the Bengal Government in the plan of an expedition under Colonel *Morgan*.

It muſt not however be omitted at the ſame time to remark, that the alarms then evidently entertained by the Duan for the fate of *Poonah*, would be ſoon afterwards removed by the retreat of General *Goddard*; a meaſure which *Dewagur* had certainly not expected, as appears by this expreſſion in his letter: "As it will not "be proper for him (General *Goddard*) to retreat, he "will deſcend from the Ghauts upon *Poonah*."

It is alſo to be remembered, that the Calcutta Board ſuppoſed the General to be ſtill in poſt on the ſummit of the Ghauts.

What degree of influence the ſubſequent knowledge of the difficulty with which he had effected his retrograde deſcent to *Callian* would have upon the politics of either Government, may be a ſubject for ſpeculation. Your Committee think it proper to confine themſelves to the ſimple remark of the fact. Yet it may be added, that the

See in the Appendix an Account of this Affair. Appx. No. 370. Letter to Chairman of Court of Directors. Jan. 6th 1781. Appx. No. 371.

1782.

Appx. No. 372.

the Superior Council have in their laſt letter manifeſted a quickneſs of alarm at any circumſtance which might tend to betray a ſlackneſs or remiſſion in the vigorous
15 May 1781. proſecution of the war; for beſides the diſlike of the defenſive ſyſtem which the Preſidency of *Bombay* had reſolved upon, they expreſſed ſome apprehenſion, leſt the meaſure of ſending back the Fort Saint George troops, though conformable to their inſtructions, "might "have an unfavourable influence on their affairs at that "time, (which might be conſidered at their criſis) by "impreſſing the minds of the public with an opinion "that ſome neceſſity, or a conſciouſneſs of their inabi-"lity to proſecute the great advantages which they had "acquired, had compelled them to ſtop at the inſtant of "their completion."

Reflecting, however, with confidence on their remaining ſtrength in thoſe parts, and with attention to the neceſſities of the ſervice on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, they added, "Yet in other reſpects we have no reaſon "to be diſſatisfied with it, ſince the troops of this Pre-"ſidency and that of *Bombay* are ſufficient for the pro-"ſecution of the war, and the defence of our poſſeſſions "on the Malabar coaſt; and the ſervices of the Madras "detachment in the *Carnatic*, may be of great uſe and "importance to the ſucceſs of the war in which you "are engaged with *Hyder Ally Cawn*."

Your Committee find, that mutual complaints and accuſations continued to paſs between the two Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Fort Saint George*, in regard to the cauſes of the diſtreſsful war in the *Carnatic*. On the
1781. Appx. No. 375. See alſo Letter dated 17 Feb. 1781. 9th of January, the Preſident and Select Committee wrote to the Court of Directors, and in terms of great diſcontent at the imputation thrown upon the conduct
Appx. No. 369. 31 Jan. 1781. Appx. No. 374. of their government by that of *Fort William*, endeavoured to fix the charge upon the latter, on account of the obſtinate ſupport they had given to the war againſt the Marattas, to which was to be aſcribed every enſuing misfortune that had befallen the reſt of the Company's poſſeſſions. From this opinion however, your Committee obſerve, that Sir *Eyre Coote* declared a very explicit diſſent, becauſe, whatever reaſon there might be to allow that the meaſures taken againſt the Marattas had given birth to the idea of a general combination of the powers of *Indoſtan* againſt the Engliſh, he could not for many reaſons admit, that the formidable incurſion of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, was owing to that cauſe alone; well knowing that the deliberate umbrage given to the Nizam, by their behaviour concerning the Peſcuſh and the Guntoor Circar, had been the provocation which had incited him to become an agent in fomenting the offences taken by *Hyder*, and which he himſelf acknowledged to have been the reaſons for his encouraging a combination of the powers againſt them. While at the very time the treaty was carrying on with *Bazalet Jung*, it was a thing certain, that *Hyder* would have entered into an offenſive and defenſive alliance with them.

Appx. No. 375. 1ſt March 1781. See alſo Letter to Sel. Committee of Bombay. Yet it is obſervable, that on the 1ſt March, Sir *Eyre Coote* wrote to General *Goddard*, and expreſſed much uneaſineſs at the apparent delay of proper means for an accommodation with the Marattas, which he thought might have been ſooner effected, and which, as the cure of all their diſtreſſes, could not be juſtifiably procraſtinated. His own words upon this ſubject will beſt point out the idea he entertained of the origin of the war, of the continuance of it under their preſent circumſtances, and of the neceſſity of putting an end to it.

"Although I ever conſidered the policy of warring "againſt the Maratta State a moſt ruinous one to the in-"tereſts both of the Company and the Engliſh nation, "ſtill, on the eve of your late ſucceſs, if we had no other "power to combat againſt, I might have ſubſcribed to "the plan you adviſed me as laid down for the ope-"rations of your campaign, as the moſt likely to pro-"cure us honourable terms of accommodation; but, "engaged as we are in a ſcene of contention, I may ſay "with every power of any conſideration in *India*, all "ſteps, the event of which could not be clearly aſcer-"tained as an unfailing remedy, muſt be exceptionable. "By proſecuting the war our difficulties muſt be in-"creaſed, and the proſpect of obtaining peace become "daily more diſtant. Our reſources, anticipated by "the current demands of our military eſtabliſhment, to "which they are unequal, and burthened with a heavy "debt, cannot long ſupport the preſent ſyſtem. I muſt "therefore impoſe it upon you as a duty you owe to "your King, your Country, and your Employers, to "leave no means which may depend upon you, untried "to effect a peace with the Marattas, and which may "enable you ſpeedily to carry into execution my orders "for entering, and creating a powerful diverſion in "*Hyder Ally*'s country on the Malabar ſide."

It has appeared to your Committee, that the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* excuſed their conduct to Sir *Eyre Coote*, in a letter dated 26th April, wherein Letter from Bombay to Sir Eyre Coote, 26 April 1781. Appx. No. 376. they attributed the particular line of it to the recommendation of the Superior Government, adding thereupon, that General *Goddard* alſo acted under ſimilar authority and inſtruction.—In further exculpation of themſelves, with regard to the object againſt which he adviſed the particular direction of their hoſtilities, they aſſured the Commander in Chief, that though they were convinced of the neceſſity, and were ſincerely deſirous of bringing the Maratta war to a concluſion, yet until that enemy would conſent to an accommodation, it would be as impracticable and as unſafe for them to employ the army againſt the poſſeſſions of *Hyder Ally*, as it would be for him to make a diverſion in their favour againſt the Marattas. They had already done their utmoſt in having reſolved to reduce their plan of military operations to a mere ſyſtem of defence; and as there was no doubt of *Hyder* and the Marattas being bound by mutual engagements which they would probably abide by ſo long as they might find it to their intereſt or ſafety, proviſion muſt be made to reſiſt the attempts of both thoſe powers, until one or other could be detached from their engagements, or effectually depreſſed.—It will be hardly neceſſary to remind the Houſe, that the remonſtrances of the Superior Council, under date 10 May, again entirely claſhed with the wiſhes and conceptions of the Commander in Chief, as much as they were repugnant to the ſyſtem of that Government to which they were addreſſed.

It is remarkable, that Sir *Eyre Coote* intimated, from See Poſtſcript to his Letter. information he had received, that *Hyder* was ſo anxious to defeat their views of peace with the Marattas, and had carried his intrigues ſo far as to authorize *Ragonaut Row* to employ his credit in the expenditure of whatever ſum might be neceſſary to that end. Your Committee have indeed, in vain ſought for any accounts of *Ragoba*'s proceedings in the lateſt records of the Company, and can therefore give no certain relation of his behaviour under the reduced circumſtances which the orders of the Superior Government had preſcribed for him. He has been diſtinguiſhed by no other apparent conſequence, or even notice in the late tranſactions, than what the ſuſpicions of the Poonah Miniſtry, and the perſonal animoſities of the Nizam have given to him. The ſingle remaining object of hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, was declared to be the hope of accompliſhing a pacification, on more advantageous and honourable terms to the Company, than had yet been offered, or liſtened to, by the enemy. It has appeared, that the Superior Government had taken chiefly upon itſelf the neceſſary ſupply of force and treaſure, as well as the direction and reſponſibility of the war, which was now ſpreading, by a variety of active operations, from the banks of the *Jumna* to the coaſt of *Malabar*. The affairs of the *Carnatic* were alſo in a great meaſure dependant for ſupport and recovery on the efforts of the Government of *Bengal*, as the ſtrength and reſources of the Madras Preſidency, and of their ally the Nabob *Wa'aw*

Jaw, were confeſſedly unequal to reſiſtance. The ſituation indeed of the latter, was by himſelf repreſented to be moſt deplorable, not only from the deſolation of his country, but from the weight of his debts, particularly to European creditors, and from the reduction of his authority. Under the preſſure of theſe diſtreſſes, he ſought for a partial relief by an extraordinary application to the Superior Council, for their ſtill further interference in the affairs of the *Carnatic*, and in the regulation of his public and private intereſts.—Some account of this addreſs, and the conduct of the Calcutta Board thereupon, is given in their letter, under date 27th April, to the Court of Directors; and the papers ſubjoined in Appendix, No. 376, will further explain this ſingular repreſentation and tranſaction. The Nabob had ſent his Dewan, accompanied by an Engliſh gentleman (Mr. *R. Sulivan*) to *Calcutta* (where they arrived in the middle of March) having given them full powers to propoſe and ſettle an interchange of articles, upon which might be founded an agreement by the immediate influence and authority of the controlling Government; and it appears, that the Governor General and Council, in aſſenting to theſe propoſals, conſidered them as a ſort of temporary engagement, which they hoped might ſerve as the baſis of another treaty, to be concluded under the orders and directions of the Company, and even with the ſanction of the Engliſh Parliament. It will be ſeen by an examination of the original papers, what were the apparent motives of the Nabob's ſolicitation, and how anxious he ſeemed for a more formal avowal of his right to nominate a ſucceſſor to his dominions, as well as to extend them by the annexation of ſeveral Talooks in the *Balagaut*, and by a reſumption of the Zemindary of *Tanjore*. There will alſo be found the reaſons which ſeemed to influence the Superior Government, when they conſidered the neceſſity of ſome arrangement, for ſecuring a more certain reſource from the revenues of the *Carnatic*, towards the expences of the war; and for that and other purpoſes, thought proper to ſend back Mr. *Sulivan*, as the Miniſter of the Bengal Government, to reſide at the Nabob's Durbar, for the repreſentation of ſuch matters as might at any time require his interpoſition in that character, and in their name, either with the Nabob, or with the Preſident and Council, or Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*; and they granted him credentials to that effect in the uſual form.

See Appx. No. 364. Appx. No. 376. B.

Your Committee have now ſubmitted to the Houſe, the full extent of information which we have been enabled to collect upon the ſubject under our enquiry, in as much order and detail as the quantity and variety of it would readily permit. We deſire to point to the annexed Papers, for ſuch a view of the ſtate of the Revenues and the Military Force of *Bengal*, as we could make out from the irregular materials with which we have been furniſhed, and to refer at the ſame time to the Appendix, No. 377, for ſome additional information upon the ſubject.

Appx. No. 377. Eſtimates for 1780-1, and for 1781-2.

STATE of the Treaſury at Bengal on the 30th April 1781, as per laſt Advices received.

			Current Rupees.
Ready Money.			
General Treaſury.			
In ready Money - - -	22,969 14 3		
In Ingots - - - -	5,00,943 5 9		
		5,23,913 4 0	
Khalſah - - - - - -		1,43,523 10 9	
			6,67,436 14 9
Bills receivable.			
General Treaſury - -	S[a] R[s] 10,963 3 5	12,717 5 0	
Khalſah - - -	3,26,269 0 0	3,78,472 0 6	
			3,91,189 5 6
Mint.			
General Treaſury - -	- -	62,158 14 9	
Khalſah - - -	S[a] R[s] 1,48,392 4 10	1,72,135 0 3	
			2,34,293 15 0
Unſorted Treaſure - -	R[s] 3,24,029 -	valued at -	3,56,431 14 6
		Current Rupees -	16,49,352 1 9

The AMOUNT of appropriated Sums as follows:

		Current Rupees.
Balance Account Depoſits - - - -	9,22,828 5 8	
D[o], Accountant General to the Mayor's Court - -	1,34,161 13 9	
D[o], of the old bonded Debt, on which the Intereſt has ceaſed by public Advertiſement - - -	79,342 11 10	
D[o], on Account the Churchwardens, bearing a running Intereſt, by Order of the Court of Directors - -	57,600 0 0	
		11,93,932 15 3

The Amount of the New Loans as follows:

		C[y] R[s]
New Bonded Debt - - - -		85,15,951 1 6
Four per Cent. Remittances		
Loan 1780, Current Rupees -	19,39,900 0 0	
D[o] 1781 - - -	5,79,800 0 0	
	25,19,700 0 0	
Annuities - - - - -	1,06,730 0 0	
	C. R[s]	1,11,42,381 1 6

East India Houſe,
5th March, 1782.

Errors excepted.
John Annis, Auditor of Indian Acco[ts].

RETURN of the ARTILLERY and INFANTRY

ARTILLERY.	Commissioned Officers.							Staff.								
	Lieut.-Col. Commandant.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Adjutant of the Corps.	Aid de Camp.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Head Surgeon.	Surgeons.	Assistant D°.	Paymasters.	Cadets.	Volunteers.
Total - - -	1	2	2	11	10	29	37	1	4	6	6	1	3	2	2	-	44
Grand Total - -	92							22								-	44

INFANTRY.	Commissioned Officers.							Brigade Staff.							Battalion Staff.											
								Non-effective.					Effective.			Non-effective.					Effective.					
	Brigadier General.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Assistant Quarter Master Gen.	Brigade Major.	Aid de Camp.	Chaplain.	Deputy Judge Advocate.	Surgeon Major.	Paymasters.	Deputy D°.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Drill Sergeants.	Drill Corporals.	Pay Sergeants.	Camp Colourmen.	Surgeons.	D°. Assistants.	Sergeant Majors.	Quarter Master Sergeants.	Drum Majors.	Fife D°.
First Regiment - - -	1	-	2	2	18	25	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	15	15	1	1	2	2	2	2
Second D°. - - - -	-	1	2	2	15	36	14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	2	3	2	2	1	2
Third D°. - - - -	-	1	2	2	15	36	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	2	2	2
Total - - -	1	2	6	6	48	97	38	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	6	6	2	2	15	15	3	8	6	6	5	6
Grand Total - -	193							24								80										

ABSTRACT.

Lieutenant General.	Brigadier General.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Subalterns.	Volunteers.	Europeans Non-commissioned Rank and File.
1	1	2	8	8	59	10	201	44	2,960

under the Preſidency of *Fort William*, 1ſt January 1781.

Effective Non-commiſſioned Rank and File.																Total Non-commiſſioned Rank and File.	Wanting to complete.				Supernumeraries.					
Serjeants.				Corporals.				Drummers.				Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matroſſes.					Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.
Fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	Abſent.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	Abſent.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	Abſent.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	Abſent.											
48	3	12	-	38	6	9	-	26	-	4	-	534	53	156	1	889	1	7	5	106	1	-	7	-	-	—
63				53				30				744				889	119				8					

Effective Non-commiſſioned Rank and File.												Total Non-commiſſioned Rank and File.	Wanting to complete.						Supernumeraries.						Commander in Chief's Company of Rangers.						
Serjeants.				Drummers.				Corp^ls and Private.					Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Total Non-commiſſioned Rank and File.
Fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	Abſent.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	Abſent.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	Abſent.																				
52	5	1	6	52	-	-	-	549	45	1	1	712	-	15	2	-	-	388	1	-	-	6	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
52	6	1	1	42	2	-	-	493	59	-	3	567	3	4	-	1	2	567	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
55	4	-	-	36	1	-	-	500	81	-	5	682	1	4	2	-	7	518	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	—
159	15	2	7	128	3	-	-	1,452	185	1	9	1,961	4	23	4	1	9	1,439	1	-	-	6	8	-	1	1	1	5	6	96	107
183				131				1,647				1,961	1,480						15						110						

DISPOSITION.

Artillery Regiments - { 3 Companies - - - - - - - - Preſidency.
2 D° - - - - - - - - - Madras.
1 D° - - - - - - - - - Berhampore.
1 D° - - - - - - - - - Midnapore.
1 D° - - - - - - - - - Cawnpore.
1 D° - - - - - - - - - Futty Ghur.

Peter Murray,
Aid de Camp.—Acting as Adj^t Genl in the Abſence of Captain Wm Bruce.

First Regiment - { 1ſt Battalion - - - - - - - - Preſidency.
2d D° - - - - - - - - Madras.
Second D° - - - 2d Regiment - - - - - - - - Cawnpore.
Third D° - - - 3d D° - - - - - - - - Berhampore.
Rangers - - - - The Foreign Rangers with Major Camac, near Gwaller.

G. Stibbert,
Brig^r General, Commander in Chief.

The STATE and DISPOSITION of the FORCES upon the Bengal Eſtabliſhment as by Letter received from the Governor General and Council, dated 3d February 1781.

	Men.
Exiſting Force within and without the Provinces on this Side of the Jumna, not including Colonel *Pearce*'s Detachment,	
European Infantry, Officers included	1,706
Artillery, - D° - D°	714
Native Infantry, Officers included	19,440
Cavalry, 2 Regiments, D°	1,017
Abroad, on Service with Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*.	
European Artillery, Officers included	116
D° - Infantry	423
Abroad, with Brigadier General *Goddard*.	
One Regiment of Cavalry, Officers included	350
European Artillery	88
Golandaaze	134
Native Infantry, Officers included	4,643
With Colonel *Pearce*.	
One Company of Europeans, Artillery Officers included.	108
Golandaaze	121
Native Infantry	5,701
With Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*.	
Native Cavalry	164
European Artillery	22
Native Infantry, Officers included	6,070
Foreign Rangers	111
Wanting to complete the Strength.	
European Infantry	475
Artillery	64
Sepoys	7,998
Cavalry	427

East India Houſe,
5th March 1782.

Errors excepted.
John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accos.

Your Committee indeed think it proper here to remark, that the accounts of the Revenues and of the Military Eſtabliſhments, which we have occaſionally exhibited in the courſe of theſe Two Reports, are only intended to convey a general idea of the ſtate of thoſe objects at different periods, and to ſerve as a ſort of table of reference for the reader, during his conſideration of each ſeries of thoſe political tranſactions and events, upon which it was our particular duty in this place to expatiate. At the end of this Report, we deſire to place a general Review of the ſame objects for a courſe of years, from 1771, to the lateſt accounts received; and have added comparative balances of the receipts and diſburſements at annual periods in that interval, as well upon the articles repreſented in the charts before exhibited, as on other ſources of profit or expence ariſing from the commercial tranſactions of the Company's Governments. The more full and more exact inveſtigation of thoſe points, as well as ſeveral others, may become the ſubjects of ſome future reports, when it ſhall be thought adviſable to purſue them. We have here only to add, that we ſhall ſubjoin in the Appendix, No. 378, the particulars of thoſe charges, which we can diſcover to have attended the ſeveral expeditions and armaments occaſioned by the war with the Marattas. It is evident, that the expence of the detachment under General *Goddard* alone, has conſiderably exceeded one crore of rupees.

See Page 361.

Appx. No. 378.

Your Committee will now conclude the whole ſubject of our enquiry, with ſome account of thoſe orders of the Company, which do not appear to have reached their Governments in *India* to whom they were addreſſed, before the laſt diſpatches were ſent from thoſe diſtant provinces. This muſt be eſteemed an indiſpenſable addition, not only for the purpoſe of explaining the ſentiments of the Court of Directors on preceding tranſactions, and on the line of conduct which they point out

for future obſervation, but alſo in the view of directing the judgement of the Houſe upon the degree of probability which the influence of thoſe inſtructions, if properly obeyed, might be allowed to add to the hope, that a ſpeedy termination would be put to our unfortunate diſſentions with the native powers of *India*.

Appx. No. 379. There has indeed been communicated to your Committee, a letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council under date 12th April 1780, which appears not to have reached *Calcutta*, before the month of March, in the following year. It ſeems to have been written under the immediate impreſſion of alarm from the powerful armaments and ſuppoſed deſigns of the French againſt our ſettlements in *India*, and to have contained an earneſt recommendation of peace with the Marattas on any terms, by which the excluſion of the French from all eſtabliſhment within that empire, might be ſufficiently determined and confirmed.

Before the arrival of this diſpatch at the place of its deſtination, the circumſtances of affairs were certainly very much altered; and the Houſe will immediately recollect, from the information they have ſeen, what the nature of thoſe changes was, and what influence they had on the political ſituation of the Company's Governments. On the 27th April 1781, the Governor General and Council acknowledge to have received this letter, with two others of ſubſequent dates, on the 13th March preceding, and make this ſhort reply to them: "We have nothing to ſay in anſwer to the letters we "have the honour to acknowledge, and in addition to "the information already ſent to you, but that the "orders given to us have received, and always will re- "ceive our punctual execution of them."

See Appx. No. 364. 29 April, and 17 May 1780.

On the 2d February 1781, the Court of Directors having then, as it appears, received accounts of General *Goddard*'s firſt campaign in the *Guzerat*, and of the deſign and proſpect of ſucceſs againſt *Baſſein*, wiſh a fortunate event to that enterprize, and ſeem to agree with the ſentiments of the Bombay Preſidency upon the defenſive plan to which they intended to confine their ſubſequent views. But it appears, that the great ſource of anxiety to the Court was ſtill the excluſion of the French from the Maratta dominions; and they remind their Council of *Bengal*, that the firſt plan of operations, when they ſent military aſſiſtance to *Bombay*, was "confined merely to the objects of ſecurity to the Engliſh "poſſeſſions in *India*, and to the excluſion of the na- "tural enemies of the Britiſh Government, from any "influence or connection with the Marattas."—Theſe ideas they declare to be conſonant to their own wiſhes on the ſubject, and expreſsly point out the conditions which they ſhould eſteem deſirable in any treaty of accommodation:—"The open and avowed predilection "of the Court of *Poonah*, in favour of French "agents, was the only ground upon which we coun- "tenanced hoſtilities againſt the Marattas. Upon the "removal of European influence, we repeat our moſt "anxious ſolicitude to have a ſpeedy termination put "to the war. And as conqueſt is by no means our "object, we deſire no other benefit from the late ſuc- "ceſs of our arms, than a full compliance with the "ſtipulations of the treaty of *Poorunder*, and the ceſſion "of *Baſſein*, as a neceſſary appendage to *Salſette*."

See the Extract from this Letter, 2d Feb. 1781. Appx. No. 380

On theſe terms they had no objection to reſtore the conqueſts in the *Guzerat*.—But they add, that if contrary to their expectations, unfortunate circumſtances ſhould have rendered it impoſſible to make peace on ſuch conditions, "and if ſupporting the war ſhould be "found impracticable, without reducing their inveſt- "ments, and depriving them of thoſe aids which *Bengal* "had uſually furniſhed to their China trade," a ſpeedy accommodation would in ſuch caſe become neceſſary upon the beſt terms poſſible, conſiſtently with the honour of the Company, and the ſecurity of their poſſeſſions.

When the firſt imperfect intelligence arrived in *England* of the invaſion of the *Carnatic* by *Hyder Ally*, your Committee find that the Court on the 11th April diſpatched letters to their ſeveral Preſidencies containing their inſtructions to them upon that alarming event.

1781. Letter from Court of Directors, 11 April. Appx. No. 381. See alſo Letter of that date from Committee of Secrecy.

They particularly exhorted the Superior Government to an harmony and unanimity in their Councils, which they more confidently expected, becauſe (to uſe their own words) "it does not appear to us that you have "differed in ſentiment concerning thoſe tranſactions on "the coaſt, which, we fear, have been the immediate "cauſe of the troubles in the *Carnatic*."

In order to counteract as much as poſſible the effect of theſe new hoſtilities with *Hyder*, the Court appear to have ſtrongly recommended an endeavour to put an end to thoſe with the Marattas, and to prevail upon the Poonah Government to quit their engagements with *Hyder*, as an unnatural alliance on their part, except againſt the Engliſh, with whom their cauſe of quarrel was temporary. But we perceive, that the Court, obſerving further on the impoſſibility of giving deciſive inſtructions, without a certain knowledge of events, leave a diſcretional power with the Governor General and Council, and only add, "that a ſafe and immediate "peace, both with *Hyder* and the Marattas, was to be "their primary object:" And indeed, your Committee find, they recommend this principle of pacification to be extended to a general reſtoration of tranquillity with all the neighbouring powers, "on terms of the moſt per- "fect moderation, in order to be able to abridge their "own inſupportable charges, and to relieve their "friends and allies from additional expences incurred "on account of the war, and alſo, that they might be "able to exert their whole force againſt the national "enemies, if the continuance of European troubles "ſhould render it neceſſary."

The fall of *Baſſein*, the news of which reached the Court of Directors after the diſpatch of the letter above-mentioned, occaſioned ſome particular orders relative to that acquiſition, and to the adviſeable terms of peace with the Marattas.

General Letter from Court of Directors, dated 31 May 1781. Appx. No. 382. See alſo Letter from Committee of Secrecy.

"As the fall of *Baſſein* was an event expected by our "Governor General and Council, and by our Select "Committee of *Bombay*, we hope, according to their "own ideas, and agreeable to the tenor of our inſtruc- "tions of the 2d of February, that upon giving up the "other diſtricts lately obtained to the Marattas, *Baſſein* "may have been preſerved to the Company; but we "are nevertheleſs clearly of opinion, that if peace could "not be re-eſtabliſhed with the Marattas without giving "up *Baſſein*, and if their aſſiſtance in repelling the in- "curſions of *Hyder Ally* could be obtained by the ſacri- "fice of that fortreſs, in ſuch caſe *Baſſein* ſhould be "forthwith reſtored. And indeed, the ſtate of affairs at "*Fort Saint George* by the laſt advices, is ſo very diſ- "ferent from what we had reaſon to expect when we "wrote the before-mentioned letter, that if peace be "purchaſed by the reſtitution of *Baſſein*, and of other "conqueſts made from the Marattas, *Salſette* and *Car-* "*ranga* excepted, we are convinced that the abſolute "neceſſity of the meaſure muſt have been evident before "it would be adopted; and in ſuch caſe it will have "our approbation."

And your Committee find, that the Court, in letters of the ſame date with thoſe we have now taken notice of, direct their adminiſtration at *Bombay* to conſider the orders ſent to the Governor General and Council on political affairs, as addreſſed to themſelves in all caſes which required their co-operation, particularly with the view of reſtoring a ſpeedy, ſafe, and honourable peace; and further enjoined them, "that all inſtructions given, and "requiſitions made by the Governor General and "Council, for the accompliſhment of that deſirable "purpoſe, ſhould be duly obſerved and carried into "execution."

2 February, 11 April, 31 May 1781. Appx. No. 383.

Par. 10. Letter 31 May 1781.

In regard to *Ragoba*, your Committee obſerve, that his perſonal ſafety and the ſecurity of a proviſion for his ſupport during his life, were objects uniformly recommended to the attention and care of the Governor General and Council, by the Court of Directors; and they appear to have given ſimilar aſſurances to *Ragoba* himſelf, in a letter dated 19th June 1781, and expreſs their hope, that ſuch proviſion would in all reſpects be ſuitable to his dignity, though they were not able at this diſtance of time and place, to ſay how far it might be in the power of their Governor General and Council to gratify all his expectations.

Letter to Ragoba, 19 June 1781. Appx. No. 384.

It having thus appeared, by the letters referred to, and by another under date 11th December 1781, that the re-eſtabliſhment of peace with the Marattas, and with all the Indian Powers, has been the principal object of the inſtructions which the Company have lately ſent to their Governments in *India*, your Committee will expreſs a hope, that ſo deſirable an end may be forwarded to a happy accompliſhment by the circumſtances of Sir *Eyre Coote's* ſucceſs in the *Carartic*, and by the very conſiderable addition of European force, which may probably have joined the Britiſh armies in thoſe parts, ſince the laſt diſpatches were ſent from thence.

Appx. No. 385

Your Committee cannot put an entire concluſion to theſe Reports, without endeavouring to remind the Houſe of the great maſs of materials from which we have been obliged to ſelect theſe points of information, now ſubmitted to their attention in the preſent form. This, we muſt hope, will be admitted as a ſufficient excuſe for the length of them; becauſe, though much was laid aſide as uſeleſs or impertinent, there remained a great deal which could not be rejected. For any deficiency of method or conciſeneſs, we have only to plead the nature of the ſubject and the neceſſity of the times, which called for as ſpeedy a return as could be faithfully made to the orders and inſtructions of the Houſe. In this laſt point, we truſt, there will be found no material, as there aſſuredly was no intentional failure; and we therefore ſubmit the other defects to the candour and indulgence of the Houſe.

REVENUE AND MILITARY ACCOUNTS

REFERRED TO IN PAGE 358 OF THE PRECEDING

REPORT.

2.

GENERAL STATE of RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS in BENGAL for

RECEIPTS.

	Nett Amount of Territorial Revenues and Cuſtoms, clear of Charges, Collection, Commiſſion to the Company's Servants, Stipends, and Jaghire.		Received on ſeveral Accounts viz. of the Nabob of Oude, Account the Treaty of Benares, and towards the Military Expences on Account of Depoſits, &c.	Bond Debt contracted in the Year.	Amount of ſundry Gains arifing on Batta, Gains at the Factories, on Indian Goods, &c.	Amount received for Bills of Exchange on the Court of Directors.	Amount of Remittances from other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes from Europe at Europe Price, with 10 per Cent.	Amount of Profit on European Goods ſold in the Year.	TOTAL RECEIPTS.
	Nett Amount of Revenues arifing from Cuſtoms, &c. poſſeſſed before the Year 1757.	Nett Amount of Territorial Revenues lately obtained.					Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.			
May to April	£.	£.	£	£.	£	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1771 — 1772	31,709	2,341,941	20,990	595,610	38,138	47,366	- -	1,511	9,963	140,265	32,071	3,259,564
1772 — 1773	28,726	2,298,441	100,460	81,417	52,818	212,198	- -	- -	10,470	56,663	25,775	2,866,968
1773 — 1774	42,999	2,438,405	419,992	29,664	50,448	51,626	- -	4,198	9,261	87,424	26,169	3,160,186
1774 — 1775	46,114	2,777,870	344,996	- -	50,347	215,651	- -	182	5,910	96,072	27,773	3,564,915
1775 — 1776	48,316	2,818,071	856,469	- -	62,402	216,826	- -	- -	17,384	146,318	32,231	4,198,017
1776 — 1777	29,459	2,755,043	544,476	- -	48,719	237,029	- -	117,450	16,907	185,276	37,081	3,971,440
1777 — 1778	37,410	2,530,042	623,355	- -	36,166	260,146	- -	- -	11,915	153,353	35,721	3,688,068
1778 — 1779	30,848	2,636,809	594,633	- -	32,186	116,476	118,500	- -	56,922	120,583	55,733	3,782,690
£.	295,581	20,616,622	3,505,371	706,691	371,224	1,357,318	118,500	123,341	138,732	985,934	272,554	28,491,868

1.

ANNUAL AMOUNT of CIVIL, MARINE, and MILITARY CHARGES incurred by the *Eaſt India* Company, in *Bengal*, from May 1771 to the laſt Accounts received; Alſo the AMOUNT of the Difference between the Nett Revenues and Charges.

	Total Nett Revenues, Cuſtoms, &c.		CHARGES.						Total Charges defrayed by the Company.	Revenues more than Charges.
			Civil.	Marine.	Military.			Buildings and Fortifications.		
					Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Nett Amount defrayed by the Company.			
May to April	£.		£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1771 — 1772	2,373,650		154,620	52,161	1,164,348	20,766	1,143,582	354,916	1,705,279	668 371
1772 — 1773	2,327,137		180.093	53,958	1,288,667	63,342	1,225,325	299,895	1,759,271	567,866
1773 — 1774	2,481,404		159 537	53,700	1,304,883	131,430	1,173,453	101,745	1,488 435	992,969
1774 — 1775	2,823,984		231,722	36,510	1,080,304	240,750	839,554	105,104	1,212,890	1,611,094
1775 — 1776	2,966,387		291,903	44,065	1,051,969	327,800	724,169	101,484	1,161,621	1,804,766
1776 — 1777	2,784 592		290,075	35,117	942,119	280,081	662,038	85,986	1,073,216	1,711,286
1777 — 1778	2,567,452		401,183	76,110	1,184,708	366,769	817,939	93,746	1,388,978	1,178,474
1778 — 1779	2,687,657		401,348	152,462	1,846,237	855,575	990,662	152,150	1,696,622	991,035
£.	21,012,173	£.	2,110,481	504,083	9,863,235	2,286,513	7,576,722	1,295,026	11,486,312	9.525,861

East India House,
23d March 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Eight Years, from May 1771 to April 1779, being to the lateſt Accounts received.

DISBURSEMENTS.

Civil and Military Charges.			Amount of Payments for Reſtitution Donation, Account, Deposits, &c. &c.	Bond Debt diſcharged in the Year.	Amount of Loſſes ariſing on Bills, Loſſes at the Factories, on Indian Goods, &c.	Amount of Loſſes on European Goods, ſold in the Year.	Amount of Remittances to other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes to Europe, valued at Prime Coſt.	TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS.
Civil Charges.	Military Charges.	Buildings and Fortifications.					Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
206,781	1,164,348	354,916	85,491	- -	64,973	2,904	- -	47,782	82,577	874,420	2,884,192
234,051	1,288,667	299,895	32,282	- -	95,515	779	- -	156,663	84,415	634,874	2,827,141
213,237	1,304,885	101,745	31,989	- -	159,945	1,534	- -	229,817	59,979	624,845	2,727,975
268,232	1,080,304	105,104	205,154	304,076	144,943	2,823	128,180	106,982	22,440	932,786	3,300,124
335,968	1,051,569	101,484	32,232	533,835	140,458	1,402	123,746	366,437	105,367	705,584	3,438,480
325,192	942,119	85,986	108,057	409,566	113,056	619	121,094	207,677	91,209	1,019,826	3,424,401
477,293	1,184,708	93,746	107,059	35,230	60,290	1,185	12,985	273,051	187,571	919,911	3,353,029
553,810	1,846,237	152,150	280,446	15,652	55,555	540	313,014	251,412	81,693	1,422,080	4,972,590
2,614,564	9,863,235	1,295,026	882,710	1,298,357	834,735	11,786	699,019	1,578,921	715,252	7,134,327	26,927,932

AMOUNT of BOND DEBT AT THE Following Periods.

	£.
1772 - - -	1,213,259
1773 - - -	1,294,629
1774 - - -	1,324,291
1775 - - -	1,020,215
1776 - - -	486,385
1777 - - -	76,819
1778 - - -	41,588
1779 - - -	25,936
February 29 - - 1780 - - -	27,589
31ſt October - - 1780 - - -	485,378

TOTAL OF Civil and Military CHARGES AND BUILDINGS.

	£.
1771 - -	1,726,045
1772 - -	1,822,613
1773 - -	1,619,865
1774 - -	1,453,640
1775 - -	1,489,421
1776 - -	1,353,297
1777 - -	1,755,747
1778 - -	2,552,197

	Receipts more than Diſburſements.	Diſburſements more than Receipts.
	£.	£.
1771 - -	375,372	—
1772 - -	39,827	—
1773 - -	432,211	—
1774 - -	264,791	—
1775 - -	759,537	—
1776 - -	547,039	—
1777 - -	335,059	—
1778 - -	- -	1,189,900
£.	2,753,836	1,189,900
Deduct Diſburſements more	1,189,900	
Nett Receipts more £.	1,563,936	

East India Houſe,
23d March 1782.

Errors Excepted.
John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

4.

GENERAL STATE of RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS at BOMBAY, and Subordinates, for

RECEIPTS.

	Nett Amount of Territorial Revenues and Customs, clear of Charges, Collection, &c.		Amount received on Account of Deposits, by the Accountt General, of the Mayor's Court, and on sundry Accounts.	Bond Debt contracted in the Year.	Amount of sundry Gains arising on Batta, Gains at the Factories, on Indian Goods, &c.	Amount received for Bills of Exchange, on the Court of Directors.	Amount of Remittances from other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes from Europe, at Europe price, with 10 per Cent.	Amount of Profits on European Goods sold in the Year.	TOTAL RECEIPTS.
	Nett Amount of Revenues arising from Customs, &c. poſſeſſed before the Year 1757.	Nett Amount of Territorial Revenues lately obtained.					Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.			
Auguſt to July	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.
1771 - 1772	68,572	6,903	6,188	70,242	4,136	115,336	- -	154,369	82,338	141,201	19,569	668,854
1772 - 1773	68,088	17,887	10,689	35,139	10,777	88,112	- -	144,757	12,524	228,668	33,238	649,879
Auguſt - April												
1773 - 1774	68,809	40,354	1,297	23,569	2,943	14,203	- -	175,114	3,236	79,579	19,272	428,376
May - April												
1774 - 1775	62,863	65,653	20,821	59,134	2,630	54,870	116,589	221,193	12,534	120,012	42,003	778,212
1775 - 1776	66,440	160,724	41,111	122,197	17,762	15,945	154,073	164,236	144	115,804	8,388	866,824
1776 - 1777	68,451	181,474	103,524	93,355	5,984	117,675	33,810	173,491	40,516	103,774	102,224	1,024,278
1777 - 1778	67,557	182,310	4,911	- -	5,826	72,117	783	222,151	4,047	111,826	31,143	702,651
1778 - 1779	55,937	173,621	745	111,871	6,751	9,616	122	193,752	373	90,257	48,221	691,266
£. stg.	526,717	828,926	189,286	515,507	56,809	487,874	305,377	1,448,953	155,712	991,121	304,058	5,810,340

3.

ANNUAL AMOUNT of CIVIL, MARINE, and MILITARY CHARGES, incurred by the *Eaſt India* Company, at BOMBAY, and Subordinates, from 1771 to the laſt Accounts received. Alſo the Amount of the Difference between the Nett Revenues and Charges.

	Total Nett Revenues, Cuſtoms, &c.	CHARGES.					Charges more than Revenues.
		Civil.	Marine.	Military.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1771 to 1772 -	75,475	75,618	80,210	214,870	40,155	410,853	335,378
1772 - 1773 -	85,975	72,914	57,748	176,306	77,848	384,816	298,841
1773 - 1774 -	109,163	81,376	63,337	172,978	29,696	347,387	238,224
1774 - 1775 -	128,516	117,959	55,087	209,918	36,598	419,562	291,046
1775 - 1776 -	227,164	86,981	63,915	199,558	22,498	372,952	145,788
1776 - 1777 -	249,915	78,515	57,320	208,037	16,907	360,779	110,864
1777 - 1778 -	249,857	70,996	61,258	219,619	12,500	364 373	114,516
1778 - 1779 -	229,558	109,357	57,988	272,037	71,509	510,891	281,333
£.	1,355,623	693,716	496,863	1,673,323	307,711	3,171,613	1,815,990

East India Houſe,
23d March 1782.

Errors Excepted.
John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Eight Years, from Auguſt 1771 to April 1779, being to the lateſt Accounts received.

DISBURSEMENTS.

Civil and Military Charges.			Amount paid on Account of Deposits by the Accountt General of the Mayor's Court and on ſundry Accounts.	Bond Debt diſcharged in the Year.	Amount of ſundry Loſſes arising on Batta, Loſſes at the Factories, on Indian Goods, &c.	Amount of Loſſes on European Goods ſold in the Year.	Amount of Remittances to other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes to Europe, valued at Prime Coſt.	TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS
Civil.	Military.	Buildings and Fortifications.					Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.		
£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.
155,828	214,870	40,155	3,984	- -	18,058	9,925	18,242	13,411	26,104	98,908	599,485
130,662	176,306	77,848	1,973	- -	26,270	8,130	20,000	32,804	22,397	127,351	623,741
144,713	172,978	29,696	1,037	- -	14,354	8,583	- -	30,619	21,283	78,194	501,457
173,046	209,918	36,598	39,739	- -	38,860	3,207	- -	2,118	15,841	72,830	592,157
150,896	199,558	22,498	115,430	- -	81,564	3,677	14,892	17,173	18,284	32,109	656,081
135,835	208,037	16,907	324,713	- -	71,404	2,530	23,557	10,341	38,753	83,401	915,478
132,254	219,619	12,500	23,665	63,490	46,984	1,761	29,630	4,177	17,866	98,126	650,072
167,345	272,037	71,509	142,824	- -	90,905	4,915	832	753	53,324	55,087	859,531
1,190,579	1,673,323	307,711	653,365	63,490	388,399	42,728	107,153	111,396	213,852	646,006	5,398,002

AMOUNT of BOND DEBT AT THE Following Periods.

		£.
April	1772	90,059
	1773	126,198
	1774	149,767
	1775	208,901
	1776	331,198
	1777	424,553
	1778	361,063
	1779	472,189
	1780	652,419
17th May	1781	1,052,527

East India Houſe,
23d March 1782.

TOTAL OF Civil and Military CHARGES AND BUILDINGS.

	£.
1772	410,853
1773	384,816
1774	347,387
1775	428,562
1776	372,952
1777	360,779
1778	364,373
1779	510,891
	£. 3,180,613

	Receipts more than Diſburſements	Diſburſements more than Receipts.
	£.	£.
1771 - 1772	69,369	—
1772 - 1773	26,138	—
1773 - 1774	- -	73,081
1774 - 1775	186,055	—
1775 - 1776	210,743	—
1776 - 1777	108,800	—
1777 - 1778	52,579	—
1778 - 1779	- -	168,265
	653,684	241,346
Deduct Diſburſements more	241,346	
Nett Receipts more £.	412,338	

Errors excepted,
John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

5.

GENERAL STATE of RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS at FORT SAINT GEORGE, and Subordinates, for

RECEIPTS.

	Nett Amount of Territorial Revenues and Customs, clear of Charges of Collection, Commiſſion to the Company's Servants, &c.		Received on ſeveral Accounts, viz. of the Nabob, towards Military Expences, Stores returned from him, on account Depoſits, &c.	Bond Debt contracted in the Year.	Amount of ſundry Gains ariſing on Batta, Gains at the Factories, on Indian Goods, &c.	Amount received for Bills of Exchange on the Court of Directors.	Amount of Remittances from other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes from Europe at Europe Price, with 10 per Cent.	Amount of Profit on European Goods ſold in the Year.	TOTAL RECEIPTS.
	Nett Amount of Revenues ariſing from Cuſtoms &c. poſſeſſed before the Year 1757.	Nett Amount of Territorial Revenues lately obtained.					Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.			
May to April	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.
1771 - 1772	59,088	499,772	204,884	14,000	24,064	55,225	- -	1,015	21,542	61,705	7,488	948,783
1772 - 1773	72,157	457,076	332,666	21,249	19,662	56,500	17,790	18,661	77,366	87,907	11,383	1,172,417
1773 - 1774	64,738	460,024	362,545	200	28,662	1,600	- -	4,664	16,474	104,405	14,961	1,058,273
1774 - 1775	72,951	430,678	467,241	- -	33,640	46,193	- -	- -	9,782	145,232	29,368	1,235,085
1775 - 1776	62,187	452,404	245,200	- -	11,670	49,091	- -	- -	93,122	103,794	19,009	1,036,477
1776 - 1777	67,337	496,012	191,466	- -	16,712	60,243	- -	- -	89,202	93,620	22,698	1,037,290
1777 - 1778	77,972	205,276	419,499	- -	14,663	50,645	26,568	8,754	166,522	206,659	26,790	1,203,348
1778 - 1779	63,630	430,578	389,557	64,392	14,663	61,182	112,963	25,928	80,646	114,121	26,790	1,381,450
£. stg.	540,060	3,431,820	2,610,058	99,841	163,736	380,679	157,321	59,022	554,656	917,443	158,487	9,073,123

AMOUNT OF BOND DEBT AT THE Following Periods.

		£. stg.
30th April	1772	53,797
	1773	75,046
	1774	75,246
	1775	68,624
	1776	51,552
	1777	51,145
	1778	50,889
	1779	115,280
13 October	1779	118,770
29 February	1780	162,750
30 November	1780	252,721

TOTAL OF Civil and Military CHARGES AND BUILDINGS.

	£. stg.
1771	749,177
1772	651,724
1773	814,992
1774	757,420
1775	538,087
1776	749,579
1777	819,245
1778	1,099,557
£. stg.	6,179,781

Eight Years, from May 1771 to April 1779, being to the lateſt Accounts received.

DISBURSEMENTS.

Civil and Military Charges.			Amount of Payments on ſundry Accounts, Stores ſupplied the Nabob, &c.	Bond Debt diſcharged in the Year.	Amount of ſundry Loſſes ariſing on Batta, Loſſes at the Factories, on Indian Goods, &c.	Amount of Loſſes on European Goods ſold in the Year.	Amount of Remittances to other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes to Europe, valued at Prime Coſt.	TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS.
Civil.	Military.	Buildings and Fortifications.					Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.		
£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.	£. stg.
49,926	633,440	65,811	2,450	- -	15,045	262	17,326	13,163	22,139	242,036	1,061,598
52,508	544,185	55,031	17,162	- -	22,737	- -	36,902	16,912	35,731	205,090	986,258
51,104	677,114	86,774	12,699	- -	48,059	76	4,664	25,436	2,781	247,702	1,156,409
48,729	594,908	113,783	744	6,623	45,875	7,180	1,825	73,523	16,589	161,701	1,071,480
47,118	474,559	16,410	828	17,072	14,530	3,937	19,652	28,924	19,525	268,487	911,042
48,662	550,663	150,254	18,050	407	23,838	4,580	4,702	21,202	16,183	293,275	1,131,816
90,368	646,870	82,007	904	256	34,307	4,682	86,422	18,822	20,901	328,587	1,314,126
92,743	930,163	76,651	2,219	- -	34,307	4,682	35,346	1,199	38,613	306,191	1,522,114
481,158	5,051,902	646,721	55,056	24,358	238,698	25,399	206,839	199,181	172,462	2,053,069	9,154,843

	Receipts more than Diſburſements.	Diſburſements more than Receipts.
1771 - -	- -	112,815
1772 - -	186,159	- -
1773 - -	- -	98,136
1774 - -	163,605	- -
1775 - -	125,435	- -
1776 - -	- -	94,526
1777 - -	- -	110,778
1778 - -	- -	140,664
£.	475,199	556,919
Deduct Receipts more - - -		475,199
Nett Diſburſements more - £.		81,720

East India Houſe,
23 March 1782.

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

6.

GENERAL STATE of RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS at BENCOOLEN for

RECEIPTS.

May to April	Nett Amount of Revenues.	Bond Debt contracted in the Year.	Notes in Circulation	Amount of sundry Gains arising on Pepper at the Factories, &c. &c	Amount received for Bills of Exchange on the Court of Directors.	Amount of Remittances from other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes from Europe, at Europe Price, with 10 per Cent.	TOTAL RECEIPTS.
						Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£
1771 - 1772	2,068	- -	10,687	14,206	4,021	1,388	8,554	10,059	18,120	69,103
1772 - 1773	3,121	- -	- -	32,432	41,460	14,879	1,565	6,298	39,762	139,517
1773 - 1774	2,580	- -	- -	22,989	45,385	6,961	4,229	11,103	39,310	132,557
1774 - 1775	2,921	- -	5,000	6,197	40,826	3,075	6,636	6,159	15,271	86,105
1775 - 1776	3,133	- -	- -	11,661	37,176	33,599	27,659	7,461	19,406	140,095
1776 - 1777	3,210	- -	15,787	6,236	5,152	4,843	14,227	14,499	14,341	78,295
1777 - 1778	3,139	- -	27,754	14,285	34,815	19,026	22,396	8,913	27,693	158,021
1778 - 1779	3,114	6,775	39,375	5,037	55,514	400	3,500	10,554	18,518	142,787
£.	23,286	6,775	98,603	113,043	264,349	84,171	88,786	75,046	192,421	946,480

TOTAL
Civil and Military
CHARGES
AND
BUILDINGS.

1771 - - -	£. 54,159
1772 - - - -	59,882
1773 - - - -	59,001
1774 - - - -	60,374
1775 - - - -	58,846
1776 - - - -	60,378
1777 - - - -	61,574
1778 - - -	64,733

Eight Years, from May 1771 to April 1779, being to the latest Accounts received.

DISBURSEMENTS.

Civil and Military Charges.			Notes in Circulation discharged in the Year.	Amount of sundry Losses arising on Goods at the Factories, &c. &c.	Amount of Remittances to other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes to Europe, valued at Prime Cost.	Total Disbursements.
Civil.	Military.	Buildings and Fortifications.			Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
32,122	17,613	4,415	- -	10,430	- -	- -	12,467	- -	77,047
37,399	18,311	4,172	5,669	9,797	183	1,924	42,705	11,759	131,919
35,071	19,035	4,895	- -	28,508	7,004	- -	19,327	20,377	134,217
37,764	18,842	3,768	- -	16,757	75	2,200	- -	21,937	101,343
35,933	19,695	3,218	- -	23,630	2,066	- -	10,008	13,944	108,494
33,699	17,989	8,790	- -	14,520	5,689	125	3,418	11,732	95,962
34,824	18,008	8,742	- -	17,981	642	12,500	11,236	15,081	119,014
40,080	18,843	5,810	- -	13,931	470	1,750	149	17,193	98,226
£. 286,892	148,336	43,810	5,669	135,554	16,129	18,499	99,310	112,023	866,222

	Receipts more than Disbursements.	Disbursements more than Receipts.
1771 - - - £.	- -	£. 7,944
1772 - - - -	7,598	- -
1773 - - - -	- -	1,660
1774 - - - -	- -	15,238
1775 - - - -	31,601	- -
1776 - - - -	- -	17,667
1777 - - - -	39,007	- -
1778 - - - -	44,561	- -
£.	122,767	42,509
Deduct Disbursements more	42,509	
Nett Receipts more £.	80,258	

East India House,
23d March, 1782.

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

7.

GENERAL STATE of RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS in CHINA for

RECEIPTS.

	Bond Debt contracted in the Year.	Amount of Profits arising on European Goods, &c. &c.	Amount received for Bills of Exchange on the Court of Directors.	Amount of Remittances from other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes from Europe, at Europe Price with 10 per Cent	TOTAL RECEIPTS
				Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.		
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
From 8th March 1772 to 15th February 1773 -	- -	23,091	227,999	23,195	- -	47,915	355,706	677,906
15th February 1773 - 31ſt January 1774 -	- -	20,622	50,374	28,397	25,054	32,700	142,939	300,086
1ſt February 1774 - 8th January 1775 -	- -	13,744	17,894	- -	53,440	14,958	57,640	157,676
9th January 1775 - 29th January 1776 -	- -	4,083	131,226	- -	15,278	8,730	137,685	297,002
30th January 1776 - 25th February 1777 -	- -	24,709	230,943	34,515	3,333	27,420	95,047	415,967
26th February 1777 - 25th February 1778 -	- -	13,135	240,915	75,580	- -	20,709	146,698	497,037
26th February 1778 - 7th March 1779 -	15,360	6,697	219,100	29,245	52,325	- -	129,641	452,368
8th March 1779 - 16th January 1780 -	- -	12,005	541,435	3,987	- -	36,870	24,641	618,938
19th January 1780 - 24th February 1781 -	- -	11,855	476,090	- -	- -	8,329	144,616	640,890
£.	15,360	129,941	2,135,976	194,919	149,430	197,631	1,234,613	4,057,870

FACTORY CHARGES.

	£.
1772 - -	23,851
1773 - -	20,753
1774 - -	12,255
1775 - -	12,856
1776 - -	17,735
1777 - -	19,098
1778 - -	16,750
1779 - -	16,565
1780 - -	24,988
£.	164,851

Nine Years, from 8th March 1772 to 24th February 1781, being to the lateſt Accounts received.

DISBURSEMENTS.

Paid on ſeveral Accounts, Bond Debt diſcharged &c.	Amount of Loſſes on European Goods, Intereſt, &c. &c.	Amount of Remittances to other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes to Europe, including the Factory Charges.	TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS.	Receipts more than Diſburſements	Diſburſements more than Receipts.
		Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.				
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
3,033	9,010	29,018	- -	1,160	551,816	594,037	83,869	—
100	14,179	4,786	- -	8,456	406,758	434,279	- -	134,193
- -	4,945	- -	1,686	1,228	207,191	215,050	- -	57,374
- -	16,357	- -	9,902	1,149	347,329	374,637	- -	77,635
- -	10,634	- -	3,418	1,810	404,256	420,118	- -	4,151
- -	7,085	- -	- -	1,417	494,141	502,643	- -	5,606
- -	6,526	- -	208	1,259	418,732	426,725	25,643	—
16,783	2,069	- -	- -	2,862	340,898	362,612	256,326	—
1,913	3,594	- -	- -	1,574	673,770	680,851	- -	39,961
21,829	74,389	33,804	15,114	20,915	3,844,891	4,010,952	365,838	318,920
						Deduct Diſburſements more	318,920	
						Nett Receipts more	£. 46,918	

Eaſt India Houſe,
23d March 1782.

Errors excepted,

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

APPENDIX.

NOTE, In the courſe of the ſeveral APPENDIXES *the Reader will meet with Paſſages ſo incorrect as to render the Senſe very incomplete; but which, upon examination, prove to be exact Copies of the Originals in the* East India *Houſe.*

No. 1.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated the 26th May 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

READ the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the honour to addreſs you laſt on the 6t March, and adviſed that I ſhould leave *Poorunder* on th next day.

Mr. *Moſtyn* had not at that time left *Bombay*, but hear he arrived at *Poonah* about the 20th of March.

The Peiſhwa's Vackeel accompanies me on the journey to *Fort William*. We expect to get to *Baliſore* by the 19th or 20th of June; and from thence, if a veſſel can be procured, ſhall proceed by water to the Preſidency.

I have, &c.

Coſſem Cotta, near *Vizagapatam*, 15th May 1777. (Signed) *J. Upton.*

APPENDIX, No. 2.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 16 June and 17 July 1777.

Tranſlates of four Papers, delivered by the Poonah Durbar to Mr. *Moſtyn*, and marked as follows:

5th.

THE *Punt Pradan* and his Miniſters agree, by way of friendſhip, to give for ever to the Engliſh Company a country of three lacks, according to cahmil or ancient ſtatement of revenues, near or adjoining to *Broach*; on which there is to be no claim of chout, or any other demand whatever; two carcoons belonging to the Peiſhwa, and two perſons on the part of the Engliſh, to proceed and ſettle exactly the places and boundaries, when the Peiſhwa will give the ſunnuds: This is according to the treaty. But the Governor and Council of *Bombay* refuſe to accept them agreeable to cahmil or former ſtatement; therefore the Governor and Council of *Bombay* ſhould write to Mr. *Carnac* and the other Gentlemen at *Broach*, to ſettle according to the ancient ſtatement of revenues, which they may learn from the Jamedars of the pergunnahs, and receive the countries of three lacks.

Mr. *Moſtyn*'s anſwers to the papers delivered by the Poonah Durbar.

5th.

IT is very extraordinary, that ſo long as Mr. *Upton* remained at this Durbar, and in ſo many letters which have paſſed on this ſubject between the Governor and Council of *Bombay* and him, he never ſhould have mentioned a word about Cahmil; but on the contrary has always declared that it is to be a country of three complete lacks, which if Cahmil is admitted can never be the caſe. In this caſe Mr. *Upton* and the Governor General and Council muſt have been much deceived by you; for neither in the tranſlates of the letter to the Colonel from you, under the 18th October, your inſtructions to *Madajee Ramchunder*, your agent at *Broach*, dated 1ſt December 1776 (both of which were tranſlated by Mr. *M'Pherſon*, Colonel *Upton*'s Perſian Interpreter) nor in the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, copy of which has been tranſmitted by the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta* to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, is there a word mentioned concerning cahmil; but on the contrary, in the 5th article of the treaty it is expreſsly ſaid, "The Marattas "do agree (by way of friendſhip) to give for ever to the "Engliſh Company a country of three complete lacks of "rupees, near or adjoining to *Broach*," &c. and in your letter to *Madajee Ramchundra* you expreſsly write, "It is en-"tered in the treaty, that pergunnahs of a complete revenue "of three lacks ſhall be given to the Engliſh."

I do therefore demand, in the name of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, a full compliance with the 5th article of the treaty concluded by Colonel *John Upton* with the Maratta State, and ratified by the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*; for which purpoſe I require that the proper ſunnuds and orders to your agent at *Broach*, drawn out in the moſt explicit terms, be immediately ſent me.

Appendix. No. 2.

7th.

This Article is exactly conformable to the 7th Article of the Treaty of Peace entered into by Colonel *Upton*, except the following addition:

When ſuch was the treaty, and two letters from *Futty Sing* to Colonel *John Upton*, declaring he had no authority to alienate any country, and incloſing copy of a former Peiſhwa's ſunnud, yet the pergunnahs of *Chickley*, &c. are detained by you; theſe ought to be reſtored.

7th.

This Article, as far as depends on the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, has been fully complied with; as will the remainder, as ſoon as the proper certificates from *Futty Sing*, declaring he has no power to alienate any part of his poſſeſſions, are produced: but, notwithſtanding you ſay Colonel *Upton* has received two letters from *Futty Sing*, with copy a of ſunnud from a former Peiſhwa, declaring he had no authority ſo to do, I can only declare, neither theſe letters nor the ſunnud were ever ſent to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*. I cannot however help obſerving, that it is very extraordinary *Futty Sing* ſhould give ſuch letters, after his vackeel had denied to the Governor and Council of *Bombay* your having the power to alienate any part of his territories, and making a formal demand in the name of his maſter for the reſtitution of theſe very pergunnahs. This aſſertion of the vackeel in the name of his maſter appears to have ſome foundation; for if the whole of the Guicawar poſſeſſions were at the will or diſpoſal of the Peiſhwa, where was the neceſſity of the Peiſhwa *Badjerow*, commonly called *Nanah*, to enter into a partition treaty with *Damajee Guicawar*, by which the Guzerat dominions were divided nearly half and half between the Peiſhwa and Guicawar families? In the ſhare which fell to the latter were included the above diſtricts. It is further remarkable, that at the very time Mr. *Price* entered into a treaty with *Futty Sing* at *Broach* in the year 1773, and I was at *Poonah*, the Peiſhwa ſhould make no objections thereto. From theſe circumſtances, your claiming the ſole right of diſpoſing of the Guicawar's territories appears very extraordinary.

14th.

The treaties between the Government of *Bombay* and the Marattas, dated July 1739, and the 12th October 1756, are to be held and continued in as full force as when they were firſt entered into, unleſs any article or articles, or either of them, ſhould in other meaſures be provided for by this treaty; in ſuch caſe, ſuch article or articles are to be rejected, and thoſe of this treaty to be abided by. And it is mentioned in a former treaty, that the Engliſh will give no aſſiſtance at any rate to my enemies, even though in friendſhip with them; accordingly, the Peiſhwa ſhall give no aſſiſtance to the enemies of the Engliſh. In another treaty, it is agreed, that orders ſhall be given to the officers of the Circar, to ſtop all ſervant, ſoldiers, or great men belonging to the Engliſh, who ſhould deſert, and acquaint the Governor or Chief of the neareſt ſettlement where ſuch perſon ſhall be taken, and when the Company's people come for them, they ſhall be delivered up to them; accordingly, the ſervants or great men belonging to the Circar, except that man who may have gone to *Bombay*, or any ſettlement under their juriſdiction, ſhall be delivered up again. To this both parties agreed on promiſe of pardon: this is the agreement; notwithſtanding which you ſent boats for *Dada Saib*, carried him to *Bombay*, and gave him protection, as you alſo did the people of *Tooteya*, with the Circar's elephants, horſes, jewels, money, &c. they carried with them. Agreeable to this treaty, our friendſhip had long ſubſiſted, but you knowing a diſpute had ariſen in my houſe, and that my Officers and forces were gone towards *Brampore*, took that opportunity to attack and take *Salſette*, and other forts, from whence the Engliſh carried away all the valuable effects. You alſo gave aſſiſtance to *Ragonath Row*, which has put me to the expence of a crore; but through the means of the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, a new treaty of peace and friendſhip has been concluded, notwithſtanding which you have given protection both to *Ragonath Row* and the Impoſtor's people, which obliges me to keep forces in the *Conkan*. Of whom am I to expect payment of this expence? and how is the treaty obſerved by the Engliſh? In former treaties the Circar's enemies were to be delivered up.

14th.

This Article ſeems principally to refer to the 3d article of the treaty made at *Bombay* the 14th September 1761, which runs as follows: "That all Europeans and natives, "either ſoldiers, ſeamen, or others, in His Britannic Majeſty's "or the Honourable Company's pay, who may hereafter "deſert from *Bombay*, ſhall be immediately ſecured and re-"turned to the neareſt Engliſh ſettlement to ſuch place where "they may be apprehended upon landing in any part of the "Maratta country, the Governor having promiſed ſuch a "free pardon, and to pay any reaſonable charges that may "be incurred upon the occaſion: in like manner ſhall be "delivered up all deſerters in the Engliſh pay from *Surat*, on "their being drawn, or immediately on receiving notice of "them within the Maratta limits, it not being in their power "to ſpeak more poſitively with reſpect to thoſe of *Surat*, as "the country thereabouts is open, and numbers go through "it without being known. It is alſo agreed, that whatever "people, Europeans of all nations excepted, who are in the "ſervice of *Maderow*, and may deſert therefrom to the Eng-"liſh, ſhall be delivered up on the ſame terms and condi-"tions." This certainly only relates to people who are immediately in the ſervice, and receive pay from either State, as menial ſervants or ſoldiers; but cannot in any ſhape be conſtrued to mean gentlemen or principal men of either. Therefore the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, giving mere perſonal protection to *Ragonath Row*, does not infringe any one article of the treaties entered into with the Maratta State; and I do poſitively deny any boats being ſent for him, for he eſcaped from *Terrapore* in boats provided by himſelf, and by mere accident met our veſſel at ſea. Your now ſtarting this objection appears more extraordinary, as Colonel *Upton*, in a letter to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, dated no longer ago than the 12th December laſt, writes them, that he had informed you how very deſirous the Governor and Council of *Bombay* were to give all poſſible ſatisfaction to the Poonah Government, and to remove, as far as they could, all doubts the Miniſters might entertain in conſequence of *Ragoba*'s reſidence at *Bombay*; for which purpoſe the Colonel had aſſured your Miniſters in their name, that *Ragoba* only reſided there as a private perſon for the ſecurity of his perſon, that they would not in any ſhape countenance or ſupport any ſchemes or deſigns to your prejudice, or in the leaſt infringe the late treaty, of which they could not allow their affording *Ragoba* mere perſonal protection to be any breach; with which he ſaid your Miniſters ſeemed well pleaſed, and for the preſent ſatisfied. After Colonel *Upton* having written this,

what am I to think of your making objections? The Governor and Council of *Bombay* were induced by humanity alone to receive the people of *Sudaba* into *Salſette*, to preſerve their lives, and to prevent their being killed immediately before their faces. They would have acted in the ſame manner by your forces, had they been reduced to the ſame ſituation. The Governor and Council gave themſelves no further trouble about them; they went where they pleaſed, and carried away whatever they had brought with them. The Engliſh certainly do not oblige you to keep forces in the *Conkan*, as they have given you every proof in their power of their ſincere deſire ſtrictly to adhere to the late treaty, of which my being ſent to you ought to be a moſt convincing one; you muſt therefore, I ſuppoſe, have ſome other reaſons than your apprehenſions of what the Engliſh may do for your keeping forces there. You have conſequently brought the expence on yourſelf.

When you have fully complied with that part of your letter to Colonel *Upton* of the 18th October 1776, relative to this Pergunnah, it will be delivered up to you; but as the true intent and meaning of the late treaty is, that the Company ſhall receive the complete ſum of 12 lacks of rupees for the expences of the war; the charges attending the collections muſt, of courſe be deducted, which the Governor and Council of *Bombay* have given ſtrict orders ſhall be confined within the moſt moderate bounds that prudence or the ſafety of the Pergunnah will permit, and you may ſend a truſty perſon to reſide there, and take receipts from the Engliſh reſident for the balance.

According to the treaty, it is agreed the Sircar ſhall pay to the Engliſh the ſum of 12 lacks of rupees, and until that amount is diſcharged, the revenues of *Jambooſeer*, as agreed with Colonel *Upton*, is given up to the Engliſh; when the whole is paid off, the Engliſh to return the ſaid Pergunnah to the Circar, with every thing belonging to it. For my ſatisfaction, I propoſe to the Governor and Council of *Bombay* two conditions, the firſt, that the amount revenues ſhould be ſettled and recovered by the Circar's man, *Madajee Ramchundra*, who would pay it to the Engliſh on their giving a receipt; the ſecond condition, that the Jemmabundy of the ſaid Pergunnah ſhould be made by *Madajee Ramchundra*, for which amount, the Engliſh to give a receipt and recover the revenues. Of theſe two conditions, the Governor and Council of *Bombay* accepted the latter; but the Gentlemen of the ſaid Pergunnah has not yet given any account of the revenues to *Madajee Ramchundra*. Without the Circar's man makes the ſettlement of the revenues, how is he to know the amount to be recovered from the ſaid Pergunnah, and take the receipt for it? therefore I deſire a letter to the Gentleman at *Jambooſeer* from the Governor of *Bombay*, to permit that the Jemmabundy be ſettled by *Madajee Ramchundra*, and the Carcoons belonging to the ſaid *Madajee*, to ſet at the Cuſtom Chowkey, to know what is recovered; the Engliſh will recover the revenues of the ſaid Pergunnah, and at the Chowky's giving a receipt of the ſaid Pergunnah to the Circar's man for the amount.

Having now replied to the ſeveral papers you have ſent me, in ſuch manner as I hope, and indeed make no doubt, will convince you with what punctuality the Engliſh have on their parts complied with every article of the treaty entered into by Colonel *Upton*, I cannot help expreſſing my wiſh that no further delay may be made in performing the ſame on your parts. I muſt in turn lay before you ſome complaints and demands in behalf of the Honourable Company, and the merchants trading under their protection.

Firſt. Notwithſtanding the treaty of peace had been ſigned by Colonel *Upton*, ſix boats with Engliſh paſſes and colours, in their paſſage from *Goa* to *Bombay*, which had been under convoy of the Company's ſhip the *Gatton*, but by ſome accident had been ſeparated from her, were attacked and taken by your fleet on the 4th April 1776; the *Terrible*, one of the Company's cruizers, fell in with your fleet, and while your ſhips ſurrounded her, your ſmall veſſels not only carried off two botellas with Engliſh colours, which were under her protection, but attempted taking two others, but did not ſucceed; theſe matters were written to Colonel *Upton*, who in his anſwer, informed the Governor and Council of *Bombay* he had repreſented them to you; that you had aſſured him you would ſend orders for the immediate reſtitution of theſe eight botellas; that you had declared your orders had been very poſitive to the commanders of your veſſels, not to moleſt any veſſels, boats, &c. with Engliſh paſſes or colours, and that you would repeat theſe orders in the ſtrongeſt manner. If you have repeated theſe orders, it is very extraordinary that your fleet no longer ago than the month of March laſt ſhould take ſundry boats, particularly one loaded with timber, coming from *Cullicut*, belonging to the Honourable Company, which had both Engliſh paſs and colours, or that your orders for the reſtitution of the eight boats before mentioned ſhould never have been obeyed, for to this day neither of them have been returned; I therefore again, in the name of the Honourable Company, not only repeat the demand made by Mr. *Upton* for them, but likewiſe demand the botella laſt mentioned; and I expect that you will ſend for and puniſh the officer in command of your fleet for the inſult he offered rhe Company's cruizer; and that you fall upon ſome method for preventing the like in future, for the Engliſh cannot, nor will not, ſuffer their flag to be inſulted with impunity.

Second. In the month of Auguſt laſt the Governor and Council of *Bombay* ſent Colonel *Upton* a liſt of the cargo of the Engliſh ſhip *Aurora*, loſt near *Rhutnagburry*, to demand reſtitution thereof from you; this liſt muſt have been dielvered to you, for in your letter to him

Appendix. No. 21.

him of the 18th Oct. you write, "Attentive to the friendſhip between the Circar and the Engliſh, after chaſtizing the ſeditious, and ſettling the diſturbances in *Conkan*, ſtrict orders ſhall be iſſued in regard to reſtoring the ſhip's cargo from the ſaid receivers, and they will be made to give it." The ſeditious have been overcome a long time ſince, yet no reſtitution has been made; I therefore require your compliance therewith, or your finding ſome method to make good the loſs to our merchants, conformable to the 13th article of the late treaty.

Third. I demand reſtitution of the *Bombay* Shybar Sacre, Tindal Gunnoo Cooley, belonging to an Engliſh Gentleman, taken by two gallivats of your fleet, and carried into *Gheriah*, after the ceſſation, with her cargo, agreeable to the liſt now delivered; her ſalt was ſold at *Canapatan*, and the other articles taken for the Circar's uſe; the boat was ſold to ſome *Goa* merchants.

Fourth. Notwithſtanding, ſo long ago as the year 1768, I adjuſted ſome diſputed articles with your predeceſſor, *Madarow*, and received ſeveral orders from him, copies of which I now incloſe, for the payment of the ſum of rupees thirty thouſand nine hundred fifteen three quarters, and thirty reas (R^{s} 30,915. 3, 30.) and the delivery of two boats, one belonging to *Naſſerwanjee Moody*, and the other belonging to *Byramjee Homjee*, your officers have not to this day complied with either of them; I therefore now again demand freſh orders from you, in ſuch manner that your officers may not have it in their power to evade complying therewith.

Fifth. You quote the 3d article of the treaty of September 1761, as having been broken by the Engliſh, on account of their giving mere perſonal protection to *Dahda Saib*; when at the ſame time I cannot help obſerving, you are daily breaking it, by receiving every European that deſerts from *Bombay*; a glaring inſtance of which I had the very day I arrived at *Panwell*, ſeven of them coming into my camp and ſetting me at defiance. I could eaſily have ſecured them, but to prevent diſputes, I thought the propereſt method was to apply to *Criſtnajee Punt*, the officer in command of your troops there, to whoſe artillery they belonged, which I accordingly did; when he replied that he could not deliver them up without the orders of *Bhimroo Panſee*, his commanding officer, who was then abſent. I therefore now in virtue of the before-mentioned treaty, demand that you ſend me an order for their being delivered up and ſent to *Bombay*.

True Copies.

T. Moſtyn.

Tranſlate of the *Poonah* Durbar's anſwers to the demands made on them by Mr. *Moſtyn*, the 30th April 1777.

1ſt. I obſerve what you ſay regarding the Shybars: but who has paid me the crore of rupees you cauſed me to expend before the late treaty, in order to enable me to pay you? However I will make enquiry about any boats which have been taken ſince the late treaty, and if there are any ſuch I will deliver them.

2d. At the bar of *Rhutnagurry* your ſhip was plundered by the ſeditious, who with your goods, and ſome belonging to the Circar, ran to *Salſette*, where you gave them protection; you ſhould therefore demand the cargo from them. The Circar anſwered Colonel *Upton*, that I would order the people of the ſeditious, to deliver the cargo belonging to the ſaid ſhip. If you would deliver theſe people to the Circar, I ſhould not only be able to make them give back your goods, but alſo recover thoſe they took from the Circar. If you protect theſe people, you ſhould order the Circar's goods to be returned.

3d. I have not till this time heard any thing of the Shybar of ſalt taken by my fleet; but as you have now mentioned it, I ſhall enquire whether it was before or after the war, or whether it was or was not taken, and will write you about it.

4th. After you have ſettled matters agreeable to the treaty, I will ſettle about the orders from *Mhaderow* for rupees 30,915.3.

5th. You have given protection to *Ragonaut Row*: In his room you make a demand for ſeven Europeans, who met you in the Circar's juriſdiction. An order ſhall be given for the Circar's people to go along with yours, to ſhew them, when they ſhall be delivered according to the treaty, and you may carry them away. You give protection to the Circar's enemies, putting me to the expence of a crore of rupees; you ſhould deliver them into my hands according to treaty.

True Copies.

(Signed) *Thos Moſtyn.*

Tranſlate of the Poonah Durbar's replies to Mr. *Moſtyn*'s anſwers to the papers delivered by them, the 20th April 1777.

5th. You ſaid more in your anſwers than is neceſſary. There was no occaſion to mention the letters of Colonel *Upton*, as proofs of what you alledge. How can you ſay that Colonel *Upton*, *Macpherſon*, and the Governor, General and Council, have been deceived?—for theſe Gentlemen, acting as Sirdars, how could they be deceived? Nobody but you will ſay ſo. You beſt know what is written in Engliſh. The Engliſh treaty, ſealed with the Company's ſeal, and ſigned by the Council, was ſent here, of which the Moonſhee at *Calcutta* made the Perſian tranſlate, wherein the word Cahmil is mentioned, according to which you ſhould act. You ought therefore to take the country of three lacks of rupees, agreeable to the Cahmil Jama, to which I have no objection.

7th. You have given for anſwer about *Chickley*, &c. country, that it is agreed in the treaty, when it is proved by the writing of *Futty Sing*, that he has no power to give away any of his country, according to the copy of the Circar's ſunnuds, you will reſtore the ſaid country. Two letters from the Guicawar, and copy of a former Peiſhwa's ſunnud, were delivered to Colonel *Upton*, for which we took a receipt from the ſaid Colonel, acknowledging that he had received theſe two letters, and the copy of the ſunnud; a copy of which receipt I now ſend you. The Circar has complied with the treaty, but you have not yet reſtored the ſaid pergunnah. You mention the diviſion of the Guzerat country, between the Peiſhwa and Guicawar, but all the world knows the Guicawar is a ſervant of the Circar; if he was not a ſervant, why would the Circar take half his country? or why would he ſerve them? According to the agreement then made, he gave a writing to the Circar. Beſides, for what reaſon ſhould he ſend a letter with his ſeal to Colonel *Upton*? Or, why ſhould he ſuffer the Circar to take from him part of the country given him by that treaty, and keep it, or return it to him, at their pleaſure? *Damajee Sayajee*, *Govind Row*, and *Futty Sing* Guicawars, made a treaty with the Circar, in which they acknowledge themſelves to be the ſervants of the Peiſhwa, and that their country is at his diſpoſal, which treaty was ſhewn, and even a copy thereof delivered to Colonel *Upton*; notwithſtanding which, you doubt the Peiſhwa's authority. Suppoſe any of my officers, who have a command at a diſtance, ſhould enter into a treaty with another power, giving away part of the country under his command, and write to me he had done ſo, but when he comes before me, he acknowledges himſelf to be my ſervant, and denies that he has a right to give away any of his country: This is exactly the caſe with the Guicawars, as appears by the letters, and copy of the ſunnud ſent by *Futty Sing* to Colonel *Upton*. You ſhould therefore reſtore *Chickley*, &c. agreeable to the treaty.

14th. You are very particular in your anſwer, with regard to the 3d article of the treaty of 1761, but ſay nothing of the firſt treaty entered into. If you will examine that which you have got with the Circar's ſeal, you will find it mentioned as I have written; in the firſt

treaty it is mentioned, that the Engliſh will not give any aſſiſtance, even to their friends, againſt this Government. In another treaty it is mentioned, whether they are ſmall or great men who deſert, they ſhall be delivered up, notwithſtanding which you have written a long anſwer. You alſo mention that *Ragonaut Row* is not a ſervant; but the cuſtom of this Government is, that every one is a ſervant, whether young or old, except one: *Sadaſew Row* and *Ragonaut Row* were under the command of the Peiſhwa, as all the world knows. Colonel *Upton* wrote to you, that he had mentioned to me regarding your keeping *Ragonaut Row* at *Bombay*; if Colonel *Upton* has any writing from me regarding it, I wiſh you would produce it. You ſay you protected the people of the ſeditious, to prevent their being killed before your face; but notwithſtanding they have deſtroyed many lacks of rupees of country belonging to the Circar, you have given them protection. If you do protect ſuch rebels, where is the uſe of the treaty? and where is your friendſhip? Though there is a treaty, you are taking every opportunity to raiſe diſputes, and bringing the Circar into loſs and danger, by protecting the ſeditious people. If this is the caſe, there can be no dependance on treaties; therefore you muſt deliver back the Sircar's enemies, and for the future never interfere in ſuch matters. By your acting in this manner our friendſhip will be firm.

Anſwer regarding *Jambooſeer*.

Jambooſeer is not mentioned in the treaty, but the Circar agreed to give twelve lacks of rupees; for the diſcharge of which the Circar gave the revenues of *Jambooſeer*, and wrote to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, propoſing two modes for the recovery thereof, when they agreed to the ſecond, that the Jamabundy ſhould be made by the Circar; a receipt for which to be taken from the Engliſh, and they to recover the revenues. According thereto I gave directions to the Amildar; but you now write about the charges, which is a new thing. What method is this? I am indebted to you the aforeſaid ſum, but you want to have the recovery of the revenues at your pleaſure. The ſaid pergunnah ſhould be delivered up to the Circar's Amildar, who will recover the revenues, and pay you the amount; but if you chuſe to collect, the Jamabundy ought to be made by the Amildar, for which amount you ſhould give him a receipt. What buſineſs have you with the recovery of the Jamabundy? You have only a right to the money; therefore you ſhould receive it from the Amildar at the proper ſeaſon, and give him a receipt. The Circar's Commawſidar, is ſufficient to take care of the pergunnah. You write me, that I may ſend an honeſt man to reſide there, which ſurprizes me: When that honeſt man is obliged to ſit quiet, and not permitted to make the Jamabundy, how will he know, or what proof has he of the amount thereof? This is not the buſineſs of an Amildar: he is to recover the revenues, and pay it to you; or elſe permit the Jamabundy to be made by the Commawſidar, when you may recover the amount. It ought not to be leſs than it formerly was; therefore let the Circar ſend a Commawſidar. You will receive the money, but you have no buſineſs with the Jamabundy.

APPENDIX, No. 3.

Letter from *Broach*, dated 12 March 1777.

To Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*, or to the Engliſh Reſident for the time being at *Poorunder*

Sir,

WE have received your favour of the 18th ultimo, incloſing copy of a letter from *Bombay* Preſidency to our addreſs, the original whereof reached us ſome time before.

In obedience to their orders, we have repeatedly aſſured the Maratta agents, that we are ready to conform to the tenor of the inſtructions communicated to them from the Peiſhwa, agreeable to the copy tranſmitted by you to the Governor and Council the 1ſt December laſt, viz. to accept the propoſed diſtricts of *Ahmood*, *Hanſoot*, and *Desborah*, and give and receive according as they may exceed or fall ſhort of the ſtipulated amount of three lacks, which we propoſed to have aſcertained by the average produce of the three enſuing years; but the agents inſiſt on our abiding by their eſtimate of R' 3,33,000, and that there muſt be a deduction from *Ahmood* for the ſurplus of R' 33,000; and they will admit of no alternative, although our commiſſioners here, who have accurately inſpected the revenues for a ſeries of years paſt, maintain they will not exceed R'2,10,000.

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We are ſorry to obſerve, there muſt be ſome colluſion on the part of the Miniſters, as the inſtructions conveyed directly to the agents, differ widely from the copy tranſmitted by you, and ſeem to authorize their ſervants in their obſtinate refuſal to accede to our reaſonable propoſals.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Broach, the 12th March 1777. (Signed) *John Carnac*, *R. H. Boddam*, *And*° *Ramſay*.

APPENDIX, No. 4.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 16th June, 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General *John Clavering*,
Philip Francis, Eſquire.
Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.

READ a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, as follows:

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to incloſe for your peruſal a letter, from *Siccaram Bapoo*, which I received yeſterday.

Ganjam, 31ſt May 1777. I am, &c. (Signed) *J. Upton*.

From *Siccaram Pundit* to Colonel *Upton*, incloſed in the above.

The particulars of the conduct of the Governor and Council of *Bombay* have already been written to the Governor and Supreme Council of *Calcutta*; ſince which, though five months are elapſed, no anſwer has been received thereto: How am I to account for this?

As it is a laudable cuſtom, that every condition ſtipulated in a ſolemn treaty between chiefs of rank on the reconciliation of differences, be ſtrictly fulfilled, and their friendſhip daily increaſed; notwithſtanding which, the Governor and Council of *Bombay* to this preſent time keep *Seremunt Dadu Sahib* with them, afford their protection to fugitives, who carried with them in their flight, effects and money of the Circar; and have alſo procraſtinated the affair of the Talooks of three lacks of rupees; and notwithſtanding the arrival of two letters from *Futtah Sing Row Rankwar*, diſavowing his authority over *Chilklee*, &c. (Mahals of the Circar ceded by him) have not yet relinquiſhed them, but are negligent and inattentive in fulfilling of every article; I muſt therefore requeſt that you will ſtate theſe matters in a clear and explicit manner to my friend *Amud ul Dowla Bahadre* and the Supreme Council, and procure the moſt poſitive injunctions to the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, that all theſe points may be finally ſettled, and the treaty ſtrictly fulfilled. Meſſrs. *Chevalier* and *Shantrolle*, on the part of the King of *France*, lately arrived on board a ſhip on this coaſt, and landed at *Rio Dunda*, belonging

Appendix. No. 5.

belonging to this Government, from whence they tranſmitted a letter to the preſence of *Seremunt Row Sahib Row Pundit Purdhan*, containing a requeſt of an audience to treat with him; which if granted they would wait on him, and fully explain to him the ſubjects of their miſſion.

As friendſhip had ſubſiſted from time immemorial between the French nation and the illuſtrious family of *Seremunt Sahib*; and moreover, as hoſpitality is due to the envoy of a great Prince, an order for their approach was ſent from the preſence: when the aforeſaid gentlemen arrive, the ſubjects of the negociation will be explained.

The Governor and Council of *Bombay* will repreſent this matter to the Supreme Council in an injurious light: I have therefore written you and the Supreme Council, the relation of what has really paſſed. Friendſhip is now eſtabliſhed between us; which ſhall never be interrupted in the ſlighteſt degree.

Do you, my friend, amply repreſent the particulars to the Governor and Council.

APPENDIX, No. 5.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 16th June 1777.

READ a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, as follows:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing you laſt under the 4th inſtant: on the next day I was informed, that the Durbar had ſent palanqueens, an elephant, camels, and a few horſemen, to eſcort ſome French gentlemen hither, who had landed at *Choul*, from a forty gun frigate. This frigate had brought a letter from the new Governor of *Pondicherry* to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and ſailed from that place with the Governor and Council's anſwer to it a day or two before I left it. I have thus long deferred adviſing you of this matter, as from reports I expected they would have arrived at *Proondur* ſome time ſince, when I ſhould have been at ſome certainty as to their intentions in coming to this Durbar; but finding they are longer on their journey than could be imagined, and not knowing how much more time they may take before they meet the Durbar, I cannot defer any longer adviſing you of ſuch intelligence regarding them as I had been able to learn.

Immediately on my receiving the above information, I repreſented to the Durbar, how inconſiſtent their conduct was, with the profeſſions of friendſhip they had made to Colonel *Upton*, both at and ſince ſettling the late treaty; where I was informed by one of the perſons appointed to tranſact the buſineſs between me and the Durbar, that their viſit was in conſequence of an application from this government to Monſieur *Briancourt*, the French Chief at *Surat*, during the late troubles (that as they had advanced ſo far, the Durbar could not with propriety refuſe ſeeing them; but I might depend nothing was intended to the prejudice of the Company, and that the principal gentleman of the embaſſy was named the Chevalier de *St. Laub*). I am now informed that he, with five other French gentlemen, accompanied by a Portugueze gentleman from *Goa*, arrived at the foot of Dew Gaut, within a few coſs of *Proondur*, five days ago, where they ſtill remain; and that they have brought a letter to this Durbar from *France*. What may be their real views, it is difficult to ſay; but from what has tranſpired, their principal object ſeems to be a factory at *Poonah*, and a ſea-port on ſome part of the Coaſt of *Malabar*, under the Maratta dominion. You may depend, Gentlemen, that my utmoſt endeavours ſhall be exerted to gain the moſt perfect intelligence of every tranſaction that paſſes at the Durbar, regarding the French, as well as to prevent their carrying ſo deſtructive a ſcheme to my Honourable Employers' intereſts into execution, and giving you the earlieſt intelligence in my power; this may not perhaps be ſo early as I could wiſh, owing to the ſtrict watch they have kept over me, to prevent, I ſuppoſe, my having any communication with thoſe whom they ſuſpect will give me certain information, no one having hitherto been near me.

In my laſt I adviſed you, that I was to have had my firſt audience of the Durbar that evening, but *Nanah Furneſe*, who had been ſome days abſent on account of a wedding, not returning until the 12th, and *Siccaram Bapoo* being taken ſick, I could not ſee the Peiſhwa until the 15th. On the 16th, at the deſire of the Miniſters, I met *Madarow Jadaroi* and *Byroo Punt*, who are appointed by them to tranſact the buſineſs between me and the Durbar tent, near *Proondur*. After the uſual compliments had paſſed, they aſked me, if the Governor and Council of *Bombay* had accepted the treaty of peace concluded by Colonel *Upton*, and ratified by you? Upon my anſwering that they undoubtedly had; of which my being ſent to them at their own requeſt, ought to be the moſt convincing proof, they preſented me a paper to ſign to that effect, but which I declined, not thinking it either neceſſary or proper; and repreſented to them, that their requiring it was doubting the authority you had, Gentlemen, to ratify that treaty, as well as the veracity of the *Bombay* Board. In conſequence of my refuſal, ſome altercation enſued; therefore to convince them of the ſincerity of the *Bombay* Preſidency ſtrictly to adhere to the treaty, and to obviate, as far as in my power, every objection they might make, I propoſed their delivering me what they had to ſay in writing, which I would anſwer in the ſame manner; to which they agreed; and accordingly on the 20th following, I received four ſeparate articles from them, tranſlates of which, together with my anſwers thereto, delivered them this day, I have now the honour to incloſe for your obſervation.

I am, &c.

Curreet, near *Proondur*, 30th April 1777.

(Signed) *Tho' Moſtyn.*

Ordered, That the incloſed in the above letter be entered after the conſultation.

Received a letter from *Bombay* as follows:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Having lately received from Mr. *Moſtyn* ſome very alarming accounts of the proceedings of the French with the Poonah Government, we think it our eſpecial duty to loſe no time in tranſmitting you copies of his letters, that you may take what meaſures you may judge proper for guarding againſt the bad conſequences which muſt enſue from too cloſe a connection between thoſe powers.

If the French ſucceed in obtaining the port of *Choul*, or any other ſo immediately in our neighbourhood, it will totally ruin the Company's trade at this ſettlement, and materially injure the commerce of *Great Britain*, excluſive of the advantage ſuch an eſtabliſhment would afford them in caſe of a national war; much therefore, in our opinion, ought to be hazarded to ſubvert their ſcheme, whether on further intelligence it ſhould prove to be directed to views of trade only, or to the forming a treaty of alliance with the Poonah Government; but we have only conſidered ourſelves authorized to direct Mr. *Moſtyn* to expoſtulate with the Miniſters on the impropriety of their giving encouragement to the French, our natural enemies, after the peace ſo lately concluded by Colonel *Upton*, and to demand from them the nature and deſign of Mr. *St. Laub's* deputation; we have alſo inſtructed him to endeavour to excite their jealouſy, by repreſenting the ambitious views and encroaching diſpoſition of that nation, and their attachment to *Hyder Ally*; and at the ſame time to make it his ſtudy himſelf to preſerve the moſt amicable correſpondence with the Durbar.

Mr. *Moſtyn* will, by our directions, continue to keep you conſtantly and fully adviſed of ſuch of their proceedings as may come to his knowledge.

Whilſt

Appendix No. 6.

Whilſt we have ſuch reaſon for ſuſpicion of the deſigns of the French, we beg leave to ſubmit to your judgment, how far it is expedient we ſhould remain in our preſent defenceleſs ſtate. The incloſed return will ſhew you the great diminution of our European corps; and until the diſpute with *America* is ſubſided, we have no reaſon to expect any conſiderable recruit from *England*; at any rate it is good to be prepared againſt every event, and the appearance of a reſpectable force will at leaſt have a good effect on the conduct of the Poonah Government, and may deter the French from deſigns, which our weakneſs might otherwiſe tempt them to undertake. From the ſame motives, and as they have lately had ſeveral ſhips of force upon this Coaſt, we have applied to Sir *Edward Hughes*, or his ſucceſſor in the command, to bring round His Majeſty's ſquadron to *Bombay* as early as he poſſibly can.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 10th May 1777. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Extract of a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, Reſident at the Maratta Court, to the Select Committee at *Bombay*; dated from *Curreet* near *Poorundur*, the 20th April 1777, and received the 24th following.

On my way to *Poonah*, I received from the Honourable Preſident copy of a letter, and ſubſtance of a meſſage to him from *Ragojee Angria*, informing that a French forty gun ſhip had arrived at *Colabby*, from which ſeveral gentlemen had landed, and intended proceeding to *Poonah*. I immediately directed *Gungadar Punt*, who was formerly vackeel from this Government at *Bombay*, and had orders to accompany me, to inform the Durbar thereof. In anſwer to which, *Nanah* wrote him that *Ragojee Angria* had ſent the ſame intelligence to the Durbar; and that in conſequence of letters they had likewiſe received from thoſe gentlemen, leave has been given them for proceeding to *Poonah*. On my arrival here, I was acquainted the principal gentleman was the Chevalier de *St. Laub*, to eſcort whom, the Durbar had ordered 25 Arab ſepoys, an elephant, 20 camels, a palanqueen, and ſome horſe, to *Logur*: only one, whoſe name and ſtation I have not been able to learn, is yet arrived; he entered *Poonah* the 6th inſtant, and had an audience of *Nanna*, then there on the 10th, but that nothing paſſed except compliments; this perſon arrived and encamped at a tope, at a little diſtance from this place on the 17th, and the next day I am informed went up to the Maſhy, where the Peiſhwa reſides, accompanied by *Couſtrow Ballot*, who is appointed to tranſact the French buſineſs. The Chevalier, by the intelligence I have received, is daily expected at *Poonah*; your Honour, &c. may depend my utmoſt endeavours ſhall be exerted to gain information of every thing that paſſes at the Durbar regarding them, as well as to prevent their carrying ſchemes into execution, to the prejudice of our Honourable Employers; I may not, perhaps, receive this intelligence ſo early as I could wiſh, from the ſtrict watch that is kept over me to prevent, I ſuppoſe, my having any communication with thoſe on whom I can depend for certain information; no one having hitherto been near me, and my own people are obliged to be very cautious with whom they converſe.

Upon my repreſenting to the Miniſters the impropriety of their conduct in permitting the French to come to this Durbar, I was credibly informed, that their viſit was in conſequence of an application from this Government to Monſ. *Briancourt* at *Surat Bunder*, about a year and an half ago; and as they had advanced ſo far as the Durbar, could not with propriety refuſe ſeeing them.

A true extract.

(Signed) *J. Spencer*,
Sub Secretary.

Copy of a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I addreſſed you laſt under the 20th ultimo. This is purpoſely to inform you, that *Byroo Punt* and *Gungedar*, paying me a viſit this afternoon, informed me that the French gentlemen were arrived, and encamped within half a coſs from our camp; and I aſked them, if they were ſo dilatory in their proceedings, how theſe gentlemen were to return to *Choul*, and the ſhip to clear the coaſt before the rainy ſeaſon? when they replied, That it was ſettled they ſhould ſtay at *Poonah* during the rainy ſeaſon; that the ſhip was unrigged, her guns and ſtores landed in order for her coming into *Choul*, and that the French had likewiſe landed from one hundred to one hundred and fifty pieces of ordnance for ſale, ſome of which, by *Byroo Punt*'s account, are of a very large callibre, beſides a large quantity of copper and broad cloth. *Byroo Punt* likewiſe informed me, that Monſ. *St. Laub* had written to the Durbar, acquainting them, that he expected two more ſhips upon the coaſt, which he requeſted might have permiſſion to winter in ſome of their harbours: this, he ſays, was granted them, but did not mention what harbour they were to go to. This I think, Gentlemen, puts the intentions of the Durbar beyond a doubt, and muſt have been determined on before the ſhip's arrival; for it is impoſſible to have been ſince the Chevalier landed at *Choul*, as he has not yet had an audience of the Peiſhwa or Miniſters.

I am, &c.

Curreet, near *Poorunder*, May the 2d 1777. (Signed) *Thos Moſtyn*.

A true copy.
J. Spencer, Dep^ty Sec^ry.

APPENDIX, No. 6.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 16 June 1777.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We beg leave to incloſe herewith a copy of a letter juſt received from Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poonah*. We cannot, from the accounts we have yet been able to obtain, add any thing certain to the intelligence communicated in that letter; but we think it proper to obſerve to you, that private letters from *Bombay* mention that French colours have been hoiſted at *Choul*, and that Mr. *St. Lubin* (called *Laub* in Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letter) came from *France* in a frigate of 36 guns, with a ſeparate commiſſion, independent of the Government of *Pondicherry*.

We take this opportunity of acquainting you, that Lord *Pigot*, after a long fit of illneſs, departed this life the 11th inſtant.

We have the honour, &c.

Fort St. George, 15th May 1777. (Signed) *Geo. Stratton*, Preſid^t, &c. Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed you laſt under the 4th inſtant, acquainting you of my arrival in quality of the Company's Reſident at this Durbar. This is purpoſely to inform you, that the Chevalier de *St. Laub*, with four other gentlemen who had landed from a French frigate at *Choul*, are arrived within a few coſs of *Proondur*, on an embaſſy to this Government, and are furniſhed, as I am informed, with letters from *France* and *Pondicherry*. This viſit is in conſequence of an application from the Miniſtry here to the French Chief of *Surat* during the late war. What may be the real motive of this embaſſy it is not in my power at preſent to ſay: your vicinity to *Pondicherry* will enable you to get more certain and earlier intelligence regarding it than I can give you. From what has tranſpired their views ſeem to be the ſettling a factory at *Poonah*,

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Poonah, and obtaining a ſea port in ſome part of the Malabar coaſt, in the Maratta dominions.

I ſhall again addreſs you on this ſubject as ſoon as I can receive any certain information of what paſſes between the French and this Durbar, and ſhall eſteem myſelf obliged by any information you can give me on this point. I am, &c.

Curreet, near *Poorunder*, (Signed) *Thoˢ Moſtyn.*
30 April 1777.

APPENDIX, No. 7.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 17th July 1777.

READ the following letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt addreſs, dated the 30th April, informed your Honour, &c. of the arrival of the Chevalier *St. Laub* within a few coſs of *Poorunder*: on the 2d inſtant he arrived and encamped within half a coſs of this place, and on the 8th had his audience of the Peiſhwa, when he delivered two letters, the one from the French King and the other from his Miniſter.

On the 2d inſtant I received certain information that the Durbar had granted permiſſion for the ſhip in which the Chevalier came from *Pondicherry*, to lay the rainy monſoon in *Choul* river, where I have lately learnt ſhe actually now is; but as my packet to your Honour, &c. was made up, I took the liberty of incloſing an extract of my addreſs to the Preſidency of *Bombay* on this ſubject to the Honourable the Governor General.

I have taken the opportunity of *Sacaram Bapoo*, *Madarow Jadarow*, and *Byroo Punt*, paying a viſit to me, to repreſent to them the extraordinary conduct of this Durbar in giving ſo much encouragement to the French; and uſed every endeavour to excite their jealouſy, with reſpect to the view the Chevalier undoubtedly has to get poſſeſſion of ſome ſea harbour or port in the Maratta dominions, on the coaſt of *Malabar*, by ſetting forth the ambitious and encroaching diſpoſition of the French, as the cloſe connection there was between them and *Hyder Ally*, with whom it is ſaid they have concluded an offenſive treaty, which has for one of its odiums the reduction of the Maratta Power. They all aſſured me, but *Sacaram* in particular, that nothing had yet been concluded on; who likewiſe ſaid, he was not ignorant of the diſpoſition of the French, nor of their connection with *Hyder*, for which reaſon the Durbar would be very cautious in complying with any requeſts the Chevalier might make to them, until they know what this Government was to expect from them: notwithſtanding theſe aſſurances there is the greateſt reaſon to fear, from the particular attention this Durbar have paid to the Chevalier ever ſince his arrival, that he will accompliſh his grand object, in obtaining a ſettlement at *Choul*, and a factory at *Poonah*.

In my laſt I forwarded to your Honour, &c. the tranſlates of four papers delivered me by the Durbar, with my anſwer thereto. I have now the honour to incloſe tranſlates of the Durbar's replies to my anſwers, and the demands I at the ſame time made on them. The copy of the receipt from Colonel *Upton* to this Durbar, mentioned to be incloſed in theſe replies, has not yet been delivered me, although I have frequently applied for it. I am, &c.

Curreet, near *Poorunder*, (Signed) *Thoˢ Moſtyn.*
21ſt May 1777.

APPENDIX, No. 8.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, 23 May 1777.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

ON the 15th inſtant I was honoured with your commands of the 10th.

It afforded me much ſatisfaction, to find that my anſwers to the Durbar's papers has met with your Honour, &c. approbation. My reaſon for not mentioning therein the obſtacle thrown in the way of our trade, was my having particularly repreſented it to *Saccaram Bappoo*, on my firſt audience; when he aſſured me the communication was open, which I believe to be true; but from the diſtreſſed circumſtances the Government are in for want of money, the merchants are fearful, if they make any conſiderable purchaſes, that loans will be required of them.

On the 8th inſtant, the Chevalier *St. Laub* had his audience of the Peiſhwa; at which the principal Miniſters were preſent, when he delivered his credentials, being letters from the King and the Miniſters of *France*, and made a preſent. I cannot help obſerving the difference of his reception and mine on this occaſion—*Saccram Bappoo* and *Nannah Furneeſe* going without the tent walls to receive him as he alighted from an elephant the Durbar had ſupplied him with, and introduced him into the Durbar; but they only ſent *Mhadarow Jadarci* and *Byroo Punt* to receive and introduce me. Indeed, in every reſpect, they pay the greateſt attention to the French.

Your Honour, &c. may depend on my continuing to exert my endeavours, not only to penetrate into the true object of Monſ. *St. Laub*'s deputation, but alſo to prevent his carrying any ſchemes into execution to the prejudice of my Honourable Employers. His real views are undoubtedly to obtain a port on this coaſt in the Maratta dominions, and a factory at *Poonah*. In ſeveral converſations I have had with the Miniſters, I have always endeavoured to excite the jealouſy of the Durbar, by repreſenting to them the ambitious diſpoſition of the French; particularly, ſo long as ſince the 5th of April, I repreſented to *Mhadarow Jadaroi*, one of the people appointed by the Miniſters to tranſact our buſineſs with the Durbar, the impropriety of their permitting the French to ſend an ambaſſador to this Durbar; and that I doubted if they conſidered the ill conſequences which might attend this conduct; for that I was well aſſured the French had not only this year founded the harbours of *Collala* and *Choul*, but laſt year that of *Gheriah*; which, in my opinion, clearly pointed out their views, notwithſtanding any profeſſions of friendſhip they might make, to be on one of thoſe ports; and deſired him to make a proper repreſentation of it to the Durbar, that they might not hereafter blame us for not giving them a timely caution: I at the ſame time mentioned to *Mhadarow* the connection between the French and *Hyder*.

On the 12th inſtant *Mhadarow Jadarci* and *Byroo Punt* waited on me with the Durbar's replies to my anſwer to the papers delivered me on the 20th ultimo, and to my demands made on them; tranſlate of all which I now incloſe. I repeated to them the above-mentioned converſation, and addreſſing myſelf principally to *Mhadarow*, demanded, in the name of my Honourable Employers, to know the real intentions of the Durbar regarding the French; having been informed the Chevalier was to ſtay here during the rains; that orders have been given for their ſhip being brought into *Choul* river; and that there was ſome talk of giving them a ſettlement on the coaſt, which, if true would certainly cauſe a breach in our friendſhip, as we could conſider ſuch behaviour in no other light than an intention to injure the Company, it being ſo contrary to the real intent of the treaty, and the profeſſions of friendſhip the Durbar had made both to Colonel *Upton* and me. To which he replied, That he now ſpoke to me as the Peiſhwa's vackeel, and as ſuch aſſured me, that nothing had yet been determined on by the Durbar; that they were to have a meeting with the French in a few days, in order to ſettle matters; but I might depend nothing was intended which might cauſe a difference between us.

Saccarum Bapoo paying me a viſit on the 7th inſtant, I took the opportunity of again repreſenting the extra-

ordinary conduct of the Durbar reſpecting the French; when he gave me the ſame aſſurance that *Mhadarow* had before done; but confeſſed the French had obtained permiſſion for bringing their ſhips into *Choul* river, and for landing their goods and ſtores, but were on no account to land their warlike ſtores. I then informed him of the cloſe connection there was, and had for a long time been, between the French and *Hyder*; when he replied, that he was not ignorant thereof, and that the Durbar would not comply with any views the French might have, until they knew what this Government was to expect from them. I likewiſe again repreſented to him the obſtructions thrown in the way of our trade, which I hoped would have been entirely removed on my arrival here; in anſwer to which he aſſured me the communication had been ordered as free as heretofore, but ſhould he on enquiry find any obſtacle had ariſen thereto, they ſhould be removed.

By the tranſlate of the Durbar's replies, your Honours, &c. will obſerve, that they really have no intention of carrying any one article of the late treaty into execution, until we have complied with every demand they may chuſe to make on us.

Ragojee Bouncello took his leave of the Durbar on the 5th inſtant, when he was preſented with a Sirpaw: he the next day broke up his camp here and marched to *Saſſwer*, is now returning to his own Government. By the laſt accounts from the *Carnatic*, *Hyder Ally* and *Hurry Punt*'s armies were about thirty coſs diſtant from each other, when the latter was much diſtreſſed for money, which this Durbar is uſing every endeavour to ſupply him with.

I ſhall ſtrictly obey your Honour, &c.'s orders with reſpect to ingratiating myſelf with the Miniſters; but whilſt they continue in the fort, where I am not permitted to go, it is impoſſible for me to have the free intercourſe with them I could wiſh, or that I might have, were they to reſide in *Poonah*.

The copy of the receipt from Colonel *Upton* to the Durbar, mentioned in their replies to be incloſed, and for which I have waited theſe two days, has not yet been ſent me.

I am, with reſpect,
Curreet, near *Poorunder*, Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen, Your moſt obedient ſervant, *Thoˢ Moſtyn.*
19th May 1777.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th Auguſt 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Lieutenant-General Sir *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Received the following letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I addreſſed your Honour, &c. laſt under the 21ſt May from *Curreet*, but the rains ſetting in I have ſince been obliged to retire to *Poonah*.

Shortly after my arrival here, I received certain accounts, from a man who ſaid he was a carpenter of the French ſhip now at *Chowle*, that the French gentleman I formerly acquainted your Honour, &c. had arrived on an embaſſy to this Durbar, was not the Chevalier *St. Laub*, as already adviſed, but Monſieur *St. Lubin*; and within theſe few days I have been informed by the Nabob of Arcot's vackeel, that by letters he has received from *Arcot*, he is aſſured this gentleman is not authorized to come here either from *France* or *Pondicherry*, therefore the letters he delivered at his firſt audience of the Peiſhwa muſt have been fictitious; of which this Government, from their preſent behaviour to him, ſeem convinced. Appendix. No. 9.

Hurry Punt Furkia, who commands the forces of this Government againſt *Hyder Ally*, I am informed, has lately had an engagement with *Tippoo Saib*, who commands the advanced part of *Hyder*'s army, in which *Hurry Punt* was entirely defeated, and has retreated to the northward of the *Tongebedra*. I have likewiſe received information that the Nizam is on his return to *Hyderabad*; that *Downſa* having received ten lacks of rupees from *Hyder*, was retreating to his own Government with a determination not to interfere again in the preſent diſputes between this Government and *Hyder*; and that ſeveral Maratta officers had gone over to *Hyder*, particularly *Monackjee Panerea* and *Mallajee Rajah*, who had carried off with them twelve thouſand horſe and foot, and were actually with *Tippoo Saib* in the above-mentioned action.

Poonah, the 15th June 1777. I am, &c. (Signed) *Thoˢ Moſtyn.*

APPENDIX, No. 9.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 16th June 1777.

ORDERED, That the ſubject of the foregoing letters lie for conſideration until the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Ordered alſo, That the return for the troops at *Bombay* be entered after the conſultation.

Mr. *Francis*—On the 26th of laſt month, the Commander in Chief laid a propoſition before the Board for bringing three battalions of the brigade in the field within the provinces, and for ſome other arrangements; which I concurred in, from a ſtrong conviction of the neceſſity of looking to the defence of this part of *Bengal*. The Governor General deferred giving his opinion, and the ſubject has ſince lain over for conſideration: I would now beg leave to move for a reſolution upon that propoſition. The letter which we have juſt read from *Bombay* tends to confirm my former opinion, that the views of the French are hoſtile to ſome part or other of the Company's poſſeſſions; and that at all events ſome meaſures ought to be taken for the ſecurity of *Bengal*, from any poſſible attempt on their part: it appears to me, that our preſent force diſperſed as it is, we are not in a ſtate of defence againſt any ſudden attacks from the ſouthward; this is an object which I wiſh might be taken into the early conſideration of the Board: previous to ſuch conſideration, I would beg leave to move that the Governor would be pleaſed to lay before us the ſubſtance of any intelligence he may have received of the deſigns or proceedings of the French, on which I preſume he founded his opinion, that the French are meditating ſome deſigns againſt the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*.

The Governor General—I will deliver my opinion and anſwer to the enquiries of Mr. *Francis* on the next council-day; I think what I ſhall have to ſay on the ſubject will be ſhort; however, ſhould it lead me to a fuller diſcuſſion than I apprehend, and other affairs intervening, prevent my having it ready by the next Council, I will requeſt a further time; but I have reſolved within myſelf to prepare it, if poſſible for the next meeting of the Board.

Warren Haſtings,
Richᵈ Barwell,
P. Francis.

Appendix. No. 9.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 14th July 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General Sir *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Phillip Francis, }

The proceedings of the 7th inſtant read and approved.

Mr. *Francis*—I deſire that my minute, recorded on the 16th of laſt month, and the Governor's anſwer to it may be read. The importance of the ſubject, and the declaration made by the Governor on the 26th of May, that it was his opinion that the French were meditating ſome deſign againſt the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*; to which he added in diſcourſe, that his opinion was founded on very good authority, oblige me to remind him of his engagement. Having now repeatedly endeavoured to bring the defenceleſs ſtate of this part of *Bengal* into the conſideration of the Board, it will reſt with the majority of the Board to determine on ſuch meaſures as the importance of the caſe may appear to require, or to be anſwerable for the conſequences that may enſue.

Governor General—I know not for what reaſon Mr. *Francis* has thought it neceſſary to bind me to the performance of my promiſe to furniſh the Board with my opinion, which when given will be but ſpeculative, and can be of no uſe. The promiſe which I made on the 16th June I meant to have fulfilled on the next council-day; the materials I had then ready; I have them ſtill; they are now in my hands; but they conſiſt of many looſe and undigeſted ſheets, which I have not had time to arrange and reduce to a conſiſtent ſubſtance. The day on which by my promiſe I ſhould have anſwered Mr. *Francis*'s enquiries, was the day on which the packets arrived from the *Cormorant*, and the other diſpatches from the Secretary at the India-houſe. Since that time many other important objects have engaged, and ſtill continue to divide my attention. But urged as I now am, I will give my opinion in very brief terms and ſuch as I think ſufficient for the preſent upon this ſubject. It has been my opinion, even from a time ſo diſtant as the year 1770, that the French have meditated the re-eſtabliſhment of their former power in *India*. This deſign, ſuſpended for ſome time before the death of the late King of *France*, I believe ſtill to exiſt; but I am now of the ſame opinion that I have all along entertained from the period which I mentioned before, that there is little danger of any attempts they may make in *Bengal*, and leſs probability that they will make any, until they ſhall have obtained ſome ſtrong footing in ſome other part of *India*. The ſeaſon of the year in which it would be neceſſary for them to embark were they to ſet on foot an expedition againſt *Bengal*, during their preſent ſtate, ſo as to arrive in time to begin their operations with effect, would lay them under great diſadvantage: the multitude of tranſports which would be required for the men, ammunition, and victualling ſtores of ſuch an armament, would exceed any preſent means they have in *India*; the length of the voyage under ſuch circumſtances would fill them with diſtempers; and even if it could be ſuppoſed poſſible for them to bring a force into *Bengal* ſuperior to that which may be collected to oppoſe it, the advantages which we derive from the poſſeſſion of the country and the command of its reſources, would more than counterbalance that inequality. It would be impoſſible for them to fit out ſo great an armament without making their deſigns known to all *India*. I am myſelf in poſſeſſion of the means of knowing with certainty what is publicly tranſacted at the French iſlands. But for ſuch intelligence there is no need of private emiſſaries; it would inevitably make itſelf known many months before the ſhips could arrive at their deſtination.

I will ſuppoſe the earlieſt period in which it is probable they would arrive, to be the month of November; long before this our forces might be collected, even from the remoteſt parts of the Vizier's dominions. Were it neceſſary to draw them altogether on ſuch an occaſion, I will venture to affirm, on an authority which I can implicitly credit, that the boats now with the brigade in the province of *Oude* would be ſufficient to tranſport all the Europeans to *Calcutta* in a very inconſiderable ſpace of time.

On ſuch a conjuncture, I preſume that this Government would be warranted even to take poſſeſſion of the town of *Chandernagore*, and to make a ſeizure of the ſhips which might lie there, even before a public declaration of the intentions of the French, if any of their acts afforded certain indications of it; if they did not it would be unneceſſary.

I have enumerated the foregoing circumſtances, and many others might be added to them, to ſhew the improbability on the one hand, that the French ſhould undertake an expedition at ſuch unequal hazards againſt *Bengal*, and on the other, that it would be the cauſe of much danger to the Company's poſſeſſions in it; but I muſt mention one more circumſtance which had eſcaped my recollection: Mr. *Chevalier* has, it is generally believed, in his correſpondence for many years paſt with his conſtituents in *Europe*, ſtrongly recommended this point; and from his long and local knowledge would be the moſt uſeful inſtrument in their hands for conducting it. I know, from an authority which I regard as certain, that he has ſolicited his recall. In a word I am perfectly convinced that we are ſafe from the attempts of the French in this quarter: I am equally convinced that they will break out in ſome other part of *India*, though the period may yet be diſtant. The language of defiance held out by the French Commiſſary at *Pondicherry*, and the very myſterious appearance of the Chevalier *St. Lubin* on the Maratta coaſt, with his reception at the Court of *Poonah*, then, I believe not publicly known, were the principal authority on which I grounded my opinion, delivered the 26th of May: I have other authorities which it might not be proper to put upon record. Since that time I have received no freſh intelligence of conſequence, which might ſerve to confirm that opinion; but I have read in a ſpeech lately made by the King to his Parliament, aſſurances of a pacific diſpoſition in the Court of *France*, which leads me to believe that the time of their hoſtilities is not ſo near as I then conjectured; I therefore think it unneceſſary and premature to withdraw any part of the forces belonging to this eſtabliſhment from their ſtations, until we have better grounds for ſuch a meaſure than we are at preſent poſſeſſed of, unleſs other cauſes ſhall require it, and it may be effected without creating dangerous alarms in the country. I think, indeed, that the preſent ſtation of the brigade is too diſtant, and that it might with propriety be brought nearer to the ſouthern line of the province of *Oude*; at preſent a better ſituation does not occur than the Fort of *Allahabad*. This is all I think at preſent neceſſary with reſpect to *Bengal*. I ſhall not now take up more of the time of the Board; I regret that I have employed ſo much of it, in propoſing the means which may be required for the general ſecurity of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, and in particular the ſafety of *Bombay*; in theſe points I would rather take the lead from the Commander in Chief, than offer my ſeparate opinion upon them.

Mr. *Francis*---I beg leave to take notice on one point in the Governor's minute, that after the meeting of Parliament on the 31ſt October, it is well known that advices had been received in *England*, I believe about the beginning of December, in conſequence of which orders were iſſued for a very great naval armament; and that this

this was underſtood to ariſe from ſome apprehenſion of the deſigns of *France*. It is poſſible that theſe apprehenſions may have ſince ſubſided.

General Sir *John Clavering*—It will be no conſolation to the *India* Company, or to the Britiſh nation, in caſe a diſaſter ſhould happen to this country, that Mr. *Francis* and myſelf have made unavailing efforts to take but common precautions, without alarming the country, to be prepared againſt an unexpected appearance of a French armament at the mouth of the *Ganges*. I cannot pretend to controvert the fidelity of the intelligence which Mr. *Haſtings* mentions he has, without knowing the means by which he obtained it, of what is publicly tranſacted at the French iſlands, and on which he founds his ſecurity, that no armament can be fitted out there, which would not be known here many months before the ſhips could arrive at their deſtination. But uninformed as I am, and as I believe the Commander of the King's ſquadron is, of what is doing at the iſlands, I confeſs I have felt much uneaſineſs at the unguarded and expoſed ſituation in which this Preſidency has been ſuffered to remain ever ſince the breaking out of the troubles in *America*. Under this anxiety, on the 25th April 1776, I propoſed to the Board to bring down the brigade in the field to *Allahabad*; and on the 26th of laſt May, I again propoſed to withdraw three of the battalions from thence to *Dinapore*, and to order one battalion from that place to *Mongheir*, and to bring the two battalions now ſtationed there to *Berhampore*. This movement could have occaſioned no alarm in the country; but would have enabled us to have collected, on a notice of ten or fourteen days, nine or ten battalions at the Preſidency, when at preſent we have only three of Sepoys, excluſive of five or ſix hundred Europeans. I likewiſe pointed out the neceſſity I think there is of eſtabliſhing and keeping up a ſmall naval force at the mouth of the river, for the purpoſe of intelligence, and, in caſe of neceſſity, for cutting away the buoys. Theſe are precautions which this Government ſhould always take, though it has no particular reaſon to be ſuſpicious of any immediate deſigns of an invaſion from the French; it is a precaution that the King's ſervants at home never fail taking, however perſuaded they may be of the good intentions of the French Court; but more particularly ſo, when the French are fitting out armaments, though perhaps only to exerciſe their fleet. As the Governor General is pleaſed to refer himſelf to my opinion for the meaſures that may be proper to be taken for the ſecurity of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, I can only reply in general, that if I may depend on the ſecurity which he profeſſed to have, that the period at which the views that he is convinced the French have on other parts of *India* is yet very diſtant, I am at a loſs to give any other advice upon, and particularly for the ſecurity of *Bombay*, than to recommend in the moſt ſtrenuous terms to the Preſident and Council of that Preſidency, to cultivate as much as they can a firm union with the Marattas, and to recommend to the Court of Directors to enforce this advice by their authority. The receiving *Ragoba* on board of the Company's veſſels; the admitting him to take an aſylum in *Bombay*; the offer of admitting *Sudaba*; the demand they made of his perſon from *Angria*, a dependant of the Maratta State; and the actual protection they afforded to the forces of this adventurer, after he was defeated, are all acts ſo apparently hoſtile to the Maratta State, that it does not appear ſurpriſing to me, that this power ſhould endeavour to form connections with the French, in order to protect themſelves againſt the unfriendly and unjuſtifiable actions of that Preſidency. But as Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* is now arrived here, and for whoſe return the Board waited, in order to conſult him before it was thought proper to reply to the letter of the 10th May from *Bombay*; I am of opinion that he ſhould be directed to attend on the next council-day for that purpoſe. I am further of opinion, that a letter ſhould be written to the Court of Directors, to acquaint them with the opinion that we may adopt, and to repreſent to them the feeble ſtate of the garriſon of *Bombay*. Appendix. No. 11.

Mr. *Francis*—In anſwer to the firſt part of the Governor's minute, I ſhall only declare, that the motion I have made has no other object than that which I profeſs. The Commander in Chief will witneſs for me, from ſeveral converſations I have had with him, how ſeriouſly I have had it at heart. I did not mean to impute blame to the Governor, for having delayed his anſwer to this time, or to bind him precipitately by any former engagement. The circumſtances which have happened here ſince the 16th of laſt month, excuſe him for having ſo long delayed the accompliſhment of his offer, as I hope it does me, for not having reminded him of it ſooner. I did not even mean to preſs for an anſwer on this particular day; but I am very well ſatisfied that the queſtion ſhould now be determined.

Agreed, That Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* be requeſted to attend the Board on Thurſday next.

A. L. G.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 10.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 17th July 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General Sir *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

RECEIVED, the following letter from *Fort Saint George*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have the honour to incloſe herewith a copy of a letter received from Mr. *Moſtyn*, at *Poonah*.

We have, &c.

Fort Saint George, 10th June 1777. (Signed) *George Stratton*, Preſident and Council.

Ordered, That the incloſures in the above letter be entered after the Conſultation.

Ordered, That an abſtract of theſe papers be made, for the more particular information and conſideration of the Board; and in the mean time, that the above letters and incloſures be delivered to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, for his opinion upon the contents of them.

Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* withdraws.

APPENDIX, No. 11.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th Auguſt 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Lieutenant General Sir *J. Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

READ the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I have with the utmoſt attention peruſed the ſeveral letters and papers regarding the tranſactions at *Poonah*, communicated by the Select Committee of *Bombay* and Mr. *Moſtyn*; I have taken extracts of the moſt material parts of theſe letters and papers, and have remarked upon them; which I have now the honour to lay before you.

In

Appendix. No. 11.

In compliance, Gentlemen, with your directions, to give my opinion on theſe papers, which though fully done in my remarks on them, yet, to avoid giving the trouble of collecting this from ſo many ſheets, I have taken the liberty to give my ſentiments in the moſt conciſe manner, on the ſubject of the differences and difficulties between the two Governments, in carrying the treaty of *Poorunder* into execution. My long reſidence at *Poonah* had made me well acquainted with the diſpoſitions and intentions of the Peiſhwa's Miniſters: concluding theſe to be nearly the ſame as when I left *Poorunder*, I ſhall eſteem myſelf ſpeaking upon almoſt certain grounds.

The Peiſhwa's Miniſters, in concluding the late treaty of peace with the Honourable Company on the part of the Maratta State, had principally in view the ſettling the Peiſhwa's family diſputes, in which the whole Maratta Chiefs were more or leſs concerned; they imagined they could have eaſily defeated the ſmall army we had in the field ſupporting *Ragonaut Row* (the returns of this army from *Bombay*, of January and February 1776, will ſhew our numbers) but they well knew this could have produced only a temporary relief, and that a general war with the Engliſh muſt have been the conſequence; they conceived by ſecuring a peace with the Company, and by ſtipulating that we were to give no aſſiſtance to *Ragonath Row*, or any of the rebellious or diſaffected ſubjects of the Peiſhwa, that little trouble would remain to them in ſettling their domeſtic diſputes, and reconciling the jarring intereſts of the other Chiefs; and they accordingly acceded to many of the ſtipulations ſo very beneficial and honourable to the Company.—Amongſt theſe muſt be particularly reckoned the twelve lacks of rupees granted to defray the expences of our army then in the field againſt the Peiſhwa, the Maratta ſhare of the collection of *Broach*, and the country of three lacks, ceeded to us in that neighbourhood. I do not mean to enumerate the advantages gained by the treaty of *Poorunder*, which I hope has been found to have put an honourable end to a war undertaken in a bad cauſe, againſt the moſt formidable power in *India*.

It now reſts to enquire, how far the views of the Maratta State, for entering into this treaty, have been anſwered. I have already obſerved what was their principal object in concluding this peace, which the Peiſhwa's Miniſters thought fully obtained by the four following articles. The remarks on them, however, will ſhew how very poſſible it is for different people to put different conſtructions on the plaineſt language.—Theſe articles therefore which remained with the Preſidency of *Bombay* to ſee accompliſhed, have not been carried into execution in the manner either expected or intended at the concluſion of the treaty, of which the Council of *Bombay* were by me frequently adviſed; and alſo, that the Peiſhwa's Miniſters had frequently declared them guilty of infringements of the late treaty.

Article 9th.

" It is agreed that *Ragonaut Row* is to " diſband his army within one month of " this date," 1ſt March.

Article 10th.

" If *Ragonaut Row* refuſes to diſband " his army, the Engliſh are to withdraw " their forces, and are not to aſſiſt him."

Remarks, Articles 9th and 10th.

Ragonaut Row did not diſband his army: We did not, according to treaty, immediately withdraw our forces. *Ragonaut Row* took refuge under the walls of *Surat*, and theſe very forces remained in the field to cover him.

Article 12th.

" It is agreed, that no aſſiſtance is to " be given to any ſubject or ſervant " of the Peiſhwa that ſhall cauſe diſ- " turbances or rebellion in the Maratta " dominions."

The Preſidency of *Bombay* have ever ſince the date of the treaty been giving aſſiſtance to *Ragonaut Row*, and other rebellious ſubjects of the Peiſhwa. *Ragonaut Row* was received into *Bombay* on the 11th or 12th November 1776, and yet continues there. The Peiſhwa's Miniſters were convinced of his being received and kept there to ſerve on a future occaſion, and informed me of his being allowed by the Preſidency of *Bombay* 10,000 rupees monthly to defray his charges. His cauſe is appealed (as Colonel *Keating* expreſsly wrote me) to His Majeſty and Council, and to the Honourable Company: The Miniſters know this, it was very publicly made known. Replies were to be waited for, and the Council of *Bombay* conducted themſelves, in hopes of theſe replies being favourable to the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row*, accordingly, and have and do act in direct oppoſition to the 12th article.

Article 16th.

It is agreed, that " the Marattas are " not to cauſe any diſturbance in any of " the ceded countries, nor ſhall the " Engliſh occaſion any diſturbances in " the Marratta dominions."

Remarks.

The perſon who was called *Sedaſhew Row*, whilſt in open rebellion againſt his country, was permitted to have vackeels in *Bombay*: Theſe men had of courſe in charge their maſter's intereſt at that Preſidency, where they were well received. A ſurgeon from *Bombay* was ſent to cure him of his (old) wounds; and the Miniſters alledged, that every mark of favour was ſhewn to this man (called *Shedaſhew Row*) during the rebellion. After his defeat, his diſperſed troops were received into *Salſette*, and are ſtill kept there; many of the Maratta Chiefs who followed this man's fortunes were received (and I underſtand yet continue) at *Bombay*. The preceding remark will fully ſhew, that much diſturbance has been occaſioned by us to the Maratta dominions, and very heavy charges have been brought on that Government by the active part taken by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in the Maratta diſputes.

The Government of *Bombay* complain of their loſs of trade, by the communication to *Poonah* being ſhut, and the very great injury that will be ſuſtained thereby to the Honourable Company and Engliſh nation. If the Council of *Bombay* will carry the 12th article of the late treaty into execution, by withholding every aſſiſtance to *Ragonaut Row*, either by preſent means or promiſes of future; by obeying the repeated orders of the Superior Council, in inſiſting on his not reſiding at their Preſidency, or any of its dependencies; if the Council of *Bombay* will oblige the diſaffected ſubjects of the Peiſhwa, who to his great loſs have taken refuge in *Bombay* and *Salſette*, to quit theſe ſettlements, they will then ſoon find that harmony and confidence reſtored, the loſs of which in their conſequences they ſo ſeverely feel: And then the trifling differences in diſpute, regarding the country of three lacks, would be eaſily adjuſted; for I conceive, whilſt we are keeping back ſo many and ſuch material articles to them, they may have determined in turn, to be tardy in making over this ceſſion: Beſides, it ſhould appear that the Miniſters may be ſomewhat alarmed about *Jamboſeer*. Whilſt *Ragonaut Row* reſides at *Bombay*, in expectation of being ſupported, the Miniſters can place no confidence in the

Council there; which muſt now be productive of the greateſt inconveniencies, and perhaps in the end of fatal conſequences. The *Poonah* Government ſeemed ever diſpoſed to comply with the wiſhes of the Superior Council. A requeſt, Gentlemen, from you to the Peiſhwa's Miniſters, for a proviſion being made more ſuitable to the wiſhes of *Ragonaut Row*, would I am perſuaded be attended to, and if carried into execution, would remove every obſtacle to the accompliſhment of the late treaty. Should ſuch requeſt be made, the Council of *Bombay* will of courſe be required to exert themſelves in perſuading *Ragonaut Row* to accept the propoſals made to him. And as objections are made by theſe gentlemen to his reſidence, or rather his going to *Banares*, ſome other place of reſidence ſhould be named; though the Miniſters ſaid, if he choſe to travel there by land, *Scindia* and *Tuccojee* would become the guarantees. I ſhould imagine, however devoted *Ragonaut Row* may be to his religion, a method might be found of removing him to *Benares*, and not prevent his indulging in the full ceremonies of it, and with abſolute ſafety (as his fears from the Miniſters are not to be overcome) to his perſon.

When the treaty in all its conditions ſhall be carried into execution, and confidence reſtored between the Government of *Bombay* and *Poonah*, the French intrigues at the Maratta Durbar will no longer alarm us. A Miniſter immediately from the Superior Council to reſide at *Poonah*, which the Peiſhwa's Miniſters were ever requeſting, would ſecure our intereſts with the Poonah Government, againſt every attempt that might be made to ſupplant us there: farther, we have it in our power to form an alliance with the Marattas, ſhould it be thought expedient, almoſt on our own terms, to the total excluſion of all other European Powers; and this does not appear to have been provided for by any treaty now exiſting between us and the Marattas.

I truſt, Gentlemen, you will excuſe the freedom with which I have given my opinion on the papers you were pleaſed to order to be laid before me: to elucidate to the utmoſt of my power ſuch parts of them, as from my reſidence at *Poonah* have come within my immediate knowledge, is a duty I owe not only to your commands, but to our Honourable Employers, to whom the differences now ſubſiſting between the Governments of *Bombay* and *Poonah*, are, in whatever light conſidered, of the greateſt conſequence.

I have the honour, &c.

Fort William, July 31ſt 1777. (Signed) *John Upton*.

A Letter from the Chief and Council of *Tannah*, to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated 30th October 1777.

Extracts from the Conſultation of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated 30th October 1776.

Early this morning it was reported, that *Sudaba* with four or five hundred of his followers were in ten or twelve boats at anchor off *Croſs Iſland*, oppoſite to *Fort George*; and that *Sudaba* propoſed coming on ſhore: about noon a meſſenger waited on Mr. *Draper*, to acquaint him that *Sudaba* had been defeated at *Rajematchee*, and requeſted to be received here; which Mr. *Draper* therefore agreed to; informing the meſſenger that he might immediately return to his maſter in a bunder boat, accompanied with *Manordoſs Rupjee* and *Bowaney*, the Gentoo Interpreter, whom he ordered to wait on *Sudaba* with his compliments, to acquaint him with Mr. *Draper*'s compliance with his requeſt, and that he had given orders for tents being pitched in *Manordoſs*'s oaſt, with a Subedar's guard to attend him; but in the afternoon *Manordoſs* and *Bowaney* returned with *Sudaba*'s compliments to Mr. *Draper*, acquainting him that as the Governor was abſent at *Salſette*, he had determined to go to *Mandvem* for two or three days, when he would return hither. He accordingly proceeded thither about two o'clock in the afternoon.

Remarks.

This letter does not require to be remarked upon, as no part had then been taken by the Chief, &c. of *Salſette*, in the Maratta diſputes.

Extracts from the Conſultation of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated Friday the 1ſt November 1776.

Read the letter received the 30th ultimo from the Chief and Council at *Tannah*, giving an account of a moſt ſudden and unexpected revolution in the affairs of *Sudaba*, and requeſting our directions with reſpect to ſome of his people who have arrived near that place after their defeat at *Rajematchee*, and have ſolicited our protection.

On conſideration of the latter point, it is agreed to ſend directions to the Chief and Factors, that in caſe *Sudaba*'s people ſhould be attacked and driven over the river into the Company's territory, they ſhould be received upon *Salſette* in order to ſave their lives; and ſhould this happen, their arms muſt be taken from them, and permiſſion given them to reſide upon *Salſette*, or depart whenever they may think proper.

Mr. *Draper*'s having conſented to receive *Sedaſhew Row*, &c. (in rebellion againſt the Maratta Government) is in direct oppoſition to the 12th Article of the late treaty, conſequently muſt have tended to widen the breach between the two Governments (*Bombay* and *Poonah*) and keep the communication to *Poonah* ſhut; but *Sedaſhew Row*'s not having being received into *Bombay* renders any obſervation on this extract almoſt unneceſſary.

Remarks.

It is here only to be obſerved, we were to take no part in the Maratta diſputes.

Extracts from the Conſultation of the Select Committee, *Bombay*, dated Monday the 4th November 1776.

The Preſident acquaints the Board, that he has received information that *Sudaba* is put in confinement in the fort of *Colabba*, by *Ragojee Angria*, who prevailed on him to land there to refreſh himſelf, with profeſſions of the utmoſt friendſhip and regard for his perſon; but getting him into his power, ſtripped him of jewels to a large amount, and, as before ſaid, impriſoned him in his fort of *Colabba*: that *Ragojee* had wrote him an account of this tranſaction, which he now lays before us; and that he intended to deliver him up to the Miniſters in caſe he ſhould prove not to be the real *Sudaba*.

The Preſident then proceeds to relate, that on receiving this intelligence he immediately wrote a letter to *Ragojee Angria*, a copy of which he now lays before us, together with tranſlation of the anſwer ſent him by *Ragojee Angria*; both of which being accordingly read, it is conſidered what meaſures are to be purſued upon the occaſion.

Appendix. No. 11.

After mature conſideration, we are clearly of opinion that it is incumbent on us to exert ourſelves for the preſervation of *Sudaba*, ſo far as we conſiſtently can, as he may in ſome degree be conſidered as under our protection, from the circumſtances ſet forth in our Diary under the 30th ultimo, and his death or perpetual impriſonment muſt be the inevitable conſequences of his being ſent to *Poonah*; but circumſtanced as we are, we do not think we can interfere in his favour further than by ſending a verbal meſſage to *Ragojee Angria* to repreſent how diſhonourable it will be for him to deliver up a perſon whom he had engaged by the moſt ſolemn obligation not to injure, which we are aſſured was the caſe; and likewiſe that as *Sudaba* was waiting there with an intention of proceeding to this place, we expected he ſhould be permitted to depart whenever he might think proper: which meſſage the Preſident is accordingly empowered to ſend to him, and we hope it will be attended with the deſired effect.

Remarks.

Suppoſe the perſon called *Sedaſhew Row* had intended to have gone to *Bombay*, did this authorize that Government to demand him from the Maratta State? The Marattas ſeized on him in their own dominions; whether by ſtratagem or otherwiſe cannot concern us. What could induce the Council of *Bombay* to give aſſurances of friendſhip, &c. to this man previous to his defeat, perhaps even as early as his firſt being in arms againſt the Poonah Government, in violation of the treaty of *Poorunder?*

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Ragojee Angria* to the Honourable the Preſident, dated the 1ſt November 1776, and received in *Bombay* the following day.

After compliments:

Bhow Pundit (or *Sudaba*) marched his army from *Rhutnagery*, and after taking many forts got as far as *Rajamatchy* upon the Gauts, where he had a battle with the army of *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, in which, by the bleſſing of God, the latter were victorious. After this *Bhow Pundit* fled to *Belapore*, and his army deſerted him: he went to your bunder, but was not received there, and therefore came to *Thull*, a village belonging to me, and ſent a carcoon to me with a meſſage, that as friendſhip had alway ſubſiſted between us, he deſired I would carry him to *Poonah*; and that after he got there "what God pleaſed "would be." I thereupon went to him, and brought him to *Colabby*. He had ſome rebels with him, who wanted to uſe force; whereupon I did take their arms from them, and turned them out, and intend to carry the ſaid *Bhow Pundit* ſhortly to *Poonah*. On account of my friendſhip for your Honour I acquaint you of theſe circumſtances, and *Mhadjee Bullol* will inform you more fully on this ſubject.

Letter from the Honourable the Preſident to *Ragojee Angria*, in anſwer to the above.

After compliments:

I have received your letter by your vackeel *Mhadjee Bullol* who communicated all you had to acquaint me, regarding *Bhow Saheb*, who, you ſay, is ſafe with you; but when he left this bunder, he promiſed to return in a day or two, or as ſoon as I returned; I therefore expect him here very ſoon. *Mhadjee Bullol* will give you every other information on this buſineſs.

Remarks.

This information ſhould have been related; *Ragojee Angria* has declared, that the Government of *Bombay* threatened to take his fort if he did not ſurrender his priſoner.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Ragojee Angria* to the Honourable the Governor of *Bombay*; dated the 4th November 1776, and received the ſame day.

After compliments:

I wrote a letter to your Honour, to which you ſent me an anſwer by *Mhadjee Bullol*, and I have obſerved its contents. I did not deſire that *Bhow Pundit* ſhall come to my place; but after weighing the matter, he did come, of which I adviſed you; notwithſtanding which your Honour writes me, that he promiſed to return to *Bombay* in a day or two; and that you therefore expected him there. I never underſtood from him, that he meant to return to *Bombay*. I ſhould have adviſed him to go, and would have conducted him to any place he deſired, had it not been publicly known that he had landed in my dominions; upon which the Poonah army, came to *Pen*, *Nagotan*, and *Aſtamy*. I had a conference with the miniſterial officers, in which it was agreed to carry *Sudaba* to *Poonah*: I therefore write your Honour this, and beg to know what I am to do; if my going to *Poonah* is prevented; and by what method I can preſerve my ſtate. If your Honour will ſecure me from the conſequences, I will ſubmit to your pleaſure. *Ambaram Bhuff* and *Mhadjee Bullol* will inform you verbally of all other particulars; your honour will therefore pleaſe to give them a ſatisfactory anſwer, and diſpatch them immediately.

Remarks.

In the next letter written by *Ragojee Angria*, dated the 4th November, how comes he, if threats towards him had not been uſed by the Gentlemen of *Bombay*, to write thus to the Honourable the Preſident? "I therefore write your "honour this, and beg to know what I "am to do, if my going to *Poonah* is "prevented; and by what method I can "preſerve my ſtate. If your Honour "will ſecure me from the conſequences, "I will ſubmit to your pleaſure. *Am-*"*buram Bhuff* and *Mhadjee Bullol* will "inform you verbally of all other par-"ticulars; your Honour will therefore "pleaſe to give them a ſatisfactory an-"ſwer, and diſpatch them immediately."

From what motive could *Ragojee Angria* ſubmit to the pleaſure of the Government of *Bombay*, but to have his ſtate preſerved to him, which it is evident had been threatened.

Extracts from the Conſultation of the Select Committee of *Bombay*; dated the 14th November 1776.

Read, the letter received this morning, from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

He muſt be acquainted, in reply, with the circumſtances reſpecting *Sudaba*, and our application in his favour to *Ragojee Angria*, exactly in the manner they happened; which will obviate the miſrepreſentations made by the Miniſters; and that we were induced by humanity alone to receive *Sudaba*'s people into *Salſette*, merely to ſave their lives, as we ſhould have done to the miniſterial forces in the like ſituation.

Remarks.

The Miniſters people received few indulgencies from the Preſidency of *Bombay* during my reſidence at *Poonah*. The vackeel ſent by the Peiſhwa to *Bombay* complained he could ſeldom get an audience; and when he did, the Go-

vernor

vernor expreſſed himſelf on every buſineſs relative to his miſſion, either very cooly or angrily. The vackeel conſtantly wrote to the Miniſters, that he had the mortification to ſee the vackeels of *Ragonath Row* and *Sedaſhew Row* careſſed and heard upon all occaſions, and himſelf treated with the greateſt indifference.

The peace was concluded with us by the Peiſhwa, that we ſhould take no part in the diſputes of the Maratta Government; we were to aſſiſt no Maratta ſubjects in rebellion againſt him: is not a very active part taken here? humanity might have induced the Council of *Bombay* to receive part of the diſperſed army of *Sudaba*; ſo it might to have marched an army into the field to have covered him: had this humanity brought on a general war between the Honourable Company and the Marattas, this would have been an unhappy conſequence of our humanity.

I conclude humanity alſo induced the Gentlemen of *Bombay* to cover *Ragonath Row* with their whole force, in breach of the treaty juſt before entered into with the Maratta States; and obliged the Marattas to keep up a very large army, great part of which ſtill remains watching the motions of *Ragonath Row*, who is yet (July 1777) in *Bombay*; and to guard the communication to *Poonah*, to prevent any ſurprize, and I fear, to the total excluſion of all trade between the two Governments; which muſt happen unleſs *Ragonath Row* is otherwiſe provided for, as the Peiſhwa's Miniſters and the Maratta Chiefs in general are firmly perſuaded, he is kept in *Bombay*, to be produced at a proper opportunity to be placed on the Muſnud.

At the ſame Conſultation, 14th November.

It is therefore agreed, That he (*Ragonath Row*) be permitted to reſide here till ſome other reſidence can be obtained for him, to which he can be reconciled.

In violation of treaty and contempt of authority.

Extract of a letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay* to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*; dated 20th November 1776.

"*Ragoba* has put himſelf under our protection, and he now reſides "in *Bombay*."

Not another word in this letter reſpecting *Ragonath Row*, though it was written in anſwer to a letter from me, requeſting to know the truth of ſuch report. What had I to ſay to the Miniſters in vindication of this meaſure? The Council of of *Bombay* ſeemed as little to have conſidered my ſituation as what they themſelves were bound to obſerve by the late treaty.

Extract of a Conſultation of the Select Committee of *Bombay*; dated Saturday the 23d November 1776.

Read, the letters received the 20th inſtant and this morning from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*.

Colonel *Upton* perſiſting in urging us not to protect *Ragoba*, and to rely on the aſſurances of the Miniſters for his ſafety is to us very extraordinary. We cannot refrain expreſſing the utmoſt aſtoniſhment that any gentleman who has been in the leaſt converſant with the natives of *Aſia*, can be ſo totally unacquainted with their genius and diſpoſition, as not to know that treachery and perfidy are their peculiar characteriſtics, and that the Marattas are the moſt treacherous and perfidious of all Aſiatics. No one poſſeſſed of this knowledge can ſuppoſe for a moment that *Ragoba*'s life would not be in danger, were he to truſt himſelf in the power of the Miniſters, his profeſſed enemies, who have ſo much reaſon to wiſh his deſtruction, and ſurrounded as he would be by people in their pay, and entirely at their devotion. Convinced by experience of the juſtice of theſe ſentiments, the Board in general, and particularly the gentlemen who ſubſcribed the treaty, thought themſelves bound by every tie to afford him the protection he ſolicited; eſpecially conſidering that he is reduced to his preſent ſituation in conſequence of that very engagement. We only mean to extend this protection to ſecure him from perſonal danger, until the Miniſters can ſettle ſome terms that are ſatisfactory to him, as it is very far from our deſire that he ſhould reſide here; and we ſhall be very glad whenever he can be removed from the Company's ſettlements without danger to himſelf.

If therefore the Miniſters will ſettle any terms that may be agreeable to *Ragoba*, it would afford us real ſatisfaction, and Colonel *Upton* muſt be deſired to acquaint them that we will with great readineſs not only communicate to him, but uſe our influence to perſuade him to accept any conſiſtent offers they make him.

And as we are very deſirous of giving all poſſible ſatisfaction to the Poonah Government, and of removing as far as we can all doubts they may entertain in conſequence of *Ragoba*'s reſidence at *Bombay*; aſſurances muſt be given to the Miniſters that *Ragoba* reſides here as a private perſon, and that we will not in any ſhape countenance or promote any ſchemes or deſigns to their prejudice, or in the leaſt infringe the late treaty; of which we have before repeatedly obſerved, we cannot allow our affording him mere perſonal protection to be any infringement.

Remarks.

I cannot ſee how my perſiſting to urge the Council of *Bombay* not to protect *Ragonath Row*, and to carry the 12th Article of the treaty into execution, ſhould imply my being ſo totally unacquainted with the genius and diſpoſition of the natives of *Aſia*, as not to know that treachery and perfidy are their peculiar characteriſtics. This obſervation is as great a matter of aſtoniſhment to me, as my requeſting the gentlemen of *Bombay* to facilitate the completion of the 12th Article of the Treaty, by deſiring *Ragonath Row* might quit *Bombay* in obedience to orders ſent from the Superior Council, could have been to them. It was propoſed that *Ragonath Row* ſhould reſide at *Benares*. Why theſe gentlemen talk of *Ragonath Row*'s being truſted in the power of the Miniſters; but no ſuch requeſt "as "urging the Council of *Bombay* not to "protect *Ragoba*, and to rely on the "aſſurances of the Miniſters" was in November 1776 made by me, as ſet forth in this Conſultation. Further, I am convinced his perſon was in no danger from the Miniſters; they could have poſſeſſed themſelves of it during the whole time of his being encamped near *Terrapore*, but their repeated orders to the officer commanding the troops obſerving his motions, were, never to attempt to ſeize upon *Ragonath Row*, unleſs it could be done with ſafety to his perſon. The Council of *Bombay* in this ſituation, for reaſons beſt known to themſelves, choſe entirely to forget the very advantageous terms (of which they were adviſed

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adviſed in my letter of the 22d Auguſt) made by the Miniſters for *Ragonath Row*, and then conſenting to his reſiding at *Benares*; he was not there to be ſurrounded by people in the pay of Miniſters, and at their devotion. The Council of *Bombay* at this Conſultation ſay, "We only mean to extend this "protection to ſecure him from perſonal danger, until the Miniſters can ſettle ſome terms that are ſatiſ- "factory to him, as it is very far from our deſire that he ſhould reſide here; and we ſhall be very "happy whenever he can be removed from the Company's ſettlement without danger to himſelf."

Why then did the gentlemen of *Bombay* not adviſe *Ragonath Row* to accept the terms forwarded by me, from the Miniſters, on the 22d Auguſt? He is there allowed a jaghire of five lacks a year, and to reſide at *Benares:* but on the contrary, when the vackeel went to talk to the Governor of *Bombay* on the ſubject of *Ragonath Row*'s jaghire, &c. the demand made by the Governor on the part of *Ragonath Row*, as the vackeel wrote to the Miniſters, was very large, conciſe, and peremptory.

I was informed by the Miniſters, that *Ragonath Row* was, and I ſuppoſe ſtill is, allowed ten thouſand rupees monthly to defray his expences; he will be in no haſte therefore to change his place of abode.

It is alſo ſaid at this Conſultation, that the Board in general, particularly the gentlemen who ſubſcribed the treaty, thought themſelves bound by every tie to afford him the protection he ſolicited, &c. After this declaration, what remains, but to take the earlieſt and beſt meaſures for carrying on a war againſt the Maratta States? The Government of *Bombay* think themſelves bound to prevent the treaty of *Poorunder* being carried into execution.

Again, they ſay, "and as we are very deſirous of giving all poſſible ſatisfaction to the Poonah Govern- "ment, and of removing, as far as we can, all doubts they may entertain in conſequence of *Ragoba*'s "reſidence at *Bombay*, aſſurances muſt be given to the Miniſters, that *Ragoba* reſides here as a private "perſon, and that he will not, in any ſhape, countenance or promote any ſchemes or deſigns to their "prejudice, or in the leaſt infringe the late treaty; of which, as we have before repeatedly obſerved, "we cannot allow our affording him mere perſonal protection to be any infringement."

The all poſſible ſatisfaction here mentioned to be given to the Miniſters, muſt have fallen very ſhort of theſe gentlemen's wiſhes; for the Miniſters knew that *Ragonath Row* was publicly received at *Bombay*, and they concluded in order to be ſupported as the replies from *Europe* ſhould direct: an allowance was accordingly fixed to defray his expences.

General *Gordon* enters a Minute on the Conſultation of this day; he points out the dangerous tendency of receiving *Ragonath Row*; and ſays, he is not informed of the cauſe that induced *Ragonath Row* to come to *Bombay*, nor of the mode of his conveyance. The Council of *Bombay* remark, that the General was not preſent at the Conſultation of the preceding day. The ſame remark might have been frequently made during the Conſultation on the buſineſs of my deputation.

Extract from the Conſultation of the Select Committee of *Bombay*; dated Wedneſday the 18th December 1776.

It is our earneſt wiſh and deſire to maintain a moſt friendly intercourſe and correſpondence with the Maratta State, of which the Preſident is requeſted to aſſure the Miniſters by letter, to be incloſed to Colonel *Upton* according to his deſire, and we ſhall expect the like friendly conduct on their part.

As a proof of the ſincerity of our intentions, Colonel *Upton* muſt be deſired to acquaint the Miniſters, that we are ready to depute a gentleman to reſide at *Poonah*, the moment they expreſs a deſire that we ſhould; and provided they will give us aſſurances that they will receive and treat him in a manner ſuitable to the character he will be inveſted with, of Repreſentative for the Honourable Company.

Remarks.

Is this a proof of the ſincerity, or the contrary, in the Council of *Bombay?* The Miniſters knew the order for ſending a Reſident from *Bombay* to *Poonah* had arrived from the Superior Council to *Bombay* near a month before: in keeping him ſo long back the goodneſs of their intentions towards the Poonah Government did not ſhew itſelf in any ſtriking manner to the Miniſters, who had been moſt preſſingly, for ſome months before, requeſting a Reſident might be ſent.

Extracts of a letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay* to the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*; dated the 14th April 1777.

The extracts we have now the honour to tranſmit from our Secret Conſultations, will place in their proper light the circumſtances mentioned in your letter, of our giving protection to ſome of the defeated adherents of *Sudaba*, our interpoſition with *Ragojee Angria* in his favour, and our receiving into *Bombay* the perſon of *Ragonath Row*. We are perſuaded that when you have given theſe extracts a candid peruſal the impreſſion made on your minds by the repreſentation you have received from *Poonah* on theſe points, will be entirely removed; and that you will no longer conſider our preventing a handful of wretched ſepoys from being ſlaughtered under the walls of a Britiſh fortreſs, as repugnant to any treaty, but as an act directed by humanity, and warranted by the law of nations. We ſend the meſſage mentioned in our Minutes to *Ragojee Angria* after he had by treachery got *Sudaba* into his poſſeſſion, becauſe the latter has been promiſed our protection; and we eſteemed it our duty to endeavour to ſave him from being murdered, which we concluded would be the caſe if he was ſent to *Poonah* by the perfidious *Angria*; but we diſclaim any declaration of war, in caſe of his refuſal to deliver *Sudaba* up.

We beg leave to obſerve, that we are not anſwerable for any thing the adherent of *Sudaba* may have thought proper to write to his confederates.

Without entering into any diſcuſſion of your authority to give us an order to expel *Ragoba* from *Bombay*, and putting out of the queſtion the diſgrace and bad conſequences which would have attended ſuch a meaſure,

Remarks.

The Council of *Bombay* ſeem determined to afford protection to all the Maratta ſubjects, whether in rebellion, or in whatever manner they may be diſaffected to the Maratta State.

The Miniſters on this ſubject have declared, that ſuch behaviour is an infringement on the treaty of *Poorunder*, and of former treaties; that they are thereby prevented recovering their dues from ſuch people as fly to *Bombay*, *Salſette*, &c. or bringing them to juſtice; and if long continued muſt in the end prove fatal.

The former part of the 3d paragraph of this letter is of too intricate a nature for me to remark upon, and the latter part of it requires no other obſervation than that the Secret Committee ſay, they have diſpenſed with putting the orders of the Superior Council reſpecting *Ragonath Row* quitting *Bombay* into execution.

meaſure, and every conſideration of honour and humanity, by which we eſteemed ourſelves bound to protect him, it appeared to us quite unadviſable, and warranted by no political neceſſity, to compel him to depart, as Colonel *Upton* had acquainted us, under the 12th December, that the Miniſters ſeemed well pleaſed, and for the preſent ſatisfied, with the aſſurances he had made them at our deſire, in conſequence of *Ragoba*'s having taken refuge here; and we had reaſon to hope, from the profeſſion they made, that ſatisfactory terms would ſoon be ſettled for him, Mr. *Moſtyn* being then ſhortly to proceed to *Poonah*, to whom this point would be given in eſpecial charge: we therefore have not ſignified your orders to *Ragoba*; and we flatter ourſelves Mr. *Moſtyn* will meet with ſucceſs, and that your intentions will thereby be anſwered, as it is very pleaſing to us whenever we can promote the execution of them.

Mr. *Moſtyn* ſet off for *Poonah* the 14th ultimo, and arrived there the 29th: he had not then had an audience from the Peiſhwa, but was to proceed to *Poorunder* in two days for that purpoſe. He adviſes the death of the Ram Rajah on the 24th ultimo, which may probably occaſion ſome alteration in the Poonah Government. We incloſe copy of his inſtructions, which we hope you will approve, and that they will convince you of our diſpoſition to preſerve a good underſtanding with the Maratta State.

Much has paſſed between us and Colonel *Upton* on the ſubject of the evaſive conduct of the Miniſters in complying with the 5th Article of the Treaty. In the beginning of December laſt he adviſed, that he had ſettled with them that the Pergunnahs of *Ahmood*, *Hanſood*, and *Deſborah*, ſhould be made over to the Company; and that if the revenues of theſe places amounted to more than three lacks of rupees, the exceſs ſhould be deducted from *Ahmood* or *Hanſood*; on the contrary, if there was any deficiency, it was to be made up by grants of villages from the Pergunnah of *Oselaſeer*. This was a very fair, equitable agreement, and we then hoped the buſineſs was entirely concluded in an advantageous manner to the Company; but owing to ſome colluſion between the Poonah agents at *Broach* and their principals, the country is not to this hour made over to the Company. That you may have full information of our proceedings, and be better able to judge what meaſures to purſue, we now tranſmit copies of all the papers on this ſubject ſince the ſettlement made by Colonel *Upton*, and the letters from Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Boddam*, and *Ramſay*, now at *Broach*, and hope that our conduct will be ſatisfactory to you.

In the above papers you will obſerve the demand made by the Miniſters for the poſſeſſion of *Jambooſeer*, which is equally oppoſite to the agreement made with Colonel *Upton*, and if complied with, would leave the Company without any ſecurity for the 12 lacks, or the country ceded by the 5th Article.

Since writing the above we have been honoured with your letter, dated the 27th January.

What we have already wrote, and the extracts above referred to, will in a great meaſure ſerve as a reply to one of them; and we can only further obſerve, that we ever underſtood it to be the cuſtom of all nations, and we think it is inconſiſtent with reaſon and common ſenſe, not to permit of hoſtilities being committed within reach of the guns of a fortification; which induced us to give the orders we did to the Chief and Council at *Tannah*, and not any intention of invading the territorial rights of the Marattas.

By the extracts from our Minutes it will appear, that *Ragonath Row* eſcaped from the fort of *Terrapore*, where he was beſieged by his enemies, on board an Engliſh veſſel, and came in perſon to *Bombay* to ſolicit our protection, without any encouragement or invitation from us. The fort ſoon afterwards was taken by the Poonah forces.

Extract of a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Select Committee at *Bombay*; dated the 20th April 1777.

I may not perhaps receive this intelligence ſo early as I could wiſh, from the ſtrict watch that is kept over me to prevent, I ſuppoſe, my having any communication with thoſe on whom I can depend for certain information, no one having hitherto been near me, and my own people are obliged to be very cautious with whom they converſe.

Extract of a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*; dated the 30th April 1777.

After the uſual compliments had paſſed, they aſked me if the Governor and Council of *Bombay* had accepted the Treaty of Peace concluded by Colonel *Upton*, and ratified by you? Upon my anſwering, that they undoubtedly had, of which my being ſent to them at their own requeſt ought to be the convincing proof, they preſented me a paper to ſign to that effect, but which I declined, not thinking it either neceſſary

It is next to impoſſible that any alteration in the Poonah Government can be occaſioned by the death of the Ram Rajah, unleſs effected by ourſelves.

Difficulties may ever be thrown in the way to prevent carrying the 5th Article of the Treaty into execution. The advantage being altogether on our ſide, we ought to endeavour at a fair eſtimation to poſſeſs ourſelves of the country to be ceded. I forwarded copies of the orders: the Miniſters ſent their carcons at *Broach* on this ſubject to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, and had great hopes, at the time of my leaving *Poonah*, that the 5th Article of the Treaty would have been inſtantly ſettled. The Miniſters told me, the Zemindars would give an account of their rents in the preſence of the Engliſh and Maratta agents, and the country valued according to former undiſturbed collections, as ſhould appear by the accounts of theſe Zemindars to have been paid by them to the Circar.

It is very likely that the Miniſters, ſeeing our protection ſo long continued to *Ragonath Row* and the other diſaffected ſubjects, are not deſirous of making over this ceſſion till they ſhall be certain of the intentions of the Preſidency of *Bombay* regarding theſe people. This however I give as a matter of opinion merely.

If it was propoſed by the Superior Council to the Peiſhwa's Miniſters to receive the country to be ceded, at an average of the collections made in the laſt undiſturbed ten or fifteen years; or ſhould this time be thought too far back, three or five years might ſuffice; this would be too equitable to be refuſed (or muſt bring on explanations;) and a fairer eſtimation, I am humbly of opinion, cannot be deſired.

Till the treaty ſhall have been fully carried into execution, confidence cannot ſubſiſt between the Governments of *Bombay* and *Poonah*: a Miniſter (for a time) deputed immediately from the Superior Council, might at a period ſo critical as the preſent appears, recover great ſervices to the Honourable Company.

Remarks.

I do not think the Miniſters aſking Mr. *Moſtyn* to ſign a paper, ſignifying that the Bombay Council had accepted the Treaty of Peace concluded at *Poorunder*, implied any doubt of the authority veſted in the Superior Council to ratify

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sary or proper; and represented to them, that their requiring it, was doubting the authority you had, Gentlemen, to ratify that treaty, as well as the veracity of the Bombay Board. In consequence of my refusal some altercation ensued; therefore to convince them of the sincerity of the Bombay Presidency strictly to adhere to the treaty, and to obviate as far as in my power every objection they might make, I proposed their delivering me what they had to say in writing, which I would answer in the same manner; to which they agreed; and accordingly on the 20th following I received four separate articles from them, translates of which, together with my answer thereto delivered them this day, I have now the honour to inclose for your observation.

Translates of four papers delivered by the Poonah Durbar to Mr. *Mostyn*, and marked as follows:

5th.

The Punt Pradan and his Ministers agree, by way of friendship, to give for ever to the English Company, a country of three lacks, according to cahmil or ancient statement of revenues, near or adjoining to *Broach*, on which there is to be no claim of chout, or any other demand whatever. Two carcons belonging to the Peishwa, and two persons on the part of the English, to proceed and settle exactly the places and boundaries, when the Peishwa will give the sunnuds: this is according to the treaty; but the Governor and Council of *Bombay* refuse to accept them, agreeable to cahmil or former statement, therefore the Governor and Council of *Bombay* should write to Mr. *Carnac* and the other gentlemen at *Broach* to settle according to the ancient statement of revenues, which they may learn from the Jamidars of the Pergunnahs, and receive the countries of three lacks.

It is agreed by the Treaty, that the Honourable Company is to receive a country of three complete lacks of rupees, near or adjoining to *Broach*.

The words in the Persian are jama cahmil, which should mean full or complete collection. It was never understood that the word kamil meant ancient or former, nor was such meaning understood by it in the drawing up the 5th Article, nor do I now learn that it can bear such meaning as ancient or former.

The Peishwa's Ministers objected to making over a country of three lacks, as collected for a few years last past, as the country had been in disturbance, and they were liable therefore by such estimation to give over a country that would greatly exceed the intended value.

This agreement has most certainly reason to support it.

The Ministers consented that an estimation of the districts, either from their former payments to the Maratta Government, or to abide by what they should now offer, when not under their influence, to rent such districts at; and in the estimating these districts, the Ministers declared they had sent private orders to their agents not to let a difference of 5,000 or 10,000 rupees prevent the country being made over.

7th.

This Article is exactly conformable to the Article of the Treaty of Peace entered into by Colonel *Upton*, except the following addition:

When such was the treaty, and two letters from *Futty Sing* to Colonel *John Upton*, declaring he had no authority to alienate any country, and inclosing copy of a former Peishwa's sunnud, yet the Pergunnahs of *Chickly*, &c. are detained by you; these ought to be restored.

Remarks.

The Letter (for I received but one, another for me is now with the vackeel) and the copies of the sunnuds, I forwarded to the Superior Council, with the treaty; these were not sufficiently satisfactory to me. *Futty Sing*, or a respectable person on his part, should have been sent to *Poonah*, and have cleared up the matter in dispute. The Ministers were always promising this; but had it been done, I did not conceive myself authorized, after the ratification of the treaty, to restore the country ceded by *Futty Sing*. I am, however, of opinion, that *Futty Sing* has not the power of alienating part of the Maratta Dominions, in which the entire Guzerat Country stands included.

14th.

The treaties between the Government of *Bombay* and the *Marattas*, dated July 1739, and the 12th October 1756, are to be held and continued in as full force as when they were first entered into, unless any article or articles of either of them should in other manner be provided for by this treaty; in such case, such article or articles are to be rejected, and those of this treaty to be abided by. And it is mentioned in a former treaty, that the English will give no assistance at any rate to my enemies, even though in friendship with them: accordingly, the Peishwa shall give no assistance to the enemies of the English. In another treaty, it is agreed, that orders shall be given to the officers of the Circar, to stop all servants, soldiers, or great men belonging to the English, who should desert, and acquaint the Governor or Chief of the nearest settlement where such persons shall be taken; and when the Company's people come for them, they shall be delivered up to them. Accordingly, the servants or great men belonging to the Circar, except hatmen, who may have gone to *Bombay*, or any settlement under their jurisdiction, shall be delivered up again. To this both parties agreed on promise of pardon. This is the agreement; notwithstanding which you sent boats for *Dada Saib*, carried him to *Bombay*, and gave him protection, as you also did the people of *Tooteya*, with the Circar's elephants, horses, jewels, money, &c. they carried with them. Agreeable to this treaty our friendship had long subsisted; but you knowing a dispute had arisen in my house, and that my officers and forces were gone towards *Brampore*, took that opportunity to attack and take *Salsette* and other forts; from whence the English carried away the valuable effects. You also gave assistance to *Ragonaut Row*, which has put me to the expence of a crore; but through the means of the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, a new treaty

The Peishwa is obliged to keep forces in the Cokun Country, whilst *Ragonath Row* is at *Bombay*. His adopted Son, with troops and the remains of the Borry army, are in that neighbourhood. The Presidency of *Bombay*, undoubtedly, in a great measure occasion this expence to the Poonah Government.

that treaty, but certainly implied a doubt of the sincerity of the conduct of the Presidency of *Bombay* towards the *Poonah* Government. *Ragonath Row* is in their thoughts ever uppermost.

of peace and friendſhip has been concluded, notwithſtanding which you have given protection both to *Ragonaut Row* and the Impoſtor's people, which obliges me to keep the forces in the Conkan. Of whom am I to expect payment of this expence? and how is the treaty obſerved by the Engliſh? In former treaties the Circar's enemies were to be delivered up.

According to the treaty it is agreed the Circar ſhall pay to the Engliſh the ſum of twelve lacks of rupees; and until that amount is diſcharged the revenue of *Jambooſeer*, as agreed with Colonel *Upton*, is given up to the Engliſh; when the whole is paid off, the Engliſh to return the ſaid Pergunnah to the Circar, with every thing belonging to it. For my ſatisfaction, I propoſed to the Governor and Council of *Bombay* two conditions; the firſt, That the Amount Revenues ſhould be ſettled and recovered by the Circar's Man, *Madajee Ramchunora*, who would pay it to the Engliſh on their giving a receipt. The ſecond condition, that the *Jemmabundy* of the ſaid Pergunnah ſhould be made by *Madajee Ramchunora*, for which amount the Engliſh to give a receipt, and recover the revenues: of theſe two conditions, the Governor and Council of *Bombay* accepted the latter; but the Gentleman of the ſaid Pergunnah has not yet given any account of the revenues to *Madajee Ramchunora*. Without the Circar's Man makes the ſettlement of the revenue, how is he to know the amount to be recovered from the ſaid Pergunnah, and take the receipt for it? Therefore I deſire a letter to the Gentleman at *Jambooſeer* from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, to permit that the Jemabundy be ſettled by *Madajee Ramchunora*, and the carcoons belonging to the ſaid *Madajee* to ſit at the Cuſtom Chowkey, to know what is recovered.

The Engliſh will recover the revenues of the ſaid Pergunnah and at the Chowkies, giving a receipt to the Circar's Man for the amount.

Remarks.

The Peiſhwa's Agent ſhould aſſiſt at the ſettling the lands for the enſuing year, he ſhould be made acquainted and adviſed with: concerning the entire collections at *Jambooſeer*, we are neither to gain or loſe by the collections; for what is collected or received receipts are to be given to the Peiſhwa's Agent, and if collected by us the Agent to be exactly informed and ſatisfied of the amount of ſuch collections: we retain poſſeſſion and all power in *Jambooſeer* till the 12 lacks ſhall be paid, and alſo until the country of three lacks ſhall be made over. In this manner it was ſettled by me with the Peiſhwa's Miniſters. It ought to be of little conſequence who makes the collections. If the *Marattas* had this, it muſt have been with the knowledge and concurrence of the Chief of *Jambooſeer*; but I underſtood it was preferred by the Government of *Bombay*, that the collections ſhould be made by the Engliſh Chief and the Maratta Agent to be informed with every particular.

Extracts from the Complaints and Demands of Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Miniſters.

Second. In the month of Auguſt laſt, the Governor and Council of *Bombay* ſent Colonel *Upton* a liſt of the cargo of the Engliſh ſhip *Aurora*, loſt near *Rhuſtnagerry*, to demand reſtitution thereof from you. This liſt muſt have been delivered to you; for in your letter to him of the 18th October, you write: "Attentive to the friendſhip between the "Circar and the Engliſh, after chaſtizing the ſeditious, and ſettling the "diſturbances in Conkan, ſtrict orders ſhall be iſſued in regard to re"ſtoring the ſhip's cargo from the ſaid receivers, and they will be "made to give it." The ſeditious have been overcome a long time, ſince which no reſtitution has been made; I therefore require your compliance therewith, or your finding ſome method to make good the loſs to our merchants, conformable to the 13th Article of the late treaty.

Remarks.

The anſwer from the Poonah Durbar to Mr. *Moſtyn*'s demand requires but little to be remarked upon, as they aſſent to the whole of them. The reply to me from the Miniſters, regarding the cargo of the *Aurora*, was as follows:

Paragraph of a letter from the Peiſhwa to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, October 18th 1776.

"A trading veſſel going to *China*, was "drove on the ſea-ſhore by the violence "of the contrary winds, and fell in the "hands of the people belonging to the "ſeditious. You are converſing with "the Circar's Miniſters concerning this "ſhip, and the vackeel of the ſeditious "reſides at *Bombay*, and the Governor of "that place converſes with him: it is extraordinary that they do not demand the ſhip's cargo from the "vackeel: keeping the vackeel there, and not ſpeaking to him about the ſhip, is very ſurpriziog. Atten"tive to the friendſhip between the Circar and the Engliſh, after chaſtizing the ſeditious, and ſettling "the diſturbances in *Conkan*, ſtrict orders will be iſſued in regard to reſtoring the ſhip's cargo from "the ſaid receivers, and they will be made to give it."

A copy of this letter was ſent to *Bombay*, October the 19th 1776.

I think, before a demand ſo peremptory had been made by Mr. *Moſtyn*, ſome method ſhould have been fallen upon to have made ſuch of the plunderers of the *Aurora* as had fled for protection to *Bombay* and *Salſette* refund what they had ſo illegally poſſeſſed themſelves of, and thereby have removed in part the complaints of the Peiſhwa.

Letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay* to the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*; dated the 10th May 1777.

Having lately received from Mr. *Moſtyn* very alarming accounts of the proceedings of the French with the Poonah Government, we think it our eſpecial duty to loſe no time in tranſmitting you copies of his letters, that you may take what meaſure you may judge proper for guarding againſt the bad conſequences which muſt enſue from too cloſe a connection between thoſe Powers.

If the French ſucceed in obtaining the port of *Choul*, or any other ſo immediately in our neighbourhood, it will totally ruin the Company's trade at this ſettlement, and materially injure the commerce of *Great Britain*, excluſive of the advantage ſuch an eſtabliſhment would afford them in caſe of a national war; much therefore, in our opinion, ought to be hazarded to ſubvert the ſcheme, whether on further intelli-

Remarks.

Should the French ſucceed in obtaining the port of *Choul*, and the Company's trade at *Bombay* with the Marattas, be totally ruined; to what can it be attributed but to the extraordinary conduct of the Council of *Bombay* in keeping up *Ragonath Row*, to anſwer, as ſuppoſed by the Miniſters, the purpoſe of ſubverting the preſent Maratta Government, with whom a treaty of peace has been ſo lately concluded; and on the part of the Marattas, for the very purpoſe of our not taking any

part

Appendix. No. 11.

gence it ſhould prove to be directed to views of trade only, or to the forming a treaty of alliance with the Poonah Government; but we have only conſidered ourſelves authorized to direct Mr. *Moſtyn* to expoſtulate with the Miniſters on the impropriety of their giving encouragement to the French, our natural enemies, after the peace ſo lately concluded by Colonel *Upton*, and to demand from them the nature and deſign of Monſ. *St. Laub*'s deputation. We have alſo inſtructed him to endeavour to excite their jealouſy by repreſenting the ambitious views, and encroaching diſpoſition of that nation, and their attachment to *Hyder Ally*, at the ſame time to make it, his ſtudy himſelf to preſerve the moſt amicable correſpondence with the Durbar.

Mr. *Moſtyn* will, by our directions, continue to keep you conſtantly and fully adviſed of ſuch of their proceedings as may come to his knowledge.

Whilſt we have ſuch reaſon for ſuſpicion of the deſigns of the French, we beg leave to ſubmit to your judgment how far it is expedient we ſhould remain in our preſent defenceleſs ſtate. The incloſed return will ſhew you the great diminution of our European corps, and until the diſpute with *America* is ſubſided, we have no reaſon to expect any conſiderable recruits from *England*; at any rate, it is good to be prepared againſt every event; and the appearance of a reſpectable force will at leaſt have a good effect on the conduct of the Poonah Government, and may deter the French from deſigns which our weakneſs might otherwiſe tempt them to undertake; from the ſame motive (and they have lately had ſeveral ſhips of force upon the coaſt) we have applied to Sir *Edward Hughes*, or his ſucceſſor in the command, to bring round His Majeſty's ſquadron to *Bombay* as early as he poſſibly can.

part in their diſputes, or affording protection or aſſiſtance to any of their ſubjects in rebellion, particularly *Ragonath Row*, on whom they are willing and deſirous of fixing a jaghire, and permitting his reſiding at *Benares*, or in fact almoſt any where, except at *Bombay* or its dependencies? The aſſiſting the perſon called *Sadaſhew Row*, and receiving his diſperſed troops, muſt have eſtranged the little remaining affection and regard they might have had towards the Preſidency of *Bombay*: we keep the communication between *Bombay* and *Poonah* ſhut by this extraordinary conduct. Will the *Marattas* ſuffer themſelves to be excluded from all trade with Europeans, becauſe we do not chuſe to trade with them? If they have any commerce with us, circumſtanced as they now are, it is at the riſk of *Ragonath Row*'s getting poſſeſſion of *Poonah*; though during the late war an invitation to the French might have been given by the Poonah Government, to enter into an alliance, or trade with them; yet I have every reaſon to conclude, from the manner in which the Peiſhwa's Miniſters conducted themſelves during my reſidence at *Poonah*, from their repeated declarations of how very deſirous they were to be on the beſt and moſt laſting terms of friendſhip with the Engliſh; nay, even their repeated requeſts to cement this by the moſt binding obligations: I ſay, from all theſe circumſtances, I am firmly perſuaded that, had theſe French ſhips arrived during my reſidence amongſt them, the Chevalier *St. Laubin* had not been permitted to go to *Poonah*, or had an audience at the Durbar been granted to him, without aſking my conſent. The Miniſters are now drove to ſeek alliance with ſome European Power; if we decline this the French will certainly avail themſelves of the opportunity to eſtabliſh an alliance with the moſt formidable power of *India*, and we may hereafter find a difficulty in breaking it: were we to remove *Ragonath Row*, and carry the treaty into execution, and ſend a Reſident immediately from the Supreme Council to *Poonah*, all might yet be well, and I am convinced would end as we deſire.

It would occaſion great ſuſpicions and alarms to the Poonah Government; were troops at preſent to be ſent to *Bombay*; but *Ragonath Row*, &c. removed, the cauſes for theſe alarms and ſuſpicions are alſo removed; and any reinforcement thought neceſſary to that garriſon might then be ſent.

Letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated the 2d May 1777.

I addreſſed you laſt under the 20th ultimo: this is purpoſely to inform you, that *Byrou Punt* and *Gungadur* paying me a viſit this afternoon, informed me, that the French gentlemen were arrived, and encamped within half a coſs from our compound. I aſked them, if they were ſo dilatory in their proceedings, how theſe gentlemen were to return to *Choul*, and the ſhip to clear the coaſt before the rainy ſeaſon? when they replied, that it was ſettled they ſhould ſtay at *Poonah* during the rainy ſeaſon; that the ſhip was unrigged, and her guns and ſtores landed, from one hundred to one hundred and fifty pieces of ordnance for ſale, ſome of which, by *Byrou Pundt*'s accounts, are of a very large calibre, beſides a large quantity of copper and broad cloth. *Byrou Punt* likewiſe informed me, that Monſieur *St. Laubin* had yeſterday written to the Durbar, acquainting them, that he expected two more ſhips upon the Coaſt, which he requeſted might have permiſſion to winter in ſome of their harbours; this, he ſays, was granted them, but did not mention what harbour they were to go to. This, I think, Gentlemen, puts the intentions of this Durbar beyond a doubt, and muſt have been determined on before the ſhip's arrival; for it is impoſſible to have been done ſince the Chevalier landed at *Choul*, who has not yet had an audience of the Peiſhwa or Miniſters.

Remarks.

It plainly appears from this letter, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* are about loſing, or indeed have actually loſt, the trade to *Poonah*, by keeping up *Ragonath Row*, &c. and by taking ſo very active a part in the Maratta diſputes, which keeps the communication ſhut between the two Governments.

Extract of a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, and Council, at *Fort William*; dated the 21ſt May 1777.

I have taken the opportunity of *Sacaram Bapoo*, *Madaron Jadaroi*, and *Byroo Pundt* paying me a viſit, to repreſent to them the extraordinary conduct of this Durbar in giving ſo much encouragement to the French; and uſed every endeavour to excite their jealouſy with reſpect to the view the Chevalier undoubtedly has, to get poſſeſſion of ſome ſea harbour or port in the Maratta dominions on the Coaſt of *Malabar*, by ſetting forth the ambitious and encroaching diſpoſition of the French, as the cloſe connection there was between them and *Hyder Ally*, with whom

Remarks.

How little can avail Mr. *Moſtyn*'s endeavour to excite the jealouſy of the Peiſhwa's Miniſters with reſpect to the views of the French on their country and their encroaching diſpoſition. And have not the gentlemen of *Bombay* given, and do they not ſtill give, full cauſe for greater jealouſy? Little I fear can be obtained

whom it is ſaid they have concluded an offenſive treaty, which has for one of its odiums, the reduction of the Maratta Power. They all aſſured me, and *Sacaram* in particular, that nothing had yet been concluded on; who likewiſe ſaid, he was not ignorant of the diſpoſition of the French, nor of their connection with *Hyder*; for which reaſon the Durbar would be very cautious in complying with any requeſt the Chevalier might make to them, until they knew what this Government were to expect from them. Notwithſtanding theſe aſſurances, there is the greateſt reaſon to fear, from the particular attention this Durbar have paid to the Chevalier ever ſince his arrival, that he will accompliſh his grand object, in obtaining a ſettlement at *Choul*, and a factory at *Poonah*.

tained from ſuch ſhrewd men as *Saccaram Bapoo* and *Bellajee Pundit*, by the arguments made uſe of, were they really diſpoſed to form alliance with the French. Mr. *Moſtyn* concludes the Chevalier *St. Laubin* will accompliſh his grand object, in obtaining a ſettlement at *Choul* and a factory at *Poonah*, from the particular attention paid to the Chevalier by the Maratta Durbar. This attention would be paid to the Chevalier, or any other foreigner, to ſhew Mr. *Moſtyn*, that where they did not conceive themſelves ill treated, they could behave with politeneſs, and in turn to occaſion ſome jealouſy to the Preſidency of *Bombay*. Appendix. No. 11.

The Secretary having been directed to collect from the proceedings ſuch particulars as appears from the *Bombay* advice to remain ſtill undecided, lays the following abſtracts before the Board for reference.

Abſtract of ſeveral papers relative to the Country of Three Lacks.

Letter from Col. Upton, 26th October, Conf. 9th Dec. 1776.

The Peiſhwa has agreed to make over *Hanſood*, *Occlaſeer*, and *Deſborah*, for the country of three lacks; the ſurplus country, if any, to be returned, or the deficiency to be made up, *Jamboojeer* mortgaged for the payment of the 12 lacks, alſo the Maratta revenues in, and about *Surat*.

Letter from the Gov. and Council of Bombay to Meſſrs. Gambier, Perrot, and Cheap, 8th Nov. 1776, inclosed in Letter from Bombay, 14th April entered 17 July 1777.

As the account of the revenues ceded will fall conſiderably ſhort of three lacks, they have deſired Colonel *Upton* to obtain an aſſignment on ſome other convenient diſtrict for the deficiency.

Letter from Col. Upton to the Select Committee, Bombay, 1ſt Dec. 1776, entered Ditto.

Has urged this to the Miniſters, they have conſented that *Ahmood* and *Hanſood* ſhall be the Pergunnahs ceded for the three lacks of revenue, and that any deficiency in that amount ſhall be made up by villages from *Occlaſeer*.

Inſtructions from the Peiſhwa to the Maratta Agents, incloſed in the above.

The Pergunnahs of *Aſhmood*, *Hanſood*, and *Deſborah*, to be given up to the Company; the Zemindars, &c. to be informed of the above. In caſe the revenues of the ſaid Pergunnahs exceeded three lacks, villages to be reſerved from *Aſhmood* or *Hanſood*, and in caſe they ſhould be leſs, villages are to be given from *Occlaſeer*; in ſhort, a complete revenue of three lacks to be ceded to the Company.

Letters from the Engliſh Deputies at Broach to the Select Committee, Bombay, the 29th Nov. 1776.

The Miniſters account of revenue annually collected by the Peiſhwa from *Deſborah* Rup^{e} 40,000, *Aſhmood* R^{e} 1,63,791, *Hanſood* 1,27,809, *Occlaſeer* 18,001. Total rupees 5,11,601.

The net revenue of *Hanſood*, *Occlaſeer*, and *Deſborah*, is eſtimated by the Engliſh deputies at only rupees 1,80,000, after deducting the tributes which are paid from theſe diſtricts. The pundits of *Occlaſeer* and *Hanſood* are collecting this year's revenues with all poſſible diligence, and ſay they have yet received no inſtructions.

Letter from the Secret Committee of Bombay to the Chief at Broach, 9th Dec.

Incloſing copy of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, and further inſtructions to the Maratta Agents, deſired to be informed if the Maratta accounts of the revenue of *Hanſood* and *Occlaſeer* are juſt.

Letter from the Chief at Broach, to the Select Committee, Bombay, 21ſt Dec.

The Maratta Agents abſolutely deny having received any orders from *Poonah*, and refuſe doing any buſineſs. Think the revenues of this ſeaſon will be loſt to the Company. Maratta account of the aſſignment, on *Occlaſeer* and *Hanſood* not a juſt one. *Broach* receives 3,800 from *Occlaſeer*, and 2,200 rupees from *Hanſood* more than they have admitted.

Have had a conference with the Poonah agents, purport thereof, (vide the letter.) The pundits have received the whole of the revenues of *Aſhmood*, *Hanſood*, and *Deſborah*, in advance. Letter from the Chief at Broach, to the Select Committee, Bombay, 28th Jan. 1777.

Is deputed to take poſſeſſion of *Jamboojeer*, which by the treaty is to be returned to the Peiſhwa. Complains of Mr. *Gambier*'s delay in not delivering it up to him. Letter from Madajee Ramchunder to Meſſrs. Carnac, Boldam, and Ramſey, 27th February.

The Poonah Agents inſiſt on our accepting *Ahmood*, *Hanſood*, and *Deſborah*, at the rate of Rupees 3,33,000 and delivering back lands for the exceſs of 33,000 from *Aſhmood*. Their real produce is only R^{e} 2,10,000; we have therefore refuſed to accept them on the Maratta eſtimate, but propoſed to take immediate poſſeſſion, and to determine the value by the average produce of the three enſuing years. Letter from Meſſrs. Carnac, Boddam, and Ramſey, 11th March.

Informing him that *Jamboojeer* cannot be given up till the 12 lacks are paid, it having been aſſigned as ſecurity for that payment. Letter from Mr. Carnac to Madajee Ramchunder, 27th Feb.

Wiſhes to make the collections of *Jamboojeer* himſelf, and pay the amount as he collects it to them; if we keep it, the Government charges muſt not be deducted from the collections. Letter from Do. to Broach Committee

More explicit orders were preparing at *Poonah*, and will be ſent to the Maratta Agents; approve their not accepting the propoſed Pergunnahs on the Maratta eſtimates; *Jamboojeer* to be kept till the twelve lacks be received, and the charges of collections of courſe to be deducted from the revenues. From the Select Committee to the Committee at Broach.

To obtain clear and poſitive inſtructions to the Agents at *Broach*; the demand of *Mahoojee* for *Jamboojeer* not conformable to Colonel *Upton*'s agreement; cannot conſent to give it up till the conditions on which it was aſſigned are fulfilled. From the Select Committee to Mr. Moſtyn.

They complain of the Engliſh, for refuſing to receive the country of three lacks by the Camil Jumma, which they ſay is the term ſpecified in the Perſian tranſlation of the treaty written at *Calcutta*. Negociations Mr. Moſtyn with the Miniſters, incloſed in his letters, 30 April and 21ſt May; Conf. 16 June and 17th July.

They aſſert the right of their Agents to collect the revenues of *Jamboojeer*, in order to liquidate the debt of twelve lacks, or at leaſt to ſettle the Jummabundy of that diſtrict, and to leave the collection to be made accordingly by the Engliſh; they ſay that the latter mode having been accepted by the Government at *Bombay*, they expect a receipt for the full amount of the Jummabundy. Mr. *Moſtyn* claims the right of deducting the charges of collection from the Jummabundy, and will only agree that receipts ſhall be given for the net collections.

Appendix. No. 12.

On the reception of *Ragoba* at *Bombay*.

Letter from Col. Upton, dated 24th Nov. Ent. 30th Dec. 1776.

Adviſing the Board that *Ragonath Row* had been received at *Bombay*, to the great ſurprize and concern of the Peiſhwa's Miniſters, as they had agreed to fix on him the jaghire he requeſted.

The Preſidency at *Bombay* were immediately written to in the following words:—"If it be true that *Ragonath* "*Row* has received the protection of your Government, "and ſhall be at *Bombay* or in any of its dependencies "when you receive this letter, we peremptorily order "and inſiſt that you immediately require and compel "him to depart therefrom;" and we further required to ſend copies of their proceedings on this ſubject.

Conſ. 17th July 1777. Extract Proceedings of the Select Committee at Bombay, 14th Nov.

By a letter from Captain *Fancourt* of the *Succeſs* ketch, it appears, that *Ragoba* had ſolicited a paſſage in his veſſel from *Terrapore* to *Bombay*, and that he had accordingly brought him. On which the Committee reſolved, "As the reaſons we have before ſo fully aſſigned, "for firſt affording protection to *Ragoba*, ſtill operate "with equal force for our continuing the ſame to him; "Agreed, That he be permitted to reſide here, till ſome "other reſidence can be obtained for him, to which he "can be reconciled."

Read alſo, the preſent letter from *Bombay*, dated 14th April laſt.

Conditions propoſed or obtained for *Ragonath Row*.

Conſ. 18 Dec. 1775. Letter from Bombay, and correſpondence with Col. Keating.

Ragonath, when apprized of our intention to treat with the miniſterial party at *Poonah*, propoſed the following ſtipulations to be obtained for himſelf, viz.

That half the produce of the country, which is reſerved for the maintenance of the reigning Peiſhwa, ſhould be delivered into his poſſeſſion; or that in caſe the infant Peiſhwa's legitimacy ſhould be proved, and that he ſhould be conſequently acknowledged Peiſhwa, the office of Guardian and Protector ſhould be ſecured for *Ragoba*, as next in conſanguinity to him, with a right to a penſion after the Peiſhwa became of age.

That during the negociation, a ſtipend ſhould be allowed him from the Durbar, of lacks per month, for the ſupport of himſelf and troops.

Treaty of Poonah.

By the Treaty of Peace, the following conditions were obtained for *Ragoba*:

Art. 9. A full pardon granted to all his adherents, except four, on his diſbanding his army within one month.

10. In caſe of his refuſal to diſband his army, the Engliſh are to withdraw their aſſiſtance from him.

11. A houſehold to be maintained for him, conſiſting of 1,000 horſe and ſome foot, to be paid by; and relieved at the pleaſure of the Peiſhwa's Government; allowed alſo 200 domeſtics, and three lacks of rupees per year, on condition that he will reſide at *Cooper-gany*.

Letter from Colonel Upton, dated 24th Auguſt. Poſtſcript of the 26th. Conſ. 30. —30th Sept.

Conſent to *Ragoba*'s reſiding at *Benares*, unattended by any of the Peiſhwa's troops, with an allowance of 5 lacks rupees per year from the Durbar, or that a jaghyre to that amount ſhould be ceded to him in the neighbourhood of *Calpee*.

Conſ. 30th Dec. 1776. Col. Upton's letter to Bombay, 12th Dec. Conſ. 17 July.

The Miniſters had fixed on *Ragoba* the jaghyre he had requeſted; they are ſurprized therefore that he ſhould retire to *Bombay*. The Miniſters will order the Maratta vackeel at *Bombay*, to lay before the Governor and Council terms for *Ragoba* to reſide at *Benares*, with a jaghyre as full as they purpoſed to fix on him, if he had conſented to reſide in the Maratta dominions.

Inſtructions to Mr. Moſtyn.

To endeavour to obtain a ſuitable eſtabliſhment for *Ragoba*, and re-payment of the Company's expence incurred by his reſidence at *Bombay*.

Reſpecting the offer of protection to *Sudaba*, and the aſylum granted to ſome of his adherents.

Letter from the Peiſhwa, in the Perſian Correſpondence, received. Proceedings of the Select Com. at Bombay, from the 30th Nov. incloſed in their letter 14th April.

Complaining that Mr. *Halſey*, the chief of *Salſette*, had threatened to fire on the Peiſhwa's forces, if they attempted to carry on their operations againſt the village of *Calval*; that he had given ſhelter to about 1000 of *Sudabah*'s party from the miniſterial army, and refuſed to deliver them up. And further, that the Governor of *Bombay* had ſent two deputies to demand the perſon of *Sudabah* from *Ragojee Angria*, and to make a declaration of war in caſe of refuſal. A party of *Sudabah*'s vanquiſhed army having drawn themſelves up under the guns of *Tannah* Fort, and the miniſterial troop approaching to attack them in that ſituation, the Chief of *Salſette* wrote to their Commander, forbidding any acts of hoſtility ſo contiguous to the Company's fortifications. He alſo received the fugitives, in order to ſave their lives from the purſuits of their enemies; to whom he in conſequence refuſed to deliver them up.

On *Sudabah*'s defeat at *Rajamatchy*, he ſent a meſſenger, requeſting to be received into *Bombay*; which 30th Oct. Mr. *Draper*, in the abſence of the Governor, agreed to. *Sudaba* in the mean time, underſtanding that the Governor was abſent, was prevailed on by the promiſes of *Ragojee Angria*, to put himſelf into his power; and the Governor, when he returned to *Bombay*, being informed by a letter from *Ragojee*, that *Sudaba* was then in his poſſeſſion, and that he meant to deliver him up to the Miniſters at *Poonah*, communicated this intelligence to the Select Committee, by whom it was reſolved to ſend "a verbal meſſage to *Ragojee Angria*, to repreſent how diſhonourable it will be for him to deliver up a perſon, whom he had engaged by the moſt ſolemn promiſe not to injure, which they are aſſured was the caſe; and likewiſe, that as *Sudaba* was waiting there with an intention of proceeding to *Bombay*, they expected that he ſhould be permitted to depart whenever he might think proper."

APPENDIX, No. 12.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 11 Auguſt 1777.

ON conſideration of the ſeveral letters from *Bombay*, and from Mr. *Moſtyn*, together with the above remarks of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, it appears to the Board that the three following points require particular attention:

1ſt. The protection which the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* have given to *Ragoba*.

2d. The differences which ſubſiſt between the Engliſh Deputies and the Maratta Agents in receiving poſſeſſion of the country of three lacks of rupees, ceded to the Company by the 5th Article of the Treaty of *Poonah*.

3d. The differences between them reſpecting the terms on which poſſeſſion of the diſtrict of *Jambooſeer* ſhall be retained until the 12 lacks of rupees, ſtipulated by the 6th Article to be paid to the Company, ſhall have been liquidated from it.

The Secretary having collected the general ſentiments of the Board upon theſe heads, is ordered to prepare the draft of a letter to *Bombay* for their approval.

It being of conſequence to aſcertain the preciſe meaning of the words of the 5th Arcicle of the Maratta Treaty, which in the tranſlation are called complete revenue, becauſe the differences between the *Bombay* Deputies and the Maratta Agents appear to turn chiefly upon them.

The Secretary is ordered to ſhew that part of the Treaty to Mr. *Chambers*, junior, who underſtands both the Perſian and Maratta languages, and to report his explanation of the term therein uſed.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 18th Auguſt 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.
Philip Francis, Eſquire,
Lieutenant General Sir *John Clavering*, and *Richard Barwell*, Eſquires, } indiſpoſed.

The proceedings of the 14th inſtant read, and approved.

The Secretary, in obedience to the orders of the Board, having conſulted Mr. *Chambers*, junior, on the true and literal meaning of the words Kumal Jumma and Jumma Bereeze, uſed in the 5th Article of the Maratta Treaty, and in the letter from the Engliſh Deputies to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, lays before the Board his reply as follows:

Sir,

I have read the Article both in Perſian and Marattas; nor does the latter at all clear up the difficulty, for the ſame Perſian word is adopted in that alſo. The term Jamma Kaumil is, I believe, in uſe all over *Hindoſtan* and the Decan; but I have not known it occur in matters of *Bengal* revenue. I believe I can ſafely ſay, it means the greateſt poſſible revenue, as collected at the time, being without any deduction for ordinary or extraordinary charges.

They conſider the revenue under four heads:
The Toomar Jamma, or original amount.
The Jamma Haumil, or complete amount.
The Jamma Naukiſs, or amount of loſs; and,
The Jamma Hauſil, or amount actually received.

The firſt is well known here; the 2d includes the 1ſt, with all the additions that oppreſſion has ſince made; the 3d is the amount of deductions to be made for Sibandy, repairs of bridges, watercourſes, &c. and other occaſional expences; and the 4th is the amount received into the Treaſury. So that the Jamma Hauſil ariſes from deducting the Jamma Naukiſs from the Jamma Haumil.

The term Jamma Bereeje, or Bêrije, correſponds I believe entirely with that of Jamma Haumil. The word Bêrije is an Hindoo word, meaning ſeparate or diſtinct; and I ſuppoſe was firſt uſed to diſtinguiſh the account of additional exactions from that of the original Jamma; as they are now lumped together, it ſignifies the complete amount.

I have been told, that the Zemindars in *Bengal* do not admit the term Jumma Kaumil, becauſe they entertain an hope, that the modern exactions may be reduced or taken off. I am, &c.

18th Auguſt 1777. (Signed) *Wm Chambers.*

The Secretary lays before the Board a draft of a letter to *Bombay*, prepared according to the orders of the 11th inſtant, which being reviſed is agreed to.

Gentlemen,

We have received your ſeveral letters, dated the 1ſt February, 14th April, and 10th of May.

Having duly conſidered the contents of theſe letters, and the papers which accompanied them, we perceive three objects, which demand our particular and immediate attention:

1ſt: The protection which you have given to *Ragoba*.

2dly. The differences which ſubſiſt between the Engliſh Deputies and the Maratta Agents, in receiving poſſeſſion of the country of three lacks of rupees, ceded to the Company by the 5th Article of the Treaty of *Poonah*: And,

3dly. The differences between them, reſpecting the terms on which poſſeſſion of the diſtrict of *Jamboſeer* ſhall be retained, until the twelve lacks of rupees, ſtipulated by the 6th Article to be paid to the Company, ſhall have been liquidated from it.

The firſt point has undoubtedly afforded juſt cauſe of offence, and jealouſy to the Maratta Government. We wiſh that *Ragoba* had been induced to accept the terms of conciliation lately offered to him by the Miniſters, to reſide at *Benares*, with a jagheer of five lacks of rupees per annum, in the neighbourhood of *Calpee*. Theſe conditions, though they effectually remove the objections formerly made by *Ragoba* againſt the terms ſecured for him by the treaty, were excepted to, by him on account of the difficulty of proceeding to *Benares*, from the danger that he thought his perſon would be expoſed to in a journey by land through the Maratta dominions, and his religious ſcruples againſt a voyage by ſea. Appendix. No. 12.

We can ſee no reaſon to doubt that the preſence of *Ragoba* at *Bombay* will continue to be an inſuperable bar to the completion of the treaty concluded with the Maratta Government, nor can any ſincere cordiality and good underſtanding be eſtabliſhed with them as long as he ſhall appear to derive encouragement and ſupport from the Engliſh; on the contrary, we think that although it may not furniſh ſufficient grounds for the actual renewal of hoſtilities, it will ſo far eſtrange the minds of the Miniſters at leaſt, as to compel them to form connections to the diſadvantage of the Britiſh Government; ſo that notwithſtanding the forms of a reconciliation ſhould exiſt, neither party will benefit by the effects of it. We therefore think it incumbent upon us to recommend to your moſt mature conſideration the dangerous effects of your perſiſting ſtill to continue that protection to *Ragoba*, and to deſire that you will do all that lies in your power to remove the obſtacles which oppoſe his departure from *Bombay*; for this purpoſe we think that he ſhould be required to make choice either of a journey by land, if *Tuckoojee Holcar* and *Madajee Scindia* will give proper ſecurity to conduct him in ſafety, which we have been aſſured they would do, or of a voyage by ſea, which might be accompliſhed, without affecting his religious purity, if he were accommodated with a veſſel, fitted out and manned immediately under his orders, and by perſons of his own ſect, to be accompanied by one of the Company's marine veſſels for his protection. If both theſe expedients ſhould be rejected by *Ragoba*, we muſt naturally conclude, that it is not his intention to part with his preſent aſylum, but that the objections which he has ſtarted to the terms propoſed to him, are mere pretexts; and on this ground we repeat our injunctions, that he be poſitively required to quit the Company's dependencies; as we ſhall hold you reſponſible for all the conſequences of continuing the Company's protection to him, after ſuch a refuſal on his part.

With reſpect to the ſecond object, it is ſtipulated by the 5th Article of the Treaty of *Poonah*, that "the Ma- "rattas do agree (by way of friendſhip) to give for ever "to the Engliſh Company, a country of three complete "lacks of rupees, near or adjoining to *Broach*, on which "there is to be no claim of choute, or any other de- "mand whatever; and that two perſons on the part of "the Company, and two on the part of *Row Pundit* "*Purdhan*, are to proceed to and determine the place "and boundaries; when the Peiſhwa will give the "ſunnuds." The diſtricts which have been mutually agreed on, for this puppoſe are *Ahmood*, *Deſhora*, and *Hanſood*; but a diſagreement has ariſen between the Deputies on each part, concerning the valuation of theſe Pergunnahs; by the Maratta Agents they are eſtimated at the annual rent of rupees 3,33,000, and by the Engliſh agents at only R' 2,10,000. We obſerve a further difference between them upon the method of forming this valuation; the former claiming a right to rate them according to the Camaul Berenge (a term which the Engliſh Deputies explain to be the greateſt amount in any year collected) and the latter inſiſting on their being rated either at the medium of the collections made by the Poonah Government during the 25 years which they have been ſubject to their authority, or by the medium

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of the actual collections to be made for three years to come. The words of the treaty in this case must without doubt be literally adhered to, and we find there expressed both in the Persian and Maratta languages, that the country of three lacks shall be valued according to the Kanul Jumma, a term which we understand to be synonymous with that of gross revenue. But even this explanation of it, will not remove every source of dispute, since it leave the time undecided, at which the gross estimate should be formed. It is impossible for us to be the judges of differences arising from the construction of technical terms, which are not in use in the provinces under our jurisdiction, and which you have the authentic means of ascertaining: we have however employed some pains to obtain the true interpretation of the words above-mentioned, and are satisfied with the sense which we have given to them; for the rest our conclusions must be conjectural, but it appears most reasonable that the gross amount of the actual collections is that implied by the words of the Treaty.

On the third point it is necessary to observe, that *Jambooseer*, which by the 7th Article of the Treaty was to have been restored to the Maratta Government, having been assigned by them for the payment of the twelve lacks of rupees which by the 6th Article of the Treaty, "the Peishwa and Ministers agree to pay to the Com- "pany, in part of the expences of the English army, in "two payments, viz; six lacks within six months of the "of the date of the Treaty (1st March 1776) and the "other six lacks within two years of the same date;" we are of opinion that, as *Jambooseer* is mortgaged to us for a specific sum, we have strictly a right to take and retain possession of it, until the net amount of the collections, exclusive of expences, shall have discharged the debt. At the same time, when we consider the great difficulty of satisfying the Poonah Government, that justice is done them, and that the charges of management are not unnecessarily swelled, as long as the collections are in our hands, we think that the easiest and safest course you can follow in this business, will be to accept of their proposal of leaving the collections under the management of an Aumildar appointed by them, but accountable to you for the amount, and that you should give him receipts for the same, until the whole debt of twelve lacks shall be liquidated. By leaving the collections with an officer of the Poonah Government, we do not mean to relinquish our right of possession while the mortgage subsists. The country is in effect our's, until the sum for which it is security is discharged; but we do not conceive that either a military or civil establishment will be necessary, or of any use to maintain the possession of an open country, in the Government of which we have no other concern but to receive the rents, unless an attempt should be made by the Marattas to introduce a military force into it. In the mean time we apprehend that it will be sufficient to depute a Company's servant to *Jambooseer*, to receive and give acquittances for the collections as fast as they are paid.

We think it necessary to point out to you two passages in your instructions to Mr. *Mostyn*, dated the 13th of last month, which appear to us very objectionable. In

You direct him "to exert his utmost endeavours to "obtain a suitable establishment for *Ragoba* from the "Poonah Government, and re-payment of the expence "of the Honourable Company, incurred by his resi- "dence in their settlements, as they have not hitherto "advanced a rupee of the stipend settled by the treaty." The Ministers having complained of your receiving *Ragoba* into *Bombay*, as an infringement of the treaty, no advances on that account could be expected from them, during his residence there, or indeed until the conditions annexed to that stipulation should be agreed to, on his part; but your continuing to afford that protection to *Ragoba*, against which they excepted, and your demanding from the Ministers the amount of the expence incurred by it, can only be considered as a voluntary aggravation of the offence: we therefore request that you will instruct Mr. *Mostyn* to recede from this article of your instructions to him.

We further observe, that Lieutenant *Torriano*, who accompanied Mr. *Mostyn*, is appointed to the office of Surveyor. We do not suppose that the Poonah Government will have given their consent to the survey of any part of their dominions, and without it we hope that none has been undertaken.

Fort William, 18th August 1777. We are, &c.

Received the following letter from *Bombay*:

Secret Department.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

We have already transmitted a duplicate of our last letter, dated the 10th ultimo.

In our letter of the 14th April we acquainted you fully of our proceedings, and the evasive conduct of the Durbar in the execution of the 5th Article of the Treaty. Mr. *Mostyn* will have communicated to you the further progress of this affair, and the new difficulty the Ministers have started to protract the final cession of the ceded country. On this occasion we referred to the Persian copy of the Treaty, transmitted to us by Colonel *Upton*, which we find corresponds with the English translation of the disputed article; though the Ministers pretend that, in the copy received from *Calcutta* under your signature, it is agreed that we shall receive this country according to the ancient statement of the revenues (for so they explain the word Kamil); and they have accordingly selected the highest year they could find, by which they want to ascertain the revenue, instead of giving us a a country of three complete lacks of rupees, according to Mr. *Macpherson*'s translation, or agreeing to our reasonable propolals of taking it at the medium of the last twenty-five years. We inclose an authentic copy in Persian of the 5th Article, taken from the extract signed by Colonel *Upton* and Mr. *Macpherson*, that you may compare it with the copy in your office; and we think it our duty to point out to you, that as Colonel *Upton* settled with the Ministers that the collections from the ceded country should take place from the commencement of the present Maratta year, and the restitutions on our part have long since been made, it seems very unreasonable the Company should sustain any further loss by the caprice and duplicity of the Ministers; and that there would be no impropriety in withholding from the revenues of *Jambooseer* a sum equal to what would have been received had the above-mentioned settlement been complied with; which with the other points we submit to your consideration, and request to be favored with your instructions.

We also request your directions respecting the restitution of the Guicawar cessions, which the Durbar has demanded. It will be a difficult matter to judge of the authenticity of any proofs they may produce after *Futty Sing*'s vackeel has asserted the independent right of his master over his own share of the Guzerat Country, and we beg you will consider how far it is proper to comply with their demands until they have fulfilled their part of the treaty, and made full restitution of the *Aurora*'s cargo, which they have refused, in direct breach of the 13th Article; for no dependence can be had upon their promises, when we have no longer security in our hands for the performance of them.

We now find that the French Deputy at the Maratta Durbar is no other than the celebrated Monsieur *St. Lubin*, and not Monsieur *St. Laub*, as we at first imagined. At his first audience he was received with a respect and ceremony greatly superior to what was paid to our Resident, the two Ministers themselves, *Sacaram* and *Nannah*, having gone without the tent walls to meet him on his alighting from an elephant provided for him by the Circar, and introduced him into the Durbar; whereas Mr. *Mostyn* was only received by two inferior officers, and with much less ceremony. We have remonstrated against the indignity offered to the nation

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by this diſtinction ſhewn to the French, and the reſtrictions laid upon Mr. *Moſtyn* and his attendants, ſo contrary to the law of nations, and inſiſted upon their allowing him the ſame privileges and freedom of communication as heretofore.

It appears by Mr. *Moſtyn*'s advices, that a ſurmiſe has been raiſed by the Nabob of *Arcot*'s vackeel at *Poonah*, that Monſieur *St. Lubin* does not act by any authority, either from *Pondicherry* or the Court of *France*; his foundation for this ſurmiſe ſeems but ſlight, but as it may have a good effect, to inſtil ſuch a ſuſpicion into the Durbar, Mr. *Moſtyn* has been directed to encourage them in this belief.

Mr. *Moſtyn* will conſtantly inform you of the operations between *Hyder Ally* and the Poonah forces. The latter have lately received a ſevere defeat, and were returning towards *Poonah* to be put in quarters for the rains.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 21ſt June 1777. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, and Council.

Reſolved, That the following reply be written to *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

Since we concluded our letter of this date, we have received your's of the 21ſt June, containing a Perſian copy of the 5th Article of the Treaty of *Poonah*; which we have compared with the original treaty in our poſſeſſion, and find it in every reſpect conformable to it.

The accompanying letter contains our ſentiments at large on the ſubject of the lands ceded to the Company by the above article, and we conſequently approve of the inſtructions which you have given to Mr. *Moſtyn*, reſpecting the rule by which the revenues of thoſe lands ought to be eſtimated.

Admitting that the ceſſion of theſe diſtricts, according to the agreement of the Miniſters with Colonel *Upton*, was to have taken place from the beginning of the preſent Maratta year, we are of opinion, that your claim upon *Jamboſeer* for an equivalent to the amount of the revenue, of which you may be deprived by any delay on the part of the Maratta Agents in delivering them over to you, is reaſonable.

We incloſe for your information, copies and tranſlations of a letter written by *Futty Sing*, in reply to a reference made to him by Colonel *Upton*, on the ſubject of his right to alienate any of the territories dependant on him, and of ſunnuds granted at divers times to the Guicawars; this letter from *Futty Sing*, though it evades a poſitive and direct anſwer to the point in queſtion, ſeems to diſavow any right in him, to alienate theſe poſſeſſions; but the concern which he has in the queſtion makes his perſonal evidence very ſuſpicious (eſpecially in the preſent inſtance, in which it is oppoſed to his own perſonal act) ſince whatever is relinquiſhed by the Company will revert to him.

By the tenure on which all jaghiery poſſeſſions are held, we doubt whether any part of them can be legally alienated for ever by the Jaghierdar; but we are not ſufficiently informed, if the lands poſſeſſed by the Guicawar family are of this nature. The anſwer to the 7th requeſt, contained in the 4th ſunnud, ſeems to allow of a right in them to diſpoſe of their own diſtricts in any manner they pleaſed, without obtaining the ſpecial concurrence of the Peiſhwa. The requeſt and anſwer are as follows:

7th Requeſt. "I ſhall commence war againſt the independent Moguls, who have eſtabliſhments in my "ſhare, and recover their poſſeſſions from them at my "own expence; let not the Government concern itſelf "with them."

Anſwer. "Should you take any meaſures with reſpect "to thoſe diſtricts, which are your own ſhare, the Go"vernment has no concern with it."

"Agreed accordingly."

Although the inference which we draw from this paſſage is not concluſive, yet we think it is ſufficient to juſtify you in retaining poſſeſſion of the diſtricts ceded by *Futty Sing*, until clearer proofs ſhall be afforded by him, or by the Miniſters, that he had no right to make thoſe ceſſions. The detention of the country for a few months longer, ſuppoſing it ſhould be at laſt reſtored to *Futty Sing*, will be no breach of the treaty on our part, as long as any material articles of it remain unexecuted on their's.

18th Auguſt 1777. We are, &c.

Appendix. No. 14.

APPENDIX, No. 13.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 27th October 1777.

THE Governor General—The following letter was delivered to me yeſterday morning by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*; and I deſire it may be entered on the proceedings, to which, I ſuppoſe, there can be no objection.

Tranſlation of a letter from *Futty Sing Kaukwar* to Colonel *Upton*, dated the 7th Mohurruneor.

After repreſenting my wiſhes for your Company, which exceed the power of expreſſion, be it known to your enlightened mind, that your very agreeable letter reached me, the ſight of which opened all the doors of gladneſs in my friendly heart, and made me perfectly happy. The queſtions which you put to me, relative to the particulars of the country which furniſhes me with the means of ſubſiſtence, whether I am poſſeſſed of all power over the Guzerat country, or hold it as a means of ſupport under the authority of *Seremunt Row Pundit Purdhan*? I underſtand my ſituation is this:

At the time that *Seremunt Dada Sahib*, accompanied by an Engliſh army, came into the neighbourhood of Guzerat, and by the terror of his army was become very powerful, and the victorious army of *Seremunt Row Pundit Purdhan* retreated to the ſouthward, he took the opportunity to incloſe me as in a circle, and diſtreſſed me on every ſide; being without reſource, I gave way to the neceſſity of my affairs; and to deliver myſelf from the hand of power, I gave my country by treaty to the Engliſh, although the power of giving or retaining the country, or any part of it, did not reſt with me, but with *Seremunt Row Pundit Purdhan*, to whom I am entirely under ſubjection, and a link of the chain of his dependants. I am hopeful that you will continually let me have the pleaſure to receive letters from you on the ſubject of friendſhip.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 14.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 28th July 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Lieutenant General Sir *John Clavering*,
Richard Barwell, } Eſquires.
Philip Francis, }

READ the following letter from Mr. *Middleton*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Incloſed I do myſelf the pleaſure to forward the Honourable Board an extract of a paper of intelligence this day received from the Decan.

The purport of it correſponds with the communica-

Appendix. No. 16.

tion made to me by *Row Gopaul Row*, a principal Maratta Chief in the ſervice of the Vizier, who maintains a regular correſpondence with different Sirdars in the Decan, and who is much intereſted in the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row*.

As the truth or falſity of theſe informations will be more aſſuredly aſcertained by the intelligence the Honourable Board will receive from the *Carnatic*, it is unneceſſary for me to add more on the ſubject, than that it has long been a received opinion among the powers in this part of *Hindoſtan*, that our nation is upon the eve of a war with *France*, and that a cloſe alliance has been entered into between the Miniſters of *Poonah*, and the Agents of the latter in conſequence. I believe the report of a war with *France* was originally ſpread by *Madoo*, who I underſtand has aſſerted, and produced ſome kind of proofs, of his having received diſpatches from the Miniſter of *France*, importing the probability of ſuch an event ſoon taking place, and deſiring him to make it known in confidence to ſuch of the Indian Powers as he thought might be prevailed upon to eſpouſe the cauſe of the French, and endeavour previouſly to engage them in that intereſt.

Madoo took his departure from *Ghoad*, about three weeks or a month ago, leaving his artillery, camp equipage, &c. with the Rana, with a declared intention of returning in the courſe of a few months, at the head of a conſiderable body of his countrymen, who were aſſembling in the Decan, in conſequence of a plan concerted with the Governor of *Pondicherry*. With reſpect to the deſigns of the French, the Honourable Board will of courſe have better and more authentic information through other channels, than can be in my power to impart. If there is any proſpect of a rupture between our nations, I think it by no means improbable that the French miniſtry ſhould have made an inſtrument of *Madoo*, inſignificant a character as he may appear to be; as to my knowledge a very conſtant communication was kept up between the Miniſtry and Monſieur *Gentil*, during the latter part of his reſidence with the late Vizier *Shujah ul Dowlah*; that even public honours were beſtowed upon him by the King, although his means of rendering the ſtate effectual ſervice were certainly not equal to *Madoo*'s; the latter having not only a well-equipped army at his command, but ſuppoſed to have acquired an influence among the Indian Powers which would make him an uſeful inſtrument in the execution of any deſigns the French might have in this country.

Lucknow, 12th July 1777. I have, &c.
(Signed) *Nath*^{l} *Middleton*,
Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

APPENDIX, No. 15,

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 22d September 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, Eſquire,
Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.

THE proceedings of the 11th inſtant read, and approved.

The Governor General having propoſed, that the following letter ſhould be written to the Preſidencies of *Bombay* and *Madras*, it was agreed to by the Board, and diſpatched in cypher to thoſe places:

Gentlemen,

Although we have no immediate proſpect of a rupture between *Great Britain* and any of the ſtates of *Europe*; yet, as ſuch as an event is by no means improbable, we think it of the utmoſt conſequence to be prepared againſt it. We therefore requeſt, that you will be pleaſed to tranſmit to us a return of the actual ſtate of the forces at your Preſidency, with your ſentiments upon the means of completing your eſtabliſhment; of co-operating in the moſt effectual manner with this Preſidency and that of *Fort Saint George*, and mutually ſupporting each other in caſe of an invaſion of either; and of the moſt eligible plan for making a diverſion in favour of your ſettlement, if an enemy ſhould appear on that ſide of *India*.

APPENDIX, No. 16.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 20th October 1777.

THE Governor General—It appears extraordinary that none of the late letters from *Bombay* take the leaſt notice of the Chevalier St. *Lubin*, who ſtill remains at *Poonah*, and his ſhip and cargo, as I underſtand, at *Choul*. The Maratta vackeel read a letter to me this morning, which he had juſt received from the Peiſhwa, containing an apology which he was directed to make to this Government, for the countenance which had been ſhewn to Monſ. *St. Lubin*, in terms, which as they were read to me, appeared ſtrongly to indicate a conſciouſneſs that their conduct reſpecting him was ſuch as required an explanation: he has promiſed me a copy of the letter, which when I have received, I will cauſe a tranſlation to be made and laid before the Board. I underſtand Mr. *Moſtyn* was arrived at *Bombay* before the *St. Helena* ſailed, which ſhip brought the laſt advices; that they ſhould not have adviſed us of his arrival, which circumſtance, connected with his ſudden call to *Proonder*, indicate ſome negociation of importance going forward, that they ſhould leave this Government in the dark; with reſpect to the other events and operations of that quarter, I mention not intending to charge that Government with neglect, but as I think it ſtrongly urges the neceſſity of obtaining ſome ſurer means and channel of information, by a proviſion made directly from this Board, than to truſt entirely to the Preſidency of *Bombay*. I ſhall leave this obſervation without following it with any immediate propoſition to the preſent conſideration of the Board.

Agreed, That the following letter be written to *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have this day received your letters of the 22d, 30th Auguſt, and 10th September.

After the intelligence which you tranſmitted to us of the arrival of the Chevalier de *St. Lubin* at *Poonah*, and of the favourable reception he had met with from the Miniſters there, which circumſtances were alſo reported to us from other quarters, we waited with impatience for further advices from you, or Mr. *Moſtyn*, of his tranſactions at that Durbar; but we have been greatly diſappointed, in all the letters which we have received from you ſince that of 21ſt June, to find no further information on the ſubject. The papers of intelligence obtained by Mr. *Moſtyn*, from a perſon lately in the ſervice of Monſieur *St. Lubin*, and incloſed in your letter of the 3d Auguſt, has left no room to doubt of the commiſſion with which he is charged from the Court of *France*; and the ſecret conferences which he has been admitted to hold with the *Poonah* Government, too ſtrongly indicate that they may have liſtened to negociations of a hoſtile nature to the Company. Monſieur *St. Lubin* remains ſtill at the Maratta Court, and may poſſibly by this time have entered into engagements with the Peiſhwa, of a dangerous tendency to the Company's eſtabliſhment; at ſuch a criſis, therefore, every circumſtance is of conſequence, and we are under great anxiety to learn the progreſs and event of his negociations.

In your letter of the 22d Auguſt, you acquaint us with the ſudden call of Mr. *Moſtyn* to *Proonder*, and we underſtand that previous to the departure of the *St. Helena*, which brought us his letter, he was actually arrived

arrived at *Bombay*. Connecting theſe two circumſtances together, which have ſuch an intimate relation with each other, we muſt conclude that he was charged with ſome very important commiſſion from the Poonah Durbar to your Government. We wiſh for the ſake of our mutual intereſts, that you had taken this opportunity of communicating it to us, or of apprizing us of the reſult of his interview at *Proonder*; and as you muſt be ſenſible of the neceſſity of a ſpeedy and unreſerved communication of any ſerious political intelligence which may in its conſequences affect the Company's affairs, we requeſt that you will continue to give us the earlieſt and fulleſt information in your power on theſe ſubjects.

In the general return of the troops on your eſtabliſhment, dated 30th June, which was tranſmitted by Colonel *Egerton* to our late Commander in Chief, we obſerve, that though your force in Europeans is very defective of its complement, yet it is conſiderably weakened by the manner in which they are diſtributed among your different garriſons; leſs than one half being left for the garriſon of *Bombay*, where the whole ought to be collected. We cannot but conſider your whole military ſtrength as expoſed to great danger by ſuch a diſſipation of it; and moſt earneſtly recommend to you to withdraw all your Europeans both infantry and artillery to the Preſidency, ſubſtituting Sepoys and Native Artillery for the defence of all your other garriſons without exception. We need not uſe arguments to prove the expediency of giving the greateſt poſſible ſtrength to that part of your poſſeſſions, on which the exiſtence of the Company in that part of *India* muſt eſſentially depend, or of collecting into the body that part of your military eſtabliſhment, which is as eſſentially neceſſary to the preſervation of the reſt. We perſuade ourſelves that you will ſee equally with us the force of this advice, and allow it to prevail, although we offer it only as ſuch, and ſhould have avoided even this kind of interference in the detail of your Government on a point of leſs importance to the ſafety of the Company's poſſeſſions.

The Governor General has written to the Peiſhwa upon the ſubject of the *Aurora*; the original letter will be ſent directed to the Peiſhwa; a duplicate goes incloſed in this, with a copy for your information; we hope it will obtain the due effect.

Fort William, the 20th October 1777. We are, &c.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 20th October 1777.

Received the following letter from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have more than once repreſented to Colonel *Upton* the caſe of the owners of the ſhip *Aurora*, which was wrecked in the month of June 1776 on the Maratta Coaſt, near *Rutnagherry*; and deſired him to demand full reſtitution of the ſhip and cargo from the Poonah Government, agreeable to the expreſs tenor of the 13th Article of the late Treaty. We alſo inſtructed Mr. *Moſtyn* on his proceeding to that Durbar to make a peremptory demand to the like effect, but we have not to this hour obtained the ſmalleſt ſatisfaction for the ſufferers; neither does the Durbar appear in the leaſt inclined to comply with our requiſition, though Colonel *Upton* acquaints us ſo long ago as the 27th Auguſt laſt, "that he had obtained the Peiſhwa's Perwannah for releaſing the crew "of the *Aurora*, reſtoring the ſhip, and what was ſaved "of the cargo, to the owners." We before mentioned the matter to you in our letter, dated the 20th Auguſt 1776, when we tranſmitted copy of a letter from the ſupracargo, giving a particular account of this accident; and the gentlemen concerned having lately made another application to us, we now incloſe copy of their letter; and beg leave warmly to recommend their caſe to your attention, that redreſs may be procured for them, either by the method they have ſuggeſted, or by any other you may judge more proper.

The ſettlement regarding the country of three lacks ſeems quite at a ſtand.

Mr. *Moſtyn* has been lately ſent for to *Poorunder* by the Miniſters, but we are not yet informed upon what account.

We incloſe duplicate of our laſt letter, and triplicate of that dated the 21ſt June; and are

Bombay Caſtle, 22d Auguſt 1777. With reſpect, &c.

Appendix. No. 17.

APPENDIX, No. 17.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 22d September 1777.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

This ſerves to incloſe copy of a paper we have received from the Reſident at the Durbar: it is ſaid to be part of a memoir intended to be preſented to the Court of *France* by the perſon who came out Secretary to Monſieur *St. Lubin*, but who has lately left him in diſguſt, and was obtained by Mr. *Moſtyn* through the means of an Engliſhman in Monſieur *St. Lubin*'s ſuite, who ſeems deſirous to be received into our protection.

Mr. *Moſtyn* writes that *Gunga Boy*, the widow of the late Peiſhwa *Narrain Row*, departed this life the 12th ultimo, and that the infant Peiſhwa is now put in charge of *Gehivetty Bhoy*, the wife of *Sudaba*.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 2d Auguſt 1777. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, Preſid^t and Council.

Paper obtained by Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poonah*.

Monſieur *St. Lubin*'s operation was taken in the beginning from Monſieur de *Buſſy*'s memoirs, and propoſed to the Miniſtry by him and Monſieur *Dumas*, a Commanding Officer in *Canada* laſt war, and late Governor of the *Iſle of France*; they both jointly waited till ſuch time as they had obtained Monſieur *Sartine*'s conſent and approbation. Monſieur de *St. Lubin* by the firſt plan was to embark in *Bourdeaux* on the *Paix*, to be commanded by *du Santy*, and was named to the commercial department, as Miniſter Plenipotentiary to the Maratta Court; Monſieur *Dumas*, on the other hand, was to embark at *Breſt* on the ſhip *L'Indien*, commanded by Monſieur *Landé*, at the head of 1,500 men; which, joined to 1000 which were to be ſhipped on the *Paix*, make 2,500 men under the command of Monſieur *Dumas*, who alone had the department of war in the expedition. Beſides the 2,500 above-mentioned, there were 500 more to be landed at the *Iſle of France* by a private merchant ſhip, which *du Santy* immediately after his arrival at this coaſt was to return for, and land where appointed by Monſieur *Dumas*. This plan was ſo far advanced, that Monſieur de *Sartine* viſited the ports wherein the above ſhips lay, with a view of examining them, and applying for them to the King. Monſieur de *St. Lubin* ſeeing Monſieur de *Sartine* much inclined in favour of Monſieur *Dumas*, ſeeing that he alone ſtood in the faireſt way of making his fortune, and perhaps fearing that he would deprive him of the glory he expected from ſuch an undertaking, worked underhand with the Miniſter, and in ſeveral memoirs he preſented him, expoſed Monſieur *Dumas*'s incapacity, as well as the bad conſequence of bringing an army here without a certainty of ſucceſs; and propoſed at the ſame time to ſend a proper perſon, acquainted with the country, to try how the Government was diſpoſed in favour of the French nation. Monſieur de *Sartine*, ſeduced as well by the eloquence as the apparently true proſpects he gave in his memoirs, propoſed him the expedition, as the only man he could find capable of undertaking it; and had orders to ſail in a private ſhip from *Bourdeaux*, leſt his affair might be diſcovered

were

Appendix. No. 18 & 19.

were he to ſail in a King's ſhip. Monſieur *Dumas* ſo little expected ſuch traiterous proceedings from Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, that he believed he had gone to *Lyons* to ſee his parents, and little thought he was diſpatched for *India*. Monſieur de *St. Lubin* in his engagement with Monſieur de *Sartine* is obliged to ſend an expreſs to *Europe*, and give an exact account of the affairs he has hitherto tranſacted: if he gives ſufficient hopes of ſucceſs, Monſieur *Dumas* will be immediately diſpatched with the above force, which he will land before the Engliſh eſtabliſhments on this and the Coromandel Coaſts, and reduce them jointly with the Marattas, who are to ſtrike the firſt ſtroke. Notwithſtanding this is the plan of operation that Monſieur de *St. Lubin* is come upon, his ambition will certainly ſubvert and ruin the whole of the ſcheme. He is far from coveting a partaker of the emoluments he thinks himſelf entitled to in caſe the affair takes; for that reaſon he has wrote for the above troops, and deſires the command thereof for himſelf. He lays by what I am informed as fair a proſpect before the Miniſters as he has already done.

A true copy.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secretary.

Ordered, That the above letter from *Bombay* lie for conſideration.

APPENDIX, No. 18 and 19.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 6th November 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

THE proceedings of the 3d inſtant read, and approved.

Read the following letter from Mr. *Graham*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, and the reſt of the Members of the Supreme Council, *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have herewith the honour to forward to you a packet juſt arrived by expreſs coſſids from *Poonah*.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble ſervant,

(Signed)

Benares, the 26th October 1777. *Tho' Graham*, Reſident.

Received a letter from Mr. *Lewis*, at *Poonah*, as follows:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

This ſerves purpoſely to give cover to a packet this inſtant received from the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to your addreſs.

I am very reſpectfully,

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Poonah, 26th September 1777.

(Signed) *Wm Lewis*.

Received the following letter from *Bombay*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

Incloſed is duplicate of our letter, dated the 10th inſtant.

We alſo incloſe copy of a letter received from Mr. *Moſtyn* after his return from *Poorunder*, whither he had proceeded at the deſire of the Miniſters, as mentioned in our letter, dated the 22d ultimo. He has ſince arrived at this place; but the propoſals he has brought from the Poonah Government reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*, have not yet been laid before us.

The Coolies, a ſet of irregular independent freebooters, who poſſeſs a ſmall tract of country to the northward of the river *Mybie*, lately made an irruption into the Pergunnah of *Jamboojeer*, and carried off about three hundred head of cattle from one of the villages. Theſe banditti have formerly, at different times, infeſted our diſtricts, and are much dreaded by the inhabitants; we have therefore judged it highly neceſſary to reſent this late attack, and have directed the Chief and Council at *Broach*, if they cannot by fair means obtain ample ſatisfaction, as well as ſecurity from future inſults, to detach a proper force from their garriſons to chaſtiſe them. Three or four companies of regular ſepoys, with two field pieces, and two hundred irregulars, will, in the opinion of theie gentlemen, effect the buſineſs.

We are, with reſpect, Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 19th September 1777.

(Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council of *Bombay*.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt addreſs to your Honour, &c. was dated the 20th ultimo.

On the 12th inſtant *Pewelly Bhoy* came in town from *Proondhur*, on account of indiſpoſition, but it is ſaid will return thither as ſoon as ſhe is recovered; and on the 13th, at night, I received a letter from *Saccaram Bappoo*, requeſting I would proceed to *Proondhur* as ſoon after the receipt thereof as poſſible, the Miniſters wanting to talk with me on ſome particular buſineſs. I accordingly ſet off for *Saſſwer* the 15th in the morning, intending to put up there for that night only; but on my arrival finding *Saccaram Bappoo* had come down thither the night before, I early the next morning ſent a meſſage to him, requeſting, if it was convenient to him, that he would inform me of the buſineſs the miniſters wanted to ſpeak to me about, as I imagined it could be as well done at this houſe at *Saſſwar* as in a tent at *Proondhur*; he therefore appointed the next morning for my meeting him.

On the 17th I accordingly waited on *Saccaram*, where were alſo preſent *Mhadarow Jadarow* and *Byroo Punt*, *Nanah Furneſe* not being able to come down from *Proondhur*, on account of its being an unlucky day for him; when, after clearing the room, he mentioned ſundry articles reſpecting *Ragoba*, which he ſaid the Miniſters requeſted I would go to ſettle with him, but deſired that no one elſe might be made acquainted with them. In anſwer to which I informed them, that it would be very improper my going to the Preſidency without your permiſſion, gentlemen, being firſt obtained; however if they inſiſted upon it, I would, upon their writing me a letter, repeating their requeſt, and another to the Honourable the Preſident on the ſubject, willingly oblige them; but with reſpect to the latter part of their requeſt, I told them they muſt be convinced I could do nothing in the buſineſs without the concurrence of your Honourable Board. I at the ſame time mentioned that I thought it would be proper ſome perſon of conſequence from amongſt themſelves ſhould accompany me on this occaſion; but they ſaid they thought it would be better to defer ſending any one, until they heard what effect the propoſals they intended to make would have; they likewiſe declined giving me the propoſals under their own hands, alledging, that in caſe *Dada Saib* did not accept them, they wiſhed not to have them appear in writing. But upon my telling them, that unleſs I had a memorandum of the articles, ſome of them might eſcape my memory

memory, and in ſuch caſe they would be apt to imagine I had acted an unfair part towards them, they ſaid *Mhadarow* would repeat them to my Linguiſt, who might take them down in writing.

Whatever might have been my opinion with reſpect to the propoſals in queſtion, I did not think it would be for the intereſt of my Honourable Employers to refuſe their requeſt, more eſpecially when I conſidered that my chief errand to this Durbar was to endeavour to conciliate matters with them; had I therefore given them a refuſal, I was apprehenſive it would only have added to the diſguſt the Miniſters have already expreſſed againſt the Bombay Preſidency; nor could my remaining here be of any utility, as the Durbar had reſolved on doing nothing with reſpect to the diſputed articles of the late treaty, until they heard from the Governor General and Council, to whoſe determination they have referred them, particularly thoſe regarding the country of three lacks, and the Chickley, &c. Pergunnahs; and with reſpect to the demands made on them on account of our merchants, they ſay they have already written to *Viſagee Punt Lela* on the ſubject, and only wait his anſwer for finally adjuſting them: theſe reaſons for my ſo readily complying with their requeſt will, I hope, Gentlemen, meet with your approbation.

From the knowledge I have of the dilatorineſs as well as the fickleneſs in the reſolutions of this Durbar, I was induced to defer adviſing your Honour, &c. of the abovementioned circumſtances until I ſhould receive the promiſed letters, and which were ſent me late laſt night. *Nanah Furneſe* came to town this day in order to give me my final inſtructions, which he has aſſured me ſhall be delivered to-morrow, in which caſe I intend leaving this place on the 26th inſtant.

After the Miniſters had finiſhed what they had to ſay regarding *Ragoba*, I demanded to know the final determination of the Durbar with reſpect to the French; when *Saccaram* aſſured me they ſhould be diſpatched as ſoon as the rains were over, which he obſerved would be about Deſera; in reſpect to which, I told him it would be of little conſequence their diſpatching Monſieur *St. Lubin*, if the French were permitted to trade to their ports; I muſt therefore inſiſt on the Durbar prohibiting the French as well as all other European nations trading from *Vizendroog* (or *Gheriah*) to the ſouthward, all up the coaſt; to which they agreed.

I am, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Poonah, Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
23d Auguſt 1777. (Signed) *Thomas Moſtyn.*

A true copy.
(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secretary.

The Board obſerve, That in the letter to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, of the 20th October, they complained of the ſilence of that Preſidency with reſpect to Mr. *Moſtyn*'s arrival, although he muſt have been charged with diſpatches of ſome conſequence. In a letter dated near a month after the date of the one at that time received from them, the Board are duly informed of the arrival of Mr. *Moſtyn*; but though the buſineſs with which he appears to have been charged from the Miniſters was ſo urgent as to induce him to quit his ſtation without waiting for permiſſion; and ſo important, that the Miniſters could neither commit it to writing, nor truſt it to the channel of an agent of their own; yet, in an expreſs diſpatched by the Preſident and Council, containing no other intelligence of conſequence, they leave this government totally uninformed of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s negociations, and of the particular objects of his viſit to *Bombay*. All that they write concerning him is,

"He has ſince arrived at this place; but the propoſals he has brought from the Poonah Government, reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*, have not yet been laid before us."

For the juſtification of this government, which is charged with the firſt reſponſibility of all affairs that have any relation to the peace of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, and which cannot act, but from the materials which are furniſhed by the other Preſidencies;

Reſolved, That the Court of Directors be adviſed of the extraordinary reſerve in the communication of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to this Board; and that it be noticed to the Preſidency in our next letter to them.

Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

Appendix. No. 20.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 1ſt December 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, Eſquire.
Mr. *Barwell*, indiſpoſed.

The proceedings of the 6th ultimo read, and approved.

The Secretary begs leave to record in this place the following letter to *Bombay*, which was written in obedience to the orders of the Board at the laſt meeting, and was diſpatched to that Preſidency the day on which it is dated.

Gentlemen,

In our letter of the 20th October, we took notice of the arrival of Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Bombay*; which intelligence we had received from private authority, and complained of your ſilence on that head in your letter then before us, dated the 22d Auguſt. We had no doubt that your next advices would bring us full information of the cauſe of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s return from *Poonah*. But conceive our diſappointment, when we received your letter of the 19th September, dated near a month ſubſequent to the former diſpatch, and containing no other intelligence of any conſequence, to find that you only mentioned his arrival, and that the buſineſs with which he was charged by the Miniſters was ſo urgent, as to induce him to quit his ſtation without waiting for your permiſſion, and ſo important, that the Miniſters would neither commit it to writing, nor truſt it to the channel of their own agent, but that you left us totally uninformed of the particulars of his negociations with them, or of the object of his viſit to *Bombay*.

Charged as we are with the firſt care of all that reſpects the peace of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, and unable to act but from the materials which are furniſhed us by the other Preſidencies, we cannot help expreſſing our own impatience of this occaſion, and obſerving the extraordinary reſerve which you have ſhewn in your communications.

Fort William, We are, &c.
27th November 1777.

APPENDIX, No. 20 and 21.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 29th December 1777.

RECEIVED the following letter from Mr. *Lewis*, aſſiſtant to Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poonah*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My ſuperiors have already acquainted you with the cauſe of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s journey to *Bombay*, I ſhall therefore proceed to acquaint you with ſuch occurrences ſince that time as may merit your notice.

Notwithſtanding the promiſes made by *Siccaram Bappoo* to Mr. *Moſtyn*, in the name of the Durbar, that Monſieur de *St. Lubin* ſhould not be permitted to remain longer at this place than Deſera (the 12th October) and that no European nation whatever ſhould in future be

Appendix. Nos. 20 & 21.

permitted to trade in any port on the Malabar coaſt within the Maratta juriſdiction, I am ſorry to obſerve to your Honour, &c. that Monſieur de *St. Lubin* ſtill reſides in *Poonah*; and from the behaviour of *Nannah Furneſe* on a late occaſion, which will be explained in the courſe of this addreſs, ſeems to have greater influence than ever.

The Durbar, in violation of the above-mentioned promiſes, have alſo lately permitted Mr. *William Bolts*, of whoſe deſtination your Honour, &c. have already no doubt been adviſed, to proceed to *Poonah*, where he accordingly arrived the 18th inſtant, and immediately proceeded to the houſe of Monſieur *St. Lubin*, with whom he now reſides, and through whoſe influence I imagine Mr. *Bolts* is in hopes of obtaining a ſettlement on the coaſt; but you may depend, Gentlemen, my utmoſt endeavours ſhall be exerted to fruſtrate his ſchemes; though I am apprehenſive they will prove fruitleſs from the encouragement which appears to be given him by *Nannah Furneſe*, at the inſtigation I believe of Monſieur *St. Lubin*; for immediately after that gentleman, who paid *Nannah* a viſit on the 22d in the afternoon, had left him, *Nannah* iſſued an order for five hundred rupees being preſented to Mr. *Bolts*, in the name of the Durbar; which I underſtand is a compliment paid only to ſuch perſons as the Durbar acknowledge are come to them in a public capacity, and they mean to countenance.

The reports with reſpect to the armies to the ſouthward are ſo various, that there is no great confidence to be put in them; though this may be depended upon, as I have received it from very good authority, that *Hurry Punt* has written the Durbar that *Monackjee Pooneria*, the *Nimilcar*, *Pattencar*, and ſeveral other principal Maratta officers being diſguſted with the Government had revolted, and encamped ſome diſtance from him; that in conſequence of this revolt, he, *Hurry Punt*, had ordered his artillery to go againſt them, in order to bring them back to their duty, but the officer in command thereof had refuſed to obey him, which the revolted officers getting intelligence of, had attacked and plundered his camp. *Hurry Punt* in ſome ſhape attributes this defection of the Maratta officers being carried to ſo great a height, to ſome promiſes and preſents made them by *Badjee Punt Burwah*, one of *Hyder Ally*'s officers, who having croſſed to the northward of the *Tongebora*, was encamped only about thirty coſs from the above Maratta officers, and between whom there was a conſtant correſpondence by means of *Dauk Camels*. Immediately on receipt of this intelligence *Nannah* waited on *Morabah Furneſe*, to requeſt he would take a ſhare in the Government and the charge of the army, offering inſtantly to give him the proper inveſture for that purpoſe; but which I am aſſured *Morabah* abſolutely refuſed, alledging, that the preſent Miniſters were not authorized to give him ſuch inveſture, nor would he receive it from any other perſon than *Dada Saib*.

Tookajee Holkar was lately on a viſit to the Peiſhwa at *Poonah* accompanied by *Madjee Scindia*'s Duan, *Scindia* himſelf pretending to be ſick at *Remutpore*, a few coſs from the Cattapore diſtrict; the Miniſters took this opportunity of ordering *Holkar* to join *Hurry Punt*, which he abſolutely refuſed, telling them, that his preſence was abſolutely neceſſary in his own country, from whence he had been abſent upwards of two years, and which was running to ruin for want of ſome proper perſon to take care of it. The like orders were given to *Scindia*'s Duan, to forward to his maſter, but he made uſe of the ſame plea for *Scindia* as *Holkar* had done. The Miniſters having a ſecond time directed *Holkar* to join *Hurry Punt*, he a few days ſince, in contempt of their orders, ſet off on his march towards *Chandore*, a ſtrong fort belonging to him, about forty coſs to the northward of this place, whither, I am informed, he has written to *Scindia* to follow him, telling him, he would wait there a certain time for him, when, if he did not join him, he ſhould continue his journey to *Indoar*.

Late at night on the 1ſt inſtant I received a letter (copy of which is incloſed under No. 2) from Mr. *James Madgett*, an Engliſh gentleman, who came from *France* in a ſhip of that nation, which your Honour, &c. have already been adviſed arrived at *Choul* in March laſt, demanding, as a ſubject of *Great Britain*, the protection of the Engliſh flag; but about half an hour afterwards he found means to eſcape the guard placed round his houſe, and in diſguiſe came to our factory on the 4th inſtant; likewiſe Monſieur de *Corcelli*, a French gentleman, belonging to Monſieur de *St. Lubin*'s train, and likewiſe demanded the protection of the Engliſh flag, as you will be pleaſed to obſerve, by tranſlate of a letter he delivered me, now forwarded under No. 3. As I did not deem the affording theſe gentlemen the protection they required any infringement of the treaties now ſubſiſting with this Government, I granted their requeſts; being alſo induced thereto from the hopes of being able to gather ſome further information from them of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*'s real views in coming to this Durbar. I have already acquainted the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* of theſe tranſactions, who have been pleaſed to approve of the ſame, and directed me to ſend the gentlemen to *Bombay* as ſoon as poſſible.

Immediately on theſe gentlemen taking our protection, I ſent to acquaint the Durbar thereof, but received no reply; on the 6th inſtant however *Byroo Punt*, one of the people appointed to tranſact our buſineſs with the Durbar, ſent a meſſage, deſiring I would meet him that evening at his houſe, as he had ſomething particular to ſay to me regarding theſe gentlemen; but as I was at that time very ill with a fever, I requeſted he would excuſe me, and at the ſame time recommended his ſending me what he had to ſay in writing, which I would anſwer in the ſame manner; this he promiſed, but has not yet done.

Having requeſted Mr. *James Madgett* to commit to writing all he knew reſpecting Monſieur de *St. Lubin*'s tranſactions, that they might appear at one view, he on the 9th inſtant delivered me a letter; copy of which is in the packet under No. 4. Permit me here, Gentlemen, to obſerve, that every circumſtance mentioned by Mr. *Madgett* has ſince been confirmed by Monſieur de *Corcelli*, and the Captain of the French ſhip. The latter declares he was preſent when Monſieur de *St. Lubin* and *Nana Furneſe* reſpectively ſwore to the due obſervance of the treaty; but ſays, he knows no further of its contents, than that *Nannah*'s enemies are to be conſidered as the enemies of *France*. It appears from Mr. *Madgett*'s letter, that though Monſieur de *St. Lubin* has no authority to appear at this Durbar as an ambaſſador, it is very probable he was ſent out by Monſieur de *Sartine* to try the ground, and make his report of the poſſibility of entering into an alliance with this Government. The above mentioned treaty being ſworn to, clearly demonſtrates *Nannah*'s wiſh to introduce a body of French troops into the Maratta dominions; which if he is permitted to do, he will in all probability firſt fix himſelf in the Peiſhwaſhip, and afterwards employ them againſt the Honourable Company's ſettlements to the northward, if not againſt *Bombay* itſelf; on which ſervices Monſieur de *St. Lubin* has promiſed to employ the troops he has written to *France* for, as you will pleaſe to obſerve by an extract of a letter from the French Captain to Meſſrs. *Madgett* and *de Corcelli*, under No. 5.

In conſequence of the orders of my ſuperiors for ſending Meſſrs. *Madgett* and *de Corcelli* to *Bombay*, I have frequently applied to the Durbar for a duſtuck to paſs them; particularly, on the 21ſt inſtant I ſent a meſſage to *Byroo Punt*, requeſting to know if I might expect the duſtuck I had applied for ſo long ſince as the 12th; to which he replied, that *Nannah* had refuſed granting it, as thoſe gentlemen had been guilty of treachery, for which *Nannah* inſiſted on their being tried at the Durbar;

when, if they were found guilty, he would cut them off, unleſs I made it a particular requeſt to him to pardon them; which perhaps he might comply with. As I was deſirous of getting under his hand on what grounds *Nannah* founded his plea, I again ſent, on the 22d, to *Byroo Punt*, acquainting him, if *Nannah* had any cauſe of complaint againſt the above-mentioned gentlemen, that I thought it would be better to give it me in writing, than to be thus continually ſending meſſages about it, without letting me know what he meant by the gentlemen having committed treachery. This, I told him, I had expected he would have done before, agreeable to his promiſe of the 6th. I at the ſame time told *Byroo Punt*, if *Nannah* was deſirous of having the matter cleared up to him, I thought I would do it to his ſatisfaction, and would willingly wait on him for that purpoſe whenever he pleaſed. To this meſſage *Byroo Punt* replied, that *Nannah* would neither give his complaint in writing, nor me the meeting on this buſineſs; but inſiſted on the gentlemen being examined at leaſt, by *Mudcherow Jadahroi*; however, as he, *Byroo Punt*, was then going to *Nannah*, he would take him in a cool moment, to ſpeak of the affair, and endeavour to ſettle it to my ſatisfaction; but hitherto I have not heard any thing further from him.

I beg leave to obſerve, here, Gentlemen, that *Nannah*, on my ſending to him under the 12th inſtant for a duſtuck, replied, As the before mentioned gentlemen had been guilty of fetteur (treachery) againſt the Government, he could not grant one until he had firſt conſulted *Sacaram Bapoo*, which he obſerved would take up four or five days. But in his ſeveral replies to my meſſages ſince that time, he has taken the whole upon himſelf; from which it may be naturally concluded, that *Sacaram* has declined interfering in the affair, or countenancing *Nannah*'s conduct in it. Indeed, I ſhould have been greatly ſurprized, had *Sacaram* interfered; for on peruſal of the incloſed letters (No. 6 and 7) from Meſſrs. *Madgett* and *de Corcelli*, and the before-mentioned letter (No. 4.) from the former gentleman, I make no doubt but it will appear to your Honour, &c. than *Nannah*'s perſecution of theſe gentlemen is entirely a private pique, inflamed by the artful inſinuations of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*.

Byroo Punt, who is a creature of *Nannah*'s, no doubt imagined, by throwing out the lure of pardon being granted the above gentlemen at my requeſt, that I ſhould be induced to acknowledge his right to be ſole judge when Europeans reſiding at *Poonah*, not in the ſervice of the Government, or under its immediate protection, had been guilty of fetteur (treachery); but as I do not deem myſelf authorized to make ſuch acknowledgment, I have not taken any notice of that part of his meſſage, nor even were I authorized, ſhould I deem it proper to do ſo, particularly at this time, when to all appearances he is guided by the councils of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, as it might be attended with dangerous conſequences; for let *Nannah* have but this one precedent, there is no knowing, in his preſent diſpoſition towards the Engliſh, where he would ſtop. Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, in order to get a knowledge of what we were doing, might perſuade him, that the Engliſh were forming ſome ſchemes againſt him, and thereby induce *Nannah* to ſtop and open our packets, when undoubtedly he would conſtrue many expreſſions into treachery, and every Engliſhman in *Poonah* would feel the effects of his malice.

Poonah, I am very reſpectfully, &c.
the 29th November 1777, (Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

Copy of a letter from Mr. *James Madgett* (No. 2.)

Sir,

The diſmal ſituation I am in, obliges me to trouble you at ſo late an hour, and as a ſubject of the King of *Great Britain*, claim your protection againſt Monſieur de *St. Lubin*'s unjuſt purſuits.

On his return from *Nannah*'s Durbar this evening, he has made an attempt on ſeizing both me and my fellow companions, who are likely to fall victims to his rage and envy; however, as officers of Monſieur de *Norrogne*'s troops, they expect the Government will ſpare them on his account. As for my part, I expect no quarters if I am delivered into Monſieur *St. Lubin*'s hands; therefore rely ſo far on your goodneſs as to relieve me from his purſuits. My being naked to my ſhirt, has prevented me from eſcaping to your quarters. Be ſo kind as to let me know, whether I may go to your houſe this evening in diſguiſe. I am juſt informed, that *Nannah* had ordered a German (whom the ſepoys miſtook for me) to be beheaded in his preſence; but that on the German's making himſelf known, *Nannah* has ordered him back to our houſe bound neck and heels. This new alarm obliges me to implore again in His Britannic Majeſty's name, the protection due to his ſubjects; and your readineſs, Sir, in granting thereof to him that is,

With due reſpect,
Saturday, Your moſt obedient,
1ſt November 1777. and humble ſervant,
(Signed) *James Madgett.*

To Mr. *Lewis.* A true copy.
(Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

Tranſlate of a letter from Monſieur de *Corcelli*,
(No. 3.)

To Mr. *Lewis*, Chargé d' Affaires on the part of the Engliſh nation at *Poonah*.

Sir,

Expoſed on every ſide to attempts, and not knowing where elſe to ſhelter myſelf, I throw myſelf into your hands, and demand from you the protection of the Engliſh flag, which I am under the neceſſity of taking, in order to ſhelter myſelf from the unjuſt purſuits of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, which give me every reaſon to fear for my life, as he has already attempted to deprive me of it, by twice firing at me with a piſtol.

I hope, Sir, that the ſimple motives of humanity will ſufficiently weigh with you to grant me this protection, aſſuring you that I am in no ſhape either a ſervant or a ſubject of the Marattas. In this perſuaſion I have the honour to be, Sir,

Poonah, Your moſt obedient
4th November 1777. humble ſervant,
(Signed in the original) *De Corcelli.*
A true copy of the tranſlate.
(Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

Copy of a letter from Mr. *James Madgett*,
No. 4.

Sir,

According to your deſire, I now proceed to acquaint you with ſuch circumſtances as occur to me relative to the deputation of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*. The paper delivered to Mr. *Moſtyn* was framed almoſt verbally from the information given me by Monſieur de *Sautry*, who acted as confidential Secretary to Monſieur de *St. Lubin*.

I had always underſtood, even in *France*, that ſome overtures, tranſmitted to the Court of *France* from *India*, had firſt given riſe to the ſteps taken relative to an alliance with the Marattas. When at *Bourdeaux*, being in the mercantile line, and having embarked only with thoſe views, I had not an opportunity of becoming intimately acquainted with Monſieur de *St. Lubin*'s deſigns; but even in *Bourdeaux* it was mentioned and generally believed, that he was deputed from the French Miniſtry, and was to form an alliance which would reſtore the influence of *France* in this country, be the means of cruſhing the power of the Engliſh, and give riſe to many commercial and other advantages to the French nation. In this light I regarded him when he embarked on the *Sartine*.

This ſhip, on which we embarked, was originally deſtined for *America*, and belongs to Monſieur *Laffonde*, of *Bourdeaux*; but by the management and perſuaſions of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, and the high advantages held

out

Appendix. Nos. 21 & 22.

Appendix. Nos. 20 & 21.

out by him to the Owners, ſhe was appointed to the ſervice ſhe came on. Monſieur *St. Lubin* aſſured the Owner, that ſoon after the cargo was landed, if it was landed according to his directions, he would ſhip five lacks of rupees in ſpecie on board, and ſend her away to *China*; the orders from the Owner to the Captain, which I have frequently ſeen, are framed in conſequence of this agreement, directing him to endeavour to ſell his cargo on the Malabar coaſt, to ſhip on board what ſandal and pepper he could get, and go off to *China*; this was to be his great view, but in all things to follow the advice of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, to land the cargo wherever he directed him, to leave one of his officers with it, and proceed to *China* with five lacks, that Monſieur de *St. Lubin* would put on board him. Unfortunately for the deluded Monſieur *Laffonde*, he has made contracts for the delivery of tea at *Bourdeaux*, from the full aſſurance he has of his ſhip's going to *China* with means to procure a valuable cargo there. The Captain is directed to behave with all poſſible attention to Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, in conſequence of the moſt pointed recommendations from Monſieur de *Sartine*.

From the eſpecial confidence repoſed by Monſieur *Laffonde* in Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, the articles to form the cargo were entirely left to him; they were choſen according to his views, viz. military ſtores 15,000 muſkets, rejected from the King's ſervice, were ſpared to him at a very low price from the King's ſtores, by means of the influence of Monſieur de *Sartine*; cloth of different colours, with aſſortments for facings, alſo formed part of the cargo, which I have frequently heard Monſieur de *St. Lubin* mention was to cloath the troops that might be raiſed in *India* for the purpoſes of the alliance; having perhaps forgot it in the Owner's cargo, he perſuaded an officer of the ſhip to get made and bring out a conſiderable quantity of buttons; the device of the button was given him by Monſieur de *St. Lubin*; it is a fleur de luce in a creſcent, which probably Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, imagined to be the Maratta ſtandard, and therefore intended as emblematic of the alliance. Monſieur de *St. Lubin* even cauſed to be ſhipped a quantity of gold thread and ſpangles, which he frequently mentioned would be wanting for the embroidering of palanqueens, &c.

Monſieur de *St. Lubin* embarked with him the two brothers *Deſauty*, the elder of whom was his Secretary and Monſieur de *Corcelli*, a young gentleman of family in *France*; to all of them he held out during the whole paſſage, ſplendid and deluded hopes of fortune; his converſation generally ran on the ſubject of the great objects that were to reſult from the alliance he was coming to form. His accounts of this country were ſplendid, as we have ſince experienced them to be falſe.

During the whole paſſage from *France* to the coaſt of *Malabar* he never made known the particular port he was deſtined to; even on his arrival at *Mihie*, he did not declare his particular intentions; and to deceive Monſieur *Piquot*, procured Bills from him on *Surat* for the appointments directed to be paid him by the Court of *France* during this ſervice, which I underſtand are 30,000 livres per annum.

He was exceedingly alarmed at the news brought off from *Cochin* by the Captain and Monſieur *Warnet* the ſupra cargo, that intelligence was received on the Malabar coaſt of his deſtination there; that the Dutch Chief aſſured them he received intimation of it in a letter from Meſſrs. de *Bellcombe* and *Chevrieul*, dated *Pondicherry*; which letter the Dutch Chief ſhewed them. He could hardly believe it, and even took the pains of examining them ſeparately; and when he met the *Conſolante* frigate, which they had alſo brought word they ſhould meet, he was accordingly alarmed, particularly on the ſcore of the Engliſh. He directed the name of the ſhip not to be mentioned if ſpoke to; the men for three weeks were kept in conſtant alarm, the guns loaded and all ready for engaging. At *Mangalore* the Captain had advantageous offers made him for part of his military ſtores, and was to receive ſandal and pepper in return; but this not ſuiting perhaps the views of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, or his fears interfering, he prevented him from accepting theſe offers in virtue of the power lodged with him by the Owner's orders, at the ſame time telling him he would carry him where they were obliged to cut down ſandal to make roads through the woods of it, and where he would trample pepper under his feet.

Shortly after we left *Mangolore*, Monſieur de *St. Lubin* declared his intention of carrying the ſhip into *Choul*, where ſhe accordingly arrived on the 16th March. From his arrival there he began to aſſume to himſelf, both in public and in private, all the ſtate of an Ambaſſador of the King of *France*. His confidential Secretary, Monſieur de *Sauty*, went firſt on ſhore with written inſtructions relative to the points to be inſiſted on for his reception; he inſiſted, that the Subedar ſhould ſend the officer next in rank to him with a letter of congratulation on his ſafe arrival; that the troops of *Choul* ſhould be under arms, and that the Subedar at the head of them to receive him as he ſtepped out of the boat; that the fort ſhould ſalute him with 21 guns, and an elephant and palanqueens be ready to carry him to the place deſtined for his reception; all theſe points were complied with except the palanqueens: he directed the Commander of the ſhip to ſalute him with 21 guns on his putting off, which was alſo complied with.

From *Choul* he ſent Monſieur de *Sauty* to *Poonah* with a letter to *Nannah*, expreſſing his impatience to ſee him, and to deliver the letters he had from the King his maſter, and from the Vizier of *France*: he made a demand of two elephants, 46 horſes, ſix palanqueens, and 40 camels, with ſufficient biggeries and bullocks to carry all his baggage: a part of this demand only was complied with, and the Chevalier, after having ſtipulated ſome arrangements regarding his reception in *Poonah*, ſet off from *Choul* the 11th April, and arrived at *Poonah* the 26th; on the road from *Poonah* to *Proonder* he was met by *Bhim Row*, the Commandant of the Artillery. He remained a few days at *Proonder* before he had a meeting with the Miniſters; the perſons preſent at his introduction were *Nannah Saccaram* and *Curſah Row*. He delivers two letters, one from the King in a gold bag, for the Peiſhwa; and one in a ſilver bag, ſaid to be from the Vizier of *France*, which was delivered to *Nanah*: at this meeting nothing material paſſed. He was afterwards introduced to the Peiſhwa; this was on the 14th May, ſhortly after which, being totally diſguſted with him, I left him.

The different meetings he has had with *Nanah* in the city are two well known to need mentioning: about the latter end of June he ſent a circular order de Parte Roi, directed to every ſubject of the King of *France* then reſiding in *Poonah*, and requeſting them to meet at the houſe of *Nanah Furneſe*, at three o'clock in the afternoon, to bear witneſs to the oaths to be taken by the Miniſters of the reſpective nations (meaning himſelf and *Nanah*) relative to a perpetual alliance to be formed between the King of *France* and the Maratta State. Amongſt others this paper was brought to me; but having then declined all connections with Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, I did not obey it. I have heard it repeatedly mentioned by the different Gentlemen who were there, that there were ſome written inſtrument; on one ſide of which *Nanah* ſwore by the cow, and to the other ſide Monſieur de *St. Lubin* ſwore by the Holy Evangeliſts; that *Nanah* further kept the book Monſieur de *St. Lubin* ſwore on. Being totally diſconnected with the Chevalier, ſince my departure from *Proonder* I have never been able to learn the particulars of the agreement with *Nanah*; but I have heard in general, that the baſis of it was the ſending out a body of troops to aſſiſt againſt the enemes of *Nanah*. About nine days after that he introduced Monſieur *Paſcal du Sauty*, brother to his confidential Secretary, to *Nanah*. This Monſieur *Paſcal du Sauty* went to *Surat* about the beginning of Auguſt, as I have learnt, with a pacquet from Monſieur de *St. Lubin* to

Monſieur de *Sartine*. He was directed to Monſieur *Briancourt* in *Surat* and was to follow his advice, in reſpect to getting to *Europe* as expeditiouſly as poſſible. *Suez* and *Buſſorah* were named: the Nanah, I have learnt, made Monſieur *Paſcal Du Sauty* a preſent of ſeven hundred rupees in money, and about three hundred more in rich piece goods; I have alſo ſince heard, that this Monſieur *Paſcal Du Sauty* has left *Surat*, but I do not know where he is gone to.

At different times all his ſuite have quarrelled with him and left him, and ſome joined him again. In theſe intervals I have frequently heard from *Du Sauty*, his Secretary, and others, that he has ſent home to *France* the moſt flattering accounts imaginable of the ſucceſs of his negociation here, his having obtained the Port of *Ckoul*, and great commercial advantages; but above all, his being in perfect intimacy with the Nanah, who is in ſupreme command of the Maratta State, and the great political benefits that may reſult if no time is loſt in ſending here a body of men.

It would be needleſs to recite the various falſities and artifices that the Chevalier de *St. Lubin* made uſe of to lead the different perſons that embarked with him to his purpoſes: the diſcovery of them, and train of every baſe and unbecoming behaviour, diſguſted every one. The Captain and Supra cargo, after finding themſelves totally deceived in reſpect to his aſſurances to their Owner, took on themſelves the management of the cargo: he himſelf placed ſuch obſtructions, and led them, till they had loſt all confidence in him, into ſuch ſteps, that it was, and ſtill is beyond a doubt with them that inſtead of aſſiſting the Owners, Monſieur de *St. Lubin* has a view of ſharing the cargo by means of his influence with *Nanah*; I have heard that he even gave him to underſtand, that the military ſtores were meant as a preſent from the King of *France*. In ſhort, after much trouble and fatigue, they effected the diſpatch of the ſhip to *China* the 24th Auguſt laſt, with 150,000 Maratta rupees, the only return they have yet got for an invoice of 900,000 livres, beſides the coſts and charges of the ſhip; and for this they have depoſited the allowed value here of three lacks, and pay twelve per cent. per annum on the one hundred and fifty thouſand, until the ſale of the goods enable them to pay off that ſum. To prevent any accounts of theſe tranſactions, of the real ſtate of this country, and affairs here, from reaching *France*, Monſieur de *St. Lubin* had the baſeneſs to open all our letters, which we had delivered to Monſieur *Paſcal du Sauty* in confidence. Unfortunately in mine ſomething was mentioned diſfavorable to his political purpoſes; it was ſhewn to *Nannah*, interpreted to him, and inſinuated that ſuch repreſentations might ruin the buſineſs between them, by preventing the troops from arriving: in conſequence of this I have ever ſince been in perpetual alarm for my life, and obliged to keep on my guard. A few days ago Monſieur de *St. Lubin* went on a viſit to *Nanah* in the evening; after his quitting him, and about nine at night, a party of *Nanah*'s people, who were conſtantly with Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, attacked the houſe where I was with Monſieur de *Corcelle*: I had but juſt time to make my eſcape to the Engliſh factory; it proved a providential retreat to me, for a poor German, who was miſtaken for me, had nearly loſt his life. He was carried to *Nanah's*; a diſpute aroſe on the manner of his death, whether by an elephant, by opening his bowels, or beheading him: it was decided for the latter. His hair was laid over his head, and the ſword lifted, when luckily a bramin knew him to be one of Monſieur *Noronah*'s men, and belonging to the Tope Khonnah here.

The ſame dread that Monſieur de *St. Lubin* had of what I might write or do to prejudice him, he alſo entertains of Monſieur de *Couronat* and de *Courcelle*, only in a higher degree; becauſe, from their ſuperior intereſt and connections in *France*, they will be able to do him infinitely more prejudice.

I ſaw Monſieur de *Couronat* the 6th inſtant on his return from *Barramooly*, where he had been to endeavour to obtain juſtice from the Durbar on Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, who has taken to himſelf 100 muſquets, a bag of 1000 dollars, and other effects belonging to the Owners, to the amount of 15,000 rupees. He told me, that had it not been for the interference of the merchant here, with whom he is engaged for his cargo, it was paſt a doubt that he ſhould have been in irons in a fort about five coſs beyond *Proonder*. It ſeems Monſieur de *St. Lubin* informed *Nanah*, that Monſieur de *Couronat* had wrote to *France* reſpecting the Maratta nation as a band of robbers, himſelf as a mere uſurper, and that no certain benefit could be derived from an alliance with them, no dependence had on their promiſes, nor any ſafety for merchant veſſels in their ports. It could not be denied that Monſieur de *Couronat* had wrote this. Monſieur de *St. Lubin* urged the neceſſity of at leaſt ſecuring Monſieur de *Couronat* in ſome fort in irons, and fining him one lack of rupees, if he, the Nanah, did not think fit to take away his life. By Monſieur de *St. Lubin*'s influence, orders were given to ſeize him, and the Sepoys ready to ſet off with him; but the beforementioned merchant repreſented the neceſſity of his being at liberty to adjuſt the concerns of his purchaſe, made ſome intereſt with the Miniſters, and procured his diſmiſſion. It may be remembered, that it was confidently reported that the French Captain was in irons.

As to the other gentleman, Monſieur de *Courcelle*, you have ſeen to what lengths he has been drove. I can myſelf bear witneſs to his aſſertion of the danger his life was in, having been preſent when Monſ. de *St. Lubin*, almoſt ſurrounded with guards, fired two piſtols at him, one ſhot of which grazed his ſide. The houſe we lived in, after ſeparating from Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, has been conſtantly ſurrounded by Sepoys, and he had nothing to truſt to but the humanity of Monſieur de *St. Lubin* and *Nannah*. This he had every reaſon to believe was but a weak defence againſt the danger that reſults to him from their political views, which may be impeded if either himſelf or his advices can ever reach *France*.

If I was to enter into the minutiæ of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*'s conduct, it would ſerve to convince you that he is a man capable of inſinuating himſelf into the eſteem and confidence of moſt men, of deceiving, miſleading, and betraying them; every perſon that came out with him have experienced this, and his various arts and falſities have been detected, ſince their ſeveral diſputes with him led them mutually to reveal his ſeveral profeſſions, promiſes, and engagements to them. I ſhould not have thought it neceſſary to mention this, but that I imagine ſome knowledge of his character may enable you to judge how far it is poſſible that he may or may not lead the Court of *France* into his views. The many deceits and falſities they detected him in with reſpect to themſelves, has frequently led thoſe who embarked with him to conſider, whether even his public character might not be an aſſumed one; but after the ſtricteſt ſcrutiny there has never yet been the leaſt ground to doubt, that in conſequence of overtures from hence, he has been ſent out at leaſt to examine the ſtate of affairs here, perhaps to make ſome definite agreements, and to ſend home his report as ſpeedily as poſſible; how far this may be true I leave you to judge, from the ſimple circumſtances of Monſieur *Piquot* at *Mibie*, and Monſieur *Briancourt* at *Surat*, having acknowledged him and anſwered his drafts: 'tis true that Monſieur de *Belcombe* diſowns him as an Ambaſſador Extraordinary from the King of *France*, but ſtill it ſeems he knew of his coming out. From the ſmallneſs of his appointments, and no Staff being ſent with him, it ſhould ſeem that it was meant he ſhould act as covertly as poſſibly, which was certainly the mode that good policy would dictate, but as the Sieur de *St. Lubin* is, I believe, very capable of ſacrificing the public benefit to his own private

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vate views, I believe that he has been led into an oſtentation here, ruinous, perhaps, to the purpoſe he has been ſent out for, the better to impoſe himſelf on this Government as a perſon of great importance, in hopes of attracting ſuch preſents as would make him perfectly eaſy on the event of public affairs. There were unguarded moments during the paſſage out, in which I believe he ſpoke from his heart; and then he was very ſanguine in his hopes of the favourable reception he ſhould meet with here, that the natives of *India* in general, and particularly the people here, in the ſituation he ſuppoſed them to be, would gladly ſeek a refuge in the arms of *France* from the oppreſſions of the Engliſh, and therefore muſt certainly receive with particular attention the perſon who offered them that refuge, even after he had found circumſtances altered, and that it was difficult to draw money from a Bramin by mere words: I have heard that as a preliminary to the treaty with *Nánah*, he inſiſted on two lacks of rupees being paid him; it is too evidently his intereſt that a body of men ſhould be ſent here, to ſuppoſe that he would not make the moſt favourable report to induce the Miniſter of *France* to that meaſure.

I have already mentioned the flattering light in which he has ſet forth the advantages that reſult from it in his diſpatches to *France*, and that above all no time ſhould be loſt in completing his agreement, by ſending out a body of men. He inſtructed thoſe in his confidence what they ſhould write, and you are already informed of the meaſures he has taken, and ſtill ſeeks to take, in order to prevent the detection of his miſrepreſentations; even though he is now perhaps in ſome meaſure diſappointed in his views by the protection afforded to Monſieur de *Courcelle* and myſelf; yet ſtill it remains a doubt, whether or not it is poſſible to deſtroy at this diſtance that confidence which there is every reaſon to ſuppoſe Monſieur de *Sartine* places in him: for among many other qualities he poſſeſſes to a great degree the talent of perſuaſion; he ſticks at no aſſertions, and has a pen capable of baffling even truth itſelf, and give whatever impreſſions he may think ſuitable to his views.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
humble ſervant,
(Signed) *James Madgett.*

Poonah, 9th November 1777.

A true copy.
(Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

Extract of a letter from Captain *Couronat* to Meſſrs. *Madgett* and de *Corcelle*; dated the 21ſt November 1777. (No. 5.)

I muſt inform you, that *St. Lubin* has made freſh complaints, not only againſt us, but againſt Monſieur *Noronho*. He has communicated to *Nanab* the letter this gentleman wrote to Meſſrs. de *Corcelle* and *Barbier*; which letter I wrote myſelf in anſwer to one they had written to him. His complaint to this Miniſter (*Nanab*) was, that Monſieur *Noronho* had deprived him of his ſubjects in concert with that merchant who lives with him, meaning your humble ſervant; becauſe it was me who wrote this letter. *Nanab* is entirely taken with this man; believes every thing he ſays, and follows his advice about us. The reaſon is, that he has been confident enough to promiſe him the entire deſtruction of the Engliſh nation; that this was his reaſon for coming to the Marattas, and that they would ſoon ſee fine work.

A true copy of the tranſlate.
(Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

Copy of a letter from Mr. *James Madgett*.
(No. 6.)

Sir,

It is with the utmoſt aſtoniſhment I have heard that *Nánah* aſſigns as a reaſon for not granting a duſtuck to Monſieur de *Corcelle* and me, that we have been guilty of treacherous practices againſt the Government. I will inform you, on my honour, and on my oath, if required, of the circumſtance that might probably have given riſe to this accuſation.

In a letter to my brother at *Bourdeaux*, I mentioned the adventures we had met with; the conduct, character, and hiſtory of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, as I had heard and found them. Among other things I mentioned, that *Nanab* was ſaid here not to be the lawful Prince of the Country, but an uſurper; and that ſome people alſo ſaid he had got the young King's mother with child, and afterwards cauſed her to be poiſoned; and that others ſaid ſhe poiſoned herſelf to avoid the puniſhment inflicted on Brahmin women who treſpaſs in this manner after the death of their huſbands. To the beſt of my remembrance, theſe are my words; and it was what I heard here from every perſon with whom I could converſe. This letter, I have before ſaid, was delivered to Monſieur *Paſcal du Sauty*, who ſolemnly promiſed to deliver it to my brother, but afterwards treacherouſly gave it to Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, who ſhewed it, and had it explained in his manner to *Nanab*. You have ſeen the conſequences that reſulted to me from it; I was near loſing my life; and ſtill, by the inſtigations of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, *Nanab*, I am well convinced, ſeeks it; and for this reaſon endeavours to keep me here, well knowing, that if the troops which Monſieur de *St. Lubin* has promiſed him arrive, he may be able to wreak his vengeance on me.

As to Monſieur de *St. Lubin*, it is eaſy to perceive his views; his fortune, and perhaps his life, depend on inducing the Miniſtry of *France* to hurry out a body of men. Should accounts different from his arrive, his views may be impeded; but eſpecially, ſhould any perſon go to *Paris* who can have acceſs to the Miniſter, in order to undeceive him: this, he knows, is the caſe with Monſieur de *Corcelle*. You have ſeen, with his own hand he attempted his life, and now endeavours to deprive him of the aſylum he would find at *Bombay*, and of the means of tranſporting himſelf to his native country.

I am, &c. &c.
(Signed) *J^s Madgett.*

Poonah, the 22d November 1777.

A true copy.
(Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

To Mr. *William Lewis*.

Copy of a letter from Monſieur de *Corcelle*.
(No. 7.)

To Mr. *William Lewis*, Chargé D' Affaires on the part of the Engliſh nation at *Poonah*.

Sir,

A perſon, ſenſible of my innocence, may eaſily conceive the aſtoniſhment I was ſtruck with, at the firſt intimation you was pleaſed to give me of the charge brought againſt me by *Nanab*; and if this ſurprize is ſince any thing diminiſhed, it is only by the reflection that this crime of High Treaſon, of which I ſtand accuſed, can only have been imputed to me by *St. Lubin*; who well knows the falſity of the accuſation, but who has been impelled by motives it is not difficult to gueſs at; his intention is to prevent me from giving any light into his conduct, either by writing or returning to *France*, well knowing the harm I might do him, either by divulging the villanies he has committed, or by undeceiving Monſ. de *Sartine*, in the accounts he has given him of this country; he could take no better pretenſions than by engaging to make me ſuffer the puniſhment due to ſuch a crime, I mean death; but what ſtill ſurprizes me, is to find *Nanab* give credit to ſuch a thing, on the ſimple word of this man: *Nanab* perhaps is ignorant that I know nothing either of him or his followers, and that it is of the laſt indifference to me whether ſuch a perſon exiſts or not; in ſhort, what could I ſay of him, who neither know him, or have the deſire

or means to be acquainted with him? and what could I ſay about his Government, which ſeems a labyrinth that a man muſt be more uſed to than I am, not to be loſt in reaſoning about it; yet, after all this, *Nanah* inſiſts that I ſhall appear before him, to be tried, promiſing me my pardon if guilty, at your requeſt. By what right does he ſummon me to his tribunal, perſecuting a ſtranger, or rather a ſubject of him with whom he either believes or hopes to be in alliance; is this the protection which his Government affords? Sir, ſince the time that the ills I had ſuſtained, and the perſecution and violences aimed at me, by Monſ. de *St. Lubin*, obliged me to quit for a time the protection of my own flag, and have recourſe to yours, I have experienced much effects from the compaſſion with which you beheld my diſtreſs, as leaves me to doubt whether I ſhould have been more humanely received even by my own countrymen; from this experience, I truſt you will not compel me to appear before this man. I muſt confeſs to you, that excluſive of the inſecurity it would bring me into, I ſhould feel it as a ſenſible diſhonour and affront, to appear before him as a criminal, and be obliged to juſtify myſelf; beſides, Sir, I doubt not you will perceive that this monſter, *St. Lubin*, has adviſed him to this meaſure, in order to make uſe of the power he would then have to deprive me of your protection.

You will perceive, Sir, that it will be impoſſible for me now to embrace the opportunity you mentioned to me of returning to *France*, both from the impediments ariſing from the refuſal of a paſſport to *Bombay*, and from the inſecurity there would now perhaps be to my returning to *France*, without taking ſome previous precautions by writing to my friends.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed in the original) *De Corcelle.*

Poonah,
22d November 1777.

A true copy of the tranſlate.

(Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

No. 21.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to *Poonah*:

To Thomas *Moſtyn*, Eſquire, Reſident at *Poonah*, or in his abſence to Mr. *William Lewis*.

Sir,

We have received a letter from Mr. *Lewis*, under date the 29th ultimo, with the ſeveral incloſures which he refers to.

We have no doubt that Mr. *Lewis* has adviſed the Preſident and Council at *Bombay* of the protection which he has granted to Mr. *Madgett* and to Monſieur *Corcelle*, and that you will be guided in your future proceedings by the directions which you may in conſequence receive from them. We, for our part, do not think it was adviſable for the Reſident at *Poonah* to afford the protection of the Britiſh flag to the dependants of a foreigner, who had been well received by that Government; ſuch an act as might tend to embroil him with the Maratta Court: indeed, the glaring improbabilities in their own narrative, of the cauſes which obliged them to ſolicit this protection, and the ſtrange manner of their appearance before the Reſident, make us ſtrongly ſuſpect them to be impoſtors: the general character of Monſieur de *St. Lubin* for intrigue, affords alſo a great probability that he has made theſe men the inſtruments to foment a diſſention between the Engliſh and the Poonah Durbar; we think it neceſſary therefore to adviſe you to be on your guard againſt the conduct and inſinuation of ſuch perſons. We are, &c.

Fort William,
29th December 1777.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

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Bengal Secret Conſultations, 26th January 1778.

Extract of a letter from Mr. *William Gamul Farmer*, to the Honourable the Preſident; dated from *Poonah* the 11th November 1777, and received the 16th following.

THIS *St. Lubin* is a moſt perfect adventurer, and I believe has cheated even the miniſtry of *France* in this buſineſs. He introduced himſelf to the confidence of Monſieur de *Sartine*, as to Indian matters, by a memorial he preſented relative to this country, which Monſieur de *Corielle* aſſures me he has frequently ſeen. In this memorial he has not forgot himſelf. He has made himſelf Generaliſſimo at one time of *Hyder*'s army; the very man who framed the treaty between him and the Marattas, for which he the next day received two lacks of rupees; but what chiefly introduced him to this buſineſs was his particular intimacy with the Rajah of the Marattas. He was the conſtant companion of his children, uſed to learn them to ride; in ſhort, he had not in the world a better friend than the Rajah. There certainly could not be ſo fit a man in *France* to ſend out to ſound the ground here, and to form an alliance with the Maratta State, if circumſtances ſhould prove favourable. You may partly judge from this, of what the Chevalier is capable of in the way of repreſentation.

Drunk and ſober, jointly and ſeparately, I have examined all the Frenchmen, with whom we have yet had connection, that is *Madgett*, Monſieur de *Corielle*, who was to have been made Engineer by *St. Lubin*, and Monſieur de *Coronat*, the Captain of the ſhip, whom I found means to get to eat ſoup with us. They are all in ſuch a ſituation with reſpect to Monſieur *St. Lubin*, that it is the firſt wiſh of their lives that he may prove totally a counterfeit, and not be ſupported by the Miniſtry of *France*; for in fact their lives may perhaps depend on *Lubin*'s reality, and the juſtifying his conduct. I have turned the matter every way to perſuade them that he was a counterfeit, in order to fiſh out their arguments to the contrary; but they are all perfectly convinced of the facts mentioned in *Madgett*'s letter. The Captain of the ſhip confirmed to me repeatedly what *Madgett* had often mentioned, that his Owner had given him his orders relative to *St. Lubin*, in conſequence of recommendations from Monſieur de *Sartine*. They all agree perfectly with regard to the ideas entertained of him at *Bourdeaux*: that it was firſt talked of ſending out a body of men under Monſieur *Dumas*. The fact of the intelligence the Captain and Supercargo received at *Cochin*, of *Lubin*'s deſtination, the Captain confirmed to me. *Picot* and *Brian Court* acknowledged him, and *Brian Court* has gone ſo far as to requeſt the Conſulſhip of *Choul*. The Count de *Mendave*, a man of good family in *France*, who has been ſeeking his fortunes in this country, and is now with *Baſſalut Jung*, heard of him; has offered to join him, and makes intereſt for a good employment under him. You will obſerve, Sir, that although it ſeems that de *Belcombe* diſavows him as an Ambaſſador from the King, yet he takes no effectual meaſures to remove him; and it is a known fact that *St. Lubin* ſent by a Frenchman a diſpatch to *Belcombe* in the month of July or Auguſt laſt. They all perfectly agree in the circumſtances of the ſummons given to attend at the *Nannah*'s to witneſs the treaty. *Nannah* was ſworn by his Brahmin, and *St. Lubin* by his Padre, and *Nannah* kept the book. The diſpatch of Monſieur *Paſcal du Sauty* to *Surat*, in order to carry from thence his diſpatches for *France*, is certain. We have learnt by a Frenchman lately arrived here, that he has been ſeen at *Brian Court*'s; his deſtination via *Suez*. This Frenchman ſays, that he wanted to take his paſſage in an Engliſh ſnow, I ſuppoſe *Barrington*, but that it was refuſed, and he is now to go in a veſſel belonging to a black man.

You ſee, Sir, how much *Lubin* has at ſtake; by the total defeat of all his ſchemes, perhaps the loſs of life, or

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or impriſonment, if theſe fellows find that he is an impoſtor; every thing therefore with him depends on his being able to perſuade the Miniſter to hurry out a body of men inſtantly on the receipt of his diſpatches, or order them from the iſlands. I leave you, Sir, further to judge what he is capable of, when he has wrote, that they are in perfect poſſeſſion of the port and harbour of *Choul*; and to make the poſſeſſion the more valuable, he wanted the gentlemen who took the draft of it for him, to put ſeven fathom water where there was only three and a half. The flouriſhing ſtate of this country, the power of *Nannah*, the certain deſtruction of the Engliſh, the great advantage to *France*; all theſe he has dwelt on, as I am well aſſured, in a manner that cannot fail to make great impreſſions in *France*.

On the whole, I think you will agree with me, Sir, that we cannot be too alert in endeavouring to parry a blow, which at all events muſt be ruinous to our ſettlements; and therefore, in the firſt place, I think we are right to make the moſt of the diſagreements between him and his ſuite. I look upon it as a very fortunate circumſtances, that Monſieur de *Coreille* has been drove to the neceſſity of taking our protection; they all allow him to be a young man of very good connections in *France*; he was juſt entering into the engineer line when *St. Lubin* met him, and perſuaded his friends that he could make his fortune in *India*. He is a young man of good parts, and very ſoon found out that *Lubin* had made a dupe of him, which operating with other circumſtances in *St. Lubin*'s conduct, has fixed in *Corceille* a rooted enmity to *Lubin*; there is nothing he would not venture on to ruin him; and there is no one *St. Lubin* ſo much dreads, becauſe he knows that de *Corceille*, from his connections, is the moſt dangerous of his enemies here. You will ſee by *Madgett*'s letter the attempt he made on him; it was as cowardly done as it was horrible to attempt; de *Corceille* was walking up towards him, *St. Lubin* advanced to meet him between two rows of ſepoys, with his hands behind him, and a piſtol in each; at what he thought an infallible diſtance, he fired them one after the other, and providentially miſſed him; one of the balls grazed his rib, and went through his coat; if he is not ſecured by our protection, well backed, I think his life is yet in danger, for *St. Lubin* conſtantly inſtils to *Nanah* the danger to their mutual cauſe if either his advices, or any other of their enemies, that is *Madgett* and the Captain, reach *France*, but particularly ſhould they go there themſelves.

Perhaps the fear of the remonſtrances of the preſent Government may be made an objection on the part of ſome to the protection afforded to the French; on this I think you have nothing to fear. By the rights of nations, and by treaty with them, we have a clear right to receive Europeans of all nations, even in their ſervice; they can certainly therefore form no juſt objection to our receiving thoſe who are neither their ſervants or their ſubjects; but their own intereſts ſeem to me your beſt ſecurity for their ſilence on this occaſion. How much ſoever they may diſlike the protection afforded to the French, there is every juſt reaſon to ſuſpect that *Nanah* ſeeks to fortify himſelf in this Government, againſt his competitors and againſt us, by means of his connection with the French, and his hopes of what *St. Lubin* may affect are ſtrongly marked in the great protection he afforded him. He muſt feel, that if we were but once convinced of this, that our intereſt would lead us into the neceſſary meaſures to prevent this connection, and the only effectual one is a total change of the Government here, which he cannot but be ſenſible we could effect long before the time that he can expect the French here: his policy therefore muſt be to keep us quiet, and the Bengal Government amuſed and unſuſpicious, till he ſees the event of his negociation with *Lubin*. Too public and violent an exertion in favour of *Lubin*, whom they affect to diſown as an Ambaſſador, would be held as clear proofs of a connection with him. Their ſilence hitherto on the ſubject of the protection afforded to de *Corcille*, confirms, I think, my opinion of the conduct they will obſerve; and the ſignifying it in writing was meant to make them feel, that their conduct in this buſineſs would be ſtated to *Bengal* in a manner that would leave them no room for evaſion.

A true extract.

(Signed) *Edwd. Ravenſcroft*, Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 23.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the the 26th January 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

THE proceedings of the 19th inſtant read, and approved.

Received the following letter from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have received your letters, dated the 18th of Auguſt and 17th September.

Bombay, 7th December

Before the receipt of theſe lettets Mr. *Moſtyn* had laid before us the propoſals he brought from the Poonah Government for an accommodation with *Ragonaut Row*, a copy of which we have the honour to incloſe. Theſe propoſals were communicated to him in form, but he was totally averſe to accepting them, and a very little reflection will ſhew that they are much more ſpecious than ſolid. The offered jaghire of ten lacks being reckoned according to Kamil, or the ancient valuation, will produce little more than ſeven, as we have experienced in the diſcuſſion of the 5th Article of the Treaty; and the five forts diſmembered of the diſtricts appropriated for their maintenance, would only prove an incumbrance upon him inſtead of any benefit, as he could not poſſibly maintain them, provide a ſuitable eſtabliſhment for himſelf, and defray his other expences with ſeven lacks; but there is another much ſtronger objection to theſe propoſals, there not being the ſmalleſt proviſion made for his perſonal ſafety.

We have appointed a deputation of our Board to announce to *Ragoba* the purport of your inſtructions, under the 18th Auguſt, and to require him to make choice of one of the propoſed expedients for retiring to *Benares*: he has requeſted time to conſider of them: but ſhould he decline complying, in what manner are we to act? We can never think of expelling him by force from the ſettlement; and the Honourable Company, in a letter juſt received, conſider the perſonal ſafety of *Ragoba* of ſo much importance, as to make it one of the conditions of their acquieſcing in the late treaty.

We can pronounce on the beſt grounds, that the diſtricts of *Ahmood*, *Deſborah*, and *Hanſood*, will not produce a groſs revenue of more than 2,40,000 rupees, from which muſt be deducted the tributes of 30,000 rupees, before annexed to *Broach*. This leaves a revenue of 2,10,000 rupees according to the eſtimate of our Commiſſioners, which may be depended on, as *Ahmood* and *Hanſood*, the two moſt conſiderable places, were under their immediate management during the time they were in our poſſeſſion. The Maratta agents, by their eſtimate, make the revenues of theſe places amount to R$ 3,33,000, including the tributes, which ought not to be reckoned, and it alſo ſeems to have eſcaped your notice, that the Miniſters propoſe diſmembering from the Pergunnah of *Ahmood* certain villages to the amount of 33,000 rupees, the exceedings of theſe three lacks according to their account, which added to the deficiency according to our accounts, will make ſo capital a deduction from the ſtipulated ceſſion of a complete

plete revenue of three lacks, that we cannot anſwer to the Company to receive theſe diſtricts upon the terms offered by the Durbar, as in our opinion the 5th Article of the treaty would not in that caſe be fulfilled.

The Miniſters, after having by a ſeries of artifice and duplicity protracted the ceſſion of the country of three lacks, may naturally purſue the ſame line of conduct to get *Jambooſeer* into their poſſeſſion again; that they may take out of our hands the only ſecurity we have for the performance of their engagements: there is not a doubt with us, that the moment the Company's garriſon was withdrawn, the Miniſters would throw in a body of troops; and it is equally clear to us, that they would in that caſe withhold the revenues from the Company, ſo long as any articles of diſpute ſubſiſted between us. We think we may with great reaſon add, that the Company, by ſuch a ſtep, would moſt probably be deprived of all proſpect of benefit from the 5th and 6th articles of the treaty, or be obliged to come to an open rupture with the Marattas, to compel the performance of them.

It is, indeed, neceſſary, that a military force ſhould be kept in *Jambooſeer*, to ſecure the collection of the revenues, and to protect the country from the depredations of the Coolies, and other banditti, of which the late irruption mentioned in our letter of the 19th September, is a ſufficient proof. It was given in particular charge to Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Boddam*, and *Ramſay*, when at *Broach*, and the utmoſt care has been taken to avoid ſwelling the Government charges of *Jambooſeer*, there being only one civil ſervant kept there, and the garriſon conſiſting of only one company of regular Sepoys, and one of Locals, which is the ſmalleſt that can in prudence be kept there.

We had before conſented, and given orders in conſequence of the Durbar's requeſt, that their Aumildar ſhould be allowed to reſide in *Jambooſeer*, and receipts given him for all collections; but we were obliged to reſtrict the number of his attendants within proper bounds, as he wanted to introduce ſo large a number of armed men in his ſuite as could not with ſafety have been admitted. Were we to permit him to have the management and collection of the revenues, it would in effect be giving him the poſſeſſion of the province, and it would depend on his pleaſure what part to pay to the Company. However, to conform as nearly as poſſible to your ſentiments, we have given orders that the Maratta Aumildar ſhall be preſent and aſſiſt at the Jammabundy, or annual ſettlement of the revenues, to ſee that all poſſible juſtice is done to his principals; which will anſwer every good purpoſe to the Durbar, as well as if their Aumildar had the collection in his own hands; for we muſt obſerve, that ſince the place has been in our poſſeſſion, the collections have exceeded any hitherto made by the Marattas.

The further demands we ſhall have upon *Jamboo-ſeer* for the loſs the Company have ſuſtained by the delay of the Miniſters in making over the ceded country, for the ſhip *Aurora* and her cargo, and other claims of individuals upon the Poonah Government, for veſſels taken ſince the concluſion of the treaty, afford additional and moſt forcible reaſons for not withdrawing the garriſon from that place.

Mr. *Moſtyn* has been inſtructed to recede from the demand on the Durbar for reimburſement of the charges incurred by *Ragoba*'s reſidence at *Bombay*.

We were glad of the opportunity of that gentleman's proceeding to *Poonah*, to gain all the knowledge we could of the country; and for that purpoſe ſent Lieutenant *Torriano*, an able draftſman, to accompany him, and make his obſervations; and we are aſſured he has conducted himſelf with ſo much circumſpection, as to give no cauſe of complaint.

We are much pleaſed to find that our letter of the 10th May, has excited your attention to the ſtate of our forces. Our eſtabliſhment as laſt ſettled by the Company, conſiſts of one battalion of artillery of four companies, two battallions of European infantry, ſix battalions of Sepoys, and a corps of 500 Sepoy marines for the ſervice of our cruizers; but ſince our late acquiſitions it is become very neceſſary, and we have accordingly recommended it to the Company, to augment the European corps. The incloſed general return will ſhew the diſpoſition of this force, and how greatly deficient the European battalions are of their proper complement, which we have no means or proſpect of completing; and notwithſtanding we give every encouragement, it is very difficult to raiſe good Sepoys on this coaſt. When any occaſion may make it expedient to augment our forces it will require ſo much time to raiſe and diſcipline a further number of Sepoys, ſo as in the leaſt degree to be conſidered as effective troops, that it will be much better in every reſpect to ſend us a reinforcement of diſciplined Sepoys, if Europeans cannot be ſpared. Appendix. No. 23.

Such being the ſtate of our forces, you will readily comprehend our inability to co-operate with the other Preſidencies in caſe of an attack upon either of them; and that on the event of an European war, the ſafety of this place can be no otherwiſe ſecured than by having a ſuperior fleet, or a proper garriſon in actual readineſs to repel an enemy, which our preſent force is by no means equal to. We can have no doubt, but in caſe of a national war with the French, *Bombay*, from the excellence of the harbour and the convenience of the docks, would be the firſt object of their attempts in *India*: and the arrival of their fleet off the port in the month of Auguſt or September, being the beſt ſeaſon for a quick run from the iſlands, might probably bring us the firſt notice of their intentions, and neither give us time to receive ſuccours from ſuch a diſtance as *Bengal* or *Madras*, or for any diverſion to be made in our favour.

We have thus, according to our duty and your deſire, laid before you a ſtate of our military force, and of our means of defence; and it will reſt with you, Gentlemen, to put into our hands reſources equal to our exigencies, and the importance of the Company's poſſeſſions in this quarter.

We have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that the ſervice againſt the Coolies, is ſucceſsfully concluded, and the detachment returned into garriſon. The Durbar was apprized with the intention and object of our operations, with which they expreſſed themſelves perfectly ſatisfied.

The Honourable Company having given us their ſentiments on the late treaty, and ſome other points conſequent thereto, we incloſe an extract from their letter, which was received the 16th ultimo, by the ſhip *York*.

Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*, has, by our direction, adviſed you of the late tranſactions there, and of Meſſrs. *Madgett* and *Corceilli*, two of Monſieur *St. Lubin*'s ſuite, having taken our protection. Mr. *Madgett* has committed to writing all the information he is able to give reſpecting Monſieur *St. Lubin*; by which it ſeems very evident, that if he has not ſome ſecret powers from the Court of *France*, he was at leaſt ſent out under the particular countenance of Monſieur de *Sartine*; but for your more full information, we incloſe a copy of his letter.

The preſent adminiſtration at *Poonah* is ſo confuſed and unſteady, and the rights of *Ragoba* either, to the Peiſhwaſhip or the regency of the Maratta empire, are ſo unqueſtionable, that we are convinced that Government can never be ſettled on a firm, permanent, or equitable footing, until he is in poſſeſſion of one of thoſe offices. We need not point out to you of what importance it is that tranquillity ſhould be reſtored to that empire: and that it ſhould be placed under a Government propitious to the Company. The Miniſters, divided and jealous of each other, particularly of *Nanah*, with an authority not generally acknowledged, a weak, diſaffected, and ill paid army, hard preſſed by *Hyder*'s forces under the command of *Badjee Punt*, may very probably ſoon behold their Government diſſolved, if not timely

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timely ſupported by the French; but unleſs we have ſome latitude given us, the Company will be deprived of every advantage they might have reaped by our interference in favour of *Ragoba*, which at ſuch a time muſt be deciſive with very little danger or difficulty. But this is not the worſt evil we have to apprehend. Mr. *Madgett's* intelligence, and the information of our Reſident, make it next to a certainty that ſome agreement has been concluded between the Miniſters and Monſieur de *St. Lubin*; in conſequence of which, he has wrote to the Miniſtry of *France*, either to ſend from *Europe*, or to order from the Iſlands, a body of forces to act in concert with the Poonah Government. *Nanah* no doubt has made great promiſes, and Monſieur *St. Lubin* will as certainly exert all the addreſs he is ſo well known to be maſter of, to perſuade the French Miniſtry to adopt this meaſure; and if their troops are once introduced into the country, an endleſs ſcene of troubles and dangers will enſue, of which there is no ſaying what may be the event. In the mean time, it muſt be the policy of *Nanah* and his colleagues, to fortify themſelves as well as they can in their Government, and to amuſe the Engliſh until the arrival of their new allies; but we have the ſtrongeſt hopes, that the materials you will now have before you, will give you a clear inſight into their views and deſigns; and that you will perceive the bad conſequences of our remaining any longer paſſive ſpectators of tranſactions in which the ſafety and welfare of the Company are ſo deeply concerned.

It will depend upon you, Gentlemen, to avert the impending dangers. Limited as our power is, and unprovided as we are with reſources, we cannot exert ourſelves as the occaſion requires. We can do no more than to repreſent our ſituation and circumſtances to you; and we truſt you will be convinced of the neceſſity of our being left at liberty, and furniſhed with the means, to take advantage of circumſtances as they ariſe in the interval that is left us for the ſecurity of the Company; or that you ſend us full and explicit inſtructions for our conduct in this moſt important criſis. Whatever may happen, we have acquitted ourſelves of our duty to the Company by this repreſentation, and cannot be anſwerable for any further conſequences.

The Reſident having received a letter from Mr. *William Gamul Farmer*, a ſenior merchant upon our liſt, and now at *Poonah* upon account of his health, which throws ſome further lights on Monſieur *St. Lubin's* proceedings, we incloſe for your notice the neceſſary extracts therefrom.

The Auſtrian ſhip, under command of Mr. *Bolts*, arrived at *Surat* the beginning of September; but we cauſed ſo many obſtructions to be thrown in his way, that he ſoon left that place, and proceeded with the ſhip to *Gogo*. The ſhip is ſtill there, but Mr. *Bolts* himſelf is at *Poonah*, ſoliciting, as we have reaſon to believe, for a ſettlement at *Gogo*; and though we ſhall exert to the utmoſt the little influence we have with the Durbar to prevent his ſucceſs, he has been ſo well received that we are apprehenſive of the event. We expect this man will be the occaſion of much further trouble and injury to the Company's affairs, as we are adviſed by our Reſident at *Tellicherry*, that the Auſtrian ſhip is expected at *Billiapatam*, a port in the territories of the Prince of *Cherika*, one of the Malabar Powers by no means well diſpoſed towards the Company, and who we ſuſpect will grant Mr. *Bolts* a factory in his dominions.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 7th December 1777. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Propoſals delivered by the Miniſters to Mr. *Moſtyn*, to be made to *Ragonaut Row*.

Firſt, that *Ragoba* ſhall have a jaghire of ten lacks annually, to be reckoned at Kahmil; and not agreeable to the preſent revenues; and the following Pergunnahs in part ſhall be immediately delivered up to him, *viz.*

Dubhoy Pergunnah,
Pittlaid D°,

and the balance ſhall be paid him in ready money, deducting only a quarter part for the charge of collecting, as the remainder Pergunnahs they intend giving are in charge of officers at preſent in camp, but which ſhall be delivered up as ſoon as they return.

Second, That the following forts ſhall be delivered up to him:

Indra Gurr, Ourjoon Gurr, Ballal Gurr, Run Gurr, and *Duboy*.

Third, That the amount of the countries of the above forts, be deducted from the ten lacks, reckoning the revenues at Kamil.

Fourth, That the Duan to attend *Ragonath Row*, ſhall be appointed by the Durbar, but with his approbation and conſent.

Fifth, That he ſhall engage not to endeavour, directly or indirectly, to raiſe any diſturbance in the country againſt the Poonah Durbar.

Sixth, That the ſeveral articles which *Ragonath Row* has agreed to, and are now with *Babah Row Canah*, ſhall be adhered to.

A true copy.

(Signed) *John Spencer*,
Deputy Secretary.

Extract of general letter to *Bombay*, dated 16th April 1777; received at *Bombay* 16th November 1777.

Par. 7. By the 39th paragraph of our letter dated the 5th April 1776, you were informed, that we approved, under every circumſtance, of keeping all territories and poſſeſſions ceded to the Company by *Ragoba*, and that we had given directions to the Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Fort Saint George*, to adopt ſuch meaſures as might be neceſſary for their preſervation and defence; but we are extremely concerned to find, from the terms of the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton* at *Poonah*, that ſo great a ſacrifice has been improvidently made; and eſpecially, that the important ceſſion of *Baſſein* to the Company by *Ragoba*, has been rendered of no effect.

8. Though we cannot but diſapprove of the mode of interference of the Governor General and Council, by ſending an Ambaſſador directly to *Poonah* without firſt conſulting you, and of their determination to diſavow and invalidate the treaty formerly entered into by an agent from your Preſidency, and ſolemnly ratified under the ſeal of the Company; yet we would hope that theſe meaſures will not operate to the prejudice of your conſequence in the eyes of the natives, but that you will ſtill be able to conduct our affairs on the Malabar coaſt with honour to yourſelves, and advantage to the Company.

9. Confiding therefore in the attention of our Governor General and Council to deduce every poſſible benefit from the terms of the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, and particularly to procure payment of the ſums ſtipulated for the charges of the war, and to take care that proviſion be made for the perſonal ſafety of *Ragoba*; we acquieſce in the ſaid treaty, provided *Salſette* and its dependencies be not reſtored; though we are convinced that *Baſſein*, which is ſo great an object with us, might have been obtained, if they had authorized you to treat either with *Ragoba* or with the Miniſters at *Poonah*; reſerving the final approval and ratification of the treaty to themſelves. This is the preciſe line we wiſh to have drawn; and if on any future occaſion our Governor General and Council ſhall think it neceſſary to exerciſe the powers veſted in them by Parliament relative to peace and war, we have directed them to purſue the ſame, and to contribute all in their power to preſerve to our reſpective Governors and Councils that conſequence which may enable them on all occaſions to promote the intereſt of the Company.

We have hitherto ſuppoſed that the affairs of *Ragoba* are rendered deſperate, and that the Miniſters at *Poonah* maintain their ground, and conſtitute at preſent the Maratta Government; we are nevertheleſs of opinion, that an alliance originally with *Ragoba* would have been more for the honour and advantage of the Company, and more likely to be laſting than that concluded at *Poonah*. His pretenſions to the ſupreme authority, either in his own right, or as guardian to the infant Peiſhwa, appear to us better founded than thoſe of his competitors; and therefore, *if the Conditions of the Treaty of Poonah have not been ſtrictly fulfilled* on the part of the Marattas, and if from any circumſtances, our Governor General and Council ſhall deem it expedient, we have no objection to an alliance with *Ragoba*, on the terms agreed upon between him and you.

APPENDIX, No. 24.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 26th January 1778.

GOVERNOR General—I informed the Board laſt council day, that I had prepared a plan for an accommodation with the Maratta Government, which I hoped to complete by this day. It is now ready; but as I could wiſh to give it ſome further correction, I hope the Board will allow of its being inſerted in this place. I ſhall ſend it to the Secretary to be circulated for the correction and opinion of the different members of the Board. As it was written before the receipt of the letter above recorded, I have taken no notice of the circumſtances mentioned in that letter, which would have given additional weight to the motives and argument on which the plan is founded; in particular I obſerve, that the Miniſters themſelves have at length departed from their pretenſions, founded on the 11th Article of the Treaty, and made an offer of ſundry aſſignments of lands ſituated in the neighbourhood of *Broach*, as a jaghire for the ſubſiſtence of *Ragonaut Row*, and for all the other proviſions intended for him by that article. This relaxation from their original demands, affords an additional reaſon to hope that they will be induced to acquieſce in a ſimilar propoſal which I conſider as the groundwork of the accommodation propoſed in this plan.

On the 12th of Auguſt the Board addreſſed two letters to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, containing full and deciſive inſtructions upon the ſeveral points remaining in diſpute between that Preſidency and the Marattas, and expreſsly referred to this Board for its deciſion upon them. To thoſe letters no anſwer has yet been returned, but we have a moral certainty that they have failed in their effect, ſince *Ragonath Row* ſtill continues at *Bombay*, and the letters from *Poonah* conſiſt of the unvaried repetitions of the ſame complaints which were made by the Miniſters before the diſpatch of thoſe inſtructions.

In a letter from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, dated the 22d Auguſt, this Board was adviſed of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s having been ſent for by the Miniſters to *Poorunder* on the occaſion of ſome extraordinary buſineſs; and by private letters received at the ſame time, we heard of the return of Mr. *Moſtyn* to *Bombay*, although that Preſidency neither apprized us of the ſubject of his commiſſion, nor even of his arrival, which we noticed in our reply to their letter. Three months are ſince elapſed, and if we then thought that we had cauſe to complain of the ſilence of that Preſidency, much more reaſon have we now to regret that they have even to this time withheld from us both the knowledge of the commiſſion entruſted to Mr. *Moſtyn*, and every other communication which could enable us to judge of the ſtate of their tranſactions with the Maratta Government, and of the progreſs which they had made in accommodating the differences which had ariſen in the execution of the treaty. In this long interval new ſources of uneaſineſs have ariſen, in the extraordinary countenance afforded by the Miniſters to the Chevalier *St. Lubin* and Mr. *Belts*, the former an Agent of the Crown of *France*, the latter a declared repreſentative of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. Theſe have been both received with marks of diſtinction, which have been never ſhewn to our Reſident, and have been admitted to ſecret conferences; the former has even obtained the dangerous grant of a port of trade in the neighbourhood of *Bombay*; and if credit may be given to univerſal report, written engagements have been interchanged between him and the Miniſters, the object of which, whatever it be, muſt if attained prove deſtructive to the trade of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and to the Britiſh influence in *India*.

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To remain longer in this ſtate of ſupineneſs and indeciſion, becauſe we have not been furniſhed with authentic and regular advices from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, might draw upon us the reproach of ſacrificing to a mere punctilio of office the care of thoſe intereſts which have been in an eſpecial manner, and under the moſt binding ſanctions, committed to our immediate truſt, the maintenance of the peace and policy of the Company's ſettlements in *India*. I have therefore, as it is my eſſential duty, drawn up ſuch a plan as appeared to me, after a very full conſideration of every ſubject relating to it, moſt likely to conciliate the minds of all parties in the differences which have hitherto retarded the execution of the treaty, and to replace the Preſidency of *Bombay* on a footing of peace and ſecurity, which were the profeſſed motives of the firſt interference of this Government, and the profeſſed end of the treaty itſelf.

But before I mention the expedients which I mean to propoſe, I requeſt the Board to give their patient attention to the following conſiderations, which have a leading connection with them.

The aſylum granted to *Ragonath Row* in *Bombay*, has undoubtedly furniſhed the Miniſters with an oſtenſible argument to impute to that Preſidency as the aggreſſor, all the differences which have enſued ſince the execution of the treaty. Whether the treaty would have been better obſerved on their part, if that pretext had not been given, or whether the reſidence of *Ragonath Row*, at *Bombay*, and the poſſibility of a revival of his pretenſions have not proved a check upon the deſigns which they might otherwiſe have entertained againſt the Company, are queſtions on which it is not neceſſary to the ſubject immediately before us to determine, though not altogether foreign from it. An impartial ſpectator might infer from the concurrence of all that has lately paſſed, an exceptionable deſign in each party; in the one, to continue its ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, in violation of the treaty by which it is bound to withhold it; in the other, to deſtroy him, in violation of the ſame treaty, and by the very means which it has ſupplied.

I ſhall conſider the preſent conteſts as originating entirely from theſe combined ſources, and depending on them ſolely for their continuance.

The 11th Article of the Treaty ſtipulates, that "The "Miniſters ſhall eſtabliſh an houſehold for *Ragonaut* "*Row*, conſiſting of one thouſand horſe and ſome foot, "who are to be paid and relieved at the pleaſure of "Government, but to obey all legal orders given them "by *Ragonaut Row*; alſo one hundred domeſtics, to be "choſen by *Ragonaut Row*, and paid by Government; "and that they ſhall cauſe to be paid to *Ragonaut Row*, "to defray his other expences, three lacks of rupees "per annum, by equal monthly payments, upon con"dition that he reſide at *Cooper Gunge*, on the banks of "the *Gunja Gadawery*."

This conceſſion was a cheap and eaſy ſacrifice on our part, and liable to no objection if the conſent of *Ragonath Row* could have been obtained for its accompliſhment, without which experience has ſhewn it to be impracticable. Whether his fears were real or affected, it was at leaſt a natural effect of his ſituation, that he ſhould

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feel a ſtrong reluctance to deſcend at once to a private and dependant ſtation, and to ſubject himſelf to the reſtraint of a fixed reſidence in the heart of the dominions of which he had lately poſſeſſed the abſolute rule, at the diſcretion of his enemies for ſubſiſtence, and at their mercy for his life, eſpecially when he found the Preſidency of *Bombay* diſpoſed to abet and ſupport him in the refuſal. In candor it muſt be added, that the conduct of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, if not warranted by the principles of that conformity, which they primarily owed, both in policy and in duty to the ruling power of that conſtitution of which they were a part, was ſuch as might have been obviouſly expected from a body of men circumſtanced and affected as they were; their paſſions were enliſted in the cauſe of *Ragoba*; it was in effect their own. The treaty, which had been recently made with his opponents, was an injury to the faith which they had pledged to a treaty executed by them; by engaging his reliance on their protection, they were in ſome meaſure the authors of the deſperate ſtate to which he was reduced by the treaty of *Poorunder*; every ſentiment of juſtice, humanity, and pride, oppoſed their abandoning him to his fate; under ſuch an influence the moſt rigid integrity might have erred in a caſe, in which it is probable, that men of leſs virtue, but of more caution, would have obſerved a more regular conduct.

We have no means of compelling the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to deſiſt from protecting *Ragonaut Row*, but by a total ſuſpenſion of their authority, which is an extremity that I am perſuaded no member of this Board will venture to propoſe without much ſtronger and ſurer grounds to warrant it; the Miniſters themſelves have relaxed from their claim to *Ragoba*'s reſidence at *Cooper Gong*, and have conſented to his retiring to *Calpee* or *Benares*; but to this propoſition he has objected the perſonal dangers to which it would ſubject him in a journey by land, and his religious ſcruples which would be affected by a voyage by ſea. The firſt is a ſolid objection, which can only be removed by allowing him a a ſtrong military eſcort, which we cannot afford; for the laſt, we have propoſed an expedient, of which I confeſs I at the time entertained doubts, and on enquiry made ſince, I find it to be impracticable—other means, therefore, muſt be tried.

By the letter of the treaty *Ragonaut Row* is entitled to the monthly ſum of 25,000 rupees for his ſubſiſtence, to a guard of 1,000 horſe and ſome foot, and to an eſtabliſhment of 100 domeſtics. By the ſpirit of the treaty, he is entitled to perſonal ſafety and freedom, or all the other proviſions are uſeleſs and deluſory. The Court of Directors, in the 24th paragraph of their commands of the 5th February 1777, have declared this to be one of two ſpecial and indiſpenſable conditions of their acquieſcence in the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, that "Proviſion be made for the perſonal ſafety "and maintenance of *Ragoba*."

I ſee no way by which theſe points can be completely ſecured but by obtaining the grant of a jaghire, equal in its real amount to all the ſtipulations made for *Ragoba*. This may be reaſonably fixed at ten lacks of nett revenue. The land allotted to him ſhould be ſituated at leaſt ſo near to *Bombay*, as to place him within the effectual reach of the forces of that Preſidency for his protection. The diſtrict of *Baſſein* poſſeſſes theſe requiſites, and is perhaps the moſt eligible and the only unexceptionable reſidence that we could chuſe for him. Though the treaty gives us no right to demand ſuch a conceſſion, yet the inſecure footing on which the Miniſters have placed the treaty itſelf, by their late connection with the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, affords a plea even for the demand, if the confirmation of the treaty and our own ſecurity cannot be effected by any other means.

The eſſential object of the treaty is peace. This was not expreſſed in it ſimply as a condition, but as the ſubſtance of it, and the other conditions follow not as the ends of the treaty, but as the means by which it was to be accompliſhed. To prove this, I ſhall ſubjoin the following extract of the treaty:—

"Whereas differences having ariſen amongſt the "Chiefs of the Maratta State, and the Government of "*Bombay* having taken a part therein, by ſending forces "into the Maratta dominions, which the Honourable "Governor General and Council of *Fort William* diſ-"approve, and being deſirous of conciliating theſe "differences, have determined accordingly to enter "into ſuch meaſures as may moſt effectually contribute "to ſo deſirable an end; they have for this purpoſe, "therefore, authorized, deputed, and given full powers "unto Lieutenant Colonel *John Upton*, in the ſervice of "the Honourable the *Eaſt India* Company, to conclude a "peace between the Government of *Bombay* and the "Maratta State; and Colonel *Upton* having accordingly "arrived at *Poorunder*, has concluded a ſolid and firm "peace on the part of the Engliſh Company, with the "Miniſters *Succeram Pundit* and *Bellajee Pundit*, on the "part of the Peiſhwa *Maderow Row Pundit Purdhan*, "and all the Maratta Chiefs; and the following are "the articles of convention which they have engaged "in:

Article 1ſt.

"Peace ſhall be eſtabliſhed and take place from this "day between the Honourable the Engliſh *Eaſt India* "Company in general, and the Government of *Bombay* "in particular, and *Row Pundit Purdhan*, and his Mi-"niſters *Succeram Pundit* and *Bellajee Pundit*, on the "part of all the Marattas; and the following articles "are to be obſerved inviolably by both parties."

Not one of the means preſcribed have yet taken effect. Even the ſubſtantial part of the treaty has been fruſtrated by one party continuing their protection to *Ragoba*, and by the other forming hoſtile connections and engagements with an Agent of *France*. Neither of theſe inſtances are contrary to the letter of the treaty; but the *ſpirit* of it is infringed by both. The 10th and 12th Articles of the treaty expreſs that the Engliſh ſhall not aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*. They have not *aſſiſted Ragonaut Row*, but they have protected him; and while they continue to protect him, the Miniſters will argue that his pretenſions are kept alive, and that the ſparks of war, though ſuppreſſed, are thus preſerved in a ſtate from which they may break out into a new flame.

In like manner the 1ſt Article, by which both parties ſolemnly declare, that "Peace ſhall be eſtabliſhed and "take place" between them, is virtually though not literally infringed by the engagements formed between the Miniſters and the natural enemies of this ſtate. It is true there is no ſpecific obligation on the Miniſters to abſtain from an intercourſe with the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, neither are we ſpecifically bound to withhold our protection from *Ragoba*; but the juſt fear of what each may do in the hands of either party, muſt infallibly produce diſtruſt, and the precautions which apparent danger dictates to common prudence.

That I may not have drawn too forcible a concluſion from the late tranſactions between the Miniſters and the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, I beg leave to call the recollection of the Board to a paper delivered to them by Mr. *Elliot* on the 1ſt October laſt. From a compariſon of the intelligence contained in that paper, and brought immediately from *Europe*, with the information obtained by Mr. *Moſtyn* and Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*, and their exact agreement in the moſt eſſential points, I think it appears proved beyond a doubt, that the French Agent there is entruſted with a plan which has for its object the ſubverſion of the Britiſh influence in *India*; we are in actual treaty of friendſhip with the ruling adminiſtration of the Maratta State, and our Treaty was formed at a time when they were engaged in a war with the Company, from which they were releaſed by the terms which we granted them, and in the proſecution of which, had it continued, they muſt have fallen. The Treaty

was concluded by an officer of rank, deputed immediately from this Government, and the attention of every Prince and Chief in *Hindoſtan* was turned upon this firſt negociation of the Britiſh power, under the direction of a general Government. It is diſgraceful to us that the Government at *Poonah* ſhould in any ſituation pay more attention, and ſhew more countenance to an Agent of the natural and known enemy of our country, than to ours. But when we are informed that the French Miniſtry have formed the plan of an offenſive alliance with the Maratta State, when we are informed that an Agent of the French Miniſtry has been received at *Poonah*, has been treated with the greateſt confidence and marks of diſtinction, while our own is diſregarded; that he has received from them the grant of a port of trade within 20 miles of *Bombay* itſelf, has exchanged mutual engagements with them, of which his part is to ſupply them with arms, and a military force; and even the common news-papers relate theſe tranſactions as tranſactions of univerſal notoriety; what concluſions are we, who are immediately concerned in them, to form from them? are we to regard them as the allowable machinations of political intrigue, and quietly to permit them to operate to their laſt effect, if the Marattas commit no overt act of hoſtility, or direct breach of the treaty? or ſhall we conſider the preparatives to a war as declaratory of an intended breach of treaty, and take ſuch meaſures as the neceſſity of ſuch a ſituation demands, for enſuring and confirming the treaty, and giving it that vigour which it yet confeſſedly wants, or if that ſhould prove impracticable, even to prevent the deſigns of our enemies, by openly counteracting and oppoſing them?

From any thing which I have ſaid in the preceding obſervations, I hope it will not be inferred, that I impute to the Preſidency of *Bombay* the reproach of having been the aggreſſor, by the protection granted to *Ragoba*.—This is by no means the caſe. I conſider that protection only as one of two co-relative acts, each (as I have already obſerved) a virtual infraction of the treaty. The protection of *Ragoba* may admit of that conſtruction, becauſe it was a continuation of the connection which had formerly given birth to the war, and which it was the object of the treaty to diſſolve. But the pertinacy of the Miniſters in requiring that he ſhould be delivered into their hands, was equally oppoſite to the ſpirit of the treaty; and if it did not render that local protection neceſſary, it at leaſt laid an obligation on the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to inſiſt on ſome proviſion being made for the perſonal ſafety of *Ragoba*; to conſider the peace as ſuſpended while that point remained undecided, and even the treaty itſelf as broken by the refuſal of the Miniſters to agree to ſo reaſonable a requiſition.

Here I cannot avoid making one general obſervation, which may be applied equally to this and to every other tranſaction which has paſſed between the Miniſters and the Preſidency of *Bombay*, which, if it does not prove the ſuperior integrity of the latter, will at leaſt ſhew the diſadvantages under which they labour in their concerns with the former. Whatever has been done by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and charged to them as contrary to good faith, has been done openly and avowedly. The Miniſters on the contrary, have ſtudiouſly avoided every overt act, working only in covert and by fraud, but ſo thinly veiled, that the whole world has ſeen through the diſguiſe; and even the unintereſted part of it poſſeſſes the ſame knowledge of the circumſtances, and has drawn the the ſame concluſions from them.

Commiſſioners were ſent to make over the ceded lands, with private orders contrary to thoſe which were pretended to have been given. Secret engagements are formed by the Miniſters with a French Agent, which they pretend to be no more than the common intercourſe of civility, and to have no other object than the encouragement of commerce. The unconditional requeſt of the perſon of *Ragoba*, conſidered with all the circumſtances of his natural influence and pretenſions; their own want of conſtitutional power; the former engagements contracted between him and the Engliſh, which ſtill ſubſiſt ſo far as they reſpected his life, and the ſtipulations made for him in the treaty, are reconcileable to no other principle; and the refuſal to commit to writing the propoſitions laſt made to Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poorunder*, is equal to a direct avowal of it.

On the ſame unequal footing the general intereſts of the Company appear to ſtand with reſpect to the future duration of the peace concluded with the Marattas; they are bound by no ties but their own intereſt and convenience: even the lives of the two only perſons who were the inſtrumental parties in it, one of them an aged man, and worn out by infirmities, will totally deſtroy its obligation on the Maratta State and nation; on the Company and on the Britiſh nation it is binding for ever. We are morally certain, that the Miniſters have already entered on preparations for breaking it, when they can break it with ſafety; and if we ſuffer them to proſecute their deſigns unmoleſted till they are ripe for execution, the treaty which was intended for peace and permanent ſecurity, will become the inſtrument of war, treachery, and of danger to the exiſtence of the intereſt of the Britiſh nation in *India*.

By what preciſe lines the faith of a treaty yet unaccompliſhed, and exiſting only on paper, is bounded, I pretend not to determine; but while we on our parts ſteadily reſolve to confirm it, while we practiſe no deception, nor cover remote acts of hoſtility by falſe profeſſions, I preſume that no breach of faith can be imputed to us if we endeavour to correct its defects, and to guard the general intereſts committed to our charge even by more ample proviſions, though war ſhould prove the conſequence of the rejection of our demands, and of the implied or even declared reſolution to aſſert them.

I ſtate the extremity of what may happen, but with little apprehenſion of ſuch a conſequence; neither are the men with whom we are to deal in a ſituation to chuſe a revival of the war, nor is it my intention to propoſe any meaſures that are likely to produce ſuch violent conſequences.

If the foregoing arguments are well founded, they will juſtify the additional motive, on which I would recommend that a requiſition be made of *Baſſein* for the jaghire of *Ragonaut Row*. I have already obſerved its contiguity to *Bombay* will prove a ſecurity to him againſt any attempts which may be made to injure his perſon; the ſame advantage will render it a preſent check againſt any dangers which the Miniſters have projected againſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*; and if they ſhould ever attempt to carry them into execution, it will afford us the ready poſſeſſion of a country extending to the defiles, which lie, as I underſtand, within a very ſhort diſtance from their capital, and lead directly to it; and of an ally whoſe natural intereſt will always enſure him partizans, with ſuch a ſupport as that of the Engliſh to encourage their declaration in his favour.

But though the grant of *Baſſein* without a further extenſion of it to *Ragonaut Row* would be an adequate proviſion for his ſafety, it would be by no means ſufficient to obviate the dangers which the Preſidency of *Bombay* would have cauſe to apprehend on the event of his death, if at the ſame time that we loſt the advantage of his influence we were to be deprived alſo of *Baſſein*.

For this reaſon, I ſhould propoſe, that the reverſion of *Baſſein* to the Company be included in the demand. In ſupport of this propoſal, it will be neceſſary to recapitulate many of the arguments which have been already uſed in the courſe of this Minute; but which particularly applying to this ſubject, require for that reaſon to be brought together in one point of view. I have already ſtated the diſadvantages under which the Company labour, from the defective terms of the treaty of *Poorunder*, and the partial manner in which the Miniſters have thought proper to explain it; that the treaty ſtill remains

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remains unexecuted after a period of two years, is an undoubted fact; and that our own safety requires a correction of it, is I think as indisputable; the present Chiefs of the Maratta Government, though bound by a treaty to the Company, have attached themselves to the only power from which we can apprehend danger to our possessions in *India*: the first of these facts affords us more than a plea for doing that which the last renders highly necessary; I mean to provide some effectual means, which may prevent the ill consequences of the combination, which we have reason to believe is either forming or already formed between our allies, the Marattas, and the French. The Company have in their general letters written for a long course of years past, repeatedly expressed their desire to obtain possession of *Bassein*; and in none so strongly as in their letter of the 5th February last, which was written with the full knowledge of the treaty, and all its obligations before them. Mr. *Tayler*'s letter to this Board on the 9th October 1775, proves the possession of this Country to be not only directly necessary for the safety of *Bombay*, but equally so to the security of our naval strength in *India*: we are now to treat with a state, which I am authorized to say is ill inclined to us, and only waits for a favourable opportunity to unite itself with that nation whose object is equally with theirs our overthrow; we are at the same time to treat with a state not in a condition to refuse its acquiescence to our proposals, whatever it may be when supported by an European alliance. The Marattas have not performed any one of the terms stipulated in the treaty; the amount of the expences incurred in the prosecution of the war remains yet unpaid; the country of three lacks is not yet ceded; no provision is yet made for the support of *Ragonaut Row*; in a word, the same differences subsist between us as prevailed whilst both parties were in actual arms against each other, nor has the treaty yet produced any other effect, than totally to disarm the one, and to leave the other in possession of almost every advantage which it could have required had the war ended in a complete victory on their side, instead of a peace formed on terms of a professed equality. In this situation the honour, interest, and safety, of the Company require that we should possess in our own hands some pledge, both for the faithful observance of the treaty, if it is to stand confirmed, and for our future security, against the designs which may be practised under cover of it: the possession of *Bassein* offers us the only prospect of such a security; no obligation precludes us from demanding it, nor can any blame be justly imputed to us, if, as the superior power, we prescribe the terms, were they even more unequal than these are, on which we are willing to release both parties from that dangerous point on which they have fluctuated between war and peace, during a long interval of two years, and are likely to continue there unless one side assumes the right of decision.

I know not whether I ought to apologize for the length to which I have been drawn in the discussion of the preceding points, but they were both too delicate and important to be slightly treated; the remaining subjects will require a very short explanation.

The acceptance of *Jamboseer* in lieu of the payment of twelve lacks of rupees, due by the 6th Article of the Treaty, was in my opinion improper, though perhaps considered by the Presidency of *Bombay* as a concession of necessity, and a better security for the performance of that article than the faith of the Ministers on which it before depended. It is a direct breach of the treaty on the part of the Ministers, and ought to have been treated as such by a formal protest against it when they failed in their first payment of the six lacks due on the 1st September 1776; the second payment will be due by treaty on the 1st of March *next*: both ought to be demanded, and *Jamboseer* restored.

We have already given our opinion very decidedly, both to the Ministers and to the Presidency of *Bombay*, upon the differences concerning the mode of rating the value of the ceded lands, and upon the cessions formerly made by *Futty Sing Guicawar*: I see no cause to alter it.

I now proceed to lay the following plan before the Board:

1st. That a demand be made of the perpetual grant of the Fort and district of *Bassein* to the *East India* Company, in trust for *Ragonaut Row* during his life-time, and of such assignments as together with the revenue of *Bassein* shall make up the sum of lacks of rupees, to be paid in equal monthly payments to *Ragonaut Row*, in lieu of all the provisions contained in the 11th Article of the Treaty of *Poorunder*; that the assigned lands shall remain in the immediate charge of Aumils appointed on the part of the Ministers, with an Agent appointed on the part of *Ragonaut Row*, to receive the collections from them; that on the death of *Ragonaut Row*, the said assignments shall cease, and the Pergunnahs of *Ahmood*, *Desborah*, and *Hansood*, shall be restored to the Marattas, and *Bassein* remain the entire property of the Company in their stead, and be considered as a full accomplishment of the 5th Article of the Treaty.

2d. That the Governor General and Council shall engage to guarantee the due payment of the sum of lacks of rupees as aforesaid, annually, to *Ragonaut Row*, and the safety of his person, against all attempts which may be made against it, contrary to the treaty of *Poorunder*; and shall engage to join the Maratta State against *Ragonaut Row*, if he shall at any time either openly assert his late pretentions against the Ministers, or attempt by intrigues to disturb the tranquillity of the present Maratta Government.

3d. That *Ragonaut Row* shall quit *Bombay* and reside in *Bassein*.

4th. That if *Ragonaut Row* shall refuse to accept these Conditions, the Ministers shall agree to make over to the *East India* Company for ever the fort and district of *Bassein*, and to put them in immediate possession of the same, on condition that the President and Council of *Bombay* shall compel *Ragonaut Row* to withdraw himself from their protection, and from all the territories of the Company; the Governor General and Council becoming the pledge for their performance of this stipulation; and that the Governor General and Council shall at the same time yield up their rights, obtained under the 5th Article of the Treaty, to a country of three lacks of rupees, adjoining to *Broach*.

5th. That a remonstrance be made to the Ministers against the countenance afforded by them to the Chevaliers *St. Lubin*, against the engagements which we understand have been formed with him, and against the grant of the Port of *Choul*, made as we understand to him, or to the French nation through him; that though we do not insist on any positive right to demand his dismission, nor the exclusion of the French from the port of *Choul*, yet as we have a right to require a knowledge of the intentions of the Ministers in regard to these points, so far as they respect the Treaty of Peace subsisting between the Maratta State and the British Government in *India*, a clear and satisfactory explanation be demanded of their intentions, and that a declaration be made to them, that we shall take such measures accordingly as prudence shall dictate for the future safety of the Company's interests and possessions committed to our charge.

6th. That a demand be made for the immediate payment of the balance of the first payment of six lacks of rupees which was due on the 1st September 1776, and for the payment of the remaining six lacks on the 1st of March next; and that the Pergunnah of *Jamboseer* be thereupon restored to the Ministers, and that if the Ministers shall not comply with this demand, a declaration be made to them in form, that it will be deemed an infraction of the treaty.

7th. That although we have a clear and uncontrovertible right by the 5th Article of the Treaty to a country of three complete lacks of rupees, according

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to the plain meaning of the word *complete* in our language, and to the grammatical meaning of the word Caumil in the Arabic tongue from which it is derived; and although we conſider it as an unworthy attempt in the Miniſters to avail themſelves of a technical diſtinction, in oppoſition to the plain and evident intention of the treaty; it being a ſelf-apparent abſurdity to ſuppoſe that we could agree to receive a deſert as a territory yielding three lacks of revenue, becauſe it might be ſo rated in the books to which we have no acceſs: yet from the deſire to remove every obſtacle to the confirmation of the peace between us, it be declared to the Miniſters that we will accept the propoſed ceſſions of the Pergunnahs of *Ahmood*, *Deſhorah*, and *Hanſood*, as a full compenſation for the 5th Article of the Treaty, although their real value, as eſtimated by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and not diſputed by the Miniſters, is only 2,10,000 rupees, excluſive of the tribute of 30,000 rupees before annexed to *Broach*, and appertaining to the Company independantly of the treaty; but that if *Ragonaut Row* ſhall refuſe to accede to the terms propoſed for him, and the Miniſters ſhall in that caſe conſent to the exchange propoſed in the 4th Article, theſe diſtricts ſhall in ſuch caſe be reſtored to the Miniſters as provided in the 7th Article.

8th. That the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* ſhall retain poſſeſſion of the Pergunnahs of *Chickly* and *Veriow*, and of the village of *Batta*, and the other three villages ſituated in *Churcaſſy* which were ceded to the Company by *Futty Sing Guicawar*.

9th. That a letter be written to the Peiſhwa, including the above propoſitions, with ſuch corrections as they ſhall have received, if they ſhall be approved by the Board; that his anſwers be required without condition or reſervation to each article; and that it be declared to him, that this Government will take its final reſolution, either to abide by the treaty as it ſhall ſtand confirmed by his anſwers, or to conſider it as annulled or invalidated by them.

10th. That copies of theſe propoſitions be alſo ſent to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, with directions to communicate the firſt, ſecond, and third to *Ragoba*, to require his declaration whether he will aſſent to them and to tranſmit the ſame to us; to demand immediate payment of the balance of the firſt payment of the ſix lacks of rupees which was due on the 1ſt September 1776, and payment of the remaining ſix lacks, which will become due on the firſt of March next; to reſtore the Pergunnah of *Jambooſeer*, if the Miniſters ſhall comply with this demand, and to proteſt againſt them for the breach of treaty, if they ſhall refuſe or neglect to comply with it: to receive the Pergunnahs of *Ahmood*, *Deſhora*, and *Hanſood*, as a full compenſation for the 5th Article of the Treaty, in caſe the Miniſters and *Ragonaut Row* ſhall reſpectively agree to the propoſitions now offered to them; to retain poſſeſſion of the Pergunnahs of *Chickly* and *Veriow*, and the village of *Batta*; and the other three villages ſituated in *Churcaſſy* which were ceded to them by *Futty Sing Guicawar*; to receive poſſeſſion of the fort and diſtrict of *Baſſein* in truſt for *Ragonaut Row*, if the Miniſters and *Ragonaut Row* ſhall reſpectively agree to theſe propoſitions; and in caſe of his refuſal, and of the conſent of the Miniſters, in that caſe to relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of the fort and diſtrict of *Baſſein* to the Company, to receive poſſeſſion of them for the behalf of the Company, reſtoring the Pergunnahs of *Ahmood*, *Deſhora*, and *Hanſood*, to the Marattas, and compelling *Ragonant Row* to withdraw himſelf from their protection, and from all the territories of the Company; that they be expreſsly forbidden to negociate on any of theſe points, or further to concern themſelves in them than we have directed, leaving entirely to this Government to take its final meaſures, if the Miniſters ſhall reject the terms which we offered them.

11th. That on the arrival of General *Stibbert* the Board do proceed to deliberate with him on the beſt and ſpeedieſt means of furniſhing the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* with a military force, with as little real diminution as poſſible of our own eſtabliſhment, for the purpoſes of enabling that Preſidency to co-operate with this in any general meaſures, which it ſhall be judged adviſable to adopt on the receipt of the ultimate determination of the Miniſters of *Poonah*, or to make the beſt advantage of any change of Government in *Poonah*, in caſe of the death or removal of *Saccaram Pundit* and *Ballajee Pundit* from the Adminiſtration; but above all to reſiſt any attempts which the French may make to the prejudice of our intereſts on that ſide of *India*.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

P. S. The revenue of *Baſſein* is eſtimated by Mr. *Tayler*, in his letter recorded on our Conſultations of the 9th October 1775, at four lacks. We are entitled by the 5th Article of the Treaty, to a country adjoining to *Broach*, which ſhall produce a revenue of three lacks. Hence it appears, that by the propoſed accommodation, the Company will be immediate loſers of 90,000 rupees in the annual amount of the ceded lands, and eventual gainers of an annual revenue of one lack in the exchange of the lands propoſed to be ceded to us for *Baſſein*, on the death of *Ragonaut Row*.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

The receipt of this letter in *Bengal*, is acknowledged by the general letter from thence dated 21ſt November 1771.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*, dated the 5th February 1777.

Par. 20. By the 48th paragraph of our letter, dated 15th December 1775, you were informed of our intention, under every circumſtance, to keep all territories and poſſeſſions ceded to the Company by *Ragoba*; and you were directed forthwith to adopt ſuch meaſures as might be neceſſary for their preſervation and defence. Our letter could not be before you at the time of concluding the Treaty of *Poonah*; but we are extremely concerned to find by the terms of that treaty that ſo great a ſacrifice has been improvidently made, and eſpecially that the important ceſſion of *Baſſein* to the Company by *Ragoba*, has been rendered of no effect.

21. In the Fourth Article of your inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*, you declare yourſelves determined on no account to relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*; and although it happened that *Baſſein* was not then in our actual poſſeſſion, we entirely agree with Mr. *Francis*, that ſuch circumſtance was not in itſelf material, much leſs was it of conſequence ſufficient to warrant a deviation from your former inſtructions to Colonel *Upton*. But as you muſt have known that it was not poſſible at the time of concluding the treaty with *Ragoba* for the Country Powers to have been apprized of your authority to controul our other Preſidencies in concluding treaties, or in making peace and war; or that our Governors and Councils reſpectively were reſtrained from acting independantly in thoſe caſes; and as that treaty had been formally entered into by an Agent from *Bombay*, and ſolemnly ratified by the Governor and Council, under the ſeal of the Company, we cannot but diſapprove of your mode of interference, by ſending an Ambaſſador directly to *Poonah*, without firſt conſulting the Governor and Council of *Bombay*; and of your determination to diſavow and invalidate the treaty concluded by them; and alſo of your taking ſuch further ſteps as muſt degrade them in the eyes of the natives, and perhaps make it impoſſible for them hereafter to conduct our affairs on the Malabar Coaſt with honour to themſelves or advantage to the Company.

22. If your direct interference in ſending Colonel *Upton* to *Poonah* was improper, as a meaſure deeply affecting the honour of our Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and

Appendix. No. 25.

and in them the honour of the Company, we deem it alſo utterly impolitic reſpecting the enemy; for it ſeems very evident, that you treated with the Marattas at great diſadvantage, whilſt the Colonel was at *Poonah*; as no other circumſtance but that of having him and his party entirely in their power, could have encouraged them to treat you with ſo much diſregard, and your propoſals with a degree of contempt which merited the ſevereſt chaſtiſement.

23. In juſtice to Colonel *Upton*, we muſt however obſerve, that notwithſtanding his critical ſituation as to perſonal ſafety, his conduct ſhewed the greateſt intrepidity: and when he thought the negociation entirely broken off, though he knew his life was at their mercy, he faithfully informed you, that with a very ſmall force you might ſoon command peace on your own terms, as the Chiefs of the country were at a loſs which ſide to take, until they knew what meaſures would be finally purſued by the Engliſh; and it is with pleaſure we direct you to ſignify to Colonel *Upton*, our entire approbation of the firmneſs and zeal manifeſted by him on that occaſion.

24. As your letter to *Ragoba* of the 7th of March 1775, was to be deſtroyed by the Chief and Council at *Surat* in caſe peace ſhould have been concluded; and we hope was accordingly deſtroyed, we feel the leſs anxiety at your abſolute and unreſerved declarations made in that letter, which were certainly conſidered by yourſelves equally binding as any treaty whatever, and muſt have been ſo underſtood by *Ragoba* if the letter had come to hand. It was likewiſe particularly fortunate that you were able to prevent the delivery of letters written to the Nizam and Maratta Chiefs; for though the reſtoration of peace is at all times a deſirable object, we ſhould be much concerned if ſuch event had been attended with another breach of faith on the part of the Company, which muſt have happened if your letter had been delivered to *Ragoba*, or if your inſtability had been formally expoſed to the Country Powers, by their receiving your invitations to take up arms in his favour; becauſe preparations might have been made at your requiſition, for which no doubt you would have been accountable, and by the Treaty of *Poonah* you would have been obliged to revoke thoſe requiſitions, and to oppoſe meaſures juſt before moſt earneſtly recommended by yourſelves. Hoping however that all theſe inconveniencies have been obviated, and confiding in your attention to deduce every poſſible benefit from the terms of the treaty, and particularly to procure payment of the ſums ſtipulated for the charges of the war, and to take care that proviſion be made for the perſonal ſafety and maintenance of *Ragoba*, we acquieſce in the ſaid treaty, provided *Salſette* and its dependencies be not reſtored; though we are convinced that *Baſſein*, which is ſo great an object with us, might have been obtained, if a good underſtanding had ſubſiſted between you and our Council at *Bombay*; eſpecially if you had authorized them to treat either with *Ragoba* or with the Miniſters at *Poonah*, reſerving the final approval and ratification of the treaty to yourſelves, in the manner directed by you in your letter to *Bombay* of 7th March 1775. This would have been the preciſe line we wiſh to have drawn; and if on any future occaſion you ſhall think it neceſſary to exerciſe the powers veſted in you by Parliament relative to peace and war, we direct that you purſue the method adopted when you thought Colonel *Upton*'s negociations at an end, and that you contribute all in your power to preſerve to our reſpective Governors and Councils that conſequence which may enable them on all occaſions to promote the intereſt of the Company.

25. You cannot but obſerve, that we have hitherto ſuppoſed the affairs of *Ragoba* are rendered deſperate, and that the Miniſters at *Poonah* maintain their ground, and conſtitute at preſent the Maratta Government; we are nevertheleſs of opinion, that an alliance originally with *Ragoba* would have been more for the honour and advantage of the Company, and more likely to be laſting, than that concluded at *Poonah*. His pretenſions to the ſupreme authority, either in his own right, or as guardian to the infant Peiſhwa, appear to us better founded than thoſe of his competitors; and therefore if the conditions of the Treaty of *Poonah* have not been ſtrictly fulfilled on the part of the Marattas, and if from any circumſtances you ſhall deem it expedient, we ſhall have no objection to an alliance with *Ragoba*, on the terms agreed upon between him and the Governor and Council of *Bombay*.

APPENDIX, No. 25.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 29th January 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have the honour to incloſe duplicates of our letters, dated the 2d and 7th inſtant.

Since then we have received a letter from Mr. *William Lewis*, Mr. *Moſtyn*'s ſubſtitute at *Poonah*, which being of a very important nature, we loſe not a moment in tranſmitting you a copy thereof, and of our reſolutions in conſequence.

We flatter ourſelves, that after a conſideration of all circumſtances, and of the neceſſity and urgency of the caſe, which would not admit of the ſmalleſt delay in our determination, you will approve of the encouragement we have agreed to give to the party formed in *Ragoba*'s favour, and that we ſhall meet with your hearty concurrence and ſupport in the meaſures we may be obliged to purſue in conſequence.

You may be aſſured we ſhall proceed with the utmoſt caution and circumſpection, and upon the beſt grounds, and adviſe you, as ſoon as we poſſibly can, of what is likely to be the iſſue of this buſineſs.

In the mean time we have judged it expedient to requeſt the Gentlemen at *Fort Saint George*, to hold in readineſs a body of two hundred European infantry, half a company of artillery, and one battalion of ſepoys, to march to *Anjengo* upon the receipt of further advices from us.

It is a certain fact that Monſieur *Du Paſcal de Sauty*, charged with diſpatches from Monſieur *St. Lubin* for the French Miniſtry, found means to get a paſſage from *Surat* about the 20th of laſt month, on a dingy bound to *Muſcat*, from whence he might eaſily proceed to *Europe*, by the way of *Grain* and *Aleppo*; he was accompanied by the Secretary to the French Conſul at *Surat*.

We are with reſpect,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Bombay Caſtle, 12th December 1777. *William Hornby*, Council.

APPENDIX, No. 26.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 10th December 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, and Governor,

The Worſh. *John Camac*, Eſquire,

Daniel Draper, *Nath. Stackhouſe*,

William Aſhburner, *Andr. Ramſay*,

Mr. *Moſtyn*, indiſpoſed.

THE

THE Preſident lays before us a letter from Mr. *William Lewis*, at *Poonah*, relating that ſome overtures had been made to him on the part of *Saccram Bappoo*, *Morabah Furneſe*, *Buchabah Pronder*, and *Tookajee Holcar*, for the aſſiſtance of the Company to bring *Ragoba* to *Poonah*.

This letter having been conſidered with the attention the importance of the ſubject requires, the following circumſtances ſtrike us in the moſt forcible manner:

That if the four perſons above-mentioned join in making formal application to us, it may certainly with the utmoſt juſtice be conſidered as an application from the Maratta State, and treated accordingly, as *Saccram Bappoo* is the Duan or firſt officer in the Government, and the principal perſon with whom Colonel *Upton* concluded the late treaty in behalf of that ſtate, he being the Miniſter firſt named in the treaty; that *Moraba Furneeſe* and *Buchabah Pronder*, are alſo perſons of the firſt conſequence, and the higheſt hereditary officers; and *Tookajee Holcar*, a very principal Jadhidar, and one of the conſtituent parts of the Maratta Empire.

That it can no wiſe affect our alliance with that ſtate, whether *Ragoba* or *Saccram Bappoo* is the Duan.

It is an inconteſtable fact, that *Nannah Furneeſe*, the colleague with *Saccram Bappoo* in the adminiſtration, has been engaged in a negociation with Monſieur de *St. Lubin*; and that ſome treaty or agreement has been concluded between them, in conſequence of which, Monſieur *Paſcal du Sauty* has actually proceeded to *Europe* over land, charged with diſpatches from the latter for the French Miniſtry, who we cannot ſuppoſe, as obſerved by Mr. *Lewis*, will neglect ſo favourable an opportunity of getting a footing in the only part of *India* which is now open to them; and will doubtleſs make it their firſt object to ſecure a ſettlement and port in our neighbourhood.

If time is given for the French Miniſtry to take their meaſures, and to ſupply *Nannah* with a body of forces, we can expect nothing but a repetition of the ſcene of wars and troubles formerly acted on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, which will certainly be fatal to the influence of the Engliſh on this coaſt, and may end in our total ſubverſion.

The circumſtance of Mr. *Bolts* being now at *Poonah*, and the encouragement given him by *Nannah Furneeſe*, has alſo its due weight in our deliberations, as it may probably lead to the introduction and eſtabliſhment of a new and dangerous competitor to the Company's power and commerce in *India*.

We have now a fair opportunity offered to us of averting theſe great evils without any breach on our part, of the alliance with the Maratta State, though it is obſerved the repeated violations committed by the other party would juſtify any meaſure we might take; if this opportunity is not loſt, we ſhall have it in our power not only to accompliſh the Company's views on this ſide of *India*, in their fulleſt extent, and in the moſt honourable manner to them, by reſtoring *Ragoba* to his juſt rights, but alſo to eſtabliſh their intereſt ſo firmly in the Maratta Government, as to prevent the poſſibility of their forming connections with the French, or any other European nation, to the prejudice of the Honourable Company.

The Maratta Chiefs in general are much diſguſted with *Nannah Furneeſe*, and jealous of his ambitious views, which apparently tend to fixing himſelf at the head of that Government, and the whole body of the people much inclined in favour of *Ragoba*, from whence there is the greateſt reaſon to conclude he may be carried to *Poonah* with little or no oppoſition: the moment it appears he is ſupported by the Company, the preſence of His Majeſty's ſquadron, now daily expected, will not only add weight to our interference, but enable us to ſpare a large body of troops to join the forces of *Saccaram*, &c. to eſcort *Ragoba* to *Poonah*; we are alſo well aſſured of *Hyder*'s favourable diſpoſition towards him, and his readineſs to afford his aſſiſtance, if called upon.

The premiſes therefore being duly conſidered, together with the Company's orders received by the *York*, which expreſs a ſtrong predilection in favour of *Ragoba*, and his pretenſions; the urgency of the caſe, which will admit of no delay; but above all, the imminent and abſolute neceſſity of ſome immediate meaſures being taken to prevent the French from getting a footing in the Maratta Country. Appendix No. 26.

It is unanimouſly reſolved, That it is our duty to make uſe of the opportunity thus thrown in our way, to avert the dangers, and ſecure the benefits above ſet forth.

It is therefore further unanimouſly reſolved, That in caſe *Saccram Bappoo*, *Moraba Furneeſe*, *Buchebah Pronder*, and *Tookajee Holcar*, will make application to us under their new Siccas and hand-writing for the aſſiſtance of the Company, we will inſtantly upon receipt of ſuch a letter, and after the neceſſary preliminaries are ſettled, join them in taking every meaſure in our power for the ſupport and benefit of *Ragoba*, and to carry him to *Poonah*, agreeable to their wiſhes.

Ordered, That Mr. *Lewis* be immediately adviſed of our reſolution, and with all poſſible caution and ſecrecy.

The Preſident acquaints us, that he has converſed with Mr. *Moſtyn*, who is too much indiſpoſed to meet us, on the ſubject of the letter from Mr. *Lewis*, and he has aſſured him that the utmoſt dependence may be had on *Anunt Row*'s being fully authorized to make the overtures, and upon the ſincerity of the party in *Ragoba*'s favour.

It is remarked that Mr. *Lewis* has not been explicit in mentioning the ſtation in which *Saccram*, &c. mean to place *Ragoba*, which he muſt be deſired to explain; as until the legitimacy of the young Peiſhwa can be clearly diſproved *Ragoba* can be entitled only to the Regency.

Mr. *Moſtyn* will proceed to *Poonah* to negociate this important buſineſs as ſoon as his health will poſſibly permit.

Ordered, That a copy of Mr. *Lewis*'s letter, and of our reſolutions thereon, be immediately forwarded to the Governor General and Council, who we flatter ourſelves will do juſtice to our motives, and afford their approbation and ſupport to the ſtep we have taken, and to the meaſures we may further purſue.

Adjourned.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Sec^y.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe,
W^m Aſhburner,
And^w Ramſay.

Sir,

The Preſident has laid before us your letter to him, dated the 5th inſtant.

We have given your letter the conſideration the importance of the ſubject requires; and have reſolved, that if *Saccram Bappoo*, *Morabah Furneeſe*, *Buchabah Pronder*, and *Tookajee Holkar*, will as a proof of their ſincerity make an application by letter, as propoſed by them, for the aſſiſtance of the Company to carry *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, we will inſtantly on the receipt of ſuch letter, under their own Siccas and own hand-writing, and after the neceſſary preliminaries are ſettled, take every meaſure in our power for his ſupport and benefit, and to carry him to *Poonah*, agreeable to their wiſhes.

You will communicate this reſolution to the party with all poſſible expedition and ſecrecy, and loſe not a moment in ſending us their anſwer.

Mr. *Moſtyn* will very ſhortly proceed to *Poonah*.

We are,

Bombay Caſtle, 10th December 1777.

Your loving friends,
William Hornby,
&c. Council.

Appendix. Nos. 27, 28, & 29.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

This is purpoſely to acquaint your Honour, &c. that *Nannah* on the 7th inſtant ſent for Mr. *Bolts*, made him a preſent, deſiring he would leave *Poonah* in a few days; and that he accordingly ſet off this morning with an intent, as I am informed, of proceeding directly to *Bombay*.

I am, reſpectfully,

Poonah, 9th December 1777. Honourable Sir, and Sirs, Your moſt obedient ſervant, *Wm Lewis*.

See Appx. 27.

Signed, the following letter to the Governor General and Council, and to the Preſident and Council, at *Fort Saint George:*

To *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, in charge of the Government and Council at *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

We addreſſed you on the 7th inſtant, to incloſe a packet for the Governor General and Council, and we now incloſe another, which we requeſt you will forward with the utmoſt care and diſpatch.

As the exigency of the Company's affairs under our management may very probably make it neceſſary for us to have an addition to our military force, we requeſt, Gentlemen, you will pleaſe to give orders for a body of two hundred European infantry, half a company of artillery, with their officers, and a battalion of ſepoys, to be held in readineſs for marching to *Anjengo* inſtantly on the receipt of further advices from us; we would recommend their being ordered to *Palamcotta*.

When we are at a greater certainty, we ſhall write more explicitly; but the matter is briefly this, we have had overtures made us from ſome of the moſt conſiderable Members of the Maratta Government, for the aſſiſtance of the Company to replace *Ragoba* at *Poonah*, which for ſeveral weighty reaſons we have thought it our duty to give encouragement to; we will adviſe you as ſoon as we poſſibly can, what is likely to be the iſſue of this buſineſs, and whether we ſhall actually want the force above mentioned; but we again requeſt, that it may be held in readineſs to march on a moment's warning. We have adviſed the Governor General and Council of this application.

We are, Gentlemen,

Bombay Caſtle, 12th December 1777. Your moſt obedient ſervants, *William Hornby*, &c. Council.

APPENDIX, Nos. 27, 28, and 29.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 29th January 1778.

THE Governor General—The Minute which I delivered to be recorded at our laſt Conſultation is of courſe rendered of no conſequence; though I may regret the loſs of ſo much time as I have beſtowed upon it, yet I ſhall be much better pleaſed, if the plan which fortune has thrown into the hands of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, ſhall be attended with a better effect than one formed on defective materials, under the diſadvantage of ſo remote a ſituation. The uncertainty of the events which might take place before it could produce its effect, and the neceſſity of a peremptory deciſion, inſtead of a negociation from which this Government is immediately precluded; and which, under the circumſtances ſuppoſed at the time in which it was written, it could not with propriety entruſt to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, whoſe ſentiments differed very eſſentially from the principles on which it was to be conducted. The letter now before the Board adviſes us of the firſt ſuggeſtion of a plan, the execution of which may have taken place long before this. It may have been attended with immediate and deciſive ſucceſs; it may have ſucceeded immediately in the firſt object, which was to conduct *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, but may have entailed a long ſeries of conſequences, which will eventually involve this Government: at all events, much depends on the reſolutions of this Government. The acts of the gentlemen at *Bombay* will have no validity, nor will any confidence be placed in their engagements unleſs they are ratified by the controlling Power which is veſted in the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*. The ſubject itſelf therefore neceſſarily demands that our reſolutions upon it ſhould be immediate, and that they ſhould be deciſive: it is equally neceſſary for the information of the Court of Directors, who of courſe will form their meaſures on the line which we ſhall have previouſly laid down, or at leaſt on a principal attention to it, that the ſhip now under diſpatch ſhould convey to them the knowledge of our reſolutions; for this purpoſe, and to prevent the loſs of time in a looſe debate, I have formed all the points which appear to me neceſſary for our preſent deliberation and determination, into diſtinct queſtions; others perhaps may occur; in the mean time I ſhall now propoſe theſe to the Board.

1ſt Queſtion. Is it the opinion of the Board, that the the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are warranted by the treaty of *Poorunder*, to join in a plan for conducting *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*, in the application of the ruling part of the adminiſtration of the Maratta State?

2d. Is it the opinion of the Board, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are either bound, or warranted by the orders of the Court of Directors, to give their ſupport to the pretenſions of *Ragonaut Row*, if they can afford it without a violation of the treaty?

3d. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that they approve the plan which the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* have agreed to form with the Maratta Government, as explained in their letter now before the Board?

4th. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that its ſanction ſhall be given to the plan which the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* have agreed to form with the Maratta Government, as expreſſed in their letter now before the Board; and that it will authorize the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to carry the ſame into execution by ſuch means as they ſhall judge moſt adviſeable, provided theſe ſhall be ſuch as are conſiſtent with the treaty, and with the orders of the Company?

5th. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that the Treaty of *Poorunder* not binding the Company to take any part in the diſputes of the Maratta Government, the Company is therefore entitled to ſuch further advantages as may be obtained by negociation, as a compenſation for the hazard and expences of their interpoſition and aſſiſtance?

6th. Is it the opinion and reſolution of the Board, that the following are proper objects to be required, and that it ſhall be recommended to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to require them as a compenſation for the Company's interpoſition? viz.

1ſt. That ſuch reaſonable and practicable ſecurity be obtained for the perſonal ſafety of *Ragonath Row* as he ſhall require.

2d. That a ſpecific ſum be required for to reimburſe the Company for the military charges which may be incurred by their interpoſition.

3d. That the fort and diſtrict of *Baſſein* be ceded in perpetuity to the Company.

4th. That an additional grant of territory be made to the Company, adjacent to *Baſſein* or to *Bombay*, in exchange for *Broach*, and the Lands ceded to the Company by *Futty Sing Guicawar* and for the Pergunnahs of *Hanſood*, *Ahmood*, and *Deſhora*.

5th. That no European ſettlements ſhall be allowed on any of the maritime coaſts of the Maratta Dominions, without the conſent of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* previouſly obtained.

7th. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* ſhall be ſupplied with money

money independent of the ordinary and annual ſupply, and to what amount?

8th. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that any military aſſiſtance ſhall be ſent to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*?

Mr. *Wheler* acquaints the Board that he is not prepared to give his opinion on theſe queſtions, and wiſhes to be allowed time to conſider them.

Mr. *Francis*—Not knowing what ſpecific propoſitions might be laid before the Board, I came prepared to deliver my opinion on that which I ſuppoſed would be the general queſtion for our determination. I believe it will be found to include an anſwer to moſt of the queſtions ſtated by the Governor, and for that reaſon I am ready to record it in this place; at the ſame time, though my general opinion is formed I would wiſh to have an opportunity of giving particular conſideration to each of the queſtions before us, with the reaſons of my aſſent or diſſent; but this I conceive cannot be done by every Member of the Board in the courſe of one day. The Board will be pleaſed to obſerve that the Minute I am going to deliver in has no direct relation to the Governor's propoſitions, as I had not ſeen them.

Mr *Francis*'s Minute.

I feel myſelf equally preſſed by the importance of the queſtion before us, and by the very ſhort time I have had to conſider it: my opinion however of it is formed on principles heretofore carefully weighed and deliberately adopted, and which no new fact belonging particularly to preſent circumſtances has induced me to depart from: I ſhall lay it before the Board without any other introduction, but to requeſt their indulgence for any irregularity in the form, or inaccuracy in the expreſſion. I would propoſe that the Board ſhould proteſt, as I mean to do for myſelf ſeparately, againſt the reſolutions of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, communicated to us in their letter of the 12th December laſt, for the following reaſons:

1ſt. Becauſe their reſolving to join with a party in the Maratta Goverment in meaſures tending to engage the Company in a war, or to their entering into engagements to that effect, as they declare they will do inſtantly on receiving an application from the perſons who are ſuppoſed to form the above party, without the conſent and approbation of this Council firſt had and obtained, is againſt law.

2d. Becauſe it is equally againſt the Company's inſtructions, in their general letters of April 1777, by which the expediency of any future alliance with *Ragoba* is expreſsly left to *our* determination.

3d. Becauſe it is a violation of the 9th and 10th Articles of the Treaty concluded between the Governor General and Council and the Peiſhwa.

4th. Becauſe ſuch violation of a public treaty between two ſtates is not to be juſtified by the reaſons aſſigned for it; (viz.) That a number of individuals in one of thoſe ſtates are inclined to engage in meaſures ſubverſive of all or any of the ſtipulations of ſuch public treaty, and have privately applied for aſſiſtance in carrying ſuch meaſures into execution.

5th. Becauſe even the evidence of ſuch a diſpoſition in the perſons alluded to appears to us very uncertain and defective, being no more than a private verbal meſſage from them to Mr. *Moſtyn*'s ſubſtitute at *Poonah*, meant perhaps for no other purpoſe but to diſcover our intentions with reſpect to *Ragoba*, and which they may diſavow at their pleaſure.

6th. Becauſe there are no proofs before us to warrant our giving credit to an aſſertion ſo improbable, as that *Sacaram Baboo*, whoſe letters to the Governor have been conſtantly, and are to this time filled with complaints againſt the non-execution of the treaty, and particularly of the protection given to *Ragoba*, ſhould voluntarily enter into private engagements to reſtore *Ragoba* to the Regency, and ſolicit the aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of *Bombay* for that purpoſe.

7th. Becauſe, admitting that a party has been formed to ſupport the pretenſions of *Ragoba*, ſuch party is either ſtrong enough to accompliſh their purpoſe without our aſſiſtance, conſequently our interference is unneceſſary, or if their own ſtrength be in itſelf unequal to the enterprize, they will then want an immediate and continued ſupport, which the Preſidency of *Bombay* is in no condition to give them. In their letter of the 7th December they tell us, "that their European battalions are greatly deficient of their proper complement, which they have no means or proſpect of completing, and that notwithſtanding they give every encouragement, it is difficult to raiſe good ſepoys on that coaſt; that they are unable to co-operate with the other Preſidencies, in caſe of an attack upon either of them; that, limited as their power is, and unprovided as they are with reſources, they cannot exert themſelves as the occaſion requires—they can do no more than repreſent the ſituation and circumſtances to us." It follows then, that the reſolution of the Bombay Preſidency to carry *Ragoba* to *Poonah* may involve us in a war, in which the ſafety our poſſeſſions on the Malabar coaſt may be immediately hazarded, and which can no way be ſupported hereafter but by ſupplies of men and money from *Bengal*.

8th. Becauſe it is at all times the duty of this Council to give their utmoſt attention to the preſervation of peace in *India*; but at this conjuncture more particularly than at any other, while a conſiderable part of the national force is employed in *America*, and while the apprehenſions of a war with *France* and *Spain* hangs over the Councils of the nation.

9th. Becauſe the requiſition made by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to that of *Fort Saint George* of a body of forces, for any purpoſe but that of immediate ſelf-defence, without our conſent and approbation, appears to us highly irregular, and in its conſequences dangerous, as it tends to defeat the intention of the legiſlature in the inſtitution of this Council, and to make it impoſſible for us to provide for the ſafety of the Britiſh empire in *India* by any general plan of meaſures. It is not poſſible that the Company's forces ſhould act under a ſteady and united direction for the general ſafety and defence of our poſſeſſions, or move together in any one plan of action, as long as the reſpective diſpoſition of the forces of each of the other Preſidencies is liable to be altered without our knowledge or conſent.

10th. Becauſe the reſolutions taken by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, not only ſtand in direct contradiction to the authorities and engagements herein-before recited, but more eſpecially to the inſtructions of this Council unanimouſly agreed to on the 18th Auguſt laſt, which they appear to have totally diſregarded, and which it is our duty to ſupport and inſiſt on. I deſire the ſecond paragraph of that letter may be read, viz.

"The firſt point has undoubtedly afforded juſt cauſe of offence and jealouſy to the Maratta Government. We wiſh that *Ragoba* had been induced to accept the terms of conciliation lately offered to him by the Miniſters, to reſide at *Benares*, with a jaghire of five lacks of rupees per annum, in the neighbourhood of *Calpee*. Theſe conditions, though they effectually removed the objections formerly made by *Ragoba*, againſt the terms ſecured for him by the treaty, were excepted to by him, on account of the difficulty of proceeding to *Benares*, from the danger that he thought his perſon would be expoſed to in a journey by land, through the Maratta dominions, and his religious ſcruples againſt a voyage by ſea.

"We can ſee no reaſon to doubt, that the preſence of *Ragoba* at *Bombay* will continue to be an inſuperable bar to the completion of the Treaty concluded with the Maratta Government; nor can any ſincere cordiality and good underſtanding be eſtabliſhed with them, as long as he ſhall appear to derive encouragement

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" ment and ſupport from the Engliſh; on the contrary, " we think, that although it may not furniſh ſufficient " grounds for the actual renewal of hoſtilities, it will ſo " far eſtrange the minds of the Miniſters at leaſt as to " compel them to form connections to the diſadvantage " of the Britiſh Government; ſo that notwithſtanding " the terms of a reconciliation ſhould exiſt, neither " party will benefit by the effects of it. We therefore " think it incumbent upon us to recommend to your " moſt mature conſideration the dangerous effects of " your perſiſting ſtill to continue that protection to *Ra-* " *goba*; and to deſire that you will do all that lies in " your power to remove the obſtacles which oppoſe his " departure from *Bombay*; for this purpoſe, we think " that he ſhould be required to make choice either of " a journey by land, if *Tuckojee Holkar* and *Madajee* " *Scindia* will give proper ſecurity to conduct him in " ſafety, which we have been aſſured they would do, or " of a voyage by ſea, which might be accompliſhed with- " out affecting his religious purity, if he were accommo- " dated with a veſſel fitted out and manned immediately " under his orders, and by perſons of his own ſect, to " be accompanied by one of the Company's marine " veſſels for his protection. If both theſe expedients " ſhould be rejected by *Rogoba*, we muſt naturally con- " clude, that it is not his intention to part with his pre- " ſent aſylum, but that the objections which he has " ſtarted to the terms propoſed to him, are mere pre- " texts; and on this ground we repeat our injunctions, " that he be poſitively required to quit the Company's " dependencies, as we ſhall hold you reſponſible for all " the conſequences of continuing the Company's pro- " tection to him after ſuch a refuſal on his part."

If the Board ſhould agree in the preceding reſolutions, I am of opinion that a copy of them ſhould be ſent to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, with an additional declaration, that we deem them ſolely reſponſible to the Company and to the nation, for all the conſequences of the meaſures they have taken, or may take on this occaſion, without our conſent and approbation; and that whereas they have not yet demanded of us any ſpecific ſupply either of men or money to ſupport the execution of the above meaſures, we are determined that whatever aſſiſtance we may be compelled to give them, by the neceſſity of defending the Company's poſſeſſions on that coaſt, ſhall be ſtrictly confined to the object of defence; and that we will never encourage or ſupport any plan of operations, calculated to carry the Company's arms beyond that line, without our conſent and approbation firſt had and obtained, or without the expreſs and ſpecific orders of the Company to that effect; that when we receive the further advices which they promiſe to give us, *of what is likely to be the iſſue of this buſineſs*, we ſhall communicate to them our opinions and reſolutions thereupon.

Mr. *Barwell*—I am ready to give my opinion directly on the queſtions propoſed from the chair; but as it would be out of rule to give my vote upon the ſeveral points that are under conſideration, before the ſentiments of the other members are delivered, I ſhall wait their leiſure. The general queſtion on which Mr. *Francis* ſuppoſed the debate would naturally turn, and which he ſuppoſes to include an anſwer to the queſtions before the Board, may be proper, abſtractedly conſidered with the circumſtances that muſt decide the political meaſures of every Government. The political intercourſe between nations is not to be ſummarily pronounced upon. The variety of intereſts which combine and lead to the greateſt objects ought not to be left unattended to, for ſpeculative ſyſtems of peace; when every inſtance that comes before us, upon the faireſt diſcuſſion, ſtrongly ſpeaks a diſpoſition in thoſe who we may regard our friends, actuated by the moſt hoſtile intentions. I mean not to free the *Bombay* Government from entire blame, in the courſe of their proceedings ſince the ratification of the treaty of *Poorunder*, but it is evident to me that they would not have ſtood exculpated to the Company or the nation, had they declined under that treaty to anſwer the expectations of the public, and availed themſelves of the favourable circumſtances that were preſented. I profeſs (however much I may wiſh to ſee a ſyſtem prevail in *India* that may enſure the public tranquillity of it) I by no means concur in any plan that ſimply profeſſes the object, while it ſows the ſeed of future trouble. The Treaty of *Poorunder*, and the acknowledgment of the Miniſterial Government, with the meaſures adopted, profeſſing an object they did not ſecure, is now at a criſis. The Government itſelf, I may ſee, invites us to a ſettlement of their own diſſenſions; and though they are all called a party of individuals, the oppoſite is but a ſingle man, who was concerned in the treaty; and he, to protect himſelf, is forming connections with the French. That the party inviting *Ragoba* are not ſtrong enough to introduce him to power, is not to be imagined, from their calling in a foreign aid. The example ſeems to have been ſet them from the weakeſt faction, and the alarm taken at the intrigues of that faction to introduce the French, to have determined thoſe who have the ruling influence. Theſe obſervations are haſtily made, and I deſire they may meet with that allowance which the expreſſion of thoughts that have ariſen on the inſtant, have a claim to. I ſhall poſſibly take a future occaſion of delivering my ſentiments more fully on this important ſubject.

Agreed, That the conſideration of this buſineſs be poſtponed till Monday next.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 2d February 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

Re-conſidered, the ſubject of the laſt Conſultation.

Read the queſtion therein propoſed by the Governor General.

Mr. *Wheler* delivers in the following Minute:

1ſt. It being agreed by the 12th Article of the Treaty, concluded between the Company and the Maratta State 1ſt May 1776, that " no aſſiſtance is to be " given by the Engliſh to *Ragonaut Row*, or to any " ſubjects or ſervants who may cauſe diſturbances or " rebellion in the Maratta dominions," I do not think that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are warranted by the Treaty of *Poorunder* to join in a plan for conducting *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*; nor can I agree with the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, " that the appli- " cation of *Sacarum Baboo*, *Morabee Furneeſſe*, *Batche-* " *ba Punder*, *Tolkagee Holkar*, may certainly with the " utmoſt juſtice be conſidered as an application from the " Maratta State, and treated accordingly," becauſe thoſe perſons, be their ſtation and influence what it may, can only be conſidered as conſtituting a party in the ſtate, in oppoſition to another party, headed (as it appears from the *Bombay* proceedings) by *Nanna Furneeſſe*; and I do not think that we are warranted by the Treaty of *Poorunder*, to take a part in the diviſions of that Government.

2d. In giving my opinion on the ſecond queſtion, I muſt firſt obſerve, that I entirely diſapprove the conduct of the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, in coming to a reſolution which may, if the conditions of it are complied with by the other contracting party, involve their Government, and all the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, in a war with the Maratta State, and this without firſt

receiving

receiving the ſanction of our Board, as required by the late Act of Parliament. I differ from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, in thinking that the urgency of the caſe would admit of no delay, and "that there was "an imminent and abſolute neceſſity of ſome meaſures "being taken to prevent the French from getting a foot-"ing in the Maratta Country." Their own proceedings ſtate no facts to prove ſuch immediate interference on the part of the French, but expreſs their ſuſpicions only of an agreement being made by the Chevalier *St. Lubin* with *Nanna Furneeſſe*, and of an expreſs having been ſent to *Europe* in conſequence. It follows, that even on the Preſident and Council's own ſtatement of the argument, that they have had the ſame opportunity as the French Agent to make repreſentations to *Europe* of ſuch negociations, and that even admitting them to take full effect there (which I hold to be very doubtful) the Company will have time to take meaſures at home in conſequence, and to tranſmit their inſtructions for the guidance of their ſervants abroad; and it follows ſtill more ſtrongly, that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* were not ſo preſſed in point of time, but they might have made application to this Board, accompanied with full repreſentations of the ſtate of affairs, and received our inſtructions accordingly. I do not therefore think that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are either bound or warranted by the orders of the Court of Directors to give their ſupport to the pretenſions of *Ragonaut Row*, even if they could effect it, without a violation of the treaty; as the conſent of this Board, as directed by the Act of Parliament, was neceſſary to be firſt had and obtained.

3d. It is true that the Company do, in their general letter of the 5th February 1777, ſay, "that if the con-"ditions of the Treaty of *Poonah* have not been ſtrictly "fulfilled on the part of the Marattas, and if from any "circumſtances you ſhall deem it expedient, we ſhall "have no objection to an alliance with *Ragoba*, on the "terms agreed on between him and the Governor and "Council of *Bombay*," yet in all their former orders, though they expreſs the ſtrongeſt deſire of poſſeſſing *Salſette*, they ſtrictly prohibit the Governor and Council from taking poſſeſſion of it by force, under any circumſtances whatever, without firſt obtaining their permiſſion for that purpoſe; and even, according to the terms of the order firſt quoted, although the treaty ſhould not be ſtrictly complied with, yet the ſanction for our making an alliance with *Ragoba*, depends on our deeming the circumſtances expedient, which from the incomplete ſtate of the Company's forces upon the Bombay eſtabliſhment, from the total inability of their treaſury to ſupport in any degree the expence of a Maratta war, from the danger and difficulty of affording them aſſiſtance from *Fort St. George* in caſe the meaſures which the Governor and Council of *Bombay* have adopted, ſhould terminate in a rupture with the Marattas, and from the ſtill greater hazard of tranſporting troops from hence, added to the ruinous conſequences that muſt follow from draining this treaſury to ſupport a war in a part of *India* ſo remote from hence, and the uncertainty of affairs in *Europe*, which require every precaution on our part to avoid even the riſque of adding to the embarraſſments of Government, I am of opinion, from ſtrong and urgent reaſons, why an alliance with *Ragoba*, or any interference in the diviſions of the Maratta State, is at this particular time dangerous and inexpedient, and in which, if the party we eſpouſe ſucceed in their views, the advantages are ſmall and uncertain; if they fail, the whole burthen of a war with the united Maratta State, muſt fall on the Company, and perhaps be extended to all their poſſeſſions; the conſequences of which are too obvious to make it neceſſary to point them out, and cannot be thought of without the deepeſt concern.

4th. As the plan propoſed by the Governor and Council of *Bombay* appears to me neither conſiſtent with the treaty, or conformable to the Orders of the Company, I cannot give my conſent to it. Appendix, Nos. 27, 28, & 29.

5th. I think the Treaty of *Poorunder* is binding to the Company, not to take any part in the diſputes with the Maratta Government, as by the 12th Article it is agreed, that no aſſiſtance is to be given by the Engliſh to *Ragonaut Row*, or to any ſubject or ſervant of the Peiſhwa, who may cauſe diſturbances or rebellion in the Maratta dominions; conſequently the future advantages which may be obtained by negociation, muſt neither expoſe the Company on the one hand, to the precarious events of a war, nor the Marattas on the other, to the hazard of internal revolutions.

6th. As proviſion for and perſonal ſecurity to *Ragonaut Row* are implied in the 9th Article of the Treaty of *Poorunder*, I can have no objection to that part of the Governor General's queſtion, nor that a ſpecific ſum be required to reimburſe the Company for military charges; except that I object to military operations being adopted. If *Baſſein* can be obtained on the terms mentioned in my anſwer to the 5th queſtion propoſed by the Governor General, I ſhall moſt certainly give my aſſent to it, but not otherwiſe; neither ſhall I object to an additional grant of land to be made to the Company adjacent to *Baſſein* or to *Bombay*, in exchange for *Broach*, and the lands ceded to the Company by *Futtah Sing*, and for the Pergunnahs of *Hanſood*, *Ahmood*, and *Deſborah*, if it can be obtained in like manner. Neither have I any objection to the reſtriction preſcribed by the Governor General on Europeans ſettling upon the maritime coaſt of the Maratta dominions, without the conſent of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* previouſly had and obtained.

7th. I am of opinion that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* ſhall have the uſual ſupply of money from this Preſidency, and no more.

8th. If the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* ſhall involve themſelves in a war with the Marattas, I am of opinion that they will require military aſſiſtance, and that we muſt of neceſſity ſupport them, as far as we can with ſafety, but I am againſt furniſhing them with the means of war.

(Signed) *Edwd Wheler.*

Mr. *Francis* delivers in his ſentiments in a Minute as follows:—

Mr. *Francis*—To the five firſt queſtions propoſed by the Governor General, I beg leave to ſtate two general objections, which, if I meant to inſiſt on them, would I think juſtify me in declining to give any anſwer to queſtions ſo ſtated. The firſt is, that they do not bring directly into our view the great general queſtion, with all its conſequences of approbation or diſapprobation of the meaſures reſolved on at *Bombay*, that is, of Peace or War; but rather tend to anticipate the deciſion of that queſtion, by engaging the Board in a ſeries of preliminary reſolutions, of which we might not ſee the extent and ultimate reſult. I do not however impute this intention to Mr. *Haſtings*; on the contrary, I acknowledge his candour, in not inſiſting on the form of debate preſcribed by the queſtions, and agreeing to receive the opinion of each member in any manner he thought proper.

My ſecond objection is, that each of the firſt five queſtions ſuppoſes ſome propoſition to be taken for granted, the truth or poſſibility of which I do not admit; but this failing, the queſtion of courſe is annihilated.

1ſt Queſtion. I deny that the application herein ſtated has been made *by the ruling part of the Maratta State*: if it has, and if they are the *ruling part*, they can re-inſtate *Ragoba* without our aſſiſtance. At all events, the Preſidency of *Bombay* are not warranted by the Treaty of *Poorunder* to join in the plan.

2d Queſtion. I deny the poſſibility of their giving their ſupport to the pretenſions of *Ragoba* without a violation of the treaty, which expreſsly declares, that "if "he

Appendix. Nos 27, 28, & 29.

" he refuſes to diſband his army, we are to withdraw " our forces, and are not to aſſiſt him." But independent of the treaty, the Preſidency of *Bombay* are neither bound nor warranted by the Company's orders, to engage in ſuch a meaſure, the expediency of which is expreſsly left to our determination alone by the 25th paragraph of the Company's letter to us of the 5th February 1777.

3d Queſtion. No plan is mentioned in the *Bombay* letter, nor does any ſeem to have been formed with the Maratta Government, unleſs the reſolution to carry *Ragoba* to *Poonah* be underſtood in that ſenſe.

4th. The ſubſtance of the third queſtion ſeems to be included in the fourth; I deem it impoſſible to carry into execution the meaſures propoſed by the Preſidency of *Bombay* of conducting *Ragoba* to *Poonah* conſiſtently with the treaty, or with the orders of the Company, who have acquieſced in it. To both theſe queſtions, generally taken, my anſwer is in the negative.

5th. In any treaty whatever, the contracting parties are undoubtedly entitled to as many advantages as they can obtain by negociation: but adhering, as I do, to the principles of that fundamental plan of policy, by which the Company themſelves have limited their views on the Malabar coaſt, and guided by the experience of former times, and ſimilar tranſactions, I do not admit that any advantages we can promiſe ourſelves from a treaty with *Ragoba*, can compenſate for the hazard and expence of engaging in an offenſive war in his ſupport. But as this queſtion cannot be more pointedly anſwered, than in the words of the Court of Directors themſelves, I beg leave to adopt, and make uſe of them.

In their letter to *Bombay* of the 12th April 1775, they ſay, "There is no part of your conduct more reprehenſible, " than that of engaging *without abſolute neceſſity* in military " expeditions. The conſequences of your proceedings " are embarraſſing in the higheſt degree; and after ſuc- " ceeding againſt the place (*Broach*) it is mortifying to " obſerve, that our affairs are in a much worſe ſituation " than they were before thoſe expeditions were under- " taken."

6th. Having given a negative to the interpoſition itſelf, I need not conſider what terms ought to be required as a compenſation for it.

With reſpect to *Baſſein*, I ſhall be at all times ready and deſirous to concur in meaſures for obtaining it, becauſe I know it is a favourite object with the Company; but it muſt be on the footing of amicable negociation, by exchange or purchaſe. As for myſelf, I confeſs my opinion of the benefit of obtaining *Baſſein* is much altered by what I have ſeen of *Salſette*. This place, ſo far from producing the extraordinary advantages expected from it, I believe does not pay its expences; and this I am convinced will be the fate of every acquiſition we make on the Malabar coaſt.

7th. No.

8th. No.

Mr. *Francis*—I beg leave to add, that I entirely adopt and ſubſcribe to the arguments urged by Mr. *Wheler*, deeming them a ſtrong confirmation of my own opinion.

Mr. *Barwell*—Suppoſing the queſtions propoſed by the Governor General to be regularly put, I ſhall go through them progreſſively.

Queſtion the Firſt.

Is it the opinion of the Board that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are warranted by the Treaty of *Poorunder* to join in a plan for conducting *Rogonaut Row* to *Poonah*, on the application of the ruling part of the adminiſtration of the Maratta State?

Anſwers.

Moſt certainly.

Queſtion 2d. Is it the opinion of the Board, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are either bound or warranted by the orders of the Court of Directors, to give their ſupport to the pretenſions of *Ragonaut Row*, if they can afford it without a violation of the treaty?

The orders of the Company are ſuch, that I do not think their Governments in *India* can decline, under preſent circumſtances, to aid the pretentions of *Ragonaut Row*.

Queſtion 3d. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that they approve the plan which the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* have agreed to form with the Maratta Government, as explained in their letter now before the Board?

Anſwer 3d. The ſcene that opens on the weſt ſide of *India* may I think, engage us too far, I mean if it is purſued to the utmoſt extent, and proſecuted with a ſpirit of conqueſt; but if confined to the ſimple objects of ſecurity to the Engliſh poſſeſſions, and the excluſion to the natural enemies of our Government, there can be no objection to our becoming parties to it, and giving full ſanction to the Bombay Preſidency in the plan it may adopt for ſuch ſalutary purpoſes. Beyond theſe neither preſent neceſſity nor future ſafety require, nor ſhould be allowed to influence our policy. Premiſing theſe objects to bound the Bombay plan, I acquieſce, but no further; and I give the grounds on which I found my acquieſcence, becauſe the views of the Bombay Preſidency are not laid down with that preciſion I think they ought to have been, at a criſis ſo important to the general intereſts of the nation.

Queſtion 4th. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that its ſanction ſhall be given to the plan which the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* have agreed to form with the Maratta Government, as expreſſed in their letter now before the Board, and that it will authorize the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to carry the ſame into execution, by ſuch means as they ſhall judge moſt adviſable, provided theſe ſhall be ſuch as are conſiſtent with the treaty, and with the orders of the Company?

Anſwer 4th. I agree to authorize the Bombay Preſidency to carry into execution their plan, under the deſcription expreſſed in my reply to the Third Queſtion, by ſuch means as it ſhall judge moſt adviſeable.

Queſtion 5th. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that the Treaty of *Poorunder* not binding the Company to take any part in the diſputes of the Maratta Government, the Company is therefore entitled to ſuch further advantages as may be obtained by negociation, as a compenſation for the hazard and expence of their interpoſition and aſſiſtance?

Anſwer 5th. The Company have a right to compenſation for the aſſiſtance to be given.

Queſtion

Queſtion 6th. Is it the opinion and reſolution of the Board, that the following are proper objects to be required, and that it ſhall be recommended to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, to require them as a compenſation for the Company's interpoſition, viz.

1ſt. That ſuch reaſonable and practicable ſecurity be obtained for the perſonal ſafety of *Ragonaut Row* as he ſhall require?

2d. That a ſpecific ſum be required to reimburſe the Company for military charges, which may be incurred by their interpoſition?

3d. That the fort and diſtrict of *Baſſein* be ceded in perpetuity to the Company.

4th. That an additional grant of territory be made to the Company adjacent to *Baſſein* or to *Bombay*, in exchange for *Broach*, and the lands ceded to the Company by *Futty Sing Guicawar*, and for the Pergunnahs of *Hanſood*, *Ahmood*, and *Deſborah*.

5th. That no European ſettlements ſhall be allowed on any of the maritime coaſts of the Maratta dominions, without the conſent of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, previouſly obtained.

Anſwer 6th. The following are proper objects to be obtained: Appendix Nos. 27, 28, & 29.

1ſt. Perſonal ſecurity to *Ragoba*.

2d. A ſpecific ſum for the military charges.

3d. The fort and diſtrict of *Baſſein*.

4th. Territory adjacent to *Baſſein* and *Bombay*, in exchange for *Broach*. The lands ceded by *Futty Sing Guicawar*, and the Pergunnahs of *Hanſood*, *Ahmood*, and *Deſborah*.

5th. Conſent of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, to any European ſettlements on the Maratta coaſt.

Queſtion 7th. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* ſhall be ſupplied with money independant of the ordinary and annual ſupply, and to what amount?

Anſwer 7th. The *Bombay* Preſidency ſhould be ſupplied with ten lacks immediately, independant of the annual remittance.

Queſtion 8th. Is it the reſolution of the Board, that any military aſſiſtance ſhall be ſent to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*.

Anſwer 8th. A military force ought to be prepared, and ſent to *Bombay* without delay.

The Governor General—To the firſt queſtion I am of opinion, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are ſo far warranted by the Treaty of *Proonder*, that they are not precluded by it from joining in a plan for conducting *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*; on the application of the ruling part of the adminiſtration of the Maratta State.

To the ſecond: I am of opinion, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are both warranted and bound by the orders of the Court of Directors, and particularly to thoſe expreſſed in the 25th paragragh of their general letter, 5th February 1777, to give their ſupport to the pretenſions of *Ragonaut Row*, if they can afford it without a violation of the treaty.

To the third: I agree with the proviſions expreſſed in Mr. *Barwell*'s anſwer to this queſtion.

I agree to the fourth, with the ſame proviſions.

I agree to the fifth.

I agree to the ſixth.

Agreed to the ſeventh, in the words of Mr. *Barwell*.

I agree to the eighth; but ſhall not myſelf propoſe that it be carried into execution, until we receive further advices from *Bombay*, which will be neceſſary to warrant it. But I propoſe, that the Commander in Chief be conſulted upon this ſubject, and that the letter received from *Bombay* of the 12th December, and their laſt military returns, with ſuch other parts of their correſpondence as may be neceſſary for his information on this propoſition, be communicated to him for that purpoſe.

Reſolved, That it is the opinion of the Board, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are warranted by the Treaty of *Poorunder*, to join in a plan for conducting *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*, on the application of the ruling part of the adminiſtration of the Maratta State.

2d. Reſolved, That it is the opinion of the Board, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* are warranted, by the orders of the Court of Directors, to give their ſupport to the pretenſions of *Ragonaut Row*, if they can afford it, without a violation of the treaty.

3d. Reſolved, That the plan which the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* have agreed to form with the Maratta Government, as explained in their proceedings of the 10th December, and in their letter of the 12th of December 1777, be approved.

4th. Reſolved, That the ſanction of this Government be given to the plan which the Preſident and Council have agreed to form with the Maratta Government as above expreſſed; and that they be authorized to carry the ſame into execution by ſuch means as they ſhall judge moſt adviſeable, provided theſe be conſiſtent with the treaty, and the orders of the Court of Directors.

5th. Reſolved, That the Company not being bound by the Treaty of *Proonder*, to take part in the diſputes of the Maratta Government, are therefore entitled to any farther advantages that may be obtained by negociation, as a compenſation for the hazard and expence of their interpoſition and aſſiſtance.

6th. Reſolved, That it is the opinion of this Board, that the following are proper objects to be required as a compenſation for the interpoſition of the Company; and that it be recommended to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, to obtain them accordingly; viz.

1ſt. That ſuch reaſonable and practicable ſecurity be obtained for the perſonal ſafety of *Ragonaut Row* as he ſhall require.

2d. That a ſpecific ſum be required to reimburſe the Company for the military charges which may be incurred by their interpoſition.

3d. That the fort and diſtrict of *Baſſein* be ceded in perpetuity to the Company.

4th. That an additional grant of territory be made to the Company, adjacent to *Baſſein* or to *Bombay*, in exchange for *Broach* and the lands ceded to the Company by *Futteh Sing Guicawar*, and for the Pergunnahs of *Hanſood*, *Ahmood*, and *Deſbora*.

5th. That no European ſettlements ſhall be allowed on any of the maritime coaſts of the Maratta dominions, without the conſent of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* previouſly obtained.

7th. Reſolved, That a ſupply of money, to the amount of ten lacks of rupees, be immediately granted to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, for the ſupport of their engagements above-mentioned, independent of the ordinary annual ſupply to that Preſidency.

8th. Reſolved, That military aſſiſtance ſhall be ſent to the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

In explanation of the grounds of the 3d reſolution, the Board think it neceſſary to remark, that they underſtand the plan of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to be confined merely to the objects of ſecurity to the Engliſh poſſeſſions in *India*, and to the excluſion of the natural enemies of the Britiſh Government from any influence or connection with the Marattas.

Appendix, Nos. 27, 28, & 29.

No. 28.

Reſolved, That the above reſolutions be immediately tranſmitted by expreſs Pattamars to *Bombay*, with the following letter:

Gentlemen,

We have received your letters of the 7th, 12th, and 17th December.

Having taken the laſt of theſe letters, with your proceedings which accompanied it, into our fulleſt conſideration, we have agreed to ſundry diſtinct reſolutions upon the general ſubject of them; a copy of which we tranſmit to you for your authority and guidance.

At the ſame time that we refer you to theſe for our reply to your letter, we muſt requeſt that you will attend particularly to the following explanation of the circumſtances and conſiderations on which they have been formed.

We have ſuppoſed, that your intentions were to act in concert with the Maratta Government; to aſſiſt in compoſing its inteſtine diviſions, at the particular ſolicitation of its chief Miniſter; and by means of ſuch a policy, to prevent the growth of an influence dangerous to the Company's intereſts; to defeat the intentions of a party adverſe to the Company, and to promote the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions. In this view, we give our aſſent and ſanction to the plan which you propoſe to engage in; making it an expreſs condition of our concurrence, that you reſtrict your operations merely to the objects ſo required and defined; and that you withdraw your forces as ſoon as theſe ſhall be fully accompliſhed.

Fort William, We are, &c.
2d February 1778.

No. 29.

Read the Governor General's propoſition contained in his opinion on the 8th queſtion.

Mr. *Wheler*—If the Board are determined to ſend troops to *Bombay*, I agree, that it will be highly proper to conſult the General upon the ſubject; but I abide by my former opinion of the impropriety of that meaſure.

Mr. *Francis*—I yield to the Governor General's propoſal as a conſequence of a reſolution already taken; but I muſt deſire it to be underſtood, that I ſhall not deem myſelf bound by the anſwer to the enquiry, diſapproving totally of the reſolution itſelf.

Mr. *Barwell* agrees to the reference.

Reſolved accordingly.

The Governor General—I further propoſe, that the ſentiments of the Commander in Chief be taken upon the propriety of augmenting the ſepoy eſtabliſhment, by new levies of thirty private to each company of ſepoys, and making the ſtrength of each battalion one thouſand men complete: in this caſe our force will not be diminiſhed by any drafts that may be made for the ſervice of *Bombay*.

Mr. *Wheler* agrees.

Mr. *Francis*.—If any force ſhould be ſent from hence to *Bombay*, I conclude it will be neceſſary to replace it by new levies here; but this is an additional reaſon with me for diſapproving of the meaſure.

Mr. *Barwell* agrees.

Reſolved, That the ſentiments of the Commander in Chief be taken upon the propriety of augmenting the ſepoy eſtabliſhment by new levies of thirty private to each company, and making the ſtrength of each battalion one thouſand men complete

Mr. *Francis*—Setting aſide all other conſiderations but thoſe of policy and expedience, I conceive, that the reſolution of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to carry *Ragobá* to *Poonah*, cannot be juſtified on any principle whatever, but that of the probability of their carrying it into execution inſtanter, or by a ſurprize. Their actual force is not equal to a regular ſeries of military operations, or to contend with a well-concerted reſiſtance; when their force was entire under Colonel *Keating*, they were unable to make any impreſſion on the army oppoſite to them: but a reſolution to aſſiſt them with money, and ſtill more with a body of troops from hence, which cannot arrive at *Bombay* till ſeveral months after the commencement of hoſtilities, ſuppoſe the continuance of a war for an indefinite time, and to an unlimited extent. It is in vain for us to ſay, that we conſent to the enterprize under ſuch and ſuch particular limitations: when once we are engaged in it, we can no longer command the event, nor determine how far it will lead us, or at what point we ſhall ſtop. For this reaſon, in addition to thoſe I have already ſtated, I diſſent from and proteſt againſt the reſolutions taken this day, and all the conſequences that may attend them.

Governor General—I muſt beg Mr. *Francis*'s permiſſion to aſk, Whether he means by this diſſent and proteſt, and by the anſwers which he has delivered to the two laſt queſtions propoſed by me on the laſt council day, to declare againſt affording any kind of aſſiſtance to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, if they ſhould be actually engaged in a war?

However we may differ in our opinions of the paſt conduct of that Preſidency, I would hope, that we ſhall be at leaſt unanimous in our reſolutions to ſupport them; which will be to ſupport the Company's and the national intereſts committed to their charge, in the caſe of a war, and for that reaſon only I propoſe the queſtion.

Mr. *Francis*—My diſſent and proteſt are meant to be applied generally to all the reſolutions taken this day on the queſtion now ſtated to me by the Governor. I have already declared myſelf very explicitly, in the minute which I had the honour of laying before the Board on Friday: it is a delicate and embarraſſing queſtion, and not to be decided on any principles, however juſt and prudent, when facts, which we cannot alter or reſiſt, may force us into meaſures againſt our moſt deliberate opinions. Defence is the only object for which I would aſſiſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*; and when I know with certainty, that they have engaged in meaſures of an offenſive nature againſt the Maratta State, my opinion will be, that we ſhould command and require them to withdraw from ſuch meaſures, and return to the defence of their own territories. I cannot give a more preciſe or determinate anſwer to a queſtion, which in its nature muſt in ſome degree be ſubject to events.

Governor General—I beg Mr. *Francis* will believe that I had no intention to embarraſs him by the queſtion which I have propoſed. I expected the anſwer which he has given to it, but choſe rather to propoſe the queſtion in form, than either to leave his intentions doubtful, as they would have appeared from the minute recorded in this day's proceedings, or to appear to impute to them an inconſiſtency with his former declaration, by referring to it.

As Mr. *Wheler*, in his anſwer to the ſecond queſtion, ſeems to doubt the reality of the deſigns of the French, as they are repreſented by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, I requeſt that the following extracts of our Perſian correſpondence may be entered in this place, and that Mr. *Elliot*'s letter, which was addreſſed to the Board on the 1ſt of October laſt, may be annexed to them; as I think it now, whatever it might have been before, of no conſequence to withhold it from a place in our records. Theſe evidences, the firſt of which have not I believe been ſeen by Mr. *Wheler*, will I think remove every doubt of the exiſtence of ſuch a deſign, and of its having been carried into execution, ſo far as it could have been effected by the avowed delivery of the credentials received by the French Agent from the Court of *France*, and by the written engagements affirmed to have been executed between him and one of the Miniſters.

Mr. *Wheler*—I do not recollect that I implied any ſuch doubt of the intention of the French interference in my minute. I have, it is true, endeavoured to make it appear that our immediate fears cannot ariſe from any

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ſuch apprehenſions from the French; as it is ſaid, before they can carry deſigns into execution, they have diſpatched Monſieur de *Sauty* with credentials to the French Miniſtry.

The Governor General—Mr. *Wheler*'s explanation is perfectly conſiſtent with the words of his minute; but as I think the danger which may ariſe from the French intrigues at *Poonah* has not been ſufficiently underſtood, and as theſe form the principal grounds for the ſuppoſed reſolutions of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, I ſtill deſire that the papers above mentioned may be recorded in this day's conſultation.

From *Row Jee* to the Nabob *Wallah Jah*, dated the 13th May 1777.

I ſome time ago tranſmitted to the Preſence two papers of intelligence; the former written on the 1ſt of Rabbe-ul-awul (11th of April) the latter the 19th of the ſame month (29th of April): theſe you have doubtleſs received, and have communicated the contents to his Highneſs. The particulars relative to the French Sirdar are theſe: Mr. *Chevalier*, with a train conſiſting of an elephant and ſtandard, and ſeven gentlemen in palankeens, came to *Durky*, where he remained ten days waiting for his things to come up. On the 24th of Rabbe-ul-awul (4th May) he ſet out from thence, and travelled to *Bhaoury: Bheem Row Pauſa* went on the part of *Seremunt Pundit Purdhaun* to meet him. On the 25th *Siccaram Pundit* and *Nanna Purnaveeſe* went to the encampment under the walls of the fort, where the French Chief was introduced to them: he had not brought his preſents with him. After the ceremony of the introduction was over he retired with *Siccaram Pundit, Nanna Purnaveeſe, Madho Row Sadaſhao, Kiſhen Row Belal, Booſila*'s vackeel, and *Congee* the Interpreter, and produced a letter from the Prime Miniſter of the King of *France*, addreſſed to *Seremunt Pundit Purdhaun*. As there was no Frenchman belonging to the Circar to read it, Mr. *Chevalier* read it himſelf, and the Interpreter explained it: the ſubſtance was, that "from time immemorial friendſhip and harmony had ſubſiſted between the two ſtates, which it was expedient to preſerve in time to come, and that Mr. *Chevalier* would perſonally explain all further particulars." The Miniſters enquired after Mr. *Buſſy*, and were informed by Mr. *Chevalier* that he was in health, and employed in an eminent ſtation about the Prime Miniſter, and that he had deſired his compliments to *Ramchunder Jaddo Row*. They then inquired if the French and Engliſh were friends, or otherwiſe; to which Mr. *Chevalier* anſwered, that they were at preſent friends, and that the French were not at variance with any power whatever. This was all that paſſed in the firſt meeting; after which he took his leave and retired. Proviſion for 200 men, provender, &c. are daily ſupplied by the Circar. *Mulhar Pundit Muttaſuddy*; and 20 hircarrahs are appointed to attend on Mr. *Chevalier*, and procure for him whatever he wants. On the laſt of Rabbe-ul-awul (9th May) Mr. *Chevalier* was deſired to attend at the aforeſaid encampment, to be introduced to *Seremunt Pundit Purdhaun*: there was nobody of conſequence preſent at this interview except *Seremunt Pundit* and the two Miniſters. Mr. *Chevalier* preſented five paintings on glaſs, a cup, a gun, a pair of piſtols, and a glaſs by which poiſon might be diſcovered. After ſome minutes ſpent in profeſſions of friendſhip, Mr. *Chevalier* preſented a letter from the French King, addreſſed to *Seremunt Pundit*: I have not yet been able to learn the contents of it; as ſoon as I do I ſhall inform his Highneſs. After receiving the letter, *Seremunt* took leave of Mr. *Chevalier* and returned to the fort; Mr. *Chevalier* remained in private with the two Miniſters and the Interpreter. *Siccaram* then deſired him to communicate what he had to ſay; to which he replied, "I have a great variety of matter to treat of, which I will fully explain at a convenient time." *Siccaram Pundit* then ſaid, "I will appoint ſome perſon to negociate your buſineſs for you; it muſt be a perſon who is well verſed in your affairs. I know of no one qualified for this purpoſe except *Madho Row Sadaſhas*." Mr. *Chevalier*, not reliſhing this propoſal, made anſwer, "He is employed in the negociations with the Engliſh, how is it poſſible we ſhould unite?" *Siccaram* replied, "Be under no kind of apprehenſions on this account; in like manner as I am ſo alſo is he, a Muttaſeddy of the Circar: all negociations are conducted through Muttaſeddies; but I act in ſuch manner as I think right." Mr. *Chevalier* made no reply, but retired. *Siccaram Pundit* then went to *Shaſhoore* to a wedding; *Nanna Purnaveeſe* is alſo going to *Poonah*, where he will ſtay ten days or a fortnight: this of courſe occaſions a delay in the negociations of the French, which I underſtand will be concluded on their return. *Madho Row* is under great perplexity; not knowing his Highneſs's pleaſure in this matter, he is at a loſs what ſteps to take. I have addreſſed frequent arzees to you in the courſe of the laſt month relative to the French, which you have doubtleſs fully explained to his Highneſs: I am aſtoniſhed that I have not yet been honoured with a line in anſwer thereto. It is now neceſſary that you communicate the above particulars relative to Mr. *Chevalier* to his Highneſs, and write me a full and explicit anſwer; and alſo inform me what conduct I am to obſerve here, that I may accordingly ſatisfy *Madho Row*. The French have till now remained perfectly quiet, but it appears from theſe late meaſures that they deſign to enter again into the affairs of this part; I have therefore ſent repeated expreſſes to the Preſence. Having made yourſelf acquainted with his Highneſs's pleaſure, write me fully on the ſubject.

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From the Nabob *Wallah Jah* to *Row Jee*, dated the 6th June 1777.

I underſtand from your letter written the 3d Rabeaſſanie (13th May) to *Sheeb Row*, that one Monſieur *Chevalier*, a Frenchman, is arrived in thoſe parts, under the pretence of having come from *Europe* on an embaſſy to *Row Pundhit Purdhaun*, and that on this news a man of rank went from *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, met, and conducted him to the preſence of the principal Miniſters, who received him with every mark of friendſhip, gave ear to the repreſentations of that impoſtor, which he himſelf had fabricated, and then produced as coming from the Prime Miniſter of *France*; and that *Madho Row Sadaſhae* conceived that a connection between him and the Miniſters muſt give offence to the Engliſh Chiefs. The hiſtory of this Frenchman is this: he was formerly in the ſervice of *Hyder Ally Khan*, and after waiting ſome time for an opportunity of quarrelling with him, he deſerted him with a party of fugitives, and continued for a long ſpace of time to wander in thoſe parts. Monſieur *Bellecombe*, who is lately arrived from *Europe* in the ſtation of Governor of *Pondicherry*, has not the leaſt knowledge of him, but ſays that he invents theſe impoſitions to procure himſelf a ſupport in the different places to which he wanders. As the firmeſt friendſhip has ſubſiſted for three generations between my family and that of *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, I deſire you will repreſent to *Madho Row Sadaſhae*, that ſince friendſhip and union has been firmly eſtabliſhed by treaty between *Row Pundit Purdhaun* and the Engliſh, the fame of whoſe good faith and ſteadineſs is every where ſpread, and whoſe conſtancy in friendſhip is become a proverb throughout the world; and ſince the Governor General of *Bengal*, who is the abſolute repreſentative of the Engliſh nation in this country, is the author of this treaty, it is neceſſary that he ſhould reflect how highly diſpleaſing the encouragement of this impoſtor of another nation muſt be to

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the Engliſh; that it is therefore incumbent on him (as a man of wiſdom, penetration, and fidelity to *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, and as he was employed, on Colonel *Upton*'s arrival at *Poonah*, on the part of the Governor General of *Bengal*, as the channel of that negociation) to paint to the Miniſters of *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, in the ſtrongeſt colours, the impropriety of ſhewing any countenance to ſuch an impoſtor, and to perſuade them ever to preſerve with the greateſt care the friendſhip of the Engliſh, which is of the greateſt value.

Extract of a Letter from *Siccaram Pundit* to Colonel *Upton*.

Monſieur *Chevalier de St. Lubin*, on the part of the King of *France*, lately arrived on board a ſhip on this coaſt, and landed on *Rio-Dunda*, belonging to this Government, from whence he tranſmitted a letter to the preſence of *Seremunt Row*, *Sahib Row Pundit Purdhaun*, containing a requeſt of an audience to treat with him, which if granted he would wait on him, and fully explain to him the ſubjects of his miſſion. As friendſhip had ſubſiſted from time immemorial between the French nation and the illuſtrious family of *Seremunt Sahib*, and moreover as hoſpitality is due to the Envoy of a great Prince, an order for his approach was ſent from the Preſence. When the aforeſaid gentleman arrives the ſubjects of his negociation will be explained. The Governor and Council of *Bombay* will repreſent this matter to the Supreme Council of *Calcutta* in an injurious light; I have therefore written you and the Supreme Council the relation of what has really paſſed. Friendſhip is now eſtabliſhed between us, which ſhall never be interrupted in the ſmalleſt degree. Do you, my friend, amply repreſent all the particulars to the Governor and Council.

Extract of a Letter from *Siccaram Pundit*, received the 17th July 1777.

Monſieur the *Chevalier de St. Lubin*, on the part of the King of *France*, lately arrived on board a ſhip on this coaſt, and landed at *Rio-Dunda*, belonging to this Government; from whence he tranſmitted a letter to *Seremunt Row*, *Sahib Row Pundit Purdhaun*, containing a requeſt of an audience to treat with him, which if granted he would wait on him, and fully explain to him the ſubjects of his miſſion. As friendſhip has ſubſiſted from time immemorial between the French nation and the illuſtrious family of *Seremunt Sahib*, and moreover in compliance with the duties of hoſpitality, an order for his approach was ſent from the Preſence. When the aforeſaid gentleman arrives, the ſubjects of his negociation will be explained.

The Governor and Council of *Bombay* will repreſent this matter to you in an injurious light; foreſeeing which, and poſſeſſing the moſt ſincere friendſhip towards you, I have given you intelligence of this gentleman's arrival, and what has actually paſſed. No interruption ſhall ever proceed from this Circar, of the friendſhip which has been ſo firmly eſtabliſhed between us.

From the Nabob *Wallah Jah*, 3d September.

I ſometime ago ſent you for your information a newſpaper from *Poonah*, containing an account of the arrival of Monſieur *Le Chevalier*, a Frenchman, at that place; and at the ſame time tranſmitted to you a copy of a letter which I wrote to *Row Jee*, my news-writer, to exert his utmoſt endeavours to prevent the Poonah Chief giving countenance to ſuch a cheat and impoſtor. I now incloſe you an anſwer from the aforeſaid news-writer, addreſſed to his brother. I am induced by the warmth of my friendſhip to ſend you this newspaper. You will keep it under the moſt profound ſecrecy; for ſhould it be known that my news-writer had communicated this intelligence, his life would be in danger.

Extract of a Letter from *Row Jee* to *Sheeſh Row*.

You ſent me two letters on the ſubject of the French Chief to this purport: That this perſon who was to come to *Poonah*, was an impoſtor; that no countenance muſt be ſhewn to him, or any extraordinary appearance of civility kept up with regard to him; for ſhould the gentlemen of the adminiſtration of *Bengal* ſuſpect ſuch an intercourſe, it will be productive of very diſagreeable circumſtances. This I perfectly underſtand. I repreſented all the particulars to the Miniſters, through the channel of *Madho Row Sadaſhae*; but *Kiſhen Row Billal* is the patron of this Frenchman, and makes uſe of every method to perſuade the Miniſters to countenance him. They therefore pretend to Mr. *Moſtyn* and me, that they are about to give him his diſmiſſion; but their real deſigns are different. They have been three or four different times to the houſe of the French Chief, and I hear that he has promiſed, that in the courſe of eighteen months he will procure them from *Europe* a reſpectable body of European troops, with all the neceſſary ſtores, &c, and that the Chiefs of all the different ſettlements ſhall likewiſe receive expreſs inſtructions for their conduct from the King of *France*. He repreſents, that a place on the ſea coaſt will be neceſſary for the reſidence of the forces, and the ſecure anchorage of the ſhips. A ſmall village has therefore been fixed upon near *Rio-Dunda*. This they will give up to him as ſoon as an anſwer arrives from *Europe*. He demands at preſent a monthly ſtipend of one lack and a half of rupees for the ſupport of the people he has with him; and that 10,000 additional ſepoys ſhould be raiſed and properly diſciplined. He has brought on ſhore from the ſhips eighty pieces of cannon; and has alſo with him 200 European ſoldiers, with all kinds of arms and ammunition; and is deſirous of diſciplining this ſmall body. The Miniſters ſay amongſt themſelves, theſe troops will be diſciplined under the direction of Europeans, and the ſepoys which we keep in our ſervice are without neceſſaries or diſcipline; but if put under the direction of Europeans, they will be rendered fit for ſervice. Such are their deliberations. I do not know if *Madho Row Sadaſhae* is acquainted with this circumſtance, and conceals it from me, or whether the Miniſters keep him ignorant of it. I aſked *Madho Row Sadaſhae*, what was the reaſon that cannon, lead, powder, and ammunition, had been landed at the Ghaut of *Rio-Dunda*, and orders given for the building of ſtorehouſes, &c.? He replied, That it was the tempeſtuous ſeaſon which rendered it neceſſary to unload the ſhips; that they had therefore been lightened of their cargoes; that after this ſeaſon was over, they would be again carried on board the ſhips, and the French Chief ſhould receive his diſmiſſion. I ſhall communicate whatever I learn in future.

Tranſlate of a letter from *Siccaram Pundit*, dated the 20th October 1777.

I ſome time ago wrote you information of the approach of a perſon deputed by the King of *France* to this quarter; Monſieur le Chevalier de *St. Lubin* has lately been honoured with an audience of *Row Pundit Purdhaun Peiſhwa Sahib*, when he delivered letters from the King of *France* on the ſubject of ſtrengthening and confirming the ancient friendſhip which ſubſiſted between the two nations; and he alſo ſpoke on the ſubject of their ancient intimacy and connection.

As the rainy ſeaſon was ſet in violently, Mr. le *Chevalier* did not deſire his diſmiſſion, and his departure has been delayed on this account. The duties of hoſpitality both to friends and ſtrangers, are incumbent on Chiefs of high rank.

Should this circumſtance be related to you in an unfavourable light, you will not, I am perſuaded, give credit to it. There will never be the leaſt deviation in Government from the duties of the friendſhip eſtabliſhed,

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but it will take deeper root. I ſend you a letter in a Koreta, from *Seremunt Row Pundit Purdhaun*, addreſſed to the King of *England*, on the ſubject of friendſhip; be pleaſed to tranſmit it to *England*, and procure an anſwer. By this you will much oblige me, give great pleaſure to *Row Sahib Pundit Purdhaun*, and increaſe the friendſhip which at preſent ſubſiſts.

Extract of a letter from *Row Jie* to the Nabob *Wallah Jah*; dated the 30th of September.

The French Chief brought here five lacks of rupees in goods, which he has ſold to the merchants of this place, but he is to deliver them here; he is accordingly gone with his people to *Rio* to fetch them.

Extract of a letter from *Dewagur Pundit*, Dewan of *Moodajee Booſla*, Rajah of *Berar*. Received 18th December.

Soon afterwards an experienced Ambaſſador arrived on the part of the King of *France*, with a letter and preſent of various articles, and earneſtly entreated an audience of *Pundit Purdhaun*, which he obtained: I was alſo acquainted with the diſcourſes they held in private: five perſons only were privy to this matter. The intention of what I have written above, is to ſhew, that as ſoon as the Engliſh entered into alliance with *Pundit Purdhaun*, the powers of other countries immediately courted his friendſhip, and his Government thereby acquired a freſh degree of ſplendor.

Firſt extract from a letter from *Rowjee* to the Nabob *Wallah Jah*; dated the 11th April 1777.

Mr. *Moſtyn* informed me, that two French ſhips, one carrying 70 guns, and the other 40, were arrived at *Rio*, and the other at *Rio-Dunda*; that they had ſent boats to learn intelligence concerning *Ingria*, who was near to them, with four or five men in a boat from the ſhip, who coming to *Rio-Dunda*, viſited the Government Gomaſtah, and through him wrote an arzee to the Preſence, to be admitted to an audience. Mr. *Moſtyn* hearing this, repreſented that the French were in alliance with *Hyder Ally Khan*, and that it was neceſſary the Government ſhould be on its guard; but the Miniſters paid no regard to him, but ſent orders to the Gomaſtahs at *Rio-Dunda* to furniſh the French who were arrived there with conveyances to tranſport them to the preſence. On the arrival of theſe orders, three European, two Caffries, with a Writer of *Ingria*'s, and forty-five Peons, ſet out for the Preſence, and arrived at *Poonah*. On the 28th *Nanah Purnaveeſſe* returning to *Poonah*, they waited on him, but what paſſed between them is not known. *Madho Row* has taken no part in this buſineſs, nor is there any perſon of credit engaged in it except *Nanah Purnaveeſſe*. I hear that ſome French officer is arrived at *Rio-Dunda*, and means to proceed to the Preſence: on this account, *Nanah Purnaveeſſe* continues ſome days at *Poonah*. This circumſtance has thrown a damp on Mr. *Moſtyn*'s negociations. The French Chief is daily expected; when he arrives I will make myſelf acquainted with the ſubject of his negociation, and tranſmit you an account thereof. I learn from report, that the French officer's name is Monſieur le Chevalier de *St. Lubin*.

From the Aumil of *Windawas*, dated 29th Auguſt 1777.

I have already informed you of the arrival of the French officer, and of his engagement with the Miniſters to bring them aid from *Europe* in the courſe of 18 months, during which time they are to give him the command of 10,000 infantry, to be diſciplined by him. They were ſettling the pay of this body when your Highneſs's letter to me arrived, directing me to explain in the cleareſt manner to the Miniſters, that by giving encouragement to a French Sirdar, the long eſtabliſhed friendſhip between them and your Highneſs and the Engliſh would be deſtroyed; and that they muſt not expect in ſuch caſe any friendſhip, either from you or the Engliſh. This repreſentation occaſioned much reflection and threw a damp on the negociation.

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I hear that the French Sirdar has written letters to *France* through the factory of *Surat*, but the purport is not known. Mr. *Moſtyn* told me that the King of *France* ſent him to gain intelligence.

It is very certain he has a letter from the King of *France*. The Miniſters ſent diſpatches to *Europe* through the Chief of *Surat*, in conſequence of which the King ſent this man, and it is probable that whatever he may have propoſed in his letters will be complied with.

For the ſake of appearances, he brought goods with him, and is engaged in commerce, but his real deſigns are different. His expences are great; how ſhould he be able to make ſuch preſents of himſelf? From theſe circumſtances it is evident that he is no impoſtor.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Having been fortunate enough to obtain ſome intelligence before I left *Europe*, in which the intereſt of the *Eaſt India* Company and the influence of *Great Britain* in *India* appear to be deeply intereſted, I think it incumbent upon me to take the earlieſt opportunity of communicating it to your Honourable Board: I am concerned at the ſame time to be under the neceſſity of laying the facts only before you, without having it in my power to point out the channels through which the intelligence was conveyed to me; as my promiſe was moſt particularly taken before I was myſelf entruſted with it, that I ſhould conceal the names of the perſons from whom I received the information. It was not without ſome difficulty that I obtained permiſſion to inform the Governor General and Sir *John Clavering* of this material circumſtance, and that only upon condition that they ſhould not truſt it to the records of the Company, however ſecret they might be. The opinions which thoſe gentlemen muſt form as to the authenticity of the facts which I now propoſe myſelf the honour of laying before you, will be a ſufficient juſtification of me for addreſſing you in this letter.

It appears by the information to which I allude, that Monſieur *Sartine*, Miniſtre de la Marine of *France*, has concerted with three or four of the principal Miniſters of that country a ſcheme, the object of which is, the total overthrow of the Engliſh intereſts in *India*; that he was ſenſible the force which *France* could herſelf bring againſt our ſettlements would prove inſufficient for ſo great an undertaking, and had therefore thought it neceſſary to the completion of his views, to begin by intriguing with the country powers, and by endeavouring to ſecure them in the intereſt of *France*, in oppoſition to thoſe of *Britain*; that for this purpoſe it was reſolved to ſend a perſon to *India* with full powers, in the character Agent, and likewiſe to ſend out perſons, who in the information are called des Exerceurs, to diſciplin the natives of *India*, and a conſiderable quantity of arms and military ſtores. The perſon who was nominated to this office was deſcribed to me as one who had before been in *India*. He was to go to *Pondicherry* firſt, but to aſſume no public character, that he might not be ſubjected to the ſuſpicions of the Engliſh; he is furniſhed with letters from the Court of *France* to all the Country Princes of any note in *India*, to be uſed at his own diſcretion; he likewiſe carries out preſents of conſiderable value, which he is to diſtribute as he may judge neceſſary. The ſubſtance of his inſtructions are as follows: To treat with ſuch of the country powers as he may have reaſon to think will moſt readily aſſiſt the views of *France*, and to form alliances with them in the name of the King of *France*, to endeavour to perſuade the country powers to fall upon the Engliſh ſettlements; and he is authorized to promiſe ſuch as will accede to his propoſal, the warmeſt ſupport of his nation ſecretly till hoſtilities are actually commenced, and then openly. He is warned however

Appendix. Nos. 27, 28, & 29.

however in his inſtructions, that *France* is not to take the lead in the war, but is to come in, as an aſſiſtant only. The perſon from whom I learned theſe particulars knows for certain that the Agent ſailed from *Marſeilles* in the beginning of April laſt, but was unacquainted with his name, and unable to inform me for certain what road he had followed to *India*, but ſeemed to be of opinion that he muſt have paſſed over to Alexandria, in the intention of embarking at *Suez* for *India*.

Having informed you of what I venture to ſay may be relied on as authentic, it will not be miſplaced to add an account more in detail of ſome enquiries which my knowledge of the above circumſtances led me to make, which though by no means ſo ſucceſsful as my zeal on this occaſion would make me wiſh, will not, I flatter myſelf, be deemed unworthy of your notice.

A circumſtance which I learned from Colonel *Capper*, who had paſſed through *Egypt* in February laſt, and which was confirmed to me by Mr. *Dighton*, who was in his Company, rendered it very probable that the Agent had paſſed through that Country in his way to *India*. That the French Conſul at *Cairo* was in daily expectation of the arrival of a ſhip at *Cairo*, when they paſſed through that town; and I was told by Mr. *Baldwin*, an Engliſh gentleman reſiding at *Cairo*, that when an account was brought of a ſhip's being ſeen off or in the *Red Sea*, which afterwards proved to be the *Swallow* ſloop of war; the French Conſul ſaid in his hearing that he was ſure it was a French ſhip, as he had certain intelligence that one was diſpatched from *India*, which ſhould arrive about that time. I was aſſured nevertheleſs by three or four French merchants at *Cairo*, from whom I made enquiries upon this ſubject, that they never had any expectation of ſeeing a French ſhip at *Suez*; and I learnt at *Mocha* that there has not been a ſingle French ſhip in the *Red Sea* this year. In paſſing through *Marſeilles* I made all the enquiries that I could, without rendering myſelf ſuſpicious, but could learn nothing of any conſequence, but that ſome ſhips had ſailed from that port early in the year for *India*. As there was no ſhip to ſail from *Suez* under three weeks or a month after my arrival at *Cairo*, I had an opportuniiy of tracing a gentleman who had left *Cairo* a few days before my arrival, and who in many particulars anſwered the deſcription given to me of the French Agent on the other ſide of the water. It appears from the intelligence which I received, which was principally derived from Mr. *Baldwin*, and partly from the gentlemen of the French factory in *Egypt*, and from a Turk whom I ſhall afterwards have occaſion to mention more particularly, that early in April, a French gentleman wearing a croſs, and calling himſelf the Chevalier de *Montagny*, arrived at *Cairo* from *France*. It was reported upon his firſt arrival that he was going to *India*, but after having ſtaid at *Cairo* about a month that report was entirely dropped, and upon my aſking the queſtion of the French Conſul was poſitively contradicted. He aſſociated but very little with the gentlemen of *Cairo*, which is uncommon where the ſociety of Europeans is ſo ſmall. A Venetian gentleman and a Janizary who attended upon the Chevalier, informed Mr. *Baldwin* and myſelf, that he had a Perſian maſter whilſt at *Cairo*, and uſed to ſtudy that language great part of the day. With ſome difficulty the man, a native of *Damaſcus*, with whom he had ſtudied, was traced, and I had an opportunity of converſing with him more than once. From him I learnt that the Chevalier had ſtudied Perſian with him about ſix weeks or two months before his departure from *Cairo*; that he underſtood the language a little before he came to Egypt, and was able to converſe in it, though not without ſome difficulty; that he brought Perſian books with him from *France*, the names of which were mentioned to me, and had likewiſe many Perſian letters, which upon queſtioning the Turk I found were letters of *Hindoſtan*, as their Alcabs, or complimentary addreſſes were uſed in *Hindoſtan* only; that his attention was given more to thoſe than to the books; and that he informed this man he was going to *India*, and offered him advantageous appointments if he would accompany him, which from an apprehenſion of the danger of a ſea voyage was refuſed by the Turk. About the 20th of June he went away from *Cairo* in a very ſecret manner, taking leave of no one, as is always cuſtomary amongſt the Europeans at *Cairo*; which was not only obſerved as a ſingularity by Mr. *Baldwin* and the Venetians, but likewiſe by the French merchants, who expreſſed their aſtoniſhment at what they deemed a want of politeneſs. It is obſervable that he left *Cairo* the day after the arrival of a mail from *France*. Mr. *Baldwin* would have remained ignorant of his departure, as the Chevalier had not been viſible for a month before, had he not by mere accident ſeen a conſiderable quantity of baggage going out of *Cairo*, which upon enquiry he found to be his, and he was then told by the Arabs, a body of whom always eſcort travellers acroſs the Deſert, that they were going to *Suez*. The air of myſtery with which every thing was conducted which had any relation to this gentleman, led Mr. *Baldwin* to be more particular in his enquiries, and the Cuſtom Maſter, a native of *Egypt*, and who could conſequently have but little idea of the jealouſy ſubſiſting between the two nations obſerved, that there muſt be ſomething very particular in this gentleman, who though there were four Engliſh veſſels at *Suez*, could not be perſuaded to embark on one of them for *India*, where he was going, but was reſolved to go to *Judda* or *Mocha* on a boat, in which he was ſubjected both to danger and delay. I cannot help dwelling a little upon this circumſtance, becauſe it ſeems to me to be a ſtrong preſumptive proof that the Chevalier is in ſome ſhape employed by the Court of *France*. It was neceſſary to apply to the Cuſtom Maſter, from his office, for a country boat; and he was the perſon who I conjecture adviſed him to embark on board an Engliſh veſſel; and unleſs the Chevalier's diſlike to this mode had been expreſſed in a manner very marked, it is not probable that a native of *Cairo* would have drawn ſuch a concluſion from it. The miſfortune which befel Mr. *Grand Maiſon*, and the ſeizure of his papers after his death on board the *Terrible*, is a circumſtance with which your Honourable Board muſt be acquainted, and of which the Chevalier could not be ignorant, as I myſelf heard the ſtory related at *Cairo*; after which it is not to be wondered at, if he would not truſt himſelf in an Engliſh veſſel. The laſt circumſtance which I learned at *Cairo*, ſeems to be the moſt concluſive, which is, that he was furniſhed with a very large credit by the Court of *France*; and this circumſtance I rely upon as authentic, becauſe I was informed of it by a French merchant at *Cairo*, and likewiſe by a French renegado at *Suez*, who learned it from the Chevalier's own ſervant. It will not be miſplaced here, to obſerve, that Monſieur *Grand Maiſon* had a ſimilar credit for ten thouſand Venetian ſequins, about 4,500*l*. When I enquired, whether it was cuſtomary for the Court of *France* to grant ſuch credits, the French gentleman who informed me of it, ſeemed ſenſible that he had committed an imprudence, and ſaid that he imagined the Chevalier de *Montagny* was employed by the Court as a man of literature and knowledge, to make a journey into *Egypt*. Upon my arrival at *Suez*, I found that the Chevalier had been there; and not being able to find a boat that would ſail with him in leſs than three weeks, had made a journey to *Mount Sinai*, from whence he returned a few days after my arrival at *Suez*, and had ſailed for *Judda* about the 15th July. I thought it worth while to enquire, whether he had uſed any mathematical inſtruments in his excurſion to *Mount Sinai*; and was aſſured by the Arabs who accompanied him, that he had carried none with him, having left his baggage at *Suez*. Had he been employed as a literary traveller, he certainly muſt have uſed inſtruments. His ſervant told the renegado, that he was a traveller of curioſity, and meant to go

from

from *Juddah* to *Mecca*; this was not poſſible, as he embarked avowedly as a Chriſtian; and as it is notorious that the Mahometans allow no Chriſtians to approach a city which they eſteem ſo holy, and which they would conceive to be polluted by the preſence of thoſe whom they call Infidels.

I have thought it neceſſary to be very minute in the account of what I was able to diſcover relative to this gentleman, becauſe it appears to me that he muſt be employed by his Court in ſome ſhape or another, though there are many circumſtances which render it probable that he is not the perſon entruſted with the commiſſion mentioned in the fifth part of my letter. Though the french title of Chevalier is a title which carries little or indeed no importance in it, in any part of *Europe*, it is not ſo common in *India*; and if the Chevalier de *Montagny* ſhould turn out to be the Agent, the Court of *France* will certainly, in ſome ſhape, have departed from their original plan, which was to give him as little external conſequence as poſſible. I was likewiſe told at *Cairo*, that he is himſelf a Major in the army, and the ſon of a perſon who either is or has been a farmer general, and that his family, by a late promotion, are become Nobleſſe. There is one part of the intelligence I received at *Cairo* which does not agree with the information given me in *Europe*, as it was poſitively aſſerted that he had never before been in *India*; though the truth of his aſſertion may be doubted, as his talking Perſian, and his being in poſſeſſion of Indian correſpondence, are ſufficient reaſons for ſuſpecting that he had been there. One French gentleman went ſo far as to ſay to me, that he was a perſon, qui vouloit ſe donner du merite envers les bureaus. If the Chevalier de *Montagny* had been entruſted with ſo important a commiſſion, it is very extraordinary that a veſſel ſhould not have been ready to receive him at *Suez*; and none having even come into the *Red Sea* in the courſe of the whole year, affords a ſtrong preſumption that he is not the perſon, though it by no means amounts to a proof, as many poſſible accidents may have occaſioned ſuch a miſtake; and it muſt be obſerved on the other hand, that the French Conſul who is the National Agent there, aſſured himſelf that one would arrive. The French merchants diſagreeing with him in this expectation, leaves room to conjecture that the ſhip he expected was employed by Government, and not upon a trading voyage, as he is himſelf reſtricted from trade. On the whole, I doubt not your Honourable Board will deem the appearances ſufficiently ſtrong to think it worth while to take ſome ſteps to clear up whatever may appear doubtful about this gentleman, and as it is poſſible, and indeed likely, that he ſhould aſſume another name and character upon his arrival at *Mocha*, I made particular enquiries about his perſon, and venture to add, however uſeleſs it may be, the deſcription I received of it: he is ſhort in his ſtature, ſtoops much, and looks down when he is ſpeaking with any one; his hair is brown, and his complection inclinable to be dark; his legs are remarkably ill proportioned, being nearly as thick at bottom as at top; he is accompanied by a European ſervant, who is a ſtout, tall man. Appendix. Nos. 27, 28, & 29.

He will in all probability make an exceeding long voyage down the *Red Sea*, and will not be able to reach *Mocha* till the latter end of Auguſt. He will find no French ſhip at *Mocha*, and will be reduced to the neceſſity of embarking on board the *Alexander*, an Engliſh ſhip trading in the *Red Sea*, or of going over land to *Muſcat*, on the Perſian Gulph, a journey not to be performed without much difficulty and great delays. It is however poſſible that he may arrive time enough to ſail in a Portugueſe ſhip, which intended to ſail from *Mocha* to *Surat* about the 20th Auguſt. At any rate I think it is not poſſible that he ſhould be landed in any part of *India* ſooner than the end of October 1777.

I have, &c. (Signed) *A. Elliott.*

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

Mr. *Francis* having drawn up objections to the reſolution of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* in the form of a proteſt, with his reaſons ſtated in diſtinct articles, I have thought it proper to copy his Minute entire, and to inſert my reply oppoſite to each correſponding paſſage, for the better comprehenſion of the ſeveral arguments contained in both.

I would propoſe that the Board ſhould proteſt, as I mean to do myſelf, ſeparately, againſt the reſolution of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, communicated to us in their letter of the 12th December laſt, for the following reaſons:

1ſt. Becauſe their reſolving to join with a party in the Maratta Government in meaſures tending to engage the Company in a war, or their entering into engagements to that effect, as they declare they will do inſtantly on receiving an application from the perſons who are ſuppoſed to form the above party, without the conſent and approbation of this Council firſt had and obtained, is againſt law.

I cannot agree to the motion made by Mr. *Francis*, for proteſting againſt the reſolutions of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, becauſe I approve thoſe reſolutions, for the reaſons which will occur in the following anſwers to Mr. *Francis*'s objections:

1ſt. This is a partial conſtruction of the Act of Parliament, which admits of two exceptions from the general prohibition. That no doubt may be left upon this caſe, I will quote the clauſe of the Act at large which Mr. *Francis* alludes to, in pronouncing the reſolution of the Preſidency of *Bombay* to be "againſt law." It is as follows:

"And be it further enacted by the authority aforeſaid, that the ſaid "Governor General and Council, or the major part of them, ſhall have, "and they are hereby authorized to have power of ſuperintending and "controlling the Government and management of the Preſidencies of "*Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen* reſpectively, ſo far and in ſo much "as that it ſhall not be lawful for any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, "*Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, for the time being, to make any orders for commencing hoſtilities, or declaring or making war againſt any Indian "Princes or Powers, or for negociating or concluding any treaty of peace, "or other treaty, with any ſuch Indian Princes or Powers, without the "conſent and approbation of the ſaid Governor General and Council "firſt had and obtained; except in ſuch caſes of imminent neceſſity as "would render it dangerous to poſtpone ſuch hoſtilities or treaties until "the orders from the Governor General and Council might arrive; and "except in ſuch caſes where the ſaid Preſidents and Councils reſpectively "ſhall have received ſpecial orders from the ſaid United Company."

The reſolution of the Preſidency of *Bombay* was formed on ſuch a caſe of imminent neceſſity as would have rendered it dangerous to poſtpone the execution of it, till the orders from this Council might arrive; a treaty concluded near two years ago, yet unaccompliſhed, and the grounds of a hoſtile alliance formed by one of the parties to the treaty, *Ballajee Pundit*, between the Maratta State and the Crown of *France*; ſuch were the dangers impending over the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*. A meaſure was offered to their choice, by which theſe dangers might be removed and averted, and it was in its nature ſuch as required their inſtant acceptance or refuſal, for it would have been impoſſible to have kept a deſign, planned by one of the two ruling parties in the Maratta Adminiſtration to diſpoſſeſs the other, in ſuſpence and

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and ſecrecy, till it could be communicated to the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, and receive their ſanction for its execution. No other expedient could have occurred, which could promiſe ſo effectually to reconcile the differences ſubſiſting between the Governments of *Poonah* and *Bombay*, nor which, if ſucceſsful, could with certainty prevent the effects of French intrigues. It was therefore a caſe of equal danger and neceſſity, and ſuch as juſtified the reſolution taken upon it by that Preſidency, on its own ſeparate authority.

2d. Becauſe it is equally againſt the Company's inſtructions in their general letter of April 1777, by which the expediency of any future alliance with *Ragoba* is expreſsly left to our determination.

2d. The Company's inſtructions, to which this paſſage refers, are contained in the 25th paragraph of their general letter of the 5th February 1777, which runs as follows:

" You cannot but obſerve, that we have hitherto ſuppoſed the affairs " of *Ragoba* are rendered deſperate, and that the Miniſters at *Poonah* " maintain their ground, and conſtitute at preſent the Maratta Govern- " ment. We are nevertheleſs of opinion, that an alliance originally " with *Ragoba* would have been more for the honour and advantage of " the Company, and more likely to be laſting, than that concluded at " *Poonah*; his pretenſions to the ſupreme authority, either in his own " right, or as guardian to the infant Peiſhwa, appear to us better " founded than thoſe of his competitors: and therefore, if the condi- " tions of the Treaty of *Poonah* have not been ſtrictly fulfilled on the " part of the Marattas, and if from any circumſtances you ſhall deem " it expedient, we have no objection to an alliance with *Ragoba*, on " the terms agreed upon between him and the Governor and Council " of *Bombay*."

Theſe inſtructions were immediately addreſſed to the Governor General and Council, as they related to a point depending on their general controul; but muſt be ſuppoſed to include the ſame exceptions as the prohibitory clauſe above quoted in the Act of Parliament. The ſame ſentiments are expreſſed in the general letter of the 16th April 1777, to *Bombay*, and almoſt in the ſame terms, without any direct reſtriction of them, to the excluſive authority of the Governor General and Council, which it is not probable that the Company would have omitted, had it been intended to bind the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* in the execution of them, further than they were already bound by the Act of Parliament.

Diſobedience of orders neceſſarily implies the exiſtence of orders. Thoſe ſuppoſed in the preſent caſe muſt be orders forbidding an alliance with *Ragoba*; but the declaration made of orders given to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, to form an alliance with *Ragoba*, cannot poſſibly admit the conſtruction of orders given to the Preſidency, of *Bombay*, not to form an alliance with him. The reſolution therefore of that Preſidency, ſo far as it tends to the formation of an alliance with *Ragoba* is not a diſobedience of orders, nor, to uſe Mr. *Francis*'s words, is it "againſt the Company's " inſtructions." On the contrary, I am of opinion, that the general tenor of their inſtructions, the urgency of the occaſion, and the legal latitude allowed them, amount, by their combined weight, to an obligation on the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, to act in ſuch a caſe as they have done.

3d. Becauſe it is a violation of the 9th and 10th Articles of the Treaty concluded between the Governnor General and Council and the Peiſhwa.

3d. The 10th and 12th Articles, which I ſuppoſe to be here meant, expreſs, that the Engliſh ſhall withdraw their forces from *Ragonaut Row*, and that they ſhall not aſſiſt him; that is, that they ſhall not take his part againſt the Maratta Government, as the 12th Article expreſſes in terms; but if that Government itſelf adopts the party of *Ragonaut Row*, and ſolicits the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh in his behalf, it can never be inferred from their compliance, that they are guilty of a violation of the treaty.

It will be remembered, that the only perſons who have ſigned the treaty on the part of the Marattas, are *Succaram Pundit* and *Ballajee Pundit*, not as principals, but as the profeſſed repreſentatives of the Peiſhwa, who is yet an infant; of theſe, *Succaram Pundit* is acknowledged to be the ſuperior, being by office the Dewan. To him only all our firſt letters were written; and Colonel *Upton*'s credentials were addreſſed, as to the perſon in whom the legal adminiſtration was veſted. By the conſtitution of all Indian Governments, the executive power is always held by the hands of a ſingle man. The perſon of the Peiſhwa and his ſeal, by which all Acts of Government are authenticated, are in the poſſeſſion of *Succaram Pundit*; whoſe Acts are therefore the regular Acts of Government, whilſt the Members of it continue divided.

He is ſuppoſed to have invited the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to unite with him in giving aſſiſtance to *Ragonaut Row*; and we have received aſſurances from that Preſidency, that they will not comply with the invitation, until they ſhall receive the due evidence of its authenticity. Their aſſiſtance of courſe will be granted equally to the Maratta State as to *Ragonaut Row*; and to the Peiſhwa, the actual Ruler of the Maratta State. It is not therefore a violation of the treaty concluded between the Governor General and Council, and the Peiſhwa.

4th. Becauſe ſuch violation of a public treaty between two ſtates is not to be juſtified by the reaſons aſſigned for it, viz. that a number of individuals in one of thoſe ſtates are inclined to engage in meaſures ſubverſive of all or any of the ſtipulations of ſuch public treaty, and have privately applied for aſſiſtance in carrying ſuch meaſures into execution.

4th. This objection appears to me to conſiſt of a ſimple denial of an argument erroneouſly ſtated. The propoſition which it introduces, is incompatible in terms. A violation of a public treaty cannot be juſtified by any reaſons aſſigned for it. The reaſons aſſigned to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, are not that *a number of individuals in the Maratta State are inclined to engage in meaſures ſubverſive of all or any of the ſtipulations of the treaty, and have privately applied for aſſiſtance, &c.* but, that the ruling Member of the Maratta State has himſelf removed the obligation of the treaty which relates to the perſon of *Ragonaut Row*, by deſiring the Engliſh to grant that aſſiſtance to *Ragonaut Row* in behalf of the Maratta State, which they had before pledged their faith to him to withhold while he was conſidered as an enemy to that ſtate. The reaſons thus aſſigned appear to me to be a complete juſtification and acquittal of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, in their ſuppoſed acquieſcence from the charge of having violated the treaty.

5th.

5th. Becauſe even the evidence of ſuch a diſpoſition in perſons alluded to, appears to us very uncertain and defective, being no more than a private verbal meſſage from them to Mr. *Moſtyn*'s ſubſtitute at *Poonah*; meant perhaps for no other purpoſe but to diſcover our intentions with reſpect to *Ragoba*, and which they may diſavow at pleaſure.

6th. Becauſe there are no proofs before us to warrant our giving credit to an aſſertion ſo improbable as, that *Succaram Baboo*, whoſe letters to the Governor have been conſtantly, and are to this time, filled with complaints againſt the non-execution of the treaty, and particularly of the protection given to *Ragoba*, ſhould voluntarily enter into private engagements, to reſtore *Ragoba* to the Regency, and ſolicit the aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of *Bombay* for that purpoſe.

5th. If the meaſures of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, have been decidedly taken on ſuch weak grounds as are ſuppoſed in this objection, their conduct would have been truly reprehenſible. The contrary appears on the face of their proceedings. I have not either of the copies before me, underſtanding that they are in circulation; but I truſt ſecurely to my memory, in affirming, that their reſolutions are guarded with all the cautions which ſuch a caſe demanded, with perhaps one exception: they had done nothing on the overtures made to them, but had only agreed on what they would do, if theſe were confirmed and authenticated by an inſtrument in writing, ſigned by the Miniſter and his colleagues, and ſealed with their ſeals, and delivered by a perſon deputed by them expreſsly to the Governor. Such evidence will be certain and complete; and on ſuch evidence only, have the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* reſolved to enter into engagements with the Miniſter. Appendix, Nos. 27, 28, & 29.

6th. We have been long ſince informed of the mutual jealouſies of the two Miniſters. This is an effect which requires no evidence of facts to prove it; it being phyſically impoſſible for two men, ſharing with equal power, and without any conſtitutional right, the chief adminiſtration of a deſpotic Government, to maintain their union entire againſt the competitions excited by their particular intereſts, or the more intereſted ſuggeſtions of their reſpective partizans and dependants; added to theſe cauſes, which are common to all men placed in a condition ſimilar to theirs, their proſpects and diſpoſitions are ſuch as muſt draw them in contrary directions; and this too is a conſequence which ſimple ſpeculation may form independant of formal evidence: one is diſqualified from action by the infirmities of old age, and whatever influence his ambition might have had on his mind when he firſt engaged in a ſcene of troubles, this muſt have wholly forſaken him with the object, which moſt probably excited it in the loſs of an only ſon. To ſuch a man eaſe and perſonal ſafety are the only comforts that life can preſent to him, or that can animate him to any degree of temporary exertion. We are accordingly told, and on the authority of credit, that he reſides entirely in the fortreſs of *Poorunder*, which is his own property, with the infant Peiſhwa in his poſſeſſion, and (as I have heard) a conſiderable hoard of treaſure, which he refuſed to part with, even at the time when his colleague was involved in great difficulties by the want of money to pay the army, which had mutinied for their arrears. The other is yet in the active ſeaſon of life, ſupported partly by the perſonal intereſt of his aſſociate joined to his own, partly by the attachment of *Hurry Punt Furkia*, the Commander in Chief of the forces of the Maratta State, and partly by the immediate direction of all the current buſineſs of Government, which he has either aſſumed or his partner has left to his ſole charge. To ſuch a man it was an obvious and neceſſary policy to employ the preſent means of precluding all future competitions, and for ſecuring the firſt place in the ſtate on the event of the death of *Succaram Baboo*: the means employed for ſuch an end, and eſpecially the proviſion made of a foreign alliance to promote it, could not fail to heighten the ſuſpicions of his preſent rival, and to breed diſaffection in others.

If *Succaram Baboo* can obtain the aſſured conditions of perſonal ſafety, and the unmoleſted poſſeſſion of his own property from *Ragoba*, I ſee no cauſe to regard his acceptance of them as improbable, although he ſhould have joined in more adverſe acts againſt *Ragoba*, than that inſtanced by Mr. *Francis* of his complaint of the protection granted by the Engliſh to *Ragoba*, whilſt his own intereſt and ſafety appeared to be endangered by it.

I am not certain whether I may not miſconceive the tendency of this and the preceding objection, but they ſeem to me to imply that the late overtures made to the Preſidency of *Bombay* by *Succaram Baboo* and his party, through Mr. *Lewis*, may have been an artifice concerted between them and *Nanna Furneeſs* himſelf, not only to diſcover our intentions with reſpect to *Ragoba*, but to gain the poſſeſſion of his perſon and to deſtroy him. This would be a very dangerous policy both to the Miniſters themſelves, if they were ſincerely united in it, as it would draw on them a very unneceſſary ſcene of troubles, which from paſt experience of the ſucceſs which has generally attended the Engliſh arms, they have ſo great a cauſe to ſolicit, and particularly to *Nanna Furneeſs*, as it would place him preciſely and truly in the ſituation which it was intended to feign, and leave him at the abſolute mercy of his accomplices, if they choſe to convert a pretended plot againſt him into a real one. In effect I ſhould conſider the exiſtence of ſuch a deſign as in the nature of things impoſſible.

7th. Becauſe, admitting that a party has been formed to ſupport the pretenſions of *Ragoba*, ſuch party is either ſtrong enough to accompliſh their purpoſe without our aſſiſtance, conſequently our interference is unneceſſary; or if their own ſtrength be in itſelf unequal to the enterprize, they will then want an immediate and continued ſupport which the Preſidency of *Bombay* is in no condition to give them. In their letter of the 7th December they tell us, that their European battalions are greatly deficient of their proper complement, which they have no means or proſpect of completing: and that notwithſtanding they

7th. I agree with Mr. *Francis*, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* is unable to ſupport a continued war, but by ſupplies of men and money from *Bengal*. This is an argument to ſupply them with men and money, but it is not in itſelf an objection to their reſolution; if their own means are equal to its immediate execution, and to its ſupport until they can be aſſiſted from *Bengal*.

This Government can aſſiſt them with both men and money, and I truſt without feeling the want of either for the ſupport of its own concerns. By the laſt returns from *Bombay*, the groſs numbers of their different military corps ſtood as follows:

Artillery,	Rank and File	-	-	261
European Infantry,	D°	-	-	783
Sepoys	D°	-	-	5621
Irregulars		-	-	1231

Appendix. Nos. 27, 28, & 29.

give every encouragement, it is very difficult to raiſe good ſepoys on that coaſt. That they are unable to co-operate with the other Preſidencies, in caſe of an attack upon either of them; that limited as their power is, and unprovided as they are with reſources, they cannot exert themſelves as the occaſion requires, they can do no more than repreſent their ſituation and circumſtances to us, &c.

It follows then that the reſolution of the Bombay Preſidency, to carry *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, may involve us in a war, in which the ſafety of our poſſeſſions on the Maratta coaſt may be immediately hazarded, and which can no way be ſupported hereafter but by ſupplies of men and money from *Bengal*.

8th. Becauſe it is at all times the duty of this Council to give their utmoſt attention to the preſervation of peace in *India*, but at this juncture more particularly than at any other while a conſiderable part of the national force is employed in *America*, and while the apprehenſion of a war, with *France* and *Spain* hangs over the councils of the nation.

9th. Becauſe the requiſition made by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to that of *Fort Saint George*, of a body of troops for any purpoſe but that of immediate ſelf-defence without our conſent and approbation, appears to us highly irregular, and in its conſequences dangerous, as it tends to defeat the intention of the Legiſlature in the inſtitution of this Council; and to make it impoſſible for us to provide for the ſafety of the Britiſh Empire in *India* by any general plan of meaſures.

It is not poſſible that the Company's forces ſhould act under a ſteady and united direction for the general ſafety and defence of our poſſeſſions, or move together in any one plan of action, as long as the reſpective diſpoſition of the forces of each of the other Preſidencies is liable to be altered without our knowledge or conſent.

10th. Becauſe the reſolutions taken by the Preſidency of *Bombay* not only ſtand in direct contradiction to the authorities and engagements hereinbefore recited but more eſpecially to the inſtructions of this Council, unanimouſly agreed, on the 18th Auguſt laſt, which they appear to have totally diſregarded, and which it is our duty to ſupport and inſiſt

The force of this Preſidency was much leſs at the battle of *Plaſſey*. It was much leſs, when it was at the ſame time occupied in the defence of theſe provinces againſt the Shahzade, and in the expedition under Colonel *Forde* againſt *Maſulipatam*; and it was much leſs when unſupported by any country power, it wreſted the provinces of *Bengal* and *Bahar* from the hands of *Coſſein Ally Cawn*.

I have no doubt of their being in a ſtate to enter upon the meaſure which they have propoſed. The diſtance of *Bombay* from *Poonah* is but a march of four days. I am informed that *Madajee Scindia* and *Tuckojee Holkar* are both encamped in the neighbourhood of *Poonah*, with about 20,000 horſe. They are, if the aſſociation has taken place, in the intereſt of *Ragoba*. *Hurry Punt Furkia* was, I am informed, on the banks of the river *Kiſtna*, at a place called *Kiſtna Teer*, with the main army of the Maratta State, engaged in a war with *Hyder Ally*: he is repreſented to be attached to *Nanah Furneeſe*, but can afford him little ſervice on ſuch an occaſion and at ſuch a diſtance. Such is the preſent ſtate of the parties on which the event of an undertaking, ſuch as has been propoſed by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, is likely to depend, at leaſt ſuch I have gathered it to be from authorities unconnected with thoſe of *Bombay*. I ſhall not preſume to draw any concluſions from ſuch uncertain and variable materials; but I am ſatisfied that all appearances, ſuch as they are, are favourable, and convinced that it depends on the prudence of the Government of *Bombay* to prevent the Company's affairs from ſuffering any prejudice by the propoſed engagements; if they ſhould even fail to derive any inſtant benefit from it.

8th. The argument which is here introduced as an objection to the propoſed meaſure, would, in my judgement, be better applied to the defence of it. If the apprehenſion of a war with *France* and *Spain* hangs over the councils of the nation, we relieve them from a conſiderable ſhare of their apprehenſion, by eſtabliſhing a firm intereſt in the moſt powerful ſtate of *India*; and by checking in its firſt growth the ſeeds which the French have ſown of an alliance with it, and which, if ſuffered to grow to maturity, may prove fatal to the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*. At the ſame time it is the moſt unexceptionable way by which the French deſigns could poſſibly be obviated; as they have no oſtenſible or direct concern in theſe diſputes, but will be eventually cruſhed by the overthrow of their friends; whereas by waiting till they have acquired an eſtabliſhment in the Maratta Dominions, we ſhall be reduced to act openly againſt them, which we cannot do without an immediate additional hazard, nor without involving the two nations in a war.

9th. A like application was made by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to that of *Fort Saint George* in the year 1775, with which, in a letter written to the latter on the 7th September, we forbad their compliance.

The ſentiments expreſſed by the Court of Directors in the 45th paragraph of their commands of the 24th December 1776 on that interference, is ſo pointedly oppoſite to the objection now ſtated by Mr. *Francis*, that I ſhall inſert an extract of that paragraph as a complete reply to it.

" We are ſorry to obſerve, that you appear to entertain an opinion " of the controlling powers veſted in the Governor General and Coun- " cil of *Bengal* over our other Preſidencies, beyond what in our " opinion is authoriſed by the late act of the Legiſlature.

" This obſervation ariſes from your interference with our Governor " and Council of *Fort Saint George*, to prohibit them ſending " troops out of their own diſtricts for aid to our ſettlement of *Bombay*, " although the ſaid act expreſsly forbids any of the other Preſidencies " to engage in political negociations with the natives, or foreign " nations, without the participation and concurrence of the Supreme " Council; yet it certainly leaves each diſtinct Government power " to take from time to time ſuch ſteps as the immediate exigency of " their affairs may require for ſelf-defence or protection, or for the ne- " ceſſary aid or aſſiſtance to be given to other ſettlements; and on this " principle we muſt diſapprove your interference in this caſe."

10th. While I was preparing the Minute recorded on the 26th January, and written before the receipt of the late advices from *Bombay*, I cauſed the laſt of theſe expedients to be ſtated in a caſe, and referred to a learned Pundit for his opinion upon it. I intended it at that time for my own information only; and it was on the ſtrength of this opinion, that I declared the expedient to be impracticable in the Minute abovementioned; I ſhall now enter the queſtion ſtated to the Pundit, his anſwer, and note of Mr. *Elliot*'s which accompanied it, and produce the originals of each at the Board for further ſatisfaction.

Queſtion.

inſiſt on. I deſire the ſecond paragraph in that letter may be read.

The firſt point has undoubtedly afforded juſt cauſe of offence and jealouſy to the Maratta Government. We wiſh that *Ragoba* had been induced to accept the terms of conciliation lately offered to him by the Miniſters, to reſide at *Benares*, with a jaghire of five lacks of rupees per annum, in the neighbourhood of *Calpee*. Theſe conditions, though they effectually removed the objections formerly made by *Ragoba* againſt the terms ſecured for him by the treaty, were excepted to by him on account of the difficulty of proceeding to *Benares*; from the danger that he thought his perſon would be expoſed to in a journey by land through the Maratta Dominions; and his religious ſcruples againſt a voyage by ſea.

" We can ſee no reaſon to doubt, that " the preſence of *Ragoba* at *Bombay* will " continue to be an inſuperable bar to " the completion of the treaty concluded " with the Maratta Government; nor " can any ſincere cordiality and good " underſtanding be eſtabliſhed with them " as long as he ſhall appear to derive " encouragement and ſupport from the " Engliſh. On the contrary, we think " that although it may not furniſh ſufficient grounds for the actual renewal " of hoſtilities, it will ſo far eſtrange " the minds of the Miniſters at leaſt, as " to compel them to form connections " to the diſadvantage of the Britiſh Government; ſo that notwithſtanding " the forms of a reconciliation ſhould " exiſt, neither party will benefit by the " effects of it. We therefore think it " incumbent upon us to recommend to " your moſt mature conſideration the " dangerous effects of your perſiſting " ſtill to continue that protection to *Ragoba*, and to deſire you will do all " that lies in your power to remove the " obſtacles which oppoſe his departure " from *Bombay*; for this purpoſe we " think that he ſhould be required to " make choice either of a journey by " land, if *Tuccojee Holkar* and *Madhajee Sindia* will give proper ſecurity to " conduct him in ſafety, which we have " been aſſured they would do; or of a " voyage by ſea, which might be accompliſhed without affecting his religious " purity, if he were accommodated with " a veſſel fitted out and manned immediately under his orders, and by perſons of his own ſect, to be accompanied by one of the Company's marine veſſels for his protection. If both " theſe expedients ſhould be rejected by " *Ragoba*, we muſt naturally conclude " that it is not his intention to part with " his preſent aſylum, but that the objections which he has ſtarted to the " terms propoſed to him, are mere pretexts; and on this ground we repeat our injunctions, that he be " poſitively required to quit the Company's dependencies, as we ſhall hold you reſponſible for all the " conſequences of continuing the Company's protection to him, after ſuch a refuſal on his part."

Queſtion. A Brahmin of high caſt is deſirous of viſiting *Bengal* from *Surat*. It is propoſed, that he ſhall be attended by perſons of his own ſect, and that the veſſel on which he may embark for this voyage ſhall be navigated ſolely by Hindoos. Will this voyage in any ſhape affect his religious purity, or hinder him from performing the neceſſary and indiſpenſable rites and forms of devotion? Appendix. Nos. 27, 28, & 29.

Note from Mr. *Elliot*.

" I ſend you the ſolution to your queſtion by the Court Pundit, the " only one I could immediately find. He is a man much reſpected for " knowledge. He added in converſation, that a ſingle European, or " other Infidel, would preclude the Brahmin from making the voy- " age."

(Signed) " *A. Elliot*."

Tranſlate of the Pundit's anſwer.

" If all the men in the ſhip are Hindoos, and all Jowlbugharge,* or " men from whoſe hands it is not impure to receive water to drink, and " two or three Brahmins ſhould accompany him, and he eats, drinks " waſhes, and prays, &c. according to the Shaſter, then he will not " ſuffer in his caſt, and in the caſe ſtated he may come upon a ſhip.

(Signed) " *Serree Ram Kiſhun Suema*,
" the Court Pundit."

I am aſſured, that though it is cuſtomary for Hindoos to navigate veſſels on the weſt coaſt of *India*, yet they are always joined with Mahometan Laſcars, who are conſtantly employed in the moſt difficult manœuvres of the ſhip, and in the working of their guns; and the ſociety of ſuch men being themſelves polluted, is, as is well known, equally forbidden to the moſt ſcrupulous Hindoos with that of the profeſſors of a different religion: this expedient was therefore impracticable. What objections either *Ragoba*'s diſtruſt of *Madhajee Scindia*, and *Tuccojee Holcar*, or their refuſal to give the requiſite ſecurities, might have created to the other expedient, we cannot know, becauſe time was not given for the trial of either; but had either been practicable, it ought not to have prevented the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* from accepting a propoſition which promiſed ſo much more effectual a conciliation of the differences ſubſiſting between them and the Miniſters, and at the ſame time accorded ſo perfectly with the declared wiſhes of the Court of Directors. It was not forbidden by our orders, for theſe profeſſed only to preſcribe the only means which had occurred to us for the firſt of theſe ends, nor had any reference to a caſe which we neither foreſaw nor imagined.

If the intentions of that Preſidency in this inſtance are juſtified by the Act of Parliament, as I have proved; if they were ſuch as the Company's orders not only juſtified but required, which I have alſo proved; no influences drawn by forced implications from the orders of this Government; can deprive them of their rectitude, which they derive from ſuch ſuperior warrants. In truth, whatever cauſe the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* have formerly given to this Government to charge them with a want of due attention to its authority, nothing could be more unjuſt than to impute that fault to them on this occaſion, if it be admitted, as it muſt, that the reſolution which they propoſed to take was ſuch as could not poſſibly wait the ſanction of this Government; as ſoon as it came in contemplation before them, and before they had either formed the plan of their operations, or propoſed the advantages to be obtained by them, they inſtantly apprized us of it, and thereby furniſhed an argument againſt themſelves, to charge them with the neglect of thoſe eſſential conſiderations, in their precipitancy to communicate to us the firſt ſuggeſtions of a deſign of ſuch importance to the political intereſts of the Company.

* Jowlbugharge is a term which includes nearly all the caſts of Hindoos, the very loweſt only being excepted.

Appendix. No. 30.

If the Board ſhould agree in the preceding reſolutions, I am of opinion that a copy of them ſhould be ſent to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, with an additional declaration, That we deem them ſolely reſponſible to the Company and the nation for all the conſequences of the meaſures they have taken, or may take on this occaſion, without our conſent and approbation; and that whereas they have not yet demanded of us any ſpecific ſupply, either of men or money, to ſupport the execution of the above meaſures, we are determined, that whatever aſſiſtance we may be compelled to give them, by the neceſſity of defending the Company's poſſeſſions on that coaſt, ſhall be ſtrictly confined to the objects of defence: and that we will never encourage or ſupport any plan of operations calculated to carry the Company's arms beyond that line without our conſent and approbation firſt had and obtained, or without the expreſs and ſpecific orders of the Company to that effect; that when we receive the further advices they promiſe to give us, of what is likely to be the iſſue of this buſineſs, we ſhall communicate to them our opinion and reſolution thereupon.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Mr. *Barwell*—As a diviſion has unhappily ariſen on the preſent queſtion, on the meaſures adopted by the Government of *Bombay*, and the reſponſibility of the approbation expreſſed in the votes of this day, pointedly fixed on the approving members: that it may not be ſuppoſed I admit in the leaſt degree the objections that now appear upon the proceedings, I adopt entirely the Governor General's reaſonings upon the ſubject of them, and ſubſcribe my name as fully to his Minute, as if it had been written with my aſſent and participation.

Mr. *Francis*—Much might be ſaid in defence of thoſe opinions, which the Governor General has been pleaſed to canvaſs ſo minutely; but as the argument would turn chiefly on the conſtruction of words, on nice diſtinctions in forming ſuch conſtructions, and probable inferences deduced from thence, I ſhall not enter into it. I do not expect that ſuch an argument would be attended to at home, nor do I think it affects the principle on which a queſtion of the magnitude of that which is now before us ought to be determined. I ſhall leave it to a higher tribunal to determine, whether the caſe of *imminent neceſſity*, deſcribed by the Legiſlature, relates ſolely to meaſures of ſelf-defence, or includes all others, according to the opinion, and at the diſcretion of the ſubordinate Preſidencies? and whether, when the Company ſay, "That, if from any circumſtance our Governor General and Council ſhall deem it expedient, they have no objection to an alliance with *Ragoba*," they mean to refer that queſtion ſolely to *us*, or to ſubject it to a ſort of concurring juriſdiction in the Government of *Bombay*? If they meant the laſt, it might have happened, that the queſtion would have received two oppoſite deciſions; and that the inferior juriſdiction might, by acts done upon their own principles, decide it againſt our judgment and reſolutions. I ſhall alſo leave another queſtion untouched, viz. Whether the caſe of *Ragoba*'s caſt is an object of ſuch importance to this Government, that we are to hazard a general war in *India* for the ſake of preſerving of it? I have but one more obſervation to make upon the Governor's Minute, in reply to my objection to the requiſition made by the Preſidency of *Bombay* for military aſſiſtance from that of *Madras*. He quotes a letter from the Company, from which he concludes, that in the opinion of the Court of Directors, we are not entitled to forbid ſuch requiſitions: I do not admit, that in any caſe whatever, eſpecially a caſe of ſuch great importance as the preſent, arguments are ever anſwered by authorities; but I contend, that the ſenſe of the Court of Directors, even in the paragraph ſo recited, does not ſtand in oppoſition to the opinion ſtated in my former Minute: it ſuppoſes, that the ſubordinate Preſidencies may lawfully apply for aſſiſtance to each other, "as the "immediate exigency of their affairs may require, for "ſelf-defence or protection." This caſe is included in that of the imminent neceſſity ſtated by the Legiſlature; and I have never affirmed, that ſelf-defence and protection did not authorize the ſubordinate Preſidencies to take meaſures tending to thoſe purpoſes only, without our previous conſent and approbation.

Mr. *Barwell*—I beg the occaſion on which the Bombay Preſidency made their application to *Madras*, the diſapprobation of this Government, the materials on which the above ſentiments on the Court of Directors are expreſſed, may follow in this place.

The Governor General—I believe it is expreſſed in the following letter, written by this Preſidency to *Fort St. George*, dated 7th September 1775.

Copy of a letter to *Fort St. George*, dated the 7th September 1775.

Underſtanding from a letter which we have received from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, dated 13th July, that they have applied to you for a reinforcement of 300 Europeans, and two complete battalions of ſepoys, to join their army now in quarters with *Ragoba*, we think it neceſſary to deſire, that you will not comply with this application, as we have judged it expedient to order that Preſidency to withdraw their army from the ſervice of *Ragoba* to their own garriſons, and confine their views and operations to the ſafety of the Company's poſſeſſions, including *Salſette*; truſting that a ſecure and honourable peace will be effected with the miniſterial party by Colonel *Upton*, on his arrival at *Poonah*.

Mr. *Francis*—I beg leave to move, that notice may be taken, in the preſent general letter, of the ſupply of 6,000 muſkets and 4,000 hand grenades, furniſhed by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to *Hyder Ally*, with our requeſt to them, that they will take it into their conſideration, and furniſh us and the Preſidency of *Bombay* with their ſentiments and inſtructions thereupon.

Mr. *Wheler* aſſents.

Mr. *Barwell*—I do not know the object of this queſtion. It appears to be ſuggeſted without conſideration, that this information muſt already have been given to the Company by that Preſidency; and to ſwell it into a degree of importance which the ſubject does not merit, the papers in courſe go home with the general intelligence from *Bombay*. I therefore am againſt the motion.

Governor General—I object to the motion. It may be mentioned in the general letter, as a propoſition made, but not agreed to. This will bring it equally before the notice of the Court of Directors, if an extract be added from the proceedings of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, of ſo much as relates to it.

Mr. *Francis*—I aſſent to the mode propoſed by the Governor General.

Reſolved, That the motion be notified to the Court of Directors, as a propoſition having been made, but not agreed to.

APPENDIX, No. 30.

Extract of a letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal* to the Court of Directors; dated 4th February 1778.

Par. 7. IN our letter by the *Europa*, dated 21ſt November, we mentioned the reſerve of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, in their communications to us: Secret Department.

after

after waiting till the 26th ultimo, in expectation of further advices on the important ſubjects which had raiſed our anxiety, we received a letter from them, dated the 7th December, incloſing a copy of the propoſals brought by Mr. *Moſtyn* from the Miniſters, for an accommodation with *Ragoba*, which he declined to accept, chiefly becauſe he did not think they contained an adequate proviſion for his perſonal ſafety.

8. On the 29th January we received another letter from *Bombay*, dated 12th December, adviſing us of overtures which had been ſecretly made by an Agent, in the names of *Succaram Baboo*, *Moraba Furneſe*, *Bucherba Proonder*, and *Tuccojee Holcar*, to Mr. *Lewis*, Mr. *Moſtyn*'s ſubſtitute at *Poonah*, for the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh in replacing *Ragonaut Row* in the adminiſtration of the affairs of the Maratta Government. The Preſident and Council conſidering theſe overtures as made by the Maratta State, have agreed, that if the above perſons ſhould join in a formal application to them, for the Company's aſſiſtance in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, they would immediately grant it, and directed Mr. *Lewis* to communicate their intentions to the party with all poſſible caution and ſecrecy.

9. We immediately aſſembled for the conſideration of proceedings of ſo much importance; and after the moſt attentive deliberation, we came to the following reſolutions; but as they were not taken without much debate, and variety of opinions, we think it neceſſary to recommend to your peruſal the Conſultations noted in the margin, which are tranſmitted a number in the book packet.

Conſ. 26 Jan. 29 Dº. 5 Feb. See Appx. 27, 28, 29.

10. In the Conſultation 2d February, you will find a motion from one of our Members, to notify to you a ſupply of 6,000 muſkets and 4,000 hand grenades, which have been furniſhed by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to *Hyder Ally*, &c. but as we did not agree to mention it in the terms of the motion, we beg leave to quote the letter from *Bombay*, wherein this tranſaction is imparted to us; viz. "We incloſe for your notice, "copy of a letter from the Nabob *Hyder Ally* to our "Reſident at *Onore*: we have to obſerve, that we ſup"plied him with the muſkets therein mentioned by "permiſſion from the Honourable Company, for the "purchaſe of ſandal wood and pepper in his domi"nions."

11. We have juſt received a letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, dated 16th ultimo, which contains a ſtate of the force and reſources of that Preſidency, with many other informations of conſequence; we have therefore cauſed a copy of it to be added to our laſt Conſultation for you notice.

12. In this letter the Preſident and Council have given us, as nearly as they could judge of them, an account of the probable views, intereſts, and connections of the different Country Powers adjacent to your poſſeſſions on the coaſt, with ſuch informations as they had received reſpecting them. It appears that the intention of *Hyder Ally* is wholly occupied in the defence of his own dominions againſt his natural enemies the Marattas, but that he has a vackeel at *Pondicherry*, who receives encouragement from the Governor Monſieur *Bellecombe*, and that this gentleman maintains a correſpondence with *Hyder*, by which he endeavours to ſecure him to the intereſts of the French.

13. The Maratta army oppoſed to *Hyder's* was greatly ſuperior to his; but he ſurprized them in the night of the 5th ultimo near the banks of the *Jungabuddra*, drove them acroſs that river, and obtained a conſiderable advantage over them.

14. We are further informed from Madras, of an application which they had received from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to hold in readineſs 200 Europeans, a battalion of ſepoys, and 50 artillery, to march to *Anjengo* if their ſubſequent engagements ſhould make it neceſſary to require them. Although the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George* did not think proper to comply with this requeſt, we have informed them of our reſolution to afford the countenance and ſupport of this Government to the undertaking at *Bombay* in favour of *Ragoba*, provided it be confined to the objects which have been defined; and we have earneſtly recommended it to them to grant a reinforcement of troops if the application ſhould be renewed. Appendix, No. 31.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your faithful humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell.
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
4th February 1778.

APPENDIX, No. 31.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors, dated the 16th February 1778.

Honourable Sirs,

1. IN addition to our advices from this department, dated the 4th inſtant, by the *Kingſton*, we have only to tranſmit duplicates of the letters from *Bombay*, therein referred to, with our proceedings on the ſubject, and copies of ſubſequent advices, which we have received from that Preſidency, and from Mr. *Moſtyn* ſince his return to *Poonah*. Theſe do not contain any account of the further progreſs of the negociations begun with Mr. *Lewis*, and we are very defective in many eſſential points of information, but we can collect from them that the Government of *Poonah* was in great confuſion. Mr. *Lewis* refers to a letter which he wrote to the Preſident at *Bombay*, on the 12th December, for the purport of a converſation which had paſſed between *Moraba Furneſe* and him, previous to the receipt of the orders of the 12th December; this we conclude is of ſome importance, as it muſt either have confirmed or diſapproved the authority of the firſt overtures made for the Company's aſſiſtance; but by ſome accident we are not furniſhed with a copy of it. A day had been fixed by *Moraba* for another interview, but in the mean time he ſuddenly retired from *Poonah*, to avoid a ſcheme which had been laid by *Nana* for ſeizing him, and it appears that he returned as ſuddenly: we are unacquainted with the cauſe, though Mr. *Lewis* mentions a conjecture, that it was at the invitation of *Siccaram Baboo*, who had it in view to engage *Nana* if poſſible in the aſſociation for introducing *Ragoba*. Secret Department.

2. On the 14th December, news was received at *Poonah* of the death of *Ram Rajah*, the Sovereign of the Maratta State, which was likely to increaſe the confuſion among the Miniſters, by the different intereſts which would be formed in the nomination of a ſucceſſor. And *Nana* was further diſconcerted, by a report which arrived ſoon after of the defeat of the Maratta army under *Hurry Punt*, in an engagement with *Hyder Ally*: he immediately went to *Poonah* in conſequence of it, where he had a long conference with *Sitcaram Baboo*.

3. This is the ſubſtance of the intelligence we have been able to collect from Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letters; and he accounts for the imperfection of it, by informing us that guards had been placed by *Nana*'s orders upon the Engliſh Reſidency, which notwithſtanding his remonſtrance to the Durbar, had not at the date of his letter been withdrawn.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
16th February 1778.

Appendix. No. 32.

APPENDIX, No. 32.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 6th January 1778.

Wedneſday, the 14th.

EARLY this morning Mr. *Moſtyn* ſet off for *Poonah*.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
The W. *John Carnac*, Eſquire, *Daniel Draper*.
Nath. Stackhouſe, *Willm. Aſhburner*.
Andrew Ramſay.

Read, and approved, our laſt Conſultation of the 2d inſtant.

The Preſident lays before us two letters from Mr. *Lewis*, one from Mr. *Moſtyn*, and one from *Moraba Furneeſe*, all entered hereafter.

It is reſolved, That nothing further can be done in the buſineſs, unleſs *Succaram Bappoo* joins in making application to us for the aſſiſtance of the Company to reinſtate *Ragoba*; as we cannot think of acting in any manner contrary to the late treaty, unleſs by expreſs deſire of the principal perſon with whom it was concluded.

Wm. Hornby,
Adjourned. *Wm. Aſhburner*,
Edwd Ravenſcroft, Sec^y. *D. Draper*,
N. Stackhouſe.

The gentleman has at laſt begun to open himſelf, by a meſſage late this evening, and I will run all riſques of having a meeting with him to-morrow or next day: he wants to know how many troops we will ſupply, and if we will ſupply warlike ſtores.

Dated 6th January 1778.

I am this moment come from *Moraba*. He began the diſcourſe by telling me, that he was ready to join us for the purpoſe your Honour knew of: but, ſays he, if we once enter into it, let us go through heartily, and let there be no excuſe on the part of the Governor and Council afterwards, that they have received orders to make peace as they did before. I told him, that I thought the moſt likely method to avoid ſuch orders, would be for the four gentlemen formerly mentioned, to ſend ſuch a letter as was promiſed me. To this however he objected, ſaying, that he would not make uſe of any other perſon's name than his own; and that he could himſelf bring twenty thouſand men into the field, if your Honour and the Board thought proper to go upon the buſineſs in his name. He further added, that if the Council would declare their reſolution to act conformable to what he now ſaid, he would open himſelf entirely to me, and tell me how many more troops he could bring, and on whom he could depend for aſſiſtance: but, ſays he, it will be improper to explain myſelf further, until I know their anſwer; for the buſineſs muſt be managed in my name only. He alſo ſaid, that if the Engliſh and he once undertook the affair in a proper manner, he would anſwer to ſettle the Government in three months time. Before I left this gentleman, he made me promiſe, that I would write your Honour the above before I went to ſleep, and to requeſt that an anſwer might be ſent in five days from this date, if poſſible.

Dated the 9th January 1778.

Honourable Sir,

I addreſſed you the 7th at night from *Compolee*, incloſing two letters I met on the road from Mr. *Lewis*; I make no doubt of their having reached you. As there was nothing in their contents to prevent my proceeding, I ſet out the next morning, and arrived here yeſterday about 10 o'clock. Nothing occurred on the road, nor did the Government take the leaſt notice of me, not even by a complimentary meſſage, though they were publicly adviſed of my coming into town tha morning by Mr. *Lewis*. Immediately on my arrival I gave the neceſſary notice both to *Nana*, *Mado Row*, and *Byrow Punt*, and requeſted of the former that I might be favoured with an audience as ſoon as poſſible, not only to acquaint them with the iſſue of the buſineſs they had entruſted me with, but alſo the buſineſs I was charged with from your Honour, &c. He replied, that that day was their Sancrant, and that to-day was an unlucky one; he therefore could not ſee me, but to-morrow would *conſider* of it. I know no remedy but patience, but will uſe every endeavour to procure one as ſoon as I can; until when, I ſhall defer addreſſing the Board, and alſo forwarding the public packet for the Governor General and Council; not only that I may inform them with the determination of the Durbar, but it may be altogether unneceſſary from the letter you will receive from Mr. *Lewis*, and a letter I now forward you from *Moraba*. This letter I procured early this morning, and will I hope convince you of his ſincerity, and alſo confirm what Mr. *Lewis* has wrote you. I wiſh to God you may be able to undertake the buſineſs; ſuch another opportunity may never again offer. *Sacram* I firmly believe is concerned, and will aſſiſt privately all he can, but I am afraid will not yet be brought to give it under his hand. *Moraba*'s deſire, that the buſineſs may be done in his name, is I judge to prevent *Buchaba* laying a prior claim to the Duanſhip, who is appointed by the Rajah, has never yet himſelf been the acting man, and indeed is unequal to the charge in theſe troubleſome times.

Yeſterday being a holiday, I could get little or no intelligence; and indeed the ſtrict watch that is kept over every one belonging to us will make it very tedious, as it can only be done by night. You may depend on my being as expeditious as poſſible.

Permit me to entreat an early anſwer to *Moraba*'s letter, and that it will be ſuch as not to diſappoint all his hopes of concluding matters through us.

I remain, with real eſteem,
Poonah, Honourable Sir,
11th January 1778. Your moſt obedient ſervant,
Thos. Moſtyn.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 19th January 1778.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I have the pleaſure of informing you that I arrived here the 10th, in the morning, without meeting any obſtruction, though not the leaſt compliment was paid me on the part of the Durbar, notwithſtanding they had been publicly adviſed by Mr. *Lewis* of my intentions to enter the town that morning; immediately on my arrival I gave the proper notice to the Durbar, and requeſted an audience as ſoon as poſſible. *Nannah* ſent me word that that day being a holiday, and the next an unlucky day, he could not conſider of it before the 12th. After repeated meſſages I at laſt obtained an audience on the 13th, at which were preſent *Nannah Furneze*, *Mada Row*, *Jada Row*, *Byroo Punt*, and *Heſſorow*, the ſon of *Mada Row*, when I delivered the letter from the Honourable the Preſident to the Peiſhwa, ſent ſome time ſince to Mr. *Lewis*, but which *Nannah* had declined receiving from that gentleman, unleſs conveyed to him through the hands of *Mada Row*, *Jada Row*, and *Byroo Punt*. I at the ſame time, agreeable to your inſtructions, remonſtrated in the ſtrongeſt terms on the diſreſpect ſhewn to the Company by the reſtrictions laid upon their Repreſentative, and demanded a poſitive and ſpeedy anſwer to every point of the letter. To which *Nannah* replied, That the Durbar would give ſuch an anſwer as was uſual with them; when I obſerved to him that none but a plain and direct anſwer would be received: I then told the Durbar that no anſwer had been ſent to a former letter from the Honourable the Preſident; on which they obſerved, it required no anſwer, that letter being only a reply to ſome letters the Peiſhwa had written him; but on my reminding them that it contained

contained a demand for a Duſtuck for the two gentlemen who came to us from the French, they pretended to recollect it; and ſaid they would likewiſe give their anſwer thereto in writing. I then acquainted them with the iſſue of my commiſſion to *Ragoba*, to which I received no reply.

After I had taken my leave of the Durbar, knowing *Byroo Punt* has great influence with *Nannah*, I repeated to him the abſolute neceſſity of a ſpeedy anſwer to the above letter, which he promiſed ſhould be ſent me in two days; however from the knowledge I have of the dilatorineſs of this Government, not chuſing to place entire confidence in this promiſe, I wrote under the 14th to *Mhado Row Jada Row* that I hoped he would procure it me as ſoon as poſſible; and ſent a meſſage of the ſame kind to *Byroo Punt*. They replied that they had ſpoken to *Nannah* on the buſineſs after I had left him, who ſaid it was neceſſary he ſhould firſt conſult with *Sacram Bappoo*; in conſequence of which the incloſed correſpondence enſued; from which your Honour, &c. will plainly perceive *Nannah* is uſing every artifice to evade giving an anſwer; I ſhall therefore write to the Peiſhwa, in hopes of procuring ſome reply; and in the mean time beg leave to obſerve that the Chowkeys are ſtill continued. I ſhould have done myſelf the honour of addreſſing you before, but was induced from promiſes made me by the Durbar to wait a few days in hopes of being able to tranſmit you their anſwer to the Honourable the Preſident's letter.

On the evening of my arrival, I endeavoured to bring *Moraba* to an explanation, in conſequence of which he ſent me a letter for the Honourable the Preſident, which was forwarded the 11th; and notwithſtanding I have ſince frequently urged him, he declines being more explicit until an anſwer thereto.

The following, according to the beſt information I have been able to procure, is the ſtate of the different armies: *Moodajee Bouncello* is ſtill at *Lackanwaddy Gaut*, about 30 coſs to the eaſtward of *Auringabad*; *Holkar* continues at his own village of *Banhjam*, and by his refuſing to ſee *Nannah*, or any one he may ſend, appears to be determined on not coming to any terms with him; *Madjee Scindy* is endeavouring to raiſe contributions on *Janojee Patancar*'s jaghire, near *Rimutpore*, has had a ſkirmiſh with him, in which *Janojee* was killed; this action it is ſaid has cauſed great diſcontent amongſt all the Maratta officers in *Scindy*'s camp.

Hurry Punt has again been defeated by *Hyder*, and has retreated to *Panchmal*, on the northern bank of the *Kiſtna*, in hopes of receiving ſome aſſiſtance from *Downſa*, who is encamped at *Narrain Pent*, about twelve coſs from *Hurry Punt*. *Hyder*'s army has croſſed to the northward of the *Tongebodras* in purſuit of him. The Durbar are uſing every endeavour to perſuade the Nizam (who, on account of a wedding in his family, has not yet left *Hyderabad*, as was reported) to join them againſt *Hyder*, but which he refuſed doing till they comply with the promiſes made him when he joined them againſt *Ragoba*, which are, their delivering him the forts of *Aſhur* and *Amadanagur*. I have reaſon to believe this intelligence can be depended on, having received it from ſeveral hands.

On my entering the town, obſerving ſeveral parties of horſe encamped about it, I ſent people to make enquiry of the numbers; from whoſe reports I find there are from 8 to 10,000, belonging to different officers.

Monſieur *de Corcelle*, the French gentleman who took our protection, having received aſſurances from people in whom he could confide, that he had nothing to fear, on the 14th at night delivered me a letter, tranſlate of which is incloſed, and immediately left the factory.

I am, with reſpect,

Poonah, Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
16th January 1778. Your moſt obedient ſervant,
Thomas Moſtyn.

APPENDIX, No. 33.

Appendix. No. 33.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 19th January 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,

The W. *John Carnac*, Eſquire, *Daniel Draper*,
Nath. Stackhouſe, *Willm Aſhburner*,
Andrew Ramſay.

READ, and approved, our laſt Conſultation of the 14th inſtant.

The Preſident informs us, that he has received a meſſage from *Ragoba*, acquainting him that advice has been ſent him from *Poonah*, that an agreement has actually been concluded in writing for giving *Row Dund* or *Choul* to the French, but that the ſunnuds have not yet been iſſued.

It being of the utmoſt importance to aſcertain the truth of this intelligence, Mr. *Moſtyn* muſt be directed to ſpare neither pains nor expence for that purpoſe; and to ſend immediate advice of the reſult of his enquiries to us, and the Governor General and Council.

From the uniform conduct of the Poonah Government for a long time paſt, and from the repeated intelligence we have received, it is paſt a doubt that ſome agreement has been concluded between them and the French, of which indeed the Governor General and Council appear to be convinced, by their letter of the 20th October.——We think it very probable that the intelligence ſent by *Ragoba* may be true; and more particularly from the circumſtance of a French gentleman having been landed at *Choul* the 30th ultimo, from a veſſel directly from *Pondicherry*, who may have had ſome commiſſion from Mr. *Bellecombe* the Governor, which may have occaſioned the ceſſion of that place. The conſequences are of ſuch a ruinous nature to the intereſt of the Company, that it is reſolved to ſend inſtant advice of the intelligence we have received to the Governor General and Council; and to aſk them expreſsly, and demand an explicit anſwer, whether in caſe a body of French ſhould arrive and take poſſeſſion of *Choul*, or we ſhould receive certain advice of ſuch a meaſure being intended, we are to ſuffer them to proceed without interruption, or to uſe our efforts to prevent ſuch a ſettlement from taking place?

It is our fixed and deliberate opinion, which we think it neceſſary to record for our own juſtification, and to make the ſame known to the Governor General and Council, that nothing but a change in the preſent Adminiſtration at *Poonah* can ſecure the Company from the dangers and bad conſequences of an alliance between the French and the Marattas, and that there is no other method to avert the impending evils but by the Company's immediately taking a deciſive part.

Read the letter received this morning from Mr. *Moſtyn*.

We think Monſieur de *Corcelle* quitting our protection, appears a very extraordinary circumſtance, after what has paſſed; but we hope during his reſidence with Mr. *Lewis*, he has not made himſelf maſter of any intelligence of conſequence; Mr. *Moſtyn* muſt ſend hither and to *Bengal* a copy of his original letter.

Mr. *Moſtyn* muſt be directed to ſend advice of every material circumſtance to *Bengal*, at the ſame time he does to us, and particularly reſpecting the French, whereby much time will be ſaved.

Adjourned.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, ſecretary. *Wm Hornby*,
John Carnac,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe,
Wm Aſhburner,
Andrew Ramſay.

Appendix. Nos. 34, 35, & 37.

APPENDIX, No. 34.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 20th January 1778.

SIGNED the following letters to Mr. *Moſtyn*, and the Governor General and Council:

Sir,

Since we wrote you the 14th inſtant, we have received your letter, dated the 16th.

Monſieur *Corcelle*'s quitting our protection, appears an extraordinary circumſtance after what has paſt; but we hope, during the time he lived amongſt the Engliſh, ſo much caution was uſed, that he did not make himſelf maſter of any intelligence of conſequence; we however direct that you tranſmit to us and to the Governor General and Council a copy of his original letter.

We have been informed by a meſſage from *Ragoba*, that the Durbar has actually agreed, by a written inſtrument, to put the French in poſſeſſion of *Choul*, but that the ſunnud is not yet iſſued; and as it is of the utmoſt importance to aſcertain the truth of this circumſtance, we direct, that you ſpare neither pains nor expence for this purpoſe; and ſend inſtant advice of the reſult of your enquiries, both to us and the Gentleman at *Bengal*, to whom you will punctually tranſmit every intelligence of importance, particularly reſpecting the French, at the ſame time you write to us; whereby much time will be ſaved.

We learn that a French gentleman from *Pondicherry* landed at *Choul* the 30th ultimo, and proceeded to *Poonah*, which makes us the more apprehenſive of the truth of *Ragoba*'s information; you will therefore make all poſſible enquiries reſpecting this perſon and his errand at *Poonah*.

We are

Bombay Caſtle, 20th January 1778. Your loving friends, *William Hornby*, &c.

Gentlemen,

Incloſed is duplicate of our laſt letter, dated the 3d inſtant.

By the intelligence we have ſince received from *Poonah*, contained in the incloſed papers, it appears that *Moraba*, moſt probably from views of ambition, inſiſts on the buſineſs being carried on in his name only; upon which we immediately reſolved, that nothing further could be done, unleſs *Saccaram Bappoo*, the principal in the late treaty, joined in making a formal application to us; and we in conſequence ſent the neceſſary orders to the Reſident at the Durbar, as per copy ſubjoined to the letters from *Poonah*.

We have ſent orders for the recall of all the European infantry from the garriſons of *Surat* and *Tannah*; but from the diſtance of *Broach*, and the importance of that province, we judged it would be imprudent to weaken that garriſon, and therefore continued it exactly upon the former footing. We have alſo thought it improper to remove the detachment of artillery either from *Surat* or *Tannah*; the latter indeed is ſo contiguous, that we can always command its ſervice at an hour's warning.

We now have it in contemplation to throw our whole body of infantry into one battalion inſtead of two, as the companies are nearly reduced to a third of their complement.

On the 30th ultimo a French gentleman landed at *Choul*, from a ſnow commanded by a King's officer, which had come direct from *Pondicherry*, and proceeded to *Poonah*. On the 18th inſtant *Ragoba* ſent a meſſage, acquainting us he had received advice from *Poonah*, that it had been agreed by a written inſtrument, to give *Choul* or *Row Dundah* to the French, and that the ſunnud would be hereafter iſſued.

Combining the above circumſtances with *Ragoba*'s intelligence, we are very apprehenſive that the French will ſoon be in poſſeſſion of *Choul*; and that the French gentleman had ſome commiſſion from Monſieur *Bellecombe* to the Durbar, which may have occaſioned the ceſſion of that place. We have however directed Mr. *Moſtyn* to ſpare neither pains nor expence to arrive at the truth on theſe points, and to adviſe you inſtantly of the reſult of his enquiry.

It is alſo extraordinary, that Monſieur de *Corcelle*, whom you were before adviſed had quitted Monſieur *St. Lubin*, and taken our protection, withdrew himſelf abruptly from our factory, and returned to Monſieur de *St. Lubin*. He delivered a letter on his departure, a tranſlation of which, as ſent us by the Reſident, is now incloſed, and we have directed him to forward you a copy of the original.

After the evidence already tranſmitted to you, it will be needleſs to inſiſt further on the certainty of ſome agreement being actually concluded between the French and the Poonah Government, of which indeed you ſeem fully convinced by your letter of the 20th October. Neither are any arguments neceſſary to prove the certain injury, if not total ruin, which muſt enſue to the Company's intereſts on this coaſt, if the French are once eſtabliſhed in a port within 12 miles from the mouth of our harbour. Our duty to the Company, therefore, prompts us to aſk you, and earneſtly to requeſt an immediate reply, whether in caſe a body of French ſhould arrive to take poſſeſſion of *Choul*, and we ſhould receive certain advice of ſuch a meaſure being intended, we are to ſuffer them to proceed without interruption, or to uſe our efforts to prevent ſuch a ſettlement from taking place?

It is our fixed and deliberate opinion, and which we think it neceſſary to make known to you for our own juſtification, in caſe what we apprehend ſhould happen, that nothing but a change in the preſent adminiſtration at *Poonah* can ſecure the Company from the dangers and bad conſequences of an alliance between the French and the Marattas; and that there is no other method to avert the impending evils, but by the Company's immediately taking a deciſive part.

Mr. *Moſtyn* arrived at *Poonah* the 10th, and incloſed is copy of the only letter we have received from him, giving an account of his reception and firſt audience. He has been directed punctually to tranſmit to you every intelligence of importance, and particularly reſpecting the proceedings of the French.

We are, with reſpect,

Bombay Caſtle, 20th January 1778. Gentlemen, Your moſt obedient ſervants, *Wm Hornby*, &c.

APPENDIX, Nos. 35 & 37.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 23d February 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

THE Governor General having ſent the following propoſition to the Secretary on Saturday afternoon, with directions to circulate it to the other Members of the Board, it was immediately ſent round.

The Governor General propoſes that the following draft of a letter be immediately written to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, in reply to their advices now before the Board, by the *Ravenſworth*, the Commander of which ſhip he underſtands will leave town this evening. He at the ſame time ſubmits to the conſideration of the Board and for their determination, the propoſitions included in the letter.

Gentlemen,

We have now to acknowledge the receipt of two letters from you dated the 3d and 20th ultimo, and two from Mr. *Moſtyn* under date the 19th and 24th ultimo.

We refer you to our letter of the 2d inſtant, a triplicate of which you will receive by this ſhip, for our reſolutions

lutions paſſed on the receipt of your advices of the 12th December.

For the purpoſe of granting you the moſt effectual ſupport in our power, we have reſolved to aſſemble a ſtrong military force near *Calpee*, the commanding officer of which is to be ordered to march by the moſt practicable route to *Bombay*, or to ſuch other place as future occurrences and your directions to him may render it expedient.

Although the Event of the overtures which have been made to you yet remains doubtful, we cannot help being exceedingly alarmed at the ſteps which are taking by the French to obtain a ſettlement on the Malabar Coaſt ſo near to *Bombay*, and to eſtabliſh a political influence in the Maratta State, the immediate object of which muſt be the overthrow of your ſettlement, and the future conſequences dangerous to the Company's poſſeſſions in the other parts of *India*. We are therefore of opinion that no time ought to be loſt in forming and carrying into execution ſuch meaſures as may moſt effectually tend to fruſtrate ſuch dangerous deſigns; eſpecially as the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced that the rains might ſet in before we could furniſh you with any military aſſiſtance, if we waited for definitive advices from you. We propoſe therefore to give immediate orders for collecting the force above-mentioned. We ſhall direct it to march as ſoon as the ſtores ſhall be provided, and the other neceſſary preparations completed, unleſs from any immediate advices received from you we ſhall judge the proſecution of this deſign unneceſſary.

We ſhall uſe every precaution which can depend on our care and influence, for enſuring a ſafe and unmoleſted paſſage to the detachment, and obtaining regular ſupplies of proviſions on its march; and we earneſtly recommend to you to aſſiſt us in theſe objects; for this purpoſe we ſhall direct the commanding officer to adviſe you continually of his progreſs and wants, and ſhall place him under your command from the day on which he ſhall move with the forces under his charge.

Fort William, We are, &c.
23d February 1778.

P. S. Vide the Governor General's motion hereafter entered.

Read the following opinion delivered by Mr. *Wheler*.

I object to the Governor General's letter, intended to be written to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*; becauſe, ſuppoſing the Board had already reſolved to grant that Preſident and Council a military force equal to the effectual ſupport of one part of the Maratta State againſt the other, which I do not think adviſeable, the route which the troops appointed for that ſervice are to take is neither fixed nor aſcertained, but left to the future determination of the Governor and Council at *Bombay*, or to the pleaſure of the commanding officer; and more particularly becauſe it is not, previous to the march of the troops, in any degree aſcertained, that the reigning powers through whoſe dominions it ſhall ultimately be judged expedient for them to paſs, are either in union or alliance with the *India* Company, or that they are diſpoſed to give ſuch aid and aſſiſtance to the ſupport of the detachment as the commanding officer may from time to time require, without which aſſiſtance and ſecurity I am apprehenſive we ſhall expoſe the detachment to imminent riſque.

Upon the whole I am of opinion, that the plan now propoſed for marching a ſmall detachment of troops into a diſtant and remote country, without firſt ſecuring the friendſhip and alliance of the governing powers, is contrary to all ſyſtem, and will prove deſtructive in practice.

To involve the Company in a diſpute with the French upon the ſubject of negociations which are ſaid to have been carried on for the purpoſe of obtaining a ſettlement on the Malabar Coaſt, and likewiſe for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a political intereſt in the Maratta State, require a more minute attention than the time allotted will admit; nevertheleſs, that part of the Governor's letter which acquaints the Governor and Council of *Bombay* that "no time ought "to be loſt in forming and carrying into execution ſuch "meaſures as may moſt effectually tend to fruſtrate ſuch "dangerous deſigns." is in my opinion extremely objectionable; becauſe a paragraph ſo looſely worded may involve not only the *India* Company but likewiſe the Engliſh nation, in a war with *France*; and becauſe I do not think we ſhould be juſtified in commencing hoſtilities againſt the French for the avowed purpoſe of depriving them of commercial advantages ſaid to be acquired by treaty. If therefore the French have already obtained, or are likely to obtain advantages from their negociations with the Maratta States, we ſhould endeavour to counteract thoſe advantages by negociation, and not by force; but above all, we ought to be particularly careful at this time to render our inſtructions to the Governor and Council of *Bombay* ſo plain, diſtinct, and obvious, as not to afford them the ſmall plea or pretence to become the aggreſſors, by commencing hoſtilities againſt the French; and as Mr. *Moſtyn* has given it as his opinion that no agreement has yet been made between the Marattas and the French, I am induced to believe that it will require no great ingenuity or addreſs to counteract their intentions.

22d February 1778. (Signed) *Edwd. Wheler.*

Appendix. Nos. 35 & 37.

Governor General—I muſt beg leave in this place to reply in a very few words to Mr. *Wheler*'s Minute, which I think is grounded on a miſconſtruction of my motion: I have not formally propoſed the route which is to be taken, becauſe the formation of the detachment, if it is to go, is the object that requires an immediate determination; but I do not propoſe that it ſhould be left either to the commanding officer or the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*: I have already determined the route in my own mind; theſe I will mention verbally to the Board; I hope it is not neceſſary yet to put them on record. I have had opportunities of ſtudying the intereſts and diſpoſitions of the different powers of *Hindoſtan* and the Decan, although we have had little intercourſe with them; and from the knowledge which I have obtained, I believe the march from *Calpee*, at leaſt as far as *Burrampore*, to be practicable and eaſy, and to lead through the country of our friends: beyond that I cannot anſwer; but the diſtance is ſo ſmall, that I have no doubt of making the remainder of our way good, whether it ſhall lead us to *Poonah* to *Bombay*, to *Surat*, or to *Broach*, even by force if it ſhould be neceſſary. Mr. *Wheler* has ſaid, that the following paragraph in the letter propoſed to be written to *Bombay* is ſo looſely worded, that it may involve not only the *India* Company, but the Engliſh nation, in a war with *France*; viz. "No time ought to be loſt in "forming and carrying into execution ſuch meaſures "as may moſt effectually tend to fruſtrate ſuch danger-"ous deſigns." I ſhould deſerve to forfeit the place I hold were I wantonly or ſtudiouſly to engage this Government in meaſures which ſhould have ſuch a tendency, if it could be avoided. The words which are above quoted are not the words in which the plan is deſcribed which we are to undertake, but they are the grounds or reaſons on which the plan is concluded. All the public advices from *Bombay* and *Poonah*, corroborated by intelligence through other channels, prove beyond a doubt, that the French have already formed a cloſe and intimate connection with the ruling adminiſtration of the Maratta State; have obtained poſſeſſion of a port, not a port of trade, but a door for the introduction of arms and troops into the Maratta Country, almoſt within ſight of *Bombay*; that they have promiſed a military aſſiſtance to the Marattas, which whether expected from *France*, or from their garriſons at the *Iſle of Mauritius*, may in the courſe of a few months be landed on the Maratta Coaſt. The French already affect to ſpeak of the port of *Choul* as their own. I have informed the Board of an expreſs, which I have every reaſon to believe has been lately ſent by Mr. *Chevalier* to the Malabar Coaſt, addreſſed both to Monſieur *Bellecombe* and

Appendix. Nos. 35 & 37.

and the Chevalier *St. Lubin*. I ſhall not be ſurprized if the next month's intelligence ſhould inform us that Monſieur *Bellecombe*, the Chief of all the French eſtabliſhments in *India*, has made his perſonal appearance at *Poonah*. It is, and always has been my opinion, and I believe that I have more than once expreſſed it on theſe records, that if ever the French make any attempts to regain their former power and influence in *India*, it will not be by a naval armament, which I repeat is impracticable, but by the previous poſſeſſion of a political eſtabliſhment in the dominions of ſome country power of the firſt conſideration. There are but two powers whoſe alliance would avail them, *Hyder Ally* and the Marattas; the former will no doubt, upon principles of good policy, keep upon good terms with them, but will never attach himſelf ſo cloſely to them as to become their dependant. The preſent rulers of the Maratta State are preciſely in that ſituation that will make them greedily catch at the offers of the French of their alliance, and to make any ſacrifices to obtain it; and I lay it down as a point incontrovertible, that if a detachment of much leſs than 1000 Europeans, with arms for diſciplining a body of native troops in the European manner, ſhall have once obtained a footing in the Maratta Country as the allies of that Government, all the native powers of *Indoſtan* united will lie at their mercy, and even the provinces of *Bengal* be expoſed to their depredations. The French therefore have now ſeized on the only means by which they can ever become formidable to us in *India*; and it is to avert the dreadful conſequences of ſuch a deſign that I have propoſed to ſtrengthen the hands of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and to enable them to counteract it. It is impoſſible to form a plan completed for this purpoſe, becauſe it muſt depend upon circumſtances, and even in a great meaſure upon the operations of our enemies; it muſt be left to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to whom nothing is neceſſary to be afforded on our part but a ſtrength adequate to the calls which they may have to exert it: I have therefore propoſed that the detachment which may be formed ſhall be ordered to march as ſoon as it is formed, to the aſſiſtance of *Bombay*, and this I apprehend is all that is at preſent neceſſary. I do not propoſe that they ſhould act againſt the French, but be ready to oppoſe any deſigns of the French; to oppoſe any deſigns of the Marattas, if the Marattas ſhould prove our enemies; or to aſſiſt the Marattas of that part of the Maratta State with which we are in alliance. There is nothing in this intention that can poſſibly involve the nation in a war with *France*, ſince the French are not the declared object of the preſent enterprize; and we have even the authority of the Peiſhwa and Miniſters themſelves to affirm, that the French have no connection or concern in their affairs, but have been received ſimply on the footing of hoſpitality, and that civility which is due from one ſtate to another.

Some time will be required to form and equip the detachment before it can march. It is not neceſſary to ſend any inſtructions to the Governor and Council of *Bombay* reſpecting the application to be made of this reinforcement, until it ſhall have actually begun to move. But I ſhall have no objection, and I think it highly proper, to enjoin them in the ſtricteſt manner, that they do not on any pretence become the aggreſſors, by commencing hoſtilities againſt the French, nor yet againſt the Marattas; but to continue to adhere, as they aſſure us they will do, to the ſtrict letter of the treaty ſubſiſting between the Company and the preſent adminiſtration of the Maratta State. I never underſtood or ſuppoſed that a formal grant by ſunnud has been made to the French of the port of *Choul*, but it is notorious that the French are in poſſeſſion of that port; and although Mr. *Moſtyn* does declare, nearly in the words made uſe of by Mr. *Wheler*, that a perſon well and officially informed, had aſſured him that he did not believe there was any agreement entered into between Monſieur *St. Lubin* and the Durbar; yet what he adds in the words immediately following, prove that Mr. *Moſtyn* himſelf did not mean by this expreſſion to contradict the belief that an agreement paſſed between Monſieur *St. Lubin* and *Nana Furneſe*; his words are as follows: "It therefore appears to me, that the "writing alluded to by my ſuperiors can be no "other than the private treaty between Monſieur *St. "Lubin* and *Nana Furneſe*, of which your Honour, "&c were informed under the 29th November." This mode of alluſion implies, that Mr. *Moſtyn* had not even a doubt of the private agreement which had paſſed between *Nana Furneſe* and Monſieur *St. Lubin*.

Since writing the above, I have verbally mentioned the precautions taken for ſecuring a free and peaceable paſſage for the detachment whenever it ſhall march; we cannot wait for their effects, becauſe the ſeaſon will be too far advanced; but if in the interval between the orders which may be iſſued for forming the detachment, and the time propoſed for the commencement of its operations, either the advices which we may receive from *Bombay* ſhall render their march unneceſſary, or any better means can be ſuggeſted for obviating and fruſtrating the deſigns of our enemies; in either caſe I will gladly agree to remand the troops to their reſpective corps; and as Mr. *Wheler* has ſaid, that if the French had already obtained, or are likely to obtain advantages from their negociations with the Maratta State, we ſhould endeavour to counteract thoſe advantages by negociation, and has even concluded with expreſſing his belief, that it will require no great ingenuity of addreſs to counteract their intentions. I hope he will point out the means by which a negociation of this kind can be conducted with ſucceſs, and the offers which may be made to induce the Miniſter to cancel his engagements with his new allies, and to accept of the friendſhip of the Engliſh Company in their ſtead. I aſk this not from any deſire of combating an argument, but of obtaining either ſuch lights as may be afforded on that ſide of the queſtion, and profiting by them for the peace and eaſier conduct of the Company's affairs, on a clear conviction that no negociation whatſoever will avail with the powers of this Company that is not immediately and pointedly directed to their intereſts or their fears.

Mr. *Wheler*—It is evident from the explanation which the Governor has now given of his letter, that no part of my Minute was either grounded upon error or miſconſtruction. The Governor aſſerts, that the French are now in poſſeſſion of a port, not a port of trade, but a door for the introduction of arms and troops into the Maratta Country, almoſt within ſight of *Bombay*. I requeſt that the Governor will favour this Board with his authority for that aſſertion, and likewiſe explain what he means by "Poſſeſſion."

The Governor General—I hope Mr. *Wheler* does not expect that I ſhall give up my time to the examination of all the voluminous papers which have been written upon this ſubject. That the French are in poſſeſſion of the port of *Choul*, has been aſſerted in the letters from *Bombay* and *Poonah*; in the intelligence tranſmitted from the Nabob of *Arcot*; in other papers of intelligence; and it has been charged to the Miniſter, as I think, in letters written from hence. The French ſhips have been for near theſe twelve months paſt at *Choul*; their goods have been landed at *Choul*, and continued there when the laſt advices were diſpatched from thence. This uſe of the port is preſent poſſeſſion. The ſunnud, or grant, can only give them property.

Mr. *Wheler*—I certainly do not mean to give the Governor any unneceſſary trouble: I thought the aſſertion a very extraordinary one, eſpecially as I had not met with any grounds for it upon the Company's Records. I do not conſider the landing of goods, without interruption for twelve months, as a proof of right, or poſſeſſion of a port.

Governor General—Whenever theſe Minutes ſhall be read in *England*, the Company will be poſſeſſed of much more

more authentic evidence than can be given here, either in proof that the French are in poſſeſſion of *Choul*, or that they are not in poſſeſſion; it is unneceſſary, therefore for me to continue to affirm my belief of the fact, nor will any contradiction invalidate it.

Read the Minute delivered by Mr. *Francis* on the propoſed letter to *Bombay*, which was circulated on Saturday.

Mr. *Francis*—I diſapprove of, and object to, every part of the letter propoſed by the Governor General to be written to the Preſidency of *Bombay*; the meaſure, which it ſtates as reſolved on, viz. "of aſſembling a "force at *Calpee*, with conditional orders to march to "*Bombay*," has not yet been debated, or even propoſed in Council; much leſs have the objections to which ſuch a ſtep is liable, and the conſequences which may attend it, been duly conſidered. At preſent I have no idea of any arguments that can induce me to conſent to the march of four battalions of ſepoys into the heart of *Indoſtan*, through an immenſe tract of country, in which we have no alliance or connection whatſoever: no magazines, nor a ſingle place of ſtrength to retreat to: I will not be anſwerable for the conſequences of hazarding a detachment of our troops, which we can very ill ſpare upon an expedition in which they will probably be cut off, and for no purpoſe but to ſupport an offenſive war, which I do not doubt will ſoon become general.

I beg leave to ſay, that I am not at all alarmed at the ſteps ſuppoſed to be taken by the French for obtaining a ſettlement on the Malabar Coaſt. If the whole ſtory be not fabricated by *Ragoba*'s party, to anſwer particular purpoſes, I have Mr. *Moſtyn*'s opinion and authority for believing that no agreement has yet been made between the Marattas and the French, for putting the latter in poſſeſſion of *Choul:* the intelligence comes from *Ragobà*, and Mr. *Moſtyn* himſelf thinks there is no foundation for it; but admitting it to be true, what right have we to make uſe of force to prevent the French from obtaining ſuch a grant by negociation with an independant ſtate? Or will the members of a fictitious, not a real, majority of this Board, created by a caſting voice, run the riſque of engaging the nation in a war with *France*, with no better cauſe of quarrel, than that they are forming an advantageous treaty or alliance with the Marattas? If our's had been faithfully executed by us, and *Ragoba* diſmiſſed from *Bombay*, the preſent queſtion would never have exiſted.

The Preſident and Council of *Bombay* now aſk us, Whether they ſhall uſe their efforts to prevent ſuch a ſettlement taking place? The anſwer propoſed by the Governor, tells them, that "in our opinion, no time "ought to be loſt in forming and carrying into execu-"tion ſuch meaſures as may moſt effectually tend to "fruſtrate ſuch dangerous deſigns:" But what thoſe efforts and meaſures are to be, remains to be explained. I conclude, that military operations againſt the French are intended, as our former permiſſion would hardly be neceſſary to authorize any others; but the *Bombay* Preſidency at this moment tell us, that their troops are nearly reduced to a third of their complement; and before the intended detachment could reach *Bombay*, even if they met with no interruption in their march, the rains would be ſet in; they muſt march in the months in which the hot winds prevail with the greateſt violence in the upper parts of *India*; and when they arrive, the rains will prevent their acting.

In my opinion, we ought to forbid the Preſidency of *Bombay* from engaging in any offenſive operations whatſoever, and moſt particularly againſt the French. I ſhall reſerve what I have farther to ſay on this ſubject till the meeting of the Council.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Mr. *Francis*—No member of this Council makes a freer uſe of his privilege of dictating Minutes at the Board, than the Governor General. I do not complain of it; on the contrary, I liſten to him at all times with reſpect, with temper, and attention. Yet, as much time is loſt by delivering opinions in this manner, I muſt own I am unwilling to enter into a diſcuſſion of all the ſuppoſed facts, aſſertions, and arguments, ſtated in this laſt Minute. I fear it would be endleſs, and lead to no concluſion. Public advices not before the Board; general intelligence from different quarters; the ſuppoſed notoriety of facts not proved, and the language ſuppoſed to be held by the French on occaſions where their intereſts are concerned, may have weight with the Governor General; they have none with me; nor will they, I preſume, be deemed by our ſuperiors to be a ſolid and warrantable foundation for the important concluſions of facts propoſed to be drawn from them. One inſtance of the uncertainty of ſuch reports, as well as of the facility with which they are introduced into our debates as acknowledged facts, appears in the Governor's repeated aſſertion, that the French are now in poſſeſſion of *Choul* of which the only proof afterwards produced is, that ſome of their ſhips have been admitted into the port, and that they have been ſuffered to land their goods there. *Choul* is ſaid to be almoſt within ſight of *Bombay*; it would be very extraordinary if the French had actually taken poſſeſſion of that place, and the Preſidency of *Bombay* had never mentioned to us a fact from which they might have drawn inferences ſo favourable to their preſent deſigns. Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letter of the 24th January, is the lateſt from that part of *India*; ſo far from intimating that the French were in poſſeſſion of that place, he denies the exiſtence of any agreement for that purpoſe, and ſays "he cannot think that *Nanah* "*Furneſe* will be ſo weak to do it until the required "aſſiſtance arrives." What may happen hereafter, I know not. My preſent opinion and reſolution muſt be founded on facts, and the authentic intelligence of facts, as they exiſt before me. I will not at preſent enter into any further conſideration of the Governor's Minute, but endeavour to bring back the queſtion on which this debate has ariſen, to its original ground.

The danger, ſtated in the propoſed letter to *Bombay*, is ſaid to ariſe from the ſteps which are taking by the French to obtain a ſettlement ſo near *Bombay*. The means recommended for obviating that danger, are, "that no time ought to be loſt in forming and carrying "into execution ſuch meaſures as may moſt effectually "tend to fruſtrate ſuch dangerous deſigns." An opinion given in this form, is plainly an inſtruction to the Bombay Council. The objection urged againſt it is, that the terms are not clear, direct, and ſpecific; and that in the only rational conſtruction which can be given to them, they amount to an authority from us to commence hoſtilities againſt the French, to prevent their being put into poſſeſſion of *Choul*. The caſe of an attack of the French againſt any part of the Company's poſſeſſions is not ſuppoſed, nor is it made the condition of our undertaking hoſtile meaſures againſt them. The letter, as it ſtands, refers only to their obtaining a ſettlement on the coaſt, and the neceſſity of our preventing it at all events. If the inſtruction recommended by Mr. *Wheler*, be now added to the letter, "That theydo not on "any pretence become the aggreſſors, by committing "hoſtilities againſt the French," I ſhall very much approve of it, becauſe I think it annihilates that part of the inſtructions to which I object; but then the form of the letter muſt be altered. I have nothing further to obſerve, but that the main queſtion, "whether a detach-"ment ſhall or ſhall not be ſent, and of what force it "ſhall conſiſt," has not yet been debated or propoſed; and that, before that queſtion is reſolved, the conſideration of the letter to *Bombay* is out of its place.

The Governor General—When the ſevereſt wounds are aimed at my public character, it is hard to deny me the privilege of ſelf-defence; but if I have taken up more of the time of the Board than I ought, in the Minute which I dictated at the Board this day, I do not

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not think that any perſon who ſhall read the preceding Minute and attend to the length of it will think it ſeaſonably prefaced with a complaint of that nature; I will however profit by the ſuggeſtion; both the preceding Minutes of Mr. *Francis*, both that written and that dictated by him, ſhall remain unanſwered, but by this ſhort remark, that they combat propoſitions which I have never made, and quote proofs as given by me even where I declared that I meant not to produce any; repeated arguments and aſſertions long ſince combated and refuted, and employed the attention of the Board on a verbal diſputation; for the whole that is ſaid and repeated of the paſſage quoted from my Minute by Mr. *Wheler*, is really ſuch. The propoſitions which were intended to follow the laſt Minutes of the Board in the military department, and which related to the ſtrength of the intended detachment, and the manner in which it ſhould be formed, have been ſent to the military ſecretary, and will be ſent in circulation to the other members of the Board, whoſe opinions may be more deliberately given by the ſame mode. It is neither my wiſh, nor did I introduce the practice, to ſpin out the time of the Board in deſultory and indefinite argumentations.

Mr. *Francis*—I do not know that any wounds whatſoever have been levelled at the Governor, or that his public character could poſſibly be in queſtion in this debate. I ſubmit to judgment, whether I have or have not ſtuck cloſe to the meaſure propoſed for deliberation. One thing I muſt beg leave to explain, becauſe I ſhould be ſorry to remain under the imputation of a failure in reſpect to the Governor General, or any member of this Board. The notice I took of the length of his Minute, aroſe from ſome words which he himſelf let fall in his anſwer to Mr. *Wheler*, "That he hoped that it was "not expected he ſhould give his time to the exa- "mination of voluminous papers, which have been "written on this ſubject." It appeared to me, that the queſtion did not lay a foundation for that anſwer. I ſhall be ready to conſider the papers when they are ſent in circulation. That mode of conducting buſineſs is convenient in matters of leſs importance, and I have no objection to it; but in a caſe of this very great conſequence, I hope the reſolution, whatever it may be, will be taken in council.

The Governor General—If the words I uſed in my reply to Mr. *Wheler* could contain any ſubject of offence, I ſuppoſe Mr. *Wheler* was the moſt competent judge of it, and did not require any other perſon to reſent it on his behalf. I meant thoſe words only as an excuſe for not replying to the queſtion which he put to me, and do aſſure him that they were dictated with temper, and with that reſpect to his character from which I never yet departed in any debate.

Since Mr. *Francis* objects to the mode which I propoſed for collecting the ſentiments of the Members of the Board, on the propoſitions which I mentioned that I had ſent to the Secretary in the military department, although it was in deference only to the objections which had been juſt urged by himſelf againſt Minutes dictated at the Board, that I propoſed to collect the opinions of the Members in circulation; I now bring them before the Board, deſiring only that they may be remanded, with the debates and opinions given upon them, to the military department.

Mr. *Francis*—I conſider myſelf as a party to every queſtion propoſed for the general information of the Board, let it come from whom it will, and of courſe intereſted in the anſwer to it. My remark was made on my own account. I did not preſume to ſpeak for any other member of the Board.

Mr. *Barwell*—The length of this debate has to me been quite unexpected; and I have declined taking a part in it, becauſe it is no more than a repetition of what has already paſſed upon the ſubject of the general intereſts of the Company, in influencing the Durbar of *Poonah*. The votes and reſolutions of the 2d inſtant are, or are not to be ſupported. They ſtand at preſent binding on the Council; and any attempts to prevent their operation or defend them, is ſimply ſubjecting the Company to the ill conſequences of miſcarriage in a point extremely intereſting to their affairs; and from the reſponſibility of which miſcarriage I hold myſelf exempted, ſhould it in fact, as I apprehend it will, ariſe from the difficulties thrown in the way of the executive power. Whatever meaſures in prudence and policy are propoſed upon the votes that are already paſſed, ought not neceſſarily to involve the propriety or impropriety of theſe votes. That queſtion is diſmiſſed totally, and the new one becomes of a very different nature, whether you will baffle the powers of the Government, or give way to them. I agree to the latter.

Mr. *Francis*—I underſtand it to be conformable to the ſentiments of the Board, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* ſhould be reſtrained from commencing hoſtilities againſt the French. I therefore propoſe, that the following paragraph may be added to the letter now reſolved on:

"We enjoin you in the ſtricteſt manner, that you do "not, on any pretence, become the aggreſſors, by com- "mencing hoſtilities againſt the French nor againſt the "Marattas; but that you continue to adhere to the "ſtrict letter of the treaty ſubſiſting between the Com- "pany and the preſent adminiſtration of the Maratta "State."

Governor General—As the preceding motion is taken from the words of my own Minute, I wiſh that it may be entered complete, with the addition of the following words, after the word adhere: "as you aſſure us you will "do." As the letter is concluded and partly ſigned, the propoſed addition can only be made in a poſtſcript, but I think it will appear too abrupt in the above form, and would therefore propoſe the following introduction and amendment:

"As we have no property or pretenſions to property "in the port of *Choul*, we cannot authorize you to uſe "any overt meaſures for preventing the French from "forming an eſtabliſhment at that place, however dan- "gerous their neighbourhood may be to your Preſi- "dency. This muſt be effected by other means; that "is, by an appeal to that power which alone can give "them the right of poſſeſſion. We think it neceſſary "alſo to add the following injunction; that you "do not, on any pretence, become the aggreſſors, by "commencing hoſtilities againſt the French directly, "nor againſt the Maratta State, but that you continue "to adhere, as you aſſure us you will do, to the ſtrict letter of the treaty ſubſiſting between the Company and the preſent adminiſtration of the Maratta State."

Mr. *Francis*—I acquieſce.

Agreed, That the poſtſcript propoſed by the Governor General, be accordingly added to the letter to *Bombay*.

No. 37.

The Governor General lays before the Board for their conſideration the following reply from Brigadier General *Stibbert*, to the queſtions propoſed to him the 2d inſtant, with his Minute upon it, containing five propoſitions, which he had ſent to the Military Secretary, intending that they ſhould be circulated by him.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In compliance with your deſire, I now beg leave to offer you my ſentiments, "upon the propriety of aug- "menting the ſepoy eſtabliſhment, by new levies of "thirty private to each company, and making the "ſtrength of each battalion one thouſand men complete.

"Alſo upon the means of ſupplying the Preſidency of "*Bombay* with a military force, and the number which "may be ſpared from this eſtabliſhment."

With reſpect to the firſt, it is my opinion, that augmenting the ſepoy battalions to one thouſand ſtrong, would be improper, and at the ſame time not anſwer the ends propoſed from it, for the following reaſons:

1ſt By

1ſt. By being increaſed to the above number, they would be too unwieldy a body to manœuvre and move together without confuſion in the field, and with that celerity and compactneſs which is requiſite, and which ought to be particularly attended to in the formation of all bodies of troops, but more eſpecially in the ſepoy corps, amongſt whom, in time of action, it is well known to every officer who has ſerved with them, that it is with the utmoſt difficulty regularity can be preſerved, even in the beſt-diſciplined battalions.

2d. By increaſing the battalions to the number propoſed, would make them larger bodies than are required for the different ſervices for which they are generally detached and ſent out upon, particularly in the Company's provinces. This could only be remedied by breaking the battalions, which would introduce great confuſion into the ſervice, and be attended with many diſadvantages, but above all be greatly prejudicial to their diſcipline, and take off from that reſponſibility which every Captain has for the regularity and good order of his corps.

3d. There, where a larger number of men are required than the preſent ſtrength of the battalions, or with the ſmall augmentation that I ſhall propoſe, it will ſeldom happen that a thouſand men will be ſufficient for the ſervice; for in ſuch caſes generally two battalions, and ſometimes three, are neceſſary to be detached, to prevent every poſſibility (as far as prudence and human foreſight can do it) of a failure.

4th. To ſtrengthen the foregoing arguments, give me leave to obſerve, that the Honourable the Court of Directors, from their directions reſpecting the European regiments, ſeem to have adopted the ſame opinion, that a thouſand men are too large a body for one battalion; and it is to be preſumed they did not form their reſolutions thereupon without firſt taking the advice of the General Officers now in England, who have ſerved in this country.

But though I am of opinion that the battalions cannot with propriety be raiſed to one thouſand ſtrong, for the reaſons I have urged, I think they may with utility be augmented from their preſent eſtabliſhment of ſeven hundred to ſeven hundred and eighty, rank and file; that is, from 3 havaldars, 3 naicks, and 64 private, to 4 havaldars, 4 naicks, and 70 private each company. This is the ſame as to number, excepting a colourman, who ranked as havaldar, as the companies ſtood rank and file upon the old eſtabliſhment; and is as large a body as ought at any time to be formed into one battalion, and that can act together with force and advantage.

By this augmentation an increaſe will be made upon the whole 30 battalions, attached to brigades, now in the pay of the Company, of 2,400 men, rank and file, equal to three battalions, which may be drafted as the exigencies of the ſervice may require, and their numbers ſupplied by freſh recruits, without being much felt by their reſpective corps. My reaſon for propoſing one additional havaldar and naick to each company, is, that the number now allowed to the companies, as they ſtand at preſent, is not found upon many occaſions ſufficient for the duties of the battalion; beſides, theſe men, whenever draughts are wanted, will be ready to go with them: it will be moreover enlarging the door of preferment, and giving additional encouragement to emulation, a matter highly neceſſary to be attended to amongſt the lower ranks, and ſepoys. No augmentation will be required of the officers of higher rank, holding warrants; a ſmall addition of pay given to the Jamadars, would not be improper, as what they receive at preſent is not ſufficient to ſupport them in ſuch a manner as to keep them from aſſociating with the lower ranks and private men, and of courſe ſo as to be able to keep up that authority which they ought to maintain in their battalions.

For ſupplying the Preſidency of *Bombay* with a military force, I would recommend to the Board, that four battalions of ſepoys be immediately drafted for this ſervice from the four brigades, viz. one from each; and that theſe battalions be formed under the inſpection of the ſeveral commanding officers of brigades, by an equal proportion of drafts, of one non-warrant officer and ten private from each company of the three eſtabliſhed brigades, which will furniſh a body of 770 rank and file from each brigade, and be within ten men of the propoſed number of rank and file, for a battalion, which may be recruited. The Subadars and Jemadars for this new battalion, to be appointed by the Colonel of the brigade, from ſuch Jemadars and Havaldars of the ſeven battalions as are moſt deſerving of preferment; attention being had to ſeniority and length of ſervices, as far it can be done with propriety. The battalion to be formed from the temporary brigade in the following proportion, viz. ſeven battalions to furniſh eight non-warrant officers and 80 private each, and the two remaining battalions, ſeven non-warrant officers and 70 private each; which together will make a body of 770 rank and file, the ſame as to be drafted from the other brigades. The warrant officers to be preferred and appointed from the Jemadars and Havaldars of moſt merit, in the ſame manner as already mentioned ſhould be done from the eſtabliſhed brigades.

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To furniſh theſe four battalions with European commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned officers, and alſo to give a due proportion thereof to the temporary brigade, which I think is highly neceſſary, I would adviſe that the battalions in the eſtabliſhed brigades ſhould be reduced from their preſent eſtabliſhment, of *Captain Commandant, 10 Subaltern Officers, one Serjeant Major, and 10 Serjeants*, to *one Captain Commandant, ſix Subalterns, and ſix Serjeants, including the Serjeant Major.* By this reduction of commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned officers, 84 ſubalterns and 105 ſerjeants will be taken from the eſtabliſhed brigades were they complete, which will be more than the number wanted to give an equal proportion of both to the temporary brigade, and the new battalions to be drafted for the *Bombay* Preſidency. The number of ſubalterns and ſerjeants which I have here propoſed that the battalions of the eſtabliſhed brigades ſhould be reduced to, I would alſo recommend to be the fixed eſtabliſhment in future for every battalion (the Militia battalions excepted) throughout the ſervice. This number is calculated ſo as to have one ſubaltern officer and one ſerjeant to be poſted in time of action, or to ſend out upon ſervice, with each grenadier company, and the ſame to each grand diviſion of the battalion, compoſed of two companies, which, with the Captain and native officers, are fully ſufficient for leading on the men, and every other kind of duty.

The eſtabliſhment of European commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned officers, fixed by the late Lord *Clive* for a battalion of ſepoys, when he was Governor and Commander in Chief of this Preſidency, and when he regimented and brigaded the troops in the year 1765, was 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Enſigns, 1 Serjeant Major, and 4 Serjeants. It was afterwards in the year 1770 ordered to be 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants, 3 Enſigns, 1 Serjeant Major, and 4 Serjeants; and in the year 1773 augmented to 1 Captain, 5 Lieutenants, 5 Enſigns, 1 Serjeant Major, and 10 Serjeants, as it ſtands at preſent; but this latter eſtabliſhment has been proved by experience to add no advantages either of diſcipline or otherwiſe, to the battalion. The ſerjeants, more than what are ſufficient to drill the recruits, or the number to be poſted as I have mentioned, are entirely loſt to the ſervice, in being taken from the regiments and put into the ſepoy corps. Beſides which, it is morally impoſſible for the regiments to ſupply the number of ſerjeants that are now wanted for the ſepoy corps, even upon a lower eſtabliſhment than eleven to each battalion, without ſelecting out all the beſt men, and promoting a great many who are totally unfit for the ſtation, and who can only be rendered uſeful by being kept in the ranks.

The four battalions I have propoſed to be formed by

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drafts from the four brigades, are, with two field pieces attached to each, full as great a force as I think can well be ſpared of diſciplined troops from this Preſidency, for the ſervice of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, keeping at the ſame time in view the defence and ſecurity of the provinces of *Bengal* and the Vizier's dominions, which altogether form an extent of country, for the defence of which, in caſe of a war or troubles, but particularly of an European war, the force we have at preſent on foot would in my opinion be rather inadequate, ſo as to give protection in every part, and repel the different attacks that may be made at the ſame time by the country powers and a foreign enemy. Europeans either of artillery or infantry can on no account be ſpared, as may be ſeen by the returns of the army.

The great difficulty which has been ever found in prevailing on the ſepoys to embark on board of ſhip, and the great deſertions that have always happened when this mode of tranſporting them has been adopted, render it neceſſary, as well as on account of their numbers, to conſider of the moſt eligible method of ſending the above detachment by land.

There are only two routes by which this can properly be done; one by the way of *Cuttack*, and through the *Decan*; the other from the weſtern provinces by the way of *Calpee*, *Narva*, *Eugine*, *Brampoor*, &c. The latter at *Narva* falls into the great public road from *Delhy* to the *Decan*, *Surat*, &c. and is much preferable to the former, both from its practicability (as I believe) for cannon, and on account of the ſhortneſs of its diſtance from the upper ſtations of our army. But the march of a body of troops with ſafety and diſpatch by this road, or any other, can only depend upon the friendſhip and aſſiſtance, which they may be aſſured of receiving from the Princes and Powers poſſeſſing the country through which they muſt paſs.

The greateſt part of the country lying between the diſtrict of *Bundelcund* and the river *Nurbudda* towards the ſouth-weſt of *Eugine*, is at preſent in poſſeſſion of the two Maratta Chiefs, *Maddajee Sindiah* and *Tokajee Holkar*, who both have very large armies on foot, and are eſteemed to hold a conſiderable influence in the Maratta Government: it will therefore be neceſſary to ſecure as far as poſſible the friendſhip and aſſiſtance of theſe leaders, for whatever troops may be ordered to march through their reſpective provinces. *Tokajee* is mentioned in the papers received from *Bombay*, which the Board have done me the honour to give me the peruſal of, to be one of the parties who are in the intereſt of and deſirous of placing *Ragonaut Row* at the head of the Maratta State, in whoſe favour the force in queſtion is intended to act in conjunction with the troops of *Bombay*, in which caſe, and ſhould *Maddajee Sindiah* be prevailed on to join the alliance, every difficulty will I think be at once obviated. *Tokajee* has at this time a conſiderable force in the neighbourhood of *Gohud* and *Bundelcund*, with the aſſiſtance of which, and the Zemindars of the diſtricts under his authority, in procuring proviſions and neceſſaries, whatever detachment Government may determine to ſend by the route I have recommended, might, I ſhould imagine, proceed with eaſe and ſafety till they could be joined by the friends of *Ragonaut Row* on the other ſide of the *Norbuddar*.

Fort William, 16th February 1778.

I have, &c.
(Signed) *G^r Stibbert.*

Proceedings of the Governor General and Council in their Military Department.

Governor General—As the letter juſt read from General *Stibbert* contains a variety of matters, which I ſuppoſe the Board would chuſe to conſider very maturely before they paſs any deciſive reſolutions upon them; I recommend, that it be ſent in circulation for the deliberate peruſal of the Members of the Board, previous to any reſolution which they may collectively form upon them; but there is one ſubject which may require an earlier attention to it. I hope that there will be no neceſſity to ſend any military aſſiſtance to the Preſidency of *Bombay*; but it is very probable they will require it; but it cannot be effectual unleſs it can reach them before the periodical rains. The mode by which the Commander in Chief has recommended a detachment may be raiſed for this ſervice, namely to draft 100 men from each battalion, would take up ſo much time, that before they could be drafted and formed into their reſpective corps, and aſſembled at the points from which the roads mentioned by him that lead to the other ſide of *India*, the rainy ſeaſon would approach ſo near as to render it impracticable for them to undertake the march. For which reaſon I ſubmit the following propoſitions to the conſideration of the Board:

1ſt. That a detachment be formed of ſix battalions of ſepoys from the firſt brigade, with their ordnance, one company of native artillery with its complement of ordnance, to be furniſhed from the field train of the 1ſt brigade at *Allahabad*, and two howitzers to be ſupplied from the ſame ſtation.

2d. That the troops which are to compoſe this detachment be directed to aſſemble at *Korah*, or in the neighbourhood of *Calpy*.

3d. That the ſtores for this detachment be furniſhed from the magazines neareſt to the place of rendezvous, and that the commanding officer be furniſhed with unlimited authority to indent for ſuch ſtores, and in ſuch quantities as he may deem neceſſary for the ſervice to be performed.

4th. That Colonel *Leſlie* be appointed to command this detachment, with one field officer from the firſt brigade, and one from the temporary brigade; and that Major *Baillie* be nominated to the charge of the artillery, with two additional ſubaltern officers of that corps to join the company ordered upon this ſervice.

5th. That Colonel *Leſlie* be directed to make the neceſſary preparations to conduct the detachment by the moſt practicable route to *Bombay*, or to ſuch other place in that neighbourhood as he ſhall be guided to by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and that it be particularly recommended to him to provide the moſt effectual means of inſuring a ſufficient ſupply of proviſions during the courſe of the march.

A true extract.
(Signed) *Robt Kyd*, Sec^r.

Agreed, That the Governor General's propoſitions be circulated for conſideration, and that the Minutes which may be delivered thereon be entered on this day's proceedings.

The propoſitions delivered by the Governor General which are entered above having been circulated, they were agreed to by Mr. *Barwell*, and the following Minutes upon them were delivered by Mr. *Wheler* and Mr. *Francis*.

Mr. *Wheler*—In my Minute of yeſterday I have given my reaſons for diſapproving of the intended ſupport of one part of the Maratta Power againſt the other. But as it is already determined in Council to aid the meaſures of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, I am clearly of opinion that the detachment ought in every reſpect to be adequate to the ſervice required; and as I muſt ſuppoſe that now propoſed by the Governor is ſo, I accede to it, and likewiſe to the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th following propoſitions made by the Governor General.

24th Feb. 1778. (Signed) *Edwd Wheler.*

24th Feb 1778.

Mr. *Francis*—Waving for the preſent all former objections to the general reſolution of ſupporting the Preſidency of *Bombay* in an offenſive war, undertaken without our previous approbation, I object to the march of the propoſed detachment to the Malabar Coaſt, as I am of opinion that ſo great a force cannot be ſpared from our eſtabliſhment

eſtabliſhment, conſiſtently with the defence and ſafety of theſe provinces, which ought to be the principal object of our attention, or with the protection of the dominions of our ally the Nabob of *Oude*, who pays us a ſubſidy for the ſervice of the troops now ordered to *Bombay*. Their removal muſt neceſſarily leave a conſiderable part of his frontier defenceleſs and open to the Marattas.

If a reinforcement muſt be ſent to *Bombay*, I beg leave to repeat my opinion, that it may be ſpared with more ſafety, and proceed with greater expedition from *Fort Saint George*: as the firſt part of this opinion is ſupported by that of Brigadier General *Stibbert*, I deſire that the following paragraph from his letter to the Board may be recorded in this place. (Signed) *P. Francis.*

Extract of a letter from Brigadier General *Stibbert*, dated 16th February.

"The four battalions I have propoſed to be formed "by drafts from the four brigades, are, with two field "pieces attached to each, full as great a force as I "think can well be ſpared of diſciplined troops from "this Preſidency, for the ſervice of the Preſidency of "*Bombay*, keeping at the ſame time in view the defence "and ſecurity of the province of *Bengal*, and the Vizier's "dominions, which altogether form an extent of coun-"try, for the defence of which, in caſe of war or "troubles, but particularly of an European war, the "force we have at preſent on foot would, in my "opinion, be rather inadequate, ſo as to give protection "in every part, and repel the different attacks that may "be made at the ſame time by the Country Powers and "a foreign enemy."

1ſt. Reſolved, That a detachment be formed of ſix battalions of ſepoys from the firſt brigade, with their ordnance, one company of native artillery from the temporary brigade with its complement of ordnance, to be furniſhed from the field train of the firſt brigade at *Allahabad*, and two howitzers to be ſupplied from the ſame ſtation:

2d. Reſolved, That the troops which are to compoſe this detachment, be directed to aſſemble at *Cora*, or in the neighbourhood of *Calpee*, as ſhall be judged expedient by the commanding officer:

3d. Reſolved, That the ſtores for this detachment be furniſhed from the magazines neareſt to the place of rendezvous, and that the commanding officer be furniſhed with unlimited authority to indent for ſuch ſtores, and in ſuch quantities, as he may deem neceſſary for the ſervice to be performed:

4th. Reſolved, That Colonel *Matthew Leſlie* be appointed to command this detachment, with one field officer from the firſt brigade, and one from the temporary brigade; and that Major *Baillie* be nominated to the charge and command of the artillery, with two additional ſubaltern officers of that corps, to join the company ordered upon this ſervice:

5th. Reſolved, That Colonel *Leſlie* be directed to make the neceſſary preparations to conduct the detachment by the moſt practicable route to *Bombay*, or to ſuch other place in that neighbourhood as he ſhall be guided to by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*; and that it be particularly recommended to him to provide the moſt effectual means of inſuring a ſufficient ſupply of proviſions during the courſe of the march.

Ordered, That a copy of theſe reſolutions be ſent to the Secretary of the Military Board, that they may be carried into execution under that department:

Ordered, That a copy of the above reſolutions be tranſmitted immediately to the Military Department, that they may be carried into execution.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 9th March 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

The proceedings of the 5th inſtant read, and approved.

The Secretary having received the following propoſitions from the Governor General, with orders to circulate them for the concurrence of the Board, they were accordingly circulated, and received back, with the opinions which are entered after them.

The Governor General recommends the following propoſitions:

That Colonel *Leſlie* be permitted to take with him, for the ſervice of his detachment, ſuch of the general ſtaff officers belonging to the temporary brigade as he ſhall think proper.

That Lieutenant Colonel *Fortnom* be appointed Field Engineer to attend this expedition,

Mr. *William Cator* to be Pay-maſter,

Mr. *Goold*, Commiſſary of Muſters.

That Colonel *Leſlie* be empowered to nominate ſuch perſons for the regulation of the depot of proviſions, ſupplies of ſtores, and proviſion of draft and carriage cattle, as the ſervice may require.

That Colonel *Leſlie* be permitted to have a Quarter-maſter General and an Aſſiſtant Quarter-maſter General, alſo an Aſſiſtant Field Engineer, for this ſervice. The choice of perſons properly qualified for theſe appointments, the Board are pleaſed to leave with Colonel *Leſlie*.

That the Board deem it neceſſary Colonel *Leſlie* ſhould be authorized to make whatever diſburſements he ſhall think neceſſary on this ſervice: they do therefore direct the Pay-maſter to obey his orders in every particular, requiring his ſignature to all charges not allowed for in the firſt regulations of the ſervice; and for all ſuch extra diſburſements they ſhall deem the commanding officer reſponſible to them in their Board of inſpection.

I agree. (Signed) *W. Haſtings.*
(Signed) *Richd Barwell.*

Mr. *Francis.*—Having delivered my opinion at large on the general meaſure, it is unneceſſary for me to interfere in the detail of arrangements, which the majority of the Board may deem neceſſary for carrying it into execution. (Signed) *P. Francis.*

Mr. *Wheler.*—I ſhall not enter into the arrangements which the majority of the Board may deem neceſſary; it is ſufficient to ſay, that I have, and ſtill continue to object to their original plan. (Signed) *Edwd Wheler.*

The Governor General's propoſitions being reſolved in the affirmative;

Ordered, That a copy thereof be tranſmitted to the military department, that the appointment and arrangements thereby formed may be carried into execution.

9th March.

The Governor General recommends, that the Reſident at the Vizier's Court be directed to reſerve the ſum of ten lacks of rupees for the pay and expences of the detachment formed under the command of Colonel *Leſlie*; that he convert as much of this ſum as he can into gold mohurs for the greater eaſe of conveyance, and alſo exchange; and that he wait the further orders of the Board for tranſmitting this treaſure to the detachment.

Agreed to.

APPENDIX, No. 36.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 16th February 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

Appendix No. 36.

Appendix. No. 36.

READ a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, as follows:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Mr. *Lewis* addreſſed you laſt under the 29th November, and I have now the honour to inform you that I returned hither on the 10th inſtant.

On the 14th ultimo, the Durbar received certain advices of the death of *Ram Rajah*; but they have not yet placed a new Rajah at *Settara*.

Mr. *Lewis* on the 28th ultimo, having received intelligence, that two or three new Chokies had been placed as ſpies on the factory, ſent a meſſage to *Madahrow Jaddaroi*, complaining thereof, and requeſted to know the Durbar's reaſon for ſo doing; it being contrary to their promiſes of the Engliſh being treated in the ſame manner as heretofore. He received no other reply, than that he was ignorant of the matter; but would aſk *Nanah Furneſe*. *Madahrow* at the ſame time added, that *Nanah* wanted all Europeans to leave *Poonah*; and that if the Engliſh muſt have a vackeel here he thought a Carcoon with four or five people would be ſufficient for every purpoſe. On the 29th the Chokies abovementioned having ſtopped and abuſed a poor ſhop-keeper, who had only been to the factory for the payment of ſome trifling articles which had been bought of him, for preſuming, as they ſaid, to go to the Engliſh without their permiſſion, Mr. *Lewis* immediately ſent a perſon to *Madahrow*, to acquaint him with this inſtance of the inſolence of the Chokies, who directly ſent one of his people with the ſervant to explain the matter to *Nanah*, who, inſtead of liſtening to the complaint, aſked the ſervant, by what authority Mr. *Lewis* ſent people to turn away the Chokies from the place where, he *Nanah*, had ordered them to ſtay? The ſervant denied the charge, and told him the affair as it had really happened; to which *Nanah* replied, that he had been informed by one *Madahjee Punt*, a man whom he had placed upon the factory. That gentleman had ſent forty or fifty ſepoys to diſlodge the Chokies; but upon the ſervant requeſting that *Nanah* would ſend for the ſaid *Madahjee Punt*, and enquire into the affair, when he would find he had been greatly impoſed upon, *Nanah* refuſed complying therewith, ſaying, he was well convinced *Madahjee Punt* had told him the truth. *Nanah* then directed the ſervant to deliver Mr. *Lewis* the ſame meſſage as had been ſent the day before by *Madahrow* with reſpect to the Engliſh leaving *Poonah*, and deſired he would immediately write it to the Honourable the Preſident of *Bombay*.—Mr. *Lewis* requeſts leave to declare in his own vindication, that not a ſingle ſepoy was ſent, nor a word exchanged with the Chokies further than one of his ſervants aſking them, by whoſe orders they acted in giving ſuch treatment to any one who came to our factory.

In conſequence of Mr. *Lewis*'s repreſentations to the Preſidency, the Honourable the Preſident wrote a letter to the Peiſhwa, which this gentleman was directed to deliver himſelf, and obtain an anſwer; but notwithſtanding he frequently applied for an audience for that purpoſe, *Nanah* abſolutely refuſed to give him one, ſaying, that he would not receive the letter from any one elſe than *Madahrow Jadahroi* and *Byroo*, who were appointed to tranſact the Engliſh buſineſs with the Durbar; and that if Mr. *Lewis* inſiſted on delivering it himſelf, he muſt go to *Proonder* for that purpoſe; he accordingly wrote a letter to *Saccaram Pundit*, informing him of the above circumſtances, and requeſting he would appoint a day for receiving the Preſident's letter, but *Saccaram*, by a meſſage through *Madahrow*, referred him back to *Nanah*.

Immediately on my arrival, I ſent proper notice thereof to the Durbar, and requeſted to have an audience as ſoon as poſſible; to which *Nanah* replied, that that day being a holiday, and the next an unlucky day, he could not take it into conſideration till the 12th; however, after repeated meſſages, I at laſt obtained an audience on the 13th, when I delivered the abovementioned letter, and duplicate of one from the Honourable the Governor General, on the ſubject of the ſhip *Aurora*: after making an apology for entering on buſineſs at my firſt viſit, contrary to the uſual cuſtom, I remonſtrated in the ſtrongeſt terms on the diſreſpect ſhewn the Company, by the reſtrictions laid on their Repreſentative; and demanded a ſpeedy and poſitive anſwer to every point in the letter from the Governor of *Bombay*: To which *Nanah* replied, that the Durbar would give ſuch an anſwer as was uſual with them. When I obſerved to him, that no other than a plain and direct one would be received. I then, agreeably to my inſtructions, acquainted them with the iſſue of the commiſſion they had given me to *Ragoba*; of which your Honour, &c. have already been adviſed.

When I had taken leave of the Durbar, I repeated to *Byroo Punt*, who attended me out, and has I know great influence with *Nanah*, the neceſſity of a ſpeedy anſwer, which he promiſed ſhould be delivered in two days; but as from the knowledge I have of the dilatorineſs of this Government, I did not place any great confidence in this promiſe. I wrote the next day to *Madahrow* and *Byroo Punt*, that I hoped they would uſe their joint endeavours to procure one as ſoon as poſſible; to which they replied, that they had talked with *Nanah* on the buſineſs, who ſaid it was neceſſary he ſhould firſt conſult with *Saccaram Bapoo*. Being now convinced that *Nanah* was uſing every artifice to evade giving an anſwer, I thought it neceſſary to addreſs a letter to the Peiſhwa, requeſting one, which I incloſed to *Saccaram Bapoo*, under the 16th. I beg leave to obſerve here, Gentlemen, that notwithſtanding my remonſtrances, the Chokies are ſtill continued on the factory; by which I am ſo ſtrictly watched, that it is almoſt impoſſible for me to have an intercourſe with any one in town.

Soon after my arrival *Moraba Furneſe* ſent me a letter for the Honourable the Preſident, which was forwarded under the 11th; in conſequence of which the Board have directed me to inform him, that they cannot take any part in the affairs of the Maratta Government, unleſs directly called upon by the perſons with whom the treaty was concluded.

By the beſt information I can procure, I learn that advices have within theſe few days been received from *Hurry Punt*, acquainting the Durbar that *Monackjee Panoria*, and the reſt of the Maratta officers mentioned in the laſt addreſs from hence, had actually joined *Hyder*'s army, and together therewith, falling on *Hurry Punt*, had entirely defeated him, taking moſt of his heavy cannon, and plundering his Buzar; this officer has retreated to *Pauncemahl*, on the northern bank of the *Kiſtna*, in hopes of receiving ſome aſſiſtance from *Downſa*, who is encamped about twelve coſs from him. The Durbar have applied to the Nizam to join them againſt *Hyder*; but which he has refuſed, until they deliver him the forts of *Aſſur* and *Amadnagur*, agreeable to the promiſes made him on his joining the preſent Miniſters againſt *Ragoba*. I cannot take upon me to aſſure your Honour, &c. of the truth of the above, the ſtrict watch kept over me preventing my having that free communication with people on whom I can depend, which I could wiſh; but from *Nanah Furneſe* going ſuddenly to *Proonder* yeſterday, on account it is ſaid of the receipt of *Hurry Punt*'s letter, I am inclined to beleive it is true, *Tookajee Holkar* and *Madjee Scindy* have received repeated orders from the Miniſters to join *Hurry Punt*, but have hitherto found means to avoid complying therewith; the former is at one of his own villages, about 15 coſs from hence, and the latter ſtill continues at *Rimutpore*. Indeed there ſeems to be a total diſaffection amongſt all the Maratta officers, which is attributed to the poverty of the Government.

Notwithſtanding the many aſſurances given by the Durbar in general, and the Miniſters ſeparately, that

Monſieur *St. Lubin* ſhould be diſpatched from hence on Deccra (the 12th October laſt) I am ſorry to inform your Honour, &c. he is ſtill permitted to remain here, and is to all appearance in high favour with *Nanah Furneſe*, but I believe with no one elſe.

The incloſed packet to your addreſs was delivered me by the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*.

I am, &c.
Poonah, (Signed) *T. Moſtyn.*
the 19th January 1778.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 23d February 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident.

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing you under the 19th inſtant.

Monſieur de *Corcelle*, the French gentleman who had taken our protection, as mentioned in a former addreſs, having received aſſurances from *Cruſt Row Balol*, in the name of *Nanah*, that no harm ſhould happen to him if he would leave the protection of the Engliſh, that gentleman on the 14th wrote me a letter (copy and tranſlate of which are now incloſed) and immediately quitted the factory; putting himſelf under the protection of *Senhor Norronho*, a Portugueſe officer in command of the artillery here, who has paſſed his word to Monſieur de *Corcelle*, that the Government do not mean him the leaſt injury, and with whom he actually now lives without having the leaſt connection with Monſieur de *St. Lubin*; nor do I ſuppoſe he will ever put it in the power of this gentleman to make a ſecond attempt on his life, in the infamous manner repreſented in Monſieur *Corcelle*'s letter of the 5th November laſt, which has already been forwarded to you. My ſuperiors apprehending from Monſieur de *Corcelle*'s leaving us ſo ſuddenly, that his coming to us at all may have been a ſcheme of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*'s to get at a knowledge of what we were doing here, has induced me to be thus particular with reſpect to him; and I beg leave to aſſure you, Gentlemen, that he has not received the leaſt intelligence of conſequence during his reſidence in the factory: indeed it appears to me, that his ſole motive for running to the Engliſh was to ſave his life; and his reaſon for quitting them was, as he explained the matter, to convince his friends in *France* that he remained no longer under the Engliſh protection than was abſolutely neceſſary for that purpoſe.

The Honourable the Preſident and Council, in a letter dated the 20th, acquainting me they have received information that the Durbar had actually agreed by a written inſtrument to put the French in poſſeſſion of *Choul*, but that the ſunnud had not been iſſued, I made the ſtricteſt enquiry into the truth thereof, and have received aſſurances from the perſon whoſe province it is to draw out all ſunnuds, that no orders have been iſſued for that purpoſe, nor did he believe the Durbar had any intention of the kind, at leaſt until they ſhould be convinced that the French would afford them ample aſſiſtance; neither did he believe there was any agreement entered into between Monſieur *St. Lubin* and the Durbar, and if there was any ſuch he was totally ignorant thereof. It therefore appears to me, that the writing alluded to by my ſuperiors can be no other than the private treaty between Monſieur *St. Lubin* and *Nanah Furneſe*, of which your Honour, &c. were informed under the 29th November. I make no doubt that *Nanah*, in order to carry his ambitious views into execution, would readily give the French the above-named place, yet I cannot think he will be ſo weak as to do it until the required aſſiſtance arrives. Appendix. No. 38.

My ſuperiors likewiſe mention that they had received intelligence of a French gentleman having landed at *Choul*, and proceeded to *Poonah*. This perſon, who proves to be a Monſieur *le Roy*, arrived here the 8th or 9th inſtant; but I cannot pretend to ſay what may be his real motive for coming hither; he was diſpatched by Monſieur *St. Lubin* in Auguſt laſt, as was then given out by him, with orders to Monſieur *Bellecombe*, though I have ſince learnt that his real errand was to raiſe money at *Pondicherry* in the name of Monſieur *St. Lubin* with which he was to have purchaſed a cargo for this market; it appears, however, that he was diſappointed herein, for it is certain he brought no goods with him to *Poonah*. The day *Nanah Furneſe* ſet off for *Proonder*, he received a letter from the *Soubadar* of *Choul*, acquainting him with the arrival of two French veſſels; and that application had been made to him for permiſſion to land their cargoes, conſiſting of ſpices and copper, which he refuſed granting until he could receive the orders of the Durbar, but I am aſſured no ſuch orders were given before *Nanah* left town.

Since my laſt addreſs, intelligence has been received that *Downſa* after *Hurry Punt*'s late defeat ſent a meſſage, requeſting he would remove from *Paunce Mahl*, which belongs to the Nizam, as his troops remaining there would ruin the country. *Hurry Punt* has in conſequence retreated to *Serahpore*, about 20 coſs to the northward of the *Kiſtna*. *Madjee Scindy* has lately had an engagement with part of the Rajah of *Collapore*'s troops, in which he was defeated, and has been obliged to retreat ſeveral coſs. *Hurry Punt*'s defeat ſeems to have thrown the Durbar into great diſtreſs; and it is imagined from their want of money, and the diſobedience of their Jaghire officers, that ſome changes muſt take place, but which way, it is impoſſible for me to ſay with any degree of certainty; however, you may depend, Gentlemen, I ſhall endeavour to gain the earlieſt intelligence in my power, and inform you of any material alteration.

Notwithſtanding my letter to *Saccaram Bapoo*, incloſing one for the Peiſhwa requeſting an anſwer to the Honourable the Preſident, as adviſed under the 19th, I have not yet been able to obtain one, though I am aſſured *Saccaram* and *Nanah* had a meeting at *Proonder* three days ago.

The incloſed packet in duplicate to your addreſs, was received this day, and ageeable to my ſuperiors orders, I now diſpatch them by the different routes of *Maſulipatam* and *Benares*.

I am, &c.
Poonah, (Signed) *Tho. Moſtyn.*
the 24th January 1778.

APPENDIX, No. 38.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 13th March 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

READ, and approved, the proceedings of yeſterday.

Governor General—I have given the Board the trouble to meet in this department, although before ſummoned for the uſual diſpatch of buſineſs in the Revenue Council, that I might lay before them a letter which I received late laſt night, ſigned with the names of Meſſieurs *Francis* and *Wheler*: addreſſes of this kind I cannot but think in-

Appendix. No. 38.

in themſelves irregular; and I hope Mr. *Wheler* will excuſe me in requeſting of him particularly, that when he ſhall have occaſion to communicate in writing to me in my public character, he will be ſo good as to make it the ſubject of a letter from himſelf only. I ſhall always pay him that reſpectful attention which it has ever been my ſtudy and even my inclination to give to his advice, his wiſhes, and opinions; but ſenſible as I am by experience of the fatal conſequences which ſooner or later muſt attend a diviſion of the Members of the Adminiſtration into decided and confirmed parties, I ſhould be wanting both in my duty and common prudence, if I conſented to to make myſelf inſtrumental to ſuch a ſchiſm formed againſt myſelf.

I have read the letter itſelf with great attention; I have compared it with the orders of the Court of Directors, to which it appears to allude; and clearly recollect the ſubſtance of the orders already iſſued for the march of the intended detachment to *Bombay*, which Meſſieurs *Francis* and *Wheler* in their letter mention it as their opinion ſhould be immediately countermanded; but I cannot perceive their connection. The orders from the Court of Directors particularly quoted by Meſſieurs *Francis* and *Wheler*, loſe their real meaning by that partial quotation; I ſhall therefore here repeat them at large, ſo far as they relate to the propoſition grounded upon them; they are as follow: "though that treaty is not "upon the whole ſo agreeable to us as we could wiſh, "ſtill we are reſolved ſtrictly to adhere to it on our "parts. You muſt therefore be particularly vigilant "whilſt *Ragoba* is with you, to prevent him from form- "ing any plan againſt what is called the miniſterial "party at *Poonah*; and we hereby poſitively order you "not to engage with him in any ſcheme whatever for "retrieving his affairs, without the conſent of the Go- "vernor General and Council, or Court of Directors." Theſe words imply an authority, equal by the conſtruction of them, to an expreſs order to engage with *Ragoba* in any ſcheme or plan for retrieving his affairs, which ſhall not be formed againſt what is called the miniſterial party at *Poonah*, and which ſhall have obtained the conſent of the Governor General and Council, or the Court of Directors. As the propoſal made for immediately countermanding the orders already ſigned for the march of the intended detachment to *Bombay*, is declared to be founded on the principle which influenced the above orders, I muſt requeſt, that the orders particularly alluded to may be ſhewn, and if they ſhall appear to have ſuch a tendency I will willingly conſent to their repeal.

Sir,

Having attentively conſidered the particular and poſitive inſtructions which the Court of Directors have given to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, in the laſt paragraph of their letter of the 4th July 1777 to that Preſidency, in regard to their connections and engagements with *Ragoba*, which they have been pleaſed to communicate to us in their general letter received this day, we think it our duty to take the earlieſt opportunity of ſubmitting to you our opinion, that as the Court of Directors declare their reſolution to adhere ſtrictly to the treaty concluded with the Marattas by Colonel *Upton*, and have particularly ordered the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to prevent *Ragoba* from forming any plan againſt what is called the miniſterial party at *Poonah*; every meaſure taken or intended to be taken by that Preſidency, in conjunction with *Ragoba*, againſt the ruling power at *Poonah*, will ſtand in direct violation of the Company's preſent orders, and for that reaſon, excluſive of all others heretofore urged to the ſame effect, ought not to be ſupported or countenanced by this Government. On the ſame principle we beg leave to ſubmit our opinion to you, that all the orders already iſſued for the march of the intended detachment to *Bombay* ſhould be immediately countermanded.

We have taken this method of communicating our thoughts to you on a ſubject equally important and preſſing, as the meeting of the Board in Council will not in the ordinary courſe take place before Monday next, unleſs the contents of this letter ſhould induce you to think it adviſable to ſummon a Council before that day.

We have, &c.

Calcutta, 12th March 1778. (Signed) *P. Francis*, *Edwd Wheler.*

Mr. *Francis*—An objection to the form in which Mr. *Wheler* and I thought fit to introduce the conſideration of a queſtion of ſuch importance as that contained in our letter to the Governor General, appears to me ſo very immaterial that I ſhall make no reply to it. I leave the letter to defend and anſwer for itſelf: the Court of Directors will judge whether it deſerves the ſtrictures which have been paſſed upon it.

A diſpute about the conſtruction of words might be endleſs; I will therefore not enter into it, but content myſelf with ſtating what I think the true ſenſe and meaning of the Company's preſent orders; every Member of the Board will judge for himſelf: it appears to me that, in the words quoted by the Governor General, there are three declarations on the part of the Company; the two firſt poſitive, and without any qualification; the third, conditional: their reſolution to adhere to Colonel *Upton*'s treaty is poſitive; their order to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to prevent *Ragoba* from forming any plan againſt the miniſterial party is alſo poſitive: the third declaration which forbids that Preſidency from engaging with him in any ſcheme whatever for retrieving his affairs, is not abſolute, but may be departed from, provided they have our conſent, or that of the Court of Directors. The true queſtion then is, Whether the late reſolutions taken at *Bombay*, and confirmed by the approbation of this Board, are or are not a violation of Colonel *Upton*'s treaty? and, Whether they do or do not make a part of a plan concerted with *Ragoba* againſt the miniſterial party at *Poonah*? In my opinion they do. The information given us by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in their letter of the 12th December laſt, of propoſitions made by or expected from the miniſterial party, in favour of *Ragoba*, appears to be totally without foundation. Does there exiſt any one fact, or the repreſentation of a fact, either from *Bombay* or *Poonah*, ſubſequent to the firſt information, that tends immediately or remotely to confirm or ſupport it? I affirm that there does not. If I am miſtaken the poſitive proof may be directly produced againſt me; yet the reſolution taken, and the orders given on the receipt of the firſt intelligence, and on the preſumption that that intelligence was well founded, remain in full force, and have been partly executed. We have remitted 10 lacks of rupees to *Bombay*; and we have given orders for forming a detachment nearly equal to a brigade, and for their march to and aſſembly at *Calpee*; the final orders for their march from thence to *Bombay* are not yet iſſued, but every preparatory ſtep is taken; and I take for granted the battalions are now on their march from their reſpective ſtations to *Calpee*. Theſe are the orders which, as Mr. *Wheler* and I meant, ſhould be countermanded. According to my underſtanding, the whole meaſure ſtands in direct oppoſition to the plain ſenſe and meaning of the Court of Directors, expreſſed in their letter now before us. I have acquitted myſelf of the duty which belongs to my ſtation, in contributing to bring the queſtion again under the conſideration of the Board, which I apprehend I am warranted in doing by the inſtructions received yeſterday, and muſt leave the determination of it to the ſenſe of the majority.

Mr. *Wheler*—Conſidering as I do that the orders already iſſued for the aſſembling of ſix battalions at *Calpee*, with the further deſign of proceeding to *Surat*, *Bombay*, or *Poonah*, are in direct contradiction to the orders of the Court of Directors, it became my duty to promote a further conſideration of thoſe orders, and

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if poſſible to prevent their being carried into execution. I imagine a letter, addreſſed to the Governor General jointly with Mr. *Francis*, whoſe opinion is well known to have concurred with my own upon this ſubject, would have more force and efficacy with the Governor General than my ſingle application: but I am ſorry to find it has had the contrary effect; and if I could flatter myſelf that the mode now recommended to me by the Governor would be the means of uniting our opinions, I ſhould be very ready to adopt the meaſure. I have done but my duty, in joining with Mr. *Francis* in an addreſs to the Governor; and I have no doubt but it will be conſidered as ſuch by thoſe who are ultimately to judge of the tranſaction.

Mr. *Barwell*—If the object of the preſent queſtion, agitated by a letter to the Governor General, is to prevent the interpoſition of this Government in ſuch political meaſures as may ariſe in the weſt ſide of *India*; and under any circumſtances whatever propoſes to decline giving the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſuch aid as may be neceſſary for its ſupport, I will venture to affirm, that it is not conſiſtent with any orders of the Company now received, nor conſiſtent with ſound policy.

The reſolutions that have already paſſed, for an effectual aid and ſupport of the *Bombay* Government, do not neceſſarily involve us in any meaſures that may not be conſiſtent with thoſe reſolutions. The defence and ſupport of one of the Company's ſettlements, and the giving them the means of being equal to any occaſions which may poſſibly call forth the exertion of our military ſtrength, cannot be imputed to us a breach of the treaty of *Poonah*, or a contradiction of any of the injunctions proceeding from the Company. In the vote that authorizes the Bombay Government to take a part in the ſcenes at the Poonah Durbar, the ultimate object of them is the tranquillity of *India*, and to ſecure our Government from deſigns clearly apparent to have originated with a faction at *Poonah*, for the introduction of the natural enemies of our nation, the French. The meaſures that have been reſolved do not in my opinion warrant a deduction of the conſequences that are imputed: they profeſs an entire different object; and I hope the public will ſo far vindicate the votes of the majority, as to give them that degree of credit ſo ſolemn an act merits. The national intereſts can only be my purſuit, and in ſupport of the Bombay Government ſecurity and peace to all our poſſeſſions, I adhere to my former opinions given on this ſubject, and am confirmed in them by a review of the precarious ſtate of parties at the Poonah Durbar. When once the blow has fallen upon *Bombay*, the greateſt exertions on our part will poſſibly fail to reſtore the ſplendour of the Engliſh Government.

Governor General—Mr. *Barwell* has ſo fully vindicated and explained the late reſolutions of the Board, that he has left me nothing more to add, but that as the objects of thoſe reſolutions are ſtrictly conformable to the Company's orders, ſo alſo was the means. We have not authorized, nor I truſt is it neceſſary to declare that we never will authorize, the Preſidency of *Bombay* to engage in any plan againſt what is called the miniſterial party at *Poonah*, while the treaty ſubſiſts inviolate on their part. A plan was ſuggeſted to us by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, which had for its object and means to engage in a plan for retrieving the affairs of *Ragoba*, in conjunction with the miniſterial party at *Poonah*, and at their invitation. The declared object of the reſolution for ſending a military reinforcement to *Bombay*, was, as it is expreſſed in our letter of the 23d February to that Preſidency, to grant them the moſt effectual ſupport in our power, but has no kind of relation, either direct or implied, to a violation of the treaty formed with the Miniſters at *Poonah*. I am againſt the motion for countermanding the orders iſſued for the march of the intended detachment to *Bombay*.

Reſolved, That the orders for the march of the detachment from the firſt brigade, be not countermanded. Appendix. No. 39.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 39.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 23d of March 1778.

THE Governor General having propoſed the following letter to be written to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, it was circulated by his order for the ſentiments of the Members of the Board:

Gentlemen,

In the late diſpatches received from the Honourable Court of Directors by the ſhip *Beſborough*, we were furniſhed with a copy of their general letter to your Preſidency, dated the 4th July, and concluding with the following paragraph:

"65. Although we cannot but agree to the protection that you have given to *Ragoba*, conſidering the connection that you have had with him, by which we muſt ſuppoſe the Company benefited, yet we are under ſome apprehenſions that the Marrattas will think it a breach of the treaty entered into with them by Colonel *Upton*; for though that treaty is not upon the whole ſo agreeable to us as we could wiſh, ſtill we are reſolved ſtrictly to adhere to it on our parts. You muſt therefore be particularly vigilant whilſt *Ragoba* is with you, to prevent him from forming any plan againſt what is called the miniſterial party at *Poonah*; and we hereby poſitively order you not to engage with him in any ſcheme whatever in retrieving his affairs, without the conſent of the Governor General and Council of the Court of Directors, at the ſame time we think common humanity will warrant us in giving you orders to protect his perſon from violence, if any ſuch attempts ſhould be made by the partizans of the Miniſters."

We have given this extract at full length, becauſe we ſhall make it the ground-work of our inſtructions on that part of it which reſtrains you from forming any engagements with *Ragoba* without our conſent.

Although two years are paſt ſince the concluſion of the treaty made by Colonel *Upton*, yet it does not appear that one article of it has been accompliſhed, except thoſe which contain the declaration of peace between the Company and Marattas; and theſe, from the inefficacy of the reſt, and from the dangerous connection which has been formed by one of the ruling Members of the Maratta State and the French, ſtand on ſo inſecure a footing, that we can place no reliance upon them: we think it neither conſiſtent with good policy nor with our public duty, to ſuffer the intereſts of our employers to remain longer in this ſtate of ſuſpence and alarm; nor the obligation of the national faith to be made the inſtrument of a policy, which aims at the ruin and extirpation of the Britiſh influence in *India*, without making ſuch efforts as our means will afford, and the treaty will allow, to remove the former, and fruſtrate the latter.

Your late advices contain no grounds for any rational expectation or concluſion, but that the diſtractions and weakneſs of the actual adminiſtration at *Poonah* were ſo ripe for a change, as to make it probable that ſome great event will have taken place before you can receive this letter; and the objects of it anticipated or precluded, by your own application of the advantages which may have been preſented to you, to the more permanent ſecurity of our common intereſts.

Yet as the reverſe is probable, we ſhall proceed to give you ſuch inſtructions and authorities for your guidance, as are neceſſary; on the ſuppoſition, that the ſame adminiſtration remains, and that the treaty continues

Appendix. No. 39.

on the ſame footing as that on which it has ſtood for theſe two years paſt.

1ſt. We direct, That you demand immediate poſſeſſion of a country of three complete lacks of rupees, near or adjoining to *Broach*, conformable to, and in the manner provided by, the 5th Article of the Treaty: but as the execution of this article has been hitherto ſuſpended by the diſputes which have ariſen between you and the Miniſters, concerning the interpretation of the original words of the treaty, *Jemma Caumil*, which are rendered by the word *complete*, in Colonel *Upton*'s Engliſh draft of it.

Although we muſt regard the advantage taken by the Miniſters in this inſtance as diſingenuous; yet as a proof of our reſolution to abide by the ſtrict letter of the treaty, even againſt the evident ſpirit and natural conſtruction of it, and againſt our own aſcertained intentions, we direct that if on enquiry, you ſhall learn that the technical meaning of the words *Jemma Caumil* is ſuch as the Miniſters have aſcribed to it, and ſuch as under that interpretation will juſtify them in their application of it to the value of the lands offered by them in virtue of the 5th Article of the Treaty, although eſtimated by you only at 2,10,000 rupees, you do accept the ſame as a full performance of that article: but if it ſhall appear to you, on valid authority, that the words *Jemma Caumil* mean in their official acceptation what their natural conſtruction implies, a complete rent, or a rent equal to the eſtimated ſum, you will in ſuch caſe inſiſt on the performance of the 5th Article of the Treaty, conformably to this interpretation: and if in either caſe the Miniſters ſhall refuſe to comply with your demand, we direct that you declare their refuſal to be a violation of the treaty.

2d. We direct that you demand immediate payment of the ſum of twelve lacks of rupees due by the 6th Article of the Treaty, or of ſo much of it as ſtill remains unpaid; and that the Pergunnah of *Jambooſer* be thereupon reſtored to the Miniſters, unleſs you ſhall have accepted of the ſame as an aſſignment, under ſuch engagements as ſhall have abſolved them from the literal performance of that article, and thoſe engagements have been fulfilled on their part; and if they ſhall refuſe to comply with the demand ſo made to them, that you declare their refuſal to be a violation of the treaty.

3d. We direct, That you keep poſſeſſion of the Pergunnahs of *Chickley* and *Corial*, the town of *Veriow*, the three villages of the Pergunnah of *Chureaſſy*, and the village of *Batta Gang*, which were ceded to the Company by *Futteh Sing Guicawar*, ſince the Miniſters have failed in producing the proofs that *Futteh Sing* did not poſſeſs power or authority to make ſuch ceſſions.

4th. We direct, That you cauſe a remonſtrance to be made to the Miniſters againſt the countenance afforded by them to the Chevalier *St. Lubin*; againſt the engagements formed between him and *Nanna Furneeſe*; and againſt the grant of the port of *Choul* made to him, or to the French nation through him, if you ſhall have obtained any ſatisfactory information, either that ſuch a grant has been actually made, or that the forms of office only are wanting to render it complete; though the grant without theſe forms may be equally effectual to the French, and equally dangerous to us; which appears to be the caſe, from the intelligence contained in Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letter of the 24th of January laſt.

Although we do not inſiſt upon any poſitive right to demand the diſmiſſion of the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, nor the excluſion of the French from the port of *Choul*; yet we have a right to require a knowledge of the intentions of the miniſters in regard to theſe points, ſo far as they reſpect the treaty of peace ſubſiſting between the Maratta State and the Britiſh Government in *India*.

We therefore deſire, That you will demand from the Miniſters, a clear and ſatisfactory explanation of their intentions; and that you declare to them, that we ſhall take ſuch meaſures accordingly as prudence ſhall dictate, for the future ſafety of the Company's intereſts and poſſeſſions committed to our charge.

We recommend it to you to obtain if poſſible a copy of the engagements entered into by *Nanna Furneeſe* with the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, and a knowledge of the meaſures which may have been taken for their execution. We cannot view this intrigue without feeling the moſt alarming apprehenſions of the conſequences: in effect, this is the ſole motive of all the late meaſures taken for the ſupport of your Preſidency. We regard the Marattas as the only native, and the French as the only foreign Power in *India*, capable of effecting the influence which the Britiſh nation has acquired in it: the former were prevented from giving us any immediate or effectual trouble, by their internal diſtractions, and the inequality of their numbers to the effect of our diſcipline; the latter, by their want of territorial property, or an alliance which might ſupply it. An alliance formed between them would at once relieve all their mutual wants, and afford them all the requiſites to diſpute with us on equal terms the dominion of *India*, which we at preſent in a degree poſſeſs without a rival. By timely proviſions, and a ſpirited negociation, it may be prevented; but if it is once ſuffered to take effect, by the admiſſion of a French force into the Maratta State, which may be the work of a few months, all our efforts may prove inſufficient to defeat it, and the whole empire become the theatre of war between two European nations, backed by their reſpective allies, with the ſame calamities attending it, which we formerly experienced in the *Carnatic*; but rendered more dreadful by the ſuperior magnitude of the conteſt.

5th. We have informed the Peiſhwa and Miniſters of our intentions to ſend a military force for the defence of the Company's poſſeſſions on your ſide of *India*; and have deſired that they will iſſue the neceſſary orders, both for their ſafe paſſage and ſuch aſſiſtance as they may require on the march; aſſuring them, that the ſtricteſt orders will be given to the officer commanding this force, to conduct himſelf in every reſpect in a manner ſuitable to the peace and friendſhip which have been eſtabliſhed between the Maratta State and ours; and that we are reſolved moſt rigidly to adhere to the letter of the treaty, and to maintain the peace intended by it.

Theſe aſſurances we deſire you will cauſe to be repeated, and that you will make the ſame requiſition for a free paſſage and aſſiſtance to our troops.

6th. While *Saccaram Baboo* and *Nana Furneeſe* continue to hold the adminiſtration, and adhere literally to the treaty to which they are parties, we recommend and enjoin the ſame literal adherence to it on your parts.

This obligation will remain in equal force, if a change of government ſhould take place, and the new members of it ſhall declare the ſtate to be bound by the treaty, and pledge their own faith to it; but if the preſent or future members of the adminiſtration ſhall either directly infringe the treaty, or permit it to be infringed by perſons acting under their authority, or ſhall refuſe to fulfil the conditions of it, we, as authorized by the Company, do inveſt you with authority to form a new alliance with *Ragoba*, and to engage with him in any ſcheme which you ſhall deem expedient and ſafe for retrieving his affairs. The like authority we have already given you, in the caſe of your receiving a formal invitation to that effect from the Firſt Miniſter, *Saccaram Baboo*, in our letter of the 2d February: we at the ſame time recommended certain ſpecific advantages, which on ſuch an occaſion we were of opinion ought to be required as a compenſation for the Company's interpoſition; but under every circumſtance, we recommended to you in the moſt earneſt manner to make the eſtabliſhment of a laſting peace, which can only be effected by conditions of reciprocal advantage with the Maratta Government, and a total excluſion of the French influence, intereſt, and property, from the Maratta Government and country, your ſole general objects, as they are ours.

7th.

7th. We do not mean however to preclude you from any advantages which it may be poſſible to obtain by negociation, though we inſtruct you to be bound by the treaty, in caſe the new members of the Maratta State ſhall declare themſelves bound by that treaty, and ſhall pledge their own faith to it. But as a change in the adminiſtration at *Poonah* will probably enable you to gain political advantages highly beneficial to the Company and to the general intereſts of our nation, and to amend the defects in our preſent engagements, we leave it to you to purſue ſuch a policy as circumſtances ſhall warrant, independent of any particular intereſt of *Ragonaut Row*, whom you muſt regard in the great political objects of our Government as ſimply meriting our conſideration, and not neceſſarily connected or blended with them.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

APPENDIX, No. 40.

Bengal Secret Country Correſpondence, No. 6.

To *Mahah Rajah Mojee Bhooſila:* written 22d Feb. 1778.

I HAVE received moſt authentic intelligence from different channels, that the French are now carrying on intrigues at *Poonah*; partly with a view of forming an advantageous alliance for their own nation, and partly with a view of deſtroying the friendſhip which has for ſome time ſubſiſted between the Engliſh and Maratta Governments. I have likewiſe learnt that the French Agent, *St. Lubin*, has met with great encouragement from ſome of the Chiefs; that a treaty has actually been concluded with him, and the valuable port of *Choul* granted to the French, which is only a few coſs diſtant from *Bombay*. The grant of this port not only marks an indiſpoſition towards us, but puts into the hands of the French an arſenal where they may collect military ſtores, and make preparations for attacking our poſſeſſions when we are unaware of their deſigns. I who have the ſuperintendance of the whole Engliſh force in *India* have nothing to fear from the exertions of a nation who are infants in ſtrength in *India*, and who muſt tranſport every ſoldier they have to bring into the field from a diſtant country, and over a wide ocean; and the conduct of ſuch of the Maratta Chiefs as may have joined the French in preference to the Engliſh intereſts, excited my pity for their want of wiſdom rather than my anger for their preſumption. It is my duty however to guard againſt the future effects of their intrigues; for if I permit the enemies of the King of *England* and the Company to gather ſtrength, though my own nation is too ſtrong to ſuffer in its intereſts from any thing they can do, the lives of many men may be ſacrificed in repelling attacks for which we might not be prepared in one part of our dominions, though we ſhould have more than ſufficient force on this ſide of *India* to puniſh our enemies for whatever loſs our Government might ſuffer from ſuch diſturbances.

For theſe reaſons I have reſolved to ſend a ſtrong military force to reinforce our ſettlement at *Bombay*; and and have directed a large detachment with a well-appointed artillery, and commanded by experienced officers, to aſſemble at *Calpee*, that they may be ready to march towards *Bombay*: there are two roads by which they may march, one by *Souhah Malwah* and the other through *Berar*. The road through *Souhah Malwah* is the ſhorteſt, but I have not yet formed any friendſhip with the Rulers of the countries ſituated on that road; and as my enemies are your enemies, and our wiſhes in all things the ſame, I have reſolved that my troops ſhall paſs through *Berar* in their way to *Bombay*; that by this means our friendſhip may be declared to all the world, and that the ſeeds of an alliance between the Engliſh and you, which has long been both my deſire and yours, may be ſown. The detachment will march in leſs than a month from this time, by which time I have no doubt you will have given orders for their free paſſage through your country, and have ſent information of your having given ſuch orders to *Calpee*. It will be better if you ſend a truſty perſon, and a part of your own army, to accompany ours. I aſſure myſelf you will give me this proof of your friendſhip, that the whole world may be a witneſs of its ſincerity; but as it is neceſſary to be certain of your conſent before the troops have proceeded too far, I deſire that if you ſhould not chuſe to comply with this requeſt, you will give notice of it to the Commander of the detachment, who will accordingly take another road. But this I will not ſuppoſe.

Appendix. No. 40.

To *Dewagur Pundit:* D°.

Of the ſame tenor as the foregoing, and requeſting he will employ his influence with his Maſter, to obtain his ready compliance for the march of the troops through his country.

To *Modajee Bhooſila:* written 25th February.

The day before yeſterday I diſpatched a letter to you on the ſubject of affairs here, and requeſting your permiſſion for a detachment of Engliſh forces to march through *Berar* in their way to *Bombay*; a duplicate of which letter accompanies this.

Since that time I have had further converſations with your vackeel *Beneram Pundit*, who has warmly diſſuaded me from ſending the forces by the route of *Malwah*, as highly inconſiſtent with the friendſhip ſubſiſting between us, and given me the fulleſt aſſurances that you will, with the greateſt pleaſure, comply with my requeſt, and will afford the detachment every poſſible aſſiſtance, by ſupplying them with proviſions, &c. and will ſend a truſty perſon with a part of your army, to accompany it to the place of its deſtination.

I have in conſequence written to Colonel *Leſlie*, the Commander of theſe forces, to repair with all expedition to *Calpee*, and from thence by *Bundlecund* to *Berar*, and proceed to *Bombay*; and that he will receive every kind of aſſiſtance from you in his march. I requeſt that immediately on receipt of this letter you will write to Colonel *Leſlie* at *Calpee*, ſignifying to him your compliance with the above requeſt; and will at the ſame time iſſue the neceſſary orders to your officers.

I have been induced to act thus from the firmeſt conviction of the ſincerity of your friendſhip, and full confidence in the aſſurances given me by your vackeel *Beneram Pundit*; but ſhould you nevertheleſs not think proper to give your conſent, you will give immediate intimation of your ſentiments to Colonel *Leſlie*, who will in conſequence take ſome other route.

To the Vizier: written 3d March.

I have received repeated and authentic intelligence that the French are now carrying on ſecret intrigues at *Poonah* with a view to form an advantageous alliance for their own nation, to enable them to acquire power and dominion in *Hindoſtan*; and alſo that their Agent, *St. Lubin*, has met with great encouragement from ſome of the Maratta Chiefs. As there can be no doubt of the uſe they would make of any force they might be ſuffered to acquire, namely, to attack the Engliſh and their allies, it is incumbent on us to apply an immediate remedy. Your Excellency's own intereſt, independent of every motive of friendſhip or alliance, requires your hearty concurrence in this meaſure. It is well known that the French can never attack *Bengal* by ſea with any proſpect of advantage, nor would they think of ſo warm an attempt: ſhould they be ſuffered to form alliances, and to become formidable, they would undoubtedly march from the weſtward, and make their firſt attempt againſt your Excellency's dominions. To prevent the poſſibility of this, and to enſure our future peace and tranquillity, I have determined to ſend a large military force to reinforce the Government of *Bombay*, and to enable it to cruſh immediately the French power in that

quarter

Appendix. No. 41.

quarter. For this purpoſe, I have directed Colonel *Leſlie* to march at the head of a large detachment, and well-appointed artillery, to *Bombay*. Mr. *Middleton* will more fully explain to you the nature of the plan, and will make application to you for your aſſiſtance and ſupport of it. I have no doubt but your Excellency, knowing that the future proſperity of your own dominions do eſſentially depend on our vigorous oppoſition againſt the common enemy, will cheerfully comply with every application which that gentleman ſhall make to you for aſſiſtance from your own brigade, or any other which it is in your power to furniſh.

To the Peiſhwa: written 23d March.

In conſequence of repeated and circumſtantial intelligence, of hoſtile deſigns forming againſt the Company's ſettlements on the other ſide of *India*, I have judged it expedient to detach a body of troops from the army for their defence. As the march of the detachment may probably lie through a part of the Maratta Dominions, I muſt requeſt you will give the neceſſary orders for allowing them a free paſſage, and direct ſuch aſſiſtance to be given them as they may require in their route.

The Commanding Officer is ſtrictly enjoined to obſerve ſuch a conduct in all reſpects, as is conſiſtent with the peace and friendſhip ſubſiſting between your Government and the Company.

I take this occaſion of repeating my aſſurances of the determination of this Government to adhere ſcrupulouſly to all the conditions of the treaty, and to maintain the peace inviolable as long as it ſhall be in our power to maintain it; and I flatter myſelf that you will likewiſe act on the ſame principles.

To the Rajah of *Boondlecund*: written 1ſt April.

Having lately come to the reſolution to diſpatch a conſiderable body of forces for the reinforcement of the Government of *Bombay*, which will march by the way of *Calpee*, through a part of your territory, I am to requeſt, that you will pay attention to all ſuch applications as may be made to you by Colonel *Leſlie*, the Commander of the detachment; and that you will afford him ſuch aſſiſtance as he may ſtand in need of, by ſupplying himwith proviſions and other neceſſaries.

I can have no doubt, from the friendſhip which ſubſiſts between us, that you will be glad to ſhew your attachment to the Company, by a ready compliance with my deſire, and have therefore directed Colonel *Leſlie* to apply to you in all caſes where your aſſiſtance can be of uſe to him; he has likewiſe received orders to obſerve the ſtricteſt regularity in his march through your territories; that ſo your ſubjects may not ſuffer any inconveniencies therefrom, but on the contrary be benefited by it. I could wiſh that you would ſend a truſty perſon to attend Colonel *Leſlie* on your part through your country, to receive his applications; and in caſe any ſtragglers from his army ſhould commit diſorders, to repreſent it to him, and procure redreſs.—For the reſt knowing me, &c.

N. B. The country of *Boondlecund* being under the juriſdiction of four different Chiefs, viz. *Anzooder Sing*, the chief of them, who ſucceeded to his father *Hindoput*, *Surrumput Sing*, *Gomaun Sing*, and *Comaun Sing*, who each poſſeſs a ſhare of the country; a letter of the ſame tenor as the above has been written to each of them; alſo one of the ſame tenor to the Chief of *Bopaul*.

To *Benaram Pundit*: D°.

I incloſe you letters to your Maſter, *Maha Rajah Modajee Bhooſilah* and *Dewan Dewagurt Pundit*, which I requeſt you will forward to them with all poſſible expedition, and accompanying them by letters from yourſelf, for which purpoſe I ſend you copies for your information.

If you have finiſhed the buſineſs for which you went to *Benares*, I wiſh you to proceed without delay and join Colonel *Leſſie*, who is very deſirous of ſeeing you, and of conſulting with you perſonally on many points relative to his march, which can be much better effected by an interview than by any other means.

To *Beneram Pundit*: written 4th April.

I have received your letter informing me of your arrival at *Benares*: I underſtand by the letters written by you to your brother, that Colonel *Leſlie* has deſired you to go to him to *Cora*, and that you have been much alarmed by the reports communicated to you from *Dondo Pundit*; I before deſired your brother to inform you of my wiſh, which I now repeat; that whenever you ſhall have finiſhed the buſineſs which was the original cauſe of your viſit to *Benares*, you will proceed to Colonel *Leſlie*, and aſſiſt him with your advice and ſuch communications as may be uſeful to him, until he ſhall have commenced his march. *Dondo Pundit* has no authority for any intelligence which he may pretend to have received from *Calcutta*; and you too well know the inventive diſpoſitions of the people of this place to give credit to rumours originating from them.

I have already communicated to you, in a confidential manner, all that was neceſſary for you to know, and have told you, that the object of the preſent undertaking was to reinforce and ſtrengthen the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and to enable them to fruſtrate any deſigns which may be formed againſt the peace and rights of the Company on that ſide of *India*: on this ſubject I have written more fully to Mr. *Thomas Graham* and to Colonel *Leſlie*; from either of whom, wherever you may be when you receive this letter, you will underſtand it.

APPENDIX No. 41.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 23d March 1778.

THE draft of the letter propoſed by the Governor to be written to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, was returned, with the following minutes from Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*:

Mr. *Francis*—As the intended letter to *Bombay* profeſſes two general principles in which I concur: firſt, to make the Company's orders of the 4th of July 1777 the ground work of our preſent inſtructions: ſecondly, to make the eſtabliſhment of a laſting peace our ſole general object; I have only to conſider how far the inſtructions contained in this letter are conſiſtent with thoſe principles, with one another, with the meaſures already reſolved on, and with the motives originally aſſigned for thoſe meaſures.

The third paragraph ſtates as preliminary facts, that no one article of the treaty has yet been accompliſhed, except the declaration of the peace; and that a dangerous connection has been formed by one of the ruling Members of the Maratta State and the French.

From thence a general concluſion is drawn, that we are bound by policy and duty to make ſuch efforts *as our means will afford*, and *as the treaty will allow*, to remove the ſuſpence and alarm of our preſent ſituation, and to fruſtrate a policy which aims at our ruin and extirpation.

On this paragraph it is ſufficient to obſerve that we continue in the peaceable poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, alſo of the Maratta ſhare of the city and Pergunnah of *Broach*.

That the complete execution of the 5th Article of the Treaty has only been retarded by a diſpute about the literal meaning of the words *Kamil Jumma*, or in effect whether thoſe words mean a nett revenue of 2,10,000 rupees, or three lacks.

In our letter of the 18th of Auguſt laſt, we ſaid we underſtood

underſtood the term to mean a *groſs* revenue, which I think decides the diſpute againſt us.

At all events we retain *Chickley*, *Corial*, and ſeveral other places, and enjoy the revenues thereof as pledges, until the ſunnuds for the country of three lacks ſhall be made out.

That the ſixth Article of the Treaty is alſo executed by the Marattas, ſince *they* have given and *we* have accepted of *Jamboojeer*, as a Mortgage to be held until the revenues collected from thence ſhall have liquidated the debt of twelve lacks.

Theſe important conceſſions having been made and fulfilled on the part of the Marattas, it ſeems juſt and reaſonable that ſome ſatisfaction ſhould be given them on our ſide; particularly that *Ragoba* ſhould be removed from *Bombay* with a proper proviſion for his eſtabliſhment in a private ſtation. In our letter of the 18th Auguſt, we were *unanimous* in conſidering his continuance at *Bombay* as an *inſuperable bar to the completion of the treaty*.

The ſecond ſuppoſed fact on which the preſent meaſures are built, is introduced as uſual, without proof; viz. "That a connection has been formed by *Nana* "*Furneeſe* with the French, and that it aims at our "ruin and extirpation." If any negociations have taken place with the French, we may trace them to their ſource in the protection given to *Ragoba*; his reſidence at *Bombay*; and the continued intrigues between him and that Preſidency. The true way to defeat the views of the French is to give the Marattas a ſolid proof of our good faith by diſmiſſing *Ragoba*. While the pretender to their government is ſupported by us, we give them too much cauſe for looking to *France* for aſſiſtance. The preſent meaſures, if carried into execution, will leave them without a choice. As for making uſe of ſuch efforts *as our means will afford*, and *as the treaty will allow*, it is a contradiction in ſenſe without ſaving appearances. The efforts in queſtion are hoſtile, which a treaty of peace and friendſhip cannot ſuppoſe or allow of.

The firſt inſtruction orders a peremptory demand of a country of three *complete* lacks, and leaves it to the Preſidency of *Bombay* to determine, whether *Caumil Jumma* means complete or not. In our letter of the 18th of Auguſt, we determined that it ſignified *groſs*. Is it meant that we ſhould go to war for the difference, while we have *Chickley*, *Corial*, *Veriow*, &c. in our hands, as a pledge for the ſecurity of the whole?

The ſecond inſtruction orders a peremptory demand of the twelve lacks, which the Marattas conſented to pay us towards the expences of the war. Is it meant that we ſhall renew the war for the immediate payment of this whole ſum, while the revenues of *Jamboojeer* are mortgaged to us for the gradual liquidation of it?

The third inſtruction decides, that *Futty Sing* had a right to make the ceſſions mentioned in the ſeventh Article of the treaty, and orders the Preſidency of *Bombay* to keep poſſeſſion of them at all events. This point ſeems to me very diſputable, and the deciſion of it in our favour, very likely to make the eſtabliſhment of a *laſting peace* impoſſible.

The fourth inſtruction ſuppoſes the fort of *Choul* to have been granted to the French. An aſſertion of the ſame nature was introduced into the debates on the 23d of February; and upon enquiry was acknowledged to be without proof. The remonſtrance againſt Monſieur *St. Lubin* is to be accompanied with the demands of a clear and ſatisfactory explanation from the Miniſters of their intentions, and a declaration that we ſhall take ſuch meaſures accordingly, as prudence ſhall dictate. Is it meant to declare war with the Marattas, if their anſwer ſhould not be ſatisfactory to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, or to the Governor General and Mr *Barwell*?

In the fifth inſtruction, a ſuppoſed intrigue of *Nana Furneeſe* with Monſieur *St. Lubin*, is ſtated, "as the ſole "motive of all the late meaſures we have taken for the "ſupport of the Preſidency of *Bombay*." The reſolution of the 2d of February, from which all the late meaſures have originated, was, "*that* our ſanction "ſhould be given to the plan which the Preſident and "Council of *Bombay* had agreed to form with the Ma-"ratta Government." Now it is not diſputed, that no ſuch a plan has ever been formed, and that Mr *Lewis*'s account of propoſals made to him in the name of the Miniſters, in favour of *Ragoba*, was founded on ſome fallacy, and had produced no effect of any kind; yet the meaſures taken on the preſumption that ſuch a plan had been formed, are adhered to, and now imputed to another motive; that is, the firſt ground failing, another muſt be aſſumed. Appendix. No. 41.

The fifth inſtruction ſays, that we have applied to the Peiſhwa for a ſafe paſſage for our army through their dominions. Suppoſe they ſhould refuſe it: is it meant that the detachment ſhall march through their territories without their permiſſion, or without their conſent? If it be, this act alone is a declaration of war, which it is in vain to attempt to qualify, by any aſſurances of our pacific intentions? Such language, united with ſuch meaſures, is an inſult to common ſenſe; and much too plain, in my opinion, to deceive either the Marattas or the Court of Directors.

The ſixth inſtruction leaves it to the Preſidency of *Bombay* to judge whether or no the treaty is directly or indirectly infringed. If they determine that it is, they are at once "veſted with authority to form a new "alliance with *Ragoba*, and to engage with him in any "ſcheme which they ſhall deem expedient and ſafe for "retrieving his affairs." In the preſent temper and diſpoſition of that Preſidency, I preſume there cannot be a doubt in the breaſt of any of us, of the uſe they will immediately make of this extraordinary power; or that they will not be forward to avail themſelves of it before it can be recalled.

The ſeventh inſtruction ſuppoſes the probability of a change in the Adminiſtration of *Poonah*, from which more extenſive advantages may be derived. In this caſe it is left to them "to purſue ſuch policy as circum-"ſtances ſhall warrant, independent of any particular "intereſts of *Ragoba*." In the preceding article they are authorized to engage with *Ragoba* in *any* ſcheme for retrieving his affairs. In the preſent article they are inſtructed to gain as many advantages as they can without any concern for his intereſts. Excluſive of the manifeſt contradiction between the two inſtructions, and the hazardous as well as diſgraceful conſequences of not purſuing ſome one determinate ſyſtem, I apprehend that we are not warranted in giving ſuch unlimited power to the Preſidency of *Bombay*: their meaſures ought to be conſtantly ſubordinate to our Councils, and ſucceſſively directed by them. The peace of *India*, perhaps the fate of the Britiſh Empire in this part of the world, is involved in the queſtion, which we leave to their excluſive deciſion. Are we juſtified in relinquiſhing our juriſdiction, even for a moment, over ſuch queſtions?

Upon the whole it appears to me, that the real tendency of this letter, notwithſtanding any qualifying expreſſions interſperſed through it, is to provoke a war with the Marattas; that it ſeeks for cauſes of offence where none exiſt; that the language it holds to the Marattas is peremptory and hoſtile, and never uſed but when a rupture is predetermined; that the cauſes of complaint on which it urges a quarrel are trifling and exaggerated; that the facts it refers to, are either clearly diſproved, or taken for granted without evidence; and that the terms of the inſtructions contained in it, are in ſome places ambiguous, in others contradictory. Whether they are or are not conſiſtent with the pacific reſolutions, ſo clearly and poſitively expreſſed by the Court of Directors in their letter of the 4th of July, muſt be left to their judgment.

Mr *Wheler*—Having already diſſented to and proteſted againſt any interference on our part between the contending

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contending powers of the Maratta Government, and declared my disapprobation of the armament now under orders for *Bombay*, and the purposes for which it is to be employed, and in general to all the measures proposed to be taken by the majority of this Board relating to the Marattas, I shall not think it necessary in future to enter into a particular discussion of any proposition which may be made in the course of our correspondence with the Presidency of *Bombay*, by the Governor General or Mr. *Barwell*, as they have taken the whole responsibility on themselves, and must be answerable for the consequence of the measures already resolved on, and such as may of necessity follow. On the present occasion I shall content myself with making some short remarks on some parts of the draft of the letter to *Bombay*, laid before us by the Governor General, and leave the whole to be more fully discussed and decided on, by our superiors.

I agree with the Governor General, in wishing to make the 65th paragraph of the Company's letter to *Bombay* the ground of our instructions to the President and Council there: but I differ with him, in thinking this ought to be extended, as far only as they are restrained by it from forming any engagement with *Ragoba* without the consent of this Board. I wish to extend our instructions to what I deem the spirit and meaning of the whole order, to adhere to the Treaty of *Poonah* made by Colonel *Upton*, and even in the protection given to *Ragoba*, to be careful to avoid what the Marattas may think a breach of that treaty; and I am of opinion that we ought to give the fullest weight to that part which directs, that the Council of *Bombay* be "particularly vigilant whilst *Ragoba* is with them, to "prevent him from forming any plan against what is "called the ministerial party at *Poonah*," by which the late resolutions on this subject, and the present propositions, are I think entirely condemned.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the consequences of the Treaty of *Poonah* to be able to enter into a particular refutation of what is asserted in the third paragraph of the Governor General's draft, that no one article of it has yet been accomplished; but the Court of Directors, who have constant information from *Bombay*, do not appear to be possessed with any such opinion, and declare, that they are resolved to adhere strictly to the treaty on their parts. With respect to the consequence to be expected from the French negociators at *Poonah*, I have already declared my opinion of them, and how far they ought to be opposed by us: any interference on our part between the contending parties of the Maratta Government, can only have the effect of forcing the other party to unite with the French, and thereby produce that very consequence which the Governor General proposes to guard against, of procuring them a powerful and useful ally, to enable them to dispute our dominion in *India*.

I object to and protest against the form and substance of all demands to be made by the Presidency of *Bombay* on the Maratta Government, and to the march of our troops through their territories, and to the powers proposed to be given to the President and Council of *Bombay*, to enter into any new engagements with *Ragoba*, or to avail themselves of any particular circumstances or change amongst the governing powers of the Maratta State, as subversive to the Treaty of *Poonah*: a violation of the Company's orders lately received; and tending to involve them, and perhaps the British nation, in a dangerous and most expensive war, which at this critical period may not be confined to *India* alone, and which proposes no adequate or reasonable purpose for incurring so great a risque.

(Signed) *Edward Wheler.*

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, 6th April 1778.

The Governor General delivers in the following answer to Mr. *Francis's* objections to the letter to the Presidency of *Bombay* on the 23d March.

Governor General—It is not perhaps incumbent upon me to make any reply to the minute delivered in by Mr. *Francis*, objecting to the proposed draft of a letter to the Presidency of *Bombay*, as I conceive that all the points brought by Mr. *Francis* as arguments against the instructions contained in that letter, have been fully canvassed in my former minutes upon the state of the Maratta in relation to the English Government; and I will venture to pronounce, that to an unbiassed reader, it will be proved by those minutes, and by the documents on which the arguments contained in them are founded, and which stand upon our records, that the seeds of a combination between the leading though not the principal members of the Maratta Administration, and an Agent who acts under the immediate instructions of the first Ministers of the French nation, are sown and have already taken deep root; that the Administration of *Poonah* have treated the Agent of that nation with all the attention due to the minister of an ally, whilst they have behaved to ours with an inattention and disrespect which in any European Court would be considered as a dismission disgraceful to the power he represented, and the consequence of which would be satisfaction or war; and that even allowing for the difference of manners to which such a conduct to our Minister may be imputed, the striking contrast in their behaviour to the French Agent, with whose nation I am on the whole to understand Mr. *Francis* supposes them not in alliance, and to ours to whom they are bound by treaty, marks too clearly to be doubted, that such conduct proceeds from some deeper cause than simply a difference of manners; and lastly, it will appear that the Treaty of *Poorunder*, dated the 1st of March 1776, hath not yet been carried into execution.

I have repeatedly and in the most formal manner declared, and I again declare it to be my opinion, that such is the state of affairs at *Poonah*.

It is unnecessary to seek further for the causes of the difference of opinion in the members of this Board upon the important questions which have lately been before it. We differ in the belief of the facts on which our decision is to be founded. Mr. *Francis* and Mr. *Wheler* appear to be for total inaction; Mr. *Barwell* and myself are for taking some steps which may secure us against the effect of intrigues, which we are persuaded are carrying on at *Poonah*, and we wish at the same time that what we do should be consistent with the Treaty of *Poorunder*.

I shall now proceed to examine the nature and force of the evidence by which I think the propositions I have above laid down are supported.

In a letter from *Bombay* under date the 10th May 1777, and entered in our Consultation of the 16th June, we are informed of the arrival of a French gentleman with his train, who afterwards turned out to be the Chevalier *St. Lubin*. We are likewise informed of the high respect shewn to him by the Durbar at *Poonah*, and of the suspicion, with the grounds of it, that the port of *Chowl* would be granted by the Ministers to the French. We find that *Mahderow Bullob*, an officer of the Government, was appointed to transact the French business.

In another letter from *Bombay*, dated the 21st June 1777, and entered in Consultation of the 18th August, is the following paragraph:

"We now find that the French Deputy at the Maratta "Durbar is no other than the celebrated Monsieur *St* "*Lubin*, and not Monsieur *St. Laub*, as we at first "imagined. At his first audience he was received with "a respect and ceremony greatly superior to what was "paid to our Resident. The two Ministers themselves, "*Succaram* and *Nanah*, having gone without the tent "walls, to meet him on his alighting from an elephant "provided for him by the Circar, and introduced him "into

" into the Durbar, whereas Mr. *Moſtyn* was only re-
" ceived by two inferior officers, and with much leſs
" ceremony. We have remonſtrated againſt the indig-
" nity ſhewn to the nation by this diſtinction ſhewn to
" the French, and the reſtrictions laid on Mr. *Moſtyn*
" and his attendants, ſo contrary to the law of nations,
" and inſiſted upon their allowing him the ſame privi-
" lege and freedom of communication as heretofore."

In Conſultation the 22d September, is entered a letter from the *Bombay* Council, incloſing a paper obtained by Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poonah*, from an Engliſhman in *St. Lubin*'s ſuite, ſaid to be the production of his Secretary's pen; in which it is ſtated that Monſieur de *Sartine* was the Miniſter who was entruſted with the management of the expedition to *India*; that he was ſo much intereſted in its ſucceſs as to viſit the ports where the ſhips intended for the expedition lay; that 3,000 men under the command of Monſieur *Dennas*, late Governor of the *Iſle of France*, were originally intended for the expedition; that *St. Lubin* was appointed Miniſter Plenipotentiary to the Maratta Court, and was bound to ſend an expreſs to *Europe* upon his arrival; of which, ſhould the contents be favourable to their views, the above-mentioned number of men would be ſent; &c.

The next information in order of time which came before us, was Mr. *Elliott*'s letter, which he circulated amongſt the Members of the Board on the 1ſt October, though for the ſake of ſecrecy it was not thought proper at that time to put it upon record. It is to be found in Conſultation the 2d February. As I mean, however, this minute to contain a pretty full abſtract of the whole of the evidence of the French intrigues, and of the high authority from which they originate, I ſhall here quote that part of it which relates to the objection which I am now writing.

" Having been fortunate enough to obtain ſome in-
" telligence before I left *Europe*, in which the intereſt
" of the *Eaſt India* Company, and the influence of
" *Great Britain* in *India*, appear to be deeply intereſted,
" I think it incumbent on me to take the earlieſt op-
" portunity of communicating it to your Honourable
" Board; I am concerned at the ſame time to be under
" the neceſſity of laying the facts only before you,
" without having it in my power to point out the chan-
" nel through which the intelligence was conveyed to
" me, as my promiſe was moſt particularly taken before
" I was myſelf intruſted with it, that I ſhould conceal
" the names of the perſons from whom I received the
" information. It was not without ſome difficulty that
" I obtained permiſſion to inform the Governor Gene-
" ral and Sir *John Clavering* of this material circum-
" ſtance, and that only upon condition, that they
" ſhould not truſt it to the records of the Company,
" however ſecret they might be. The opinions which
" thoſe Gentlemen muſt form as to the authenticity of
" the facts which I now propoſe myſelf the honour of
" laying before you, will be a ſufficient juſtification of
" me for addreſſing you in this letter.

" It appears, by the information to which I allude,
" that Monſieur *Sartine*, Miniſtre de la Marine of
" *France*, has concerted with three or four of the prin-
" cipal Miniſters of that country a ſcheme, the object
" of which is the total overthrow of the Engliſh in-
" tereſts in *India*; that he was ſenſible the force
" which *France* could herſelf bring againſt our ſettle-
" ments would prove inſufficient for ſo great an under-
" taking, and had therefore thought it neceſſary to
" the completion of his views to begin by intriguing
" with the country powers, and by endeavouring to ſe-
" cure them in the intereſts of *France* in oppoſition to
" thoſe of *Britain*; that for this purpoſe he was re-
" ſolved to ſend a perſon to *India* with full powers, in
" the character of Agent; and likewiſe to ſend out per-
" ſons, who in the information are called Des Exer-
" ceurs, to diſcipline the natives of *India*; and a con-
" ſiderable quantity of arms and military ſtores. The
" perſon who was nominated to this office was deſcribed
" to me as one who had before been in *India*; he was
" to go to *Pondicherry* firſt, but to aſſume no public
" character, that he might not be ſubject to the ſuſpi-
" cions of the Engliſh; he is furniſhed with letters from
" the Court of *France* to all the country Princes of any
" note in *India*, to be uſed at his own diſcretion; he
" likewiſe carries out preſents of conſiderable value,
" which he is to diſtribute as he may judge neceſſary.
" The ſubſtance of his inſtructions is as follows:—To
" treat with ſuch of the country powers as he may have
" reaſon to think will moſt readily aſſiſt the views of
" *France*, and to form alliances with them in the name
" of the King of *France*; to endeavour to perſuade the
" country powers to fall upon the Engliſh ſettlements;
" and he is authorized to promiſe ſuch as will accede to
" his propoſal, the warmeſt ſupport of his nation ſe-
" cretly, till hoſtilities are actually commenced, and
" then openly. He is warned however in his inſtruc-
" tions, that *France* is not to take the lead in the war,
" but is to come in as an aſſiſtant only. The perſon
" from whom I learnt theſe particulars knew for certain
" that the Agent ſailed from *Marſeilles* in the beginning
" of April laſt, but was unacquainted with his name,
" and unable to inform me for certain what road he had
" followed to *India*, but ſeemed to be of opinion that
" he muſt have paſſed over to *Alexandria*, in the inten-
" tion of embarking at *Suez* for *India*.

" Having informed you of what I venture to ſay may
" be relied on as authentic, it will not be miſplaced,"
&c.

If we had no other proof of the authenticity of the information contained in this letter, but its agreeing ſo exactly in all the material facts with the intelligence tranſmitted to us from *Poonah*, in the paper I have already mentioned, and in the letters of Mr. *Farmer* and Mr. *Madgett*, entered in conſultation the 26th January, I ſhould hold it to be incontrovertible.

The ſame circumſtances brought from *Europe*, and traced in the capital of the Maratta Empire, upon the ſame ſubject, muſt be facts; the authenticity of Mr. *Elliott*'s information does not, however, ſingly depend even upon this ſtrong ground, he takes upon him in his letter to pronounce it to be authentic, and he has communicated to me, as he would have done to Sir *John Clavering* had he been alive, which Mr. *Elliott* thought he was, when he drew up the letter, as will appear from the terms of it, the grounds upon which he makes the declaration; and I now declare that he has not in the ſmalleſt degree ſtated the authenticity of his information more forcibly than he is warranted from the nature of it. It is not therefore in ſupport of Mr. *Elliott*'s letter, that I make the compariſon between the intelligence diſcovered in *Europe* and at *Poonah*; but it is to examine how far we ſhould give credit to thoſe parts of Mr. *Madgett*'s letter, which are not corroborated by Mr. *Elliott*'s. If the parts of his letter which admitted of proof are aſcertained by that proof's being obtained, we are I think bound to believe that the other parts of it are equally authentic, in ſupport of which we are ſenſible no proof could be obtained. The following is an extract of his letter:—

" I have heard it repeatedly mentioned by different
" gentlemen who were there, that there was ſome
" written inſtrument, to one ſide of which *Nanab* ſwore
" by the cow, and the other ſide Monſieur *St. Lubin*
" ſwore by the Holy Evangeliſt; that *Nanab*, further,
" kept the book Monſieur *St. Lubin* ſwore on."

Mr. *Farmer* in his letter to Mr. *Hornby*, an extract of which is here entered, uſes the following words on the ſame ſubject:

" They all perfectly agree in the circumſtances of the
" ſummons given to attend at *Nanab*'s to witneſs the
" treaty. *Nanab* was ſworn by his Bramin, and *St.*
" *Lubin* by his Padre, and *Nanab* kept the book."

From the following extract of our letter to *Bombay*, under date the 20th of October, which is conſiderably before the letters from Mr. *Farmer* and Mr. *Madgett*

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were received by us, it will appear what was the unanimous opinion of the Board upon the ſubject of the French intrigues. The words with a black ſtroke under them are in Mr. *Francis's* hand writing. I know not why the great additional weight of evidence, brought before the Board ſince that period, ſhould have made him change his mind upon this important ſubject.

" The paper of intelligence obtained by Mr. *Moſtyn* " from a perſon lately in the ſervice of Monſieur *St.* " *Lubin*, and incloſed in your letter of the 2d of " Auguſt, has left no room to doubt of the commiſſion " with which he is charged from the Court of *France*; " and the ſecret conferences which he has been admitted " to hold with the *Poonah* Government, too ſtrongly " indicate that they may have liſtened to negociations " of a hoſtile nature to the Company. Monſieur *St.* " *Lubin* remains ſtill at the Maratta Court, and may " poſſibly by this time have entered into engagements " with the Peiſhwa of a dangerous tendency to the " Company's eſtabliſhments; at ſuch a criſis therefore, " every circumſtance is of conſequence, and we are " under great anxiety to learn the progreſs of his nego- " ciations."

I delivered in to the Board on the 2d of February 1778, extracts from the Perſian Correſpondence.

The evidence contained in thoſe letters appears to me to amount to proof.

Saccaram Babboo the firſt Miniſter, and whoſe name is one of the two affixed to the treaty, tells us, that Monſieur *St. Lubin* is come to *Poonah* with the character of Miniſter on the part of the King of *France*; that he brought a letter from his Royal Maſter to the Pundit Purdhaun (that is to the Peiſhwa) that friendſhip is the object of his negociation. This letter is from the firſt Miniſter, and eſtabliſhed incontrovertibly the character in which Monſieur *St. Lubin* came to *India*. It cannot then be aſſerted that *St. Lubin* is an adventurer. The Nabob of *Arcot's* vackeel details to his Maſter what paſſed between the French Agent and the Maratta Miniſter. The whole letter is worthy of the utmoſt attention, but I ſhall here quote only the following words:

" *Succaram Pundit* then ſaid (to *St. Lubin*) I will ap- " point ſome perſon to negociate your buſineſs for you; " it muſt be a perſon who is well verſed in your af- " fairs; I know of no one qualified for this buſineſs, ex- " cept *Mado Row Sudaſhee.*" Mr. ——— not reliſhing this propoſal made anſwer, " he is employed in the negociations with the Engliſh, how is it poſſible we ſhould unite?"

The ſame vackeel mentions the Chevalier *St. Lubin's* deſire, that 10,000 ſepoys ſhould be raiſed to be diſciplined; the Aumil of *Guyacawar* mentions the ſame circumſtance. It muſt be obſerved how exactly this agrees with the information brought by Mr. *Elliott* from *Europe* who ſays, " That for this purpoſe he (Monſieur *Sartine*) " reſolved to ſend a perſon with full powers to *India*, " in the character of Agent; and likewiſe to ſend out " perſons who in the information are called Des Exer- " ceurs, to diſcipline the natives of *India*." I will here, for the ſake of bringing the whole ſubject into one point of view, introduce an extract of Mr. *Madgett's* letter which has been before quoted.

" Military ſtores, 15,000 muſquets, rejected from " the King's ſervice, were ſpared to him at a very low " price from the King's ſtores, by means of the influence " of Monſieur de *Sartine*; cloth of different ſortments " and colours, with a quantity proper for facing, for- " med alſo a part of the cargo, which I frequently " heard Monſieur de *St. Lubin* mention, was to clothe " the troops that might be raiſed in *India* for the pur- " poſe of the alliance: having perhaps forgot it in the " owner's cargo, he perſuaded an officer in the ſhip to " get made and bring out a conſiderable quantity of " buttons; the device of the buttons was given by Mon- " ſieur de *St. Lubin*; it is a fleur de lys in a creſcent, " which probably Monſieur de *St. Lubin* imagined to " be the Maratta ſtandard, and had therefore intended " it as emblematic of the alliance."

The Aumil of *Guyacawar* writes from *Poonah* upon the ſubject of the French Agent, " The expences are " great; how ſhould he be able to make ſuch preſents of " himſelf? From theſe circumſtances it is evident that " he is no impoſtor."

In Mr. *Elliott's* letter are the following words, " He " likewiſe carries out preſents of conſiderable value, " which he is to diſtribute as he may judge neceſſary."

Dewagur Pundit, the Duan of *Moodajee Booſlah*, writes to me, that an experienced Ambaſſador is arrived from *France*, &c.

In a letter from Mr. *Lewis* to the Governor of *Bombay*, which is recorded in our Conſultation the 16th February, we find, that Chokees were placed upon the Engliſh factory; and that none of the Engliſh Reſident's people could ſtir without being attended with one or two; and that the inſolence of the Chokees was carried ſo far as to have ill treated a ſhopkeeper who ſerved the factory with the common neceſſaries of life; the only ſatisfaction which the Durbar would give for an indignity greater than ever was borne by any nation, was a declaration that *Nanah Furneſſe* wanted all Europeans to leave *Poonah*, and that if the Engliſh muſt have a vackeel there, he thought a Carkoon was enough; we are informed nevertheleſs, that Monſieur de *St. Lubin* was cloſeted with *Nannah Furneſſe* for three hours on the ſame day.

The Governor and Council of *Bombay* in their inſtructions to Mr. *Moſtyn*, entered in the ſame Conſultation, direct him to obtain a ſatisfactory explanation of the indignity offered to the Company in the perſon of their Reſident; and to declare to the Durbar, that if they continue to treat their Reſident with the ſame indignity in future, it will be conſidered as a breach of the treaty, &c.

Mr. *Moſtyn* informs us in his letter of the 19th January, that he was promiſed an anſwer to his complaints in two days; on the 13th of January, that he has not only received no anſwer to his complaints, but the Chowkies are continued on the factory.

In anſwer to all this, I am told that I take a fact for granted without proof: I have ſtated my proofs, and I think they are clear and decided, and unleſs we could ſend a commiſſion to *Poonah* to take the evidence of the confidential officers of the Maratta Government, I know not how ſtronger proofs could be obtained, and I do not conceive, that upon a political queſtion, ſtronger could be required. I will quote the words uſed by Mr. *Francis* in a minute which he circulated on the 1ſt December laſt, from which it will appear what his opinions were at that time of the French deſigns.

" In the preſent ſituation of public affairs, and with " the opinion entertained by every member of this " Board, that the French are meditating deſigns againſt " ſome part of the Company's poſſeſſions in *India*, I " think we cannot be too watchful in obſerving their " motions, and taking early precautions againſt any " attempts they may poſſibly have in view; whether " ſuch attempts be likely to ſucceed or not, at this time " every new appearance on their part is a juſt object of " ſuſpicion."

In the minute to which I mean this as a reply, he ſhews, pretty clearly, that he does not ſo totally differ with me in opinion as he would appear to do; for he apologizes for the protection given by the Marattas to the French. The apology which he makes for them is, that our conduct in the protection of *Ragoba* has authorized them to ſeek for ſafety in the arms of our natural enemy. We do not then differ in the fact; we only differ in the cauſes which gave riſe to the connection. I ſhall not now enter into an argument with Mr. *Francis* upon the rectitude of meaſures which are paſt. It will be here ſufficient to ſay, that the Court of Directors made *Ragoba's* perſonal ſafety and indiſpenſable condition of

their

their approbation of the treaty. It will ſcarcely be denied, that ſhould he be delivered up to the Miniſters, or driven naked and defenceleſs from under the protection of the Britiſh flag, his life muſt fall a ſacrifice to ſuch injuſtice. The conveyance of *Ragonaut Row* to *Bengal* by ſea, has already been under the conſideration of the Board, and proved to be impracticable. Mr. *Francis*, I cannot doubt, though he has introduced this ſubject by way of argument, would ſhudder at the thought of delivering over a man, to whom the Britiſh faith has once been pledged, to certain death. He ſays, nevertheleſs, that the true way to defeat the French views, is to give the Marattas a ſolid proof of our friendſhip by diſmiſſing *Ragoba*. The connection which he ſuppoſes to be formed between the French and the Marattas, and which he makes the ground-work of this propoſal, might poſſibly be diſſolved by adopting it; but if it ſhould not be diſſolved, we ſhould, by an untimely act of ſubmiſſion, contrary to hoſpitality, contrary to the inſtructions of our ſuperiors, and contrary to policy, give additional ſtrength to that power which has been proved to be in combination with our natural enemies, the French. The perſonal ſafety of *Ragoba* was an implied article of the treaty; no Member of this Board will, I apprehend, ſtain the Britiſh faith with ſo foul a reproach as to ſuppoſe it was not: if, however, it was not, the deciſion of the Court of Directors has made it ſo. The article of the treaty which relates to his perſonal reſidence, is incompatible with his perſonal ſafety; for it was ſtipulated, that he ſhould reſide in the heart of the Maratta Dominions. Mr. *Francis* may argue on this queſtion, as he has on another, that there is no proof that his life would not be ſafe in the place allotted for his reſidence. I muſt leave the deciſion of this queſtion to the conviction which every man will feel upon it in his own breaſt; and ſhall only ſay, that ſhould we try the experiment, and the proof afterwards come, it muſt be ſealed in blood. Mr. *Francis* ſeems to dwell upon an expreſſion uſed in the preface to the inſtructions to *Bombay*. He ſays, that to make uſe of ſuch efforts as our means will afford, and as the treaty will allow, is a contradiction in ſenſe without ſaving appearances. I am ſorry he ſhould think it worth while to play with words when deliberating upon the moſt important queſtions which can come before this Board. It is torturing words to make them convey a meaning which they do not imply. The efforts which our means will afford muſt be directed by future events, by neceſſity, or by policy. They may be productive of war; but they may be productive of harmony between the Engliſh and Maratta Government: if they ſhould be hoſtile, it muſt be upon the principle of no treaty of friendſhip and peace exiſting. The treaty might allow us to demand the payment of twelve lacks of rupees for the expences of the war; it might not however follow, that our means would allow us to make uſe of ſuch efforts as might enable us to enforce the payment of our due.

I ſhall here reply to that part of Mr. *Francis*'s minute which alludes to the fifth inſtruction in the letter to *Bombay*, becauſe it is connected with the ſubject of which I am now treating. The impreſſion meant to be conveyed by it is, that not having originally approved the treaty of *Poorunder*, I was reſolved to break it at all events. Mr. *Francis* ſays, that all the late meaſures, originated from the reſolution of the 2d February; and upon the truth of this fact, he appears to reſt his proof of my determination on a breach of faith.

I ſhould draw this minute to an unwarrantable length were I to quote all the paſſages from my minutes, prior to that date which clearly diſprove the fact aſſerted: I am loth to ſuppoſe that Mr. *Francis* has made this the ground-work of his attack upon my meaſures, in hopes that the papers, which are upon record, are too voluminous to be read. In anſwer to what he has ſaid on that ſubject, particularly to theſe words, "The firſt "ground failing, another muſt be aſſumed," I quote the following extracts from my minute entered in Conſultation the 26th January, which was prior to the receipt of the letter on which the reſolutions of the 2d February were founded. Appendix. No. 41.

"That I may not appear to have drawn too forcible "a concluſion from the late tranſactions between the "Miniſters and the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, I beg leave "to call the recollection of the Board to a paper de"livered to them by Mr. *Elliott* on the 1ſt of October "laſt. From the compariſon of the intelligence con"tained in that paper, and brought immediately from "*Europe*, with the information obtained by Mr. *Moſtyn* "and Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*, and their exact agreement "in the moſt-eſſential points, I think it appears beyond "a doubt, that the French Agent there is entruſted with "a plan which has for its object the ſubverſion of the "Britiſh influence in *India*. We are in actual treaty of "friendſhip with the ruling adminiſtration of the Ma"ratta State; and our treaty was formed at a time "when they were engaged in a war with the Company; "from which they were releaſed by the treaty which we "granted them, and in the proſecution of which, had it "continued, they muſt have fallen. The treaty was "concluded by an officer of rank, deputed immediately "from this Government; and the attention of every "Prince and Chief in *Hindoſtan* was turned upon this "firſt negociation of the Britiſh power under the direc"tion of a general Government. It is diſgraceful to "us, that the Government at *Poonah* ſhould in any "ſituation, pay more attention, and ſhew more counte"nance to an Agent of the natural and known enemy "of our country than to ours; but when we are infor"med, that the French Miniſtry have formed a plan of "an offenſive alliance with the Maratta State; when we "are informed that an Agent of the French Miniſtry has "been received at *Poonah*, has been treated with the greateſt "confidence and marks of diſtinction, while our own is "diſregarded; that he has received from them the grant "of a port of trade within twenty miles of *Bombay* itſelf; "has exchanged mutual engagements with them, of which "his part is to ſupply them with arms and military force; "and even the common newspapers relate theſe tranſ"actions of univerſal notoriety; what concluſions are "we, who are immediately concerned in them, to form "from them? Are we, to regard them as the allowable "machinations of political intrigue, and quietly permit "them to operate to their laſt effect, if the Marattas "commit no overt act of hoſtility, or direct breach "of the treaty? Or ſhall we conſider the preparations "to a war as declaratory of an intended breach of "treaty, and take ſuch meaſures as the neceſſity of "ſuch a ſituation demands for enſuring and confirming "the treaty, and giving it that vigour which it yet con"feſſedly wants? Or, if that ſhould prove impracticable, "even to prevent the deſigns of our enemies, by openly "counteracting and oppoſing them?

"That a remonſtrance be made to the miniſters "againſt the countenance afforded by them to the "Chevalier *St. Lubin*, againſt the engagements we "underſtand have been formed with him, and againſt "the grant of the port of *Chowl*, made as we underſtand "to him, or to the French nation through him; that "though we do not inſiſt on any poſitive right to de"mand his diſmiſſion, nor the excluſion of the French "from the port of *Chowl*, yet as we have a right to re"quire a knowledge of the intentions of the Miniſters "in regard to theſe points, ſo far as they reſpect the "treaty of peace ſubſiſting between the Maratta State "and the Britiſh Government in *India*, a clear and ſatiſ"factory explanation be demanded of their intentions: "and that a declaration be made to them that we ſhall "take ſuch meaſures accordingly as prudence ſhall dic"tate for the future ſafety of the Company's intereſts "and poſſeſſions committed to our charge."

I ſhould apologize for the extreme length of this minute, and for the number of quotations I have been under the neceſſity of making from our records, with which every member of the Board muſt be ſuppoſed to be acquainted

Appendix. No. 41.

quainted, but the haſty manner in which Mr. *Francis* accuſes me of introducing ſuppoſed facts, as uſual without proof; and the aſſertion which he makes, that the cauſes of complaint, on which the letter urges a quarrel, are trifling and exaggerated; and that the facts it refers to are clearly diſapproved, or taken for granted without evidence, has forced me in my own defence to diſprove the aſſertions of Mr. *Francis*.

Let Mr. *Francis* and Mr. *Wheler* weigh the force of evidence upon which the proof of the combination between the French and Marattas is founded. Should they hereafter ſee the armies and fleets of *France* in alliance with the Marattas, the offspring of the preſent intrigues, and their propoſed inaction, triumphing over the Engliſh ſettlements in the weſtern parts of *India*, it would be a bad excuſe to their country and to themſelves, to ſay, "We had no proof that it would be ſo."

I am well aware of the innumerable cauſes which may ariſe between this time and the period intended for the execution of this plan, to prevent its being executed at all; had I the ſame conviction that the plan would be carried into execution, as I have that it exiſts, I ſhould not have propoſed that troops ſhould be ſent to reinforce our ſettlement at *Bombay*, but I ſhould have propoſed, that Engliſh armies from *Calpee* and *Bombay* ſhould have met at *Poonah*. Ido not therefore act upon the conviction that the French will ſend out armies to *India* for the purpoſe of effecting our overthrow; I acknowledge the chapter of accidents to be open, and that it is a voluminous one. I am convinced however that when Monſieur *St. Lubin* was diſpatched from *France*, it was the intention of that Government to back his negociations by force; and, as far as human foreſight can lead us, we have every reaſon to think that the French Adminiſtration will do every thing they intended, for *St. Lubin*'s negociations appear to have been much more ſucceſsful than their moſt ſanguine expectations could have permitted them to hope. The line I have taken in conjunction with Mr. *Barwell* is ſtrictly conſiſtent with theſe principles; we tell the miniſters, that if they do not give us a clear and ſatisfactory explanation of their intentions, we ſhall take ſuch meaſures accordingly as prudence ſhall dictate, &c.

This declaration does not in any ſhape commit us. Prudence may dictate to us the neceſſity of reinforcing our ſettlement at *Bombay*, and no more. Such a declaration may however alarm the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, and make them act with more good faith towards thoſe with whom they are in alliance; the requiſition for permiſſion that our troops ſhall paſs through their country, will give this declaration additional weight; and I think it is more than probable, that ſhould *Nanah Furneſe*, the patron of the French, ſtill wiſh to ſupport the views of that nation, he will be checked by *Succaram Baboo*, and his other colleagues in office. This leads me to anſwer the part of Mr. *Francis*'s minute, where he aſks, what is meant to be done ſhould the Marattas refuſe a paſſage to our troops through their country? future events muſt decide this queſtion; the detachment is not yet marched; when it does march it may take another road, or march, but a part of the way. It is no declaration of war to aſk a free paſſage for our troops, from one of our ſettlements to another; and I will never give my conſent to a declaration of war, or to any act which is equal to it againſt the Marattas, whilſt they maintain their faith to us or whilſt we are not obliged to act in our own defence. The advantages of our military preparations muſt at all events be acknowledged. If the detachment reaches *Bombay*, it ſecures that ſettlement againſt every effort with which the French and Maratta intrigues appear to be pregnant. If it ſhould ſtop in the country of the Rajah of *Berar*, *Poonah* will be between an Engliſh army at *Bombay* and another in *Berar*. Its march may be ſuſpended, or it may be rendered wholly unneceſſary, by advices received from *Bombay*, that the members of that Preſideney have of themſelves effected the purpoſes for which it was formed, either before the detachment has made a conſiderable progreſs, or poſſibly before it has even moved from the ground of its firſt ſtation. But even in theſe caſes it may have been productive of ſome advantage by the confidence excited in our friends, and by the impreſſion which the rumour of ſo powerful a reinforcement may have made on the minds of a weak, unconſtitutional, and divided miniſtry; which abandoning all its hopes in the French alliance, may chuſe, on any terms, to ſolicit ours as their only reſource; or to yield into their hands, for the condition of perſonal ſafety, a power which they are unable to retain.

I ſhall now endeavour to prove my third propoſition, that the treaty of *Poorunder* paſſed on the 1ſt March 1777 is not yet executed; which will at the ſame time anſwer the only part of Mr. *Francis*'s minute which remains unanſwered.

The firſt proof which is produced in that minute in ſupport of the opinion, that the treaty is executed, is, that we are in poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, and the Maratta ſhare of the city and Pergunnah of *Broach*.

It would be ſtrange indeed if we were not: we were in poſſeſſion of them when the treaty was concluded, and nothing but force could have wreſted them from us; and that force muſt have been greater than the whole Maratta Empire, unſupported by an European alliance, could have brought againſt us. This is not a very ſtriking inſtance to produce of the Maratta good faith.

It is ſtipulated in the treaty that *Salſette* and the other iſlands ſhould remain in our poſſeſſion. The only way by which this condition of the treaty could be accompliſhed was by ſilence and acquieſcence; but the treaty was ſcarcely ſigned when the miniſters reclaimed thoſe ceſſions, and have ſince repeated the requiſition not as a point of option but of right, with an intimation too ſtrongly implied to be miſunderſtood, that at a proper time they would uſe force to recover it; yet Mr. *Francis* inſtances this as one condition of the treaty which has been accompliſhed: ſurely it has not.

The 5th Article of the Treaty entitles us to a country of three complete lacks of rupees, &c. &c. This article is not executed; and Mr. *Francis* acknowledges it, for he ſays, "The complete execution of the treaty "has only been retarded by a diſpute about the literal "meaning of the *Kaumil Jumma*, &c." Mr. *Francis* ſays, "That in our letter of the 18th Auguſt, we de-"clared that we underſtood the term to mean a groſs "revenue;" which he thinks decides the diſpute againſt us: by no means; Mr. *Francis* has miſtaken or forgotten the point in diſpute. It is not a groſs revenue of three lacks which the miniſter offers, for that we ſhould have accepted, but lands which ſtand rated in the books at a revenue of three lacks. Our inſtructions to the Preſidency of *Bombay* upon this article in the letter quoted by Mr. *Francis*, are ſtrictly conſonant to thoſe which we have now given, as will appear from the peruſal of both.

Mr. *Francis* aſks, "Is it meant that we ſhould go to war? &c." The inſtructions direct the Council of *Bombay* to aſcertain the right; if we are wrong to relinquiſh our demands, if we are right to inſiſt on our right; and if not admitted to declare it a breach of treaty. It is extraordinary, that if upon proof it appears that we have rights, that we ſhould relinquiſh thoſe rights becauſe they are controverted by the Marattas. It is not very conſiſtent with the honour of this Government to yield at ſo critical a time to the dictates of an ally, the terms of whoſe alliance are not yet completed. To declare it will be a breach of treaty is not a declaration of war, but it is a declaration that we have a right to go to war, and will I have no doubt be ſufficient to ſecure us our right unleſs the Marattas ſhall be ſupported by an European ally.

Though I am not fond of commenting, I cannot help taking notice of a word uſed by Mr. *Francis* in the part of his minute which alludes to the execution of the 5th Article of the Treaty. He ſays, "The complete "execution of the 5th Article of the Treaty has *only* been "retarded by a diſpute about the literal meaning of the

" words *Kaumil Jumma*." Any one not acquainted with the ſubject would infer from this expreſſion, that the execution of the treaty was delayed, till by looking into a dictionary we could aſcertain the meaning of a word. The treaty has been concluded upwards of two years, and this article by Mr. *Francis*'s confeſſion is not yet accompliſhed. How long would he permit it to remain ſo?

He ſays, " We retain *Chickley*, *Corial*, and ſeveral " other places, and enjoy the revenue thereof as pledges " till the ſunnuds for the country of three lacks can be " made out."

We do not hold the places he mentions as a pledge: they are the ceſſions made to us by *Futty Sing*, and are our propetty, as will be ſeen in my anſwer to Mr. *Francis*'s objection to the third inſtruction. Appendix. No. 41.

The 6th Article of the Treaty is equally unaccompliſhed. The Marattas agree to pay us ſix lacks within ſix months of the date of the treaty, and ſix lacks within two years of the ſame date, which laſt period expired on the firſt of laſt month.

Mr. *Francis* appears to object to the inſtructions propoſed for enforcing the execution of this article, upon a reliance that they will not be read by thoſe who read his objections. To contraſt his objection with the inſtructions is the ſhorteſt, but I am ſure the moſt concluſive of all replies to his obſervation.

Inſtruction.

2d, " We direct that you demand immediate payment of " the ſum of twelve lacks of rupees, due by the ſixth Article " of the Treaty, or of ſo much of it as ſtill remains unpaid; " and that the Pergunnah of *Jambooſeer* be thereupon reſtored " to the Miniſters, *unleſs you ſhall have accepted of the ſame* " *as an aſſignment under ſuch engagements as ſhall have abſolved* " *them from the literal performance of that article, and thoſe* " *engagements have been fulfilled on their part*; and if they " ſhall refuſe to comply with the demands ſo made to them, " that you declare their refuſal to be a breach of the treaty."

Obſervation.

" The ſecond inſtruction orders a peremptory " demand of the twelve lacks, which the Ma- " rattas conſented to pay us towards the expences " of the war. Is it meant, that we ſhall renew " the war for the immediate payment of this " whole ſum, while the revenues of *Jambooſeer* " are mortgaged to us for the gradual liquidation " of it?"

It will ſcarcely be denied, that a temporary mortgage of an open country from one nation to another, is not equal to ready money, which was our original agreement. War would mutually releaſe us from all our engagements, and the mortgaged country would be as much theirs as ours; but a ſum of money in our own treaſury would be indiſputably our own. I leave others, leſs unbiaſſed in their opinions than my opponent, to judge from this minute of the ſecurity we have, that peace will long exiſt between the Engliſh and Maratta Governments.

The deciſion that *Futty Sing* had a right to make the ceſſions he made to us, contained in the third inſtruction, is likely, Mr. *Francis* ſays, to make the eſtabliſhment of a laſting peace impoſſible.

To our letter of the 18th Auguſt I refer for a reply to this objection; it was a letter written by the unanimous conſent of the Board, and the line with a black ſtroke under it, is in the hand writing of Mr. *Francis*. An attentive reader will perceive, that the line to which I allude to forms the moſt forcible part of the argument in favour of our retaining the ceſſions, as it is meant to prove that *Futty Sing*'s evidence did not make againſt our right.

" We encloſe for your information copies and tranſ- " lations of a letter written by *Futty Sing*, in reply to " a reference made to him by Colonel *Upton* on the " ſubject of his right to alienate any territories dependent " on him, and of ſunnuds granted at divers times to " the *Guicawars*. This letter from *Futty Sing*, though " it evades a poſitive and direct anſwer to the point in " queſtion, ſeems to diſavow any right in him to alienate " theſe poſſeſſions; but the concerns which he has in " the queſtion makes his perſonal evidence very ſuſ- " picious (eſpecially in the preſent inſtance, in which " it is oppoſed to his own perſonal act) ſince whatever " is relinquiſhed by the Company will revert to him.

" By the tenure on which all Jagheery poſſeſſions " are held, we doubt whether any part of them can be " legally alienated for ever by the Jagheerdar, but we " are not ſufficiently informed if the lands poſſeſſed by " the *Guicawar* family are of this nature. The anſwer " to the 7th requeſt, contained in the 4th ſunnud, " ſeems to allow of a right in them to diſpoſe of their " own diſtricts in any manner they pleaſed, without " obtaining the ſpecial concurrence of the Peiſhwa.

" The requeſt and anſwer are as follow:

" 7th requeſt. I ſhall commence war againſt the in- " dependent Moguls who have eſtabliſhments in my " ſhare, and recover my poſſeſſions from them at my " own expence; let not the Government concern itſelf " with them.

" Anſwer. Should you take any meaſures with re- " ſpect to thoſe diſtricts which are your own ſhare, the " Government has no concern in it.

" Agreed accordingly.

" Although the inference which we draw from this " paſſage is not concluſive, yet we think it ſufficient " to juſtify you in retaining poſſeſſion of the diſtricts " ceded by *Futty Sing*, until clear proof ſhall be afforded " by him or by the Miniſter, that he had no right to " make thoſe ceſſions. The detention of the country " for a few months longer, ſuppoſing it ſhould at laſt " be reſtored to *Futty Sing*, will be no breach of the " treaty on our part, as long as any material articles " of it remain unexecuted on theirs."

I have now I think anſwered every thing advanced in oppoſition to the late inſtructions to *Bombay*.

Mr. *Francis* and Mr. *Wheler* may perhaps conſider themſelves as little reſponſible for voices, which as the voices of a minority, are not effectual. Mr. *Barwell* and myſelf are in different ſituations. I could wiſh to have been joined by every member of the Board on this occaſion, becauſe I think unanimity would add vigour to our diſtant meaſures; and I hold them reſponſible for whatever effects may be produced by their oppoſition.

Mr. *Francis*—I beg leave to offer a few ſhort obſervations on the preceding minute: they are meant for explanation only, and not to continue the argument at a point of time when argument is uſeleſs.

1. With reſpect to the ſuppoſed connection between the Marattas and the French, and which is ſaid to aim at our ruin and extirpation, the Governor General aſſerts, *that we do not differ in the fact* for that I have admitted " that our conduct in the protection of *Ragoba* " has authorized them to ſeek for ſafety in the arms of " our natural enemies." The words in my former minute, from which this concluſion is drawn, are as follows: " While the pretender to their Government is " ſupported by us, we give them too much cauſe for " looking to *France* for aſſiſtance. The preſent meaſures, if carried into execution, will leave them " without a choice." I ſubmit to judgment, whether theſe words have relation to events which I expect to follow from the ſyſtem we are now purſuing, or to events which have already taken place?

2. The paſſage quoted from my minute of the 21ſt of December related to the number of French ſhips at that time at *Chandernagore*, and to the neceſſity of guarding

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guarding this country againſt the deſigns which that appearance ſeemed to indicate. I have uniformly and repeatedly declared my opinion, that *Bengal* is not in a ſtate of defence; and I have this reaſon, in addition to every other for oppoſing a reſolution, which not only tends to provoke a war without neceſſity, but immediately weakens us in that quarter, where all is at ſtake, and where our chief ſtrength ſhould be collected.

3. When I propoſed that *Ragoba* ſhould be diſmiſſed from *Bombay*, I never meant, and Mr. *Haſtings* knows it well, that he ſhould be delivered up a ſacrifice to his enemies; he has no right to ſuppoſe that I have departed from the opinion, in which the Board was unanimous on the 18th of Auguſt laſt, when the queſtion concerning the proviſion to be made for *Ragoba*'s perſonal ſafety, was thoroughly diſcuſſed, and our ſentiments united thereupon; I deſire to be underſtood to adhere to the terms of our letter of the 18th of Auguſt, to the Council of *Bombay* on this ſubject.

4. The words of our letter of that date, and of the 20th of October, which the Governor General ſtates to be in my hand writing, were intended to correct and qualify other expreſſions in the Secretary's original draft, which appeared to me too ſtrong. I deem it highly irregular and uncandid to attribute to me excluſively or particularly, any language or opinions, which the Board, by their unanimous concurrence and aſſent, have adopted and made their own: to obtain that concurrence in queſtion, ſomething, I believe, was given up on both ſides. Since however the Governor General has quoted the correction as it ſtands in my writing, it is proper that the original draft may be compared with thoſe which I ſubſtituted in the room of them.

18th October 1777.

Original draft.	Alteration agreed to.
This letter from *Futty Sing*, though *very illuſive*, &c.	though it evades a poſitive and direct anſwer to the point in queſtion, &c.

20th October 1777.

Monſieur *St. Lubin* remains ſtill at the Maratta Court, and *may probably by this time have formed an alliance with the Peiſhwa of the moſt dangerous tendency to the Company's eſtabliſhments.*	" *and may poſſibly by this time have entered into engagements with the Peiſhwa of a dangerous tendency to the Company's eſtabliſhments.*"

(Signed) *P. Francis.*
Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 15th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

The Governor General delivers in the following minute in reply to Mr. *Francis*'s of the 10th inſtant; and deſires that it may be ſent round to the Members of the Board for their peruſal.

Mr. *Francis*—

10th April 1778.

I beg leave to offer a few ſhort obſervations on the preceding minute; they are meant for explanation only, and not to continue the argument at a point of time when argument is uſeleſs.

1ſt. With reſpect to the ſuppoſed connection between the Marattas and the French, and which is ſaid to aim at our ruin and extirpation, the Governor General aſſerts that, *we do not differ in the fact*, for that I have admitted " that our conduct " in the protection of *Ragoba* has authorized them " to ſeek for ſafety in the arms of our natural " enemy." The words in my former minute from which this concluſion is drawn, are as follow: " While the pretender to their Government is " ſupported by us, we give them too much cauſe " for looking to *France* for aſſiſtance: the preſent " meaſures, if carried into execution, will leave " them without a choice." I ſubmit to your judgment, whether theſe words have relation to events, which I expect to follow from the ſyſtem we are now purſuing, or to events which have already taken place?

2d. The paſſage quoted from my minute of the 21ſt of December, related to the number of French ſhips at that time at *Chandernagore*, and to the neceſſity of guarding this country againſt the deſigns which that appearance ſeemed to indicate. I have uniformly and repeatedly declared my opinion, that

Governor General—

My reply to Mr. *Francis*'s obſervations, dated the 10th inſtant, on my minute of the 6th, ſhall be very ſhort; and to avoid the embarraſſment of quotations, I ſhall here inſert his obſervations at large with my own upon them in the oppoſite column.

1ſt. The words quoted by Mr. *Francis* from his minute have certainly, in the plain and obvious conſtruction of them, a relation to events which have already taken place ſince the aſylum granted to *Ragoba*, which I underſtand to be intended by the words " while the pretender to their Government is " ſupported by us," is of a date as old as the treaty, and of courſe the conſequence inferred from it by Mr. *Francis*, muſt allude to the paſt, not to the future. Whether the protection granted to *Ragoba* was conſiſtent with good faith, or contrary to it, is not now the queſtion. I have aſſerted as a fact, that the miniſters had looked to *France* for aſſiſtance, and Mr *Francis* not denying the fact, has barely aſſigned a reaſon for it; I am therefore juſtified in ſaying, that *we do not differ in the fact.*

2d. The whole tenor of Mr. *Francis*'s minute of the 1ſt (not the 21ſt) December, was intended to prove, that the French had deſigns againſt our poſſeſſions in *India*. The circumſtance which at that time attracted his attention, and which he thought indicated ſuch deſigns, was the number of French ſhips lying at *Chandernagore*: it was my opinion delivered

that *Bengal* is not in a ſtate of defence; and I have this reaſon in addition to every other, for oppoſing a reſolution which not only tends to provoke a war without neceſſity, but immediately weakens us in that quarter where all is at ſtake, and where our chief ſtrength ſhould be collected.

livered then, and formed many years before Mr. *Francis* came into the country, that either the French would never attempt the invaſion of *Bengal* by ſea, or if they did they muſt immediately fail in it, in conſequence of the natural difficulties which, independent of other cauſes, would oppoſe it. In oppoſition to Mr. *Francis*'s preſent opinion, I declare it to be mine, that *Bengal is now in a better ſtate of defence* than it ever has been ſince the Engliſh were intereſted in its ſafety; that its beſt defence againſt the French is to render their deſigns abortive before their execution; and that if they do exiſt, as Mr. *Francis* himſelf ſuppoſes, it is a better policy "to "provoke the war," to uſe his words, if ſuch muſt be the conſequence of our preſent meaſures, than to wait till they are ripe for action, and have every engine prepared that can enſure their ſucceſs againſt us.

But I preſume it is now no longer neceſſary to dwell on this argument. However doubtful the ſuppoſition of the French engagements with the preſent rulers of the Maratta State were at the commencement of this conteſt, or even when Mr. *Francis* wrote the minute before me, that ſuppoſition is now reduced to a certainty, if any evidence can make it ſo. It is long ſince I acquainted the Board with the intention of Monſieur *Bellcombe* to viſit the Malabar Coaſt, and verbally ſince of his actual departure from *Pondicherry*. The laſt letter from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, dated the 8th of March, confirms this report, and expreſſes their opinion in terms to which I think Mr. *Francis* himſelf will now ſubſcribe, that the deſign of Monſieur *Bellcombe* "is not merely to ſupervise a ſettlement of ſo little importance as "*Myhie*, which, they hear, is the avowed motive; but is rather occaſioned by the negociations of Monſieur de *St. Lubin*."

With the duplicate of the ſame diſpatches I received a letter from Mr. *Hornby*, of a later date, expreſſing the ſame apprehenſion; and adding, that he had juſt heard a Captain in the Portugueſe ſervice ſay, "that the Governor of *Goa* had written to him, that he expected Monſieur *Bellcombe* there."

To theſe authorities I ſhall add that of Mr. *Rumbold*, on the following extract of a letter, which I have received from him, dated the 23d of March. "Monſieur *Bellcombe* embarked ſome time ago with one "hundred Europeans, ſome artillery, and a quantity of ſtores on a frigate. We have ſince heard of "their arrival at *Mahé*, on the Malabar Coaſt. Before he left *Pondicherry*, he wrote the Nabob, "that having received orders from his Court to viſit all the garriſons in *India*, belonging to his moſt "Chriſtian Majeſty, he was entering upon that ſervice, and would be abſent from *Pondicherry* about "five months; it is not improbable but he intends ſome aſſiſtance to the Marattas."

It is not without heſitation that I make this uſe of a private communication; but it appears to me ſo concluſive of the deſigns which have been long imputed to the French, that I have thought I could not with propriety withhold it from the knowledge of the Board, for whoſe information, and not for the maintenance of an argument, I have given it a place in this minute. What may be the real object of Monſieur *Bellcombe* will be better ſhewn by the event, which cannot be very remote, than by any reaſoning upon appearances; but theſe will at leaſt juſtify the preſent concluſion, that if a war ſhould enſue, we cannot have provoked it by any acts ſubſequent to them, and I have only advanced to meet it.

3d. When I propoſed that *Ragoba* ſhould be diſmiſſed from *Bombay*, I never meant, and Mr. *Haſtings* knows it well, that he ſhould be delivered up a ſacrifice to his enemies: he has no right to ſuppoſe that I have departed from the opinion, in which the Board was unanimous on the 18th of Auguſt laſt, when the queſtion concerning the proviſion to be made for *Ragoba*'s perſonal ſafety was thoroughly diſcuſſed, and our ſentiments united thereupon. I deſire to be underſtood to adhere to the terms of our letter of the 18th Auguſt to the Council at *Bombay* on this ſubject.

3d. To diſmiſs *Ragoba* from *Bombay* without proviſion made for his perſonal ſafety, to diſmiſs him with ſuch a proviſion only made for his ſafety as cannot avail him, and to deliver him up a ſacrifice to his enemies, are in my ſenſe of them propoſitions of ſynonymous import. I had proved in a former minute, that one of the proviſions, ſuggeſted in our letter of the 18th Auguſt, to the Council of *Bombay*, for the ſafety of *Ragoba*, was totally impracticable; of the other, that is the faith of *Toocajee Holcar* and *Madajee Sindia*, pledged for his ſafe paſſage through their territories, no trial had been made; and Mr. *Francis* muſt allow that it was at leaſt capable of valid objections, but without having deigned to make any other reply to my proofs, except a trait of ridicule, by which he affected to repreſent this Government as precipitately reſolving on a war with the united provinces of *France* and the Maratta Empire in defence of the religious ſcruples of *Ragonaut Row*. If I have treated this as equivalent to a propoſition made for the ſacrifice of *Ragoba* to his enemies, for I do not know the preciſe words of my minute, I muſt ſtill abide by the ſame conſtruction of it.

4th. The words of our letter of that date, and of the 20th October, which the Governor General ſtates to be in my hand writing, were intended to correct and qualify other expreſſions in the Secretary's original draft, which appeared to me too ſtrong. I deem it highly irregular and uncandid to attribute to me, excluſively or particularly, any language or opinions which the Board by their unanimous concurrence and aſſent have adopted and made their own. To obtain that concurrence in the inſtance in queſtion, ſomething I believe was given up on both ſides. Since however the Governor General has quoted the correction as it

4th. Mr. *Francis* is too liberal in the uſe which he makes of the words "candour and regularity." After having in the preceding paragraph quoted for the third or fourth time my opinion, as it was included in the letter written to *Bombay* on the 18th of Auguſt laſt, he has no right to charge me in ſuch ſtrong terms with want of candour and regularity in quoting his opinions, as included in our letter of the 18th and 20th of October. It was not my intention to attribute thoſe opinions to Mr. *Francis* excluſively, but to ſhew that they were not the ſentiments of a majority in oppoſition to his; for which purpoſe I appealed to his hand writing in the draft of the letter. That theſe were his opinions at that time he does not deny, nor do I contend for more. The quotations

Appendix. No. 41.

ſtands in my writing, it is proper that the words in the original draft may be compared with thoſe which I ſubſtituted in the room of them.

18th October 1777.

Original draft.	Alteration agreed to.
This letter from *Futty Sing*, though *very illuſive*, &c.	—" *though it evades a poſitive and direct anſwer to the point in queſtion*," &c.
20th October 1777. Monſieur de *St. Lubin* remains ſtill at the Maratta Court, and *may probably by this time have formed an alliance with the Peiſhwa of the moſt dangerous tendency to the Company's eſtabliſhments.*	*and may poſſibly by this time have entered into engagements with the Peiſhwa of a dangerous tendency to the Company's eſtabliſhments.*

of the original drafts do not contain the evidence for which they ſeem to have been intended, ſince the firſt draft, and his corrections of it, are in ſenſe the ſame; the 1ſt inſtance being no more than the change of a ſingle word for a periphraſis, I own of more preciſion, and perhaps of elegance; and the latter of the words *probably* for *poſſibly*, and *alliance* for *engagements*.

(Signed) *W. H.*

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 27th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edwd Wheler*, } Eſquires.

The Governor General's minute, recorded in the Conſultation of the 15th inſtant, having been circulated agreeable to his deſire, Mr. *Francis* wrote the following in reply to it; a copy of which was ſent a number in the *Reſolution*'s packet.

I will not continue to argue a queſtion on which I have already ſubmitted to judgment. If the event of the preſent meaſures ſhould ever force an enquiry into the origin and motives of them; the merit of thoſe perſons, who have promoted or oppoſed them, will not be tried by nice verbal diſtinctions, or by torturing particular expreſſions in debate to a ſenſe inconſiſtent with the general principles, avowed opinions, and uniform conduct of thoſe who uſe them. The enquiry will commence at the ſource of the meaſures in queſtion. The part unanimouſly taken by this Council in the firſt inſtance, that is when the treaty between *Ragoba* and the Preſidency of *Bombay* was firſt communicated to us, will be compared with the ideas which have ſince been adopted by ſome members of the Board on the ſame ſubject, and with the meaſures lately reſolved on and now in execution. A careful review of our debates will lead to a deciſive judgment on that point, which it is moſt material to the Governor General to eſtabliſh on ſolid grounds; viz. that the evidence on which it has been reſolved to ſend one fourth of our whole military eſtabliſhment from the frontiers of *Oude* to *Bombay*, is direct, authentic, and material. Much pains have been taken to collect it, and very high colourings induſtriouſly given, as I think, to facts of little moment. There muſt be a diſtreſs for evidence when recourſe is had to private letters, eſpecially in a caſe where, if the intelligence contained in them had been thought of conſequence, it would naturally have been communicated to us through the regular channel. Mr. *Rumbold* tells Mr. *Haſtings*, " that Monſieur *Bellcombe* " had embarked from *Pondicherry* with one hundred " Europeans, and ſome artillery and ſtores, and that it " is not improbable but he intends ſome aſſiſtance to " the Marattas." And Mr. *Hornby* ſays, " that he had " juſt heard a Captain in the Portugueze ſervice ſay, " that Monſieur *Bellcombe* was expected at *Goa*." Neither the facts nor the evidence are worth diſputing; nor do I think it eſſential to our ſafety to aſcertain the deſtination of an armament of one hundred men. It is probable enough that ſome low French Agents have been intriguing with the Marattas, and it is not impoſſible that they may have had hopes given them of being allowed an eſtabliſhment on that coaſt. Such eſtabliſhment, however, has not yet been granted them, nor would it ever if good faith on our part were preſerved to the Marattas. They can have no motive for introducing the French into their country, but to protect themſelves againſt that ſpirit of conqueſt which prevails in our Councils, and which they ſee is never to be ſatisfied.

The Governor General has quoted part of the laſt letter from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, dated the 8th March, to ſhew that the deſign of Monſieur *Bellcombe* is occaſioned by the negociations of Monſieur *St. Lubin*. What his deſigns may be I know not, but I believe it would be very little in his power to injure us, if it appeared by our conduct to the Marattas that we were ſincerely diſpoſed to keep the peace with them. There is another paſſage in the above letter which I muſt beg leave to point out to the attention of the Court of Directors, as it ſhews with what eagerneſs evidence is ſought for in ſupport of particular views, and how readily any evidence, with that tendency, is accepted.

On the 23d February Mr. *Haſtings* aſſerted at the Board, *that it was notorious the French were in poſſeſſion of Choul*. If it were ſo, they muſt have had poſſeſſion ſix weeks at leaſt before the intelligence of the fact could have reached us, that is about the middle of January; yet on the 8th March the Preſidency of *Bombay* tells us, " they much fear Monſieur *Bellecombe*'s viſit *will* " *be* followed by the French taking poſſeſſion of *Choul*."

Whatever difference of opinion may now exiſt between the Governor General and me on the ſubject of our connection with the Marattas and the conduct we have obſerved to them, there certainly have been times in which we were agreed. There was a time when he thought * " the meaſures adopted by the Preſidency of " *Bombay* had a tendency to a very extenſive and inde- " finite ſcene of troubles, and that their conduct was " *unſeaſonable, impolitic, unjuſt*, and *unauthorized*." It is alſo not very long ago ſince he thought† " that there was " no reaſon to doubt, that the preſence of *Ragoba* at " *Bombay* would continue to be an inſuperable bar to " the completion of the treaty concluded with the Ma- " ratta Government, and that no ſincere cordiality and " good underſtanding could be eſtabliſhed with them, " as long as he ſhould appear to derive encouragement " and ſupport from the Engliſh."

* Vide Mr. Haſtings's minute, 31ſt May 1775.

† Letter to Bombay, 18 Aug. 1777.

If the Governor General departs from theſe opinions I am

I am not bound to follow him; if he adheres to them, we are agreed. In either caſe he is bound to prove, that the meaſures he now purſues are not built on thoſe which he has heretofore ſolemnly condemned.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

The above minute having been circulated the Governor General wrote the following in conſequence; a copy of which was alſo ſent a number in the *Reſolution*s, packet.

I ſtill adhere to the opinions delivered by me on the 31ſt May 1775, and on the 18th of Auguſt 1777; they have no relation, at leaſt none apparent to me, to the preſent argument. It is not neceſſary that we ſhould withhold our ſupport of the Company's intereſts under charge of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, becauſe we had occaſion to cenſure their conduct in the year 1775, or becauſe expedients were recommended by us in the month of Auguſt 1777 for the removal of *Ragoba* from *Bombay*, and for a proviſion for his perſonal ſafety as the means of it. This is all that I think it requiſite to add, in reply to the minute laſt written by Mr. *Francis*. For the reſt I rely on the growing evidence of facts, on the events yet depending and perhaps not very remote, and on the ſuperior knowledge of the French deſigns which is poſſeſſed by thoſe who are to be the ultimate judges of our conduct. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

APPENDIX, No. 42.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 6th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Warren *Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

THE Governor General lays before the Board the following drafts, which he has prepared, of inſtructions to Colonel *Leſlie*, and of a letter to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* for their conſideration and approval.

Draft of inſtructions to Colonel *Leſlie*.

1ſt. Having thought proper to inveſt you with the command of the troops deſtined to reinforce the Preſidency of *Bombay*, we direct you to proceed with the ſame under your charge, by the moſt convenient and practicable route to *Bombay*, or to ſuch other place as you ſhall be directed to by the Preſident and Council of that Preſidency. We judge the road through *Bundlecund* and the province of *Berar* the moſt eligible, on account of our connection with the Rajah of *Berar*; and recommend it preferably to any other, unleſs his anſwers to the letters which have been written to him by our Preſident for that purpoſe, ſhall expreſs a diſinclination to allow a paſſage to the detachment through his territories; in which caſe your own judgment, and the opportunities of nearer enquiry, will beſt enable you to chuſe your own road. You will make it your firſt care to reconcile the Chief of the country through which it may lie, to your march; but if he ſhall refuſe his aſſent, we authorize you to proſecute it, even againſt oppoſition; obſerving the rules hereinafter preſcribed for ſuch caſes, if ever they ſhall happen.

2d. From the day on which you ſhall begin your march, you will obey all orders which you ſhall receive from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, except ſuch as ſhall be contrary to theſe inſtructions.

3d. Our Preſident informs us, that on the 4th of February laſt he wrote to Mr. *Hornby*, requeſting him to endeavour to obtain from *Mahadajee Sindia* and *Tucoojee Holcar*, paſſports for the march of a detachment through their territories, and their orders for ſupplying it with proviſions, in the caſe of ſuch a detachment being ſent, and ordered to take that route. A letter to the ſame effect has been ſince written by our Preſident to *Moodajee Booſla*, the Chief of *Berar*, a tranſlation of which we encloſe for your information. We recommend it to your attention to take every opportunity that ſhall offer in the courſe of your march, for cultivating a good underſtanding with theſe Chiefs, particularly the laſt mentioned; and we authorize you to make uſe of any expedient which you ſhall judge eſſentially neceſſary for enſuring your ſafe conduct and ſupplies of proviſions for your detachment; provided they ſhall not have a tendency to infringe the treaty exiſting between the preſent miniſters of the Maratta State and this Government, or involve this Government in future engagements. For your fuller guidance on this ſubject, we incloſe you a copy of the Treaty of *Poorunder*, and you muſt make it the ground-work of your negociations in the courſe of your march. It is needleſs to require your attention to the ſtate and intereſts of the petty Chiefs, whoſe poſſeſſions lie near your line of march; they may be of much ſervice to you in ſupplying you with proviſions, and facilitating your progreſs, from their natural enmity to the Marattas, and fear of their power.

4th. We recommend to you to obſerve the ſtricteſt attention to the ſafety of the inhabitants, and of their property, on your march; and that the moſt exemplary puniſhment be inflicted on all perſons detected in marauding, or acts of perſonal violence to the people.

5th. We enjoin you to uſe the greateſt circumſpection in avoiding every act which may, by any conſtruction, be imputed to you as hoſtile to the particular ſtates through which you paſs, or contrary to the treaty ſubſiſting between the Maratta Miniſters and our Government. You muſt not ſuffer yourſelf to be diverted from the proſecution of your march, by any new object, however plauſible, except only for the ſafety or ſubſiſtence of your troops, indiſpenſably requiring it. You are to be careful, on arriving near any new frontier, to obſerve the form of ſending to the Chief of the diſtrict a declaration of your pacific intentions, a demand of permiſſion to paſs through his country, and a requeſt for the neceſſary paſſports and aſſiſtance of proviſions; and if after ſuch precautions your march ſhall be impeded or oppoſed by force, you are to repeat the ſame declarations to the leaders in command of the forces prepared to oppoſe you, warning them not to commence a war by a cauſeleſs attack. So poſitively is your attention demanded to prevent any poſſible imputation of blame being thrown on your conduct, that you will not be authorized in acting offenſively, even ſhould the Governor and Council of *Bombay* require it, unleſs they ſhall have firſt declared that there is war, and ſhall point out to you whom you are to regard as friends and whom as enemies.

6th. We deſire that you will adviſe the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* of your progreſs as frequently as poſſible, whether you have any other occurrence of moment to communicate or not; for even ſuch information will be of itſelf not only ſatisfactory, but of the greateſt conſequence.

7th. We cannot preſcrib the time of your march; but require you to begin it as ſoon as you ſhall be fully provided for it.

To *Bombay*.

We have already written to you in duplicate, under date the 23d February. You will there find our ſentiments at large on the ſubject of the reinforcement of troops, which have been ordered to march to your ſide of *India*, with full inſtructions for your conduct in the ſervices intended to be effected by them.

From the high opinion we entertain of the experience and abilities of Colonel *Matthew Leſlie*, we have been induced to appoint him to the command of this detachment; and as we have every reaſon to rely on his activity, ſkill, and good conduct for the ſucceſs of the expedition, if the operations of the army are left to his judgment, we hope, and earneſtly entreat, that he may not be ſuperſeded

Appendix. No. 42.

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perſeded in the command, unleſs the exigency of the ſervice ſhould at any time make it abſolutely neceſſary for you to employ the whole of your European force, in conjunction with the troops of this Preſidency, and to give the command to an officer of ſuperior rank.

We have given inſtructions to Colonel *Leſlie* for his guidance in every occurrence that may happen; a copy of which we encloſe: for the reſt, we muſt leave it to you to furniſh him with ſuch orders from time to time, as the nature of the ſervice may require. The ſucceſsful iſſue of the preſent undertaking muſt neceſſarily depend, in a great meaſure, on a full and unreſerved communication of intelligence with Colonel *Leſlie*; we therefore recommend it to you to ſend him the earlieſt advices of every circumſtance that may ſerve either to guide him in his march, or in the execution of any ſervice that may be neceſſary for him to perform.

We are, &c.

Mr. *Francis*—I object to the orders for the march of the detachment, becauſe I conceive it will not be poſſible for them to begin their march before the end of this month, and becauſe the periodical rains, as I am informed, will be ſet in long before they can arrive at the place of their deſtination; as for the reſt, I am of opinion, that the pacific declarations contained in Colonel *Leſlie*'s inſtructions, will have little weight in the minds of the powers of *India*, againſt the hoſtile act of forcing a paſſage through their country without their conſent.

Mr. *Wheler*—Having already objected to the armament preparing for *Bombay*, I ſhall only add for the reaſons aſſigned by Mr. *Francis*, that I likewiſe object to the march of the troops.

Mr. *Barwell* approves of the drafts of the letters above entered.

Governor General—It was a very early ſubject of my enquiry to know to what inconveniencies our troops would be expoſed by marching in the rains, which at firſt occurred to me as an inſurmountable obſtacle: I have every reaſon to believe, and am confirmed in this opinion by that of Colonel *Leſlie*, that the rainy ſeaſon, ſo far from proving an objection, will rather facilitate the march and prove a relief to the troops, which will ſuffer more from the exceſs in heats, and from drought in the elevated and open plains, through which they will probably paſs, than by the rainy ſeaſon, whenever it ſhall overtake them, as it certainly will; poſſibly too they will be leſs expoſed to the attacks of cavalry in the rains; and in reſpect to health, our own records afford us one inſtance, and I believe more, of our ſepoys, and even European infantry, recovering from a ſtate of ſickneſs by a march begun in the very height of the rains, as was the caſe in the laſt campaign of Colonel *Champion*.

Agreed, that the above letters be accordingly written, and immediately diſpatched.

APPENDIX, No. 43.

Secret Department.

Extract of a letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal* to the Court of Directors; dated 20th March 1778.

Par. 2. THE negociations lately propoſed by a party of the Miniſters at *Poonah* to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, for the reſtoration of *Ragoba* to the principal authority in the Durbar, of which we have already adviſed you, appear by the ſubſequent letters we have received from that quarter to be entirely laid aſide, at leaſt for the preſent, as *Moraba Furneſe*, one of the principals mentioned in it, but apparently the only oſtenſible perſon concerned, had inſiſted on carrying on the buſineſs with the Preſidency of *Bombay* in his own name ſolely; and was informed by them, that they could not agree to take any part in the affairs of the Maratta State, unleſs expreſsly ſolicited by the members of that ſtate with whom the treaty was concluded; which made it neceſſary that *Siccaram Baboo*, whoſe name was included in the original overture, ſhould join with him in a formal requiſition for the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh. *Moraba Furneſe* ſoon after this quitted *Poonah*, with intention, as he reported, of proceeding on a religious duty to *Pundapore*; and we have heard nothing farther of the matter in agitation with him.

3. We have nevertheleſs continued to carry into execution the reſolutions which we formed on the 2d ultimo, for the aid and ſupport of the Bombay Preſidency, as the contentions among the Miniſters at *Poonah* ſtill ſubſiſt with unabated violence; and the confuſion likely to prevail in that Government as well from the repeated defeats of the Maratta army under *Hurry Punt* by *Hyder Ally*'s forces, as from the probable increaſe of their inteſtine diviſions, may we think afford opportunities to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, aided as they will be by a reſpectable force, and ample reſources, to interpoſe with ſuch advantages as will be of the moſt eſſential conſequence to the Company's intereſts, and which if neglected might add new ſtrength to their enemies, and poſſibly hazard the ſafety if not the very exiſtence of that ſettlement. We cannot help making theſe reflections when we ſee the alarming ſteps which the French have been taking to ſecure an influence and connection in the Maratta Government, and obtain a port ſo cloſe to *Bombay* as *Choul* is, and when we alſo ſee the encouragement which they have met with. Their intrigues at this juncture can only be formed with an hoſtile intention to the Engliſh, and if attended with ſucceſs which there is every reaſon to ſuppoſe, an uninterrupted continuance of them would effectually ſecure; we think they muſt be productive of the moſt dangerous conſequences to the Company's poſſeſſions in *India*.

4. From theſe premiſes it is evident that no time ought to be loſt in taking every fair advantage that may offer to fruſtrate the deſigns of the French in their infancy, and to ſecure a permanent peace with the Marattas without openly oppoſing or counteracting the ſchemes of the French, which will be avoided by the plan we have adopted; as the object of our declared purſuit has no ſort of connection with them, we have therefore completed the extraordinary ſupply we reſolved to ſend of ten lacks to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, which we have the pleaſure to acquaint you was remitted by bills of exchange, at the advantageous rate of 100 Bombay rupees for 90 Sicca, and we have ordered a force conſiſting of ſix battalions of brigade ſepoys, and one company of native artillery, to aſſemble under the command of Colonel *Leſlie* at *Calpee*; they will have orders to march directly to *Bombay*, or to ſuch other place as they may be directed to by that Preſidency to ſupport them, in caſe of any attack made immediately upon your poſſeſſions, or in any operations which good policy may lead them to engage in, for the relief of that part of the Maratta Government with which we are in treaty, or for commanding and enforcing the due execution of the articles of the treaty, which to this day remain unaccompliſhed.

5. We have taken every precaution that appears neceſſary to ſecure a ſafe paſſage, and a conſtant ſupply of proviſions and ſtores for the uſe of this detachment in its route to *Bombay*, by letters which have been written to the different Chiefs, through whoſe countries it muſt paſs; and we have recommended the ſame to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, under whoſe orders and guidance we ſhall place the Commanding Officer, from the day on which he ſhall march; we have alſo directed the Reſident at the Vizier's Court to reſerve ten lacks of rupees in gold for the diſburſements of the expedition.

Extract of a letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal* to the Court of Directors; dated 23d April 1778. Secret Department.

Par. 4. The detachment of ſix battalions prepared for the

the reinforcement of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, is now under orders to march to that place, by the route of *Bundlecund* and *Berar*, as we hope from the friendly intercourſe which has long ſubſiſted with the Chiefs of thoſe diſtricts, that it will meet with no impediment in traverſing their countries.

5. Colonel *Leſlie*, who commands this detachment, having been furniſhed with inſtructions for his conduct, a copy of which will be found in the packet, we beg leave to refer you to them, and to a letter which we wrote to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay* on the occaſion, which accompanies them.

APPENDIX, No. 44.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th May 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

Mr. *Moſtyn* has already adviſed you of the revolution that has taken place in the Poonah Government.

Though on this important occaſion we earneſtly wiſh to ſend you the moſt perfect and diſtinct account of the meaſures we meant to purſue, yet ſuch is the uncertainty of our ſituation, that we have come to no further reſolution than to order all the troops we can poſſibly ſpare, to be held in readineſs to accompany *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, the moment matters are advanced to that ſtage as to render ſuch a meaſure proper. An Agent from *Moraba* had arrived here before his maſter had got poſſeſſion of *Poonah*, who only ſignified in general terms *Moraba*'s deſire that no time ſhould be loſt in ſending *Ragoba* to join his party, but without making propoſals of any kind, either to him or us, neither have any yet been made to Mr. *Moſtyn*.

According to our advices *Sacaram Bappoo*, the Chief Miniſter, has joined *Moraba*; but we are ſorry to add, that a compromiſe is likely to be effected between the party of *Nana Furneſe*, upon their becoming ſecurity for the ſafety of his perſon and treaſures from *Ragoba*'s reſentment.

The approbation you were pleaſed to give our plan for conducting *Ragoba* to *Poonah* was in a high degree gratifying to us, as our propoſal proceeded from the moſt firm conviction, that our acceding to the overtures which had been made was the only reſource left us for accompliſhing thoſe important objects we had in view. It is an unfortunate circumſtance, that whilſt we through the want of powers were unable to take a part, *Ragoba*'s friends have found their own power ſufficient to procure them ſucceſs without our aſſiſtance, as we may not be able to procure the terms we ſhould have had a right to demand, had our interference been more timely. However, you may be aſſured, Gentlemen, we ſhall make the beſt ſtipulations we poſſibly can for the advantage of the Company, in which we ſhall be guided by your late inſtructions, and our treaty with *Ragoba*.

Whatever may be the other conſequences of this revolution, we hope at any rate it will defeat the deſigns of the French, on which point we inſtantly gave proper inſtructions.

Monſieur *Bellcombe* arrived at *Mahé* the 3d ultimo, with the *Brilliant* of 64 guns, and the *Sartine*, the ſhip that was at *Choul* laſt ſeaſon. They both ſailed to the northward on the 10th and 11th, and it was ſaid they were bound to *Choul*. Sir *Edward Vernon* ſailed from hence the 10th, with the *Rippon*, *Coventry*, and *Seahorſe*, and we expect will fall in with, and will accompany, the French ſhips up the coaſt.

The force Monſieur *Bellcombe* brought with him conſiſted, as we hear, of 300 Europeans, which he landed at *Mahé*, and received on board 140 of the garriſon: we are doubtful whether he has proceeded up the coaſt or remained at *Mahé*. Appendix No. 45.

Upon an attentive examination into the ſtate of our force, we find we ſhall only be able to detach from the Preſidency 300 European infantry, rank and file, two companies of artillery, 2,000 ſepoys, and 500 laſcars.

We ſhall ſend you further advices the moment we can write with more preciſion. We have been honoured with your letters of the 16th and 18th February, but have not yet received the new cypher. Since writing thus far, your three letters of the 26th February have come to hand.

We are, with reſpect, Gentlemen,

Bombay Caſtle, 5th April 1778.

(Signed) *Wm. Hornby*, &c. &c. Council.

This letter having arrived on the 9th inſtant it was immediately circulated for the information of the Board; the following motion was delivered thereupon by Mr. *Francis*, and the opinions of the other members taken as follow it. *Vide Appendix No.* 45.

APPENDIX, No. 45.

Minute of Mr. *Francis*, the 11th May 1778.

MR. FRANCIS—As this letter leaves us no room to doubt that a revolution has taken place in the *Poonah* Government, and as the re-eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba*, by whatever means it may have been effected, muſt immediately defeat the deſigns attributed to the French, and put an end to any negociations which they may have entered into with *Nanah Furneſſe*, and the party oppoſed to *Ragoba*, I conceive that the expedition under Colonel *Leſlie* can no longer be neceſſary, even on the principles on which it was undertaken. No pretence is left for marching an army acroſs *India*, to counteract any real operations, or ſuppoſed ſchemes of the French on the Malabar Coaſt, when the party which they were to aſſiſt, and without whoſe aſſiſtance in return no deſigns of their own could promiſe the moſt diſtant poſſibility of ſucceſs, is itſelf overſet.

For theſe reaſons I ſubmit my opinion to the Board, that immediate orders ſhould be diſpatched to Colonel *Leſlie* to ſuſpend the march of the detachment under his command: or, if they have already marched, to return forthwith to *Calpee*, or ſuch ſtation in the Nabob of *Oude*'s dominions, as Colonel *Leſlie* may think moſt convenient.

Mr. *Wheler*—I concur with Mr. *Francis* in ſubmitting my opinion to the Board, that immediate orders ſhould be diſpatched to Colonel *Leſlie* to ſuſpend the march of the detachment under his command; or, if already marched, to return forthwith to *Calpee*, or ſuch other ſtation in the Nabob of *Oude*'s dominions, as Colonel *Leſlie* may think moſt convenient.

Governor General—I do not agree to Mr. *Francis*'s motion, as I think it would be highly impolitic and imprudent to ſuſpend the progreſs of the expedition on ſuch ſlight grounds. The detachment may eaſily return when we know with certainty that the Company's affairs on the other ſide of *India* are in ſuch a ſtate of ſecurity as not to require its aid. If it ſhould otherwiſe happen, its aſſiſtance would arrive too late, if it was now recalled, and it ſhould in ſuch an emergency be again ordered on ſervice.

Beſides we are not yet informed that the revolution has been effected. We ſcarcely know the firſt movements of it, and ſhould be liable to the imputation of levity and precipitancy, were we on ſuch weak grounds to annul a meaſure of ſuch importance in its deſign, its conſequences, and univerſal notoriety.

I am ſurprized that Mr. *Francis* ſhould ſtill attempt to diſcredit the ſuppoſition of the French intrigues at *Poonah*. Does he really regard the letters and preſents delivered to the Peiſhwa from the King of *France*, by the Chevalier *St. Lubin*; the written engagements declared

Appendix. No. 45.

clared by Mr. *Moſtyn* to have been interchanged by *St. Lubin* and *Nonah Furneſſe*; the extraordinary viſit made by Monſieur *Bellecombe* to that coaſt, and irreconcileable with any other motive, as facts of a doubtful nature? To my judgment they appear to bear the certain demonſtration of engagements actually formed, and mature for execution; and I ſhould deſerve to be deprived with ignominy of the office which I fill, if I neglected to uſe ſuch means as were in my power to defeat them.

Upon this occaſion, I muſt take notice of a very ſtriking evidence afforded us in the letter now before us, not of the connection of *Nanah Furneſſe* with *St. Lubin*, but of the French Government with the adminiſtration at *Poonah*.

The *Sartine*, the veſſel ſaid to have accompanied Monſieur *Bellecombe* in his expedition to the Maratta Coaſt, is the ſame that brought Monſieur *St. Lubin* from *France*.

In the narrative delivered by Mr. *Madgett* to Mr. *Lewis*, it is ſaid that the *Sartine* was diſpatched to *China* on the 24th of Auguſt. The manner in which this is related, proves evidently that *Madgett* was himſelf impoſed upon in this concluſion of her deſtination, ſince he introduces it not as a political event, but merely as a fact, connected with other circumſtances, which were intended to fix a charge againſt Monſieur *St. Lubin* of having embezzled the cargo, and defrauded his owners. We now find, that inſtead of making a voyage to *China* the *Sartine* went directly to *Pondicherry*, and returned with Monſieur *Bellecombe* to the ſame coaſt, if not the ſame port, which ſhe quitted.

This circumſtance affords more than a preſumptive proof that Monſieur *St. Lubin* had imparted the effects of his negociations to Monſieur *Bellecombe*; that he had ſolicited Monſieur *Bellecombe* to fulfil the engagements which he had formed, and ſent the *Sartine* to *Pondicherry* for that purpoſe; that Monſieur *Bellecombe* had adopted the deſign, and had in compliance with it employed the *Sartine* in tranſporting the men and ſtores promiſed by *St. Lubin*'s engagements, and himſelf gone in perſon to aid or conduct what might remain of the negociation.

I ſhall take this occaſion to offer a few remarks on the intelligence now received from *Bombay*, which I think may throw ſome lights on the ſtate of the Maratta Government, as it appears to have been circumſtanced at the time in which the letter was written, and may convince the Board of the neceſſity of proſecuting with vigour the meaſures which we have begun, until the deſigns of them ſhall be fully accompliſhed.

The Preſident and Council of *Bombay* inform us, that "an Agent from *Moraba* had been ſent to *Bombay* to "notify in general terms *Moraba*'s deſire, that no time "ſhould be loſt in ſending *Ragoba* to join his party; "but without making propoſals of any kind either to "him or them, and that neither had any been yet made "to Mr. *Moſtyn*;" and that "a compromiſe was likely "to be effected between the party and *Nana Furneeſe*." This they mention with regret, and add "that it is an "unfortunate circumſtance that *Ragoba*'s friends had "found their own ſtrength ſufficient to procure them "ſucceſs without our aſſiſtance."

I rather regard all theſe as fortunate circumſtances, if a proper advantage be made of them, and the following, are my reaſons for this concluſion:

Ragoba, naturally ſuſpicious and timid, as I am told he is, can never truſt his intereſts and perſon to the diſcretion of his new partizans; men who were lately his moſt inveterate enemies, and who even in their former connection with him betrayed him. He will have had more cauſe than the Government of *Bombay* to be alarmed at an invitation made to him, to put himſelf into their hands without any ſtipulation or propoſal either for his perſonal ſafety, or for the ſhare which he was to expect in the public adminiſtration. Nor could he be better pleaſed with the compromiſe made with *Nana Furneeſe*, when in additionto the perſonal diſaffection which he has ever borne to *Ragoba* in a more eminent degree than the reſt, and from which he will have departed only from the motive of urgent neceſſity, poſſeſſes the ſupport of *Hurry Punt Furkia*, the Commander in Chief of the forces, and engagements with the French nation, which if they are ever carried into effect will give him an abſolute and irriſiſtible command of the Maratta State.

With ſuch reaſons to diſtruſt the party which has recalled him to the chief adminiſtration of affairs, he muſt ſtrongly feel the oppoſite neceſſity of truſting to the protection of the Government of *Bombay* as his only and ſure reſource. That Government has eſpouſed his cauſe with a zeal far exceeding that which a political principle alone would have excited, a zeal heightened by common diſappointment, and a long perſonal communication of the ſame regrets, apprehenſions, and hopes.

Such being his ſituation, I cannot ſuppoſe that he will conſent to move from *Bombay* without an Engliſh military force, nor perhaps under any future ſituation of his affairs, however proſperous, to part with it while thoſe are in power to whoſe friendſhip he may think he can truſt.

The Preſidency of *Bombay* have a right to require conditions of equal advantage for that which they beſtow. Theſe are not likely to be unreaſonable, and whatever they may be, he is not in a condition to refuſe them.

The union of *Nana Furneeſe* with the party muſt inevitably produce this good effect. It will indiſpoſe every other member of the adminiſtration to the French alliance, by which, if it takes place, he alone will be a gainer. Had he fallen in the contention, it is not improbable that his adverſaries would have taken up the negociation where he left it, and one great, if not the only real benefit expected from the revolution, would have been loſt to us. In a word, I repeat that this accommodation muſt prove an advantage. It completes a ſyſtem of diſjointed and diſcordant parts, which the Government of *Bombay* may hold together, but no other power can; or by withdrawing their graſp, let it fall to pieces, and erect any other that they pleaſe in the room of it.

But to enable them to ſupport the character which I have aſſigned them in this important ſcene, they muſt poſſeſs the means both of ſurmounting all immediate obſtacles to *Ragoba*'s elevation, and of maintaining him in the poſſeſſion of it, until his authority ſhall be thoroughly confirmed by the ſuppreſſion of every party capable of oppoſing it. The ſame means and the ſame opportunity will equally ſerve for the advancement and ſecurity of the Company's intereſts, which, as their primary concern, I cannot ſuppoſe will be neglected. For the firſt of theſe ends, the force which they tell us they propoſe to ſend will be ſufficient; it will preſerve the aſcendant of *Ragoba* over his aſſociates, and quiet his apprehenſions with reſpect to their fidelity—but it may prove an inadequate proviſion for future contingencies. The reinforcement which we have prepared for them, will render their ſtrength equal to any ſervice; I have no doubt of its having already produced ſome effect; for if we reflect upon the langour which followed the firſt overtures of the confederacy, and the ſudden execution of their deſign, in the ſame inſtant of time in which the knowledge of the armament formed by this Government muſt have reached the confederated party, we muſt attribute the former to a diffidence in their own ſtrength, and the latter to the confidence excited by their expected aid; which though not immediately intended for them, was profeſſedly calculated to counteract the deſigns of our common adverſary.

If in the criſis of ſuch a project we were to recall the detachment, it might alarm our friends and inſpire their enemies, who in effect are our's, with the hope of ſucceeding

ceeding in any attempts to ſubvert all that has been already effected. By a perſeverance we ſhall be ſure of maintaining the ground which we may have gained; and if it ſhould be found neceſſary to let the detachment proceed to its deſtination, of commanding every point which we can wiſh for the Company. On the whole, I repeat, becauſe I think it concluſive of the preſent argument, that if the ſervices of the detachment ſhall not be wanted, nothing will have been loſt by its having marched, and it may be eaſily recalled; but if it ſhould be now withdrawn, and its aid ſhould be hereafter required, it will be too late to afford it.

All the difficulties which ſeemed at firſt to oppoſe the meaſure, have gradually diſappeared. The apprehenſion of having the whole force of an empire to contend with is removed by the late movements at *Poonah*; and the difficulty of ſubſiſting an army in ſo long a route is removed by the offer of ſupplies, and of every aſſiſtance, made by *Moodajee Booſlah*, the only power lying between the point of its departure, and the confines of *Poonah*. After ſuch pains taken to obtain them, ſuch advantages ought not to be lightly abandoned. Even the credit of our Government, in a meaſure which has attracted the attention and expectation of all *Indoſtan*, demands the proſecution of it.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Mr. *Francis*—The letter from *Bombay* begins with theſe words:—"Mr. *Moſtyn* has already adviſed you of "the revolution that has taken place in the *Poonah* Go- "vernment." I conſider this as a fact, and I draw the ſame concluſion from it with the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, that whatever may be the other conſequences of this revolution, they hope at any rate it will defeat the deſigns of the French.

It is not of moment to the preſent queſtion, whether I relinquiſh or adhere to my firſt opinion of thoſe deſigns, becauſe I ſuppoſe an event to have happened, which admitting ſuch deſigns to have exiſted, neceſſarily defeats the effect of them. If the Board do not believe the fact, they will of courſe continue the expedition on the principles on which it was undertaken. If they do believe it, I cannot comprehend how we ſhould be liable to an imputation of levity or precipitancy in ſuſpending the execution of a meaſure which an unforeſeen event has made unneceſſary.

Governor General—It matters not what interpretation the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* have put upon Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letter to this Government, ſince it is a fact that Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letter does not ſay that a revolution had actually taken place in the Poonah Government; it ſays only, that three only of the confederacy had joined their forces, amounting to thirty thouſand horſe and foot; that they expected to be joined by *Succaram Baboo* at the village of *Courey*; that fifty horſemen had been ſent into the city of *Poonah* by *Moraba Furneſe*, to aſſiſt at a proclamation made in the name of *Ragoba*; and that *Nanah Furneſe*, with an army of 5000 men, was encamped at the foot of the hill of *Proonder*, and had ſummoned all his friends and adherents to join him. Theſe are the only eſſential facts contained in Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letter, and certainly do not amount to a decided revolution; neither can I conſider it as much more advanced by the looſe intelligence contained in the letter from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, that a compromiſe was likely to be effected between the party and *Nana Furneſe*. From what I know of the ſituation, intereſts, and connections of the different parties, I am convinced, that without the ſupport of an Engliſh force it will never be accompliſhed. It is not neceſſary in this place to detail my reaſons; it is ſufficient only to have ſhewn, that the work, though begun with every proſpect of ſucceſs, was very far from being accompliſhed at the period of which we are ſpeaking, and of courſe that the meaſure in queſtion is not rendered unneceſſary, as Mr. *Francis* has ſtated.

Mr. *Barwell*—I do not think the reaſons aſſigned by Mr. *Francis* will warrant an inſtant aſſent to his propoſition. I ſhall have no objection to acquieſce in it as ſoon as the great political meaſure has been ſecured, which was the object of the expedition projected to *Bombay* by this Government. Appendix. No. 46.

The majority of the Board being againſt Mr. *Francis*'s motion, it is reſolved in the negative.

APPENDIX, No. 46.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt May 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edwd Wheler.* } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letters from *Fort Saint George*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have the honour to encloſe you a copy of a letter juſt received from *Bombay*, with a copy of our anſwer, for your information.

In conſequence of your letter to us of the 4th of February, we ordered the number of troops requeſted by the Gentlemen at *Bombay* to be in readineſs to march if it ſhould be thought neceſſary on a further application from them; but the ſeaſon is now ſo far advanced that it would be impoſſible for them to reach *Anjengo*, in time to embark before the monſoon breaks on the Malabar Coaſt. We propoſe therefore to hold them ſtill here in readineſs to proceed to *Bombay* the firſt favourable opportunity, ſhould the gentlemen there continue to be in want of them, and the ſituation of affairs will enable us to diſpenſe with this force. We ſhall in the mean time be obliged to you for ſuch information as you may think proper to afford us, regarding the aſſiſtance which you propoſe yielding from *Bengal*, and the deſigns you may have further formed in conſequence of the preſent ſtate of the Government at *Poonah*.

In your letter of the 4th February you acknowledged the receipt of our's dated the 16th January, and promiſed us your ſentiments upon it ſhortly; we hope in conſequence, that you will be pleaſed to favour us with them as ſoon as poſſible.

We have, &c.

Fort St. George, 29th April 1778. (Signed) *Thos Rumbold*, &c. Council.

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, &c.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter of 13th February, and beg leave to congratulate Mr. *Rumbold* on the appointment to the Government of your Preſidency.

The Pattamars diſpatched from *Madras* the firſt of March, arrived here without any packet from you; but as ſeveral of the private letters which they brought concur in the intelligence, that you had ordered a body of forces to the aſſiſtance of this Preſidency, in conſequence of the requiſition we made in our letter of the 12th December, we can only impute our not having heard from you, to your packet having been intercepted by the Marattas; the Pattamars having informed us the packet of letters was ſtopt and opened near *Poonah*.

As the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced as not to allow of our waiting for more particular advice from you, we have judged it expedient to give immediate orders for a ſufficient number of veſſels proceeding to *Anjengo* to bring up the troops, which according to our accounts conſiſt of 200 European infantry, 50 artillery, and a battalion of ſepoys; and we hope we ſhall not be diſappointed in our

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our expectations, that our veſſels will find them at that place ready for embarkation.

We have thought it neceſſary to apprize the Commanding Officer at *Palamcotta* of our intentions, and we beg leave to encloſe a copy of our letter to him for your notice.

Mr. *Moſtyn* has adviſed you of the revolution which has happened in the Maratta Government; and in conſequence thereof we have judged it neceſſary to collect all the force we poſſibly can to accompany *Ragoba* to *Poonah*.

Sir *Edward Vernon*, in his paſſage down the coaſt, having fell in with the *Brilliante* and another French ſhip, which from the intelligence we had received, we had before ſuggeſted to him were coming with a deſign to form a ſettlement at *Choul*, a Maratta port cloſe to the mouth of our harbour, he has again returned hither in order to prevent their ſcheme taking effect; and we hope and truſt, that in conſequence of the late revolution we ſhall be able totally to deſtroy the French influence at the Court of *Poonah*, an object of the utmoſt importance to the Honourable Company.

We have, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 8th April 1778. (Signed) *William Hornby*.

A true copy.

(Signed) *Charles Oakeley*, Secretary.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, &c.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We are much concerned to obſerve, by your letter of the 8th inſtant, that our's to you of the 15th January had miſcarried. We now tranſmit a duplicate, by which you will perceive, that from the poſture of affairs at that time we thought ourſelves under the neceſſity of declining an immmediate compliance with your requeſt for ſo large a body of troops as 250 Europeans and a battalion of ſepoys, to be aſſembled at *Palamcottah*, for the purpoſe of marching to your aſſiſtance. This miſcarriage of our letter gives us the more concern, as you have been led to ſend veſſels to *Anjengo*, in the idea that the troops had been collected at *Palamcottah* as you deſired, and were ready to march to *Anjengo* for embarkation.

We aſſure you, Gentlemen, that we paid every attention to your requeſt, and ſhould have been happy if the ſituation of affairs here had permitted us to comply with it in the extent you wiſhed; but circumſtanced as we then were, the meaſure appeared too unſafe and imprudent to be adopted: however, upon hearing from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, that their ſanction and aſſiſtance would be given to your proceedings, and upon their opening and recommending the deſign more fully to us, we then determined, notwithſtanding the incomplete ſtate of our eſtabliſhment, to order the troops you had before requeſted to hold themſelves in readineſs to march. They are now under theſe orders; but as the ſeaſon is too far advanced to ſend them to *Anjengo*, we ſhall keep them in readineſs to proceed to your aſſiſtance the firſt opportunity that offers, if your abſolute want of them ſhould continue, and no material change ſhould happen here in the mean time. But we muſt obſerve to you, that the number of our Europeans fit for duty is ſo ſmall and diſproportionate, that we deem it unſafe, even in the moſt favourable times, to detach any part of them upon ſo diſtant a ſervice; and we wiſh, therefore, that ſepoys only may be required, as we can with much leſs difficulty replace their loſs.

Private advices from *Bengal* mention, that the detachment ordered from thence were to winter at *Korah*, and afterwards proceed on their march.

Fort Saint George, 29th April 1778. We are, &c. (Signed) *Tho. Rumbold*, &c. Council.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *Charles Oakley*, Secretary.

The following minutes having been delivered on the 16th inſtant on papers circulated from the military department, are ordered to be recorded in this place.

In circulation, 16th May 1778, three letters from Colonel *Leſlie*, dated 26th of April, 1ſt and 3d May.

Governor General—I have to propoſe ſubmitting the requeſts in Colonel *Leſlie*'s letters to the conſideration of the Commander in Chief, and his opinion required on the propriety of complying with them.

Mr. *Barwell*—I acquieſce to Colonel *Leſlie*'s propoſitions, as far as they may be judged proper by the Commander in Chief.

Mr. *Francis*—I muſt acquieſce in the above propoſal if it be unalterably determined that the detachment ſhall proceed; but I ſhould imagine the letters received this day from Mr. *Moſtyn* and *Fort St. George*, would naturally induce the Board to ſuſpend their march, at leaſt until the rains are over, or until ſome direct and poſitive intelligence ſhall be received of the deſigns imputed to the French, and ſome overt act of theirs tending to carry ſuch deſigns into execution. Whatever theſe may have been, the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in their letter of the 8th of laſt month to that of *Fort Saint George*, ſay, "that they hope and truſt that in conſequence of the "late revolution they ſhall be able totally to deſtroy the French influence at the Court of *Poonah*."

This influence, if we may believe Mr. *Moſtyn*, could not at any time have been very conſiderable, notwithſtanding any reports to the contrary induſtriouſly circulated by a low French Agent, whoſe infamous character is too well known in *India* to entitle him to the ſmalleſt degree of credit. Mr. *Moſtyn*, in his letter of the 19th April, ſays, "that when the Poonah Durbar "demanded of him, Whether he had written to us "on the ſubject of their having given a port to the "French, and appointed Monſieur *St. Lubin* to the "command of their artillery, and whether to his know-"ledge it was ſo? he replied, that he had not informed "us thereof, neither did know that any thing had been "yet done for the French."

As this is the caſe, and as we know with certainty that in November laſt there was no expectation of a rupture between the two Crowns in *Europe*, I truſt the Board will at leaſt ſuſpend the execution of a meaſure evidently tending to a rupture with *France*, and founded either on facts which appear to have been groſsly miſrepreſented, or on the ſuppoſition of deſigns which, if they ever exiſted, are defeated without our interpoſition.

Governor General—I muſt requeſt Mr. *Francis*'s permiſſion to transfer the above minute to the Secret Department, to which the ſubject properly belongs.

Mr. *Francis*—Agreed. The other letters from Mr. *Auriol* came to me at the ſame time, and I wrote on this paper by miſtake.

A true extract.

20th May 1778. (Signed) *Robert Kyd*, Secretary.

The Governor General—I cannot diſcover any thing either in the letter from *Fort Saint George*, or in Mr. *Moſtyn*'s, which ought to induce us to recall the detachment, or to ſuſpend its operations; on the contrary, the whole tenor of the letter proves the neceſſity of its proceeding.

Whatever hopes the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* may have entertained of the effects of the revolution, neither was the revolution accompliſhed at the time in which their letter was written, nor was the French influence in any apparent degree leſſened by their proſpect of it. Notwithſtanding Mr. *Moſtyn*'s remonſtrances, and the promiſe made to him by the Miniſters on the 10th of April, that the Chevalier *St. Lubin* ſhould be diſmiſſed from *Poonah*, it is certain that he was not gone on the 19th.

Mr.

Mr. *Francis* has quoted a part of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s reply to the miniſters, to which I ſhall add the remainder, and leave it to the impartial readers of theſe papers to form their own concluſions from both:

" But that from Monſieur *St. Lubin*'s being permitted " to remain here, notwithſtanding you had been infor- " med of the promiſes made me by the Durbar, that " he ſhould be diſpatched as laſt Decera, together with " the aſſurances which Monſieur *St. Lubin* had given " to all the French ſettlements, that they had delivered " *Choul* into his hands, and that the French flag was " actually flying there; you, Gentlemen, might with " very great propriety imagine ſuch was abſolutely the " caſe; I then deſired they would inform me what were " the real intentions of the Durbar with reſpect to the " French: when *Succaram Babboo* replied, that they " had the diſpatching Monſieur *St. Lubin* under con- " ſideration: and I have ſince received aſſurances from " *Moraba*, that this matter ſhould be ſettled agreeable " to our wiſhes."

Neither to the ſuſpicions thus pointedly expreſſed by Mr. *Moſtyn*, nor to the direct queſtions put to them in my letters, have the miniſters made any reply, except an aſſurance given to Mr. *Moſtyn*, that they had the diſpatching of *St. Lubin* under conſideration, and that this matter ſhould be ſettled agreeably to our wiſhes. Not to deny a direct and formal charge, preferred by thoſe who have a right to a reply, is to admit it.

I have no authority for the belief, much leſs do I know with certainty, that in November laſt there was no expectation of a rupture between the two Crowns in *Europe*. But why is this ſuppoſed? neither is the deſign which has been attributed to Monſieur *St. Lubin* connected with ſuch an event; nor can a proviſion made by this Government, to ſtrengthen one of its dependencies, in any reſpect tend to it. Monſieur *St. Lubin* may bring men and arms to *Poonah*, and diſcipline half the Maratta army; our detachment may traverſe the whole empire of *Indoſtan*; and the peace between *Great Britain*, and *France* continue uninterrupted, and inſenſible of ſuch alien movements.

In the opinion which I delivered on a former motion made by Mr. *Francis* for recalling the detachment, I objected to the grounds of it as erroneous, and I intimated my belief that the attachment, which *Hurry Punt Furkia*, the Commander in Chief of the Maratta forces, was known to bear to *Nana Furneſs*, would prevent a reconcilation from being effected between *Nana Furneſs* and *Ragonath Row*. A circumſtance obſcurely related by Mr. *Moſtyn*, corroborates this opinion, and affords but too much reaſon for the ſuſpicions that *Nana Furneſs* in the refuſal to accept of the proffered terms of accommodation, and in the deſire which he has ſhewn to retire to the river *Kiſtna*, the ſtation of *Hurry Punt Furkia*, ſtill looked to that Chief for protection. I am informed, and by good authority, that the Maratta General ſuddenly marched towards *Poonah* on the firſt intelligence of the projected revolution and was followed by the army of *Nizam Ally Cawn*, with the ſame deſign as I underſtand of preventing or defeating it.

As it will not be exacted from me to act upon concluſions drawn from premiſes which I do not allow; and as the reſolution which has been taken to ſend a powerful military aid to the Preſidency of *Bombay* was founded on a ſuppoſed neceſſity of guarding the Company's intereſts in that quarter againſt impending dangers; while thoſe dangers exiſt or appear to exiſt, it will be my duty conſiſtently to ſupport and proſecute the meaſure undertaken at my inſtance. Theſe dangers originated from the intrigues of *Nana Furneſs*, the executive ruler of the Maratta State, and the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, a proclaimed miniſter of the Crown of *France*. Mr. *Francis* affirms that the grounds of this apprehenſion are all diſſipated by a revolution which by the expulſion of *Nana Furneſs* from the Government has at once diſabled him and annihilated the French influence in the Maratta Councils; and therefore he inſiſts on the repeal or ſuſpenſion of the intended aid, as no longer neceſſary even on the grounds on which it was propoſed to be given. Appendix. No. 46.

Theſe are not Mr. *Francis*'s words, for I have not his minute at this time before me, but they contain his ſenſe, and I hope not diſcoloured in the expreſſion.

To this a ſummary view of the ſtate of the contending parties, as it is deſcribed by our lateſt advices, will be a complete anſwer.

Ragonaut Row, the intended Chief of the new adminiſtration, had not left *Bombay* nor was likely ſoon to leave it: his friends at *Proonder* had proclaimed a change of Government, but had neither reſolved on the form of it nor prevailed on their late competitor, even with all the terrors which are the uſual attendants of new dominion, to participate it with them. The French Miniſter remained undiſturbed at the capital, and two powerful armies were marching to the relief of *Nana Furneſs*. Such was the revolution which is now ſtated as a proof that our political affairs at *Bombay* are in a ſtate of quiet and ſecurity, and as a reaſon for repealing the meaſures which have been adopted for thoſe ends.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings*,
Seen. (Signed) *Edward Wheler*.

Mr. *Francis*—I am not ſolicitous to refute opinions that differ from mine, when the meaſures they relate to are unalterably determined. My reply to the preceding minute is intended for my own juſtification, and to ſatisfy the Court of Directors, that if I perſiſt in a conduct oppoſed to the decided ſenſe of the majority, it is not from obſtinacy or paſſion, but that I have ſome reaſon of my ſide, and that I am not ſo ill adviſed as to endeavour to ſupport any opinion by appealing to evidence which proves directly againſt me.

It is ſaid that when the laſt letter from *Bombay* was written, the revolution at *Poonah* was not accompliſhed; that the French influence was not yet leſſened by the proſpect of it, and that Monſieur *St. Lubin* was not diſmiſſed on the 19th April.

The Preſidency of *Bombay*, in their letter to *Fort Saint George* of the 28th, ſay, " Mr. *Moſtyn* has adviſed " you of the revolution *which has happened in the Ma-* " *ratta Government*." That they were preparing to accompany *Ragoba* to *Poonah* with all the force they could collect, and that " in conſequence of the *late revolution* " they hope and truſt they ſhall be able *totally* to de- " ſtroy the French influence there." It appears by Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letter of the 19th, that the Marattas had not delivered *Choul* to the French, nor engaged Monſieur *St. Lubin* in their ſervice; in this ſtate of things it ſeems immaterial to any eſſential intereſt of ours, whether Monſieur *St. Lubin* continues at *Poonah* or not.

In ſtating the facts, with the direct evidence that belongs to them, I meet the Governor General's argument on his own principles: I admit of a ſuppoſition deſtitute of all foundation, that the preſent expedition was undertaken to effect a revolution in the Maratta Government, conſequently that there is a neceſſity for its proceeding until ſuch revolution is accompliſhed; I allow it to be ſuppoſed, that the prevalence of French influence at the court of a neutral power would warrant our invading their country and taking poſſeſſion of their capital, and that as long as a French Miniſter is permitted to reſide there our military operations ought not to be countermanded. If the facts could by any means be accommodated to the concluſions drawn from them, the Governor General is ſtill bound to defend the principles on which they are formed: they are ſuch as I do not think neceſſary to diſpute: thoſe which I profeſs, and have ſteadily endeavoured to purſue, are taken from the higheſt authority, and founded, as I believe, upon true policy, on juſtice, and right reaſon: to preſerve the peace of *India*; to make the ſafety of *Bengal* the principal

Appendix. No. 47.

cipal object of all our deliberations; never to employ the Company's forces in distant expeditions; and in all our treaties with the country powers to take care that they be so framed, as neither immediately or eventually, if possible, to engage the Company in any disputes between those powers. It is not for us to examine the wisdom or weakness of a system established on such authority; it is our duty to conform to it.

The distance of time is sufficient to assure us, that in November last the peace between the two Crowns was not interrupted. A private letter from *Constantinople*, dated in December, and which every body here has seen, takes notice, that at that time there was no expectation of a rupture with *France* or *Spain*. The march of an English army across *India* in time of profound peace, is a measure too extraordinary not to attract the attention of the French Government and excite their suspicions: appearances may perhaps lead them to conjecture, that the real object of the expedition is only the plunder of *Poonah*, now supposed to be the richest city in *India*, but it will furnish them with reasons sufficient to charge us with disturbing the peace of *India*; to impute designs to us in which their own security may be concerned; and to justify their taking part in a quarrel which we alone have created. When a suspicion alone that the French are carrying on intrigues to the prejudice of our interest at *Poonah* is supposed to warrant the march of an army across *India* to counteract their designs, we cannot without manifest inconsistency affirm, that the march of this army gives *them* no ground of umbrage or alarm, or that it has no tendency to interrupt the peace between the two nations.

If the contests in the Maratta Government are really not ended by the late revolution, I cannot but apprehend, that by engaging in them we are laying the foundation of a general war in *India*, which cannot fail of extending to *Europe*. The French and English have usually began hostilities in this country as auxiliaries to some of the native powers, but they soon become principals. If the defence and security of our present acquisitions were not at all times the only object we ought to have in view, this certainly is not a season for provoking a rupture with *France*: every measure that prudence and moderation dictate ought to be taken to avoid it. *If our political affairs at Bombay are not in a state of quiet and security*, it depends on that Presidency to provide for their own safety, by disengaging themselves from quarrels in which the Company's interests are not concerned; but when they tell us, that *they are collecting all the force they possibly can to accompany Ragoba to Poonah*, it would be the grossest reproach to them not to conclude that neither *Bombay* nor any of the Company's possessions are in danger of being invaded in the absence of the army established for their defence.

If they deceive us in asserting that a revolution has happened in the Maratta Government; if it be true that the French Minister remains undisturbed at the capital, and that two powerful armies, of whose existence we have never been informed, are marching to the assistance of *Nana Furnese*, it does not follow that an expedition, which never had a revolution for its object, should not be countermanded until that revolution be completed. It does not follow that we have a right to march an army to *Poonah*, because the Minister of a Crown with which his Majesty is at peace, is permitted to remain there undisturbed; or that it would not be our wisest policy to suffer the competitors for the Maratta Government (if such competition still subsists) to decide their internal quarrels, or to waste their strength against each other without our interposition.

(Signed) *Philip Francis.*

APPENDIX, No. 47.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, the 1st June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Governor General, President,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Esquires.

THE following minute from the Governor General was sent in since the last Council, and circulated. The minutes entered after it were returned upon it.

Governor General—By imputing principles for the purpose of reflecting on them, and by repeating facts which have been denied, and opinions which have been disputed, without any notice taken of the preceding reasonings upon them, a very short and simple question may be drawn out to an endless length, and the original subject lost in the changes which are rung upon it.

I do not allow the principles which Mr. *Francis* has imputed to me, and has been pleased to say he admits: of course it is unnecessary to reply to his inferences from them.

Mr. *Francis* still persists in affirming, that a revolution has been accomplished at *Poonah*, by which *Ragoba* has been restored to the chief administration of the Maratta State, the French influence destroyed, and the designs of *St. Lubin* defeated; to this I refer for a reply to the reply contained in my last minute on this subject and to time, the best arbiter in such a contest.

In Mr. *Francis*'s minute of the 16th instant, he said, that "we know with certainty that in November last "there was no expectation of a rupture between the "two Crowns in *Europe*." To this I replied in my minute of the 20th instant. He now repeats the same insinuation for what purpose I can only conjecture: the same reply will serve for both.

If the march of an English army through a tract of country far remote from any possessions of the French, is likely to serve as a pretext for interrupting the peace between the two nations, I think it full as likely that the same effect may be inferred from any other given act of our Government. The simple operation of the revenue, whether for the alleviation or increase of the public taxes, may be construed to aim at the ruin of the French commerce in this country: the cantonments at *Barrapoor* may give umbrage by their vicinity to *Ghiretty*; and the unusual assemblage of our forces in the neighbourhood of the European settlements may be attributed to a design of plundering *Chandernagore*; yet the acts of Government ought not to be suspended, because such arbitrary constructions might be put upon them; neither ought we to withhold the assistance which the interests of our common masters require at their Presidency of *Bombay*, because there is a possibility that the French may take an unreasonable offence at it. It is sufficient that we neither commit, nor even afford the slightest shew of committing, any act of hostility against them, unless to arm ourselves against any hostilities which they may hereafter commit, may be termed such; but to remain quiet and passive, and to abstain from the necessary precautions of self preservation, because hostile designs have been imputed to the French, and therefore every such precaution must point at them as its object, would be to adopt a principle of humble forbearance, of which I have never yet read a single example in the British history; and which for the national honour, I hope will never appear in the latest annals of it. If in these reflections I have misconstrued Mr. *Francis*'s words, I have unwillingly wronged him; and therefore for his vindication and my own I will here subjoin them.

"When a suspicion alone that the French are carrying "on intrigues to the prejudice of our interests at *Poonah*, "is supposed to warrant the march of an army across "*India* to counteract their designs, we cannot, without "manifest inconsistency, affirm, that the march of this "army gives them no ground of umbrage or alarm, or that

" it has no tendency to interrupt the peace between the " two nations."

Mr. *Francis* has introduced four quotations from the Company's orders to juſtify his oppoſition to the preſent meaſures; of theſe quotations one only appears to me to be in point. To this, and to the others, if they are ſuppoſed to imply a prohibition to ſend a military aid to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, I ſhall oppoſe the following extract from their commands of the 5th February 1777, which as the moſt recent of courſe ſuperſede all orders of a prior date, in thoſe points in which they diſagree.

" His (*Ragoba*'s) pretenſions to the ſupreme au- " thority, either in his own right of as guardian to the " infant Peiſhwa, appear to us better founded than " thoſe of his competitors, and therefore if the con- " ditions of the Treaty of *Poonah* have not been ſtrictly " fulfilled on the part of the Marattas, and if from any " circumſtances you ſhall deem it expedient, we ſhall " have no objection to an alliance with *Ragoba*, on the " terms agreed upon between him and the Governor " and Council of *Bombay*."

To obviate the inference which may be naturally ſuggeſted by this quotation. I think it proper to obſerve that an alliance with *Ragoba* is not the object of the meaſures which have been lately undertaken by this Government for the ſupport of the Preſidency of *Bombay*. Their declared object is to give ſecurity and permanenty to the peace of that ſettlement. It has fortunately happened that while we were in the purſuit of this object. *Ragoba* was offered to us as an inſtrument; the Company have warranted us to accept him as ſuch, and he is the moſt likely to prove effectual of any that we could have choſen: we have accepted him, and while his agency ſhall be neceſſary to the above end, and can be employed with a ſacred obſervance of every other engagement, I hope we ſhall continue to employ it.

As the grounds and deſign of the late meaſures which have been ſo violently conteſted by Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, have been explained in the fulleſt detail in my minutes of the 22d January, 2d February, and 6th April; I hope I may have leave to refer to theſe for a fuller and more authentic comprehenſion of the ſubject, and even for the correction of any inaccuracies to which in theſe looſer debates I may have in advertently fallen; for ſuch I ſuſpect. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Mr. *Francis.*—On the preceding minute I ſhall only obſerve, that when I aſſert any thing as fact, I conſtantly give the evidence from which I draw my concluſion. Aſſertions ſo ſupported are not gratuitous. It ſeems the object of the expedition is to *give ſecurity and permanence to the peace of Bombay.* Beſides that *Bombay* has never been attacked, the deſcription of the meaſure is defective in point of accuracy and preciſion, and gives no clear determinate idea of the thing intended. Such general declarations may eaſily be accommodated to any event, or any purpoſe. It is proper the Court of Directors ſhould know that Monſieur *Bellecombe*, on whoſe viſit to the French ſettlements on the Malabar Coaſt ſuch violent ſtreſs was laid, as if the moſt alarming deſigns were to be inferred and the moſt formidable conſequences to be expected from it, is returned quietly to *Pondicherry*. I have this fact from Captain *Panton*.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Governor General—It was not my intention in theſe looſe debates, to deſcribe the deſign of the late meaſures with the accuracy and preciſion of formal inſtructions, but merely to ſtate their general and eſſential object. For a minuter detail I have referred to my former minutes which were written for that end.

I preſume that the fact which Mr. *Francis* relates on the authority of Captain *Panton*, was reported to him with many other circumſtances which had a relation to the deſigns which were imputed to Monſieur *Bellecombe*, and it is poſſible that the ſum of their evidence may amount to a proof of it. I hope that Mr. *Francis* will in candour add all the information which he has received on this ſubject from Captain *Panton*. Appendix. Nos. 48 & 49.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Mr. *Francis*—Captain *Panton* did not mention any other particulars to me. The concluſion I meant to draw from the fact was, that admitting the French to have entertained hopes of obtaining from the Marattas an eſtabliſhment on the Malabar Coaſt, and to have formed a plan for ſecuring it, ſuch hopes and deſigns muſt now be diſappointed.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

APPENDIX, Nos. 48 and 49.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 21ſt May 1778.

THE following minutes were delivered upon the draft of a letter prepared by order of the Governor General, in anſwer to a letter from *Fort Saint George*, and laid before the Board for their approbation:

Mr. *Francis*—Letters of this great importance ought to be debated in Council, where the Members of the Board may receive information, if they want it, and any doubts that may occur to them may be cleared up.

I think the refuſal of a ſupply of money to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, who tell us, " they have " none in their treaſury, nor any controul over the re- " ſources of the *Carnatic*," is too peremptory and unqualified; eſpecially conſidering the unexampled profuſion with which we have ſupplied *Bombay*. The reaſons for which it is ſuppoſed that a remittance to *Madras* may be made at any time, and with leſs difficulty in time of war than peace, appear to me ſpeculative and uncertain; nor do I ſee any neceſſity for aſſigning ſuch reaſons.

As for continuing the march of the detachment to *Bombay*, I have re-conſidered the ſubject with the utmoſt attention, and in every point of view, and muſt own I am unable to diſcover a tolerable pretence, much leſs a ſolid argument, for purſuing that meaſure, even on the principles on which it was undertaken.

A reſolution to ſend ſo conſiderable a portion of the force eſtabliſhed for the defence of theſe provinces, to the other ſide of *India*, will never appear warrantable in the eyes of the Court of Directors on any ground but that of clear irreſiſtible neceſſity, unleſs they ſhould have departed from their own moſt ſolemn and deliberate declarations and orders on this ſubject. In their letter of the 15th December 1775, par. 4, they ſay, " We " diſapprove all ſuch diſtant expeditions as may even- " tually carry our forces to any ſituation too remote to " admit of their ſpeedy and ſafe return to the protection " of our own provinces, in caſe of emergency."

In our original inſtructions they direct us, *in all our deliberations and reſolutions, to make the ſafety and proſperity of Bengal our principal object.* I ſtate theſe orders, out of many to the ſame effect, that the Board may have an opportunity of conſidering, before it be too late, whether it be poſſible to reconcile the preſent meaſures to thoſe principles of policy which the Court of Directors have ſo ſtrongly and urgently inculcated for the particular guidance of this Government.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Mr. *Wheler*—I ſubſcribe to the opinion of Mr. *Francis*, on the anſwer propoſed by the Governor General to the letter received from *Fort Saint George.*

Governor General—I deſire that the Secretary will acquaint Mr. *Francis*, if it is his deſire, that a meeting of the Board ſhall be held to take into further conſideration the letter propoſed to be written to *Fort Saint George*; I ſhall have no objection to the Council aſſembling to- morrow

Appendix. Nos. 48 & 49.

morrow morning for that purpoſe. The Secretary accordingly wrote to Mr. *Francis*, in conformity to the Governor General's minute.

The Governor General having propoſed an addition to the letter to *Fort Saint George*, it was circulated, and the opinions of the Board, which are entered after it, were delivered thereon.

Governor General—I beg leave to recommend an additional clauſe to the letter propoſed to be written to the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, to the following effect: That if they ſhould ſee a proſpect of a continuance of the troubles at *Poonah*, we recommend to them to aſſemble a force near the northern frontier of the *Carnatic*, for the purpoſe of affording either a direct aſſiſtance to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, or a diverſion in their favour, in any way which they may judge moſt adviſable. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

I diſapprove of the above clauſe to the letter propoſed to be written to the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, both becauſe I apprehend the military eſtabliſhment of that Preſidency is already too much weakened by the draft of the detachment now under orders for *Bombay*, to admit of a ſecond equipment; and likewiſe, becauſe I am of opinion that our interference in the troubles of *Poonah* was founded in bad policy, conſequently, the further we engage the more we ſhall involve the affairs of the Company.

(Signed) *Edward Wheler.*

The military eſtabliſhment of the *Carnatic*, including the Nabob's diſciplined troops, is equal to that of *Bengal*, though the territory which it has to defend is ſcarce equal to a tenth part of that which is guarded by the latter.

The detachment now under orders for *Bombay* cannot accompliſh its original deſtination before the month of November; it is of courſe not likely to proceed at all.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Mr. *Francis*—I have heard of no troubles yet at *Poonah*, but if any have exiſted there, the late revolution muſt have put an end to them; neither have I heard that *Bombay* was likely to be attacked, conſequently can ſee no occaſion for ſending them aſſiſtance. The Preſidency of that ſettlement do not ſeem to think *Bombay* in any danger, when by their laſt letter we find that they were going to march the principal part of their force to *Poonah*. I diſapprove of the motion for theſe reaſons, and becauſe I think it rather too arbitrary and inconſiſtent to refuſe the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* a ſupply of money, when they tell us they have not a rupee in their treaſury, and in the ſame letter to order them to aſſemble a force upon their frontiers, and perhaps to march into the Maratta country, which we know it is impoſſible for them to do without money.

It ſeems to be forgotten, that all the military operations now in agitation muſt be executed in the midſt of the rains.

I agree to the Governor General's motion. (Signed) *P. Francis.* (Signed) *Richard Barwell.*

Governor General—To Mr. *Francis*'s minute I reply, that it has been ſuppoſed that the iſland of *Bombay* was in danger of immediate invaſion; that it will be too late to make remote propoſitions for the aſſiſtance of that ſettlement when it is engaged in actual hoſtilities; that Mr. *Moſtyn*'s laſt letter, and the other advices from that quarter, afford us every reaſon to expect a ſcene of great troubles at *Poonah*; that our application to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* is not an order, nor have we a right to write to them on ſuch a ſubject with the ſtyle of command; that by declining to ſend them an immediate ſupply of money, we have not precluded them from every hope of ſuch aſſiſtance; and that when our own means and exigencies will admit, and their occaſions require it, I ſhall readily agree to relieve them.

I am ſorry Mr. *Francis* ſhould ſuppoſe me ſo inattentive to the ſervice which I have recommended, as not to have conſidered whether the ſeaſon of the year would admit of its execution. I have in a former minute declared, that I regarded the rainy ſeaſon as favourable to the expedition conducted by Colonel *Leſlie*: in the *Carnatic* it does not commence till the month of November.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

The above addition having been agreed to by a majority of the Board, and added to the letter to *Fort Saint George*, it was ſigned and diſpatched.

The Secretary lays before the Board the following letter, which he received from Mr. *Francis* in reply to his notification of the Governor General's offer of aſſembling a Council to take into further conſideration the letter to *Fort Saint George*:

To *J. P. Auriol*, Eſquire, &c.

Sir,

Having already delivered my opinion on the propoſed letter to *Fort Saint George*, and on the addition ſince made to it by the Governor General, and having no new matter before me, I have now no ground for making it my particular deſire that a Council ſhould be ſummoned for re-conſidering the ſubject. I beg you will return my moſt reſpectful thanks to the Governor for the offer contained in your letter.

I am, &c.

19th May 1778. (Signed) *P. Francis.*

No. 49.

The Governor General—As Mr. *Francis*, in his minute of the 19th May, has objected to our refuſal of a ſum of money to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* as being too peremptory and unqualified, and as nothing was further from my intention, nor from the plain conſtruction, of the letter itſelf, I ſhould be very glad if the opinions of the Board and this point may be brought to one point of argument. Part of the words of our letter which have been conſtructed too peremptory and unqualified is as follows: "we conſider the aid of the Com-"pany's reſources, whereſoever they may exiſt, as due "to the exigencies of all their ſettlements. On this "principle we ſhall always be ready to contribute every "means in our power to the relief of yours, whenever "they ſhall indiſpenſably require it, and we can afford "it, without ſubjecting the intereſts of our common "employers to a greater inconvenience in one place "than that which we ſhould attempt to avert in "another." This paſſage, and the whole tenor of the reſt, mark the intention of this Board to ſupply the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* with money whenever their exigencies ſhall require it and we can afford it, but decline an immediate ſupply: for this I will ſtate ſuch reaſons to the Board as I hope will convince them of the propriety of this anſwer. By the ſtate of our two treaſuries of yeſterday's date, now lying before the Board, it appears that the amount of both was rupees ſeventy-two lacks ſeventeen thouſand one hundred and eighty-three: - - - - - - 72,17,183.

From this ſum the following muſt be deducted:

Depoſits - - -	12,39,658	
Remains in the mint uncoined	12,22,914	
Depoſit in the new Fort -	35,96,000	
Remaining unpaid of the advances ordered to the Board of Trade	8,00,000	
		68,58,572
		3,58,611.

From this account it appears that we cannot at this time command a larger ſum than three and a half lacks of rupees, were we diſpoſed to comply with the application from

from the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, unleſs we were to break in upon the fund which we have appropriated for our own extraordinary occaſions. Add to this conſideration the preſent ſeaſon of the year in which the collections are entirely at a ſtand, and it will appear that we ſhall meet with ſome difficulty in defraying our own ordinary expences; neither do the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George* require a pecuniary aid to relieve their actual wants, but only to ſerve as a fund to anſwer the exigencies of a war. To me it appears that ſuch a fund will be as ſafe and as effectual in our hands as in theirs; but if it ſhall be the opinion of the Board that at this time there is a probability that the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* may be preſſed for means beyond their ordinary reſources, I ſhall very readily join in appropriating a ſum for that purpoſe, and in fixing a period for advancing it either by bills, or if theſe cannot be obtained, by remittances in ſpecie; in the mean time I recommend to the conſideration of the Board the advice offered to that Preſidency in our letter of the 7th April 1777, as it points out the natural and reaſonable means of enlarging their own reſources, without unneceſſarily exhauſting the currency of this country, and I deſire that it may be entered after this minute. I ſhall here leave the ſubject thus at large, either to be determined at this meeting of the Board; or, as it appears to me of too much importance for ſo precipitate a deciſion, to be more deliberately conſidered, and the opinions of the Board taken upon it in the interval between our meetings.

" It appears from the general tenor as well as the particular paſſages of the Nabob's letters, that he is " greatly indebted to Britiſh ſubjects in the ſervice of the " Company, or reſiding at *Madras* under their protection. " We have ſtrong grounds to conclude that he may have " granted to theſe creditors, tuncaws or aſſignments of " the revenues of the *Carnatic*, in the ſame manner as " he had formerly mortgaged to them the collections " of *Tanjore*. We cannot avoid expreſſing our diſapprobation of this act, if it has really taken place, be" cauſe it muſt evidently tend to leſſen the power of the " *Carnatic*, by depriving it of its reſources, and thereby " expoſe it to the danger of foreign invaſion. In this " caſe therefore we recommend to you, to require in " form of the Nabob, that he reſume all ſuch grants; " that he deliver to you an account of his debts con" tracted with the ſubjects of *Great Britain*, and ſuſ" pend the liquidation of them until he ſhall have fully " diſcharged thoſe due to the Company, or until you " may be furniſhed with inſtructions from the Court of " Directors reſpecting the demands of his private cre" ditors, as it is poſſible that ſuch inſtructions may " ſpeedily be received in anſwer to the reference which " you made to them on this ſubject in the courſe of the " laſt year."

Mr. *Francis*—The letter to *Fort Saint George* upon the whole amounts to a poſitive refuſal of their requeſt; the following expreſſion appeared to me too harſh and peremptory: " to theſe conſiderations we muſt add, " that we ſhall not think ourſelves warranted, even " under the moſt preſſing ſituation of your affairs, to " offer our relief, if it ſhall appear to us that you have " the means of it left in your own hands unapplied." Either the means herein alluded to could never be in their own hands, or their affairs could not be in the moſt preſſing ſituation.

When the draft of the letter was ſent round, the ſtate of our treaſury now preſented to the Board was not before me, nor is it mentioned or alluded to among the reaſons aſſigned for not granting the ſupply requeſted of us; if it had, I ſhould have thought it unanſwerable, becauſe as I deem the preſervation and ſecurity of *Bengal* of all others the moſt important object of conſideration to the Company, I ſhould never have approved of ſupplying the wants of the other Preſidencies out of the treaſury of this Government, already ſo nearly exhauſted; on the ſame principle I ſhould have endeavoured to diſcourage every enterprize likely to be attended with extraordinary expences, particularly the preſent expedition to *Poonah*. I conſider the money in the new fort as a reſource againſt a poſſible invaſion of theſe provinces, and not to be employed for any other ſervice but their immediate defence; deducting this ſum, and the others already appropriated from the balance in our treaſury, it appears that we are going to maintain a war on the other ſide of *India*, or military operations at leaſt in point of expence equivalent to a war, with an unappropriated ſurplus in our treaſury of three lacks and a half, and which from the ſeaſon of the year we are ſo little likely to increaſe, that we ſhall meet with ſome difficulty in our ordinary expences. In this ſituation of our affairs I certainly ſhall not be for ſending ſupplies of money either to *Madras* or *Bombay*, and I would aſſign the true reaſons of our conduct to thoſe Preſidencies. Appendix. Nos. 48 & 49.

Governor General—The ſtate of our two principal treaſuries is preſented to the Board every Monday morning, and a daily report I underſtand to be conſtantly made to every Member of the Board: it was to theſe treaſuries only that my minute alludes, as it is from theſe only that remittances could be made to the other Preſidencies; but Mr. *Francis* has carried his concluſions far beyond mine, and greatly miſunderſtood me if he ſuppoſes that I mean to repreſent the Company's reſources as exhauſted. The ſtate of our treaſuries at the Preſidency has ever been at its loweſt ebb in the three firſt months of the year; but this does not prove that our reſources are exhauſted; a fair ſtate of the Company's reſources can only be ſeen in the collective ſum of all their treaſuries, and the eſtimate of their growing reſources and diſburſements. The caſh in the principal treaſuries may be diminiſhed by means which proportionably augment that of the provincial, as is actually the caſe in the twelve lacks of rupees lately ordered to be granted to the Board of Trade at the Preſidency, in exchange of the provincial aſſignments formerly made to them. The general ſtate of the Company's treaſuries will make a number in the packet; and compared with that ſent home the laſt year near the ſame period of time, will better ſhew than any argument, the ability of this Government to ſupport all its expencies, whether external or internal.

Mr. *Barwell*—When I approved the draft of the letter to *Fort Saint George*, I did not decline to ſend the ſupply required by the Gentlemen of *Fort Saint George* from any idea of the inability of this Government to give it, but becauſe I did not know, and do not at this preſent moment know, under what circumſtances the extraordinary demand we have from that Preſidency was made; their reſources were the ſame the preceding year, and the year preceding that, and proved a ſufficient fund for defraying the expences of their Government. I know of no extraordinary charges to which the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* has been ſubjected during this preſent year, nor do the Preſident and Council ſtate any deficiency in their ordinary funds; I therefore cannot ſuppoſe there is any very preſſing call, or that there can be any real neceſſity for impoveriſhing the *Bengal* treaſury to ſupply that of *Madras*; beſides, at this ſeaſon of the year, we have not the means of tranſporting bullion to the coaſt.

Mr. *Wheler*—I conſider the requeſt of the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, of a ſupply of money from this ſettlement, rather to ariſe from the apprehenſion of ſome ſudden emergency requiring an increaſe of their expences, which their treaſury was in no degree prepared to anſwer, than from any augmentation of their eſtabliſhment: under theſe circumſtances I judged it reaſonable to comply with their requeſt, not being furniſhed at that time with an exact ſtate of our own treaſury, which I am now well convinced will not admit of. In a mercantile view many reaſons may be aſſigned in favour

Appendix. Nos. 50 & 51.

favour of an annual ſupply to that Preſidency; the only one I ſhall offer to the Board at preſent is, that every cargo from *Fort Saint George* to *Europe*, when ſold by the Company, nearly doubles its original coſt and charges, while thoſe from this ſettlement, which we are increaſing daily in moſt of the articles which are ſuppoſed to render them valuable, upon an average loſe upwards of 30 per cent.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
21ſt May 1778.

APPENDIX, Nos. 50 and 51.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt May 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident.

Richd Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edwd Wheler,
} Eſquires.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In your commands of the 9th March you are pleaſed to direct me to reſerve in my hands the ſum of ten lacks of rupees, for the pay and expence of the detachment ordered to be in readineſs to march to *Bombay*, and to wait your further orders for tranſmitting the ſame to the detachment. In conſequence of theſe inſtructions, I immediately prepared that ſum, converting as much of it as I poſſibly could into gold ſpecie, and packed it up in readineſs to be forwarded on the ſhorteſt intimation from the Honourable Board: but not receiving ſuch intimation, and learning from Colonel *Leſlie* that his final inſtructions and orders of march had been tranſmitted to him, I conclude that ſome accident muſt have befallen the orders which the Honourable Board ſent me on this head, or that they may not have adverted to the injunction they gave me to wait their further commands. I have therefore, in compliance with the moſt preſſing requiſitions of Colonel *Leſlie*, taken upon me to forward to him the ſum of twelve lacks of rupees (upwards of three lacks and thirty thouſand whereof are in gold mohurs) which the Honourable Board will perceive from a copy of the Colonel's eſtimate herewith encloſed, was deemed neceſſary for the ſervice.

The charge of the Nabob's Raſſaulah was neceſſarily included in Colonel *Leſlie*'s eſtimate, as the ſtate of his Excellency's finances and reſources rendered it impoſſible for me to have attained immediately the requiſite advance from any other funds than thoſe I am at preſent in poſſeſſion of. I hope however in the courſe of the year, to reclaim a conſiderable part of this ſum, which for the preſent I have been obliged to the Vizier's debt with the Honourable Company, from the funds originally aſſigned for the maintenance of *Abdul-nahman Cawn*'s Reſſaulah.

For the further information of the Honourable Board I beg leave to ſubmit to their peruſal copies of Colonel *Leſlie*'s letters to me, regarding the diſpatch of the treaſure for the uſe of his detachment; which, I truſt, will juſtify my compliance with his requiſition, though not ſtrictly conformable to the orders I had received.

I have, &c.

Lucknow, (Signed) *N. Middleton,*
8th May 1778. Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Copies of letters from Colonel *Leſlie* to the Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Sir,

As I have received the final orders of the Honourable the Governor General and Council to proceed on my march to *Bombay*, with all poſſible diſpatch; and by what I learn from Mr. *Chandler*, you have not yet received the Board's orders to remit me the treaſure deſtined for this ſervice.

The Paymaſter of this detachment (Mr. *Cator*) is not yet arrived, as he has been delayed by ſickneſs, and I think it is probable has orders to receive the treaſure from you, but has neglected in his indiſpoſition to tranſmit the order to you or to me; upon this ſuppoſition I have ſent an expreſs to him, to deſire, if he has ſuch an order, to tranſmit it to me immediately; and as I have not any money to defray the expence of the current ſervice, I am to requeſt that you will pleaſe to remit me, as ſoon as poſſible, ſome lacks of rupees, or ſend me credit for ſuch ſums as I may want for the current ſervice, leſt it ſhould ſuffer by delay for the want of it, which I ſhall hold myſelf accountable to you for, till ſuch time as you may receive the neceſſary orders from the Board, immediately from themſelves, or through Mr. *Cator*.

I have adviſed the Government with this circumſtance of delay, and of my having made this requiſition to you, leſt the ſervice ſhould ſuffer before their orders can arrive.

Camp near *Corah*, I am, &c.
28th April 1778. (Signed) *M^r Leſlie.*

Sir,

I have been favoured with your letter of the 24th inſtant on the morning of the 27th, previous to which, on the night of the 25th, Mr. *Chandler* arrived here, as did *Almaſs Ally Cawn* on the morning of the 26th.

I am extremely obliged to you for your attention in ſending Mr. *Chandler* to this place, in order to ſee that the Vizier's injunctions and your own are duly executed by *Almaſs Ally Cawn*, by which I hope the ſervice will be furthered, and all obſtacles removed that have hitherto retarded it; and I hope, by this interpoſition, that the ſupplies I have demanded, which are very trifling to the abilities of the country, will be ſpeedily and effectually ſupplied, in order that I may begin my march without loſs of time.

I muſt refer you to Mr. *Chandler* for the progreſs we have made with *Almaſs* for your further information.

In my letter of yeſterday I informed you of the circumſtances of the delay in the ſupply of the treaſure. I now encloſe you an eſtimate of what I think will be wanting for the current expence of one month, which, you will obſerve, amounts to one lack ſeventy thouſand rupees; therefore I do ſuppoſe that not leſs than thirty thouſand will be neceſſary for contingencies, or that two lacks will be barely ſufficient, excluſive of the firſt expence of ſupply; as the Government have thought that ſix months ought to be provided, twelve lacks will be neceſſary, which I hope will be ſent to me as ſoon as poſſible.

Camp near *Corah*, I am, &c.
29th April 1778. (Signed) *Math^w Leſlie.*

Sir,

The Paymaſter of my detachment (Mr. *Cator*) being arrived, and having no other orders than to join me, I preſume the Governor General and Council thought my order for your ſending the ſum of money deſtined for the expence of my expedition, ſufficient for your doing ſo; and as they have put the Paymaſter entirely under my controul alone, I ſuppoſe it was not conſiſtent any order ſhould be ſent to him to receive it, or in the hurry of buſineſs the neceſſary orders for your ſending it have been forgot; let this be how it will, the ſervice muſt ſuffer if the treaſure is not ſent immediately. I therefore muſt repeat my requeſt to you, that a ſum, amounting to twelve lacks of Sicca rupees be ſent me with all expedition,

pedition, for which I will grant my receipts, and become accountable to you.

Camp near *Corah*, 30th April 1778. I am, &c. (Signed) *M. Leſlie.*

True Copies.
(Signed) *N. Middleton.*

Eſtimate of charges of the detachment under the command of Colonel *Leſlie*, per month.

1 Company of artillery, including Field Officers, Quarter-maſter, and Adjutant, &c.		12,000
2 Regiments of cavalry	34,000	
Quarter-maſter Adjutant D°	2,000	
		36,000
6 Battalions of infantry	78,000	
Quarter-maſter Adjutant D°	3,500	
		81,500
Quarter-maſter General's eſtabliſhment, &c.		3,000
Field Engineer's D°		4,500
General, Staff, &c. 1 Colonel, 2 Lieutenant Colonels, 2 Majors, Major of Brigade, Interpreter, Aid de Camps, Secretary, Surveyors, Pay-maſter, Commiſſary, &c.		25,000
Contingencies to artillery, cavalry and infantry, allowed		8,000
Sonat Rupees		1,70,000

For extraordinary ſupplies and contingencies.

A true Copy.
(Signed) *N. Middleton*,
Reſid^t at the Vizier's Court.

No. 51.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to Mr. *Middleton:*

Sir,

We have received you letters of the 30th ultimo, and 1ſt, 6th, and 8th inſtant.

Inſtead of complying with the aſſurances which have been made by Mr. *D. Barwell* to *Fyzala Cawn*, we think it will anſwer the ſame purpoſe to addreſs a letter to him, confirming the obligation of this Government to abide by the guarantee of the treaty concluded by the Vizier with him, which you have engaged in by our authority, and the Governor General will write to him accordingly.

We authorize you to receive the amount of the obligation which *Fyzala Cawn* has delivered to Mr. *Barwell* for one lack of rupees, as a complimentary mark of his reſpect and attention to the Company for the part they have taken in his concerns.

We think it proper to expreſs our approbation of the conduct of Mr. *Daniel Barwell* in the tranſaction of the buſineſs on which you have deputed him to *Fyzala Cawn*, and we direct that he prepare and tranſmit to us through you an account of the expences which he has incurred by this expedition.

Having conſidered the earneſt requiſition of Colonel *Leſlie* for twelve lacks of rupees, with the eſtimate which he tranſmitted you of the monthly diſburſements of his detachment, we conſent to his retaining the additional two lacks with which you have ſupplied him, as we are convinced that the extraordinary charge of the cavalry, which was not provided for in the firſt eſtimate of the expence, will require that ſum to defray it; but we muſt nevertheleſs ſignify our diſapprobation of your having taken upon yourſelf to exceed our original orders on this ſubject without previouſly applying for our permiſſion. Directions were tranſmitted you, under date the 4th inſtant, for diſpatching the treaſure which we had ordered you to prepare, to Colonel *Leſlie*; but you acted properly in forwarding it before the receipt of thoſe orders, as the exigency of the ſervice required it, and you were acquainted with the uſe for which it was intended.

We are, &c.
Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
Phil^p Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William, 21ſt May 1778.

Vol. VIII.

Appendix No. 52.

APPENDIX, No. 52.

Extract of *Bengal* Military Conſultations, the 27th March 1778.

READ a letter from Colonel *Leſlie*, dated 14th March 1778.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General and Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have been favoured with your reſolutions of the 23d ultimo, through the Commander in Chief; and I cheerfully embrace the honour you conferred upon me, in the command of ſo conſiderable a part of the Honourable Company's troops; and the confidence and reliance you have placed in me demands my utmoſt gratitude; I am very ſenſible of this mark of your favour, which it will be my duty to deſerve.

I ſhall proceed with all diligence to collect together the equipment of this expedition, and hope with the power you have intruſted me, to be able to proceed upon it in due time, and that it may anſwer the purpoſe you intend. I beg leave to ſuggeſt to you that it will be abſolutely neceſſary it be attended with a corps of cavalry, in order to eſcort my ſtores and ſupplies, and preſerve my baggage and bazaars from inſult, and the frequent alarms that are given on marches of this kind by a ſtraggling cavalry enemy, as well as to preſerve my communication and correſpondence. I am therefore to requeſt you will permit me to take the firſt regiment of cavalry (now here) with me on this ſervice, which I flatter myſelf you will approve. I have ordered it in readineſs and to proceed with me to *Calpee*, where I hope to receive your approbation.

The artillery you have appointed to this command is very reſpectable, and I do not apprehend the Golundaze Company from this Brigade ſufficient to conduct it properly. You are pleaſed to add four officers from the firſt company to join it, and I muſt requeſt you will add twenty-five or thirty European artillery men, with ſome ſerjeants, and one hundred laſcars from the firſt company, that this artillery and the magazines may be properly conducted; and if you pleaſe to indulge me with a company of fifty men from the firſt regiment, as a guard to the whole, it will give it the neceſſary reſpect, and I hope you will ſee the neceſſity of this, and concur in my requeſt.

As you have not been pleaſed to take notice of any attendant ſtaff, I preſume you will have no objection to my taking my preſent with me, which I requeſt your concurrence in. And as this ſervice will require every aid, I muſt requeſt the favour you will pleaſe to order Lieutenant *Frith*, the preſent Brigade Major of the temporary Brigade, to join this detachment as Brigade Major, which it muſt neceſſarily have, and that another officer be ordered to do his duty here till his return; I ſhall take the liberty to take him along with me to *Korah*, where I hope to receive your approbation.

I preſume you will think a Commiſſary of Muſters neceſſary to aſcertain every thing you are pleaſed to require: a Judge Advocate alſo you may think requiſite; and I muſt requeſt your power for aſſembling general courts martial on Europeans, and to qualify any perſon to act as Judge Advocate; I requeſt alſo you will

pleaſe

Appendix. Nos. 53, 54, & 55.

pleaſe to appoint ſome additional ſurgeons, which are abſolutely neceſſary for us. I muſt endeavour to procure what medicines I can from the firſt brigade.

I muſt requeſt alſo your inſtructions and orders relative to the neceſſary ſupply of money, and you will gratify me by putting it under the direction of Mr. *Leſlie* (my preſent Secretary), as Paymaſter, and I will become anſwerable for him. I have taken the neceſſary ſteps for procuring the draft and carriage cattle that may be wanted, by ſending to *Korah*, *Calpee*, and *Bundlecund*, to provide them, as alſo to ſecure my ſupplies of proviſions, which I have no doubt I ſhall be able to effect, but wiſh your requeſt to the Rajah of *Bundlecund* to give all the aſſiſtance in his power. There being no carriage cattle here attached to the Golundazes, I have requeſted Lieutenant Colonel *Wilding* to procure what number may be wanted at *Allahabad*, to be ſent to *Suragepore*; and that nothing may be wanting on my part, I propoſe ſetting out this night for *Lucknow*, to ſettle with Mr. *Middleton* what may be wanting on his part or the Vizier's, and to comply with your inſtructions relative to the arſenal there, which I ſhall report to you.

The Vizier not having a twelve pounder fit for the ſervice we are going upon, I have wrote to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to diſpatch with all expedition two twelve pounders from *Chunar*, and if cattle can be provided I hope they will be brought up by Captain *M'Pherſon*.

I ſhall hope for your general inſtructions to proceed, and have the honour to be, with the higheſt reſpect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Camp, *Futty Gurr*, your moſt obedient
14th March 1778. humble ſervant,
Matt^w Leſlie.

Governor General---It is with much reluctance that we conſent to any further drafts from our troops ſtationed in the Nabob Vizier's dominions; but if you ſhall judge it indiſpenſably neceſſary to join the 1ſt regiment of cavalry, or any part of it, to your detachment, we authorize you to do it, but we rather recommend that you apply to the Nabob for a party of his cavalry to attend you on this ſervice.

We cannot conſent to your requeſt that 25 artillery men, and a company of Europeans, be added to your detachment, though we are convinced that they would prove an addition of great ſtrength to it. We conſent to your taking Lieutenant *Frith* as your Brigade Major.

The other requiſitions contained in your letter have been already anſwered by our public orders already iſſued.

Mr. *Francis*—I think, that before we conſent to the detaching of a regiment of cavalry in addition to the troops already ordered to this ſervice, we ought to be furniſhed with the Commander in Chief's opinion, whether ſuch detachment of cavalry can be ſpared with ſafety from the defence of the great line of frontier which we have now to defend?

Governor General—I believe I already know General *Stibbert*'s opinion. It was in deference to it that no mention was made of cavalry in the firſt propoſed arrangement; but as Colonel *Leſlie* will be reſponſible for the execution of the ſervice, and as the preferable object in my opinion is the intereſt of the enterprize, not the defence of the Nabob's dominions, which will be eventually better defended by it than a much larger force acting at home, I am of opinion, that the diſcretionary power which I have propoſed in the above draft of the letter to be written to him in reply to his, ſhould be given to him. I have too great a reſpect for General *Stibbert*, to aſk his advice on a point on which I myſelf formed a determined opinion.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree to the draft of the letter to Colonel *Leſlie*, relying upon the foreſight and attention of the Governor General to the ſafety and ſecurity of the frontiers.

Mr. *Barwell* agrees to the draft.

Reſolved, That a letter be accordingly written to Colonel *Leſlie*.

APPENDIX, Nos. 53, 54, and 55.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations,
8th June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

READ the following letter from Colonel *Leſlie*:

Gentlemen,

Although I have been arrived in this neighbourhood ſome days, I have delayed writing to you until I ſhould have croſſed the firſt diviſion of my detachment over the *Jumma*.

Purſuant to your directions every means in my power were uſed to reconcile the Chiefs holding the diſtricts between *Culpee* and *Bundelcund* to my march, and I received aſſurances of their willingneſs and ready aſſiſtance of proviſions. They alſo ſent a vackeel to me for my orders, and to receive my declarations of peace and protection to the inhabitants on my march; but the Kellidar of the fort waived acquieſcing to my application for the aid of his boats, and indicated in all his actions the hoſtility of his intentions.

Many attempts and threats were uſed to intimidate my workmen at the boats I had been able to collect, and at the inſtant their vackeel was in my camp, they commenced direct acts of hoſtility, and abſolutely fired at my people employed at the boats, which was retorted on them by the guard placed for their protection. In the afternoon they returned to the ſame attempts, and the officer then thought it neceſſary to puniſh them more effectually, and fired a few rounds from two ſix pounders that had been ordered there to cover the landing of the troops. This obliged them to retreat with the loſs of ſome men; ſome gabions that were thrown up before the party at the boats entirely ſecured them from the effects of their ſhot.

I had told the vackeel my intention of croſſing as yeſterday, but he was very ſolicitous for my delaying another day, and expreſſed his maſter's wiſh that I would croſs the river at 16 coſs higher up. I could not accede to either. The firſt was incompatible with the declaration I had made, having already delayed my paſſage of the river, with the expectation of ſeeing the vackeel, who confirmed to me the promiſes I had received from the Chiefs *Ballajee* and *Gungadur*, and the latter was leading me far out of my way, and therefore not to be complied with.

I explained theſe objections to the vackeel, and repeated my profeſſions of amity and protection to the country. And he left me on the pledge of peace to give the requiſite injunctions to the Kellidar's troops, and to ſend the boats, ſeemingly ſatisfied, and promiſed to return to me in the evening. This he did not perform, and the declared hoſtility the Marattas had ſhewn at the Gaut, gave me reaſon to expect ſome oppoſition. Yeſterday morning at day-break the troops reached the Gaut, conſiſting of three battalions and their guns. And on the firſt embarkation being formed on the oppoſite beach, the troops that had been collected at *Culpee* began to aſſemble. Colonel *Goddard* immediately diſpatched a meſſenger to their Chief, with a deſire to paſs unmoleſted; and was deſired to come on. However, before one battalion was quite formed, their horſemen began a diſtant fire with their matchlocks, and finding no immediate reſiſtance, their inſolence was ſo great

great as to draw very near the troops in ſingle men to moleſt them, by which means two ſepoys were ſlightly wounded. The ſecurity of the people then required a reſiſtance, and the two guns placed for covering the landing, with a ſmall battery I had poſted for the ſupport of the troops, in poſſeſſing themſelves of the poſt they were to occupy, diſcharged a few ſhot amongſt them, which did execution.

The detachment marched from the beach, and met with no oppoſition, the Maratta troops retreating before them the whole way to the village, from whence they wheeled off through ſome rugged ground to a plain about a mile inland from the fort. Colonel *Goddard* had detached Major *Fullarton*, with four grenadier companies, to his left, to prevent any ſurprize in the rear of his detachment from the high grounds, with directions for their joining at the village, but the road being much interſected through the deep broken ground, he was led near a mile from the extremity of the village, almoſt intercepting the retreat of the troops from the fort; at this time the parties that had gone off with their baggage and effects to a poſt about three coſs on the *Yellapoor* road, were returning in ſearch of plunder, and to aid in harraſſing our troops, collected here to the number of about 1,200 men, they attacked the grenadiers with ſome ſuttrenals and rockets, and preſſed them ſo hard, that the 4th battalion, with two guns, immediately marched from the village to their relief; and the 7th battalion was ordered to follow. On the junction of the 4th battalion, a few rounds decided the conteſt, and the enemy retreated to *Etowrah*, the place where they had carried their effects. It was too far in the day, and the troops too much harraſſed by being a long time under arms, to think of purſuing them, and the detachment returned to the bank of the river, taking up their poſt between the village and the fort. The fort they found evacuated; Colonel *Goddard* therefore poſſeſſed it immediately. In this attack a few grenadiers were wounded, but none dangerouſly.

I have been thus particular to point out to you, Gentlemen, that the ſteps I have purſued, and the endeavours I uſed to obtain the acquieſcence of the Chiefs *Ballajee* and *Gungadur*, were conſonant to your orders, and ſuch as will obtain your approbation; and that the jealous diſaffection of the Maratta Chiefs alone has produced this firſt hoſtility. I do alſo aſſure you, that I will yet ſtrive to ſecure their peaceable admiſſion of my march. The fort of *Culpee* is an excellent hoſtage; this, together with the knowledge they now have that your troops will not patiently bear an inſult, may effect their ready acquieſcence.

Another vackeel from *Ballajee* is with me, who denies that the oppoſition has been made by authority, and ſolicits friendſhip from me: on proper pledges I will grant it; but the deceit they have already uſed, will not admit of my placing too much confidence in their profeſſions.

I have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that the officers and troops behaved with the greateſt alacrity, at the ſame time they obſerved the ſtricteſt diſcipline and regularity.

I have, &c.

Camp near *Culpee*, (Signed) *Matt*^{w} *Leſlie*.
May 20th 1778.

No. 54.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following draft of an anſwer to the above letter, for their approbation:

We have received your letter, dated the 20th ultimo.

It affords us great ſatisfaction, and adds to the confidence which we before repoſed in your conduct, to obſerve the attention which you have ſhewn to our inſtruction in your endeavours to conciliate the Maratta Chiefs to the march of your detachment, and in your forbearance to retaliate their hoſtilities until the ſafety of your party made it neceſſary to repel them. Appendix. Nos.

We do not regret the oppoſition which you have met with, ſince it has afforded you an occaſion of proving the ſincerity of our profeſſions, and the Marattas to be the aggreſſors in this early act of hoſtility; at the ſame time that the ill ſucceſs which attended it cannot have failed to make an impreſſion which we hope will diſcourage them in their future attacks, for ſuch we ought to expect, nor can we doubt that this was made by authority, though diſavowed by their principals. We have leſs apprehenſion of their open hoſtilities than of their treachery, and therefore although you inform us that you ſhall not place too much confidence in their profeſſions; yet we think it neceſſary to repeat the caution, and to recommend that you do not ſuffer yourſelf by any appearances to relax from it. 53, 54, & 55.

We deſire that you will adviſe Mr. *Moſtyn*, the Company's Reſident on the part of the Government of *Bombay* at *Poonah*, of your proceedings, and of all ſuch occurrences as may require his explanation of them to the Government at *Poonah*, or the interpoſition of its authority to prevent the like attempts in others to interrupt the courſe of your march.

We are, &c.

Mr. *Francis*—The oppoſition made by the Marattas to Colonel *Leſlie*'s paſſage over the *Jumma*, is to me, I confeſs, an unexpected event. I underſtood that great reliance had been placed on the ſolemn promiſes given us by the Maratta Chiefs of their pacific diſpoſition, and of their reſolution not only to permit the detachment to march quietly through their country, but even to give them every poſſible aſſiſtance. At any rate, I did not expect that they would have diſcovered a hoſtile intention to us until the detachment was engaged further in their country. As we at preſent know what we have to truſt to, and as it ſeems to be agreed that we ought to expect that they will do every thing in their power to interrupt the march of the army, it is my opinion that we ought not to attempt to proceed any further, at leaſt until the rains are over. I think that we hazard the ſafety of that army, on which perhaps the ſafety of *Bengal* and of the whole Britiſh empire in *India* may depend, by attempting to force a paſſage from one ſide of *India* to the other at this unfavourable ſeaſon of the year, and in the face of an enemy determined to oppoſe it. The Marattas have it in their power to diſtreſs, harraſs, and perhaps ruin any army that enters into their country in theſe circumſtances, without ever coming to an engagement. I wiſh the opinion of military men to be taken, whether it be probable that Colonel *Leſlie*'s army under theſe difficulties can make good its paſſage from *Calpee* to *Bombay*, or how it is poſſible for them to enſure the neceſſary ſupplies of forage and proviſions during ſo long a march in the rains, if the Marattas are determined to do every thing they can to diſtreſs him? On theſe principles I cannot approve of the propoſed letter, except that part of it which recommends extraordinary caution, which undoubtedly ought to be obſerved if the expedition is to be continued.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree with Mr. *Francis*, particularly in that part of his minute which recommends the taking of military opinions upon the preſent ſtate of the army under the command of Colonel *Leſlie*.

Mr. *Barwell* approves of the draft.

The draft of the letter to Colonel *Leſlie* being approved;

Agreed, That it be written and diſpatched accordingly.

Governor General—During a former period, in which my voice was excluded from an influence on the reſolutions of the Board, I made it a rule, from which I never deviated, to aſſiſt and ſupport every meaſure of the Council after it had received the ſanction of the concurrent opinions of a majority of its members, although

Appendix. Nos. 53, 54, & 55.

though paſſed in oppoſition to my opinion. It was a duty which I owed to the ſervice, nor has even the change of influence ever induced me to depart from it. But meaſures which I deemed the moſt pernicious to the ſervice having been allowed to take their effect, I have ſupported them, and I do ſupport them even to this hour. I have a right to complain of the contrary conduct of Mr. *Francis* in particular, and of Mr. *Wheler*, who has invariably joined with him, in loading every meaſure of Government, originally undertaken againſt their opinions, with unremitted oppoſition. This is I believe the fifth time, if not more, that Mr. *Francis* has urged the recall of the detachment, after having thrown upon me and Mr. *Barwell* the entire reſponſibility of its appointment. I ſhould not feel ſo ſenſibly as I do the authority of two members of the adminiſtration, which ought to be applied ſolely to the promotion of the Company's intereſts, and the effectual proſecution of the regular acts of Government, thus employed to impede and counteract them, if their objections were derived from a ſtudied knowledge of the ſubjects, how erroneous ſoever the concluſions from them might be: but it is my hard lot to contend with either miſinformation or miſrepreſentation; for I will venture to ſay, that there is not a ſyllable of Mr. *Francis*'s minute that is not built upon wrong grounds of fact. I will examine every part of it in the order in which it was dictated. The minute begins with theſe words: "The oppoſition made by "the Marattas to Colonel *Leſlie*'s paſſage over the "*Jumma*, is to me I confeſs an unexpected event. I "underſtood that great reliance had been placed on the "ſolemn promiſes given us by the Maratta Chiefs of "their pacific diſpoſition, and of their reſolution not "only to permit the detachment to march quietly "through their country, but even to give them every "poſſible aſſiſtance." No ſuch declaration of the ſolemn promiſes thus given by the Maratta Chiefs appears on any part of our records, nor can I conceive why this aſſertion is ſo pointedly made, unleſs it be to ſuggeſt the danger of a march of the detachment through a country united under one government, and combining all its powers to deſtroy it from the banks of the *Jumma* to *Bombay*. I can ſay for myſelf, that I never entertained the ſame aſſurance of the pacific diſpoſition of the Chiefs of the Peiſhwa's immediate juriſdiction.

I proceed with the words of the minute. "At any "rate I did not expect that they would have diſcovered "a hoſtile intention to us until the detachment was "engaged further in their country. As we at preſent "know what we have to truſt to, and as it ſeems to be "agreed that we expect that they will do every thing in "their power to interrupt the march of the army, it is "my opinion that we ought not to attempt to proceed "any further, at leaſt not until the rains are over. I "think that we hazard the ſafety of that army, on "which perhaps the ſafety of *Bengal*, and of the whole "Britiſh empire in *India* may depend, by attempting to "force a paſſage from one ſide of *India* to the other at "this unfavourable ſeaſon of the year, and in the face "of an enemy determined to oppoſe it. The Marattas "have it in their power to diſtreſs, harraſs, and perhaps "ruin any army that enters into their country in "theſe circumſtances, without ever coming to an en-"gagement." I lament that ſuch alarming declarations cannot be confined to our records; and I lament the dangerous conſequences to which the Company's intereſts muſt be expoſed, both here and at home, by ſuch a denunciation pronounced by a member of this adminiſtration, and of univerſal ruin to the Britiſh empire, from the effects of a partial meaſure, which was unfortunately undertaken without his concurrence. A very ſhort reply will be ſufficient to diſſipate ſuch ill-grounded apprehenſions. The diſtricts which depend on the Chiefs who have commenced the firſt hoſtilities againſt the detachment, extend but to a ſhort diſtance from *Calpee*; three or four days, or at moſt a week, will be ſufficient for it to reach the borders of *Bundlecund*, a country neither ſubject to the Government of the Marattas, nor likely to be influenced by their example; from *Bundlecund* the route will lie through the diſtrict of *Bopaul*, which is under the Government of a Patan Chief, acknowledging no other ſubmiſſion to the Maratta State than the payment of the chout. I am not maſter of the exact geography of this country, but I can affirm that this diſtrict includes ſo narrow a ſpace, that it is neither mentioned in our maps, nor known at this diſtance but to perſons who have occaſionally paſſed through it. The reſt of the way, to the borders of *Candeiſh*, and of the countries which are contiguous to *Poonah*, lies in the dominions of *Moodajee Booſla*, who is at this time the moſt powerful of the Chiefs who bear the Maratta name, who holds his poſſeſſions in his own right, and independent of the Government of the Peiſhwa, even by the confeſſion of the members of that adminiſtration. From him I have received the warmeſt aſſurances of aſſiſtance, and even invitations, repeated to Colonel *Leſlie* as well as to myſelf, for the march of the detachment into his country. The knowledge which I have acquired of his political intereſts and objects is a warrant yet ſtronger for my confidence in his fidelity. If the ſafety of our detachment has been thus far ſecured, I think there is little danger from the oppoſition it may meet with in the remainder of its progreſs except the events of a war, ſhould a war be the conſequence, which in defiance of the moſt guarded precautions of human prudence, muſt ever be in ſome degree fortuitous; yet it is my opinion, that this undertaking is as little liable to adverſe conſequences as any expedition that has ever yet been ſet on foot by any one of the Engliſh Governments in *India*, and I am willing to ſtake my reputation on the event of it. Twice is the rainy ſeaſon repeated in this minute as an objection; the ſame objection has been before twice made by Mr. *Francis*, and very fully anſwered. It is hard to exact from me repeated anſwers to the ſame objections, without an argument urged to ſupport them. I ſhall content myſelf with appealing to my former reply, which is contained in my minute of

To proceed in the words of Mr. *Francis*'s minute, "I "wiſh the opinion of military men to be taken, whe-"ther it be probable, that Colonel *Leſlie*'s army, under "theſe difficulties, can make good its paſſage from "*Culpee* to *Bombay*, or how it is poſſible for them to "enſure the neceſſary ſupplies of forage and proviſions, "during ſo long a march in the rains, if the Marattas "are determined to do every thing they can to diſtreſs "him?" I do not deſire to conſult opinions on a meaſure already determined; but to ſtate the queſtion in the terms propoſed would be to deceive thoſe to whom it was put into falſe opinions, the neceſſary conſequences of falſe premiſes. The minute concludes in the following words:—"On theſe principles I cannot approve of the "propoſed letter, except that part of it which recom-"mends extraordinary caution, which undoubtedly "ought to be obſerved if the expedition is to be con-"tinued." The queſtion before the Board is, Whether a letter ſhall be written to Colonel *Leſlie*, conſiſting of two diſtinct points? The firſt is an approbation of his paſt conduct; the ſecond a caution, to beware of treachery. The reply given by two of the members, applies only to the laſt point included in the queſtion, with a total ſilence on the firſt; while the debates of the Board have been introduced, and conſumed the whole time of the morning, on a ſubject totally foreign from both.

It may ſuit the ſyſtem adopted, whatever that be, by the diſſenting members of this Council, to continue the ſame means which have been uſed to this time, to defeat the meaſures which have been adopted againſt their conſent. I declare in this place my unalterable determination to proſecute it to the utmoſt of my power to its concluſion.

Mr. *Francis*—What rules of conduct Mr. *Haſtings* may have preſcribed to himſelf, in former times, is not

a queſtion

a queſtion I am concerned in. My conduct, I truſt, will want no apology, as long as it is guided by my own ſenſe of what my duty demands of me, though it ſhould not correſpond with his example. Neither do I know, nor do I mean to enquire, what thoſe meaſures are, which, though taken by the late majority in oppoſition to his opinion, and though of a nature the moſt pernicious to the Company's ſervice, he continues to ſupport; but this I do know, that all our meaſures were approved of by the Company, and none of them ſo ſtrongly as thoſe which received the greateſt oppoſition at this Board.

Admitting the rule alluded to by the Governor to be a good one, I conceive it does not ſtrictly apply to the preſent queſtion. In propoſing to ſtop the march of the detachment, I do not properly retard or embarraſs the execution of a meaſure already reſolved on, while all circumſtances continue the ſame. I propoſe a new meaſure on the ground of a new and unexpected event. With reſpect to the conſtant oppoſition which I am charged with having heretofore given to this meaſure, I avow the fact, and am glad to ſee it eſtabliſhed by teſtimony that cannot be diſputed. In referring to the pacific declarations of the Maratta Chiefs, I ſpoke from a ſtrong impreſſion of my memory, which I believe has not miſled me. *Moodajee Booſla* repeatedly promiſes to furniſh the army with all neceſſaries, and to conduct them with ſecurity through his territories. I did underſtand that *Ballajee* and *Gungadur* had given us aſſurances to the ſame effect. Their letters to Colonel *Leſlie* are full of amicable profeſſions, which were continued to him by their vackeels in his camp, even to the time when their troops were attacking his advanced parties. He now ſays, "that the jealous diſaffection of the Ma-"ratta Chiefs alone has produced this firſt hoſtility." I for my own part ſee no reaſon why all thoſe Chiefs ſhould not act on the ſame principles. Their general intereſt I conceive muſt be to prevent a foreign force from penetrating into their country, under any pretences whatſoever. What the particular conduct of *Moodajee Bhooſla* may be is uncertain; the proceedings of the other Chiefs give us no cauſe to rely on his good faith or pacific intentions. I for myſelf place no confidence in them. My objection to the march of the army, on account of the rainy ſeaſon, does not now ſtand on the ſame ground on which it was firſt urged; it was confined to that conſideration only, it is now united with that of a military oppoſition; either of theſe difficulties ſingly might perhaps be ſurmounted. It now appears that we have both to contend with.

I have no apprehenſion that my opinions given at this Board will reach the Marattas, or will have any effect upon the operations in the field. They are eaſy and obvious concluſions, from facts known to every body. If I am ſingular in drawing ſuch concluſions my opinion, though it ſhould be univerſally known, can produce no effect. I confeſs that I did not attend to the formality of approving Colonel *Leſlie*'s conduct, which I ſhould not have objected to: my mind was filled with objects of more conſequence. To the concluding ſentence of the Governor's minute, I ſhall content myſelf with ſaying, that I neither have formed a ſyſtem of perſonal intereſt, nor am I able to deviſe one, which could be promoted or retarded by ſtopping the preſent expedition; neither am I peremptory in ſaying, that I ſhall, at all times and in all circumſtances, oppoſe it to the utmoſt of my power, becauſe a ſtate of facts may exiſt, to which I may be compelled by neceſſity to accommodate my conduct.

The Governor General—I will not lengthen a debate, which originally aroſe from a ſubject to which it does not regularly belong, and has run into others yet more foreign from it; but there is one point which demands my reply.

I have complained of the unfair application which Mr. *Francis* has made of the general and equivocal term "Maratta," which in the only ſenſe it will bear in his inferences, means only that part of the Maratta Government which acknowledges the ſovereignty and immediate authority of the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters; but the facts from which theſe inferences are deduced relate to a variety of powers and intereſts, which are entirely ſeparated from the Peiſhwa's Government, and which their original dependance on it has even converted by a neceſſary conſequence into an oppoſition to it. The greateſt part, at leaſt two thirds of the line propoſed for the march of the detachment, belongs to powers that acknowledge no obedience to the Maratta State properly ſo called; that of *Bundlecund* does not bear even the Maratta name; yet it will be impoſſible for any uninformed perſon to read Mr. *Francis*'s minutes, even the latter, though dictated after he had been reminded of this eſſential diſtinction, without concluding from them that the whole country, lying between the preſent ſtation of the detachment and its termination at *Bombay*, was occupied by one power, and that power ready to act uniformly againſt the detachment in every ſtage of its progreſs. Appendix. Nos. 53, 54, & 55.

The promiſes given by *Moodajee Bhooſla* will not warrant the ſuppoſition with which Mr. *Francis* begins his firſt minute, and on which he expreſſes his diſappointment, ſince this Chief, though confounded in the general Maratta name, is not a dependent of the Maratta Government; neither will the aſſurances given by the Chiefs, *Ballajee* and *Gunga Dur*, juſtify Mr. *Francis*'s expectations of a pacific conduct in the Maratta Chiefs, ſince their names were never mentioned before, and they are now only mentioned to ſhew that neither their conduct or intentions were pacific.

Yet one word more: it would lead me into a diſcuſſion too pointed and too perſonal, were I to reply to the latter part of the preceding minute, in which Mr. *Francis* is pleaſed to ſay that he is not able to divine one ſyſtem which could be promoted or retarded by ſtopping the preſent expedition: to this I ſhall briefly anſwer, that the diſgrace of thoſe who planned the preſent expedition; the irreparable loſs of the credit of this Government; and a perpetual diſtruſt in all its future acts, excluſive of the forfeiture of the advantages for which it was originally concerted, would be the infallible conſequence of ſtopping the preſent expedition. It would ill become me to connect ſuch conſequences with a ſuppoſed ſyſtem of party, how obvious ſoever the tranſition may be, and however warranted by univerſal practice, from the defeat of thoſe who have the conduct of affairs to the triumph of their opponents: a conſtant ſeries of oppoſition may likewiſe produce the effect of ſtamping on the authors of public meaſures the opprobrium of every failure of ſucceſs which may at any time attend them, at the ſame time that its public and popular influence eſſentially tends to prevent their ſucceſs.

No. 55.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following draft of a letter, which he propoſes, with their approbation, to write to the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters; and he further propoſes, that copies of it, and of the letter juſt received from Colonel *Leſlie*, be tranſmitted to Mr. *Moſtyn*; that he be informed of the directions given to Colonel *Leſlie*, to adviſe him of his proceedings, and of all occurrences that may require his explanation of them to the Poonah Government, on his application to that Government for the interpoſition of its authority to prevent any impediment to the march of the detachment; that he be alſo deſired to correſpond with Colonel *Leſlie*, and to inform him of any circumſtances that he may deem it uſeful for him to be acquainted with.

I ſome time ago informed you of my deſign to diſpatch a body of troops from hence to ſtrengthen the garriſon of *Bombay*, and requeſted that in conſideration of the friendſhip and treaty ſubſiſting between you and the Company, which it was my determination ſtrictly to abide by, you would give orders to all your Chiefs in the

Appendix. Nos. 53, 54, & 55.

the ſeveral diſtricts through which the march of the troops lay, for their unmoleſted paſſage, and to ſupply them with ſuch aſſiſtance as they ſhould ſtand in need of. Notwithſtanding which, I learn from Colonel *Leſlie* the Commander of the detachment, that being arrived on the banks of the *Jumna* he halted, and wrote letters to *Ballajee* and *Gunga Dur*, the Chiefs of the diſtricts lying between their river and *Bundlecund*, under your authority, aſſuring them of his pacific intentions, and requeſting permiſſion for the march of the detachment through their territory: in anſwer to which he received aſſurances of friendſhip and aſſiſtance, which were confirmed to him by the arrival of a vackeel on their part; that he in conſequence prepared to croſs with his army, but before the firſt diviſion were fairly embarked a party of a horſe came down and fired on them, and on their arrival on the oppoſite bank they were oppoſed by a body of 1200 horſe, with the Kelladar of *Culpee* at their head. On this the Commander of the diviſion ſent a meſſage to the Kelladar to deſire he might paſs unmoleſted; and receiving an anſwer to come on accordingly advanced, but was fired on at a diſtance, which he in conſequence of the orders he had received, declined returning; emboldened by which the horſe advanced their attack ſo near the troops that ſeveral being wounded, it became neceſſary for their own ſafety to make a vigorous oppoſition, which was not effected without the loſs of many lives before the aſſailants were put to the flight; and our officers finding the fort of *Culpee* evacuated, took poſſeſſion of it as a pledge of their future goodbe haviour. I am convinced that theſe acts of hoſtilities muſt have been employed without authority from you or the Miniſters of your Government, becauſe of the treaty which ſubſiſts between you and the Company. The Preſidency of *Bombay* is ſituated at ſuch a diſtance from this, that any reinforcement which is ſent them muſt neceſſarily paſs through a variety of diſtricts ſubject to different Chiefs; and whatever conduct might be expected from ſtrangers with whom the Company have no connection, it could never be expected from you with whom they are on terms of friendſhip. Neceſſity required that the troops ſhould be ſent, and they muſt either paſs through part of your country, or not go at all. I was therefore remedileſs, but the moſt ſtrict injunctions were given to the Commander, to obſerve the moſt friendly conduct and regular diſcipline in his march which I am ſatisfied he will literally comply with.

I do not mean to demand ſatisfaction for what is paſt, as thoſe of your people who were the aggreſſors have received the puniſhment due to their temerity; but I am to requeſt that you will without delay iſſue ſuch poſitive injunctions to all the officers of your Government as may effectually prevent any thing of the like nature in future.

(To *Siccaram* and *Ballajee Pundit*, of the ſame tenor.)

The Board approving of the above letters, agreed that the Governor General be requeſted to order them to be written in Perſian, and that they be forwarded in the following letter to Mr. *Moſtyn*:

Sir,

Colonel *Leſlie* who commands the detachment ordered to proceed to *Bombay* having met with oppoſition in croſſing the *Jumna* at *Culpee*, we encloſe a copy of his letter to us on this occaſion, and of a letter which has in conſequence been written by the Governor General to the Peiſhwa, that you may be prepared to anſwer any remonſtrances that may be made to you by the Poonah Government on that ſubject.

We have directed Colonel *Leſlie* to adviſe you of his proceedings, and of all occurrences that may either require your explanation of them to the Maratta Government, or an application for the authority of that Government, to prevent his meeting with any further impediment in the courſe of his march through their dominions. We alſo requeſt that you will be regular in correſponding with Colonel *Leſlie*, and that you will apprize him of any circumſtances which you may deem it uſeful for him to be informed of.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

To the Peiſhwa: written 9th June.

I ſome time ago informed you of my deſign to diſpatch a body of troops from hence to ſtrengthen the garriſon of *Bombay*; and requeſted, that in conſideration of the friendſhip and treaty ſubſiſting between you and the Company, which it was my determination ſtrictly to adhere to, you would give orders to all your Chiefs in the ſeveral diſtricts through which the march of the troops lay for their unmoleſted paſſage, and to ſupply them with ſuch aſſiſtance as they ſhould ſtand in need of. Notwithſtanding which I learn from Colonel *Leſlie*, the Commander of the detachment, that being arrived on the banks of the *Jumna*, he halted, and wrote letters to *Ballajee* and *Gunga Dur*, the Chiefs of the diſtricts lying between that river and *Bundlecund*, under your authority, aſſuring them of his pacific intention, and requeſting permiſſion for the march of the detachment through their territory. In anſwer to which, he received aſſurances of friendſhip and aſſiſtance, which were confirmed to him by the arrival of a vackeel on their part; that he in conſequence prepared to croſs with his army; but before the firſt diviſion were fairly embarked, a party of horſe came down and fired on them, and on their arrival on the oppoſite bank they were oppoſed by a body of 1,200 horſe, with the Kelladar of *Calpee* at their head. On this the Commander of the diviſion ſent a meſſage to the Kelladar to deſire he might paſs unmoleſted; and receiving an anſwer to come on, accordingly advanced, but was fired on at a diſtance, which he, in conſequence of the orders he had received, declined returning; emboldened by which, the horſe advanced their attack ſo near the troops, that ſeveral being wounded, it became neceſſary for their own ſafety to make a vigorous oppoſition, which was not effected without the loſs of many lives, before the aſſailants were put to flight; and our officer finding the fort of *Calpee* evacuated took poſſeſſion of it as a pledge for their future good behaviour. I am convinced that theſe acts of hoſtility muſt have been employed without authority from you, or the Miniſters of your Government, becauſe of the treaty which ſubſiſted between you and the Company. The Preſidency of *Bombay* is ſituated at ſuch a diſtance from this, that any reinforcement which is ſent them muſt neceſſarily paſs through a variety of diſtricts, ſubject to different Chiefs; and whatever conduct might be expected from ſtrangers, with whom the Company have no connection, it could never be expected from you, with whom they are on terms of friendſhip. Neceſſity required that the troops ſhould be ſent, and they muſt, either paſs through part of your country, or not go at all; I was therefore remedileſs; but the moſt ſtrict injunctions were given to the Commander, to obſerve the moſt friendly conduct and regular diſcipline in his march, which I am ſatisfied he will literally comply with.

I do not mean to demand ſatisfaction for what is paſt, as thoſe of your people who were the aggreſſors have received the puniſhment due to their temerity; but I am to requeſt that you will without delay, iſſue ſuch poſitive injunctions to all the officers of your Government, as may effectually prevent any thing of the like nature in future.

(To *Siccaram* and *Ballajee Pundit*, of the ſame tenor and date.)

APPENDIX, Nos. 56 & 57.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 11th June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We are ſtill in the ſame ſtate of uncertainty as when we laſt had the honour of addreſſing you on the 5th ultimo.

The new Durbar, after preſerving a long and myſterious ſilence with reſpect to their intentions towards *Ragoba*, had a meeting with Mr. *Moſtyn* on the 10th, when they deſired he would accompany a deputy, they intended ſending to *Bombay* with propoſals reſpecting *Ragoba*, but without making the leaſt diſcovery that could lead to any knowledge what ſhare of the Government they would admit him to, or whither they would admit him to any, which in fact is now optional with them.

They have ſtill continued to find pretences for delaying the diſpatch of their Agent; and the recollection of the former trifling propoſals committed to Mr. *Moſtyn*, ſuggeſted to us to hold up to him the propriety of his not quitting *Poonah* without ſome adequate commiſſion; but our ſentiments were conveyed to him in ſuch a manner, as to leave it to his diſcretion to act in this point as he might judge moſt good for the ſervice, and we have in a late letter given him a ſtill more explicit permiſſion.

The aſſurance they have given of breaking off their connections with the French, of which you have been adviſed by Mr. *Moſtyn*, make us willing to hope that the firſt and grand object of theſe meaſures we have propoſed to you may be accompliſhed by this reſolution; but as Monſieur *St. Lubin* is not yet diſmiſſed from *Poonah*, we ſhall not relax in our vigilance, or ſuffer ourſelves to be lulled into ſecurity by promiſes which are not confirmed by their actions; however, ſtill we can judge with more certainty of their diſpoſition; the opinion we have formed on the preſent ſituation of affairs, and of our deſire to ſave the Honourable Company from the heavy expences, and their troops from the danger and difficulties of a march from your provinces to this ſide of *India*, have led us to ſend an order to the officer in command of the forces you have been pleaſed to order to our aſſiſtance, not to advance any further, until he may again hear from us.

It is proper you ſhould be acquainted, that when we came to this reſolution, we had expectations of a reinforcement from *Madras*, which were indeed formed upon private advices; but the pattamers which brought theſe letters, having been ſtopped near *Poonah*, and their packets opened, we concluded the public advices from that Preſidency had been intercepted, and gave the more credit to the private.

Alſo that Meſſ. *Draper* and *Stackhouſe* did not concur with us in this reſolution, which they were of opinion was not warrantable by any change in our ſituation, either with reſpect to the deſigns of the French, the conduct of the Poonah Government, or our own military reſources.

Sir *Edward Vernon*, after leaving this place, fell in with the French ſhips the *Brilliant* and the *Sartine*, and immediately returned to the northward, taking his ſtation off *Choul*, with a reſolution to prevent the French from landing any troops there; he continued cruizing off that port till the 18th, when the French ſhips not making their appearance, he proceeded to the other coaſt.

We eſteem it incumbent on us to ſend Sir *Edward Vernon* a letter of thanks for his conduct on this occaſion, in which he diſplayed ſo pointed an attention to the intereſt and welfare of the Honourable Company. Appendix: Nos. 56 & 57.

We have ſince learned that Monſieur *Bellecombe* himſelf remained at *Mahé*, and that the *Brilliant* proceeded to *Mangalore*, where ſeveral artillery officers, two hundred men, and a large quantity of military ſtores, were landed for the ſervice of the Nabob *Hyder Ally*; and the ſhip after Sir *Edward Vernon* was out of ſight to the northward of her, returned to *Mahé*, to carry Monſieur *Bellecombe* back to *Pondicherry*. The *Sartine* is gone to *Goa* river, where ſhe may probably remain during the monſoon; and it is there ſaid the French were deterred from proceeding to *Choul* by the appearance of our ſquadron, and ſuppoſing that war was declared, and perhaps by the news of the revolution of *Poonah*; but we have learned that the Captain, who was at *Choul*, has ordered her up thither (to *Choul*).

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 2d May 1778. (Signed) *William Hornby*, &c. Council.

No. 57.

Received the following letter from *Poonah*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing you laſt under the 19th ultimo; on the 25th I received a letter from the Honourable the Governor General, encloſing three for the Durbar, and acquainting me with your determination to ſend a reinforcement of troops to *Bombay*. As I apprehended the march of ſo large a body of forces through the Maratta Dominions might greatly alarm the Durbar, I thought it neceſſary to ſend Mr. *Lewis* to camp, not only to preſent the letters, but alſo to explain the cauſe of our apprehenſions, from the connection between *Nana* and Monſieur *St. Lubin*, and to apply for the neceſſary paſſports for the free paſſage of theſe troops, and their being ſupplied with a friendly Buzar. He accordingly ſet out the 28th ultimo, and returned the 4th inſtant, when he delivered me the minutes of his proceedings; to the encloſed copy of which I beg leave to refer you, from which your Honour, &c. may perceive, that no dependance can be had on what the Durbar jointly, or the Miniſters individually, ſay; for notwithſtanding their ſo publicly diſpatching me, of which they alſo adviſed the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and *Moraba*'s aſſurances to Mr. *Lewis*, they have not to my knowledge taken one ſtep towards completing that buſineſs.

I cannot account for *Moraba*'s evaſive behaviour reſpecting the duſtucks, in any other manner than the hopes he entertains of the troops not marching until the Governor General ſhall have received the Durbar's anſwers, agreeable to what he declared their vackeel had written, or that they will be recalled in conſequence of the late change in this Government; however to leave him as little room as poſſible for further evaſions, under the 5th inſtant I wrote *Moraba* a letter, demanding a deciſive anſwer, in writing, and declaring him accountable for any ill conſequences which may happen from the want of the duſtucks. But I am ſorry to inform you, that notwithſtanding this, and ſeveral meſſages I have ſince ſent him, I have not been able to procure an anſwer. Notwithſtanding *Moraba*'s aſſertions to Mr. *Lewis*, Monſieur *St. Lubin* has not yet been to *Proonder*, though it is ſaid he is now ſent for; but from the equivocating conduct of the Durbar, both before and ſince *Moraba* has had the executive authority, it is a doubt with me whether they will diſpatch him, or even if they do, whether he will leave *Poonah*, as from the lateneſs of the ſeaſon, he will have it in his power to delay the time till the rains ſet in, when he will make the plea of its being impoſſible for him to go any where.

In conſequence of *Hurry Punt*'s retreat to *Mirzi*, *Hyder*

Appendix. No. 58, 63 & 64.

Hyder has lately taken two ſmall forts, named *Copallée* and *Behadurburrah*, and was by the laſt accounts attacking the fort of *Dánvar*, about thirty coſs to the ſouthward, after the reduction of which it is ſuppoſed he will attack the latter place, particularly ſhould the reports of *Hurry Punt*'s being on his march from thence to *Proondur*, by orders from the Durbar, be true.

The encloſed packet to your addreſs was received yeſterday, in duplicate from the Preſidency of *Bombay*. On the 9th I received a letter from the Chief of *Maſulipatam*, dated the 22d April, encloſing a packet for *Bombay*, from your Honour, &c. which was forwarded immediately.

Poonah, 12th May 1778. I am, &c. (Signed) *T. Moſtyn.*

APPENDIX, No. 58—63 and 64.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 22d June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Mr. *Lewis*'s Journal of his Deputation to the Maratta Camp.

Camp near *Curreet*, April 1778.

Tueſday, 28th. ARRIVED at *Morabah*'s camp about five o'clock P. M. I immediately ſent to inform *Morabah* thereof, requeſting to know when I ſhould wait on him. He promiſed to give me a meeting at night; but in the evening ſent me word he could not ſee me until to-morrow.

Wedneſday, 29th. On account of ſome particular religious ceremonies *Morabah* was engaged in, this being a holiday, I had not an opportunity of ſeeing him until ſeven o'clock P. M. I found there *Chintoo Wittul* and *Gopal Naique Tumbuckur*. After delivering the letters from the Governor General, agreeable to Mr. *Moſtyn*'s orders, I explained their contents, when *Morabah* aſked me, whom we had to fear? I told him, that in conſequence of the Governor General and Council being adviſed of the treaty with Monſieur *St. Lubin*, they had cauſe to imagine ſome evil deſigns were intended againſt the Company's ſettlements on the weſtern ſide of *India*; he immediately anſwered, that there was no treaty between this Government and that gentleman: I replied, that I ſincerely believed there was not; but that I was convinced there was one ſubſiſting between *Nanah* and him, the contents of which we had the greateſt reaſon to ſuppoſe were greatly to our prejudice, and that it was in conſequence of this treaty that the troops mentioned in the Governor General's letters, were coming to the aſſiſtance of *Bombay*; I therefore requeſted the neceſſary duſtucks for their freely paſſing through any part of the Maratta Dominions they might have occaſion to come to, as well as their being properly ſupplied with a friendly Buzar. *Morabah* confeſſed a knowledge of the treaty between *Nanah* and Monſieur *St. Lubin*, but ſaid, he could not give me an anſwer with reſpect to the duſtucks I required, until after the Durbar met to-morrow: he then aſked me how many battalions were coming? I replied I could not tell the exact number, but ſuppoſed about three or four. I then told him that the Governor and Council at *Bombay* had written to Mr. *Moſtyn*, that they thought it very extraordinary the Durbar ſhould not have explained themſelves with reſpect to the buſineſs they had requeſted he would accompany *Tumbuckur* to *Bombay* upon, and reminded him of the trifling occaſion they ſent him upon in Auguſt laſt; I added that the Governor and Council would not approve of a Member of their Board being ſent upon every trivial errand, and therefore requeſted *Morabah* would inform me what the Durbar had to ſay to Mr. *Moſtyn*, or if he did not chuſe to explain himſelf to me, to let me know if he would order *Tumbuckur* to acquaint Mr. *Moſtyn* with the particulars before he ſet out? *Morabah* replied, that he would ſpeak to me on this buſineſs before he diſpatched me: I then told him that it would appear very extraordinary to the Governor and Council, after what had paſſed with *Morabah* on the 9th, and at *Nanah*'s tent on the 10th inſtant, all which Mr. *Moſtyn* had written to *Bombay*, that *Tumbuckur* had not yet ſet out; the reaſon of which I requeſted he would inform me; to this *Morabah* made no reply.

May 1778, Friday the 1ſt. This afternoon *Morabah* went to *Sacaram Bapoo* at *Bury*, where were alſo *Nanah* and *Cruſtrow Beloh*; what paſſed between them I cannot learn, but a hircarrah whom I ſent there informs me, that *Nanah* on his going away ſaid to *Morabah*, he might bring *Dadah Saib* to *Poonah*; but he requeſted *Morabah* would take care he did him no harm. However I look on this as a mere blind, as I am informed *Moraba* has told *Tookajee Holkar* that he does intend bringing *Ragoba* to *Poonah* before Decera, and has requeſted *Holkar* would ſend for *Anundy Bhoy* and her child immediately, and let the latter live with the young Peiſhwa in the fort; to which *Holkar* replied, that he had nothing to ſay to *Savoy Badjeerow*, (meaning *Ragoba*'s ſon) but inſiſted on *Dadah Saib*'s being brought directly. The public reaſon given for the meeting between *Morabah* and *Sacaram*, was the Beired Rajah and Havaldar of the *Matcky*, coming down to pay their compliments to *Morabah*; it is true they did come down, and the hircarrah informs me that after *Nanah* returned to his camp *Morabah* gave the Beil Bundah to the Rajah and Havaldar, and their people, in the name of *Ragoba*, that they ſhould not permit any one to go into either fort without his permiſſion.

I am alſo informed that *Ragooputrow*, *Narroo Sunker*'s ſon, who is encamped with *Holkar*, has declared to him that unleſs he will force the Durbar to bring *Ragoba* immediately into government, he will march into the *Conkan* with his troops, amounting to about four thouſand men.

Saturday, 2d. This afternoon *Saccaram Bapoo* paid a viſit to *Tookajee Holkar*, from whence he came to the Pagoda, in the tope of which *Morabah* is encamped, and about four o'clock ſet off on his journey to *Ninygam*, a village about ſix coſs on this ſide *Settera*, in order it is ſaid to be married.

I have been informed from ſeveral perſons, that *Morabah* by the advice of *Bapoo*, has now laid aſide all thoughts of bringing *Ragoba* into Government. *Buchabah Proondur* particularly, on the 29th ultimo, ſent a meſſage acquainting me that *Sacaram* and *Morabah* had totally broken the agreement made with him and *Holkar*, and were reſolved that *Ragoba* ſhould not come to *Poonah*, but that he and *Holkar* were determined on bringing him, and wiſhed much the Engliſh would aſſiſt them. And at a viſit I paid *Buchabah* this evening, he ſaid he could not give me a private meeting on the ſubject as he had ſpies on him, but requeſted I would repreſent to Mr. *Moſtyn* he had already ſent me, and that whatever we might have to ſay on the buſineſs may paſs through the perſon who acts as my linguiſt.

Not having heard any thing from *Morabah* theſe three days, in the evening I ſent the linguiſt deſiring to know when he intended diſpatching me, as Mr. *Moſtyn* would be very deſirous of ſending the Durbar's reply regarding the duſtuck to the Governor General; when *Morabah* ſaid he would certainly ſend for and diſpatch me before ten o'clock in the morning.

Sunday the 3d. I ſent again at noon to *Morabah* to aſk, when he would diſpatch me? he replied, that as Mr. *Moſtyn* had ſo often ſpoke to the Durbar with reſpect to diſpatching

patching Monſieur *St. Lubin*, they had ſent for him in order to give him his diſpatches, after which they would diſpatch Mr. *Moſtyn* to *Bombay*. About ſix P. M. *Morabah* ſent a meſſage, deſiring my attendance at the Durbar; I accordingly went, and found there *Cruſtrow Belob*, *Chintoo Wittul*, and *Gopaul Naique Tumbucker*. *Morabah* told me, that as the letters from the Governor General mentioned the troops he was ſending to *Bombay* to be on account of the French being here, he had ſent Monſieur *St. Lubin* in order to give him his diſpatches; and requeſted to know if in ſuch caſe we ſhould ſtill want the duſtucks I aſked for at laſt viſit, or whether the troops would be prevented proceeding? I anſwered that according to the Governor General's letter to Mr. *Moſtyn*, the troops would now have been near twenty days on their march, and that of courſe the duſtucks would be neceſſary to prevent any diſputes on the road; to which he anſwered, that the Durbar's vackeel had written them, the Governor General had told him the troops would not march until the Durbar's anſwers were received. I replied, that this was contrary to what the Governor General had written to Mr. *Moſtyn*, but that perhaps they might be ſtopped, ſhould the news of the change in government, which Mr. *Moſtyn* had diſpatched the day after it happened, reach *Calcutta* in time; but as this was very uncertain, I repeated my requeſt for the duſtucks being delivered me to prevent any bad conſequence which might happen for the want of them. *Cruſtrow Belob* then took up the diſcourſe, and mentioned again the letters they had received from the Governor General reſpecting *Choul* being given to the French, and Monſieur *St. Lubin* having the command of the Tope Connah, and made ſome trifling excuſes for Monſieur *St. Lubin* ſtaying here ſo long; he allowed that ſome kind of promiſes had been made that gentleman, but ſaid that they were given only with a deſign to amuſe him. I replied, that the Durbar beſt knew their own reaſons for detaining him, but that after the many equivocations they had been guilty of, until he arrived at ſome French or Engliſh ſettlement, we could not believe they really meant to ſend him away; and that Mr. *Moſtyn* had already replied to the other points. *Morabah* then ſaid, that the Durbar had hitherto acted very improperly in making ſo many evaſions about him, from which the Engliſh had an undoubted right to ſuſpect ſomething was intended againſt them, but I might however depend Monſieur *St. Lubin* ſhould be diſpatched in two or three days: to which I obſerved, that we expectedno leſs from him, and that it would convince us he meant to preſerve the friendſhip which had ſo long ſubſiſted between this Durbar and the Engliſh. *Morabah* then ſaid, that the Durbar really intended to have diſpatched Mr. *Moſtyn* and *Tumbuckur* at the time they mentioned, but that ſomething had intervened which prevented it. I replied, that the Durbar ſhould have ſettled every point before they ſent for Mr. *Moſtyn* in ſuch a hurry to camp; that it was not treating the Engliſh in a proper manner, making their Reſident run backwards and forwards upon every trifling occaſion, and it was what they would not ſuffer. *Morabah* immediately replied, that the real cauſe of Mr. *Moſtyn*'s detention was a letter he had received from *Ragoba*, deſiring that *Tumbuckur* might not be diſpatched for ſome days; that *Dadoo Punt* arrived this day from *Bombay* with letters from *Dadab Sahib*, which would require a few days to conſider of; and that then the Durbar would poſitively ſend Mr. *Moſtyn* to *Bombay*. He then aſked me if I thought it would be proper he ſhould write a letter to the Governor, accounting for this long delay? I told him, that he undoubtedly ought to have done it before, in order to remove any bad opinion the Governor and Council might entertain from this trifling behaviour of the Durbar. *Morabah* then ſaid, he would write, and ſend it to Mr. *Moſtyn* to be forwarded, as well as the anſwer to the Governor General's letter. I repeated my requeſt for the duſtucks, but he ſtudiouſly avoided giving me a reply. After my return from the Durbar I ſent the linguiſt to *Morabah*, to know whether he would grant the duſtucks I had applied for; when he replied, that he was obliged to go to *Jeſury* to-morrow, where he ſhould remain two days, but that on his return he would conſider of it, and ſend his anſwer to Mr. *Moſtyn*. A true copy.

(Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

Appendix. Nos. 58, 63, & 64.

No. 63.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 22d June 1778.

Received the following letter from Colonel *Leſlie*

Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing you on the 30th ultimo, tranſmitting to you a copy of a letter received from the Honourable Preſident and Council of *Bombay*.

The day before yeſterday I advanced with the principal part of the troops that form this detachment, with intention to take poſt on the banks of the *Betowah* river, leaving part of the park of artillery, the magazine, and one battalion of ſepoys, at *Kalpee*.

Yeſterday expreſſes arrived at my camp from the Reſident at *Poonah*, covering orders under date the 4th of May, that were diſpatched in quadruplicate from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, which require the proſecution of my march towards that quarter, in countermand of their former orders of the 22d April. Their original letter I now do myſelf the pleaſure to lay before you, together with the Reſident, Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letters of advice, which accompanied it from *Poonah*. In conſequence of theſe inſtructions, I have diſpatched orders to the officer commanding at *Kalpee* to join my detachment with the magazine and troops under his charge, and ſhall wait his junction on the bank of the *Betowah*, from whence I ſhall proceed on my route through *Bundlecund* with all poſſible expedition.

I am ſorry to inform you, that the backwardneſs which the Maratta Chiefs have ſhewn to the performance of the engagements they have entered into with me, make me dubious of their real intentions. This circumſtance will in ſome ſhape protract my march; but you may be aſſured that I ſhall not be diverted from my direct route through theſe diſtricts by any reſentment of their duplicity, however their conduct may merit it, more than the ſecurity of my detachment may abſolutely require.

I have diſpatched coſſids in acknowledgment of the the letters I have received from *Poonah* and *Bombay*, and ſhall be punctually attentive to their deſire of being frequently informed of my advance.

Head Quarters, *Meer Gawa*, 5th June 1778. I have, &c. (Signed) *Matw Leſlie.*

To the Officer at *Calpee*, in command of the troops under orders for *Bombay*.

Sir,

I wrote you under the 3d inſtant, encloſing a letter from the Preſidency of *Bombay*. This is purpoſely to give cover to a letter in quadruplicate from the ſame place, which is diſpatched by different routes, as I am uncertain what road you mean to take; I ſhall therefore be obliged to you to inform me as ſoon as poſſible, that I may be enabled to place Dawk Hircarrahs between this place and you. The men who will deliver you theſe letters are any of them able to inform you of the beſt and ſhorteſt roads towards *Poonah*. Agreeable to the orders I have received both from *Bengal* and *Bombay*, I am uſing my endeavours to procure the neceſſary paſſports for your free paſſage through the Maratta Dominions. I have not yet a determinate anſwer from the Durbar with reſpect to them, but hope in a few days to be able to inform you with more preciſion; however, it will be neceſſary to be ſtrictly on your guard, and to avoid as much as lays

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lays in your power, the giving any cauſe of complaint; though, from the diſtracted ſtate of this Government, and the diſſentions amongſt the heads, I do not believe they will dare to oppoſe your march. You may depend I ſhall keep you adviſed of every material occurrence neceſſary for your knowledge, as ſoon as I know where to addreſs you.

Poonah, the 11th May 1778. I am, &c. (Signed) *T. Moſtyn.*

To the Officer at *Calpee*, in command of the troops under orders for *Bombay*.

Sir,

Notwithſtanding our letter of the 22d ultimo, we hereby direct, that on the receipt hereof you march forward with the troops under your command, agreeable to your orders from the Governor General and Council; and that you give us the moſt conſtant and punctual advice of your motions, and the route you purſue, that we may do all in our power to provide for the wants, and facilitate the march, of the army.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 4th May 1778. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

No. 64.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 22d June 1778.

Received the following letter from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have the honour to forward a triplicate of our laſt letter, dated the 2d inſtant, ſince when we have received your letter of the 23d of March.

We have not ſince received any further advices from the reſident at *Poonah*, nor taken your letter into full conſideration; and we only diſpatch this to acquaint you, that we have taken off the reſtraint we had laid on the march of the troops from *Calpee*, and directed the commanding officer to advance towards this ſide, agreeable to the orders he has received from you.

We ſhall do all in our power to facilitate his march, and to procure a ſafe and unmoleſted paſſage for the army, and write to you with all poſſible preciſion, the moment we have taken our reſolutions.

From the friendly intercourſe that has appeared for ſome time paſt to ſubſiſt between the French and *Hyder Ally Cawn*, of which we gave an inſtance in our laſt letter, we think it would be a very proper meaſure to keep a Reſident at his Durbar, to endeavour to penetrate and counteract their ſchemes; we therefore requeſt to know if you approve this meaſure, to which we preſume the Nabob can have no reaſonable objection, as we are aſſured both the French and Dutch maintain Reſidents at his court.

Having hitherto obtained no ſatisfaction from the Durbar for the concerned in the *Aurora*, notwithſtanding our repeated repreſentations, and the letter from the Governor General, we have fixed the amount of their loſs as a claim upon the revenues of *Jamboofeer*, after the Company's demands on account the twelve lacks and the country of three lacks are made good; and have reſolved to retain that Pergunnah until the ſum due to the ſufferers is diſcharged with intereſt; our proceedings, and the papers now tranſmitted by a ſea conveyance to *Madras*, will ſhew the care we took to examine and aſcertain the claims, and to do all poſſible juſtice to the Poonah Government; and we doubt not you will approve the method we have taken to obtain ſatisfaction for the merchants, whom it is our duty to protect.

It is with much concern we acquaint you, that by the London Gazette of the 16th December, juſt received from *Buſſora*, we learn that General *Burgoyne* with his whol army, conſiſting of 3,500 fighting men, was compelled to ſurrender to General *Gates* on the 14th of October, on condition of being tranſported to *England* from *Boſton*, and not to ſerve again in *America* during the war. General *Howe* remains in poſſeſſion of *Philadelphia*, with which place the fleet have in vain endeavoured to open a communication, and three of our ſhips have been deſtroyed in the attempt, viz. the *Auguſta* of 64 Guns, the *Roebuck* of 44, and the *Merlin* of 16. General *Waſhington* was encamped within a few miles from *Philadelphia*, and the Congreſs had removed to *Lancaſter*: General *Clinton* with a ſmall army had proceeded up the river of *New York*, and had met with ſome ſucceſs.

The Council at *Buſſora* have acquainted us that about the latter end of January, two French gentlemen arrived at *Grain*, from *Surat* in their way to *Aleppo*, and not chuſing to wait for the caravan, juſt preparing to ſet out from the former place, had come to *Buſſora*, from whence they had proceeded by water to *Hilla*: "they gave out that one of them was writer to the "French Chief at *Surat*, and the other a military officer "and that they were proceeding to *Europe* with letters "to the French Miniſtry, regarding a new ſettlement "that had been lately made by their nation at *Choul*." We doubt not theſe are the individual perſons mentioned in our letter of the 12th December; but the Council at *Buſſora* add, that through their impatience they had taken a route which did not promiſe much expedition.

Bombay Caſtle, 9th May 1778. We are, &c. (Signed) *John Carnac*, &c. Council.

Ordered, that the encloſures in the above letter be entered after the Conſultation.

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following minute:

Mr. *Francis*—As a formal motion from me on the ſubject of the preceding letters would only be productive of uſeleſs debate, I ſhall content myſelf with laying my opinion before the Board, leaving it to their conſideration to adopt any part of it they may think proper. Theſe letters bring new matter, and of courſe a new queſtion before us. On the ſecond of May, the Preſidency of *Bombay* inform us, that the opinion they had formed of the preſent ſituation, added to other conſiderations, had induced them to ſtop the march of the detachment. In two days they ſuddenly change their reſolution without aſſigning any reaſon for it, and order the detachment to proceed. By this extraordinary omiſſion, I think they have failed very much in the reſpect they owe to this Government, and in their duty to the Company. If they act capriciouſly and without reaſon, common prudence dictates to us that we ought not to leave our army under ſuch direction: if they have reaſons for this change of ſyſtem, ſtrong enough to ſuperſede the arguments on which their firſt reſolution was founded, (which, conſidering the ſhortneſs of the interval, and that no event of any moment had happened in that time, is hardly conceivable) they deſignedly leave us in the dark with reſpect to the motives of their conduct; and make it impoſſible for us to act in concert, or in confidence with them. I can place no reliance in the wiſdom of men, whoſe councils in the determination of the moſt important queſtions, appear to fluctuate without plan, principle, or object; much leſs can I think it ſafe or honourable to co-operate in the ſupport of men who affectedly conceal the motives of their actions from us, though it be one of their principal duties to explain thoſe motives to us. Either way it is my opinion, that we ought not to ſuffer the detachment to proceed, until we are informed what change of circumſtances has induced the Preſidency of *Bombay* to revoke their reſolution of the 2d May; that reſolution we know was taken on ſolid ground, becauſe their reaſons for it were explained. We ought to be equally ſatisfied that the reaſons for revoking it are powerful enough to juſtify the change: it would but ill become the dignity of the Supreme Council of *India* to follow blindly the caprices

of a ſubordinate Government, nor perhaps would it be quite conſiſtent with our ſafety, conſidering that the Preſidency of *Bombay*, even in this laſt act, endeavour to fix the reſponſibility of it upon us. They do not take it upon themſelves to juſtify the march of the detachment as an act of their own: they ſay only that they have taken off the reſtriction under which they had laid the commanding officer, and directed him to advance, agreeable to the orders he had received from us; we then are conſtituted the authors of the meaſure, and muſt be anſwerable for the event.

On what grounds they have proceeded I know not, but their own letter ſtates a fact to us which they ought to have compared with the actual circumſtances of Colonel *Leſlie*'s army, and which I think ſhould have deterred them from expoſing it to a ſimilar event. In the ſame breath they order the detachment to continue its march acroſs *India*, forgetting every thing they had ſaid of the dangers and difficulties of ſuch a march; and tell us a Britiſh Army, attempting a Paſſage through *North America*, had been obliged to capitulate. It may be folly to draw omens from misfortunes; but it is equally want of wiſdom not to ſuffer example and experience to have any weight with us. Independant of this particular conſideration, I would wiſh the Board to conſider whether the unfortunate events in *America* ought not to have a general influence upon our meaſures here: whether this be a ſeaſon for hazarding offenſive operations of any kind; and, whether policy and prudence do not plainly dictate to us, that while the nation is ſo deeply engaged and preſſed on one ſide, with every thing to apprehend from the deſigns of *France* and *Spain* on the other, we ſhould ſtand on our defence, and not weaken or divide the force on which the ſafety of *Bengal* may depend.

Governor General—Whether Mr. *Francis*'s minute is delivered as a motion, or merely as reflections upon the meaſures now before us, it equally claims the conſideration of the Board. Mr. *Francis* is conſiſtent with his conduct in repeating his inſtances for the recall of the detachment: I am equally conſiſtent in propoſing, that the meaſure which has been ſo deliberately reſolved on ſhall be proſecuted, ſince no new circumſtances have intervened to induce me to change my opinion; nor has Mr. *Francis* urged one new argument in ſupport of his, except the defeat of General *Burgoyne* in *America*, to which I hope he does not expect an anſwer. The reaſons given by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, in their letter of the 2d May, for ſuſpending the march of the detachment, were grounded on circumſtances of which they were not competent judges: the expence, the danger, the reſponſibility, were ours. In effect, theſe do not appear to me to have been the reaſons; we ſhall probably be informed of them with their promiſed letter, containing their reſolutions; but it is of little moment to the preſent queſtion, what were the motives for their conduct, either in ſuſpending the march of the detachment or in directing the proſecution of it. The original meaſure is ours, and all our reſolutions concerning it ought to proceed from our own knowledge of the circumſtances which have any relation to it.

I hope that our affairs in *America* are not in the deſperate ſituation in which they are deſcribed to be; but I ſee no connection between them and the concerns of this Government, much leſs can I agree, that with ſuch ſuperior advantages as we poſſeſs over every power which can oppoſe us, we ſhould act merely on the defenſive; and abruptly ſtop the operations of a meaſure of ſuch importance to the national intereſts, and to the national ſafety, as that in which we have now decidedly engaged, with the eyes of all *India* turned upon it. On the contrary, if it be really true that the Britiſh arms and influence have ſuffered ſo ſevere a check in the weſtern world, it is more incumbent on thoſe who are charged with the intereſts of *Great Britain* in the eaſt, to exert themſelves for the retrieval of the national loſs. We have the means in our power, and if they are not fruſtrated by our own diſſenſions, I truſt that the event of this expedition will yield every advantage for the attainment of which it was undertaken. It is not long ſince one of the many motions which have been made for the recall of the detachment, was ſupported by an argument drawn from the certainty that there was no probability of a war with *France*; and the deſigns attributed to the French in this quarter of the world were treated as chimerical and groundleſs: now we are told, that the nation is deeply engaged and preſſed on one ſide with every thing to apprehend from the deſigns of *France* and *Spain*; on the other, the concluſion drawn from this ſtate of appearances is, that we ſhould ſtand on our defence, and not weaken or divide the force on which the ſtate of *Bengal* may depend. The concluſion which I ſhould draw from ſuch premiſes is the very reverſe; not that we ſhould act upon the defenſive, and wait till the deſigns of our enemies are ripe, and they have choſen their own time to carry them into execution, but that we ſhould provide for the ſafety of *Bengal*, by obviating the impending dangers, and by rendering their attempts abortive, before the time deſtined for their birth.

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Mr. *Francis*—As I do not mean to enter further into the general argument, I ſhall only obſerve that the new matter which I think theſe letters bring before us, ariſes in part from the profound ſilence of the Bombay Council on the motives of a poſitive reſolution: when nothing is ſaid in ſupport of the affirmative of any queſtion, that circumſtance alone is ſufficient to juſtify the negative.

My language and opinion, with reſpect to the deſigns of *France*, and the policy to be obſerved by this Government, will be found invariably the ſame. I do indeed believe that the ſchemes imputed to them of alliances with the Marattas, and of hoſtile projects on the Malabar Coaſt, were chimerical; their connections with *Hyder Ally* ſhew at leaſt that they have taken a very different turn: but I have conſtantly urged the neceſſity of arming in *Bengal*, and ſtanding in a poſture of ſecurity and defence here, without provoking a quarrel with *France*, as long as it could be avoided, becauſe I am inſtructed by the Company, and convinced by my own judgment, that we ought to make the ſafety and preſervation of *Bengal* our principal object.—As I find there are no public letters before the Board, to inform us of the particular circumſtances that attended Colonel *Leſlie*'s march on the firſt day from *Calpee*, I beg leave to lay before the Board an extract of a private letter from Camp, to which I gave credit, and which I think deſerves our conſideration: I underſtand there are many private letters in town which give the ſame accounts:

"On their firſt day's march from *Calpee*, by the "little care that was taken to provide proper guides "they loſt their road; and although the ground they "propoſed to encamp upon was but eight coſs from "*Calpee*, yet they were eleven hours on the road, from "midnight till eleven o'clock; during this time they "marched above 30 miles, over a burning ſandy plain, "without a drop of water; between three and four "hundred ſepoys and followers of the camp died raving "mad with thirſt.

"Captain *Crawford*, one of the beſt and braveſt military "characters in *India*, died that day, according to the "opinion of the doctors, for want of a draught of "ſimple water; he died mad after two hours illneſs; "Colonel *Parker*, Major *Fullarton*, Captain *Aſhe*, Cap"tain *Shoners*, and about ten ſubalterns, were dan"gerouſly ill."

Governor General—May I aſk Mr. *Francis* the name of the writer of this letter, ſince it is delivered as authentic?

Mr. *Francis*—I have ſtated it to be a private letter, conſequently cannot mention the writer's name; nor would I have introduced it at all, if there had been any public letter from Colonel *Leſlie*, ſtating the circumſtances

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ſtances that attended his march: I do not find that he has even reported the death of Captain *Crawford*; but I can aſſure the Board with certainty that there are many letters in this town to the ſame effect.

Governor General—Of the death of Captain *Crawford* I received advice from Colonel *Leſlie*, written at the ſame time with his public letter to the Board; and confounding one letter with the other, did believe till this inſtant that it was mentioned in his public letter; I have not the letter by me, but will ſend it, or an extract of it, that it may be entered in this place. I believe that the troops muſt have ſuffered from the heat and want of water on the road; I did in effect foretell it in a minute dictated at this Board; but I believe that the anonymous extracts produced by Mr. *Francis* is a groſs exaggeration, and calculated more to conciliate the favour of the perſon to whom it was probably addreſſed, than to convey a ſtrict relation of the truth.

" I will addreſs you again to-morrow; I have ſent " the requiſite orders for the magazine to join me from " *Calpee*, and can aſſure you I ſhall do my utmoſt to " get on, though we have at preſent to ſtruggle with a " moſt inclement ſeaſon.

" I have had the misfortune to loſe Captain *James* " *Crawford*, who commanded the 4th battalion of " Sepoys, by a moſt violent fever which carried him off " in leſs than two hours. His private character, and his " acknowledged abilities in his profeſſion, are not un- " known to you.

" I bear more than my ſhare in the univerſal regret " and grief at this accident, not only by the loſs the " ſervice in general ſuſtains, but the preſent expedition " in particular. I have the honour to be,

" Dear Sir,

" Your faithful humble ſervant,

(Signed) " *Matt*[w] *Leſlie*."

I now return to Mr. *Francis*'s laſt minute. I cannot agree with Mr. *Francis*, in terming the ſilence of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, new matter for a queſtion depending ſolely on our own reſolutions; but whatever, weight this argument may have on one ſide, it is equally counterpoiſed on the other, and leaves us juſt were we were with reſpect to the motives of our own actions. They were ſilent on the cauſes which induced them to ſuſpend the march of the detachment: they were ſilent on their motives for repealing this ſuſpenſion; and I for my own part am better pleaſed with the ſolicitude they have ſhewn, to make Colonel *Leſlie* acquainted with their laſt intentions, than if they had waited; and of courſe unneceſſarily impeded the ſervice, for the tedious official formalities of a public letter, detailing all their reaſons.

If Mr. *Francis* does indeed ſtill believe, that the ſchemes imputed to the French of alliances with the Marattas, and of hoſtile projects on the Malabar Coaſt were chimerical, I would beg leave to aſk him, but do not inſiſt on his anſwer, Whether he believes the character aſſumed by the Chevalier *St. Lubin* of a Miniſter from the Court of *France* to be falſe? and whether the atteſtations of it by *Siccaram Baboo*, and *Nana Furneſe*, the Miniſters of the Maratta State and the formal notification made by them to this Government, that the Chevalier *St. Lubin* had delivered letters and preſents from the King of *France*, were falſe, and for what purpoſe this colluſion was concerted? If it be admitted, that the Chevalier *St. Lubin* is Miniſter from the Court of *France* to that of *Poonah*, What is the object of his long reſidence, and what was the object of his miſſion? When the concluſion which I have drawn from each appearance, and which has been echoed by all the world, is pronounced chimerical, I have a right to require that ſome other be ſet up in its ſtead. Much ſtreſs has been laid on a former aſſertion, made by me, reſpecting the ſuppoſed grant to *St. Lubin* of the port of *Choul*. I had but repeated what I knew to be on our records; but could not immediately turn to the paſſages which related to it; and I truſted to time, the beſt diſcoverer of truth, to juſtify the opinion which I founded upon them. I now beg leave, in this place, to quote the following paſſage of a letter from *Fort St. George*, dated 16th January laſt, which mentions the grant of the port of *Choul* as a fact of undoubted notoriety. " With reſpect to " any connections which may have been formed by the " Maratta State, we can only ſpeak from conjecture. It " ſeems probable that ſome engagements may be in " agitation, or perhaps concluded between that ſtate " and the Soubah; and they have lately, we believe, " maintained a cloſe correſpondence with the French; " as appears from the proceedings of Monſieur *St. Lubin* " at *Poonah*, and the grant which they have given to the " French at *Choul* on the Malabar Coaſt, of which you " have lately been adviſed." I never ſuppoſed that a public grant or ſunnud had been executed for this purpoſe. This would not have ſuited the policy of either party. The preſent uſe of the port, and the promiſe of it in property, was all that the Chevalier *St. Lubin* could deſire, until his deſigns were ripe for execution. I believe moſt firmly, that ſuch a promiſe was made him by the ruling member of the adminiſtration; nay, I have been informed, and by an authority which (though I think myſelf not at liberty to mention it) merits my entire credit of it, that *St. Lubin* did make a purchaſe of a church ſtanding near the ſhore, for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a preſent ſtore houſe, and of converting it, with the ground around it, to a fortreſs hereafter. I ſhall now produce the laſt and moſt concluſive evidence of the reality of the engagements, executed between *Nana Furneſe* and the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, and even of the deſign to grant the property of the port of *Choul* to the latter. It is extracted from Mr. *Lewis*'s diary. I ſhall inſert the paſſage at large, and deſire that the parts to which I allude may be marked with a line drawn underneath.

" Wedneſday 29th April. On account of ſome par- " ticular religious ceremonies *Moraba* was engaged in, " this being a holiday, I had not an opportunity of ſee- " ing him until 7 o'clock P. M. I found there *Chintoo* " *Wittul* and *Gopaul Naique Tumbuckur*. After deliver- " ing the letters from the Governor General agreeably to " Mr. *Moſtyn*'s orders, I explained their contents, when " *Moraba* aſked me, Whom we had to fear? I told him " that in conſequence of the Governor General and " Council being adviſed of the treaty with Monſieur *St.* " *Lubin*, they had cauſe to imagine ſome evil deſigns " were intended againſt the Company's ſettlements on " the weſtern ſide of *India*. He immediately anſwered, " That there was no treaty between this Government " and that gentleman. I replied, that I ſincerely be- " lieved there was not; but that I was convinced there " was one ſubſiſting between *Nana* and him, the con- " tents of which we had the greateſt reaſon to ſup- " poſe were greatly to our prejudice; and that it was in " conſequence of this treaty that the troops mentioned " in the Governor General's letter were coming to the " aſſiſtance of *Bombay*. I therefore requeſted the neceſ- " ſary duſtucks for their freely paſſing through any part " of the Maratta dominions they might have occaſion " to come to, as well as their being properly ſupplied " with a friendly Buzar. *Moraba* confeſſed a knowledge " of the treaty between *Nana* and Monſieur *St. Lubin*, " but ſaid he could not give me an anſwer with reſpect " to the duſtucks I required, until after the Durbar met " to-morrow.

" Sunday 3d May about 6 P. M. *Moraba* ſent a " meſſage deſiring my attendance at the Durbar. I ac- " cordingly went and found there *Cruſtrow Belol*, *Chin-* " *too Wittal*, and *Gopaul Naque Trumbuckar*. *Moraba* " told me that as the letters from the Governor General " mentioned the troops he was ſending to *Bombay* to be " on account of the French being here, he had ſent for " Monſieur *St. Lubin*, in order to give him his diſ-

" patches

" patches, and requeſted to know if in ſuch caſe we " ſhould ſtill want the duſtucks I aſked for at my laſt " viſit, or whether the troops would be prevented pro- " ceeding? I anſwered, that according to the Gover- " nor General's letter to Mr. *Moſtyn*, the troops would " have been near twenty days on their march, and that " of courſe the duſtucks would be neceſſary to prevent " any diſputes on the road; to which he obſerved, that " the Durbar's vackeel had written them, that the Go- " vernor General had told him the troops would not " march until the Durbar's anſwers were received. I " replied that this was contrary to what the Governor " General had written to Mr. *Moſtyn*, but perhaps they " might be ſtopped ſhould the news of the change in " Government, which Mr. *Moſtyn* had diſpatched the " day after it happened, reach *Calcutta* in time; but as " this was very uncertain I repeated my requeſt for " the duſtucks being delivered to me, to prevent any " bad conſequences which might happen from the " want of them. *Cruſtrow Beloll* then took up the diſ- " courſe, and mentioned again the letters they had re- " ceived from the Governor General, reſpecting *Choul* " being given to the French, and Monſieur *St. Lubin* " having the command of the Toff Counah, and made " ſome trifling excuſes for Monſieur *St. Lubin* ſtaying " here ſo long; he allowed that ſome kind of promiſes " had been made that gentlemen, but ſaid they were " given only with a deſign to amuſe him. I replied, " that the Durbar beſt knew their own reaſons for de- " taining him; but that after the many equivocations " they had been guilty of, until he arrived at ſome " French or Engliſh ſettlement, we could not believe " that they really meant to ſend him away; and that " Mr. *Moſtyn* had already replied to the other points. " *Moraba* then ſaid, that the Durbar had hitherto acted " very improperly in making ſo many evaſions about him, " from which the Engliſh had an undoubted right to " ſuſpect ſomething was intended againſt them; but I " might, however, depend Monſieur *St. Lubin* ſhould " be diſpatched in two or three days."

Mr. *Francis*—My private belief is not ſtated as an argument that ought to weigh with the Board, but merely to clear the conſiſtency of my own conduct and opinion, in anſwer to an objection urged againſt it. In many of our late debates I have formally admitted the poſſibility of the ſchemes and negociations ſaid to be carrying on between the French and the Marattas, but at the ſame time have contended that all ſuch ſchemes and negociations have totally failed of ſucceſs. The fact beyond all queſtion is, that the French at this day are not in poſſeſſion of *Choul*: and I preſume it will not be diſputed that they are engaged in connections with *Hyder Ally*, who is at war with the Marattas, and that they have furniſhed him with military aſſiſtance.

With reſpect to Monſieur *St. Lubin*, he is an Agent of ſo low an order, and a perſon of a character ſo infamous in *India*, that I cannot believe he was ever intruſted with a letter from the King of *France*. What his deſigns have been, or what inſtructions he may have received from his employers, I know not. It is ſufficient, for the ſupport of every argument in which I have taken a part on this ſubject, that his hopes, whatever they were, have been diſappointed, and that his deſigns are actually defeated.

Governor General—As Mr. *Francis* has ſhifted the grounds of the queſtion, I am not bound to continue the argument, but in anſwer to one paſſage only which is directly applied to the preſent ſubject of debate. As Mr. *Francis* is now pleaſed to ſay, that he cannot believe that he was ever entruſted with a letter from the King of *France*, I beg leave to enter here for the third time the ſtrongeſt proof which a fact of that nature can admit, the declaration to which I have before alluded of the miniſters themſelves, in the following extracts of their letters to me. With reſpect to the French connections with *Hyder Ally*, thoſe I admit, and ſhall hereafter explain, as well as the inconſiſtency imputed to what I alledged on this ſubject in the minutes delivered by me on the 11th June.

Appendix. No. 59 & 61.

Extracts of letters from the Poonah Durbar to the Governor General.

" Monſieur Le Chevalier de *St. Lubin*, on the part of " the King of *France*, lately arrived on board ſhip on " this coaſt, and landed at *Rio Dunda* belonging to the " Government; from whence he tranſmitted a letter to " *Seremunt Row Sahib Row Pundit Purdhaun*, containing " a requeſt of audience to treat with him, which if " granted they would wait on him and fully explain to " him the ſubjects of their miſſion. As friendſhip has ſub- " ſiſted from time immemorial between the French na- " tion and the illuſtrious family of *Seremunt Sahib*, and " moreover in compliance with the duties of hoſpitality, " an order for their approach was ſent from the preſence. " When the aforeſaid gentleman arrives, the ſubjects " of their negociation will be explained."

" I ſome time time ago wrote you information of the " approach of a perſon deputed by the King of *France* " to this quarter. Monſieur Chevalier de *St. Lubin* has " lately been honoured with an audience of the *Pundit* " *Purdhan Peiſhwa Sahib*, of ſtrengthening and con- " firming the ancient friendſhip which ſubſiſted between " the two nations, and he alſo ſpoke on the ſubject of " their ancient intimacy and connexion."

" As the rainy ſeaſon was ſet in violently, Mr. *Le* " *Chevalier* has been delayed on this account. The " duties of hoſpitality, both to friends and ſtrangers, " are incumbent on Chiefs of high rank."

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, Nos. 59, and 61.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 11th June 1778.

THE Governor General—I forbear in this place to comment upon the preceding letters. I ſuppoſe that the orders ſent by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to Colonel *Leſlie* muſt have been received; but as it is poſſible they may have been intercepted, I propoſe that a letter be written to Colonel *Leſlie*, informing him of the ſubſtance of this order, and confirming it by an order from this Board; but that he be directed to complete the preparations which he has been making for the equipment of his detachment, and that he hold himſelf in readineſs to march on immediate warning.

Mr. *Wheler*—I feel myſelf very much averſe to throwing any difficulty or embarraſſment upon the ſubject now before the Board.

The queſtion as it ſtands I can approve of in part, but without ſome further explanation, I fear I cannot entirely accede to it; the firſt part of the letter, adviſing Colonel *Leſlie* of the ſubſtance of the Bombay letter, and the confirmation of this Board, is acceded to, and likewiſe that he be directed to complete the preparation which he has been making for the equipment of his detachment, as I have reaſon to fear he is very ill provided and prepared for ſo long and hazardous a march. As to the laſt part, " that he holds it in readi- " neſs to march on immediate warning," I do not conſent to it, unleſs the order ſhall previouſly receive the ſanction of this Board; I likewiſe think it ſhould be aſcertained, whether Colonel *Leſlie* ſhould with his army recroſs the *Jumna*, or if not, where and how he is to diſpoſe of it during the approaching rains.

Mr. *Francis*—Conſidering the nature of the advices received yeſterday from *Bombay*, I own I had not the leaſt doubt that the preſent extraordinary Council was ſummoned with a view to countermand the expedition, and to recall our forces to the defence of our own dominions. The Preſidency of *Bombay* tell us, " that the " opinion they had formed on the preſent ſituation of " affairs,

Appendix. Nos. 59 & 61.

" affairs, and their desire to save the Company from the " heavy expence, and their troops from the dangers and " difficulties of a march from our provinces to that side " of *India*, had led them to put a stop to the march of " the army." After such a rebuff as this from the Government, in support of whose projects these extraordinary steps have been taken here, and after so plain a declaration from them, that they will not take any part in the responsibility of a measure so expensive, so dangerous, and so difficult, I confess I had no thought that any idea of persevering in the execution of such a measure could still prevail at this Board. I was in hopes that nothing would be required of me to-day, but to join as I should have done, heartily in approving the reversal of measures, which I had constantly opposed and condemned; the motion by no means answers my expectations, or comes home to my opinion.

I think we should immediately send orders to Colonel *Leslie* to recross the *Jumna*, and to station his troops in such places as may be most convenient and most easily made for their reception during the rains; I can never agree to their halting on the other side of the river: if it be in an enemy's country, the army must be exposed to many of the dangers and difficulties which would attend their march, and probably be forced into acts of hostility, which may produce a general war. If it be meant that they shall quarter in the territories of the Rajah of *Bundlecund*, I suppose it may be done without danger, but it must be attended with the ruin of his country, at the same time that our army is detained from the defence of our own frontier. It is in vain for me to say more on a subject which has been so often discussed; I must leave it to the majority to decide as they think proper. One circumstance only I think it necessary to point out to the attention of the Court of Directors. We have been hitherto told that the French were engaging in dangerous negociations with the Marattas, and this fact has often been pressed upon the Board as a reason for the part we have taken in their affairs. It now appears by the letter from *Bombay*, that Monsieur *Bellecombe* had sent a ship of war to *Mangalore*, where several artillery officers, two hundred men, and a large quantity of military stores, are landed for the service of the Nabob *Hyder Ally*. But *Hyder Ally* is at war with the Marattas, and has lately obtained some advantages over them; it is impossible then that any intrigues between the French and the Marattas can have taken effect if ever they existed. The conclusions therefore drawn from that supposed fact fall to the ground, and if we act consistently with our reasonings, the measures built on those conclusions must fall with them.

Mr. *Barwell*—It seems to be the sentiments of Mr. *Wheler* and Mr. *Francis*, that the detachment should continue embodied, and remain under the command of Colonel *Leslie*. The only proposition contained in either of the votes, that appears at all to militate against the orders proposed by the Governor General, is that the troops shall be directed to recross the *Jumna*. Considering the policy that renders it necessary to continue the detachment embodied, I see no reason for restricting the officer in command of it from chusing that station for the troops he may in his judgment conceive best calculated either to facilitate his progress, or to enable him to return to the provinces. From the time that has elapsed in preparing this force, the readiness in which it is to be kept to march at a minute's warning, is equally calculated for offence and defence, and whilst it is not advanced to a greater distance than thirty or forty cos from the frontier of *Oude*, or Rajah *Cheyt Sing*'s dominions, I will venture to affirm that our powers of defence are greatly increased. In giving my opinion for the proposed order to Colonel *Leslie*, I do not think it essential to go back into the policy that gave rise to the armament at *Calpee*, though I think it necessary to propose an addition to the quotation made from the *Bombay* letter by Mr. *Francis*, following the words " landed " for the service of the Nabob *Hyder Ally*;" " and the " ship, after Sir *Edward Vernon* was out of sight to " the northward of her, returned to *Mahé*, to carry " Monsieur *Bellecombe* back to *Pondicherry*. The *Sartine* is gone into *Goa* river, where she probably may " remain during the monsoon; and it is there said, that " the French were deterred from proceeding to *Choul* by " the appearance of our squadron, and supposing that " war was declared, and perhaps by the news of the " revolution at *Poonah*, but we have learnt that the Captain who was at *Choul*, has ordered her up thither (to " *Choul*.)"

Mr. *Francis*—I have not made myself understood. My opinion is, that the expedition should be absolutely counrermanded, and Colonel *Leslie*'s present command of course dissolved as soon as he has quartered his troops on this side the *Jumna*, in the best manner the season will permit; after the rains the several detachments of which his army is composed, ought to be remanded to their former stations.

Governor General—If I had thought it necessary to have replied minutely to the objections which have been made to this question, Mr. *Barwell* has precluded me, by anticipating all that I could have said upon the subject; but there is an observation which Mr. *Francis* has introduced, and expressed as it is, to be foreign from the question of which I am compelled to take notice, by the solemn reference which he has made of it to the Court of Directors. Mr. *Francis* has said, " One cir- " circumstance only I think it necessary to point out to " the attention of the Court of Directors; we have " been hitherto told that the French were engaging in " dangerous negociations with the Marattas, and this " fact has often been pressed upon the Board as a reason " for the part we have taken in their affairs. It now " appears, by the letter from *Bombay*, that Monsieur " *Bellecombe* had sent a ship of war to *Mangalore*, where " several artillery officers, two hundred men, and a " large quantity of military stores, were landed for the " service of the Nabob *Hyder Ally*." Mr. *Barwell* has properly added the context of this quotation, and thereby restored it to the proper sense implied and intended by both. By this method of selecting partial passages, and by an artificial application or combination of them, of which I have too frequently had occasion to complain in the contest in which I have been unfortunately involved with Mr. *Francis*, it is in his power not only to pervert the original meaning of the text, but to draw any conclusions he pleases from them, however opposite to the sentiments of those who wrote them. I am in possession of materials, received through channels too remote for the possibility of their having been suggested by the knowledge of what has happened on the other side of *India*, by which I learn that the destination of the troops, which were landed from the *Brilliante* at *Mangalore*, were for *Choul*. The additional sentence of the *Bombay* letter, which Mr. *Barwell* has desired to be inserted, may serve in part to explain the apparent inconsistency of troops intended for the service of the Marattas, being converted to that of the enemies, nor will it be difficult to comprehend the cause of so sudden change in the conduct of Monsieur *Bellecombe*, on the difficulties presented to him, if we suppose him to have been reluctantly compelled into the support of a system formed independent of his authority, and that his own inclinations led him to prefer another alliance, which I have reason to believe was the case.

Mr. *Francis*—I beg leave to say that my argument is not answered; I state it as a fact which is not disputed, that the French have lately sent military assistance to *Hyder Ally*, who is at war with the Marattas. From this undisputed fact, I conclude that, even admitting any negociations whatsoever to have been carried on between the French and the Marattas at a former period, and even admitting the private information to which the

Governor General refers to be authentic (though to this Board it could be no evidence before it was mentioned) ſtill it is true, that the French have now taken part with *Hyder Ally*; of courſe we have nothing to fear from thoſe dangerous intrigues, which, to ſave time and argument, I will admit to have taken place between them and the Marattas, nor any reaſon to perſevere in the execution of meaſures, which were adopted with a profeſſed view to counteract thoſe intrigues. This argument I take to be ſtrict, and in point; I ſubmit to judgment, whether it is anſwered by general complaints of unfair quotations, which conſidering that the letter quoted it before the Board, and will be before the Court of Directors, would be no leſs injudicious than they would be unfair.

Governor General—I will anſwer Mr. *Francis*'s argument in the manner in which he requires; ſtill complaining, as I have a right to complain, of the partial ſelection of facts for the purpoſe of maintaining his opinion. It is true that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* write, that they had learnt that the *Brilliante* proceeded to *Mangolore*, where ſeveral artillery officers, two hundred men, and a large quantity of military ſtores, were landed for the ſervice of the Nabob *Hyder Ally*: they do not aſſert this for a fact, nor do they aſſert that the report, which they thus repeat to us, went further than the landing of the troops, and the ſimple intention of employing them for the ſervice of *Hyder Ally*; in effect, this intelligence conſiſts only of conjectural concluſions from an unaſcertained fact; to this obſcure intelligence, and to this vague inference drawn from it, I deſire leave to oppoſe the following extract from Mr. *Moſtyn*'s letter, containing the recital of an authenticated fact, admitting but of one concluſion, namely, that the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, the public and avowed Miniſter of the Court of *France*, was ſtill retained at *Poonah* in defiance of all the remonſtrances of our Agent there, and of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*; and that the ſame countenance was ſhewn him by the Members of the new Adminiſtration as he had before received from the ruling Members of the former Government: hence I conclude, in oppoſition to Mr. *Francis*'s concluſion, that we have yet ſtronger grounds than ever, both for the conviction of the French intrigues with the Maratta State, and for the fear of their conſequences. "Notwithſtanding *Moraba*'s aſſertions "to Mr. *Lewis*, Monſieur *St. Lubin* has not yet been "to *Proonder*, though it is ſaid he is now ſent for; but "from the equivocating conduct of the Durbar, both "before and ſince *Moraba* has had the executive autho- "rity, it is a doubt with me whether they will diſpatch "him, or even if they do whether he will leave *Poonah*, "as from the lateneſs of the ſeaſon he will have it in "his power to delay the time until the rains ſet in, "when he will make the plea of its being impoſſible for "him to go any where."

Mr. *Francis*—I did underſtand from the Governor General's preceding Minute, that the facts had been admitted.

No. 61

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th June 1778.

Reſolved, That the following letters be written to Colonel *Leſlie*, to *Bombay*, and to Mr. *Moſtyn*:

Sir,

By a letter which we have received from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, under date the 2d May, we are informed, that the aſſurances given by the new Miniſters at *Poonah*, of their breaking off the connection with the French, had made the Preſident and Council willing to hope that the firſt and grand object of the meaſures thus propoſed to us, might be accompliſhed by the late revolution in the Government of *Poonah*; but as Monſieur *St. Lubin* had not been diſmiſſed, and they were uncertain whether the new Miniſtry were ſincere in their promiſes, they did not mean to be relax in their vigilance toward the intentions of that Government; however, until they could judge with more certainty of their diſpoſition, the opinion which the Preſident and Council had formed of the preſent ſituation of affairs, and their deſire to ſave the Company from the heavy expence, and our troops from the dangers and difficulties of a march from theſe provinces to the weſt ſide of *India*, had induced them to ſend you an order not to advance any further until you ſhould hear again from them.

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We conclude, that ere this you have received their orders, and put a ſtop to the march of the detachment in conſequence; but leſt they ſhould have been intercepted, or by ſome accident prevented from reaching you, we think it proper to confirm them, by directing them to halt accordingly, until you ſhall receive further orders on the ſubject from the Preſident and Council at *Bombay* or from us; but you will nevertheleſs continue the preparations which you have been making for the equipment of the detachment under your command, until they ſhall be completed; and we further direct, that you hold it in readineſs to march on immediate warning.

We are, &c.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter of the 2d ultimo.

Leſt the orders which you inform us you have ſent to Colonel *Leſlie* ſhould have been intercepted, or by any accident prevented from reaching him, we have confirmed them by injunctions to halt with the detachment under his command where he now is, on the other ſide of the *Jumna*; but to hold himſelf in readineſs to continue his march on immediate notice.

We are, &c.

Sir,

We have this day received your duplicate letter of the 12th ultimo, encloſing one from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, dated the 2d of the ſame month.

For want of the copy of Mr. *Lewis*'s proceedings, which are ſaid to be encloſed in your letter, we are much at a loſs to comprehend the facts which you allude to; but we obſerve, with great concern upon the whole, that the new Miniſters, by a dilatory and evaſive conduct, have already furniſhed grounds to diſtruſt the ſincerity of the intentions which they had profeſſed to you: we therefore wait with impatience for more clear and deciſive advices of their proceedings; and we requeſt you will not delay to acquaint us with them by every opportunity.

In conſequence of the letter from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, wherein they inform us that they had thought it proper to ſend orders to Colonel *Leſlie* not to advance any further with the detachment under his command, until they ſhould be able to judge with more certainty of the diſpoſition of the new Government, and to furniſh him with inſtructions for his conduct; we have confirmed theſe orders, by directing him to halt accordingly where he now is, but to hold himſelf in readineſs to continue his march on immediate notice.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 60.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th July 1778.

Letter from *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

ENCLOSED we have the honour to forward a triplicate of our laſt addreſs, dated the 20th inſtant.

Having ſince received ſome material advices from Mr. *Moſtyn*, we now forward copies thereof by a ſhip bound to *Madras*, the conveyance by ſea being at this ſeaſon the moſt expeditious.

We alſo encloſe copies of two French letters which lately fell into our hands: they are from the Commander of the French ſnow, mentioned in our letter of the 20th

Appendix. No. 62.

January to have arrived at *Choul*, and having been put on board a veſſel at *Damaun*, of whoſe deſtination he was ignorant, came into our poſſeſſion, after having been carried to *Buſſorah* and back again. As you will now have theſe letters before you, it is needleſs for us to make any comments.

The Reſident at *Tellicherry* has lately adviſed us, that he has received certain information that the number of men landed at *Mangalore* from the *Brilliante* was only 12 artillery, 12 infantry, and one officer, inſtead of two hundred men as before adviſed.

We have received the new cypher from Captain *Roddam*; and are, with reſpect, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 31ſt May 1778. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

APPENDIX, No. 62.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 15th June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letter from Colonel *Leſlie*:

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you on the 20th inſtant, with the information of the firſt diviſion of this detachment having paſſed the *Jumna*; the park of artillery, magazine, ſtores, &c. with two battalions of the 2d diviſion and the Nabob's cavalry, croſſed a few days following; and I have been delayed commencing my march from *Calpee* by the negociations the Maratta Chiefs have been carrying on with me for the re-eſtabliſhment of peace. This day I have received their final acquieſcence to my free paſſage through their country, and their promiſed aid of proviſions; for their faithful performance of which I am to be attended by a perſon of rank, and to retain poſſeſſion of the fort of *Calpee*, ſo long as it may be neceſſary for the convenience of my communication with theſe provinces.

The terms upon which theſe matters are adjuſted are contained in the encloſed Paper, which I now lay before you, and ſhall be happy if in this endeavour to effect the ſpirit of your inſtructions I may merit your approbation.

It was my intention to have advanced a part of the troops to-morrow morning; but an expreſs letter, which I have received by this day's poſt from the Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and tranſmitted by your Reſident at *Benares*, poſitively forbids my advance, as unneceſſary in the preſent ſtate of affairs at *Poonah*, and directing me to wait their further orders. Under cover I have the honour to lay before you a copy of their letter. Your inſtructions, requiring my ſtrict compliance with the orders of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* on my croſſing the *Jumna*, entirely prohibits my taking any meaſures upon the preſumption of what may be your ſentiments on the preſent occaſion; but as the ſituation of *Calpee* will not admit of my taking poſt there ſo long as it may be before I receive their promiſed inſtructions, I ſhall extend my front to the banks of the *Betowa* river, about 10 coſs on the road to *Chatterpore*, in which ſituation I ſhall be moſt conveniently ſituated for putting in execution any orders you may pleaſe to honour me with, and I ſhall be ready to purſue my march if the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſhould require it. I eſteem my advance thus far from *Calpee* neceſſary to ſupport the appearance of my progreſs, that the Chief of *Berar* may not conclude himſelf neglected, and I ſhall addreſs him to this purport: the preſumptuous Chiefs of this diſtrict will alſo be convinced by this ſtep, that their efforts have not in any ſhape tended to retard the march of the detachment. I earneſtly ſolicit your directions for my conduct in this ſituation of affairs, and whatever orders I may receive in the interim from the Bombay Preſidency ſhall be complied with, and immediate notice thereof tranſmitted to you.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

Head Quarters, *Calpee*, 30th May 1778. (Signed) *Matt^w Leſlie*.

Tranſlation of a letter from Colonel *Matt^w Leſlie* to *Gangadhur Pundit*, dated the 27th May 1778.

Upon my approach to *Calpee* I wrote to you and your brother *Balagee*, informing you that I ſhould proceed to the ſouthward through your country; that I had no hoſtile intentions towards you; that I ſhould be careful in preventing my troops and their followers from committing depredations or moleſting the inhabitants during my march through your country; that I required your friendly aſſiſtance in ſupplying me with grain, and ſuch other neceſſaries as I might require of you for the ſervice of my Camp; and that whatever neceſſaries I might be ſupplied with, I would pay a proper price for them.

In your anſwers to my letters, you expreſs the higheſt reſpect for the Engliſh, likewiſe your inclination to encreaſe that friendſhip which you had before eſtabliſhed with them; and you ſeemed happy that this event would afford you an opportunity of evincing your readineſs to oblige the Engliſh Government.

After ſuch very friendly expreſſions and aſſurances, I little expected the reception of an enemy on croſſing my troops at *Kulpee Gaut*: as I have already given you my ſentiments very fully on the conduct of your people towards me, I judge a repetition unneceſſary; but as you have ſolicited me to make you acquainted with ſuch circumſtances as I may deem material for my ſervice, I do therefore ſtipulate the following articles:

1ſt. That my troops are to have a free and unmoleſted paſſage through your country.

2d. That you will cauſe the troops to be ſupplied with proviſions and other neceſſaries during their march through your country, for which a proper price ſhall be given.

3d. That the communication to and from my Camp be kept open and protected, and that you afford every aſſiſtance required of you on this ſubject.

4th. As your people of your own accord did evacuate the town and fort of *Kulpee*, I am now in poſſeſſion of both; I therefore judge it expedient to retain the fort by placing a ſmall guard in it, as a ſecurity for the performance of your promiſes to me; I likewiſe require a man of credit, reſpect, and of your confidence, who ſhall proceed with me; and if upon my arrival at *Chatterpore* I ſhall have experienced the effects of your friendly intentions and readineſs to give me aſſiſtance, I ſhall then direct the return of your friend, and order the guard to be withdrawn from the fort, and you put in poſſeſſion of it.

5th. That no bodies of your troops are at any time to appear near my line of march; if they do, I ſhall conclude that their intentions are hoſtile.

Theſe are my demands, and as I cannot doubt your good intentions towards the welfare of your country, I ſhould ſuppoſe you will immediately comply with them. I once more aſſure you, that my intentions towards you and your country are moſt friendly, and I ſhall be attentive in preventing my troops and their followers from committing the ſmalleſt irregularities during my march through your country: I want not the aſſiſtance of troops, as I have no hoſtile intentions towards any one.

(Signed) *P. Hay*,
P. Tranſlator.

To the Officer at *Calpee* in command of the troops under orders for *Bombay*.

Sir,

From the preſent ſituation of affairs in this quarter, we think it neceſſary to deſire that you will not advance further towards *Bombay* until you hear again from us.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 22d April 1778. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Reſolved, that the following letter be written to Colonel *Leſlie*:

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 30th ultimo.

We approve of the intention you expreſs to move the detachment to the banks of the *Betowa* river, for the purpoſe of encamping them. We leave the choice of the ground in that ſituation to your judgment, but forbid you to advance any further than the line on which you propoſe to encamp, till you receive orders to that effect.

We alſo think it neceſſary to forbid the application of the treaſure conſtituting the military cheſt for the expedition, which was ſent to you from *Lucknow*, to the pay or any other expences of the detachment, until you ſhall receive orders either from the Preſidency and Council of *Bombay* or from us, to continue your march; but in the mean time you will cauſe the diſburſements of the Paymaſter to be made from the uſual ſupplies, which the Reſident at the Nabob's Court has been directed regularly to furniſh you with.

Fort William, 15th June 1778. We are, &c.

Agreed, That the following letter be written to Mr. *Middleton*:

Sir,

Having ordered Colonel *Leſlie* with the detachment under his command to halt on the banks of the river *Betowa* till further orders, we think it proper that the treaſure conſtituting the military cheſt for the intended expedition, ſhould be reſerved unapplied till he may find it neceſſary to proceed; we therefore direct that you continue to furniſh the regular and neceſſary ſupplies for the pay and expences of this corps during the continuance of its ſtay in that place.

We have received your letter of the 29th ultimo.

Fort William, the 15th June 1778. We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, Nos. 65 & 66.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated 29th June 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your letter of the 6th ultimo, encloſing copy of your inſtructions to Colonel *Leſlie*.

Our letters of the 2d and 9th inſtant have been already forwarded in duplicate.

In the firſt of theſe letters we acquainted you of having directed the Commander of the Bengal detachment not to advance without further advice from us; and in the latter, of our having taken off that reſtraint, and directed him to move forward agreeable to his inſtructions from you. Appendix Nos. 65 & 66.

When the late change was effected in the Poonah Government, we at firſt entertained hopes it would be followed by all the good conſequences our propoſed meaſures were intended to produce, but we more particularly depended that the French influence at the Maratta Court would be deſtroyed by that event: for theſe and the other reaſons mentioned in our letter of the 2d inſtant, we judged it beſt to ſtop the march of the Bengal detachment till we could form a more certain judgment of the diſpoſition of the adminiſtration.

Having indulged theſe hopes as far as probability will warrant, we think we can no longer in prudence take our meaſures upon ſuch expectations; and your letter of the 23d March more fully explaining your views, and giving us authority to demand proper explanations from the Durbar on certain points, we then judged it expedient to order the Bengal detachment to advance; which from the nature of your orders prior to that letter, we did not think could anſwer any end adequate to the expence and danger of the march; for we beg leave to obſerve, that after the plan for *Ragoba* had miſcarried, it was impoſſible for us to defeat the deſigns of the French, and not to break the Treaty of *Poonah*.

Every letter we have received from *Poonah* ſince the revolution, and the uniform tenor of the conduct of the new Adminiſtration, evidently prove that they ſtill mean to continue the ſame line of evaſive conduct ſo long purſued by that Government; we doubt not but your advices from Mr. *Moſtyn* will have impreſſed you with the ſame opinion. Though the executive power is tranſferred from *Nanah* to *Moraba*, the former is ſtill in office, and a member of the Durbar: the latter, as far as we can judge, ſeems inclined to tread in the footſteps of his predeceſſor, and unwilling to part with any ſhare of his power to *Ragoba*, may ſeek to ſecure the whole to himſelf by the ſame means. Monſieur *St. Lubin* is ſtill permitted to remain at *Poonah*, although his diſmiſſion was the firſt object of our inſtructions to Mr. *Moſtyn* after the change in the Adminiſtration took place, and he received every ſatisfaction on that head that promiſes could give, ſo long ago as the 10th of laſt March. Notwithſtanding the requeſt then made in public Durbar to Mr. *Moſtyn*, to accompany their Agent to *Bombay*, with propoſals reſpecting *Ragoba*, we find by his lateſt advices, that they have been only trifling with him, nor have they to his knowledge yet taken one ſtep towards ſettling that buſineſs, though the ſeaſon is now ſo late. The treaty ſtill remains on the ſame footing on which it has ſtood theſe two years paſt, nor has the new Government taken any meaſure whatever for fulfilling the unexecuted articles.

Such being the ſituation of affairs, we could not, with your orders before us, wait any longer in expectation of propoſals from *Poonah*; we have, therefore, given Mr. *Moſtyn* inſtructions to the following purport, being exactly agreeable to the directions contained in your letters of the 23d of March.

Firſt, We have directed him in the name of this Government, and under your authority, to call upon the new Adminiſtration to declare, expreſsly whether they conſider the Maratta State as bound by the Treaty of *Poonah*, and to pledge their own faith to it.

Secondly, We have directed him, agreeable to the ſaid treaty, to demand immediate poſſeſſion of a country of three complete lacks of rupees, near or adjoining to *Broach*, in the manner ſtipulated by the fifth Article, and in caſe the Miniſters ſhall refuſe to comply with this demand, we further directed him to declare their refuſal to be a violation of the treaty.

It is neceſſary to obſerve, that we directed Mr. *Moſtyn* to ſignify to the Miniſters at the time he made his demands, that we were willing to receive, in full completion of the 5th Article, a country that will produce to the Company three lacks of rupees a year in the groſs revenue,

Appendix. Nos. 65 & 66.

revenue, without any allowance being made for the charges of collection.

Thirdly, We have directed him to acquaint the Miniſters that we have orders from you to keep poſſeſſion of the countries ceded to the Honourable Company by *Futty Sing*, ſince they have failed in producing the proofs required by the treaty; that *Futty Sing Guicawar* did not poſſeſs power or authority to make ſuch ceſſions.

Fourth, We directed him to make a proper remonſtrance, agreeable to the terms of your letter, againſt the countenance afforded to the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, againſt his being permitted to continue at *Poonah*, notwithſtanding the promiſes we have received ſince the late change in the Government, and to demand from them a clear and ſatisfactory explanation of their intentions with reſpect to the French, declaring to them that the Governor General and Council will take ſuch meaſures as prudence ſhall dictate for the future ſafety of the Company's intereſt, and poſſeſſions committed to their charge.

In this place we think it our duty to requeſt to be informed what meaſures you propoſe to purſue, in caſe their anſwer on this occaſion ſhould not prove ſatisfactory, or their future conduct ſhould give us reaſon for apprehenſion, as our being furniſhed with timely inſtructions may be of the utmoſt importance.

Fifthly, As we have experienced ſo much equivocation and delay in the conduct of the Poonah Government, we thought it neceſſary, in addition to the points laid down by you, to direct Mr. *Moſtyn* to deliver his demands in writing; and at the ſame time to acquaint the Miniſters, that we expected an immediate and explicit anſwer likewiſe in writing; but that if ſuch an anſwer was not returned within fourteen days from the time of the delivery of our demands, we ſhould conſider any further evaſion or delay as a refuſal, and take our meaſures accordingly.

The ſettlement made by Colonel *Upton* reſpecting *Jambooſeer* having been agreed to by us, rendered it unneceſſary to make the ſecond of the demands enjoined in your letter. You will pleaſe to bear in mind, that our claim on *Jambooſeer* has been encreaſed by the further demands for an equivalent for the loſs the Company have ſuſtained by the delay of the Miniſters in making over the country of three lacks, and for reſtitution of the loſs ſuſtained by the merchants concerned in the *Aurora*, which we have fixed as charges on the revenues of that province.

The reſolutions we have taken, will put the conduct of the new Adminiſtration to a clear teſt; and their anſwer will enable us to form a judgment of the footing we are to be on with that Government.

The anſwer Mr. *Moſtyn* has received from the Durbar to his application for paſſports and ſupplies for the *Bengal* detachment, amounting to a denial, we gave him directions, which he had anticipated, to make a direct application for that purpoſe to *Tookajee Holkar* himſelf, and to *Mhadjee Scindy*; to both of whom the Preſident has likewiſe written, and given them the aſſurances directed in your letter. Mr. *Lewis's* report, tranſmitted to you by Mr. *Moſtyn*, will place the conduct of the durbar on this point in a clear light, and give you a further idea of their views and intentions. In a letter juſt received, he further acquaints us, that being uncertain which route the army would take, whether by the road of *Ugein* and *Indoor*, or through the Toll Bopall country, which lies upon the *Nerbudda*, to the eaſtward of the two former, and is the road generally taken by the Pattamars, he had, in order to provide as much as poſſible for our troops having an unmoleſted march, written to the Nabob of that country, and had been aſſured by his vackeel at *Poonah*, that there was not the leaſt doubt of the Nabob readily complying with his requeſt.

We have acquainted Colonel *Leſlie* with our proceedings reſpecting the paſſports, and directed Mr. *Moſtyn* to communicate conſtantly with him. We have alſo, with a further view of expediting his march, directed Colonel *Leſlie* to correſpond with Mr. *Moſtyn*, and ſhall ourſelves give him every intelligence and advice that can be of ſervice.

We beg leave to ſuggeſt to you, that if on any future occaſion it ſhould be neceſſary to ſupply us with a reinforcement of troops, the eaſieſt and beſt method would be to ſend troops hither directly from *Madras*, which can be replaced from your eſtabliſhment if neceſſary.

Mr. *Moſtyn* has been inſtructed to obtain, if poſſible, a copy of the engagement entered into by *Nana Furneſe* with the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, and a knowledge of the meaſures which may have been taken for its execution. The intelligence tranſmitted in our laſt letter, adds much ſtrength to our ſuſpicions, that a grant has been given or promiſed them for the port of *Choul*.

The route by *Mazulipatam* appearing to be the moſt expeditious for the conveyance of advices, we beg leave to recommend to you to tranſmit your original letters through that city.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 20th May 1778. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

No. 66.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th June 1778.

Received the following letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt reſpects waited on you under the 12th inſtant. On the 13th I received an anſwer to the letter: I therein informed you I had written to *Moraba*, on the ſubject of paſſports for the troops you are ſending to *Bombay*, telling me, that as theſe troops are coming on account of the French, he had ſent for Monſieur *St. Lubin*, in order to diſpatch him; after which he ſays, he ſees no neceſſity for the troops continuing their march, or for his granting duſtucks. Although this letter is no direct reply to my requeſt, I could not but conſider it as a refuſal: however, to avoid if poſſible all future altercation on this buſineſs, I thought it my duty to write *Moraba* a ſecond letter, deſiring he would re-conſider the matter, and again declaring him anſwerable for any ill conſequences which might enſue from his refuſal; telling him, as the troops had undoubtedly begun their march, I had not authority to countermand them, nor would the want of paſſports ſtop their proceedings. To this I received *Moraba's* anſwer on the 16th, referring me to his laſt.

Finding from *Moraba's* anſwer that there was no proſpect of obtaining paſſports from the Durbar, and as the march of our troops may probably lay through *Madjee* and *Tookajee Holkar's* countries, I embraced the opportunity of a perſon I could truſt going to *Scindy*, to write him a letter, requeſting he would favour me with orders to his officers for our forces having a free paſſage through *Ugein*, as well as their being ſupplied with a friendly Buzar; and that no time might be loſt in conveying them, I encloſed *Scindy* a letter to the commanding officer of our troops, which I requeſted he would forward with the above orders. I did intend to have made a like application to *Holkar* as ſoon as I could find a proper channel through which to apply to him, being apprehenſive a direct application might have given offence to this Durbar: however, my ſuperiors having lately directed me to make immediate application both to *Scindy* and *Holkar* for paſſports, I wrote the latter under the 24th inſtant, and am in hourly expectation of receiving anſwers from each. It being uncertain which route our troops will take, whether by the road of *Ugein*, *Indoor*, or through the Toll Bhopall country, which lays upon the *Nurbedah* to the eaſtward of the two former, and is the road our Pattamars generally take; to provide, therefore, as much as poſſible for our troops having an unmoleſted march, I have written a letter to the Nabob of that place, which I prevailed on his vackeel here to forward with one from himſelf, requeſting, in caſe they take that route, he will grant them a free

free paſſage, and afford them every aſſiſtance in his power; which the vackeel aſſures me, he makes no doubt his maſter will readily comply with.

On the 13th Monſieur *St. Lubin* went to camp, and the next day had a meeting with *Moraba*, who then told him that as the Engliſh had taken amiſs his ſtaying here ſo long, it was neceſſary he ſhould go away for a time; but that he might depend this ſhould not occaſion any difference in the friendſhip between the French and this Government. On the 17th in the afternoon, *Morabah*, *Buchabah*, *Chintoo Wittul*, and *Cruſtrow Belol*, paid Monſieur *St. Lubin* a viſit at his tent; and after ſtaying with him about half an hour, returned to *Moraba*'s tent, whither Monſieur *St. Lubin* followed them ſhortly after, and ſtaid with them ſome hours. *Morabah* then made him a preſent, and diſpatched him. On the 20th *Nanah* came down from the fort, where he has reſided for ſome time paſt, to pay a viſit to *Sacaram Bapoo* at *Bury*, when they ſent for Monſieur *St. Lubin*, in order to take leave; and he accordingly waited on them. Notwithſtanding theſe appearances of Monſieur *St. Lubin* being diſpatched, it is beyond a doubt with me, that he has no real intentions of leaving *Poonah*, or at leaſt if he does, that he will ſpeedily return; and that the Durbar are in hopes, by publicly diſpatching him, to lull us into a belief of their good intentions, whilſt they have recourſe to the French for aſſiſtance, a door for which has already been opened by Monſieur *St. Lubin*'s negociations with *Nanah*, and which have been lately taken up by *Morabah*, as your Honour, &c. will pleaſe to obſerve by the encloſed copy and tranſlate of a letter I have received from a perſon at camp, who, from the knowledge I have of him, I do not think would deceive me. The intelligence contained in this letter, of *Morabah*'s tranſactions with Monſieur *St. Lubin*, has been ſince confirmed by two perſons, whoſe employs in the Government ſervice are ſuch as to afford them frequent opportunities of knowing what paſſes.

Conformable to my Superior's orders, I ſhall deliver a remonſtrance to the Durbar on the ſubject of the French, and make a demand for the immediate compliance of the treaty of *Proondur*, as ſoon as they can be properly tranſlated into the Maratta language. I have already acquainted you, Gentlemen, that I am aſſured the French have not got a grant for the port of *Choul*; but by the report of Mr. *Lewis*'s proceedings at camp, forwarded in my addreſs of the 12th, it appears, that *Cruſtrow Belol* confeſſed before him at the Durbar, a promiſe thereof had been made Monſieur *St. Lubin*; and I am convinced the French will not only get that, but much more, the moment the French can afford the promiſed aſſiſtance. Although I have hitherto failed in my endeavours to obtain a copy of the engagements entered into between *Nanah Furneſe* and Monſieur *St. Lubin*, I have lately been fortunate enough to procure the encloſed copies of ſome letters written by the latter to the viceroy of *Goa* and the Governor of *Damaun*, which prove, that he had made ſome agreements of the kind. I am not acquainted with any ſteps having been taken by the Durbar for the carrying this ſcheme into execution, excepting Monſieur *St. Lubin* being permitted to remain here, in direct violation of the moſt ſolemn aſſurances to us that he ſhould be ſent away, and the preſent conduct of the Durbar.

On the 27th I received a note from a perſon at camp, informing me, that in conſequence of our troops coming from *Bengal*, and a report of *Hyder*'s army marching this way, the Durbar had determined on ſending *Chintoo Whittul* and *Gopal Naique Tumbuckur* to meet me, and requeſt I would proceed to *Bombay*. They accordingly viſited me yeſterday, and informed me they were ſent purpoſely to requeſt I would accompany the former on the buſineſs the Durbar had already ſpoken to me about. I replied, that I did not ſee any neceſſity for my going, unleſs the Durbar would explain themſelves, which was now become the more neceſſary from the evaſive manner they had hitherto acted in this affair. To this they gave me the ſame anſwer the Durbar had before done, that it was to aſſure *Ragoba* they were his ſincere friends. I immediately replied, that I conſidered their preſent requeſt as a mere fineſſe, intended only to ſtop the march of the troops we expected from *Bengal*, and to gain time; for had they been ſincere, the Durbar would long ſince have diſpatched me on this buſineſs, and ſent Monſieur *St. Lubin* away, but that I was convinced, from the extraordinary attention *Morabah* and the Durbar had paid him, the former had taken up *Nanah*'s plan, and entered into ſome engagements with the French. This they poſitively denied, though they acknowledged Monſieur *St. Lubin* had made a tender thereof to *Morabah*, who told him, that as long as this Government continued in friendſhip with the Engliſh they would not enter into an alliance with any other European nation, and that *Morabah* had abſolutely diſpatched him. I told him, that I conſidered his being publicly diſpatched as done with a view to blind us, and perhaps ſome others; but that I was poſſeſſed of what I deemed a ſufficient proof of my allegation, producing the encloſed copy of a letter written by Monſieur *St. Lubin* to the Viceroy of *Goa*, under the 26th April, which I had a few hours before luckily procured. They anſwered, it was very poſſible Monſieur *St. Lubin* might have written in that manner; but they ſaid, they defied me to produce any writing from the Durbar: upon which I obſerved, that it was the art of this Durbar not to give any thing under their hands, that they might have an opportunity of denying their own words. It was therefore for this reaſon, before I would give credit to Monſieur *St. Lubin* being finally diſpatched, or my promiſe to accompany *Chintoo Wittul* to *Bombay*, that I inſiſted on the Durbar giving me a writing, with their Sicca affixed, declaring they had not at preſent, nor would in future have, ſo long as they continued in friendſhip with the Engliſh, any treaty with the French, nor ſuffer them to trade in any of the Maratta Ports, being exactly conformable to the promiſes made me by *Sacaram Bapoo* when I was diſpatched by the Durbar to *Bombay* in Auguſt laſt. This they promiſed to deliver me, together with a letter for the Preſident, accounting for my being detained ſo long here; and requeſted I would ſend the Linguiſt with *Tumbuckur* to camp to bring them. The Linguiſt accordingly ſet off this morning; and if he returns in time with the above paper, I ſhall accompany *Chintoo Wittul*, who leaves *Poonah* to-morrow, otherwiſe will follow him as ſoon as I receive the paper.

Appendix. No. 66.

From the information contained in the letter from camp, mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, it appears to me that this ſudden embaſſy has been ſet on foot in conſequence of *Hyder*'s army advancing this way ſince *Hurry Punt*'s retreat, and our forces coming from *Bengal*, by which they judge we are determined to be no longer trifled with, and that they are in hopes thereby to amuſe us until the rains ſet in, which will cauſe a delay of four or five months, by which time, if ever, they ſuppoſe Monſieur *St. Lubin* can perform his promiſes. That the Durbar have already ſhewn their willingneſs to enter into engagements with the French, highly prejudicial to our Honourable Employer's intereſt, all accounts I have received agree; and though I do not imagine it will be in Monſieur *St. Lubin*'s power to comply fully with his engagements, yet it is poſſible the French may be able to bring ſuch a force as to give them the ſuperior influence in this Durbar, the dangerous conſequences of which are too plain to need my pointing out.

Madjee Scindy is come from *Rimutpore* to *Javer*, a village within eight coſs of *Proonder*. You will already have perceived, Gentlemen, from Mr. *Lewis*'s report, that *Holkar* had been very urgent with *Morabah* to keep his engagement for bringing *Rageba* into Government; he ſtill continues preſſing *Morabah* on this ſubject, in

Appendix. No. 67.

which, from the beſt information I can procure, *Scindy* heartily concurs; and it appears to me that theſe two Maratta officers are by no means ſatisfied with the preſent conduct of the Durbar. *Hurry Punt* has been for ſome time paſt near *Pundapore*.

Since writing the above I have received a letter from *Madjee Scindy*, informing me that he has forwarded my letter to the Commanding Officer of our troops, with an order to his own officers for their free paſſage through his country, and that he had forwarded another to me by one of his own Hircarrahs; the latter, however, is not yet come to hand.

I am, &c.

Poonah, the 29th May 1778. (Signed) *Thos Moſtyn.*

P. S. Since diſpatching the original of this addreſs, I have received the paſſport from *Madjee Scindy*, which ſhall be immediately forwarded to Colonel *Leſlie*.

(Signed) *T. Moſtyn.*

Tranſlate of a letter from a perſon at *Proonder*, dated the 21ſt Rabellacor, and received the 19th May 1778.

At noon I received your note by *Shahjee*, and obſerved the contents thereof. *Morabah* has had two Councils regarding the French. He told Monſieur *St. Lubin*, that he had made an agreement with *Nanah* to bring 2000 Europeans within fifteen months, which he has not yet complied with; but that if it is in his power to fulfil that engagement, *Morabah* deſired he would ſend for them with ammunition, ſo as to be here before the battalions can arrive from *Calcutta*, which Monſieur *St. Lubin* has agreed to, and diſpatched a letter expreſs to his place.

The contents of the letter wrote by the Durbar to *Bengal*, are as follows:—"Colonel *Upton* concluded a "treaty between our two Governments; where then is "the neceſſity of your ſending troops into my country? "If it is on account of Monſieur *St. Lubin* remaining here, "I have, in conſideration of our friendſhip, diſpatched "him; and you may depend, I never will do any thing "that ſhall injure you. The French brought goods "here to ſell, which is the reaſon of their ſtaying ſo "long, but he now intends to go away, and I have ac-"cordingly given him leave: I therefore wiſh you "would recall your forces, and prevent a breach in our "friendſhip. I hope you will pay no attention to what "the Bombay Gentlemen may have already written, or "ſhall hereafter write you on this ſubject. With reſpect "to *Ragoba*, I have determined to bring him here; "but as *Hurry Punt* is coming hither with a large force, "it is neceſſary he ſhould be conſulted on it; for ſhould "*Ragoba* be brought without his concurrence, it will "probably create ſome diſturbances. He will ſoon be "here, and I ſhall ſatisfy the troops that are with him; "after which *Ragoba* ſhall be ſent for. I deſire you will "write to the Bombay Gentlemen, not to make any "diſturbances."

The following is the contents of a letter written by this Durbar to *Europe*:—"There is friendſhip ſubſiſting "between our Governments; beſides, a treaty was "concluded with the Gentlemen of *Bengal*, of which "you are acquainted, and with which I am complying. "Notwithſtanding this, the Bengal Gentlemen are "ſending their forces into my country, which will "make a difference in our friendſhip. This is not right; "I therefore hope you will ſend poſitive orders both to "*Bengal* and *Bombay* on this ſubject."

The following is the contents of a letter from the Durbar to the Nabob:—"The Engliſh are ſending "forces from *Bengal* with bad intentions; ſhould they "make any diſturbances, I ſhall ſend for your forces, "and hope you will aſſiſt me with your army. The "Engliſh alſo intend to bring *Ragoba* by force, which "will cauſe a diſpute with them; therefore, in con-"ſideration of our friendſhip, it is neceſſary you ſhould "attend with your whole army."

Monſieur *St. Lubin* is diſpatched, and *Morabah* wants him to go away, in order to haſten the troops he has promiſed; but he ſays he will remain here, and ſend a man with letters for him, This they are at preſent conſidering about.

A true copy of the tranſlate.

(Signed) *T^s Moſtyn.*

Minute of Mr. *Francis*.

It ſeems to me that the following paragraph in the letter from *Bombay* will require particular conſideration: "In this place we think it our duty to requeſt to be in-"formed what meaſures you propoſe to purſue in caſe "their anſwer on this occaſion ſhould not prove ſatis-"factory, or their future conduct ſhould give no reaſon "for apprehenſion; as our being furniſhed with timely "inſtructions may be of the utmoſt importance;" and I wait to hear the Governor General's ſentiments upon it. There is another part of the letter in which I would beg leave to propoſe a paragraph in reply:—"We beg leave to ſuggeſt to you, that if on any future "occaſion it ſhould be neceſſary to ſupply us with a "reinforcement of troops, the eaſieſt and beſt method "would be to ſend troops hither directly from *Madras*, "which can be replaced from your eſtabliſhment if ne-"ceſſary." On the 2d February I ſubmitted my opinion to the Board on this point, in the following words:—"Suppoſing it a point determined by the "majority, that a reinforcement of troops ſhould be "ſent to *Bombay*, I think it had better go from the "coaſt, and if neceſſary be replaced from hence, than "directly from *Bengal* to *Bombay*; on this principle, I "yield to the propoſition." On the 23d February, I again urged this opinion in the following words:—"If a reinforcement muſt be ſent to *Bombay*, I beg "leave to repeat my opinion, that it may be ſpared "with more ſafety, and proceed with greater expedition "from *Fort St. George*." I would now propoſe, that we ſhould tell the Preſidency of *Bombay*, that we are convinced of the propriety of their opinions in this particular, and conformably to their advice, if any future occaſion ſhould make it indiſpenſably neceſſary to ſend them a reinforcement of troops, they ſhall be ſent directly from *Madras*, and not from this place. I do not mean this motion to be taken into conſideration now, but defer it till the anſwer to the letter ſhall be propoſed.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 67.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 6th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

READ the following letter from Colonel *Leſlie*:

Col. Leſlie, 9th June.

Gentlemen,

In my former letters I had the honour to acquaint you, that I deemed the poſſeſſion of the fort of *Calpee* neceſſary, both for ſecuring my communication with the *Korah* province, and enſuring the accompliſhments of the engagements the Maratta Chiefs of theſe diſtricts had entered into with me. With this view I ſolicited the orders of the officer commanding the temporary brigade, that I might employ ſuch part of the battalion of Sepoys,

Sepoys, commanded by Captain *Rawſterne*, which was ſtationed in the neighbourhood of *Toonga*, as this ſervice might require. He accordingly put Captain *Rawſterne* under my command, and I have directed that officer to take poſt at *Kalpee*, with ſuch part of his battalion as are not required with the Aumil, and to wait there my further orders. I ſhall detain him there no longer than I may conceive the poſſeſſion of the fort neceſſary to the ſervice of the expedition; and I hope to receive your concurrence to this meaſure.

I am ſorry to inform you of the demiſe of Captain *James Crawford*, who commanded the 4th battalion of Sepoys, who expired ſuddenly, the 3d inſtant, of a violent fever. His character and abilities as an officer make him a ſevere loſs to the ſervice in general, and to this expedition in particular.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

Head Quarters, *Jelallpore*, 9th June 1778. (Signed) *Matth Leſlie.*

The Governor General—As it appears from the poſtſcript of a duplicate letter received from Mr. *Moſtyn* that he had "received the paſſport from *Madajee Scindia*, "which ſhould be immediately forwarded to Colonel *Leſlie*," as it is poſſible that Colonel *Leſlie* may chooſe the route of *Malva*, which appertains to the jagheers of *Madajee Scindia* and *Tuckajee Holkar*, I muſt beg leave to move, that poſitive orders be ſent to Colonel *Leſlie*, to march through the province of *Berar*, and on no account to take any other road, unleſs he ſhall receive a direct and expreſs refuſal from *Moodaja Booſla*, the Chief of *Berar*, to admit the detachment within his territories. As that Chief may be more ſafely truſted than any other power lying between this and the other ſide of *India*, on account of the long and friendly intercourſe which has ſubſiſted between his family and this Government, and the detachment will continue, during a conſiderable part of its progreſs, within the reach of our orders for its recal in caſe of neceſſity, by its line of march in that route inclining to the borders of *Bengal*, until it ſhall have reached the centre of *Berar*; but if it ſhould have proceeded by the way of *Malva*, it may be difficult to recall it before it ſhall have marched too far; this will be better underſtood by an inſpection of the map than by words. As an additional motive for this propoſition, it is to be obſerved, that on the firſt application to *Moodajee Booſla*, for permiſſion to the army to march through his country, he not only expreſſed an inſtant compliance, but wrote letters immediately to Colonel *Leſlie* inviting him to come by the way of his country, and ſent a perſon of conſequence with a military eſcort to the banks of the *Nurbudda*, which are the borders of his dominions, to receive and conduct the detachment. With *Madajee Scindia* this Government has had no connection, and he has been always repreſented as a partizan of *Nana Furneſe*, which may render his offers ſuſpicious, although I have lately received a letter from him, being the firſt that he has written to me ſince I have been in this Government, containing profeſſions and overtures of friendſhip.

Agreed to the Governor General's motion: And,

Reſolved, That the following letter be immediately written to Colonel *Leſlie*:

To Colonel *Leſlie*.

Sir,

By a letter which we have juſt received from Mr. *Moſtyn*, we underſtand that he has procured and tranſmitted to you a paſſport for the detachment under your command, to proceed through the dominions of *Madajee Scindia*. As it is poſſible that this circumſtance may have induced you to prefer the route of *Malva* to that of *Berar*, we think it neceſſary to give you poſitive injunctions to purſue your march through the province of *Berar*, and by no means to follow any other road, unleſs you ſhall receive a direct and poſitive refuſal from *Moodajee Booſla*, the Chief of that diſtrict, to admit the troops within his territories, which, from the long and friendly intercourſe ſubſiſting between us, and from the intention of compliance expreſſed in letters from him, we cannot ſuppoſe will be the caſe. Appendix. No. 68.

We are, &c.

Fort William, the 6th July 1778: *Warren Haſtings*, *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 7th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

The Board think it proper, before they proceed any further in the conſideration of this buſineſs, to annul the letter to Colonel *Leſlie* prepared yeſterday and now laid before them for ſignature, and to direct him, on the grounds of the information now received, to proceed with the detachment under his command to *Berar*, a country on his road to *Bombay*, which is at the ſame time contiguous to *Bengal*, and convenient for the return of the troops, if it ſhould appear expedient to recal them for the defence of the provinces. The following letters are therefore written to Colonel *Leſlie*, and ordered to be diſpatched to him this evening by expreſs Pattamars.

APPENDIX, No. 68.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 9th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

THE Governor General delivers in the following minute:

I ſtate the war with *France* as a fact of undoubted certainty. It is the part of this Government to conſider in what manner it is likely to affect the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, and to provide accordingly for their ſecurity. This muſt comprize and limit all our operations. In the view of this opening ſcene, the relative conditions of the parties engaged in it will merit our firſt attention, and cannot fail to engage it by the ſtriking contraſt which appears between them; and I mention it becauſe I think it an eſſential point in the conſideration of our firſt and perhaps our future meaſures.

Great as the power is which the Britiſh Nation has acquired in *India*, compared with that of its rival, its general line of action is and muſt be purely defenſive: it can gain, the French loſe nothing. Even the capture of *Pondicherry*, and of the other poſſeſſions of the French, will yield no poſitive advantage to the Engliſh, although it will deprive the French of their inſtruments of attack, and thereby affect our own ſafety.

From this point, therefore, all our concluſions muſt originate, and all our meaſures be ſo laid as to obviate or to oppoſe the probable deſigns of our enemies. Their firſt attempts will be againſt *Bombay* or *Fort Saint George*, *Bengal* will be their laſt, at leaſt their diſtant object.

The Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* poſſeſſes in itſelf the complete means of defence; we can add nothing to them but in the effects of our political arrangements; we have already yielded it a large ſupply of treaſure. It requires no other preſent aid.

Bombay

Appendix. No. 68.

Bombay requires every thing. Weak in itſelf and intangled rather than ſtrengthened by its diſſipated poſſeſſions on the Continent, it can only defend itſelf againſt a direct invaſion, and to that it is perhaps equal if it has to contend with the French alone; but this is unlikely. The laſt advices from *Poonah* contain ſuch evidence as the event itſelf muſt ſoon refute or realize, of an engagement actually made by the French Miniſter there, to bring a large military force to *Poonah*, profeſſedly deſigned to act with that Government againſt *Ragoba*, who at that time reſided at *Bombay* under the Engliſh protection.

In effect this is the obvious policy which the French ought to adopt if they ſeek to regain their influence in *India*, and it is no longer to be doubted that they have adopted it. They have beſides an ancient claim to the alliance of *Nizam Ally*, which beſides is enſured by their accidental union in a common cauſe, the defence of the ruling Adminiſtration at *Poonah*; of which his letters to Mr. *Rumbold* and the Nabob of *Arcot* afford an undoubted proof.

It is then certain that the French mean to eſtabliſh a firm intereſt at *Poonah*. It is probable that they will effect it. The conſequences may be the attack of *Bombay*, or without it the re-union of the vaſt powers of the Maratta State under its preſent Government, ſtrengthened by ſo formidable an alliance and a prædatory war, brought by their united forces into the dominions of our Ally the Nabob of *Owde*, or even into the heart of our own.

To guard againſt ſuch conſequences ought, in my opinion, to be our firſt object, both for the immediate defence of *Bombay*, and the future ſecurity of *Bengal*. We cannot ſend ſuccours directly to *Bombay*. If *Bombay* ſhould be attacked by the French, unſupported by a Maratta alliance, I have already ſaid, that I hope its preſent force is equal to its defence; but if it ſhould be attacked, or in certain danger of being attacked by the French and Marattas in alliance, an offenſive war muſt be undertaken in defence of *Bombay*.

The detachment under Colonel *Leſlie* may be employed in this ſervice. It can be ſpared without danger to *Bengal*, which is ſecure from a preſent invaſion, and can ſoon be replaced; but it conſiſts of a force too inconſiderable to engage ſingly in ſuch a conteſt, unleſs it can be aſſiſted by an Ally equal in power, or ſo nearly equal to that of the Peiſhwa, as to give our united ſtrength a degree of ſuperiority over the combination to which it would be oppoſed; the undertaking would be too hazardous. *Moodajee Booſla*, the Chief of *Berar*, anſwers to this deſcription. His family has always borne a conſiderable rank among the Powers of *India*. His father, *Rágogee*, ſubjected the Provinces of *Bengal* to the Chout, under the Government of the moſt able Chief that ever ruled them. His elder brother, *Iannoagee*, attacked and burnt the city of *Poonah*, at a time when the power of the Peiſhwa far exceeded its preſent ſtate, and the Maratta Conſtitution, excepting *Berar*, was undivided. His dominions extend from the ſea coaſt of *Oriſſa*, and from the weſtern borders of *Bengal* to the neighbourhood of *Aurengabad*. His revenue, though not proportionate to their magnitude, is conſiderable; and his ſtanding forces are numerous, excluſive of the militia, which in all the Maratta States is always ready to join their regular armies when they take the field. While the conteſt prevailed between *Ragonaut Row* and the miniſterial party, *Moodajee* ſided with the former; his brother with the latter. This conduct drew on him the reſentment of the Miniſters, who, as ſoon as they were freed by the interpoſition of this Government from the dread of their great competitor, encouraged and ſupported the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* in an invaſion of his country, which at that time had not yet recovered from the diſtractions occaſioned by the contention between the two brothers. On this occaſion he was glad to purchaſe a peace of *Nizam Ally Cawn*, with the loſs of ſome forts of conſequence, the remembrance of which he ſtill retains, with a determination to avail himſelf of the firſt opportunity to reclaim them.

As the provinces which are now united under the Government of *Berar*, are a conſtitutional part of the Maratta empire, a natural enmity muſt ever ſubſiſt between thoſe who poſſeſs the ſovereign authority, and the Rulers of *Berar*; the former looking to the recovery of their unalienable rights, the latter jealous of their independency: thus *Moodajee* may be conſidered as the certain enemy of the Peiſhwa into whatever hands the fluctuating ſtate of the parties at *Poonah* may throw his adminiſtration; but a late event has given *Moodajee* pretenſions to a rank even more elevated than that of the Peiſhwa. I need not inform this Board that the power which the Peiſhwas have poſſeſſed for about forty years paſt, is an uſurpation on the ſovereign authority veſted by the Conſtitution in the Rajah; *Raja Saboo*, the laſt who retained it, having no children, adopted *Moodajah Booſla*, and as I am informed, deſigned him for his ſucceſſor; but *Ballajee*, the Peiſhwa or Prime Miniſter, had the art to deprive *Moodajee* of the benefit of this intention, and to transfer the inheritance to *Ram Raja*, who was alſo an adopted ſon of *Raja Saboo*, and an infant at his death. *Ragoogee*, the father of *Moodajee*, inſtantly marched to *Poonah* with a formidable army, and by a negociation of a day obtained, for a ſurrender of his ſon's actual pretenſions, a large acceſſion of territory, and other advantages, ſtill reſerving a future claim to the Rajaſhip, and refuſing to commit himſelf by any formal deed in an acknowledgment of the title of *Ram Raja*. From that time the grandeur of his family may be dated. *Ragojee* continued to authenticate all his public acts by the name of *Saboo Raja*, and on the ſeals which have been affixed to all the letters which I have received from *Shabajee Booſla*, and even ſince his death from his brother *Moodajee*, they are ſtiled the vaſſals of *Saboo Rajah*. I know not with certainty what are *Moodajee*'s preſent views. *Ram Raja* died in December laſt, and the ſucceſſion is either ſtill vacant, or but lately filled; *Moodajee*'s rights are ſtill in force, and unqueſtionably ſuperior to any other.

I muſt ſuſpend the thread of this narrative to relate a tranſaction which brings it nearer to the concerns of this Government. An alliance with the *Booſla* family has been long its object; and conſiderable advances were made to the attainment of it in the Adminiſtration of Lord *Clive*. In the latter end of the year 1773 *Shabajee Booſla* ſent a vackeel to me with letters, containing general profeſſions of attachment, but expreſſed with ſuch warmth as induced me to aim at a formal connection with him. Finding the vackeel an intelligent man, I ſent him back furniſhed with a plan for that purpoſe. Unfortunately, *Shabajee* fell by the hands of his brother a little before the vackeel's return, and the negociation dropped; but *Moodajee* himſelf ſoon after adopting his brother's line, again deputed the ſame vackeel to *Calcutta*; but many cauſes, which it is unneceſſary to enumerate, prevented me from improving the diſpoſition of this Chief. A conſtant intercourſe of letters, and in ſome degree confidential, has been kept up between us. On a falſe rumour of the death of *Ramraja*, foreſeeing the uſe which might be made of this new diverſion in the Maratta policy, I employed the Agency of the vackeel to excite the ambition of *Moodajee* to aſpire to the ſovereign authority; which ſuch an event, then probable at leaſt, from the infirm ſtate of the Raja, and the diſtractions at *Poonah*, ſeemed to preſent to him, and I intimated the ſame advice in a letter which I wrote at the ſame time to *Dewangur Pundit*, the Miniſter of *Moodajee Booſla*, and the man whoſe counſels have long guided the affairs of that Government. While theſe letters were on their way the Raja died. No anſwers were given, for the purport required none; but every letter ſince received from *Moodajee* and his Dewan has

repeatedly and urgently preſſed the diſmiſſion of the vackeel, for the purpoſe, as expreſſed, of communicating with him on ſome affairs of the greateſt importance. The vackeel is at this time with Colonel *Leſlie*.

From theſe facts it will appear that *Moodajee Booſla* is by intereſt and inclination likely to join in an alliance with this Government, and that two advantages may be offered to him as the inducements to it. The firſt is the ſupport of his pretenſions to the ſovereign power, the ſecond the recovery of the captures made on his dominions by *Nizam Ally*. On our parts, we ſhall poſſeſs a powerful barrier on our frontier, an alliance which may counterbalance, and if properly employed, may totally overthrow the preſent power of the Maratta State, and give us a laſting aſcendant in its operations, and for ever diſſipate all the deſigns which the French have at this time ſo wiſely and hitherto ſucceſsfully concerted for their aggrandizement and our deſtruction. A more fortunate concurrence of circumſtances could ſcarcely have been conceived than thoſe which appear of themſelves to draw the two States of *Berar* and *Bengal* into a decided and laſting union by the powerful bonds of common intereſt and common danger. The Poonah Government is the natural enemy of *Moodajee*. It is ours by their connection with our natural and declared enemy the French. *Nizam Ally* for the ſame reaſon is the decided adverſary of both; and the contiguity of our reſpective territories in the wildeſt and leaſt valuable parts of both, and of courſe the leaſt ſubject to competition and incroachment, renders their union important and eſſential to the ſtrength of both.

On theſe grounds I recommend that a Company's civil ſervant be immediately deputed to *Moodajee Booſla* with full powers to form a treaty of alliance between that Chief and the Company on the terms herein above ſtated. Theſe may be hereafter detailed in his inſtructions.

The Governor General—It was my intention, had the time permitted it, to have extended the above Minute into other details, immediately required for the internal defence of theſe provinces. I can now only ſtate thoſe which are moſt urgent in ſhort propoſitions. The reaſons, if neceſſary, may be given ſeparately.

Firſt, I propoſe that three additional battalions of ſepoys be immediately formed upon the plan recommended by General *Stibbert*.

Secondly, That Raja *Cheyt Sing* be required in form to contribute his ſhare of the burthen of the preſent war, by conſenting to the eſtabliſhment of three regular battalions of ſepoys, to be raiſed and maintained at his expence.

Thirdly, That the militia corps be re-eſtabliſhed for the defence of the city of *Calcutta*; and for this purpoſe, if it ſhall be found neceſſary hereafter, I would further recommend, that the Commiſſioner of law ſuits, with the aſſiſtance of the Company's attorney and ſtanding council, be inſtructed to prepare a bill for its legal incorporation.

Fourthly, That the Maſter Attendant be directed to conſult ſome of the moſt able ſeamen of this port upon the means of forming ſuch an addition to our marine eſtabliſhment as may be moſt effectual for the communication of immediate intelligence of the approach of an enemy's fleet or ſingle ſhips of war, and for cutting away the buoys, and uſing ſuch other precautions as may be neceſſary for guarding this port and its commerce againſt the effects of a ſurprize.

Fifthly, That the opinion of the Chief Engineer be alſo taken with reſpect to the other means which may be neceſſary to prevent or impede the progreſs of an enemy by the entrance of the river.

Sixthly, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to furniſh the Board with ſuch a general plan of defence as he ſhall judge neceſſary, in addition to the preſent diſpoſition of our army, and in the ſuppoſition that the detachment now employed under Colonel *Leſlie* may not return for a length of time into the provinces; and to attend the Board with it when prepared.

Seventhly, The propoſitions with which I ſhall now conclude I offer with much diffidence and heſitation: it has been the conſtant ſubject of my thoughts ſince our laſt meeting; and though I now incline to recommend it, I ſee the objections to it in a ſtrong light, as added perhaps to thoſe which may be ſuggeſted by other Members of the Board may induce me to change it; but I will briefly ſtate it. The war having been notified to us, though not by authority, yet confirmed by evidence of ſuch ſtrength as to amount to a degree of certainty next to abſolute, ſhall we proceed upon it as upon the grounds of a war declared and notified in all its forms? or ſhall we wait the confirmation of it, which it is probable we may not receive for this month or ſix weeks yet to come? The conſequence of our determination on this queſtion, if in the affirmative, will be inſtantly to detach a military force to guard the approaches of *Chandernagore*, to demand the ſurrender of that town, and to appoint Commiſſaries to take poſſeſſion of the public ſtores, ſhipping, and private effects of the inhabitants. This combined queſtion I propoſe for the determination of the Board. Appendix No. 68.

The firſt queſtion being conſidered is agreed to. Ordered, That the Secretary to the military department do prepare and lay before the Board an eſtimate of the expence of the above augmentation, and of that which will ariſe from the increaſe of men to the preſent eſtabliſhment lately ordered in the military department.

The ſecond queſtion conſidered.

Mr. *Francis*—On the ſuppoſition that the detachment now employed under Colonel *Leſlie* will not return for a length of time into the provinces, I acquieſce in the propoſal relative to Raja *Cheyt Sing*; but I think he ſhould be informed, that this additional charge will not be impoſed on him beyond the continuance of the preſent war.

The Governor General—The qualification propoſed by Mr. *Francis* is conſonant to my intention in the queſtion, and is implied in it; I ſhould have no objection to its being expreſſed in an additional clauſe: that our reſolution upon this ſubject may be unanimous, I agreed to add to the queſtion the following words, "and "to be diſbanded at the end of the war;" but perceiving that the difference in our opinions upon the ſubject ariſes not from a diſagreement reſpecting the requiſition ſimply conſidered by itſelf, but from a different underſtanding of the right of the Company, to exact under any preſſure of affairs more than the ſum ſtipulated by the ſunnud granted to *Cheyt Sing*, and the pubbooleat given by him in return, I muſt adhere to the queſtion as it ſtands, wiſhing to avoid the queſtion of right; if however we cannot agree upon this point, ſtill I would wiſh to have the requiſition made in the words of the queſtion, and leave the deciſion of future right to our ſuperiors.

Mr. *Wheler*—Wiſhing to avoid the queſtion of right, I acquieſce in the motion; but I think it ſhould be qualified in the manner propoſed by Mr. *Francis*.

Mr. *Barwell*—An acquiſition of revenue and military force I ſuppoſe to have been annexed to the grant of the Zemindarry of *Benares* and *Gauzipore* to the Company; any military eſtabliſhment, independant of the Engliſh adminiſtration, in the heart of the Company's dominions, may, in the time of danger, be turned againſt thoſe intereſts which under another policy it would protect. I have long regarded the military eſtabliſhment of *Benares* under the Rajah's native officers, and not ſubject to the diſcipline, command, and regulation, of our own battalions, as a defect: I therefore moſt heartily agree to the preſent propoſal for three diſciplined battalions to be kept up, and paid by the Rajah; and ſincerely hope the Company will direct, that the whole force of *Benares* and *Gauzipore* under the Zemindar be placed upon the ſame footing as the regular military force of the Preſidency.

The Governor General—I agree to the queſtion in the original terms of it, deeming it a right inherent in every Government to impoſe ſuch aſſeſſments as it judges

Appendix. No. 69.

expedient for the common ſervice and protection of all its ſubjects, and we are not precluded from it by any agreement ſubſiſting between the Raja and this Government.

Reſolved, That Rajah *Cheyt Sing* be required in form to contribute his ſhare of the burthen of the preſent war, by the eſtabliſhment of three regular battalions of ſepoys, to be raiſed and maintained at his expence; and the Governor General is requeſted to write to him to that effect.

The Board agree to the third queſtion.

To the fourth agreed. } Orders are accordingly iſſued
Agreed to the fifth. } by the Secretary.
To the ſixth agreed.

APPENDIX, No. 69.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

MR. FRANCIS—In addition to the reſolutions already taken, and in reply to the Governor General's motion introduced yeſterday, I ſhall ſtate my opinion of the farther meaſures which we ought to purſue in the preſent juncture, as briefly and as clearly as poſſible; declaring at the ſame time that I do not mean either to ſupport my own opinion, or to oppoſe that of any other member, by a controverſy, which at this time can have no good effect.

1ſt. I am unalterably of opinion that the detachment under Colonel *Leſlie* ſhould be immediately recalled within the provinces, becauſe I think that the ſecurity of *Bengal* is the firſt and moſt eſſential of all objects to this Government: as ſuch the Company have invariably conſidered it. I will quote one paſſage, out of a multitude that might be found in the letters from the Court of Directors, to ſhew how ſtrongly they have inculcated this object, and made it the baſis of their whole political ſyſtem in *India*. In a letter to *Fort Saint George*, dated the 17th March 1769, they ſay, "the preſervation of "our preſent influence in the Bengal provinces is the "great object of our attention. All political connec"tions in the reſt of *India* are only important as they "may affect us there.

"Every acceſſion of influence or poſſeſſion elſewhere, "which by dividing our troops may prevent the exer"tion of our whole force, in caſe we ſhould be at"tacked in that quarter, is hazarding a ſubſtance for "a ſhadow."

Admitting a ſuppoſition, that the firſt attempts of the French may be made in another part of *India*, which can only be matter of conjecture, ſtill I think we are bound, by every rule of policy and prudence, to make our principal preparations of defence in that quarter where our moſt eſſential intereſts are at ſtake. Conſidering the extenſive frontier we have now to guard, I cannot think that *Bengal* is in a ſtate of defence, much leſs of ſecurity, while the force under Colonel *Leſlie* is engaged in any diſtant operations.

2d. I think the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſhould be directed to make ſome conceſſions to the miniſterial party at *Poonah*, and to endeavour to come to an accommodation with them as ſoon as poſſible. If we were to relinquiſh every one of the points which have been in diſpute between us ſince the concluſion of the treaty, we ſhould neither give up any thing that originally belonged to us, nor indeed any thing that is worth our keeping. Territorial acquiſitions on that ſide of *India*, are inconſiſtent with the Company's true intereſt, and no leſs contrary to their avowed fundamental policy.—When we ſee that even their favourite acquiſition of *Salſette* is attended with an annual loſs of 1,40,849 rupees; that is, that the expences of maintaining the different eſtabliſhments there exceed the revenues of the iſland by ſo great a ſum; we ought, I think, to be deterred by this deciſive experiment from wiſhing to gain more in that part of *India*, or even to keep a great part of what we have gained.

By purſuing even now a plan of moderation with the Marattas, we ſhall probably take the moſt effectual courſe for defeating the deſigns of the French, and inducing the Marattas to relinquiſh any engagements they may have formed with them. To introduce a European army either French or Engliſh, into their country, can never be a meaſure of choice with the Poonah Government, much leſs can they be urged by any thing but neceſſity to make their country the ſeat of war.

At the ſame time that we ſend theſe inſtructions to *Bombay*, I think that at all events it might be adviſable to ſend them a reinforcement of two or three battalions of ſepoys, but they ſhould go from *Madras*, and be replaced from hence if neceſſary. The whole force of *Bombay*, in my opinion, ſhould be employed upon a defenſive plan only, to which with the above reinforcement it will be adequate; that is, to the defence of *Bombay*, *Salſette*, and the iſlands and poſts immediately adjacent; for as to the acquiſitions of territory made by the late treaty, in the ſuppoſed caſe of their being attacked by the united force of the French and of the Marattas, I would not think of defending them. —For this opinion I cannot aſſign a ſtronger reaſon than that with which the Governor's Minute furniſhes me, viz. that "*Bombay* is weak in itſelf, and entangled "rather than ſtrengthened by its diſſipated poſſeſſions on "the Continent, and that it can only defend itſelf "againſt a direct invaſion."

3d. If by undertaking an offenſive war in defence of *Bombay* is be meant to continue the march of Colonel *Leſlie*'s detachment from our frontier to *Poonah*, I am entirely againſt it. I need not repeat the reaſons I have ſo often urged for this opinion, but I will ſtate one which has not yet been mentioned: admitting that the French may have intended to begin their operations on the Malabar coaſt, it is not unlikely that, when they ſhall have heard of our having ſtripped *Bengal* of ſo conſiderable a part of its defence, they may ſuddenly turn their views this way: at all events I do not think that detachment can be ſpared without danger to *Bengal*.

If a treaty of peace and alliance can be formed with *Moodajee Booſla*, on the uſual terms, of having the ſame friends and the ſame enemies (which we may interpret and uſe hereafter as we think fit) ſome advantage may be made of it; but I cannot think that his friendſhip, or that of any Maratta Chief, is worth purchaſing at the expence of ſuch engagements as are propoſed to be offered to him, viz. "to ſupport his pretenſions to this "ſovereign power of the Maratta State, and the re"covery of the captures made on his dominions by "*Nizam Ally*." I know not whither ſuch engagements may lead the Company's arms, or how long they may implicate us in the political conteſts of the country powers. Our general line of action is, and muſt be purely defenſive: the inſtructions we have given to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* to cultivate the friendſhip of *Hyder Ally* are formed on this principle, and it makes part of the Company's fundamental policy, repeatedly inculcated in their inſtructions to their ſervants, to avoid becoming parties in any diſputes between the Powers of *India*. On one particular occaſion they have gone ſo far as to ſay, "that this rage for negociations, treaties, "and alliances, has private advantage more for its "object than the public good." This remark is not meant to be applied to the propoſal before us, but it ſhews the general ſenſe the Company entertain of treaties and alliances with the country powers.

(Signed) P. F

The Governor General—I ſhould be very unwilling to anſwer the above Minute under the painful impreſſion which it has laid upon my mind, and indeed I hope it will be altogether unneceſſary, as it conſiſts (excepting one diſtinct propoſition) of points of mere controverſy, upon which every thing has already been ſaid that can be ſaid on both ſides of the queſtion; and it is yet my ſincere and anxious hope, that whatever differences of opinion may ſubſiſt on ſubjects long agitated, or which may not reſpect the new ſtate of our affairs, our reſolutions reſpecting every meaſure for the defence of the national poſſeſſions in *India* may be unanimous, and our meaſures poſſeſs that degree of vigour and conſiſtency, which they can only derive from a cordial, a temperate, and a confidential communication of opinions. One ſingle obſervation I ſhall make upon Mr. *Francis*'s Minute, becauſe it applies to the eſſential part of his objections; namely, that the meaſure which I have propoſed is formed on grounds purely defenſive: though it ſhould lead to offenſive operations, its objects are the immediate preſervation of *Bengal*, and the protection of theſe the moſt valuable parts of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, from an invaſion not very diſtant, if we confine all our operations within the boundaries of our dominions and of our Ally the Nabob of *Owde* There is one propoſition contained in Mr. *Francis*'s Minute which will merit the conſideration of the Board; and although I fear that it is too late, ſince the engagements between the adminiſtration at *Poonah* and the French Miniſter have been carried to too great lengths to admit of their retracting on either ſide, it may yet be given in inſtruction to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, but it ought not to be the motive for a ſuſpenſion of any ſingle meaſure which will be neceſſary for the ſupport of the general intereſts of the Company committed to our charge, on the ſuppoſition that theſe engagements have already taken place. I beg leave to add one more obſervation, ſuggeſted by Mr. *Francis*'s Minute, and encouraged by the candid declaration with which it is introduced. It is undoubtedly the duty of every Member of this Board to contribute his ſentiments on all affairs, but more eſpecially on ſuch as thoſe at preſent under our conſideration; but I preſume to offer it as my opinion, that it is equally the duty of every Member of the Board to afford his utmoſt aſſiſtance to the execution and ſucceſs of every meaſure that has ever been adopted, although originally paſſed againſt his judgment, and to proſecute it with the ſame ardour as if it had received his primary concurrence. I hope it is needleſs to purſue this ſubject: I will leave Mr. *Francis* the advantage of an undiſputed ground in the many objections forcibly ſtated in his Minute, rather than contribute to diſturb the temper of our Councils by a debate which can produce no good effect but that of perſonal vindication.

Now give me leave to recal the attention of the Board to the ſubject regularly before it. The queſtion in brief is, ſhall negociations be undertaken for a treaty of alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*? an affirmative or negative is all that is now neceſſary. The conditions of this alliance will be the proper ſubject of a future debate, and will be contained in the inſtructions to be given to the perſon who will be employed in the commiſſion for conducting the negociation. I ſhall prepare them without delay.

Mr. *Wheler*—I think it abſolutely neceſſary, before I give my affirmative or negative, that I ſhould know the extent and nature of the treaty which the Governor General propoſes to form with the Rajah of *Berar*, and I am the more deſirous of an explanation on this head from the queſtion being now ſtripped of that introduction which preceded it in the Governor's former motion, and which I fear I cannot aſſent to.

Mr. *Francis*—I agree with Mr. *Wheler*.

Mr. *Barwell*—I agree to the propoſition. When the objects of the treaty come under conſideration, I ſhall give my affirmative only to ſuch points as may be advantageous and uſeful to this Government. Appendix. No. 70.

Reſolved, That negociations be undertaken for a treaty of alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*.

The Governor General—I beg leave to recommend Mr. *Alexander Kynynnround Elliott* to be employed on this commiſſion. Independently of the perſonal confidence of which from long experience I think him worthy, I have made choice of Mr. *Elliott* for this ſervice, on account of his intimate knowledge of the political ſtate of this Government, in relation to the other powers of the country; having given him, under the preſcribed oath of ſecrecy, an early and continued acceſs to the official records of this department, and employed him in an eſpecial manner in all my communications with the Government of *Berar*, ſince his return to *Bengal*. I flatter myſelf that his general abilities, and the qualifications which he poſſeſſes for a truſt of this kind, will not need my recommendation of him to the Members of this Board.

Reſolved, that Mr. *Elliott* be accordingly appointed the Miniſter and public Agent of this Government at the Court of *Moodajee Booſla*, Rajah of *Berar*, for the purpoſe of negotiating a treaty of alliance with that Chief.

APPENDIX, No. 70.

Bengal. Secret Conſultations, the 18th July 1778.

THE Governor General lays before the Board inſtructions for Mr. *Elliott*, which are as follow, *viz.*

Copy of Inſtructions to Mr. *Alexander K. Elliott.*

We hereby appoint you our Agent and Miniſter, and inveſt you with full powers to negociate and to conclude a treaty with *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, or the Rajah for the time being; and that you may be completely enabled to accompliſh our intentions in this commiſſion, we give you the following inſtructions, leaving it to your diſcretion to effect them in any mode which your judgment, formed on the actual ſtate of that Government, and the intelligence which you ſhall receive concerning the neighbouring ſtates, and from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, ſhall ſuggeſt; and to agree to ſuch other conditions as are not expreſſed in theſe inſtructions, but ſhall be conformable to their general tenor, or not contrary to them; and you are to obſerve this diſtinction in the articles of agreement which you ſhall conclude with the Rajah of *Berar*, viz. that although all are to be, and we hereby declare that they ſhall be, immediately binding on this Government, and on every other of the Company's Preſidencies, yet ſuch as are in their nature permanent muſt be referred to us for their confirmation; but ſuch as are intended for preſent or temporary purpoſes, are to be carried into execution without waiting for our ſanction, and ſhall be equally binding as if they had received our ſpecific ratification.

Firſt, It is our firſt deſire to eſtabliſh a perpetual alliance with the Government of *Berar* on the terms of mutual defence: to accompliſh ſuch a connection, it muſt be conſtituted on principles of mutual intereſt and mutual confidence; theſe principles you muſt make the ground-work of your negociation in every part and ſtage of it, taking eſpecial care that the demand for our aſſiſtance, and its duration, ſhall be optional in the Ruler of *Berar*; that it may be inſtantly yielded, and that the proviſion made for it be ſo guarded as to preclude the dependants of this Government, to whoſe conduct the execution of this part of the treaty may be committed, from acquiring an undue influence or exerciſing any kind of authority in the countries belonging to our Ally.

On

Appendix. No. 70.

On the principles thus premiſed the following ſtipulations may be formed:

1ſt. That there ſhall be a perpetual alliance of friendſhip between the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and the Rajah of *Berar* and his ſucceſſors, each party ſolemnly engaging to regard the friends of the one as the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one as the enemies of the other; and that this condition ſhall ſubſiſt independently of all others in this treaty.

2d. That a certain force, conſiſting of battalions of ſepoys, to which may be added a corps of native artillery, be ſtationed in ſome convenient place within our own frontier, and in the neighbourhood of his, to be always ready for inſtant motion on a requiſition in writing from him, and for any military ſervice which he may preſcribe within the line of his dominions, but not to paſs beyond it.

That for the maintenance of this corps a monthly ſubſidy be fixed, equal to their probable expence; that is to ſay, for each battalion of ſepoys in quarters 10,000 rupees per month, and in the field 13,000 rupees; and for a company of native artillery in quarters 4,000 rupees, in the field 5,000 rupees; that ſuch regular and aſſured funds ſhall be aſſigned for the ſubſidy as may prevent future diſagreements on this ſubject, and not leave it in his power to withhold it.

That each party ſhall be at liberty to cancel this engagement whenever it ſhall be judged inconvenient to their reſpective intereſts, or incompatible with their means, or to propoſe a reduction of the force, but not of the proportionate rate of ſubſidy for the remainder, giving one year's previous notice.

3dly. That if at any time it ſhall be neceſſary to require the aſſiſtance of a body of cavalry for the defence of *Bengal*, the Raja ſhall engage to afford the ſame within two months after the requiſition made to him for any force not exceeding 10,000 horſe of the fixed eſtabliſhment of his Circar; their pay, diſcipline, and internal command to remain ſubject to their own officers, but the general command ſubject to the officer commanding the Engliſh forces acting in junction with them; their pay to be defrayed by the Company at a ſtipulated rate for each rank, from the day on which they ſhall enter the borders of *Bengal*, until the time requiſite for their departure from the ſame, eſtimated by daily marches of five coſs from the day of their diſmiſſion. In the clauſe reſpecting this article, care muſt be taken to diſtinguiſh the cavalry of the regular and paid eſtabliſhment from the native militia and infantry of every denomination; which muſt be totally excluded from compoſing any part of the ſtipulated aid; their occupations and all their operations conſiſting ſolely in plunder. Although this article is propoſed to complete the ſyſtem of reciprocal defence, yet if the Raja ſhall object to it, we do not regard it as an indiſpenſable clauſe, but you may make a merit of receding from our claim to it.

Such are our ideas of the general limitations which ſhould be preſcribed for a defenſive alliance, and we direct you to make them the ſubject of your firſt propoſitions, allowing you to change, or qualify, or add to them, in any manner which in the courſe of your negociation you ſhall judge fitting, provided ſuch alterations be ſtrictly conſonant to the principles which we have dictated as eſſential to it.

When you ſhall have mutually agreed on the plan of propoſed treaty, you muſt tranſmit it to us for our confirmation or correction, according to the diſtinction which we have laid down in the introductory part of theſe inſtructions.

Second. But as it may be neceſſary to enter upon an immediate train of active and offenſive operations with the aſſiſtance of *Moodajee Booſla*, if it can be obtained, we ſhall proceed to give you ſuch inſtructions as may be proper for that effect; firſt explaining the object of our views, and ſtating the grounds of our expectations from *Moodajee Booſla*.

By conſecutive intelligence received from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and from their Miniſter at the Court of *Poonah*, it appears that the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, an agent deputed from the Court of *France*, has entered into an engagement with the ruling members of the Maratta State, to bring a large European force, and a proportion of military ſtores to *Poonah*, to be employed in their ſervice, or, as we may conclude, in promoting the reciprocal advantages of the French and Maratta nations.

War having been lately declared between *Great Britain* and *France*, it is not to be doubted, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* will feel the firſt effects of this combination: the capture of that place by the French, and the recovery of the iſland of *Salſette*, and the diſtricts poſſeſſed by the Government of *Bombay* on the Continent, rendering ſuch an enterprize equally eſſential to the intereſts and views of both. We conceive alſo, that although ſuch may be their immediate deſign, and we are warned by the Court of Directors to expect, that the firſt attempt of the French will be on *Bombay*, yet we believe, that the principle of their union looks to deſigns of much greater conſequence, though yet remote, and may affect the peace and ſafety of theſe provinces. An early apprehenſion of theſe effects induced us to authorize the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to carry into execution a plan which was propoſed to them in the month of December laſt, by a party formed among the principal members of the Maratta Government, to exclude *Nana Furneſs* from the chief authority which he then poſſeſſed, and to reſtore *Ragonaut Row* to the place which he formerly held in the Adminiſtration; and for the ſame purpoſe, the detachment under Colonel *Leſlie*, which is now on its march towards *Berar*, was formed. The deſign failed; a change was effected by means in which neither the Preſidency of *Bombay* nor *Ragonaut Row* had any ſhare. *Nana Furneſs* was diveſted of authority, but was ſoon afterwards re-admitted into the Adminiſtration, which has ſince conſiſted of *Saccaram Babboo*, *Moraba Furneſs*, and *Nanah Furneſs*. Theſe Miniſters appear to have been all united in the reſolution of oppoſing the pretenſions of *Ragonaut Row*. He has now no party left among the Marattas with whoſe aid he could venture to aſſert them; nor under any circumſtances could that Preſidency now afford him their aſſiſtance, without departing from the immediate care of their own ſafety. Thus deprived of the reſource on which we depended in the partizans of *Ragonaut Row*, deeming it indiſpenſably neceſſary to prevent, or to counteract the deſigns which may have been projected by the Miniſters and the French in their alliance, and too hazardous to allow the detachment to proceed on its firſt deſtination without the ſupport of a powerful alliance; we are therefore deſirous of joining our forces, and our intereſts with thoſe of *Moodajee Booſla*, for effecting that purpoſe, or others more conducive to the ends of it.

Our reaſons for giving this preference to *Moodajee Booſla*, and our expectations of finding him well diſpoſed to enter heartily into our views, are briefly theſe: his dominions lie between *Bengal* and the dependencies of the Peiſhwa, and border on both. A natural jealouſy has ever ſubſiſted between his family and the Government of *Poonah*. This has been heightened into a confirmed animoſity by acts of mutual violence. He has ſtrong pretenſions, if not an abſolute legal right to the ſucceſſion of the *Rauje* or ſovereign authority of the Maratta State, vacant by the death of the late Ram Raja, and the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, who has always been connected with the French, and is now in cloſe union with the Miniſters of *Poonah*, is from his ſituation the natural enemy of the Government of *Berar*, and perſonally that of *Moodajee*.

Although we have no doubts either of the engage-

ments which are ſaid to exiſt between the Miniſters of *Poonah* and the Chevalier *St. Lubin*, or of the inability of the Preſidency of *Bombay* to engage in any new undertaking for the reſtoration of *Ragonaut Row*; yet theſe are facts on which we wiſh you to obtain the moſt certain knowledge, as you muſt be guided entirely by them in the line of your negociations.

As there is a conſtant intercourſe between the Courts of *Naugpore* and *Poonah*, you will not find it difficult to learn the actual ſtate of affairs at the latter; and that you may be leſs liable to diſappointment or deception, we ſhall give directions to Mr. *Moſtyn* to keep up a conſtant correſpondence with you, and to inform you of the moſt ſecret tranſactions of that Adminiſtration during your continuance at *Naugpore*.

If from his advices or the information you can collect on the ſpot, you are aſſured that the Preſidency of *Bombay* have not entered into any new engagements, either with *Ragonaut Row* or any other party among the Marattas, which may claſh with the tenor of the following inſtructions; if you ſhall at the ſame time underſtand either that a French force is actually arrived at *Poonah*, or is expected, or that the Chevalier *St. Lubin* is ſtill there; or if you are convinced from other circumſtances of the exiſtence of the engagements which we ſuppoſe to have been formed between him and the Miniſters, or even if no circumſtance ſhall have come to your knowledge that may afford you cauſe to doubt it: in theſe caſes we authorize you to make an offer to *Moodajee Booſla*, to unite with him in a direct and open war with the miniſterial party at *Poonah*; and we give you a full and abſolute diſcretion to concert with him ſuch a plan for conducting the ſame as you ſhall judge moſt conducive to the ends which we propoſe from it, and to which your whole attention muſt be directed; namely, to defeat the combination of the French and Marattas, to prevent the latter from aſſiſting the French in their deſigns on *Bombay*; and further, if it can be effected, to eſtabliſh ſuch an intereſt and connection between our Government and that of the Marattas as may enſure the future ſupport and aſſiſtance of the Maratta State againſt the French, or any other power that may be in enmity with us.

But if you ſhall have reaſon to believe that the Preſidency of *Bombay* have commenced any negociation or entered into any engagements either for the firm eſtabliſhment of peace with the Poonah Miniſtry, or for the reſtoration of *Ragonaut Row*, or for any other purpoſe which may prove incompatible with the operations which we have above authorized; you will in ſuch caſe ſuſpend your negociations until you ſhall have received authentic information, either from Mr. *Moſtyn* or the Preſidency of *Bombay*, of the the nature of the engagements either projected or executed by them; and you will ſo conduct yourſelf as to conform to their meaſures if you can conſiſtently with the prior attention which you will give to our views; or at leaſt not to engage in any offenſive plan which ſhall be contrary to that of the Preſidency of *Bombay*. Remembering that a defenſive alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* being the permanent object of your commiſſion, you are to ſuffer no conſideration whatever to divert you from that object but the refuſal or inability of *Moodajee Booſla* to accede to it, or the ſafety of *Bombay* rendering it impracticable.

You are to obſerve that the treaty at preſent ſubſiſting between the Company and the Peiſhwa, even admitted to be in its fulleſt force, can by no conſtruction affect our connection with the Government of *Berar*, which we not only regard as poſſeſſed of a ſovereign and independant power in fact, but we have a right to deem it ſuch with the Poonah Government from the teſtimony of the Miniſters themſelves, who on a requiſition made by Colonel *Upton* on the part of this Government, that *Moodajee Booſla* ſhould ſubſcribe to the treaty, excuſed themſelves by declaring in effect though not in expreſs terms, that they had no right or power to compel him.

And if you ſhall receive any aſſurances from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, or from Mr. *Moſtyn*, that the engagements between the French and the Miniſters are diſſolved, and that the latter do not entertain any deſigns hoſtile to the poſſeſſions of the Eaſt India Company, you muſt in that caſe regard the treaty between the Company and the Peiſhwa as poſſeſſing full force, and abſtain from any poſitive engagement with *Moodajee Booſla* which may be contrary to it; but this, as we have already obſerved, muſt not prevent you from concluding any engagement with him of a defenſive kind, or even of an offenſive, with reſpect to other powers or ſtates who are not under their ſubjection. Even in the caſe thus ſuppoſed, it will be no breach of our faith with them to agree to ſtation an Engliſh force near the weſtern borders of *Berar*; and we even recommend it as a guard upon their fidelity, and as a ready means of counteracting any attempts which they may make in violation of it. Appendix No. 70.

Having deſcribed the ends which we propoſe to derive to the Company from an offenſive alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, we ſhall next proceed to thoſe which we may reaſonably expect in return; for we cannot ſuppoſe that he will hazard the peace of his own Government without proſpect of ſome advantage adequate to the riſque, nor could we rely equally on his engagements unleſs his intereſt, by being involved in them, were made a pledge for his ſincerity and zeal in the performance of them.

The points which appear to us the moſt likely to excite his ambition, are the aſſertion of his pretenſions to the inheritance of Ram Raja, and the recovery of the conqueſts which have been made from his country by *Nizam Ally*.

The latter is a more diſtant object, and at this moment appears to us foreign from our preſent intereſts; you may receive any propoſitions which he may make to you upon this ſubject; you may treat upon them; but you muſt refer them to us for concluſion, unleſs he ſhall require it as an indiſpenſable condition of his forwarding our views in the weſtern part of *India*, and even in that caſe your engagements muſt be confined to the places originally appertaining to the Government of *Berar*, and wreſted from it ſince the death of *Iannove*. We are not unaware at the ſame time of the probability of our being called upon immediately to oppoſe the French in the dominions of *Nizam Ally*, ſhould he openly and avowedly join the French, or ſhould he join the miniſterial party at *Poonah* in declared alliance with the French.

We authorize you to agree to ſuch terms as may be propoſed by the Rajah of *Berar*, if you ſhall be perſuaded that the execution of them will tend to the accompliſhment of our views in oppoſition to the ſchemes and intereſts of our enemies the French, and in ſuch caſe you are authorized to fulfil your part of the agreement without waiting for our ſanction.

With reſpect to the former, if from the ſtate of *Moodajee*'s forces, his reſources and connections, compared with thoſe of the Miniſters of *Poonah*, you ſhall be clearly of opinion that the chances of ſucceſs are conſiderably on his ſide, and he ſhall require our aſſiſtance in the undertaking, we empower and direct you to enter into an expreſs treaty to that effect.

The conditions which may be required for our participation in an enterprize of ſuch magnitude muſt of neceſſity be left to your judgment, both in the choice and mode of ſecuring them. Our immediate ends will be effectually anſwered by it, if it is attended with no other effect than the excluſion of the French influence from the Maratta State, and the introduction of our own in its ſtead. But the poſitive advantages, if it ſucceeds, will be all on his ſide, and theſe will therefore at leaſt entitle us to ſome return, beſides the proviſion effected by it, of ſecurity from future contingencies.

The reimburſement of our charges in this expedition, from its commencement to the period of its return to

Appendix. No. 70.

our own frontier, or of a ſum ſuppoſed equivalent to them, ought to be made the firſt ſtipulation.

The confirmation of the ceſſions made to the Preſidency of *Bombay* by *Ragonaut Row* and *Futty Sing Gaycwar* and to this Government, by the Peiſhwa in the treaty of *Poorunder*, may be demanded.

On this ſubject you will receive as inſtructions whatever may be written to you by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, but exerciſe your diſcretion in the execution of them. In the mean time the Secretary will furniſh you with extracts of ſuch parts of our letters to the Preſidency of *Bombay* as have a relation to this ſubject, and from them you will take the general line of your conduct reſpecting it.

On this ſide *India* we deſire no acceſſion of territory, but ſhall prefer the improvement of our connection with *Moodajee Booſla* on the footing propoſed in the firſt part of theſe inſtructions to any other ſtipulations.

As ſoon as you have agreed to the plan of military operations to be undertaken by our forces in alliance with thoſe of *Moodajee Booſla*, you will give due notice thereof to Colonel *Leſlie*, or the officer who ſhall be in the command of the detachment now under his orders, that he may carry his part of it into execution. To this effect orders will be written to Colonel *Leſlie*, who has our preſent directions to continue his march till he ſhall have entered the province of *Berar*, and to remain there; you will alſo give immediate advice to the Preſidency of *Bombay* of the treaty when concluded, tranſmitting extracts of ſuch parts as have any relation to them, or a copy of the whole, unleſs it ſhall contain any matters which may require immediate ſecrecy.

We think it proper to caution you againſt encouraging any propoſals from *Moodajee*, to take a part in any deſigns which he may entertain to the prejudice of his brother *Bimbajee*, and againſt any interference in the competitions of his family.

To obviate any miſconception of the extent of your commiſſion, we think it proper to explain that we do not mean to continue it to the perſon of *Moodajee Booſla*, nor to the local juriſdiction of *Berar*; but that it extends to his ſucceſſor in the event of his death, or any change in his Government before or during the courſe of your negociation, and to the Government dependant on him or his ſucceſſors under any change or argumentation of it.

You will correſpond with Colonel *Leſlie*, or the officer in the command of the detachment now under his charge, concerting with him ſuch meaſures as you may think neceſſary for the ſucceſs of your negociation, or the ſafety of the Company's poſſeſſions, and conſulting him on any points of information which you may require concerning the ſtate of the country he may paſs through, or the views, forces, and circumſtances of the different Chiefs who govern it.

We have notified your appointment to the Preſident and council at *Bombay* to Mr. *Moſtyn*, and to Colonel *Leſlie*, in letters, of which we encloſe copies for your information.

You will be furniſhed with a cypher, in which you may correſpond with the Preſidencies of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay*, and Colonel *Leſlie*; obſerving that the words written in red ink, which have been inſerted for the occaſion, are only to be uſed in your correſpondence with us. We are, &c.

Fort William, the 18th July 1778. (Signed) Governor General and Council.

Mr. *Francis*'s Minute on the Inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott*.

Fort William, 15th Auguſt 1778.

Mr. *Francis*—Having already declared my entire concurrence in one general principle laid down by the Governor, viz. "that notwithſtanding the ſuperiority "of the Britiſh force in *India*, its general line of action "is and muſt be purely *defenſive*;" and having repeatedly ſtated to the Board my opinion of the wiſdom of thoſe inſtructions which the Court of Directors have conſtantly given us, and which we ought to conſider as the baſis of the Britiſh policy in *India*, viz; "to make the "defence and ſecurity of *Bengal* at all times the princi-"pal object of our care; never to employ the Company's "forces on diſtant expeditions; and never to engage the "Company in diſputes between the country powers, "but to leave thoſe powers to be a check upon one "another, without our interference;" I cannot but expreſs the ſtrongeſt diſapprobation of a plan which has for its object a union of forces and intereſts with one of the Indian States againſt another, and which, in order to engage the former to unite *in a direct and open war* againſt the other, propoſes to engage the Company's arms in an enterprize of no leſs magnitude and extent than the attainment of the ſovereignty of the Maratta ſtate for our Ally, and the recovery of any conqueſts heretofore made by the Soubah of the *Decan* over the Rajah of *Berar*. I conſider the propoſed treaty as not only ſubverſive of all the general principles of policy which ought to direct this Government, but as highly dangerous and inexpedient in itſelf at all times, and more eſpecially at the preſent criſis, at a time when our whole force is wanted for the defence of the Company's poſſeſſions, to which object alone I conceive it is or may eaſily be made adequate. I will never conſent to ſend any part of it upon diſtant expeditions, far from the protection of our frontiers, or to employ it in ſupporting any projects of intereſts in which we have no concern; defence alone ſhould be our object. With reſpect to *Bengal* and *Fort Saint George*, we have nothing to fear if we make a proper uſe of the means in our poſſeſſion, and apply them ſteadily to wiſe and attainable purpoſes; that is, if we do not ſuffer the firſt to be divided, and the ſecond to be waſted in ſupport of projects in which diſtant ſhadows are purſued at the expence of ſolid and ſubſtantial intereſt. With reſpect to *Bombay*, which it is ſaid *cannot now afford Ragoba their aſſiſtance without departing from the immediate care of their own ſafety*, the true and only way of putting that place in a poſture of defence, is to ſend them a reinforcement from *Madras*, and they tell us ſo themſelves. As for Colonel *Leſlie*'s detachment, I very much fear they will never derive any aſſiſtance from it.

Theſe remarks and objections are of a general nature. I come now to the particular inſtructions propoſed for Mr. *Elliott*, and ſhall conſider them in the order in which they ſtand.

I object to the powers propoſed in the preamble to be given to Mr. *Elliott*; and whereas his commiſſion propoſes to have two objects, I cannot help expreſſing my ſurprize, that our ſanction to him ſhould be thought neceſſary for coming to a concluſion with the Rajah of *Berar*, upon that which is by far the leaſt hazardous and exceptionable of the two meaſures, I mean the defenſive treaty, but that he ſhould be allowed to follow his own judgment in concluding and carrying into execution the terms of our *offenſive alliance*, for the ſupport of enterprizes of uncommon magnitude and extent, without waiting for our ſanction. Againſt all ſuch abſolute and diſcretionary powers I hereby moſt ſolemnly proteſt, and I declare, that I ſhall never deem this Government bound by any agreement entered into by him in the execution of his preſent commiſſion, without the previous knowledge and approbation of this Board.

1. I object to the defenſive treaty on the terms propoſed, becauſe I think our preſent frontier is as much as we are able to defend, and will not admit of our ſubjecting any part of our force to march beyond it at the requiſition of the Rajah of *Berar*; becauſe, without paſſing the moſt diſtant limits of his dominions, ſuch requiſition may carry our army into the heart of *Indoſtan*, at a vaſt diſtance from *Bengal*, and to a ſituation too remote to admit of their ſafe and ſpeedy return to the protection of our own provinces in caſe of emergency; becauſe, on the

other hand, I never can approve of our calling in ten thouſand Maratta horſe, in any caſe, to the defence of *Bengal*, being thoroughly convinced that ſuch allies would only diſtreſs and ruin the country, and never do us real ſervice againſt an enemy; and laſtly, becauſe I have no idea, that if *Moodajee Booſla* has a ray of underſtanding, and reflects on the fatal conſequences which the Nabob of *Owde* has experienced from his connections with this Government, and which took their origin from a treaty of ſubſidy, he will ever ſuffer an Engliſh army to eſtabliſh themſelves in this country under any pretences whatſoever.

2. The plan of an offenſive union with *Moodajee Booſla* ſeems to be founded on a ſuppoſition that *Ragoba* has no party left, and that the Preſidency of *Bombay* have or will abandon him. On my principles it is immaterial whether this ſuppoſition be well founded or not, becauſe I think it highly impolitic to implicate ourſelves in the ſupport of either of theſe perſons, but is very material to the ſucceſs of the plan now propoſed that no miſtake ſhould be made in this matter. I do not believe that the Preſidency of *Bombay* will eaſily relinquiſh their connections with *Ragoba*; if they ſhould not, it is worth conſidering what our ſituation may be, and what appearance our conduct will have in the eyes of the world. In the firſt inſtance, we have a treaty with the Peiſhwa, which we break or renounce in favour of *Ragoba*: we authorize the Preſidency of *Bombay* to execute a plan for reſtoring him to the Adminiſtration, and we ſend a detachment of troops acroſs *India* to ſupport that plan The preſent meaſure ſuppoſes a third diſtribution of power and a third competitor for it, to be ſupported by our alliance; and it is not impoſſible, that while this Government is uniting its forces and intereſts with thoſe of *Moodajee Booſla* on one ſide of *India* the Preſidency of *Bombay* may be equally engaged on the other, in executing the plan which we have already authorized in conjunction with *Ragoba*.

All theſe difficulties and inconveniences are ſuppoſed to be obviated by the conditional inſtructions given to Mr. *Elliott*, and the confidence repoſed in his caution and prudence. I need not queſtion the perſonal qualifications of any individual, when the truſt propoſed to be veſted in him is ſuch as I would repoſe in no man. The caſes, in which he is authorized to unite with *Moodajee Booſla*, in a direct and open war againſt the miniſterial party at *Poonah*, with full and abſolute diſcretion to concert the plan of operations with him, are to depend on Mr. *Elliott*'s knowledge, or on his perſuaſion of the exiſtence of many facts, concerning which it is very poſſible he may be miſinformed; but the conſequences of a miſtake, either in point of judgment or information, may be fatal.

I do not pretend to know what the nature of *Moodajee Booſla*'s pretenſions may be to the ſucceſſion of the Ram Raja. It is a queſtion of no ſort of importance to this Government, unleſs we voluntarily involve ourſelves in it. But if it were poſſible for me to entertain an idea of engaging the company's arms in the ſupport of ſuch pretenſions, the precipitation with which the concluſion of ſuch an engagement is preſſed, and the implicit confidence propoſed to be placed in Mr. *Elliott*'s ſole judgment and diſcretion to decide upon meaſures which may affect the very exiſtence of the Britiſh power in *India*, would be ſufficient to deter me from giving any countenance to the meaſure. I ſhould be guilty of a breach of truſt, if in an inſtance of this magnitude, I conſented to ſurrender the powers of this Government to the diſcretion of any individual. To that part of the inſtructions, therefore, in which we are "to impower and direct Mr. "*Elliott* to enter into an expreſs treaty for ſupporting "*Moodajee Booſla*'s pretenſions, *if he ſhall be clearly of* "*opinion that the chances of ſucceſs are conſiderably on his* "*ſide; and to leave the conditions of our participation in* "*an enterprize of ſuch magnitude in* Mr. Elliott's *judgment* "*both in the choice and mode of ſecuring them;*" I ſhall only ſay, that I believe ſuch a truſt was never yet repoſed in a public miniſter; and that I ſhall never conſider myſelf as a party to any terms concluded without my knowledge. Appendix No. 70.

The ſecond condition relative to our aſſiſtance againſt *Nizam Ally*, is at firſt ſtated as a ſubject of negociation, to be referred to us for concluſion; but it is preſently added, "unleſs *Moodajee Booſla* ſhall require it as an indiſpenſable condition, &c." that is, in effect, we tie and unbind Mr. *Elliott* in the ſame breath. In the end, we authorize him to agree to ſuch terms as may be propoſed by the *Rajah* on this point, *if he* (Mr. Elliott) *ſhall be perſuaded, that the execution of them will tend to the accompliſhment of our views*; and in ſuch caſe, he is authorized to fulfil his part of the agreement, without waiting for our ſanction.

The firſt propoſition tends to lead the Company's arms into the heart of *Indoſtan* againſt the Maratta State, in the ſupport of *Moodajee Booſla*'s pretenſions to the ſucceſſion of the Ram Raja. The ſecond may carry them into the *Decan*, in ſupport of his claims againſt *Nizam Ally*; and in both caſes, the deciſion is referred to the ſole judgment and diſcretion of Mr. *Elliott*. In my opinion, both the object and the means need only to be ſtated to enſure their condemnation.

After ſuch an extraordinary delegation of powers to Mr. *Elliott*, it does not ſeem that farther explanations were neceſſary *to obviate any miſconception of the extent of his commiſſion*. The laſt article, however, baniſhes every idea of limitation in this reſpect; neither the death of the Prince, with whom he is ſent to treat, and on whoſe perſonal views and diſpoſition towards us great ſtreſs has heretofore been laid, nor any change in the Government, is to affect the execution of the plan. The treaty is to be executed with his ſucceſſor, whoſoever he may be; perhaps a minor, perhaps an uſurper, perhaps a man hoſtile to the Engliſh intereſt, and it is to extend to the Government dependant on him, *under any change or augmentation of it*; that is, we conclude our treaty with a Prince, who either may not have half the territory now poſſeſſed by *Moodajee Booſla*, or who may have extended his dominion to the other ſide of *India*. In the latter caſe, it would be prudent at leaſt to ſpecify, *in the defenſive treaty*, what thoſe limits ſhould be which, the Company's troops are not to paſs, and within which the Rajah of *Berar* may employ them on any military ſervice he thinks proper.

A true copy.

(Signed) J. P. Auriol, Sec*t*.

Mr. *Wheler*'s Opinion on the inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott*

Fort William. 18th July 1778.

Mr. *Wheler*—The Minute now before the Board, and on which I am called to deliver my opinion, was received by me in circulation at nine laſt night, and I am abſolutely required to give my opinion on a ſubject of this great magnitude before ten this morning: thus circumſtanced, I believe it cannot be expected that I ſhould enter into a full diſcuſſion of the various articles which compoſe the Governor's Minute before us; but that it will be ſufficient for me to declare my general ſentiments on the whole queſtion; reſerving to myſelf the right of a fuller diſcuſſion, ſhould I find it neceſſary hereafter.

But I muſt here obſerve, that Mr. *Francis* has expreſſed himſelf ſo ably and fully upon the ſubject, that little more is neceſſary for me than to concur with him moſt heartily in his diſſent and proteſt, and likewiſe in the ſeveral opinions delivered by him upon the propoſitions contained in the Governor's Minute.

I am entirely againſt all diſtant expeditions and connections, as contrary to the Company's inſtructions, their fundamental policy, and particularly inexpedient at this time.

I join heartily with Mr. *Francis*, in thinking that our whole

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whole force ought to be retained here for the defence of our own territory and thoſe of our *Ally* the Nabob of *Oude*; and that this ſo far from being diminiſhed by detachments ſhould be materially increaſed on this emergency. I have a very unfavourable opinion of entering into alliances with Maratta Princes, which they uſually maintain no longer than it is for their own intereſt.

I am againſt the detachment under Colonel *Leſlie* advancing further into the Maratta territory, leſt they either meet with ſome fatal diſaſter, or we ſhould be unable to procure their return, when we may want them for the defence of *Bengal*.

I am at a loſs to conceive how we ſhall be able to fulfil ſtipulations with *Moodajee Booſla* for forwarding his pretenſions either to the dignity of Peiſhwa, or on the dominions ſaid to be taken from him by *Nizam Ally*; how our army is to act, or be ſupplied at that diſtance, or what good effect ſuch meaſures are to produce, either for the defence of *Bengal* or *Bombay*, other than of driving thoſe ſtates, from apprehenſions of our ambitious views, entirely into the arms of the French, and compelling them to form a general alliance for extirpating us from *Indoſtan*. What will then avail our alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*? how are we to depend on his faith; or to get back our detachment, when it will be moſt material to us?

For my part I apprehend the moſt melancholy conſequences: with theſe impreſſions it will not be wondered if I here enter my diſſent and proteſt againſt the expedition, the treaty now propoſed, and the powers propoſed to be given to Mr. *Elliott*, to bind this government in meaſures, which I deem neither wiſe nor expedient, and which it is highly probable we may hereafter be unable to fulfil, and thereby add our preſent propoſed Ally to the number of our enemies.

A true copy.
(Signed) *J. P. Auriol*, Secr.

Mr. *Barwell*'s opinion on the Inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott*.

Mr. *Barwell*—I agree to the inſtructions as they now ſtand: the arguments oppoſed to the policy that has dictated the intended treaty with *Moodajee Booſla* do not in my opinion weaken the grounds on which it has been regulated. The defence of *Bengal* is no leſs an object of it than the defence of the weſtern poſſeſſions of the Company on the Peninſula. The objections urged to the powers delegated to our Ambaſſador I conceive are fully anſwered by a reference to the map, at the inſtant the reader ſhall reaſon on the means by which it is propoſed to effect the ſafety of the Company's poſſeſſions. The time and opportunity would be loſt by a reference, in participating the reſponſibility annexed to a meaſure of ſuch a magnitude. I diſclaim every other rule for my judgment but the very object Mr. *Francis* himſelf propoſes. We differ as to the means; I adopt ſuch as in my opinion will prove moſt efficacious; he, ſuch as he conceives better calculated to the ſecurity of thoſe intereſts we have mutually in view.

A true copy.
(Signed) *J. P. Auriol*, Secretary.

APPENDIX, No. 71.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 18th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edwd Wheler,
} Eſquires.

THE Governor General having prepared inſtructions for Mr. *Elliott*, on his deputation to *Berar*, now lays them before the Board.

Mr. *Wheler*, Mr. *Francis*, and Mr. *Barwell*, deliver in their opinions on this ſubject.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

The preſent criſis calls for action not for debate. I think it improper to waſte my time, or to conſume that of the the Board in the latter, when it can be better employed, and when I know that no argument will avail. Whenever I ſhall find it neceſſary to reply to the objections and proteſts of Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, I ſhall addreſs myſelf to higher powers. I ſhall therefore now proceed to ſuch other propoſitions as I think neceſſary for the concluſion of this buſineſs.

In the firſt place, I move that the office draſts of the inſtructions, after they are written fair for Mr. *Elliott*, be ſealed and authenticated in any manner that the Board may think proper, and depoſited in ſome ſecret and ſecure place; and that they be not entered in the Conſultations until Mr. *Elliott* ſhall have concluded his negociations, or ſhall have made ſuch a progreſs in them as may make a longer concealment unneceſſary. The ſame caution was obſerved with the inſtructions which were delivered to me by the late Council, in the year 1773. When I was deputed from them to treat with the late Vizier at *Benares*, the effect was anſwerable to the intention; the ſubject of my negociation remained a profound ſecret, not only to the time of my interview with the Vizier, but from the private manner in which it was conducted, it was unknown, and ſcarcely ſurmiſed, till the concluſion of the treaty of courſe divulged it. I own I do not expect the ſame caution on the preſent occaſion, for I am ſorry to add, that the ſubject of Mr. *Elliott*'s commiſſion is already known; yet it may have this good conſequence, that what now only paſſes as a report, wanting that authentication which the original documents, though but in poſſeſſion of a few, would give them, may ſtill continue a report, and either die away, or be little heeded. If the Board approve of this motion, it will be equally proper, that the Minutes which have been delivered upon the ſubject of the inſtructions be alſo kept back from our Records depoſited with them. Copies may notwithſtanding be taken to be ſent to the Court of Directors by the firſt and ſubſequent diſpatches.

2dly. I move that letters be written to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, to Mr. *Moſtyn*, and Colonel *Leſlie*, to inform them that Mr. *Elliott* is deputed to the Rajah of *Berar*, to treat with him on the part of this Government; to requeſt that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* will adviſe Mr. *Elliott* of all occurrences in which the political intereſts of the Company, or of that Preſidency in particular, are concerned; and to inſtruct him upon any points reſpecting his negociation, which either their own ſituation and circumſtances may ſuggeſt, or on which he ſhall requeſt their advice. That to prevent any oppoſition of meaſures, they refrain from any engagements that may be hoſtile to the actual adminiſtration at *Poonah*; except ſuch as ſhall be neceſſary for the defence of their own poſſeſſions, until they ſhall have received our further information concerning the particular object and deſigns of the preſent negociation, ſhould it be found neceſſary to require their co-operation with them; and that Mr. *Moſtyn* may have their directions to correſpond with Mr. *Elliott*, and to inform him conſtantly of the ſtate of affairs at *Poonah*, both ſuch as reſpect the concerns of that Preſidency with the Maratta State, and the views, connections, and ſtrength of the different parties at *Poonah*; that our letter to Mr. *Moſtyn* requires from him the ſame communication. That Colonel *Leſlie* be required to conform to ſuch engagements as ſhall be concluded in our name with *Moodajee Booſla*, and as reſpect the forces under his command.

The

The Governor General's firſt propoſition being reſolved in the affirmative; the inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott*, and the Minute thereon, are accordingly ſealed up and depoſited in the Secretary's office.

Mr. *Wheler* acquieſces to the ſecond propoſition.

Mr. *Francis*—If the treaty be concluded Colonel *Leſlie* muſt conform to it.

Mr. *Barwell* agrees to the ſecond propoſition.

The ſecond propoſition being reſolved in the affirmative; the following letters are written to the Preſidency *Bombay*, Mr. *Moſtyn*, and to Colonel *Leſlie*:

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Council at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

Upon a mature and full conſideration of the different views and connections of the country powers of *Hindoſtan*, we think that an alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, the Raja of *Berar*, may be attended with the greateſt utility in providing for the defence of the Company's poſſeſſions in the preſent war; we have therefore deputed Mr. *A. K. Elliott* with full inſtructions to negociate and conclude a treaty with that Chief: we requeſt that you will correſpond with Mr. *Elliott*; adviſe him of any occurrences that may affect the general political intereſt of the Company's ſettlements, and of your's in particular; and inſtruct him upon any points reſpecting his negociation, which either your own ſituation and circumſtances ſhall ſuggeſt, or on which he may apply to you for information and advice.

The ſucceſs of the meaſures we have entruſted to Mr. *Elliott* muſt depend in a great meaſure upon their preſent ſecrecy; he will however notify to you ſuch articles as he may agree to with the Raja; in the mean time to prevent any ſteps of a contrary tendency on your part, we requeſt that you will refrain from forming any engagements of a nature hoſtile to the actual adminiſtration at *Poonah*, excepting ſuch as may appear abſolutely neceſſary for the defence of your own poſſeſſions.

We alſo requeſt that Mr. *Moſtyn* may be enjoined to communicate to him conſtantly the ſtate of affairs at *Poonah*, both ſuch as concern the intereſts of your Preſidency with the Marattas, and the views, connections, and ſtrength of the different parties in that Government.

Fort William, the 18th July 1778. We are, &c.

P. S. Both Colonel *Leſlie* and Captain *Elliott* are poſſeſſed of copies of the ſmall cypher B, formed in 1755.

To *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire.

Sir,

Having thought it neceſſary to depute Mr. *A. K. Elliott*, to *Naguipore*, to treat with *Moodajee Booſla*, the Chief of *Berar*, on certain points which we deem eſſential to the welfare of the Company's ſettlements in *India*, we requeſt that you will correſpond with him, and communicate to him, from time to time, a particular ſtate of the affairs and tranſactions at *Poonah*, both as far as they concern the immediate intereſts of the Company, and the views, connections, and ſtrength of the different parties in the Maratta Government.

Fort William, the 18th July 1778. We are, &c.

To Colonel *Leſlie*.

Sir,

Having thought it neceſſary to depute Mr. *A. K. Elliott* to treat with *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, on certain points which we deem eſſential to the welfare of the Company's poſſeſſions in *India*, we direct that you correſpond with him on ſuch ſubjects as may be neceſſary for his information, as well with reſpect to the views, connections, and forces of the ſeveral Chiefs who govern the countries through which you may or have paſſed, as to their different ſituations and circumſtances; and that you conform to ſuch articles and engagements as he may conclude on behalf of this Government with *Moodajee Booſla*, as far as they may reſpect the forces under your command. Appendix. No. 71.

Fort William, the 18th July 1778. We are, &c.

Mr. *Francis*—I agree with the Governor General, that this is a time to act, and that none ſhould be waſted in debate. Mr. *Wheler*'s Minute and mine have occaſioned no other delay than what was neceſſary for reading them. There are two points however, of which no notice is taken in the inſtructions, and which I think ſhould be provided for; I ſubmit them to the Governor's conſideration as they occur to me.

The firſt is, that Mr. *Elliott* is not inſtructed to correſpond with Colonel *Leſlie*'s or to concert any meaſures whatever with him; yet caſes may occur in which Colonel *Leſlie*'s opinion, as well with reſpect to the ſtate of the country he has paſſed through, and the views and forces of the different Princes who govern that country, as to the actual ſituation and circumſtances of his own army, may be very neceſſary for Mr. *Elliott*'s information and guidance in the conduct of his negociations.

The ſecond is, that no proviſion is made for a caſe, which, whether probable or not, deſerves conſideration, as the conſequences of it may materially affect the ſucceſs of Mr. *Elliott*'s negociations: I mean the poſſibility that Colonel *Leſlie*'s march ſhould have been ſtopped either by direct oppoſition, or any other unforeſeen difficulties; or that he may have received a check in attempting to croſs the *Cane* River. In his letter of the 24th June, he informs us, "that he is not at preſent able to ſay "what part they will take, whether they mean to oppoſe "his march or not; their forces are collected between "*Chatterpore* and *Pannah*, on the banks of the *Kaine* "River, where *Anrood Sing*'s forces, with *Ballajee* and "*Beſſa Pundit*, have taken poſt," we cannot be abſolutely certain of the event. It is poſſible at leaſt that ſome miſchance may have happened, and ſuch a poſſibility ought to be provided for.

The Governor General—The firſt propoſition I think very proper; although it comes within the line of his inſtructions, I have no objection to its being made a ſpecific part of them. I think it unneceſſary to make any proviſion in the inſtructions for the caſe ſuppoſed in the latter part of Mr. *Francis*'s minute: it is included in the former.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree to the firſt; and as the ſecond is a precaution which cannot be attended with any inconvenience by being inſerted in Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, I ſee no objection to its making a part of them.

Mr. *Barwell*—I think both theſe points included in the inſtructions, and the repetition of them unneceſſary.

Agreed, that the firſt part of Mr. *Francis*'s Minute be added to Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions.

The 20th of July the Governor General moves, that Mr. *Elliott*'s appointment be notified to the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*; that they conſider whatever intelligence he may tranſmit to them as the authentic intelligence of a public Miniſter; and that they correſpond with Mr. *Elliott*, informing him of any events which relate to peace or war, but particularly of any changes in their political ſituation with *Nizam ul Mulk*. 20th 177

Appendix. No. 72.

* Colonel *Upton*'s allowances were ſettled by the Governor General and Council as follows, viz.

	per annum.
1,000 Sonaut rupees per month, — or,	
His pay as Lieutenant Colonel per annum	12,000
Double batta as Lieutenant Colonel	2,920
40 Rupees per day, or per annum	14,600
500 Rupees per month for ſervants, ſtationary, and every other incidental charge not particularly ſpecified	6,000
Rupees per month for a moonſhie	1,200
Sonaut rupees	36,720
Batta 11 per cent.	4,039
Total of Colonel *Upton*'s allowances per annum while on his embaſſy to *Poonah* — C^Rs	40,759
£. ſterling	4,075

N. B.—The above were excluſive of the allowances made to the Colonel's ſuite.

The Governor General moves, That Mr. *Elliott* draw the ſame fixed allowances as Colonel *Upton**, viz.

Lieutenant Colonel's pay and double full batta fixed ſalary, contingencies, including moonſhies, ſervants, &c. That Mr. *Farquhar* attend Mr. *Elliott* as Aſſiſtant, and be allowed Captain's pay and double batta. The Governor General ſuppoſes, that the whole expence of Mr. *Elliott*'s deputation, excluſive of the neceſſary preſents, will not much exceed his perſonal allowances, as above ſtated, and thoſe of his Aſſiſtant; that he has every reaſon to believe that Mr. *Elliott* will be attended from *Cuttack* to *Naigpore* by a troop of the Rajah of *Berar*'s cavalry; but ſhould this not be the caſe, he propoſes that Mr. *Elliott* be authorized to diſburſe ſuch ſums as may appear to him reaſonable in procuring a military eſcort. The Board agree to the Governor's motions, and alſo to Mr. *Elliott*'s credentials, which are dated 20th July 1778.

Letter of Credence to Mr. *Alexander Elliott:* written the 20th July 1778.

To *Alexander Elliott*, Eſquire.

Whereas an intercourſe of friendſhip has long ſubſiſted between this Government and that of *Berar*, and it is our deſire, and we believe it to be that of *Modajee Bhooſila*, the Rajah or Chief for the time being of *Berar*, to confirm and perpetuate the ſame by a formal treaty of alliance, We the Governor General and Council, in virtue of the powers veſted in us by the King and Parliament of *Great Britain*, and by the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, to direct and controul the political affairs of all the Company's ſettlements in *India*, relying on your fidelity, prudence and integrity, have deputed you to proceed to *Naigpore*, or to ſuch other place where the Rajah ſhall reſide, and to negociate and conclude with *Maha Raja Modajee Bhooſila*, or the true Rajah for the time being of the province of *Berar* and its dependencies, a treaty of peace and friendſhip between him and his heirs and ſucceſſors on the one part, and the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company on the other, on ſuch terms as ſhall be for the mutual benefit, honour, and ſatisfaction of both parties; and we hereby give you full powers to that effect, declaring that we will ratify and confirm whatever ſhall be ſo concluded by you in our names, and on our behalf, according to the inſtructions with which we have furniſhed you for that purpoſe.

Given in *Fort William*, under our hands and the ſeal of the Company, this 20th of July 1778, in the year of our Lord, or 24th of Jumma See Aſſanee 1192 Hejeree.

APPENDIX, No. 72.

Extract of a letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors, dated 17th Auguſt 1778.

Secret department.

Par. 5. With ſuch circumſtantial evidence before us we thought that no time ſhould be loſt in proceeding upon it as fact, and therefore agreed to take ſuch immediate meaſures as we judged neceſſary for the ſecurity of your poſſeſſions committed to our charge. We ordered Colonel *Leſlie* with his detachment to halt when he ſhould arrive within the diſtrict of *Berar*, and to wait there for further orders. We wrote to the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, recommending it to them to aſſemble a ſufficient force in the neighbourhood of *Pondicherry* with all poſſible expedition, to be ready to inveſt that place the moment that a confirmation of the news ſhould arrive. We adviſed them to open a negociation with the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, who lately had made repeated applications to their Preſident to ſolicit an alliance with the Company. We ordered the balance of caſh which had accumulated in the hands of our Reſident at *Owde* to be immediately ſent down to the Preſidency, and called for ſuch accounts as might enable us to determine the ſtate of our immediate reſources.

6. At the enſuing meeting of the Council the Governor General propoſed a plan for an alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, a powerful Chief, with whom a friendly intercourſe had long ſubſiſted, and who on many occaſions had manifeſted a diſpoſition uniformly amicable to the Company. As the plan is particular and worthy of your attention, we beg leave to refer to it, and to the Minutes which have been entered upon it; contenting ourſelves in this place with informing you that we have accordingly appointed Mr. *Alexander Elliott* with full powers and inſtructions to negociate and conclude a treaty of alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*. As the ſucceſs of Mr. *Elliott*'s endeavours muſt be governed in ſome meaſure by the ſecrecy in which the powers of conceſſion confided in him are preſerved, we have thought it neceſſary for the preſent to keep his inſtructions from our records; a copy, however, with the Minutes upon them, is made a ſeparate number in the packet for your information.

26. The ſituation of affairs in the north-weſt quarter is nearly as follows: Colonel *Leſlie*, with the detachment under his command, notwithſtanding the promiſes of friendſhip which were delivered to him from *Ballajee* and the other Maratta Chiefs poſſeſſing the diſtricts about *Calpee*, met with ſome ſlight oppoſition from their troops in croſſing the *Jumna*. They retired before the advanced party when they had landed, and after ſome ſkirmiſhes retreated, leaving the fort of *Calpee* evacuated, which Colonel *Leſlie* in conſequence took poſſeſſion of. He then continued his march without further moleſtation till his arrival at *Chatterpore*, where he was obliged to halt for the purpoſe of repairing his gun carriages, which had been a good deal ſhaken by the badneſs of the roads.

27. When the detachment had been ſome days at *Chatterpore*, the above Chief continued to manifeſt the ſame ſpirit of jealouſy and oppoſition which he had at firſt diſcovered, by joining with the inferior Rajahs to throw every obſtruction and annoyance in the way that he could accompliſh. He publiſhed the ſtrongeſt prohibition to the inhabitants to furniſh grain or any kind of refreſhment to the troops; haraſſed their foraging parties; intercepted their proviſions, and drove away their cattle. In this ſtate of affairs Colonel *Leſlie* received intelligence of the unfortunate end of Captain *Munro*, who was cut off in his way to join the detachment; he therefore reſolved, from theſe combined outrages, to attack the principal ſtation of the enemy at the fort of *Mow*, about three coſs weſt of his encampment, where they had about 600 cavalry, and 2,000 matchlock-men, with a train of eleven pieces of cannon. Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard* was accordingly diſpatched

patched with three battalions and a body of horſe; and after having forced his way through ſome breaches in the wall of circumvallation, he engaged and drove the enemy out of the fort. The diſperſed parties have ſince withdrawn to *Rajegûr*, on the banks of the river *Kain*, where *Ballajee* having aſſembled his men, ſtill declares his intention to oppoſe the progreſs of our troops.

28. By our laſt advices per *Northington*, you were fully informed of the change in the Government at *Poonah*, by the reverſion of the principal direction of affairs from the hands of *Nana Furneſe* to thoſe of *Moraba Furneſe*; of the different invitations which *Moraba* had given to *Ragoba*; and of his propoſal to charge Mr. *Moſtyn* with powers to conduct that Chief to *Poonah*. After having amuſed our Reſident for ſome time with reiterated promiſes and protractions, it evidently appeared that the profeſſions he made were calculated merely to deceive; while the real object of his intentions was nothing more than to eſtabliſh his own authority in the Government.

29. Mr. *Moſtyn*, after waiting a conſiderable time for the propoſed overtures to be made to *Ragoba*, and deſpairing of them at length, from the inſincerity of the Miniſters, and their apparent adoption of *Nana*'s ſyſtems, which were unfavourable to the Engliſh, formally made the demands of them, which were enjoined by our letter to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, under date the 23d March. He repeatedly ſolicited their anſwer to each ſeparate article, but ineffectually, till many days after the time limited in his requiſition had elapſed.

30. About this time another revolution took effect in the adminiſtration at *Poonah*. *Nana Furneeſe*, by a conſiderable ſum of money, which he engaged to pay to *Madajee Scindia* and *Tuccojee Holcar*, having gained thoſe Chiefs over to his aſſiſtance, wreſted the Government again from the hands of *Moraba*; who, finding his influence and power thus failing him, applied in earneſt, as we underſtand, in concert with the principle perſons who adhered to him (among which number the name of *Tuccojee* appears, notwithſtanding he had been induced by a pecuniary conſideration to ſeem to ſide with *Nana*, and is repreſented, in conjunction with *Madajee Scindia* in perſon, to have compelled *Moraba* to ſurrender the Sicca, which was the enſign of his office, to *Nana Furneeſe)* to Mr. *Moſtyn*, offering preciſe terms to fix *Ragoba* in the place of Regent, if the Preſidency of *Bombay* would agree to bring him with the Company's forces to join their party; and delivering at the ſame time under the ſeal of the Peiſhwa, ſatisfactory aſſurances in reply to the demands which had been inſiſted upon by Mr. *Moſtyn*, for the accompliſhment of the treaty.

31. We have juſt received expreſs advices from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, dated 25th July, of which we ſend a copy in the packet, containing their proceedings on the above propoſals, which Mr. *Moſtyn*, being duly authorized by the party, had delivered to them in perſon; alſo other anſwers to the Reſident's demands, which *Nana Furneſe* upon re-aſſuming the Government at *Poonah*, had cauſed to be given to Mr. *Lewis* after Mr. *Moſtyn*'s departure.

32. Theſe are pronounced by the Select Committee to be vague, evaſive, unſatisfactory, and amounting to a refuſal, aggravated by a compariſon with *Moraba*'s anſwers. They therefore, in virtue of the authority given by our letter of the 23d March, proceeded to declare the anſwers of *Nana* a violation of the treaty; and on theſe grounds, urged by *Nana*'s avowed predilection for the French, the proſpect of inevitable war with that nation, and the means which they would poſſeſs conjointly with the Marattas, to cut off the ſupplies required by the iſland of *Bombay* from the Continent, they proceeded to conſider and attend to the offers made in favour of *Ragoba*. In conſequence of which they have reſolved to purſue the moſt practicable way of placing him in the Regency of *Poonah*, by means of their own forces, aided by Colonel *Leſlie*'s detachment, and ſupported by the party and troops of *Moraba* and *Tuccojee*, if the advices which they may receive from *Europe*, or from us, before they can begin their operations in September, ſhall not render a different plan of meaſures expedient.

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33. The general tranſactions of this Government with the Nabob of *Owde* being of ſuch a nature as not to require ſecrecy, and the buſineſs of war furniſhing additional matter for our private department, we have tranſferred our correſpondence with the Reſident at *Owde*, and various other ſubjects, to the public Records; and ſhall only mention in this place, that the Nabob having conſented to Captain *Oſborne*'s plan, for raiſing a battalion of ſepoys for the protection of the *Douab*, which we recommended to him, Captain *Oſborne* is accordingly employed in forming this corps.

34. *Nudjiff Cawn* having made peace with the Seicks, is again deſirous of receiving Major *Hannay* as an Agent from this Government; and has addreſſed the Governor General, requeſting that he may be permitted to repair to his Court. We have in conſequence directed the Major to viſit *Nudjiff Cawn*, with the Vizier's conſent, and to report to us any propoſals which he may have to offer to our conſideration.

35. We have this day taken into conſideration the advices from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, mentioned in the foregoing part of this letter; and have approved of their reſolutions, under certain proviſoes, which will appear in the extract of our proceedings, encloſed a number in the packet.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Fort William, your moſt faithful humble ſervants,
17th Auguſt 1778.
Warren Haſtings,
Richd *Barwell*,
P. Francis,
Edwd *Wheler*.

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Perſian Correſpondence; received 20th May 1778.

From *Moodajee Bhoſila*: received 24th May 1778.

YOUR agreeable letter under date the 3d of Rubbeeul-awal reached me on the 27th of the ſame month (26th April) and afforded me the greateſt pleaſure. You write that you have appointed to the command of the detachment deſtined for the reinforcement of *Bombay*, Colonel *Leſlie*, an officer of abilities, experience, and approved bravery, and one who is poſſeſſed of your entire confidence, and have directed him to correſpond with me; that he will accordingly apply to me on every occaſion where he may ſtand in need of aſſiſtance and ſupport, which may probably frequently happen; and you requeſt that regarding his letters in the ſame light as if written by yourſelf I will afford him every degree of aſſiſtance he may require, and conſider him as every way worthy of my entire confidence, and that I will always reckon you as my moſt warm and ſincere friend. An invariable regard to the duties of friendſhip is highly commendable and praiſeworthy, and I have accordingly replied to your ſeveral letters on this ſubject in the ſame manner which friendſhip dictated, and hope that my repeated letters have ſafely reached you. It is near twenty days ſince truſty Agents have been diſpatched from this to the *Nurbudder* where they wait the arrival of Colonel *Leſlie*, and for the greater ſecurity I have written to that gentleman to give him information of my Agents being in waiting for him there. As the veil which ſeparated us is now removed, and we are ſo intimately connected with each other, I have regarded whatever you have written me as proceeding from the dictates of friendſhip, and your wants I regard as my own. You will therefore ſend him in full confidence, and on his arrival on the banks of the *Nurbudder*, he will find every kind of aſſiſtance and ſupport from my

Envoys,

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Envoys, both with reſpect to proviſions and other neceſſaries, as well as inſtructions for his route. I have not yet heard from Colonel *Leſlie*; as ſoon as I do, I ſhall return him a ſatisfactory anſwer.

From *Modajee Bhoſila*: received 4th July 1778.

I have been favoured with your agreeable letter in reply to two of mine, and expreſſing your pleaſure at the proofs of my ſteady friendſhip in my ready compliance with your requeſt, reſpecting a free paſſage for your troops, in having deputed a truſty perſon to meet them on the banks of the *Nurbudder*, and invited the Commander to advance with confidence and ſecurity; and adding, that by the bleſſing of God the greateſt advantages will be derived to our reſpective ſtates by our intimate union; alſo, that you have, agreeably to my deſire, directed *Beneram Pundit* to repair to the Commander of the forces, and accompany him, and doubt not of his compliance. This letter reached me on the 4th of Jummadee-ul-awul, 3d of April, and made me very happy by its contents. Your many friendly letters, reſpecting the diſpatch of your forces to *Bombay*, which are filled with profeſſions of the moſt ſincere and perfect friendſhip, and of the mutual advantages which will accrue therefrom to our reſpective ſtates, have taken ſuch deep root in my mind, that I am not only perfectly convinced of them, but entertain even ſtill greater expectations from ſo intimate an union. With reſpect to the intrigues and connection of the Poonah Miniſters with the French, and their eſtrangement from the Engliſh, you obſerve, that although you do not implicitly credit all the various reports you have received on this ſubject, yet it is the duty of a Ruler of a State to be always on his guard, and prepared againſt every event, and that my remarks on this ſubject were very juſt and proper. The matter ſtands thus: it has been the invariable practice of my family ſteadily to purſue a friendſhip once contracted, and to act with the greateſt candour, and to give ſuch friend every neceſſary piece of intelligence which comes to our knowledge; this, by the bleſſing of God, you have already had, and will have ſtill further proofs of. The good faith and integrity of the Engliſh nation is alſo become a proverb, and are moſt firmly impreſſed on my mind, they are clearly proved to me by the intimate and unreſerved communications which you make in the courſe of the correſpondence which has been eſtabliſhed between us. God, who penetrates the ſecrets of the heart, knows the ſincerity of this declaration, which is ſufficient.

Whilſt my Son, and my Miniſter *Dewagur Pundit* were at *Poorunder*, all that they ſaw there was afterwards communicated to you by the latter. In your firſt letter on this ſubject, you write that the Poonah Miniſters had received the French vackeel, and granted him the port of *Choul Bunder*, and a topekana, and eſtranged themſelves from you, and formed connections with the enemies of the King of *England*; and that it was incumbent on you to guard againſt their deſigns; I therefore, with a view of diſcovering their real intentions, wrote letters, in which I ſlightly alluded to theſe matters, and now ſend you, for your inſtruction, the ſubſtance of the Peiſhwa's reply to me and *Luckman* vackeel. You muſt likewiſe have received continual advices from that quarter, and will receive further. The Peiſhwa informs me likewiſe, that he has written to *Calcutta* aſſurances of his ſteady adherence to the treaty, and information of his having given the French vackeel his diſmiſſion: this letter if it has reached you, will alſo give you further information.

The whole to be deduced from this is, that it is ſound policy, and the duty of the Ruler of a State to attend to all the advices he receives; to ſearch into the truth of them, and to take his meaſures on whatever is proved true; keeping himſelf conſtantly on his guard, and prepared againſt every event. You are bleſſed with wiſdom and experience; it is therefore unneceſſary for me to dwell on ſuch ſubjects to you. I have written two or three different letters to Colonel *Leſlie*, and have received a letter from him, accompanying one from you. My Agents have been waiting near two months on the banks of the *Nurbudder*, in expectation of the arrival of the forces; I do not yet know if they have croſſed the *Jummun*. As the rainy ſeaſon is at hand, and they have a long march before them, and have not yet arrived on this ſide the *Jummun*, I requeſt you will inform me if they are to advance or not, that I may give inſtructions to my Agents accordingly. I am much pleaſed that you have, agreeable to my deſire, ſent *Beneram* to join the detachment; it was highly proper.

I have not replied to the Peiſhwa's letter, but ſhall do it in whatever manner you intimate to me. I wait your reply, which I beg may be expeditious.

Knowing me ever anxious for your welfare, favour me with frequent accounts of your health, views, and the ſtate of affairs, which will be the means of encreaſing our friendſhip.

Encloſure in the above.

Copy of a Letter in the Hindoo language from the Peiſhwa to Maha Raja *Modajee Bhoſila* and *Luckman Row* vackeel; received at *Nagpore* the 5th of Jummadee-ul-Awul, 4th of April 1778.

The particulars reſpecting the French are as follows: This is a powerful ſtate, and every power is deſirous of ſending Ambaſſadors to cultivate its friendſhip, and ſeek its connection. To refuſe admittance to the Ambaſſadors of the French Monarch, or other powers charged with propoſitions of friendſhip from their Maſter, would be highly improper, and not to hear their repreſentations would be inconſiſtent with the credit and dignity of the ſtate. It is the duty of the Ruler of a State to make himſelf acquainted with the affairs of every ſtranger; for which purpoſe it was neceſſary to admit the French vackeel to an audience, and he was treated in a manner becoming the dignity of this ſtate.

When a treaty of friendſhip and union has been eſtabliſhed with the Engliſh, ſo that no ſhadow of difference remains, to break this connection for the ſake of an alliance with the French, would not only be a proof of the greateſt folly, but would be totally unprofitable. The report of the grant of a fort to the French, and topekanna to their Ambaſſador, is entirely groundleſs; the matter is this: when the French vackeel arrived, he brought with him merchandize; and by my permiſſion landed them at *Readunda*; part of them he ſold there, and part at *Poonah* and *Poorunder*. His ſtay here ſo long is ſolely to collect in the money for the goods.

At what period have the French ſhewn themſelves, or what great action have they performed, to induce any one to ſeek their friendſhip or connection? and for what purpoſe ſhould a fort and topekanna be entruſted to them? I have given them neither one nor the other; I have of my own accord given the French vackeel his diſmiſſion to his own country; his ſtay is ſolely to collect the amount of the merchandize he has ſold; it would be improper forcibly to drive him away; but I underſtand he will ſhortly depart. It is therefore improper that the Engliſh Chiefs ſhould form any ſuſpicions of this quarter on that account, and I am convinced they will not give way to any ſuch. I have not, nor will ever deviate a hair's breadth from the duties of friendſhip to them. You will therefore (this is addreſſed to the vackeel) repreſent this matter in a clear light to the Rajah, and cauſe him to write letters, explaining it ſatisfactorily, to *Calcutta*; I have likewiſe written to *Calcutta* on this ſubject to remove all doubts which may have ariſen. Should this matter be repreſented differently by any news-writer, you will pay no degree of credit to it.

From

From *Dewagur Pundit:* received 6th July 1778.

I have been honoured in an happy hour with your gracious letter, which afforded me the greateſt ſatisfaction, and by its contents gave great pleaſure to the Rajah. The ſending *Beneram Pundit* to accompany the Commander of the Detachment was highly proper; the great and mutual advantages which will naturally be produced by the unreſerved communication of your mutual ſentiments in the correſpondence which has been eſtabliſhed between you and the Rajah, by which your friendſhip will be carried to the higheſt pitch, will appear at a proper opportunity. The ſubſtance of a letter from the Peiſhwa to my Maſter and *Luckman Row* is ſent for your information. For further particulars permit me to refer you to my Maſter's letter.

To Maha Raja *Modajee Bhoſila:* written 24th July.

I have already written you a full account of the affairs of this quarter, and of my deſign to depute Mr. *Elliott* to conclude a perpetual treaty of friendſhip and alliance between you and the Company, on ſuch terms as may be for the mutual benefit, honour, and ſatisfaction of both parties. That Gentleman took leave of me on the 20th inſtant, or 24th of Rubbee-aſſanee, and begun his journey to *Naigpore*, where he will have the pleaſure of delivering you this letter. I have already written you ſo fully on the abilities, prudence, and worth of this gentleman, who poſſeſſes my entire eſteem and confidence, that it is needleſs to enlarge on the ſubject. I ſhall therefore only repeat that nothing has paſſed between you and me, either by letters or through *Beneram Pundit*, but what he is informed of, and that he has *full power from* the Government to negociate and conclude a perpetual treaty of alliance with you, in ſuch manner that whatever he concludes in our name and on our parts, we will ratify and confirm.

I requeſt that you will regard him as myſelf, and pay equal attention to whatever he ſhall repreſent to you, and treat him with every mark of honour and regard.

To *Dewagur Pundit*, D°

Containing the ſubſtance of the above letter, with this addition. I rely on you that you will exert yourſelf ſo warmly with your Maſter as to enſure a fortunate iſſue to the negociations entruſted to Mr. *Elliott*, which will be productive of the moſt advantageous conſequences to both ſtates; I am too well acquainted with the wiſdom of the Maha Rajah's Government and of your adminiſtration, to propoſe any thing which will not add to the power of the Maha Rajah, and to the reputation of his Miniſters.

To *Modajee Bhoſila:* written 27th July.

I have already written you repeatedly on the ſubject of my deſign to depute Mr. *Elliott* to conclude a treaty of perpetual friendſhip and alliance between you and the Company.

That gentleman took leave of me the 20th inſtant, 24th of Rubbee-aſſanee, and as he means to proceed with the greateſt expedition, I doubt not but you, agreeable to my requeſt, will uſe every means in your power to prevent any delay or obſtructions to his journey. I hope he will arrive almoſt as ſoon as you receive this letter.

He is a gentleman of my own houſe, and particularly attached to me, and of great abilities; he poſſeſſes my entire confidence, and is inveſted with the fulleſt powers from this Government, which has the controul of all the Engliſh poſſeſſions and forces in *India*, to conclude a firm treaty with you in our name and on our behalf, and whatever he ſhall ſo conclude we will confirm and ratify.

I therefore requeſt that you will regard him in the ſame light as myſelf, and pay equal attention to whatever he ſhall repreſent to you, as if it had proceeded from my own mouth.

The advantages to be mutually derived from ſo intimate an union as I propoſe to form with you, will be evident to you who are poſſeſſed of the greateſt judgment and penetration; and I doubt not but you will enter warmly into the propoſals which will be made to you by Mr. *Elliott*, and conclude with him a treaty on ſo firm a baſis as may continue to our lateſt poſterity.

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APPENDIX, No. 74.

From the *Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah* to the Governor. No date: received 21ſt June 1778.

I AM given to underſtand, that the gentlemen at *Bengal* have wrote to you to prepare warlike ſtores, &c. in order to aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*; and that you are accordingly making preparations for that purpoſe. When the Company at *Madras* have entered into a ſolemn treaty with me, that wherever my enemies are theirs ſhall be alſo, what conſiſtency is there in their giving their aſſiſtance to *Ragonaut Row*, my profeſſed enemy? either the gentlemen of *Bengal* are not acquainted with the engagements of thoſe at *Madras*, or if they are, they ſuppoſe that theſe engagements are thoſe of the Company at *Madras*, and not of the Company of *Bengal*; which of theſe two am I left to ſuppoſe? If you have not already acquainted them with the treaty which ſubſiſts between us, you ought to do it now; but if the gentlemen at *Bengal* in ſupporting *Ragonaut Row* are determined to make war with the *Pundit Purdhaun Madherow*, I ſhall be obliged, in conſideration of the treaty ſubſiſting between him and me, to give him every poſſible aſſiſtance on my part.

You, Sir, will be pleaſed to communicate theſe particulars to the Governor of *Bengal*, and acquaint me with the reſult of it. What ſhall I ſay more?

From the *Nabob Nizam Ally Khan:* received 23d July 1778.

When a merchant of *Bengal* formerly came here with rarities, and curious productions of that quarter, I diſcourſed with him on the treaty which ſubſiſted between me and *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, *Madho Narrain Row*, of the deceitful murder of *Narrain Row* by *Ragonaut Row*, his expedition againſt me, the war which enſued, his ſubſequent defeat, and the renewal of my engagements on the firmeſt baſis with *Pundit Purdhaun*; all which particulars I enlarged upon to the ſaid merchant, that he might give you a minute detail of them, which I doubt not he did. Some time ago, when Colonel *Upton* quitted *Poorunder*, and returned by the route of *Hyderabad*, he paid me a viſit: I took the opportunity of diſcourſing largely with him of the bad faith and invincible villainy of *Ragonaut Row*, and of the renewal of the treaty between me and *Pundit Purdhaun*, and ſhewed him the treaty which the Governor of *Madras* had contracted with me, of which (if you are deſirous of it) I will ſend you a copy for your inſpection. The treaty I allude to declares, that my enemies are the Company's and the Company's enemies mine; that the Company ſhall not protect the enemies of my Government, and in like manner, I ſhall not protect the enemies of theirs; I therefore aſked Colonel *Upton*, "whilſt ſuch "a treaty ſubſiſts, what is the motive of giving refuge to "*Ragonaut Row*, the inveterate enemy of my Govern-"ment, and labouring at his eſtabliſhment?"—Colonel *Upton* replied, "The King of *England*, who has ſent out "a Company to *Bengal* (Council I ſuppoſe he means) "did it ſolely with this view, that they might fully inform "themſelves of all the treaties which had been contracted "with every power, and comply with the terms of them."

It ſeems that the *Nizam* of *Bengal* is unacquainted with this treaty, as I have received repeated advice that

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the deſign of eſtabliſhing *Ragonaut Row* is again taken up, and that he is levying armies; what can be the deſign of this I cannot fully penetrate. When it is clearly expreſſed in the treaty, that the enemies of my Government are the enemies of the Company, and the enemies of the Company my enemies, to what can I attribute this deſign, except your ignorance that ſuch treaty exiſts, or by ſuppoſing that the treaty being made by the Company at *Madras*, is not binding on the Company at *Bombay?* one or other of theſe ſuppoſitions I muſt abide by. My meaning in what I have above written is this; that if you have any quarrel with *Pundit Purdhaun*, on any other account than that of *Ragonant Row*, it matters not to me, I have nothing to do with it; but if you engage in hoſtilities with *Pundit Purdhaun* on account of *Ragonaut Row*, as I am inviolable in my engagements, and am bound by a firm treaty to *Pundit Purdhaun* in caſe *Ragonaut Row* makes war on him, it becomes my indiſpenſable duty, in conſequence of ſuch engagement, to give my aſſiſtance to *Row Pundit Purdhaun*: you will in ſuch caſe refer to the treaty I have before alluded to. It was neceſſary to intimate theſe particulars to you, and I have accordingly done ſo.

Should you aſk, why did the rulers at *Poonah* receive a French vackeel? the anſwer is this: after the departure of Colonel *Upton*, and his arrival with you, freſh advices were received, that preparations were making at *Bombay* to bring back *Ragonaut Row*. In the mean time a French vackeel arriving at *Poonah*, in conſequence of the reports which prevailed univerſally that *Ragonaut Row* was again becoming formidable, the Poonah Miniſters detained him with them, arguing thus: if the peace eſtabliſhed by Colonel *Upton* is preſerved, it is well; in caſe it ſhould be broken, it is political to have the French vackeel. On theſe grounds they detained him; notwithſtanding which, when I heard it I wrote to them in the ſtrongeſt terms, on the impropriety of their keeping a French vackeel with them, and they accordingly gave him his diſmiſſion, and I doubt not he is already ſet off.

APPENDIX, No. 75.

To the *Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah:* written 24th July.

YOUR friendly letter arrived in a fortunate hour, and made me happy by its contents. You write—[Here follows a repetition of the ſubſtance of this letter.]

The fact is this: it is now more than a year ſince an Agent from the court of *France* arrived at *Poonah*, and commenced a negociation with the Miniſters there, for the formation of an alliance between the French and the Marattas; nearly about the ſame time we were informed, by authentic advices from *England*, that the King of *France* had formed the plan of an alliance with the Marattas, for the purpoſe of aſſiſting him in his hoſtilities againſt the Engliſh; and we have ſince received a certain knowledge, that engagements have actually been executed between the Miniſters of *Poonah*, and the French Agent, in conſideration of which the latter is to bring a force of Europeans and military ſtores to *Poonah*; and this engagement ſubſiſts, notwithſtanding the friendſhip which was contracted between the Maratta State and the Company, and notwithſtanding the changes which have taken place in that Adminiſtratron; of this I repeat that I have a certain knowledge: In the mean time war has been declared between the Engliſh nation and the French. The foreknowledge of all theſe circumſtances induced me to prepare a force to be ſent to *Bombay*; not for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, to whom this Government is under no engagement, nor to make war with the Miniſters with whom we are in friendſhip, but in conformity to the duties incumbent on this Government, charged with the care and protection of all the Engliſh poſſeſſions in *India*, for the purpoſe of ſecuring the Preſidency of *Bombay*, which is now expoſed to a war with our declared enemies the French, and may be alſo involved in one with the Marattas, for ſuch are their apparent deſigns. If theſe deſigns really exiſt, we ſhall certainly oppoſe them with all our power; and the Miniſters, by making themſelves our enemies, are alſo yours, and by treaty you are bound to oppoſe them as ſuch, not to take a part with them: if, on the contrary, the deſigns attributed to them have been erroneouſly furmiſed, or they, refraining from the dictates of enmity and bad faith, ſhould relinquiſh them, we ſhall undertake nothing prejudicial to their intereſts, but our friendſhip and the ſucceſsful operation of our arms will eventually prove a benefit to them. The ſum of all I have ſaid is this: we are the friends of the Peiſhwa and of the Miniſters of *Poonah*, and ſhall continue whilſt they are our friends; we ſhall be their enemies, if they compel us to be ſuch by becoming our enemies; and you, by the treaty which you have quoted, and the precepts which you have preſcribed for my conduct, will remain their friend, or become their enemy, from the ſame cauſes.

As I wiſh to preſerve inviolable the friendſhip and engagements which ſubſiſt between you and the Company, I have thought proper to give you this explanation of my conduct, and have no doubt but you, actuated by the ſame motives, will adopt ſuch meaſures as may tend to the confirmation and daily increaſe of our friendſhip, which muſt be attended with the greateſt mutual advantages.

Knowing me ever anxious for your welfare, let me frequently have the pleaſure to hear from you.

APPENDIX, No. 76.

From *Nizam ul Dowlah:* received 28th January 1779.

I HAVE received the letter you did me the favour to write, and perfectly underſtand the contents of what you ſay in reply to my former letter, as well as on the ſubject of your determination to preſerve the faith of former treaties; your having no intention to ſupport *Ragonaut Row*, or wiſh to engage in hoſtilities with the Poonah Miniſters.

The good faith I have found in the Company exceeds what I have experienced from any other power, and imagining that you might not be acquainted with all the treaties executed by the Company, I formerly wrote you full information on that head, and God be praiſed you are ſteady and firm in your adherance to former treaties? with reſpect to what you write on the ſubject of *Ragonaut Row*, the conduct you have purſued is ſuch as faith of treaty required.

I formerly in the ſtrongeſt terms deſired the Poonah Miniſters not to give encouragement to the French vackeel: they are now aſhamed of their conduct, and have not the leaſt idea of connecting themſelves with the French; but ſhould the leaſt ſymptom of ſuch a deſign be proved on them, I will give immediate information to you, and withdraw myſelf from my engagements with them. you may be perfectly aſſured of this.

Let me frequently have the pleaſure to hear from you the events and occurrences of that quarter.

APPENDIX, No. 77.

Enclosures in a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn:* received 31ſt July 1778.

N° 1. Copy of a letter from *Ballajee Jennarjam* to *Nizam ul Dowlah.*

THE diſturbances on foot owe their riſe to certain perſons who ſet juſtice at defiance, and have invited *Dada* from *Bombay*; but your ſacred mind may be perfectly ſatisfied that they will effect nothing, for *Siccaram Baboo* is joined with me: I hope that when I require troops

troops from you, you will diſpatch *Zuffer ul Dowlah Bahadre* to this quarter with the greateſt expedition, and that your Highneſs will repair in perſon to *Aurungabad*, and canton there; that awed and terrified by your vicinitude, no perſon may be able to get head; the ambitious Engliſh will not effect any thing: we ſhall manage the Engliſh by means of the French, whoſe vackeel is with us, with whom we have entered into a treaty. After the preſent diſturbances are quelled, we ſhall call in his troops, and act in the moſt vigorous manner, to be a future example to others. You will learn further particulars from the Arzee of *Kiſhen Row Billal*. I have nothing to add but aſſurances of my reſpect.

N° 2. Copy of a Treaty concluded through the vackeel *Monſieur St. Lubin*, by *Ballajee Jennajun*, as follows:

After an end is put to the diſturbances of *Moojee Pundit*, which will ſhortly be eaſily effected, you ſhall call forces from your own country, and in conjunction with the army of *Seremunt Saib*; which ſhall join you; you will act in the moſt vigorous manner; for which ſervice a Jaghire ſhall be beſtowed on you from the Peiſhwa's *Sirkar*; but you muſt remain quiet at preſent; the opportunity of acting will ſhortly preſent itſelf, and the nation which has preſumptuouſly ſet itſelf up and adopted maxims of injuſtice, and by its influence protected many perſons who ſet right at defiance, ſhall be properly dealt with, and receive the puniſhment due to their actions. Dated the 15th of Rubbee Aſſaine in the 19th year of the reign, or 13th of May, Anno Domini 1778.

APPENDIX, No 78.

Intelligence from the *Decan*: received the 23d of June 1778.

RAGONAUT Row before he began his march from *Bombay*, diſpatched *Ummajee Mahadar* to *Hyder Naig*, informing him, that the Engliſh of *Bombay* were of his party; and that, if he wiſhed to promote his intereſt, he would march from the *Jungbudder*, and join him; and by means of their united force, his affairs would be ſatisfactorily concluded. *Hyder Naig* replied, that he was then engaged in a war, but that as ſoon as it was at an end, he would attend to his intereſts. *Ummajee Mahadoa* is ſtill with him (3d of Rubbe Aſſanee, 1ſt May.)

Siccaram Pundit, *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, &c. have written to *Hurry Pundit Purdkea* and *Scindia*. It appears that they can do nothing without the concurrence of *Hurry Pundit Purdkea*, who is become very powerful, having near 60,000 horſe with him, excluſive of the force under *Scindia* and *Dhouſa*. *Nanna Purnaveeſe* and *Hurry Pundit* are in their hearts united in the deſign to keep the Government in the hands of *Mhadoo Row*, the ſon of *Narrain Row*, and to give the *Dewanny* to *Bajee Row*, the ſon of *Ragonaut Row*, an infant of three years old, with *Moraba Purnaveeſe* for his Naib, and to leave the adminiſtration in the hands of *Ragonaut Row*, until *Madlo Row* and *Bajee Row* arrive at the age of maturity; but that he ſhall conduct the buſineſs with the advice of *Nanna Purnaveeſe* and *Siccaram Pundit*, to keep up an union amongſt the ſeveral Chiefs, and to tranſact the buſineſs on the former plan.

APPENDIX, No. 79.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 18th July 1778.

THE Governor General—As the time will not admit of any delay in raiſing the three battalions of ſepoys, which are to be maintained by Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, I propoſe that the Commander in Chief be deſired to give orders immediately for that purpoſe.

Agreed to. The following letter is therefore written to Brigadier General *Stibbert*.

To Brigadier General *Giles Stibbert*.

Sir,

We have already acquainted you with our reſolution, to cauſe three battalions of ſepoys to be raiſed and maintained at the expence of Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, for the defence of the Company's poſſeſſions: as the preſent criſis will not admit of delay, we requeſt that you will give the neceſſary orders for raiſing and forming theſe corps with all poſſible expedition.

Fort William, 18th July 1778. We are, &c.

To Rajah *Chite Sing*, D°

War having been declared between the Courts of *Great Britain* and *France*, by the former on the 18th of March, or 18th of Suffer, and by the latter on the 30th of March, or 1ſt of Rubbee-ul-awal 1192, Hejeree, I am to requeſt of you, in my own name and that of the Board, as a ſubject of the Company, bound to promote their intereſt on every occaſion, to contribute your ſhare of the burden of the preſent war, which will equally affect your intereſt and ours. It has been determined by the Board, that an eſtabliſhment of three regular battalions of ſepoys, to be commanded by Britiſh officers, be raiſed and maintained at your expence, and employed on ſuch ſervice as the ſituation of affairs may require. I have no doubt but, regarding this meaſure equally conducive to your own and the Company's intereſt, you will with the greateſt readineſs comply; and I hope you will intimate your conſent without delay.

From Maha Raja *Chite Sing*: received 30th July 1778.

I have been honoured by the receipt of your gracious letter, communicating the intelligence of a war having broke out between the Courts of *Great Britain* and *France*; and deſiring me to take on myſelf a ſhare of the burden of expence. My patron, I am the ſervant of the Sirkar. I will write you more fully hereafter. On all occaſions I am hopeful of your Highneſs's favour and ſupport.

APPENDIX, No. 80.

Appendix No. 80.

From Rajah *Chite Sing*: received 28th September 1778.

I HAVE been honoured by your gracious letter, deſiring that I will, as a ſubject of the Company, take on myſelf the payment of five lacks of Muchledar rupees, as my proportion of the expence of the preſent war, and pay them to Mr. *Graham*: although I have no ability left, and the great burden of expence I laboured under from the time of the deceaſe of the late Rajah, till the expiration of the Nabob Vizier's authority over me is well known to God and your Excellency; yet ſolely with a view to a compliance with your orders, and to prove my fidelity, having ſold and pledged every thing belonging to me, I will make good the aforeſaid ſum in inſtalments in ſix or ſeven months. Although by parting with my effects, which are clearly neceſſary, I am left in a ſtate of inability for the future, yet you will ſhew me ſuch favour, that I ſhall again recover myſelf.

As a time is required for the ſtate of my effects, and raiſing the money, I hope from your kindneſs, that the officers of Government may take from me in different payments the ſaid ſum in Sonaut rupees; as I ſhall not be able to procure this ſum in Muchledar rupees; and that you will be graciouſly pleaſed to affix your ſignature to my requeſts, that I may apply myſelf with ſatisfaction and aſſiduity to the buſineſs of the Sirkar.

To Rajah *Chite Sing*, Do

I have been favoured with your letter, intimating your conſent to the requiſition made to you by this Government

Appendix. No. 81.

ment as a ſubject of the Company, to bear a part of the expence of the preſent war: I am pleaſed with your ready compliance; of this indeed I could have no doubt, as your intereſt is equally concerned with the Company's in the ſucceſs of it. The expence of keeping up three regular battalions has been calculated and found to amount to five lacks of rupees per annum, at which rate your annual ſubſidy has been accordingly fixed; I am therefore to deſire in the name of this Government, that you will pay immediately to Mr. *Thomas Graham* the ſum of five lacks of Muchledar rupees. Thus you will perform your duty to the Company, and ſecure their favour and ſupport.

APPENDIX, No. 81.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 4th May 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

READ the following letters and encloſure from the Reſident at the Nabob's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I do myſelf the honour to encloſe you muſter returns of his Excellency the Vizier's body guard, and the three battalions commanded by Major *Hannay*, for the month of February laſt. I have, &c.

Lucknow, 20th March 1778. (Signed) *Nath*^{l} *Middleton*, Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Encloſed I have the honour to tranſmit you my accounts for the Hindoo month of Faugun, or from the 12th February to the 13th March 1778, Engliſh ſtile, agreeably to the accompanying liſt.

I have, &c.

Lucknow, 4th April 1778. (Signed) *Nath*^{l} *Middleton*, Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have been duly honoured with your commands of the 9th March; and have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that after being fully aſſured by Mr. *Barwell* of *Fyzoola Cawn*'s neither keeping up any conſiderable force, holding improper correſpondence or connections, or appearing in any reſpect to have violated the engagements he entered into in his treaty with the late Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*, I communicated to the Vizier the Honourable Board's permiſſion to me to guarantee on the part of the Honourable Company, the treaty ſubſiſting between him and *Fyzoola Cawn*; provided his Excellency ſhould give his concurrence to that permiſſion.

The Nabob having approved of the purpoſes of Mr. *Barwell*'s miſſion, and being aſſured from his report, and other concurrent circumſtances, that *Fyzoola Cawn*'s conduct furniſhed no grounds of accuſation by which he could be juſtified in an infringement of the rights confirmed to him by treaty, readily and without heſitation conſented to a renewal of the treaty under guarantee of the Honourable Company only, ſignifying his expectations that ſome complimentary preſent, conformable to conſtant cuſtom, and ſuitable to his rank ſhould be made him by *Fyzoola Cawn* on the delivery of the Khelaut: as I could not entertain a doubt from *Fyzoola Cawn*'s anxiety for the completion of this buſineſs under the ſanction of the Honourable Board, but that he would of his own accord be ready to ſhew the Vizier ſuch marks of gratitude and reſpect as would manifeſt his due conſideration of the great obligation conferred on him, I preſumed to aſſure his Excellency he might certainly expect to receive on the occaſion an acknowledgement not diſparaging to his rank and dignity, nor betraying in *Fyzoola Cawn* a deficient ſenſe of the benefits he derived from an alliance with his Excellency.—From what I was able to diſcover in my converſation with the Vizier, I have reaſon to believe he looks not to any ſum which could be conſidered as a pecuniary acquiſition, but confines his expectations merely to ſuch complimentary nuzzers as are uſually offered in token of reſpect by a ſubordinate to a ſuperior power on ſimilar occaſions: I have therefore taken upon me to deſire Mr. *Barwell* to repreſent this matter in its proper light to *Fyzoola Cawn*; and I have no doubt but that Chief's concurrence in whatever may be reaſonable and proper, will cloſe the negociation in a manner entirely ſatisfactory to the Vizier.

I have the honour to encloſe for your peruſal copies of the Vizier's treaty with *Fyzoola Cawn*, and of the obligation which I have entered into in conſequence of the authority you were pleaſed to delegate to me on the part of the Honourable Company; and for your more particular information. I muſt alſo beg leave to trouble you with a complete tranſcript of my correſpondence with Mr. *Barwell* on the ſubject of his miſſion, commencing with my original inſtructions, which I hope will meet with the Honourable Board's approbation.

In obedience to your commands I have reſerved a ſum in my hands amounting to ten lacks of rupees, for the uſe of the detachment under orders of march for *Bombay*, which I am converting as faſt as I poſſibly can into gold mohurs; but ſo ſmall is the circulation of gold currency in theſe parts, and ſo much is it the practice among men of property to hoard it up, as riches eaſily concealed, that I am afraid I ſhall not be able to procure any conſiderable amount within the time it may be wanted. The Honourable Board, however, will pleaſe to reſt aſſured that no endeavours or aſſiduity on my part ſhall be wanting to ſecure as large a ſum as poſſible; as gold coinage, from the facility of carriage, muſt be infinitely preferable to ſilver ſpecie, which would be extremely bulky and difficult of conveyance.

The reſervation of ſo conſiderable a ſum for the ſervice of the Bombay detachment has neceſſarily fruſtrated my intention of making the Honourable Board an immediate remittance; however as the ſeaſon of the heavy collections is now arrived, and the harveſt to all appearance a very promiſing one, I flatter myſelf I ſhall ſhortly have repleniſhed my treaſury, ſo as to admit of my carrying my former intention into effect, leaving a ſufficiency for the exigencies of the current ſervice.

I have, &c.

Lucknow, 10th April 1778. (Signed) *Nath*^{l} *Middleton*.

APPENDIX, No. 82.

From *Nejif Khan*: received 10th Auguſt 1778.

A LONG ſpace of time has elapſed ſince I have had the pleaſure to hear from you, which gives the greateſt pain to a heart which abounds with affection for you, and to which the news of your welfare would communicate the greateſt pleaſure. I hope from your ſincere regard for me, that you will number me amongſt your moſt zealous friends, and will frequently make me happy by your letters.

In the courſe of laſt year you were kindly pleaſed to diſpatch Major *Hannay*, to ſtrengthen and confirm the ties between us. The wars in which I was then engaged with *Zabita Khan*, the Seiks and Mahrattas, would not admit of my diſmiſſing a certain perſon, or of my inviting Major *Hannay* to come to me and acting agreeably to the pleaſure of the Engliſh Chiefs. From theſe events the negociations commenced laſt year were ſuſpended.

As I am deſirous at all times and on all occaſions to comply with the will of the illuſtrious Chiefs, to which I will never act contrary, I requeſt that you will now give directions to Major *Hannay* to repair to me without delay. God willing, on his arrival, every thing ſhall be done agreeable to the will of the illuſtrious Chiefs. My zeal and attachment to the Company is firmly rooted in my heart. Your Excellency may be fully aſſured that I will never take any ſtep which may be diſagreeable to the illuſtrious Chiefs; and if the circumſtances and particular occurrences of the times, all the particulars of which are well known to you, neceſſarily cauſed a delay in my compliance with the wiſhes of the illuſtrious Chiefs, you muſt not impute it to me as a fault. I am with my whole heart and ſoul attached to the Company, from whom I have alſo expectations of great advantages. How can it then be ſuppoſed that I would act in ſuch a manner as to deſtroy them? Your Excellency may rely on this with the moſt implicit confidence, and ſend Major *Hannay*, when every thing ſhall be conducted agreeably to your wiſhes.

Knowing me entirely attached to you, I hope that till I have the happineſs of a meeting with you, you will favour me with frequent letters and commiſſions, which will be the cauſe of the greateſt joy to me.

Intelligence of tranſactions at the Royal Durbar, from the 1ſt of Rujjub to the 4th, or from the 26th to the 29th of July: received the 20th Auguſt.

A newspaper was preſented from the Camp of *Nejif Cooley Khan*, mentioning, that the ſaid Khan had taken from the fort of *Shaheepore* ſeveral pieces of artillery, and a magazine of grain, and had diſtributed the latter amongſt his ſepoys; that having given the fort into the charge of one of his creatures, an Afghan, he marched from thence with *Afraſcal Khan*, againſt the fort of *Kaeſur*, where the ſons of *Chatter Jaut* reſide, who not being able to oppoſe him, commenced a negociation for the payment of a further tribute, which is not yet concluded.

An Arzie was then preſented from the Nabob *Mujed-ul-Dowlah*, ſetting forth, that the Nabob *Zoolfikar-ul-Dowlah* had conceived a hatred to him, and was coming to the preſence with a determination to proſecute his evil intentions againſt him; that this circumſtance, joined to the clamours of the ſepoys and the ſervants of the Mohul, had placed him in the moſt alarming ſituation. His Majeſty having peruſed it, replied, the ſervants of the Mohul, &c. will undoubtedly inſiſt on the payment of their dues, and with reſpect to his accuſation of the Nabob *Zoolfikar-ul-Dowlah*, why does he act in ſuch manner as to draw on himſelf his hatred and reſentment, he points himſelf out as the object of his vengeance; we are therefore remedileſs. At this inſtant news was brought that the ſepoys had ſurrounded the houſe of the Nabob *Mujed-ul-Dowlah* in a clamorous manner, on which his Majeſty ſent a meſſage to *Litafut Ally Khan*, to go and appeaſe the diſturbance; ſoon after which an Arzie was preſented from the Nabob *Mujed ul-Dowlah*, that *Litafut Ally Khan* had quelled the diſturbance, but that he had no money in his hands from whence to pay them their arrears, and notwithſtanding he had made the moſt preſſing inſtances to the jewellers to lend money on the royal jewels to receive them in pawn, agreeable to his Majeſty's directions for raiſing money for defraying the expence of the nuptials of the Princeſſes, they had abſolutely refuſed to lend any money on them. His Majeſty having read it, ſaid, it is plain that *Mujed-ul-Dowlah*'s evil day is arrived.——*Hiſſum-ul-Dowlah* made attempts of the ſame nature, and met with the chaſtiſement of his demerits. *Mujed-ul-Dowlah* has acted treacherouſly, and embezzled the income of the provinces, and when having no other reſource I ordered our jewels to be depoſited and money raiſed on them, he has contrived to fruſtrate his intent. It is plain from this that he deſigns to ruin himſelf after the example of *Hiſſum-ul-Dowlah*. Appendix. No. 84.

Intelligence of *Mujed-ul-Dowlah*.

At a muſter taken of the ſepoys there were great clamours for their arrears, and many of the Najeeb ſepoys inſiſted on immediate payment from *Roſſe Khan* their Chief, over whom they placed a guard. The Nabob being alarmed ſtationed guards at his houſe, with orders to oppoſe and chaſtiſe any of the Nejub ſepoys who ſhould attempt to enter; on hearing this a party of them went and attacked the houſe and penetrated to the burradery; in this dilemma the Nabob ſent to *Litafut Ally Khan*, who came and appeaſed the rioters with a promiſe of full payment in three months, and the diſtribution of 16,000 rupees amongſt them in part of their arrears.

Untajee and *Babojee Holcar* have excuſed their not repairing to the preſence immediately, having their hands full of buſineſs, and promiſed to go as ſoon as they have leiſure; this is a great diſappointment to *Mujed-ul-Dowlah*, who told their vackeel that if they came before the arrival of *Nejif Khan* they might obtain what they pleaſed, but after that event their coming would be needleſs.

Goolloo, the eunuch, brought more jewels from his Majeſty, with a meſſage to *Mujed-ul-Dowlah* to borrow 30,000 rupees on thoſe and the former jewels, and to depoſit them with the lender. The Nabob ſent for jewellers, and again preſſed them to lend money on them; but they would on no account conſent, ſaying they would never agree to receive the royal jewels in pawn; that they had much rather be baniſhed the city.

The Nabob *Nejif Khan* ſet out from *Deeg* for *Ackberabad* on the 3d of Rujjub, 28th of July, and arrived there on the 5th of Rujjub, or 30th July.

Intelligence of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, from the 5th to the 8th of Rujjub, from 30th of July to the 2d of Auguſt.

The Nabob is highly diſpleaſed again *Hoſſein Reza Khan* and *Hyder Khan*: Mr. *Middleton* ſpoke to him in their favour, and was anſwered by the Nabob, "Theſe "two unfaithful wretches have ruined both my family "and my dominions; ſpeak not in their favour." The Nabob then directed *Meaun Ulmaus* to appoint officers of his own, and ſend them into the diſtricts under his charge, and to pay a nuzzir of ten lacks of rupees, and he would appoint him to the Niabut in the room of *Hoſſein Reza Khan*. *Meaun Ulmaus* half conſented, but it is not yet certain what will be the event.

(Note. There is no Appendix No. 83, the ſubject matter being inſerted elſewhere.)

APPENDIX, No. 84.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 31ſt Auguſt 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richd Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edwd Wheler*, } Eſquires.

READ the following letters from Colonel *Leſlie*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I beg leave to tranſmit you herewith a duplicate of my addreſs to you of the 13th inſtant; ſince that period little alteration has happened in this quarter.

The troops of *Anrood Sing*, alarmed by the ſwelling of the *Kaine* from the heavy rains that have lately fallen, precipitately croſſed the river, with intentions to cover the road to *Panna*; and they have poſted themſelves between

Appendix No. 85.

between the pass of *Moncaow* and the bed of the river, having thrown up entrenchments with strong breast works along the opposite bank, to defend the passage of the river. The Rajah himself is there with his principal ministers and officers, and *Himut Cawn*, who was the Chief Sirdar at *Mhow*, has joined him with most of his troops. By all accounts they are in great consternation at the ill success of their treacherous designs. Their troops are much disheartened by the loss they suffered at *Mhow*, and are much disgusted at their being kept in the field during this season, labouring under the want of provisions and of cash: they have even declared they will not stand an attack of our troops, whatever their Chiefs may wish to undertake.

Ballajee is, I am informed, making preparations to receive me on the *Sagur* route; and I have had very certain intelligence, that a freebooter, formerly in the service of *Janoojee*, is on his march to join *Ballajee* with a body of near 5,000 cavalry.

Yesterday evening I received an express from Mr. *Boddam*, Chief of *Surat*, covering a letter from the Bombay Presidency. They contain news of a most interesting nature to the Company's affairs; and left any delay should happen in the consequence of this intelligence immediately to *Calcutta*, I deemed it necessary to transmit copies of them to the Honourable the Governor General, by an express coffid last night. Authenticated copies of these letters I now do myself the honour to lay before the Board.

My train of carriages have undergone a thorough repair during my stay here, and I am using all speed in completing my deficiencies of draft and carriage cattle. A very few days will enable me to prosecute my march, I hope, as I now only wait the collecting the small stock of grain to attend my camp; which precaution appears absolutely necessary by the steps *Ballajee* is taking to obstruct my advance, and the junction of these troops will afford him a greater opportunity of attempting it. You may depend on my utmost attention to the wish expressed in the Bombay Presidency's letter in using all expedition; and every faculty of mine shall be exerted, to effect as speedy an advance as can be made through a tract of country yet but little known, and the delays I must expect to encounter at this season of the year, by the swelling of the many nullas and rivers which this country abounds with.

I am, with the highest respect, &c. &c.

Chatterpore, 25th July 1778. (Signed) *Matt^v Leslie.*

Secret Department.

To Colonel *Leslie*: received July 24th, noon.

Sir,

We received your letter of the 14th May, and hope soon to hear you are well advanced on your march.

Mr. *Mostyn* has obtained from *Tookajee Holcar*, and transmitted to you, orders for the free passage of the army under your command through his dominions; so that we flatter ourselves, you will meet with no obstructions or impediments in your march to this place.

We have no further instructions or information to add to those contained in our letter of the 5th instant, already forwarded by seven different routes, only that you will pursue your march with all possible diligence, which we doubt not will be accelerated by a circumstance Mr. *Boddam* will apprize you of, and to which you will give full credit. We do not mention it ourselves, there being less danger of a letter from *Surat* being intercepted, and it does not appear you are furnished with a cypher.

We are your most obedient humble servants,

(Signed).

Bombay Castle, 19th June 1778.

W. Ashburner, *And^r Ramsay*, *Wm Hornby*, *John Carnac*, *D^l Draper*, *Henry Moore*, *N^l Stackhouse*,

A true copy. (Signed) *Matt^v Leslie.*

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APPENDIX, No. 85.

Letter from the Governor General and Council.

Gentlemen,

WE have received your letters, dated the 25th ultimo, by the *Terrible*.

Received at Bombay 27th Sept. 1778. Sel. Com.

That no time may be lost in conveying our sentiments to you, we send this by different routes, to acquaint you, that we approve your resolution of the 21st July, and authorize you to assist *Ragoba* with a military force, to conduct him to *Poonah*, and to establish him in the Regency there, on the following express provisions:

First. That it do not interfere with any engagement formed with *Moodajee Bouncello* by Mr. *Elliott*, and previous notice to you by him.

Second. That your latest advices from *Europe* shall be equal to an assurance, that the force required for this service may be spared, without endangering the safety of *Bombay*, in the event of a French invasion.

Third. That the engagement you may form with *Ragoba* himself, or *Moraba* and his associates, be not contrary to those concluded with *Moodajee* by Mr. *Elliott*, and notice to you; nor of a hostile tendency to the Government of *Berar*.

We are,
Gentlemen,
your most obedient servants,
Warren Hastings,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler.

Fort William, 17th August 1778.

P. S. We have received the letters from the President and Council, dated 31st May, 3, 12, 18, and 25 June, and 6th July.

APPENDIX, No. 86.

Extract of Secret Letter from *Bombay*, dated 14th March 1778: received in *London* 29th July 1778.

Par. 2. ENCLOSED is duplicate of our address by that ship * in the Secret Department. We therein fully mentioned the overtures which had been made to us through Mr. *Lewis*, for the assistance of the Company to carry *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, and our reasons for not proceeding further in the business.

* The Hawke.

3. We have since had the satisfaction of receiving the most complete sanction and approbation of the Governor General and Council, to the plan and principle upon which we had determined to proceed; which that you may the more clearly comprehend, we enclose a copy of our Minutes, and of the letter and resolutions of the Governor General and Council in consequence.

4. The failure of this promising scheme may in a great measure be ascribed to the distrust entertained by *Ragoba*'s friends, of our want of power to fulfil our engagements. *Moraba*'s words to Mr. *Lewis* were "If "we enter into business, let us go through it heartily; "let there be no excuse on the part of the Governor "and Council afterwards, that they have received or- "ders to make a peace, *as they did before*." This objection may be now entirely removed, if the party are sincere in the attachment they have professed for *Ragoba*, and are really desirous of the Company's assistance to conduct him to *Poonah*. We therefore transmitted to Mr. *Mostyn*, on the 10th instant, a copy of the resolutions of the Governor General and Council, and have not heard from him since.

5. The necessity of taking some measures to anticipate the designs of the French, and to counteract the party in the Poonah Government, inimical to the Company, appears every day more imminent. The Governor General and Council's approbation is too much confined to the particular plan proposed to them, without giving us any more general latitude to act as circumstances

ſtances might require, which we had very ſtrongly preſſed them to do; ſo that at laſt we may be obliged either to hazard the conſequences of acting without authority from them, or paſſively behold the very exiſtence of the Company endangered, without making an effort to preſerve it.

10. From Mr. *Moſtyn*'s advices there appears little or no proſpect of the diſputed articles of the treaty being adjuſted, or of obtaining ſatisfaction on any one of the points given in charge to him; of which indeed we almoſt give up all hopes whilſt the preſent Government ſubſiſts.

11. Your ſervants at *Madras* have acquainted us, in a letter dated the 15th January, that they did not think it ſafe or prudent to ſpare the whole or any part of the force we had wrote for; becauſe, as they ſay, the preſent poſture of affairs gives them reaſon to apprehend a war with *France*, and their eſtabliſhment was incomplete and inſufficient for the defence of the poſſeſſions belonging to the Nabob, the Company, and the Rajah of *Tanjore*, whom they had taken lately under their protection; becauſe the unfiniſhed ſtate of the fortifications there and at *Tanjore* would render it unſafe to detach any part of the force ſtationed for their ſecurity, even was their eſtabliſhment complete.

APPENDIX, No. 87.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 29th March 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,

The W. *John Carnac*, Eſquire, *Daniel Draper*,
Nath. Stackhouſe, *Wm Aſhburner*,
Andrew Ramſay.

Honourable Sir,

I ADDRESSED you early yeſterday morning, and this is purpoſely to adviſe you of the revolution I have ſo long expected. About noon *Morabah* accompanied by *Chintoo Wittul* and *Narro*, *Sunker*'s ſon, with about 10,000 horſe, came and encamped on the other ſide of the river, and immediately ſent 50 horſe into town, 25 of which went to the Palace, and the reſt through all the ſtreets, directing the inhabitants in *Ragoba*'s name to open their ſhops, and not to run away, on pain of puniſhment, for they had nothing to fear; the appearance of ſo large a force without knowing who they were, had put the town into the utmoſt confuſion, and every body was moving off as faſt as poſſible; at one o'clock *Morabah* came into town, and went directly to the Palace to pay his reſpects to *Perwettybah*, who immediately inveſted him with the Sirapan of *Duan*, and preſented him with the Mutalick, Sicca, Cataree, Nobut, and Terree Putca; *Morabah* after removing all the old chowkies out of the palace, and placing his own people, alſo putting a chowkie on the houſe of *Nannah*'s duan, and receiving the compliments of *Viſſagee Punt Beney*, *Sadaſſew Ramchunder*, and *Janabah*, the Governor of the town, being the only people of conſequence left, returned accompanied by them to his tent on the other ſide of the river. This letter would have been diſpatched in the evening, but having ſent my man to *Morabah* with compliments of congratulation, and to learn what further ſteps he intended to take, I waited for his return. He is this moment come, and gives me the following particulars: on his arrival at *Morabah*'s tent he found *Morabah* with *Butchaba Pronaur* and *Chintoo Wittul*, were gone to meet *Holcar*, who is come and encamped about three coſs off; that *Sacram* had left *Pronder* and reached *Cowree* about ſix coſs diſtant, and would join *Morabah* in the morning; that the whole of their forces now here amounted to 30,000; this intelligence I have had confirmed by other hands, with the addition, that *Cruſt Row Belal* and *Mhada Row Jada Roi*, were both coming. On *Morabah*'s return from *Holcar*, my man met him, but had only time to give my compliments, when *Morabah* deſired him to ſtay; that he muſt go to his victuals, having eat nothing all day, come 15 coſs in the morning, and been buſy ever ſince: my man waited until near 11 o'clock, and finding he did not come out, ſent to deſire to ſpeak to him; he was ſent for, but there was ſuch a concourſe of people to pay their reſpects, that *Morabah* could only return his compliments, and requeſt I would ſend him again in the morning. I am alſo informed, that after all the party is met they intend to march to *Pronder*; it may therefore be ſome days before I ſee *Morabah*, unleſs he ſends for me; in which caſe I ſhall not heſitate going, as *Sacram* and in ſhort the whole of the Government except *Nannah*, are here, I do ſuppoſe, they will determine ſoon to ſend ſome perſons of conſequence to *Bombay* to ſettle matters and to attend *Ragoba* if he comes; in which caſe it is probable they will deſire me to accompany them; therefore to ſave time I ſhould be glad to have your directions on this point. I am ſorry to find the party are likely to ſucceed ſo eaſily, for I ſee no reſource *Nannah* has but to come into *Morabah*'s terms, or to fly into one of his forts, which are *Logur* and *Perletgur*, but the latter is by moſt judged to be the place; ſhould *Nannah* condeſcend to make up matters, I fear it may induce the party to comply wholly with *Ragoba*'s treaty; and ſhould *Ragoba* refuſe to accept of their invitation on any other terms, *Morabah* and his party may look upon themſelves as abſolved from the oath they gave to *Ragoba*, which is the reaſon of their having made this effort, and think no more of them. Our conſideration ſeems now to be, whether it would not be more advantageous for the Company to recede ſomething, and thereby fix *Ragoba* in the Government with a body of our troops, and remain in ſtrict friendſhip with the Maratta State, and conſequently entirely ſhut out our natural enemies the French, and all other Europeans, than by perſiſting in a full compliance of the treaty, have *Ragoba* thrown upon our hands without any further proſpect; at variance with this Government, leave all hopes of any future advantage from them even by the preſent treaty, than what we are in abſolute poſſeſſion of, and give them on opening to admit the French or any other power they pleaſe. This is only conjectural, and what has occurred to me may be the caſe; for I cannot tell what may be their ultimate reſolutions on this head until I talk with them.

The revolution has ſet the French Captain at liberty to come here; I ſaw him this evening, and he tells me he has received a letter from *Monſieur Picot*, dated *Myhie* the 29th January informing him that his ſhip would leave *Pondicherry* the 5th February, in company with the *Brilliante*; that Monſieur *Bellcombe* was on board the latter, and purpoſes proceeding in her up the coaſt as high as *Surat*, where he intends ſtaying the rains. I know not what may be his views, but by the time he reaches *Myhie* he will have full knowledge of *Lubin*'s conduct and character here, not only from the officer of the veſſel he ſent up, but alſo from a black ſpy who talks French, he ſent here in the character of a merchant, and who found means to get to live with *Lubin*, by which means he got at all his proceedings. He alſo learnt from the Captain every thing reſpecting him, and what paſſed between the Durbar and *Lubin*. *Lubin* at laſt heard this man often viſited the Captain, and ſuſpecting his errand, acquainted *Nannah* therewith, who directly ordered him to be watched and if poſſible ſeized; in conſequence the fellow was one day purſued, but got off by running into the Captain's houſe and deſired to be ſecreted; this raiſed the Captain's curioſity, and he queſtioned the man particularly; when he candidly confeſſed his errand, and that he was employed by *Bellcombe*, who having heard various reports concerning *Lubin* and the Captain, ſent him to know the truth, and that he was ordered to meet *Bellcombe* at *Myhie*; the man further told the Captain he came to

Poonah

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Appendix, No. 88.

Poonah in company with two *Madras* Pattamars bound to *Bombay*, who promiſed to call on him in their way back; one of theſe Pattamars was ſeized, ſuppoſing him to be the man, but *Nannah* finding his miſtake only kept him one night, and next morning ſent him with a guard out of town, to prevent his making a complaint to me; this affair happened about twelve days ago. Theſe circumſtances, with the views of the alteration in the Government, will I hope induce *Bellcombe* to lay aſide his ſcheme of coming up to *Surat*. Monſieur *Lubin* has already met with ſome diſgrace by *Morabah*'s taking away the elephant lent him to carry his colours; and I flatter myſelf he will ſoon be glad to quit *Poonah*, unleſs detained by the Captain, who has thoughts of complaining to *Morabah* for money owing to him by *Lubin*, and get him made a priſoner: if the Captain cannot do this he is in hopes *Bellcombe*, who is a relation to *Belfond* the owner of the *Sartine*, will ſtop at *Choul* and demand of the Government that *Lubin* be delivered up to him. I will uſe my endeavours that *Lubin* be ſent away before this can happen, otherwiſe it may lead to an intercourſe by no means for our intereſt.

As I do not intend to addreſs you publickly until I have talked with *Morabah* or *Saccaram Bappoo*, or ſomebody for them, I beg you will be pleaſed to lay before the Board ſuch parts of this letter as you may judge neceſſary and proper.

Poonah, the 27th March, one o'clock, morning.

I am very reſpectfully, Honourable Sir, your moſt obedient ſervant, *Tho' Moſtyn.*

The following letter to Mr. *Moſtyn* was immediately ſigned and diſpatched from the Council Table.

Sir,

The Preſident has laid before us your letter dated the 27th at one in the morning.

In the preſent unſettled ſtate of the new Government, and until we receive more particular advices from you, we cannot give any preciſe directions for your conduct; but as you are well acquainted with our views and ſentiments, we do hereby empower you to act as you may think moſt conſiſtent with thoſe views and the intereſt of the Honourable Company, until we can give you more particular inſtructions.

As it will be of the utmoſt importance to effect the diſmiſſion of Monſieur *Lubin* from *Poonah* before the arrival of Monſieur *Bellcombe*, you will uſe your utmoſt addreſs to effect this point; but in ſuch a manner as not to appear too anxious about it, which the new Government might endeavour to take advantage of.

Bombay Caſtle, 29th March 1778. 6 P. M.

We are, your loving friends, *William Hornby*, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 88.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 6th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,

The W. *John Carnac*, Eſquire, *Daniel Draper*, *Nath. Stackhouſe*, *Willm Aſhburner*, *Andrew Ramſay.*

READ the letter received yeſterday from the Governor General and Council, &c.

If the French ſhould now ſucceed in getting an eſtabliſhment at *Choul*, the conſequence muſt reſt entirely with the Governor General and Council, as we have done every thing in our power to defeat their deſigns; not only by our repeated repreſentations at the Court of *Poonah*, and our application to Sir *Edward Vernon*, but by the reference we made to the Governor General and Council, whether we ſhould not purſue more active meaſures, to prevent the execution of a plan ſo replete with dangers to the Company's poſſeſſions. Their anſwer, now before us, confines our efforts to an appeal to the Maratta Government; and if that ſhould fail of ſucceſs, the conſequences, as we ſaid before, muſt reſt with them.

The Preſident lays before us, a letter to him from Mr. *Moſtyn*, as entered hereafter; by which we find there was to be a meeting of the principal members of the new Government about the 4th or 5th of this month, when we may expect to receive propoſals reſpecting *Ragoba*, and be at more certainty with regard to their intentions, until when, we cannot come to any direct reſolutions.

However, if the terms expected by the Company ſhould become a ſubject of diſcuſſion between Mr. *Moſtyn* and *Morabah*, he muſt conſtantly give him to underſtand that we ſhall expect a full confirmation of the grants made by *Ragoba*; it will be time enough hereafter to relax in our demands, if we ſhould find it neceſſary

The Preſident acquainting us that *Ragoba* expreſſes much impatience to go over to the continent, and talks of ſetting off in a few days, a deputation muſt be ſent, to repreſent to him the impropriety of ſuch precipitation, and that matters are not yet arrived at ſuch a ſtage, as to admit of his quitting *Bombay* with prudence or decorum; no forces having yet marched from *Poonah* to meet him, nor any perſon of conſequence come to invite him. They muſt alſo obſerve to him, it will be proper to ſettle ſome terms previous to his departure, and receive what offers he may make on the occaſion.

Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Ramſay* are appointed a Committee for that purpoſe, through whom our intercourſe with *Ragoba* muſt be conducted till matters are ſettled.

Mr. *James Sibbald* is to act as interpreter to the Committee, after being previouſly ſworn to ſecrecy.

Adjourned.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secretary.

Wm Hornby, *John Carnac*, *D. Draper*, *N. Stackhouſe*, *Wm Aſhburner*, *Andrew Ramſay.*

Honourable Sir,

My laſt reſpects were dated the 28th, and informed you *Morabah*, with the whole army, had marched to *Cowree* to meet *Sacram*. Yeſterday morning they all proceeded to Currut River in front, and about two coſs from *Pronder*, and this night at eleven o'clock, to my very great mortification, I am from ſeveral hands aſſured all matters are accommodated; but in what manner, they all are or chuſe to appear ignorant, except a Carcoon belonging to *Tombacker*, who was directed to inform me of all that paſſed. He ſends me word, a man from *Tombacker* arrived this afternoon, and acquaints him, *Nannah* has agreed to every thing *Morabah* propoſed regarding *Ragoba*; but inſiſted *Sacram* and *Morabah* ſhould ſtand ſecurity that his life ſhould be ſafe; that they were all to meet, and a general reconciliation to take place this afterooon, and to-morrow afternoon the child would be brought down to receive the compliments of *Morabah* (who has never ſeen him) and of the other Miniſters and officers; and for this purpoſe *Morabah* to day ſent to town for ſome jewels and clothes to preſent him; and in three or four days after, he expected they would all come to *Poonah*. He further ſays, that *Sacram* wanted to appoint people to the different offices now, but *Morabah* deſired it might be deferred until *Ragoba* came, when he would appoint whom he pleaſed. If this man's information is true, which I ſhall know to-morrow night or next morning, I do not expect to hear any thing from them until they come to *Poonah*.

At nine o'clock this evening I was honoured with yours and the Board's command of the 29th. Be aſſured, Sir, I will exert every nerve for the benefit of my employers. I am perfectly convinced of the importance

portance and utility *Baſſein* would be to us; but I very much fear this Government will not, on any conſideration, be brought to relinquiſh it; and we muſt wait and watch for a future opportunity to accompliſh this point. The diabolical ſcheme of *Nanah* to introduce the French, the moſt deſtructive one ſurely that could have been thought on for us, has totally changed our ſyſtem of politics; and it ſeems to me beſt at preſent, if we cannot do as we will, to do as well as we can; therefore I have been thinking, if we cannot do better, to endeavour to get *Jamhooſeer* made over in perpetuity, in lieu of all demands we have upon this Government, both for the Company on account of the late war, and for the merchants loſſes, and get rid of this endleſs ſource of diſpute; as much more as we can for our expences and trouble on account of *Ragoba* ſince the war, and ſecurity in hand for any troops we may aſſiſt *Ragoba* with; for they have not money to give us. All this I mean excluſive of *Upton*'s treaty: I mention theſe particulars, that no time may be loſt when I come to talk with *Morabah*, and wiſh to be favoured with your ſentiments on this head.

I would wiſh that you would not permit *Ragoba* to come over, until I have talked and ſettled matters with *Morabah*; but the objection ſhould appear to come from *Ragoba*, which he can with great propriety make; by obſerving, that no one of ſufficient conſequence was come over to accompany him; and I know no force is yet come down to receive him. I am alſo pretty clear *Morabah* (if he can be believed) will not take any further ſteps in this buſineſs, without acquainting us; nor does he expect *Ragoba* will come over, without proper people being ſent to receive him, or that he will truſt himſelf without a body of our troops to accompany him the whole way, and I think to remain: I judge two battalions and a train. As to *Dada Punt*, he wiſhes to diſtinguiſh himſelf; but *Tombacker* told me he was only ſent with the letters, and no doubt he may be directed to ſound the ground, and poſſibly ordered to wait and come with *Ragoba*, but who I hope will not be in too great a hurry; if he is, our buſineſs may be ruined. I hope in a few days to give you all particulars, and think the whole may be accompliſhed in a little more than a month. I will take care the neceſſary orders are given for bullocks, &c. I know not well what to do with the *Chickley*, &c. Pergunnahs: I could wiſh to have them deferred being ſettled for the preſent, as I know *Morabah* and *Holkar* mean to place *Govind Row* in the Guzerat Country. Poſſibly ſome lucky circumſtance may turn up from the change, or that *Ragoba* will have influence enough with *Govind Row*, to let us keep them.

You may depend I will uſe every endeavour for the knight's being diſpatched, and with the neceſſary precaution. *Morabah*, the day he marched for *Cowree*, removed the old guard and placed one of his own, with orders not to ſuffer any thing to be carried out of the garden where he lives, but not to prevent his going about where he pleaſes. I hear he is keeping people at his own expence, but this I believe is to protect himſelf againſt the Captain, who ſwears vengeance againſt him.

The letter from *Morabah* is delivered to *Tombacker*'s Carcoon, who will forward it to-morrow morning at Gun-fire: I remain with much reſpect,

Poonah, Honourable Sir,
31ſt March, your moſt obedient ſervant,
midnight. *Thomas Moſtyn.*

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 7th April 1778.

Signed the following letter to the Reſident at the Durbar:

The Preſident has laid before us your letter, dated the 31ſt March; in conſequence of which we think it neceſſary to direct that you do not at preſent give the Durbar any hopes that we will recede in the leaſt degree from the ſtipulations made for the Company, in the treaty with *Ragoba*. It will be ſoon enough to relax from our demands ſome time hence, if we ſhould find the ſame neceſſary. Appendix No. 89.

We do not doubt your diligence or addreſs; but our anxiety on account of the French leads us to repeat our directions, that you exert yourſelf to the very utmoſt to defeat their deſigns. The conduct of the new members of the Durbar on this occaſion will be a criterion to us to judge of their diſpoſitions towards the Company.

Bombay Caſtle, We are,
7th April 1778. your loving friends,
William Hornby, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 89.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 10th April 1778.

RECEIVED the following letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poonah*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt reſpects were dated the 6th; and early this morning I was favoured with your commands of the 7th.

On the 8th I received a letter from the Durbar, ſealed with the Maratta ſicca, requeſting I would repair to his camp with all poſſible expedition; I accordingly arrived the ſame evening. Yeſterday afternoon I had a meeting with *Morabah*, when he informed, that the reaſon for the Durbar ſending for me, was to requeſt I would accompany *Gopul Naigue Tumbacker*, who they were going to ſend to *Bombay* with propoſals regarding *Ragoba*; to which I replied, I thought it was proper the Durbar ſhould inform your Honour, &c. thereof in writing; which he promiſed ſhould be done. This afternoon *Morabah* ſent to requeſt I would meet him at *Saccram Bappoo*'s tent; accordingly, a ſhort time after he had paſſed I ſet out, but before I had reached *Saccram*'s camp they had gone to *Nanhab*'s encampment cloſe to *Pronder Hill*, whither *Tumbacker* deſired I would alſo go. On my arrival *Nanhab* received me in the public tent, where he deſired I would wait a few minutes, as the Durbar were in Council. In a ſhort time I was introduced, when I found the Durbar aſſembled in form, viz. *Butchaba Pronder*, *Sacram Bappoo*, *Morabah*, *Furneeſe*, *Nannah Furneeſe*, *Cruſt Row Belil*, *Nuda Row Sada Roi*, *Gopal Naigue Tumbacker*, *Buchaba*'s brother, and *Cruſt Row*'s ſon. After the uſual compliments, *Sacram* began the converſation by ſaying, that the Durbar had formerly requeſted I would go to *Bombay* on ſome buſineſs for them, and they now made a requeſt I would accompany a perſon they were going to ſend to *Bombay* on the buſineſs which *Morabah* had already acquainted me with; to which I made the ſame anſwer as I had done to *Morabah*, when they delivered me the encloſed letter for the Honourable the Preſident, referring me to *Morabah* for further particulars on this buſineſs. *Sacram* then ſaid, that the Durbar had received a letter from the Governor General, mentioning his having been informed that this Government had given a port to the French, and appointed Monſieur *St. Lubin* to the charge of the Tope Konnah here; he therefore aſked me, if to my knowledge ſuch was the caſe? I replied, that no ſuch circumſtances had to my knowledge taken place, but that I was not ſurprized the Governor General and Council, finding the Durbar, notwithſtanding their ſolemn promiſes to diſpatch us laſt Decera, had detained him until this time, ſhould believe ſuch was the caſe. I then deſired they would inform me what were their real motives with reſpect to the French; when *Sacram* replied, that they then had under conſideration the diſpatching Monſieur *St. Lubin*. I have alſo received aſſurance from *Morabah*, both yeſterday and this evening, ſince his return to his tent, that this point ſhall be ſettled as we wiſh.

I ſhall ſtrictly obey your commands, with reſpect to not

Appendix. No. 92.

not giving the Durbar any hopes of your Honour, &c. receding in the leaſt from the treaty entered into with *Ragoba*, indeed, I have ever endeavoured to inſtil this idea into the minds of the Miniſters, and have always recommended, as the moſt eligible method, their ſending a proper perſon to ſettle affairs both with your Honour, &c. and *Ragoba* at *Bombay*; which you will pleaſe to obſerve by the foregoing I have effected, and hope my conduct will meet with your approbation.

I am, very reſpectfully,

Camp near *Curret*, 10th April 1778. Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen, your moſt obedient humble ſervant, *Thomas Moſtyn.*

APPENDIX, No. 90.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 16th April 1778.

RECEIVED the following letter from Mr. *Moſtyn.*

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your commands of the 8th inſtant.

Before the receipt of your letter, a pair of Pattamars, diſpatched from the Preſidency of *Madras* on the 3d, acquainted me that they had been ſtopped at *Baramooty*, and ſent from thence to *Morabah*, who had ordered them to me. I immediately ſent the Linguiſt to repreſent to him that this was the ſecond time our Pattamars had been ſtopped ſince the late change in Government, and requeſted he would prevent the like in future; to which he replied, that he was extremely ſorry it had ſo happened, but that he having given orders to ſtop all letters, to prevent an improper correſpondence from the other party, and his having forgot in the hurry of buſineſs to except Engliſh letters, his Chowkies had of courſe intercepted them; he had however iſſued the neceſſary orders for our Pattamar's paſſing freely. The Pattamars, your Honour, &c. mention to have been ſtopped at *Barramooty*, came to me at *Poonah*; I aſked them particularly if any letters had been taken out of the packet? when they declaring there had not, and that only the wax-cloth covering had been opened, I directed them to proceed to *Bombay*; however on the 12th inſtant, in conformity to your orders, at a meeting I had with *Morabah*, I made a ſecond repreſentation to him, and aſked him if he had taken any letters from thoſe Pattamars? when he repeated his aſſurances of the foregoing day, and declared he had not taken any letter, nor did he know of any one elſe doing ſo.

The Durbar having been much engaged for ſome days paſt, I had not an oppurtunity of meeting with *Tumbacker* until this morning, when he aſſured me, that he ſhould be inveſted with full powers to ſettle both with your Honour, &c. and *Ragoba*; that a full Durbar is to be held to-morrow for his final inſtructions and diſpatch; that he is to leave this place to-morrow night, and after ſtaying a day or two at moſt at *Poonah*, ſhall proceed with all expedition to the Preſidency by the way of *Tannah*, in order to avoid going in a boat.

I am, very reſpectfully,

Camp near *Curret*, 14th April 1778. Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen, your moſt obedient humble ſervant, *Tho⁸ Moſtyn.*

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 20th April 1778.

Received the following letter from the Reſident at *Poonah.*

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I addreſſed you laſt on the 14th inſt. and not having heard any thing from *Morabah* concerning *Tumbacker's* leaving the camp, notwithſtanding his aſſurances that he ſhould do ſo as the next evening, on the 16th at night I ſent to requeſt *Morabah* would inform me the reaſon thereof: when he replied, that matters were not fully adjuſted with the Durbar; but that they were all to meet the next morning at his tent, and deſired I would meet them. Accordingly yeſterday, about eleven o'clock, I waited on the Durbar, where I found aſſembled *Butchaba*, *Morabah*, *Chintoo Wittal*, *Tookajee Holcar*, *Narroo Punt*, (*Holcar's* Duan) *Dadoo Punt Pootneſs*, *Gopal Naigue Tumbacker*, and one of *Holkar's* principal officers. *Morabah* began the diſcourſe by telling me, that every body preſent requeſted I would ſhew *Ragoba* they confirmed the agreement formerly made with him, and to deſire that he would not believe what any malicious perſons might write to the contrary.

The Durbar not mentioning any thing of empowering *Tumbacker* to ſettle terms with your honour, &c. agreeable to what he had aſſured me on the 14th; I endeavoured to ſound the intentions of the Durbar with reſpect to what they meant to do for the Company, by obſerving to them that there had been two treaties entered into, and the other by Colonel *Upton*, with the late Durbar; when *Morabah* replied, that this point would be eaſily ſettled after *Dada Sahib's* arrival at *Poonah*; and indeed this method, which I hope will meet with your approval, will in the preſent ſituation of affairs, I am of opinion, be moſt for the intereſt of my employers, as well as *Ragoba's* credit, who I make no doubt will for his own honour conſider the treaty made with him as the only legal one. It is true he may perhaps at firſt be under ſuch reſtrictions as not to be able immediately to comply therewith; yet if he acts with prudence, and endeavours to conciliate the minds of the miniſters, and convince thoſe who have been in the oppoſition that he means faithfully to obſerve any agreement he ſhall make, now for the ſafety of their perſons and property, I make no doubt he may in a ſhort time have the uncontrouled management of affairs.

No notice being taken at the above meeting with the Durbar of *Tumbacker's* departure, I ſent the Linguiſt to deſire he would inform me when he was to ſet off; he replied, that he did not ſuppoſe it would be until *Morabah's* man, *Daddoo Punt*, who arrived from *Bombay* in the morning, and was immediately returning thither, ſhould either return to camp, or write to them; but that he would ſend me word as ſoon as he could ſpeak with certainty. The arrival of *Daddoo Punt* explains in ſome ſhape the Durbar's reaſon for detaining me ſo long, he having brought a letter with him from *Ragoba*, and I apprehend ſome terms to be ſettled with his friends here, to which he is carrying their anſwers.

In the evening I took my leave of *Morabah*, when he delivered me a letter to be preſented to the Honourable the Preſident on my arrival.

I am with reſpect,

Poonah, 18th April 1778. Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen, your moſt obedient ſervant, *Tho⁸ Moſtyn.*

APPENDIX, No. 92.

Extract of the Secret Letter from *Bombay*: dated 26th April 1778; received in *London* 21ſt December 1778.

2. THE ſeveral letters from Mr. *Moſtyn*, entered in our ſhip diary ſince the departure of the *Hawke*, will inform you of his proceedings, and all material occurrences at *Poonah*, till the 29th ultimo; when the Preſident received advice from him of a revolution which had taken place in that Government on the 26th.

3. On that day *Morabah Furneeſe* and his party, after having marched from their different ſtations, met and encamped cloſe to *Poonah*, which they immediately took poſſeſſion of, and without any oppoſition or bloodſhed, removed the guards placed by *Nannah Furneeſe*, at the palace, and other officers of Government, making proclamation

clamation in the name of *Ragoba* for reſtoring peace and good order in the city.

4. *Morabah*, after having aſſumed the office of Duan, and made his arrangements at *Poonah*, proceeded to have an interview with *Sacaram Bappoo*, the late Chief Miniſter, with whoſe concurrence he appears to have proceeded from the beginning, as you will recollect *Morabah* made uſe of his name in his firſt overtures to us, and they have acted in concert ever ſince.

5. *Nannah Furneeſe*, the other Miniſter, after heſitating for ſome time what conduct to purſue, we are aſſured has agreed to all the terms *Morabah* has propoſed reſpecting *Raboba*, on conditions that *Morabah* and *Saccaram* would be ſecurity for his perſonal ſafety.

6. The Confederacy having thus accompliſhed their purpoſe without our aſſiſtance, and having no further oppoſition to expect from *Nannah Furneeſe*, preſerved a long and moſt myſterious ſilence with regard to their intentions toward *Ragoba*. *Morabah* had indeed, a few days before he took poſſeſſion of *Poonah*, ſent at Agent to *Ragoba*, to preſs him to join the party without a moment's delay, but did not make any propoſals of any kind either to him or us.

7. It was not till the 10th of this month that Mr. *Moſtyn* was deſired to meet the Durbar, when he was acquainted they were going to ſend *Gopal Naigue Tumbacker* (who is a perſon of conſideration) to *Bombay*, with propoſals regarding *Ragoba*, and a requeſt made to him to accompany this perſon. We were in daily expectation of their arrival till the 20th, when we received advice from Mr. *Moſtyn*, that the Durbar had not yet given *Gopal* his final inſtructions, and it ſeemed even then very uncertain when he would ſet out, though they profeſſed ſentiments of great reſpect and regard towards *Ragoba*.

8. We can draw no very favourable concluſions from this dilatory conduct of the Durbar; and as we do not think it conſiſtent that the Company's Reſident ſhould come to *Bombay* upon every requiſition from the Durbar, before he is ſatisfied ſuch a meaſure is really neceſſary, or may be attended with benefit to the Company's affairs, we have expreſſed our wiſhes to Mr. *Moſtyn*, but in ſuch a manner as not to lay an abſolute reſtraint upon him; that he ſhould not quit *Poonah* before he is convinced his coming here will anſwer ſome buſineſs of importance; and we have obſerved to him, that he may with great propriety demand from the Durbar, before he ſets out, the nature of the buſineſs they want to intruſt to him, that he may judge whether it is of ſufficient conſequence to require his preſence here. The recollection of the trifling propoſals they committed to him on his laſt journey to *Bombay* makes this precaution the more neceſſary.

9. In this uncertain ſituation are affairs at preſent: we can neither write or determine any thing deciſive, until we know the terms *Morabah* and his party mean to offer to *Ragoba*.

10. It is a moſt unfortunate circumſtance, that whilſt we, through the want of powers and *Saccaram Bappoo*'s extreme caution, were prevented from taking a part, *Morabah* and his party have found their own ſtrength ſufficient to gain their point without our aſſiſtance. We did, as adviſed in our addreſs by the *Cormorant*, do all we could to remove their ſcruples the moment we received the ſanction and approbation of the Governor General and Council to our plan, and *Morabah* promiſed to give us the deſired inſtrument, under the hand of *Sacram Beppoo*, the Chief Miniſter, without whoſe expreſs ſolicitation we were prohibited from engaging in their ſcheme; and are not without ſuſpicion, that when the Confederacy found they might be certain of our aſſiſtance in caſe of neceſſity, they reſolved to make trial if they could do without it; and unhappily they have met with ſucceſs.

11. It now ſeems to be optional with them to what ſhare of the Government to admit *Ragoba*, or whether they will admit him to any ſhare at all. Their fears for the ſtability of their Government ſo long as *Ragoba* remains with us, and the demonſtrations we have given of our attachment to him, are now his beſt ſecurity, and we ſtill hope will lead them to offer conſiſtent terms to him. All that we can write about the terms for the Company muſt be mere conjecture, though we have inſtructed Mr. *Moſtyn* not to give the Durbar the leaſt hopes we will recede from *Ragoba*'s treaty. We can only aſſure you, that we will endeavour to procure the moſt advantageous ones we poſſibly can; and we firmly believe, if *Ragoba* is admitted to a ſufficient influence in the Government, he will confirm his former grants made by the treaty of *Surat*.

12. Immediately on receiving advice of the revolution, we gave orders for our forces and military apparatus to be held in readineſs, to accompany *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, the moment matters are advanced to that ſtage.

13. *Ragoba* is extremely ſanguine on the occaſion; and betrays ſo much impatience to move towards *Poonah*, that we find it neceſſary to ſend Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Ramſay*, as a deputation from us, to expoſtulate with him on the precipitancy of his conduct, and to endeavour to moderate his impatience. Their conferences with him are recorded; to which we beg leave to refer you.

22. Two of *Ragoba*'s principal domeſtics having applied to us for a loan of rupees 15,000, we complied with their requeſt, as they ſtand high in his confidence, and might be of ſervice to the Company, in the turn affairs were then likely to take.

23. *Ragoba*, at one of his conferences with Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Ramſay*, took occaſion to expreſs his wiſhes, that when he was reinſtated at *Poonah*, the Company would afford him their aſſiſtance to recover the large and valuable territories diſmembered from the Maratta dominions, during the weakneſs of the late Adminiſtration, by grants to the Nizam and other Powers. He was acquainted, we could give no anſwer to ſuch a propoſition; and it is at his particular deſire we mention this matter to you, and requeſt your orders and ſentiments on the ſubject.

24. Having hitherto received no ſatisfaction from the Durbar to the ſufferers by the wreck *Aurora*, notwithſtanding our repeated repreſentations, we have fixed the amount of their loſs as a claim upon the revenues of *Jamboofeer*, after the Company's demands on account the twelve lacks, and the country of three lacks, are made good; and have reſolved not to reſtore the Pergunnah till the ſum due to the ſufferers is diſcharged, with intereſt. Our proceedings will ſhew the care we took to examine and aſcertain the amount for which the Poonah Government was anſwerable, according to treaty, with all poſſible juſtice to both parties; and we doubt not you will approve the method we have taken to obtain ſatisfaction for merchants trading under your protection.

25. The Governor General and Council, in purſuance of their reſolution for ſupplying us with money to ſupport the engagements they concluded we ſhould form in favour of *Ragoba*, have remitted us bills to the amount of nine lacks and a half out of ten lacks, the propoſed ſupply; ſo that if matters at *Poonah* turn out to our wiſhes, we ſhall leave a ſufficient command of money to anſwer every purpoſe.

APPENDIX, Nos. 91 and 93.

Bombay Select Conſultations, the 22d April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor;

The W. *John Carnac*, Eſquire, *D. Draper*, *Nathaniel Stackhouſe*, *Willm Aſhburner*, *Andrew Ramſay*.

Appendix. Nos. 91 & 93.

CONSIDERING

Appendix. No. 94.

CONSIDERING the ſtation Mr. *Moſtyn* holds at *Poonah*, we think it is not conſiſtent that he ſhould come to *Bombay* upon every intimation from the Miniſters of ſuch a deſire, unleſs he is firſt ſatisfied that ſuch a meaſure is neceſſary, or may be of benefit to the Honourable Company's affairs. In the preſent caſe we do not wiſh Mr. *Moſtyn* ſhould quit *Poonah* before he is convinced that his coming here will anſwer ſome purpoſe of conſequence; and we think he may with very great propriety demand from the Durbar before he ſets out, the nature of the buſineſs they now want to entruſt to him, that he may judge whether it is of ſufficient importance to require his preſence here. This precaution appears the more neceſſary from the recollection of the trifling propoſals they committed to him on his laſt journey to *Bombay*; though we do not mean by the above to reſtrain Mr. *Moſtyn* from acting in this point as he may judge moſt for the Honourable Company's intereſt.

From the preſent ſituation of affairs, we do not think there is any proſpect of our having occaſion for the Bengal troops this ſeaſon; and therefore in order to ſave the heavy expence that will be incurred by their marching forward, it is agreed to write to the Commanding Officer at *Culpee* to remain there till he hears further from us.

Meſſrs. *Draper* and *Stackhouſe* are clearly of opinion that the Governor General and Council having been induced, by our advices of the 7th of December laſt, to order a body of troops to the aſſiſtance of this Preſidency, and they do not think our ſituation is ſo much altered either with reſpect to the Marattas, the probable deſigns of the French upon *Choul*, or our own military reſources, as to juſtify the countermanding the march of theſe troops; they do not therefore concur in the above reſolution, which will throw the whole reſponſibility upon us in caſe of accidents. Another reaſon for their opinion is, that it ſeems very uncertain whether any reinforcement will be ſent from *Madras*, no public advices having been yet received of any ſuch intention in the Preſident and Council, though a public Pattamar arrived laſt night.

The majority hereupon eſteem it neceſſary to obſerve further in vindication of their reſolution, that the difficulties of the march from *Culpee* to *Bombay* are ſo great as to make the attempt next to impracticable, and they would not upon any account expoſe the Company's troops to ſuch dangers without the moſt abſolute and imminent neceſſity. Beſides, it is totally out of our power to procure ſupplies of proviſions for them on the march, or paſſes from the different Powers through whoſe countries they muſt come, as deſired by the Governor General and Council. The majority allow that the Governor General and Council may have in a great meaſure been led to that reſolution by our advices, but at the ſame time their apprehenſions of a French war muſt have been a further inducement to them to order ſo conſiderable a body of troops, which by our advices from *Europe* of a much later date than they could have at *Bengal*, we do not ſee any reaſon to apprehend: and therefore the majority think the ſubjecting the Honourable Company to ſo heavy an expence as would unavoidably attend the march of the Bengal troops would not be warrantable.

Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Ramſay* lay before us a report of their late conference with *Ragoba*; which is ordered to be entered after this conſultation.

Adjourned.

Edward Ravenſcroft, Secretary.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe,
Wm Aſhburner.

No. 93.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 22d April 1778.

The ſubject of a Conference between the Committee and *Ragoba*, 10th April 1778.

The Committee acquainted *Ragoba*, that for material reaſons the Board would wiſh him to poſtpone his intentions of moving to *Mahim* on Monday next, unleſs he was very much bent upon ſo doing. They informed him, that the Honourable the Preſident had juſt received a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, of the 8th inſtant, adviſing, that he was that evening to have an interview with *Moraba*, who had propoſitions to make on the part of the Miniſtry, and that, until the reſult of the conference was known, he could wiſh that no freſh ſteps ſhould be taken either by *Ragoba* or the Board. *Ragoba* replied, that he did not regard deferring his intentions of moving a few days, would the Board but poſitively fix upon a time for his march; and hoped that the reſult of the interview with *Moraba* would occaſion no material alterations in the Reſolutions of the Board, as he well knew that unleſs the Engliſh would declare in the moſt open manner their determination to ſupport him in his juſt rights, and take ſome immediate ſteps to convince the preſent faction at *Broach* of ſuch our intentions, that even thoſe who had already declared in his favour, would begin to waver through dread of reſentment from the other party; and he would aſſure the Board, that the propoſitions they would receive would be very unbecoming his dignity to accept. The Committee aſſured him he might rely upon the friendſhip of the Company, and in having their ſupport in all his juſt and legal rights and pretenſions; but that at the ſame time the Board thought it adviſable to wait the overtures that might be expected in conſequence of the aforeſaid interview. With this he appeared ſatisfied; but expreſſed a wiſh of moving on Monday next to a ſpot of ground near the Mount, provided the Board approved of it. The Committee acquainted him, that the Board by no means wiſhed to put any reſtraint upon his inclinations, and would make known to them his deſire in this particular. He took occaſion to mention his earneſt deſire of ſeeing the Company in poſſeſſion of the places ſtipulated for in his late treaty with them; and obſerved, that his principal motive for wiſhing to march by the way of *Callian* was, that *Viſſagee Punt* would moſt probably be thereby induced to make an early acknowledgement of obedience to his Government, when he meant to embrace the opportunity of putting the Company in poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*: he alſo expreſſes a deſire of ſeeing a ſtatement of his accounts with the Company, as he was unacquainted with the expences and charges incurred by the aſſiſtance of their troops in the late ſervice; as alſo of the collections made from the Pergunnahs aſſigned over to the Company. The Committee acquainted him his requeſt ſhould be complied with; and then took their leave, aſſuring him, that the moment any freſh advices arrived from Mr. *Moſtyn*, that they ſhould be made known to him.

APPENDIX, No. 94.

11th July 1778.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c.

Members of the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

MY laſt reſpects were dated the 17th inſtant.

By a hircarrah whom I keep at camp, I learn that *Morabah*, *Buchabah*, *Chintoo Vittul*, and *Cruſtrow Belol*, on the 17th in the afternoon, paid Monſieur *St. Lubin* a viſit

viſit, and that ſhortly after their return to *Morabah*'s tent, Monſieur *St. Lubin* followed them, where he ſtaid until eight o'clock, when *Morabah* made him a preſent; that on the 20th *Nanah* came down from the Matchy to pay *Saccaram* a viſit at *Bury*, when they ſent for Monſieur *St. Lubin* to take leave, and accordingly waited on them. Notwithſtanding theſe appearances of Monſieur *St. Lubin* being diſpatched, it is ſtill a doubt with me whether he will leave *Poonah*, but even if he does, it will only be in order to lull us into a belief of the good intentions of this Durbar, whilſt they have recourſe to the French for aſſiſtance, a door for which has already been opened by Monſieur *St. Lubin*'s negociations with *Nanah*, and which have been lately taken up by *Morabah*; as you will pleaſe to obſerve by the encloſed copy and tranſlate of a letter I have received from a perſon at *Proonder*, who, from the knowledge I have of him, I do not think would deceive me; but as he is not in the Government's ſervice, and might poſſibly be deceived by the perſon from whom he received his intelligence, therefore, though this letter was received the 19th, it containing matters of ſuch importance I thought it proper to wait until I could receive a confirmation thereof from ſome other quarter, that the loſs of a few days would not be attended with ſo much prejudice as a miſrepreſentation.

From a perſon, whoſe employ in the Government's ſervice is ſuch as to give him frequent opportunities of knowing what paſſes, I have received information that when *Cruſtrow Belol* was laſt in town, it was agreed between him and Monſieur *St. Lubin* to make the ſame propoſal to *Morabah* as he had formerly done to *Nanah* with reſpect to the French aſſiſting him; that in conſequence thereof *Cruſtrow* went firſt to *Proonder* in order to prepare *Morabah*; and that Monſieur *St. Lubin* on his firſt viſit accordingly made the propoſal, when *Morabah* replied, he would conſider of it; but that in the mean time receiving intelligence from *Moodajee Bouncello* of our troops coming from *Bengal* being near *Naugpore*, *Morabah* diſpatched Monſieur *St. Lubin* at his ſecond viſit.

I am informed by a man, who ſays he is a doctor in *Scindy*'s employ, but has for ſome time paſt reſided in *Poonah*, that *Senhor Norronho* a few days ago wrote a letter to the perſon who tranſacts his buſineſs in *Poonah*, acquainting him of his having received information from *Cruſtrow Belol*, that Monſieur *St. Lubin* had engaged with *Morabah* to bring five hundred Europeans hither in forty days, and that *Morabah* had promiſed him, *Lubin*, the command of the Toff Counah. The man farther added, that in conſequence of this promiſe, Monſieur *St Lubin* had inveigled away almoſt all *Norronho*'s people, by advancing them from fifteen to twenty rupees a man, and promiſing to make good the arrears of pay due to them, but at the ſame time ordered them to remain quiet in *Poonah*, until he ſhould call for them; however, that *Senhor Norronho* getting intelligence of this tranſaction, has, by paying out of his own pocket the arrears due to them from Government, induced all his people to return to his ſervice, and they accordingly went to him at *Proonder* on the 21ſt. This man further tells me, that eight Europeans, who have lately deſerted from our ſervice, entered into that of Monſieur *St. Lubin* on the 20th, that he has two men, one a Frenchman named *Le Bourchadiez*, who came from *Mahé*, the other a Portugueze, at *Bombay*, purpoſely to entice our Europeans to deſert, and that theſe people ſent them to *Panwell* in two boats, which Monſieur *St. Lubin* has provided for that purpoſe, and which are conſtantly employed between that place and *Bombay*. It will undoubtedly appear ſomewhat ſtrange that *Cruſtrow Belol*, who is Monſieur *St. Lubin*'s Agent, ſhould give the information above-mentioned to *Senhor Norronho*; it is therefore neceſſary, in order to explain this point, to inform your Honour, &c. that as *Cruſtrow* was the perſon who brought *Norronho* from the Mogul's into this government's ſervice, he has always conſidered him as immediately under his protection.

I have thought it neceſſary to be thus particular in mentioning the different accounts I have received of *Morabah*'s tranſactions with Monſieur *St. Lubin*, and the honours paid the latter ſo far ſuperior to any they have ever ſhewn the Engliſh, in order that you may, Gentlemen, be better enabled to judge of the probability of his having formed a connection ſo highly prejudicial to our honourable employers' intereſts. I am convinced of the impoſſibility of the French ſupplying two thouſand men; but at the ſame time I think it is very probable that they may have it in their power to ſend five hundred at leaſt, as ſoon as the ſeaſon will admit; at any rate, all accounts agree, that the new Adminiſtration have entered into ſome engagements with the French very dangerous to our exiſtence on this ſide *India*. Appendix. No. 94.

On the 22d, I received your commands of the 16th; and, conformable to your directions, immediately forwarded the letters encloſed therein for Colonel *Leſlie*, with one from myſelf, by different routes.

The remonſtrance and demands you have been pleaſed to order me to make to the Durbar, is drawn out, and ſhall be ſent as ſoon as it can be properly tranſlated into the Gentoo language. I have already acquainted you, Gentlemen, that I am aſſured the French have not got a grant of *Choul*; but that promiſe thereof was made to Monſieur *St. Lubin*, appears from *Cruſtrow Belol*'s confeſſion at the Durbar before Mr. *Lewis*; and I am convinced they will not only get that, but much more, the moment they can afford the aſſiſtance Monſieur *St. Lubin* has promiſed. I have uſed every poſſible means to obtain a copy of the engagement entered into between *Nanah* and Monſieur *St. Lubin*; but as no other perſon than thoſe two, with the Linguiſt of the latter, were employed in drawing it up, it is totally impoſſible; nor do I know of any ſteps having been taken for the carrying it into execution, excepting Monſieur *St. Lubin* being permitted to remain here, in direct violation of the moſt ſolemn aſſurances to us, that he ſhould be ſent away, and the preſent conduct of the Durbar. Conformable to your orders, I have written a letter to *Holkar*, on the ſubject of paſſports, and am hourly in expectation of receiving his anſwer, as well as one from *Madjee Scindy*, to the letter I formerly adviſed I had written him.

On the 23d, one of the Pattamars diſpatched by the Honourable the Preſident with letters to *Holkar* and *Scindy*, came and informed me that they had all been ſeized at *Culvern*, immediately on their croſſing Tanna river, and carried to *Billapore*, the Subadar of which place ſent them to one *Dandaker*, the officer commanding the troops at *Gallican*, who diſpatched three of the Pattamars under charge of two of his own ſepoys with the letters to *Morabah*, detaining the other a day longer; and after plundering him of the trifle he had, being five rupees, told him he might go about his buſineſs, when the man made the beſt of his way to me. I have acquainted *Holkar* of this circumſtance, deſiring he would apply to *Morabah* for the letters. I have likewiſe written to *Morabah*, expreſſing my ſurpriſe at this conduct, deſiring, ſhould he not have delivered the letters, that he would ſend them to me.

Monſieur *St. Lubin* returned from *Proonder* laſt night, being ſupplied by *Morabah* with twenty-five peons, two jaſſoods, and four camels, which it is given out are to attend him as far as *Surat*.

I am, &c.

Poonah, the 25th May 1778. (Signed) *Thomas Moſtyn.*

Tranſlate of a Letter from a perſon at *Proonder*; dated the 21ſt Rabellacar, and received the 19th May 1778.

At noon I received your note by *Shirbjee*, and obſerved the contents thereof. *Morabah* has had two councils regarding the French. He told Monſieur *St. Lubin*, he had made an agreement with *Nanah* to bring 2,000 Europeans within fifteen months, which he had

Appendix. No. 94.

not yet complied with; but that if it is in his power to fulfil that engagement, *Morabah* desired he would send for them with ammunition, so as to be here before the battalions can arrive from *Calcutta*; which Monsieur *St Lubin* agreed to, and dispatched a letter express to his place.

Monsieur *St. Lubin* is dispatched, and *Morabah* wants him to go away in order to hasten the troops he has promised; but he says he will remain here, and send a man with letters for them; this they are at present considering about.

A true copy.

Received at *Bombay*,
the 28th May 1778. (Signed) *Thomas Mostyn.*

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I late last night received the Secretary's letter of the 22d, and shall obey your orders for fowarding the packets to the Governor General and Council.

After closing my last address to your Honour, &c. I received a note from *Morabah*, enclosing three letters for the Governor General, being answers to those delivered by Mr. *Lewis*, which he requests I will forward.

This morning I received a note from *Proonder*, acquainting me, that in consequence of our troops from *Bengal* advancing, and a report of *Hyder*'s army marching this way, *Morabah Sacaram* and *Holkar* had a consultation; when they determined on sending *Chintoo Wittul* and *Gopal Naigue Tumbuckur* to meet me: the latter arrived this morning, and the former was to leave *Proonder* about noon. This evening *Gopal Naigue* sent a message, desiring I would send the Linguist to him; who on his return informed me that he confirmed the note so far that they will meet me to-morrow, to request I will accompany *Chintoo Wittul* to *Bombay* with proposals respecting *Ragoba*. You may depend, Gentlemen, I shall advise you of the particulars of the conversation as early as possible.

Poonah, I am very respectfully, &c. &c.
the 27th May 1778. (Signed) *Thomas Mostyn.*
Received the 30th.

True Copies.
(Signed) *Edwd Ravenscroft*,
Secretary.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. *Mostyn* to the President, dated *Poonah* the 26th May, and read in Council the 2d of June.

The remonstrance the Board have been pleased to direct me to make to the Durbar, I could wish had not been sent; I have advised them it shall be delivered as soon as translated; but for the following reasons I intend to detain it until I can be favoured with your answer to this letter: First, because the Durbar, to pursue their present plan of amusing you and gaining time to carry their views respecting the French into execution, will undoubtedly promise to comply therewith. Secondly, because it entirely debars us from all further expectation either for ourselves or *Ragoba*, and we may be saddled with him as long as he lives. Thirdly, because the Durbar are amongst themselves much divided; *Holkar* urging them to bring *Ragoba*, in which *Scindy* will most likely concur: and also seeing us determined to be no longer trifled with, should they be inclined to make any offers worth our acceptance, this remonstrance will certainly put a stop to them.

Lastly, Because the time fixed for the Durbar to deliver their answer, and by the time it can be transmitted to you, the rains will be set in, therefore the delay of a few days can be of no material consequence, in case you should still think it proper to be delivered. Therefore I flatter myself you will approve my conduct, and speedily favour me with your commands on it. Excuse me, Sir, for having given my sentiments thus freely, and I beg leave to entreat you will put a favourable construction on them; my only wish being, that you should be informed of every thing that can be of any use in your deliberations upon this important matter. *Scindy* is advanced within twelve cos's of *Proonder*; I hourly expect an answer from him and *Holkar* regarding the districts; your letters to them you will perceive by the public addres's are stopt, and carried to *Morabah*; I have wrote both *Morabah* and *Holkar* about it. By a note from *Proonder* this evening, I am informed the Durbar have intelligence that the *Bengal* forces are on the banks of the *Nerbedah*, and taking the road for *Brampore*, but as I have had repeated reports of this I don't give entire credit to their being advanced so far, as I think I should have heard from them by this time if they were. From *Butchaba* I learn to-night that the Durbar has wrote to *Moodajee Bouncello*, to desire the officer of our troops in a friendly manner to return; if he will not, then to endeavour to make him by force, and should he want any assistance to advise them the (Durbar) but I am under no apprehensions on his account, as I hear he stands well with the Bengal Gentlemen. The only danger I think to be apprehended for the army is their want of provisions, from their having no horse with them to forage.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Esquire.

Honourable Sir,

Agreeable to what I wrote you last night, this morning both *Tombiker* and *Chintoo Wittul* waited on me, when they informed me they were sent on purpose to request I would accompany *Chintoo Wittul* to *Bombay*, with some proposals to *Ragoba*. I made the same objections I had done to the Durbar before, that I did not see any necessity for my going unless the Durbar would explain themselves, particularly after the evasive manner they have behaved with respect to this business. They made me the same answer the Durbar had done, that it was to assure *Ragoba* of their good intentions towards him. I told them that I considered this all finesse, only intended to gain time and stop our troops from *Bengal* advancing, for had they been sincere the Durbar would long since have dispatched me, and sent away Monsieur *St. Lubin*, but that I was convinced from the extraordinary attention *Morabah* and the Durbar had paid him, the former had taken up *Nana*'s plan, and entered into the same engagement with Monsieur *St. Lubin*. This they positively denied, though they acknowledged *Lubin* had made the tender to *Morabah*, who replied, as long they were in friendship with the English this Government would not enter into any alliance with any other European nation, and that he, *Morabah*, had absolutely dispatched him. I replied, that it was very true, Monsieur *St. Lubin* had been publicly dispatched, but it was only with a view to blind us, and perhaps others; however, that I had in my possession what I esteemed as a sufficient proof of my allegation; and produced copy of a letter written by Monsieur *St. Lubin* to the Captain General of *Goa*, by Monsieur *De Sauty*, which I luckily this morning procured. They answered it was possible Monsieur *St. Lubin* might have written in that manner, but denied my being able to produce any writing from the Durbar: upon which I observed it was the art of this Durbar not to give any thing under their hands, that they might have an opportunity of denying it, and that it was for this reason, before I could give credit to their having finally dispatched Monsieur *St. Lubin*, on a promise to proceed to *Bombay* with *Chintoo Wittul*, that I insisted on a writing from the Durbar with their seal affixed, to the following effect: "That in order to satisfy "the English Company, they declared they had not at "present, nor would have so long as they continued in "friendship with the English, any treaty with the "French, or suffer the French to trade in any of their "ports," being exactly conformable to the promises made me by *Saccaram Bappoo*, *Nanak Furnese*, *Madah Roe Jadee Roe*, and *Byro Punt*, when I was dispatched to *Bombay* in August last. This they promised to deliver

me,

me, with a letter for the Preſident, accounting for the Durbar's having kept me here ſo long; and requeſted I would ſend the Linguiſt in company with *Tumbiker*, who returns this evening to camp to bring them, which I conſented to. *Chintoo Wittul* informed me he ſhould ſet off on the 30th. If the Linguiſt returns with the above papers in time I ſhall accompany him, otherwiſe will follow as ſoon as I receive them, agreeable to the permiſſion the Board have already given me. Encloſed is a copy of the letter from *Lubin* to the Captain General of *Goa*, mentioned above; Mr. *Lewis* being taken ill, and I having been much employed in ſeeing a number of people to-day, I take the liberty to requeſt you will favour me in laying the above before the Board.

Chintoo Wittul informs me he ſhall be four days in going to *Panwell*, where he will wait two days for me, by which time I hope you will order a proper boat to carry him over.

I have not been able to procure the written intelligence from B ——— to day, but he has promiſed to ſend it me in the morning.

I remain very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, &c.

Poonah, the 28th May 1778, midnight. (Signed) *Thomas Moſtyn.*

APPENDIX, No. 95.

Letter from *Bombay* to *Bengal*.

Gentlemen,

Bombay, 3d June 1778. SINCE cloſing our letter of the 31ſt ultimo we have received further advices from Mr. *Moſtyn*, copies of which, and of the correſpondence between Monſieur de *St. Lubin* and the Portugueſe Governments of *Goa* and *Damaun*, now wait on you.

By his laſt letter to the Captain General at *Goa*, written long after the late change in the Poonah Government, it is indiſputably evident that *Nanah*'s engagements with the French have been taken up by the new Adminiſtration.

Upon the inſpection of theſe letters, we reſolved to make a repreſentation to the following effect to the Governors of *Goa* and *Demaun*:

"That we have reaſon to believe ſchemes are "concerting between the French and the Poonah Go- "vernment, which have for their objects the annoyance "and detriment of the Britiſh nation; but that, from "the alliance and good harmony ſo happily ſubſiſting "between his Moſt Faithful and his Britannic Majeſty, "we have every reaſon to hope, and ſhall rely, that "the Portugueſe will not in any ſhape interfere or take "any meaſure that may promote the ſucceſs of the "French ſchemes, which in the end would prove "equally ſubverſive of the Portugueſe influence in "*India*."

You will obſerve Mr. *Moſtyn*'s reaſons for deferring to make his demands on the Durbar, and our orders to him to abide by his former inſtructions, which we doubt not you will approve. Any offers the Durbar may now make to *Ragoba* can only be intended to gain more time, and the more important objects we have in view cannot be put to the hazard upon the mere hopes of advantage to him.

We have no certain accounts of the *Bengal* detachment; reports at *Poonah* ſay it has reached the *Nerbudda*: we have, however, thought it neceſſary that the commanding officer ſhould have timely inſtructions whither to direct his march; and as *Surat*, in point of ſituation, accommodation, and every other reſpect, appeared to us the moſt eligible place, we have reſolved to ſend inſtructions to Colonel *Leſlie* to direct his march to that city, unleſs from circumſtances he ſhould think it expedient, or it ſhould prove more convenient to him to proceed to *Broach*: in which caſe we have given him a diſcretional power for that purpoſe.

The Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* will be directed to ſpare no expence to open a correſpondence with Colonel *Leſlie*, and to afford him all poſſible aſſiſtance to expedite his march. Appendix, Nos. 95 & 96.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 3d June 1778. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

P. S.—We have juſt received advice from Mr. *Moſtyn*, that he has obtained and tranſmitted to Colonel *Leſlie* paſſports from *Mhadjee Scindia*, for the ſafe conduct of the Bengal detachment through his country, as well as orders for their being properly ſupplied with proviſions.

Ordered, That the letters from *Bombay* lie for conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 96.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 13th July 1778.

PRESENT;

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

To Colonel *Leſlie*.

Sir,

WE have been acquainted, by the Governor General and Council, of your being the officer appointed to the command of the forces ſent by them to our aſſiſtance; and have received a copy of your inſtructions.

On the 4th inſtant we diſpatched a letter to you by four different routes, countermanding our order of the 22d April, and directing you to proceed on your march to this ſide of *India*. We hope ſoon to hear from you what route you have taken, when we ſhall ſend you more particular directions for your guidance; this being diſpatched to acquaint you that we have not been able to procure paſſports for your army from the Poonah Miniſters, or orders for your being ſupplied with proviſions, but we have ordered application to be made directly to *Tookajee Holkar* and *Mhadajee Scindia*, the Jaghiredars through whoſe dominions you muſt paſs, and ſhall as ſoon as poſſible adviſe you of the reſult.

It is neceſſary to obſerve to you, that the rainy ſeaſon on this coaſt may be expected to ſet in about the 10th or 15th of June.

We direct, that you correſpond punctually with Mr. *Thomas Moſtyn*, the Company's Reſident at *Poonah*, who has our orders to give you every advice, and to do every thing in his power towards facilitating your march.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, the 16th May, 1778. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Extract of *Bombay* Secret Conſultations, the 5th June 1778.

Signed the following Letters to Colonel *Leſlie*, the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, and to Mr. *Moſtyn*.

To Colonel *Leſlie*.

Sir,

Our laſt letter, dated the 16th of May, has been tranſmitted by four ſeparate conveyances, and we hope has come ſafely to your hands. Friday 5th. Col. Leſlie, Letter to.

We therein directed you to proceed on your march to this ſide of *India*, promiſing ſoon to ſend you more particular inſtructions; and we accordingly now deſire, that you will direct your march to the city of *Surat*, which, in point of ſituation, accommodation, and in every

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every other reſpect, appears to be the moſt eligible place.

You will therefore bend your march with all expedition to that city, unleſs from circumſtances you ſhould think it expedient, or it ſhould prove more convenient to you, to proceed to *Broach*; in which caſe we hereby give you a diſcretional power for that purpoſe.

Mr. *Boddam*, the Chief of *Surat*, and Mr. *Gambier*, the Chief of *Broach*, are directed to ſpare no expence to open a correſpondence with you, and to give you every information reſpecting the roads, and every other aſſiſtance that may be neceſſary; and you will not fail to communicate conſtant and punctual advice of your ſituation and wants to either or both of theſe gentlemen, accordingly as you may reſolve to proceed, in conſequence of the diſcretional power we have now given you.

We have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that Mr. *Moſtyn*, the Reſident at *Poonah*, has obtained from *Mhadjee Scindia*, and tranſmitted to you, the proper paſſports for the ſafe conduct of the army under your command through his country, as well as orders to his officers for all neceſſary ſupplies of proviſions. We hope ſoon to obtain the like orders from *Tookajee Holcar*, and flatter ourſelves you will in conſequence have an unmoleſted and well ſupplied march through the Dekan.

We muſt ſtrongly recommend and enjoin your finding ſome method to correſpond either with us or ſome of the gentlemen above-named, as we cannot but be under anxiety until we receive ſome certain advice of your ſituation, and are apprehenſive your letters muſt be intercepted. We are,

Sir,

your moſt obedient ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 5th June 1778.

William Hornby, &c. Council.

Extract of *Bombay* Secret Conſultations, 18th June.

Signed, the following Letters to Colonel *Leſlie*, and the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*.

To Colonel *Leſlie*.

Sir,

Col. Leſlie, Letter to

We have received your letter of the 14th May, and hope ſoon to hear you are well advanced on your march

Mr. *Moſtyn* has obtained from *Tookajee Holkar*, and tranſmitted to you orders for the free paſſage of the army under your command, through his dominions; ſo that we flatter ourſelves you will meet with no obſtructions or impediments in your march to this coaſt.

We have no further inſtructions or information to add to thoſe contained in our letter of the 5th inſtant, already forwarded by ſeven different routes, only that you purſue your march with all poſſible diligence, which we doubt not will be accelerated by a circumſtance Mr. *Boddam* will apprize you of, and to which you will give full credit; we do not mention it ourſelves, there being leſs danger of a letter being intercepted from *Surat*, and it does not appear you are furniſhed with a cypher.

We are,

Sir,

your moſt obedient, humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 19th June 1778.

William Hornby, &c. Council.

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 17th Auguſt 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letters from Mr. *Moſtyn*, and from Mr. *Lewis* his deputy, at *Poonah*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing you laſt under the 29th May, and the next day forwarded the paſſport and order from *Madjee Scindia*, therein mentioned, to Colonel *Leſlie*.

My Linguiſt having written me from camp, that *Morabah* did not ſeem inclined to deliver the writing reſpecting the French, which he was ſent in company with *Gopaul Naigue Tumbuckur* to receive, but that *Morabah* ſaid, if he did give it, I muſt likewiſe give one, certifying that the enemies of this Government were thoſe of the Engliſh; I directed him to acquaint *Morabah*, that what he demanded was unneceſſary, it being already ſettled by treaty, and that the one I demanded related merely to the French, who were not thought of when the late treaty was made; ordering him at the ſame time to make another application, and if *Morabah* refuſed, or made any evaſion, to return to me without loſs of time; he accordingly arrived here the 3d, but I am ſorry to inform your Honour, &c. without the writing; and though *Morabah* told him he would forward it to me either as that day or the next, I have not heard any thing further about it, nor do I believe the Durbar have any intentions of delivering it.

In conſequence of a letter from the Preſident of *Bombay*, *Madjee Scindy* on the 3d ſent me another duſtuck and order to his officers for the free paſſage of our troops through his country, which have alſo been forwarded to Colonel *Leſlie*. I have not yet received any from *Tookajee Holkar*, though I have ſtill hopes thereof.

On the 5th in the evening *Saccaram Bapoo* had a meeting with *Madjee Scindy*, as had *Hurry Punt*, who is arrived from *Pundapore* the ſame night, and the next day *Morabah* likewiſe met him. Yeſterday I received a letter from camp, informing me that *Madjee Scindy* and *Hurry Punt* arrived at *Proonder* the day before, when they paid a viſit to the Peilhwa, who came down from the fort for that purpoſe, at which were alſo preſent *Saccaram Bapoo*, *Nanah Furneſe*, *Cruſtrow Belol*, and *Madabrow Jahdahroi*: from *Buchabah*, *Morabah*, and *Holkar* not attending, it appears to me that a party is formed by the former againſt the latter. It is not yet in my power to ſay how affairs will turn out, but it is poſſible the executive part of Government may again revert to *Nanah*; though I imagine it will require ſome time before it can be carried into execution, and that it will not be decided without bloodſhed.

Notwithſtanding the aſſurances from the Durbar that Monſieur *St. Lubin* was diſpatched, he is ſtill permitted to remain here, and within theſe few days has pleaded ſickneſs in order to delay time until the rains ſet in.

The encloſed is copy of the paper I have delivered to the Durbar in conſequence of my ſuperior's orders.

I am, &c. &c.

Poonah, the 10th June 1778. (Signed) *T. Moſtyn.*

To the Miniſters of the *Poonah* Durbar.

It is now upwards of two years ſince Colonel *Upton* concluded a treaty with you, and yet nothing has been done on your part towards the accompliſhing it; I am therefore directed by the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, and under the authority of the Governor General and Council, to call on you in the name and behalf of the Honourable Company, for explicit anſwers to the following articles:

Firſt. I demand to know whether you conſider the Maratta State as bound by the treaty made at *Proonder* by Colonel *Upton*, and whether you will pledge your own faith to the due obſervance thereof?

Second. Agreeable to the ſaid treaty I demand immediate poſſeſſion of a country of three lacks of rupees,

near or adjoining to *Broach*, in the manner ſtipulated by the fifth article, by which we mean three lacks groſs revenue, that is, without any allowance for charges.

Third. I am alſo directed by the Governor and Council of *Bombay* to acquaint you that the Governor General and Council have directed them to keep poſſeſſion of the countries ceded to the Honourable Company by *Futty Sing Guicawary*, ſince you have failed in producing the proofs required, that *Futty Sing Guicawar* did not poſſeſs power or authority to make ſuch ceſſions, and that they will accordingly keep poſſeſſion of thoſe countries.

Fourth. I have made frequent remonſtrances to the Durbar on the impropriety of their conduct in countenancing Monſieur *St. Lubin*, and have as often received aſſurances from them that he ſhould be ſent away; notwithſtanding which, I am ſorry to obſerve, you ſtill permit him to remain here. In a letter I lately received from you, you ſay Monſieur *St. Lubin* is diſpatched; but this I cannot conſider as a ſufficient anſwer, and therefore do now, in conſequence of orders from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, demand of you a clear and ſatisfactory explanation of your intentions with reſpect to the French; that is, whether in future you mean to admit any of their ſhips into your ports, or have any further connections with them? declaring to you that the Governor General and Council will take ſuch meaſures accordingly as prudence ſhall dictate, for the future ſafety of the Company's intereſts and poſſeſſions committed to their care.

Fifth. As the Honourable Company have ſuſtained a loſs of two years revenue by your delay in making over the country of three lacks, conformable to the treaty made with Colonel *Upton*, and you have failed in making good to the merchants concerned in the ſhip *Aurora*, the loſs they ſuſtained by that ſhip, amounting to R^s 1,97,705. 3. 84. with intereſt from the 27th Auguſt 1776, being the date of Colonel *Upton*'s letter, adviſing you had agreed to reſtore the ſhip and cargo; I am directed by the Governor and Council of *Bombay* to inform you they will charge the amount of theſe two articles to the revenues of *Jamboſeer*, and that when the ſum, for which it was originally mortgaged, with theſe two aſſignments, are paid off, they will be ready to reſtore the ſaid pergunnah to you.

We having experienced ſo much equivocation and delay in all your proceedings, I am ordered to ſend you this in writing, to which I have ſigned my name and fixed the Company's ſeal, and demand from you an explicit anſwer likewiſe in writing with your Sicca affixed thereto; which, if not ſent me in fourteen days from the date hereof, the Governor and Council will conſider any further evaſion or delay as a refuſal. Dated in *Poonah* this 4th day of June 1778.

A true copy.
(Signed) *Thos Moſtyn.*

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt reſpects waited on your Honour, &c. under the 10th inſtant.

In the evening after I had diſpatched the above addreſs, I received intelligence that *Madajee Scindia*, having ſent 5,000 men to eſcort him, *Nanah* had fled to him, conveying with him his own people, amounting to about 2000 men and his Bazar, &c.; that *Nanah*, ſoon after his arrival at *Scindia*'s camp, wrote to *Morabah*, requiring him to deliver over the Sicca Cuttary and Jerry Putkey, which the latter refuſed complying with; and that ſeveral of *Morabah*'s inferior officers had received notes from *Nanah*, ordering them to attend him; but that they, ſo far from obeying theſe orders, had all declared their reſolution to ſtand by *Morabah*.

On the 20th, one of my own hircarrahs informed me, that it was reported in *Morabah*'s camp, *Nanah* had promiſed nine lacks of rupees each to *Holkar* and *Scindia*, five lacks of which was immediately paid to either, and the remainder was to be paid as the next day; in conſequence of which, *Holkar*, who was encamped in the rear of *Morabah*, advanced to his front, and *Scindia*, who was the front of the other party, alſo advanced; and theſe two officers joining, now form one camp between *Morabah* and *Nanah*. What may be the real motives for this junction, I cannot pretend to ſay, though I make no doubt they have ſome ſcheme in agitation againſt ſome of the Miniſters. Append. No. 97.

On the 12th at noon I received a letter from *Morabah* deſiring that I would ſend him a copy of the papers regarding the French; the one delivered by my Linguiſt having been miſlaid, and at the ſame time earneſtly requeſting I would go to him at camp. To this I replied; that having delivered the Durbar a paper on the 4th, in which every thing neceſſary was mentioned, and to which a plain and direct anſwer would be expected in the time limited, the paper he requeſted was of no conſequence: I at the ſame time excuſed myſelf from waiting on him, for the reaſons I had formerly given him through *Gopaul Naigue Tumbuckur*; but told him, if he had any thing particular to offer, and would deliver it in writing, I would forward it to *Bombay*, and obtain him an anſwer as ſoon as poſſible. The reaſons here alluded to, were the evaſive and trifling treatment, both myſelf and Mr. *Lewis* had met with at the different times we went to camp, and the extraordinary attention paid by the Durbar to Monſieur *St. Lubin*; but I was more particularly led to evade going, by a letter I had received that morning from a perſon in *Scindia*'s camp, informing me, that *Nanah* either had written or would write me, to requeſt I would go to him; and being convinced from the ſituation the Government is in, that the parties in general would take for granted, the Engliſh would ſupport whichever I ſhould viſit, it appeared of too much conſequence for me to decide. Having received the letter from *Nanah*, I immediately addreſſed my ſuperiors, requeſting their orders on the ſubject; in the mean time excuſing myſelf in the politeſt manner to *Nanah*. On the 22d I was favoured with my ſuperiors' anſwer, dated the 18th, wherein they ſay, they think no objection could lay againſt my viſiting *Morabah*, as the Miniſter with whom I have lately tranſacted all buſineſs in behalf of the Maratta State, without any reference to them.

On the 17th I received another letter from *Morabah*, expreſſing his concern that I did not wait on him, he having ſome particular buſineſs to ſpeak to me about, which he ſaid he had ſent a man to explain to me. The man told me he was empowered to promiſe an immediate compliance with the paper I delivered the 4th, for which purpoſe ſunnuds ſhould be accordingly inſtantly given for the country of three lacks, and the other articles agreed to in every point, and to deſire that he would bring over *Ragoba* with our forces. I replied, that it was not in my power to give an anſwer to this requeſt; but if they were ſincere in this application, *Morabah* and his party ought to loſe no time in writing to the Preſidency of *Bombay*. I added, that in caſe of compliance it would be expected that the treaty made with *Ragoba* ſhould be adhered to: to which the man replied, that neither *Morabah* nor any of his party would make mention of the treaty; for as it had been made by their maſter, it reſted entirely with *Ragoba* to act therein as he thought fit. On the 21ſt the man returned to me, bringing with him letters from *Morabah* and *Bucheba* to the Honourable the Preſident and me, anſwers to the paper I delivered the 4th, and duſtucks for the free paſſage of the forces you are ſending to *Bombay* through the Maratta dominions; but there being ſome alteration neceſſary in the anſwers to the articles, I propoſed to the man his returning with them to camp, and obſerved to him, that as the above letters mentioned *Holcar* being joined with them, it would be better if he alſo wrote: upon which the man conſented to return, and deſired my Linguiſt might accompany him to ſee the papers were properly drawn out. The Interpreter accordingly

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accordingly ſet out the 23d, and returned the 26th in the evening, when he informed that *Morabah* had conſented to every point of the articles which he had ſeen the Sicca affixed to, as alſo to the ſunnuds for the country of three lacks; that *Holcar* had alſo written letters, in which he declares he is firmly attached to *Morabah*, and agrees to whatever they do, and expreſſes his earneſt deſire that we will aſſiſt with our forces in bringing *Ragoba* hither; and that though theſe papers and letters were all ſealed in his preſence, neither *Morabah* nor *Holcar* choſe to truſt them with the Interpreter to bring down, as the Government they ſaid would in a few days be entirely in *Nanah's* hands, by whoſe people the Gauts between this and *Proonder* were already ſo ſtrictly watched, that not a man could paſs without being ſtripped and ſearched, which indeed happened to the Interpreter, but they added, as it had been agreed by the parties that *Morabah* ſhould retire to the village of *Bhole*, about ten coſs to the northward of *Poonah*, for which place he ſhould paſs through the town in two or three days, he would take that opportunity of ſending theſe papers and letters to me by one of his own people. The Interpreter further tells me, that on the 25th *Morabah* and *Buchaba* paid *Holcar* a viſit; that *Scindy* in the mean time coming in, the two officers retired to a private room, where, after conſulting ſome time, they ſent for the two Brachmans, when they told *Morabah* he muſt deliver up the Sicca Cuttary and Jerry Putkey to *Nanah*; which *Morabah* refuſed, ſaying, that as he had received them from *Perwetty Bhoy* he ſhould return them to her.

On the 25th *Madarow Jadary*, who came into town the day before, ſent me a letter from *Nanah*, written in the name of the Peiſhwa, which referred me to *Madajow* for ſome circumſtances he was ordered to tell me, and deſired I would go to his camp. Upon my ſending to *Madarow* to know what theſe circumſtances were, and what *Nanah* had to ſay to me that he required my attendance, he mentioned the excuſe I ſent to *Nanah*, as already recited in the former part of this letter, that *Baboo* and *Nanah* thought it very extraordinary my delivering a letter directed to all the Peiſhwa Miniſters, with the Company's ſeal affixed at the top, and that the Miniſters only wanted to talk with me on the ſubject thereof. I have therefore written to the Peiſhwa in reply, that as we found ſo much evaſion and prevarication in his Miniſters ever ſince the late treaty, it was abſolutely neceſſary every thing ſhould be done in writing. I had therefore on the 4th inſtant, delivered certain articles not a letter, to which I had ſigned my name and affixed the Company's ſeal, to ſhew that their anſwer muſt have both the Sicca and Mortab affixed thereto, and to which, agreeable to the orders I received from my ſuperiors, I had demanded a plain and poſitive anſwer in fourteen days from that date; but notwithſtanding they had exceeded that time by ten days, I had not yet received one; and that, as it would therefore only be loſing time to talk about the articles, not having it in my power to ſay any thing until I received the Miniſter's anſwers, I hoped the Peiſhwa would excuſe my attendance; adding, if the Miniſters had any thing particular to ſay, I requeſted they would give it me in writing, when if I found it material enough I would readily wait on them.

On the 12th I received paſſports from *Tuckojee Holcar* for the free paſſage of our troops through his country, which were forwarded the next day to Colonel *Leſlie*, and on the 22d alſo forwarded him the duſtuck from the Durbar mentioned above.

Having procured copies of a letter *Nanah* has lately written to the Nizam, and of a paſs he delivered to Monſieur *St. Lubin*, when that gentleman viſited him under pretence of taking leave on the 20th ultimo, I now encloſe copy of them for your notice, and which as they have been explained to me, ſhew *Nanah's* real views with reſpect to *Ragoba*, the Engliſh, and the French; but not being able to get them properly tranſlated here, I am under the neceſſity of forwarding their Perſian copies.

All roads being ſtopt by *Nanah's* people, who have ſtrict orders to ſeize all letters, I have written this on country paper, for the greater convenience of conveyance, and its greater ſafety.

Morabah paſſed the town yeſterday, and in his way ſent me the letters, &c. agreeable to what is mentioned above, with a paper containing ſundry articles to be ſettled between his party and *Ragoba*, which he requeſts the Board's mediation in. The whole party having requeſted I will go to *Bombay* on this occaſion, and I having my ſuperior's permiſſion for ſo doing, whenever I may find it neceſſary I ſhall accordingly proceed thither as ſoon as I poſſibly can without giving umbrage to the preſent adminiſtration.

I am, &c. &c.

Poonah, 30th June 1778. (Signed) *T. Moſtyn.*

Read, the following letters from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We encloſe duplicates of our letters of the 31ſt ultimo, and 3d and 12th inſtant, and likewiſe another copy of Mr. *Baldwin's* letter.

Colonel *Leſlie* has adviſed us of his having arrived oppoſite to *Kalpey* the 14th ultimo, and of his intention to proſecute his march in a few days. We do not apprehend he can reach this coaſt until after the rains, but as his early arrival will be of the utmoſt importance, we ſhall direct him to expedite his march as much as poſſible. Mr. *Moſtyn* has ſucceeded in obtaining paſſports from *Tuckajee Holcar* as well as *Mhadajee Scindy*, which he has tranſmitted to Colonel *Leſlie*.

We find, by Mr. *Moſtyn's* advices, that a party is now formed againſt *Morabah*, and that it is poſſible the executive part of Government may again revert to *Nanah*, though not without oppoſition. Both parties have deſired an interview with Mr. *Moſtyn*, who on that occaſion referring to us for inſtructions, we thought, that as *Morabah* held the Sicca, and was the acting Miniſter with whom he had lately tranſacted all buſineſs on the part of the Maratta State, there would be an impropriety in his viſiting *Nanah*, and that it might have a bad effect; whereas no objection could lay againſt his viſiting *Morabah*, whenever he might find it neceſſary, without any regard to their party diſputes. On the 19th, the term we have limited for receiving the Durbar's anſwer will expire.

As the preſence of his Majeſty's ſquadron at this place might be our preſervation in caſe of an attack, and it can be of little ſervice, and is only expoſed to danger from a ſuperior fleet, on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, we now write to Sir *Edward Vernon*, by a veſſel expreſs, deſiring he will immediately come round to *Bombay* by the ſouthern paſſage; in which caſe he may arrive here in Auguſt.

Encloſed is a general return of our forces for laſt month.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 18th June 1778. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 17th Auguſt 1778.

Copy of a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire.

Honourable Sir,

The foregoing is copy of my addreſs under the 17th, which unfortunately was ſeized near the top of the Gotts, and carried to *Logur*, and the letter ſent to *Nanah*. I hope to recover it unopened, otherwiſe it will irritate him exceedingly. When I diſpatched it, I knew not that the Chowkies extended far beyond the town; but Jaſſoods are now ſpread all over the country, even in all the bye-roads. Mr. *Farmer* diſpatched a pair of Patta-

mars yeſterday; they proceeded as far as the Gotts in the night, but finding every avenue guarded, they were obliged to ſecrete his letters; and one returned this evening to acquaint us thereof. I am alſo informed, that five pair of our Pattamars, with one from *Chintoo Wittul*, and another belonging to *Naro Sunker*, who were coming from *Bombay*, were all ſtopped on the Gotts; one man only belonging to us got off; but the letters are all carried to *Logur*, from whence they will be ſent to *Nanah*. Theſe impediments will make our correſpondence tedious, not only from the neceſſity of every thing being wrote in cypher, but the Pattamars will alſo be obliged to go much round about, and can only travel by night. Let me requeſt, Sir, your letters may be made up as round as poſſible, and that you will ſend them by the Poonah Pattamars, and I will venture my life they will come ſafe, though perhaps take a little more time.

I can add nothing but what the public addreſs will inform you, for it is paſt my power to gueſs what are the real intentions of *Scindia* and *Holkar*; every thing ſeems to depend upon them. However, I do not believe *Morabah*'s affairs are ſo deſperate as the Junto make them; if they were, he would not remain quiet at *Proonder*, nor his family in *Poonah*. I am rather inclined to think ſomething is intended againſt the other party; but the better to blind them into a belief of ſecurity, *Todkajee* and *Scindia* permit them to go on. From the general letter you will learn how the different armies are ſituated. I cannot think they can long remain in this ſtate; and I have hopes *Monacjee Ponercah*, and *Badjee Punt Burba*, who are hourly expected, will turn the table in favour of *Morabah*; and I think *Scindia*'s ſcheme, in moving from *Sacaram* and *Nanah*, is to afford thoſe officers an opportunity to attack them. I have juſt now received a chit, informing me, that the man from *Morabah*, who was to have come two days ago, will be with me this night; therefore permit me to requeſt your ſpeedy determination, with reſpect to my proceeding to *Bombay*. The putting into cypher, and copying the letter to the Committee, has taken up ſo much time, it could not be ready laſt night; I was therefore obliged to keep it until now. The Perſian papers encloſed to the Board are in a character. Mr. *Farmer* could not take upon him to tranſlate, and I was afraid to truſt them with any one elſe. I think they are inconteſtable proofs of *Nanah*'s intentions; and it behoves us ſeriouſly to determine to fruſtrate them. I hope you will ſoon have a fair opportunity. I remain with much reſpect,

Honourable Sir,
your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
Poonah, (Signed) *Thomas Moſtyn.*
the 21ſt June 1778.

P. S.—The man is arrived, and I make no doubt matters will be ſettled in two days, agreeable to what is mentioned under the 17th. If you loſe this opportunity, I have no hopes of any one hereafter joining you, or making any more offers.

Bombay Secret Conſultations, the 17th of June 1778.

The Preſident and Council of *Bombay* wrote to the Court of Directors as follows, viz.

"On the 26th of March a change was effected in the "adminiſtration at *Poonah* by *Morabah Furneeſe*, who, "without oppoſition or bloodſhed took poſſeſſion of "that city, aſſumed the executive power from *Nanah* "*Furneeſe*, and appeared to act in all affairs of Govern- "ment in concert with *Saccaram Bappoo*; they had ſo "taken their meaſures, as to impreſs, we may ſay, a "general belief that this revolution was intended in "favour of *Ragoba*.

"We for ſome time entertained hopes that this change "would be followed with the moſt favourable conſe- "quences to the Company and to *Ragoba*, and we more "particularly depended that the French influence at the "Maratta Durbar would be deſtroyed by that event. Appendix. No. 97.

"The following extract of our letter to the Governor "General, dated the 20th of laſt month, will in a few "words ſhew you how far theſe expectations have been "realized, the terms we are likely to be on with the "Poonah Government, and the inſtructions laid down "for our conduct by thoſe gentlemen, which, though "given before the revolution, were ſtill applicable to our "then ſituation.

"Every letter we have received from *Poonah* ſince "the revolution, and the uniform tenor of the conduct of "the new adminiſtration, evidently prove, that they ſtill "mean to continue the ſame line of evaſive conduct, ſo "long purſued by that Government; we doubt not but "your advices from Mr. *Moſtyn* will have impreſſed you "with the ſame opinion. Though the executive power "is transferred from *Nanah* to *Morabah*, the former is "ſtill in office, and a member of the Durbar; the latter "as far as we can judge, ſeems inclined to tread in the "footſteps of his predeceſſor, and unwilling to part with "any ſhare of his power to *Ragoba*, may ſeek to ſecure "the whole to himſelf by the ſame means.

"Monſieur de *St. Lubin* is ſtill permitted to remain at "*Poonah*, though his diſmiſſion was the very firſt object "of our inſtructions to Mr. *Moſtyn* after the change in "the adminiſtration took place, and he received every "ſatisfaction on that head that promiſes could give, ſo "long ago as the 10th April. Notwithſtanding the re- "queſt then made to him in public Durbar to accompany "their agent to *Bombay* with propoſals reſpecting *Ra-* "*goba*; we find by his lateſt advices, that they have "been only trifling with him, nor have they to his "knowledge yet taken one ſtep towards ſettling that "buſineſs, though the ſeaſon is now ſo late. The treaty "ſtill remains on the ſame footing on which it has ſtood "theſe two years paſt, nor has the new Government "taken any meaſures whatever for fulfilling the unexe- "cuted articles.

"Such being the ſituation of affairs, we could not, "with your orders before us, wait any longer in expec- "tation of propoſals from *Poonah*; we have therefore "given Mr. *Moſtyn* inſtructions to the following pur- "port, being exactly to the directions contained in your "letter of the 23d of March.

"Firſt, We have directed him to demand from the "new adminiſtration, an expreſs avowal of the treaty "concluded by Colonel *Upton*.

"Secondly, The immediate poſſeſſion of a country of "three lacks, ſtipulated by the fifth article of the ſaid "treaty, and to declare a refuſal to be a violation of the "treaty.

"Thirdly, To acquaint the Durbar we have orders "from *Bengal* to keep poſſeſſion of the Guicawar ceſ- "ſions, ſince they have failed in producing the proofs "required by the treaty, that *Futty Sing* did not poſſeſs "power to make ſuch ceſſions.

"Fourthly, To make a remonſtrance againſt the "countenance afforded to the Chevalier de *St. Lubin*, "and to demand a clear and ſatisfactory explanation of "their intentions with reſpect to the French, declaring "to the Miniſters, that the Governor General and "Council will take ſuch meaſures accordingly as pru- "dence ſhall dictate, for the future ſafety of the Com- "pany's poſſeſſions.

"We thought it neceſſary to direct Mr. *Moſtyn* to "deliver theſe demands in writing, and to acquaint the "Miniſters, that we expected an immediate and explicit "anſwer, likewiſe in writing; but that if ſuch an an- "ſwer was not returned within fourteen days, we ſhould "conſider any further delay or evaſion as a refuſal, and "take our meaſures accordingly.

"Mr. *Moſtyn* delivered his demands on the 4th in- "ſtant, when it was ſignified to the Miniſters, that *Jam-* "*booſeer* would be reſtored, on their making good the "balance of the twelve lacks, the loſs you have ſuſtained "by

Appendix. No. 99.

" by their delay in making over the country of three " lacks, and the amount due to the concerned in the " *Aurora*.

" The Governor General and Council, on the Poonah " Government refuſing to comply with theſe demands, " or in any other ſhape infringing the treaty, have " authorized us to conclude an alliance with *Ragoba*.

" We have lately obtained from Mr. *Moſtyn* very " ſtrong evidence, that *Nanah*'s engagements with the " French have been taken up by the new adminiſtra- " tion; and the ſame gentleman diſcovered, that ap- " plication had been made by Monſieur de *St. Lubin* " to the government of *Goa*, for permiſſion for two " French regiments to paſs through the Portugueze " territories to the aſſiſtance of the Poonah Miniſters; " on which head we have made a proper repreſentation " to the Governor of *Goa*.

" Our lateſt advices from *Poonah* inform us, that a " party is formed againſt *Morabah*; and that it is not " unlikely the executive part of government may again " revert to *Nanah Furneeſe*. Both parties ſeem prepar- " ing to come to extremities; and it is not improbable " but one or both may make application to us for aſſiſt- " ance. In this critical ſituation, you may be aſſured " we ſhall proceed with the utmoſt caution and circum- " ſpection, and take no ſteps but what may appear, " on the moſt attentive conſideration of every circum- " ſtance, as beſt ſuited to enſure the ſafety and welfare " of your poſſeſſions."

The 8th of July 1778, the Board at *Bombay* addreſſed the Court as follows; viz.

" By the advices received from Mr. *Moſtyn* ſince that " period, we now find, that the change we then had " reaſon to think would take place in the Poonah Go- " vernment, has really happened; the adminiſtration " having reverted into the old channel, and the execu- " tive power veſted in *Nanah Furneſe*; in conſequence " of which, that government is now again in the ſame " ſituation it was at the time the treaty was concluded " by Colonel *Upton*.

" Our laſt letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* is dated the 3d " inſtant, in which he informs us, that not having re- " ceived from the new adminiſtration an anſwer to the " demands he made under the 4th ult. and having " received from the other party every neceſſary paper " and credential for ſettling our demands upon that State, " and bringing *Ragoba* again into government, he had " at their requeſt determined to proceed immediately " hither, to lay the ſame before us, and propoſed ſetting " off as ſoon as he had received the proper paſſports for " that purpoſe."

APPENDIX, No. 98.

Extract of *Bombay* Secret Conſultations, the 6th July, 1778,

RECEIVED the follow letter from the Reſident at *Poonah*.

Poonah, Letter from.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My laſt reſpects were dated the 29th ultimo: the ſame evening I received another letter from *Nanah*, requiring my attendance at camp in the name of the Peiſhwa; as alſo one from *Mhadjee Scindia*, telling me that he underſtood there was ſome difference between the Durbar and us, with reſpect to the late treaty, he would get it ſettled, and therefore requeſted I would go to him; to the former I have made the ſame reply as formerly adviſed, and to the latter, that I ſhould be very happy to meet him; but as this could not be done without diſguſting the miniſters whom I had for certain reaſons refuſed, I hoped he would excuſe me for the preſent.

Yeſterday I received in the evening a note from *Keſſorow*, the ſon of *Mhaderow Jaderow*, requeſting I would ſend the Linguiſt to him as he had ſomething to ſay; the Linguiſt accordingly went when *Keſſorow* told him, that as *Morabah* had got poſſeſſion of the articles I delivered the 4th ultimo, he was directed to requeſt I would deliver another copy thereof; to this I replied in writing, that I did not underſtand this behaviour, being certain that the paper is in *Nanah*'s poſſeſſion, if not, it was very extraordinary that he did not apply for a ſecond copy, when he deſired I would go to camp purpoſely to talk on theſe articles on the 25th ultimo, or that *Mhaderow* at a viſit he paid me the 27th, ſhould not have aſked for a copy, but on the contrary repeated the articles to me verbatim, and preſſed me to go to camp, to talk upon them; and that it therefore appearing perfectly clear to me, the Durbar ſo far from meaning to give an anſwer, only wanted to trifle with me, and by obtaining another copy, have it in their power to ſay they did not receive the articles until the 2d inſtant, when they would expect a further time of fourteen days to anſwer; I could not comply with their requeſt; to this, *Keſſorow* replied in writing, that in conſideration of our friendſhip, I ought to deliver the copy in queſtion.

From the above meſſage I make no doubt it will appear clear to your Honour, &c. that the Durbar have no real intention of replying to that paper; and as I have received every neceſſary paper and credential from the other party for ſettling our demands and bringing *Ragoba* into government, with which they have earneſtly requeſted I will proceed to the Preſidency, and lay before the Honourable Board for your final determination, I judge it neceſſary to comply with their requeſt, and intend ſetting out as ſoon as I can receive the proper duſtucks, which I hope will be in a few days.

I was in hopes of receiving an anſwer from the preſent Durbar to the paper delivered the 4th ultimo, which would have afforded me an opportunity of leaving *Poonah* under pretence of laying them before you, without giving the leaſt to ſuſpect the real motive of my journey; but being diſappointed therein, I have been under the neceſſity, as the only means left to prevent ſuſpicion, of making uſe of your Honour, &c.'s name by writing to the Peiſhwa, it is by your orders, I proceed.

I am informed that *Holcar* and *Scindia* are preſſing *Nanah* for the balance of the money promiſed them as mentioned in my addreſs of the 20th ultimo, which *Nanah* is endeavouring to evade by ſaying that he has no money with him, but will come to *Poonah* to raiſe it. To this, however, the officers object, and inſiſt on its being paid there; *Nanah* has in conſequence ſent for all the Shroffs, both Bramins and Guzarattees, to *Proonder*, but I underſtand they have agreed amongſt themſelves not to lend a rupee, and it is imagined this will bring on a freſh diſpute.

Monſieur *St. Lubin* left this place the 9th inſtant, with an intent as it is publicly given out, of proceeding to *Damaun*, though I am privately aſſured that he will not go further than *Dannoo*, where I ſuppoſe he will remain until *Nanah* is ſatisfied whether he can comply with his engagements.

I am, very reſpectfully,

Poonah, 3d July 1778. Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen, your moſt obedient Servant, *Thomas Moſtyn*.

APPENDIX, No. 99.

Letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, dated 13th July 1778.

Bombay Sel. Conſns. 21 July 1778.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

CONFORMABLE to what I wrote you under the 3d inſtant, I left *Poonah* the 6th, and have now the honour to lay before you ſundry letters and papers from *Morabah* and his party, as per enclosed liſt, and hope my

my conduct in the whole of this buſineſs will meet with your Honour, &c.'s approbation.

On the 5th I received another letter from *Scindia*, requeſting I would go to him, as he wanted to ſettle the articles; but as I had ſo often refuſed both him and the Durbar, telling him that it was not in my power to talk on the articles, as your Honour, &c. required a plain and direct anſwer in writing, and being convinced it was a ſcheme of *Nannah*'s to delay time, I thought my going to camp at *Scindia*'s requeſt might appear as if I meant to trifle only with them: I therefore wrote to *Scindia*, deſiring that he would ſend me the Duſtucks, for which I told him I ſhould ſtay that day only; I alſo added, that if he had any thing particular to ſay, and would deliver it me in writing, I ſhould lay it before your Honour, &c. and procure him an anſwer.

I likewiſe encloſe copy of my addreſs to the Honourable the Governor General and Council under the 30th ultimo. I am, very reſpectfully,

Bombay, 13th July 1778. Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen; Your obedient humble Servant, *Thomas Moſtyn.*

Liſt of ſundry Letters and Papers brought by Mr. *Moſtyn* from *Poonah*.

No. 1. Letter from *Mahiput Row Trimbuck*, or *Butchebah Pronder*, to the Honourable the Preſident, dated 22d Rabillaker.

2. Letter from *Morabah Furneſe* to d°, of the ſame tenor and date.

3. Letter from *Mhaderow Narrain* to d°, dated the 2d June 1778.

4. Letter from *Tookajee Holcar* to d°, dated the 20th June 1778.

5. Letter from *Mora Babarow* to d°, without date.

6. Letter from *Mora Babarow*, or *Moraba*, to *Ragoba*.

7. Letter from *Tookajee Holcar* to d°.

8. Letter from *Mahiput Row*, or *Butchebah Pronder*, to d°.

9. Three Sunnuds, in the name of *Maderow Narrain* Peiſhwa, to deliver to the Engliſh of *Bombay* the Pergunnahs of *Deſborah*, *Hanſood*, and *Ahmood*, dated 15th Rabillaker.

10. Demands made by Mr. *Moſtyn* on the part of the government of *Bombay*, with the anſwers.

11. Anſwers under the Sicca and Mortab to the paper delivered by Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Poonah Durbar, on the 4th June, 1778.

12. Tranſlation of a memorandum delivered to Mr. *Moſtyn* by *Morabah*.

13. Memorandum of articles given in by Mr. *Moſtyn*, and anſwered under the Sicca.

14. Articles of a treaty propoſed by *Mora Babarow* and *Mahiput Row Trimbuck*.

No. 1. Tranſlation of a Letter from *Mahiput Row Trimbuck*, or *Butchebah Pronder*, dated 22d Rabillaker.

After compliments:

The *Row Saheb* State has fallen into diſorder, which cannot be ſettled without the preſence of the proper maſter; the *Row Saheb* being a minor, your Honour, &c. will therefore join your army with *Dada Saheb*, and ſee him come to *Poonah*. I have communicated ſome matters regarding the coming of *Dada Saheb* to *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire, and have diſpatched him to your Honour, &c. by whoſe verbal information you will know all. Your Honour, &c. will have no ſcruples in your mind, and manage ſo that *Dada Saheb*'s coming may take place immediately.

No. 2. A Letter from *Morabah Furneſe*, exactly of the ſame date and tenor as the preceding one.

No. 3. Tranſlation of a Letter from *Mhaderow Narrain* Peiſhwa, dated 2d June 1778.

After compliments.

Mr. *Moſtyn* has repreſented to me, that there is a treaty in force between the Circar and the Company, and they continue in terms of friendſhip; for that reaſon it is proper no manner of agreement ſhould be made or entered into with Monſieur *St. Lubin*, a Frenchman, who is come to this Circar, and is permitted to reſide at *Poonah*. To this I anſwer; that hitherto no agreement has been concluded between him and this Durbar; neither ſhall any be made hereafter; and I never will hold with him or his nation any ſort of friendſhip, or permit the French ſhips to come into any of my ports, either for trade or otherwiſe: this will continue ſo long as the Honourable Company and I remain in friendſhip. I have not any occaſion to depend on the French nation. Your Honours, &c. will alſo act agreeable to the treaty. Appendix. No. 99.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Tookajee Holcar*, dated 20th June 1778. No. 4.

After compliments:

Diſorders have ariſen in the government of *Row Saheb Pundit Pradhan*, owing to which, ſome enemies of the State have grown powerful; therefore, without the preſence of *Dada Saheb*, theſe diſorders cannot be put a ſtop to, nor can the government be ſettled. I have had a conference on this head with *Morabah Dada* and *Butchebah*, wherein we have agreed to bring *Dada Saheb* to *Poonah*; and both the aforeſaid perſons have communicated the ſame to Mr. *Moſtyn*, and written letters to him on the buſineſs. We are heartily agreed, ſo that your Honour will ſee that *Dada Saheb* comes here immediately with your forces; and entertain no doubts reſpecting us; but do what is ſettled by Mr. *Moſtyn* with the two governments' officers. I want very much to have the government properly ſettled; and your Honour is likewiſe a friend to this State. You will know the reſt of the verbal information of Mr. *Moſtyn*. I am hearty in the buſineſs, and ſo are the two above-mentioned Chiefs.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Mora Babaro*, or *Moraba*, without date. No. 5.

After compliments:

I have delivered to Mr. *Moſtyn* a liſt of every article of my terms, which he will communicate to you, and you will take the ſame into conſideration, and ſee every article agreed to. Your Honour will mediate between the parties, and get the articles confirmed under the ſeal of the Company, and ſend them to me; all which, and other matters, I have communicated to Mr. *Moſtyn*; who will acquaint you of the ſame. I have not any other intention than to be on friendly terms with you, and your Honour will do the ſame on your part.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Moraba* to *Ragoba*. No. 6.

After compliments:

Moraba ſends his reſpects. I have communicated every thing to Mr. *Moſtyn*; all of which you will underſtand from his repreſentation. I have no other dependance beſides you, God is my judge.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Tookajee Holcar* to *Ragoba*. No. 7.

After compliments:

I *Tookajee Holcar*, your ſervant, ſend you my reſpects, and hope you will act agreeable to the requeſt of *Mora Babarow*, who now writes to you. Some differences have happened, to which you might take exception; but I hope you will not, becauſe we are all one; this you may rely on. Dated the 5th Jamadillaker.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Mahiput Row*, or *Butchebah*, to *Ragobah*. No. 8.

After compliments:

I your child, *Mahiput Row Trimbuck*, ſend you my reſpects. I have communicated to Mr. *Moſtyn* all matters on our part, which he will inform you of; and you will, without any heſitation, undertake the buſineſs. I ſwear that no obſtacle will ariſe on our ſide. Three Sunnuds, in the name of *Maderow Narrain* Peiſhwa, to deliver to the Engliſh of *Bombay*, the Pergunnahs of *Deſborah*, *Hanſood*, and *Ahmood*. Dated 15th Rabillaker. No. 9.

No. 10. Demands made by Mr. *Moſtyn*, on the part of the Government of *Bombay*; with the anſwers.

Appendix. No. 99.

1ſt. The ſix articles already delivered are to be agreed to, and anſwered under your Sicca, in a column oppoſite to each article. Should *Dada Saheb* beſides give us an additional grant of territory, you will aſſiſt therein, and ſend Sunnuds accordingly.

Anſwer. The above mentioned ſix articles have been already determined on, and anſwered by an inſtrument which is ſealed and delivered, and ſhall be obſerved; you will do the ſame on your part. Beſides which, we agreed to *Dada Saheb*'s giving you additional Jaghire.

2d. The pay and expence of the Engliſh troops, who will come with *Ragobah*, are to be defrayed in ready money, according to the terms ſettled with *Ragonaut Row*, in the treaty of *Surat*, which treaty you will agree to; or if ready money is not paid, particular countries ſhall be aſſigned over for the ſame purpoſe.

Anſwer. You will ſhew the article in the treaty of *Surat* reſpecting the pay of the troops to *Chintoo Wittul*; if he approves of it we will abide by what he may ſettle; whatever may be ſettled we will either pay in ready money, or aſſign over countries near the ſea coaſt, which you will reſtore on the money being paid; we agree to *Dada Saheb*'s treaty.

3d. On *Dada Saheb*'s arrival either at *Bellapore* or *Panwell*, *Butcheba* and the Subedar's ſon are to come and compliment him.

Anſwer. Conſidering the preſent ſituation of affairs, none of us can conveniently come. You will bring him over the Ghauts, and we are ready for his ſervice in all things. You will do the buſineſs without fail.

We agree to the above as it is written. Dated 15th Rabillaker.

L. S.

No. 11. Anſwers under the Sicca and Mortab to the paper of demands delivered by Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Poonah Durbar, the 4th June 1778.

Sicca.

Firſt. We agree to obſerve the treaty of *Poorunder*, and will willingly perform the ſame: you will do the ſame on your part.

Second. Sunnuds are iſſued for the country of three lacks, according to the treaty. You allege there is a difference between the Cahmil Jumma and the preſent revenues; into which we ſhall hereafter enquire and do what may be neceſſary. If it appears on a juſt examination, that the revenues fall ſhort of three lacks, villages will be given from the Pergunnah of *Occlaſeer* to make up the difference: if on the contrary there ſhould be an exceſs, you will diſmember villages from the Pergunnah of *Hanſood*, and reſtore them to the Circar.

Third. The proofs from *Futty Sing* mentioned in the treaty of *Poorunder* not having been produced to this day, we now agree to your keeping the country of one and a half lack of rupees, given the Company by *Futty Sing Guicawar*.

Fourth. Monſieur *St. Lubin*, the Frenchman, is already diſpatched. No treaty is concluded with him, nor will any be hereafter, ſo long as we are in friendſhip with you. A letter is written to the Governor on this ſubject.

Fifth. You ſpeak of the ſtipulations made by Colonel *Upton* reſpecting the country of three lacks, to which we anſwer that we ſhall obſerve the agreement made by the Circar. The juſt amount due on that account, according to the treaty, ſhall be paid in ready money, or out of the revenues of *Jambooſeer*, as may be ſettled; which Pergunnah ſhall be reſtored after the amount is paid.

Sixth. We have anſwered your five articles oppoſite to each other, agreeable to which we will act.

We agree to the ſix articles, in the above manner.

Mortab.

Tranſlation of a Memorandum delivered to Mr. *Moſtyn* by *Morabah*.

No. 12. A true friendſhip ſhould ſubſiſt between us; regarding which, a letter to me, under the Company's ſeal, is required to the following purport:

That ſeveral points have been agreed to between us by an inſtrument under the Company's ſeal, which we will obſerve: you will have no objection or doubts in your mind about the ſame; our friendſhip will be continued to the end of time, and you will cultivate the ſame on your part.

Memorandum of Articles given in by Mr. *Moſtyn*, and anſwered under the Sicca.

No. 13. *Futty Sing* has given the Company a territory of one lack and a half of rupees, to which you will have no objections.

Anſwer. This article is anſwered in the reply to the paper of demands given in to the Durbar by Mr. *Moſtyn*.

You will ſettle reſpecting the pay of the troops that are to accompany *Ragoba*, in the ſame manner as ſtipulated by the treaty of *Surat*; or leave the ſame to be adjuſted by *Chintoo Punt*, giving him a proper power for that purpoſe.

Anſwer. *Chintoo Punt* has authority and inſtructions on this point, as mentioned in a former paper. We agree to the treaty made with *Ragoba*.

The Circar have given us, by the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, a country of three lacks of rupees. The Pergunnahs ſhall be *Ahmood*, *Desborah*, and *Hanſood*. Any difference there may be in either of the revenues of theſe diſtricts ſhall be ſettled, as mentioned in paper No. 11.

Anſwer. This paper has been alſo already anſwered.

We

We have mutually agreed to reſtore *Ragoba*; it now remains to be ſettled, to what place we ſhall bring him, and where you will come and join him. We will come to the foot of the Ghauts; but it is very difficult to get above them. After we have got above the Ghauts, there can be no obſtacle; but that enterprize will be very difficult.

Holcar is equally engaged with you in this buſineſs; you will therefore deſire him to confirm the ſame to one of my people.

To tranſport the artillery, ſtores, &c. Ten thouſand biggaries, and two thouſand bullocks will be wanting. We will bring as many Laſcars as our Bundar can afford: but the reſt muſt be ſupplied by you.

I will endeavour to get your articles confirmed; but you muſt ſend ſome perſon with letters for the Governor and *Chintoo Punt*.

Anſwer. The principal officers and their armies are now here, and when it is convenient we will adviſe you thereof. You may now go to *Bombay*; and when you have ſettled every thing, let us know; and ſend the articles, according to our agreement. All our time and attention are taken up in the buſineſs. We have given you full powers; but the matter muſt be kept a ſecret. Appendix. No. 100.

Anſwer. The Subedar has had a meeting with *Bapoojee*, and ſatisfied him, and given him his letters.

Anſwer. You have every thing. We on our part will aſſiſt with as many as our ſituation will permit; but you muſt not make any delay on this account.

Anſwer. I have delivered to you letters for the Governor, and deputed a proper perſon; but no letters for *Chintoo Punt*; your being there will be ſufficient.

Our treaty is not to be diſcovered to any perſon, not even to *Chintoo Punt*.

We agree to the above, the 29th Jamdillowah.

Seal.

Articles propoſed for a Treaty by *Mora Baberow* and *Mahiput Row Trimbuck*.

No. 14

Article 1ſt. The Peiſhwa being a minor, the State has fallen into diſorder, for that reaſon we have agreed that *Dada Saheb* ſhall come, in order that the government may be ſettled; but the Sicca, &c. ſhall be continued in the name of *Maderow Narrain*, and until he comes of age *Dada Saheb* ſhall conduct the government, through our hands as the principal miniſters.

2d. *Dada Saheb* will not keep any of his preſent attendants near him, nor liſten to their evil counſel; he may ſettle on them reaſonable appointments, but not let them approach near him.

3d. In conſequence of the diſorders that have prevailed in the State for theſe four years paſt, *Ragoba* may have intentions to puniſh particular perſons; he muſt not entertain any thoughts of that kind, but baniſh all enmity from his heart in a general amneſty. If any one hereafter ſhall raiſe diſturbances againſt the State, *Dada Saheb*, in conjunction with us, will inflict the proper puniſhment; and the Engliſh ſhall never at any time interfere with us in this point; the Engliſh ſhall not, without our advice, make an alliance with any power that may affect us.

4th. The Engliſh army that will accompany *Ragoba* ſhall remain ſo long as we may have occaſion for it, and be diſmiſſed when he may think proper; to which you will make no objection.

5th. Whenever we may hereafter at any time require your aſſiſtance, you will ſend an army well equipped for our ſervice.

6th. Whatever grants have been made to any perſon for ſervices to government, ſhall be confirmed by *Ragoba*.

7th. We will on our parts faithfully obſerve the treaty concluded during the government of the late *Nanah* and *Row Saheb*.

8th. The ſeveral principal officers belonging to the Peiſhwa's government, and the dependants on him, are to be provided with ſuitable appointments, according to their rank: but ſtate of the government's finances muſt be conſidered.

9th. We confirm the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, and agree to the further demands made by Mr. *Moſtyn*, according to what is wrote in our anſwer to thoſe demands.

10th. Should any Chiefs of the government want to bring in *Dada Saheb*, without our participation, you will not conſent thereto; you muſt bring him in through our interpoſition alone, and not through any other; the late *Mhaderow* took the government as chief Miniſter out of our hands; but you will uſe your intereſt to reſtore us to our places, and will not ſupport any perſons that may endeavour to prejudice us in *Ragoba*'s favour, but ſupport us.

11th. You will without fail bring *Dada Saheb* to *Poonah*, according to our wiſhes, aſſiſting him with troops and warlike ſtores as may be neceſſary to accompliſh it.

12th. The King and other Chiefs in *Hindoſtan* have made encroachments on the territories belonging to the Circar and its officers, which you will get reſtored by force, and aſſiſt us in our endeavours for that purpoſe.

13th. *Govind Row* and *Futty Sing* having made an equal diviſion between them of the Guicawar's country, you will ſee this agreement punctually complied with. *Govind Row* ought to receive the revenues of his ſhare from the time the diviſion was firſt made, but *Futty Sing* has withheld it. An equivalent thereof muſt therefore be given and continued to *Govind Row*. You will not favour *Futty Sing*, who ought not to charge *Govind Row* with half of the countries he gave to the Engliſh. You will aſſiſt *Govind Row* in all things.

14th. This Circar has ſuſtained a loſs on account of the diſturbance raiſed by *Sudabah*. The effects, &c. he had in his poſſeſſion ought to revert to the Circar. You will aſſiſt in this buſineſs, and not protect whoever may be in poſſeſſion thereof.

15th. The management of the Guicawar buſineſs is to be in the hands of *Gopal Naigue*.

APPENDIX, No. 100.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, dated 27th June, 1778.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

On the 22d inſtant I was honoured with your commands of the 18th.

On the 21ſt, the man mentioned in my laſt to be

Appendix. No. 100.

ſent by *Morabah*, returned to me with Letters from *Morabah* and *Butchebah* both to the Honourable the Preſident and me, with the anſwer to the paper I delivered the 4th, and Duſtucks for the free paſſage of our troops coming from *Bengal* through the Maratta dominions. The letters from *Morabah* and *Butchebah* were to requeſt we would bring over *Ragobah* with our forces, and to aſſure that *Holcar* was ſtrictly joined with them; but there being ſome alterations neceſſary in the anſwer to the paper, and not having received any letter from *Holcar* on the ſubject, which I told the man was likewiſe abſolutely neceſſary, he agreed to return to *Morabah*, at the ſame time deſiring that my Linguiſt might accompany him to ſee that the papers were drawn out in a proper manner, to receive the Sunnuds for the country of three lacks, and letters from *Holcar* to the Honourable the Preſident and myſelf, which I conſented to. The Linguiſt accordingly ſet out on the 23d, and returned laſt night, when he informed me that *Morabah* had agreed to the articles in every point, which he had ſeen properly ſealed, as alſo the Sunnuds for the country of three lacks, and letters from *Holcar* to the Honourable the Preſident. That *Holcar* had alſo written the letters declaring he is firmly attached to *Morabah* and *Butchebah*, and that whatever they do he agrees to, and expreſſing his earneſt deſire to bring *Ragobah* here; that *Morabah* had drawn up ſundry articles which he wiſhes to have ſettled between his party and *Ragobah*, through the mediation of your Honour, &c. and that though theſe papers were all ſealed, neither *Morabah* or *Holcar* choſe to truſt them with the Linguiſt to bring down, as the government would in two days be in the hands of *Nannah*, by whoſe people they were ſo ſtrictly watched that not a man could paſs without being ſtopped and ſearched, which indeed happened to the Linguiſt; but ſaid as it had been agreed between the parties that *Morabah* ſhould reſide at the village of *Bhole*, about ten coſs northward of *Poonah*, for which place he ſhould paſs through the town on Sunday, he would take that opportunity of ſending theſe papers to me by one of his own people. *Morabah* requeſted, that the utmoſt ſecrecy might be obſerved, until matters were entirely adjuſted, and we began to act; and ſaid, that he would acquaint us when he and *Holcar* were ready to co-operate with us, but could not now take upon himſelf to ſay the exact number of troops he could join us with. The Linguiſt further tells me, that the day before yeſterday *Morabah* and *Butcheba* viſited *Holcar*; that whilſt they were with him, *Scindia* came in, when the two officers retired to a private tent; that after conſulting ſome time, they ſent for the others, and told *Morabah* that he muſt give up the Sicca Cuttary and Jury Putkey to *Nanah*; which he refuſed, ſaying, that as he had received them from *Perwetty Roy*, he ſhould return them to her. The Linguiſt alſo ſays, he heard at camp that *Badjee Punt Burwah* and *Monackjee Phaneria* hearing of the junction of *Holcar* and *Scindia*, imagined that *Morabah* was left entirely to himſelf; and fearing that the *Kiſtnah* would fill ſo much by the rains, as to prevent their retreat, they had haſtily retired to the ſouthern bank of that river, from whence they are plundering the country round.

On the 25th *Mhaderow Jaderow*, who came into town the day before, deſired I would ſend a man to him, as he had ſomething particular to ſay. I complied therewith by ſending my Gentoo writer, to whom he delivered the following meſſage; viz. that when I came from *Bombay* he ſent a Jaſſood to pay his compliments to me, who I ſaid was not a proper perſon; that ſome time ago I delivered a letter directed to all the miniſters of the Peiſhwa, with the Company's ſeal affixed at the top, at which *Nannah* and *Bappoo* were much ſurprized, but that he had excuſed this to them, by telling them I was unacquainted with their method of affixing ſeals: that the Peiſhwa had lately ſent me a letter deſiring I would go to camp, but inſtead of anſwering it in the manner I ſhould have done, I had written an anſwer to *Ballajee Janourdeen* (alias *Nannah*) that I ſhould not go without orders from *Bombay*, which they thought very extraordinary, as there could be no objection to my Vackeel attending the government; that *Nannah Bappoo* and *Madajee Scindia* having ordered him to preſent their compliments to me, and deſire my attendance at their camp, he had repreſented to them that it was neceſſary they ſhould write a letter to me on the ſubject, which they have accordingly done; he now ſent it to me, requeſting I would take into conſideration and fix a day for going to them, when he would accompany me. This letter, written in the name of the Peiſhwa, and ſealed with the Muttalic Sicca, mentions, that *Mhaderow* will acquaint me with ſome circumſtances, and deſires I would accompany him to camp. As I ſuppoſed the circumſtances here alluded to were no other than the meſſage above recited from *Maderow Jaderow*, I ſent him the following reply: that I could not conſider a Jaſſood as a proper perſon to meet me on my firſt arrival (which was the caſe when I came here in March 1777) particularly as I was convinced the Durbar knew better from their behaviour to Monſieur *St. Lubin*; that ſo many people being in poſſeſſion of the Muttalic Sicca, it was impoſſible for me to know from whom letters ſealed therewith came; if therefore there was not ſome fixed rule for my conduct, I might attend upon any officer poſſeſſed thereof, who might chuſe to write me in the Peiſhwa's name: and as *Morabah* was the perſon to whom the Durbar laſt referred me for tranſacting buſineſs with the government, I did not conſider myſelf at liberty to obey the ſummons mentioned by *Maderow*; that the Durbar having ever ſince the late treaty acted in ſo evaſive a manner, it was become abſolutely neceſſary to do every thing in writing, which was the reaſon of my delivering the paper the 4th inſtant; that it was not a letter, but certain articles to which I ſigned my name and fixed the Company's ſeal, to ſhew them that their anſwer muſt have both the Sicca and Mortab affixed thereto; and with reſpect to the ſeal being at the top of that paper, and my name at the bottom, I obſerved to him that it was exactly conformable to their own method of affixing the Sicca at top and the Mortab at bottom, and not through ignorance of their cuſtoms, as he pretends to ſay. As the circumſtances mentioned by *Mhaderow* appeared to me too trifling to need my attendance at camp, I this morning ſent another meſſage to him, deſiring to know if he had any further particulars to inform me of, and what it was *Nannah* wanted to talk to me on; telling him, if only on the articles, it was unneceſſary, becauſe they explained themſelves, and I was directed to demand an anſwer in a certain time, which had now been exceeded eight days; but if *Nannah* had any other particular buſineſs, I deſired he would deliver it in writing; when, if it appeared of conſequence ſufficient, I would immediately wait on him: to which *Mhaderow* replied, that he had no further particulars to inform me of, and that the buſineſs *Nannah* wanted me for was to talk on the articles and the increaſe of our friendſhip. This more fully points out their view in ſending for me to be nothing more than to delay time, and to evade giving an anſwer to the paper in writing; and as from the exceſs of time your Honour, &c. may judge it a refuſal, I have thought it moſt prudent to evade going, and from experience I am convinced it is the only method of drawing any thing from them in writing. *Nannah* having again got the power of government, I make no doubt but the ſame, if not greater obſtructions will be thrown on our communication with the town as formerly, which will of courſe render my future intelligence very imperfect.

The letter mentioned in my laſt to have been ſtopped by *Nannah*, has in conſequence of my application been returned to me unopened; as have alſo a large packet coming from *Madras* for *Bombay* which was immediately forwarded by a pair of Pattamars, thoſe from *Madras*, being taken ſick and unable to proceed; and a packet

with

with the Honourable Company's ſeal for the Captain General at *Goa*, with ſeveral private letters from that place; which were all immediately forwarded.

I am informed that *Nannah* has lately ſent an order to Monſieur *St. Lubin* to leave *Poonah*, and that he has in conſequence been ſupplied with camels, bullocks, &c. for his baggage, and a guard; but he now pleads, that his Linguiſt being at *Nannah*'s camp, he cannot ſet out until his return. Notwithſtanding *Nannah* has given this order, I am convinced it is only done with a view to blind us; for where can he go at this ſeaſon of the year?

The Duſtucks mentioned in the former part of this letter, were forwarded to Colonel *Leſlie* on the 22d.

I am, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
your moſt obedient ſervant,
Thos Moſtyn.

Poonah, 17th June 1778.

APPENDIX, No. 101.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 17th Auguſt 1778.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

CONFORMABLY to what Mr. *Moſtyn* wrote under the 30th ultimo, he proceeded to the Preſidency the 6th inſtant; a few hours after he had ſet out a Government's Carcoon came to the factory, with the Durbar's anſwers to the paper delivered the 4th ultimo; but on finding Mr. *Moſtyn* was gone, refuſed to deliver them, ſaying he had received poſitive orders to follow him, and deliver them into his own hands; however, the next evening he returned, telling me he had received freſh orders from his maſter to deliver them to me. The original I have forwarded to *Bombay*, and now encloſe copy of tranſlate for your obſervation.

Your commands of the 8th, and duplicate of thoſe of the 11th June, have been received, the former on the 9th and the latter on the 11th inſtant; immediately on receipt of the firſt, I wrote a letter to the Peiſhwa, requeſting to know how I ſhould convey that from the Honourable the Governor General to him; and on the 18th received an anſwer, deſiring I would ſend it to *Proondur*, which I have accordingly done, with another from myſelf, requeſting, as the readieſt way to prevent all diſputes between your troops and thoſe belonging to this Government they may meet with on their march, that he would ſend me a Duſtuck for their free paſſage through the Maratta dominions, which I would forward to Colonel *Leſlie*; but *Nanah Furneſe* being now the only Miniſter, I cannot ſay I have the leaſt hopes of this requeſt being complied with, as he views the march of theſe troops with a very jealous eye. It is neceſſary to obſerve here, Gentlemen, that in the month of January laſt, the Honourable the Preſident of *Bombay* forwarded a letter from the Peiſhwa to me, with directions to deliver it myſelf, but both *Nanah Furneſe* and *Saccaram Bapoo* refuſed receiving it, unleſs I ſent it through the hands of the two people appointed to tranſact the Engliſh buſineſs with the Durbar; and that at the time of the receipt of the Honourable the Governor General's letter, one of theſe people was at *Nanah*'s camp, and the other ſaid he was ſo ill as to be unable to tranſact buſineſs; in order therefore to avoid all diſputes on this head, and to prevent my receiving a ſecond inſult, I judged it the beſt method to write the Peiſhwa as before recited, and hope it will meet with your approbation. The copy of my proceedings, mentioned by your Honour, &c. to be wanting, was forwarded in the original packet of the 12th May, via *Benares*.

On the 1ſt Monſieur *St. Lubin* left *Poonah*, with an intent, it is publickly given out, of proceeding to *Damaun*, but Mr. *Moſtyn* received private aſſurances that he would not proceed any further than *Damaun*, where it is imagined he will remain until *Nanah* ſees whether he is able to perform his engagements.

On the 10th *Madjee Scindy*, at the requeſt of *Nanah Furneſe*, ſent two thouſand men to the village of *Bhele*, to ſeize *Morabah*, and the next day they arrived, and encamped with him on a plain, about a mile without the town. *Nanah* and *Scindy* not agreeing what ſhall be done with him, *Morabah* ſtill remains encamped, guarded by three hundred horſe, the reſt having rejoined *Scindy*. Appendix. No. 101.

A perſon in *Scindy*'s camp informs me, that *Holcar* has been obliged to deliver up his Duan, and two of his officers, to *Nanah*; that *Nanah* and *Scindy* have appointed another man to be *Holcar*'s Duan; and that every one, whether Brahmins or officers, who joined *Morabah*, had been ſeized, and conſiderable fines demanded from them; amongſt the reſt is *Buchabah Proondur*.

From the beſt intelligence I have been able to procure, I learn that *Saccaram Bappoo* has not been in the leaſt conſulted on the late tranſactions; and I am even aſſured, that it is *Madjee Scindy*'s intention ſhortly to ſeize and confine him; in which caſe I much doubt whether *Scindy*'s ambition will not lead him to take the Government entirely into his own hands.

I am, &c. &c.
Wm Lewis.

Poonah, the 20th July 1778.

Tranſlation of the Poonah Durbar's Replies to the paper delivered by Mr. *Moſtyn* on the 4th June, received the 7th July.

Firſt. A treaty was made between the Circar and the Engliſh, to which they affixed their ſeals; the Engliſh ought to keep it faithfully, and the Circar will do the ſame.

Second. Conformable to what is written in the 5th article of the treaty, I have offered you a country, but you would not ſettle and take it. There is no agreement to give you a groſs revenue of three lacks, according to the treaty. You may ſettle and take it to day, and the Circar will ſettle and deliver it. The delay is on your part, not on the Circar's.

Third. It is mentioned in the treaty, that when proofs ſhall be produced, under *Futty Sing*'s hand, that he has no power to give away any country; the Engliſh would deliver up *Chickley*, &c. country. *Futty Sing* ſent two letters, directed to Colonel *Upton*; alſo copy of the Peiſhwa's Sunnud, with his ſeal, which were delivered to Colonel *Upton*, ſhewing that this power is not with the Gnicawar, but with the Peiſhwa. A receipt for the ſaid letters and papers was taken from Colonel *Upton*, with his ſeal affixed thereto, which is in the poſſeſſion of the Circar. Conformable to the treaty, *Chickley*, &c. Pergunnah ought to be reſtored to the Circar. What you now write being contrary to the treaty, is very extraordinary, and much ſurpriſes me.

Fourth. There is no agreement between Monſieur *St. Lubin* and this Government.

Fifth. You would not receive the country of three lacks, agreeable to the treaty; if you will now receive the country, I have this to obſerve about the two years arrears of the revenues: you muſt debit the amount of the collections that have been made theſe two years from that country; and whatever collections have been made in the Pergunnahs of *Chickley*, &c. muſt remain depoſited with the Engliſh, and further, that according to what is written in the treaty, you muſt deduct the value of the *Chickley*, &c. Pergunnahs; and whatever may be the difference, either on one ſide or other, ſhall be paid. I do not perfectly underſtand what you have wrote about the ſhip. I have ſent to call you, and after your arrival I ſhall talk with you, conformable to what I have written to Colonel *Upton*.

A true Copy.
Edward Raverſcroft,
Secretary to the
Select Committee.

Appendix. Nos. 102 to 106.

Lewis, Mr. Wm. Letter from.

APPENDIX, No. 102.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Consultations, the 26th July 1778.

RECEIVED a letter from Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

My last respects were dated the 11th instant. The same night I received information, that *Morabah* had been seized by two thousand men belonging to *Scindy*; and that they were encamped with him on the plain close to the town, from whence they were to proceed next day to *Poorunder*. That he still remains upon the plain, guarded by three hundred horse only, the rest being returned to camp.

By messages I have lately received from a man at camp, I learn that *Holcar* has been obliged to deliver up his Duan; and that every one, whether Bramins or officers, who joined *Morabah*, have been seized, and considerable fines demanded from them. Amongst the rest are *Vissajee Punt* and *Butchebah Proondur*; the latter was taken the 14th instant. The same person yesterday sent me word, that *Nannah* had the day before ordered a body of men to surround our factory; and that *Scindy* getting notice thereof, immediately sent to him to desist, which *Nannah* was obliged to comply with.

I have not received an answer from the Peishwa, to the letter I wrote, informing him of my having received one for him from the Governor General and Council, as mentioned in my last address. I have not therefore yet been able to deliver it; indeed, at present there does not appear to be any proper Government. *Nannah*, it is true, has the name, but *Scindy* is in fact the Minister, for the former dares not do any thing without his permission; *Sacqram* is not even consulted; and I was told yesterday, that it is *Scindy*'s intention to confine him in a very short time; in which case I make no doubt he will go a step further, and by also confining *Nannah*, seize the Government.

I am, very respectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble servant,
Poonah, 17th July 1778. *William Lewis.*

APPENDIX, No. 103.

Appointment of a Select Committee at *Bombay*, by the Court of Directors, 10th April 1778.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Esquire, President and Governor of *Bombay*,
John Carnac, Esquire,
Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and
Daniel Draper, Esquire.

HAVING appointed *George Wombwell*, Esquire, Chairman of our Court, *William James*, Esquire, our Deputy Chairman, and *William Devaynes*, Esquire, to be a Committee of Secrecy, we hereby direct that all orders and instructions which you shall receive from our said Committee of Secrecy, be observed and obeyed with the same punctuality and exactness as though they had been signed by thirteen or more Members of the Court of Directors.

And having also thought proper to appoint a Select Committee for transacting all political, military, and naval affairs, and likewise all such as may require secrecy at our settlement of *Bombay*, it is our order, and we hereby direct, that the said Select Committee do consist of *William Hornby*, Esquire, our President and Governor, or our President and Governor for the time being, *John Carnac*, Esquire, the Second Member of our Council, or the Second Member of our Council for the time being, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, our Military Commander in Chief, or our Military Commander in Chief for the time being, and *Daniel Draper*, Esquire, the Fourth Member of our Council, or the Fourth Member of our Council for the time being.

If our Military Commander in Chief shall at any time be absent from the Presidency, then our order is, that our President and the Second and Fourth Members of our Council shall be a Select Committee for the purposes aforesaid, during the absence of the Commander in Chief from the Presidency.

We direct that all orders and instructions shall be issued in the name of the President and Select Committee, and that all such orders be implicitly obeyed by every person in service, or enjoying our protection, civil or military, on pain of suspension from the service, or of forfeiting our licence and protection.

If our Select Committee shall think fit to suspend any person or persons from our service, such person or persons shall not be restored, otherwise than by the said Committee, except by order of the Court of Directors.

We direct that at every meeting of our Select Committee, when all the Members shall be present, the President shall have a casting vote, and that in all cases where the Committee shall not be unanimous, the minority shall co-operate in carrying into execution the resolutions of the majority.

In case of a vacancy by the death or removal of any of the Members of our Select Committee, it is our order that every such vacancy be forthwith filled up by the next Member of our Council in rotation, except in cases where we may think fit to make particular exceptions. We are

London, the 10th April 1778.

Your loving friends,

R. Hall,	*G. Wombwell*,
Rich. Becher,	*W. James*,
Chas *Boddam*,	*Ben. Booth*,
Saml *Peach*,	*W*^{m} *Mills, jun.*
L. Sulivan,	*Jn*^{o} *Michie*,
W. G. Freeman,	*Geo. Tatem*,
T. B Rous,	*Tho*^{s} *Cheap*,
Jno *Woodhouse*,	*Robt. Gregory*,
W. Devaynes,	*J. Stables*,
H^{y} *Fletcher*,	*John Roberts.*

APPENDIX, Nos. 104, 105, and 106.

Bombay Select Consultations, the 21st July, 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Esquire, President and Governor,
John Carnac, Esquire,
Colonel *Charles Egerton*,
Daniel Draper, Esquire.

THIS meeting being appointed to take into consideration the situation of affairs with the Marattas;

Reference being made to Mr. *Mostyn* in the several letters from *Moraba*, *Butchebe*, and *Tookajee Holcar*, and it being also judged necessary to consult him on some other points before we take our resolutions on the papers before us, he is now summoned to attend the Committee.

Mr. *Mostyn* attending accordingly, and being made acquainted with the cause of his being summoned, delivered himself to the following purport:

He refers to his former letters and to the papers he brought from *Poonah*, for an explanation of the views of *Morabah* and his party, which are in short to place *Ragoba* in the Government as Regent, on this express condition, that the Sicca shall continue in the name of the Peishwa *Mhaderow Narrain*, and with some other restrictions which they consider necessary for their own safety and continuance in office, and for the internal peace and good order of the Government: these restrictions he doubts not will also appear to us, from a knowledge of *Ragoba*, to be both just and requisite. He particularly enforces to our attention, that these papers were regularly executed under the Sicca during the time *Morabah* was the acknowledged Minister, though the change in favour of *Nanah Furneese* took place immediately after. With respect to *Nanah*'s views and intentions,

tions, he doubted not, they muſt be very apparent to the Committee, from the whole tenor of his conduct ever ſince the treaty of *Poorunder*; and that his anſwer now before us, to the paper of demands, will prove beyond contradiction that he never means to comply with that treaty; that his deſigns with reſpect to the French will appear obvious upon a review of the advices from *Poonah*, and more particularly by the paper he delivered to Monſieur *St. Lubin* the day he had his audience of leave; copies of which have been already tranſmitted to the Committee and to the Governor General and Council.

Mr. *Moſtyn* then proceeds, That on an attentive ſurvey of the different parties at *Poonah*, their views and intentions with reſpect to us, the French, and *Ragoba*, there appears to him no alternative but to take part with *Morabah*; and that it ſhould be done without the ſmalleſt delay, conſidering the preſent ſituation of affairs with *France*, for ſhould we be attacked at this place in the courſe of the war, and the executive power of the Maratta State remain in the preſent hands, there is not a doubt but the French will receive every aſſiſtance in the power of *Nanah* to give, whilſt we ſhall be confined in our own ſettlements, and deprived of every ſupply whatever from the Continent.

Should we determine upon taking part with *Moraba* Mr. *Moſtyn* thinks it neceſſary to obſerve to us, that at preſent the greateſt part of the Maratta forces are aſſembled on *Poorunder* plains; but that they muſt neceſſarily ſeparate in all next month, on account of the rains and the want of forage, and the neceſſity of *Nanah*'s ſending the forces immediately depending on him to oppoſe the progreſs of *Hyder*, whoſe army is now actually inveſting *Meritz*: that the uſual time for their again aſſembling, is about *Deſſera*, or the beginning of October, when it generally takes up near two months before they are collected; but of the motions of the armies, *Moraba* can beſt keep Mr. *Lewis* well informed, who may alſo be directed to be attentive thereto himſelf. If the army ſhould diſperſe, as he ſuppoſes it will, he recommends the beginning of September for the commencement of our operations, of which *Moraba* alſo ſhould have advice, that he may be ready to co-operate.

To facilitate our meaſures, and prevent as far as may be all oppoſition, placards might be iſſued in proper time by *Ragoba*, declaring his intentions are to continue the Sicca in the boy's name, and to preſerve the Peiſhwa Government without doing injury to any one who does not oppoſe his juſt deſigns, or fly; commanding all officers to join him, and ſummoning the Miniſters to attend him. To give the greater weight, the Honourable Company's ſeal may be affixed thereto.

Mr. *Moſtyn* having concluded what he had to ſay, the following queſtions are put to him by the Committee:

Queſtion. What ſervice can be rendered by *Morabah*, *Butchebah*, and *Holcar*, equivalent to the conceſſions they demand on the part of *Ragoba*?

Anſwer. He doubts not they will be able to aſſiſt him with a body of thirty thouſand horſe; and that having Chiefs of ſo much power and influence to co-operate with us in our plan for reſtoring *Ragoba*, and openly eſpouſing his cauſe, will enſure a ſpeedy and ſucceſsful iſſue; whereas it would otherwiſe be more difficult, and take up much time. He further ſignifies his belief, that if we proceed in concert with the above Chiefs, *Mhadjee Scindia* will not oppoſe *Rogoba*, or ſeparate himſelf from *Tookajee Holkar*.

Queſtion. If *Nanah Furneeſe* remains in the chief management of the Maratta State during ſo long a minority, what are the conſequences reaſonably to be apprehended?

Anſwer. Every injury to the Company it can be in his power to offer, and an aſſociation with the French for their annoyance and deſtruction.

Queſtion. What are his reaſons for believing the paper delivered by *Nannah* to Monſieur *St. Lubin*, and *Nannah*'s letter to the Nizam, to be genuine and authentic? Appendix Nos. 105, 106.

Anſwer. He procured them by means of the Vackeel of the Rajah of *Toll Bhopall*, who obtained them from the Pharanovees, or Perſian writer to the Government, to whom he pays an annual penſion of rupees 5,000 for intelligence. Their contents were afterwards in part confirmed by the Gentoo writer to the Government. Mr. *Moſtyn* deſires theſe circumſtances may be kept inviolably ſecret, as the parties would certainly loſe their lives if any diſcovery was made that this information was obtained from them.

Mr. *Moſtyn* was alſo particularly queſtioned reſpecting the country about *Poonah*, and the roads and paſſes between that place and *Bombay*. He ſays, that *Rajematchy* is the only one of the paſſes defended by a fort; that the others have no other obſtacles but what are raiſed by nature; and that the principal one, called *Bhore Gaut*, may be approached by water, within the diſtance of ſix coſs, and may be eaſily ſecured, by advancing a ſingle battalion, with light field pieces, the ground being ſuch that the Maratta horſe cannot act, if any oppoſition ſhould be intended; but ſo little difficulty does he apprehend, that he would have no objection to accompany the battalion himſelf.

He is deſired, with the aſſiſtance of ſuch charts as he may have, and ſome capable perſon out of the engineer's office, to frame the beſt map he can of the country fifty coſs round *Poonah*; and having given us very clear and diſtinct information on the ſeveral ſubjects propoſed to him, he is permitted to withdraw.

No. 105.

The Committee then proceeded to the conſideration of the Durbar's anſwers to the paper of demands preſented by Mr. *Moſtyn*, and tranſmitted by Mr. *Lewis*, ſince *Nanah Furneeſe* reſumed his place in the adminiſtration.

Theſe anſwers having been carefully compared with the demands, and conſidered with the utmoſt deliberation, reſolved, by an unanimous vote, That the anſwers are in the higheſt degree vague, evaſive, and unſatisfactory, and amount to a refuſal, which is aggravated on a compariſon with the anſwers given by the preceding adminiſtration, as per No. 11.

Reſolved unanimouſly, That we are authorized, by the letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 23d of March, to declare the Durbar's anſwers to be a violation on their part of the treaty of *Poorunder*, and that conſequently we are freed from all obligation laid on us by that treaty, and at full liberty to purſue whatever meaſures we may deem expedient and ſafe, for the ſubverſion of a party in that Government, connected with the French in ſchemes hoſtile to the Company, and for eſtabliſhing an adminiſtration at *Poonah* with which we can maintain a ſecure and permanent alliance.

Reſolved unanimouſly, That the ſituation of public affairs in *Europe*, and the reſtoration of *Nanah Furneeſe* to the executive power of Government at *Poonah*, render it a caſe of indiſpenſable neceſſity that meaſures ſhould be taken with all poſſible expedition to effect theſe two points.

Reſolved unanimouſly, That for the accompliſhment of theſe purpoſes we purſue the moſt practicable meaſures for placing *Ragoba* in the Regency at *Poonah*, with this ſpecial proviſo, that the Government and Sicca be conducted in the name of the Peiſhwa during his minority, and ſurrendered on his attaining the legal age.

No. 106.

The meaſures to be purſued being next diſcuſſed, the articles propoſed by *Morabah* and his party are conſidered; when it is agreed, That it will be proper and requiſite to make equitable and ſecure terms for them with *Ragoba*, but that it will be better to ſettle the articles reſpecting the internal management of the Government when *Ragoba* is eſtabliſhed at *Poonah*. The article reſpecting

Appendix. Nos. 107, 108.

reſpecting the diſputes between the Guicawars will be determined with more propriety by *Ragoba* and *Morabah* without our interference; and that reſpecting the recovery of the territories ſeized by different powers during the late troubles, might lead us into meaſures totally inconſiſtent with our plan, and repugnant to treaties formed by other Preſidencies.

Upon the moſt attentive conſideration of every circumſtance, the moſt ſafe plan, the moſt promiſing of ſucceſs, and the leaſt liable to diſappointment, appears to be;

To aſſure *Morabah* and the party of our good diſpoſition towards them; that we ſhall heartily join in the propoſed plan; and that they may depend on our paying the utmoſt regard to their intereſt and pretenſions in whatever engagements we may make with *Ragoba*, provided they on their part faithfully perform their promiſes:

To revoke our orders to Colonel *Leſlie*, for marching the army into quarters at *Surat* and *Broach*, and to direct him to move to the ſouthward, quitting the Guzerat country, and purſuing the moſt eligible route to the town of *Juneir*, about thirty miles to the N. E. of *Poonah*, and near to a fort in the intereſt of *Morabah*, diſtinguiſhed in *Jefferies*'s map by the name of *Ziner*. He muſt be directed in his march to avoid approaching *Aurungabad* or part of the Nizam's dominions, and rather to take the *Brampore* road, and through the country of *Buglana*. By the time he approaches *Ziner* we can ſend him orders either to act in proſecution of our plan, by ſecuring the paſſes and effecting a junction with our force and *Ragoba*, or to proceed on to *Bombay*, according as our advices from *Europe* may render expedient, which, about the beginning of September, when it will be proper to begin our operations, we may expect to receive, to a very late date, by the way of *Suez*; and by that time we may alſo obtain the ſentiments of the Governor General and Council.

To direct Mr. *Lewis* to ſend us conſtant and punctual advice of the motion of the Maratta armies.

To recommend to the Governments of *Bengal* and *Madras*, to demand of *Mhodajee Bouncello* and the Nizam to obſerve a ſtrict neutrality at leaſt, if they will not aſſiſt *Ragoba*.

To proceed in our preparations, without communicating our reſolutions to *Ragoba*, till matters are more ripe; and in the terms to be made with him for the Company, to look to nothing further than the performance of the treaty of *Surat*, the total excluſion of the French, and the payment of our expences.

Theſe ſeveral heads of our plan are all unanimouſly agreed to, and the ſecretary is directed immediately to prepare the neceſſary advices agreeable thereto.

APPENDIX, No. 107.

Copy of a Letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, to Colonel *Leſlie*.

To Colonel *Leſlie*.

Sir,

THE Honourable the Court of Directors having been pleaſed to inveſt us as a Select Committee, with full powers for conducting all political and military operations, you will in future receive all inſtructions from us, and are to addreſs your correſpondence accordingly.

Since the letter from the Board of the 19th ultimo, we have received your letters of the 6th and 14th.

We hope you have already effected a paſſage over the *Nerbuddah*; for the ſituation of affairs is ſuch, that inſtead of continuing your march through the Guzerat province to *Surat* or *Broach*, we now find it expedient to direct, that you proceed more ſoutherly, and purſue the moſt eligible route to the town of *Juneer*, about thirty miles to the north-eaſt of *Poonah*, and near to the fort diſtinguiſhed in *Jefferies*'s map by the name of *Ziner*. By taking this courſe you will find the weather more moderate, and the road more practicable than in the Guzerat province; but we would recommend to you to avoid approaching *Aurungabad*, or any part of the Nizam's dominions; and rather to take the *Brampore* road, and through the country of *Buglana*.

Excluſive of the Duſtucks already ſent from *Tookajee Holkar* and *Mhadjee Scindy*, Mr. *Moſtyn* has lately forwarded to you paſſports from the Poonah Durbar; ſo that we hope you will have an unmoleſted march through the whole of the Maratta territories; but you are nevertheleſs to be ſtrictly on your guard.

The Chief of *Surat* and Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah* will have orders to ſend you the beſt information they can obtain reſpecting the road you are now directed to take, and we ſhall ſend you further inſtructions as you approach, or as we may ſee neceſſary.

We ſhall rely on your adviſing us frequently of your progreſs, and are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

(Signed) *William Hornby*,
John Carnac,
Charles Egerton,
Daniel Draper,

Dated July 21ſt 1778.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 108.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 25th July 1778.

SIGNED the following letter to the Governor General and Council, to be tranſmitted by the *Terrible* bomb ketch.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*. Fort William, Letter to.

Gentlemen,

The Honourable the Court of Directors, in their commands of the 10th April laſt, having been pleaſed to appoint us a Select Committee for the management of all military and political buſineſs at the Preſidency, we encloſe for your information an extract from their ſaid commands, and requeſt that your future inſtructions on theſe ſubjects may be addreſſed to us.

The advices from the Board here and from Mr. *Moſtyn*, will have acquainted you of the late tranſactions at *Poonah*, by which matters are brought to ſuch a ſtate, that it became abſolutely neceſſary to take the moſt ſpeedy and deciſive reſolutions for our conduct.

Having therefore ſeriouſly conſidered the ſituation of affairs with the Marattas, the proſpect of an approaching rupture with *France*, and every other circumſtance neceſſary to be attended to, the reſult of our deliberations is contained in the encloſed copy of our proceedings, which we loſe not a moment in tranſmitting to you by a veſſel expreſs, with copies of every neceſſary paper.

We flatter ourſelves you will approve theſe reſolutions. The monſoon has been ſo uncommonly ſevere, that we ſhall ſcarcely be able to begin our operations ſooner than the beginning of September, by which time we hope to receive your ſentiments.

We requeſt, if you think it neceſſary, that you will apply to *Mhodajee Bouncello* and the Nizam, to obſerve a ſtrict neutrality in the diſpute.

We have ſubjoined to the extract of the Company's letter, the paragraph reſpecting the ſituation of public affairs in *Europe*, though we are adviſed a packet for you was forwarded at the ſame time with ours.

The ſervice of this veſſel (the *Terrible*) being much wanted, we requeſt ſhe may be immediately returned.

We are, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 25th July 1778.

William Hornby,
&c. Select Committee.

The 31ſt of July 1778, the Select Committee at *Bombay* wrote to the Court as follows; viz.

" Mr. *Moſtyn* arrived here from *Poonah* the 12th " inſtant, with letters from *Morabah*, *Butcheba*, and *Tooka-* " *jee Holkar*, and a moſt ſatisfactory reply to the de- " mands made on the Durbar, accompanied with Sun- " nuds for the country of three lacks, and propoſals for " our aſſiſtance on placing *Ragoba* in the Government. " Theſe were all regularly executed under the Sicca, " whilſt *Moraba* was chief miniſter, but ſoon after- " wards *Nannah Furneeſe*, by the aſſiſtance of *Madew* " *Scindia*, regained the chief place in the adminiſtration, " and deprived *Moraba* of his office and the Sicca.

" A few days after Mr. *Moſtyn* had quitted *Poonah*, " and after *Nannah* had reſumed the executive part of " Government, another and a very different reply to our " demands was ſent to Mr. *Lewis* by the Durbar, and " by him tranſmitted to us, of which a copy is now en- " cloſed.

" By this ſecond revolution at *Poonah*, and the proſ- " pect of an approaching war with *France*, affairs were " brought to ſuch a ſtate that it became abſolutely ne- " ceſſary for us to take the moſt ſpeedy and deciſive re- " ſolutions for our conduct; and after proper tranſlations " had been made of the papers brought by Mr. *Moſtyn*, " and Colonel *Egerton*, who had not hitherto aſſiſted at " our Secret Conſultations, had referred to the records " to inform himſelf fully on the ſubject; we on the 21ſt " inſtant, after full conſideration of every neceſſary " circumſtance, unanimouſly agreed to the following " reſolutions, which we think it proper to convey to you " in the moſt expeditious manner.

" That the anſwers delivered by the Durbar ſince " *Nannah Furneeſe* reſumed the adminiſtration, are in " the higheſt degree vague, evaſive, and unſatisfactory, " and amount to a refuſal; which is aggravated on a " compariſon with the anſwers given by the preceding " adminiſtration.

" That we are authorized by the letter from the Go- " vernor General and Council, dated the 23d March, " to declare the Durbar's anſwer to be a violation on " their part of the treaty of *Poorunder*, and that conſe- " quently we are free from all obligation laid on us by " that treaty, and at full liberty to purſue whatever " meaſures we may deem expedient and ſafe, for the " ſubverſion of a party in that Government, connected " with the French in ſchemes hoſtile to the Company, " and for eſtabliſhing an adminiſtration at *Poonah*, with " which we can maintain a ſecure and permanent al- " liance.

" That the ſituation of public affairs in *Europe*, and " the reſtoration of *Nannah Furneeſe* to the executive " power of Government at *Poonah*, renders it a caſe " of indiſputable neceſſity that meaſures ſhould be taken " with all poſſible expedition to effect thoſe two points.

" That for the accompliſhment of theſe purpoſes we " purſue the moſt practicable meaſures for placing *Ra-* " *goba* in the Regency at *Poonah*, with this ſpecial pro- " viſo, that the Government and Sicca be conducted " and continued in the name of the Peiſhwa during his " minority, and ſurrendered to him on his attaining the " legal age.

" At this ſeaſon of the year it is impoſſible for us to " take any ſteps in proſecution of theſe reſolutions, " further than making the neceſſary preparations. In " the beginning of September, when it will be the " proper time to commence our operations, we may " expect to receive advices from *Europe* to a very late " date, by the way of *Suez*, by which we ſhall be able " to judge how far it may be prudent to detach any " part of our force from *Bombay*, and in the mean time " we have ſent orders to Colonel *Leſlie* to march with " the army under his command to a place called *Zinir*, " about 30 coſs to the N. E. of *Poonah*, inſtead of pro- " ceeding to *Surat* or *Broach*, as before ordered. That " officer, by advices juſt received, dated the 3d of this " month, was then advanced no further than *Chatter-* " *pore* in the Bundlecund country, at no great diſtance " from *Coulpy*; ſo that the order we have given him, " cannot give any further alarm to the Poonah Miniſters, " until our plan is ripe for execution, and our forces " ready to act on this ſide in conjunction with *Ragoba*.

" *Moraba* and his party had engaged to join *Ragoba* " with all their forces, as ſoon as he had paſſed the " Ghauts; but we cannot place much dependance upon " them, at leaſt for any immediate aſſiſtance, as *Nanah* " *Furneeſe*, upon ſuſpicion of their deſigns, has ſeized " and confined moſt of this party, and even ſecured the " perſons of *Moraba* and *Bucheba* themſelves; yet ſo " much is the Poonah Government weakened by the in- " teſtine diviſions which have ſo long ſubſiſted, that " we hope we ſhall be able to effect our point without " much difficulty, even if *Moraba* ſhould not be able " to join us; and we doubt not when it is ſeen that we " openly eſpouſe *Ragoba*'s cauſe, but many principal " Maratta officers will declare for him, as his claim and " family are in general favoured by them, and *Nanah*'s " oppreſſive Government deteſted.

" In the terms to be made with *Ragoba* for the Com- " pany, we propoſe to look to nothing further than the " performance of the treaty of *Surat*, the total excluſion " of the French, and the payment of our expences."

The 29th of December 1778, the Select Committee addreſſed the Court as follows, viz.

" Our addreſs of the 31ſt of July will have informed " you how matters then ſtood with the Poonah Go- " vernment. In purſuance of the reſolutions then com- " municated, we on the 12th of October, on the mo- " tion of Mr. *Carnac*, gave orders for proceeding forth- " with in the execution of our plan for reſtoring *Ragoba*. " The limits of an over-land addreſs will not permit us " to enter into a detail of the ſeveral circumſtances of " our preparations and negociation, which will be com- " municated by the firſt ſea conveyance. It will be " ſufficient to acquaint you, that on the 25th ultimo, " we concluded a treaty with *Ragoba*, by which the " Honourable Company were bound to aſſiſt him with a " body of 4,000 men to conduct him to *Poonah*, and to " place him in the regency of the Maratta Government " during the minority of the infant Peiſhwa."

We have the honour to encloſe a copy of the treaty, and of the manifeſto, publiſhed when our forces landed on the continent, which we hope will be approved of by you; and we beg leave moſt heartily to congratulate you on the proſpect of retrieving thoſe valuable acquiſi- tions loſt by the treaty of *Poorunder*, and of reſtoring ſuch a government at *Poonah* as will greatly contribute to the general ſecurity of your poſſeſſions in *India*.

APPENDIX, No. 109.

Extract of Bombay Select Conſultations, the 28th September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Willm Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor,
John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel *Chas Egerton*,
Danl Draper, Eſquire.

READ the letter received yeſterday from the Governor General and Council.

This letter, and the reſolutions to be taken in conſe- quence, being of the moſt important nature, the ſub- ject was very ſeriouſly conſidered; but it is judged beſt to defer for a few days fixing upon any preciſe meaſures, as we have every moment reaſon to expect ſome in- telligence of the ſucceſs of our operations againſt *Pondi- cherry*, as well as advice from Colonel *Leſlie* and other quarters.

It is remarked as extraordinary in the Governor General and Council having kept us ſo much in the dark, reſpecting

Appendix No. 109.

Appendix. Nos. 110&111.

respecting the object of their negociation with *Moodajee Bouncello*, and the nature of the commission they have given to Mr. *Elliot*, especially when it appears by their letters, the interests of this Presidency may be so considerably affected thereby.

APPENDIX, No. 110.

Bengal Secret Consultations, 28th September 1778.

READ the following letter from Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*:

Honourable Sir and Gentlemen,

I did myself the honour of addressing you last, under the 20th ultimo.

Nanah Furneese having made *Madjee Scindy* a present of three lacks of rupees, in order to induce him to consent to *Morabah*'s being sent a prisoner to *Amdanagur*, it had the desired effect; for on the 24th July, *Scindy* removed his people, giving *Morabah* into charge of five hundred horse, and wo hundred foot, belonging to *Nanah*, who set off with him the same evening to the above place. It was at one time determined on sending *Buchabah Proonder* prisoner to *Pontabgur*, close to *Pundapore*; but *Scindy* afterwards objected thereto, as it belongs to *Nanah*, and proposed his being sent to *Solahpore*, on the *Kistna*; but *Nanah* being apprehensive that *Hyder*'s troops would release him, it was finally determined on confining him in *Chundur*, close to *Settora*; but on his being sent there, the Kelledar refused to take him in, alledging that *Buchabah* was as much his master as either *Sacaram* or *Nanah*; he has therefore at last been sent to *Wundun*, a fort close to the before-mentioned, belonging to *Bhimrow Panjee*.

Nanah Furneese, *Sacaram Bapoo*, *Madjee Scindy*, *Tookajee Holcar*, *Hurry Punt*, and *Purjobram Bhow*, have all lately come from *Proondur*, and encamped on the plain just without the town, with their forces, amounting in the whole to about twelve thousand men; and I am assured, that within a few days the Durbars have been consulting how they shall oppose Colonel *Leslie*'s march, but are much puzzled what officer to send; for *Sacaram* and *Nanah*, being mutually afraid of each other, will not consent to *Scindy*'s going, as they consider him as the umpire between them. *Hurry Punt* has declared his resolution of not stirring from hence without the Ministers, who are afraid to trust *Holcar* with a command; and *Purseram Bhow* must return to *Meritz*, *Hyder*'s army being encamped on the other side of the *Kistna*, with a determined resolution of attacking it as soon as the season opens. However, in order to do all in their power to prevent Colonel *Leslie*'s advancing, they have sent private orders to the different Rajahs and officers through whose districts the Colonel will be obliged to march, to use every endeavour, without coming to action, to harrass him, and prevent his proceeding; particularly recommending the his receiving supplies of provisions; at the same time telling them, should they find their efforts to oblige him to retreat ineffectual, they are to deny having authority from this Government for the opposition they may make, which that Durbar will likewise do, in case of a complaint of their behaviour from your Honour, &c. I have already acquainted Colonel *Leslie* with these orders, and recommended to him not to trust any proffers of service from *Madjee Scindy*'s officers; being apprehensive, from his general character for deceit, that he may have given the like orders.

I am also informed, that the Durbar, in order the more securely to carry on the above scheme, have determined on sending a person of consequence to *Bombay*, with proposals to *Ragobah*; though, as far as I can learn, they are to be nearly the same as those sent by Mr. *Mostyn* last year.

Enclosed I have the honour to forward three letters, from the Durbar, in answer to those from the Honourable the Governor General, received with your commands of the 8th June; and beg leave to observe, gentlemen, that I have not received an answer to the application I made for a Dustuck for the free passage of your troops through the Maratta dominions, as mentioned in my last address.

I am very respectfully, &c.

Poonah, the 6th August 1778. (Signed) *Wm. Lewis.*

APPENDIX, No. 111.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Consultations, the 12th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Esquire, President and Governor,

John Carnac, Esquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, *Daniel Draper*, Esquire.

THE Committee being assembled, Mr. *Carnac* delivers in the following minute:

Mr. *Carnac* is sorry to observe, that "although we "had by an unanimous vote pronounced the treaty of "*Poorunder* to have been infringed in almost every article, not a single step has yet been taken in prosecution "of our resolution of the 21st July, and to avail ourselves of the opportunity afforded by the distractions "in the Bramin Ministry, to exclude *Nanah* from any "share in the Peishwa government, who, ever since he "has had the lead thereat, has been incessantly plotting "mischief against us, and to invest in his room, during "the minority of the Peishwa, *Ragonaut Row* with the "chief administration of the Maratta State, to which he "has the fairest claim, and whose pretensions good policy requires us to support, on account of the close connections we have had with him, and of his known "favourable disposition towards us. The times will "not allow of further delay: and if we do not soon "openly espouse the cause of *Ragonaut Row*, there is "great danger that the happy moment for establishing "his authority, so essential to our welfare, will be irrecoverably lost. It is not to be doubted that the "French have been invited to *Cheul* by *Nanah*, and "should he be joined by four or five hundred men of "that nation (which it may be expected will be the case) "it is to be apprehended he will with their aid acquire "such a preponderancy in the government, as to be "able to baffle our utmost efforts, and perhaps to "usurp the dignity of Peishwa. The degree of power "*Nanah* actually possesses is already so considerable, "that if he be suffered to retain it, the most serious "evils must ensue to the Company from his avowed "enmity to the English, and the French will be "admitted to the exclusive trade and intercourse with the "Marattas, which by a timely exertion we might have "secured, and without which our possessions on this side "of *India* are scarcely worth our holding. Mr. *Carnac* "entertaining these sentiments, is inclined to believe we "were warranted, by the most urgent plea of necessity "in behalf of the Company's interest, to give our most "strenuous assistance to *Ragonath Row*, for procuring "him the office of Regent, even independently of the "Governor General and Council; how much more "then must he think it incumbent upon us so to do, "when we have their express sanction of the measure; "especially as in the present state of affairs there is no "risque likely to be incurred by the settlement, during "the short time the troops may be supposed to be employed in effecting this service? We do not conceive "we ought to be deterred from our purpose, as it has "been argued we should, by the paragraph in the Governor General and Council's letter to us, dated 17th "August, respecting any engagements formed with

" *Moodajee Bouncello* by Mr. *Elliott*, and previous notice to us given. By a ſtrict attention to the words and to the context, nothing more ſeems to be meant, than that we ſhould enter into no final engagements with *Ragonath Row*, which may be contrary to ſuch as ſhall be concluded with, or of a hoſtile tendency to the Government of *Berar*. If the letter is to be underſtood as containing a direction that we are abſolutely to undertake nothing till we have advices from Mr. *Elliott* of the nature, progreſs, and reſult of his commiſſion with the Bouncello, it would be tantamount to a prohibition of the expedition we had meditated, and which they have approved, by ſuſpending it to ſo diſtant a period as to leave us little or no hopes of ſucceſs.

" It will be proper here to remark that there is no reaſon to believe *Moraba*'s party is ſo depreſſed but that, in conjunction with the other favourers of *Ragoba*, they may render us material ſervice in the execution of our plan; however, at all events Mr. *Carnac* deems it our indiſpenſable duty to uſe every endeavour to anticipate, if poſſible, the French in ſo important a point, as the having the prevailing influence at the Maratta Durbar.

" Our conduct muſt appear ſtrangely inconſiſtent to our honourable employers, if, after having ſo earneſtly and repeatedly lamented to them, as we have done, our misfortune in being precluded by the controlling power of the Bengal Government, from taking advantage of theſe lucky circumſtances which have occurred, we ſhould now remain wholly inactive, when that Government has given us a full latitude to act, and has provided us with the neceſſary reſources to do it with vigour and effect."

The ſubject of this minute being taken into conſideration, it is thought neceſſary, before we come to any reſolution, to conſult Mr. *Moſtyn* on ſome points; who attending accordingly, the ſubject of debate was communicated, and the neceſſary papers read to him, he delivers himſelf as follows:

" If the Committee are determined to take any meaſures for placing *Ragoba* in the Regency of the Poonah Government, it evidently appears to me the ſooner it is undertaken the better; the leſs oppoſition you will meet with, therefore the greater certainty of ſucceſs, of which indeed I have not in my own mind a doubt, and I do not conceive there can offer a more favourable criſis than the preſent, and for the following reaſons:

" Firſt. The army is at preſent diſperſed, and though this is the time for their beginning to join, it will be at leaſt ſix weeks before they are aſſembled; and even then I do not ſuppoſe a man will move until they are in ſome meaſure ſatisfied for the arrears due to them, now three years, except a few partial payments, and the advance of a further ſum for the enſuing ſeaſon, which is uſually two months pay: this, it is well known, the Government is in no capacity to do, and the diſunion amongſt the party now in power, particularly *Saccaram Bappoo* and *Nanah*, which you, gentlemen, are well acquainted with, will prevent their adopting any effectual means to remove this difficulty: they will not advance any money themſelves; none but *Nanah* is indeed able to do it, and no one elſe, while their diſſentions continue, will lend.

" Secondly. Another very material reaſon why it ſhould be deferred as little as poſſible is, that *Holcar*, with ſeveral other Maratta officers, now adherents of *Moraba*, will naturally conclude, if you let ſlip this opportunity, that you have quite given up *Ragoba*'s cauſe, and be under the neceſſity, for their future ſupport and ſecurity, to take part with *Nanah*: It may occur to you, gentlemen, that *Morabah* being under ſome reſtraint in *Ahmednagur*, little aſſiſtance can be expected from him; but I have reaſon to believe, and from pretty good information, that whenever he is convinced of your determination to eſpouſe *Ragoba*'s cauſe, and are landed on the Continent, he can eaſily effect his enlargement, and join you on the other ſide of the Gauts with his friends.

" Thirdly. That with reſpect to the diſtance of Colonel *Leſlie*'s detachment, though it might be of more utility if nearer, yet I am of opinion, they may in their preſent ſituation render material ſervice, by keeping *Madjee Scindy* (in the neighbourhood of whoſe capital they now are) in awe, ſhould he be inclined to oppoſe us; but this I think, from his known character, he will not venture to do, when he finds a reſpectable Engliſh army along with *Ragoba*, but be one of the firſt to make his ſubmiſſion, not only from the immediate danger he will apprehend on account of Colonel *Leſlie*'s army, but in future, from his knowledge of the influence the Engliſh have over the King, which might deprive him totally of his Jaghier north of the *Nerbedah*; and the ſooner you begin, the ſooner, in my humble opinion, will Colonel *Leſlie* be able to advance, as it will no doubt put an immediate ſtop to the oppoſition and delay he has and will otherwiſe continue to meet with.

" Fourthly. But what appears to me the moſt weighty reaſon of all is, that by any further delay, the danger there is of the French gaining an influence at the Maratta Court, which I took the liberty to mention under the 21ſt July, and which is fully ſtated by Mr. *Carnac*; and I can aſſure you, *Nanah* will ſpare neither pains nor expence to procure aſſiſtance from them; in which caſe I much fear it will render any future attempts very hazardous, if not wholly impracticable.

" As you have been pleaſed to favour me with the peruſal of the Governor General and Council's letter of the 17th Auguſt, it is my duty to inform you, from what knowledge I have of the Maratta Government, I do not apprehend any engagement you may have formed with *Ragoba*, can interfere with the treaty Mr. *Elliott* may enter into with *Moodajee Bouncello*, unleſs in one inſtance, that of placing *Moodajee* in the Rajaſhip. They are both Miniſters of the Rajah, and their government entirely diſtinct; however, to prevent a poſſibility of the two treaties claſhing, an article may be inſerted in your's, with *Ragoba* to provide againſt it."

On full conſideration of all circumſtances, it is reſolved by a majority of the Committee, Mr. *Draper* only diſſenting thereto, that we forthwith carry into execution the plan agreed to under the 21ſt July laſt, for conducting *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, and placing him in the Regency during the minority of the young Peiſhwa; and that the neceſſary meaſures for that purpoſe be undertaken as ſoon as poſſible.

Appendix, Nos. 112 to 117.

APPENDIX, Nos. 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, and 117.

Bombay Select Conſultations, the 19th October 1778.

MR. *DRAPER* acquaints us he will deliver in his reaſons in writing for diſſenting to the above reſolution.

At a Select Committee; Preſent, as in the preceding one.

Mr. *Draper* now lays before us his reaſons in writing for diſſenting to our reſolution of immediately conducting *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, as entered at length after this conſultation.

" To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire,
" Preſident and Governor, &c.
" Select Committee at *Bombay*.

" Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

" I am concerned that after concurring with your " Honour, &c. not only in the reſolutions of the 21ſt of " July, but with the Board at large in every other ſince " the

Appendxi. Nos. 112 to 117

" the 10th December laſt, for conducting *Ragonath Row* to *Poonah*, in quality of Regent, I ſhould think it my indiſpenſable duty, from the difference of circumſtances ſince the firſt mentioned period, to diſſent to the reſolution you came to the 12th inſtant for doing it at this juncture, and which I have been further induced to from thinking it a meaſure, all circumſtances conſidered, the moſt important which has ever been agitated at this Preſidency, and for the following reaſons.

" Firſt, Becauſe of the expreſs conditions contained in the Governor General and Council's letter of the 17th Auguſt.

" Secondly, Becauſe of the reſtraint *Moraba*, *Bucheba*, and their adherents, ſtill appear to be under.

" Thirdly, Becauſe of the remote diſtance of Colonel *Leſlie*'s very conſiderable reinforcement.

" Fourthly, Becauſe of the very great deficiency in our European force, to the laſt eſtabliſhment ordered by the Honourable Company.

" As to the firſt point, becauſe though the Governor General and Council have approved the plan of the 21ſt July, it is only on the following expreſs conditions:

" That it do not interfere with any engagement formed with *Moodajee Bouncello*, and previous notice to you by him.

" On this it muſt be obſerved, that we have not yet received a ſingle line from that gentleman; but may ſhortly expect it, conformable to the Governor General and Council's letter of the 18th July, wherein they tell us, that Mr. *Elliott* would ſend us ſuch articles as he might agree to with the Rajah; that in the mean time, to prevent any ſtep of a contrary tendency on our part, they requeſted we would refrain from forming any engagements of a nature hoſtile to the Government at *Poonah*, except ſuch as may appear abſolutely neceſſary for the defence of our poſſeſſions. Mr. *Moſtyn* remarks in his minute, delivered the 12th inſtant, that he does not apprehend any engagement we may have with *Ragonath Row*, can interfere with the treaty Mr. *Elliott* may enter into with *Moodajee*, except that of placing him in the Rajaſhip, which poſſibly may be the very object they may have in view; as we have had reaſon to think, from what the Governor and Council have communicated to us, that it is a negociation of a very extenſive nature, and meant to comprehend the Company's general intereſts. Mr. *Moſtyn*, to prevent their and our treaty claſhing, propoſes, that an article may be inſerted in ours to provide againſt it; but I refer it to your Honour, &c. whether, conſiſtently with the ſecrecy the Governor General and Council have enjoined us in this reſpect, and much leſs without exciting the jealouſy of the Maratta Government, any ſuch article could be propoſed? The words contained in the latter part are ſo very expreſs and ſignificant, and ſo much enforced by being repeated in the third, that I cannot adopt any other than their literal meaning, eſpecially as by doing it, the whole political ſyſtem the Governor General and Council may intend to eſtabliſh, may be entirely unhinged.

" Second Condition, That our lateſt advices from *Europe* ſhall be equal to an aſſurance, that the force required for executing the plan of the 21ſt July, may be ſpared without endangering the ſafety of *Bombay* in the event of a French invaſion. Your Honour, &c. will, I hope, excuſe my differing with you on this point, as I know of no ſuch advices; on the contrary, you will give me leave to remark, that the general tenor of the Honourable Company's commands this ſeaſon, ſtrongly inculcate our merely attending to our own defence, without intimating the leaſt idea that they expect we ſhould be able to undertake any offenſive meaſure. The Governor General and Council have certainly been equally attentive to our defence; as they, near a twelvemonth ago, recommended our withdrawing our Europeans from the ſubordinates, which has accordingly been done; and your Honour, &c. are ſenſible that in their letter of the 11th July, they even recommended our evacuating *Tannah*, and the other forts on *Salſette* for the ſame purpoſe; and with reſpect to our aſſiſting in the propoſed reduction of *Myhie*, ordered us to do it in a manner conſiſtent with our ſafety; which, they added, muſt be particularly attended to. I am in hopes we ſhall not be attacked by the French the current ſeaſon; but it is no more than hope; and ſo far am I from concurring with your Honour, &c. that a ſufficient force for the intended ſervice can be ſpared from *Bombay*, without endangering the ſafety of it in the event of a French invaſion, that I apprehend we ſhall have few more than the Bandarees and miſerable militia to depend on; for as to recalling any part of the deſtined force, after it has left the iſland; in caſe of ſuch an event, I think it cannot, in common prudence, be truſted to.

" Mr. *Moſtyn* in his minute, delivered the 12th inſtant, ſeems very preſſing for our embracing the preſent juncture; but if I miſtake not, he has been equally ſo ſince the 10th December laſt, and I conclude it muſt have eſcaped him, that on the 21ſt July, in anſwer to the firſt queſtion put to him by your Honour, &c. he replied, that he judged *Moraba* *Bucheba* and *Tookajee Holcar* might aſſiſt us with 30,000 horſe; ſuch a conſiderable aſſiſtance, conſidering that the two former are under reſtraint, and the latter greatly ſuſpected, I think cannot now be reaſonably expected; in which caſe, according to Mr. *Moſtyn*'s opinion at that time, the ſervice will become more difficult and tedious; which is corroborated by the 4th article of the treaty propoſed by *Moraba* and *Maheputt Row Trimbuck*, even on the ſuppoſition of the above mentioned aſſiſtance, viz. The Engliſh army that will accompany *Dada Sahab* ſhall remain as long as we may have occaſion for it, and be diſmiſſed when we may think proper, to which you will make no objection;" alſo to part of the 10th Article, viz. " If the undertaking ſhould take up time you will afford ſuch an increaſe of men and ſtores as may be neceſſary to accompliſh it, which, after the main body is gone, I apprehend we ſhould be much at a loſs to make good.

" Third Condition. That the engagement you may form with *Ragonath Row* himſelf, or *Moraba* and his aſſociates, be not contrary to thoſe concluded with *Moodajee* by Mr. *Elliott*, and noticed to you, nor of a hoſtile tendency to the Government of *Berar*.—Having fully remarked on the firſt condition, to which this is ſimilar, I have only to allow that it would be eaſy to avoid entering into any agreement with *Ragonath Row* or *Moraba*, of a hoſtile tendency to the Government of *Berar*, but for the objection noticed under the firſt condition.

" Regarding the ſecond point, becauſe it appears by a letter received from Mr. *Lewis*, a few days after tranſmitting our plan of the 21ſt July to the Governor General and Council, that they were then only acquainted that *Moraba* and *Buchebah* were ſeized and confined by *Nanah Furneeſe*, and that their adherents, whether Brâmins or officers, had been ſeized, and conſiderable fines demanded of them; alſo that *Tookajee Holkar*, had been much diſgraced by the appointment of a Duan contrary to his inclination, which the Governor General and Council could not be apprized of for ſome time after the 17th Auguſt, nor of their ſubſequent alteration of confinement, otherwiſe that they might not have approved the plan in the manner they have done: and as to Mr. *Moſtyn*'s remark, that *Holkar* with ſeveral other Maratta officers, now adherents of *Moraba*, will conclude that your Honour, &c. have quite given up the cauſe of *Ragonath Row*, and be under the neceſſity of taking part with *Nanah Furneeſe*, I imagine it may be eaſily obviated by giving them intimation to the contrary.

" With

" With reſpect to the other point, becauſe it was re-
" ſolved the 21ſt July, and orders ſent to Colonel *Leſlie*
" the day following, to bend his march to *Junieer*,
" about 30 miles N. E. of *Poonah*, by which time we
" could order him to act either in proſecution of the
" plan, by ſecuring the paſſes and effecting a junction
" of our forces and *Ragonath Row*, or to proceed on to
" *Bombay*, according as our advices from *Europe* might
" render it expedient. But it ſeems that your Honour,
" &c. as well as Mr. *Moſtyn*, are now of a different
" opinion, notwithſtanding that the Colonel in his laſt
" letter from *Rajee Ghur*, dated the 25th of Auguſt,
" aſſures us that he ſhall be attentive to the alteration
" we had thought it expedient to direct in his route from
" the *Nabedah*, and notwithſtanding that his deſtination
" hither is in conſequence of an urgent repreſentation of
" a want of aſſiſtance for this very ſervice.

" Fourthly. Becauſe, although I am not acquainted
" with the exact deficiency in our European force, I am
" ſenſible that it is a lamentable one, compared with
" the laſt eſtabliſhment ordered by the Honourable
" Company in April 1775, of 312 artillery and 1200
" infantry, and indeed it cannot be better deſcribed than
" in our letter of the 8th ultimo to Sir *Edward*
" *Vernon*; and I beg leave to remind your Honour, &c.
" that when you propoſed conducting *Ragonath Row*,
" to *Poonah* in December laſt, you judge it abſolutely
" neceſſary to requeſt the Preſident and Council at *Fort*
" *Saint George* to hold in readineſs a very conſiderable
" body of European artillery and infantry, with a bat-
" talion of Sepoys to repair hither to aſſiſt in our then
" intended operations, and we have ſince that period re-
" ceived no reinforcement of Europeans, but what has
" been recalled from the ſubordinates.

" But notwithſtanding the foregoing reaſons, which
" have induced me to differ from your Honours, &c.
" reſolution of the 12th inſtant, I beg leave to aſſure you
" I am too well convinced of the neceſſity of removing
" *Nanah* from the adminiſtration of affairs in the Ma-
" ratta Government, and reinſtating *Ragonath Row* in
" quality of Regent, for the welfare of this Preſidency,
" and the certain advantages we may expect to reap from
" it, in conſequence of the treaty concluded at *Surat*,
" not to concur in it, whenever it can conſiſtently and
" ſecurely be done; and which it appears to me may
" be effected with more propriety, and a much greater
" probability of ſucceſs, in about two months, as we
" may by that time hope the reſolutions, with reſpect
" to Mr. *Elliott*'s negociations, may be removed, that
" Colonel *Leſlie* may arrive at the deſtination ordered
" him in July, and that the Honourable Company's
" expected ſhips, as alſo the ſquadron, may then be
" with us; but at any rate, I moſt ſincerely wiſh the
" plan your Honour, &c. have adopted, may be attended
" with all imaginable ſucceſs.

" Being with reſpect,

Bombay, " Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
16th Oct. 1778. " Your moſt obedient and moſt
" humble ſervant,
" *Daniel Draper.*"

No. 113.

Extract from a Conſultation held the 26th October.

Preſent the ſame as the foregoing.

In reply to the reaſons alledged by Mr. *Draper*, for diſſenting from the reſolution of the Committee under the 12th inſtant, the other members who concurred therein have only to obſerve, that in their opinion the ſucceſs of the meaſures determined upon, the abſolute neceſſity whereof Mr. *Draper* admits depend upon its being immediately undertaken; and the execution will become much more difficult, if not altogether impracti-cable, by being ſuſpended to ſo diſtant a period as that gentleman propoſes: it is certain that very advan-tageous offers have been made by *Nanah* through Monſieur *St. Lubin* to the French nation, in order to engage their aſſiſtance in ſupport of his uſurped authority; and if a junction of their forces with him be once effected, they will acquire ſo predominant an influence at the Poonah Durbar as will occaſion a perpetual warfare be-tween the Marattas and us, whereby the Company's poſſeſſions on the weſtern ſide of *India* muſt be rendered inſecure and unprofitable; they therefore deem themſelves bound in duty to their honourable maſters to prevent (if poſſible) an accident ſo ruinous to their intereſts, by a timely interpoſition of the only reſource that is left, namely, to take advantage of the preſent diviſions amongſt the Bramin Miniſters, to eſtabliſh *Ragonath Row* in the Regency, and to aſſiſt him with as conſider-able a part of our force as we can ſpare for that pur-poſe. Although it is near two months ſince we had the firſt advice from the Governor General and Council, of their having deputed Mr. *Elliott* on an important embaſſy to the Government of *Berar*, we have as yet no information whatever of or from him, and it is hard to gueſs when we may; but it is no way likely the degree of ſupport we mean to give *Ragonath Row* can be at all affected by any negociation that may be concluded with *Moodajee Bouncello*, for even ſuppoſing it ſhould be recommended to him to aſſert his pretenſions to the Rajahſhip of *Sattara*, and that he ſhould in conſequence aſſume that dignity, it is moſt probable he would continue the Huſht Prandaun Go-vernment, taking care to reduce them to their original ſubjection to the Rajah; and the ſovereignty being in the perſon of *Moodajee*, who is in friendſhip with the Bengal Adminiſtration, it would perhaps be more for the general intereſt, that the Huſht Prandaun, a council of eight, ſhould be dependant.

Appendix Nos. 113 to 116.

No. 114.

The Secretary now lays before us a draft of the letter from *Ragoba* to the principal Maratta officers, to be cir-culated on his landing on the Continent; which being approved, is ordered to be explained to *Ragoba*, and if approved by him a proper number of copies muſt be made in the country language, and the Company's ſeal, and *Ragoba*'s private ſeal affixed thereto.

No. 115.

Extract from a Conſultation held in *Bombay*,
4th November 1778.
Preſent as before.

As we hope the forces will be ready to move the next Spring, about the 20th of the month, it is thought ne-ceſſary to fix the method of carrying our plan into exe-cution; and as the appointment of a committee is thought beſt ſuited for the purpoſe, the Preſident pro-poſes that Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and *Moſtyn*, ſhould be the committee appointed; and they are appointed accordingly.

The ſaid committee will conſider of the further ar-rangements neceſſary for the intended ſervice, and wait upon *Ragoba* to communicate our intentions to him, and the conditions to be previouſly ſtipulated with him; in which they muſt enjoin him to obſerve the utmoſt ſecrecy.

No. 116.

7th November 1778.
At a Committee; preſent as before.

The Preſident acquaints us, that he has ſummoned this meeting at the deſire of Colonel *Egerton*; who ac-quaints us, that having through miſapprehenſion aſſented to the appointment of the committee to accompany the army to *Poonah*, he now withdraws his aſſent, and diſ-ſents thereto, for which he explains his reaſons in writing as follow:

" A committee having been appointed a few days
" ago, of Mr. *Carnac*, myſelf, and Mr. *Moſtyn*, to
" treat with *Ragoba*, as I conceived, for the immediate
" tranſaction of buſineſs on this iſland, I gave my con-
" ſent

Appendix. Nos. 117 to 120.

" ſent thereto; but having ſince diſcovered by accident, " that it is the intention of the ſaid Committee to ac- " company me in that capacity on the intended expe- " dition; I deſire to know if that was the Honourable " the Governor's deſign, when he made the propoſal " for forming it at the Board; and ſhould that be the " caſe, to declare, that I find myſelf neceſſitated not " only to withdraw my aſſent to the meaſure, but even " to enter my proteſt againſt it, for the following " reaſons:

" Firſt, Becauſe I deem it diametrically oppoſite to " the Intentions of the Honourable the Court of Di- " rectors.

" Secondly, Becauſe it is morally impoſſible any ne- " gociation can take place on the road, on which the " commanding officer, with the Poonah Ambaſſador " (who will of courſe proceed with the army to his ſta- " tion) cannot immediately receive the orders of the " Honourable the Governor and Select Committee.

" Thirdly, Becauſe it appears very clearly, from the " commands of the Honourable Directors of the 10th " April laſt, received per ſhip *Caranja*, paragraph the " 3d, that in the commanding officer's abſence, the Select " Committee is to conſiſt, till his return, of the Ho- " nourable the Governor, the ſecond and fourth in Coun- " cil. This can, I think, bear only one interpretation, " viz. that the perſons above-mentioned, and not a part " of them, are competent to act in that capacity."

After the diſcuſſion of this matter, the Preſident puts the following queſtion, in which Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* decline voting:

Whether two members of this Committee can be detached from the Preſidency at the ſame time, upon any temporary ſervice? and whether the two remaining members are, in their abſence, competent to form a Committee?

Mr. *Draper* votes in the negative on this queſtion, being of opinion it is the Company's meaning, that none of the civil members of the Committee ſhould be detached from the Preſidency when the commanding officer will likewiſe be abſent, as it would occaſion the ſame inconvenience they have guarded againſt in the paragraph reſpecting the commanding officer.

The Preſident is of opinion, that from the laſt paragraph, in caſes of great emergency, as in the preſent, two members may be abſent, or even he himſelf, if the ſervice ſhould require it; and that the remainder can form a Committee in the abſence of the other two.

The queſtion being therefore determined in the affirmative by the Preſident's caſting vote, it is the reſolution of the Committee, that the remaining two members, in the abſence of the other two, are competent to form a Select Committee; and therefore our former appointment of the committee to accompany *Ragoba* ſtands confirmed.

No. 117.

11th November 1778.

At a Committee; preſent as before.

Mr. *Carnac* delivers in his opinion on the general queſtion propoſed at our laſt meeting, as follows:

" It having been judged highly neceſſary, that our " utmoſt endeavours ſhould be exerted to effect the re- " moval of the preſent Miniſters of the infant Peiſhwa, " who are avowedly and inveterately hoſtile to us, and " to place the chief adminiſtration of affairs in the " hands of *Ragonath Row*, of whoſe good diſpoſition " towards us we have every reaſon to be aſſured; Mr. " *Carnac* is of opinion, the Company are ſo deeply in- " tereſted in the event of ſuch a meaſure, that the con- " ducting of it cannot with propriety be entruſted to " any ſingle perſon, but that a committee ought to be " appointed for the purpoſe; and as there can ſcarcely " be any other political buſineſs of equal importance, " he thinks one of the civil members of the Secret " Committee ought to be nominated for that ſervice. " He does not conceive that the temporary abſence of " one of the civil members, during the ſpace of time " that may be required for the accompliſhment of the " buſineſs we are now about to undertake, can be con- " ſtrued into a vacancy, or that the powers of the Secret " Committee are to be ſuſpended during the abſence of " ſuch members."

When Mr. *Draper* acquaints us, that he likewiſe apprehended, from our minute of the 4th November, that the object of the committee's appointment was only confined to ſettle the arrangements of *Ragoba*, previous to his quitting the iſland, and was not meant to accompany the army to *Poonah*, as he thought the committee for that purpoſe was hereafter to be appointed; he alſo begs leave to obſerve, that in the opinion he gave on the 7th inſtant, he did not mean to imply that this Committee was not competent to tranſact buſineſs in the ſickneſs or accidental abſence of two of the members, but only that it was not according to the meaning of the Company's orders, that any two of themembers ſhould be detached from the Preſidency on any temporary ſervice.

18th November 1778.

At a Committee; all preſent.

Colonel *Egerton* now delivers the following minute, in reply to Mr. *Carnac's*, entered under the 11th inſtant.

" Colonel *Egerton* entirely agrees with Mr. *Carnac*, " that the placing the chief adminiſtration of the Poonah " Government in the hands of *Ragoba*, is a matter of " ſuch important concern to the Honourable Company " that it ought by no means to be entruſted to the ma- " nagement of any one perſon ſingly; and therefore moſt " heartily acquieſces in the appointment of a committee " for modelling the buſineſs on the ſpot, before any " ſteps were taken publicly and avowedly for his ſup- " port; and when it may be effected and ratified with " the ſanction and approbation of the Select committee, " nothing more can remain to be done, but to effect " their orders by the due and vigorous exertion of the " military power; for which purpoſe he flatters himſelf " the Honourable Directors deem the ſervices of the " committee needleſs.

" The Colonel's objection was ſolely to the deviation " from the Honourable Directors' plain order, that in " the abſence of the commanding officer the Select Com- " mittee is to conſiſt of the Honourable the Governor, " the ſecond and fourth in Council; he therefore wiſhes " you ſeriouſly to conſider beforehand, what diſagreeable " conſequences ſuch a deviation will be liable to, par- " ticularly in the preſent caſe, when it may be thought " unneceſſary, as any unforeſeen occurrences can in a " couple of days be communicated to the Select Com- " mittee, whoſe powers ſhould not be ſubject to the " ſmalleſt ſhadow of cavil or diſpute."

APPENDIX. Nos. 118, 119, and 120.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 11th November 1778.

At a Committee; preſent as before.

THE circular letter intended to have been iſſued by *Ragoba* on his landing on the Continent having been explained to him by the committee, he at firſt made ſome exceptions againſt it, particularly to that clauſe reſpecting his carrying on the Government as Regent only during the minority, and the Sicca being continued in the Peiſhwa's name. After the proper arguments on the occaſion had been urged by the committee, and afterwards by Mr. *Moſtyn*, his objections appeared to ſubſide, and he ſeemed very ready to agree to the terms, on condition we would lend him three lacks of rupees, and indulge him in ſome other articles of warlike ſtores; but having expreſſed a deſire that the letter might be left

with him for further conſideration, it was accordingly left with him, and to our great ſurprize it was returned yeſterday to the Preſident, accompanied with a paper containing ſundry alterations of a very material nature, which he propoſed ſhould be made therein. Theſe will appear by the letter itſelf as drawn out by the Secretary, and the letter altered as propoſed by him, both entered hereafter. The alteration he has made in the very title is itſelf an inſuperable objection. Mr. *Moſtyn* acquaints us that Mookia Purdhan is the title only due to the Peiſhwa himſelf; but when we obſerve that he has totally omitted the clauſe reſpecting the footing on which he is to aſſume the Government, and promiſing to continue the Sicca in the boy's name, we cannot heſitate a moment in declaring that we cannot proceed further without entirely renouncing the principles we have acted upon, and upon which we obtained the ſanction of the Governor General and Council: Reſolved, therefore, that the committee be deſired to wait upon *Ragoba*, and to acquaint him expreſsly that unleſs he will accede to the propoſed conditions we muſt immediately give up his cauſe, and proceed no further in the buſineſs; that the alterations above noted, and the omiſſion he propoſes, are totally inadmiſſible, but that we will agree to his being ſtiled Punt Purdhan, which Mr. *Moſtyn* acquaints us will be his proper title, and was the title uſed by *Badjuar* in the treaty of the year 1739; and that we cannot pay any attention to his other requeſts until this point is firſt ſettled. The committee muſt alſo expreſs our ſurprize at his having ſo greatly receded from what he had declared both to them and to Mr. *Moſtyn*, reſpecting thoſe points, which we cannot account for otherwiſe than by imputing it to the advice of evil counſellors, who are in the intereſt of his enemies, and have prevailed on him to raiſe thoſe objections, purpoſely to defeat his expectations from us. They muſt alſo obſerve to him, of how much importance it is that no time ſhould be loſt in moving with our forces, as our preparations cannot much longer be kept ſecret, and when diſcovered to the Miniſters, muſt greatly increaſe our difficulties, if not defeat the whole ſcheme.

In ſhort, the committee muſt be very explicit with him, and give him plainly to underſtand that his compliance with the terms offered is a *ſine qua non.*

Circular Letter as drawn out by the Secretary from *Ragonath Row Ballajee Badjuar*, to all the Mootſeddees, Sirdars, and ſubjects of the Maratta State.

You will no doubt hear with pleaſure that the Government of *Bombay*, with the ſanction and concurrence of the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*, have now determined to ſupport my cauſe with vigour, and with the aſſiſtance of the Almighty to place me in the Regency of the Maratta empire, which you all know is my juſt right. The Governor and Select Committee have been moved to this reſolution in my favour by the unjuſt conduct of the preſent Adminiſtration of *Poonah*, who have violated in almoſt every article the treaty concluded with the Honourable Company in March 1776, and by their great deſire to ſee peace and good order reſtored to the Maratta empire, which has been ſo long involved in troubles and confuſion, and experienced ſo many calamities by miſmanagement and the diſcord of oppoſite factions.

That no officer or ſubject of the Maratta State may be deterred from following the dictates of his duty by any ſuſpicion of the rectitude of my intentions, I do in the moſt ſolemn manner avow and declare thus in the face of the world, that my only view is to remove the Government out of the preſent improper hands, and to take upon myſelf the Regency during the minority of the young Peiſhwa *Madarow Narrain*; in the mean time I ſhall conduct the affairs of Government as Regent, and continue the Sicca in the Peiſhwa's name, without doing injury to any one who does not oppoſe my juſt deſigns, or endeavour to abſcond, and ſhall bury in oblivion all paſt injuries from every perſon whatever, unleſs provoked by any new act of enmity after this notice. Appendix. Nos. 119 & 120.

I now call upon you, and require you immediately to join my forces and the Engliſh army, and to attend me to *Poonah*, where I hope, by the divine bleſſing, to ſettle the Government upon a firm and ſolid footing, and aided by the advice of upright and wiſe miniſters, to reſtore the Maratta empire to its former happineſs and ſplendour.

In further confirmation of what is herein contained, the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* have cauſed the ſeal of the Honourable Company to be affixed.

No. 119.

Circular Letter (as propoſed by *Ragoba*) from *Ragonath Badjerow Mookia Purdhan*, or head Miniſter.

To all the Modſeddies, Sirdars, Jaghierdars, and ſubjects of the Maratta State:

You will no doubt hear with pleaſure that the Government of *Bombay*, with the ſanction and concurrence of the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*, have determined now to ſupport my cauſe with vigour, and with the aſſiſtance of the Almighty to place me in the Regency of the Maratta empire, which you all know is my juſt right. The Governor and Select Committee have been moved to this reſolution in my favour by the unjuſt conduct of the preſent Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, who have violated in almoſt every article the treaty concluded with the Honourable Company in March 1776, and by their deſire to ſee peace and good order reſtored through my hands to the Maratta empire, which has been ſo long involved in trouble and confuſion, and experienced ſo many calamities by the miſmanagement and diſcord of my ſervants.

That no officer or ſubject of the Maratta State may be deterred from following the dictates of his duty by any ſuſpicion of the rectitude of my intentions, I have in the moſt ſolemn manner granted this, and declare thus in the face of the world, that my only view is to remove the Government out of the preſent improper hands, and to take upon myſelf the Regency, without doing injury to any one who does not oppoſe my juſt deſigns or endeavour to abſcond, and ſhall bury in oblivion all paſt injuries from every perſon whatever: but after this notice you will, without making any freſh acts of enmity, come and join my forces, and attend me to *Poonah*, where I hope, by the divine bleſſing, to ſettle the Government upon a firm and ſolid footing, and reſtore the Maratta empire to its former happineſs and ſplendour.

In further confirmation of what is here contained, the Honourable the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* have cauſed the ſeal of the Honourable Company to be affixed.

No 120.

16th November 1778.

At a Committee; all the members preſent except Colonel *Egerton*, indiſpoſed..

Mr. *Carnac* lays before us a report of the Committee's conference with *Ragoba* in conſequence of the reſolution of our laſt meeting; and further acquaints us, that *Ragoba* had at laſt agreed to wave his demand for having it ſtipulated in the treaty, that if the child ſhould be proved ſpurious, he, *Ragoba*, ſhould be declared Peiſhwa; and had put his Sicca to the circular letter as drawn out by the ſecretary, after a few alterations of no material conſequence, on condition that we would engage to repreſent to the Honourable Company, in the ſtrongeſt terms, his moſt ſolemn declaration that the child is ſuppoſititious, and that he can produce the real father and mother, and alſo that he will point out to them the extreme injuſtice of his being obliged to hold the Government in the name of ſuch ſuppoſititious child, and that he will requeſt to receive their explicit orders by the earlieſt conveyance, how we are to proceed in caſe he ſhould produce unqueſtionable proofs of his allegation, and

Appendix. Nos. 121 to 124.

and whether they will permit him then to assume the Government in his name, which on such proof will be his undoubted right. That *Ragoba* further requested it might be mentioned to the Honourable Company, that in case the child should prove to be really the son of *Narrain Row*, he wished in such case an equal partition might be made of the Government and country agreeable to what he says is the Gentoo law.

Resolved, since *Ragoba* is so earnest in his request, That a representation to the above effect be made to the Honourable Company,

Ordered, that a proper number of copies of the circular letter be made in the Gentoo language, and that it be entered after this consultation in the form it now stands.

Ragoba's relation of the transaction between him and Mr. *Shaw*, respecting the grant of *Ahmood*, as stated in the Committee's conference, being next considered, the Broach records are referred to, where we cannot discover any trace of the promise *Ragoba* mentions, but on the contrary, it appears by the proceedings of the chief and council, under the 8th June 1775, that the cession of *Ahmood* was a voluntary gift from *Ragoba* to the Honourable Company, and that the grant passed through the proper forms, by which a considerable expence was incurred; the grant itself is entered upon the Broach records, under the 25th September of the same year;

Resolved, therefore, That *Ragoba* has no right to expect from us the performance of the promise said to be made by Mr. *Shaw* on that account, but that we will consent to receive the cession of *Ahmood* on the same terms he has offered *Hansood*, namely, as a mark of the regard to the Honourable Company; and mention it to them in that light.

As a supply of money will be absolutely necessary to enable *Ragoba* to proceed; Resolved, That a loan be made him of three lacks of rupees: which the state of our treasury at *Bombay* and *Surat* will enable us to make without inconvenience, and the season for collection now coming on.

His request for a supply of military stores, as specified in the annexed list, being next considered, it is agreed to let him have 1,500 stand of arms with their accoutrements, and four or five guns and their carriages, with the particular gun he points out, and the flints and gunpowder. We cannot spare any howitzers, but it must be represented to *Ragoba*, that our army will carry a sufficient train and ammunition, and that any thing further will only be an incumbrance; and therefore such only of the articles as he may have occasion for will now be delivered; and the remainder afterwards.

APPENDIX, Nos. 121, 122, 123, and 124.

Bombay Select Consultations, the 18th November 1778.

THE draft of the proposed treaty with *Ragoba* is now laid before us by the Secretary; and having been seriously and deliberately discussed, article by article, it is, after a few alterations, approved.

Ordered, that a translation thereof, in the Maratta language, be immediately made, and sent to *Ragoba* for his inspection, who must be desired to fix a short day to meet us, to execute and exchange the treaty.

Articles of Agreement and Treaty between the Honourable *William Hornby*, Esquire, President and Governor, and the Select Committee of *Bombay*, on the part and behalf of the Honourable United English *East India* Company, on the one part; and *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan*, on the other part; done and concluded at *Bombay* this day of November, in the year of our Lord 1778.

Article 1st. The treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton* with *Siccaram Pundit* and *Ballajee Pundit*, Ministers, in behalf of the Peishwa and the Maratta State, having been violated by those Ministers in almost every article, the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*, with the sanction and concurrence of the Governor General and Council, do hereby engage and agree in behalf of the aforesaid Company, to assist *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* to the utmost of their power, to put him in possession of *Poonah*, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta empire during the minority of the young Peishwa *Maderow Narrain*, hereby declaring that the true intent and meaning of this treaty is not to alter the form of Government, or to interrupt the peace between the Honourable Company and the Maratta State, but only to remove the Administration out of the present improper hands, and to place in the Regency the man who has the justest title to that office.

2d. *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan*, on his part, doth hereby engage and agree to accept the office of Regent, which he is to exercise with full power during the minority of the Peishwa *Maderow Narrain*, in whose name he further engages to continue the Sicca and conduct the Government; but *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan*, having expressed his doubt of the legitimacy of the Peishwa *Maderow Narrain*, the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* do hereby engage, on *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* his strong solicitations, to request explicit orders from the Company, whether, in case he should prove to their satisfaction that the child is suppositious, they will place him in the Peishwaship, which, on such proof, will be his unquestionable right; and whether, in case the child should prove to be really the son of *Narrain Row*, they will guarantee to him an equal division of the Government and country, on the Peishwa attaining the age of seventeen, agreeable to what *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* says he is entitled to by his birthright, according to the Gentoo law.

3d. The Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* do hereby stipulate, and *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan*, for their satisfaction, and that his upright intentions may appear manifest, doth hereby engage, and agree, that the person of the Peishwa *Maderow Narrain* shall be kept under the charge and custody of such persons as may be agreeable to the Select Committee.

4th. *Morabah Furneese*, *Butcheba Pronder*, and *Tookajee Holcar*, having invited *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* to take upon himself the Government as Regent and promised their assistance, *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth hereby engage, upon their performing their promise to his and the Select Committee's satisfaction, that he will shew favour to them according to their ranks in settling the offices of Government, and that their persons and fortunes shall be unmolested.

5th. Any articles respecting the internal management of the Government, or the appointment and removal of officers, can be better settled by *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* on his part faithfully promising to observe the terms mentioned in the circular letter, with respect to the personal safety of those whom he may be of opinion have injured him.

6th. In consideration of the assistance to be afforded by the Honourable Company for placing *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* in the regency at *Poonah*, *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth hereby engage to confirm and ratify the former treaty concluded with him at *Surat* in March 1775, and to cede and make over to the Honourable Company for ever, the several places and territories granted by the said treaty, which were restored by the treaty of *Poorunder*, and *Bassein* and its districts, and the island of *Kennery*, which were not put in possession of the Company. The several acquisitions which will devolve to the Honourable Company by virtue of this treaty, are as follow:

Bassein fort and town, and the whole of its districts and dependencies in the fullest extent, according to the just and fixed boundaries of that province.

Jamboosier and *Orpad*. In the same full and ample

manner as ceded by the Treaty of *Surat*.

The iſland of *Kennery*.

An aſſignment upon the Purgunnah of *Occlaſier* for the ſum of rupees 75,000 per annum, as ſettled by the 8th article of the Treaty of *Surat*.

There being ſome ſmall places known by the name of the *Autgoms*, always annexed and actually making a part of the iſland of *Salſette*, which have been withheld from the Company by the Poonah Miniſters, *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth hereby engage and agree that the ſaid Autgoms ſhall be ceded to the Honourable Company.

7th. In addition to the ſeveral grants and ceſſions hereinabove ſpecified, *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth hereby engage and agree to cede and make over for ever the Purgunnah of *Ahmood* and *Hanſood*; which grants are to be conſidered as an inſtance of his good will and affection to the Honourable Company.

8th. All the places herein ceded to the Honourable Company are to be conſidered as their ſole right and property from the day this treaty is executed, without any claim of chout to the Maratta Government, or any other demand whatever, and may be taken poſſeſſion of by the Company's people whenever they think proper; for which purpoſe *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth with theſe preſents deliver the neceſſary orders to the Maratta officers to ſurrender the ſaid places. *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth further promiſe and engage, that immediately after taking charge of the regency at *Poonah*, he will execute and deliver to the Government at *Bombay* regular Sunnuds, under the Peiſhwa's Sicca, for the ſeveral ceſſions granted to the Honourable Company by this treaty.

9th. *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* engages to pay and make good the charges and expences of the army and ſtores with which he is now to be aſſiſted, which he hereby faithfully promiſes to make good in ready money, as ſoon as the ſituation of his affairs will poſſibly permit; and for the further ſecurity of the Honourable Company, till the account due for the expences of the army is fully diſcharged, when all right and title there to on the part of the Honourable Company will be relinquiſhed.

10th. *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* engages to pay in full for the body of forces, conſiſting of 4000 men, with which he is to be aſſiſted, the ſum of two lacks and a half of rupees per month, which the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* agree to accept without further account in full of every expence attending the army, and is to commence from the day the forces leave *Bombay*.

11th. *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* faithfully promiſes to diſcharge his preſent debt to the Honourable Company, as ſoon as the ſtate of his finances will permit, agreeable to an account which will be delivered to him.

12th. The Engliſh forces are to continue with *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* until the object of this treaty is accompliſhed, which is to place him in the Regency of *Poonah*; and when that is effected, they are to be at all times ready to aſſiſt *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* with their forces, ſo far as may be conſiſtent with their other engagements, or the ſituation of their own affairs will permit.

13th. The ſeveral treaties and agreements ſubſiſting between the Government of *Bombay* and the Maratta Government are hereby ratified and confirmed in as full force, as when they were firſt concluded, unleſs otherwiſe provided for in the treaty.

14th. After the eſtabliſhment of *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* in the Regency at *Poonah*, there ſhall be a firm peace and alliance between the Honourable Company and the Maratta Government; *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* engages never to aſſiſt the enemies or moleſt the dominions of the Company in any part of *India*, nor to make war or commit depredations in the *Carnatic*, or any other part of the dominions of their ally the Nabob of *Arcot*: the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* in like manner engage in behalf of the Honourable Company, not to aſſiſt the enemies of *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan*. Appendix No. 121.

15th. *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* hereby engages and agrees that no European ſettlements ſhall be allowed to be made on the maritime coaſts, or any other parts of the Maratta dominions, without the conſent of the Company, or of their repreſentatives being previouſly obtained, and that no manner of intercourſe or connection ſhall be maintained between the Maratta Government and the French nation; any failure in which ſtipulation will be conſidered as a breach of the alliance between the Maratta Government and the Honourable Company.

16th. When the contracting parties have mutually interchanged this treaty, it will be ſent to *Bengal* for the ratification of the Governor General and Council.

17th. *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth hereby ſtipulate and engage, that the Engliſh ſhall enjoy all their former privileges and freedom of trade within the Maratta dominions without interruption; and he further engages to give all poſſible encouragement to the Honourable Company's trade, and to promote, as far as he can, an excluſive vend to the Engliſh for European commodities in the Maratta dominions.

18th. If any article of the preſent treaty ſhould interfere with any engagements formed by the Governor General and Council, not yet known to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, ſuch article may be altered or amended as may be neceſſary.

The foregoing articles having been mutually agreed to by the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*, on the part of the Honourable Company, and *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan*, the contracting parties have interchangeably affixed their hands and ſeals, and the ſeal of the Honourable Company, in Bombay Caſtle, the day and year above written.

19th November 1778.

The Secretary, by the Preſident's order, ſent round the following note to the Members; on which they gave their opinions ſubjoined to the note.

To the Worſhipful *John Carnac*, Eſquire, &c.
Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

The 16th article of the propoſed treaty, as ſettled yeſterday by the Committee, appearing to the Preſident, on further reflection, to be a greater conceſſion than the Gentlemen at *Bengal* are by law entitled to, and not only unneceſſary in this caſe, but a precedent which may be very dangerous to the influence and dignity of this Preſidency; he has therefore ordered me to new model this article, and I have the honour to ſend it round for your opinion.

I am with reſpect,
Thurſday, Gentlemen, &c. &c.
19th November 1778. *Edward Ravenſcroft*. Sec^y.

I conceive the Act of Parliament obliges us to ſubmit the propoſed treaty to the controul of the Governor General and Council; and therefore prefer the article approved of yeſterday to that now propoſed to be ſubſtituted for it. *Daniel Draper*.

I in a great meaſure agree with the Preſident; however, as our determination of this matter may be attended with ſerious conſequences, I think it ſhould be fairly debated in the Committee; and after hearing a full diſcuſſion of the arguments in favour of the ſeveral opinions, we ſhall be better able to reſolve.

John Carnac.

I have this moment received the act; and therefore will not delay giving my opinion; viz.

That

Appendix. Nos. 122 & 123.

That in this whole affair, we are bound to proceed with the ſanction and approbation of the Supreme Council, which is already obtained for our private juſtification; but it is needleſs to make any public mention thereof in the treaty.

Charles Egerton.

No. 122.

Extract from a Conſultation held in *Bombay*, 21ſt November 1778.

The Committee, except Mr. *Draper*, indiſpoſed, aſſembled in the Preſident's chamber, who is alſo much indiſpoſed; when he communicates to them a letter from Mr. *Lewis*, and one from *Ragoba* to the Gentoo Tranſlator; by which it appears, and which is likewiſe confirmed from various quarters, that the Miniſters have got intimation of our intentions, and are making preparations to oppoſe us.

Reſolved, upon this intelligence, that it is neceſſary no time ſhould be loſt in moving the forces: and as the ſpring tides now ſerve, and the Colonel acquaints us the preparations are in ſufficient forwardneſs, reſolved, That the firſt diviſion under Captain *Stewart*, be embarked with to-morrow night's tide, and proceed to *Apta* to ſecure *Bhore Gaut*; and that another diviſion proceed immediately after, to ſecure *Bellapore Fort* for a magazine, and ſupport the firſt diviſion, in caſe of neceſſity; and that the remainder of the forces proceed afterwards with all expedition.

The Preſident deſires that Mr. *Carnac* will take upon him the execution of the neceſſary meaſures to forward the intended ſervice; and acquaints him, that he has given orders for ſecuring all the boats and ſmall craft of this iſland and *Salſette*; and deſires that Mr. *Carnegie* may be immediately ordered to ſend the boats from *Caranja*, which, being beſt acquainted with the navigation of *Apta* river, will be moſt proper to tranſport Captain *Stewart*'s diviſion.

The boats are to be arranged in diviſions, under the command of marine officers.

Ordered, That all communication between this iſland and the continent be immediately ſtopped, and advice ſent to Mr. *Lewis*, that he may take the neceſſary meaſures for his own ſecurity.

The ſeveral neceſſary points muſt be adjuſted with *Ragoba* as ſoon as poſſible; for which purpoſe Mr. *Moſtyn* will immediately wait on him.

The 16th article of the propoſed treaty being now reconſidered, the Act of Parliament is referred to; wherein we find it laid down, "that it ſhall not be lawful for "any Preſident and Council &c. to make any orders "for commencing hoſtilities, or declaring or making "war, againſt any Indian princes or powers, without the "conſent and approbation of the Governor General and "Council firſt had and obtained." It therefore certainly follows, that it is lawful for us to do and perform the things aforeſaid, when we have obtained ſuch conſent and approbation, which is the preſent caſe: and the propoſed article appears the more unneceſſary and ſuperfluous, after the recital in the firſt article, that we have proceeded with the ſanction and approbation of the Governor General and Council. Such a ſtipulation muſt create much diſtruſt and doubt in *Ragoba*; and certain we are, that it would entirely deſtroy the conſequence and dignity of this Government in the eyes of the country powers, and be attended with many bad conſequences to the Company's intereſts; for after we have proclaimed in our negociation, that we have obtained the conſent of the Governor General and Council, which is neceſſary to be done, as their controlling power is univerſally known, if, when we come to the point, we declare that we have no authority to conclude a final engagement, in what trifling light muſt we appear, and what power will waſte time in treating with us? Reſolved, therefore, for the above reaſons, and thoſe recorded in our proceedings under the 9th inſtant, and becauſe we have adhered ſtrictly to the principles upon which we obtained the ſanction of the Governor General and Council, that the 16th article of the propoſed treaty, as it now ſtands, is highly improper and unneceſſary; and that the following be ſubſtituted in lieu thereof, which will provide equally well againſt our treaty interfering with the engagement Mr. *Elliott* may form with *Moodajee Bouncello*, and which was our ſole object in the article as firſt drawn out.

Amended article. If any article of the preſent treaty ſhould interfere with any engagement formed by the Governor General and Council, not yet known to the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*, ſuch article may be liable to be altered or amended, as may be neceſſary.

No. 123.

22d November 1778.

At a Committee; all preſent but Mr. *Draper*, indiſpoſed.

Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, Mr. *Draper* being indiſpoſed, met in the Preſident's chamber, who ſtill continues very indifferent; when Mr. *Moſtyn* reports that he had a conference with *Ragoba*, on the ſubject of the propoſed treaty, who objected to ſeveral parts thereof, and promiſed to ſend ſome of his people this morning to meet Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and *Moſtyn*, in order the more fully to explain his objections.

If the final execution of the treaty ſhould take up more time than we expect, *Ragoba* muſt be deſired in the mean time to put his Sicca to ſome of the letters to be ſent over with Captain *Stewart*'s party, which we before agreed is to embark this evening.

Immediately on the Committee's breaking up, Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and *Moſtyn*, had a meeting with four agents from *Ragoba*, with whom they had a tedious conference of upwards of four hours, which ended without any thing concluſive being ſettled. The principal objections made by the agents were, firſt, to the article providing for the ſecurity of the child's perſon; in which they want to have ſpecified, the place of his reſidence, the perſons names who were to have the charge of him, and alſo the fort wherein he might be kept, ſhould he be under *Ragoba*'s orders. Secondly, To the article reſpecting *Moraba*, &c. which they wanted to have altered in ſuch manner as to leave him entirely dependant on *Ragoba*'s pleaſure, and to be conſidered by him in the diſtribution of the offices, as he might think their ſervices might merit. Thirdly, they inſiſted an expreſs article ſhould be inſerted, ſtipulating that the Select Committee ſhould not in any ſhape interfere in ſettling the internal Government.

The agents declaring they had no power to relax from theſe demands, and Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and *Moſtyn*'s arguments being ineffectual, the conference broke up.

The Poonah Committee particularly deſired the agents to get ſome of the circular letters, ſigned by *Ragoba*, to be ſent with Captain *Stewart*'s party; and the Company's Linguiſt waited on him for that purpoſe, but *Ragoba* refuſed to ſign the circular letter till he executed the treaty.

The Committee ſend a meſſage to *Ragoba*, deſiring him to meet them at 10 o'Clock to-morrow morning; which he agrees to.

At 11 P. M. Captain *Stewart*'s diviſion, having embarked in the afternoon, weighed with the tide, and ſtood over to the *Apta* river.

23d November 1778.

At a Committee; all the Members preſent.

Ragoba now meets the Committee according to appointment, when, after a conference of near ſeven hours, he agreed to execute the treaty, with ſome ſmall

alterations which were made at his earneſt deſire, and promiſed to put his Sicca to ſome of the circular letters this evening.

Previous to his taking leave, he requeſted the intended loan might be enlarged from three to four lacks of rupees, pleading, as he had obliged us in the affair of *Ahmood*, he had a right to expect that favour; which being a very juſt plea, it is agreed to grant his requeſt, and cannot doubt but the Honourable Company will approve the loan, conſidering the valuable acquiſitions we ſhall gain from them by the treaty.

Ragoba deſiring that the treaty, when fair copied, may be ſent to him to execute, the Secretary is ordered to get it ready with all expedition, when it will be ſent to him by a deputation.

No. 124.

Ragoba then took his leave of the Committee with the uſual ceremonies.

The ſecond diviſion of the troops, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Cay*, proceeded to *Bellapore*.

Ragoba returned ſix of the circular letters, executed under his Sicca, which were immediately counterſealed with the Company's ſeal, and four of them ſent over to Captain *Stewart*.

Colonel Charles *Egerton* proceeded in the yatch to *Billapore*.

The Committee met in the Preſident's chamber, and executed the treaty, which in the evening was ſent to *Ragoba* by Mr. *Moſtyn*.

The Committee, except Colonel *Egerton*, with the army, aſſembled in the Preſident's chamber.

Mr. *Moſtyn* reports, that *Ragoba*, notwithſtanding his promiſe at the meeting with the Committee, after the treaty had been fully canvaſſed, and every article particularly explained to him, ſtill refuſed to ſign it, unleſs an addition was made to the third, more fully providing for the charge of the child's perſon, in caſe *Perwettyboy* ſhould decline the offer; and that he likewiſe objected to the article ceding over the Aurgoms, alledging, that they were not anciently annexed to the diſtrict of *Salſette*, and inſiſting, that the value of this ceſſion ſhould be aſcertained, and not to exceed a certain ſum.

As we much wiſh to remove all doubts from *Ragoba*, and to give him ſatisfaction, ſo far as we conſiſtently can; reſolved, that we conſent to the following additions being made to the diſputed articles:

To the 3d. "In caſe *Perwettyboy* ſhould refuſe to "undertake the charge, the child ſhall be put under the "care of any of his relations by the mother's ſide."

To the 6th. "But although the Governor and Se- "lect Committee have even underſtood that the Aurgoms "made a part of the iſland of *Salſette*, yet if the con- "trary ſhould be made plainly to appear, they will give "up their claim."

But as we have experienced ſo much evaſion and delay on the part of *Ragoba*; reſolved, that the following meſſage be ſent to him, if he ſhould not agree to the treaty with the above additions:

"That we are determined not to permit of any fur- "ther additions being made in the treaty. That if he "refuſed to execute it in its preſent form, we ſhall drop "all connection with him, and take poſſeſſion of the Go- "vernment of *Poonah*, in the name of the Peiſhwa, and "carry it on in his name, until we receive orders from "*Bengal* whom to appoint Regent; and that in the mean "time we ſhall not permit of his continuing ſuch a "number of armed men on the iſland, but ſhall inſiſt "on their being immediately diſmiſſed."

No. 125.

27th November 1778.

At a Committee, preſent;

The Honourable the Preſident and Mr. *Carnac*,

Colonel *Egerton* being with the army, and Mr. *Draper* indiſpoſed.

Mr. *Moſtyn* reports that *Ragoba* is not ſatisfied with the addition made to the 3d article, and wanted to have it ſtipulated, that in caſe the perſons ſpecified therein ſhould decline the charge; the child ſhould then be put under the charge of ſuch perſons as may be agreeable to him (*Ragoba*) and to the Select Committee.

Appendix. Nos. 124 to 126.

As the dangerous tendency of this clauſe is obvious, by giving *Ragoba* an abſolute negative in the choice of guardians for the child, and we cannot be too guarded in every ſtipulation that regards its ſafety; it is reſolved at all hazards to reject the propoſed addition: but ſtill, as we are very anxious to have the treaty concluded, and unwilling it ſhould be known at *Poonah* that any diſagreements ſubſiſt between us and *Ragoba*; it is agreed to conſent to the following addition being made to the 3d article, which is the furtheſt we can go to ſatisfy *Ragoba*: and in this place we judge it proper in juſtice to him to declare, that we firmly believe the many objections he has raiſed to the 3d article do not proceed from any evil deſigns againſt the child, but occaſioned entirely by his fears that we ſhould place the child under the charge of *Moraba*, or ſome of the great officers, which would give them too great an aſcendancy; for if any of them ſhould have the child in their hands they will in fact have the Government.

Further addition to the 3d.

"But in caſe all theſe ſhould decline the truſt, the "child ſhall then be diſpoſed of in ſuch manner as may "be deemed moſt adviſable for his ſecurity, and for the "honour of the contracting parties."

Mr. *Moſtyn* acquaints us that he delivered the meſſage to *Ragoba* agreed to yeſterday, as he ſtill hoped the matter would be accommodated, which is approved.

In the afternoon Mr. *Sibbald*, the Company's Interpreter, was ſent out to *Ragoba* with the propoſed addition to the article; which after much argument he agreed to, and the neceſſary alterations having been made to the treaty, *Ragoba* put his Sicca to it this night.

The treaty with *Ragoba* as finally ſettled and executed is as follows.

A true copy,

Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

No. 126.



(Signed)
Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

Articles of Agreement and Treaty between the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, and the Select Committee of *Bombay*, on the Part and Behalf of the Honourable United Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, on the one Part, and *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* on the other Part, done and concluded at *Bombay* this Twenty-ſeventh day of November in the Year of our Lord One thouſand Seven hundred and Seventy-eight, or the 3d Day of Jeclud Soohurſun Tiſſah Subein Miah wa Alluff, or Year 1179 Mahometan Style, or according to the Gentoo Æra, the 5th Day of Manguaſhier Sood, in the Year Vellamby 4,700.

Article 1ſt.

THE treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton* with *Sicaram Pundit* and *Ballajee Pundit*, miniſters in behalf of the Peiſhwa and Maratta State, having been violated by thoſe miniſters in almoſt every article, the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*, with the ſanction and concurrence of the Governor General and Council, do hereby engage and agree, in behalf of the aforeſaid Honourable

Appendix. No. 126.

Honourable Company, to aſſiſt *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* to the utmoſt of their power, to put him in poſſeſſion of *Poonah*, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta empire, during the minority of *Mhadarow Narrain*, the infant Peiſhwa; hereby declaring, that the true intent and meaning of this treaty is not to alter the form of Government, or to interrupt the peace between the Honourable Company and the Maratta State; but only to remove the adminiſtration out of the preſent improper hands, and to place in the Regency the perſon who has the juſteſt title to that office.

Article 2d.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan, on his part, doth hereby engage and agree to accept the office of Regent, which he is to exerciſe with full power during the minority of the Peiſhwa *Mhadarow Narrain*; in whoſe name he further engages to continue the Sicca and conduct the Government: but *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* having expreſſed his doubts of the legitimacy of the Peiſhwa *Mhadarow Narrain*, the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* do hereby engage on *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* his ſtrong ſolicitation, to requeſt explicit orders from the Company, whether, in caſe he ſhould prove to their ſatisfaction that the child is ſuppoſititious, they will place him in the Peiſhwaſhip, which, on ſuch proof, will be his unqueſtionable right; and whether, in caſe the child ſhould prove to be really the ſon of *Narrow Row*, they will guarantee him an equal diviſion of the Government and country, on the Peiſhwa's attaining to the age of ſeventeen, agreeable to what *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* ſays he is entitled to by his birthright, according to the Gentoo laws.

Article 3d.

The Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* do hereby ſtipulate, and *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* for their ſatisfaction, and that his upright intentions may appear manifeſt, doth hereby engage and agree, that the perſon of the Peiſhwa *Maderow Narrain* ſhall be kept under the charge and cuſtody of ſuch perſons as may be agreeable to the Select Committee, who wiſh that the child may be committed to the charge of *Perwettybhoy*, if ſhe will undertake the charge; and in ſuch caſe the Matchy of *Poorunder* where the child is kept muſt be guarded with a party of the Company's troops, and *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* may keep a Chowkey on the outſide of the gate to ſee that no improper perſons be admitted: but no perſon whatever muſt have admittance to the child's preſence without permiſſion of *Perwettybhoy*. In caſe *Perwettybhoy* ſhould refuſe to undertake the charge, the child ſhall be put under the care of any of his relations on the mother's ſide; but ſhould all theſe decline the truſt, the child ſhall then be diſpoſed of in ſuch manner as may be deemed moſt adviſable for his ſecurity and for the honour of the contracting parties.

Article 4th.

Morabah Furneeſe, *Butchebah Pronder*, and *Tookajee Holcar*, having invited *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* to take upon himſelf the Government as Regent, and promiſed their aſſiſtance, *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth hereby engage, upon condition of their performing their promiſes to his and the Select Committee's ſatisfaction, and behaving like faithful obedient ſervants, that he will ſhew favour to them according to their ranks and ſervices in ſettling the offices of Government, and that their perſons and fortunes ſhall be unmoleſted.

Article 5th.

The Governor and Select Committee engage not to interfere in the appointment or nomination of officers to the forts, army, artillery, or revenues, or in the management of the Government; provided nothing be done in breach of any of the articles of the preſent treaty, *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* on his part faithfully promiſing to obſerve the terms mentioned in the circular letter, with reſpect to the perſonal ſafety of thoſe whom he may be of opinion have injured him.

Article 6th.

In conſideration of the aſſiſtance to be afforded by the Honourable Company for placing *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* in the Regency at *Poonah*, *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth hereby engage to confirm and ratify the former treaty concluded with him at *Surat* the 6th March 1775, and to cede and make over to the Honourable Company for ever the ſeveral places and territories granted by the ſaid Treaty, which were reſtored by the Treaty of *Poorunder* and *Baſſein*, and its diſtricts, and the iſland of *Kennery*, which were not put in poſſeſſion of the Company. The ſeveral acquiſitions which will devolve to the Honourable Company by virtue of this article are as follows:

Baſſein fort and town, and the whole of its diſtricts, and its dependencies in their full extent, according to the juſt and fixed boundaries of that province.

Jamboſer and *Orpad*, in the ſame full and ample manner as ceded by the Treaty of *Surat*.

The iſland of *Kennery*.

An aſſignment upon the Pergunnah of *Occlaſeer* for the ſum of 75,000 rupees per annum, as ſettled by the 8th article of the Treaty of *Surat*.

There being alſo ſome ſmall places known by the name of the Outgoms always annexed, and actually making a part of the diſtricts of *Salſette*, which have been withheld from the Company by the Poonah Miniſters, *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth hereby engage and agree that the ſaid Outgoms ſhall be ceded to the Honourable Company: but although the Governor and Select Committee have ever underſtood that Outgoms made a part of the diſtricts of *Salſette*, yet if the contrary ſhould be made plainly to appear they will give up the claim.

Article 7th.

In addition to the ſeveral grants and ceſſions herein ſpecified, *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth hereby engage and promiſe to cede and make over the Pergunnahs of *Ahmood* and *Hanſood*, which grants are to be conſidered as an inſtance of his good-will and affection to the Honourable Company. The conditions upon which they were formerly granted not having, as he declares, been fulfilled.

Article 8th.

All the places herein ceded to the Honourable Company are to be conſidered as their ſole right and property from the day this treaty is executed, without any claim of chout to the Maratta Government, or any other demand whatever, and may be taken poſſeſſion of by the Company's people whenever they may think proper; for which purpoſe *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth with theſe preſents deliver the neceſſary orders to the Maratta officers to ſurrender the ſaid places. *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* doth further promiſe and engage, that immediately after his taking charge of the regency at *Poonah* he will execute and deliver to the Government at *Bombay* regular Sunnuds under the Peiſhwa's Sicca for the ſeveral ceſſions granted to the Honourable Company by this treaty.

Article 9th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan engages to pay and make good the charges and expences of the army and ſtores with which he is now to be aſſiſted, which he hereby faithfully promiſes to make good in ready money as ſoon as the ſituation of his affairs will poſſibly permit; and for the further ſecurity of the Honourable Company he by theſe preſents aſſigns over the Pergunnah of *Verſal* and the remainder of *Occlaſeer*, the revenues of which are to be collected by his Aumildars, and paid to the Honourable Company till the amount due for the expences of the army is fully diſcharged; but in caſe of

failure

failure therein theſe Purgunnahs are to be put in poſſeſſion of the Company, and the revenues collected by them till the ſaid amount is fully diſcharged, when all right and title thereto on the part of the Honourable Company will not interfere with the ſaid Purgunnahs.

Article 10th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan engages to pay in full for the body of forces, conſiſting of 4,000 men, with which he is to be aſſiſted, the ſum of two lacks and half of rupees per month; which the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* agree to accept without further account, in full of every expence attending the army, and is to commence from the day the forces leave *Bombay*.

Article 11th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan faithfully promiſes and engages to diſcharge his preſent debt to the Company, as ſoon as the ſtate of his finances will admit, agreeable to an account which will be delivered to him.

Article 12th.

The Engliſh forces are to continue with *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* until the object of this treaty is accompliſhed, which is, to place him in the Regency at *Poonah*; and when that is effected, they are to be at liberty to return to *Bombay*. The Company will be at all times ready to aſſiſt *Ragonath Row Budjerow Purdhan* with forces ſo far as may be conſiſtent with their other engagements, or the ſituation of their own affairs will permit.

Article 13th.

The ſeveral treaties and agreements ſubſiſting between the Government of *Bombay* and the Maratta Government, are hereby ratified and confirmed, and ſhall be held and continued in as full force as when they were firſt concluded, unleſs otherwiſe provided for in this treaty.

Article 14th.

After the eſtabliſhment of *Ragonath Row Budjerow Purdhan* in the Regency at *Poonah*, there ſhall be a firm peace between the Honourable Company and the Maratta Government. *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* engages never to aſſiſt the enemies, or moleſt the dominions of the Company in any part of *India*; nor make war or commit depredations in the *Carnatic*, or any other part of the dominions of their ally the Nabob of *Arcot*. The Governor and Select Committee in like manner engage in behalf of the Honourable Company, not to aſſiſt the enemies of *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan*.

Article 15th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan hereby engages and agrees that no European ſettlements ſhall be allowed to be made on the maritime coaſts, or in any other part of the Maratta dominions, without the conſent of the Company, or of their repreſentative, being previouſly obtained; and that no manner of intercourſe or connection ſhall be maintained between the Maratta Government and the French nation, any failure in which ſtipulation ſhall be conſidered as a breach of the alliance between the Maratta Government and the Honourable Company.

Article 16th.

Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan doth hereby ſtipulate and engage that the Engliſh ſhall enjoy all their former privileges and freedom of trade in the Maratta dominions without interruption, and he further engages to give all poſſible encouragement to the Honourable Company's trade, and to promote as far as he can, an excluſive vend to the Engliſh for European commodities in the Maratta dominions; but the Honourable Company will make no ſettlement therein without permiſſion from *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan*.

Article 17th.

If any article of the preſent treaty ſhould interfere with any engagement formed by the Governor General and Council, not yet known to the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* ſuch article may be liable to be altered or amended, as may be neceſſary. Appendix, No. 127.

The foregoing articles having been mutually agreed to by the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*, on the part of the Honourable Company and *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan*, the contracting parties have interchangeably affixed their hands and ſeals, and the ſeal of the Honourable Company in *Bombay Caſtle*, the day and year above written.

William Hornby,
John Carnac,
Daniel Draper.

A true Copy.

Edwa Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

Ragoba's Seal. Company's Seal.

APPENDIX, No. 127.

Bombay, 7th December 1778.

The Diary and Proceedings of *John Carnac* Eſquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn* Eſquire; appointed by the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* a Committee to accompany *Ragonath Row* to *Poonah*.

A PACKET from the Honourable the Select Committee directed to *John Carnac* Eſquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn* Eſquire, the Committee proceeding to *Poonah*, having this day been delivered to Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn*, they embarked on board the yatch for *Panwell*, in order to meet *Ragoba*, and proceed with him from thence to join the army under the command of Colonel *Egerton*, now on its march towards *Bhore* Gautt. Monday, 7th.

Landed at *Panwell* at ſix A. M. and hearing that *Ragonath Row* had paſſed that place in his way from *Callian*, determined alſo to proceed with the utmoſt expedition; the want of bullocks, &c. for the tranſport of our baggage, prevents our ſetting out this day; but expecting a ſupply from the commiſſary of the army, hope to be able to proceed early to-morrow. Learnt that the army was laſt night at *Coyoke*: the inhabitants of *Panwell* had moſtly deſerted with their effects. Tueſday, 8th.

Burwa, 9th December.

Proceeded to *Burwa*; where finding that *Ragonath Row* was up in the fort of *Purbull*, where he had been three days, ſent him a meſſage acquainting him with our arrival. He ſent word in return that he ſhould come down to-morrow morning: that *Amrut Row* with all his baggage, guns, &c. were ordered to march from *Panwell* to *Burwa*, and when they arrived he would accompany us to the army. Wedneſday, 9th.

At eight P. M. received a letter from *Amrut Row* directed to Mr. *Carnac*, wherein he informed him, he had his father's orders to march and join him at *Panwell*, but the want of bullocks for the tranſport of his baggage had prevented him; that the bullocks which he had hired had been taken for our army; that he was endeavouring to procure others, and would march to join him to-morrow morning. A village near the fort of *Purbull* deſerted.

Chintoo Wittol waited on us, and acquainted us in the name of *Ragonath Row*, that he requeſted we would remain at *Burwa* this day; that to-morrow he would certainly come down and ſettle with us about proceeding to the army: though our preſent delays do not appear in the leaſt to retard the marching of the army, yet in purſuance to the injunctions of the Honourable the Select Committee to expedite as much as poſſible our march to *Poonah*, it was thought fit to avail ourſelves of this opportunity to urge to *Ragonath Row* the neceſſity of this point; Thurſday, 10th.

Appendix. No. 127.

point; and therefore a letter was written by Mr. *Carnac* in return to this meſſage, acquainting him, that from his meſſage of yeſterday it was hoped he would have come down this morning, and therefore that he (Mr. *Carnac*) had propoſed to proceed to *Chowke* this afternoon; but that in conſequence of his meſſage by *Chintoo Wittol*, that he would certainly come down to-morrow, and deſiring he would wait till then, he had determined to remain where he was, but earneſtly entreated he would loſe no time, as his affairs required the utmoſt diſpatch; and any further delays might be attended with inconveniencies by giving his enemies time to ſtrengthen themſelves, that he therefore depended on having the pleaſure of ſeeing him to-morrow morning.

This afternoon, *Amrut Row* came from *Panwell* on a viſit. The receipt of his letter was mentioned to him, and he was deſired to be expeditious in forwarding the baggage of his father *Ragonath Row* from *Panwell*. He ſaid it would be here to-morrow, and that he ſhould return inſtantly for that purpoſe.

Friday, 11th. At about one, P. M. *Ragonath Row* came to us.—After previous complimentary diſcourſe, the utility of his ſpeedy appearance above the Gautts being repreſented to him, he acquieſced therein; and it was ſettled, that as ſoon as *Amrut Row* had joined him, he would proceed directly with us to *Condolah*, and there remain till the army and heavy baggage had come up, and act in purſuance to the advice we might give him, relative to the remaining point of reaching *Poonah*. He deſired we would proceed on to *Colipore*, where he would follow us to-morrow, with *Amrut Row*, whom he expected at *Burwa* this morning. In conſequence of this, we determine to proceed on to *Chowke*, in our way to *Colipore*. Arrived in the evening, and found it almoſt deſerted.—Many complaints made of our Sepoys plundering.

Saturday, 12th. At about two, P. M. decamped from *Chowke*, where *Ragonath Row* was juſt arrived, and proceeded on to *Colipore*. At half paſt ten at night, a meſſage came from *Ragonath Row*, informing us that ſome of his cannon and heavy baggage not being come up, would prevent him from proceeding on to *Colipore* to-morrow. *Colipore* chiefly deſerted, and complaints brought of our Sepoys plundering.

Colipore, 13th December 1778.

Sunday, 13th. This morning intelligence was received that *Ragoo Ram* of *Vambory*, *Tapkeer*, and *Bandy*, left *Poonah* laſt Monday, with 1,500 horſe and 3,000 foot, in order to come down *Dew* Gautt, towards *Tully Gonſalah*, which is about twelve coſs to the ſouthward of *Bhore* Gautt. As it ſeems probable that the enemies of *Ragonath Row*, if they mean to act with vigour, ſhould advance a body of men into the *Conkan*, as well to diſtreſs us for proviſions on our march, by cutting off our communication with *Panwell*, as to endeavour to ſeize the perſon of *Ragonath Row*, whom they may have heard has not yet joined our army, we think it requiſite to apprize him of this intelligence, and deſire that he will immediatly move forwards to the army at *Campoly*. It is alſo neceſſary that Colonel *Egerton* ſhould be acquainted with the receipt of this intelligence, and to direct Lieutenant *Harvey* at *Panwell* to be on his guard, and to have boats ready for ſhipping off any ſtores at a moment's warning.

From *John Carnac*, Eſquire, to *Ragonath Row*.

I received your meſſage laſt night, acquainting me, that ſome of your heavy cannon being ſtill behind, you ſhould not be able to leave *Chowke* this day, and requeſted I would therefore remain at *Colipore* till you could join me.

It is neceſſary to inform you, that I this morning received intelligence, that *Ragoo Ram* of *Vambory*, with 1,500 horſe and 3,000 foot, together with *Tapkeer* and *Bandy*, left *Poonah* on Monday laſt, with an intention of coming down *Dar* Gautt, into the *Conkan*. As your perſonal ſafety is the firſt thing that muſt be attended to by your friends, I muſt take the liberty to adviſe you to ſecure it, by joining the Engliſh army at *Campoly* as ſoon as poſſible. In full confidence that you will follow my advice, I ſhall immediately proceed towards that place, and hope at fartheſt to have the pleaſure of ſeeing you there to-morrow.

Colipore, 13th December 1778. *J. Carnac.*

To Colonel *Charles Egerton*, Commander in Chief of the Engliſh Forces, *Campoly*.

Sir,

Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn* have directed me to acquaint you, that intelligence has been received this morning, of the march of 1,500 horſe and 3,000 foot from *Poonah*, on Monday laſt, with the intention of coming down *Dew* Gautt, towards *Gonſalah*, about twelve coſs to the ſouthward of *Bhore* Gautt. If the enemies of *Ragonath Row* mean to oppoſe him with vigour, it ſeems probable that they ſhould advance a body of men into the *Conkan*; and therefore they have thought it requiſite to appriſe you of this intelligence having been received, that you may take ſuch meaſures in conſequence as may appear to you expedient.

They further direct me to inform you, that they mean to proceed from hence this day, towards *Campoly*; and that they hope to be able to join you, with *Ragonath Row*, to-morrow or next day at fartheſt.

I am,

Colipore, 13th December 1778. Your obedient humble Servant, *W. G. Farmer*, Secretary to the Council.

To Lieutenant *Harvey*, at *Panwell*.

Sir,

Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn* have directed me to acquaint you, that intelligence has been received of the march of a body of troops from *Poonah* towards the *Conkan*; and they have thought fit to adviſe you of this, that you may be on you guard, and have boats in readineſs to tranſport to *Billiapore* the detachment with you, and ſuch ſtores as may be at *Panwell*.

Should not the armed boats which you mentioned to them when at *Panwell*, have yet been ſent you; you will pleaſe immediately to forward a copy of this letter to *Bombay*, as an inſtance of the expediency of its being ſent forthwith. I am, Sir,

Colipore, 13th December 1778. Your moſt obedient Servant, *W. G. Farmer*, Secretary to the Council.

Hull, 13th December 1778.

At ſix in the evening arrived at a tope near the village of *Hull*, about three miles from *Campoly*. The inhabitants of the village all fled.

No anſwer being yet received from *Ragonath Row* to the letter addreſſed him by Mr. *Carnac*, and, contrary to our hopes, no appearance of his advancing this evening nearer to our army under Colonel *Egerton*, the following reflections occur on the retardment that ſeems ſtudiouſly to have been made of his junction with our forces. There is no point which his enemies have ſo ſtudiouſly aimed at as to poſſeſs themſelves of his perſon, for many evident motives. In the ſituation which *Nanah Furneeze* appears to be, to us it ſeems probable, that he would attempt this as his laſt and moſt certain reſource for retaining the government, and for defeating the hopes of the party that may be formed in favour of *Ragonath Row*. It ſeems beyond a doubt, that he receives certain intelligence of every thing that paſſes relative to *Ragoba*, and perhaps ſome of the perſons in his confidence may be engaged with *Nanah Furneeze* to embrace any opportunity to ſeize and carry him off. It muſt be owned, that if the conduct of *Ragonath Row* has been regulated by ſuch treacherous adviſers, it concurs ſtrongly with other circumſtances, to warrant the ſuppoſition that a deſign is formed for ſeizing him. He was firſt led to *Callian*; from thence to the fort of *Purbull*, where he remained four days. When he came down, he promiſed

promiſed to leave his heavy baggage behind him, and proceed directly to our army. This was almoſt a propoſal of his own. The next day he ſent word, that one of his heavy cannon being retarded, he ſhould remain at *Chowke* a day longer; and now, notwithſtanding the advice that was this day ſent him, he ſtill remains at *Chowke*, which is at leaſt eleven miles from our army at *Campoly*, a diſtance that renders it impracticable to afford a timely aid, ſhould any deſign be formed by his enemies to poſſeſs themſelves of his perſon. Theſe ſeveral circumſtances concurring with the advice received at noon, of the march of a body of men on Monday laſt towards the *Conkan*, render it our duty to take the beſt means in our power for effectually ſecuring the perſon of *Ragonath Row*, whoſe ſeizure would be equally diſgraceful, diſtreſſing, and diſadvantageous to us, in the preſent ſtate of our connections with him. This may be done, we apprehend, by advancing a further guard inſtantly for his protection, and acquainting him inſtantly with our apprehenſions and our intentions to advance this guard. It was therefore reſolved to ſend Mr. *W. G. Farmer* directly to Colonel *Egerton*, at *Campoly*, to ſtate our ideas to him, and recommend it to him, to order a further guard of not leſs than 300 Sepoys, to be immediately advanced to *Chowke*, for the protection of *Ragoba*. A meſſage was alſo ſent to *Ragonath Row* as above ſtated.

At ten at night Mr. *Farmer* returned from *Campoly*, and informed us, that having acquainted Colonel *Egerton* fully with our opinions, as above ſet forth, the Colonel returned for anſwer, that the army was but juſt come to its ground, and that it would be harraſſing the men too much to march them back ten or eleven miles to *Chowke*; that he apprehended the guard now with *Ragonath Row* was ſufficient for the ſecurity of his perſon, and if it was not thought ſufficient, it would be much eaſier for Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn* to advance the guard with them, than to ſend one from the army.

Monday, 14th. No anſwer being yet received from *Ragoba* to the letter ſent him yeſterday, Mr. *Sibbald* was ſent at about nine A. M. to repreſent ſuitably to him our apprehenſions of what might poſſibly be the deſigns of his enemies; and to engage farther to him our wiſhes, that he would effectually ſecure his perſon by advancing nearer to our army.

Received the following letter at nine A. M.:

To *W. G. Farmer*, Eſquire, Secretary to the Committee appointed to accompany *Ragonath Row*.

Sir,

I am directed by Colonel *Egerton* to acquaint you, that he has received your letter of this date, and that he is much obliged to Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn* for the intelligence they have ſent him. He thinks there is nothing to be apprehended from any oppoſition the enemies of *Ragonath Row* may attempt againſt him in the *Conkan*; but he will however take ſuch meaſures in conſequence as to him ſhall appear neceſſary.

The Colonel is very glad to hear he may ſo ſhortly expect the pleaſure of ſeeing *Ragobah* and Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn*, at *Campoly*.

I am, Sir,

Campoly, 13th December 1778. Your obedient humble Servant,

M. Murray,
Secretary to Colonel *Egerton*,
Commander in Chief.

At about ten A. M. an anſwer was received from *Ragonath Row* to the letter written him yeſterday, of which the following is a tranſlate:

To *John Carnac*, Eſquire.

After compliments:

You ſent me a letter, in which you mention news being received of the march of the horſe, &c. of the *Bharobies* to the *Conkan*, and recommend me to move on to *Campoly*. I alſo got intelligence that their horſe was come to the Gautt; but now they are gone back: ſhould they perchance come down, I will ſeize them; there is nothing to fear. I have great trouble to get bullocks and people for my cannon and baggage; but I will uſe my beſt endeavours, and to-morrow or Tueſday will arrive at *Campoly*: you will pleaſe to ſend me 300 men. Why ſhould I write more?

13th December.

At about ſix in the evening Mr. *Sibbald* returned from *Ragonath Row*, and brought an anſwer in ſubſtance the ſame as the foregoing letter. He further expreſſed himſelf much obliged for the attention ſhewn to his ſafety; and though, by the detachment with him and his own guards, he apprehended no danger, yet if convenient he would farther wiſh to have the force ſent him propoſed by Mr. *Carnac*. Mr. *Sibbald* had perſuaded him to advance beyond *Colipore*; as he is now within about a mile from hence, it does not appear requiſite to advance any further guard for his protection.

At about eight this evening the following letters were received under cover, to Mr. *Wm. Lewis*, from the camp at *Campoly*:

To *William Lewis*, Eſquire, at *Poonah*.

Sir,

This is purpoſely to encloſe you duplicate of a letter to the Honourable Select Committee, together with one wrote yourſelf on the 31ſt ultimo.

Since my laſt, I have left *Ballagee*'s territories, and am arrived within four coſs of *Seronge*, which I leave upon the right, and proceed towards *Bhopall*.

I have met with no material interruption ſince my laſt letter: upon the day of quitting *Ballagee*'s territories, his troops made their appearance, and made repeated attempts to carry off the baggage, &c. in all which they were however baffled; for knowing the deceitful character of the Maratta, I had, notwithſtanding his peaceful and amicable profeſſions, obſerved the moſt particular precautions againſt any treacherous deſigns he might intend to me.

The nature of the ſervice I am engaged in requiring me to avoid all unneceſſary delays, I am proceeding towards *Narbuddah*, and ſhall at preſent defer giving the chaſtiſement due to *Ballagee*'s conduct.

Camp, 4 coſs from *Seronge*, 12th Nov. 1778. I am, Sir, Your moſt obedient Servant, *Thomas Goddard*.

To Captain *James Stewart*.

Honoured Sir,

A letter came from *Goa*, dated the 3d of October, written by *William Bolts*, and directyd to Monſieur *St. Lubin*: he mentioned in his letter, he ſent what news he could pick up, viz. the French have acknowledged the avowed independency of the Americans, but *Spain* will not join them; *Pruſſia* has declared war with *Auſtria* for their pretenſions in *Bavaria*; the *Ottoman Porte* has declared war with *Ruſſia*; ſome ſay 16, others 22, ſhips of war have ſailed from *Toulon*, which ſome ſay are deſtined for *America*, others ſay for *India*; that *Hyder Ally* has given him a factory at *Billeapatam*, one at *Mangalore*, and one at *Canvaar*, in the neighbourhood of *Goa*; the Nabob of *Scindy* has given him a factory at *Tattah* and *Shabunda*; he deſires *St. Lubin* to acquaint *Nanah Furneeze* that he was very willing to ſerve *Nanah* if he pleaſes, in making an union between the Poonah Durbar and *Hyder Ally*; and promiſes the utmoſt ſecrecy, fidelity, and obedience to *Nanah*'s command and inſtructions; he alſo mentions, that if *Nanah* does not employ him in this affair, he will ſhortly return to *Bombay*. The *Eaſt India* Company ſend out 21 ſhips under convoy this year, and two regiments of infantry are deſtined for *Bombay*: he deſires *St. Lubin* to ſend him *Nanah*'s determination concerning the affair of *Gogah*, but he is not anxious about it, becauſe *Scindy* and *Dumaon* will be ſufficient for him in this part of *India*. *Thomas Barnes* explained this letter to the Durbar, and gave me this extract.

Dadajee Adoujee.

Addreſſed the Honourable the Select Committee as follows:

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To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

The occaſion of the preſent diſpatch is to forward you a letter from Colonel *Goddard*, ſent under cover to the Reſident at *Poonah*; as a letter he writes at the ſame time to Mr. *Lewis* informs us generally of the contents of his diſpatch to you, and as we have not your expreſs permiſſion to open letters directed to you, we have forborn to take that liberty at preſent, but beg leave to ſubmit to you the propriety of having this permiſſion in future, as a ſpeedy knowledge of the contents of advices both from the Governor General and Council, and from Colonel *Goddard*, may hereafter be very important to us in our negotiations.

We have alſo thought fit to forward to you without loſs of time, copy of a letter from *Dadajee Adowjee* at *Poonah* to Captain *Stewart*; becauſe as it ſeems this Mr. *Wm Bolts* means ſhortly to proceed to *Bombay*, you will be able to judge of the danger of admitting to an Engliſh port a man who under neutral colours appears to be immediately connected with our moſt dangerous enemies, both in *Europe* and this country: the mode in which this intelligence was obtained by *Dadajee Adowjee* appears to be through *Thomas Barnes*, an Engliſhman who has been long in the ſervice of the Poonah Government, and is uſually employed by them to explain intercepted letters written by Europeans.

Although we arrived at *Panwell* ſo long ago as the 8th inſtant, yet owing to the various delays of *Rogonath Row*, whom we wiſhed to keep as near to us as poſſible, we have not yet joined Colonel *Egerton*: as theſe delays have in no ſhape we believe retarded the march of the army, they cannot have had any material conſequence; but as the appearance of *Ragonath Row* above the Gautts muſt tend to encourage his partizans, and to expedite the accompliſhment of what a the Committee have in charge, by inducing thoſe partizans either to join him or to act openly and deciſively in his favour, we have never ceaſed to urge to him the propriety of proceeding expeditiouſly; and having once brought him to conſent to leave his cannon and heavy baggage to come on at leiſure, we hope in a day or two to be able to adviſe you of his being at *Condolah*.

The 13th inſtant we received intelligence of the march of 1500 horſe and 3000 foot from *Poonah* towards the *Conkan*. If the enemies of *Ragonath Row* mean to act vigorouſly, it ſeemed to us they would endeavour to intercept our communication with *Bombay*, as well in the hope of diſtreſſing us by cutting off our ſupplies of proviſions and ſtores, as perhaps with a view to attempt ſomething againſt the perſon of *Ragonath Row*, whom they muſt have known went firſt to *Callian*, and afterwards up to the fort of *Purbule*; we therefore adviſed Colonel *Egerton* of the receipt of this intelligence, and have perſuaded *Ragonath Row* to advance nearer to our army: There has yet been no advice of theſe troops having entered the *Conkan*; on the contrary, it appears to us by a letter yeſterday from *Ragonath Row*, that they had advanced to the Gautt, but retired again.

Tueſday, 15th. *Dadojee Adowjee* alſo writes to Mr. *Lewis* under the 11th inſtant, that *Sacaram* and *Nanah* have diſpatched one *Amrut Row* to *Sattarah*, with orders to proclaim a new Rajah, and to procure from him a Succa to *Mhadoo Row Narrain*.

We are with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient ſervants,
Jno Carnac,
Thos Moſtyn.

Eſdl,
one coſs from *Campoly*,
15th Dec. 1778.

P. S. We are juſt adviſed that two ſix pounders were yeſterday got up the Gautts by hand, and are now with the erachment at *Condolah* under Captain *Stewart*.

Campoly, 15th December 1778.

At ſix in the evening arrived at the camp at *Campoly* The Secretary to the Committee ſent the following ſummons to Colonel *Egerton* and Mr. *Moſtyn*:

To Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire.

Gentlemen,

I am directed by Mr. *Carnac* to requeſt you will pleaſe to meet him at his tent to morrow at ten o'clock, in order to open and peruſe a packet from the Honourable the Select Committee of *Bombay*, addreſſed to *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire, the Committee proceeding to *Poonah*.

I am, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
W. G. Farmer,
Secretary to the Committee.

Camp at *Campoly*,
15th December 1778.

Received a letter from *Dadajee Adowjee* at *Poonah* to Captain *Stewart*, dated the 14th inſtant, forwarding one from the Nabob of *Tall Bopaal* to Mr. *Lewis*, which he could not read; but that he had learned that Colonel *Goddard* was arrived at *Tall Bopaal*, and had ſtaid there eight days; that the 13th inſtant a new Rajah was proclaimed at *Sattarah*, but that the Sicca was not yet arrived; that ſome perſon had deſired him to acquaint Mr. *Lewis* that *Rogojee Angria*, who was a relation of *Scindia*'s, and entirely devoted to the Miniſters, intended, to offer *Ragoba* 1000 horſe for his ſervice, with a view to betray him.

The letter from the Nabob of *Tall Bopaal* mentioned the arrival of the Bengal army in the diſtrict of *Bopaal*, and that agreeable to what had been written him, he (the Nabob) ſhould furniſh the Colonel with grain, and afford him any other friendly aid in his power.

In conſequence of the contents of the letter received yeſterday from *Dadajee Adowjee*, Mr. *Carnac* at nine A. M. ſent Mr. *Sibbald* to *Ragoba*, to adviſe him of the intelligence received relative to the treacherous deſigns of *Angria*; to caution him againſt thoſe deſigns; and to adviſe him to advance nearer to our army. Wedneſday, 16th.

At a Meeting of the Committee;

PRESENT,
John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel *Charles Egerton*,
Mr. *Moſtyn* indiſpoſed.

Opened a packet from the Honourable the Select Committee at *Bombay*, directed to *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire, the Committee proceeding to *Poonah*, containing the following papers:

Inſtructions, dated 5th December 1778.
Commiſſion to the Committee.
Gentoo copies of *Ragonath Row*'s circular letter.
Copy of the tranſlation of d°.
D° of the treaty concluded between the Select Committee and *Ragonath Row*.
D° of the cypher framed for Colonel *Leſlie*.
D° of the treaty of *Surat*.

Peruſed the commiſſion and inſtructions directed to the Committee,

Reſolved, That the copy of the commiſſion be ſent to the Commander in Chief of the army, who is directed to publiſh it in general orders.

Colonel *Egerton* requeſting it, the Secretary is alſo directed to furniſh him with a copy of the inſtructions to the Committee.

Mr. *Moſtyn* being indiſpoſed, and no further particular buſineſs offering;

Adjourned.

John Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

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We the Preſident and Select Committee for all Political, Military, and Naval Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, on the coaſts of *India*, *Perſia*, and *Arabia*, and of his Majeſty's Caſtle and Iſland of *Bombay*;

To all to whom theſe preſents ſhall come, Greeting,

By virtue of a Power given us by the Honourable Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, and derived unto them from the Authority of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, and his Royal Predeceſſors, do nominate and appoint you, *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire, a Committee for concerning and conducting all the neceſſary Operations, Political and Military, for conducting *Ragonath Row Badjerow Purdhan* to *Poonah*, and for placing him in the Regency of the Maratta Government; hereby giving you full power to execute and perform all Matters and Things in any way appertaining or conducive to the due diſcharge of the Truſt repoſed in you, agreeable to the Inſtructions herewith delivered to you. And we hereby require and order all Factors, Officers, Servants, or others in the ſervice of the Honourable Company, that may be employed on this ſervice, to conform, ſubmit, and pay due obedience to you, *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire, you following all ſuch directions as ſhall be given you by us, or by the Preſident and Select Committee for the time being, purſuant to the Truſt hereby repoſed in you. Sealed with the Seal of the aforeſaid Honourable Company, and given under our hands in *Bombay* Caſtle, this Fifth day of December, in the Nineteenth Year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord King *George* the Third, and in the Year of our Lord One thouſand Seven hundred and Seventy-eight.

L. S.

Wm. Hornby,
Jn. Carnac,
D. Draper.

d Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the
Select Committee.

To *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire.

Gentlemen,

You are well informed of the ſeveral ſteps that have led to the concluſion of a new treaty with *Ragonath Row*, by which the Honourable Company are bound to aſſiſt him with a body of forces, to conduct him to *Poonah*, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta empire.

As the welfare, and we may almoſt ſay the exiſtence, of this Preſidency, will depend on the ſucceſs of the meaſure we have embarked in, we have thought it proper to commit to you the execution of our plan; and you are appointed a committee, and by the accompanying commiſſion veſted with the neceſſary powers to concert and conduct all political and military operations in the courſe of this expedition; relying upon your zeal, addreſs, and judgment, to bring the buſineſs to a ſpeedy and happy concluſion.

Upon receipt hereof, Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn* are to proceed with all convenient expedition to *Panwell*, where the army intended for this ſervice is now encamped, under the command of Colonel *Egerton*. *Ragoba* proceeds by the way of *Tannah*; and as ſoon as he has joined the army, we direct that you urge him to march without loſs of time to *Poonah*, a meaſure which we truſt will be effected with little difficulty or oppoſition, as the paſſage of the Ghauts is already ſecured by Captain *Stewart*'s diviſion; and we have ſtrong reaſons to believe that a very general diſpoſition prevails amongſt the Maratta Officers and people in favour of *Ragoba* and his pretenſions.

You will not fail ſtrongly to inculcate to *Ragoba* the neceſſity of his making himſelf maſter of *Poonah* without a moment's loſs of time, and take the utmoſt care to keep him ſteady to this point, which ought to be and muſt be his firſt object; for according to the treaty we are only bound to put him in poſſeſſion of *Poonah*, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta empire; and it is equally for his intereſt and the Company's, that it ſhould be accompliſhed in the moſt expeditious manner poſſible.

We ſhall deliver to you herewith a number of circular letters under *Ragoba*'s Sicca, and the Company's ſeal, and a tranſlation thereof for your notice. Theſe are to be ſent to the principal officers, and diſperſed over the country, that our intentions in bringing over *Ragoba* may be made known to all ranks of people; and if after this declaration your march ſhould be oppoſed by the Poonah Miniſters, or their adherents, we hereby authorize you to repel force by force, and to conduct *Ragoba* to *Poonah* againſt all oppoſition.

If overtures ſhould be made on the march to *Poonah* by any of the Maratta Chiefs or Miniſters, you will aſſiſt *Ragoba* with your beſt advice, and promote to the utmoſt of your power any accommodation that you may judge favourable to our views, which are to connect *Ragoba* with men of influence and eſtimation in their own country, and well inclined to the Honourable Company; and in this light we muſt regard *Morabah Furneeſe*, *Tookajee Holcar*, and *Butchebah Pronder*, in the foremoſt rank.

We flatter ourſelves that from the experience *Ragoba* has had of our attachment, and his confidence in your judgment and regard to his intereſt, that he will pay great attention to your advice upon all occaſions; and the better to ſecure your influence we recommend to you to cultivate his good opinion by every conſiſtent method. We are likewiſe very earneſt in our injunctions that you uſe every means in your power to conciliate the minds of the people in general to the Engliſh, and to the undertaking we are engaged in: for which purpoſe no violence muſt be offered to the perſons or property of thoſe who remain quiet in their habitations, and every act that can give offence to the religious ſcruples of the Gentoos muſt be carefully avoided.

After *Ragoba* is put in poſſeſſion of *Poonah*, you are to ſee him placed in the Regency, and the Sicca put into his hands, with all the uſual forms and ceremonies, and upon the terms ſtipulated in the 2d article, from which we cannot admit the ſmalleſt deviation; our part of the treaty will then be performed; but here will begin a taſk, in which the utmoſt delicacy and judgment will be neceſſary on your parts, to ſecure on a firm and permanent footing the advantages by which we were attracted to this expedition, and on which the ſafety of this Preſidency will ſo much depend, namely, the entire ſubverſion of the party in the French intereſt, and filling the offices of truſt under the Poonah Government with perſons well diſpoſed towards the Honourable Company.

By the copy of our treaty with *Ragoba*, now put into your hands, you will ſee the limitations we are under with regard to our interference, in the appointment or nomination of the officers of Government. You are well acquainted how much *Ragoba*'s jealouſy was excited by our ſtipulations in favour of *Morabah Furneeze*, *Butcheba Pronder*, and *Tookajee Holcar*, which you will ſee duly performed; and for the reſt, it muſt be your rule, by a line of judicious conduct, to make the perſons you approve of, the men of *Ragoba*'s own choice. We could wiſh, and we imagine, *Morabah* will expect to be *Ragoba*'s Dewan, though it is not improbable that *Ragoba* may for ſome time at leaſt conduct the executive part of Government himſelf, but this is entering upon a matter ſo much depending upon future circumſtances, that

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that we ſhall wave ſaying any thing further at preſent, as we ſhall have ſufficient time to give you more explicit inſtructions when we are better informed.

It will be particularly requiſite, that *Ragoba* ſhould, as ſoon as poſſible, place the forts in the *Conkan*, and upon the ſea coaſt, under the charge of perſons we can depend upon for obedience to his orders, and that will oppoſe the admiſſion of the French into any part of the Maratta dominions; on which head you muſt deſire *Ragoba* to give them immediate and particular inſtructions, according to the terms of the treaty.

The perſonal ſafety of the young Peiſhwa is a point wherein our own reputation, and the honour of the nation are ſo deeply concerned, that we give it you in charge with the moſt implicit confidence of having our intentions faithfully executed, and that every precaution be taken your prudence can ſuggeſt, or the treaty will warrant, to prevent any poſſibility of injury happening to him.

The other parts of the treaty that will reſt with you to ſee executed, are to receive from *Ragoba* the monthly ſtipend for the payment of the forces, and the Sunnuds under the Peiſhwa's ſeal, for the ſeveral places ceded to the Honourable Company, which we ſhall rely on your care to ſee punctually performed as ſoon as *Rogoba*'s circumſtances will permit.

As it is highly proper that this garriſon, conſidering the ſtate of affairs with *France*, ſhould be in a reſpectable ſituation, we recommend it to you, and hereby give you a diſcretional power, to return to *Bombay* ſuch part of the forces as you may think can be ſpared, whenever you may judge the objects of this expedition are brought to ſuch a point as to admit of the force being leſſened with propriety.

We recommend and enjoin as a point very eſſential to the ſucceſs of this expedition, that the utmoſt harmony and good underſtanding be obſerved among yourſelves; and in order to avoid all miſtakes or miſconceptions, we think it proper to deſcribe the following line between the powers of the committee and the commanding officer, which muſt be ſtrictly obſerved by both.

All political intercourſe with *Ragoba* muſt be confined entirely to the committee, who are to have the ſole management of all matters of negociation.

The execution of the general plan of the expedition, being as before mentioned entruſted to the committee, it is our intention and order that the deciſion and determination on points that may appear to them conducive to the accompliſhment thereof, ſhall reſt ſolely with the committee, and the commanding officer hereby enjoined punctually to comply with all requiſitions made to him in writing by the committee on all ſuch points.

On the other hand, the committee is hereby expreſsly prohibited from interfering in the detail of the duty of the army, or from preſcribing to the commanding officer, in reſpect to the mode of march or encampment, or the method of carrying any military meaſure into execution, all of which are the diſtinct province of the commanding officer.

We have given orders to the commanding officer agreeable to the above, and directed him to appoint a guard, and treat the committee with all proper reſpect.

The correſpondence with this Board muſt be conducted ſolely by the committee, who muſt likewiſe adviſe the Governor General and Council of all material tranſactions. Mr. *Lewis* left the Company's cypher buried at *Poonah*, but we now furniſh you with a copy of one we framed for our correſpondence with the late Colonel *Leſlie*, which will ſerve your purpoſe till your arrival at *Poonah*.

A regular diary muſt be kept of all your proceedings and the motions of the army, in which every circumſtance of moment muſt be punctually recorded, and two copies thereof delivered to us on your return.

Your expences will be defrayed by the Honourable Company, and we permit you to keep a table at their charge ſuitable to your ſtation.

The accounts of your paymaſter and commiſſary of the army muſt be ſubject to your ſuperintendence and controul, and you will take care they are forwarded to the Preſidency, at ſuch ſtated times as you may judge reaſonable. The paymaſter has been furniſhed with a lack and a half of rupees; and ſhould that ſum be expended before you can obtain a ſupply of money from *Ragoba*, we have given authority to thoſe officers to paſs their neceſſary drafts upon us, ſubject to your approbation.

Mr. *Wm Gamul Farmer* is appointed your Secretary and Maratta Tranſlator, for both which offices he is to be paid an allowance of three hundred rupees per month. Mr. *James Rivett* is ordered to the aſſiſtance of Mr. *Farmer*, in his buſineſs of Secretary, and is likewiſe to act as chaplain to the army.

Mr. *James Sibbald*, who is under order for an embaſſy to *Hyder Ally*, is to act as your Interpreter, and is to be diſpatched to *Hyder*'s court from *Poonah*, whither we ſhall ſend his inſtructions in due time.

We wiſh you all poſſible ſucceſs and honour in the diſcharge of your important commiſſion, and are,

Gentlemen,

your moſt obedient

Bombay Caſtle, 5th December 1778. humble ſervants,

Wm Hornby,
Jno. Carnac,
D. Draper.

Circular Letter from *Ragonath Row Budjerow Punt Purdhan*.

To all the Mootſeddees, Sirdars, Jaghiredaars, and ſubjects of the Maratta State.

You will no doubt hear with pleaſure that the Government of *Bombay*, with the ſanction and concurrence of the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*, have now determined to ſupport my cauſe with vigour, and with the aſſiſtance of the Almighty to place me in the Regency of the Maratta empire, which you all know is my juſt right. The Governor and Select Committee have been moved to this reſolution in my favour by the unjuſt conduct of the preſent adminiſtration at *Poonah*, who have violated, in almoſt every article, the treaty concluded with the Honourable Company in March 1776, and by their deſire to reſtore, through my hand, peace and good order to the Maratta empire, which has been ſo long involved in trouble and confuſion, and experienced ſo many calamities by miſmanagement and diſcord.

That no officer or ſubject of the Maratta State may be deterred from following the dictates of his duty, by any ſuſpicions of the rectitude of my intentions, I have in the moſt ſolemn manner granted this circular letter; and declare thus in the face of the world, that my only view is to remove the Government out of the reſt of improper hands, and to take upon myſelf the full power of Regent, during the minority of the young Peiſhwa *Madoo Row Narrain*, without doing injury to any one who does not oppoſe my juſt deſigns, or to endeavour to abſcond: and ſhall bury in oblivion all paſt injuries from every perſon whatever, unleſs provoked by any new acts of enmity after this notice.

I now call upon and require you immediately to join my forces and the Engliſh army who are with me, and to attend me to *Poonah*, where I hope, by the Divine Bleſſing, to ſettle the Government upon a firm and final footing, and to reſtore the Maratta empire to its former happineſs and ſplendour.

In further confirmation of what is herein contained, the Honourable Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* have cauſed the ſeal of the Company to be affixed.

A true copy.

Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

Purſuant to the reſolutions of the committee this day, the ſecretary wrote the following letter to the Commander in Chief of the army.

To Colonel *Charles Egerton*, Commander in Chief of the Engliſh forces at *Campoly*.

Sir,

I am directed by the committee appointed to proceed with *Ragonath Row*, to *Poonah*, to encloſe you a copy of the commiſſion from the Honourable the Select Committee at *Bombay*, veſting them with the neceſſary powers to concert and conduct all political and military operations in the courſe of the preſent expedition; and to require you to publiſh the ſaid commiſſion in the general orders to the army under your command.

I am, with reſpect,

Sir,

your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Campoly, December 16th 1778. *W. G. Farmer*, Secretary to the Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 128.

Extract of Secret Letter from *Bombay* to the Court of Directors, dated 29th December 1778.

OUR addreſs of the 31ſt of July will have informed you how matters then ſtood with the Poonah Government. In purſuance of the reſolutions then communicated, we, on the 12th of October, on the motion of Mr. *Carnac*, gave orders for proceeding forthwith in the execution of our plan for reſtoring *Ragoba*. The limits of an overland addreſs will not permit us to enter into a detail of the ſeveral circumſtances of our preparations and negociations, which will be communicated by the firſt ſea conveyance; it will be ſufficient to acquaint you, that on the 25th ultimo we concluded a treaty with *Ragoba*, by which the Honourable Company were bound to aſſiſt him with a body of 4000 men, to conduct him to *Poonah*, and to place him in the Regency of the Maratta Government, during the minority of the infant Peiſhwa.

We have the honour to encloſe a copy of the treaty, and of the manifeſto publiſhed when our forces landed on the Continent, which we hope will be approved by you; and we beg leave moſt heartily to congratulate you on the proſpect of retrieving thoſe valuable acquiſitions loſt by the treaty of *Poorunder*, and of reſtoring ſuch a Government at *Poonah* as will greatly contribute to the general ſecurity of your poſſeſſions in *India*.

According to the plan we had concerted, a detachment of grenadier Sepoys was ſent off the 22d of laſt month, under the command of Captain *Stewart*, who fortunately ſecured the paſſage of the Ghauts without oppoſition on the 25th, and took poſt there; the remainder of the forces left *Bombay* the 23d, and took poſſeſſion of the fort of *Bellapore*, which guards the entrance of *Panwell* river, where they were joined by Colonel *Egerton*, who took on him the chief command of the army.

The force detached on this ſervice conſiſts of 172 artillery, 549 European infantry, and 2689 Sepoys, all officers included, together with 500 artillery Laſcars; which we truſt, all circumſtances conſidered, will be able to bring the buſineſs to a happy concluſion.

By our lateſt intelligence from the army, we find them, at the 26th of this month, at Captain *Stewart*'s poſt at *Condilah*, on the ſummit of the Gauts. They have hitherto met with no oppoſition; but we are adviſed that the Miniſters are aſſembling an army to oppoſe their march, when they make their appearance about the Gauts.

Ragoba left *Bombay* a few days after our forces, and is now with them, and a ſmall body of his own troops at *Condilah*. We hear he is already joined by a party of horſe, and we flatter ourſelves, that when he is a little farther advanced, a number of the principal Maratta officers will declare in his favour.

The management of the expedition, and the ſettlement of the Government at *Poonah*, is entruſted to a committee, conſiſting of Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton* and *Moſtyn*, who are entruſted to conduct *Ragoba* to *Poonah* with all poſſible expedition, and to place him in the Regency, on the terms mentioned in the treaty. They are then inſtructed to uſe their utmoſt judgment and addreſs in ſettling the Government upon a firm and permanent footing, and effecting the ſubverſion of the party in the French intereſt, and filling the offices of truſt with perſons well diſpoſed towards the Honourable Company. Appendix. N°s. 128&129.

We have the moſt ſanguine hopes of a happy iſſue to this undertaking, as we have ſtrong reaſons to believe a very general diſpoſition prevails amongſt the Maratta officers and people in favour of *Ragoba* and of his pretenſions; and the fall of *Pondicherry* muſt damp the expectations of *Nannah Furneeſe*, of aſſiſtance from the French. The approach of the Bengal detachment will alſo greatly diſtract the efforts of that party, in the ſame degree that it will give encouragement to the friends of *Ragoba*; and if the enterprize ſhould prove more difficult than we expected, we ſhall be able, with their aſſiſtance, to overcome all oppoſition.

APPENDIX, No. 129.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, September 5th 1778.

SIGNED the following letter to Sir *Edward Vernon*:—

To Sir *Edward Vernon*, Knight, Commodore, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's ſhips in the *Eaſt Indies*.

Sir,

We were extremely concerned to obſerve by your letter of the 15th July, that the neceſſity did not ſtrike you ſo forcibly as it did us, of the ſquadron's being removed immediately to this place, which, on the ſuppoſition of a war with the French nation, is moſt likely to be the firſt object of their operations in *India*.

As you have taken the letter from the Preſidency at *Madras*, as the ground for your determination of continuing on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, we think it material to ſtate to you in reply our reaſons for being of opinion that the ſquadron could render more important ſervice to the nation, and to the Company, by making *Bombay* its preſent ſtation; and if they appear to you of ſufficient weight to occaſion an alteration in your ſentiments, we cannot doubt but you will ſtill comply with our former requeſt.

The moſt favourable and probable opportunity for the French to attack *Bombay*, will be undoubtedly early in the commencement of a war, before the arrival of a Britiſh fleet in *India* ſufficiently powerful to contend with them at ſea, and whilſt we have no other reſources for defence than our own garriſon; ſuch is exactly our preſent ſituation, if the war is commenced, with this further diſadvantageous circumſtance, that our force conſiſts almoſt wholly of Sepoys, though we have drained every European we poſſibly could from our ſubordinate ſettlements.

Thus circumſtanced, if the French proceed upon a plan of ſurprize, and proportion their armament to our garriſon, the ſtrength of which muſt be pretty well known to them, the preſence of his Majeſty's ſquadron under your command, even in its preſent force, might be the means of preventing an attack, but it cannot poſſibly be denied that it would in any caſe be greatly inſtrumental in repelling it; and the number of men which could be landed from the ſhips would be of the moſt important ſervice in the defence of our works, and prove the preſervation of the place, eſpecially when it is conſidered, as before obſerved, that our force in Europeans is very ſmall.

The

Appendix. No. 130.

The Governor and Council at *Madras* are pleaſed to allow, if we rightly comprehend their meaning, that it is probable the French will early form a deſign upon *Bombay*, before they proceed to what is conceived to be their main object in caſe of war, namely, a powerful attack upon the Company's poſſeſſions at *Madras* or *Bengal*, which they add would be rendered much more difficult and hazardous by proceeding with reſpect to *Bombay* upon any other plan; it therefore certainly follows, that the ſafety of this place, which is of ſo much conſequence in itſelf, and ſo eſſential to the ſecurity of the Company's other valuable poſſeſſions, ſhould be the firſt object of attention, in preference we think to the annoyance of the enemy's poſſeſſions.

We will allow the protection your ſquadron will afford to the Company's ſhipping on the coaſt, to be an argument of much weight in ſupport of your reſolution, but ſtill we hope you will think the ſafety of this Settlement a ſuperior conſideration.

We hope we ſhall ſtand excuſed for expreſſing our apprehenſions for the ſafety of His Majeſty's ſquadron if you perſiſt in your preſent reſolution; for as we are informed by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, that the three ſhips of the line for *Madras* would not fail before the beginning of Auguſt, we think it very poſſible, before they can arrive in *India*, the French may obtain ſo decided a ſuperiority by ſea as to make your continuance on the coaſt extremely hazardous, and *Bombay* the more eligible ſituation, where we expect a ſhip of 64 guns, which we are informed by the ſame authority was to convoy the Company's ſhipping to this Preſidency.

We have the honour to encloſe two packets, received from *England* by the way of *Buſſora* on the 3d of this month; and are, with reſpect,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 8th September 1778.

William Hornby, &c.
Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 130.

Campoly, 16th December 1778.

Wedneſday, 16th.

THIS day received the following letter from Colonel *Goddard*, directed to Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*, and forwarded from thence by *Dajadee Adviojjee*:

William Lewis, Eſquire.

Since my laſt of the 12th inſtant, from within four coſs of *Seronge*, I have been favoured with both yours of the 9th October and 1ſt November, written in cypher. As the figures do not in any reſpect correſpond with thoſe of the cypher tranſmitted me by the Select Committee, I have not been able to diſcover the meaning of your letters; I muſt wait therefore for a key to them, till I receive the cypher compoſed by the Honourable the Supreme Board, which I expect in a few days, and which I am led to believe will anſwer to the figure of your letters.

I have the pleaſure to encloſe you a letter for the Honourable Select Committee, informing them of my arrival at *Bhopal*, from which place I propoſe marching to-morrow morning towards the *Nerbuddah*, and croſſing near the Gauts of *Huſſengabad*, diſtant about 18 coſs. I have acquainted them with the treacherous conduct of *Ballajee*, and the ineffectual attempts made by him in conjunction with the troops belonging to the Bilſah Chief, to carry off the baggage, and cut off the ſupplies of proviſions.

They have alſo uſed their endeavours, by threats and menaces, to prevail upon the Nawab *Mahomet Huat Chawn* to concur in their views of preventing our paſſage acroſs the *Nerbuddah*, which they affirm to be in obedience to the orders of the Peiſhwa *Phurdhan Maderow*.

Hitherto I have experienced the moſt friendly behaviour from the Nawab, and if he adheres to his engagements of ſupplying me with grain, &c. I ſhall have every reaſon to be ſatisfied with his conduct. I ſhall write you again ſoon; and remain,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Nov. 26th 1778, Camp at *Bhopal*.

*Tho*s *Goddard*.

Received alſo at the ſame time a letter from *Dadaja Adowja* at *Poonah*, to Captain *Stewart*, dated the 13th inſtant; in which he mentions the receipt of two letters from Colonel *Goddard*, one for Mr. *Carnac* and one for Mr. *Lewis*, both which he then forwarded. That by the reports at *Poonah*, *Scindia* and *Holkar* had taken an oath to act with the miniſters; *Nanah* having further prevailed upon *Scindia*, by a preſent of three lacks, that *Mhadjee Scindia* was firſt to go againſt the Engliſh troops, and if he was worſted, *Holcar* was to aid him; that on the 11th inſtant *Nanah* had diſpatched *Bhimrow Ponſia*, and *Ramchund Gunneiſs*, with ſome guns, to *Fullegaon*: That the miniſters were deſirous to try their ſucceſs in an engagement with us; and if they were defeated, it was then to be left to *Saccaram* to make the beſt peace he could with us: That *Nanah Furneeſe* was for diſpatching troops through the different Gauts into the *Conkan*. For the information of the Committee, Mr. *Lewis* delivered different letters received by him ſince his departure from *Poonah*; one from Colonel *Goddard*, dated camp near *Rimlaſſey*, October 31ſt 1778, received at *Bombay* 1ſt December 1778.

To *Wm Lewis*, Eſquire, Reſident at *Poonah*.

Sir,

Encloſed I have the pleaſure to tranſmit you a letter for the Honourable the Governor and Select Committee at *Bombay*, which I requeſt you will forward to them with all expedition. Nothing very material has occurred ſince my laſt of the 4th inſtant, which I hope has arrived ſafe; it contained accounts of the death of Colonel *Leſlie*, and of my intention to proceed on my march from *Raje Ghur*, which I did on the 8th in the morning; and am now near *Rimlaſſy*, a town belonging to *Ballajee*, about 12 coſs from *Gunge Berondah*, which you will find laid down in Mr. *Smith*'s route about the ſame diſtance from *Bilrah*, by which road I mean to march.

A Vakeel, named *Ragoo Ram*, yeſterday waited upon me from the *Poonah* Durbar, with a letter in the name of the young reigning Peiſhwa *Punndit Purdhan Mhadoo Row*; which after mentioning the friendſhip exiſting between himſelf and the Engliſh, and expreſſing a ſurprize at the hoſtilities committed at *Kalpy*, requeſts to be informed of my intentions in marching through the *Maratta* empire. In reply to this I have told him, that in obedience to the orders of my maſters I am marching from one Engliſh ſettlement to another; and that my wiſh and object is to preſerve peace and amity with every State and Chief I may meet with on my route. I have explained to him the conduct of *Gungahder* at *Kalpy*, which drew upon him the Engliſh arms, and of that fortreſs having been again reſtored to him, as a proof of our friendly and pacific views. I conceive this embaſſy muſt have been ſent unknown to you from *Poonah*, having before received no intimation of it; and I learn the Vakeel left *Poonah* near two months ago. This however muſt have been much about the time of your laſt letter, which is dated September 2d. I hope ſoon to hear from you, and beg you will communicate to me any circumſtance you can relative to the *Poonah* Durbar, by which my operations may be poſſibly effected.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient humble ſervant,

Camp near *Rimlaſſy*, October 31ſt 1778.

*Tho*s *Goddard*.

Different Letters from *Dadajee Adowjee*, dated 27th and 29th November, and 2d December 1778.

At about noon Mr. *Sibbald* returned with a meſſage from *Dada Saheb* to Mr. *Carnac*, thanking him for his friendly

friendly caution; that he thought he had nothing to apprehend from *Ragojee Angria*, who had preſented him with an elephant and 25 horſe; that he ſhould advance, and encamp within a mile of us.

At a Committee; PRESENT,

John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel *Charles Egerton*.
Mr. *Moſtyn* indiſpoſed.

Read, and approved, the minutes of the laſt committee.

Colonel *Charles Egerton* now delivers in to the Committee the following minute:

"The commiſſion granted to the Committee appointed to attend *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, bearing date *Bombay Caſtle*, December 5th, 1778, being in my opinion highly contradictory to a paragraph in the inſtructions accompanying the ſaid commiſſion, and repugnant to the military powers veſted in me as Commander of the forces of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and now in the field, I do moſt ſtrenuouſly proteſt againſt publiſhing the ſame at preſent in general orders.

"I do alſo proteſt againſt this commiſſion reſting military authority, and alſo to the mode in which it was granted; together with many articles of the inſtructions appertaining to the ſaid commiſſion, for ſuch reaſons as I ſhall hereafter exhibit at a more reaſonable opportunity."

For the foregoing reaſons the Colonel is of opinion, that the commiſſion ſhould not at preſent be publiſhed in general orders to the army; and farther, that according to the letter of the commiſſion appointing the committee, he holds any meeting incomplete and informal without the preſence of every member, and therefore the order iſſued to him in conſequence of the reſolution paſſed at the laſt meeting of Mr. *Carnac* and himſelf, was in his opinion of no validity, till he ſhall have received farther inſtructions from his ſuperiors at *Bombay*, or till the recovery of Mr. *Moſtyn* permits him to attend in committee.

Mr. *Carnac* is of opinion, that the ſickneſs of one of the members of the committee diſenabling him to attend, does by no means render the proceedings of the other invalid. According to the general rules of the Company's ſervice, a majority of any board can form a legal meeting of it; and that therefore the Colonel was bound to have obeyed the requiſition ſent to him in conſequence of the reſolution paſſed at this laſt meeting; however, being unwilling to enter into any diſcuſſion on the ſubject, he conſents to refer the matter to the judgment of our ſuperiors at *Bombay*, and therefore propoſes that the minutes of the laſt committee, relative to the publiſhing the commiſſion, together with the minutes now made, ſhould be inſtantly forwarded, with an addreſs to our ſuperiors, requeſting their inſtant deciſion on theſe ſeveral points, as, according to the opinion entertained by the Colonel, it ſeems to him (Mr. *Carnac*) of no utility to meet again in committee; and that of courſe the buſineſs committed in charge to them muſt remain at a ſtand till ſuch deciſion comes, or till the recovery of Mr. *Moſtyn*, which he is ſorry to obſerve, by the accounts of the ſurgeons, is very doubtful, and at beſt not likely to be for ſome days.

The Colonel concurs in opinion with Mr. *Carnac*, relative to the tranſmitting, with an inſtant addreſs to our ſuperiors, the minutes he makes mention of; but differs in opinion with him as to his general concluſion; for though he (Colonel *Egerton*) thinks fit to inſiſt that the point which immediately relates to himſelf, *viz.* the publication in general orders of the commiſſion to the army under his command, ſhould be diſcuſſed in a full committee, yet he is far from thinking that this propoſal can give any impediment to the conduct of affairs committed in charge to the committee, as Mr. *Carnac* and himſelf can meet, deliberate, conduct, and give final anſwers to *Ragoba* relative to thoſe affairs. Appendix. No. 130.

Mr. *Carnac* obſerving that from the accounts of the ſurgeons there is great room to apprehend Mr. *Moſtyn* may not recover, thinks it requiſite to obſerve to our ſuperiors the very great loſs the Company will ſuſtain at this critical juncture by his death, and how much it may probably impede the execution of the material points they have in charge, both from the want of local knowledge, and particular ability and acquaintance Mr. *Moſtyn* poſſeſſes in Maratta affairs; and becauſe that moſt of the engagements formed at *Poonah* were immediately formed with him; and that the perſons he treated with, looking immediately to him, may now be backward in making freſh overtures to the committee. To which the Colonel concurs.

Mr. *Stibbald* now lays before the committee a paper, as entered hereafter, containing intelligence tranſmitted from *Ragoba*, with which he was made acquainted by *Naro Gopal* and *Trimbuck Ballerow*. With reſpect to his propoſal of having a body of men from *Bombay*, we are ſenſible that from the ſtate of the garriſon it is impoſſible to accede to it.

Mr. *Carnac* lays before the committee the following minute.

"As the ſpeedy arrival of the army upon the Ghauts, and their being puſhed forwards as quickly as poſſible, is very eſſential to the eaſier accompliſhment of the ſervice on which the army is now employed, the enemy having thereby ſo much the leſs time to prepare and collect themſelves; and as our troops have been hitherto but very ſlow in their progreſs, they having diſembarked at *Pancook* 25 days ago, and yet are little more than the ſame number of miles diſtant from it, it is much to be regretted that a more expeditious mode had not been found out for conveying to the top of the Ghauts the ordnance ſtores and baggage, than the one at preſent purſued. It appears to Mr. *Carnac*, that much labour, time, and a conſiderable expence, are unneceſſarily waſted in the making a carriage road up the Ghaut; and that with the ſame number of people now employed for this purpoſe, every thing intended to be caſted up might have been carried up by hand with more eaſe, ſecurity from accident, and diſpatch; and from the converſation he has had with many on the ſubject, he is inclined to believe this to be the general opinion. The Commander of artillery has actually paſſed ſome of his guns beyond the road conſtructed by Major *Snaith*, and by a route wide of it, which may be adduced as a teſtimony that this part of the new-made road at leaſt was wholly needleſs."

As an anſwer to Mr. *Carnac*'s minute might be productive of altercation and argument, the Colonel defers ſaying any thing on the ſubject till he has an opportunity of having his conduct properly ſcrutinized by his ſuperiors at *Bombay*.

(Adjourned.)

John Carnac,
Cha' Egerton.

Campoly, 20th December, 1778.

This morning *Ragoba* ſent *Naroo Gopal* and *Trimbuck* Sunday 20th. *Ballerow* to Mr. *Carnac*, to inform him of the following intelligence he had juſt received from the enemy's camp.

That the miniſterial forces, under the command of *Bhim Row Ponſia*, *Badjee Punt Joſey*, and *Guneiſh Punt*, conſiſting of 10,000 horſe, 15 pieces of cannon, and a large number of Bhondaars, were encamped at *Wurgaon*, 3 coſs on this ſide *Tullagaong*, in order to haraſs our troops and obſtruct their march, ſo ſoon as they might make their appearance above the Ghauts; and that a body of 5,000 horſe were ordered to proceed down *Kurſora* Gaut, with an intent to cut off our communication with *Panwell*.

Appendix. No. 130.

That *Nanah Furneeze*, *Saccaram Bapoo*, *Madjee Scindia*, and *Tookajee Holcar*, were encamped near *Poonah* with 5,000 horſe; but whether they meant to join the main body at *Wurgaon*, was not yet known.

Ragoba deſired the above perſons to acquaint Mr. *Carnac*, that he ſubmitted it to his conſideration, whether it would not be adviſable to have a detachment of Sepoys, with 2 guns, ſent from *Bombay*, to be kept below the Gauts, in order to protect our convoys of proviſions, and to keep the communication open with *Panwell*.

Ragoba is confident that the miniſterial party have adopted the above plan, as they make no ſcruple to declare that it is the only likely mode of haraſſing and diſtreſſing the Engliſh troops; being unequal to an actual engagement with ſuch a body of forces as we have now in the field.

Monday, 21ſt. Diſpatched the following addreſs to the Honourable the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

On the 15th inſtant Meſſieurs *Carnac* and *Moſtyn* arrived at this place, and on the evening of that day, Mr. *Carnac* directed the Secretary to the committee to deſire the attendance of Colonel *Egerton* and Mr. *Moſtyn* at his (Mr. *Carnac*'s) tent on the following day, in order to open a packet from you, directed to Mr. *Carnac*, Colonel *Egerton*, and Mr. *Moſtyn*. The latter gentleman being indiſpoſed, the meeting was held by Mr. *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton* only.

Mr. *Moſtyn* being ſtill indiſpoſed, thoſe two gentlemen only again met this day, conformable to a ſummons ſent by Mr. *Carnac*, when it was agreed immediately to tranſmit the whole of both days proceedings for your conſideration, From the nature of the doubts and queſtions that have ariſen, you will no doubt perceive the neceſſity of favouring us with your deciſions as ſpeedily and as explicitly as poſſible, as, from the nature of the ſervice, and the accidents common to all men, it may frequently happen that only two of the members can attend in committee.

The particulars of the intelligence received from *Ragoba* are, That the miniſterial forces, under the command of *Bhim Row Ponſia*, *Badjee Punt Joſey*, and *Gunneſs Punt*, conſiſting of 10,000 horſe, 15 pieces of cannon, and a large number of Bhondaars, were encamped at *Wurgaon*, 3 coſs on this ſide *Tullagaon*, in order to haraſs our troops, and obſtruct their march ſo ſoon as they might make their appearance above the Gaut; and that a body of 5,000 horſe were ordered to proceed down *Kurſora* Gaut, with an intent to cut off our communication with *Panwell*: That *Nanah Furneeze*, *Saccaram Bappoo*, *Mhadjee Scindia*, and *Hurry Punt*, were encamped near *Poonah* with about 5,000 horſe; but whether they meant to join the main body at *Wurgaon*, was not yet known.

Ragoba ſays he is confident the miniſterial party have adopted the above plan, as they make no ſcruple to declare, that it is the only likely method of haraſſing and diſtreſſing the Engliſh troops, being unequal to an actual engagement with ſuch a body of forces as we have now in the field; and he therefore directed the perſons whom he ſent with this intelligence to acquaint the committee, that he ſubmitted it to their conſideration, whether it would not be adviſable to have a detachment of Sepoys ſent with two guns from *Bombay*, to be kept below the Gaut, in order to protect our convoys of proviſions, and to keep the communication open with *Panwell*?

The above intelligence from *Ragoba* generally correſponds with the contents of a letter received from *Dadajee Adowjee*, at *Poonah*, except that he mentions the miniſterialiſts were determined to engage us, and that *Holkar* had engaged to aſſiſt them; which latter circumſtance we hope and truſt will prove untrue. If the miniſterialiſts mean to act with vigour, it ſeems to us probable they may adopt the plan mentioned by *Ragoba*.

For theſe two days paſt, *Ragonath Row* has been encamped cloſe to us: He had determined to have proceeded up the *Cocindar* Gaut, and had abſolutely marched for that purpoſe; but, fearful of the conſequences of his being widely ſeparated from us, and from the whole tenor of his conduct lately, having reaſon to apprehend that treacherous deſigns were formed relative to the ſeizure of his perſon, Mr. *Sibbald* was deputed by Mr. *Carnac* to repreſent to him the apprehenſions entertained and the unneceſſary riſque he at beſt expoſed himſelf to, by proceeding up another Gaut, whilſt we had one open, and guarded by our own troops. He paid due attention to theſe repreſentations; and this night, at midnight, being a lucky hour, he has determined to march up *Bhore* Gaut to *Condolah*.

We are, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient ſervants,

Camp at *Campoly*, 20th December 1778.

Jn° Carnac,
C. W. Egerton.

P. S. Laſt night *Ragonath Row* proceeded up the Gaut.—December 21 1778.

At about 3 P. M. received the following letter from the Honourable the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

To *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire.

Gentlemen,

We have received a letter from Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn*, dated the 15th inſtant, and authorize you to open any packets addreſſed to us, which may come to your hands.

Having juſt received a letter of importance from the Governor General and Council, we tranſmit an extract of all the material parts for your information; and we have in conſequence ſent orders to Colonel *Goddard* to move forward with all poſſible expedition, although we doubt not he will already have proſecuted his march, in conſequence of our former orders.

Our lateſt advices from Colonel *Goddard* are dated the 26th ultimo, from *Bhopaal*, within 18 coſs of the *Nerbuddah*, which he hoped to croſs in five or ſix days at *Huſſengabad*, and in two days more enter the country of the *Berar* Rajah.

We hope ſoon to hear of your having aſcended the Gauts, with the army and ſtores; and ſtrongly recommend to you to proceed with all poſſible expedition, and to urge *Ragoba*, ſo as that no delay may ariſe on his part.

You will correſpond with Colonel *Goddard* on all neceſſary points, and we have directed him to ſend you advice of his motions. A packet is now encloſed for him in duplicate, which is ſent open for your peruſal; and you will forward it by ſeparate conveyances, in the moſt ſecure and expeditious manner.

We now return five paces of Pattamars, arrived from the army with advices; and are,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 19th December 1778.

Wm Hornby,
Danl Draper.

Signed by the Secretary, for and by Order of the Governor, who is unable to hold a pen.

Edward Ravenſcroft, Secretary.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council; dated the 15th October 17-8, and received the 18th December following, per *Terrible*.

We adviſed you in our laſt of the appointment of Mr. *Elliott* to the court of *Moodajee Bonſicello*, the Rajah of *Berar*, with inſtructions to negociate and conclude a treaty of alliance with that Chief; but we are ſorry to inform

inform you of the demiſe of Mr. *Elliot*, on his way to *Naguipore*, at a place called *Sarungur*. The Rajah having expreſſed great ſatisfaction at the overtures which we made for a connection with him by this deputation, and being, as we have every reaſon to believe, firm in his attachment to the Engliſh, we conclude, as ſoon as he hears of the unfortunate event of Mr. *Elliot*'s death, that he will take an active part in proſecuting the intended negociation, either by deputing a proper miniſter to us on his part, or by ſoliciting our alliance on ſuch terms as may prove a general advantage to the Company's poſſeſſions. For theſe reaſons, we do not mean to appoint any one to ſucceed Mr. *Elliot*, until our advices from the Rajah ſhall enable us to determine on the expediency of that meaſure.

We have thought it incumbent on us to remove Colonel *Leſlie* from the command of the detachment of forces which was ordered to march for the ſupport and aſſiſtance of your Preſidency, on account of the little progreſs it had made under him; as we underſtand he was advanced no further than *Rajgur* on the 25th ultimo, and of his manifeſt diſobedience alſo of our poſitive orders, in forming and concluding a treaty of perpetual peace and friendſhip, in the name of the Company, with the Rajahs *Gomaun* and *Comaun Sing*, Chiefs of a part of the *Bundelcund* diſtrict.

Colonel *Thomas Goddard* is now appointed to the chief command of theſe troops, and we have ordered him to proſecute his march, without further loſs of time, into *Berar*, where on his arrival he will apply to *Moodajee Bouncello*; and if that Chief ſhall agree to join him with a ſufficient body of forces for the purpoſe, he is to continue his route in conjunction with them; but if he ſhall not have received any freſh directions for his march, or if the Rajah ſhall decline or refuſe to grant him his aſſiſtance, we have then veſted in him a diſcretionary power to ſuſpend his proceedings.

If the plan which you had reſolved to adopt and carry into execution in September, for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, and which you notified to us in your letter of the 25th July, ſtill ſubſiſt; or if you ſhall have formed any other for the ſame end, conſiſtently with the terms preſcribed for our aſſent to that meaſure; or if you ſhall judge a ſtrong reinforcement immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary to enſure the ſafety of *Bombay* againſt a French invaſion, and ſhall deem it requiſite or adviſable in either of theſe caſes, to command the detachment at all hazards to proceed further towards *Bombay*, even without the junction of the troops of any power in alliance with us; you will in ſuch caſes, and ſuch only, require Colonel *Goddard* to advance with it; but in all other caſes you will give him notice of your intentions, and leave him to act under our directions.

A true extract.
Edward Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

To Colonel *Goddard*.

Sir,

The Governor General and Council have adviſed us of their reſolution to have removed Colonel *Leſlie*, before they heard of his death, and of their having appointed you to the chief command of the detachment of forces ordered for the ſupport of this Preſidency. They have alſo apprized us of the orders they have given for your conduct on your arrival in the *Berar* country. We congratulate you on this mark of diſtinction conferred on you by the Governor General and Council; and though we hope this will meet you well advanced on your march, in conſequence of our letters of the 15th of November and 6th inſtant; yet to prevent all diſappointment, and that you may not be at any loſs in your proceedings, we judge it proper to repeat to you, that our forces have actually taken the field, in proſecution of the plan communicated to the Governor General and Council, for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, and that we deem it requiſite and adviſable that the army under your command ſhould move forward towards *Bombay*. We therefore hereby require you to advance according to our former orders, even without the juncture of the troops of any power in alliance with the Honourable Company; and we likewiſe deſire and enjoin you to conduct your march with all poſſible expedition. Appendix. No. 130.

The ſettlement of the Government of *Poonah* is committed to Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and *Moſtyn*, with whom we deſire you will correſpond; and we flatter ourſelves, the movement of our forces will facilitate your march in like manner as we expect the advance of your detachment will leſſen the oppoſition to our forces.

We yeſterday received your letter, dated at *Bhoſſall* the 26th ultimo, and we now ſend a fifth copy of our letter of the 6th inſtant.

We are,
Sir,
Your obedient humble ſervants,
Bombay Caſtle, 19th Dec. 1778. *Wm Hornby*. *D. Draper*.

Signed by the Secretary, for and by order of the Governor, who is unable to hold a pen.

Edward Ravenſcroft, Secretary.

This morning *Thomas Moſtyn* being dangerouſly ill, ſet off for *Bombay*. Tueſday, 22d.

It is worthy obſervation, that by the accounts taken this day, either in or after the attack made on Captain *Stewart*'s poſt at *Condolah*, it appears that the body of men which made this attack firſt went to *Corindah* Gaut, where they were purpoſely diſpatched to ſeize the perſon of *Ragonath Row*, whoſe intentions to proceed up that Gaut his enemies at *Poonah* had been well adviſed.

The army proceeded up the Gaut to *Condolah*. In the evening received a letter from *Dadajee Adaujee* at *Poonah*, to Mr. *Lewis*, informing him that he had learnt from *Mhaderow Jadooſy*, that *Nanah Furneeze* would not permit of his (*Adaujee*'s) remaining in *Poonah*; requeſting to know what was to be done with the Company's effects at *Poonah*, the removal of which would coſt very dear on account of the people having moſtly deſerted *Poonah*. It was ſaid *Nanah* expected ſome troops from *Goa*, French and Portugueſe, who were to ſet out this day from *Cudkey*; that our factory was given to the French gentleman who before lived in *Curril Row Bullol's* ſtable. Wedneſday, 23d.

At 3 P. M. received the following letter from the Honourable the Select Committee at *Bombay*. Friday 25th.

John Carnac, Eſquire, Colonel *Charles Egerton*, and *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſquire.

Gentlemen,

We have received the letters from Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, dated the 20th inſtant.

We are ſorry to obſerve, that any occaſion of difference has already ariſen, and at the ſame time ſurpriſed to find an idea could be entertained, that the powers of the committee were ſuſpended by the ſickneſs or accidental abſence of one of the members, when it is ſo obvious, that the practice in all communities or bodies of men aſſociated in any public ſervice, is directly and univerſally the reverſe. But ſince ſuch an opinion has prevailed, we find it neceſſary to direct, and lay it down as our poſitive order, that whenever any one of the members of the Poonah committee is by ſickneſs, or any other accidental cauſe, unavoidably abſent, the full exerciſe of the powers granted to the committee, ſhall be veſted and continue in the remaining two, and in caſe of a difference of opinion, the ſenior member muſt, as always uſual, have a caſting voice.

To

Appendix. No. 130.

To prevent any further diſſatisfaction, we could wiſh that the point of publiſhing the committee's commiſſion, was waved

We are, Gentlemen,
your moſt obedient humble ſervants,
Wm Hornby,
Danl Draper.

Signed by the Secretary, for and by order of the Governor, who is unable to hold a pen.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secy.

Sunday, 26th. Received the following letter from Colonel *Goddard* to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, at 8 A M. in original and duplicate.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

I wrote you the 26th from *Bhopall*, ſince which time I have croſſed the *Nerbuddah*, at *Huſſingabad*, and am encamped on the ſouth bank of it.

Not having been favoured with any letter from you of a later date than the 21ſt July, I am in daily hopes of receiving one, informing me of many circumſtances highly neceſſary at this time to determine the meaſures proper to be purſued, and the plan of my future operations.

It appears from every intelligence I can obtain, that the Peiſhwa and his miniſters have taken the alarm, and are aſſembling troops in every quarter to oppoſe my march, conceiving, that the intention of it is to aſſiſt your Government in advancing the pretenſions of *Ragoba*. It becomes therefore expedient that ſome vigorous ſteps be immediately taken to counteract their deſigns and cauſe a diverſion from different quarters, in order to prevent their aſſembling their whole force, which I am apt to believe will be ſtrengthened by that of the Nizam againſt me.

I learn that *Hyder Ally* is in the field with a large army; and how far his views might concur or his motions be made to co-operate with ours, you muſt be beſt able to determine. I am perſuaded that every neceſſary precaution will have been uſed by you; but their not being communicated to me deprives me in a great meaſure of the opportunity a knowledge of them would furniſh for regulating my future operations.

I ſhall halt a few days in this place in determining the route, which I expect will be by *Burhampore*, and in the intervening time I hope to be able to prevail on *Moodajee Bouncello*, the Rajah of *Berar*, to join me with a body of troops, by which means the inconveniences I might otherwiſe experience reſpecting the ſupplies of proviſions may be obviated.

I hope alſo to be favoured with letters from you during my ſtay here, and as ſoon as I have fixed upon any route from this place, I will ſend off a diſpatch informing you of it.

I think it proper to acquaint you, that two letters received within this month from Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*, being written in cypher different from the one you ſent me through Mr. *Boddam*, I have not been able to underſtand their contents.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
Camp near *Huſſingabad*, *Thos Goddard*.
on the ſouth ſide of the *Nerbuddah*,
December 6th 1778.

Received at the ſame time, a letter from *Dadajee Adowjee* at *Poonah*, dated the 23d inſtant, mentioning, that he now ſends letters received from Colonel *Goddard*'s army; that 5 days before he had ſent 2 Madras packets with 4 P^r^ of Pattamars; that *Mhadoo Row Jadooſey* acquainted him *Nanah Furneeze* would not ſuffer any Engliſh Vackeel there, or have any thing to do with the Engliſh; that the agent to the Nabob of *Tall Boppal* informed him he had aſked *Holkar* whether he meant to obſerve his word paſſed to Mr. *Moſtyn*? who ſaid, he ſhould till death.

On Wedneſday laſt the troops marched from *Condolah* to *Mount Snarl*; on Thurſday, from *Mount Snarl* to *Dungergaon* plain; on Monday, from *Dungergaon* plain to *Corla*, where Captain *Stewart* was unfortunately killed by a cannot ſhot; proceeded from *Corla* on the Wedneſday following to *Mondhurna* plain. Wedneſday, 6th.

Mondhurna Plain, 6th January 1779.

At a Committee; PRESENT,

John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel *Charles Egerton*.

Colonel *Egerton* now repreſents to the committee, that having borne up as long as he could againſt an illneſs with which he has now for ſome time paſt been afflicted, he at length finds himſelf under the diſagreeable neceſſity of acquainting the committee, that the Surgeon-Major is of opinon, that the fatigues of a campaign co-operating with his indiſpoſition certainly endangers his life, and that at any rate he cannot hope to have the requiſite ſtrength to attend properly to the many avocations of the Commander in Chief; for theſe reaſons he requeſts permiſſion to reſign the command to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and proceed immediately to *Bombay*; which is agreed to.

The committee taking into conſideration the neceſſity of having an able and experienced officer to command the army now in the field in caſe of accidents to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, think proper to recommend it to the Commander in Chief, to appoint Major *Dagon* of the artillery, to act as Lieutenant Colonel till the pleaſure of the Honourable the Select Committee at *Bombay* ſhall be known; and that it ſhall further be recommended to our ſuperiors, to continue this appointment.

The departure of Colonel *Egerton*, the unfortunate loſs of Lieutenant Colonel *Cay*, and of Captain *James Stewart*, the firſt wounded and returned to *Bombay*, and the latter killed, and the proſpect there is that the preſent ſervice may be much more ſevere, and of much longer continuance than was expected, render it very expedient that the army ſhould be ſupplied with as many officers of experience as can be ſpared from *Bombay*; and it is therefore reſolved to recommend it to the Honourable the Select Committee, to ſend up Major *Hopkins*, Captains *Eames* and *Jameſon*, to join the army as ſoon as poſſibly can be done with ſafety to them.

We reflect with ſome concern, on the difference between the expectations we were flattered with on our arrival at the top of the Gauts, and the actual ſtate of affairs. We were given to hope, that immediately on the appearance there of the ſtandard of *Rogonath Row*, *Holcar*, and many other Chiefs of rank and reſpect would join him with a numerous body of horſe; and there was every reaſon to hope we might have terminated ſpeedily the object of our commiſſion. Inſtead of theſe reputable partiſans, none but a few mercenaries have yet joined us; and *Ragonath Row*, in a meſſage yeſterday by Mr. *Sibbald*, gave us plainly to underſtand he had been deceived; that unleſs we could convince his friends of their ſafety in joining us by the ſpeedy defeat of his enemies, he had no hope of being joined by any one; and that our ſituation would rather prove worſe than better as we advanced towards *Poonah*, by being cut off from all communication with the *Conkan*, from whence we may now be ſupplied with proviſions and ſtores. The mode adopted by the enemy, of retiring before us, and ravaging the country, ſeems to render his reaſoning apparently juſt; but we ſtill hope as we advance towards *Poonah*, *Holcar*, on whoſe junction there may be ſome dependance, will be enabled and encouraged to keep firm to the promiſes he has given us through the late Mr. *Moſtyn*. It is further obſervable,

there is too much reaſon to apprehend that *Ragonath Row*, truſting to ſubdue every one by our arms, has not only neglected the fit means to conciliate the reſpectable Chiefs to his cauſe, but has acted in ſuch a manner as will naturally tend to unite them againſt him. The grounds of this ſuſpicion are theſe: The agent of *Moraba* in our camp, informed Mr. *Lewis*, that he had learnt from his maſter that *Ragoba*, inſtead of taking the proper means for his releaſe from *Ahmednagur*, had ſecretly ſent directions to the Killedar not to releaſe *Morabah* till he got poſitive orders from him on his arrival at *Poonah*. This is in direct violation of his agreements with us, and could the fact beclearly proved, it would have been ſo ſignified to him.

Reſolved, That we do immediately acquaint our Superiors at *Bombay* with the foregoing, that they may ſend requiſite orders, in caſe it ſhould appear that the extent of our military operations in the cauſe of *Ragoba* may be very indefinite and uncertain: at any rate aſſure them, that at preſent we ſee no proſpect of their terminating on our arrival at *Poonah*, which by their inſtructions to us, they ſeem moſt confidently to expect.

By the death of Mr. *Moſtyn* and the departure of Colonel *Egerton*, the powers of this committee may ſeem ſuſpended for the preſent: it is however recommended to Mr. *Carnac* to continue ſtill to act when it may be requiſite, till explicit orders may arrive from our Superiors at *Bombay*. Adjourned.

John Carnac,
Charles Egerton.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

On the 25th ultimo we received your commands of the 24th.

We are ſorry to acquaint you, that this day Colonel *Charles Egerton* repreſented to us in committee, that having borne up as long as he could againſt an illneſs with which he has been for ſome time paſt afflicted, he at length found himſelf under the neceſſity of acquainting the committee, that the Surgeon Major is of opinion that the fatigues of a campaign co-operating with his indiſpoſition, would certainly endanger his life; and that at any rate he cannot ſoon hope to have the requiſite ſtrength to attend properly to the many avocations of the Commander in Chief in the field; for which reaſons he requeſted permiſſion to reſign the command of the army to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and proceed immediately to *Bombay*; which being complied with, he now accordingly proceeds.

Taking into conſideration the neceſſity of having an able and experienced officer to command the army now in the field in caſe of accidents to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, we thought it adviſable to recommend it to the Commander in Chief to appoint Major *Gaſpar Dagon*, of the artillery, to act as Lieutenant Colonel till your pleaſure ſhall be known; and having by this means ſecured, as far as in us lies, a fit commander on the event above ſtated, we hope for your approval on this occaſion, and that you will be pleaſed to direct this appointment to be continued.

The return of Colonel *Egerton*, the unfortunate loſs of Lieutenant Colonel *Cay* and Captain *Stewart*, the former wounded and returned to *Bombay*, and the latter killed, together with the proſpect there is that the preſent ſervice may be much more ſevere and of longer duration than was at firſt expected, render it very expedient that the Army ſhould be ſupplied with as many officers of experience as can be ſpared from *Bombay*, having firſt had reference to the opinion of the Commander in Chief, we therefore take the liberty to recommend, that you will be pleaſed immediately to direct Major *Hopkins*, Captain *Eames*, and Captain *Jameſon*, to proceed to *Bhore* Gaut, in order to join the army, in caſe it ſhall appear to them practicable with any degree of ſafety; regarding which they will be furniſhed with ſuch information as we can ſend to them, and proper guides ſent to meet them at the Gaut. Appendix. No. 130.

It is with ſome concern we muſt now acquaint you with the difference between the expectations we were flattered with on our arrival at the top of the Gauts, and the actual ſtate of affairs. We were given to hope, that immediately on the appearance there of the ſtandard of *Ragonath Row*, *Holcar* and many other Chiefs of rank and reſpect were to join him with a numerous body of horſe. With theſe, in caſe of reſiſtance from his adverſaries, we might at leaſt have been able to have ſecured proviſions and forage from this country; and there was every reaſon to hope that we might ſpeedily have terminated the object of our commiſſion. Inſtead of theſe reputable partizans none but a few mercenaries have yet joined us; and *Ragonath Row* yeſterday, in a meſſage by Mr. *Sibbald*, gave us plainly to underſtand he had been deceived; that unleſs we could convince his friends of their ſafety in joining us, by the ſpeedy defeat of his enemies, he had no hope of being joined by any one; and that our ſituation would rather prove worſe than better as we advanced towards *Poonah*, by being cut off from all communication from the *Conkan*, from whence we may now be ſupplied with proviſions and ſtores. The mode adopted by the enemy of retiring before us, and ravaging the country, ſeems to render his reaſoning apparently juſt; but we ſtill hope, as we advance towards *Poonah*, *Holcar*, on whoſe junction there may perhaps be ſome dependance, will be enabled and encouraged to keep firm to the promiſes he made us through the late Mr. *Moſtyn*. We muſt further obſerve to you, there is but too much reaſon to apprehend that *Ragonath Row*, truſting to ſubdue every one by our arms, has not only neglected the fit meaſures to conciliate the reſpectable Chiefs to his cauſe, but has acted in ſuch a manner as will naturally tend to unite them againſt him. The grounds of this ſuſpicion are theſe: The agent of *Moraba Furneeze* in our camp, informed Mr. *Lewis*, that he had learnt from his maſter that *Rogoba*, inſtead of taking the proper meaſures for his releaſe from *Ahmednagur*, had ſecretly ſent directions to the Killedar not to releaſe him *(Moraba)* till he got further poſitive orders from him on his arrival at *Poonah*. This is in direct violation of his engagements with us; and could the fact be clearly proved, it would have been ſo ſignified to him. We have thought it neceſſary to be thus explicit as to our ſituation, that you may reflect on the neceſſary meaſures to be purſued, and ſend explicit orders, in caſe it ſhall hereafter appear to you that the field and extent of our military operations in the cauſe of *Ragoba* may be very indefinite and uncertain; and we are ſorry to aſſure you, that at preſent we ſee no proſpect of their terminating on our arrival at *Poonah*, which, from your inſtructions to us, you ſeem moſt confidently to have expected.

By the death of Mr. *Moſtyn* and the departure of Colonel *Egerton*, the powers of this Committee may ſeem ſuſpended: it has however been recommended to Mr. *Carnac* to act as occaſions may require in the ſeveral points entruſted to us, till explicit orders may arrive from you, which Mr. *Carnac* requeſts may be as ſpeedily as poſſible.

The army marched this morning from the village of *Koſla*. During the march, the guns of the enemy opened on our line from the wood of *Mondhurna* in our front; and a large party of horſe ſeemed inclined either to take us in flank, or to enter in our rear among the baggage. They were however prevented from both, driven from the wood of *Mondhurna* into the plain below. Our army ſtill advancing, drove them from a height near the *Ridorainy*, which we now poſſeſs. This party ſent to haraſs us, we are informed is commanded by *Bhim Row Ponſia*, and may conſiſt of about 5,000 horſe and ſeven guns. We have the pleaſure to inform you, that both officers

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officers and men behaved on this, and all occaſions, with the greateſt cheerfulneſs and intrepidity.

We are, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Jn° Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

Camp near the *Indorainy*, 6th January, 1779.

P. S. After writing the above, Colonel *Egerton*, who had ſet off for *Bombay*, was obliged to return, on the receipt of certain intelligence from the officer at the paſs at *Condolah*, that a large party of horſe were in the *Conkan*, ſome of which he could perceive at *Campoly*. On this account Colonel *Egerton* is compelled to proceed for ſome time with the army; his return, however, makes no change in the purport of the foregoing with regard to the command of the army, which ſtill remains with Colonel *Cockburn*.

Tullegaon, 9th January 1779.

Saturday, 9th. The army on Thurſday laſt moved from *Mondhurna* plain to *Carculla*; on Friday, from *Carculla* to *Wurgaon*; and on Saturday, from *Wurgaon* to *Tullegaon*.

At a Committee; PRESENT,
John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel *Charles Egerton*.

Read, and approved, the minutes of our laſt committee.

The apprehenſions expreſſed in the minutes of our laſt meeting ſeem verified now beyond all doubt. So far from any perſon of conſequence having yet joined *Ragoba*, *Holkar*, the only one from whom there appeared the leaſt aſſurance of ſupport to his cauſe, is now in arms againſt us, and joined with *Scindia* and other Chiefs, whoſe guns have been firing on our camp, and who are now before us with a large army. The burning of the large and populous town of *Tullegaon* alſo confirms our ſuſpicion, and the general information we daily receive from all ſides, of their intended mode of procedure, viz. by the deſtruction of the country, by haraſſing us, and cutting us off from all ſupplies of proviſions. In ſhort there appears to be a general determination to oppoſe the eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba* with that degree of authority, which from his confident aſſurances of effectual ſupport, and from the repreſentations of the late Mr. *Moſtyn*, the Honourable the Select Committee have been led to engage for.

This diſappointment in our expectations opens to us a ſcene very widely different from that we had in view at our firſt ſetting out from *Bombay*. From the open diviſions amongſt the Brahmins, and from poſitive engagements with the party in oppoſition to *Nanah Furneeze*, we were given moſt confidently to expect immediate and effectual aid, if we once openly and declaredly entered on meaſures for the ſubverſion of his government, a general reputed indiſpoſition to that government amongſt the Maratta officers and people alſo afforded good grounds of expectation for effectual aid: The words of our inſtructions warrant theſe ſuppoſitions: From all which it was concluded that the march to *Poonah* would be attended with little difficulty or oppoſition; that little time would be employed in military operations; and that our great difficulty would not be in reducing the Maratta officers to obedience, and placing the government of the country with *Ragoba*, but in ſettling the different pretenſions of theſe Chiefs, and bringing *Ragoba* to form his government from men on whom he might depend for effecting the great object of this expedition, namely, the entire ſubverſion of the party in the *French* intereſt. After having thus conducted him to *Poonah* and ſettled his government, there remained only to receive the Sunnuds for the grants that were to form the rewards of our aid, and the monthly ſtipend for the expence of our army. It ſeems never to have been doubted that all this would have been effected, and the army returned to *Bombay* time enough for its defence.

Inſtead of this definite and limited ſcheme, it appears to us that we are engaged in an indefinite ſcene of military operations, without any reſources but our own, againſt the moſt reſpectable chiefs of the Maratta empire, and againſt an enemy with whom we cannot hope to bring matters to the only iſſue from which we can obtain reaſonable aſſurance of ſucceſs; viz. the trial of arms. We muſt repeat that we are confirmed by the deſtruction of *Tullagaon*, as to their intended mode of procedure, a mode which muſt infallibly force us back in a ſhort time to *Bombay* without reaping the leaſt benefit in any one point, both from the great exertions and expence of the Governor General and the Government of *Bombay*. It is requiſite here alſo to obſerve, that from every information we can obtain from deſerters, priſoners, and others, it is determined to burn *Chemſwer*, a town ſtill more large and populous than *Tullagaon*, and that meaſures are alſo taken even for the deſtruction of *Poonah*, ſo bent are thoſe now in oppoſition to *Ragonath Row* to avail themſelves of every poſſible means in their power, in order to fruſtrate the plan we are now proceeding on in conjunction with him.

From all theſe circumſtances it appears to us, that the plan of eſtabliſhing *Ragonath Row* even but in the Regency of the Maratta empire, without the immediate co-operation of a reſpectable party in that State, is impracticable, with any probability of ſucceſs; and having decided this point in our own minds, the preſent ſtate of our army with reſpect to proviſions, and the total improbability of a ſupply, render it neceſſary to turn our attention immediately towards the means of compaſſing, as well as in us lies, the main object which led towards our engagements with *Ragoba*, the defeat of the deſigns of the *French*.

From every experience we have had of the Marattas, and particularly in this buſineſs, it appears clear to us, that the tie of their own intereſt is the only one to be depended on. From all the late Mr. *Moſtyn*'s advices, and from every information we can obtain, it appears that *Saccaram Pundit* and *Nanah Furneeze*, though at times apparently united, have each been aiming, though by different modes, to ſecure to themſelves the effectual power in the *Poonah* Durbar. As *Nanah*, from ſeveral circumſtances, ſeems peculiarly to look to the French, and is indeed the very man whoſe ſubverſion is the object we now aim at, we are of courſe precluded forming any connection with him: it therefore appears to us, that *Saccaram Pundit* is the only man with whom we can hope to form the engagements that muſt lead to our main object; *Moraba Furneeze* and *Butcheba Pronder*, the two perſons mentioned in our inſtructions, being at preſent impriſoned, and, as far as we can perceive, wholly incapable of affording us any effectual aid, whatever their intereſts may incline them to do.

The two next perſons who ſtrike our attention, are the Jaghirdars *Holkar* and *Scindia*, whoſe troops form the chief force of our enemies, and whoſe deciſions, if favourable to us, muſt, to all appearance, enable us effectually and ſpeedily to cruſh the powers of *Nanah Furneeze* and his party. During the diviſions amongſt the Brahmins, we are given to underſtand, they have made great acceſſions to their Jaghires; and was the *Poonah* Durbar once in power to enforce their demands, they would probably inſiſt on the reſtitution of theſe, as well as the arrears due from them for the country they hold. Theſe are conſiderations that muſt ever influence them to prevent the unconditional reſtoration of ſuch power amongſt the Brahmins; and therefore it ſeems they are naturally led to oppoſe the eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba*, which great line of intereſt ſeems on the trial now to influence them both, notwithſtanding any promiſes or writings they may have given, relative to a junction with *Ragoba*.

The mode of ſecuring theſe ſeveral perſons and their partizans, appears to us as follows: To aſſure them that we

we mean the government ſhall go on in the name of *Mhadoo Row Narrain*, leaving only to *Ragoba* the Naibſhip, as in the time of the minority of *Mhadoo Row*; to aſſure *Saccaram* of the Duanſhip, of our ſupport to him in the real powers of it, and of the aid of our army, in conjunction with *Scindia* and *Holkar*, againſt *Nanah Furneeze*; to offer to the two Jaghire Daars our guarantee, ſecuring to them their Jaghires, free from all demands for arrears from the Poonah Durbar.

Agreed therefore, that Mr. *Sibbald*, who was deſired to be preſent at this meeting, ſhould acquaint *Ragoba*, in a ſuitable manner, with our ſentiments relative to the cauſe we are embarked in; to remind him we have been led into this diſtreſſed ſtate by too great a reliance on his promiſes and aſſurances, relative to a plentiful ſupply of proviſions when we got above the Gauts, and to the junction of *Tookajee Holkar*, which he acquainted Mr. *Sibbald* on the 22d ultimo, he was confident would be in eight days; that the ſingle circumſtance of having now but ſufficient proviſions to conduct our army back into the *Conkan*, added to the total impoſſibility of procuring a ſupply in a country laid waſte all round us, muſt infallibly force us to retire, which would be the total ruin of his cauſe poſſibly for ever: That the only probable mode to remove this diſtreſs was to make immediate overtures of accommodation to *Scindia*, and to *Holkar*, and to *Saccaram*, which muſt be done by committing to us the power of negociating for him, ſignifying to theſe different perſons his conſent to any agreements we might conclude for him: That we ſee no alternative between this and an inſtant retreat to *Condolah*; and that unleſs he conſents to it our army muſt per force immediately retire, in order to prevent a total diſtreſs from the utter want of proviſions. That we muſt leave to him the mode of opening this negociation; and that during the courſe of it, we ſhould be guided as much by his advice and intereſt as we conſiſtently could.

Adjourned.

John Carnac,
Charles Egerton.

Sunday, 10th. *Tullagaon*, 10th January 1779.

At a Committee; PRESENT,
John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel *Charles Egerton*.

Read, and approved, the minutes of our laſt committee.

Mr. *Sibbald* now delivers in writing his report of his conference held yeſterday with *Ragonath Row*, which is entered hereafter.

The Commiſſary, Mr. *Holmes*, being ſent for, and aſked how long he can depend for a certainty on ſupplying the army with proviſions, informs the committee, from his ſtock now on hand, which is all he can depend on, he can ſupply the army till the 28th inclusive, barring the accidents which on our further advance into the country we may expect, having met with ſome loſs on our march of yeſterday: and the Commander in Chief, Colonel *Cockburn*, being called on, further acquaints the committee, that without a body of horſe he thinks it impoſſible, as we advance further into the open country, to ſecure our baggage from the numerous cavalry, and that of courſe the proviſions are equally expoſed with the reſt of it.

Upon duly weighing theſe circumſtances, it appears clearly that the prediction *Ragonath Row* mentioned in our proceedings of the 6th inſtant, relative to the multiplication of our diſtreſſes as we advanced forward, are now certainly verified; and that even ſhould we proceed to *Poonah* during the courſe of any negociation that might be opened, the army would moſt probably be reduced to ſuch diſtreſs as would compel us into any terms the party we might treat with ſhould think fit to impoſe upon us, for it is certainly not preſumable that they would fail to avail themſelves of a circumſtance ſo ſignally favourable as our total dependance on them for proviſions, which they muſt very ſoon perceive. Appendix, No. 130.

With reſpect to the confident aſſertion of *Ragoba* relative to the junction of *Holkar*, and to his ſupplying our army with proviſions for ſome days from this place, we muſt obſerve from the information of Mr. *Holmes*, who has examined into the probability of this with his own eyes, that *Ragoba*, whatever he may be led to believe by the people about him, muſt be ſo totally deceived in this point of ſupply that there is no dependance on him. It appears that what grain the enemy could not carry off from the plunder of this place, they have ſcattered in the ſtreets, and mixed with pernicious ſeeds ſo as to render it almoſt wholly uſeleſs. As to the junction of *Holkar*, it appears wholly imprudent to ſuffer ourſelves to be led into a ſcene of diſtreſs by this ſo long protracted hope; but as from the report of the Commander of artillery it appears requiſite to remain here a day longer, we may make a virtue of this neceſſity by a compliance with his requeſt, and at the ſame time acquaint him if we are now deceived, this compliance he muſt feel to be the laſt we can poſſibly give into; and farther, to do as much as in us lies towards fulfilling the hope he entertains of the junction of *Holkar*: It is reſolved immediately to write that Chief a ſuitable letter, reminding him of his promiſe made to Mr. *Moſtyn*, and expreſſing our ſurpriſe, that inſtead of joining with us he appears now in league with our enemies, and acting hoſtilely againſt us; as we mean to oblige *Ragoba* to fulfil all the promiſes and engagements which had been made him relative to his Jaghire.

Mr. *Lewis* preſents to the committee a paper, containing information relative to the march of a body of troops belonging to *Moraba Furneeze* into the *Conkan*. On this we muſt obſerve, that however uſeful this body might be, it does not appear to us that this circumſtance can effectually relieve our preſent main difficulty, which conſiſts in the total improbability of any further ſupply of proviſions but through the *Conkan*.

Upon due conſideration of every circumſtance, it is reſolved inſtantly to ſend off copies of the minutes of yeſterday's and this day's conſultation, for the information of our ſuperiors at *Bombay*: and unleſs the army of *Tookajee Holcar* does join us conformable to the aſſurances of *Ragoba*, it is farther reſolved, however diſpleaſing the circumſtance may be, to ſecure effectually the preſervation of our army, by falling back ſo far from this place as is requiſite to ſecure our communication with the *Conkan*, and that the Commander of the army muſt be inſtantly acquainted with this our reſolution, in order that he may have time to concert the requiſite means for putting it in execution.

As to the troops of *Moraba*, ſaid to be below the Gauts, they will be of infinite ſervice in conducting our ſupplies of proviſions through the *Conkan*, and therefore the officers who command them muſt be directed by the agent of *Moraba Furneeze* to remain at *Campoly* till he receives further directions from him. Mr. *Frazer* muſt be immediately acquainted with the circumſtances of theſe troops being friendly to us, but directed not to ſuffer them to aſcend through the paſs he commands until further orders.

Adjourned.

John Carnac,
Charles Egerton.

Mr. *Sibbald* this evening waited upon *Ragoba* by the committee's directions, to make known to him the reſolutions of this day, which he delivered to the following effect: That *Ragoba* muſt be ſenſible that when the Governor and Select Committee firſt engaged, by treaty, to ſupport him and place him in the Regency of the Maratta empire, that they were induced thereto by the aſſurances of being joined by a conſiderable body of troops belonging to *Holkar*, and other *Maratta* Chiefs, who had entered into engagements with the late Mr. *Moſtyn* to this effect, and which aſſurances had been repeatedly

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peatedly confirmed to the committee by *Ragoba* himſelf, at their different meetings ſince leaving *Bombay*, till within theſe two days paſt; but that he himſelf now allowed matters were ſo ſenſibly altered, that he did not expect to be joined by any one, unleſs a defeat could be given to the miniſterial army now in our fronts, which by their mode of proceeding, in retreating as we advanced, appeared impracticable: That he muſt therefore allow that we are greatly deceived and diſappointed in his aſſurances and repreſentation; and that ſo far from having any friends in the empire, that the whole empire was in arms againſt him, and *Holkar* amongſt the reſt, who was the perſon he ſeemed to have the moſt dependance upon: That it was with concern the committee muſt obſerve that they had too good reaſon to believe that there ſubſiſted a total want of confidence on the part of the *Maratta* Chiefs in his promiſes and aſſurances; and that no negociation would ever be ſet on foot with them, unleſs commenced by us. In this ſituation of affairs (as he was acquainted we had only 16 days proviſion for the army) the committee ſaw an abſolute neceſſity of taking ſuch meaſures as appeared to them eligible, without further dependance on him, and had therefore ſent to adviſe him, that they were determined, in the name of the Engliſh Company, to invite *Holkar*, *Scindia*, and *Saccaram* to a conference, and upon their ſhewing an inclination to join the Engliſh in the preſent buſineſs, that we would guarantee to them their reſpective Jaghires, together with all their other pretenſions, as officers of the Maratta State. After deliberating ſome time upon the ſubject of the committee's meſſage, he allowed that their reaſons for their determinations were juſt; that he certainly did give us the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of being joined by a large body of troops, in which he had found himſelf deceived: he allowed that *Holkar* appeared in arms againſt him, and that he had this day two guns firing upon our camp, but that conformable to his aſſurances all their ſhot had fallen ſhort. He however earneſtly requeſted the committee would defer for one day writing to any of the *Maratta* Chiefs but *Holkar*, as he expected in the courſe of to-morrow a Vakeel from *Scindia*, which a letter from the committee might probably prevent, as he would from thence infer that we began to deſpair of ſucceſs, which would of courſe encourage the whole of the miniſterial party to hold out. Mr. *Sibbald* obſerves to him, that the loſs of a day would be a matter of no great conſideration, had we any proſpect of meeting with ſupplies of proviſions for our army; but as that was not the caſe, we had not an hour to loſe. To this he replied, that the care of ſupplying the army with proviſions was his, and that he would furniſh the Commiſſary from this town with a ſufficient quantity for ſome days, and that we ſhould get more at the next village.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We addreſſed you on the 6th inſtant, and now ſend a a duplicate of that addreſs.

On the 7th in the morning the army moved from the plain below *Mondhurna* to *Carculla*, on the 18th from *Carculla* to *Wargaon*; and on the 9th from *Wargaon* to this place, where we were given to expect they had aſſembled their whole force, and were determined to make a ſtand and oppoſe our advance; the event however has proved to us their determination of adhering to their plan of burning the towns, ravaging the country, haraſſing us, and cutting off our ſupplies of proviſions. We are informed, that on Friday laſt the 8th, about noon, this town was given up firſt to be plundered, and on the evening of that day it was ſet on fire. We found it yeſterday in flames as we entered, which was with ſo little oppoſition, that we are convinced they do not mean to hazard an engagement with us, but under ſome manifeſt diſadvantage on our ſide. The mode they have invariably purſued is a very diſtant cannonade, and by movements with their horſe, haraſſing our men by conſtantly engaging our attention on every ſide.

For the ſake of expedition, we determined to ſend you immediately copies of the minutes of our conſultations when met in committee yeſterday and to-day, which will fully inform you of our ſituation and intentions. We are informed, that *Saccaram*, *Nanah*, *Holcar*, *Scindia*, *Bhim Row*, *Ponſia*, and *Hurry Punt*, with other Chiefs, are now in the field, and that the real number of their troops is about 25,000 horſe.

We are, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Tullegaon, 10th January 1779.

Jn° Carnac,
Chas Egerton.

To *Tookajee Holcar*.

After compliments:

The agreements which you made with Mr. *Moſtyn* are well known to you. The Engliſh army is now come to this place in their way to *Poonah*, and I am much ſurprized that you have not yet acted according to your promiſe; if you have any doubts about what was promiſed you by Mr. *Moſtyn*, on the part of the Company, I muſt tell you that the government of *Bombay* has given the full powers to ſettle theſe matters into my hands. I know what Mr. *Moſtyn* told you; and I write this letter under the ſeal of the Company, to acquaint you, if you comply with your agreements, I will ſecure to you fully all that was promiſed by Mr. *Moſtyn*, and the Engliſh friendſhip to you will laſt for ever. What can I ſay more?

J. Carnac.

At a Committee: PRESENT, Monday, 11th.

John Carnac,
Colonel *Charles Egerton*.

Read, and approved, the minutes of our laſt meeting.

The committee met to conſider on the following report from Mr. *Sibbald*.

That *Ragonath Row* had told him, that finding the neceſſity of gaining over *Scindia* to his party, he had three days ago written him a letter, ſignifying to him, that though the Miniſters had confederated againſt his government, and were deſtroying the State, yet it was ill in him and *Holkar*, the two ancient officers of the Circar, to abet them; that he wiſhed to end every thing amicably with them, and therefore offered them his friendſhip; and that if *Scindia* would ſend two perſons to talk with him, whom he named, he truſted by their means to accommodate all differences: That he muſt not think he made this overture from any ſenſe of an inability to oppoſe his enemies, as he held himſelf equal to it by the aid of the Europeans only, but that theſe Europeans, in taking part in his quarrels, ſought only their own aggrandizement, and to obtain the country; which neither ſuited his views or *Scindia*'s. That *Scindia* had returned an anſwer, the purport of which was, that he had ſent two perſons who would communicate what he had to ſay on the ſubject; and if it then pleaſed *Ragoba*, he might ſend his orders, and the two men he requeſted ſhould come: That *Ragoba* had ſent back theſe two men, deſiring *Scindia*'s Vakeels might be ſent, and that he expected them this evening. He ſaid his ſcheme in this was, by a total compliance with the demands of *Scindia*, to gain him over for the preſent, and afterwards he would do as he pleaſed; that he meant even to deſire the Company's guarantee to his agreement with him. Whilſt the committee was debating on this buſineſs, a meſſage arrived from *Ragoba* to Mr. *Sibbald*, who on his return acquainted the committee, that *Ragoba* now told him, that the two men he had ſent back to *Scindia* had been prevented from going by a party of horſe, and that therefore he could not expect the Vakeels of *Scindia* to-night;

but as the people were gone in the habit of Jogeys, and it was now three hours ſince he had ſent them, he hoped they might get ſafe, and that he ſoon ſhould have an anſwer.

Whatever importance the gaining over *Scindia* may be in our preſent ſituation, yet this uncertain ground we do not think ſufficient to warrant any departure from our reſolutions of yeſterday, particularly as it is now certain, that though *Holcar* may not act againſt, yet that he cannot act for us: This *Ragoba* plainly declares; and in further confirmation, Mr. *Carnac* now lays before the committee a letter from Lieutenant *Richardſon*, this inſtant received.

Reſolved therefore, that the Commander of the army, Colonel *Cockburn*, who was preſent at this committee, and concurred in opinion with us, be directed to march back the army this night towards *Condolah*.

Adjourned.

John Carnac.
Charles Egerton.

To Colonel *Goddard*, commanding the Engliſh forces from *Bengal*.

Sir,

You will no doubt ere this have received advice from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, of our being appointed conjointly with Mr. *Thomas Moſtyn*, who is ſince deceaſed, a committee for conducting *Ragonath Row* to *Poonah*, and their directions for your communicating with us on all important occaſions.

Within theſe two days paſt the face of our affairs is ſo changed with reſpect to the primary cauſe that led to directing your march towards *Kineer*, a fort in poſſeſſion of *Moraba Furneeze*, that we muſt now give you the following advice:

If you are joined by ſuch a body of the forces of *Moodajee Bouncello*, that you can advance forward in ſpite of an enemy, who with a large body of cavalry will keep hovering round you on all quarters, aiming at the ſeizures of your baggage and proviſions; and if you have alſo a ſufficient quantity of proviſions to laſt you till you can either reach *Broach* or *Surat*, we would then adviſe you to proceed forward to either of thoſe places, as may be moſt convenient for your ſpeedy arrival there; but if you think you cannot proceed forward in face of ſuch an enemy as we have deſcribed, without imminent hazard of diſtreſs on your march, from accidents happening to your proviſions, of a ſupply of which you may not be certain till your arrival either at *Broach* or *Surat*, we then adviſe you to remain on the borders of *Berar*, or wherever you think you can ſecure proviſions, till you may receive further directions from the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Camp at *Tullegaon*, 11th January 1779. — *Jn° Carnac*, *Ch. Egerton.*

To Lieutenant Colonel *William Cockburn*, commanding the Engliſh Forces now at *Tullegaon*.

Sir,

Having maturely deliberated upon the neceſſity of the meaſure, you are hereby directed to march back the army under your command towards the paſs at *Condolah*, as expeditiouſly as poſſible.

We are, Sir,
Your obedient humble ſervants,

Tullegaon, 11th January 1779. — *J. Carnac*, *Ch. Egerton.*

Tueſday, 12th. The army fell back to the village of *Wurgaon*.

Wedneſday, 13th. Received the following letter from the Honourable the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

To *John Carnac*, Eſquire, and Colonel Charles *Egerton*.

Gentlemen,

Having thought proper to promote Major *Gaſpar Dagon* to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel; we now enclose a commiſſion for him, ſigned by the Board, which you are accordingly to deliver to him. Appendix, No. 130.

We are very ſorry to adviſe you, that Mr. *Moſtyn* departed this life, the 1ſt inſtant, at this place.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 7th January 1779. — *William Hornby*, *Daniel Draper.*

Addreſſed the Honourable the Select Committee at *Bombay*, in the following letter.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

Agreeable to what was written to you under the 9th inſtant from *Tullegaon*, we fell back with the army to this place on yeſterday morning; and the enemy having by ſome means got intelligence of our moving, attacked us on the march before day-light, which they continued with great vigour until two o'clock in the afternoon.

Their numerous bodies of cavalry rendered it impoſſible to protect our baggage, a part of which conſequently fell into their hands, as the commanding officer foretold would be the caſe; and it is with concern we acquaint you, that in the courſe of the very long attack our people yeſterday ſuſtained, we ſuffered ſome loſs, the particulars of which ſhall be hereafter tranſmitted. In juſtice to our troops, both Europeans and Sepoys, we have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that they behaved with the utmoſt intrepidity and alacrity during the whole attack.

We ſhall continue our march to *Condolah* with all poſſible expedition, in the purſuit of which we expect to be much haraſſed; but to render our baggage as little troubleſome as poſſible, and our body as compact as circumſtances will admit, the commanding officer means to reduce every part of the baggage that is not abſolutely neceſſary.

We are, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Wurgaon, 13th January 1779. — *J. Carnac*, *Ch. Egerton.*

A committee held to deliberate relative to overtures for the peaceable return of the army to *Bombay*. No minutes taken, being in a ſevere cannonade, and a number of perſons ſtanding round.

Letter to the Peiſhwa.
Ditto from ditto, in anſwer.
Ditto to ditto, at night.

This morning Mr. *Farmer* was ſent to the Maratta camp to propoſe an accommodation, which we judged might be brought about by *Rogoba*'s going over to *Scindia*, which he ſeemed determined to do, rather than run the riſk of another day's march with our army, as he declared his fears of its proving fatal both to him and us, ſo great an idea does he ſeem to entertain of the enemy's ſtrength. We directed Mr. *Farmer* to deliver the following meſſage to the Durbar, "that having had aſſurances given us, that the eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba* in the Regency of the Maratta empire, was a meaſure much wiſhed for by many of the Sirdars of the Maratta Sircar, as well as by the country in general, we had conſented to conduct him with an Engliſh army for that purpoſe; but contrary to our hopes and expectations, we found his eſtabliſhment oppoſed by the whole empire: That we had ſeen with infinite concern the country laid waſte and deſtroyed at our approach, which being ſo very contrary to our intentions by eſpouſing the cauſe of *Ragoba*, that we were determined to be the occaſion of no further deſolation, and were therefore reſolved to march back with the army to *Bombay*: That after this declaration we expected all hoſtilities would ceaſe, and by ſo doing, peace and friendſhip would be eſtabliſhed between the Engliſh and the Maratta State; if on the other hand ſhould we Thurſday, 14th.

Appendix. No. 130.

experience the leaſt act of hoſtility on our march, we ſhould conſider it as a declaration of war againſt the Engliſh nation."

Received the following letter, with a note written in cypher, from Mr. *Farmer*.

To *John Carnac* and *Charles Egerton*, Eſquires.

Gentlemen,

I was conducted to the *Topa* High Hill, where I was preſented to *Mhadja Scindia*, *Nanah Furneeze*, and *Hurry Punt Furkia*, as to the Durbar, and delivered them your letter. They appointed *Hurry Punt Furkia* and *Badjee Punt Ponſia* to talk with me, and deliver their anſwers. I explained the cauſe of our coming in the manner you directed, and the reaſon of our return, and I left it to them to accept on one hand the friendſhip of the Engliſh nation, by ſuffering us to return peaceably, or their enmity by moleſting us on our march. After many exclamations for our coming thus uninvited, and repreſenting the great charges and loſs their State had ſuſtained by the aid given to *Rogoba*, their final anſwer is this, That if we wiſh to remain at peace with them, *Ragonath Row* muſt be delivered up, and then we may return quietly; otherwiſe we may do as we pleaſe. I write ſurrounded with people, not permitted to go down to my cheſt for paper, and hardly permitted to have my palankeen brought up, and I am to wait your final anſwer; regarding which I dare not venture any opinion.

I am, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
W. G. Farmer.

Maratta Camp,
14th January, 12 A. M.
1779.

The purport of the note received from Mr. Farmer, written in cyphers.

They are fully informed of your ſtate. I ſee no remedy, but either to give *Scindia* to underſtand, through *Ragoba*, that you ſhall puſh on with him in your hand at all perils, or to treat with them whilſt you have him, which muſt ſtill be on their own terms. Of proviſion there are no hopes.

As *Rogoba* has already intimated his intentions of delivering himſelf up to *Scindia* rather than run the riſk of marching with our army, and has in conſequence carried on a correſpondence with *Scindia* for two days paſt, we think in the preſent ſituation of affairs it is moſt adviſable to write to Mr. *Farmer*, that all difficulty of accommodation is removed by *Ragoba*'s deſign of going over to *Scindia*; and that we expect in conſequence the proper ſecurities from the Durbar for our proceeding unmoleſted on our march.

Sent off the following letter to Mr. *Farmer* at ten o'clock this morning:

To Mr. *William Gamul Farmer*.

Sir,

We have juſt received your letter, and have in anſwer to acquaint you, that we do not conceive there will be any difficulty in complying with the propoſition of the Miniſters, as *Rogoba* has juſt informed us of his deſire to deliver himſelf up to *Madjee Scindia* at nine o'clock tomorrow morning, in conſequence of a conference he had this morning with his Vakeels; and upon his ſo doing we have no doubt that the Miniſters will give us proper ſecurity on their part for a due performance of the terms now propoſed, and that you will return with them. Mr. *Sibbald* will accompany *Ragoba* to *Scindia*'s encampment.

We are, Sir,
Your obedient ſervants,
J. Carnac.
Ch: Egerton.

Wurgaon Camp,
14th January 1779.

This morning Mr. *Farmer*'s ſervant returned with the following letter diſpatched laſt night. Friday 15th.

To *John Carnac*, Eſquire, and Colonel *Charles Egerton*.

Gentlemen,

I waited on the top of the hill where the Durbar ſat till near ſun-ſet, when I received yours; and having ſent to acquaint *Hurry Punt Furkia* with an anſwer being come, he conducted me to *Nanah Furneeſe*. I there told them, That the difficulty, which I apprehended, was removed by the determination of *Ragoba* to ſurrender himſelf to *Madjee Scindia*; and I now imagined the Durbar would preſerve the friendſhip of the Engliſh Nation, by ſuffering our army to return quietly to *Bombay*. *Nanah Furneeze* ſaid, as we had broken the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton* before our army moved we muſt agree to remain as we were by our treaty formed with the late Peiſhwa *Nanah*. I obſerved, that in the morning the only difficulty that was ſtarted was relative to *Ragoba*, who had ſmoothed it by conſenting to ſurrender himſelf; that I deſired at once an explicit anſwer, whether or not hoſtages would be given for the march of the army to *Bombay*, if *Ragoba* did ſurrender himſelf? They then ſaid they muſt conſult *Madjee Scindia*. I then withdrew; and after ſome time *Hurry Pundit* came again to me, and told me I might go to my tent to-night, and that an anſwer would be delivered to me in the morning; but I inſiſted on a clear and poſitive anſwer inſtantly to that queſtion relative to hoſtages for our proceeding unmoleſted, if *Dada Saheb* was permitted to ſurrender himſelf to *Scindia*. *Hurry Punt* went back, and I was ſoon after introduced to a Durbar, where *Madjee Scindia* entirely preſided. *Hurry Punt* was there, and other perſons whom I did not know. After ſtating the buſineſs which I came on this morning, which related only to the two queſtions, whether they would ſuffer us to proceed peaceably to *Bombay*? or, whether they would declare what, by moleſting us? and reminding him of the objection relative to the perſon of *Ragoba* being removed, by his voluntary conſent to ſurrender himſelf, I deſired an explicit anſwer. He ſaid, that as to the ſurrender of *Ragoba*, it mattered little; that we muſt ſettle a new treaty with the Maratta State, the one made by Colonel *Upton* being entirely broke by the preſent invaſion of their country. In a few words, they ſeem to me to feel themſelves in that ſituation with reſpect to us, which the Turkiſh Vizier felt himſelf in with reſpect to *Peter* the Firſt, at the time the Empreſs *Catherine* ſent in her jewels to the Vizier. I dare not ſpeak any plainer; but by their language you may judge what they think: in any ſituation whatever they could not ſpeak in a higher tone. The reſult of my converſation with *Scindia* was juſt this, that whether there was peace or war, it was equal to him; but that having broken the treaty made with Colonel *Upton*, we muſt now on the ſpot ſet about forming a new one, to ſerve as a future guide between the Maratta State and the Engliſh. I told him, that my buſineſs at firſt related only to the two points, of their permitting us to proceed peaceably, or not; that I had then further to deſire an explicit anſwer relative to the wilful ſurrender of the perſon of *Ragoba*. To both which he replied, that excluſive of this, a peace muſt now be ſettled betwixt the Maratta State and the Engliſh on the ſpot. That I had no directions about this; but I would communicate to you this night what he ſaid, and get an anſwer to-morrow morning. Although my heart is full, yet I muſt reſtrain my pen; nor dare I by any means, in ſo nice a caſe, offer any *mark* to guide you by. I beg a ſpeedy anſwer to this, and remain with reſpect,

Your obedient humble ſervant,
W. G. Farmer.

P. S.—I waited on the hill where the Durbar met till paſt ſeven; and where I was then led, and how conducted, the bearer will inform you. I am afraid no good effect will come from my deputation, though I riſk my life.

By

By what with want of food, and watching, I am fatigued to death; ſo you will excuſe my writing. 11 o'clock, 14th January.

Colonel *Cockburn* being called upon by the Committee to give his opinion in writing, relative to the practicability of marching back the army to *Bombay*, delivers in the following:

Being called upon for my opinion on the poſſibility of making a retreat to *Bombay*, I muſt declare that I think the ſame utterly impracticable. Our troops are already much haraſſed and diſpirited from the neceſſity we were under of retiring from *Tullegaon*: and were we to ſuſtain another attack from the Maratta army, I am of opinion the troops would not ſtand it; and that conſequently the whole army, with its numerous followers, would be cut to pieces. But the diſtance from *Panwell* being about forty-five miles, it is not the attack of one day we ſhould have to ſuſtain, as I think, were it poſſible to move from hence, that we could not gain that place in twenty days; and it is therefore chimerical to the laſt degree, to ſuppoſe that our ſmall army could ſupport themſelves from the daily attacks they would be certain of for ſo long a period. I therefore cannot charge myſelf to conduct the army under theſe circumſtances to *Bombay*; and humanity muſt prompt ſome other method than an attempt to retire in the face of the whole ſtrength of the Maratta empire with ſuch a handful of men, who muſt in ſuch caſe be ſacrificed.

Wm Cockburn.

Camp, at *Wurgaon*,
15th January 1779.

We obſerve with concern, that the enemy appear too ſenſible of our preſent very diſagreeable ſituation from the dictatorial ſtrain in which they now deliver themſelves. It is, however, neceſſary we think to adviſe Mr. *Farmer* that we have no powers to enter into or conclude any treaties, ſuch powers being lodged ſolely with the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*; but if the Durbar will abide by their firſt propoſal, we are ready to agree to it on our parts.

To Mr. *William Gamul Farmer.*

Sir,

We received your letter of laſt night only an hour ago, the Harcarrahs having been detained by ſome accident. In anſwer to which you muſt acquaint the Durbar, that they demand what we have no power to agree to, the entering into and concluding treaties being ſolely confined to the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*, to whom therefore they muſt ſend their Vackeels. The only power left to us, is the giving up the cauſe and perſon of *Ragonath Row*, which done muſt certainly put an end to all diſputes between the Engliſh and the Maratta State, and there is no doubt that peace and friendſhip will then ſubſiſt between us from henceforwards.

You muſt inform them, ſhould we enter into any treaty we ſhould only deceive them, having no ſuch powers; we therefore deſire they will immediately acquaint us, whether upon our abiding by the conditions firſt propoſed, of delivering up *Ragoba*, they will comply on their parts by ſuffering us to march unmoleſted to *Bombay*, and for which purpoſe to give us the neceſſary ſecurities.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient ſervants,

Wurgaon, *Jn° Carnac*,
15th January 1779. *Ch. Egerton.*

As we have good reaſon to believe, that a gentleman being ſent from us to *Madjee Scindia*, is more likely to produce an accommodation than a deputation to the Durbar in general;

Reſolved, immediately to diſpatch Mr. *Thomas Holmes*, who has offered himſelf for that purpoſe; and to give him full powers to ſettle with the Durbar for the peaceable return of the army to *Bombay*, on ſuch conditions as he may be able to obtain, ſince it is the opinion of the Commander in Chief that a retreat is impracticable. Appendix No. 130.

At noon to day received the following letter from Mr. *Farmer*, dated this morning, which it is now unneceſſary to anſwer, as Mr. *Holmes* is diſpatched with full powers.

To *John Carnac*, Eſquire, and Colonel *Charles Egerton*.

Gentlemen,

I am this inſtant arrived at the Durbar, where your letter was delivered to me by *Apajee Bawn*, on the part of *Mhadjee Scindy*: as repreſenting the Durbar, he deſired to be informed of the contents; when I explained what you ſaid relative to the want of powers, and deſired an explicit anſwer relative to the ſingle propoſition, whether on the delivery of *Ragoba*, ſecurities would be given for our ſafe and unmoleſted arrival at *Bombay*? He obſerved in anſwer, that if you had not powers to make new treaties, he wiſhed to ſee by what powers you broke that made by Colonel *Upton*, by the aid given to *Ragoba*, and deſired an explicit anſwer, whether or not it was by virtue of any direct authority from the Governor General and Council, that if it was he deſired to ſee that authority, in order that he might look to them about it. I told him, this was foreign to the buſineſs, and that I requeſted the explicit anſwer mentioned in your letter; but ſtill he inſiſts firſt knowing by what authority you acted, becauſe, if you acted on your own authority you muſt anſwer it, and make a new agreement. A true tranſlation of your letter was demanded, and I was given to underſtand, that if I did not give one, there were people in the camp who underſtood Engliſh. I am rather ſorry for it, becauſe your own declarations ſeem to preclude all peaceable arrangements. After much talk, I brought the matter to this point, that in reſpect to what was paſt, we expected every thing to be forgot in conſequence of our returning back; that *Dada Sahab* had coſt us many lacks of rupees; that all we had now left of him was his perſon; that I deſired to know, whether on the delivery of his perſon, our army ſhould be permitted to proceed quietly to *Bombay* without further diſpute, and whether ſecurities would be given for that purpoſe? The anſwer I received is plainly this, That *Dada Saheb* may be ſurrendered, or not, as we pleaſe; but till a new treaty is made between the Engliſh and the Maratta State, our army muſt remain where it is, whatever may be the conſequence.

I am,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
Maratta Camp, humble ſervant,
15th January 1779. *W. G. Farmer.*

This night about 10 o'clock Mr. *Holmes* returned from the Maratta camp, and adviſes us, that he has ſettled matters with *Mhadjee Scindia*, and the reſt of the Durbar, for the peaceable return of the army to *Bombay* on the only conditions they would hear of, and which are ſuch as cannot fail to fill us with the deepeſt concern, being humiliating in the higheſt degree, and which nothing but the avowed opinion and declaration of the principal officers, as to the impracticability of effecting our retreat, could juſtify our acceding to. We muſt however, obſerve, that *Madajee Scindia* and the whole Durbar cannot plead ignorance of our want of powers to conclude ſuch a treaty as they have now preſcribed to us; they having demanded both a true explanation and tranſlation of our letter of yeſterday to Mr. *Farmer*, wherein we expreſsly direct him to acquaint them, that we have no powers to enter into any treaty whatever; that were we to pretend ſuch powers, we ſhould be only deceiving them, ſo they have evidently compelled us to enter into a treaty, they were apprized we had no powers to agree to.

Appendix, No. 130.

Wurgaon, Saturday 26th.

Mr. *Holmes* returned this morning to *Scindia*'s encampment, in order to finiſh the agreement, of which a rough ſketch was yeſterday drawn out.

This evening Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Holmes* returned from the Maratta camp, with *Scindia*'s Vackeels; in order for their having an interview with us, and to ſee the treaty entered into duly executed; of which a tranſlate is hereafter entered, as alſo of a ſeparate article in favour of *Mhadajee Scindia*, which Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Holmes* adviſe us they were obliged to conſent to.

Tranſlation of the Articles of Agreement between *Seremunt Mhaderow Narrain, Pundit Purdhan*, on one part, and the Engliſh Company on the other part.

In the time of the late *Seremunt Pundit Purdhan Mhadoo Row Bullol*, matters went on peaceably: ſince then, the Engliſh obtained poſſeſſion of ſeveral places belonging to the Sircar, ſuch as the iſlands of *Salſette* and *Ouram*, *Jamboſeer*, and the Mahaals and Pergunnahs of *Broach*, both belonging to the Sircar and the Guicawar; and the Engliſh gave their aid to *Ragonath Row Dada Saheb*. Upon which, war having commenced, Colonel *John Upton* came from *Calcutta* with full powers, and made an agreement; and according to that agreement matters were to go on between the Company and the Maratta Sircar. But on the ſide of the Engliſh this agreement was not adhered to; they having given aid to *Ragonath Row*, and making preparations for war, mounted the Gauts, invaded the diſtricts of the Maratta Sircar, and began to make hoſtilities; upon which the Sircar alſo prepared for war. At the diſtrict of *Wurgaon*, near *Indonny Tulligarn*, Mr. *John Carnac* and Colonel *Charles Egerton*, of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, being fully empowered, did depute Mr. *Thomas Holmes* and Mr. *Farmer*. Further, from the beginning there was a friendſhip between the Sircar and the Engliſh; which being interrupted, Colonel *John Upton* made an agreement, according to which treaty matters did not proceed, and therefore that treaty is annihilated; and in the ſame manner, and on the ſame footing, as the Engliſh and the Sircar were in the time of the late *Mhadoo Row*, in that manner are they now to remain, the aid and cauſe of *Ragoba* to be given up, no protection to be afforded him, nor any aid to be afforded to the enemies of the Maratta Sircar. The iſlands of *Salſette* and *Ouram*, and the other iſlands and places, as *Jamboſeer* and the Mahaals of *Broach*, formerly belonging to the Maratta Sircar and the Guicawar, ſuch as *Chickly*, *Veriow*, &c. were taken poſſeſſion of: theſe we give up, and agree to go on and remain as we were in the time of the late Peiſhwa *Mhadoo Row Bullol*. Upon which this agreement is made with the Sircar. That in the time of the late *Mhadoo Row Bullol Pundit Purdhan*, matters went on peaceably; and ſince then different places belonging to the Sircar, ſuch as the iſlands of *Salſette* and *Ouram*, and other iſlands, and further *Jamboſeer* and other Mahaals, and the Aumils of *Broach* belonging to the Sircar and to the Guicawar, the Engliſh got poſſeſſion of; theſe muſt be delivered back to the Sircar, and no aid or protection muſt in future be afforded to *Ragonath Row*, or to any of the enemies of the Sircar. In this manner do we faithfully promiſe to perform; and on the part of the Sircar good faith is alſo to be obſerved. *Ragonath Row Dada Saheb* was with us: he by his own free conſent committed himſelf, with all his effects, to the care of *Tookajee Holcar* and *Madjee Scindy*. The Engliſh army with us is now at *Wurgaon*: it muſt be permitted to proceed, with all its effects and appurtenances to *Bombay*; and as ſecurity for this on the part of the Sircar, two perſons will proceed, belonging to each of the Sirdars, by name *Nazo Gunciſh*, and *Wiſſajee Sameſh*, *Ballanow Govind* and *Rana Cawn*, to conduct the army to *Bombay*; and for this purpoſe troops ſhall be ſent with you, or not, as you pleaſe. The Engliſh army that is with us ſhall not offer any moleſtation to any perſon on the road. The Antrewede and Bundlecund provinces, and their Sardars, being always under the Sircar, no damage is to be done to them; and the Engliſh army from *Calcutta* having croſſed the *Nerbuddah*, is now at *Huſſengabad*. It is not to be permitted to proceed forwards, but is to be ſent back to *Calcutta*, and on the road no moleſtation is to be given to any one. The before-mentioned agreement is formed by the mediation of *Tookajee Holkar*, and *Madjee Scindy*, and according to it matters are in future to proceed, without any kind of failure. This we pledge the Engliſh faith to obſerve, and the Sircar is alſo to obſerve it. No aid or protection is to be afforded to the French.

Signed in the Maratta Camp, by *Thomas Holmes*, and *W. G. Farmer*. } D° in the Engliſh D° by *Jn° Carnac*, and *Ch. Egerton*.

Agreement of *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Counſellor, and Colonel *Egerton*, an Engliſh Committee of *Bombay*, with *Madjee Scindia*.

That after falling out with the Sircar of *Mhaderow Narrain Pundit Pradhan*, we with an army came upon the Gaut, and remained at *Tullegaon*; on which you ordered a fighting, and we both parties did fight, in which we were defeated; returned back, and encamped at *Wurgaon*, with *Dada Saheb*. We could hardly reach *Bombay* with our army and ſtores; conſidering which we ſent Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Holmes* to you, deſiring you would come between us, and get the Sircars and our treaty ſettled as before, and conduct us and the army to *Bombay*. You came between us, and got the Sircars and Engliſh treaty ſettled, and you promiſed to conduct us and the army to *Bombay*, without moleſtation from any body. You made our eſcape entirely; all which we took into our conſideration, and were very glad. You are a principal officer and well-wiſher to this Government, which has induced us to to keep a friendſhip with you; this came into our mind, and we were ſatisfied: That you made us free from the Sircar's, and every body's moleſtation, and got the treaty ſettled as before, without any diſpute from the Sircar; therefore we thought we ſhould ſerve you, and for which reaſon have of our free will and accord agreed, under the King's and Company's ſeal, to deliver up to you the fort of *Broach*, with its Government, in the ſame manner the Mogul did hold it; which fort is now in our poſſeſſion, and which we have given you. We further agree, that we will on our arrival at *Bombay*, obtain the Governor's Duſtuck under the King's ſeal to the Killedar of *Broach*, and deliver the fort and its country in the manner the Mogul did hold it, up to you. Under oath no diſpute ſhall ariſe in this: this we promiſe ſolemnly; and we have left Mr. *Farmer* and Mr. *Charles Stewart* with you as hoſtages for the performance of this agreement; we will let no diſpute ariſe. This we agree to in writing.

Wurgaon near *Fullegam*, 27th Julheze.

N. B.—The above was tranſlated by a native Linguiſt, and is an exact copy thereof.

This morning Mr. *Farmer* returned to the Maratta camp with *Madjee Scindia*'s Vackeel, with the papers executed, and by whom we ſent *Madjee Scindia* a preſent of a horſe. He came back to our camp about noon, with a party of horſemen who are to accompany the army to *Panwell*; and acquaints us we may march immediately, and that the hoſtages mentioned in the treaty will overtake us before we reach the village of *Korta*. Sunday, 17th.

The army marched this afternoon at one o'clock, and reached *Khamſetta* about ſix in the evening.

At five this morning the army marched from *Khamſetta*, and arrived at *Condolah* about one o'clock. Monday 18th.

This morning diſpatched the following letter to Colonel *Goddard*:— Tueſday 19th

To

To Colonel *Goddard.*

Sir,

We diſpatched you on the 16th a letter, containing orders which, upon recollection, we do not think ourſelves authorized to give you; you are therefore to pay no regard thereunto.

We are, Sir,
Your obedient humble ſervants,
Jno Carnac,
Ch. Egerton.

Campoly,
19th January 1779.

The letter which we mention in the foregoing to have written Colonel *Goddard* under the 16th inſtant, is not entered upon our diary, as Mr. *Farmer* carried the original letter with him to the Maratta camp, and it eſcaped him to leave a copy. The purport, however, was to adviſe Colonel *Goddard* that the face of things was ſo materially altered ſince writing to him laſt, as to occaſion our marching back to *Bombay*, and that in conſequence of an agreement entered into by us with the Maratta State, we now directed him to march back with the army under his command to *Bengal.*

Wedneſday, 20th. This morning the army moved down the Gaut to *Campoly.*

This evening arrived a pair of Hircarrahs, with the following letter from the Honourable the Select Committee:

To *John Carnac*, Eſq. and Colonel *Charles Egerton.*

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter of the 6th inſtant, and having fully conſidered your repreſentation of the ſtate of affairs, we are of opinion, that the beſt and moſt effectual way to improve your own ſituation, and to induce *Ragoba*'s friends to declare openly in his favour, will be for our army to advance with vigour and expedition towards *Poonah*: and we accordingly now ſend inſtructions to that effect to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, to whom we find Colonel *Egerton* has delivered over the command. Colonel *Egerton*'s bad ſtate of health, and the death of Mr. *Moſtyn*, rendering it neceſſary to make a new arrangement in the Poonah committee, we have reſolved to appoint Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* and Mr. *James Sibbald* to ſupply the places of the aforeſaid gentlemen in that committee, with the ſame powers and inſtructions as given to the former committee, by our commiſſion and general letter, bearing date the 5th of laſt month; and hereby appoint *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and Mr. *James Sibbald* to be a committee accordingly, for the uſes and purpoſes mentioned in our ſaid commiſſion and letter of inſtructions; obſerving nevertheleſs, that this appointment is not to take place unleſs Colonel *Egerton*'s bad ſtate of health ſhould ſtill continue to diſqualify him for public buſineſs, or oblige him to return to *Bombay*; in either of which caſes Mr. *Carnac* is to act jointly with the above-named gentlemen in manner aforeſaid, and this letter will be to them a ſufficient warrant. Our appointment of Major *Dagon* to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, has anticipated your application on that ſubject; but we cannot conſent to ſend to the army the other officers you mention. The Preſident has written very plainly to *Ragoba* our ſentiments reſpecting the circumſtances mentioned in your letter; and we think a very good method to bring the matter to a proof would be for you to deſire *Ragoba* to deliver to *Morabah Furneeze*'s Vackeel an order to the Killedar *Ahmadoraſut* for his releaſe, and to open the communication through the *Conkan*, by affording relief to the port at the head of the Gauts, which we are much ſurprized has been left deſtitute of all kinds of ſupplies. We have determined on ſending a detachment of a company of Europeans, three of Sepoys, with two field-pieces, and a party of artillery men, under the command of Captain *Richard Eames*, to clear the roads between *Panwell* and *Campoly* of the Maratta horſe, which we learn are hovering in thoſe parts, and to convoy a ſupply of proviſions to that port. The party is to be a ſeparate command, and not to be conſidered as belonging to the army now above the Gauts. Appendix, No. 130.

We have juſt received a letter from the Governor General and Council, of which we ſhall ſend you a copy when the roads are open. The contents in ſhort are, That they have given Colonel *Goddard* full powers to conclude a treaty with *Moodajee-Bouncello*; for which reaſon they think it neceſſary to revoke the controul they had given us over that detachment, though they obſerve their intention is not to withdraw the ſervices of the detachment entirely from the ſupport of any meaſures we might have formed in reliance of ſuch ſupport, if thoſe meaſures ſhall not prove incompatible with the inſtructions given to Colonel *Goddard*, and with the engagements he may form in conſequence. We ſhall however immediately deſcribe our preſent ſituation to Colonel *Goddard*, who on the 22d ultimo was ſtill at *Huſſengabad*, and preſs him to march towards *Poonah.*

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient ſervants,
Wm. Hornby,
Daniel Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
11th January 1779.

19th January 1779.

The Pattamars diſpatched with this letter having returned, it is neceſſary to acquaint you, that Lieutenant *Fraſer* has abandoned his poſt at *Condolah*, and which it is reported is now in poſſeſſion of the enemy.

The following letter to Colonel *Cockburn* was encloſed in the foregoing one to the committee:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn.*

Sir,

As we find Colonel *Egerton* has been obliged by bad health to reſign to you the chief command of the army, we judge it proper to obſerve to you, that from the repreſentation we have received of the ſtate of affairs, it appears very neceſſary the army ſhould advance with the utmoſt vigour and expedition towards *Poonah*, in order to give ſpirits to *Ragoba*'s friends, and ſecure proviſions for our own troops; we ſhall therefore truſt to your activity and zeal for the ſervice, that no time be loſt in moving forwards, or meaſure neglected to diſtreſs and fruſtrate the attempts of the enemy.

We are,
Your loving friends,
Wm Hornby,
Dan' Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
11th January 1779.

Chowke, 21ſt January 1779.

Tueſday, 21ſt. At half paſt five this morning, the army marched from *Campoly*, and came to their ground at *Chowke* at one o'clock.

Received on the road the following letter from Mr. *Farmer:*

To *John Carnac*, Eſquire, and Colonel *Charles Egerton:*

Gentlemen,

The Durbar have appointed on their part *Gunneiſh Hurry*, and *Tookajee Holcar* and *Mhadjee Scindia* on their part *Apajee Savajee*, to ſee the different articles in the late agreement performed; they bring with them the requiſite letters from your Durbar and from theſe Sudars; and they farther deſire one from me to introduce them to you, and ſignify their being the perſons ſo appointed.

In the articles of Durbar expences, which formed part of the late ſtipulation for the unmoleſted march of the army to *Bombay*, it was ſettled, that a thouſand rupees ſhould be paid to Chubdars, &c. belonging to the Durbar of *Mhadjee Scindia*, and the like ſum to the Durbar ſervants of *Nanah Furneeze*; you will pleaſe to

Appendix. No. 130.

pay the whole amount immediately to *Apajee Savajee*, who is reſponſible to them; and for the other ſums ſettled for ſuch ſervice, I could wiſh the notes ſhould if poſſible be returned to me.

Madjee Scindia ſent yeſterday to acquaint me that as he was ſecurity to the Durbar for the due performance of the late ſtipulations, he deſired that Mr. *Stewart* and I would accompany him wherever he went. The change is very agreeable to me in every ſhape, as he treats us with great civility and attention; and the cultivating a proper connexion with him ſeems to me the only mode to retrieve the ſad ſacrifices we have been compelled to make in capitulating for the ſafe and unmoleſted return of our army to *Bombay*. Whatever he may have to propoſe I believe will be through *Appajee Savajee*, who ſeems to poſſeſs much of his confidence, and to whom I would therefore venture to propoſe a particular attention ſhould be ſhewn, keeping every thing that he may propoſe or mention a ſecret from the agent of the Durbar.

I could wiſh that a p^{r} of Pattamars ſhould be ſent me as ſoon as poſſible to diſpatch with any advices I may have to ſend. I am, with reſpect,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Camp near *Tullegaon*, 19th January 1779. *W. G. Farmer.*

Friday, 22d. This morning Mr. *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton* took their leave of the army, and ſet out for *Panwell*, where they arrived about noon, and reached *Bombay* the ſame evening.

It eſcaped us to notice under the 16th inſtant, that we found the prevailing cuſtom of giving preſents amongſt the officers and others of the Durbar, was not to be diſpenſed with, and that their expectations were very conſiderable; we however ſettled this charge by means of *Appajee Savajee*, for the ſum of 41,000 rupees to be paid to him on his arrival at *Bombay*; and he made himſelf anſwerable to the dependents of the Durbar for this amount.

Report from Lieutenant *Richardſon* to Colonel *Egerton*, as noticed in Committee under 11th inſtant.

Sir,

Agreeable to your deſire I ſend you the information that I received laſt night on examining two men that *Ragoba* had ſent to *Tookajee Holcar*. They told me there was no hope of his joining us till we had beat the miniſterial army; that *Holcar* declared himſelf thoroughly acquainted with our ſituation: that our force did not exceed four battalions, and with that number we could never expect to reduce the Maratta empire; that his force added to ours would give us very little more weight; that by joining *Ragoba* he riſked every thing, without the ſmalleſt proſpect of advantage to himſelf: therefore all that he could promiſe was to be neutral; and though he might be obliged to bring his troops into the field, yet he engaged that they ſhould not fight againſt *Ragoba*. I have further to inform you, that in a private converſation with *Ragoba*, two days ago, he told me he had deceived the Governor, in the hopes he had given of people joining him; but that he had been deceived himſelf, and that he was aſhamed of it, as he now found he had been led into an error by falſe promiſes.

I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Tullagaon, 11th January 1779. *William Richardſon.*

These Minutes were omitted in the proper place, through the miſapprehenſion of the Committee's Secretary, and without the knowledge of Mr. Carnac.

Bombay, 22d January 1779.

Minutes of the Conſultation held by the Poonah Committee at *Wurgaon*, the 15th January, which Colonel *Egerton* diſavows and proteſts againſt; and to authenticate which Mr. *Carnac* has brought the Evidence of Mr. *Sibbald* the Secretary, Colonel *Hartley*, and Mr. *Holmes*, as per their Letters forwarded in the Packet.

Camp at *Wurgaon*, 15th January 1779.

At a Committee; PRESENT,

John Carnac, Eſquire,
Colonel *Charles Egerton*.

The committee now meet to take into their ſerious conſideration the meaſures neceſſary to be immediately purſued to extricate the army from its preſent very critical ſituation, ſurrounded as it is by the whole ſtrength of the empire, and with only about ten days proviſions in camp.

It is judged neceſſary to have the opinion of Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, now in command of the army, as to the practicability of effecting our retreat to *Bombay*; who is accordingly called in.

Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* delivers in his written opinion as entered hereafter.

Colonel *Egerton*'s opinion being alſo required, declares his ſentiments are the ſame as thoſe of Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*; that a retreat in our preſent ſituation is impracticable; and if attempted, the conſequences muſt be the loſs of the whole army.

Mr. *Carnac* is ſo confident the army is ſufficiently numerous, and ſo well provided with artillery, as to be able to force their way back againſt all oppoſition, if the officers and men will do their duty; that there is no doubt with him, the attempt ought to be made at all events, rather than ſubmit to the terms preſcribed by the enemy, by which we have no authority to bind our employers; and for his own part, he declares he would much ſooner run his ſhare of the riſk than that they ſhould be complied with: however, as Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* have given it as their poſitive opinions that the troops will not ſtand, and conſequently muſt be cut to pieces, Mr. *Carnac* dares not take upon himſelf ſingly to preſs a retreat, which it is pronounced will be inevitably attended with conſequences that cannot fail endangering the preſervation of the ſettlement; he, therefore, however reluctantly and contrary to his own ſentiments, finds himſelf obliged to concur in the acceptance of whatever conditions can be obtained. Allowing therefore that the opinions of Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* to be well-founded (in which we are given to underſtand many officers of the army concur) there ſeems to be no other reſource left, but to accept of ſuch conditions as can be obtained from the enemy.

Adjourned.

For Colonel *Cockburn*'s opinion, vide before.

(A true copy.)

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Sec^{y}.

Letter from the Preſidency of *Bombay* to the Court of Directors; dated 27th March 1779.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee, &c. &c.

Gentlemen,

1. We had the honour to addreſs you the 29th December, by the way of *Buſſorah*; and on the 8th of laſt month Colonel *Capper* arrived by that route with your commands dated 31ſt Auguſt.

2. It gave us infinite ſatisfaction to find by your ſaid commands, that our vigilance reſpecting the tranſactions of the French has met with your approbation; and we flatter ourſelves that you will do equal juſtice to the motives on which we undertook the late expedition in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, which we are deeply concerned to acquaint you, has been brought to a moſt unſucceſsful concluſion.

3. This diſpatch is intended to convey to you, in the quickeſt manner poſſible, an account, ſufficiently circumſtantial, of the unfortunate affair, accompanied with every neceſſary paper, to enable you to form a judgment of the conduct

conduct of the concerned in this expedition, and of our preſent ſituation.

4. The letters from the Board in their Secret Department, dated the 17th of June and 8th of July, and our letter of the 31ſt of that month, tranſcripts of all which are in this packet, will inform you of the ſteps which more immediately led to the reſolution we formed on the 21ſt of July, to purſue all practicable meaſures, with the utmoſt expedition, for placing *Ragoba* in the Regency at *Poonah*; and under No. 1 we now tranſmit a copy at length of our proceedings on that day, in order the more fully to explain the grounds upon which we acted.

5. Subjoined to the minutes of the 21ſt July, is a copy of the anſwer delivered by the Poonah Durbar, upon *Nanah Furneze* being reinſtated in the adminiſtration, to the paper of demands preſented by Mr. *Moſtyn*, as mentioned in the letter above referred to, dated 17th June.

6. The firſt letter we received from Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*, after we had taken our reſolutions, adviſed us that *Moraba* had been ſeized by *Madjee Scindia*, and that *Tookajee Holcar* had been obliged to deliver up his Duan, and two of his officers, to *Nannah*, who together with *Scindia* had appointed another Duan for *Holcar*, and that every one, whether Bramin or officer, who had joined *Moraba*, had alſo been ſeized, and amongſt the reſt *Bucheba Pronder*; *Scindia* was ſoon after induced, by a preſent of three lacks of rupees from *Nannah*, to deliver *Moraba* into his charge, who immediately ſent him priſoner into the fort of *Aſhmednagur*; and *Buchebah* was likewiſe confined in another fort belonging to *Nannah*

7. On the 1ſt of July Monſr *St. Lubin* left *Poonah*, and proceeded to *Damain*, where it was given out he intended to remain, until *Nannah* diſcovered whether he was able to fulfil his engagements, and where we underſtand he now is.

8. Our advices from *Poonah* at this juncture tended to perſuade us that *Nannah Furneze* and *Madjee Scindia* had the chief direction of the Government, and that *Saccaram Bappoo* was not conſulted, but even kept under a degree of confinement. *Scindia*'s influence appeared the moſt predominant; and it was ſurmiſed that he had views to the enlargement of his own power at *Poonah*, independent of *Nannah*, or of *Saccaram Bappoo*.

9. We were ſoon after given to underſtand, that the Poonah Durbar had not only refuſed to grant Duſtucks for the paſſage of the Bengal detachment, but ſent orders to the different officers through whoſe diſtricts Colonel *Leſlie* would be obliged to paſs, to uſe every endeavour to moleſt and haraſs him in his march; and the army at *Poonah* was then ſaid to conſiſt of about 12,000 men, which was to be diſmiſſed in a few days, with orders to aſſemble again at *Deura*, or about the beginning of October, as they could not procure provender for their cattle at that ſeaſon of the year.

10. Colonel *Leſlie* appearing to make but a ſlow progreſs in his march, we wrote to him in the moſt preſſing manner to advance as quick as poſſible, aſſuring him that the early arrival of the army under his command would be of the utmoſt importance to the Honourable Company's affairs.

11. At this time *Madjee Scindia* acquainted Mr. *Lewis*, that the Miniſters had given him full powers to ſettle affairs with the Engliſh, and promiſed to ſend a perſon to *Bombay* for that purpoſe, who accordingly did arrive ſome time afterwards; but, as the Preſident lately acquainted us, he did not open himſelf on the buſineſs for which he was ſaid to be deputed, thinking perhaps that our connection with *Ragoba* did not ſuit his maſter's views.

12. Mr. *Lewis* alſo adviſed, that the Durbar, in order to amuſe us, intended ſending a perſon of conſequence with propoſals to *Ragoba*; and the Preſident, at our meeting on the 15th Auguſt, reported that propoſals had been made to him verbally, by an agent for *Nannah Furneze*, to bring *Ragoba* into the Government nearly on the ſame terms as propoſed by *Moraba* and his party, which will appear by the papers annexed to our proceedings of the 21ſt of July; but as we had reaſon to ſuſpect that every propoſal from that quarter was inſidious, and only meant to amuſe us, we returned for anſwer to the agent, that we could not give his propoſals any conſideration, unleſs they came before us authenticated under the Sicca of *Nannah* himſelf; after which we had no farther overtures on the part of *Nannah Furneze*. Appendix. No. 130.

13. On the 16th of Auguſt we received advice from Mr. *Lewis*, that he was informed from very good authority, that it had been determined by *Nannah* and *Scindia* to ſend two principal officers to oppoſe Colonel *Leſlie*'s march; and that *Nannah* had ſent to recall Monſr *St. Lubin* from *Damaun*, where he had reſided ſince the beginning of July, giving out that he intended employing him againſt *Hyder*. We immediately ſent this intelligence to Colonel *Leſlie*, that he might be prepared to take his meaſures with the proper caution and vigour: and the Chief of *Surat* adviſed us, under the 9th of September, that Chokeys had been placed on the *Brampore* and *Ugien* roads, in order to intercept all letters.

14. Under the 8th September Mr. *Lewis* adviſed the Preſident, that he had been informed by the Nabob of *Arcot*'s Vackeel, that the Killedar of *Ahmednagur* fort, in which *Moraba* was confined, had not only refuſed complying with an order from *Nannah* for delivering that fort to *Scindia*, but had ſeized ſome treaſure to a great amount belonging to *Nannah*, and declared he acted in behalf of *Ragoba*. The Vackeel further added, that though *Moraba* was not abſolutely maſter of the Killa, yet he and the Killedar underſtood one another perfectly; and that it was entirely by the advice of the former the latter had acted. Mr. *Lewis* cloſes his letter with theſe words: "Not a man is yet come in, and the "few who remained here belonging to *Hurry Punt*'s "army are ſo very importunate for their arrears of pay, "that the poor man is afraid of ſtirring out of houſe." In a letter to us, dated 24th September, he ſays, "*Purſo* "*Ram Boſe* is ſtill here, not being able to raiſe a man "for want of money, which the Government is either "unable or unwilling to advance him."

15. In the laſt mentioned letter, Mr. *Lewis* acquaints us, that on the 20th September, a Frenchman arrived at *Poonah*, with letters for *Nannah*, but notwithſtanding his utmoſt endeavours, he could not learn until the night before the date of his letter, who the Frenchman was, or from whence he came; when he was informed it was Monſieur *Le Roy* from *Surat*. This was one of the gentlemen mentioned in the Secret Letter of the 15th January 1778, to have been landed on *Choul* from *Pondicherry*, and he now brought letters to *Nannah* from Monſieur *St. Lubin*, with whom he had a meeting at *Damaun*, and from Monſieur *Briencourt*, the French Conſul at *Surat*; the contents of which Mr. *Lewis* learnt were to deſire *Nannah* not to liſten to any terms of accommodation with the Engliſh, at leaſt for one month, as he made no doubt the aſſiſtance promiſed by Monſieur *St. Lubin* would arrive by that time.

16. On the 27th Auguſt we received the firſt advice from the Governor General and Council, of their having deputed Mr. *Elliot* to the court of *Moodajee Boojla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, with full inſtructions to negociate and conclude a treaty with that Chief, acquainting us no farther with the object of their intended treaty, than expreſſing their opinion in general terms, that an alliance with him might be attended with the greateſt utility, in providing for the defence of the Honourable Company's Poſſeſſions in the preſent war. They deſired us to correſpond with Mr. *Elliot*, and to adviſe him of any occurrences that may affect the general political intereſts of the Company's ſettlements and of our own in particular, telling us, that the ſucceſs of the meaſures entruſted to Mr. *Elliot*, muſt in a great meaſure depend upon their preſent ſecrecy; that he would however ſend us ſuch articles

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articles as he might agree to with the Rajah, and in the mean time, to prevent any ſtep of a contrary tendency on our part, they requeſt we would refrain from forming any engagement of a nature hoſtile to the Government at *Poonah*, except ſuch as might appear abſolutely neceſſary for the defence of our own poſſeſſions.

17. From the very general information the Governor General and Council gave us of their projected alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, we could not form any judgment in what manner this Preſidency might be affected thereby, nor did it ſtrike us that we could receive either injury or benefit from the Rajah of *Berar*, unleſs he ſhould aſſert his claim to the Rajahſhip of the Maratta empire, to which he has ſome pretenſions, and reſtore the ancient form of the Maratta Government. We did not pretend to judge what advantage a connection with him might afford to your Bengal provinces, to which his country is contiguous, but ſo far as we might venture an opinion, we conceived them ſo little liable to danger, that an alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* merely for their ſecurity, ſo far as he could contribute to it, which appeared by their letter to be the object of Mr. *Ellict*'s deputation, did not ſeem to be a conſideration equivalent to the injury your general intereſt would ſuſtain, were we to forego the proſecution of the plan reſolved on the 21ſt July.

18. Theſe were the ſentiments we expreſſed on the 31ſt Auguſt, when this letter came under conſideration; and as we were then every day in expectation of advices from *Europe* by the way of *Suez*, which would place us at a certainty with reſpect to the war with *France*, we did not think it proper to take any deciſive reſolution for the proſecution of the intended meaſures, though the neceſſity thereof ſtill continued to ſtrike us in the moſt forcible manner.

19. On the 9th September Mr. *William Moore* arrived from *Suez*, having left *London* 16th June, and *Marſeilles* the 2d July. By him we received intelligence next to a certainty, that the Count *D'Eſtaing*'s ſquadron was gone to *America*, and that Admiral *Byron* had ſailed in purſuit of him, nor had we any reaſon to apprehend the French intended ſending any armament to *India* this ſeaſon.

20. On the 27th following we received a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated 17th Auguſt, in which they acquainted us, that they had approved our reſolution of the 21ſt July, and authorized us to aſſiſt *Ragoba* with a military force to conduct him to *Poonah*, and to eſtabliſh him in the Regency there, on the following expreſs proviſions:

Firſt, That it do not interfere with any engagement formed with *Moodajee Booſla* by Mr. *Elliot*, and previous notice to us given.

Second, That our lateſt advices from *Europe* ſhall be equal to an aſſurance that the force required for this ſervice may be ſpared without endangering the ſafety of *Bombay*, in the event of a French invaſion.

Third, That the engagement we might form with *Ragoba* himſelf or *Moraba*, and his aſſociates, be not contrary to thoſe concluded with *Moodajee* by Mr. *Elliot*, and noticed to us, nor of a hoſtile tendency to the Government of *Berar*.

21. On the 30th, we received advice from Colonel *Leſlie*, that he had on the 15th Auguſt left *Chatterpore*, or *Chunderpore* as it is called in the maps, where he had remained on account of the heavy rains ſince 3d July, in order to proceed on his march to the *Nerbuddah*, and after two days march had arrived at *Raje Gur*, from whence he dated his letter the 25th Auguſt. By this letter it appeared he had a ſlight ſkirmiſh with the troops of one of the Bundella Chiefs, but was in treaty for a pacification, and at the ſame time taking meaſures for croſſing a river between him and the enemy, that if drawn to that extremity, he might by diſperſing them ſecure his march from further moleſtation.

22. We have now brought our detail down to the 12th October, and matters were circumſtanced as ſtated in the foregoing ſheets, when Mr. *Carnac* delivered in a minute, urging the danger of loſing any further time, and preſſing us immediately to undertake the meaſures reſolved on under the 21ſt July.

23. Before we came to any reſolution on Mr. *Carnac*'s minute, we thought it neceſſary to take the advice of Mr. *Moſtyn* in ſome points; and that gentleman being accordingly conſulted, gave it ſtrongly as his opinion, that if we did intend to take any meaſures in favour of *Ragoba*, the ſooner they were undertaken the better, the leſs oppoſition we ſhould meet with, and therefore the greater certainty of ſucceſs; of which indeed, he ſaid, he had not in his own mind the leaſt doubt; and upon the whole, he ſaid, he did not conceive there could offer a more favourable criſis than the preſent; for which he fully explained his reaſons, as will appear by our proceedings on that day.

24. After full conſideration of all circumſtances, it was reſolved by the majority of the Committee, Mr. *Draper* only diſſenting thereto, forthwith to carry into execution the plan agreed to under the 21ſt July, for conducting *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, and placing him in the Regency there, during the minority of the young Peiſhwa; and that the neceſſary meaſures for that purpoſe be undertaken as ſoon as poſſible.

25. That you may have our whole proceedings on this ſubject before you in as ſmall a compaſs as poſſible, we now ſend in the packet a copy of our minutes from the 12th October to the time the army left *Bombay*, and the treaty as executed by *Ragoba*, collected in one paper, under No. 2.

26. Mr. *Draper*'s reaſons for not concurring in the reſolution for immediately putting our plan into execution, will appear at length in the paper mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

27. Our whole proceedings previous to the army's leaving *Bombay* being comprized in that paper, it appears unneceſſary to repeat them here; and we chearfully ſubmit them to your candour and judgment.

28. For our future guidance we muſt requeſt your opinion and inſtructions on the point debated at our meeting of the 7th November, whether two members of the Committee can be detached from the Preſidency at the ſame time, upon any temporary ſervice; and whether the two remaining members are in their abſence competent to form a Select Committee.

29. Every argument that was advanced on either ſide of the queſtion is contained in the extract from our proceedings.

30. Under No. 3, we tranſmit a copy of the treaty as executed by *Ragoba*.

31. To avoid ſwelling the extract of our proceedings; we ſend in a ſeparate number, copy of a letter from the executors of the late Mr. *William Shaw*, on the ſubject of the loan to *Ragoba*, with our minutes thereon; and we are perſuaded, that when you reflect how we were circumſtanced with *Ragoba* at the time, and the flattering proſpect then opening to the Company, you will approve our determination to diſcharge the debt, and not to ſuffer him to be embarraſſed with demands from the executors at ſuch a juncture.

32. *Ragoba* having afterwards ſtated his account with Mr. *Shaw*'s eſtate in a different manner from the executors, we ſent his ſtatement to them, and demanded them to refund the overplus according thereto. In reply to which we received another letter from them, controverting *Ragoba*'s ſtatement, and ſupporting their own. A copy thereof is annexed to the other letter. And *Ragoba* departing a few days afterwards to join the army, we had not time to obtain from him the neceſſary proofs, even if he had any to produce, which we much doubt.

33. We hope and truſt likewiſe that, conſidering how affairs were then ſituated, you will approve the loan of four lacks of rupees, which it was abſolutely neceſſary to make to *Ragoba*, to enable him to make the neceſſary preparations for the expedition. We alſo thought

thought it for the good of the ſervice to make a further loan of rupees 15,000 to two principal officers of *Ragoba*'s, to whom we acquainted you, in our addreſs by the *York*, we made a loan of the like ſum when the reſolution in March 1778 took place.

34. We beg leave to mention that *Ragoba*'s jewels depoſited on executing the treaty of *Surat*, are ſtill in our poſſeſſion at *Bombay*.

35. Our addreſs, 29th December, of which a triplicate is now encloſed, informed you briefly of the progreſs of the army to that time; however, to bring their operations before you in one point of view, we will begin our account from the day the forces left *Bombay*.

36. Captain *James Stuart*, who had been previouſly ſent to *Poonah* to make himſelf acquainted with the roads and paſſes, embarked from this place the 22d November, with a detachment of grenadier Sepoys and ſome light artillery, as mentioned in the extract of our proceedings, and proceeding up *Apta* river by a route different from what was taken by the remainder of the army, ſecured the paſſage of the Ghauts, and took poſt on the ſummit of *Condella* the 25th following, the 3d day from his leaving *Bombay*, where he was to remain till joined by the army.

37. The remainder of the forces left *Bombay* the 23d, and were followed the next day by Colonel *Egerton*, who took on him the chief command. After ſecuring the fort of *Bellapore*, which commands the entrance of *Panwell* river, the army proceeded to *Panwell*, where it arrived the 25th.

38. To prevent, as far as we could any diminution from the ſtrength of the army, the fort of *Bellapore* was ſoon afterwards garriſoned from *Bombay*.

39. The army remained at *Panwell* the 25th November to the 4th December, waiting the arrival of their ſtores, proviſion, oxen, &c. and employed in clearing the road in front for their advance. On the 4th they began their march, and on the 13th arrived at *Campoly*, at the foot of the Ghauts. Here they were joined by Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Moſtyn*, who, with Colonel *Egerton*, formed a Committee for the general conduct of the expedition, and the ſettlement of the government at *Poonah*. Their commiſſion and inſtructions are entered at length in their diary now tranſmitted.

40. Mr. *Moſtyn* only remained a few days at *Campoly*, when he was obliged to return to *Bombay* by a violent diſorder, which put an end to his life on the 1ſt of January. In him you loſt a very faithful, valuable ſervant; but it was an inexpreſſible misfortune to be deprived of his ſervices juſt at the very time when they were ſo particularly requiſite for the accompliſhment of a plan which he had been ſo very inſtrumental in bringing to bear.

41. At a meeting of the Poonah committee held at *Campoly* on the 26th December, Mr. *Carnac* delivered in a minute, remarking on the ſlow progreſs hitherto made by the army, and the time loſt by making a carriage road up the Gauts, inſtead of carrying up the ſtores by hand. This minute will appear under its proper date in the Poonah diary; and with the other papers hereafter mentioned, we tranſmit a copy of Colonel *Egerton*'s reply, delivered ſince his return, and of a letter from the Commandant of artillery, and the other papers on the ſame ſubject, which we beg leave to ſubmit to your judgment.

42. At length, on 23d December, the troops and artillery were got up to *Condilla*, at the top of the Gaut, but ſome further time was employed in bringing up the Commiſſary's ſtores, and compleating the proviſions to a ſtock for twenty-five days.

43. Till this time there had been no appearance of an enemy, but on the 24d they made a trifling and unſucceſsful attack on a ſmall party of *Ragoba*'s Sepoys, which with three of his guns had been poſted in front of Captain *Stewart*'s detachment. They were, however, beat off by *Ragoba*'s people, with the aſſiſtance only of two of our artillery officers to point their guns. Captain *Stewart* judged that the number of the enemy exceeded ten thouſand horſe and foot. Appendix, No. 130.

44. From this time the enemy daily cannonaded our camp at a diſtance, with a very trifling effect till the 31ſt, when, after they had withdrawn their guns, a ſmall party concealed in a gully threw ſome rockets, one of which mortally wounded Lieutenant Colonel *Cdy*, who died at *Bombay* the 14th January.

45. After ſeveral ſmall movements towards the edge of the plain, the army, equipped with a ſtock of proviſions for 25 days, began the march for *Poonah* on the 4th January, having left a fortified poſt at the head of the Gauts to ſecure the paſs, under the command of Lieutenant *Frazer*. On the ſame day they met with a very heavy loſs by the death of Captain *Stuart*, who was a moſt active, gallant, and judicious officer, and poſſeſſed of the true military ſpirit.

46. On the 5th the army halted.

47. On the 6th the army reſumed its march, and in the proſecution thereof the guns of the enemy opened on the line from a wood in front, and a large party of horſe ſeemed inclined either to take them in flank or rear; they were however prevented from both, driven from the wood into the plain, and afterwards from an eminence which our troops took poſſeſſion of.

This party ſent to haraſs them the committee were informed was commanded by *Bhim Row Ponſia*, and might conſiſt of 5,000 horſe, with ſeven guns.

48. On the ſame day Colonel *Egerton* repreſented in committee, that having borne up as long he could againſt an illneſs with which he had been for ſome time paſt afflicted, he found himſelf under the neceſſity of acquainting them, that the Surgeon-Major was of opinion, that the fatigues of a campaign co-operating with his indiſpoſition would certainly endanger his life, and that at any rate he could not ſoon hope to have the requiſite ſtrength to attend properly to the many avocations of a Commander in Chief in the field; for which reaſons he requeſted permiſſion to reſign the command of the army to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and to proceed immediately to *Bombay*. He accordingly did ſet off, but was obliged to return upon the receipt of intelligence that a large party of the enemy's horſe were in the *Conkan*; the temporary command of the army however remained with Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, though Colonel *Egerton* continued to act as a Member of the Poonah committee.

49. It was at this time judged neceſſary to promote Major *Dagon* of the artillery, to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, in order to provide a fit officer to hold the ſecond command of the army, or to ſucceed to the chief command, in caſe of accidents to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*.

50. The Poonah committee at the ſame meeting expreſſed their diſappointments on the difference between the expectations they were flattered with on their arrival at the top of the Gauts, and the actual ſtate of affairs. Inſtead of *Holkar* and many other Chiefs of rank and reſpect, who it was hoped would have joined them with a numerous body of horſe immediately on the appearance there of the ſtandard of *Ragoba*, none but a few mercenaries had yet come in, and *Ragoba* in a meſſage to the committee gave them plainly to underſtand that he had been deceived, that unleſs they could convince his friends of their ſafety in joining him by the ſpeedy defeat of his enemies, he had no hope of being joined by any one, and that their ſituation would rather prove worſe than better as they advanced towards *Poonah*, by being cut off from all communication with the *Conkan*, from whence they could then be ſupplied with proviſions and ſtores.

51. Though the mode adopted by the enemy of retiring before our army, and laying waſte the country, ſeemed to render *Ragoba*'s reaſoning apparently juſt, the committee ſtill hoped that as they advanced towards

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Poonah, *Holkar*, on whoſe junction there might be ſome dependance, would be enabled and encouraged to keep firm to the promiſes he had made through the late Mr. *Moſtyn*; and they further obſerved, there was too much reaſon to apprehend that *Ragoba*, truſting to ſubdue every one by our arms, had not only neglected the fit means to conciliate the reſpectable Chiefs to his cauſe, but had acted in ſuch a manner as would naturally tend to unite them againſt him; in proof of which they adduced an information given by the agent of *Moraba* then in our camp, that *Ragoba* had ſecretly ſent directions to the Killedar of *Ahmednagur*, not to releaſe *Moraba* till he got further poſitive orders from him on his arrival at *Poonah*.

52. The army continued to advance till the 9th January, when it arrived at *Pellagom*, a conſiderable town about 18 miles from the ſummit of the Gauts, and 16 miles from *Poonah*. *Tellagon* was burnt and abandoned before our troops arrived; and here they found a very numerous army aſſembled to oppoſe them, under the orders of the Miniſters *Saccaram* and *Nannah*, *Madjee Scindia*, *Tookajee Holkar*, and other principal officers.

53. The committee finding ſo general an oppoſition to *Ragoba*, and no hopes of being joined by any conſiderable Chief, were of opinion that the plan of eſtabliſhing *Ragoba* in the Regency of the Maratta empire would be impracticable, without the immediate cooperation of a reſpectable party in that State; and conſidering likewiſe the total improbability of procuring any further ſupply of proviſions, or even of ſecuring their own ſtock as they advanced, came to the reſolution to fall back with the army ſo far as might be requiſite to ſecure their communication with the *Conkan*, or the country below the Gauts. The meaſure taken by the committee, previous to and in conſequence of this reſolution and ſituation of the army at the time, are fully deſcribed in their proceedings under the 9th, 10th, and 11th January, to which we beg leave to refer.

54. At this place the committee received information that a body of horſe belonging to *Moraba* had marched into the *Conkan* to join *Ragoba*.

55. The army accordingly began to fall back on the night of the 11th; and the enemy having by ſome means got intelligence of their moving, attacked them on the march before day-light, which they continued with great vigour until four o'clock in the afternoon, before our troops could make their retreat good to *Burragom* or *Wargaum*, which they effected at laſt with much difficulty and danger. The committee's account of the action is entered on their diary under the 13th January; and Colonel *Cockburn*'s is tranſmitted with the copies of his other letters during the ſervice under No. 9. Both accounts agree that a part of the baggage fell into the enemy's hands, and that the troops during the whole attack behaved with the greateſt intrepidity. The particulars of the loſs ſuſtained in the action will appear by the return annexed to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*'s letter; and in killed, wounded, and miſſing, of artillery, infantry, and Sepoys, and artillery Laſcars, amounted to 362.

56. Some ſtraggling Sepoys and Laſcars having eſcaped from the action to the head of the Gauts, brought the moſt dreadful accounts of the entire deſtruction of the whole army; upon which Lieutenant *Fraſer* immediately abandoned his poſt. We had the ſame alarming accounts, which filled us for ſome days with great apprehenſions.

57. On the 13th, the day after the action, the following minute appears in the committee's diary:

"At a committee held to deliberate relative to "overtures for the peaceable return of the army to "*Bombay*;—no minutes taken, being in a ſevere "cannonade, and a number of perſons ſtanding "round.

"Letter to the Peiſhwa, ſent by *Ram Sing*.
"D° from D°, in reply.
"D° to D°, at night."

58. Theſe imperfect entries the committee afterwards explained were owing to their ſeparation from their Secretary, Mr *Farmer*.

59. On the 14th Mr. *Farmer* was ſent to the Maratta camp to propoſe an accommodation, which the committee judged might be brought about by *Ragoba*'s going over to *Scindia*, which he ſeemed determined to do, rather than run the riſk of another day's march.—The meſſage ſent to the Durbar by Mr. *Farmer* will appear at length on the Poonah committee's diary.

60. The anſwer given by the Durbar to Mr. *Farmer*'s meſſage was ſimply this: "That if we wiſhed to remain "at peace with them, *Ragonaut Row* muſt be delivered "up, and then we may return quietly, otherwiſe we "might do as we pleaſe."

61. The committee wrote to Mr. *Farmer* in reply, that all difficulty of accommodation was removed by *Ragoba*'s deſign of going over to *Madjee Scindia*, and that they expected in conſequence proper ſecurities from the Durbar for proceeding unmoleſted on their march.

62. On the 15th appears a letter from Mr. *Farmer*, containing the reſult of his conference with the Durbar, on his making known *Ragoba*'s determination of going over to *Madjee Scindia*: their language then was, that excluſive of this, a new treaty muſt be made on the ſpot between the Engliſh and the Maratta State, the one made by Colonel *Upton* being entirely broke by the invaſion of their country. Mr. *Farmer* in a few words conveys a very expreſſive idea of the ſenſe entertained by the Durbar of the advantage at which they held our army. "They ſeem to feel themſelves (he ſays) in "that ſituation with reſpect to us, which the Turkiſh "Vizier felt himſelf in with reſpect to *Peter* the 1ſt, at "the time the Empreſs *Catherine* ſent in her jewels to "the Vizier."

63. On the ſame day is entered an opinion, ſubſcribed by Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* then in command of the army, with reſpect to the practicability of making good their retreat, which he deſcribes as utterly impoſſible. He concludes with theſe words, "I therefore "cannot charge myſelf to conduct the army under theſe "circumſtances to *Bombay*, and humanity muſt prompt "ſome other method than an attempt to retire in the "face of the whole ſtrength of the Maratta empire, with "ſuch an handful of men, who muſt in ſuch caſe be "ſacrificed."

64. The committee directed Mr. *Farmer* to acquaint the Durbar, in anſwer to the further condition they inſiſted on, that they demanded what the committee had no powers to agree to, the entering into, and concluding treaties being ſolely confined to the Governor General and Council; that the only power left them was to give up the cauſe and perſon of *Ragoba*, which done, muſt certainly put an end to all diſputes between the Engliſh and Maratta State. The committee further deſired Mr. *Farmer* to inform the Durbar, that ſhould they enter into any treaty they ſhould only deceive them, having no ſuch powers.

65. All their applications having been hitherto directed to the Durbar in general, it appeared to the committee that a gentleman being ſent to *Madjee Scindia* would be more likely to produce an accommodation, and Mr. *Holmes* the Commiſſary was accordingly deputed with full powers to ſettle for the peaceable return of the army to *Bombay*.

66. In the mean time the committee's letter was delivered to Mr. *Farmer* in the Durbar, by *Ajee Phow*, on the part of *Madjee Scindia*: as repreſenting the Durbar, he deſired to be informed of the contents; when Mr. *Farmer* explained what the committee had ſaid relative

lative to want of powers, and deſired an anſwer to the ſingle propoſition, whether on the delivery of *Ragoba*, ſecurities would be given for the ſafe and unmoleſted return of the army to *Bombay*. After further argument on the ſubject, the Durbar ſtill inſiſted that a new treaty ſhould be made, and demanded a true tranſlation of the committee's letter, at the ſame time giving Mr. *Farmer* to underſtand, that if he did not comply, there were people in the camp who underſtood Engliſh. Mr. *Farmer* appeared concerned at this, becauſe the committee's declaration ſeemed to preclude all peaceable arrangements; but however the Durbar ſtill continue to inſiſt that till a new treaty was made the Engliſh army muſt remain where it was.

67. Late in the evening of the 15th, Mr. *Holmes* returned from the Maratta camp, and reported, that he had ſettled matters with *Madjee Scindia* and the reſt of the Durbar, for the peaceable return of the army to *Bombay*, on the only terms they would hear of, which in ſhort were the ſurrender of all the poſſeſſions under this Preſidency, acquired ſince the reign of *Madarow*; and the retrogreſſion of the Bengal army. The committee however, remarked in their diary, that *Madjee Scindia* and the whole Durbar could not plead ignorance of their want of powers to conclude ſuch a treaty, they having demanded both a true explanation and tranſlation of their letter to Mr. *Farmer*, in which they ſo ſtrongly diſclaimed all ſuch power.

68. Under the 16th is entered a tranſlation of the treaty, as alſo of a ſeparate article in favour of *Madjee Scindia*, which Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Holmes* adviſed the committee they were obliged to conſent to. A copy of the treaty, and of the ſeparate article, is alſo tranſmitted in the packet, under No. 42.

69. Mr. *Carnac*, has minuted on our proceedings, that having ſince his return peruſed the tranſlation of the treaty and ſeparate article, he finds them conceived in ſuch terms, that he ſhould certainly have objected thereto at the time of ſignature, had they been literally explained to him; but that he only underſtood the contents in general terms, and indeed was the more indifferent as to the particular wording of them, as he always bore in his mind the idea that they were of no validity, and would never be ratified by our ſuperiors.

70. Mr. *Farmer* and Lieutenant *Charles Stewart* were left with *Madjee Scindia* as hoſtages for the performance of the agreement with him.

71. The committee delivered to *Madjee Scindia*'s Vackeel, a letter addreſſed to Colonel *Goddard*, which does not appear in the diary, Mr. *Farmer* not having kept a copy: the purport however was to adviſe him, that the face of things was ſo materially altered ſince their writing to him laſt, as to occaſion their marching back to *Bombay*; and that in conſequence of an agreement entered into by them with the Marattas, they directed him to march back with the army under his command to *Bengal*. This letter was dated the 16th January. On the 19th the committee adviſed Colonel *Goddard*, that upon recollection not thinking themſelves authorized to give the order contained in their letter of the 16th, he was to pay no regard thereto.

72. On the 17th Mr. *Farmer* returned to the Maratta camp with the papers executed, and a preſent of a horſe for *Madjee Scindia*. He came back to our camp about noon with a party of horſe, who were to accompany the army to *Panwell*. The army accordingly began their march on the 17th in the afternoon, and in ſeven days reached *Panwell*, from whence they were tranſported to *Bombay*.

73. The Select Committee then at *Bombay*, beg to take notice in this place, that the reſolution for retreating, the difficulties the army was brought into, and the negociation commenced in conſequence, were tranſacted and concluded before we had any knowledge thereof, the communication with the army being ſtopt by the enemy.

74. The Poonah committee on making the agreement found themſelves under a neceſſity, in compliance with the cuſtom of the eaſt, to make preſents amongſt the officers of the Durbar, to the amount of rupees 41,000, for which notes were given. Appendix. No. 130.

75. Under the 20th January are entered on the Poonah committee's diary the orders we gave under the 11th, on being apprized of their ſituation and proſpects when they arrived at *Mondhurna* plain, as deſcribed therein under the 6th; which orders, owing to the ſtoppage of the roads, did not reach them till the army was on its return.

76. Before the committee arrived at *Panwell*, they received a letter from Mr. *Farmer*, adviſing that *Madjee Scindia* had acquainted him, that as he (*Madjee Scindia*) was ſecurity to the Durbar for the due performance of the late ſtipulations, he deſired that Mr. *Farmer* and Lieutenant *Stewart* would accompany him wherever he went; and Mr. *Farmer* added, the charge was very agreeable in every reſpect, as he treated them with great civility and attention.

77. We have now brought the account of this expedition to a concluſion; in which we have confined ourſelves to a mere narrative of facts, as ſtated in the committee's diary and Colonel *Egerton*'s letters to the Preſident, avoiding an opinion, or entering into particulars more than neceſſary to connect our account, and give you a general idea of the matters repreſented. Any judgment offered by us might be imputed to the feelings naturally ariſing from the diſappointment of a ſcheme which we had promoted with ſo much zeal, and by the event of which we, Mr. *Draper* excepted on account of his diſſent, are ourſelves liable to be affected; and it has for theſe reaſons appeared the moſt equitable and impartial method to ſend only a general ſtatement to you and to the Governor General and Council, accompanied with every voucher that can tend to illuſtrate the ſubject, and make your information as complete as poſſible, leaving to you to form your own judgment from the materials before you, to what cauſes the failure of the expedition is to be attributed, and on whom cenſure ought to fall.

78. In purſuance of this plan we ſhall lay before you in order, the ſeveral letters and papers that have been delivered in relative to this expedition, the particulars of which will be mentioned in the ſequel of this addreſs, as many of them are connected with matters not yet mentioned, which have taken place ſince the expedition.

79. In the 21ſt paragraph our advices, brought down to the 30th September, left Colonel *Leſlie* at *Rajegur* the 25th Auguſt, and, as we then thought, preparing to continue his march. We had no further accounts of the Bengal army till the 28th October, when we received a letter from Colonel *Goddard*, dated the 4th of that month; by which we obſerved with concern that the army ſtill remained at *Rajegur*. Colonel *Goddard* therein adviſed, that Colonel *Leſlie* had died on the preceding day; and that the command having thereby devolved on him, he ſhould march from that place in three or four days. In our reply to this letter, dated the 13th Nov. we repeated the directions before given to Colonel *Leſlie*, for the army to march towards *Poonah* with all poſſible expedition; at the ſame time giving to underſtand that his early arrival might be very eſſential to the ſucceſs of the important ſcheme we had then in agitation. By his next letter, dated the 31ſt Oct. and received the 30th November, we found him advanced to *Kemlaſſy*, on the road to the *Nerbudda*; and after the treaty had been concluded, and our forces had actually landed on the Continent, we then more fully explained our plan, and again urged him to purſue his march with all poſſible expedition.

80. On the 18th December, whilſt our army lay at the foot of the Ghauts, we received advices from Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard* in twenty-two days, dated at *Bopaul*,

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Bopaul, within 18 coſs of the *Nerbudda*, which he hoped to croſs in five or ſix days, and in two days more to enter the territories of the Berar Rajah.

81. The ſame day we received a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 15th October, adviſing us of their having removed Colonel *Leſlie* from the command, on account of the little progreſs the detachment had made under him, and of his manifeſt diſobedience of their poſitive order, in concluding a treaty with two Chiefs of the Bundelcund country; that they had appointed Colonel *Goddard* to the chief command, and ordered him to proſecute his march without further loſs of time into *Berar*, where, on his arrival, he was to apply to *Moodajee Booſla*, and if that Chief ſhould agree to join him with a ſufficient body of forces for the purpoſe, he was to continue his route in conjunction with them, and to obey all orders he might receive from us; but if he ſhould not have received any freſh directions for his march, and if the Rajah ſhould decline or refuſe to grant his aſſiſtance, they had then veſted in Colonel *Goddard* a diſcretionary power to ſuſpend his proceedings.

82. The Governor General and Council to our great ſatisfaction added, that if the plan we had reſolved in July to carry into execution in September, for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, ſtill ſubſiſted, or if we ſhould have formed any other for the ſame end, conſiſtently with the terms which they had preſcribed for their aſſent to that meaſure; or if we ſhould judge a ſtrong reinforcement immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary to inſure the ſafety of *Bombay* againſt a French invaſion; and ſhould deem it requiſite and adviſable in either of thoſe caſes to command the detachment at all hazards to proceed further towards *Bombay*, even without a junction of the troops of any Power in alliance with the Company; they gave us the power in ſuch caſes, and in ſuch only, to require Colonel *Goddard* to advance, but in all others, to give him notice of our intentions, and to leave him to act under their directions.

83. They likewiſe acquainted us of the death of Mr. *Elliot*, and that as the Rajah had expreſſed great ſatisfaction at the overtures made for a connection with him, by that deputation they concluded he would take an active part in proſecuting the intended negociation, either by deputing a proper Miniſter to them on his part, or by ſoliciting an alliance on ſuch terms as might prove a general advantage to the Company's poſſeſſions; for theſe reaſons, they did not mean to appoint any perſon to ſucceed Mr. *Elliot*, until their advices from the Rajah ſhould enable them to determine on the expediency of the meaſure.

84. Upon receipt of this letter, though we concluded that Colonel *Goddard* having by that time received freſh inſtructions from us, would according to the clauſe in his orders from *Bengal* continue to advance to this coaſt, yet, to prevent all diſappointment, and that he might be at no loſs in his proceedings, we immediately acquainted him in the terms of the letter from *Bengal*, that we deemed it requiſite and adviſable the detachment under his command ſhould move forwards towards *Bombay*; and therefore directed him to advance according to his former orders, even without a junction of the troops of any Power in alliance with the Honourable Company; hoping, that the movement of our forces would facilitate his march in the ſame degree that the advance of his detachment would leſſen the oppoſition to our forces.

85. On the 28th December we had the pleaſure to receive a letter from Colonel *Goddard*, dated the 6th, adviſing of his having croſſed the *Nerbudda*, and his being encamped at *Huſſengabad* on the ſouth bank of that river. He acquainted us, that he ſhould halt there a few days to determine his future route, and that in the intervening time, he hoped to be able to prevail on *Moodajee Booſla* to join him with a body of troops, by which means the inconveniences he might otherwiſe expect, reſpecting his ſupplies of proviſions, would be obviated.

86. In theſe letters, Colonel *Goddard* further urged the expediency of immediately taking ſome vigorous meaſures to counteract the oppoſition of the Miniſters to his march, and to cauſe a diverſion in order to prevent their employing their whole force againſt him, which he was apt to believe would be ſtrengthened with that of the Nizam.

87. The march of our forces had already anticipated his wiſhes in that reſpect; and on reference to our proceedings of the 12th October you will pleaſe to obſerve, that the facilitating the march of the Bengal detachment was a ſtrong conſideration with us for immediately undertaking the expedition. Matters now wore rather a pleaſing aſpect; our troops had juſt aſcended the Ghauts, and we had reaſon to expect that Colonel *Goddard* would ſoon make good his march, and that every ſtep both armies advanced, would be a mutual advantage to both, by dividing the efforts of the enemy.

88. We have already acquainted you how fatally we have been diſappointed in the hopes we entertained from the advance of our troops; and Colonel *Goddard* received advice of the miſcarriage of our army a ſhort time before we had been put under ſuch reſtrictions, that we began to be apprehenſive he would loſe the advantage of the exertion we had made, and that we ſhould even be entirely deprived of the ſervices of his detachment, at leaſt for this ſeaſon; for on the 10th January we received a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 23d November, referring to a letter of the 16th of that month, which we have never yet received, wherein they had informed us of their having veſted Colonel *Goddard* with full powers to conclude a treaty with *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, on the grounds of their inſtructions to the late Mr. *Elliot*; a copy of which was ſaid to be encloſed, but which has likewiſe never come to hand, ſo that we are to this moment totally uninformed as to the particular points of the intended alliance with that Chief. But the Governor General and Council acquainted us, that the event of that negociation was likely to cauſe a very ſpeedy and eſſential change in the deſigns and operations of the detachment; and as the plan which they had choſen to ſupply the place of that originally recommended by us, rendered it neceſſary that they ſhould retain in their own hands the means of effecting it, they therefore revoked the power which they had given us in their letter of the 15th October, and ſhould direct the commanding officer of the detachment to obey only ſuch orders as he might hereafter receive from them. This letter was tranſmitted by Colonel *Goddard*, who adviſed that he ſhould regulate his conduct accordingly.

89. They further acquainted us, that although the circumſtances into which they had been thrown by the failure of the plan for which the detachment was originally formed, had rendered it neceſſary to make that alteration in the controul and direction of it, their intention was not entirely to withdraw the ſervices of the detachment from the ſupport of any meaſures we might have formed in reliance on them, if ſuch meaſures ſhould not prove incompatible with the inſtructions given to Colonel *Goddard*, and with the engagements which he might conclude in conſequence of them; that they ſhould therefore leave him ſtill ſubject to our inſtructions under thoſe proviſions; and they requeſted we would communicate to them ſuch points as we might judge proper to be included in the operations to be concerted with the Rajah of *Berar*.

90. We have recited at length the letter from the Governor General in Council, and when our ſituation at the time is conſidered, you may eaſily conceive the perplexity we were thrown into by the intelligence it conveyed to us; we had then juſt received the advices from the army entered in the Poonah committee's diary under the 6th January, when affairs above the Ghauts ſeemed

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not to wear an appearance as we had expected, and the aſſiſtance of the Bengal detachment, on which we had always depended, appeared abſolutely neceſſary on that account; excluſive of this conſideration, we reflected that there was only an interval of little more than four months left him to perform his march before the monſoon would ſet in, and that it was highly proper he ſhould reach this coaſt before that time, in order to ſecure *Bombay* in caſe of an attack by the French at the opening of the ſeaſon, which it might be out of his power to perform if any conſiderable time was employed in the negociations. Uninformed as we were as to the object thereof or of the plan ſaid to be ſubſtituted in lieu of ours, we could not judge what points it might be neceſſary to include reſpecting this Preſidency in the alliance to be concluded with *Moodajee Booſla*; all we could do in ſuch a ſituation was to explain to Colonel *Goddard* our views in the engagement we had formed with *Ragoba*, and to ſend him a copy of the treaty, that he might judge how far our meaſures were compatible with his inſtructions from *Bengal*: and we at the ſame time ſtrongly urged to him the neceſſity of his advancing to this coaſt as ſoon as poſſible, explaining the difficulties we ſhould be under in caſe he ſhould not think himſelf at liberty to comply with our requiſition.

91. We think it proper to tranſmit copies of the letters we wrote on this occaſion to Colonel *Goddard* and to the Governor General and Council, which wait on you under No. 5; and leſt we ſhould be diſappointed in the arrival of the Bengal detachment, we deſired the gentlemen at *Madras* in ſuch caſe to give us a latitude to detain a part of the forces deſtined for the expedition againſt *Mahé*, after that ſervice ſhould be brought to an iſſue.

92. On the 21ſt January we again found this detachment returning to its former deſtination, Colonel *Goddard* informing us, under the 3d, from his camp at *Huſſengabad*, that the Rajah of *Berar* wiſhed at preſent to delay the buſineſs that was to have been concluded with him, urging, that our forces having taken the field obliged him to wait for anſwers from the Governor General and Council to letters he had wrote them, before he could take any further ſteps; that in this ſituation he had reſolved to march with all expedition towards *Zenor*, by the way of *Brampore*; but that it would be a week before he could commence his march, as he was waiting for the arrival of ſome money from *Naigpore* to pay his army, then two months in arrears.

93. At this time we knew no more of the ſituation of affairs above the Ghauts, than that there had been an action, in which we had ſuffered ſome loſs; and that the army was on the return to *Bombay*, after ſome very diſagreeable compromiſe; and as in ſuch circumſtances it might be improper and dangerous for Colonel *Goddard* to proceed to *Zenor*, and we concluded from his letter he was then actually on the march, we reſolved to ſend him immediate orders to direct his courſe to *Surat*; which order we repeated on the 3d February. By Colonel *Goddard*'s ſubſequent letters, we learnt that he had left the *Nerbudda* the 17th January, and after a march of eleven days, excluſive of three he had halted, two of which were on account of the illneſs and death of Lieutenant Colonel *Fortnom*, arrived in the neighbourhood of *Brampore* the 30th January, on which day he received the letter from the Poonah committee dated the 19th, revoking their orders of the 16th; which letter, though delivered to *Madjee Scindia*, had not then reached Colonel *Goddard*, which is a remarkable circumſtance, conſidering that *Madjee Scindia*, if he had been anxious for the quick diſpatch, could have conveyed the letter to the army in leſs than half the time employed by our Putamars. Colonel *Goddard* left *Brampore* on the 6th February, and on the 8th received the letter from the Poonah committee, dated the 16th January, with one from the Durbar to the ſame effect; and proceeding without interruption or intermiſſion, arrived at *Surat* the 25th February, after a march performed with wonderful rapidity from the time of his leaving the *Nerbudda*, through a tract of country almoſt unknown, and not leſs in extent that 500 miles; and for which much merit is due to Colonel *Goddard*.

94. We truſt to your candour and attentive conſideration of all circumſtances relative to this detachment, that you will not, drawing your concluſion from the event, impute error or temerity to us in undertaking the expedition before its arrival. We had beheld its ſlow progreſs, and the obſtructions it met with under Colonel *Leſlie*, and could foreſee the increaſed dangers and difficulties it would have to encounter in the paſſage through the Maratta dominions, which, conſidering the temper of the Durbar, might be termed a hoſtile country. We therefore judged, and we conceive with good reaſon, that by ſending our forces into the field, we ſhould facilitate the approach of Colonel *Goddard*. We hope it will ſtill be allowed, that this meaſure did at leaſt produce that good effect; and that by drawing off the enemy's forces to another quarter, we ſecured an unmoleſted march to the Bengal army, whoſe arrival has inſured ſafety to our poſſeſſions, and put us in a condition to act as circumſtances may render neceſſary. At the ſame time, in juſtice to Colonel *Goddard*, we muſt obſerve, that he made the proper uſe of the advantage given him, and by his ſingular activity, did not allow the enemy time to take meaſures for giving him any material interruption, even if ſuch had been their intention, after the convention of *Worgaum*.

95. If our army had been found unequal ſingle to the accompliſhment of the undertaking we had engaged in, and not ſufficiently formidable, whether with reſpect to numbers or the vigour of its operations, to give confidence to the partizans of *Ragoba* to declare openly in his favour, we never could entertain a doubt but that it would be able to keep the field againſt any country enemy; in which opinion, we are perſuaded, we ſhall have the ſuffrage of all perſons converſant in India ſervice; and a ſpace leſs than a month from the concluſion of their operations would have brought Colonel *Goddard* ſo near that the enemy muſt have divided their force, *Poonah* being nearly the ſame diſtance from *Brampore* as *Surat*; and a junction once effected, the expedition might have been brought to a happy iſſue.

96. It is impoſſible to ſay whether Colonel *Goddard* could have made his way through ſo large a tract of country adverſe to his march, had it not been for the diverſion made by our troops, who took up the whole attention of the enemy; but this being a matter not decided by experiment, we ſhall ſubmit to your judgment.

97. Had we been apprized in time that the negociation with *Moodajee* was to affect the operations of the Bengal detachment, or that in the intended alliance with him was comprehended a plan to ſupply the place of the one originally recommended by us, and to anſwer the ſame purpoſes; we certainly ſhould not have proſecuted our plan for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, and thereby have avoided the confuſion inſeparable from a complicate ſcheme, when ſo great a diſtance lays between the parties. But we appeal to you, whether from the letters from *Bengal* of the 17th of Auguſt and 15th October, we had any reaſon to entertain ſuch an idea of the negociation with *Moodajee? on the* contrary, in the laſt of theſe letters the Governor General and Council, after they knew of the reſtraint laid on *Moraba*, and the members of his party, gave us reaſon to conclude, that they ſtill depended on us for the accompliſhment of thoſe grand objects we both had in view, by their giving us the controul over Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, whether the plan formed in July exiſted, or "whether we had formed "any other for the ſame end, conſiſtently with terms "they had preſcribed for their aſſent."

98. We never viewed the negociation with the Rajah of *Berar* in a light ſo intimately affecting this Preſidency,

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till the receipt of the letter from *Bengal* on the 10th January, and then it was too late for us to retract; and as we could not conceive it to be very material to the Company, whether the ſame purpoſe was effected by an alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, or by a connection with *Ragonath Row*, we immediately urged Colonel *Goddard* to advance to the ſupport of our meaſures in favour of *Ragoba*, which he ſaw the propriety of complying with; *Moodajee* having made a plea therefrom to protract the intended negociation with him. With reſpect to the political ſentiments of *Moodajee*, Colonel *Goddard* obſerved, that he did not think him partial to the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row*, but he was convinced he was amicably inclined to the Engliſh.

99. We ſhall now proceed to a detail of our proceedings after the return of the troops from the expedition.

100. At our firſt meeting, held on the 29th January, when Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* reſumed their ſeats, the diary of the Poonah committee was laid before us, and read through with attention; in the courſe of which Colonel *Egerton* made ſundry remarks, as noticed in the copy of our proceedings on that day, and in particular proteſted againſt and diſavowed the minutes of a meeting noticed in the diary to have been held by the Poonah committee on the 15th January, alledging, that to the beſt of his knowledge no meeting was held on that day. The ſeveral papers delivered in reſpecting this point are in the packet; and when the peruſal of the diary was finiſhed, the Preſident laid before us a minute, ſtating generally, that the cauſes of the failure of the expedition might be matter of future conſideration, but that no time ought to be loſt in determining on the means neceſſary for ſupporting and retrieving our affairs; for which purpoſe he meant ſoon to deſire another meeting, when he hoped to be able to propoſe ſome plan of conduct for extricating us from the difficulties of our preſent ſituation. In this minute, after giving due praiſe to the bravery and merit of our troops on the late ſervice, who he doubted not, under proper conduct, would be fully ſufficient to ſecure your poſſeſſions under this Preſidency againſt all attempts of the moſt formidable country enemy. He proceeded to ſhew the neceſſity of keeping up the gallant ſpirit of the army, which could not be done without diſtinguiſhing thoſe whoſe behaviour had done them honour, and marking the men who had been wanting in their duty, and whoſe example could not fail of corrupting our military eſtabliſhment in all its branches. He noticed the miſbehaviour of three ſubaltern officers who were to be tried by a general court martial; but obſerved he did not think an example made of them ſufficient, and that he had accordingly intimated to Colonel *Egerton* on his arrival, that his conduct, as well as Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*'s, as officers, appeared to him ſo far impeached, that he judged it would be proper for them both to decline acting in any military character. That Colonel *Egerton* having thought proper to inſiſt on taking the command of the garriſon, unleſs a formal charge was delivered againſt him; the Preſident did then deliver in a formal charge againſt him, and againſt Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, for refuſing to charge themſelves with conducting the army from *Worgaum* to *Bombay*; grounding the accuſation on the written opinion ſubſcribed by Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, in which Colonel *Egerton* did on the ſame day declare (and again at this meeting) he entirely concurred.

101. The Preſident then giving it as his fixed opinion, that nothing could juſtify officers in their ſtation for giving in ſuch an opinion of the troops under their command but an open mutiny in the army, declared he would not conſent to their continuing in the command. That their own orders of thanks to the troops for their behaviour on the 12th, ſufficiently ſhewed how totally void of foundation the opinion was, "That our troops "would not ſtand a ſingle attack;" yet that the fatal influence and infection of ſuch opinions, when adopted and avowed by the ſuperiors in command, were well known, and would not ſuffer us to wonder if ſentiments of the like kind did gain ſome ground under ſuch a ſanction. That this however could not be admitted as an extenuation, much leſs as a juſtification of the conduct of Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and was beſides a circumſtance ſo big with danger, that they could not be allowed to ſupport their extraordinary and unſoldier-like way of thinking, by the authority of the inferior officers. Thus circumſtanced, the Preſident obſerves he ſhould think himſelf juſtified in moving for ſuſpending both thoſe officers from the ſervice; but that they might prevent that extremity, if they choſe to decline all military duty, till their conduct, together with the reſt of the late tranſactions, had been ſtated to *Bengal*, and the opinion and advice of the Governor General and Council with regard to them were received. The Preſident acquainted us his intention was to be guided by the ſentiments they might expreſs as to the propriety of continuing Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* in the ſervice, or the expediency of diſmiſſing them from it.

102. If they did not chuſe to accept this propoſal, the Preſident moved, that they might both be immediately ſuſpended the ſervice.

103. It was agreed this minute ſhould lie on the table; and at our next meeting on the 1ſt of February, the Preſident acquainted us, that Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* had declined all military duty till our further orders; and he then deſired the ſenſe of the Committee might be taken, whether according to your commands, Colonel *Egerton* was entitled to hold his ſeat in the Select Committee, ſince he had relinquiſhed all military command?

104. It was voted by the majority and reſolved accordingly, that Colonel *Egerton* had no right, and was not to be conſidered as a member of the Select Committee, until he might reſume the exerciſe of his office as Commander in Chief; and he in conſequence was ſuperſeded.

105. A copy of our proceedings on that day is tranſmitted in the packet, wherein is ſtated at length the opinion of each member on the queſtion of Colonel *Egerton*'s right to his ſeat in the Committee; and we alſo tranſmit a copy at length, of the Governor's minute, and of the correſpondence between him and Colonel *Egerton*, in the interval between our meetings of the 29th of January and the 1ſt of February, and of the general order given out in conſequence; which it is neceſſary to recommend to your attention, as Colonel *Egerton* has ſince denied his having accepted the alternative offered him by the Preſident.

106. Colonel *Egerton* has wrote us ſeveral letters on the ſubject, and inſiſting upon reſuming the command of the army; but we continued in our reſolution not to admit of his retracting, or of his taking the command, until he received the ſentiments of the Governor General and Council on his conduct.

107. A copy of his letters, and of our anſwers in their proper order, is tranſmitted in the packet, alſo of a proteſt he thought proper to deliver, and a minute made by the Preſident, in conſequence, with an addreſs from the Colonel to you, and a copy of his addreſs to the Governor General and Council; all of which, agreeable to our before-mentioned reſolution, we beg leave to ſubmit to your judgment.

108. Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* having delivered in a letter relative to his own conduct on the late ſervice, a copy thereof is tranſmitted in the packet with the other papers, the particulars of which will be mentioned in the ſequel.

109. The predicament in which Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* now ſtand, and the death of Lieutenant Colonel *Cay*, rendered it a caſe of indiſpenſable neceſſity to make ſome immediate arrangement for the command of the army; Lieutenant Colonel *Nelſon*,

the chief engineer, as the ſenior officer on the eſtabliſhment, received the command of the garriſon, when Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* declined all military duty, and Lieutenant Colonel *Dagon* held the command of the artillery, but we had no field officer for the command of the infantry eſtabliſhment, in whoſe abilities or experience we had ſufficient confidence to intruſt ſo important a charge at a time like this. We had before, whilſt the army was in the field, when Colonel *Egerton* gave up the command to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, been under the neceſſity of appointing Major *Dagon* of the artillery a Lieutenant Colonel, in order to ſecure a fit officer for the ſecond command, or to ſucceed to the chief command in caſe of accidents to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*: our reaſons for which are fully ſtated in our proceedings of the 5th of January, a copy of which waits on you under No. 17.

110. At this time Major *Emanuel Henney* was the ſenior officer, and in command of the infantry; who, on his firſt appointment as a field officer, was barred from further promotion, and was the officer whom we judged it our duty to ſuperſede in the field, by the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Dagon* as above mentioned. We deemed it, therefore, in no ſhape proper to continue Major *Henney* in command of our infantry eſtabliſhment.

111. Major *Charles Frederick* was the next officer in ſtanding. He had been but lately arrived from *England*, and, as we underſtand, had borne a commiſſion in the guards, but had never ſeen actual ſervice before the late expedition. When you ſent him out as the youngeſt Brevet Major, we preſume you did not expect he would ſo early arrive at the ſucceſſion to an advanced rank, and a poſt of the firſt military charge: and as by an unforeſeen chain of circumſtances, it had devolved to us to make the appointment of an officer for the command of the infantry, we conſidered ourſelves as reſponſible for the choice we made, and on that principle we did not think we ſhould do juſtice to the charge repoſed in us by promoting Major *Frederick*.

112. However it was abſolutely neceſſary that we ſhould have an officer at the head of the infantry, on whoſe conduct we could ſafely rely, and it was at the ſame time highly incumbent on us, conſidering the ſtate of the army, to confer the moſt honourable marks of notice on thoſe officers who had particularly diſtinguiſhed themſelves on the late unfortunate expedition; both theſe conſiderations ſtrongly united in pointing out Captain *James Hartley*, who of all the officers on our military liſt appeared the moſt fit for this command: his behaviour in a courſe of fourteen years ſervice has been unexceptionable, and his conduct and intrepidity in the action of the 12th of January, when he commanded the rear diviſion, merited every reward in our power to beſtow, and, as far as we can judge, proved the preſervation of the whole army. His merit, and the judgment he ſhewed on that occaſion, are acknowledged in the general orders given out by Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* and Colonel *Egerton* immediately after the action, wherein Captain *Hartley* is the only officer particularly commended, except Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* himſelf.

113. Under theſe circumſtances, we reſolved to appoint Captain *Hartley* a Lieutenant Colonel of infantry, and we do moſt earneſtly ſolicit you to confirm this appointment, to convince the army that we ſhall meet with your ſupport when the good of the ſervice makes it requiſite that we ſhould diſtinguiſh particular officers. We are very ſorry that we have been obliged to act contrary to your orders reſpecting the promotion of field officers, but we truſt the neceſſity will plead our excuſe. On the terms we are with the Marattas, and in a time of actual war with *France*, it would have been highly unjuſtifiable in us to have ſuffered our military to remain for any length of time without an officer to command them, qualified either to preſerve them in proper diſcipline, or lead them into the field; and we hope that the reluctance we muſt naturally feel to all kinds of ſuperceſſion, and the complaints we foreſaw we ſhould expoſe ourſelves to from individuals, will be a conviction to you of the ground and neceſſity for the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*. Appendix. No. 130.

114. Captain *John Weſtphall*, the ſenior Captain of artillery, having alſo particularly diſtinguiſhed himſelf on the late ſervice, we reſolved unſolicited to appoint him a Major of artillery, to which he had a title by ſeniority; and the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Dagon* was a reward due to his ability and merit.

115. We alſo conferred marks of our attention on Captain *Bellas*, of the artillery, Captain *Cadger*, of the infantry, and Lieutenants *Dawſon*, *Bowles*, *Jackſon*, *Thomas*, *Waddington*, *Bannatyne*, *Macpherſon*, and *Burchall*, and the ſix companies of grenadier Sepoys, who compoſed the rear diviſion under Captain *Hartley*; the particulars of all which are mentioned in the copy of our minutes under the 1ſt ultimo, tranſmitted under No. 17.

116. Lieutenant *John Rattray* of the Bengal eſtabliſhment, who arrived from *England* in the *Royal Henry*, and went a volunteer on the expedition, where he gave ſtrong proofs of his ſkill and conduct as an officer, we returned him our public thanks for his ſervices; and as we were glad of the opportunity of adding ſuch a valuable officer to our eſtabliſhment, we offered him a commiſſion as youngeſt Captain, which we doubt not you will approve.

117. As in *India* ſervice in general, and particularly in our ſmall army, the charge and reſponſibility of each Captain is very great, and the moſt dangerous conſequences may ariſe from improper perſons being promoted to that rank, we judged it for the good of the ſervice to make it a rule, and ſignified accordingly to the army, that the Lieutenants will not in future be promoted in rotation to the rank of Captains, either in the infantry or artillery, unleſs they ſhall be judged fully qualified for that ſtation.

118. Agreeable to this rule, we have ſet aſide Captain *John Holebrook* from the command of a company of artillery, to which he was next in ſucceſſion; the Commandant of the corps having repreſented him ſo much addicted to liquor, as to be unfit for that charge. Lieutenant *Coldbatch* of the infantry, and Lieutenant *Layton* of the artillery, have alſo been paſſed over in a late promotion; but we ſhall re-conſider the caſe of the latter, if we diſcover proper ſigns of amendment.

119. We have received repreſentations on the ſubject from ſeveral of the officers who were ſuperſeded by the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*: and Major *Frederick* has reſigned his commiſſion, and ſet out for *England* by the way of *Suez*. In his letter he aſſumes to himſelf the chief part of the merit attributed to Captain *Hartley*, in the action of the 12th; and we therefore think it neceſſary to mention, that although Major *Frederick* was ſent to reinforce Captain *Hartley*, he has made a great miſtake in reſpect to the time when he was ſent, which is confirmed by the evidence of Captain *Rattray* and other circumſtances; it muſt be obſerved, though not taken notice of by Major *Frederick*, but which is confirmed by Captain *Rattray*, and in part allowed by Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* himſelf in his letter to us, that when Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* ſent him down to ſupport the rear diviſion, he was ordered, though the ſuperior officer, to act in concert with Captain *Hartley*, and not to make any movement without his advice. This is a very particular circumſtance, and ſtrongly expreſſive of the commanding officer's confidence in Captain *Hartley*, to which we may add the general orders given out at the time, when no other impreſſion prevailed but the ſenſe of Captain *Hartley*'s diſtinguiſhed ſervices. In theſe orders not a word is mentioned of Major *Frederick*; but ſince the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* we have received commendations of Major *Frederick*.

120. In the packet we ſend copies of the letters we have received

Appendix, No. 130.

received from Majors *Frederick* and *Hopkins*, and Captains *Jackson*, *Fewtrell*, *Campbell*, and *Turner*, and of our anſwers. The laſt-mentioned officer is in the engineer corps, and is not ſuperſeded by Colonel *Hartley*, but thought himſelf reflected on in the general orders. This point we cleared up and did him juſtice.

121. It is a plea much inſiſted upon by our officers, that if we have any fault to find with their conduct, and think it neceſſary to ſuperſede them, they ought to have a trial by a general court martial. To this we anſwer, that many officers may paſs through the ſervice without laying themſelves open to the military law, and yet may be very unqualified to riſe to the higheſt ſtations in their line. The times required an officer who had ſomething more to plead than merely not having committed a fault: we wanted an officer of active and approved merit, and on whoſe ability and conduct we could depend for the execution of any ſervice committed to him.

122. It is ſcarce poſſible to give you an adequate idea of the deficiency of our military eſtabliſhment in point of officers. In the artillery and engineer corps indeed we are ſo fortunate as to have a number of well-formed, active, deſerving officers; but in the infantry we ſee a very ſmall proportion of our long liſt of Captains, from whom we can flatter ourſelves with any extraordinary expectations, in caſe of their ever riſing to a ſuperior command, and even of this ſmall number we muſt look for the greater part amongſt the junior Captains. You will ſee on reference to the correſpondence between the Preſident and Mr. *Carnac* during the late ſervice, and by the Preſident's letter to Colonel *Cockburn* upon his taking the command, how much was thought to depend on the abilities of Captain *Hartley* and Captain *Stewart*, and how eſſential a point to fix them in Colonel *Cockburn*'s particular confidence. The very ſtrong, natural, and acquired qualifications of Captain *Stewart* as an officer, had giving us the moſt flattering hopes of ſeeing him in the liſt of thoſe names that have done the greateſt honour to your military ſervice, and his loſs is one of thoſe circumſtances which in our preſent ſituation we moſt ſenſibly feel. The unhappy termination of the expedition, on which he was cut off, together with the general opinion entertained of the different ſucceſs that would have attended our army had Captain *Stewart*'s rank been ſuch as to have enabled us to have given him the command, are circumſtances that juſtly augment our regret.

123. Captain *Hartley*'s merits cannot be ſeen in a more favourable point of view than in the choice that was made of him to ſucceed Captain *Stewart* in the command of the advanced diviſion of the army, and his conduct in that charge was in every inſtance ſuch as did him honour, and will we hope juſtify the diſtinction to which we have thought it entitled him. On the day of the 12th there is reaſon to think, that had his ſpirited and judicious counſels been followed, of moving up the line to ſupport him, inſtead of his retreating to the line, the fortune of that day might have been ſuch as to have ſecured our honour, if not our ſucceſs; and as it was, his keeping his ground with his diviſion till his repreſentation of the inevitable bad conſequences of ſuch a meaſure induced Colonel *Cockburn* to revoke his orders for retreating, was probably the chief circumſtance to which the preſervation of our divided forces was due.

124. Many particulars will appear in the papers to which we have referred in this letter, to ſupport and confirm the opinion we have given with regard to the merit of Captain *Hartley*, and to juſtify our motives in advancing him to his preſent rank. Yet we are ſenſible we muſt ſtill truſt much to your favourable interpretation of our conduct, and to your confidence in the motives by which we were governed in taking this ſtep.

125. At a time when the two chief officers on our eſtabliſhment are under cenſure for a conduct totally oppoſite to that we think ourſelves bound to promote, and to that ſpirit which it is our duty to encourage among your troops; when ſo great a number of perſons find an intereſt in maintaining, by any means, the claim of ſeniority to promotion, in preference to diſtinguiſhed merit and ſervices; it is impoſſible for us to produce thoſe general and deciſive teſtimonies of our aſſertions and opinions which we always wiſh ſhould accompany. There is a tenderneſs due to moderate talents and exertions of perſons of ordinary merit, which does not allow us even to point out to themſelves, the inſtances in which we judge them deficient, or in which we think their junior far ſurpaſſes them. Our anſwers therefore to the ſeveral complaints of ſuperceſſion have been of a general kind; but we would not therefore have you to ſuppoſe that we have not particular reaſons, founded on the perſonal knowledge of characters, for preferring Captain *Hartley* to every one of thoſe gentlemen. It would be to no purpoſe to enter into them here, ſince however minute we might be, the whole weight of what we might urge would depend on the authority you might be willing to allow to our capacity and integrity in forming our judgments of the men, and in the faithful communication of our real ſentiments; we will therefore only beg leave to remind you, that in the preſent critical circumſtances our own intereſt is too much complicated with that of the public to ſuffer us to be ſwayed by motives of partial or private regard. The opportunities we likewiſe have of acquiring an intimate knowledge of the characters of your ſervants, we hope will entitle our opinions of them to ſome conſideration; and we will only obſerve further, that the abilities, integrity, temper, and the general eſtimation each perſon ſtands in in his reſpective branch of ſervice, are commonly well underſtood on the ſpot, and that while we are conſcious of being guided by ſuch qualities, we feel that we have paid that attention to your intereſt which our duty exacts from us, and ſhall rely on that ſupport from you which the performance of it requires, and warrants us to hope for.

126. There are two circumſtances which in this place we cannot paſs over, both as they are material for your information, and are inſtances of the neceſſity of the meaſure we have adopted in the military line, and of the occaſion we have for your ſupport and confidence. The firſt relates to the ſeveral complaints of the perſons ſuperſeded by Colonel *Hartley*'s promotion; the ſecond to the caſe of Major *Frederick*, who would have it thought that he was particularly injured by it.

127. You will ſee by Colonel *Cockburn*'s letter to us of the 16th February, in what manner he endeavours to exculpate himſelf, and juſtify that written opinion of his, on which the Governor has formed his charge againſt him, in his minute of the 29th January. This you will find he attempts, by referring to the reports of deſertion amongſt the Sepoys, and panic amongſt the Europeans, brought to him by ſeveral unnamed officers; and we have reaſon to think that much of this ſpirit had ſpread through the army; and it is no ſmall occaſion of the diſſatisfaction we expreſs at the conduct of Colonel *Cockburn*, that he does not ſeem to have at all exerted himſelf to repreſs that deſpondency, or to revive and ſupport the ſpirits and courage of his troops. Had he ſhewn the firmneſs, vigour, and example ſo eſſentially requiſite in a commander on ſuch an emergency, we have no reaſon to ſuppoſe but that a retreat might have been effected; for neither the loſs on our ſide in the action of the 12th, nor any advantage gained by the enemy on that day, were ſuch as can be termed deciſive. At any rate, the trial ſhould have been made, and a few marches would have put it out of the power of the enemy materially to annoy them.

128. The bad conſequences of a contrary conduct have been too ſeverely felt in their effect to need further deſcription; but we are aſſured that Captain *Hartley*, in that trying ſituation, notwithſtanding the contagion of bad example, diſtinguiſhed himſelf more honourably, becauſe in a manner more uncommon, than

he had before done in action. He inſiſted he could depend on the men he had commanded; and ſome deſertion having appeared in his own battalion, from which he had been removed to command the advanced diviſion of the army, he joined that diviſion to his battalion, whilſt the army remained at *Worgaum*, and at once put a ſtop to the evil, ſo far as the limits of his command extended. When he was conſulted on the occaſion, he urged every argument to attempt the forcing a retreat, rather than ſubmit to the humiliating terms preſcribed by the enemy; he even formed a diſpoſition, and preſented it to Colonel *Cockburn*, for conducting the retreat, and avoiding the inconveniencies reſulting from a night march, and the diviſion of the troops. Theſe are circumſtances we have every reaſon to believe; and yet you will plainly perceive, that in the preſent ſituation of affairs, we cannot expect to have them vouched for by thoſe from whom any formal teſtimony could with moſt propriety have been received; and indeed they imply a compariſon ſo unfavourable for the generality of our officers, that prudence requires us in ſome degree not to promulgate them.

129. With regard to Major *Frederick*, we muſt take the liberty, in addition to what we have already ſaid of his military talents, to advance, that we conſider his reſignation, not only in that, but in every other reſpect, as a very fortunate event for the ſervice. He came out recommended very powerfully, and the reſpect entertained for the friends who had intereſted themſelves in his favour, ſecured him every attention that could be ſhewn him; but we are ſorry to ſay, that he has waſted and exhauſted the good offices of his friends, in ſcreening him from the bad conſequences to which the violence of his temper, and other qualities, muſt have ſubjected him; ſo that there is hardly a magiſtrate in the place who has not in turn had cognizance of his exceſſes. The idea of his intereſt in *England* being uſeful to thoſe who now make a common cauſe with him in the complaint of ſuperceſſion, has ſince the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* united more perſons to him than before; and we believe he is now gone to *England* as a general ſolicitor for the ſuperceded officers. But our opinion of Major *Frederick* was ſo little in his favour, that when his pretenſions in the ſervice became ſuch as could not be allowed, without ſacrificing the intereſts of the Company and of the ſettlement, we ſhould have thought ourſelves highly culpable had we not rejected them.—We have, notwithſtanding, in our reply to his letters, confined ourſelves to thoſe general anſwers, which we apprehend are fully ſufficient in the public line of buſineſs; but to you, to whom we owe a more circumſtantial explanation of our conduct, and ſuch information as may ſerve to guard you againſt miſapprehenſions and miſrepreſentations, we find it neceſſary to open ourſelves without reſerve, even on the tender point of perſonal character; a ſubject which, if poſſible we ſhould avoid, but cannot in this caſe, without making ourſelves anſwerable for the errors into which you might be naturally led by the ſpecious and bold plea of irreproachable ſervice, unleſs furniſhed by us with a knowledge of circumſtances and character, which have been the ground of our proceedings, and will, we truſt, influence yours. This communication we think at leaſt our duty, and ſuch a taſk as we can expect no perſon to take on himſelf, who is not called on by the ſame principle; and therefore, however neceſſary, it muſt have been left undone, unleſs performed by us.

130. From the above repreſentation, we truſt you will be convinced of what importance it is, and what diſagreeable meaſures it will relieve us from, that the gentlemen ſent out for field officers, ſhould be officers of ſervice and experience, and of known merit and character; and we make it our earneſt requeſt that you will attend to thoſe qualifications, in any you may think proper to ſend to *Bombay* in future.

131. On the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Dagon*, a doubt occurred to us, whether, according to the tenor of your orders, we are abſolutely prohibited from promoting a field officer from one degree to another, when there is an actual vacancy, and the firſt appointment has been approved and confirmed by you; both of which were the caſe with reſpect to Lieutenant Colonel *Dagon*. We requeſt an explanation of your intentions, to ſerve us for a guide in future. Appendix. No. 130.

132. At our meeting on the firſt February, it was agreed to diſpatch a veſſel to *Bengal*, with copies of all neceſſary papers, and a full account of the late tranſactions and our preſent ſituation, and that in the mean time a ſhort addreſs ſhould be diſpatched over land, to adviſe the Governor General and Council, in abſtract, of the unfortunate iſſue of the expedition, and to requeſt them to ſuſpend their judgment and determination till the promiſed detail was laid before them. A letter on that plan was accordingly diſpatched, ſubſcribed by the preſent members of the Committee: But Mr. *Draper* having, at our next meeting, expreſſed his diſſent and diſapprobation of that letter, and of one of the ſame date to Colonel *Goddard*, terming them partial and fallacious; this proceeding drew minutes from the Preſident and Mr. *Carnac*, and replies from Mr. *Draper*; all of which, with the letters objected to, are collected in one paper, and tranſmitted under N° 18.

133. Shortly after the return of the army, a Vackeel from the Poonah Durbar, and a ſeparate Vackeel on the part of *Madajee Scindia*, demanded in form the poſſeſſion of the ſeveral places ſtipulated to be ſurrendered by the agreement at *Worgaum*. The anſwer we reſolved to give them, was in effect as follows:—That Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* had no authority whatever to form any treaty or engagement binding on the Honourable Company, which their Principals were given clearly to underſtand before the paper upon which they ground their demands was ſubſcribed by thoſe gentlemen, and that we likewiſe had no authority to take any ſteps in conſequence until we received the ſentiments of the Governor General and Council, to whom we ſhould diſpatch a veſſel expreſs with a full account of the whole tranſaction, and wait their determination.

134. The Preſident was deſired in the delivery of this anſwer, to make uſe of ſuch terms as would leave an opening for further negociation or overtures from *Madajee Scindia*; which we ſurmiſed from ſome part of his conduct might be expected, and that he had even views to a connection with us upon principles of mutual intereſt.

135. According to the intimation given us by the Preſident in his minute of the 29th of January, of his intention of ſhortly propoſing ſome Plan of conduct for extricating us from our preſent difficulties, he on the 19th ultimo laid before us a minute of review of Maratta affairs, and containing ſundry reſolutions propoſed by him in conſequence. A copy thereof is tranſmitted in the packet, with the remarks made by Mr. *Draper* and our deciſions on the propoſal, and will exhibit ſo extenſive a view of our political ſituation as leaves us little to add on the ſubject. He therein ſtrongly ſet before us the great probability that *Nanab*'s determination on our anſwer to the demand made by the Durbar for the ſurrender of our poſſeſſions, would be hoſtile to us, if he could prevail on the Chiefs who had acted with him againſt *Ragoba* to ſupport him in a war againſt us; that we had therefore no time to loſe in guarding againſt ſuch an union, and that it would be expected from us, that we ſhould exert ourſelves in extricating our affairs from their preſent embarraſſment according to the powers already given us by the Governor General and Council, and not ſupinely to throw on them difficulties which it was our duty to meet, and if poſſible to overcome. The ſeveral meaſures propoſed for this purpoſe will appear by the reſolutions; and after full conſideration of the advantages of a connection with *Madjee Scindia*, and the grounds we had to hope that overtures

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tures from us would be well received, determined to take the ſtep recommended by the Preſident for putting his diſpoſition in our favour, to the teſt, by writing to him in terms mentioned in his minute. But we are ſorry to add, he does not ſeem to meet our advances in the manner we hoped for. Whether it may be his idea, that he ſhall find his advantage in keeping us in our preſent ſituation, and that we cannot extricate ourſelves without his aſſiſtance, or whether he may think himſelf able to effect his own purpoſes at *Poonah* without our aid, we cannot determine; but, however, we ſtill think it will be good policy to obſerve ſuch a conduct towards him as if we did not conſider him connected with *Nannah* in any deſigns againſt the Engliſh, and as having ſeparate and diſtinct views; which appears to be really the caſe; and we hope we ſhall derive advantage from his conduct in any meaſures we may find it neceſſary to purſue at the Poonah Durbar.

136. The Reſident at Fort *Victoria* having ſent intelligence that the Marattas at *Sevendroog* were making preparations for the attack of that fort, and requeſted a reinforcement, we ſent down a company of Sepoys in a bomb ketch, and in the interim, on the 13th inſtant, an attack was made, the particulars of which we are not yet acquainted with, the Reſident's letter having been intercepted; but in a ſubſequent letter referring thereto, he deſired the reinforcement might be ſent without a moment's delay.

137 We had before received ſeveral letters from the Durbar, demanding a compliance with the terms of the convention of *Wirgaum*, and complaining of the reference to *Bengal*; and we had alſo received intelligence of an attack being intended againſt *Salſette* and *Caranja* at the ſame time; but we conclude the meaſures immediately taken for the ſecurity of thoſe iſlands, prevented the Marattas from making any attempts in that quarter. But by this open act of hoſtility committed at Fort *Victoria*, it appeared the Durbar were reſolved not to keep terms with us; and we therefore reſolved, on the 19th inſtant, to meet on ſome early day, that after due conſideration we might determine what conduct to purſue with the Marattas, and in what manner to diſpoſe of the Bengal detachment, and to provide funds for its ſupport, as well as our other charges; an eſtimate of which, and of our reſources, we directed to be laid before us, and in the mean time we deſired the Preſident to write a ſuitable letter to the Durbar on this open act of hoſtility.

138. We ſhall communicate the reſult of our deliberations on this important ſubject, and the meaſures we ſhall fix upon, in the moſt expeditious manner we can; but as the ſeaſon draws late, we cannot detain this veſſel any longer without defeating the intent of her diſpatches, and hazarding her ſpeedy arrival in *England*.

139. That we might obtain a full account of the ſtate and objects of the negociation with *Moodajee Bouncello*, and alſo of the condition and wants of the Bengal detachment, we deſired Colonel *Goddard* to come down to *Bombay* to give us information on theſe particulars; and alſo that we might have the benefit of his advice in our proceedings at this criſis. By a return he preſented on his arrival, we find his force conſiſts of upwards of 4,000 Sepoys rank and file; about 300 horſe, being part of a regiment of your cavalry; 500 of the Vizier's cavalry, which accompanied him on the march; and a company of native artillery, with proper eſtabliſhments of Laſcars, artificers, and labourers, attached to the artillery and other branches of the army.

140. As the expence of this detachment on its preſent footing muſt be very conſiderable, we thought proper to conſult Colonel *Goddard* on that head; and whether it might not be poſſible to make ſome conſiderable reduction therein; and upon his meeting us in Committee for that purpoſe, he acquainted us that the monthly iſſues for his detachment amounted to two lacks and ten or twenty thouſand rupees; and that this ſum might be reduced ſo far as twenty-five or thirty thouſand rupees a month, by ſending back the cavalry, and cutting off ſome of the eſtabliſhment for the ſtaff: but ſubmitted to us how far any meaſure of that kind might be proper, in caſe we had any near proſpect of employment for the troops, and eſpecially how far it might be prudent to part with the cavalry, whoſe ſervices would be of the utmoſt importance in caſe of any operations againſt a country power, which he obſerved we muſt be ſenſible of from the great difficulties our army lately experienced from the want of ſuch aſſiſtance.

141. He informed us, that he had authority from the Governor General and Council, to draw on them for the expences of the army, and ſeemed to think that for ſome time at leaſt he might be able to ſupply his wants without aſſiſtance from us, by means of the Surat Shroffs; but this does not appear to us a reſource on which he can long depend.

142. He gave us an account of the ſtate in which he left his negociation with the Rajah of *Berar*, which appears to be ſtill in a train; and as we had a few days before received from the Governor General and Council a copy of their inſtructions to the late Mr. *Elliot*, dated the 18th July, we are now poſſeſſed of full information with reſpect to their views and deſigns in the propoſed alliance with that Chief, which will be a grand advantage to us in our councils, and enable us to frame our meaſures correſpondent with their plan of politics; an advantage we regret was not ſooner given to us. We preſume you muſt long ago have received Mr. *Elliot*'s inſtructions; but we now tranſmit in the packet a copy of Colonel *Goddard*'s letter above-mentioned.

143. Colonel *Goddard* has had the materials put into his hands to inform him fully of the late tranſactions; and as we ſhall entruſt to him the execution of whatever meaſures may be adopted, we deſired him to attend at our future meetings, in order that he might obtain a proper inſight into our political proceedings.

144. We ſhall conclude our letter with ſome general matters of detail not immediately connected with our proceedings above related.

145. Upon the firſt notice of an approaching war with *France*, which was received in June laſt, orders were given for our fortifications being carried on with all poſſible vigour; and we have the pleaſure to inform you, that our works towards the ſea are in great forwardneſs. The *Royal Admiral*, now under diſpatch, the plans and eſtimates ordered by the Honourable Court in their commands of the 19th March, will be tranſmitted, and a full reply ſent thereto by the Governor and Council.

146. Conſidering the importance of *Tellicherry*, and its vicinity to *Mahee*, we thought it highly incumbent on us to take meaſures for its ſecurity, and accordingly permitted of ſome ſmall additions to the fortifications, and formed an independent corps, conſiſting of three companies of regular Sepoys drafted from the other battalions, to compoſe the garriſon. The drafts were replaced by the recruits, ſo that by this plan our own force was not diminiſhed; and we gave ſtrict orders to the factors of *Tellicherry* to attend only to the defence of their own ſettlement, and not to engage in offenſive operations.

147. Colonel *Egerton* having frequently preſſed this Government to make trial of a corps of native Portugueze infantry, with their own officers, on the footing of a Sepoy battalion, and urging our great deficiency in Europeans, we, on 15th Auguſt, conſented to raiſe a ſmall body, conſiſting of 400 privates, to be divided into five companies, with Portugueze officers anſwerable to the black officers of the Sepoys, an European commiſſioned officer to each company, and the whole to be commanded by one European Captain. If it is poſſible to make good ſoldiers of theſe people, this plan gives them all poſſible encouragement, which they never received before; and this poſſibly may be the reaſon why they

they have not hitherto been in much repute; and it was upon that principle Mr. *Carnac* gave his aſſent to the meaſure. In our proceedings, which will be ſent home by the *Royal Admiral*, you will find under the above date the particulars of the eſtabliſhment of this corps; which, however, we may perhaps find it neceſſary to retain, when our European battalions are completed, even if it ſhould be found to anſwer the expectations formed from it, which we begin to doubt

148. A general return of the troops on this eſtabliſhment is forwarded under No. 43.

149. Agreeable to your directions, a ſheer hulk has been fitted up for the uſe of his Majeſty's ſhips; and under No. 39 we tranſmit copy of a report from the committee appointed to ſurvey our docks, and of the liſt therein referred to, the purport of which was mentioned in our addreſs of the 29th of December.

150. We have not come to any determination on the propoſal for building additional docks, capable of admitting 74 gun ſhips.

151. In our addreſs of the 29th of December, we adviſed of our having taken poſſeſſion of the French factory at *Surat*, and ſeized the perſons of the Conſul, and of every other Frenchman in that city. This ſtep, we doubt not, from your commands of the 31ſt Auguſt, will be approved; and we removed all the French gentlemen to *Bombay*, except the Conſul and his family, whom we permitted to remain at *Surat* upon his parole. Amongſt the priſoners removed to *Bombay* was a prieſt, who ſome time after his arrival ſent to inform the Preſident that he had intelligence of an important nature to communicate; and being accordingly examined, gave information, and which was confirmed by another of the priſoners, that a plan had been concerted between Monſieur *Briancourt*, the French Conſul, and Monſieur *St. Lubin*, for bringing down a body of Maratta troops to ſeize and plunder the city of *Surat*, whilſt our troops were employed on the expedition: in which ſcheme they had engaged ſome of the Nabob's officers. A copy of the narrative of what was declared by the prieſt and the other priſoner Monſieur *Charleval*, now wait on you under No. 40; and the Preſident preſerving the moſt profound ſecrecy, immediately ſent up the latter to *Surat*, in hopes of his being able to find the box of papers mentioned in the narrative, which contained the particulars of the conſpiracy. He, however, did not ſucceed, and no farther diſcovery has yet been made, though we have offered a reward of ten thouſand rupees, and directed Mr. *Boddam* to trace this matter with all poſſible diligence; but as it appeared very improper under ſuch a ſuſpicion to permit the Conſul to remain any longer at *Surat*, we have removed him with his family to the Fort at *Tannah*, where we propoſe to keep them till they are ſent to *Europe*.

152. In our diary, which will be ſent by the *Royal Admiral*, is entered under the 18th Auguſt a letter we received from Sir *Edward Vernon*, in anſwer to our requiſition for his bringing round the ſquadron to *Bombay* by the ſouthern paſſage, which we mentioned in our addreſs of the 31ſt July: and under the 8th September you will find our reply to the reaſons urged by the Commodore in ſupport of his reſolution for remaining on the coaſt; and circumſtanced as affairs then were, we flatter ourſelves you will think our reaſoning well founded. We alſo, upon an application from the merchants of the place, made a requeſt to Sir *Edward Vernon* to ſend a convoy into the Straits of *Malacca*, to ſecure the returning ſhips from *China*; which the ſtrength of his ſquadron would not admit of his complying with; but the Governor General and Council diſpatched your ſhip the *Reſolution* on that ſervice, and ſhe has ſince arrived on this coaſt with ſome of the China ſhips, and is now under the orders of Sir *Edward Vernon*, on the expedition againſt *Mahé*.

153. We have long thought it would be for your intereſt to have a Reſident at the Durbar of *Hyder Ally*, to endeavour to counteract and penetrate into the ſchemes of the French, and to bring him into a diſpoſition more favourable to the Honourable Company; and in the beginning of May laſt we propoſed this meaſure to the Governor General and Council, who ſeemed to have ſome doubts how far it might be agreeable to the Nabob of *Arcot*, and accordingly wrote to the Preſident and Council of *Madras*, deſiring them to acquaint us with the Nabob's ſentiments on the ſubject, leaving us nevertheleſs in a great meaſure to act in this point according to our own judgment. Not hearing from the gentlemen at *Madras* for a conſiderable time, we on the 4th November, upon receipt of advices from the Reſident at *Tellicherry*, of ſome particular inſtances of the Nabob's attention to the French, in affording liberal ſupplies of proviſions, and even money, to their ſettlement at *Mahé*, and exciting ſome of the petty Rajahs dependent on him to aſſiſt them with their forces, we came to the reſolution of deputing Mr. *James Sibbald* to his Durbar, to make the proper remonſtrances on that head, and to endeavour to detach him from the French intereſt; judging that the reduction of *Pondicherry*, which we daily expected to be informed of, would be a favourable opportunity for effecting our point. Being afterwards informed that the Nabob had given the Governor of *Mahé* permiſſion to hoiſt his colours in caſe of the place being attacked by the Engliſh, and that he intended ſending his fleet with ſupplies of grain to the French iſlands, we have judged it beſt, as theſe will be ſuch decided inſtances of his attachment to them, not to diſpatch Mr. *Sibbald* till we are at a certainty with reſpect to the part the Nabob will take when *Mahé* is attacked, which we hope you will approve; and we took care to give notice to the Preſidency of *Madras* and Sir *Edward Vernon*, of the intelligence we had received of the Nabob's intentions, that they might be prepared to regulate their conduct accordingly, in caſe the Nabob ſhould openly aſſiſt the French.

154. We have actual advice that a veſſel of the Nabob's, formerly the *Salamander* bomb ketch, ſailed for *Mauritius* the 16th ultimo, with ſome French gentlemen, and a few articles of merchandize, and 40,000 pagodas in money.

155. On the 18th December we received a letter from the Select Committee at *Madras*, dated the 8th November, acquainting us that they deemed it ſo important to acquire poſſeſſion of *Mahé* before the arrival of any French armament from *Europe* or *Mauritius*, that they then wrote purpoſely to concert with us the neceſſary meaſures for the attainment of that object; and they deſired to know what aſſiſtance we could afford in troops or ſtores; acquainting us likewiſe, that as their loſs before *Pondicherry* in Europeans, and particularly in the artillery corps, had weakened them very conſiderably, any aſſiſtance we could give in theſe would be very acceptable, and that if we could ſupply any part of the heavy cannon, mortar, and ſtores, it would be a great relief to them.

156. They alſo deſired us to take the neceſſary meaſures for ſecuring proviſions for the troops, and engaging in our intereſt the country powers adjoining to *Mahé*, and ſignified their intention that the troops ſhould leave *Madras* in December, if nothing ſhould happen to preſent it.

157. We did not loſe a moment in acquainting the gentlemen at *Madras* that we ſhould immediately ſend down to *Tellicherry* a train of battering cannon and mortars, with all their apparatus and appurtenances complete, ſpare carriages, and a proper quantity of ſhot, ſhells, and gunpowder; which we accordingly diſpatched the 25th of December in the *Revenge* and *Bombay Grab*; and at the ſame time ſent the neceſſary orders to your ſervants at *Tellicherry* on the other points, and alſo the Reſident at *Anjengo*, to take all neceſſary meaſures for facilitating the tranſportation of the troops from thence to *Tellicherry*, if the ſquadron under Sir from

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Edward Vernon, which we learnt was to come round, ſhould not be found ſufficient.

158. Our troops were at that time in the field with *Ragoba*, and it was not in our power to promiſe to ſpare a man for the ſiege of *Mahé*.

159. Whilſt we were anxiouſly expecting to hear of the arrival of the Madras troops on the coaſt, we received on the 11th February another letter from the Committee at *Madras*, dated the 7th January, acquainting us of their troops having marched, but that it was out of their power, (even had they conveyances) to ſend more than half of the ſtores neceſſary for the expedition, ſo great had been their iſſues for the ſiege of *Pondicherry*, they therefore ſent us a liſt of the ſtores they could not furniſh, and requeſted we would immediately diſpatch them to *Tellicherry*, as the expedition could not otherwiſe go on. Though the demand made upon us was very heavy, we inſtantly reſolved to comply with it, and being unprovided with any other conveyance, we made application to the Commander of his Majeſty's ſhip *Aſia*, then under orders to join the Commodore, to receive them on board, which he readily agreed to, and arrived with them at *Tellicherry* the 2d of this month.

160. The force deſtined for this ſervice conſiſts of

One battalion of Europeans - -	439	
Three companies of artillery - -	150	
		589
Three battalions of Sepoys, each -	750	2,250

under the command of Colonel *Braithwaite*; who is inſtructed, in caſe of ſucceſs againſt *Mahé*, to avoid if poſſible entering into any agreement for preſerving the fortifications.

161. Sir *Edward Vernon*, with the *Rippon* and *Sartine*, arrived at *Tellicherry* the 9th of February, having left at *Anjengo* the *Seahorſe* and *Coventry* with your ſhips the *Revenge*, *Bombay Grab*, *Royal Charlotte*, and *Reſolution*, and the *Ravenſworth* country ſhip taken up at *Anjengo* for that purpoſe, to tranſport the troops from thence to *Tellicherry*. He acquainted us he ſhould endeavour to prevent any reinforcement being thrown into *Mahé*, and give every aſſiſtance in his power towards the reduction of that fortreſs; after the performance of which ſervice, he ſhould proceed to *Bombay* to clean and refit the ſquadron. In the mean time he deſired we would afford all poſſible aſſiſtance in refitting the *Aſia* and *Sartine*, by which we conclude he had revoked his orders for the *Aſia*'s joining him; and the *Sartine* arrived here the 18th inſtant, and will ſhortly come into dock.

162. By our lateſt advices from *Tellicherry*, dated 9th inſtant, we learn that two of the battalions of Sepoys were arrived there with Major *Kelly*, who acts as principal Engineer; and that the remainder of the forces with Colonel *Braithwaite*, were expected to arrive at *Anjengo*, in the month of February. As the ſeaſon begins to grow late, it will give us great pleaſure to hear of their having commenced their operations.

163. The Kings of *Cotidee* and *Cartinaddee*, and the Samorine, are now in arms to recover their dominions, of which they were diſpoſſeſſed by the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, and have made conſiderable progreſs. It was thought the latter will ſoon be in poſſeſſion of *Callicut*, having already expelled the Nabob's people from ſeveral of his forts. They have made offers of granting to the Honourable Company any privileges of trade in their different countries, provided we will take them under our protection, or aſſiſt them with ammunition. The Samorine's Miniſter informed Mr. *Church*, that his Maſter had been ſecretly ſupplied with powder and balls by the Dutch, who have been for ſome time in a ſtate of hoſtility with the Nabob; but he hoped the Company would in future ſupply him, as being his old ally, and whoſe friendſhip he ſhould prefer to that of the Dutch.

164. The King of *Cotidee* has promiſed to give the pepper of his country to the Company as formerly, which, whilſt it was in the hands of the Princes of *Chinka*, to whom the Nabob had made it over, was given to the French.

165. Theſe inſurrections will be very favourable to the operations againſt *Mahé*, and we hope put it out of the power of the Prince of *Cherika* to impede them, for which purpoſe we underſtand he had aſſembled a conſiderable number of men by the Nabob's order. A party of his people had ſtopped a party from the poſt at Mount *Dilly*, who were making faſcines for the ſiege, and fired upon them; but upon the poſt being reinforced, the Prince's people retired.

166. The Prince of *Cherika* had juſt before ſent to acquaint the Reſident, that he was well diſpoſed to be upon the beſt terms with the Honourable Company, but that being tributary to *Hyder Ally* was under the neceſſity of obeying his orders, and that in conſequence thereof he was then at *Chinibra*, to give every aſſiſtance to the French whenever our army ſhould proceed to the attack of *Mahé*. That he wiſhed the Company to defer the attack till they heard the reſult of a negociation then on foot between *Hyder* and the gentlemen at *Madras*, to whom *Hyder* had promiſed a neutrality between the French and Engliſh in *India*, to be guaranteed by him; and that in caſe the negociation failed, *Hyder* was determined to fall upon the *Carnatic*, and at the ſame time to ſend effectual ſupport to *Mahé*. The Reſident returned a ſuitable anſwer to this meſſage, but we cannot take upon ourſelves to ſay whether there is any foundation for the Prince's aſſertion of a negociation being on the carpet between *Hyder* and the gentlemen at *Madras*, not having heard a ſyllable from them on the ſubject.

167. In the beginning of laſt month we were informed by the Chief of *Surat*, that the famous Vizier *Ghaziáy Cawn*, had been diſcovered in the diſguiſe of a Fakier, near that city, and had been ſecured by the Nabob. He had reſided at a moſque, and ſaid he intended proceeding on a pilgrimage to *Mecca*. This perſon is the ſon of *Gazie ul Dien*, eldeſt ſon of *Nizam ul Mulk*, formerly Subah of the Decan, and at an early age was made Buxey to the Emperor *Ahmed Shaw*, in the year 1751. He afterwards became remarkable by his abilities and crimes, and the murder of one Mogul Emperor, and depriving another of his ſight; after which he fled to the Jauts, in the year 1761, and has ever ſince been wandering from one power to another, as he could find ſecurity.

168. When we firſt received this intelligence we were of opinion, that as ſo diſtinguiſhed a perſon had been thus thrown within our power, it was proper to detain him until we could receive inſtructions from the Governor General and Council, whom we apprized of this event; and that, as he could not be entirely ſafe at *Surat*, and as his remaining there would be attended with other inconvenience, we thought *Bombay* would be a more eligible place for his reſidence; with which both he and the Nabob afterwards expreſſed their ſatisfaction, and he accordingly arrived here the 5th inſtant.

169. Whilſt the Vizier remained at *Surat* we received a letter from him, containing very ſplendid accounts of the powerful aſſiſtance he had intended bringing to *Ragobah*'s cauſe, by his connections with different Rajahs, and the moſt profuſe expreſſions of regard to the Engliſh. In the concluſion, he acquainted us his intentions were to go to *Mecca*, but having no neceſſaries for that expedition, he deſired we would conduct him thither.

170. On making enquiry from Colonel *Goddard* reſpecting this perſon, we learn he had ſome time ago been in the Bengal provinces, and that the Government had not thought it material to detain him; therefore, as he was very earneſt to be permitted to proceed on his pilgrimage, and his reſidence here would be attended with conſiderable expence, we did not judge, from Colonel *Goddard*'s information, that it would anſwer any adequate purpoſe to detain him here, contrary to his conſent;

conſent; and we reflected likewiſe, that if the Governor General and Council choſe to have him ſent round to *Bengal*, he would probably return from *Mecca* ſufficiently early for that voyage the following ſeaſon: we therefore ſent him up again to *Surat* in one of your cruizers, to take paſſage from thence in a country ſhip bound to *Juddah*; which we hope will be approved.

171. Mr. *William Lewis*, late aſſiſtant to the Reſident at the Durbar, having acquitted himſelf with great merit, and very much to our ſatisfaction, in remaining at *Poonah* to the very laſt moment, with apparent danger to his perſon, till our forces were actually embarked, and we had ordered him to retire, by which we had the advantage of the lateſt intelligence of the proceedings of the Miniſters; and Mr. *Moſtyn* having likewiſe warmly recommended him for his diligence and attention in the diſcharge of his duty; we reſolved, on the 3d December, as a mark of our particular approbation, to augment his ſalary to R' 500 per month; but as our intentions in his favour have been defeated by the unhappy iſſue of the expedition, we think it a juſtice due to Mr. *Lewis* to give this teſtimony to you of the ſatisfaction received from his behaviour.

172. Since the arrival of Colonel *Goddard*, Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* has made application to us to have a General Court Martial for his trial, upon the charge given in againſt him by the Preſident. Copy of his letter is tranſmitted under No. 15; and before we gave him an anſwer Colonel *Goddard* was conſulted, who being of opinion, that as the reference to the Governor General and Council had been accepted by Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, there would be an impropriety in withdrawing the deciſion on his conduct for their cognizance; we returned him an anſwer to that effect, and at his deſire mention this application to you.

173. Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* having juſt ſent in a letter, addreſſed to you, and one for the Governor General and Council, the former is encloſed, and a copy of the latter.

174. This veſſel, the *Betſey* Snow, will proceed direct to *England* with this packet; and in order to multiply the chances of our advices getting ſafe and early to your hands, a duplicate of this addreſs is put on board the *Betſey*, to be delivered to the Commander of any of your homeward-bound ſhips ſhe may fall in with at the *Cape*, or *St. Helena*. Our diary from ſhip to ſhip will be ſent home by the *Royal Admiral*, and the annual one by the *Morſe*; and in the mean time we hope the extracts now forwarded will furniſh you with every neceſſary information.

175. We ſhall, as ſoon as poſſible after the departure of this veſſel, diſpatch the *Panther* to *Bengal*, with copies of the ſame papers we now tranſmit to you; and we ſhall then, according to the reſolution propoſed by the Preſident after his review of Maratta affairs, depute Mr. *George Horſley* to ſupply the Governor General and Council with ſuch information and details of local knowledge as they may require.

176. Agreeable to what was mentioned in a former part of this addreſs, we now ſet down in order the papers forwarded by the preſent diſpatch, which we ſubmit to your candour, with a firm reliance of receiving an impartial and diſpaſſionate judgment.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 27th March 1779.

(Signed) *Wm Hornby*, Preſident, &c.

A true copy.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secretary.

23d March 1780.

At a Committee of Correſpondence;

PRESENT,

The Committee having met very often to read the papers tranſmitted from *Bombay*, relative to the expedition undertaken in favour of *Ragoba* in November 1778, and having alſo duly conſidered the ſaid papers, do now, upon the moſt mature deliberation, ſubmit to the Court the following opinions on that ſubject. Appendix. No. 130.

1780. *Report on Bombay Affairs.*

The Committee find, by a letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, dated 23d March 1778, and received at *Bombay* the 3d of May following, that the Select Committee of *Bombay* were therein expreſsly authorized, under certain circumſtances, to form a new alliance with *Ragoba*, and to engage with him in any ſcheme which they ſhould deem expedient and ſafe, for retrieving his affairs.

That on the 21ſt of July the ſaid Select Committee reſolved unanimouſly, that they were then at full liberty to take meaſures for ſubverting a party in the Poonah Government, which was connected with the French in ſchemes hoſtile to the Engliſh Company; and that in order to accompliſh the meaſure, the moſt practicable means to be uſed for placing *Ragoba* in the Regency at *Poonah*, during the minority of the infant Peiſhwa.

And the Committee find, that the Governor General and Council, by letter dated the 17th of Auguſt, approved the reſolution of the Select Committee at *Bombay*, and authorized them to aſſiſt *Ragoba* with a military force, to conduct him to *Poonah*, under the following expreſs proviſions; viz.

Firſt, That it do not interfere with any engagement formed with *Moodajee Bouncello* by Mr. *Elliot*, and previous notice to the Select Committee of *Bombay* by him.

Second, That the lateſt advices from *Europe* ſhall be equal to an aſſurance that the force required for this ſervice may be ſpared without endangering the ſafety of *Bombay*, in the event of a French invaſion.

Third, That the engagements which the Select Committee may form with *Ragoba* himſelf, or *Moraba* and his aſſociates, be not contrary to thoſe concluded with *Moodajee* by Mr. *Elliot*, and noticed to the Committee at *Bombay*, nor of a hoſtile tendency to *Berar*.

And the Committee find, that the above letter was received at *Bombay*, the 27th of September 1778: and that no ſtep had been taken by the Select Committee of *Bombay*, in proſecution of the meaſures reſolved upon the 21ſt of July preceding.

The Committee alſo find, by letters from Mr. *Lewis*, the Company's Reſident at *Poonah*, entered on the Select Committee's proceedings of the 26th and 30th of July, that ſeveral Maratta Chiefs, ſuppoſed to have been in the intereſt of *Ragoba*, and capable of aſſiſting him with a large body of horſe, had been ſuddenly impriſoned, or laid under reſtraint by *Madjee Scindia*, another Chief, who was in the oppoſite intereſt.

And it appears, that on the 12th of October following, the Select Committee of *Bombay* reſolved forthwith to carry into execution the plan agreed to the 21ſt of July; to which reſolution Mr. *Draper* diſſented.

The Committee find, that when the Governor General and Council approved the reſolution of the 21ſt of July, they could not have been informed of the confinement of thoſe Maratta Chiefs, who were ſuppoſed to be well inclined to *Ragoba*, and capable of affording him the aſſiſtance above-mentioned.

And the Committee having duly attended to the whole of the proceedings previous to the expedition under conſideration, are of opinion, that the reſolution of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, of the 21ſt of July, for placing *Ragoba* in the Regency at *Poonah*, was not improper, under the favourable circumſtances ſet forth on their proceedings at that period.

The Committee are of opinion, that the change which happened ſoon afterwards, reſpecting the ſituation of *Ragoba*'s friends, and the lapſe of time from the 21ſt of July to the 22d of November, rendered it extremely imprudent to undertake the expedition at that period.

Appendix. No. 130.

Sel. Conf. 16th Nov. 1778.

And the Committee find the force allotted for the Poonah expedition conſiſted of

	Artillery,		
Rank and File	-	-	143
Laſcars	-	-	500
	Infantry,		
Rank and File	-	-	448
Sepoys	-	-	2,278

that, officers included, the whole are ſtated at 3,900 men; and upwards of 400 rank and file, with officers in proportion, were afterwards ordered on this ſervice; and that a conſiderable part of the additional force conſiſted of Europeans.

And the Committee are of opinion, that the ſtate of the garriſon of *Bombay*, as repreſented to Sir *Edward Vernon* by the Select Committee the 8th of September 1778, did not warrant the ſending of ſo large a force on foreign ſervice at the commencement of a European war, more eſpecially as ſpeedy ſuccour was rendered precarious, and conſequently ſucceſs very doubtful, by the diſagreeable ſituation of the ſuppoſed friends and partizans of *Ragoba*.

The Committee are therefore clearly of opinion, that in November 1778, the expedition, under all circumſtances, was evidently very hazardous, and not to be juſtified; that the reaſons ſtated by Mr. *Draper* for diſſenting thereto at that period, were ſolid and judicious; and that the Select Committee of *Bombay* ought to have waited the arrival or nearer approach of the Bengal detachment under the command of Colonel *Goddard*, before they attempted to reinſtate *Ragoba* at *Poonah*.

But as the majority of the Select Committee of *Bombay* ſeemed convinced that delay would render the execution of the enterprize much more difficult, if not altogether impracticable; that the French might thereby acquire ſuch influence at the Poonah Durbar as would occaſion perpetual war with the Marattas, and render the Company's poſſeſſions on the weſtern ſide of *India* inſecure and unprofitable; that they conſidered themſelves bound in duty to the Company to endeavour to prevent meaſures ſo ruinous to their intereſt, by taking advantage of diviſions then ſuppoſed to be ſubſiſting among the Bramin miniſters, and by attempting to eſtabliſh *Ragoba* at that critical juncture, and therefore perſiſted in the reſolutions to aſſiſt him with forces for that purpoſe. Under the above conſiderations, though this Committee cannot concur in the reaſons offered by the Select Committee of *Bombay*, ſo far as to approve their conduct, they are nevertheleſs of opinion that the ſaid Select Committee appear to have acted according to the beſt of their judgment, in undertaking to place *Ragoba* in the Regency at *Poonah*, in November 1778.

Your Committee find, that the amount due from *Ragoba* to the Company, the 30th day of April 1777, was rupees 24,72,775.

Sel. Conf. 16th Nov. 1778.

And your Committee find, that in November 1778, the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* paid to the executors of the late Mr. *William Shaw*, 80,000 rupees, on account of *Ragoba*; alſo that in the ſame month they lent 4 lacks of rupees to *Ragoba*, beſides 15,000 rupees lent to two of his ſervants, amounting in the whole to rupees 4,95,000; and excluſive of 1,500 ſtand of arms, four or five guns and their carriages, 30 candies of gunpowder, 10,000 flints, and 2,000 cannon ſhot, agreed by the Select Committee to be delivered to him the 16th day of November 1778.

Sel. Conf. 23d Nov. 1778.

And your Committee are clearly of opinion, that the late loan to *Ragoba* was unjuſtifiable, more eſpecially as ſo large a ſum as 1,50,000 rupees was ſent with the troops, and authority granted to the Commiſſary and Paymaſter to paſs drafts on the Select Committee for the neceſſary diſburſements during the expedition: And the Committee find that bills have been accepted on that account to the amount of rupees 2,28,529.

And your Committee ſubmit it to the Court as their opinion, that unleſs the Select Committee give better reaſons than have yet appeared for lending the ſum of 4,95,000 rupees in the manner above-mentioned to *Ragoba* and his ſervants, that the Court take into conſideration the propriety of rendering the ſaid Select Committee reſponſible for that amount to the Company.

John Woodhouſe, *John Purling*, *George Cuming*, *Henry Fletcher*, *John Manſhip*, *John Michie*, *Wm James*, *W. Devaynes*, *L. Sulivan*, *John Harriſon*, *Henry Savage*.

Your Committee find that the Select Committee of *Bombay* appointed Mr. *Carnac*, Colonel *Egerton*, and Mr. *Moſtyn*, to be a ſeparate committee for carrying their plan into execution, and directed them to accompany *Ragoba* to *Poonah*: That the Commander in Chief proteſted againſt the meaſure: That of courſe there remained no more than two Members of the Select Committee at *Bombay*: That the Preſident, by having a caſting vote, became, in the abſence of the Poonah committee, poſſeſſed of abſolute power for tranſacting all political, military, and naval affairs, and ſuch as might require ſecrecy at *Bombay*. And as this tranſaction militated againſt the letter and ſpirit of the Court's orders of the 10th April 1778, the Committee are clearly of opinion, that the appointment of a member of the Select Committee at *Bombay*, to accompany the Commander in Chief to *Poonah*, was altogether improper, and that the majority of the ſaid Committee are very reprehenſible for their conduct in that reſpect; but the Committee exempt Mr. *Draper* from this cenſure, becauſe he juſtly ſuppoſed it to be the intent of the Company, that none of the civil members of the Committee ſhould be detached from the Preſidency, if the Commander in Chief were to be abſent alſo, and delivered his opinion in the Select Committee accordingly.

Wm Devaynes, *John Harriſon*, *Henry Fletcher*, *John Manſhip*, *John Michie*, *George Cuming*, *Wm James*, *John Woodhouſe*, *John Purling*, *Laur. Sulivan*, *Henry Savage*.

The Committee find the firſt detachment of the army embarked for the Continent the 22d of November 1778, and Colonel *Egerton* two days afterwards:

That the army was at *Panwell* the 25th of November, and remained there till the 4th day of December following.

That the 30th of November, the Quarter Maſter General proceeded with a company of Sepoys to *Bara*, to mark out an encampment for a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, who however was not able to proceed as was intended, for want of bearers.

And by letters from Colonel *Egerton* and Mr. *Carnac* to Governor *Hornby*, it appears, that there was an almoſt immediate and total want of harmony in their proceedings during the expedition; that the diſtinct powers veſted in the Poonah committee and in the Commander in Chief of the army, the propriety of the commiſſion granted to the committee, the military honours to be paid to Colonel *Egerton* and Mr. *Carnac* reſpectively, and the propriety of keeping ſeparate tables for them, were objects of much diſcuſſion and contention.

The Committee find, that Mr. *Moſtyn* was compelled by a ſevere indiſpoſition, to return to *Bombay*, where he died the 1ſt of January; and that Mr. *Carnac* thereupon claimed the right of a caſting vote, whenever Colonel *Egerton* only ſhould meet him in Committee; which was decreed and ordered accordingly by the Select Committee at * *Bombay*.

* Sel. Conſ. 24th Dec. 1778.

The Committee find it ſtated by Mr. *Carnac*, on the 20th day of December 1778, that the troops had, in 25 days from their debarkation at *Panwell*, marched little more than the ſame number of miles: that it appeared

to him, that much labour, time, and money, were unneceſſarily waſted in making a carriage road for the artillery and ſtores up the Ghauts: that with the number of people employed, every thing intended to be carted might have been carried up by hand, with more eaſe, ſecurity, and diſpatch: that from converſation he believed this to be the general opinion; and that the Commandant of artillery had actually paſſed ſome of the guns by a different route wide of the new road then making by the engineer, which proved it to be needleſs.

Colonel *Egerton* deferred replying to Mr. *Carnac's* minute until his return to *Bombay*; when he appealed to his diary, and to the Commiſſary of the army, to prove the propriety of his remaining ſo long at *Panwell*; he denied there having been any languor in the motions of the army; he ſaid, the Commander in Chief could not take the ſtores and proviſions under his arm at *Panwell*, and walk away with them to *Poonah*: that no guns, expect two, had been paſſed by any route wide of the road made by the Engineer; and he produced ſeveral vouchers in ſupport of his aſſertions.

Sel. Conſ. 10 March 1779.

The Committee find the repreſentation and vouchers produced by Colonel *Egerton*, relative to the guns, was partial and defective; for although no more than two guns as mentioned by Colonel *Egerton*, were actually paſſed by Major *Dagon* up the Ghauts, in the manner ſtated by Mr. *Carnac*, it appears that the meaſure was practicable, and that the Colonel was highly diſpleaſed with Major *Dagon's* activity in attempting to move the guns up the Ghauts, before the road was made; that he poſitively forbad it, and threatened to poſt centinels to prevent it. That this conduct of Colonel *Egerton* diſpirited Major *Dagon*, who has ſince declared, that if Colonel *Egerton* would have allowed him the number of hands employed in making the road, he had not the leaſt doubt but the whole of the artillery, with the ſtores and ammunition, might have been carried up the Ghauts in two days and a half to the poſt occupied by Captain *Stewart*.

The Committee find, that the two guns before mentioned were ſent by Major *Dagon* up the Ghauts the 14th day of December; that the road was began by the engineer the ſame day; that it was the next day when Colonel *Egerton* expreſſed his diſpleaſure at Major *Dagon*, for attempting to carry up the guns and ſtores; that the roads were not finiſhed till the 23d December; and that the troops had halted the 9th and 11th of December for the roads.

And the Committee are clearly of opinion, that the ſlow progreſs of the army was inexcuſable, and very prejudicial to the undertaking; that the conduct of the Commander in Chief was extremely defective; that it gave the enemy the fulleſt opportunity of collecting their ſtrength; and muſt have had a direct tendency to diſcourage ſuch Maratta Chiefs as might have been friendly to *Ragoba* from appearing active on his behalf; and that the moſt ſpirited exertions on our part were abſolutely neceſſary, in order to afford them proper encouragement for that purpoſe.

Select Letter, 27th March 1779.

The Committee do not find, that the troops experienced any obſtruction from the enemy till the 22d of December: from that day to the 4th of January they were at times cannonaded, with trifling effect; except the loſs of Lieutenant Colonel *Cay*, by a rocket, the 31ſt December, and of Captain *Stewart*, by a ſpent ſhot, the 4th of January; by which accidents the Company were deprived of two very gallant and meritorious officers.

Mr. *Carnac* in a letter to the Select Committee, dated the 11th of February 1779, has delivered his ſentiments as follows:

" For the ſpace of near five weeks the army did not " meet with the ſmalleſt moleſtation; and it can never " be ſufficiently regretted, that more advantage was not " taken of that interval, when the enemy by their conduct appeared to be wholly unprepared. However " they at laſt puſhed a party forwards near to *Condola*, " where they began their oppoſition. As our troops advanced they conſtantly gave way; or if they attempted " to make a ſtand were diſlodged; yet ſo ſoon as we had " taken up our ground, and fixed our encampment, " they never failed bringing up cannon near enough to " annoy us; and we were I believe more than fifteen " days ſucceſſively cannonaded in our camps; to which " the enemy were encouraged to perſiſt in, by finding " they could do it with impunity; as our line nor " any part of it was ever moved out, to endeavour by a " vigorous effort to get poſſeſſion of ſome of their " guns."

Appendix No. 130.

To the above remarks of Mr. *Carnac* Colonel *Egerton* has made the following reply:

" I ſhall ſay no more on his remark of our line, nor " any part, having never moved out, to endeavour by a " vigorous effort to get poſſeſſion of ſome of their (the " enemy's) guns, except that the commanding officer " knew the duties of his profeſſion too well to give ſo " unjuſtifiable an order, for which he would have been " highly reprehenſible by all military judges."

The 5th of January Colonel *Egerton* wrote as follows to the Governor:

" We have had the uſual cannonade to-day, but rather " faint, and without any loſs; and I intend trying to-mor- " row morning, about 4 or 5 o'clock, if we can catch " them in their encampment."

But the Committee find, that Colonel *Egerton*, the next day, inſtead of perſevering in his deſign of ſeeking the enemy in their camp, declared to the Poonah committee, that having borne up as long as he could againſt an illneſs, with which he had been for ſome time paſt afflicted, he was then under the neceſſity of acquainting them, that the Surgeon Major thought the fatigues of a campaign, co-operating with his indiſpoſition, endangered his life; that he could not hope to have ſtrength ſufficient to attend to the avocations of a Commander in Chief; and therefore he requeſted permiſſion of Mr. *Carnac* and himſelf, to reſign the command of the troops to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and to proceed immediately to *Bombay*; which being granted, he ſet out accordingly; and having obtained intelligence of a party of horſe being in the *Conkan*, he afterwards thought proper to return back to the army, but did not attempt to reſume the command.

As Colonel *Egerton's* want of health did not prevent him from reſuming his ſeat at the Poonah committee, it will be neceſſary hereafter to ſtate the part which he took in the ſubſequent proceedings of that committee; but your Committee nevertheleſs think proper in this place to expreſs their unanimous opinion, that the conduct of the late Colonel, now Brigadier General *Charles Egerton*, during the late diſgraceful expedition towards *Poonah*, was ſuch as renders it highly improper that he ſhould be continued in the command of the Company's forces at *Bombay*; and that he be therefore diſmiſſed from the Company's ſervice.

Wm James,	*Wm Devaynes*,	*John Michie*,
Lau. Sulivan,	*John Manſhip*,	*John Harriſon*,
John Woodhouſe,	*Henry Savage*,	*Geo. Cuming*.
John Purling,	*Henry Fletcher*.	

And the Committee find a minute entered on the Poonah diary of the 6th of January, ſtating the difference between their former expectations and the real ſtate of affairs. They had been given to hope, that on the appearance of *Ragoba's* ſtandard above the Ghauts, *Holkar* and many other reputable Maratta Chiefs would join them; that however none but a few mercenaries had done ſo; that *Ragoba* acknowledged, unleſs we could convince his friends of their ſafety, by ſpeedily beating his enemies, he had no hope of being joined by any one; and that our ſituation would be rather worſe than

better

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better, as we advanced towards *Poonah*, becauſe the army would be cut off from communication with the *Conkan*, from whence proviſion and ſtores would be ſupplied.

The Committee allowed that the conduct of the enemy, in ravaging the country and retiring before our army, ſeemed to warrant *Ragoba*'s reaſoning, but they hoped as they advanced towards *Poonah*, *Holcar*, on whoſe junction they ſtill placed ſome dependance, would be enabled and encouraged to fulfil the promiſes heretofore made by him to Mr. *Moſtyn* in favour of *Ragoba*.

The ſame morning, the 6th of January, the army marched, and the guns of the enemy opened from a wood on the line. A large party of horſe ſeemed inclined to take the army in flank, or to enter the rear, but were prevented, and driven from their high ground by our troops, who behaved on this and on all occaſions with the greateſt intrepidity and cheerfulneſs.

And the Committee find, that on the three ſucceeding days the army marched from *Mondburna* to *Tullagoan*, 18 miles from the ſummit of the Ghauts, and 16 miles from *Poonah*, without moleſtation from the enemy.

The 9th of January 1779, Meſſieurs *Carnac* and *Egerton* deputed Mr. *Sibbald* to *Ragoba*, to repreſent the diſtreſs occaſioned by relying on his promiſe for a ſupply of proviſions above the Ghauts; and on his aſſurance that *Holkar* would join the troops in eight days from the 22d ultimo; and alſo to inform him, that having only proviſions ſufficient to ſubſiſt the army back again to the *Conkan*, and the country being laid waſte, the only probable mode of removing their diſtreſs was to make overtures of accommodation to *Scindia*, *Holkar*, and *Saccaram*. That the power of negociating muſt be left to the committee; and that they ſaw no alternative but the inſtant retreat of the army, to prevent a total diſtreſs from the utter want of proviſions.

The next day the Commiſſary reported, that from the ſtock of proviſions on hand he was able, barring accidents, to ſupply the army with proviſions for 18 days; but Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* thought it would be impoſſible, without a body of horſe, to ſecure the baggage from the enemy's numerous cavalry, as the troops advanced further into the country, and that the proviſions were equally expoſed with the baggage.

The ſame day information was received that a body of horſe belonging to *Moraba* had marched into the *Conkan* to join *Ragoba*; but Meſſieurs *Carnac* and *Egerton* obſerved, that however uſeful thoſe troops might be, it did not appear that they could effectually relieve the main difficulty of the army, which was the total impoſſibility of receiving any further ſupply of proviſions, except through the *Conkan*; it was therefore reſolved to preſerve the army by falling back ſo far as might be neceſſary to ſecure their communication with the *Conkan*, unleſs *Holkar*'s army ſhould join them, conformably to the aſſurances of *Ragoba*.

And your Committee find, that Lieutenant *Frazer* was not to ſuffer *Moraba*'s troops to aſcend through the paſs where he was poſted, till further orders.

In the evening of the ſaid 10th of January Mr. *Sibbald* reported that *Ragoba* had earneſtly requeſted the committee to defer their application to any of the Maratta Chiefs, except *Holcar*, for one day, leſt *Scindia*, from whom he expected a Vackeel, ſhould infer that they began to deſpair of ſucceſs, which would of courſe encourage the miniſterial party to hold out; that the care of ſupplying the army with proviſions reſted with him; that he would furniſh the Commiſſary from this town (*Tullagoan*) with a ſufficient quantity for ſome days, and that we ſhould get more at the next village.

Ragoba alſo informed the Poonah committee, that he had wrote to *Scindia* to endeavour to engage him in his intereſt; but the ſaid committee not being able to place any dependance on *Ragoba*'s promiſe for a ſupply of proviſions, nor deeming the gaining of *Scindia* an object of ſufficient importance to warrant a departure from their preceding reſolution; and believing it certain, that though *Holcar* did not act againſt them, he could not act for them; iſſued orders to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, the 11th of January, to march back the army towards the paſs at *Condolah* as expeditiouſly as poſſible; and the 12th of January the army fell back to *Wargaon*.

And the Committee find that the order to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, as entered on the Poonah diary, is ſigned,

"*John Carnac*,"
"*Charles Egerton*."

But in a letter from Colonel *Egerton* to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated the 8th of March 1779, he ſays he never ſaw or ſigned the letter to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*; and in a letter of the 16th of February Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* ſays he received orders from Mr. *Carnac*, in preſence of Lieutenant *Richardſon*, to retreat; that he deſired a written order, which was promiſed to be ſent him, though it never was.

And the Committee find it reported by Meſſieurs *Carnac* and *Egerton*, that the enemy having obtained intelligence of their moving, attacked them on their march before day-light, and continued the attack with great vigour till two in the afternoon; that the numerous bodies of horſe rendered it impoſſible to protect the baggage, and that part of it fell into the enemy's hands; that ſome loſs was ſuffered; that in juſtice to the troops, both Europeans and Sepoys, they with pleaſure declare that they behaved with the utmoſt intrepidity and alacrity during the whole attack. That they ſhall continue their march to *Condolah*, and expect to be much haraſſed; but the army will be rendered as compact as circumſtances will admit, and every part of the baggage not abſolutely neceſſary will be reduced by the commanding officer. Vide Sel. Letter from, 27th March 1779, Par. 55.

As Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* was in command of the army, the Committee will ſtate his account of the action of the 12th of January, as tranſmitted in the following letter to Governor *Hornby*, dated the 13th of January:

"To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire.

"Honourable Sir,

"I did myſelf the honour of informing you of our arrival at *Tellagon* on the 9th inſtant. We halted here the 10th and 11th; and it being determined by the committee that the army could not proceed any further, but was under the neceſſity of retreating immediately, I accordingly gave out orders for the march at eleven o'clock at night, in hopes, by leaving our ground at that hour, to gain a day's march of the enemy, before they could know of this ſtep; but in this I was diſappointed, for I found they had got intelligence of it before we moved, which muſt have been conveyed to them by ſome treacherous perſons about *Ragoba*. About two o'clock a large party of horſe firſt attacked our advanced guard, which had got on ſome diſtance from the main body. On account of the confuſion occaſioned by the vaſt quantity of baggage, and the badneſs of ſome part of the road, they unfortunately took a great deal of our baggage and camp equipage in this attack; however, the advanced guard reached this village about day-light, with a great deal of the proviſions and ammunition ſafe.

"Our main body was attacked about four o'clock on the rear and both flanks; and as we were frequently obliged to halt and fire ſome guns at them, it retarded our march, and gave them time to bring up their cannon, which obliged us to form in the beſt manner we could to oppoſe them. It was ſhortly after day light when the attack became general, but the weight of it fell principally on Captain *Hartley*'s diviſion, which I ſupported with Europeans and Sepoys at different times. From the ſituation of the ground I found it impracticable

ticable to join the whole line to Captain *Hartley*'s diviſion, as there were large bodies of horſe ready to charge us, when they found us in ſuch a ſituation that we could not uſe our guns. The attack continued till four o'clock in the afternoon before we could retire, which was effected at laſt with much danger. The troops during the whole time behaved with the greateſt bravery. I am truly ſorry to convey ſuch diſagreeable news to you; the laſt time I wrote I had no thoughts of any thing of this kind happening. I now encloſe you a return of the killed, wounded, and miſſing. They have engaged us all this day with ſmall arms from their Arabs, &c. and a very heavy cannonade; fortunately we have not ſuffered much, and we obliged the Arabs to give way at laſt. It is not determined when the army marches, I wait the committee's orders. Appendix. No. 130.

"I have the honour to be, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
William Cockburn."

Barragam, 13th January 1779.

And your Committee find the following Return made of the killed, wounded, and miſſing, dated the 12th of January 1779, amounting in the whole to 362.

	ARTILLERY.											INFANTRY.											SEPOYS.													
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Matroſſes.	Gunners.	Laſcars.	Total.	Colonel.	Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Cadets and Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Private.	Total.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Doctors.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Trumpeters.	Drums and Fifes.	Watermen.	Sepoys.	Total.
Killed	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	3	4	9	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	12	16	-	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	26	31
Wounded	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	6	11	-	-	-	5	2	2	-	2	3	-	30	44	1	2	-	-	1	1	1	-	11	5	-	-	-	74	96
Miſſing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	3	6	1	-	-	98	110
Total	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	5	3	53	63	-	-	-	5	3	2	-	3	4	1	44	62	1	3	-	-	3	4	1	-	15	11	1	-	-	198	237

And the Committee find the following general orders iſſued by the Commander in Chief, the 12th of January:

General Orders iſſued at *Burgaum*.

"Tueſday, 12th January 1779.

"The commanding officer is ſo extremely ſatisfied "with the gallant behaviour of the troops in general, "that he orders that a week's pay be given to "the Europeans and Sepoys; and returns the officers "his public thanks for their cool and ſpirited conduct, "and in a particular manner to Captain *Hartley*, not "only on that account, but his judgment as an officer.

"Colonel *Egerton* having by accident been an eye "witneſs of Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*'s conduct this "day, cannot help expreſſing his higheſt approbation "thereof; and is willing to hope, that this will be a "ſtrong recommendation of him to the Board.

(Signed) *Rich*d *Campbell*,
Adj. General."

And the Committee find, on the Poonah diary the 13th of January, the following particulars:

"A committee held to deliberate relative to overtures "for the peaceable return of the army to *Bombay*. No "minutes taken, being in a ſevere cannonade, and a "number of perſons ſtanding round.

"Letter to the Peiſhwa, ſent by *Ramſing*.

"D° from D°, in anſwer.

"D° to D°, at night."

But the Committee find no copy of the letters ſaid to have been ſent to the Peiſhwa on the 13th of January, nor of his anſwer, in any proceedings tranſmitted from *Bombay*.

And the Committee find, that Mr. *Farmer*, Secretary to the Poona committee, was ſent to the Maratta camp to propoſe an accommodation, which they judged might be effected by *Ragoba* going over to *Scindia*; and which they obſerve he ſeemed determined to do, rather than riſque another day's march with the army.

The meſſage ſent to the Marattas was as follows:

"That having had aſſurances given us, that the "eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba* in the Regency of the Ma-"ratta empire was a meaſure much wiſhed for by many "of the Sirdars of the Maratta Sircar, as well as by the "country in general, we had conſented to conduct him "with an Engliſh army for that purpoſe; but contrary "to our hopes and expectations we found his eſtabliſh-"ment oppoſed by the whole empire: That we had "ſeen with infinite concern, the country laid waſte "and deſtroyed at our approach; which being ſo very "contrary to our intentions by eſpouſing the cauſe of "*Ragoba*, that we were determined to be the occaſion "of no farther deſolation, and were therefore reſolved "to march back with the army to *Bombay*: That after "this declaration, we expected all hoſtilities would ceaſe; "and, by ſo doing, peace and friendſhip would be eſta-"bliſhed between the Engliſh and the Maratta State. "If, on the other hand, we ſhould experience the leaſt "act of hoſtility on our march, we ſhould conſider it as "a declaration of war againſt the Engliſh nation."

The anſwer of the Durbar to Mr. *Farmer* was, "That if we wiſhed to remain at peace with them, "*Ragonath Row* muſt be delivered up, and then we "may return quietly; otherwiſe we may do as we "pleaſe." Letter from, 27th March 1779, Par. 60.

The committee wrote to Mr. *Farmer* in reply; "That all difficulty of accommodation was removed, "by *Ragoba*'s deſign of going over to *Mhadjee Scindia*; "and that they expected, in conſequence, proper ſe-"curities from the Durbar for proceeding unmoleſted "on their march." 61

On the diary of the 15th of January, there appears a letter from Mr. *Farmer*, ſtating the reſult of his conference with the Durbar. He reports that having informed 62

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formed them of the difficulty being removed by the determination of *Ragoba* to deliver himſelf up to *Scindia*, and that he ſuppoſed the army would therefore be ſuffered to return quietly to *Bombay*, *Nannah* obſerved in reply, that as we had broken the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, we muſt agree, before the army moved, to abide by the treaty concluded with the late Peiſhwa *Nannah*.

On preſſing the queſtion, whether, if *Ragoba* ſurrendered himſelf to *Scindia*, hoſtages would be given for our proceeding unmoleſted to *Bombay*, it was anſwered, that the ſurrender of *Ragoba* was of little conſequence; that a new treaty muſt be made on the ſpot with the Maratta State, becauſe the treaty made by Colonel *Upton* had been broken by the invaſion of their country. Mr *Farmer* conveys his ideas of the advantage obtained over our army by the Marattas in the following words: "They ſeem to me to feel themſelves "in that ſituation, with reſpect to us, which the Turkiſh "Vizier felt himſelf in with reſpect to *Peter* the Firſt, "at the time when the Empreſs *Catherine* ſent in her "jewels to the Vizier."

It appears that *Scindia* preſided at the Durbar on that occaſion; who finally told Mr. *Farmer*, that whether there be peace or war, it was equal to him; but that having broken the treaty made with Colonel *Upton*, we muſt on the ſpot ſet about forming a new treaty, to ſerve as a future guide between the Maratta State and the Engliſh.

At this juncture Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* was called upon by the committee to give his opinion in writing relative to the practicability of marching back the army to *Bombay*; which was done in the following words; viz.

"Being called upon for my opinion on the poſſibi-
"lity of making a retreat to *Bombay*, I muſt declare,
"that I think the ſame utterly impracticable. Our
"troops are already much haraſſed and diſpirited, from
"the neceſſity we were under of retiring from *Tullegaon*;
"and were we to ſuſtain another attack from the Ma-
"ratta army, I am of opinion the troops would not
"ſtand it; and that conſequently the whole army, with
"its numerous followers, would be cut to pieces.
"But the diſtance from *Panwell* being about forty-five
"miles, it is not the attack of one day we ſhould have
"to ſuſtain; as I think, were it poſſible to move from
"hence, that we could not gain that place in twenty
"days; and it is therefore chimerical to the laſt degree,
"to ſuppoſe that our ſmall army could ſupport them-
"ſelves from the daily attacks they would be certain of
"for ſo long a period. I therefore cannot charge my-
"ſelf to conduct the army, under ſuch circumſtances, to
"*Bombay*; and humanity muſt prompt ſome other me-
"thod than an attempt to retire in the face of the whole
"ſtrength of the Maratta empire, with ſuch a handful of
"men, who muſt in ſuch caſe be ſacrificed.

(Signed) *William Cockburn.*"

"Camp at *Wurgaon*,
"15th January 1779."

At the cloſe of the Poonah diary, immediately after the proceedings of the 22d of January, it ſtands recorded, that the committee met the 15th at *Wurgaon*, to take into conſideration the meaſures neceſſary to be immediately adopted for extricating the army from its very critical ſituation, ſurrounded by the whole ſtrength of the Maratta empire, and with only about ten days proviſions in camp:

That Colonel *Egerton*'s opinion was alſo required, and that his declared ſentiments were the ſame with thoſe of Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, that a retreat in their then ſituation was impracticable, and if attempted, the conſequence muſt be the loſs of the whole army.

Mr. *Carnac*'s opinion is then recorded as follows, viz.

"Mr. *Carnac* is ſo confident the army is ſufficiently numerous, and ſo well provided with artillery, as to be able to force their way back againſt all oppoſition, if the officers and men will do their duty: that there is no doubt with him the attempt ought to be made at all events, rather than ſubmit to the terms preſcribed by the enemy, to which we have no authority to bind our employers. And for his own part, he declares, he would much ſooner run his ſhare of the riſk, than that they ſhould be complied with. However, as Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* have given it as their poſitive opinions, that the troops will not ſtand, and conſequently muſt be cut to pieces, Mr. *Carnac* dares not take upon himſelf ſingly to preſs a retreat, which it is pronounced will be inevitably attended with conſequences that cannot fail of endangering the preſervation of the ſettlement. He therefore, however reluctantly and contrary to his own ſentiments, finds himſelf obliged to concur in the acceptance of whatever conditions can be obtained. Allowing, therefore, that the opinions of Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* be well founded (in which we are given to underſtand many officers in the army alſo concur) there ſeems to be no other reſource left, but to accept of ſuch conditions as can be obtained from the enemy.

(Signed) *John Carnac.*"

In the margin of the diary of the 22d of January it is noted, that the above minutes were omitted in the proper place, through the miſapprehenſion of the Committee's Secretary, and without the knowledge of Mr. *Carnac*.

Colonel *Egerton* has diſavowed and proteſted againſt the ſaid minutes; and in regard to the written opinion of Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, he has declared, in his letter to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, that he never ſaw it till it was read at the Board at *Bombay*; but he there allows it to have been founded on ſolid reaſons and uncontrovertible facts. The Colonel adds, that he is much at a loſs to conceive how he could be ſaid to have concurred in Colonel *Cockburn*'s opinion at a committee which was never held, and in a written opinion which he never ſaw, till produced at *Bombay*; and he has alſo declared, that the greateſt part of the diary was ſpurious and inadmiſſible.

Mr. *Farmer*, the Secretary to the Poonah committee, was on ſervice at the Maratta Durbar, on the 15th of January; Mr. *Carnac* has therefore appealed to other perſons to authenticate ſuch proceedings of that day as have been diſavowed by Colonel *Egerton*; and the following letters on the ſubject ſtand recorded on the proceedings of the Select Committee of the 10th March 1779:

Letter from Mr. *Sibbald* to the Secretary.

To Mr. *Edward Ravenſcroft*, Secretary.

Sir,

I have received your letter of yeſterday's date, acquainting me that the Honourable the Select Committee require of me a clear and full ſtatement of the circumſtances relative to a meeting of the Poonah committee at *Worgaum* on the 15th January: in anſwer to which I have to acquaint them,

That being deſired on that morning to attend at Colonel *Egerton*'s tent, in conſequence of a letter juſt received from Mr. *Farmer* of the 14th, I concluded that the meeting was a committee, and prepared to take minutes accordingly, by beginning the uſual preamble; but the immediate diſpatch of the anſwer to Mr. *Farmer*'s letter being required, I did no more while in the tent that morning, than writing the letter to Mr. *Farmer*, and taking a tranſcript of it for the diary: but ſoon after as I got a place to write in, which I believe was the next day, I took minutes of what paſſed in argument on the 15th, to the beſt of my recollection, which I ſhewed to Mr. *Carnac*, and he thought them nearly expreſſive of his own ſentiments; but not deeming them ſufficiently full, he then delivered me his opinion more at large,

when a fair copy was made of the minutes, and ſigned by him, and afterwards preſented by me to Colonel *Egerton*.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
James Sibbald.

Bombay,
2d March 1779.

Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* to Mr. *Carnac*.

Sel. Conf. 10th March 1779.

Sir,

In anſwer to your letter of yeſterday, where you deſire to know if I recollect what paſſed at Colonel *Egerton*'s tent at *Worgaum* on the 15th January laſt; I have to inform you, that I perfectly remember you there declared, (where Colonel *Egerton*, Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, Mr. *Sibbald*, Mr. *Holmes*, and myſelf were preſent) that you were decidedly of opinion, that the army ought at all events to attempt a retreat, and not ſubmit to the mortifying terms propoſed by the enemy; but that as Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* declared their opinion, that the army could not make good their retreat, and that the troops would not ſtand another attack, you could not take upon you, under ſuch circumſtances, to preſs a retreat.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
humble ſervant,
James Hartley.

Bombay,
5th March 1779.

Letter from Mr. *Holmes* to Mr. *Carnac*.

Sel. Conf. 10th March 1779.

Sir,

I have a perfect recollection of the opinion delivered at the meeting held in Colonel *Egerton*'s tent at *Worgaum* the 15th January laſt, where yourſelf, Colonel *Egerton*, Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, Captain *Hartley*, Mr. *Sibbald*, and myſelf, were preſent; and I well remember you declared, in preſence of us all, that you were decidedly of opinion the army ought at all events to attempt a retreat, rather than ſubmit to the extravagant terms propoſed by the enemy; but that as the principal officers, Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, had declared it as their opinion the army could not make good a retreat, and that the troops would not ſtand another attack, you could not, under ſuch circumſtances, take upon you ſingly to preſs a retreat.

I am, with regard, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Holmes.

Bombay,
9th March 1779.

And the Committee find the following anſwer, dated the 15th of January, returned by Meſſieurs *Carnac* and *Egerton* to Mr. *Farmer*'s repreſentation of the Durbar's demands:

To Mr. *William Gamul Farmer*.

Sir,

We received your letter of laſt night only an hour ago, the Hircarrahs having been detained by ſome accident: in anſwer to which you muſt acquaint the Durbar, that they demand what we have no power to agree to; the entering into and concluding treaties being ſolely confined to the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*; to whom therefore they muſt ſend their Vakeels. The only power left to us, is, the giving up the cauſe and perſon of *Ragonaut Row*; which done, muſt certainly put an end to all diſputes between the Engliſh and the Maratta State; and there is no doubt that peace and friendſhip will then ſubſiſt between us from henceforwards.

You muſt inform them, ſhould we enter into any treaty, we ſhould only deceive them, having no ſuch powers: we therefore deſire they will immediately acquaint us, whether, upon our abiding by the conditions firſt propoſed, of delivering up *Ragoba*, they will comply on their parts, by ſuffering us to march unmoleſted to *Bombay*, and for which purpoſe, to give us the neceſſary ſecurities.

We are, Sir,
Your obedient ſervants,
J. Carnac,
C. Egerton.

Wurgaon,
15th January 1779

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And after writing the above letter to Mr. *Farmer*, it was reſolved immediately to diſpatch Mr. *Thomas Holmes* to *Scindia*, with *full powers* to ſettle with the Durbar for the peaceable return of the army to *Bombay*, *on ſuch conditions as he might be able to obtain*, ſince it was the opinion of the Commander in Chief, that a retreat was impracticable.

In anſwer to the Poonah committee's letter, ſtating their want of powers to make treaties, Mr. *Farmer* replies, that *Madjee Scindia* deſires to be informed, by what authority they had broken that made by Colonel *Upton?* If the Governor General and Council had authorized the meaſure, he deſired to ſee the authority; otherwiſe, if the committee had acted on their own authority, they muſt anſwer it, and make a new agreement: that *Ragoba* might be ſurrendered, or otherwiſe, as we pleaſed; but till a new treaty were made between the Engliſh and the Maratta State, our army muſt remain where it was, whatever might be the conſequence.

At 10 o'clock in the evening of the 15th of January, Mr. *Holmes* arrived with terms for the peaceable return of the army to *Bombay*; to which, the committee declare, nothing but the avowed opinion of the principal officers, relative to the impracticability of effecting a retreat, would juſtify their acceding. They alſo declared, that the Durbar could not be ignorant of the want of power in the committee to conclude *ſuch a treaty* as the Durbar then preſcribed, and evidently compelled them to enter into, becauſe they were already informed, that the committee had no powers to conclude any treaty whatever.

In the morning of the 16th of January, Mr. *Holmes* was diſpatched to the Maratta camp, to finiſh the agreement; of which a rough ſketch had been prepared the preceding day. In the evening Meſſieurs *Farmer* and *Holmes* returned with *Scindia*'s Vakeels, to ſee the treaty duly executed by the committee; and alſo with a ſeparate article in favour of *Madjee Scindia*, to which Meſſieurs *Farmer* and *Holmes* had been obliged to conſent.

By the treaty with the Durbar on the one part, and the Engliſh Company on the other, it is ſtipulated,

That the Engliſh ſhall remain on the ſame footing as they were in the time of *Madarow*.

That the iſlands of *Salſette*, *Ouran*, and other iſlands and places, ſhall be given up:

Alſo *Jamboſeer*, and the diſtricts of *Broach*:

Alſo *Chickly*, *Veriow*, &c.

And the Bengal detachment ordered back to *Calcutta*: which Meſſieurs *Carnac* and *Egerton* promiſe faithfully to perform; and for which performance they pledge the Engliſh faith.

And concerning the above agreement, it is ſtated, that Mr. *John Carnac* and Colonel *Charles Egerton*, of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, being *fully empowered*, did depute Mr. *Thomas Holmes* and Mr. *Farmer*.

The ſeparate article is ſtiled an agreement between *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Counſellor, and Colonel *Charles Egerton*, an Engliſh committee of *Bombay*, with *Madjee Scindia*.

And the terms of that agreement being more extraordinary and degrading than the public treaty, the Committee have thought it right to inſert the ſame in this place without any abridgment.

Agreement of *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Counſellor, and *Colonel Egerton*, an Engliſh Committee of *Bombay*, with *Madjee Scindia*.

That after falling out with the Circar of *Mhaderow Narrain Pundit Purdhan*, we * with an army came upon the

* The Engliſh.

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the Gaut, and remained at *Tullagaun*; on which you † ordered a fighting, and we, both parties did fight, in which we were defeated, returned back, and encamped at *Worgaon* with *Dada* ‡ *Saheb*. We ‖ could hardly reach *Bombay* with our army and ſtores; conſidering which, we ſent Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Holmes* to you, deſiring you § would come between us, and get the Circars and our treaty ſettled as before, and conduct us and the army to *Bombay*. On which you did ſuſpend the war; you came between us, and got the Circar's and the Engliſh treaty ſettled; and you promiſed to conduct us and the army to *Bombay* without moleſtation from any body; you made our eſcape entirely; all which we took into our conſideration, and were very glad. You are a principal officer and well-wiſher to this Government, which has induced us to keep a friendſhip with you: this came into our mind; and we were ſatisfied that you made us free from the Circar's and every body's moleſtation, and got the treaty ſettled as before, without any diſpute from the Circar; therefore we thought we ſhould ſerve you; and for which reaſon have, of our free will and accord, agreed, *under the King's and Company's ſeal*, to deliver up to you the fort of *Broach*, with its Government, in the ſame manner the Mogul did hold it; which fort is now in our poſſeſſion, and which we have given you. We further agree that we will, on our arrival at *Bombay*, obtain the *Governor's Duſtuck, under the King's ſeal*, to the Killedar of *Broach*, and deliver the fort and its country, in the manner the Mogul did hold it, up to you. Under oath, no diſput ſhall ariſe in this. This we promiſe ſolemnly; and we have left Mr. *Farmer* and Mr. *Charles Stewart* with you, as hoſtages for the performance of this agreement. We will let no diſpute ariſe. This we agree to in writing.

† Marrattas.
‡ Ragoba.
‖ Engliſh.
§ Madjee Scindia.

Worgaon, near *Tullagaun*, 27th Julheze.

Letter from, 27th March 1779, Par. 74.

And your Committee find, that on concluding the above treaties, preſents were made by the Poonah committee to officers of the Durbar, to the amount of 41,000 rupees, for which notes were given.

And your Committee find it minuted by Mr. *Carnac* on the proceedings of the Select Committee *at Bombay*, the 16th of March 1779, "That having, ſince his return from the expedition, peruſed the tranſlation of the treaty and ſeparate article, he finds them conceived in ſuch terms, that he ſhould certainly have objected thereto at the time of ſignature, had they been literally explained to him; but that he only underſtood the contents in general terms; and indeed was the more indifferent as to the particular wording of them, as he always bore in his mind the idea that they were of no validity, and would never be ratified by their ſuperiors."

Letter from, Par. 70.

And your Committee find, that Mr. *William Gamul Farmer*, late Secretary to the Poonah committee, and Lieutenant *Charles Stewart*, were left as hoſtages for the performances of the treaties concluded by the Poonah committee.

Letter from, 27 March 1779, Par. 73.

And your Committee likewiſe find, that the whole of the above tranſactions were completed before the Select Committee of *Bombay* could be informed thereof.

After the concluſion of the treaty, Mr. *Carnac* addreſſed Governor *Hornby* as follows:

Sir,

It is with the deepeſt grief and indignation I have to inform you, the army is returning very diſgracefully to *Bombay*. Indeed, the Commander in Chief, the ſecond in command, and I fear too many more of the officers are unfortunately ſo forcibly impreſſed with the idea that the troops would throw down their arms, and ſuffer themſelves to be cut to pieces if attacked on the march by the enemy, that I am confident they would, rather than have made the attempt, ſubmitted to any conditions, even to the whole of the forces ſurrendering themſelves priſoners of war, and remaining as hoſtages till *Bombay* was delivered up, if this had been inſiſted on. I moſt certainly recommend your keeping a profound ſecret what I now communicate, except that the army is on its way back, until I ſee you; and you may depend upon my coming forwards with Mr. *Holmes*, ſo ſoon as it can be done with ſafety.

You will be pleaſed to order boats immediately to *Bellapore* for the reception of the troops; and will endeavour to get a letter conveyed to Mr. *Carnegie*, directing him to ſend thither what boats can be collected at *Carranjah*.

Letter from, 27th March 1779, Par. 71.

And your Committee find that Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, the 16th of January 1779, directed Colonel *Goddard* to march back with the army under his command to *Bengal*; and that two days afterwards countermanded that order.

That on the 17th of January the Bombay troops began their march back to *Bombay*, and were eſcorted by a party of Maratta horſe to *Panwell*, which they reached in ſeven days, and from whence they were tranſported to *Bombay*.

Notwithſtanding the general character given of the troops by Mr. *Carnac*, your Committee find that he afterwards ſubſcribed to an exception, which, in the opinion of this Committee, would have fully juſtified his iſſuing the moſt poſitive orders for the army to attempt to force a retreat to *Bombay*.

In the letter of the Select Committee, dated the 27th of March 1779, par. 128, which is ſigned by Mr. *Carnac*, it is ſtated, that Captain *Hartley*, on that trying occaſion, notwithſtanding the contagion of bad example, inſiſted upon it, that he could depend on the men which he had commanded; that he *actually* put a ſtop at once to deſertion, ſo far as the limits of his command extended; that when conſulted, he urged every argument to attempt the forcing of a retreat, rather than ſubmit to the humiliating terms preſcribed by the enemy; that he even *formed*, and preſented to Colonel *Cockburn*, the neceſſary diſpoſition for conducting the *retreat*, and avoiding inconveniencies reſulting from a night march, and the diviſion of the troops.

Having ſtated the above particulars, your Committee remark, that the army was only 18 miles, or about two days march, from the ſummit of the Ghauts, and about 16 miles, or two days march from *Poonah*, on the 11th of January, when orders were given to march back towards *Condolah*; that advice had juſt been received of *Moraba*'s horſe being in the *Conkan* to act in favour of *Ragoba*; that the Commiſſary had 18 days proviſions in ſtore; and that *Ragoba* had promiſed a further ſupply; that in every preceding ſkirmiſh, the enemy had been worſted, and compelled to retreat; that the troops were in ſpirits, and intrepid; that no council of war was called at *Tullagaon* to take the ſenſe of the officers of the army on the neceſſity of retreating; that although the order for the retreat of the army on the 11th of January was the joint act of Mr. *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton*, yet as Mr. *Carnac* had a caſting vote in the Poonah committee, and poſſeſſed in fact ſupreme authority in camp at the time, he was more particularly reſponſible for that meaſure.

Sel. Letter from 27th March 1779 Par. 52.

And it appears by the return of the commanding officer, that our loſs of men in the action of the 12th of January, was not very great; the general orders of the day expreſs his extreme ſatisfaction with their gallant behaviour in general; the officers were publicly thanked for their cool and ſpirited conduct; and Captain *Hartley* was particularly diſtinguiſhed for his judgment as an officer: it is allowed that there were ten days proviſions in camp after the action; it is aſſerted by the Select Committee, that the officer laſt mentioned declared he could rely upon the men he commanded, and urged every argument in favour of forcing a retreat rather than ſubmit to the terms preſcribed by the enemy: it cannot be doubted, that Mr. *Carnac* continued in poſſeſſion of authority without controul, except to make treaties; he was confident, if the officers and men did their duty that the army was ſufficiently numerous, and ſo well provided

vided with artillery as to be able to force their way back againſt all oppoſition; he had no doubt but the attempt ought to have been made; his words are, "at all events "rather than ſubmit to the terms preſcribed by the "enemy;" —yet, under all circumſtances, rather than preſs a retreat, he ventured to pledge the Engliſh faith, in the moſt ſolemn and ſacred manner, for the obſervance of treaties, of which he owns he did not at the time expect the confirmation. He ſtipulated to obtain the Governor's Duſtuck for delivering up the Company's poſſeſſions to the Marattas, and gave hoſtages for the due performance of extraordinary agreements, under *mental reſervations* and pre-conceived ideas that they were of no validity, and would never be ratified by his ſuperiors.

And your Committee do not find that any cenſure has been paſſed on Mr. *John Carnac* at *Bombay*; nor that any enquiry has been made by the Select Committee into his conduct and behaviour during the late expedition.

And upon the moſt impartial review of the whole conduct of Mr. *Carnac* during the late expedition towards *Poonah*, and after duly conſidering all the circumſtances relative thereto, the Committee are unanimouſly of opinion that Mr. *John Carnac* be diſmiſſed from his office, as one of the Council and Select Committee of *Bombay*.

Wm James, *John Purling,*
Wm Devaynes, *John Woodhouſe,*
Lau. Sulivan, *Henry Savage,*
John Michie, *Henry Fletcher,*
John Harriſon, *John Manſhip.*
Geo. Cuming,

Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn.*

Letter from, 27 March 1779, Par. 100. Alſo, Sel. Conf. 29 Jan. 1773.

And your Committee find, that on the 29th of January 1779, Governor *Hornby* delivered in a formal charge againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, for refuſing to charge themſelves with conducting the army from *Burgaum* to *Bombay*; and that the ſaid charge was grounded on the written opinion of Colonel *Cockburn*, concurred in by Colonel *Egerton*, above mentioned.

In ſupport of this charge, the Governor remarked, that the general order of thanks to the troops, for their behaviour on the 12th of January, ſufficiently demonſtrated that the ſaid opinion was totally void of foundation: that the fatal influence and infection of ſuch opinions, when adopted by officers in ſuperior command, was well known: that it was not a matter of wonder if, under ſuch ſanction, ſimilar ſentiments had gained ſome ground: that this however could not be admitted in extenuation; and ſuppoſing it true, the commanding officers could not be allowed to ſupport their unſoldierly ſentiments by the authority of their inferior officers.

Your Committee do not find that any circumſtance reſpecting the different ſentiments and opinion expreſſed by Captain *Hartley*, relative to the propriety of attempting to force a retreat, as ſtated in the Select Letter of the 27th March, par. 128, was mentioned by Governor *Hornby* (or by any member of the Select Committee) when the Governor delivered in his charge againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*; nor at any time before the date of the ſaid letter.

And your Committee find, that Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* has acknowledged, in his letter of the 16th of February 1779, that he gave the written opinion already ſtated: that it contained his real ſentiments of the army's ſituation: that having remained at *Burgaum* the 13th of January, without any thing being determined, cannonaded as uſual by the enemy; an European officer of Sepoys informed him at 8 in the evening, that he could not get his company to do their duty on the rear guard; that the black officers would not aſſiſt him: that it was apprehended they intended to deſert in the night:—That upon this information, he ordered Captain *Samper* to join the rear guard, with a view to look after the Sepoys: that another European officer, from the 6th battalion, brought him reports equally diſagreeable; that *Ragoba* informed him that 300 Sepoys intended to deſert that night; and that Mr. *Sibbald*, at midnight, communicated the ſame intelligence; that the language of the Europeans proved them to have been greatly alarmed, dejected, and diſpirited; that it was by no means correſpondent with their former ſteadineſs; that in ſpite of all precautions 11 black officers and 155 men, Europeans, Sepoys, and Laſcars, did deſert; that both Europeans and Sepoys continued ſo to do till after they left *Burgaum*; that ſuch another attack as that of the 12th of January, would nearly have exhauſted their ammunition; that the army was reduced 2,138 rank and file; that 300 ſick and wounded were to be taken care of; that the very exiſtence of the army neceſſitated him to give the opinion he delivered; and that Colonel *Egerton* was convinced of the propriety thereof.

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And your Committee find, that Colonel *Cockburn* has denied having abſolutely refuſed to charge himſelf with the conducting of the troops to *Bombay*; and declared, that all he meant was, that as he did not think it poſſible to effect a retreat, he could not be anſwerable for the bad conſequences which he foreſaw would follow: that if Mr. *Carnac* had ordered it to be attempted, he ſhould not have diſobeyed him, whatever conſequences might have enſued; that Mr. *Carnac* was all-powerful; that the only reſponſibility reſting with the commanding officer was, for the mode of executing any military meaſure, but not for the meaſure itſelf.

That Major *Dagon* had alſo wrote and ſigned an opinion, which agreed with that of Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, as to the impoſſibility of a retreat; that ſuch opinion was ready to have been delivered, but not demanded by Mr. *Carnac*.

That he had on former occaſions hazarded his life in the ſervice, and repeatedly led the Company's troops in attacks which have been attended with honour, and produced great advantages to the Company; and that Mr. *Carnac* himſelf had paſſed encomiums on his mode of conducting the troops, both in advancing and retreating, during the late ſervice; though now, for an opinion only given to the beſt of his judgment, he was to be ſtigmatized, and in a manner excluded the ſervice.

Letter from, 27th Mar. 1779, Par. 101.

And your Committee find, that when Governor *Hornby* preferred the charge againſt Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* and Colonel *Egerton*, he would have thought himſelf juſtified in moving for their ſuſpenſion from the ſervice, if they had not agreed to decline all military duty until their conduct and the late tranſactions ſhould have been ſtated to the Governor General and Council, and their opinion reſpecting the propriety of continuing the ſaid officers in, or of diſmiſſing them from the Company's ſervice, ſhould be received; by which opinion he declared it his intention to be guided. And your Committee find, that the caſe of Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, as well as that of Colonel *Egerton*, together with all proceedings relative to the late expedition, have been tranſmitted for the conſideration of the Governor General and Council accordingly.

Your Committee do not find that the Select Committee of *Bombay* have informed Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, of their being in poſſeſſion of the facts ſtated in their letter of the 27th of March, concerning Captain *Hartley*'s opinion for attempting to force a retreat.

And your Committee find, that Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* entertained the higheſt opinion of Captain *Hartley*'s abilities, previous to the action of the 12th of January, as appears by the following extracts of private correſpondence during the expedition.

Extract of a Letter from Governor *Hornby* to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, dated the 5th January 1779.

"There is one other point on which I muſt deſire to be no leſs preſſing; which is, my recommendation of Captains *Hartley* and *Stewart* to you. I can aſſure you, that

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that in this I do not mean any perſonal mark of favour to either of them; but that the general good of the ſervice is my only object."

Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*'s anſwer, dated the 8th of January 1779.

"You cannot have a higher opinion of Captain *Hartley* than I have; and I am ſo well convinced of his great abilities as an officer, and exceeding zeal to promote the ſervice, that he juſtly merits every attention and confidence from me. He was appointed by Colonel *Egerton* to take the command of the grenadier corps, when it became vacant a few days ago, by the moſt lamentable and unfortunate accident of the death of Captain *Stewart*."

Select Conſ. 16 Mar.

And your Committee find, that on the 13th day of March 1779, Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* entreated that a court martial might be ordered, to try him upon the charge delivered in againſt him by the Governor: that he was acquainted in anſwer, that as a reference to the Governor General and Council had been agreed upon, and accepted by him, and the neceſſary papers prepared for their information, there would be an impropriety in withdrawing the deciſion from their cognizance; for which reaſon, Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*'s requeſt for a court martial was not granted. And your Committee remark, that the date of the requeſt for a court martial, is ſix weeks after the charge had been preferred againſt him by Governor *Hornby*.

And your Committee having maturely and deliberately conſidered the conduct of Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* during the late expedition, are unanimouſly of opinion, that he be diſmiſſed the ſervice of the Company.

Wm James,
Wm Devaynes,
Lau. Sulivan,
John Manſhip,
Geo. Cuming,
John Purling.
Henry Fletcher,
John Harriſon,
John Michie,
John Woodhouſe,
Henry Savage,

Promotion of Captain *James Hartley*.

And your Committee find the following obſervations and reſolutions entered by the Select Committee of *Bombay*, on their proceedings of the 1ſt of February 1779; viz.

"The great importance in our preſent critical ſituation, of having an officer at the head of our infantry, on whoſe conduct we may ſafely rely; and the juſtice we owe to the ſervice, of diſtinguiſhing thoſe who eminently ſignalized themſelves on the late unfortunate expedition, unite in pointing out Captain *James Hartley*; who, on both conſiderations, is intitled to our firſt notice in the arrangements now indiſpenſably neceſſary to be made amongſt the field officers. Since Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* have choſe to decline all military duty and command, and the death of Lieutenant Colonel *Cay*, the chief command of the infantry has devolved by ſeniority to Major *Emanuel Hanney*, who, on his firſt appointment as a field officer, was barred from further promotion, and whom, on the 5th of laſt month, we found it neceſſary to ſuperſede in the field, by giving a Lieutenant Colonel's commiſſion to Major *Dagon* of the artillery: it is therefore deemed in no reſpect proper to advance him to a higher rank, or to continue him in command of our infantry; neither do we judge that Major *Frederick*, the next officer ſtanding, poſſeſſes ſufficient experience to qualify him for ſo important a charge, in theſe very critical times.

"In looking over our whole military liſt, no officer appears ſo fit for this command as Captain *Hartley*; his behaviour in a courſe of fourteen years ſervice has been unexceptionable, and to his conduct and intrepidity are we principally indebted for the preſervation of our whole army in the action of the 12th ultimo. His merit as an officer on the late ſervice is particularly acknowledged in the general orders given out by Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* and Colonel *Egerton*, immediately after the action, as entered hereafter. To which Mr. *Carnac* adds his teſtimony, in a manner much to Captain *Hartley*'s honour.

"In theſe circumſtances, and prompted by our deſire to reward ſuch diſtinguiſhed merit, we do unanimouſly reſolve to appoint Captain *James Hartley* a Lieutenant Colonel of infantry, and ſtrongly ſolicit the Honourable Company to confirm this appointment; truſting that the uncommonneſs of the ſtep, and the reluctance we muſt naturally feel to all ſuperceſſion, will be a conviction to them of the grounds and neceſſity for this meaſure.

"We alſo conſider it equally incumbent on us to confer marks of our notice on the other officers, who particularly diſtinguiſhed themſelves on the late ſervice; and on this principle it is unanimouſly reſolved to confer, unſolicited, a Major's commiſſion on Captain *Jno Weſtphall*, the ſenior Captain of artillery, to which he has a right by ſeniority, and the late promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Dagon*, and which he amply merits by his ability and ſignal good behaviour.

"Captain *John Bellas*, of the artillery, having likewiſe deſervedly attracted our notice, it is unanimouſly reſolved to appoint him Director of the Laboratory, for which he is well qualified, and which will be vacated by the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Dagon*, and the neceſſity of his attending to his other avocations as Commandant of artillery.

"Captain *Alexander Cadger*, of the infantry, having alſo behaved in a diſtinguiſhed manner, reſolved unanimouſly, that he be confirmed in command of the 5th battalion of Sepoys, vacant by the death of Captain *James Stewart*.

"Lieutenant *Thomas Dawſon* having proved himſelf a brave and active officer on this and every other ſervice on which he has been employed, it is unanimouſly reſolved, in order to convince the army that we will ſpare no effort to reward merit, to give Captains Brevets to three ſenior officers, that the promotion may reach Lieutenant *Dawſon*, who is alſo to have a Captain's Brevet. The three officers ſo to be promoted are, Lieutenants *Lendrum*, *Bowles*, and *Peche*; and we are glad to mention, that Lieutenant *Bowles*, who was on the late ſervice, has by his behaviour merited ſome mark of our notice.

"Lieutenant *John Colbach*, who is a ſenior officer to Lieutenant *Dawſon*, not being eſteemed properly qualified for a Captain's commiſſion, is not included in this promotion.

"Lieutenant *John Rattray*, of the Bengal eſtabliſhment, who arrived from *England* in the *Royal Henry*, and went a volunteer on the expedition, where, in the moſt trying ſituations, he gave eminent proofs of his ſkill and conduct as an officer, reſolved unanimouſly, that our thanks be given him in general orders; and as we ſhall be very glad to add ſuch a valuable officer to this eſtabliſhment, it is further unanimouſly reſolved to offer him a Captain's commiſſion, to rank next below Captain *Dawſon*.

"Lieutenants *James Jackſon*, and *S^t Lo Thomas*, of the artillery, having alſo merited particular notice, the former is appointed Aſſiſtant to the Director of the Laboratory, and the latter confirmed in his poſt of Adjutant, to which he was appointed on the expedition.

"Lieutenants *Waddington*, *Bannatyne*, *Macpharſon*, and *Burchall*, having alſo diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the action of the 12th, we ſhall be glad to give thoſe officers further proofs of our ſenſe of their good behaviour when opportunities offer; and it is now unanimouſly reſolved to give our particular thanks in the public orders of this garriſon.

"Reſolved unanimouſly, that our thanks in general be given to the whole of the officers whoſe behaviour has been commended in the above reſolutions; and if any inſtance of particular good behaviour has eſcaped our notice, we will with great pleaſure rectify the omiſſion.

"Reſolved

" Reſolved unanimouſly, That our thanks be given to the ſix companies of grenadier Sepoys that compoſed the rear diviſion under Captain *Hartley*, for their gallant behaviour on the 12th ultimo; and that badges be given them to commemorate the honour they gained on that occaſion.

" As in *India* ſervice in general, and particularly in our ſmall army, the charge and reſponſibility of each Captain is very great, and moſt dangerous conſequences may ariſe from improper perſons being promoted to that rank, Reſolved unanimouſly, and it muſt accordingly be ſignified to the army, that the Lieutenants will not in future be promoted in rotation to the rank of Captains, either in the infantry or artillery, unleſs they ſhall be judged fully qualified for that ſtation."

Bombay Gen. Conſ. 17th Feb. 1779.

And your Committee find, that on the 17th of February 1779, the Select Committee preſented to the Governor and Council the military commiſſions which they had deemed it for the good of the ſervice to grant to particular officers; but the Select Committee did not think it proper to explain their reaſons for having granted the ſaid commiſſions, when it was recommended to the Board to ſign them.

And your Committee find the following minutes entered by two members of the Board, who were not members of the Select Committee.

" Meſſrs. *Ramſay* and *Moore* deliver in the following minutes on the occaſion; and the other members declare, that by ſigning the commiſſions they do not mean to take any ſhare of reſponſibility for theſe appointments.

" Mr. *Ramſay* ſigns the commiſſions now preſented to the Board, becauſe the Select Committee recommend it as neceſſary for the good of the ſervice, and becauſe he thinks it will be agreeable to the Honourable Company, that the Board ſhould co-operate with the Committee in every meaſure which may be thought conducive to their intereſt; but as theſe commiſſions appear to Mr. *Ramſay* to be a deviation from the eſtabliſhed rules of the ſervice, and contrary to the expreſs orders of the Company, and as the Committee have not been pleaſed to communicate to the Board the motives which have induced them to grant them, Mr. *Ramſay* cannot poſſibly be a judge of the propriety or neceſſity of the meaſures, and therefore diſclaims every degree of reſponſibility for the ſame, more eſpecially as he is clearly of opinion, from the 48th paragraph of the Company's inſtructions to the Governor General and Council at *Bengal*, to which the other Preſidencies are directed to conform, that no Board in *India* have a power to grant a field officer's commiſſion.

" On this occaſion Mr. *Ramſay* begs leave to remark the very diſagreeable predicament he and the other members of the Board may be ſubjected to, by the Select Committee determining on meaſures to which, as in the inſtance now before us, it is neceſſary to have the ſanction of the Board's ſignature, though the members are deprived of the means of judging of the propriety of ſuch meaſures. Mr. *Ramſay*, for his own part, has not a doubt that the power of granting commiſſions alone reſts with the Governor and Council; and conſequently that all appointments ſhould originate with them, except in particular inſtances, where, in the courſe of military operations under the immediate direction of the Committee, it may become neceſſary to diſtinguiſh merit. This Mr. *Ramſay* ſuppoſes to be the caſe at preſent; but then he is of opinion the neceſſity of it ſhould be explained to the Board, and they become the judges; for it ſeems abſurd to ſuppoſe a member of the Board can be obliged to give his ſanction to a meaſure on which he has not been conſulted.

" The orders for the inſtitution of the Select Committee are certainly in ſuch general terms as may admit of their being conſtrued in the very extenſive ſenſe the members ſeem to have taken them. They are to tranſact all political, military, and naval affairs, and likewiſe all ſuch as may require ſecrecy. Theſe are, no doubt, very indefinite orders; but Mr. *Ramſay*, taking the ſpirit, and not the letter of the inſtitution, conceives they are meant to extend only to ſuch military and naval affairs as may depend on political meaſures, which the Honourable Company very wiſely think it proper to confine to a few, and by no means intended to throw the whole military detail of the eſtabliſhment into the Committee's department. To effect this, the mutiny act muſt neceſſarily be repealed, or at leaſt amended; and the Court of Directors muſt have ſeen the neceſſity of revoking former orders, whereby the *ſupreme military power* is expreſsly veſted in the Governor and Council, and they required to ſign all commiſſions. Had they meant to tranſfer theſe powers to the Committee, they moſt certainly would have ſaid ſo in expreſs terms, and not have taken it for granted, that the appointment of the Committee would ſet aſide all former orders on the ſubject. Mr. *Ramſay* requeſts this his opinion may ſtand recorded; at the ſame time declaring, that he will at all times, when called upon, co-operate in carrying into execution all meaſures which the Committee may deem for the Company's intereſt."

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" Mr. *Moore* begs it may be minuted, that he ſigns the commiſſions now preſented to the Board by the members of the Select Committee for ſigning, from the following principles:

" 1ſt. Becauſe he has not a doubt but the members of the Select Committee, by giving the commiſſions they now give to Colonel *Hartley*, Captain *Dawſon*, and Captain *Rattray*, are convinced that it is neceſſary for the good of the ſervice that ſuch commiſſions ſhould be given, and that they are given as rewards of diſtinguiſhed merit.

" 2d. Becauſe the Honourable the Court of Directors, in their commands of the 10th April 1778, to the Board at large, expreſs themſelves, after appointing the preſent Select Committee for tranſacting *all* political, *military*, and naval affairs, as follows:

" We direct that all orders and inſtructions which " ſhall be iſſued by our ſaid Select Committee, be iſſued " in the name of the Preſident and Select Committee; " and that all ſuch orders be implicitly obeyed by every " perſon in our ſervice, or enjoying our protection, civil " or military, on pain of ſuſpenſion, or of forfeiting our " licenſe and protection."

" Mr. *Moore* further begs it may be minuted, that from the cloſeſt conſideration of the power veſted in the Select Committee, as above recited, he is of opinion that the Select Committee are alone authorized to grant all military commiſſions whatever, they alone being reſponſible for granting them. The commiſſions now before the Board are, to Mr. *Moore*, proofs that the Select Committee think themſelves ſo authoriſed. Mr. *Moore* therefore, his ſigning commiſſions, without being conſulted as to the propriety of granting them, Mr. *Moore* not only thinks unneceſſary, but abſurd, becauſe it fixes his name to a meaſure which conſequently carries with it the appearance of approbation.

" When Mr. *Draper* preſented Lieutenant Colonel *Dagon*'s commiſſion to the Board for ſigning, which commiſſion was given by the Select Committee, Mr. *Moore* then mentioned to Mr. *Draper*, that as the Select Committee had granted the commiſſion, he thought the Select Committee alone ſhould ſign it. Mr. *Moore* ſigned it, however, to avoid the appearance of ſingularity, becauſe he thought the occaſion an urgent one, and becauſe he never wiſhes to enter a minute, whether of diſſent or obſervation, unleſs compelled to it from the duty which he owes to the Company, to the public, and to himſelf.

" The commiſſions were then ſigned."

And the Select Committee of *Bombay* have moſt earneſtly ſolicited the Court's confirmation of the appointment of Captain

Letter from, Par. 113, 27th March 1779.

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Captain *Hartley* as Lieutenant Colonel of infantry, in order to convince the army, that ſupport will be given to the Select Committee when the good of the ſervice makes it requiſite to diſtinguiſh particular officers. The Select Committee are ſorry to have acted contrary to the Court's orders in the promotion of field officers, but hope the neceſſity of the caſe will plead their excuſe: that on the terms they are on with the Marattas, and at a time of actual war with *France*, it would have been highly unjuſtifiable to have ſuffered their military to remain for any length of time, without a commanding officer qualified to preſerve proper diſcipline, or to lead them into the field.

Par 121. That the times required an officer who had more to plead than merely not having committed faults; they wanted an officer of active and approved merit, on whoſe ability and conduct they could depend for the execution of any ſervice committed to him.

123. That the loſs of Captain *Stewart* had been ſeverely felt. That the conduct of Captain *Hartley*, who on the death of Captain *Stewart* ſucceeded to the command of the advanced diviſion of the army, did him honour; that if his judicious and ſpirited counſel had been purſued, and the army moved up the line to ſupport him, inſtead of ordering him to retreat to the line, there is reaſon to believe that the fortune of the day might have ſecured our honour, if not our ſucceſs; and that keeping his ground till the inevitable conſequence of the meaſure induced Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* to revoke his order for retreating, was probably the chief circumſtance to which our troops owed their preſervation.

125. That when two chief officers were under cenſure for conduct oppoſite to that which the Select Committee are bound to ſupport, and to that ſpirit which it is their duty to encourage; when ſeniority, maintained by any means, is pleaded by ſo many perſons, and claims promotion in preference to diſtinguiſhed merit and ſervices, it is impoſſible for the Select Committee to produce thoſe general and deciſive teſtimonies in favour of their aſſertions and opinions which they always wiſh to accompany them: that in the preſent critical circumſtances their own intereſt is too much complicated with that of the public, to ſuffer them to be ſwayed by motives of partial or private regard; and while they are conſcious of having been guided by the abilities, integrity, temper, and general eſtimation of the perſon, they believe they have paid ſuch attention to the Company's intereſt as their duty exacted; and they rely on that ſupport which the performance of duty requires, and warrants them to hope for on the occaſion.

Extract of Letter from the Court of Directors to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated 12th April 1780.

Par. 1. Having duly attended to your proceedings previous to the late expedition towards *Poonah*, we allow that your reſolution of the 21ſt of July was not improper, under the favourable circumſtances ſtated by you at that period; but the change which happened ſoon afterwards in the ſituation of *Ragoba*'s friends, and the laps of time, from the 21ſt of July to the 22d of November, rendered it extremely imprudent to undertake the expedition at that time.

2. The ſtate of your garriſon, as repreſented by yourſelves to Sir *Edward Vernon* in your letter of the 8th of September 1778, could not warrant your ſending ſo large a force on foreign ſervice at the commencement of an European war, more eſpecially when ſpeedy ſuccour was rendered precarious, and conſequently ſucceſs very doubtful by the diſagreeable alteration which had happened in the ſituation of *Ragoba*'s friends.

3. Under the above circumſtances the undertaking was evidently become hazardous, and not to be juſtified; the reaſons urged by Mr. *Draper* againſt it were ſolid and judicious; and you ought certainly to have waited the arrival or near approach of the Bengal detachment, before you attempted to reinſtate *Ragoba* at *Poonah*.

4. And although we are willing to hope, for the reaſons offered by the majority in anſwer to Mr. *Draper*'s diſſent, that you acted according to the beſt of your judgment in undertaking to place *Ragoba* in the Regency at *Poonah* in November 1778, we nevertheleſs conſider you as having proceeded with great indiſcretion on that occaſion.

5. Your appointment of a member of the Select Committee, to accompany the Commander in Chief to *Poonah*, was highly improper. By the departure of the Commander in Chief and Mr. *Carnac*, the Governor having a caſting vote, became poſſeſſed in fact of abſolute authority, for tranſacting all political, military, and naval affairs, and ſuch as require ſecrecy at *Bombay*. And as this tranſaction militated againſt the letter and ſpirit of the Court's orders of the 10th of April 1778, the appointment of a member of the Select Committee at *Bombay*, to accompany the Commander in Chief to *Poonah*, muſt have our diſapprobation; and we declare the majority of the ſaid Committee very reprehenſible for their conduct in that reſpect. We find the Commander in Chief proteſted againſt the meaſure; and we exempt Mr. *Draper* from this cenſure, becauſe, juſtly ſuppoſing it to be the intent of the Company that none of the civil members of the Committee ſhould be detached from the Preſidency, if the Commander in Chief were to be abſent alſo, Mr. *Draper* very properly delivered his opinion in the Select Committee accordingly.

6. We find the amount of money due from *Ragoba* to the Company, is ſtated on your quick ſtock the 30th day of April 1777, at rupees 24,72,775.

7. Your payment of 80,000 rupees to Mr. *Shaw*'s executors, and your loan of four lacks to *Ragoba*, and 15,000 rupees to his ſervants, beſides arms and military ſtores furniſhed for his uſe, were unjuſtifiable meaſures; more eſpecially as ſo large a ſum as 1,50,000 rupees was ſent with the troops, and as authority was alſo granted to the Commiſſary and Paymaſter to paſs drafts on the Select Committee for their neceſſary diſburſements during the expedition; and we find that bills have actually been accepted on that account, to the amount of rupees, 2,28,529. Unleſs, therefore, you ſhall be able to produce better reaſons for having made the above loans, and payment, amounting to 4,95,000 rupees, than appear to us at preſent, you muſt expect to be made reſponſible to the Company for the ſaid amount.

8. As a Select Committee, your granting of military commiſſions was unwarrantable; your preſenting them to the Council for ſigning, without ſtating your reaſons for having granted them, was an indignity to the Board; and the Council are very blameable for not rejecting every commiſſion ſo preſented by you as aforeſaid.

9. Having noticed the above particulars, we proceed to examine the behaviour of ſuch perſons as were immediately concerned in conducting the late expedition towards *Poonah*.

10. The firſt object that ſtrikes us, is the ſlow progreſs of the army. This we deem an irreparable injury to the ſervice; and in this reſpect the conduct of the Commander in Chief appears extremely defective. The conſequence was obvious: the enemy had full opportunity to collect their ſtrength: the friends of *Ragoba*, inſtead of being encouraged by the ſpirited exertion of our force to join his ſtandard, muſt, as we conceive, have been deterred from declaring in his favour, by the languor of our own military proceedings.

11. And upon the moſt impartial review of the conduct of the late Colonel, now Brigadier General *Egerton*, during the late diſgraceful expedition towards *Poonah*, we are of opinion, that it was ſuch as rendered it highly improper for him to be continued in the command of the Company's forces at *Bombay*; we have therefore reſolved,

That

That he be diſmiſſed from the Company's ſervice, and he is hereby diſmiſſed accordingly.

12. In regard to Mr. *Carnac*, we are very ſorry to find his conduct not leſs exceptionable than that of Colonel *Egerton*.

13. We remark, that the army was only eighteen miles, or about two days march from the ſummit of the Gauts, and about ſixteen miles, or two days march from *Poonah*, on the 11th January, when orders were given to march back towards *Condolah*: That advice had juſt been received, of *Moraba*'s horſe being in the *Conkan*, to act in favour of *Ragoba*: that the commiſſary had eighteen days proviſions in ſtore, and that *Ragoba* had promiſed a further ſupply: That in the preceding ſkirmiſh, the enemy had been worſted, and compelled to retreat: That the troops were in ſpirits, and intrepid: That no council of war was called at *Tullagoan*, to take the ſenſe of the officers of the army on the neceſſity of retreating: That although the order for the retreat of the army, on the 11th of January, was the joint act of Mr. *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton*, yet as Mr. *Carnac* had a caſting vote in the Poonah committee, and poſſeſſed in fact ſupreme authority in camp at the time, he was particularly reſponſible for that meaſure.

14. It appears, by the return of the commanding officer, that our loſs of men in the action of the 12th January, was not very great. The general orders of the day expreſs his extreme ſatisfaction with their gallant behaviour in general. The officers were publicly thanked for their cool and ſpirited conduct; and Captain *Hartley* was particularly diſtinguiſhed for his judgment as an officer. It is allowed, that there were ten days proviſion in camp after the action. It is aſſerted, by the Select Committee, that the officer laſt mentioned, declared, he could rely upon the men he commanded; and urged every argument in favour of forcing a retreat, rather than to ſubmit to the humiliating terms preſcribed by the enemy. It cannot be doubted that Mr. *Carnac*, continued in poſſeſſion of authority without controul, except to make treaties. He was confident, if the officers and men did their duty, that the army was ſufficiently numerous, and ſo well provided with artillery, as to be able to force their way back againſt all oppoſition. He had no doubt but the attempt ought to be made. His words are, "At all events, rather than ſubmit to the "terms preſcribed by the enemy;" yet under all circumſtances rather than preſs a retreat, he ventured to pledge the Engliſh faith in the moſt ſolemn and ſacred manner, for the obſervance of treaties, of which he owns he did not at the time expect a confirmation. He ſtipulated to obtain the Governor's Duſtuck for delivering up the Company's poſſeſſions to the Marattas; and gave hoſtages for the due performance of extraordinary agreements, under mental reſervations and preconceived ideas that they were of no validity, and would never be ratified by his ſuperiors.

15. Notwithſtanding the deſpicable character given of the troops by Mr. *Carnac*, in his letter to Governor *Hornby*, when the army was on its return to *Bombay*, we find that he afterwards ſubſcribed to an exception, which in our opinion would have fully juſtified his iſſuing the moſt poſitive orders for the army to attempt to force a retreat from *Wurgaon* to *Bombay*, rather than ſubmit to the diſgraceful conditions preſcribed by the enemy.

16. In your letter of the 27th of March, 1779, par. 128, which is ſigned by Mr. *Carnac*, it is ſtated, that Captain *Hartley* on that trying occaſion, notwithſtanding the contagion of bad example, inſiſted upon it, that he could depend on the men which he had commanded. That he actually put a ſtop at once to deſertion ſo far as the limits of his command extended; that when conſulted, he urged every argument to attempt the forcing of a retreat, rather than ſubmit to the humiliating terms preſcribed by the enemy; that he even formed and preſented Colonel *Cockburn* the neceſſary diſpoſition for conducting the retreat, and for avoiding inconveniences reſulting from a night march, and the diviſion of the troops.

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17. And we do not find that any cenſure has been paſſed on Mr. *Carnac* at *Bombay*; nor that any enquiry has been made by the Select Committee into his conduct and behaviour during the late expedition.

18. And upon the moſt impartial review of the whole conduct of Mr. *Carnac* during the late expedition towards *Poonah*, and after duly conſidering all the circumſtances relative thereto, we have reſolved that *John Carnac*, Eſquire, be diſmiſſed from his office, as one of the Council and Select Committee of *Bombay*; and he is hereby diſmiſſed accordingly.

19. The charge brought by Governor *Hornby* againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* was very proper; but we do not find it noticed on your proceedings on that occaſion that Captain *Hartley* had given a different opinion, concerning the propriety of attempting to force a retreat from *Wurgoan*; nor that you have, in any ſtage of the buſineſs, informed Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* of your being in poſſeſſion of that fact; which certainly you ought to have done. We find Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* has acknowledged that he gave the written opinion contained in the Governor's charge againſt him; and upon the moſt mature conſideration of his conduct, we have reſolved to diſmiſs Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* from the ſervice of the Company, and he is hereby diſmiſſed accordingly.

20. We are ſorry to obſerve, that in appointing Captain *James Hartley* to be a Lieutenant Colonel of infantry on the Bombay eſtabliſhment, you have concurred unanimouſly in a direct breach of the Company's orders; but as you have repreſented the merit and ſervices of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* in a light ſo very favourable for that officer, we have reſolved, rather than degrade an officer whoſe ability and merit ſeems univerſally acknowledged, that Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* ſhall remain the youngeſt of that rank at *Bombay*; but that he ſhall, from the receipt of this letter at *Bombay*, receive the pay and allowances of Captain of infantry only, until ſuch meritorious officers as have been ſuperſeded by his promotion, ſhall have riſen in regular ſucceſſion above him, to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

21. Having taken into our particular and moſt ſerious conſideration the ſtate of the Company's military force at your ſettlement, we have reſolved to appoint an able officer to the command of the troops at *Bombay*.

22. And having the higheſt opinion of the zeal, experience, and military abilities of Colonel *Thomas Goddard*, we have thought fit to appoint Colonel *Goddard* Commander in Chief of the Company's forces at *Bombay*, and granted him a commiſſion of Brigadier General in our ſervice.

23. We have alſo requeſted his Majeſty to grant a commiſſion of Brigadier General, with local rank, to Colonel *Thomas Goddard*, which we doubt not will be granted accordingly.

24. We feel the moſt ſenſible concern for the ſituation of Mr. *William Gamul Farmer* and Lieutenant *Stewart*, as hoſtages for the performance of the convention of *Wurgaon*; but as we have no doubt, but that meaſures will have been taken, either by you or by our Governor General and Council, to procure their liberty before this letter can reach you, we for the preſent only add, that early information of their enlargement will afford us very great ſatisfaction.

25. We direct that no additional pay or emolument be allowed to Lieutenants *Dawſon*, *Lindrum*, *Bowles*, and *Piché*, in conſequence of brevets granted to thoſe officers. By a future opportunity we ſhall conſider the propriety of revoking or of finally confirming the ſaid brevets.

26. It is our pleaſure that Mr. *Daniel Draper* be ſecond of Council, and of the Select Committee at *Bombay*. And as a further teſtimony of our approba-

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tion of the conduct of Mr. *Draper*, it is also our pleasure that Mr. *Draper* do succeed, and we hereby expressly appoint him to succeed to the office of President and Governor of *Bombay*, upon the death, removal, or resignation of Governor *Hornby*.

27. It is our order that Brigadier General *Goddard*, have a constant seat as third in our said Council and Select Committee. We likewise direct, that Mr. *Henry Moore* be the fourth member of our Select Committee at *Bombay*.

28. As a further mark of our approbation of the conduct of Brigadier General *Goddard*, we have directed, that the pay and allowances received by him from *Bengal*, as Commander in Chief of the detachment sent from that settlement, be continued to him, and paid by our Governor General and Council, so long as those troops shall remain under General *Goddard*'s command on the western side of *India*; he must also receive the pay and allowances of third of our Council and Select Committee at *Bombay*: but if our Governor General and Council shall recal the Bengal detachment, the pay and allowances received by General *Goddard* on that account must be discontinued, and cease immediately upon the return of the said detachment, as it will then be no longer under his authority or command; and after that period, General *Goddard* must receive the pay and allowances of our Commander in Chief of our troops at *Bombay*.

APPENDIX, No. 131.

At a Committee of Secrecy of the *East India* Company, Friday 31st July 1778,

PRESENT,

Sir *George Wombwell*, Baronet, Chairman,
Sir *William James*, Baronet, Deputy,
John Purling, and *William Devaynes*, } Esquires.

RESOLVED, That in addition to the military force promised by Administration, a further supply of troops is necessary for the protection of the Company's settlements, and that the Chairman and Deputy Chairman do attend his Majesty's Ministers, to request that such additional supply of troops may be granted for that purpose as to His Majesty in his great wisdom shall seem fit.

Ordered, That draft of instructions to *Bombay* be prepared relative to *Ragoba*, to the views of the French, and to the situation of affairs in that part of *India*.

Thursday 13th August 1778.

At a Committee of Secrecy;—present, Sir *George Wombwell*, Baronet, Chairman; Sir *William James*, Baronet, Deputy; Mr. *Sulivan*, Mr. *Devaynes*, Mr. *Purling*, Mr. *Roberts*, Mr. *Booth*.

Read the following draft of instructions to *Bombay*.—*(See page 300 of the Sixth Report.)*

N. B.—The above was dated the 31st of August, and signed

G. Wombwell,
Wm James,
Will. Devaynes.

Ordered, That the foregoing instructions to *Bombay*, be transmitted to Lord *Weymouth*, with the following letter:—

My Lord,

In addition to the orders and instructions sent over land to our settlements in *India*, a draft whereof we had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship with our letter of the 11th of April last, we now beg leave to lay before you the draft of a further letter to be written to our President and Council of *Bombay*, if it shall be honoured with His Majesty's approbation.

The advices of our servants respecting the proceedings of the French in *India*, are already before your Lordship; and therefore we have to request, that you will be pleased to communicate to us His Majesty's pleasure on the enclosed orders and instructions immediately, a messenger being ready to proceed over land to *Bombay*, by the way of *Bussorah*, as we conceive it essentially necessary that no time be lost, if the measure be adopted.

We have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient,
most humble servants,
G. Wombwell,
East India House, *Wm James*,
13th August 1778. *W. Devaynes.*

Read, and approved unanimously, the following draft of a letter to Lord *Weymouth*:—

My Lord,

The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the *East India* Company having on the 31st ultimo resolved,

"That in addition to the military force promised by "Administration, a further supply of troops is necessary "for the protection of the Company's settlements; and "that the Chairman and Deputy Chairman do attend "His Majesty's Ministers, to request that such addi- "tional supply of troops may be granted for that pur- "pose, as to His Majesty in his great wisdom shall seem "fit."

And the Deputy Chairman having, on the 1st instant, in consequence of the said resolution, laid the Committee's humble request before your Lordship, you will permit us farther to entreat that the King's pleasure may be speedily communicated thereon, in order that proper dispositions may be made for the reception and accommodation on board our ships, of such troops as His Majesty shall be graciously pleased to grant, for the protection of the Company's settlements.

We have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient,
and most faithful humble servants,
G. Wombwell,
East India House, *Wm James*,
13th August 1778. *Wm Devaynes.*

Ordered, That the above letter be wrote fair, and transmitted to Lord *Weymouth* immediately.

Wednesday, 26th August 1778.—At a Committee of Secrecy;—present, Sir *William James*, Baronet, Chairman; Mr. *Devaynes*, Mr. *Roberts*, and Mr. *Sulivan*.

Read the following letter from Lord *Weymouth*, dated the 22d instant:

"Secret.

"*St. James*'s 22d August 1778.

"Gentlemen,

"Your letters of the 13th instant were duly received, "and laid before the King.

"The draft of your secret letter to *Bombay* has been "taken into consideration. It is extremely expedient "that every means should be used to prevent the French "from extending their influence at *Poonah*, and getting "any footing in that part of *India*; but whether the "taking *Ragoba* by the hand is the most proper means "must be left to your determination.

"With respect to your application for an additional "military force, I have in command to acquaint you, "that in case the Company will pay the expence of "raising and maintaining a new battalion, His Majesty

" will have no objection that ſuch means may be pro-
" poſed for that purpoſe, as you ſhall ſee likely to have
" effect.

" I am, Gentlemen,
" Your moſt obedient
" humble Servant,
" *Weymouth.*"

" Chairman and Deputy Chairman
" of the *Eaſt India* Company."

The Committee having taken his Lordſhip's letter into their ſerious conſideration, it is upon a queſtion reſolved unanimouſly, That it is not neceſſary, in conſequence thereof, to make any alteration in the ſecret letter propoſed to be ſent to *Bombay*.

Ordered, That the letter to *Bombay* be forthwith put in cypher, and prepared for ſigning.

Ordered, That letters be prepared in cypher to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William*, and to the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, tranſmitting copies of the Committee's orders to *Bombay*, and enjoining the ſtricteſt attention thereto.

27th Auguſt 1778.

Wrote the following letter to *Sir George Wombwell*, by order of the Deputy Chairman:

Sir,

The Committee of Secrecy, aſſiſted by Mr. *Sulivan*, have reſolved that no alteration ſhall be made in the letter propoſed to be ſent to *Bombay*, and directed that it be put in cyper immediately.

As the powers of the Committee of Secrecy had expired, and are now revived, a ſhort letter on that ſubject has been propoſed and ſigned by the Court; copy whereof I beg leave to encloſe for your peruſal.

Sir *William James* has this morning had an interview with Lord *North*, on the ſubject of that part of Lord *Weymouth*'s letter which ſtates the conditions on which an additional battalion of men may be raiſed for the ſervice of the Company. Extracts of proceedings have been ſelected, in order to aſcertain the ſpecific allowance heretofore made, when his Majeſty's troops ſerved in *India*. Theſe extracts have juſt been tranſmitted to Lord *North* by the Deputy Chairman, and a copy is preparing for your inſpection.

As the Select Committee at *Bombay* have not been informed from hence of the orders ſent by the Committee of Secrecy to *Fort Saint George* and *Bengal*, the 15th of April laſt, a copy of thoſe orders is now prepared in cypher, in order to be tranſmitted by the intended conveyance to *Bombay*. You will alſo receive herewith draft of ſhort letter to *Bengal* and to *Fort Saint George*, covering the preſent orders wrote in cypher to *Bombay*, and enjoining attention thereto. This draft waits your approbation, and if approved will be ſigned by the Committee of Secrecy only.

The encloſed letter to your addreſs was received this afternoon by the *Hawke* from *Bombay*.

The ſubſtance of the papers ſent to Lord *North* is, that the Company have allowed levy money, £. 3 per head; alſo a ſum of money to the Colonels of marching regiments, to enable them to replace the cloathing and accoutrements of non-commiſſioned officers and private men taken from their reſpective regiments; alſo an allowance for the paſſage of ſuch officers and men as went on board the Company's own ſhips; alſo an allowance to the field officers for a table, &c. in *India*; and finally, ſuch additional pay to both officers and privates as rendered their whole allowance equal to the pay and batta to the Company's troops in *India*.

I have the honour to be, with the moſt perfect conſideration,

Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
faithful humble ſervant,
Sam. Wilks.

Eaſt India Houſe,
27th Auguſt 1778.

Downing Street, Monday 31ſt Auguſt 1778.—At a Committee of Secrecy;—preſent, Sir *George Wombwell*, Baronet, Chairman; Sir *William James*, Baronet, Deputy; *William Devaynes*, Eſquire. Appendix. No. 131.

The Committee being met to ſign inſtructions to the ſeveral Preſidencies in *India*, the following were ſigned accordingly:

Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, dated this day; alſo,

Letter to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William*, dated the ſame day; alſo,

Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, dated the ſame day.

Our Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

Encloſed we tranſmit you copy of a letter wrote in cypher to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated this day, to which we enjoin your ſtrict attention. The like copy has been ſent to our Governor General and Council at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, with the ſame injunction. And as we muſt ſuppoſe that our orders of the 15th April laſt will have been duly executed before this comes to hand, we can have no doubt of your ability and readineſs ſo to co-operate with our ſaid Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, as ſhall enable them to accompliſh effectually the meaſures recommended to their immediate conſideration.

We tranſmit for your information extract of a letter from our Governor and Deputy Governor of *Saint Helena*, dated the 20th of May 1778; alſo one from Captain *Douglas*, dated the 10th of June 1778; and from our Secretary, of this day's date, to the Agent and Council at *Buſſorah*.

We are
Your loving friends,
G. Wombwell,
Wm James,
Wm Davaynes.

London,
31ſt Auguſt 1778.

The letter to *Bengal* is ſimilar to the above, except the following addition:

Poſtſcript. As hoſtilities have actually commenced between *Great Britain* and *France*, and as we think it probable that our ſervants on the coaſt of *Coromandel* may ſtand in need of aſſiſtance from you, we direct that you fail not, upon their application, to afford them ſuch aſſiſtance, in money or otherwiſe, as the exigence of the caſe may require.

G. Wombwell,
Wm James,
W. Davaynes.

Ordered, That the above diſpatches be delivered to Lieutenant Colonel *James Capper*.

Sir *William James* deſires, that the following extracts may be entered upon the minutes of the Committee:

Extract of a Letter from *John Purling*, Eſquire, to Sir *William James*, dated *Weymouth*, 29th Auguſt 1778.

" I am glad you perſevere in ſending your diſpatches
" over land.

" Your orders relative to *Ragoba* are ſo guarded that,
" truſted to the execution of prudence, I think no harm
" can come of them; and I muſt ſay the conduct of the
" Governor and Council of *Bombay*, in all matters
" concerning the Marattas, has been extremely prudent
" and ſenſible."

Extract of a Letter from *Robert Gregory*, Eſquire, to Sir *William James*; dated *Cool Lodge*, near *Gort*, *Ireland*, 12th Auguſt 1778.

" I wiſh we could bring about an alliance with *Hyder*
" *Ally*, and place *Ragoba* on the Muſnud of *Poonah*; we
" ſhould then have little to fear from the French on the
" continent of *India*."

Liſt

Appendix. No. 131.

List of Packet to *Bombay*, by Colonel *Capper*.

N° 1. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Preſident and the Select Committee, at *Bombay*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in cypher.

N° 2. Letter from D° to the Honourable the Governor General and Council at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in cypher.

N° 3. Letter from D° to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in cypher.

N° 4. Letter from the Court of Directors to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, dated 26th Auguſt 1778.

N° 5. Extract of a letter from the Governor and Deputy Governor of *Saint Helena*, dated 20th May 1778.

D° from Captain *Douglas*, dated 10th June 1778.

D° from *Peter Michell*, Eſquire, to the Agent and Council at *Buſſorah*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778; with an encloſure containing a liſt of ſhipping taken up for 1778.

N° 6. Copy of a letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Governor General and Council at *Bengal*, dated 15th April 1778.

N° 7. Copy of a letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, dated 15th April 1778.

N° 8. Copy of a circular letter to all the Preſidencies, dated 15th April 1778.

N° 9. Copy of a letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, dated 15th April 1778.

List of Packet to *Bengal* by Colonel *Capper*.

N° 1. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Governor General and Council at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in cypher.

N° 2. Letter from D° to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in cypher.

N° 3. Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council, dated 26th Auguſt 1778.

N° 4. Extract of a letter from the Governor and Deputy Governor of *Saint Helena* to the Court of Directors, dated 20th May 1778.

D° from Capt *Douglas*, dated 10th June, 1778.

D° from *Peter Michell*, Eſquire, to the Agent and Council at *Buſſorah*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778; with an encloſure containing a liſt of ſhipping taken up for 1778.

N° 5. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Governor General and Council at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in cypher.

List of Packet to *Fort Saint George* by Colonel *Capper*.

N° 1. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in cypher.

N° 2. Letter from D° to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in cypher.

N° 3. Letter from the Court of Directors to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, dated 26th Auguſt 1778.

N° 4. Extract of a letter from the Governor and Deputy Governor of *Saint Helena* to the Court of Directors, dated 20th May 1778.

D° from Captain *Douglas*, dated 10th June 1778.

D° from *Peter Michell*, Eſquire, to the Agent and Council at *Buſſorah*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778, with an encloſure containing a liſt of ſhipping taken up for 1778.

N° 5. Letter from the Secret Committee, directed to the Honourable the Governor General and Council at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778. Wrote in cypher.

Extract of Letter from the Governor and Deputy Governor of *Saint Helena*, dated 20th May 1778.

" Having received intelligence from Captain *Moutray*, " that on his outward bound voyage to this iſland, he " received information at the iſland of *Palma*, that " there had been two American privateers lately there; " the one a two-deck ſhip, and the other a frigate; and " on his arrival at *Saint Jago*, he was further informed, " that the ſaid two privateers had alſo been there, and " had left that iſland fourteen days before his arrival, " giving out that they were bound to the ſouthward.

" This intelligence we thought neceſſary to communicate to Captain *Frazer*, Commander of the *Earl of* " *Mansfield*, by letter, copy of which goes herein enclоſed for your information.

" *John Scottowe*,
" *Dan. Corneille*."

Extract of a Letter from Captain *Peter Douglas* of the Ship *Queen*, to Mr. Secretary *Michell*, dated *Saint Helena*, 10th June 1778, received by a Daniſh China Ship 26th Auguſt 1778.

" I beg you will acquaint the Honourable Court, " that a few days before the 17th May, when I parted " company with the *Southampton* and *Naſſau*, in latitude " 27° ſouth, all well, we ſpoke with a French Eaſt In- " diaman from *L'Orient*, but laſt from *Madeira*, who " informed us of two ſhips of conſiderable force, com- " manded by a Captain *La Roche*, had ſailed from *Boſ-* " *ton* to the ſouthward, which he was informed were in- " tended to cruiſe off *Johanna*."

Extract of Letter from Mr. Secretary *Michell* to the Company's Agent and Council for all the affairs of the Engliſh nation at *Buſſorah*.

A general liſt of ſhips entertained to this time for the Company's ſervice is ſent under this cover; that you communicate copies thereof in the ſpeedieſt manner to their ſeveral ſettlements, by ſuch conveyances as ſhall offer from your port.

The ſituation of public affairs, ſince you was laſt adviſed thereof, renders a rupture between the Britiſh and French crown inevitable.

His Majeſty's fleet, under the command of Admiral *Keppel*, has actually had a ſmart engagement with the French, on the 27th July laſt; and though the latter were compelled to retreat into *Breſt*, you are nevertheleſs to make the cautions given by the Court's orders, in my letter of the 15th of April laſt, the rule for exerting yourſelves, in order to ſecure the property and concerns of the Company committed to your care.

The Court having received intelligence of ſome cruizers ſaid to have been lately on their way to the *Eaſt Indies*, copy thereof is encloſed for your notice; and that you may immediately make the ſame known to all our Preſidencies, in order that the Company's ſhipping and the country trade may be put well on their guard againſt the deſigns and operations of thoſe cruizers.

APPENDIX, No. 132.

Letter from the Governor General and Council, 15th October 1778.

Received at Bombay 18 Dec. 1778. Sel. Conſ.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Gentlemen of the Select Committee, *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

WE have not received any letters from you ſince the date of your diſpatches by the *Terrible* of the 25th July laſt; but we have been informed, by letters received from Mr. *Lewis*, dated the 6th Auguſt, that *Nanna Furneſe* had effected the impriſonment of *Morabah* and *Buchaba*, by means of a preſent of three lacks of rupees given to *Madjee Scindia*; that *Nannah*, *Succaram*, *Scindia*, *Holkar*, *Hurry Punt*, &c. had aſſembled their forces on a plain near *Poonah*; and that the Durbar were concerting ſchemes to oppoſe and diſtreſs the detachment; and that they had actually circulated orders to the different Rajahs, to practiſe every ſecret and underhand means in their power to effect this purpoſe.

We adviſed you in our laſt of the appointment of Mr. *Elliot* to proceed to the Court of *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, with inſtructions to negociate and conclude a treaty of alliance with that Chief: but we are now concerned to inform you of the demiſe of Mr. *Elliot* on his way to *Naguepore*, at a place called *Sarungar*. The Rajah having expreſſed great ſatisfaction at the overtures which we made for a connection with him by this deputation; and being, as we have every reaſon to believe, firm in his attachment to the Engliſh, we conclude, as ſoon as he hears of the unfortunate event of Mr. *Elliot*'s death, that he will take an active part in proſecuting the intended negociation either by deputing a proper miniſter to us, on his part, or by ſoliciting our alliance on ſuch terms as may prove a general advantage to the Company's poſſeſſions. For theſe reaſons, we do not mean to appoint any perſon to ſucceed Mr. *Elliot*, until our advices from the Rajah ſhall enable us to determine on the expediency of that meaſure.

We have thought it incumbent on us to remove Colonel *Leſlie* from the command of the detachment of forces, which was ordered to march for the ſupport and aſſiſtance of your Preſidency, on account of the little progreſs it had made under him; as we underſtand that he was advanced no further than *Rajigur* on the 25th ultimo; and of his manifeſt diſobedience alſo of our poſitive orders, in forming and concluding a treaty of perpetual peace and friendſhip, in the name of the Company, with the Rajahs *Gomaun* and *Comaun Sing*, Chiefs of a part of the Bundlecund diſtrict.

Colonel *Thomas Goddard* is now appointed to the chief command of theſe troops, and we have ordered him to proſecute his march without loſs of time into *Berar*; where on his arrival he will apply to *Moodajee Booſla*, and if that Chief ſhall agree to join him with a ſufficient body of forces for the purpoſe, he is to continue his route in conjunction with them, and to obey all orders which he may receive from you; but if he ſhall not have received any freſh directions for his march, and if the Rajah ſhall decline or refuſe to grant his aſſiſtance, we have then veſted in him a diſcretionary power to ſuſpend his proceedings.

If the plan which you had reſolved to adopt, and to carry into execution in September, for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, and which you notified to us in your letter of the 25th July, ſtill ſubſiſts; or if you ſhall have formed any other for the ſame end, conſiſtently with the terms which we have already preſcribed for our aſſent to that meaſure; or if you ſhall judge a ſtrong reinforcement immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary to enſure the ſafety of *Bombay* againſt a French invaſion, and ſhall deem it requiſite and adviſable, in either of theſe caſes, to command the detachment at all hazards to proceed further towards *Bombay*, even without a junction of the troops of any Power in alliance with us; you will in ſuch caſes, and ſuch only, require Colonel *Goddard* to advance with it; but in all others you will give him notice of your intentions, and leave him to act under our directions. Appendix. Nos. 132 to 134.

We diſpatched the *Morning Star* in the beginning of laſt month to *Fort Saint George*, in conſequence of the requeſt of the Preſident and Council there; and we take the firſt opportunity of the favourable ſeaſon for ordering the *Terrible*, which ought to have ſailed in company with the *Morning Star*, but was prevented by the want of men, to return to your port.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
Fort William, *P. Francis*,
15th October 1778. *Edwd Wheler*.

APPENDIX, No. 133.

Letter from Governor General and Council to *Bombay*, 23d November 1778.

Gentlemen,

IN our letter of the 16th inſtant we informed you, that we had thought it proper to inveſt Colonel *Goddard* with full powers to conclude a treaty with *Moodajee Booſla*, Rajah of *Berar*, on the grounds of our inſtructions to the late Mr. *Elliot*; of which we encloſe a copy for your information. As the event of his negociation is likely to cauſe a very ſpeedy and eſſential change in the deſigns and operations of the detachment; and as the plan which we have choſen to ſupply the place of that originally recommended by you, has rendered it neceſſary that we ſhould retain in our hands the means of effecting it; we hereby revoke the power which we gave you in our letter of the 15th ultimo, and ſhall direct the commanding officer of the detachment to obey only ſuch orders as he ſhall hereafter receive from us.

Although the circumſtances into which we have been thrown, by the failure of the plan for which the detachment was originally formed, have rendered it neceſſary to make this alteration in the controul and direction of it, our intention is not to withdraw the ſervices of the detachment entirely from the ſupport of any meaſures which you may have formed in reliance on them, if theſe meaſures ſhall not prove incompatible with the inſtructions given to Colonel *Goddard*, and with the engagements which he may conclude in conſequence of them: we ſhall therefore leave him ſtill ſubject to your inſtructions, under theſe proviſions; and requeſt that you will communicate to him ſuch points as you may judge proper to be included in the operations concerted with the Rajah of *Berar*.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
Fort William, *P. Francis*,
23d November 1778. *Edwd Wheler*.

True Copies.
Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secy to the Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No 134.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 19th February 1779.

The Preſident's Review of Maratta affairs, and Reſolutions propoſed by him in conſequence.

SINCE the firſt advice of the unfortunate iſſue of our late expedition, my whole time and attention has been employed in a careful review of our paſt tranſactions with reſpect to Maratta politics, in the conſideration of the circumſtances of our preſent ſituation, and in forming ſuch a plan of conduct as ſeems beſt adapted to meet the many difficulties and dangers that we may have to expect, and muſt guard againſt.

Appendix. No. 134.

This laſt is ſo much my object, that I neither intend to go into any enquiry of the cauſes of the failure of our hopes from the late expedition, nor into any juſtification of the firſt undertaking. The motives on which we determined on it were certainly no weak ones: they have been felt, acknowledged, and even preſſed on us, both by the Governor General and Council; and within theſe few days by the Honourable the Secret Committee, in their diſpatch of the 31ſt Auguſt. I am however well aware, that the judgment that is to be given on enterprizes of great moment, muſt be expected to be formed from the event; that objections will hardly ever be wanting againſt meaſures which have proved unſucceſsful; and that hardly any anſwer can be found that will ſatisfy objections ſo ſupported. I think it beſt therefore for every member, according to the ſhare he has had in this buſineſs, to leave the public proceedings and records to juſtify or condemn his opinions and conduct, with a general reference to the candour of thoſe who are to be our judges, as to our attention to the public intereſt with which we are charged; the ſteps we have taken for the ſecurity of it; and the cauſe to which our late miſcarriage is to be attributed; the remedy of which is the only point I can now think of moment, how much ſoever we may be concerned individually in the approbation or cenſure of our paſt conduct.

Since the removal of Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* from the command of the army, we have made ſome promotions, and otherwiſe diſtinguiſhed thoſe officers whoſe merit is acknowledged to have been moſt conſpicuous on the late ſervice. I hope this will produce a ſpirit of emulation, that will be of the greateſt advantage to the army; and I truſt we have now at the head of the infantry and Sepoys, a gentleman who will diſtinguiſh himſelf in garriſon no leſs than he has done in the field, by the ſtricteſt attention to the diſcipline and general improvement of our troops. I now propoſe further, that we apply to the Governor General and Council for a tried, experienced, and active officer, of the rank of Colonel, to take the command of the troops on this eſtabliſhment; that it be repreſented to them how very material the choice of ſuch an officer is; and that we rather wiſh them to promote to the above-mentioned rank an officer whoſe merit they entertain an high opinion of, than to be guided in their appointment by any other rule. It would likewiſe be a conſiderable advantage and improvement to the ſervice, if they would furniſh us with a Major and five or ſix Captains of infantry, all choice and experienced officers, whom we might replace with officers of the ſame rank, whoſe want of experience is the only objection to them. Our troops would then, I think, be on a footing equal to any ſervice that might be required of them; which I fear has not for ſome time paſt been the caſe. Whatever is to follow from the doubtful ſtate we are now in with the Marattas, I think we ſhould thus, even with our preſent force alone, be well prepared for a defenſive war with them; and prepared it is neceſſary we ſhould be, as ſoon as poſſible.

The firſt and moſt important object of our attention abroad is to endeavour to ſecure Colonel *Goddard* and his army from accidents: by a letter I have had from him, dated the 26th January, I find he was then within four days march of *Barampore*, where he intended to ſtop ſome days for further advices from us, and to determine on his route. I have ſince had certain intelligence of his arrival on the 29th at *Barampore*, where I flatter myſelf he will be ſecure from all hoſtile attempts: I preſume that having ſo conſiderable a city at his command, he will be able to furniſh his troops with every thing they may ſtand in need of for a long time, and that no enemy therefore will be able to diſlodge him, while he remains there. He ſhould I think be adviſed immediately of the preſent ſtate of affairs, as far as we are acquainted with them, among the Maratta Chiefs, who certainly do not ſeem united enough at preſent to concur in ſo diſtant a march as to *Barampore*, and each of whom has probably too important concerns to manage near *Poonah* to accept a command at ſo great a diſtance, and which they all may think too dangerous for any one to undertake alone. But however this may be, I would leave it to himſelf to take his own opportunity for coming on to *Surat* or *Broach*; informing him at the ſame time of the urgent occaſion this Preſidency has for his army, and how much we think our ſafety may depend on its ſafe and ſpeedy arrival, together with the meaſures we are taking to facilitate this important purpoſe.

The conſideration of the conduct to be purſued with the Maratta Chiefs opens a wider field, through which, however perplexed it may be, we are now to find our way—nor is there any time for procraſtination: the Marattas are aiming at this very moment to ſtrip us of every thing we are in poſſeſſion of, to the very edge of our iſland: they are aſſembling troops in the neighbourhood of *Caranja* and *Salſette*, and are ſaid to meditate an immediate invaſion of thoſe iſlands, if they are not peaceably yielded up to them, together with all the ceſſions ſtipulated for in the convention of *Woorgom*. I have already given *Gunnis Punt*, the agent of *Nannah* (or of the Durbar as he is called) a general anſwer: that his maſter muſt have known at the time the convention was made, that it was not valid: that Mr. *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton* had previouſly declared ſo to him: that he had beſides been long before informed of, and knew by his own experience, the controlling power of the Governor General and Council in matters of this kind: that I had informed that Board of the convention, and would do nothing further in it without their orders.

What may be the reſolution of *Nannah* in conſequence of this anſwer, I do not know, but have no doubt of its being hoſtile to us, if he can but prevail on the Chiefs, who have been acting with him againſt *Ragoba* to ſupport him in a war againſt us: we have therefore no time to loſe to guard againſt ſuch an union; nor do I think that in ſuch an emergency as this, we can defer coming to the neceſſary reſolutions, under colour of waiting for orders from the Governor General and Council, without being wanting to the duty we owe to the Company and to ourſelves; nor do I think it would be a fair and conſiſtent conduct towards the Governor General and Council themſelves, who have certainly furniſhed us in their letters of the 23d March and 17th Auguſt, with ample powers for the war we have begun, and may juſtly expect from us that we exert ourſelves in extricating our affairs from their preſent embarraſſments, and not ſupinely throw on them difficulties which it is our duty to meet and if poſſible overcome.

The war was undertaken with the moſt flattering expectations of aſſiſtance from ſome of the moſt powerful Maratta Chiefs; of theſe, after our troops had been near two months in the field, and had advanced almoſt to the capital, not one eſpouſed our cauſe; it was thought deſperate; and indeed, ſeems to have been ſo; but had our troops after all been brought back to *Bombay* in ſpite of all oppoſition, as I make no doubt they might have been, the reſpect with which every Maratta in the enemy's army muſt have felt himſelf impreſſed at the inſtance of our forces unaided by any ally, would have been an advantage equal almoſt to victory; and might ſhortly perhaps been uſed to ſuch an effect, as to leave us little to regret in our preſent diſappointment.—Humiliating as the terms are, to which our troops ſubmitted, I am happy to ſay, I can ſtill perceive we are not fallen wholly into contempt. Left as we now are, to wage war alone, the credit we yet preſerve muſt be employed, and trial made what new friends it will procure us, and what enemies it may detach from the confederacy we have drawn on us as the allies of *Ragoba*.

Before I enter into particulars with regard to theſe objects, I muſt deſire the purpoſe for which our laſt

treaty with *Ragoba* was calculated; the principal conſideration on which the Governor General and Council approved our plan; and the evident motive of the orders now before us, from the Honourable the Select Committee, may be kept in view. I hardly need ſay, I allude to the dangerous connections forming or formed between *Nannah* and the French; and the abſolute neceſſity we were under on the principle of ſelf-preſervation to attempt to remove from the chief adminiſtration of the Maratta empire a miniſter whoſe pernicious deſigns if ever ripened into action, might end in an expulſion from all our valuable poſſeſſions in this part of the world. This neceſſity appears to me ſtill the ſame, and ought ſtill to be the leading principles of our conduct. The means we have to effect our purpoſe are indeed at preſent inadequate, but they are not perhaps unattainable; and while the poſſibility of accompliſhing ſo important a point exiſts, I think no exertion is to be omitted to effect or facilitate it.

When the refuſal of the principal officer to charge himſelf with the conduct of our army to *Bombay*, and the countenance given to this refuſal by the Commander in Chief of our forces, made it neceſſary to enter into ſome ſort of treaty with the enemy for the ſafe return of the troops, the firſt application was made to *Nannah*, as the oſtenſible miniſter. The ſurrender of *Ragoba's* perſon at firſt was the only condition demanded of us; but on finding that he had already made terms with *Scindia*, *Nannah* inſiſted on articles ſtill more humiliating, and at laſt ſeemed determined to accept of none but the moſt rigorous of all; viz. the detention of the whole army as hoſtages for the performance of the terms on which their lives were ſpared. On this preſſing occaſion, it was thought of applying to *Madjee Scindia*, whoſe influence in the Maratta Durbar was reported conſiderable, and whoſe connections now formed with *Ragoba*, it is to be hoped, would diſpoſe him to ſhew ſome ſort of regard to ſo faithful an ally as the Engliſh had proved themſelves to *Ragoba*.

Mr. *Holmes* was accordingly ſent out to him: every thing immediately ſhewed how ſenſibly *Madjee Scindia* was flattered with this acknowledgment of his conſequence and authority, which was at once diſcovered to be ſupreme. Mr. *Holmes*, in his way to *Scindia's* tent, was ſtopped by a picket guard of *Nannah's* troops, who would have perſuaded, and even forced him, to go to *Nannah* inſtead of *Scindia*. Mr. *Holmes* declared poſitively that he would and muſt go immediately to the latter. The diſpute laſted till *Scindia* ſent down a party of his own, who diſperſed *Nannah's* people, and brought Mr. *Holmes* to him: he received Mr. *Holmes* with every demonſtration of kindneſs and civility; and on his repreſentation of the treatment Mr. *Farmer* met with from *Nannah*, to whom he had before been ſent, and by whom he had been kept the whole day, expoſed in the open Bazar, with no other covering than his palanquin, from whence he had been obliged to write the particulars of his converſation with *Nannah*, and to wait the anſwers of the committee; *Madjee Scindia* immediately ſent and conducted Mr. *Farmer* to his own quarters; and deſired that he, as well as Mr. *Holmes*, would regard himſelf as his gueſt.

The terms to which we muſt ſubmit were ſo far known, that tolerable ones could no longer be demanded for us; but we were however obliged to *Madjee Scindia* for making them as eaſy as he could now attempt to do, without he had abſolutely declared againſt the reſt of the Maratta Chiefs, and joined us. It was owing to him that the point of detaining the whole army as hoſtages was given up, and by that means that we have it in our power to diſavow the convention: this, together with articles for the ſurrender of the caſtle of *Surat* and *Fort Victoria*, and for the payment of the expences of the war, were actually ſent by *Nannah* to *Scindia*, to be added to the conditions impoſed on us: *Madjee Scindia* replied, that he had already ſettled the conditions, and could not now in honour think of adding more. It is true that a private promiſe had been made to *Scindia*, of ceding to him *Broach*, and the ſhare of its pergunnahs conquered from the Nabob; yet he could not but well know that the performance of this article could be no way effectually ſecured by him, but by the very means he rejected, the detention of our army as hoſtages. Appendix. No. 134.

In the little while Mr. *Holmes* was at *Scindia's* Durbar, he had an opportunity of obſerving, that *Scindia* concerted and determined on all affairs of importance; which were only referred to *Nannah* for the neceſſary forms of office, the Sicca being affixed of courſe to every paper or diſpatch that *Scindia* had once paſſed; and that *Holcar*, though treated with all external marks of reſpect by *Scindia*, as the head Subedar of the empire, was entirely at his diſpoſal. The buſineſs of the treaty being concluded, *Madjee Scindia* took advantage of the ſtipulation we made for hoſtages to be delivered us in exchange for thoſe we put into his hands, to ſend a perſon hither, whom he has deſired me to conſider as a confidential miniſter: he even offered to ſend *Rona Cawn*, his chief confidant and favourite, whom he treats as a brother, and is reſpected next to himſelf in his (*Scindia's*) Durbar. In converſing concerning the diſcipline and manœuvres of our troops, he whiſpered Mr. *Sibbald*, that he hoped one day to ſee them and our forces acting together. Underſtanding that Mr. *Holmes* was one of my family, he charged him with the moſt friendly aſſurances, and ſeemed ſtudious to give him every mark of his confidence. Mr. *Farmer* is ſtill kept with *Madjee Scindia*, who behaves perfectly well to him; and does not allow *Nannah* to have any intercourſe with Mr. *Farmer*, but through him. I muſt not omit to mention too, as the moſt convincing inſtance of *Madjee Scindia's* good diſpoſition towards us, that on the firſt propoſal on our part, for inſerting in the convention an article to exclude the French from all protection and countenance in the Maratta empire, he admitted it, and ſupported it againſt *Nannah*.

Theſe are circumſtances well known to Mr. *Carnac*, and perhaps to Mr. *Draper* too: I have however been at the pains to collect them, as they have been communicated to me in converſation, and as they do not appear on any public record; owing to the confuſion which naturally attended ſuch a ſtate of things as our army was in while the treaty laſted, and to the ſudden departure of Mr. *Farmer*, the committee's ſecretary.

The lead that *Scindia* has taken in the adminiſtration, and the condition to which he has reduced *Nannah* to be no more than a creature of his, were never thoroughly known, till the facts diſcovered themſelves on this occaſion; yet they are to be traced in Mr. *Moſtyn's* and Mr. *Lewis's* advices, ever ſince the revolution effected by *Madjee Scindia's* means in June laſt, when *Nannah* fled to him.

It was only a few days after that event, that *Holcar* obliged *Moraba* to deliver to him the inſignia of office, which he ſent to *Scindia*, who conſtituted *Nannah* miniſter, by delivering them to him. It was *Scindia* who ſeized *Moraba* and *Butcheba Prondar*, and afterwards confined them: it was he who confined *Holcar's* Duan, and appointed him another, by whoſe means *Holcar* has ever ſince been a mere puppet, at *Madjee Scindia's* diſpoſal: he too removed *Saccaram Bappoo* from the adminiſtration of affairs, and made him priſoner in his own houſe: *Hurry Punt's* reſignation of the command of the troops, ſeems to have been in compliance with *Madjee Scindia's* pretenſions to the office of Suray Putty, which he demanded at the ſame time as he inſiſted on the ceſſion of *Ahmednagur* and *Aſhur*. Whether that important office has been ever conferred on him in form, I do not learn; but being at the head of his own and *Holcar's* forces (the beſt in the empire,) he has in fact the command of the whole army: he accordingly treats *Hurry Punt* quite in the ſtyle of a dependant; and ridiculed him to his face, before Mr. *Holmes*, for his ill ſucceſs in his campaign againſt Colonel *Keating* in *Guzerat*.

The ſeveral propoſals for a ſettlement of the Govern-

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ment among the Chiefs at *Tellowgaum*, ſince the return of our army, confirm this repreſentation of the uncontrouled power of *Scindia*. In every change, ſtill *Madjee Scindia* has appeared ſupreme; and I have advice under the 11th inſtant, that the arrangements are actually made at laſt in the following manner:

Madarow Narrain, Peiſhwa.

Sewajee Badjerow, *Ragoba*'s ſon, Naib.

Scindia and *Holcar* to act in the name of *Sewajee Badjerow*.

Ragoba relinquiſhes the Government, and is to have a Jaghire, and reſide at *Jaſſi*. This he is to ſignify in writing to all the Powers in *India*.

Nannah and *Saccaram* to conduct the Government as miniſters, and derive their authority from *Scindia* and *Holcar*.

The above ſettlement was paſſed in writing. All the Maratta officers were aſſembled, and informed, that this muſt be regarded as a concluſive ſettlement; and any attempt to oppoſe it would be conſidered as treachery againſt the State. The uſual rejoicings on ſuch occaſions were obſerved.

Madjee Scindia's diſpoſition towards us, and averſion to the French, have in like manner appeared in various inſtances, ſince the period of the June revolution; and I cannot help feeling reſpect for the abilities of a man, who has thus perſiſted in a point, which he has, no doubt, thought it good policy to endeavour to attain—a connection and alliance with our nation, in ſpite of all the diſappointments he muſt have met with, from the circumſtance of our not underſtanding his advances.

Upon Mr. *Moſtyn*'s firſt application for *Madjee Scindia*'s paſſports for the Bengal troops, he ſent them without heſitation, and forwarded duplicates from himſelf to his officers. Only two days after, upon receipt of my letters on the ſame ſubject, he forwarded to me another copy of theſe paſſports, and orders to his officers; and it is remarkable, that at this very time Mr. *Moſtyn* was in vain ſoliciting the ſame mark of confidence from *Moraba*, then at the head of adminiſtration. Theſe paſſports ſeem to have been given with ſincerity, and to have had their effect; ſince, by Colonel *Goddard*'s letter of the 26th November, it appears, that in conſequence of them he had paſſed peaceably through a province of *Madjee Scindia*'s. At that time (26th November) *Madjee Scindia*'s officer had indeed joined *Ballajee* to obſtruct his (Colonel *Goddard*'s) march; but the mere date of Colonel *Goddard*'s letter ſufficiently accounts for this. A few days after the grant of *Madjee Scindia*'s paſſports the revolution was brought about; and the very day following *Tookajee Holcar* ſent Mr. *Moſtyn* his paſſports likewiſe. On the 1ſt July, *Lubin* left *Poonah*, and has never ſince returned. This was a point Mr. *Moſtyn* had been ineffectually labouring to carry in both the preceding adminiſtrations of *Nannah* and *Moraba*. *Nannah*, together with *Scindia*, ſent early invitations to Mr. *Moſtyn* to come to the Durbar; and Mr. *Moſtyn* was told by *Madarow Jadarow*, in anſwer to his enquiries concerning the buſineſs *Nannah* wanted to ſpeak to him on, that it was for the increaſe of our friendſhip. Theſe overtures having failed, *Madjee Scindia* made two to Mr. *Moſtyn*, directly and ſeparately from himſelf; offering to ſettle our diſputes with the Durbar before Mr. *Moſtyn* left *Poonah* in Auguſt laſt: theſe were both rejected; and *Madjee Scindia*, in alluſion to theſe, told Mr. *Holmes* in camp, that he was the man to whom Mr. *Moſtyn* ſhould have applied; that he had twice made advances, but had as often been ſlighted. After Mr. *Moſtyn*'s departure, *Madjee Scindia* made the ſame offers to Mr. *Lewis*; and then, on Mr. *Lewis*'s declining to viſit him, he determined on ſending an agent to *Bombay*. He did accordingly ſend this very *Appajee Sabajee*, his preſent agent; who, I ſuppoſe, finding reaſon to think that our meaſures were already taken with *Ragoba*, too much beyond his maſter's views, confined himſelf to general profeſſions of friendſhip, on the part of *Madjee Scindia*, without opening himſelf further.

Since his return hither with an army, ſuch general profeſſions have been his chief topic; but he has at the ſame time given me to underſtand, that *Gunnis Hurry* and he are by no means employed on the ſame errand; and has even deſired to be ſeparated from him, in order that his intercourſe with me may not be ſubject to the enquiries and obſervations of *Nannah*'s agent. He has even intimated, in pretty direct terms, that his maſter intereſts himſelf but little in the anſwer that may be given to *Gunnis Hurry*, with regard to the ceſſions ſtipulated for the Poonah Circar; and that he *(Appajee)* had the particular intereſts of *Madjee Scindia* only in his charge. He has talked looſely of alliances between *Madjee Scindia* and the Company, for reducing the power of the Nizam and *Hyder*; ſtill demands the ceſſion of *Broach*, ſtipulated for *Madjee Scindia*, but is by no means preſſing on the ſubject; and in ſhort, plainly indicates his views on the part of his maſter, which however (as in the preſent circumſtances we ſeem to have more immediate occaſion for him than he for us) he does not ſeem diſpoſed to explain particularly, without ſome further opening on our part. *Madjee Scindia*'s own letters, which I now lay before you, are written in a ſtrain entirely conformable to this language of his Miniſter: in the firſt of them it is obſervable, that he takes no notice of the return of the Bengal troops; and in the laſt, though this is demanded, yet it appears from Colonel *Goddard*'s laſt letter, that he had not then received the order of the Poonah committee, directing him to return, notwithſtanding the ſame had been delivered to *Madjee Scindia* himſelf to be forwarded to him, three days before a letter of their own, which Colonel *Goddard* acknowledged the receipt of.

From this ſtate of paſt and preſent circumſtances, I think I am warranted in the following concluſions:

1ſt. That the actual adminiſtration of the affairs of the Maratta empire is at *Madjee Scindia*'s diſpoſal, and that *Nannah*, the great enemy of the Engliſh, is reduced, for the preſent at leaſt, to be no more than the tool of *Madjee Scindia*'s power.

2d. That *Madjee Scindia* is not only well inclined to us, preferable to the French, but is earneſt for ſome cloſer connection and alliance with us.

3d. That the accompliſhment of the terms of the convention, as far as they concern the Poonah Circar, is not at all the object of his views, ſince he has in fact made it optionable with us, whether to comply with them or not.

4th. That the performance even of the private article in his *(Madjee Scindia*'s) favour, is not the firſt object of his conſideration; but that this, as well as the ceſſions ſtipulated for by the Poonah Circar, is chiefly intended by him as a fund to pay us from, in any alliance he may enter into with us, without any real expence to himſelf.

5th. That independent of his views to an alliance with us, he has ſome motives of policy, which render him unwilling that our power and poſſeſſions on this coaſt ſhould be very materially reduced.

6th. That it is for the intereſt of the Company, and neceſſary to their purpoſe at this ſettlement, to inform ourſelves forthwith what *Madjee Scindia*'s real intentions are; and to take ſuch meaſures as we conſiſtently can, in concert with him, for the excluſion of *Nannah* from all real and effectual power in the adminiſtration of the Maratta empire.

I have ſaid that independent of *Madjee Scindia*'s views to an alliance with us, I conclude he has ſome motives of policy, which render him unwilling that our power and poſſeſſions on this coaſt ſhould be very materially reduced. I ground this opinion on that very ſtriking circumſtance, his obtaining for our army permiſſion to depart, without any adequate ſecurity for the promiſed ceſſions to the Poonah Circar, or to himſelf. This was too obvious to have eſcaped his notice; and leſt it ſhould be ſuppoſed to have paſſed through neg-

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ligence, the propoſal for detaining the whole army as hoſtages, together with the further ceſſions of *Surat* and *Fort Victoria*, was actually made to *Madjee Scindia* by *Nannah*. Whatever theſe views of *Madjee Scindia* may be, they cannot yet be penetrated with certainty, and can be only known by his future intimation or conduct. I will however venture to give my preſent ideas of what may be probably the motives for the great attention he has paid to us and our intereſt.

The inteſtine diviſions among the Maratta Chiefs has effected what civil diſſenſions long continued have never failed to bring about in every age and country—the overthrow of all power and dominion but that of the ſword: of this *Madjee Scindia* is now in poſſeſſion, and we may be aſſured, does not mean to part with it; his great object therefore muſt be to ſecure it, and ours not to let ſlip the preſent criſis, while our alliance is ſought, and worth his purchaſe. His intention muſt be either to remove the ſeat of his Government to *Poonah*, or to eſtabliſh ſome kind of power there ſubordinate to his own.

The firſt he muſt find very dangerous; the Chiefs, whoſe Jaghires lie neareſt *Poonah*, will be naturally alarmed at the thought of ſeeing the Peiſhwa domains united to the other poſſeſſions of a Power already ſo formidable as *Madjee Scindia*; who by his acceſſion will be able to cruſh the independence they have been aiming at in common with the other Jaghirdars of the empire. The Nizam and *Hyder*, whoſe dominions bound the Peiſhwa domains to the ſouthward and eaſtward, *Madjee Scindia* knows, will be always ready to ſupport the diſcontented Chiefs in the ſouthern part of the empire; where the Bramins muſt ſtill likewiſe be of conſequence and weight, from their riches, their intrigues, their experience in the revenues, and all other departments of Government, and in a word, from that ſacred character which protects them at all times from open violence, better than any other ſet of men. Theſe difficulties are not relieved by the ſtate of things in *Scindia*'s own Jaghire. The King taking the advantage of the abſence of him and *Holcar*, is I find ſtill making ſome progreſs, and I am informed has lately reduced ſome of the *Holcars* to his obedience. *Moodajee Bouncello* is ſaid to have views to the Rajahſhip, and there are conjectures abroad of his being encouraged in them by an alliance with the Governor General and Council. Both the King and the Bouncello, who are already formidable to *Madjee Scindia*, from the ſituation of their dominions with reſpect to his, muſt be conſidered by him as the moſt dangerous enemies he can ever have, if they are aided by us, and undertake to oppoſe him in the purſuits of his ambition.

The eſtabliſhment of ſome kind of power ſubordinate to his own, ſeems a policy more ſuitable to *Scindia*'s circumſtances, and more agreeable to the conduct he has hitherto obſerved. The difficulty in this caſe lies in the choice he ſhall make, and on the means to be employed whenever he may chuſe to ſecure his dependence. *Nannah* has been choſen, and hitherto employed by *Madjee Scindia* in the character of Duan: his abilities, long experience in buſineſs, and above all, the appearance of moderation diſplayed in the continuance of a Bramin miniſter, who has ſo long filled the firſt civil department of the ſtate, juſtify this choice. But the ſame qualifications added to *Nannah*'s riches, will doubtleſs render him dangerous to *Scindia*, whenever he ſhall be obliged to retire for any time to his own dominions. *Tookajee Holcar* has been long deſirous of returning to

Madjee Scindia has no leſs urgent inducements to re-viſit *Eugene*; and the diſtance they will be at when there, and the power *Nannah*, if he continues in the management of the Peiſhwa domains, muſt have in their abſence, will ſoon put him in a condition to aſſert again his independence. *Madjee Scindia* is certainly not ignorant of *Nannah*'s connections with *Lubin*, and the promiſes of aſſiſtance he has received from that quarter: it was one of the firſt meaſures of *Scindia*'s Government to ſend away this man, no leſs dangerous perhaps in his eſtimation to him than to us: he muſt know that a very ſhort time may now bring *Nannah* the ſuccours that have been promiſed him; and that ſhould they arrive in his (*Scindia*'s) abſence, his hopes of retaining this aſpiring rival in his dependance is at an end. He may perhaps, in caſe of ſuch an event, foreſee the probability of the reſtoration of the Peiſhwa power in the perſon of *Nannah*; and fancy the Jagheirdars of *Eugene* and again reduced to the ſtate of ſubmiſſion in which they were held by *Badjerow*.

Thus circumſtanced, what may we ſuppoſe *Madjee Scindia*'s views with regard to us, and what the principles on which he acts in his endeavours to conciliate our friendſhip, and ſecure to us our poſſeſſions on this coaſt.

Madjee muſt have obſerved in our conduct with regard to *Ragoba*, ſince our firſt alliance with him, marks of the moſt hearty and honourable attachment to his cauſe. He will no doubt have remarked, that though *Ragoba*'s affairs when in a proſperous courſe were ſuddenly ruined by ſome diſagreement among ourſelves, which perhaps he cannot very eaſily explain; though the engagements of this ſettlement were given up and departed from by the Governor General and Council, and the moſt declared partiality ſhewn to *Ragoba*'s avowed enemies, ſo far as to proceed even to orders for the ſurrender of his perſon into their hands: he will, I ſay, no doubt have remarked, that the good faith and honour of an Engliſhman is ſuch, that under all difficulties, he cannot determine to withdraw protection from the man to whom it has been once ſolemnly promiſed: he will have ſeen that this principle of good faith has at laſt prevailed over all temporary oppoſition; that we have again taken *Ragoba* by the hand; conducted him with our own forces alone almoſt to *Poonah*; and have at laſt only quitted him, when it was evident that there was not one Chief in the empire who would draw a ſword for him; and after he had concluded terms for himſelf with this very *Madjee Scindia*.

He finds that throughout the whole period in which we have been actors in the Maratta ſcene, our objects in point of acquiſition have been the ſame—a territory on the ſea coaſt and in the neighbourhood of *Bombay*, nearly equal to our expences. He has ſeen this ſcheme of acquiſition abided by under all changes, with little variation; and this muſt ſtrike him the more forcibly, as he muſt be well informed, that at the time of the concluſion of the treaty of *Poorunder*, the plan might have been conſiderably enlarged, if that had ever been the intention: our preſent line of territory, which we have never thought of extending beyond the Ghauts, cannot be an object of jealouſy to *Madjee Scindia*; on the contrary, it may be highly uſeful to him, and that whether we are engaged to him by alliance or not.

On account of the well-founded jealouſy he knows we entertain of *Nannah* and his connections with the French he may be aſſured, that an union can never take place between us and *Nannah*: whilſt our poſſeſſions and forces continue ſuch as they now are, we are both conſiderable and near enough to keep *Nannah* in conſtant apprehenſion; and yet the barrier of the Ghauts, between us and him will always be ſufficient to reſtrain us, unleſs we act in conjunction with ſome Power above the Ghauts, who can ſecure us the paſſes, and ſubſiſtence. *Madjee Scindia* knows too, that while we continue able to reſiſt the attempts of the French to throw a body of troops into the Maratta empire, we can never ſit ſtill and ſuffer it. The ſupport of our power therefore on the coaſt is his greateſt ſecurity againſt *Nannah*'s attempts for independence; the ſucceſs of which would be almoſt inſured, if ſupported by a reſpectable body of European forces: *Scindia* has the more reaſon to turn his thoughts to this point, (the excluſion of the French) ſince a connection with them appears to have been ſo far the plan of policy adopted by the Bramins, that *Moraba* when in power actually proceeded on it, no leſs than *Nunnah*, by whom it ſeems to have been firſt formed: and it is remarkable, that much of the intelligence Mr. *Moſtyn* received

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received on this ſubject, which was found very exact, was conveyed to him through perſons cloſely connected with *Scindia*.

Should *Madjee Scindia* turn his thoughts to an alliance with us (as I have no doubt he has done already) he has advantages in ſuch a connection, far beyond any other Indian Power, to induce him to court it. The ceſſion of a territory of no conſequence or value to him is the eaſy price he will have to pay for our friendſhip; which territory will ſerve him as a frontier againſt the introduction of an European force, engaged to other intereſts than to his; be a curb upon his delegate of the Peiſhwa domains to ſecure his dependance; and will thus enable him to give his attention and preſence to his northern dominions, in the proportion they demand. The Rajah of *Berar* and the *Shaw Alium*, ſituated between our Bengal poſſeſſions and *Madjee Scindia*'s country, will be content to leave him in tranquillity, if they find us ſeriouſly bent to prevent its being diſturbed. As *Madjee Scindia*'s poſſeſſions border no where on ours, he has leſs to fear from our encroachments than any Prince of *Hindoſtan* with whom we are at preſent connected. Or if the Peiſhwa domains are already to be conſidered as his, the mountains form a ſeparation between us and him, that we never can be ſuppoſed to carry our ſchemes of territorial poſſeſſion beyond them.

Thus the opinion he may juſtly have formed of the good faith of our nation; the moderation of our views in point of territory; his own cauſes of jealouſy of the ſchemes of *Nannah*, for rendering himſelf independent, and of his connection with the French for this purpoſe; our mutual intereſt to guard againſt both, and, above all, to prevent the introduction of French troops into the Maratta empire: the ſupport our poſſeſſions on this coaſt will afford to his authority at the Poonah Durbar; the little value to him of the countries we ſeek to acquire; the ſecurity an alliance with us will afford him from his moſt formidable neighbours; the obſtacles that muſt for ever prevent us from encroaching on his dominions or ſovereignty; theſe all ſeem juſt and concurring arguments to diſpoſe him to an alliance with the Company, advantageous to both parties.

The motives on our ſide are for the moſt part ſo connected with his, that they ſeem to be almoſt the ſame; yet they are further enforced on us by the particular ſituation we are placed in by the convention of *Worgaum*; a convention forced on thoſe who had no authority to accept of the terms inſiſted on, and who declared ſo in the moſt poſitive expreſſions, which were explained verbatim from Meſſieurs *Carnac* and *Egerton*'s own letter before *Nannah*, in open Durbar. There can be no heſitation in declaring ſuch a convention invalid; yet we are not to forget (as I have before remarked) that we are indebted to *Madjee Scindia* for our having this ſtill left in our power. He, the whole Maratta army, and we, muſt be equally ſtruck with this fact. I do therefore think our national honour concerned in finding ſome way of acquitting ourſelves to him. 'Tis impoſſible to proceed on ſuch rotten grounds as that of renouncing both the engagements with the Durbar and with him, who enabled us to reject them: it would be breaking faith with the whole world at once, with our friends, and with our enemies. The perſons who promiſed *Madjee Scindia* the ceſſion of *Broach*, and engaged for thoſe to the Poonah Circar, were the ſame, and their powers in both caſes equally incompetent: but a great diſtinction ought to be made between the obligation we are under to *Nannah* and to *Scindia*: the firſt could and would have ſtripped us of every thing; the latter, by relieving us from the hard terms of the former, did in fact, give a valuable conſideration for what was promiſed to him. I flatter myſelf it will not be impoſſible to ſatisfy him, without parting with any of our preſent poſſeſſions; but at any rate, I think we muſt ſhew a real deſire of giving him ſatisfaction: for this purpoſe, and to try further what the real extent of his views in relation to us is, it will be neceſſary to enter into negociation with him, and to open ourſelves to him in ſome degree confidentially.

I cannot think that any new powers are wanting for proceeding in this immediately, as the neceſſity and emergency of the occaſion demands. When the Governor General and Council gave their ſanction for our treaty with *Ragoba*, and for our ſupporting his cauſe by arms, in that ſanction was neceſſarily included every power which the cauſe of events might call for. The Governor General and Council have a right, as I ſaid before, to expect every exertion on our part, and would juſtly reproach us were we timidly to withdraw ourſelves from the reſponſibility that belongs to our ſtation at the preſent criſis.

There is a paſſage in the Governor General and Council's letter, which though deſigned for another occaſion, ſeems perfectly applicable to the preſent circumſtances. They tell us that they do not mean to preclude us from gaining any advantages we can by negociation; that a change in the Adminiſtration at *Poonah* will probably afford opportunity for obtaining ſuch advantages; and they conclude in theſe remarkable words: "And we "leave it to you to purſue ſuch a policy as circumſtances "require, independent of any particular intereſts of "*Ragoba*, whom you muſt regard, in the great political "objects of our Government, as ſimply meriting our "conſideration, and not as neceſſarily connected or "blended with it."

We find a change of Adminiſtration, or at leaſt of the power on which the Adminiſtration depends, has actually taken place at *Poonah*, which gives very favourable hopes of our being able to attain at leaſt one, and that the firſt object of our policy, the excluſion of the French from the connections they were forming by *Nanah*'s means in the Maratta Court. *Ragoba* has already relieved us from the care of his intereſts, and left us nothing to attend to but our own, which require the exertion of our beſt talents, but depend no leſs on ſeizing the preſent moment. With ſuch proſpects before us, and ſuch a general inſtruction for our conduct, can we doubt whether to take an active part in the very line that inſtruction has marked out to us?

The Governor General and Council, in their letter of the 17th Auguſt, lay us under one reſtraint, which I make no doubt we ſhall agree in thinking it no leſs to be obſerved in our preſent circumſtances, than in thoſe for which it was originally deſigned: I mean, that in any engagement or treaty of alliance we may enter into with *Madjee Scindia*, or any other Power, we are to avoid all ſtipulations of a tendency hoſtile to the Rajah of *Berar*. I mention this now for this reaſon only, that the Governor and Council may obſerve the caution with which we determine to act in every caſe wherein their deſigns can be foreſeen. Our object is to make what new friends we can, and to avoid all enmities that are not unavoidable.

Madjee Scindia is undoubtedly the perſon from whoſe friendſhip we have the moſt to hope, and whoſe enmity is moſt to be apprehended. Could he therefore be determined to an alliance with us, that would anſwer the purpoſes of the Company, and the nation on this ſide of *India*, by excluding the French effectually and permanently by providing againſt their chief abettor *Nannah*'s recovering his former power; by ſecuring to us the territory we are deficient in to defray the expences of this ſettlement, or at leaſt preſerving that we at preſent hold: could theſe purpoſes be effected, I ſhall not ſcruple, if there be any riſk of loſing the opportunity by waiting to refer the matter to *Bengal*, to give my hearty concurrence to the neceſſary meaſures, without delaying further time in expectation of other powers than we are now furniſhed with. But I do not mean by this, that I wiſh any thing to be concluded precipitately; all I propoſe to do at preſent is, to give *Madjee Scindia* an opportunity of explaining himſelf further, and put his diſpoſition in our

favour to one more teſt; which I think will be ſo deciſive, that if he comply with our wiſhes in this reſpect we may be ſatisfied that I have not gone too far in any hopes I have entertained from him.

In the firſt place, however, as an inſtance of the different light in which we regard the ſtipulations made in behalf of the Poonah Circar, and the return to be made for *Madjee Scindia*'s friendly offices, I would propoſe, that the notes given among *Madjee Scindia*'s officers, as Durbar charges, ſhould be immediately taken up and diſcharged; which amount I find to be R^{s} 41,000. This is abſolutely neceſſary, not only as a mark of our regard to *Scindia* himſelf, but as a failure in this article would make every man of his Durbar our enemy, at a time when the leaſt important of them might be able to do us ſome injury.

I next propoſe to write to *Madjee Scindia*, to acknowledge the inſtances we have received of his friendſhip; to make him very frank offers of a return on our part; to hint generally to him, that we wiſh much to fall on ſome expedient to ſatisfy his expectations from us; to explain to him that our army, when it paſſed the Ghauts, had no deſigns inimical to him; that on the contrary, we had reaſon to think, that he wiſhed us to undertake *Ragoba*'s cauſe; that we are therefore well pleaſed to have left *Ragoba* in his (*Madjee Scindia*'s) hands, as our common friend, though we never could have conſented to put him into thoſe of *Nanah*, whatever benefit we might have derived from ſuch a bargain with him; to acquaint him, that *Nanah*'s views with regard to the French, and the preference ſhewn by him of them to us (the ancient allies of the Maratta State) had given us much juſt cauſe of alarm; that his (*Madjee Scindia*'s) profeſſions on this ſubject have afforded us much ſatisfaction; and that we particularly confide in his authority over *Nanah* which, we are now informed of, and heartily rejoice at: to inform him of the arrival of our Bengal army at *Brampore*; to remind him that he long ago granted his Duſtucks for their friendly paſſage through his territories; and that his credit as well as ours is now concerned that they ſhould not turn back, after coming ſo far; that they are coming hither for the protection of our ſettlement againſt the French; and that on the terms we would have him eſteem himſelf to be with us, we hope he will conſider that they may be ſerviceable to him, as well as to us; to deſire he will therefore now grant his Duſtucks and letters to *Futty Sing*, and the other friends he may have between *Brampore* and *Surat*, to permit our army to paſs as friends through their countries; ſupplying them with proviſions and other neceſſaries on their march, for which they will punctually pay. I think it may be proper too to propoſe to him to ſend one thouſand of his horſe to meet our army, and accompany them to *Surat*; adviſing him; that the object of this requeſt is, that the world may be witneſſes of the friendſhip that ſubſiſts between us, which, after ſuch an inſtance, can never afterwards be departed from on our ſide. I ſhall at the ſame time congratulate him on the grant of *Brampore*, which has lately been added to his Jaghire; and inform him, that I have written to the Commander of the Bengal army, to acquaint him of our hopes from his (*Madjee Scindia*'s) friendſhip, and ordering him to conſider the friends of *Madjee Scindia* as ours. With this letter, if approved by the Committee, I ſhall ſend back his own agent, whom I flatter myſelf I can make uſeful to us, in our tranſactions with his maſter.

While we are waiting for his anſwer, I think it will be abſolutely neceſſary, in order to be prepared for every event, that we direct the field train and equipage of the troops to be completed, and held in readineſs for ſervice at the ſhorteſt notice: for ſhould *Madjee Scindia* refuſe his concurrence to the march of the Bengal army to *Surat*, I am of opinion that we muſt ſend a ſtrong detachment into the field, near *Surat* or *Broach*, to act in concert with Colonel *Goddard*, and to favour his march towards one or other of thoſe places; on the ſucceſs of which every thing now depends, and all muſt be riſked to enſure it. Appendix. No. 134.

A connection with the Guicawars offers another reſource, which in the preſent poſture of our affairs is by no means to be neglected. My ſentiments with regard to this family appear at large on our proceedings under the 10th October 1777: their near neighbourhood to our northern poſſeſſions, their diſcontents at the treatment they have received from the Poonah Government, the very advantageous offers formerly made by *Futty Sing* for an alliance with the Company, the command of the country through which Colonel *Goddard*'s march lies, their actual force, and the diſtance from the centre of the empire, which in theſe times muſt render them proportionably more independent, point them out to us as allies of the firſt conſequence; yet it muſt be acknowledged that the diviſions in their family render it leſs conſiderable, and our dependance on it therefore muſt be leſs than it otherwiſe might be. It is well known that *Futty Sing* is the party favoured by the Poonah Miniſters, as *Govind Row* has been that which has been hitherto moſt ſtrictly attached to *Ragoba*'s intereſt: *Madjee Scindia* is ſaid too to favour *Futty Sing*: our ground therefore in this quarter ſhould be tried with caution: a paſſage for Colonel *Goddard*'s army may however be demanded from both, and both may be ſounded with regard to their diſpoſition towards an alliance with the Company. *Govind Row*, on our late motions in favour of *Ragoba*, made ſome overtures to me; but, conſidering *Futty Sing*'s ſuppoſed connection with *Scindia*, to whom our preſent views muſt be principally turned, as well as from a political regard to his greater authority at this moment in the territories dependant on his family, his ſhould certainly be the party to which we ſhould at preſent rather incline.

I have only one or two reflections more to make on the preſent ſtate of affairs with the Marattas.

The ſchemes of the Governor General and Council with regard to the Rajah of *Berar* being yet unknown to us, it is impoſſible for us to found any meaſures on them: yet I cannot help now obſerving, that if, as has been conjectured, the gentlemen of that Preſidency have entertained thoughts of reſtoring in his perſon the ancient Rajah Government, the attempt ſeems likely to be attended with no ſmall difficulty. The Powers who are now in poſſeſſion of the Peiſhwa domains, together with all the Jaghierdars, however diſunited among themſelves, would probably concur in oppoſing *Moodajee Bouncello*, who, from every thing I have been able to learn, has for ſome time taken no part in theſe weſtern broils, nor appears to have any party among the leading men of this part of the empire. And I would wiſh to ſubmit to the Governor General and Council, whether we might not better anſwer our views by ſupporting a formidable Chief like *Madjee Scindia*, who has already acquired the actual poſſeſſion of the Peiſhwa's domains, with all the authority of the office, who is backed with the reſources of his own Jaghire, and has the perſon of *Ragoba* at his diſpoſal to give a colour of lawful authority to that he has aſſumed, than by attempting to model the whole State anew, and to place the rule of it in hands of our own chuſing; a labour that is perhaps too arduous, and the ſucceſs certainly dubious.

The ſame objection lies againſt our acting upon the orders of the Honourable Secret Committee for the reſtoration of *Ragoba* to the Peiſhwaſhip. However favourite an object this was with me in 1775, circumſtances are now entirely changed; and councils muſt be changed with them: at that time the Jaghierdars kept aloof from the quarrel. *Madjee Scindia* who is now the ſupreme head of the Poonah Government was making tenders of his ſervices from *Eugene* to *Ragoba*, then at the head of a formidable army; and would have been content with ſome acceſſions of Jagheer, and ſome honorary diſtinctions.

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diſtinctions. Even the officers in whom the miniſters were forced to put their greateſt confidence, were wavering, and thinking more of ſecuring themſelves than of ſupporting the party they were ſtill engaged in. Since that time, while *Ragoba* has been kept inactive, a new ſtate of things has taken place. Even the forms of the Government are now hardly left, and the command of the army is the only real title to the empire. He who might then have called out at leaſt half the forces of the State, has not found five hundred horſe to aſſiſt him in the late attempt we have made in his favour. He has been undeceived, as well as we; and has found all, to which the ſplendor of his former fortune and the glory of his name can entitle him, is no more than to become the penſioner of *Madjee Scindia*, and the cloak of his ambition.

After ſtating thus fully my ſentiments on the preſent poſture of affairs, it only remains for me to propoſe to the Committee that we come to the following reſolutions:

1ſt. That the aſſiſtance of military officers (mentioned in the firſt part of this minute) be requeſted from *Bengal*.

On this, however, it is proper to remark, that in caſe of Colonel *Goddard*'s making good his way to *Surat*, our wants on this reſpect will moſt probably be ſupplied.

2dly. That Colonel *Goddard* be written to in terms propoſed above.

3dly. That the convention concluded by Meſſieurs *Carnac* and *Egerton* at *Worgom* was invalid; and that the public faith cannot be conſidered as pledged, after their expreſs declaration to the Maratta Durbar, that they had no powers to accéde to the terms inſiſted on from them. That the general anſwer however given to *Nanah*'s agent, is all that is neceſſary to be communicated on this ſubject, for the preſent to him.

4thly. That *Madjee Scindia*'s good offices were of the greateſt ſervice in the negotiation of the terms of the convention, and particularly in procuring permiſſion for the immediate return of the army: that he is in conſequence entitled to every mark of regard we can conſiſtently ſhew him; and that it will be neceſſary to find ſome means of expreſſing the ſenſe we entertain of his attention to the intereſt of the Company, in ſome degree equivalent to the ceſſion of the Mogul ſhare of the Broach Pergunnah.

5thly. That the notes paſſed at *Worgom* to the ſeveral officers of *Madjee Scindia*'s Durbar as gratification to them, amounting to rupees 41,000, out of reſpect to *Madjee Scindia*, as well as out of motives of good policy, ought to be forthwith taken up and diſcharged.'

6thly. That we have good ground to hope, that *Madjee Scindia* is well diſpoſed towards the Company, and will be willing to enter into a connection with us, advantageous to the Company.

7thly. That the grand objects to be kept in view in forming of ſuch a connection, are,

1ſt. To exclude the French effectually and permanently from all connection, whether commercial or political, in the affairs of the Maratta empire, and with all perſons concerned in the adminiſtration thereof.

2d. To exclude *Nanah Furneze*, if poſſible, from the adminiſtration of the Poonah Government; or if this cannot be, to unite with *Madjee Scindia*, for the purpoſe of guarding againſt *Nanah Furneze*'s acquiring any ſort of independent authority in the Poonah Government; and to obtain the beſt ſecurity for the Company againſt ſuch an event.

3d. To endeavour to obtain for the Company ſuch a territory as may be ſufficient for defraying the expences of this ſettlement, or at leaſt to preſerve that we at preſent hold.

8thly. That it is abſolutely neceſſary to loſe no time in the meaſures to be taken, as well to inform ourſelves of *Madjee Scindia*'s intentions with regard to an alliance with the Company, as to guard againſt the pernicious deſigns of *Nanah Furneze*, and thoſe of the French.

9thly. That in any connection to be formed with *Madjee Scindia*, every engagement that may have a tendency hoſtile to the Rajah of *Berar* be avoided.

10thly. That nothing be finally and concluſively ſettled in way of alliance with *Madjee Scindia*, until we receive the concurrence of the Governor General and Council; unleſs the ſeveral points ſpecified in the 7th reſolution can be ſatisfactorily provided for.

11thly. That the Preſident write to *Madjee Scindia* to the purpoſe propoſed in the foregoing.

12thly. That the Chief of *Broach* be ordered to apply to *Futty Sing Guicawar*, alſo likewiſe to *Govind Row Guicawar*, for their paſſports and Duſtucks, for the paſſage of the Bengal troops through their country; and for their being ſupplied on their march with proviſions; for which the Commander will take care that the inhabitants are punctually paid. That the Chief of *Broach* make the ſame profeſſions of peace and amity to the Guicawars as thoſe directed in the inſtructions from the Governor General and Council to Colonel *Leſlie*. And that he adviſe this Committee and Colonel *Goddard* without delay of his ſucceſs.

13thly. That the Chief of *Broach* be likewiſe directed to ſound with proper caution, the diſpoſition of the Guicawars towards an alliance with the Company of mutual defence; and adviſe us of the ſucceſs we might expect, ſhould we judge it expedient to make any overtures for that purpoſe.

14thly. That the field train and equipage be completed, and held in readineſs for ſervice at the ſhorteſt notice.

15thly. That a gentleman well informed in the ſtate of the Company's affairs under this Preſidency, and particularly inſtructed for this occaſion in the preſent political circumſtances of the ſettlement, and in the deſigns of this Government, be immediately diſpatched with our advices to *Bengal*, in order to ſupply the Governor General and Council with ſuch information and details of local knowledge as they may require, or the ſupport of our preſent plan may render neceſſary.

A true copy.
Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secy to the Select Committee.

Extracts from the Conſultations of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, relative to the Preſident's Review of Maratta Affairs.

Friday, 19th February 1779.—At a Committee;—preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *John Carnac* and *Daniel Draper*, Eſquires.

The Preſident now lays before us, a minute containing a review of Maratta affairs, and ſundry reſolutions propoſed by him in conſequence.

This minute having been attentively peruſed, the Preſident, in conformity to the 15th of his propoſed reſolutions, acquaints us, that he thinks Mr. *George Horſley* a perſon every way qualified to be ſent to *Bengal* on the intended ſervice, and therefore nominates him for this commiſſion.

Mr. *Draper* thinks it is very unneceſſary to ſend any perſon to *Bengal*, with regard to the paſt tranſactions to this time, excluſive of the Preſident's minute, and therefore diſapproves of it, both on account of the expences that will be incurred by ſuch a meaſure, and the probability he thinks there is that the Governor General and Council will order an enquiry to be made here into the late tranſactions.

Mr. *Carnac* entirely concurs with the Preſident, not only in the propriety and neceſſity of the meaſure, but alſo in his nomination of Mr. *Horſley*, whom he thinks perfectly qualified for ſo important a commiſſion.

Mr.

Mr. *Horſley* is therefore appointed accordingly, and muſt hold himſelf in readineſs to proceed with the utmoſt expedition, after our diſpatches and the inſtructions to him are prepared, which the Secretary is ordered to get ready with all ſpeed.

Mr. *Thomas Shotbolt* is appointed to accompany Mr. *Horſley* to *Bengal* as his aſſiſtant.

The further conſideration of the other propoſed reſolutions is deferred.

Tueſday, 23d February 1779.—At a Committee;—preſent, as in the preceding one.

The Preſident's review of the Maratta affairs being now re-peruſed, Mr. *Draper*, in the courſe of reading, makes the following obſervations:

With reſpect to what is advanced of the motives for the late expedition being preſſed on us by the Governor General and Council and the Secret Committee, he perſiſts in thinking that the letter from the former of the 17th Auguſt, was conditional; and the letter's depending on the co-operation of the other Preſidencies, which leaves us only to lament that it has been ſo prematurely undertaken.

With reſpect to the requiſition for a Colonel from *Bengal*, inſtead of Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* removed, Mr. *Draper* has no objection, provided they are thought by the Governor General and Council unworthy of being continued; though he remarks, we have no reaſon to expect Colonel *Goddard* ſoon.

With regard to the Major and five or ſix Captains, he could wiſh to conſult the commanding officer, either in the Committee or in council. The great difference in emoluments ought to be conſidered, and likewiſe the Board conſulted.

He entirely concurs in the propoſed meaſures for facilitating the march of Colonel *Goddard*'s army; but thoſe now appear unneceſſary by his near approach.

He approves the Governor's anſwer in general about a reference to the Governor General and Council reſpecting the convention of *Worgaum*, though he makes a reſerve, in conſequence of the Poonah committee having deputed Mr. *Farmer*, and afterwards made a declaration alſo about Mr. *Holmes*'s being ſent with full powers, or *carte blanche*, as declared by Colonels *Egerton* and *Cockburn*.

The meaſures propoſed for defending ourſelves againſt the Marattas he approves.

The reaſons why a proper retreat ſhould have been made to or attempted from *Worgaum* to *Bombay* he conceives are juſt.

Several inſtances of *Scindia*'s good diſpoſition towards us are quoted, but Mr. *Draper* declares he knows nothing regarding the excluſion of the French but from the ſequel of the treaty, except from private converſation, ſince the return of the expedition.

Mr. *Draper* cannot enough lament that we have ſo lately become fully acquainted with *Scindia*'s being the principal perſon in power, notwithſtanding the reſidence of Meſſrs. *Moſtyn* and *Lewis* at *Poonah*; and does not recollect hearing any thing of his agent's being ſent here till ſince the return of the expedition.

The ſix concluſions appear plauſible; but he does not approve the 4th, which appears to him to claſh with the 5th.

He thinks the conjectures about *Scindia*'s motives of action ſhould be ſubmitted to the Governor General and Council, and that the determination, as well reſpecting the convention as the point, whether we are indebted to *Madjee Scindia* or not? for the power of deciding on it ſhould alſo be referred to the Governor General and Council.

He remarks on the argument about the Poonah committee having no authority to treat. Why did they then inveſt Mr. *Holmes* with full powers, and ſend Mr. *Farmer* making a ſubſequent declaration to the letter?

He thinks the negociation with *Madjee Scindia* may be commenced, provided nothing concluſive is done without the Governor General and Council's approbation, and that it is put on that footing on the commencement, that they may not pretend we deceive them. Appendix. No. 134.

With reſpect to the notes for rupees 41,000 to *Scindia*'s Durbar officers, though he highly diſapproves them, as exorbitant, and never heard of them till the laſt meeting of the Committee, he is ſorry to ſay, that in our preſent ſituation it ſeems neceſſary to diſcharge them.

The propoſals for the letter to be written by the Preſident to *Madjee Scindia*, appears in general proper; but he thinks that the circumſtance of 1,000 horſe accompanying the Bengal army had better be declined, and ſeems now to be totally unneceſſary.

The propoſals for the field train and equipage here being got in readineſs, Mr. *Draper* approves, but thinks that a detachment being ſent out to join the Bengal army now, ſeems totally unneceſſary.

He thinks the Guicawars may be ſounded, but with caution, leſt *Scindia*'s jealouſy might be excited; and that the remarks on the Governor General's ſuppoſed ſcheme concerning *Moodajee Bouncello*, ought to be ſubmitted to them.

He concurs in opinion with the Preſident, that the Select Committee's late orders regarding *Ragoba*, received the 8th inſtant, cannot now prove uſeful.

The queſtion being then put on the ſeveral reſolutions propoſed by the Preſident, in the order they ſtand in his minute;

1ſt Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* cannot concur in the firſt reſolution, becauſe of Colonel *Egerton*'s and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*'s preſent ſituation; becauſe Colonel *Goddard* may be ſoon expected; becauſe of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*'s late promotion; and becauſe he concludes, that in caſe of emergency, we can more eaſily get a field officer from the Madras troops, intended to be employed againſt *Mahé*.

Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident think the neceſſity of this reſolution in a great meaſure ſuperſeded by the rapid approach of Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*.

2d Reſolution. Approved by Mr. *Draper*. Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident being of the ſame opinion as on the foregoing.

3d Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* is of opinion the late convention at *Worgaum*, concluded by Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, ſhould be referred to the Governor General and Council.

Voted in the affirmative by Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident.

4th Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* is of opinion appears proper; and agreed to by Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident.

5th Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* acquieſces therein conſidering the reaſons above given; and agreed to by Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident.

6th Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* is of opinion, that we have ſome ground to hope that *Madjee Scindia* is well diſpoſed towards the Company, in conſequence of the late tranſactions, and that he may be willing to enter into a connection with us on advantageous terms.

Agreed to by Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident.

7th Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* concurs with Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident, in thinking the objects mentioned under this article the grand ones to be kept in view.

8th Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* concurs in, provided nothing definitive be done without the ſanction of the Governor General and Council, and that no great expence be incurred by ſo doing, after the immenſe ſum already diſburſed in ſupport of *Ragoba*, and with the reſerve before expreſſed reſpecting the previous declaration upon the commencement of the negociation;—concurred in by Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident.

9th Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* entirely concurs in this, as do Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident.

10th Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* in his remarks had already declared his opinion regarding the former part of this reſolution, and he thinks it will be time enough to decide on the latter, when we find the ſeveral points therein attended to can be obtained, and in the mean time to apprize the Governor General and Council of them.

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Agreed to by Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident.

11th Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* agrees thereto, with the reſerve above noticed, regarding the 1,000 horſe.

Agreed to by Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident, except what regards Colonel *Goddard*'s army, which is now become unneceſſary by his near approach, in which Mr. *Draper* concurs.

12th Reſolution. Mr. *Draper* agrees thereto, provided it can be done in ſuch a manner as not to give offence to *Scindia*, though not ſo neceſſary on account of Colonel *Goddard*'s approach.

Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident are of opinion the meaſure therein propoſed is not now neceſſary; in which Mr. *Draper* alſo concurs.

13th Reſolution. Approved by Mr. *Draper* as matters ſtood before, but now unneceſſary.

Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident think the meaſure ſhould be ſuſpended for the preſent.

14th Reſolution. Unanimouſly agreed to.

15th Reſolution. Not thought neceſſary by Mr. *Draper*, being of opinion we ought to be very explicit in our repreſentations to the Governor General and Council by letter, in conſequence of the Preſident's minute of review.

Mr. *Carnac* and the Preſident continue in the opinion and reſolution as they ſtand on the minutes of our laſt meeting.

A true copy.
Edwd. Ravenſcroft,
Secretary to the Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 135.

Letter from Governor *Hornby* to the Committee of Secrecy, dated 28th March 1779; enclosing Conſiderations on the State of Affairs at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sirs,

OUR advices conveyed by this veſſel will inform you at large of all occurrences of moment up to this time; but as we have come to no reſolutions with regard to the meaſures neceſſary to be taken at this critical juncture, the letters from the Committee will ſtill leave you unſatisfied on this ſubject; which of all others I preſume will be that you will be moſt ſolicitous about. My thoughts have been much employed on it, and I now do myſelf the honour of encloſing for your information a paper which is the reſult of them. The form is that in which I have prepared to bring the matter before the Committee as ſoon as the *Betſey* is diſpatched.

I have in that paper given my ſentiments ſo fully, as well on the preſent poſture of affairs, as on the proſpect before us, between this time and the end of next October, that I have nothing to add here on thoſe ſubjects, and muſt beg leave to refer you entirely to it. I flatter myſelf you will eſteem the meaſures I propoſe, ſuch as are beſt adapted to remedy our preſent and future difficulties, to provide for the ſecurity and proſperity of your affairs under this Preſidency, and to enable us to take the part which may be hereafter aſſigned us by the Governor General and Council in their general plan, with the greateſt proſpect of affording effectual aid in the execution of it.

The *Royal Admiral*, which will ſail about the 15th or 20th of next month, will bring you advice of the reſolutions of the Committee on my propoſed plan of operations. As I have but juſt completed it, I thought it beſt not to detain the *Betſey*, that we might be relieved from all other buſineſs before we took this into conſideration; for as it requires diſpatch, ſo the importance of it renders it the more neceſſary that our whole attention ſhould be confined to it.

On the other hand, I was unwilling you ſhould be left to ſuppoſe that no plan had yet been thought of, and our future reſolutions bear an appearance of precipitation for want of your receiving by this opportunity ſome intelligence regarding them.

Thinking it a duty I owe to my honourable employers to ſtay in *India* until anſwers are received to this letter, and being confident it will be pleaſing to you, I intend doing it, though I was fully bent on leaving it this ſeaſon had the ſhips arrived early; but now it is abſolutely neceſſary that I ſhould ſtay till anſwers are received, for ſeveral reaſons; and I hope we ſhall be favoured with your commands by the way of *Aleppo* and *Buſſorah*, for the conveyance of which I ſhall keep a veſſel at *Buſſorah* purpoſely to receive and bring them hither in November, ſo that I hope to receive them all in December next.

Lieutenant *Brice Hardie* has been advanced four hundred German crowns ſhould he have occaſion for them, of which he will render you an account; he is a very truſty and good officer.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient humble ſervant,
William Hornby.

Bombay, the 28th March 1779.

Select Conſultations, 30th March 1779.

We have now before us that information of the views of the Governor General and Council in their projected alliance with *Moodajee Bouncello*; and in the ſtate of which Colonel *Goddard* has left the negociation with him, the want of which has hitherto rendered it impoſſible for us to come to any final reſolution, either with reſpect to the ſteps neceſſary to be taken here, or with regard to the future meaſures proper to be recommended and ſubmitted to the Governor General and Council for their approbation and ſanction.

It appears that the firſt object of Mr. *Elliott*'s embaſſy to *Nigapoor*, was a defenſive alliance between the Company and *Moodajee Bouncello*, for the mutual ſecurity of their reſpective poſſeſſions. The Governor General and Council charged with the care of all the wide extended territory of the Company have with great judgment at the commencement of a French war, turned their thoughts thus early to the cultivation of a friendſhip with a Power, whoſe dominions, ſituated between the Company's provinces in *Bengal*, and on the coaſt of *Coromandel* on one ſide, and the country under the command of the Poonah Miniſters, and the eſtates of the Nizam, on the other, render him the beſt able of any Prince in *Indoſtan*, to afford us aſſiſtance, and of check the deſigns of our enemies, at the ſame time that his near neighbourhood to the ſettlements where the principal force of the Company is maintained, muſt make him ſenſible of the intereſt he himſelf has in a hearty union with our nation.

The Governor General and Council proceed from this firſt meaſure planned for the general ſafety, to point out to their miniſter ſuch particular circumſtances on the affairs of the Preſidency, and in thoſe of the Poonah Miniſters and the Rajah of *Berar*, as relate to the more immediate ſecurity of this ſettlement, to the excluſion of the French and their faction from the direction of the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, and to the eſtabliſhment of the Government there in the hands of perſons well diſpoſed to our intereſt.

Mr. *Elliott* was for theſe purpoſes authorized to enter into a treaty with *Mpodajee Bouncello*, to unite with him in a direct and open war againſt the Poonah Miniſters, and to concert with him plans for the proſecution of it, for counteracting the deſigns of the French, and for eſtabliſhing him in the dominions and authority of the Ram Rajah.

Theſe are the meaſures Mr. *Elliott* was to purſue, under the following expreſs limitations and proviſos, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* had neither entered into any new engagement with *Ragoba*, nor with any other party

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in the Maratta State, with which a connection with *Moodajee Bouncello* might claſh; nor had concluded a peace with the Poonah Miniſters; in either of which caſes Mr. *Elliott* was to ſuſpend his negociations relative to the eſtabliſhment of *Moodajee Bouncello* in the Ram Rajaſhip, to conform to the Bombay meaſures, and to engage in no offenſive plan contrary to that of the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

The intentions of the Governor General and Council with regard to a defenſive alliance with *Moodajee Bouncello*, were communicated to us by a letter dated on the ſame day as Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions (the 18th of July) and received here the 27th of Auguſt; but with regard to the union projected between the Company and *Moodajee Bouncello*, for the removal of the French faction from the Poonah Durbar, and for the eſtabliſhment of *Moodajee* in the Rajaſhip, we have till this * time remained uninformed. On the 27th of September we received from the Governor General and Council their approbation of our reſolutions of the 21ſt July, and of the meaſures we propoſed taking in favour of *Ragoba*, without any intimation of the deſign in favour of *Moodajee Bouncello*, excepting a reſtriction from entering into any engagements of a tendency hoſtile to the Government of *Berar*, or contrary to ſuch as Mr. *Elliott* might have apprized us of his having concluded with *Moodajee Bouncello*.

Under theſe circumſtances our treaty with *Ragoba* was concluded; and we heard no more of the negociation with *Moodajee Bouncello* till the 18th of December, when the Governor General and Council's letter of the 15th of October adviſed us in general, that the Rajah's diſpoſitions towards the Company were favourable, but that Mr. *Elliott* was dead; and that the Governor General and Council propoſed to wait for advices from the Rajah, before they appointed any other perſon to ſucceed Mr. *Elliott*. We were at the ſame time authorized to give Colonel *Goddard* orders for proceeding forwards, at all events, in ſupport of our plan for reinſtating *Ragoba* in the Regency, if we ſhould judge this neceſſary.

On the 10th of January the Bengal letter of the 23d of November came to hand, referring to one of the 16th, which enclоſed a copy of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions; adviſing of Colonel *Goddard*'s being inveſted with full powers to conclude a treaty with *Moodajee Bouncello*, on the ground of thoſe inſtructions; and informing us that Colonel *Goddard* was no longer under our orders, but in a very limited degree; and what the limitations might be, we remained utterly ignorant of, as the letter of the 16th of November, and M *Elliott*'s inſtructions contained in it, had miſcarried.

That of the 23d of November was forwarded to us by Colonel *Goddard*, accompanied by one from himſelf, which relieved us from much of the anxiety we muſt have felt, while doubtful how far we might depend on the ſupport of the forces under his command: but the Colonel, aware of the difficulties we might be thrown into by an uncertainty with regard to this point, aſſured us that he would aſſiſt with his troops in any meaſures we might have formed in reliance on them, as far as *we* might deem conſiſtent with the negociation he was then engaged in. And on receipt of our letters of the 6th and 19th of December, and on *Moodajee Bouncello*'s declining to proceed further in the treaty propoſed to him by the Governor General and Council, after he knew of the Bombay troops being in the field in favour of *Ragoba*, Colonel *Goddard* determined to march forward, without waiting to hear further from us.

I have entered into theſe particulars in order to ſhew, that no over-weening partiality for meaſures of our own, prevented us from paying the attention and deference to the views of the Governor General and Council, to which I ſhall always think them entitled. I make no doubt the Governor General and Council had good reaſon for reſerve to us, with regard to fixing *Moodajee Bouncello* in the Rajaſhip; which reſerve I conjecture was owing to the preference they were willing to give to the deſign formed here for the re-eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba* in the Regency, which is evidently the principle on which Mr. *Elliot*'s inſtructions are framed. The Governor General and Council probably thought, that the communication of another ſcheme of theirs, while ours was under conſideration, might ſerve only to embarraſs us, and produce a difference in our councils, which ought not to allow us to purſue our own meaſures with the neceſſary degree of confidence and vigour. I cannot refuſe myſelf the acknowledging the attention ſhewn throughout Mr. *Elliot*'s inſtructions to the intereſt of this Preſidency, and to the ſupport of that credit and influence of the Adminiſtration here, ſo neceſſary to the ſucceſsful management of the affairs under our charge. The liberal ſpirit we have experienced from the Governor General and Council, as well in their judgment of our principles and conduct, as in the aſſiſtance they have offered this ſettlement, is the beſt encouragement to us to act with that confidence in them, which, in times of difficulty, is neceſſary to ſupport us through our exertions beyond the mere line of duty.

It is impoſſible likewiſe to paſs without noticing the great merit of the gentleman who has conducted the Bengal troops with ſuch prudence and diſpatch to our aſſiſtance at this critical time. The difficulties were very great which he muſt have been under, while charged with the management of a moſt important negociation from the Government of *Bengal*, to which he muſt have found himſelf unable to reconcile the meaſures already taken at this Preſidency. The delays and doubts which the ſame cauſe naturally occaſioned in the reſolves of the Rajah, to whom he was deputed, rendered his ſituation ſtill more embarraſſing, as they left him without any determinate plan for his conduct, but ſuch as he himſelf might form for the occaſion. The preſſing exigency of the Company's affairs on this ſide, the united oppoſition he had reaſon to expect from the Maratta Chiefs, in the courſe of a very long march through an enemy's country, the unſucceſsful event of our expedition, the ſtipulation for his return, the inſtances made him at the ſame time, even on the part of *Moodajee Bouncello*, to induce him to it, and a regard to the future reſolves of the Governor General and Council, were circumſtances that all claimed a ſhare in his conſideration, and rendered the choice, whether to proceed on, to return, or to wait for further orders, no eaſy one: his ready determination of coming without delay to our aid, in my opinion does the greateſt honour to his judgment. Attention to the intereſts of the Company, prudence, deciſion, and diſintereſtedneſs, were equally conſpicuous on this occaſion; and they are ſuch as I think it becomes us to acknowledge to Colonel *Goddard*; and to point out, with the ſtrongeſt expreſſions of our approbation, to the Governor General and Council, who, I flatter myſelf, will eſteem Colonel *Goddard*'s conduct deſerving the ſame degree of commendation; and permit us to requeſt from them ſome diſtinguiſhed mark of their and our ſenſe of his ſervices.

The knowledge of the ſtate of the negociation entruſted to Colonel *Goddard* with the Rajah of *Berar*, and the arrival of Bengal troops, have made a very conſiderable change in our affairs.

It appears that the diſpoſition of *Moodajee Bouncello* towards an alliance with the Company, on the terms propoſed by the Governor General and Council, is ſuch as to give us reaſon to expect that he will be ready to conclude the propoſed treaty, as ſoon as ever he receives the anſwers of the Governor General and Council to the letters tranſmitted to them through Colonel *Goddard*. Theſe, however, it is likely may not arrive near ſo ſoon as Colonel *Goddard* ſuppoſes they may be expected.—

* Copy of Mr. Elliott's Inſtructions was firſt received at Bombay the 17th March 1779.

Appendix. No. 135.

The impoſſibility of cloſing with the Rajah, while our engagement with *Ragoba* ſubſiſted, will of courſe be a cauſe of delay on the firſt receipt of them. The Governor General and Council's expectations of receiving the particulars of our unſucceſsful expedition, together with copies of the convention concluded at *Worgom*, information of the ſtate of our affairs ſubſequent to that period, and advice of Colonel *Goddard*'s arrival at *Surat*, will probably ſtill prevent their coming to any final reſolution with regard to the alliance with *Moodajee Bouncello*, for ſome time longer. Yet there ſeems no reaſon to doubt of their determination to proceed with this deſign, which they have repreſented as originally planned to ſupply the place of the ſcheme entered into here, for the excluſion of the French faction from the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*. The alliance with *Moodajee Bouncello* therefore is what we muſt look to as the leading circumſtance in our political tranſactions with the Marattas in future. The ſenſe of the honourable the Secret Committee, of the Governor General and Council, and of this Committee, with regard to the neceſſity of ſettling the Maratta Government in ſuch a manner as will render us ſecure of the favourable diſpoſition of the heads of it to our intereſt, is perfectly uniform; I ſhall not therefore inſiſt further on this ſubject, on which I take it for granted we muſt be all agreed.

In my review of Maratta affairs I ſtated very particularly the reaſons I thought there were for preſuming that *Madjee Scindia* was favourably inclined to us, and might be diſpoſed to enter into a connection for the mutual advantage of the Company and himſelf. I took notice of the claims his conduct towards us at *Worgom* had eſtabliſhed on us, and the reaſons which his preſent authority in the Poonah Government, and the diſpoſition he had ſhewn to avoid taking part in the connection which the Bramins have formed with the French, together with the natural oppoſition of intereſt between him and *Nannah*, furniſhed for us to wiſh for ſuch a connection between us and him. To the letter which I wrote him as agreed by the Committee, I have hitherto received no anſwer. The two letters from him of the 2d and 6th inſtant are written in the name of the Poonah Durbar, claiming the ſeveral ceſſions ſtipulated for in the convention of *Worgom*. His agent however has ſtill continued the ſame profeſſions of friendſhip, but has at laſt taken leave without opening himſelf further as to the particular views of his maſter. Had *Scindia* thought proper to have met the advances I made him in my letter, and to have come at once to a ſettlement that might have fixed our affairs under this Preſidency on that footing which is neceſſary to the intereſts of the Company on this ſide of *India*, and for the ſecurity of the general intereſt againſt the deſigns of the French, and their dangerous connection with *Nanah*, I ſhould, as I before declared, have been much diſpoſed to have cloſed with him. But he has choſen to proceed in a manner leſs open, though his intentions I think may be eaſily ſeen into, and it is neceſſary for us to take our meaſures accordingly.

Madjee Scindia's idea ſeems to be, that he has already laid us under ſuch obligations by the aſſiſtance he gave in extricating our troops at *Worgom*; and is ſo ſecure of our jealouſy of *Nanah*'s connection with the French, that he may depend on our ſtill courting his friendſhip. And he imagines, by preſerving his claims on us for the ceſſions ſtipulated for in the convention of *Worgom*, he ſhall be able to maintain ſuch an influence over us as to chuſe his own time and terms for any aſſiſtance he may expect from us. At preſent he finds his power in the Maratta Durbar ſufficiently ſecured by his preſence, and by his command of his own and *Holcar*'s troops near the capital; and conceiving our affairs to be more urgent than his, he hopes for a more advantageous bargain, by waiting till he can draw propoſals from us. He has already taken advantage of the ground we have given him to rely on a diſpoſition in his favour, by ſeizing *Succaram Bappoo*, and removing his party from all truſt and power, and by keeping a ſtricter hand than before on *Nanah*, with whom however he has ſtill refrained from coming to extremities, probably with a view to making the moſt of him, and draining him completely of his treaſures.

Nanah's preſent ſituation is ſuch as renders his views far leſs intelligible than *Scindia*'s; but it is thus I think they muſt be underſtood: while the latter continues at *Poonah*, *Nanah* can promiſe himſelf but a very moderate ſhare of real power in the Government; yet *Scindia*'s troops are at preſent the chief ſecurity he has even for that little. Knowing that he muſt reckon on the Engliſh as his enemies, on account of the meaſures he has taken with the French, he ſeems to aim at maintaining himſelf by *Scindia*'s means, till he can receive from *Europe* the aſſiſtance promiſed him by *Lubin*; and while he continues rich, he will probably preſerve influence enough with *Scindia* to prevent him from coming to an explanation with us. If he can manage in the mean time to puſh things to that extremity as to break altogether the connection he ſees likely to take place between us and *Scindia*, he may hope that the authority and actual force he will acquire by the arrival of his European allies next ſeaſon, will enable him to force *Scindia* into his meaſures, and to keep him in future in his dependance.

The attack on *Fort Victoria* by *Moraba Bapoojee*, the Subada of *Sevendroog*, who is the nephew of *Hurry Punt Furkia*, and, as well as his uncle, a creature of *Nanah*, I make no doubt has been concerted by *Nanah* with a deſign of obliging *Scindia* to declare againſt us, and involving him in one common cauſe with himſelf, as he cannot but have obſerved the diſtinction we made between them; and *Scindia* probably connives at the meaſure, with a view of marking to us, that all our dependance muſt be on him. Upon our application to the Durbar, I take it for granted that *Scindia* will oblige *Nanah* to diſcourage the Soubah, and order him to deſiſt; thus purſuing his ſcheme of keeping things in their preſent ſtate of uncertainty and ſuſpenſe, *Nanah* will probably give private orders contrary to the public ones; and we may be ſubject ſtill to repeated inſults and depredations, which will be diſavowed and renewed continually, while the fair ſeaſon will be conſumed in this ſort of trifling and diſgraceful intercourſe.

Every principle of good policy is againſt our ſuffering ourſelves to be thus amuſed, and forbids us to loſe a moment in inaction. The Poonah Durbar ſtill inſiſts on our yielding up all our territories, claiming the full execution of the convention of *Worgom*. *Fort Victoria* is actually attacked; the iſlands have been threatened for ſome time paſt: we muſt therefore either chuſe peace on the terms on which the enemy preſcribe it; or we muſt take our meaſures according to the actual ſtate of war we are now in. While we reſolve on neither, we ſubject ourſelves to inconveniencies which threaten our that affairs with total ruin; and loſe the only opportunity can preſent itſelf, for putting ourſelves in that forward and advantageous ſituation, which will enable us either to retrieve our affairs by an honourable peace, or to proſecute the war with ſucceſs.

The Bengal detachment muſt already have coſt an immenſe ſum; and its expence, while it remains here, is more than equal to the full amount of all our preſent revenues. Colonel *Goddard* has hitherto ſupplied himſelf with the ſums neceſſary for the payment of his troops, by the drafts on *Bengal*; but this is a reſource which cannot be depended on for more than eight or ten lacks at furtheſt. The Colonel has likewiſe already expreſſed his anxiety with regard to the burthen his expences may prove upon the Bengal treaſury; and indeed, if we conſider the increaſed military and naval eſtabliſhment of that Preſidency, on account of the war with France, and the demands which have probably been already made on the Governor General and Council by the gentlemen of *Madras*, whoſe diſtreſs for money, we have underſtood, has been the cauſe of their delaying ſo long to carry into execution the projected expedition

againſt *Mahé*, we muſt conſider it as highly probable that our hopes of ſupplies of caſh from *Bengal* may fail us. In 1776, when the Governor General and Council propoſed ſupporting us in a war with the Maratta Miniſters, on a proſpect of Colonel *Upton*'s negociation proving ineffectual, they had adviſed that they had reſolved to ſupply us with ten lacks; which ſum ſeemed all they could allow us to depend on, for they inſiſted that it ſhould be reſerved for the purpoſes of the war only, and even ordered a ſeparate account to be kept of it, that they might be ſatisfied it was applied to no other. If ſuch was the caſe at that time, how much lower muſt our expectations be at this, when their own occaſions, as well as the expences of the Preſidency of *Madras*, muſt be increaſed much beyond what we can venture even to gueſs at? By the moſt exact eſtimate I have been able to make, I judge that between this time and the 31ſt October next, we ſhall have occaſion for about 50 lacks; and all our reſources together do not afford a proſpect of more than 20 lacks; great part of which laſt, depending on the clearing of purchaſers goods from our warehouſe, and on revenues, a conſiderable part of which is to be received in kind, will be apt to fall ſhort of the eſtimate; while our expences are likely to exceed, rather than prove leſs than they are rated at. We might indeed, by putting a total ſtop to our inveſtments, apply about four lacks appropriated for the purchaſe of pepper, and the completion of the China ſhips' cargoes, to defray our unavoidable expences; but, beſides the inadequate proportion of this ſupply to our wants, the remedy will I believe be thought very deſperate.

Another very alarming circumſtance calls for our moſt ſerious conſideration: Colonel *Goddard* informs us, that one half of his Sepoys have refuſed to receive their pay for the month of January unleſs that for the month of February is at the ſame time diſcharged; and he ſeems to think that this has proceeded from a diſpoſition among the men to return home, if they could furniſh themſelves with money enough to bear their charges to their own country. It is true, Colonel *Goddard* is of opinion that he ſhall be able to put a ſtop to this ſpirit in his return to camp; but we have every reaſon to fear the increaſe of it, ſhould the troops remain long unengaged in ſervice, which might divert them from ſuch thoughts.

Whatever our difficulties may be, from the increaſe of our expences, and the neceſſity of providing for the punctual payment of our troops, yet the defence of the ſettlement abſolutely requires that we ſhould find means of keeping up our preſent force, while things remain in the ſtate they are now, with the Marattas, and while the war with *France* continues. The only way in which this can be effected, is by ſecuring ſuch a revenue under our own collection, as may be nearly anſwerable to our expences; and it is abſolutely neceſſary to think of taking meaſures for this purpoſe, before the diſtreſs we foreſee arrives at ſuch a height as to render our efforts ineffectual. By the month of October our finances will be utterly exhauſted, the full amount procurable for bills on *Bengal* taken up, and a large ſum ſtill due: in this ſtate, ſhould we have to ſupport an united attack from the French and Marattas; in what condition ſhall we then be to oppoſe them? Our bond debt is already increaſed near eight lacks; none of the money expected from *Bengal* for paying off that before contracted, is yet arrived; and to moſt people here it ſeems incredible, that the ſubſcription opened at *Bengal* for raiſing the ſum neceſſary, can be filled, or any dependence had on it for ſupplies.

Let any one carry his views forward to the month of October next, and imagine what our ſituation muſt then be, if we continue inactive to that time; and let him tell me whether the moſt unſucceſsful war could be attended with more ruinous conſequences than we are then to expect, without the loſs of a ſingle battle, and in poſſeſſion of every foot of land we at preſent hold. It will then be in vain to talk of waiting for orders or aſſiſtance of any ſort from abroad: when all our hopes at home fail us, and the moment for providing for our own neceſſities is paſt, the Poonah Durbar will ſoon find that the terms of the convention, which they ſtill inſiſt on, will be every day leſs in our power to refuſe; and we may depend, that with ſuch a claim on us, which they ſtill keep up, they mean to enforce it whenever the opportunity may ſeem favourable. After allowing for draft of ten lacks more on *Bengal* between this and next October, which is to the full as much as we ſhall find bills for, and I fear may be more than that Government can conveniently ſpare us, we muſt expect to be at leaſt 20 lacks in debt; which is ſo large a ſum, that I have doubts whether we may be able to borrow it: but granting that money is ever ſo plentiful, yet we have no funds to pay even intereſt; and if once it is ſeen that the drains of inexhauſtible wealth from *Bengal* are at an end, that our ſupplies from thence are ſtopped, and our expences more than double our annual revenue, our credit muſt fail, and we may fix a ſhort day for the period of our ability to raiſe money by loans. The Bengal troops, which may now give vigour to our operations, by the time I allude to, may become quite uſeleſs for want of money to pay them; or if they were to have no cauſe of diſſatisfaction on this account, there is reaſon to fear their numbers will every day diminiſh by their going off to their own country, for which they will naturally be growing more impatient, the longer they are kept without employment. We have yet between two and three months of the fair ſeaſon left; and during that time and the rains, we are ſecure from all attempts of the French, either immediately againſt us, or in ſupport of their faction at *Poonah*. If this time be not employed, we know not when ſuch another may occur; it is therefore of the laſt conſequence to put ourſelves in the beſt poſture againſt the opening of the next ſeaſon, for oppoſing a French armament, if any ſhould arrive, and for rendering their Maratta allies as little capable as poſſible of affording them aſſiſtance. Appendix. No. 135.

Upon the fulleſt conſideration of all circumſtances, the following are the meaſures I think we ought to adopt, and which, with the concurrence of the Committee, I propoſe to enter on immediately:

Colonel *Goddard* ſhould, I think, be deſired to write to *Moodajee Bouncello*, to notify to him his arrival at *Surat*; and inform him that he only waits to know the final determination of the Governor General and Council, and of him (M. B.) with regard to the ſubject of his (Colonel G.'s) negociations, to take his meaſures for co-operating with him in ſupport of our mutual intereſt. And that no doubts may be entertained of the diſpoſition of this Government in the ſame cauſe, I propoſe writing likewiſe to inform him, that our connection with *Ragoba* being at an end, by his having put himſelf under the protection of another power, we remain entirely at liberty to unite with him (M. B.) in any deſign the Governor General and Council may have formed in his favour; and ſhall be ready to act accordingly, as ſoon as ever we are informed of their having concluded with him the terms of their propoſed treaty.

In the mean time *Madjee Scindia* may be dealt with according to the ſame temporizing plan of conduct, which he purſues with us. The actual power he at preſent poſſeſſes in the Poonah Durbar, and the poſſibility that the ſcheme of a union with *Moodajee Bouncello* may yet fail, require that we ſhould keep on terms with *Scindia* as long and as far as we can, and maintain the diſtinction between him and *Nanah*. I propoſe, therefore, ſtill to continue to treat with him for an equivalent for the town and Pergunnah of *Broach*; to receive any propoſals he may have to make towards an alliance with us, or for aſſiſtance againſt the Nizam or *Hyder*; and to make any of theſe particulars the ſubject of negociation in ſuch a manner as to prevent him, as long as poſſible, from declaring againſt us; and to ſpin out time till we can receive the final anſwer of the Governor General and Council, both with regard to the general ſyſtem of Maratta affairs they

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they reſolve on, and the particular conduct they may judge moſt honourable and advantageous towards *Madjee Scindia* in particular; I do not think this will be difficult, as our intention of gaining time will be greatly forwarded when the rains ſet in, and before the ſeaſon opens we ſhall certainly receive directions from *Bengal* for our guidance.

Our proceeding with reſpect to *Nannah* ought to be very different. The juſt reaſon we have for eſteeming him our irreconcileable enemy, and the open abettor and head of the French faction, was the ground of our commencement of hoſtilities. The claims on us in conſequence of the convention of *Worgom*, as they cannot be complied with on our part, and are ſtill inſiſted on his, render the war unavoidable, till they are departed from at leaſt. Even were this point gained, no dependance could be had on any terms of accommodation we might enter into with the Poonah Government while *Nanah* continued to ſhare in the Adminiſtration, or had a proſpect of recovering his authority in it; ſuch accommodation is however at preſent out of the queſtion. His dependants are at this time actually attacking our poſſeſſions, and we muſt of force continue the war. It is however our buſineſs to ſhew that the quarrel is perſonal againſt him and his faction. It will be proper therefore to profeſs our friendly diſpoſition towards the Maratta State and Chiefs in general; declaring that our only view is to remove from the Adminiſtration, a party which has ſhewn an avowed enmity againſt our nation; and to procure a ſettlement of the Maratta Government, in conjunction with perſons on whoſe friendſhip to us we can depend.

The plan of operations I would propoſe for our forces, and which I would wiſh to carry into immediate execution is as follows:

Colonel *Goddard*, to whom the moſt conſiderable part will of courſe be committed, will in the firſt place take poſſeſſion of the Pergunnahs of *Dolpuar*, *Hanſoot*, *Occlaſeer*, *Deſhora*, and *Ahmood*. This will be a matter of no difficulty, the country being entirely open and unprotected, and ſituated between our garriſons of *Surat*, *Broach*, and *Jambooſer*; and it ſhould be recommended to him to effect this in concert with the Chiefs of thoſe ſettlements, in order that the perſons of the Maratta collectors may all be ſecured at once; by which means we ſhall be able to bring them to account for the arrears and balances in their hands, which will be a matter of great importance, as the difficulties of our affairs, from the low ſtate of our finances, form one of the principal objects to which our views muſt be directed. The above Pergunnahs yield an annual revenue of ſix or ſeven lacks of rupees, and the balances collected from them I flatter myſelf will be conſiderable.

The Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* muſt receive charge of theſe Pergunnahs, and endeavour to put them under the moſt advantageous and regular form of management, conformable to the mode adopted in our other northern poſſeſſions.

Colonel *Goddard* in like manner will proceed in the reduction of the country ſouth of the *Tappi*; which, with *Oolpaar*, *Hanſoot*, and *Occlaſeer*, comprehend the ancient domain of *Surat*, known under the name of the *Surat Auterwuzey*; obſerving the precaution before noticed, of ſecuring the collectors in the ſeveral Pergunnahs, or ſuch of them as he may be able. The ſhare of the revenues of the city of *Surat*, collected by the Poonah Chotea, muſt likewiſe be appropriated to the uſe of the Company. But the Guicawar Chotea and collectors in the Pergunnahs ſhould be ſuffered to remain unmoleſted in their reſpective Aumils, while Colonel *Goddard* ſhould give their principals notice, that he is empowered to ſettle the province of *Guzerat* in conjunction with them, without delay.

The revenues of the Poonah Circar in this quarter being taken into our hands, Colonel *Goddard* ſhould be inſtructed to bring the brothers *Futty Sing* and *Govind Row* to a ſettlement with the Company; the ground of which muſt be our ſecuring to them their preſent poſſeſſions in the province of *Guzerat*, independent of the Poonah Government, and their engaging to ſupport us in the ſhare now retained in that province by the Poonah Government. It will be Colonel *Goddard*'s care to accommodate the differences between the brothers under our mediation and guarantee, obſerving that as *Futty Sing*'s authority is at preſent that which is acknowledged in the Guicawar dominions, his meaſures muſt be taken with him as the head of the family, provided he finds both equally ready to unite with us, as he probably will.

The revenue of the Poonah Circar, north of the *Mihi*, from the beſt account I have been able to procure of it, amounts to about eleven lacks: the Guicawars in the ſame country is much more conſiderable, amounting to near 29 lacks: the diſtricts ſituate between the *Mihi* and the *Tappi*, will be held by us as far eaſtward as *Brodria*, *Dubhey*, *Zinnore*, and *Verſavee*, ſouth of the *Tappi*. The country is held jointly by the Poonah Circar, the Guicawars, Nabob of *Surat*, and *Graſſias*, and is uſually eſtimated to yield a revenue of about 20 lacks, of which a full half belongs to the Poonah Circar; the remainder is divided among the other ſhares, but the largeſt proportion to the Guicawars. The revenue collected by the *Poonah* Circar north of the *Mihi* and ſouth of the *Tappi*, according to this eſtimate, amounts to 21 lacks; and beſides this, the Guicawars pay a tribute for their Jaghire in *Guzerat*, amounting to 27 lacks, which makes up the revenue of the Poonah Circar from this province 48 lacks, excluſive of the Pergunnahs between the *Tappi* and the *Mihi*.

The Pergunnahs north of the *Mihi* belonging to the Poonah Circar, I would propoſe to yield to the Guicawars, in exchange for their diviſion of the country ſouth of the *Tappi*, for their ſhare in the revenue of the city of *Surat*, and ſuch other lands as might nearly make up an equivalent: The tribute of 27 lacks per annum I would propoſe to relieve them from, till ſuch time at leaſt as the Poonah Government ſhould be ſettled, and a final treaty of peace concluded between us and that Durbar.

As *Govind Row* has always ſhewn himſelf well diſpoſed to our intereſt, it will be proper (in our arrangements with *Futty Sing*) to provide for him in a ſuitable manner, and procure a Jaghire for him more conſiderable than he has ever yet been able to obtain from *Futty Sing*, which has never I believe exceeded three lacks per annum. This has ſtill been the ſubject of diſpute betwixt them, and is the cauſe of their preſent contention. *Futty Sing* might well afford his brother an increaſe, both on account of the advantageous exchange he would make with us, and of his being relieved from the heavy load of tribute he pays to the Poonah Government.

It might be proper to provide ſome gratification for the Nabob of *Cambay*, and procure ſome acceſſion of territory for him in the final ſettlement of the northern country. But this, with all particulars of leſs conſequence, ſhould be given in charge to Colonel *Goddard*; with diſcretional powers to adjuſt the ſeveral intereſts in ſuch a manner as might be moſt honourable and advantageous for this Government; obſerving always that we wiſh the general plan of arrangement to be ſuch as to conciliate the ſeveral Powers to our intereſt, and detach them from the preſent Adminiſtration at *Poonah*.

In order to enable Colonel *Goddard* to accompliſh this the more effectually, I would propoſe that all our forces to the northward ſhould be put under his command, and a general authority given him to treat and conclude with the Guicawars, the Nabobs of *Surat* and *Cambay*, the Rajahs of *Radjpipley*, *Mandavie*, *Futtypore*, *Baunſela*, and *Magrom*, the Cooley Chiefs, and all others who might be affected by our military operations to the northward: I ſhould however recommend to him to refer the adjuſtment of the intereſt of all but the Guicawars, either to the Chief of *Surat* or Chief of *Broach*, or to the Reſident of *Jambooſeer*, or Reſident of *Cambay*, according to their reſpective ſituations, in order that his own attention might not be

diſtracted from greater objects by more minute affairs; but I would ſtill propoſe to reſerve the final regulation of the affairs of the Guzerat province in general to Colonel *Goddard*, guided by our inſtructions; and the ſervants of the Company to the northward ſhould be directed to give him all the aſſiſtance and information that might be required for the ſucceſsful management of this important buſineſs.

It may be proper to obſerve likewiſe, that the treaty to be concluded with the Guicawars, muſt contain a reſervation with regard to the confirmation and approval of it by the Governor General and Council; and it is with a view to this, and to the future meaſures to be taken by them with the Rajah of *Berar*, that I have propoſed that nothing definitive ſhould be concluded with the Guicawars relative to their tribute to the *Poonah* Circar, which will be a point of conſideration, whenever the general arrangements of the Maratta Government come to be thought of.

If Colonel *Goddard* finds it practicable, and conſiſtent with the general plan, he might endeavour to obtain from *Futty Sing* the ceſſion of *Dubhey* and *Zinnore*, which lie very commodiouſly for completing our line of northern territory, and yield together a revenue of about two lacks; it will be the leſs difficult, as a conſiderable ſhare in the former, and ſome part likewiſe in the latter, I believe is collected for the Poonah Government.

Our preſent poſſeſſions to the northward, with the additions above-mentioned, would complete a line of country extending from the *Mihi* to the borders of the Portugueſe diſtrict at *Damaun*; the preſent amount of its revenue may be eſtimated at about 37 * lacks of rupees, and from its productions of grain, cotton, indigo, and timber, its manufactures, compact ſituation, and near neighbourhood to the Preſidency, it ſeems capable of conſiderable improvements; out of the above ſum 24 lacks would be an acceſſion of revenue, from the ſucceſs of the plan I now propoſe.

In conſequence of the exchange propoſed to be made with the Guicawars, ſhould they requeſt the Colonel's aſſiſtance for putting them in poſſeſſion of the territories of the Poonah Circar north of the *Mihi*, he ſhould be authorized to afford it them; and it ſhould be recommended to him to exert himſelf to accompliſh this ſervice with all diſpatch, in order to return at the very firſt opening of the ſeaſon to the ſouthward, as well to protect our own Pergunnahs, as to be ready to afford any aid we might ſtand in need of at *Bombay*.

I flatter myſelf Colonel *Goddard* will think the force he now commands near *Surat*, with the addition of a detachment of 100 European artillery, would be equal to the ſervice I have above propoſed. The force we at preſent have here I ſhould wiſh to keep entire, that we might not be expoſed to inſult from the enemy at the very ſeat of Government. I am in hopes likewiſe that our troops might be applied to other uſeful purpoſes, and prevent the enemy, by a judicious diverſion, from attempting any oppoſition of conſequence to Colonel *Goddard*'s operations.

The force remaining in garriſon here I think will be ſufficient to enable us to make a vigorous effort for poſſeſſing ourſelves of *Baſſein*, which if ſucceſsful will nearly complete our views in this neighbourhood; and as it will be what our enemies will hardly expect, to find themſelves preſſed both here and to the northward at the ſame time, it will ſerve above all to recover our reputation, and impreſs them with a reſpect of our force.

Here our military ſchemes might terminate, if it were not that all our meaſures at this time have ſo great a reference to the probable deſigns of the French, that they will ſtill be incomplete, unleſs we can diſconcert their views by poſſeſſing ourſelves of the port where they have propoſed to eſtabliſh themſelves; I ſhould therefore, if the ſeaſon and other circumſtances ſeemed favourable, wiſh much to attempt next the reduction of *Choul*. The arrival of the King's ſhips towards the cloſe of the ſeaſon may facilitate this enterprize, and the accompliſhment of it would give us ſuch advantages over our enemies, as they could hardly make head againſt. Should the French arrive, and find themſelves prevented in this grand ſcheme of theirs, on the ſucceſs of which all their projects againſt this place are probably founded, nothing could tend ſo much to the final defeat of them. They would be without a port; they muſt begin all their negociations and intrigues anew, while their force would be waſting away; or they muſt begin their operations under manifeſt diſadvantages, which they would have ſuppoſed obviated by their poſſeſſion of *Choul*. Appendix No. 135.

By a proper exertion of the force we now have, all theſe purpoſes may, I think, with a moderate ſhare of good fortune, be effected before the opening of the next ſeaſon; againſt which time it is neceſſary we ſhould be prepared, either to repel an attack on our ſettlement by the French, or to act in ſupport of our ally the Rajah of *Berar*, or ſuch other party among the Marattas as the Governor General and Council may determine to unite with. Our advantages in either caſe are apparent: our forces will be paid during the interval, without diſtreſſing ourſelves by carrying the war into the enemy's country; our actual revenue will be more than doubled; the reputation of our arms reſtored; the grand object of our politics, the ſettlement of the *Poonah* Government, will be the only point we ſhall have to attend to; and the reſources of our enemies reduced, by the loſs of above 50 lacks of yearly revenue.

The oppoſition we may expect is in no degree proportionate to the great advantages we have in proſpect; the union of *Nanah* and *Scindia* is evidently imperfect, their Miniſters have never acted together ſince they have been here, not even in what might ſeem a common intereſt, the demand of the ceſſions they came to receive; *Scindia* has plainly a view of our friendſhip, and will hardly relinquiſh it, and engage in a hazardous enterprize ſo far from *Poonah* as *Guzerat*, eſpecially while his jealouſy of the Nizam, who is known to favour *Nanah*, and *Hyder*'s operations to the ſouthward, call him the direct oppoſite way; *Nanah* has no other chief, or any other army but *Scindia*'s to oppoſe us, and if he had, it would take more time to collect forces from different parts, and march them to the ſcene of our action, than now remains between this and the ſetting in of the monſoons.

The objection of want of authority from the Governor General and Council can hardly, I think, be urged in this caſe; we are in an actual ſtate of war: this ſingle fact ſeems to me an anſwer to all objections of this kind, even if it were true that we had not the expreſs ſanction of the Governor General and Council for commencing hoſtilities: but when we conſider further the imminent danger to our affairs from inaction, the contrary advantages of deciſion, and the few real difficulties we have to meet in a vigorous proſecution of the war, I cannot have a doubt of the meaſures we ought to take: our powers are in my opinion expreſs and ample; but if they were not, this I am convinced is no time for delay in expectation of them; and while I have the honour of bearing a public truſt, I ſhall in all caſes of great moment chuſe rather to riſk the conſequence, which can only affect me individually, than to bear the imputation of having neglected or delayed meaſures eſſential to the common good, for no better reaſon than to ſecure myſelf from blame, if they ſhould prove unſucceſsful.

Bombay, the 28th March 1779. *Wm Hornby.*

* Thus: Preſent Broach revenue, 10 lacks; preſent Surat revenue, 3 lacks; Oolpaar, Hanſoot, Occlaſeer, and Deſſora and Ahmood, 6 lacks; Poonah revenue, ſouth of the Tappi, 10 lacks; Guicawar revenue, ſouth of the Tappi, 6 lacks; Dubhey Zinnore, 2 lacks.

Appendix. Nos. 136 to 138.

APPENDIX, No. 136.

Letter from *Fort William* to Colonel *Leſlie*.

Sir,

WE have received your letters from the 25th July to the 9th inſtant.

The unexpected length of time which the detachment under your command has remained at *Chatterpore*, made it neceſſary to endeavour for our own ſatisfaction to collect the cauſes aſſigned for it in your letters from that place. We obſerve by your firſt letter, dated two days after your arrival on the 3d July, that it would be neceſſary to halt for ſome time to repair the gun carriages which had been much ſhaken in the march from *Calpee*. On the 25th July you informed us, that they had undergone a thorough repair, and that you waited then for nothing but to complete your complement of cattle, and to collect a ſtore of grain to carry with you in caſe of exigency, but that you ſhould march in a few days. On the 30th July you repeated, that you ſhould proceed on your march in a few days, when the heavy rains were abated; but neither of your laſt letters, dated 9th Auguſt, though ſtill written from *Chatterpore*, mention your intention of quitting that place in the proſecution of your march, nor do they give any reaſon for deferring it; we cannot therefore help expreſſing the greateſt ſurprize and uneaſineſs at this unexpected delay; and though we doubt not you will be able to aſſign a ſatisfactory cauſe for it, we think it neceſſary to call on you for ſuch cauſe, as we are uninformed of any ſince the 25th July.

On this occaſion we think it proper to recall to your attention the caution given you in our letter of inſtructions, "That you do not ſuffer yourſelf to be diverted "from the proſecution of your march by any new object, "however plauſible, except only for the ſubſiſtence or "ſafety of your troops indiſpenſably requiring it." And we alſo repeat the hope expreſſed in our laſt letter, that you will purſue your march to *Berar* with all convenient expedition, according to our orders of the 7th ultimo.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
31ſt Auguſt 1778.

APPENDIX, Nos 137 and 138.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 2d September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General; Preſident.

Philip Francis, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.

THE Governor General lays before the Board the following letter, which he received from Colonel *Leſlie* laſt night; and deſires that it may be recorded, as it may ſerve to remove the doubts which are expreſſed in the minutes of the laſt conſultation, reſpecting the proſecution of the march of the detachment, and the cauſes of its detention at *Chatterpore*. He had letters from camp dated the 14th, the day which Colonel *Leſlie* had fixed on for leaving *Chatterpore*. The camp was ſtill there on that day; but from the terms of his letter he does not entertain the leaſt doubt that Colonel *Leſlie* muſt have been then on the point of leaving it; and is equally ſatisfied, as he hopes the Board will be, that no conſideration will have induced Colonel *Leſlie* to enter into engagements of a tendency to retard his progreſs, or to divert the ſervices of the troops under his command a moment from their deſtined courſe or preſcribed objects. 16

Camp *Chatterpore*,
Auguſt 11th, 1778.

Dear Sir,

My letter of the 4th inſtant will inform you of the ſituation of affairs betwixt *Surnet Sing Goman* and *Coman Sing*, from the united friendſhip of whom I thought every difficulty at an end, as they had informed me they had ſettled all their matters, and made a firm connection, which I was to become the witneſs of; but when I preſſed my ſupply, and was preparing to move, I found ſome doubts had interpoſed: I requeſted to be informed of them. *Goman* and *Coman Sing* ſuppoſed when I was gone the whole would join againſt them, and drive them out; and I then plainly ſaw my ſtay here was what they wiſhed for, to ſecure them on the ſide of *Surnet Sing*: but if I went away, *Anrood Sing* being the ſtronger party, they reſolved to accept his propoſals, and join him: both *Surnet Sing*, and *Anrood Sing* had made the ſame propoſals; but they had accepted the firſt and rejected the latter's. I preſſed them to come to an immediate ratification, as I would not ſtay a moment longer, and required their anſwer at a certain time. I had an interview with their agents the 7th at night, and all parties ſeemed ſatisfied, and promiſed to be with me in the morning; but freſh diſputes ariſing that night, they broke through every agreement with *Surnet Sing*. *Goman* and *Coman Sing*'s men came to me on the morning of the 8th: they informed me their maſters had ſent them with the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of friendſhip to the Engliſh, and of their aid to me; and they doubted not of a reciprocal return. In ſhort, they required that I ſhould return back to *Jaitpore*, drive *Gudd Sing* from thence, and give them poſſeſſion of his fort. I told them I had often informed them, that it was out of my power, but particularly ſo now; that they did not conſider the delay and expence of ſuch an undertaking, which I could not anſwer for. They then very kindly offered me thirty thouſand rupees. I replied, thirty lack would not induce me to fire a ſhot at it; and therefore I requeſted to hear no more on the ſubject. I deſired to know what agreement they had made with *Surnet Sing*. As I was on the point of marching, they informed me all agreement was at an end, as they had an offer from *Anrood Sing* of the reſtoration of their country, taken by *Hindooput*, and could not be at the expence of ſupporting *Surnet Sing*. I deſired them to inform their maſters, I was not only ſurprized, but ſorry for this circumſtance; that I was obliged to them for the trouble they had put themſelves to, to demonſtrate their friendſhip to the Company in a viſit to me; and as their buſineſs was now at an end, I wiſhed them to return to their country as ſoon as convenient. They aſked me when they ſhould go? and I replied, the ſooner the better; to-morrow, if they choſe it, as I could have no objection: thus we parted. As the Vakeels had informed me their maſters would take their leave of me, I thought no more of it, as I was to be informed from *Surnet Sing* the cauſe of all this. He aſſured me, they had intended nothing from the beginning, and only acted a part to cover a treaty with *Anrood Sing*, which he had reaſon to believe they had concluded; that he had no farther expectation from them, and that they were better at a diſtance; that he would give me all the aid in his power to forward my march, whatever riſk he run.

On the 9th early I had a report of *Goman* and *Coman Sing* having marched in the night, and gave it out that it was by my orders they had marched away; and that they were afraid to diſobey me. They were got ſeven coſs off before I was aware of it, near to *Seerangur*: I ſent immediately after them, to know the meaning of ſo precipitate a departure, without taking leave: Soon after an Hircarrah arrived from *Pannah*, from *Benny Hozoory*, one of *Anrood Sing*'s miniſters, with an intercepted letter from the Vakeels of *Goman* and *Coman Sing*, ſent by them to *Anrood Sing*, in which they inform their maſters of having executed their orders, had concluded a treaty with *Anrood Sing*, entreating them to

raiſe

raiſe troops at my expence, and preſcribe a mode of their joining *Anrood*'s army: *Benny Hazoory*, offended at this meaſure, has quitted *Anrood* and the reſt; has ſecured himſelf at *Pannah*, and offers to join *Surnet Sing* whenever I ſhall deſire him. *Cullock Sing* has offered to quit them alſo, and join *Surnet* with three hundred horſe. They are ſuch a ſet of vile ſcoundrels, that in the midſt of all this I reſolve to march from this place on the 14th, by the route of *Rage Gurr*, to induce *Anrood* to move to *Callinger*; when I ſhall turn to the right, and purſue my route to *Sagur*, by which means I ſhall have nothing to offend me but *Ballajee*, who I think will acquieſce. The rains are leſſened, and I hope pretty fair weather till I reach *Houſkenabad*, which I ſhall get to with every poſſible diſpatch; and I think I have met with no diſadvantage or delay by my halt here; and I am in hopes to have the Board's ſentiments regarding *Munroe*'s affair at *Mhow*, ere I quit it. *Goman* and *Coman Sing*'s Vakeels are returned, and expreſs their maſters' uneaſineſs at going away without taking leave: but to convince me of their friendſhip, ſay they are going to chaſtiſe my enemies, and bring the head of *Gunnaiſh Hazoory* (the Kellidar of *Raat*) to my feet, who all agree was the perpetrator of the horrid tranſaction on Captain *Munroe*. I find the Board's orders for garriſoning *Kalpee* has reached Lieutenant Colonel *Wilding* and Captain *Rawſtorne*, and retaining it for their further inſtructions, without any reference to my agreement with *Ballajee* and *Gunga Durr*.

I ſhould therefore be glad to have the Board's inſtructions whether upon *Ballajee*'s future conduct to me I may not promiſe the reſtitution of *Calpee*, according to agreement: in this caſe, I muſt requeſt the Board's inſtructions to Captain *Rawſtorne*, to comply with ſuch requiſition as I may make to him on that account.

I am with the higheſt regard, &c.

(Signed) *Matt^w Leſlie.*

No. 138.

Mr. *Francis*—As further intelligence may naturally be expected every day of Col. *Leſlie*'s march from *Chatterpore*, or of his ſubſequent proceedings, I ſhall only ſay at preſent, that the doubts which I entertain concerning the motives of Colonel *Leſlie*'s conduct, and which appeared to have made the ſame impreſſion upon every member of the Board, at our laſt meeting, are not removed, nor can they be removed, until I ſee ſatisfactory reaſons aſſigned for his halting at *Chatterpore*, from the 3d July to the 14th Auguſt; how much longer he may ſtay there is uncertain. It appears by the preſent letter, that he is implicated in ſome ſhape or other, in the diſputes and intereſts of the Rajah, and other Chiefs of the Bundlecund country; but it does not appear of what nature his connections with them are, or what reaſons induced him to take part in their affairs: That the Prince of the country ſhould wiſh to detain a foreign army in the heart of his dominions, and in the poſſeſſion of his capital, and that he ſhould endeavour to prevent ſuch an army from marching out of his country, if it were their inclination to do ſo, I preſume, will be thought too unreaſonable to deſerve credit. As to the rains to which Col. *Leſlie* in part attributes his delay, I muſt beg leave to remind the Board that it was conſtantly and repeatedly urged in argument here, when the poſſible difficulties that might attend the march were in conſideration, that the rains would rather relieve the army, or at leaſt that they would be no impediment to their march. For theſe reaſons I muſt declare for myſelf, that the doubts I have entertained of Colonel *Leſlie*'s halt at *Chatterpore* remain unremoved.

The Governor General—Of what nature the connections are which may have been formed between Colonel *Leſlie* and the Chiefs of *Bundlecund*, I know not: and I think it will ill become the juſtice or dignity of this Board to form their opinion on them from public rumours, or to prejudge his conduct, while the circumſtances and motives of it are confeſſedly unknown. I will own that I have felt the diſappointment of his continuing ſo long at *Chatterpore*, at leaſt equally with the other members of the Board, perhaps much more ſenſibly; and I have been as little pleaſed with the apparent connection between him and *Surnaut Sing*, becauſe I knew not the nature of it, nor to what it tended, and becauſe I had expected as a right the moſt unreſerved communication of it: I feared the detention of our forces for the purpoſe of effecting a revolution in the Government of *Bundlecund*; an event, to which he might be naturally led, if he conſulted only the influence of his paſſions by the ſtrong provocation which he has received from the Rajah, and the ſenſe of obligation ariſing from the ſeaſonable offers of ſervice made to him by *Surnaut Sing*, the Rajah's elder brother. It is a juſtice due to Colonel *Leſlie* to afford the Board ſuch information as I am in poſſeſſion o relative to his connection; and it is the more neceſſary, as the letter which I have juſt recorded refers for ſuch an explanation to one which he had before written to me: this I ſhall therefore beg leave to inſert.

Appendix. No. 138.

(Duplicate.) Camp at *Chatterpore*,

Sir, Auguſt 4th 1778.

Laſt night I received by expreſs Coſſids from *Poonah* (which they left the 22d of June) a letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, a copy of which I tranſmit you, with the Maratta Governor's credentials for my free march through their territories; which with the particular ones I am already in poſſeſſion of, I am in hopes I ſhall have no further moleſtation in my march, and that I ſhall be amply ſupplied with proviſions, as I have the voluntary aſſurances of ſeveral of the leſſer Chiefs ſouth of *Sagur*, of giving me all the aſſiſtance in their power.

I do not know what further line *Ballajee* will take, as he is ſtill in arms, and lying in my way, but I apprehend he will be now ſubmiſſive, perhaps complaiſant, as *Benny Ram* will neceſſarily ſee him on his journey, as he lies on his road, and will have a memorandum from me. I have had no late communication with him, but I find he is anxious for the return of his fort of *Kalpee*, which I think from his behaviour ought to be retained, unleſs his future conduct may deſerve the ratifying the agreement made with his brother, which he acknowledges himſelf bound by. I have received a letter from *Goonga Durr*, requeſting the fulfilling my engagement to him, of re-delivering him *Kalpee* on my arrival at *Chatterpore*. I have anſwered him, that from his own behaviour I would comply with his requiſition of the return of *Kalpee*; but as I hold his brother *Ballajee* equally bound by that agreement (and which he acknowledges himſelf to be) his breach of it by taking up arms, and urging all the Powers around to do the like, and in conjunction with him, to oppoſe a march they had conſented to, and by committing acts of hoſtility againſt me, I did not think myſelf juſtifiable in delivering back *Kalpee*, until I had received the further orders of Government, whom I had informed of the circumſtances, and his further conduct deſerved ſuch acquieſcence.

I ſhould be glad to know the ſentiments of the Government on this occaſion; and whether, if the conduct of *Ballajee* be friendly and hoſpitable towards us, I may not promiſe the immediate delivery of it. *Anrood Sing* is ſtill in force, and doing all in his power, by power of money, to draw more forces together; he has made large offers to *Goman* and *Coman Sing* to join him and extirpate us: They confeſs ſo. *Saurnet Sing* and they are in agreement to ſupport one another; they will, I hope, finiſh it to-morrow (when I am to ſee it) and which they hope will meet with the protection of your Government, which they ardently wiſh their behaviour will merit. This over, all my ſupplies are to be amply found me, and every aid given me into *Ballajee*'s territories lying before me, and preventing *Anrood Sing* from haraſſing my rear. The rains are now heavy; but I hope receſs in a few days, when my march will be continued.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) *Matt^w Leſlie.*

Appendix. No. 139.

Governor General—As motives have been aſſigned on conjecture for Colonel *Leſlie*'s conduct, and theſe ſtrongly ſupported by the apparent inconſiſtency of the Rajah's oppoſition on any other grounds, I hope I ſhall be excuſed if I take up a ſmall portion of the time of this Board in ſuggeſting the probable grounds of both.

The Rajah is a youth, I think of fifteen years of age; his judgment of courſe pliant to every advice and information given him by thoſe who are in poſſeſſion of his confidence. It is not poſſible that his conduct can be governed by the principles of prudence, or by a real knowledge of his own intereſt. We know that *Ballajee*, the Maratta Chief, who oppoſed the firſt movement of our troops in the paſſage of the *Jumna*, and has continued his hoſtilities to them without intermiſſion from that time, notwithſtanding the accommodation concluded between him and Colonel *Leſlie*, very ſoon after joined the Rajah and has been the prime mover of all his actions. In effect it is *Ballajee*, an alien, and not the ſovereign of the country, who, to uſe the words of Mr. *Francis*'s minute, has endeavoured to prevent our army from marching out of his country. *Ballajee* might have obviouſly ſuggeſted to the Rajah, that the object of this armament, though ſpeciouſly diſguiſed under the pretext of being deſtined for the protection of *Bombay*, a part of the world too remote for his knowledge, was ſolely to aſſiſt the pretenſions of his elder brother to the ſovereignty of his State; and the ſubſequent junction of his rival with our army, which could not but have been foreſeen by the Maratta Chief, might be eaſily made by him to appear a proof of his inſinuations, though in effect a neceſſary conſequence of his councils, and mere aſſertions would have been ſufficeint to convince a young Prince of fifteen years of age, and to induce him to regard and treat our army as his enemies. This may ſuffice for the probable motives of the Rajah's conduct. As to Colonel *Leſlie*, after the unprovoked enmity which had been ſhewn him by the Rajah, and the attempt made by him to diſtreſs the army in the moſt important article of proviſions, it was an obvious policy to embrace the friendſhip of any competitor, who might at the ſame time ſerve to intimidate the Rajah to peace, and inſure ſupplies of proviſions under his command. If this was his motive, it was ſo far laudable; if he had any other, or, to ſpeak more plainly, for there can be but one other, if it was his intention to diſpoſſeſs the Rajah in being, and to raiſe his brother to the ſovereignty of *Bundlecund* in his ſtead, he has diſobeyed the poſitive orders of the Board, and proved himſelf unworthy of the confidence which they have repoſed in him. The truth of this will hereafter appear.

I am ſorry that Colonel *Leſlie* ſhould have made uſe of the rains as a reaſon for his continuance at *Chatterpore*; it might be the cauſe of retarding his march, but certainly could be none for fixing him for forty-two days together to one ſpot; and it is as certain that his infantry could, at leaſt with equal facility, have paſſed over the ground over which the cavalry of his enemies have retreated. I ſtill affirm, not as a point of belief, but of certainty, that the ſeaſon of the rains was beyond all compariſon more favourable to the march of the troops than the dry weather which preceded it: but as Mr. *Francis* has quoted my former declarations upon this ſubject from memory, I believe and hope at leaſt that he has carried his recollection of my aſſertions beyond the reality. It was ſcarcely poſſible that I could have ſaid that the rains would be no impediment to the march of the army. I had made this a ſubject of very minute inquiry; and I knew that at certain times the heavy rains which fell would ſwell the little rivers of that country over which his route lay, ſo as to render them impaſſable, but that they would preſently ſubſide, as the cauſe which filled them ceaſed. They might certainly impede and delay, but they undoubtedly would not prove a total obſtruction to the march. What I ſaid, reſpected the health and ſafety of the troops, and the conveniency of ſhade and water; the hardſhips to which the troops were expoſed until the ſetting in of the rains, have verified what I foretold. The extract will be but ſhort of what I formerly dictated on this ſubject; and I beg that the Secretary may be allowed to enter it after this minute.

Governor General—It was a very early ſubject of my inquiry to know what inconveniencies our troops would be expoſed to by marching in the rains, which at the firſt occurred to me as an inſurmountable obſtacle. I have every reaſon to believe, and am confirmed in my opinion by that of Colonel *Leſlie*, that the rainy ſeaſon ſo far from proving an objection, will rather facilitate the march, and prove a relief to the troops, which will ſuffer more from the exceſſive heats and from drought in the elevated and open plains, through which they will probably paſs, than by the rainy ſeaſon whenever it ſhall overtake them, as it certainly will; poſſibly too they will be leſs expoſed to the attack of cavalry in the rains, and in reſpect to health, our own records afford us one inſtance, and I believe more, of our Sepoys, and even European infantry, recovering from a ſtate of ſickneſs, by a march begun in the very height of the rains, as was the caſe in the laſt campaign of Colonel *Champion*. Ext. Conſ. 6 Apr. 1778.

Governor General—I have in a former minute declared, that I regarded the rainy ſeaſon as favourable to the expedition conducted by Colonel *Leſlie*. Conſ. 21 May.

Mr. *Francis*—I do not mean to prejudge Colonel *Leſlie*'s conduct, or to aſſign any motives whatever for his actions. Thoſe which the Governor General has ſtated may be well founded, but they are formed upon conjecture only: I have only ſaid that my doubts are not removed; and I ſubmit it to the judgment of the Court of Directors, taking things in the point of view in which they ſtand before us at this moment, whether ſuch doubts are warranted or not: I hope the Governor General will pardon me, if I ſay that it appears to me, that even his mind is not yet quite ſatisfied on this ſubject.

Governor General—I muſt beg leave to cloſe the debate, which I think does not require my continuation of it: the event will better prove, than any concluſions drawn by Mr. *Francis* or myſelf upon the preſent appearances, whether Colonel *Leſlie* has conducted himſelf with a ſtrict regard to his duty and attention to the ſervice on which he was entruſted.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Ew^d Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 139.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 28th September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

THE proceedings of the 17th inſtant read and approved.

Read the following letters from Colonel *Leſlie*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing you the 15th inſtant, encloſing copies of two letters I had received from Mr. *Lewis* at *Poonah*. The encloſed is a copy of a ſubſequent letter to the former, which reached me ſince the diſpatch of my laſt.

I encamped here this morning, and ſhall proceed tomorrow to *Raje Gur*, from whence I hope to be able to inform you further of the ſtate of affairs here.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Camp at *Keſſoar Gunge*, 16th Auguſt 1778. (Signed) *Matt^w Leſlie.*

Appendix. No. 139.

To Colonel *Leſlie.*

Sir,

Encloſed is duplicate of my laſt letter under the 18th inſtant.

I diſpatch this purpoſely to acquaint you, that notwithſtanding the Duſtucks already granted by *Madjee Scindia*, for your free paſſage through his country, I yeſterday received intimation he intends ſhortly marching from hence with his whole force, amounting to about twenty thouſand men, to ſtop your march; and to put you on your guard, not only againſt his declared deſigns, but alſo againſt any ſimilar ſchemes he may have formed, in the hopes he entertains of your repoſing a confidence in his Duſtucks, and the private orders he may in conſequence have given to his officers, which in my opinion are the moſt to be apprehended; for of all the Marattas, *Scindia* bears the character of being the moſt deceitful. I would not adviſe you to place too much confidence in *Tookajee Holcar*'s Duſtuck, for though he may really mean well, yet in the late change which has happened in this Government, he is ſo much reduced as to be obliged to comply with whatever orders *Madjee Scindia* may give him.

Poonah, I am, &c.
26th July 1778. (Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Members of the Supreme Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that I arrived at this encampment in three days from *Chatterpore*, being the 17th, in the forenoon.

I purpoſed to have encamped on the banks of the *Kaine* river; but on advancing to examine the ground with the Quarter-maſter-general, the troops of *Anrood Sing*, who are poſted on the oppoſite banks of the river, immediately opened their batteries: I therefore withdrew, and fixed my camp about a mile diſtant, out of the range of their ſhot. As this unprovoked attack confirmed to me their hoſtile intentions, I thought it neceſſary to take a nearer view of their poſt, and as ſoon as the troops came up, I advanced a picquet of one battalion with ſome pieces of cannon to the banks of the river. The enemy began a ſmart fire upon the troops as ſoon as they came in view, but without any effect. I thought it neceſſary to exchange a few ſhot and ſhells, to ſhew my ſentiments of their behaviour; and as I did not like to withdraw the artillery immediately, without doing them ſome greater miſchief than merely the alarm of a cannonade, I ordered a few carcaſes to be thrown among their huts, which ſoon took fire, and burnt with great fury till ſunſet. As they have ſecured all the boats on the oppoſite banks, and I deem it unſafe to purſue my route along the *Kaine*, with ſo conſiderable an enemy in my rear, the diſlodging them is become abſolutely neceſſary, and the artificers of the army are buſy at work preparing punts and rafts to paſs the river, and I hope to be able to make the attempt in a couple of days at fartheſt.

The Rajah continues to deny that thoſe acts of hoſtilities are committed by his authority, although his troops keep up a conſtant fire on any of our people going to the river for water, both with their guns and matchlocks.

The ceſſation of the heavy rains is a very favourable circumſtance for my croſſing; the river is fallen greatly, and is leſs rapid than the firſt day I arrived, and I am anxious to take the advantage of the opportunity for diſlodging the enemy from their poſt. I am yet doubtful of the part *Ballajee* will take on my advance towards *Saugur*. It is this circumſtance that renders it more immediately neceſſary I ſhould take ſome effectual ſteps to diſperſe the army of *Anrood Sing*, for the force of *Surnaut Sing* will not be able to withſtand him, and my communication and ſupplies muſt be inevitably interrupted.

I have the honour to be, &c.
Camp *Raje Gur*, (Signed)
Auguſt 20th 1778. *Matt^w Leſlie.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I do myſelf the honour to encloſe you a duplicate of my addreſs of the 20th inſtant; I alſo beg leave to forward to you an original letter, which I received on the 22d, from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, under the ſignature of a Select Committee, authorized by the honourable the Court of Directors, for the conducting all political and military operations in that part of *Aſia*; in which you will perceive I am directed to change my route, and to march by the way of *Kooranpore* and *Juneer*, through the Buglana country, inſtead of my former deſtination to *Surat* or *Broach*; which theſe gentlemen, from the preſent ſtate of affairs at *Poonah*, deem more liable to difficulty than a more ſouthern route.

On the 22d inſtant advances were made by the Miniſters of *Anrood Sing* to come to terms of pacification; and yeſterday two meſſengers came acroſs to my camp with the moſt humiliating profeſſions from the Rajah, *Anrood Sing* totally denying that the acts of hoſtility committed by his army were in any ſhape authorized, and declaring they were ready to receive my orders. I returned them with my requiſitions, comprized in a few words, and I am promiſed an ultimate anſwer to-day. The ſituation of the enemy's poſt, and the rapidity of the river, requires every precaution to be taken for the ſupport of any attack I may be neceſſitated to make; and the artificers of the army are buſy building boats and rafts for this ſervice, which I ſhall not heſitate to attempt the moment I am reſolved whether their propoſals are real, or meant only to deceive and protract time, as their whole conduct has hitherto ſhewn.

The readineſs with which the other brother, *Surnaut Sing*, complied with the application of Government, to the extent of his abilities, and the ſervices he has rendered my camp in the article of ſupplies, prompts me to ſecure his independence and property, in my agreement with *Anrood Sing*; and I hope you will approve of my providing againſt any jealouſy of theirs' reaching him after my departure.

The ſituation of affairs at *Poonah*, and the advices communicated in Mr. *Lewis*'s letters, will, I truſt, evince to you the neceſſity of my deſtroying all poſſibility of having my communication cut off, which muſt have happened, had I purſued the more direct route to *Sagur*, by the way of *Gool Gunge*. I have now no doubt of effecting this advantage, either by a treaty of friendſhip with the Rajah *Anrood Sing*, or the diſperſion of his army.

I have the honour to be, &c.
Camp at *Raje Ghur*, (Signed)
Auguſt 24th 1778. *Matt^w Leſlie.*

To Colonel *Leſlie.*

Sir,

Juſt after I had diſpatched my letter of the 26th (duplicate of which is encloſed) I received your two favours of the 2d and 6th inſtant, with the packets encloſed for the Preſidency of *Bombay*, which were immediately forwarded.

I have this day received information, that the Durbar have ſent orders to the Rajahs of *Bundella*, *Coneha*, *Dutty*, and *Chunderry*, to uſe every endeavour to moleſt you on your march, and to avoid, if poſſible, coming to an action; but ſhould they find they are unable to ſtop your progreſs, they are to deny having any authority from this Government for oppoſing you. It is particularly recommended to them to prevent your receiving ſupplies of proviſions.

I alſo now incloſe the original of a letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay* to your addreſs, received this morning; its duplicate ſhall be forwarded in a day or two, or as ſoon as I can get any information of the roads between *Brampore* and *Juneer*.

Poonah, I am, &c.
the 30th July 1778. (Signed) *Wm Lewis.*

Appendix. Nos. 140 & 141.

APPENDIX, Nos. 140, 141, 142, and 143.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 5th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Philip Francis, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.

RECEIVED the following letter from Colonel *Leſlie*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I am favoured with your letter of the 4th ultimo; and it gives me great ſatisfaction you approve of the neceſſity I was under of reducing the port of *Mhow*, and of inviting *Surnait Sing* to join me. I have with the utmoſt caution avoided interfering with the Bundellah Chiefs, either in their private or public diſputes, and I ſhall perſevere in this conduct; but in the inſtance of *Surnaut Sing*, I hope you will think me juſtifiable in requeſting his brother, *Anrood Sing*, to let him peaceably enjoy the eſtate left him by his father, and confirmed by a treaty ſince his death by the Miniſters of the young *Anrood Sing*; and that all animoſity ſhould ceaſe betwixt them, and no jealouſy remain for *Surnaut Sing*'s joining me, which the young Rajah moſt readily agreed to; and the original treaty to be finally determined by their own agents. In fact, this is not near ſo much as they offered him not to join the Engliſh; but *Surnaut Sing*, wiſhing to be at eaſe, is willing to quit all other pretenſions to enjoy this undiſturbed; and I am induced to hope my interfering ſo far will meet with your approbation, when I aſſure you he has rendered us the moſt ſingular ſervice in our ſupplies, which have hitherto, by his induſtry, been very ample. But I do not believe the Miniſters of *Anrood Sing* mean to have any thing ſettled, as they have evaded ſending the proper perſons to do ſo for many days; nor will they determine what route I am to take, and give me ſupply, until the rain and rivers will give me leave to chuſe for myſelf, when I ſhall moſt certainly purſue my route, according to your orders.

I informed you in my letter of the 24th ultimo, of the proſpect I had of accommodating matters with *Anrood Sing*; but on the 29th the rains fell very heavy, and continued to do ſo all the 30th and 31ſt, which ſwelled the river exceedingly, and put a ſtop to *Hiera Loll*, the perſon *Anrood Sing* was to ſend me to determine finally my route and ſupply.

On the evening of the 31ſt, I received intelligence that *Pudham Sing*, who was ſtationed at *Gool Gunge*, had quitted that place with the greateſt part of his forces, and had placed himſelf betwixt me and *Chatterpore*, with a view to ſtop my ſupplies, which he ſo far ſucceeded in, as to carry off three or four hundred oxen load; and threatened *Chatterpore* with pillage, if they admitted any ſupply being ſent me. On this information, I ordered Captain *Popham*, with his battalion and guns, with the Candahar horſe, to march immediately towards *Gool Gunje*, to endeavour to drive *Pudham Sing* from his poſt, and recover the proviſion. He marched on the 1ſt inſtant; on the evening of which day he had intelligence of *Pudham Sing*'s ſituation, and the next morning early he marched towards him. It was one o'clock on the 2d before he could come up: on his approach *Pudham Sing*'s troops got under arms: Captain *Popham*'s grenadiers being advanced, and the Candahar horſe on their flanks, the Bundellahs began a briſk fire on them; but the grenadiers advancing, with a few vollies drove them, which gave an opportunity to the Candahars to fall in amongſt them, and totally routed them, purſuing them near three coſs to *Gool Gunje*, where they retreated to, and near, to which Captain *Popham* encamped. This ſervice was performed with the very inconſiderable loſs of one Sepoy killed and three wounded, one Candahar horſeman killed and ſix wounded; nor was there a cannon ſhot fired, as the guns were not up. On the 3d, one of Captain *Popham*'s officers, Lieutenant *Tiſdall*, going too near the fort, was ſhot through the ancle with a muſket ball; and on this night *Pudham Sing* abandoned the fort, and is gone toward *Punchumnagar*, to join *Ballajee*.

The river has roſe again very conſiderably, which evinces a heavy fall of rain to the weſtward.

My detachment is healthy; and the very moment the rains will admit, I ſhall continue my route.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

Camp at *Raje Ghur*, September 4th 1778. (Signed) *Matth*w *Leſlie*.

No. 141.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following letter from Colonel *Leſlie*, dated 7th September:

Sir,

Nothing has happened ſince the 4th but an inceſſant fall of rain, and *Anrood Sing*'s people uſing every diligence to prevent my croſſing the river, notwithſtanding *Hiera Loll* ſays, in a letter to me, he is impatient till he can ſee me.

I have this day received a letter from *Moodajee Boſſa*, a copy of which I tranſmit you, which will beſt explain his ſentiments, as he has requeſted I would communicate them. It gives me ſatisfaction to find he is pleaſed at your ſending an embaſſy to him, as I ſuppoſe he has got rid of the jealouſy a report of troops marching by *Cattack* had given him.

I have received alſo a letter from *Lollah Judd Roy*, from *Houſhengabad*, with repeated offers of friendſhip, and expreſſing his anxiety for my coming up.

I have a letter alſo from the Nabob of *Bopal*, expreſſive of his friendſhip and aſſiſtance. The rains he ſays are very heavy, and roads bad; *Beneram* has not got near that country yet, as I expected, but I expect every hour to hear from him.

I have received letters alſo from *Ballajee* and *Gungadar*, expreſſive of their ſatisfaction at the evacuation of *Kalpy*, and declarations of friendſhip towards us; yet I wiſh this circumſtance had not taken place, until I had got out of *Ballajee*'s territory, as our retaining it a little would have kept him in awe, but he will now ſuppoſe we are ſoliciting his friendſhip, and he will plume himſelf upon the condeſcenſion, and be retrograde.

Ballagee has paid no attention to the demand of the Vakeels of *Ragoba* for five lacks, which the Tuncaw expreſsly ſays, is for the uſe of the Engliſh army under my command, but to be paid to them on their receipt: he deſires they would come to him and confer on the ſubject, but gives not the leaſt hint of payment or refuſal. He ſays in his letter to me, he has wrote to his maſter, informing him of all circumſtances, and will ever be obedient to his will. I do not believe he means *Regoba*.

The inceſſant fall of very heavy rain has prevented this letter being ſent laſt night, and has poured down in torrents all this day, and gives me an opportunity of tranſmitting to you copies of the friendly engagements given me by *Goman* and *Coman Sing*, and mine on account of the Company at their requeſt, which I hope will meet with your approbation, and evince how much I have endeavoured to eſtabliſh a confidence in theſe Chiefs towards us, by every conciliatory means in my power, and baniſhing that jealouſy impreſſed on them by *Ballajee* and others: ſtill his influence makes *Anrood Sing*'s Miniſters averſe to us; but I have the moſt ſolemn aſſurances his Vakeel will be with me to-morrow, and I doubt not of reconciling them to my further march.

I have juſt received an account that twelve hundred (inſtead of three hundred) Maratta cavalry had advanced near to *Gool Gunge*, and did not go away with *Puddum Sing*, but ſtill remain: Captain *Popham* has taken a look at them and their ſituation, and will watch them narrowly; ſo that I cannot place the leaſt ſhare of dependance on that ſubtle fellow, *Ballajee*, who is I am confident

fident lying by, urging every difficulty to be thrown in my way, until time gives him an opportunity of diſtreſſing me effectually himſelf. But the inſtant the weather and rivers will permit, I will put him to the teſt.

I am, Sir,

Camp, *Raje Ghur*, September 7th 1778. Your moſt obedient and faithful humble ſervant,

(Signed) *Matw Leſlie.*

Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire.

Enclosures in Colonel *Leſlie*'s Letter of the 7th of September 1778; received the 1ſt October.

No. 1.

Copy of an Engagement on the part of Maha Rajah *Gomaun Sing* and Rajah *Comaun Sing*, as follows:

We have entered into a firm and ſteady friendſhip with the Sirkar of the Engliſh company, through the channel of the Nabob *Shumſh ul Dowla Mobarez ul Moulk*, Colonel *Matthew Leſlie* Bahadre (to wit) We will ever continue ſteady and unſhaken in friendſhip and attachment to the Engliſh Company, and will never conſider ourſelves as in any manner diſtinct from them. We will regard the friends of the Engliſh Company's Sirkar as our friends, and their enemies as our enemies; and whenever the Engliſh Company's Government requires our aſſiſtance, we will certainly afford it. We have therefore written and delivered theſe few lines in the nature of a treaty and engagement, to which we have affixed our ſeal and ſignature to be made uſe of as occaſion requires. Written the 26th of Rujjub 1192, Hegira, and the 20th year of the reign, or 19th Auguſt 1778.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *P. Hay*, Perſian Tranſlator.

No. 2.

Copy of an Engagement on the part of *Shunuſh ul Dowlah Mobarez ul Moulk*, Colonel *Matthew Leſlie*, Bahadre *Sabut Jung*, as follows:

In conſequence of the engagement which Maha Rajah *Gomaun Sing* and Rajah *Comaun Sing* have executed to the Company and delivered to me, I, in the name of the Engliſh Company, have alſo executed and delivered an engagement, that whilſt the ſaid Maha Rajah is the friend of the Engliſh Company's Sirkar, we are likewiſe their friend, at all times and on all occaſions; nor will give any interruption to the country of the ſaid Maha Rajah: we deſire nothing more than friendſhip and union; and God grant that this friendſhip and union may continue to the end of time. I have therefore written and delivered theſe few lines, to which I have affixed my ſeal and ſignature, in the nature of a treaty and engagement to be employed as occaſion requires. Written the 20th Rejjub 1192 Hegira, in the 20th year of the reign, or 13th Auguſt 1778.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *P. Hay*, Perſian Tranſlator.

No. 142.

Mr. *Francis*—I know with certainty that the detachment was ſtill at *Rajegur* on the 9th September, and I believe we are not in poſſeſſion of any information of a later date. Colonel *Leſlie* has now been at *Chattepore* or in the neighbourhood of that place ſince the 3d July. I think the delay is very extraordinary, and the cauſes of it ought to be inquired into. It appears further by his private letter to the Governor General of the 7th, that he has entered into certain engagements on the Company's account with the Rajahs *Gomaun* and *Comaun Sing*; and it appears by his letter to the Board of the 4th September, that he intends to interfere ſo far between the two brothers, *Amrood* and *Surnaut Sing*, as to obtain a ſecurity for the latter for the peaceable enjoyment of the eſtate left him by his father. As Colonel *Leſlie* had no authority from the Board to enter into treaties with the Princes of the *Bundlecund* country; and as he is reſtricted by his inſtructions from engaging the Company or himſelf in any negociations with them, I think that this part of his conduct ſhould alſo be inquired into. The public ſervice may be materially affected, and poſſibly the object of the expedition under his command totally defeated, while he delays his march apparently for no other purpoſe but to carry on negociations, and to make treaties with the Princes of the country.

There is another point which I think deſerves the attention of the Board, though it is not regularly before us. A difference has ariſen between Colonel *Leſlie* and Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard* the ſecond in command, in conſequence of which the latter has demanded a court martial. The Board cannot but be ſenſible of the dangerous conſequences of ſuch a difference being ſuffered to continue between theſe officers; I muſt beg leave to ſubmit my opinion to the Board, that the occaſion of it ſhould be inquired into, and our determination given thereupon as ſpeedily as poſſible.

Governor General—It is not without great reluctance that I have ſuffered another member of the Board to take the lead in a point in which I think myſelf the moſt intereſted, both on the public account and my own. I ſhall not oppoſe Mr. *Francis*'s motion for an inquiry; on the contrary, I ſhould myſelf have been the firſt to propoſe it, if I had thought the materials with which we are at preſent furniſhed, had brought the ſubject to that ſtate of maturity which a meaſure of that kind demanded. It is not only true that Colonel *Leſlie* had no authority from the Board to enter into treaties with the Princes of *Bundlecund*; but the whole of his conduct in this inſtance appears to be in direct oppoſition to the expreſs orders of the Board. I have formerly hazarded many conjectures to account for the political conduct of Colonel *Leſlie*, and have waited with the moſt anxious impatience for ſuch an explanation of it, as ſhould verify my ſuppoſitions; but to this hour I am equally uninformed with the Board, of the cauſes and particulars of Colonel *Leſlie*'s negociations. I have laid before the Board his letter to me above recorded, becauſe I could not conſider it in its nature as private, and the Board had a right to my communication of the treaty concluded by Colonel *Leſlie* with two of the Chiefs of *Bundlecund*, eſpecially as they are yet unacquainted with it by any letter from him. The irregularity with which the diſpatches have been received, and the evident miſcarriages which have attended ſome of them, induce me to believe that he has not been deficient in tranſmitting to the Board the regular advices of ſo important a tranſaction. Although it has not yet been received, the treaty itſelf which has been formed with *Gomaun* and *Comaun Sing*, appears to be of little conſequence. He has given the Board reaſon to expect that it would have been ſoon followed by a treaty with *Surnaut Sing*, the elder brother and competitor of the Rajah of *Bundlecund*. I for my own part wiſh to be in poſſeſſion of this treaty, which I muſt ſuppoſe will be accompanied with his reaſons at large for taking a part in the domeſtic contentions of that Government, and ſuſpending the courſe of his march for the purpoſe, as it appears, of involving this Government in future engagements, which he was expreſsly, and in thoſe terms warned to avoid. On the 9th September, the lateſt period of my advices from the detachment more than four months had elapſed from the commencement of its march. It had advanced 120 miles, and I fear at an expence of 12,00,000 rupees; and in this interval Colonel *Leſlie* has been informed of a war declared between *France* and *Great Britain*, and been urged by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to quicken his progreſs for the preſervation of the Company's poſſeſſions on that ſide of *India*, from the effects of a very formidable invaſion, which they were inſtructed by authority to expect. The importance of

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the various objects which are connected with the operations of the detachment, its distance, and the ambiguous appearances of the circumstances which have hitherto attended it, and have retarded, or seem to have retarded its progress, have furnished grounds for a variety of rumours and suggestions, which for the credit of Colonel *Leslie* he himself ought to use every endeavour to efface, which it will be the duty of this Government to scrutinize, and which for my own reputation more especially I most earnestly wish to bring to the most effectual test. For these reasons I shall not oppose the present motion, nor any other to which it must necessarily lead, if it shall be resolved to act upon it immediately: yet I must own I have many objections to a measure of such importance too precipitately undertaken; and my objections arise from an experience which I believe no member of this Board possesses in an equal degree. I shall not mention the instances, but I must express it as my opinion that this Government will hazard too much in the prosecution of an officer of such high rank, attended with a circumstance of his removal from a command of such great and public importance as that which Colonel *Leslie* holds. The world seldom look beyond the surface of affairs; even men of business are often prevented from entering deeper into them, and unless the proofs of misconduct are established beyond a possibility of a doubt, the charge may be resented here as a common cause, and at home be converted to the reproach of Government itself. I shall here leave the question without any further decision upon it. With respect to the difference that has arisen between Colonel *Leslie* and Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*, the next officer in command, I have received the particulars of it in a letter from Colonel *Goddard*, dated 9th September, in which he mentions that he had written a letter to the Commander in Chief, of which and its enclosures he has sent me copies. As these contain all the circumstances of the dispute, and were expressly written to the General for the information of the Board, through the regular and official channel, and his original letter to the General has by some accident miscarried, I shall here lay them before the Board, and sincerely wish that the explanation of Colonel *Leslie*'s general conduct may prove as satisfactory to the Board as it will in this trivial instance, from the perusal of the papers now delivered.

Ordered, That the letters from Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard* be referred to the public department.

Mr. *Francis*—I yield to any delay which the Governor General may think necessary, and not inconsistent with the public safety.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree to the inquiry being postponed until the Governor General has received the necessary papers from Colonel *Leslie*.

Agreed, That this subject lie for consideration.

No. 143.

Read the following letter from Mr. *Farquhar*:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I enclose a duplicate of my last letter; and it is now with the deepest sorrow and affliction that I am to inform you of the death of Mr. *Elliott*. From the time I wrote you on the 9th there was no room for hope, and last night he expired, after a severe and painful illness.

On the 8th instant he desired that your orders and instructions to him should be sealed up immediately after his death, which has already been done in the presence of Mr. *Anderson*. We are under the necessity of proceeding immediately to *Savangur*, from which place I shall again have the honour of addressing you in a few days.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

On the Banks of a Nullah, 2 cos to the eastward of *Surangur*, 13th September 1778.

(Signed) *Robt Farquhar.*

Governor General—The loss which this Government has sustained, and which I most sensibly regret in the death of Mr. *Elliott*, renders it necessary for me to propose the appointment of a person to succeed to the commission entrusted to him. I do therefore formally move, that a person be immediately appointed to repair to the Court of the Rajah of *Berar*, and furnished with the same instructions as were delivered to Mr. *Elliott*, for concluding a treaty with that Government.

Mr. *Wheler*—The same objections which were started by Mr. *Francis*, and acceded to by myself, still remain in force against the commission intrusted to the late Mr. *Elliott*; but as that measure was adopted by a majority of the Board; and as they alone are responsible for the consequences, I shall not now object to the negociation being carried on.

Mr. *Francis*—I adhere to my original objections to the measure. I think they are greatly strengthened by the consideration of the time that will have been lost by the unfortunate event of Mr. *Elliott*'s death, as well as by the loss of that gentleman in whose personal qualifications the confidence of this Government was particularly reposed. I am therefore against the continuance of the commission: at all events I am of opinion that it cannot be safely intrusted to any other person with the same discretional powers which were given to Mr. *Elliott*.

Resolved, That the commission entrusted to Mr. *Elliott* be continued.

Governor General—The absence of Mr. *Barwell*, with whose concurrence and advice the original commission was recommended, induces me to decline the further prosecution of this subject until I can receive the benefit of his opinion and aid on the further measures which may be necessary for the execution of it; I shall therefore suspend for a day such propositions as may be necessary; and in the mean time I shall prepare to bring in a complete form before the Board.

Warren Hastings,
Richard Barwell,
Edward Wheler.

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, the 7th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Governor General, President.

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Esquires.

MR. *Barwell*—I agree to the resolutions of the Board on the propriety of this Government taking some measures on the conduct of Colonel *Leslie*, and to the suspension of the subject, provided it do not continue for an indefinite time.

Governor General—Having more thoroughly considered the subject of the commission lately given to Mr. *Elliott*, and the late season of the year, from which I very much apprehend that any renewal of it would be attended with many difficulties, and a great degree of uncertainty, I now request the permission of the Board to withdraw the motion made by me at the last consultation, for the appointment of a person to succeed Mr. *Elliott* as Minister to the Court of the Rajah of *Berar*; I cannot immediately offer any other expedient to the Board. The news of Mr. *Elliott*'s death must have reached *Naguepore* within little more than a week after that unhappy event. It cannot have escaped the attention of *Moodajee Boosla*, that both his interest and ours, so far as they were connected with the design of that negociation, must suffer materially from the delay which

will be occaſioned by the appointment of a new commiſſion; and this conſideration will probably have ſuggeſted to him the neceſſity of preventing it, by making immediate and ſpecific propoſals to this Government. His letters contain proofs of a deſire, and even a degree of impatience to enter upon the buſineſs which was to be propoſed to him by Mr. *Elliott*; and I can ſee the ſtrongeſt reaſons which ſhould induce him to ſolicit our alliance. As a proof that this is not a merely ſpeculative concluſion, I beg leave to inſert in this place an extract from his laſt letter.

" The deputation of Mr. *Elliott*, to conſult with me, " and negociate certain points, is highly proper and " expedient, and I now wait his arrival. As Rajah *Ram* " *Pundit* is well acquainted with the ſtrict ties of friend- " ſhip and union between us, he has, doubtleſs, agreeable " *to your* deſire, ſecured the French Chief, ſhould he have " come that way; yet I have in conſequence of your " wiſh, ſent him expreſs orders to that effect, directing " him to make ſtrict ſearch throughout the diſtrict under " his charge, for him and his followers, and having appre- " hended, to ſend them with their papers to you, which " he will without doubt comply with."

For theſe reaſons, and becauſe there is always a greater advantage in receiving ſolicitations than in making advances, I wiſh to wait for the receipt of his letters before we form any decided plan for our future tranſactions with him. The ſubſtance and complexion of theſe may ſuggeſt the beſt means of accompliſhing the ends propoſed by the late deputation; and I have the greater reaſon to hope they may, becauſe from the information and inſtructions which I have formerly given to *Benaram Pundit*, the Rajah's Vakeel, who is lately returned to his maſter, and was ſent back for the purpoſe of aſſiſting in the intended negociation, he will be able in a great meaſure to ſupply the place of an immediate agent from this Government, and to ſuggeſt to the Rajah ſuch propoſitions to be made to us for our alliance, as will be moſt likely to receive our concurrence. In the mean time I think it will be ſufficient to write a ſhort letter to the Rajah, mentioning the misfortune which has put a ſtop to the negociation, and deſiring only for the preſent he will afford his aſſiſtance in promoting the march of the detachment to the place of its deſtination.

Mr. *Wheler*—If the letter is not meant to include any thing further than a deſire to forward the march of the detachment, in caſe it ſhould hereafter be expedient for it to continue its route I have no objection to the motion.

Mr. *Francis*—Having oppoſed the original motion, I can have no objection to its being withdrawn. The objects of Mr. *Elliott*'s negociation were ſuppoſed to be of ſo inſtant and preſſing a nature that he was authorized to come to an immediate concluſion with *Moodajee Booſla*, without waiting for further orders from this Board. If the nature of theſe objects be not ſince altered, the delay which has already happened, and the further delay which is now propoſed, muſt annihilate the whole plan of the commiſſion upon its own principles. I am therefore againſt any intimation being given to the Rajah, that ſuch plan will ever be renewed; I am againſt deſiring his aſſiſtance in promoting the march of the troops to the place of their deſtination, becauſe it is my opinion that the detachment ſhould be immediately ordered into the provinces. They cannot be of uſe in carrying into execution any object of an alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, ſince that alliance, whatever were the objects of it, is now put off *ſine die*; they cannot be of uſe in promoting the views of the Council of *Bombay* for the reinſtatement of *Ragoba*, becauſe we have intelligence that his party is completely overſet; and I believe every member of this Board is convinced, as well as myſelf, that the Bombay Council have really relinquiſhed all views of that nature, though they have not told us ſo themſelves, as it was their duty to have done. The march of the detachment cannot, as I conceive, be of any ſervice in any other ſenſe. Suppoſe, for example, againſt the French, for that I think is the only poſſible caſe that remains to be put; they have taken above four months to march from *Calpee* to their preſent ſituation, that is about 120 miles, and we have yet no certain intelligence that Colonel *Leſlie* was making any effectual preparations to croſs the *Cain* river. At this rate of marching, I ſubmit it to the Board to conſider in what poſſible time the detachment is ever likely to arrive at *Bombay*, excluſive of any check or delay to which they may be expoſed by direct oppoſition on the part of an enemy. I have a right by fair computation to conclude that they would not arrive this twelvemonth. In the mean time the Board will conſider to what accidents they are liable in the courſe of ſuch a march, and how very poſſible it is that this part of our force may be equally loſt in every quarter to the defence of the Company's different poſſeſſions. I do not mean to make it a formal motion, becauſe I will not trouble the Board with uſeleſs debates; but I am glad to acquit myſelf of what I think is eſſentially my duty in ſtating my opinion that the detachment ſhould be recalled, and this ſhould be done even upon the new grounds which new and unexpected events have created: if, nevertheleſs, it ſhould be determined to proceed, I muſt remind the Board that the detachment is actually under orders to halt in *Berar*, and that we muſt now determine poſitively whether its future motions are to be regulated by the orders of the Council at *Bombay*, or by ours. It is a point, as I think, of very great conſideration, not to place the commanding officer between two authorities.

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Mr. *Barwell*—I agree entirely to the propoſitions made by the Governor General; and though I think it very poſſible that the untimely death of Mr. *Elliott* may deprive this Government of thoſe great advantages I expected from his abilities, and the plenitude of the powers with which he was entruſted, yet I cannot upon the principle of that policy that regulated my aſſent to the political meaſures planned by the Governor General, think with Mr. *Francis*, that becauſe I deſpair of reaping every advantage, I ſhould loſe ſight of thoſe few, which, under the preſent circumſtances, we may ſtill graſp. The Maratta power, and that of the *Decan*, require to be counterpoiſed by an influence in the Engliſh Government, which may operate by means of alliances, ſeparating the powers of which it is compoſed, and uniting a part of their proper ſtrength to ours. The intereſt of the Governments at *Bengal* and *Berar* lead to a natural union between the two States; but as it is not my purpoſe at preſent to enter into a long diſcuſſion of a great political queſtion, I ſhall content myſelf with obſerving, that in prudence we ought to make the beſt of the circumſtances that may preſent themſelves.

Governor General—Mr. *Barwell* has made it unneceſſary for me to anſwer the principal parts of Mr. *Francis*'s defence; my reply will therefore be very ſhort.

The objects of Mr. *Elliott*'s negociation, though inſtant and urgent, are not therefore neceſſarily annihilated; time perhaps may decide this point between us.

The march of the detachment is not unneceſſary, becauſe the alliance is put off *ſine die*. The reaſon for this concluſion not having been aſſigned, nor being ſelf-apparent, cannot be anſwered by other reaſons.

It is true that we have every reaſon to believe that the Preſidency of *Bombay* have really relinquiſhed all views to the reinſtatement of *Ragoba*; but the reſtoration of *Ragoba* was never the object of this Government, though it might have eventually proved a means. My reliance is placed on *Moodajee*, and on the ſtrong connection of his intereſt with ours, in the event of any operations of our detachment.

It is not fair to draw concluſions of future events from paſt errors, and the ſuppoſition of their being ſuffered ſtill to prevail. The march of the detachment from *Calpee* to

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to *Rajegur* might have been made with eaſe in ten days. I hope the meaſures which the Board will take for the future conduct of the detachment, will effectually prevent ſuch delays in the progreſs of it.

On the whole, whether the detachment ſhall be required to act in the proſecution of any engagements with *Moodajee*, or for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, or in direct oppoſition to the French, or even ſhould it be found neceſſary or expedient to recall it at a future period, ſtill the preſent continuance of its march is proper, until the criſis ſhall arrive that ſhall call upon us to make our option of its ultimate deſtination: its ſituation in *Berar* will be central to all our ſettlements in *India*; it will be a check on the Poonah Government, if it only meditates deſigns againſt us; it will be at hand to oppoſe them, if they ſhall be actually formed: and that ſuch deſigns are formed, I am morally certain.

The intimation given by Mr. *Francis* of the preſent ſituation impoſed on the detachment, is an incroachment on a new queſtion not before the Board. So much of the time of this Board is waſted in debate, that I am obliged to procraſtinate many ſubjects, which I have wiſhed to bring before its immediate conſideration, and which have required immediate determination, becauſe the hour of buſineſs was paſt. There now remains to reſolve what orders ſhall be given to Colonel *Leſlie* for the future march of the detachment, and what information or inſtructions ſhall be written to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*. For the firſt, I think it will be neceſſary to order Colonel *Leſlie* to proſecute his march, in conjunction with the troops of *Moodajee Booſla*, if that Chief ſhall agree to join him with a force ſufficient for that end; and to obey all orders which he ſhall receive hereafter from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* for the detachment to proceed; with a diſcretionary power to ſuſpend his march after his arrival within the territories of the Rajah of *Berar*, if the Rajah ſhall refuſe or decline to afford his aſſiſtance, and he ſhall not have received any orders from the Preſidency of *Bombay* to proceed. And for the latter, to inform them of the preceding reſolutions; to deſire them, that if the plan which they adviſed us in their laſt letter of the 25th *July* ſtill ſubſiſts, or if they ſhall have formed any other plan or deſign for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, under the conditions already preſcribed for our aſſent thereto, which ſhall require the aſſiſtance of the detachment commanded by Colonel *Leſlie*; or if the neceſſity of providing for the immediate ſafety of their Preſidency againſt a French invaſion, ſhall require the detachment to proceed at all hazards to their aſſiſtance, even without the junction of any power in alliance with us; they will, in either of ſuch caſes, and ſuch only, command the detachment to advance, but in all others leave it to act under our orders. Theſe are the outlines and ſubſtance of the reſolutions which I think neceſſary for concluding the buſineſs now before us; and I beg leave to ſubmit them in this looſe manner to the conſideration of the Board, that if they ſhall meet their approbation, they may be reduced into a more correct form as the reſolutions of the Board.

Ordered, That the Governor General's propoſition be ſent round for the opinions of the Members of the Board.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
Edward Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 145.

Letter from Governor General to *Modajee Bhooſila*; written 11th October.

A FEW days ſince I received advices of the death of Mr. *Elliott* on his way to *Naigpore*. This unfortunate event, which is equally a loſs to you and to myſelf, as he would have been the inſtrument of cementing a friendſhip between your Government and the Company, which would have endured for ever, has unavoidably, and to my great concern, put a ſtop to the negociations which that gentleman was to have conducted with you on the part of this Government, as the preſent ſituation of affairs will not admit of a delay which muſt attend the deputing another perſon from hence: but I have ſtill a reſource for effecting the important objects of Mr. *Elliott*'s miſſion in your favourable diſpoſition towards the Company; your conviction that your intereſt and theirs are inſeparably connected; and in the zeal of *Beneram Pundit*, whom during the long period he reſided with me, I found ſo deſerving of my confidence, from his ſincere attachment to our common intereſts, that I communicated to him my ſentiments and views with reſpect to the engagement I wiſhed to form with you in the moſt full and explicit manner; he will explain to you both the conditions which I ſhould require, and thoſe to which I ſhould yield my acquieſcence: to him therefore I refer you, and requeſt that you will give him a very attentive hearing. You will perceive that it is not my intention or wiſh to gain advantages without a return: I know that no public alliance, no private friendſhip can ſubſiſt without reciprocal and equal advantages. It is on theſe principles that I have long planned an alliance with you, and the time is now come for its accompliſhment; for I conceive it to be equally for your intereſt as for ours, our countries bordering on each other, and our natural enemies the ſame. Such being my views, I have the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of your ready concurrence in my deſigns; from you I want nothing but the junction of your powers with the ſtrength of this Government; each is ſingly conſiderable, but united they will be augmented to a tenfold proportion. The detachment intended for *Bombay* has been impeded in its progreſs, not by the oppoſition of an enemy, but by other cauſes unneceſſary, and perhaps improper to mention; but it will now ſoon arrive in your territories, and depend on you for its ſubſequent operations. It is my deſire, that you will order a ſtrong force to join it, and accompany it to the place of its deſtination. I have given orders to the commander of the detachment to co-operate with the forces which you may think proper to unite with his: I require the aſſiſtance of the forces of your Sirkar for promoting the ends of mine, and offer you the forces of this Government to promote your wiſhes: I have acquainted you with mine; and it will reſt with you to propoſe the ends which may be attained for your advantage in this junction: I myſelf have ſuggeſted in converſation to *Beneram Pundit* the probable advantages which I have ſuppoſed you would require, and I could grant; and the knowledge of my ſentiments will therefore enable you to form ſuch a concluſion as ſhall be equal in its effects to a treaty already agreed on.

It is the character of my nation to adhere inviolably to its engagements, as long as faith is obſerved by others; and it has been the invariable rule of my conduct to maintain that character in all acts depending on me; and having on good and judicious grounds once formed any deſign of importance, to perſevere in it ſteadily to its execution.

Having thus explained to you my views and wiſhes, I wait only to know yours, and on the knowledge of theſe I ſhall form my ultimate reſolutions.

To *Dewagur Pundit*. D°.

A few days ſince, &c. (the ſame as the foregoing as far as) " the preſent ſituation of affairs will not admit of the delay which muſt attend the deputing another perſon from hence:" But I have ſtill a reſource in your wiſdom, your favourable diſpoſition towards the Company, your approved attachment to the Houſe of *Bhooſila*, and your conviction that your maſter's intereſts and thoſe of the Company are inſeparably connected, for effecting the important objects of Mr. *Elliott*'s miſſion. *Beneram Pundit*

is

is fully acquainted with all my ſentiments and views, and will explain to you both the conditions which I require from the Maha Rajah, and thoſe to which I can yield my acquieſcence: to him therefore I requeſt you will give an attentive hearing; and that you will jointly with him clearly ſtate them to your maſter, and employ your influence to procure them a favourable reception.

You will perceive that it is not my intention, &c. (continued to the end the ſame as the foregoing letter, except where the different rank and ſituation of the perſon addreſſed requires a change in the expreſſion.)

APPENDIX, Nos. 146 and 147.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 12th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Philip Francis, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.

MR. *Wheler* gives in the following minute, containing his ſentiments on the propoſals offered to the conſideration of the Board by the Governor General at the laſt meeting.

Fort William, the 10th October 1778.

Mr. *Wheler*—When the firſt propoſals were made by the Governor General, for ſupporting the Government at *Bombay* in their interference in the diviſions of the Maratta State, they were uniformly oppoſed by me, becauſe I thought the Bombay Government unable from their reſources either of men or money to ſupport the alliance; becauſe I doubted the ſtrength of *Ragoba*, and his friends; and becauſe I thought the time peculiarly improper for diſtant expeditions, and new ſchemes of alliance and conqueſt, when the nation was already involved in great difficulties from a domeſtic, and under immediate apprehenſions of a foreign war; and with reſpect to one great argument uſed, that it was neceſſary we ſhould interfere in the Maratta diſputes becauſe the French were ſuppoſed to have made alliances with them (though the fact was not ſupported by authority) I thought that ſuch interference in us was more likely to force the Marattas into terms with the French, from the neceſſity of the contending parties oppoſing one European ally to another, from finding that we are determined, although againſt ſubſiſting treaties, to interfere.

From theſe motives I judged, that in good policy we ought to leave the Marattas to ſettle their own diſputes, to endeavour to cure rather than foment their jealouſy of our former interference, and to preſerve our reſources, both of troops and money, for the defence of our own already too extenſive poſſeſſions, againſt our more natural enemies.

But theſe reaſons and arguments were then over-ruled; and it being reſolved by the majority of the Board to aſſiſt *Ragoba*, and to ſupply *Bombay* both with men and money, Colonel *Leſlie*, the object of the preſent diſcuſſion, was ordered to march thither; to this meaſure I likewiſe moſt particularly objected, ſtating the enormous expence, the riſque of parting with ſo large a proportion of our beſt troops, and the length, the dangers, if not the impracticability of the march; yet I was again overruled, a detachment in conſequence was ordered on the moſt expenſive eſtabliſhment ever yet formed, and directed to proceed by a route hitherto unknown and unpaſſed by our troops.

Such being the reſolutions of many months ago, I will now take a view of the effects produced by them. At *Bombay*, *Ragoba*'s affairs, notwithſtanding ſome unforeſeen revolutions in his favour, are not one jot advanced; on the contrary, our laſt advices prove to us, that his hopes are entirely at an end, his friends impriſoned, his party diſperſed, and even the Governor General himſelf has formally given up his cauſe by his propoſal to ſupport the pretenſions of *Moodajee Booſla*, and by his anſwer to the letter to *Fort St. George*, under date the 14th of Auguſt. Appendix. Nos. 146 & 147.

The progreſs of Colonel *Leſlie*'s detachment has equally juſtified my former opinions; the Governor General in his minute of the 5th of October, having acquainted the Board, that from the lateſt period of his advices from the detachment, although more than four months had elapſed from the commencement of its march, it had advanced only 120 miles, and the Governor General fears at an expence of 12,00,000 rupees; that the commanding officer had been informed of a war declared between *France* and *Great Britain*, and been urged by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to quicken his progreſs for the preſervation of the Company's poſſeſſions on that ſide of *India*, from the effects of a very formidable invaſion, which they were inſtructed by authority to expect; nevertheleſs, our laſt public advices leave him on the banks of a rapid river, oppoſed by and in actual hoſtility with a large army of the natives, through whoſe country he is to paſs, having yet near a thouſand miles to proceed to *Bombay*: I would therefore wiſh to be informed, how the detachment is to ſubſiſt on the reſt of their march, which will be after they have paſſed the *Cane* river, at leaſt for a conſiderable diſtance, through an enemy's country, before they enter *Berar*; whether there is not ſome danger of their being ſurrounded, and their proviſion cut off, or whether the country through which they are to paſs can ſupply proviſions for ſo large a detachment; whether the roads are paſſable, or how the detachment is to croſs the *Nerbudda*, ſince they have met with ſuch difficulties at the *Cane* river; how they are to be ſupplied with money, ſtores, and ammunition, after they ſhall have expended what they have at preſent; how diſpatches and orders are to reach them; and what aſſurances we have that *Moodajee Booſla* will receive them as friends, or join them as allies, or give them a paſſage through his country?

I am likewiſe at a loſs to diſcover, ſuppoſing the detachment to arrive in *Berar*, and ſuppoſing them to meet with every favourable reception, and that their object is to proceed to *Bombay*, how the Governor General can *ſeriouſly believe* that Colonel *Leſlie* will effect a long march acroſs the hoſtile part of the Maratta territory, and in the face of their numerous armies, ſo expeditiouſly as to afford any relief to *Bombay*, if that place ſhall actually require it, in conſequence of the invaders that threaten them.

Until theſe queſtions are reſolved to my ſatisfaction, I muſt and ſhall continue uniformly againſt the march of the detachment, and againſt any treaty or alliance to be made in conſequence, ſeeing no poſſible good that can ariſe from either, but foreſeeing dangers, difficulties, diſappointments, and enormous expences from their further attempt to proceed.

(Signed) *Edward Wheler.*

Mr. *Francis* delivers his opinion, in the following minute:

12th October 1778.

Mr. *Francis*—Having already objected to the further march of the detachment, and having ſtated my opinion that it ought to be recalled, I might have been content with voting againſt the preſent motion, if other and more particular objections to the meaſures did not, as I think, ariſe out of the motion itſelf.

1ſt. The march of the army has now no fixed and determinate object, if it ever had any; nor indeed, as far as I can diſcover, has it any object at all. It is not poſitively to act in conjunction with *Moodajee Booſla* upon the plan of Mr. *Elliott*'s negociation, ſince that negociation, with the alliance and ſubſequent projects propoſed to be accompliſhed by it, is relinquiſhed.

It is not poſitively to co-operate in the reinſtatement of *Ragoba*, ſince caſes are put, in which it muſt either

Appendix. Nos. 146 & 147.

halt in *Berar*, (with or without the conſent of the Rajah) until further orders from *Calcutta*, or proceed at all hazards to *Bombay* "for the immediate defence of that Preſidency "againſt a French invaſion."

Laſtly, it is not even poſitively determined that it ſhall proceed to *Bombay*, ſince in the two other ſuppoſed caſes its march may either end in *Berar*, or be directed to operations unconnected with the immediate defence of *Bombay* againſt a French invaſion. As the future movements of the army are to depend on different contingencies, and as the inſtructions to the commanding officer muſt of conſequence be conditional (to ſay nothing of the perplexity in which ſuch inſtructions may involve him) it appears plainly that this Board has no one determinate object in view in ordering the detachment to proceed: if the contrary be true, I deſire that ſuch object may be ſtated in clear and preciſe terms.

2. If this were not, as I deem it, an objection fatal to the meaſure, and admitting that there might be no danger in leaving the courſe of an army to be determined by future contingencies, in a point ſo eſſential as the ultimate object of its operations; ſtill the ſuppoſed caſes which are eventually to guide the motions of the army, ought to be ſuch as may probably happen, not ſuch as we certainly know neither do nor can poſſibly have any exiſtence. How is it poſſible, for example, that *Moodajee Booſla*'s troops ſhould now act in conjunction with Colonel *Leſlie*, who in the firſt caſe is ſuppoſed to act under orders from *Bombay*, when the plan of alliance, which alone could have engaged *Moodajee Booſla* to take ſuch a ſtep is dropped? or what motive can he now have for acting in conjunction with Colonel *Leſlie*, when by the terms of the motion the march of the detachment can in no ſhape promote his perſonal advantage? He has no concern in defending *Bombay* againſt an invaſion; much leſs is it his intereſt to aſſiſt in reinſtating *Ragoba*, whom he muſt conſider as his rival and competitor for the government. Such at leaſt was the principle on which Mr. *Elliott*'s negociation was planned and founded; if it be falſe, the whole ſcheme of that negociation, with all the facts and reaſonings introduced to ſupport it, falls to the ground.—Again, it is ſuppoſed that the Bombay Council may have adhered to their firſt project for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, and may be actually engaged in the execution of this project, or of ſome other of the ſame nature, and for the ſame purpoſe; and on this ſuppoſition conditional orders are given to Colonel *Leſlie*. This part of the motion I ſay implies a falſe fact, and which the Governor General himſelf in ſome of his former minutes admits to be ſo. It is well known that *Ragoba*'s party is annihilated, and that the gentlemen of *Bombay* have dropped all thoughts of executing the plan of which they adviſed us in their letter of the 25th July, or of engaging any farther in ſimilar deſigns. But if the contrary were true, with what reaſon or conſiſtency could *we* reſume the cauſe of *Ragoba*, whom we have renounced in the moſt formal manner, and whom above two months ago, we looked upon as abandoned by the partizans of his own nation. In our letter of the 14th of Auguſt we even forbid the Preſidency of *Fort St. George* from taking any meaſures in concert with *Hyder Ally* for the ſupport of *Ragoba*, and declared, "that an attempt to reinſtate "him in the Government of the Maratta dominions "might be attended with endleſs difficulties." Yet now Colonel *Leſlie* is to be ordered to co-operate in promoting the ſucceſs of ſuch an attempt.

The third ſuppoſition, on which conditional orders are given to Colonel *Leſlie*, though not amounting to an abſolute impoſſibility, implies a fact as nearly approaching to impoſſible as the higheſt degree of improbability can do. The neceſſity of providing *for the immediate ſafety of Bombay* againſt a French invaſion, is ſtated as one of the caſes which eventually determine the march of the army. We are now at the 12th of October; where Colonel *Leſlie* may be when our letters reach him is very uncertain, I will ſuppoſe him however to have croſſed the *Cane* river, and to have reached *Panna*: has the diſtance from that place to *Bombay* been computed? Is the road known? Have allowances been made for the difficulties as well as the length of the march? Is it certain that he will not meet with conſtant hoſtilities and oppoſition from the Marattas? Or have we forgotten that he has already taken four months to march one hundred and twenty miles, through a country much better known than that through which the remainder of his march is to be proſecuted? When all theſe circumſtances are combined, and even a moderate allowance made for the delay which they muſt unavoidably create, is there a ſhadow of probability left that the detachment will reach *Bombay* time enough to provide for its immediate ſafety againſt a French invaſion, ſuppoſing ſuch invaſion to be attempted? But if there be no ſuch probability, we plainly reſt our meaſures upon falſe grounds, and by implication endeavour to juſtify the further march of the army, by profeſſing to have in view an object which, we know, or on every rational principle ought to believe is unattainable.

On failure of all the preceding ſuppoſitions a fourth conditional inſtruction is propoſed, that if *Moodajee Booſla* ſhould refuſe to join Colonel *Leſlie*, and if Colonel *Leſlie* ſhould not have received any orders from the Preſidency of *Bombay* to proceed, he ſhall in that caſe halt in *Berar*; but it is neither determined what he is to do there, or whether he is to ſtay there againſt *Moodajee Booſla*'s conſent. It is not very likely that this Chief will be content to ſuffer a foreign army to continue long in the heart of his dominions; but whether he be or not, Colonel *Leſlie*, in the caſe ſuppoſed, muſt ſtay there at all events, and perhaps be obliged to maintain his ground by force, and to enter into hoſtilities with the very Prince whoſe alliance we have lately ſolicited, and whoſe pacific diſpoſition to us I deem to be eſſentially neceſſary to the preſervation of the detachment.

Colonel *Leſlie*'s ſituation in *Berar* I admit will be nearly central with reſpect to the three Preſidencies; that is, he will be in the centre of *Hindoſtan*, and at ſuch a diſtance from all of them as to make it impoſſible that the force under his command ſhould be of the leaſt ſervice to any of them.

It is out of my power, for want of time, to put theſe obſervations in a more regular form. I ſtate them as they occur to me. The Governor General, in whoſe hands the abſolute diſpoſition of all meaſures is now veſted will conſider not only the conſequences of the meaſure itſelf, but the appearance which it is likely to carry in *England*; and whether it be not probable that the Court of Directors, having in their view all the events that have happened ſince the detachment was firſt ordered, its manifeſt departure from the direct and open route to the other ſide of *India*, the circuitous and ſlow proceeding of the army, the inſtructions now intended, and the various reaſonings which have been recorded at this Board upon the whole tranſaction, may not conclude that it never was really and ſeriouſly intended that the detachment ſhould go to *Bombay?*

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Governor General—I hope it will not be expected from me to reply to all the objections contained in the preceding minutes, by the unprepared reflections that may occur upon them at this Board, and under an anxiety of mind which I confeſs I feel, and which I wiſh to ſhake off before I enter into the cuſtomary field of debate. I am weary of verbal contention. I feel for the ſituation of the public, and I feel too much for my own, to be ſolicitous about any concluſions that may be formed upon my conduct in the paſt meaſures of this Government, which have been ſo ſeverely canvaſſed by the preſent members of this Board. If there are in *England* men ſo devoid of common ſenſe as to ſuppoſe it poſſible for me to have formed a plan oſtenſively profeſſed for the aſſiſtance of *Bombay*, but really meant as a

cover for other deſigns, let them: whoever they be, of in whatever relation they may ſtand to this Government, ſuch opinions will give me no kind of concern.

It has been the will of God to blaſt my deſigns by means which no human prudence could have foreſeen, and againſt which I had therefore provided no reſource. We were called upon by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to aſſiſt them in a plan which both their peace and future proſperity, the Company's orders, and the general intereſts of the Britiſh nation in *India*, combined to recommend. It came further juſtified to us by the evident facility of its execution, and our aſſiſtance was only required to ſupport it, and render its future conſequence permanent. I was not privy to their deſign; it came as new to me as to the other members of the Board. I inſtantly propoſed, and the Board agreed, to give our ſanction to the plan, and our aſſiſtance to its execution. A large ſupply of money (10 lacks of rupees) was immediately remitted to them, and this was ſhortly after followed by an order for forming a large military force to march to their aſſiſtance. There was no other way of ſending this force but that which I recommended; neither would the ſeaſon of the year admit of their being tranſported by ſea; and the ill treatment to which our Sepoys have been invariably expoſed, whenever they have been conveyed from this Preſidency by ſhipping, will render that mode of tranſportation impracticable, until time ſhall have effaced the memory and tradition of thoſe injuries. There remained therefore no other way, but to ſend the detachment by land. I knew it to be practicable, and I knew the officer whom I recommended for the conduct of the expedition eminently qualified to accompliſh it.

Had I had occaſion to recur to the detail of this undertaking, at a period ſomething diſtant from this, I ſhould have had a pleaſure in joining Mr. *Barwell*'s name with my own, in mentioning the formation of the meaſure; and ſhould have been contented with that ſeparate ſhare of credit only, which was due to me from it. I am leſs ſcrupulous now on this point, as I ſee nothing left to either but a dangerous reſponſibility, which is become the more ſo from the ſyſtem which ſeems to have been lately adopted in *England*, of condemning every public act, which would be imputed to us. Having taken ſo decided a part in ſupport of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, nothing remained for us but to leave it to operate; the reſt depended on the Preſidency of *Bombay*: they have done nothing: they attempted nothing. The influence alone of our meaſures produced the revolution which had been projected with the Preſidency of *Bombay*; but they had no part in it, nor appear to have availed themſelves, or to have wiſhed to avail themſelves, either of the ſucceſſive revolutions, or of the continued anarchy which have ſince prevailed in the Maratta State. The ſupineneſs on their part, and perhaps the ſlow movement of the detachment, have afforded time to the opponents of *Ragoba* to recover their loſt authority, and utterly to deſtroy the influence of thoſe, on whom the Preſidency of *Bombay* had placed their hopes of his reſtoration. Their power, it is true, ſtill continues as weak and divided in itſelf, as it was at the time in which the firſt ſuggeſtion was made to us to aſſiſt in its ſubverſion, but without an inſtrument left for that Preſidency to employ, and without any inclination in it to ſeek for any.

Thus embarked in a ſcene of difficulties, which were rendered ſuch only by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and into which we were drawn by their urgent ſolicitation, and thus abandoned by them after all that we had done for their relief, we laid hold of the reſource which next preſented itſelf, in the diſpoſition which the Chief of *Berar* had ſhewed, not only to co-operate with us, but to make our cauſe his own, by uniting his intereſts with it. Mr. *Elliott* was therefore deputed to his Court, with inſtructions to form a treaty with him, both for a plan of immediate operations in conjunction with him, and for a future and permanent alliance. Here I ſhall cloſe the narrative. Colonel *Leſlie*, the officer whom I had ſelected from the reſt of the army, in the fulleſt confidence both in his military ſkill, integrity, and perſonal attachment, that he would moſt effectually accompliſh the deſigns which had been committed to his charge, has been lingering with the detachment, I know not why, within the diſtance of 120 miles from the place where it was formed, and is perhaps to this hour no further advanced. This is the fifth month of his campaign; a period within which I had formed the hope that he would have reached the place of his ultimate deſtination, and in which I affirm that he might have reached it. He has had no enemy to impede him; for the very few troops who have ſtood in his way were confeſſedly inferior to his army in numbers, and have been routed and diſperſed whenever he approached them. The weather could be no impediment, ſince every inconvenience which the troops could have ſuffered from it in motion and in the field, muſt have been doubly felt by them in their encampments; and the little ſtreams, denominated rivers, which have interſected their route, have, as I believe it will appear even from Colonel *Leſlie*'s own letters, and as I know to be fact, been fordable even in the greateſt height of the rains, ſubſiding as ſuddenly as the torrents ruſhing from the mountains have ſwelled them. It could not have been the want of proviſions that detained them, for that would have been moſt ſeverely felt while the troops were confined to one ſpot, and the enemy at leiſure to ſurround and cut off their ſupplies; beſides that I know, and it is within the compaſs of every member of this Board to obtain the ſame knowledge from inquiry, that *Chatterpore* and its neighbourhood, to which the detachment had been ſo long fixed, draw all their ordinary ſupplies of proviſions from the diſtricts of *Benares* on one hand, and from the country of *Sauger*, which lies in the line of march, on the other; yet they have thus long remained in that unfavourable ſituation, and have not wanted ſubſiſtence. Here my deſign therefore has moſt unexpectedly failed; and Mr. *Elliott*, on whoſe uncommon abilities and fidelity I had placed my greateſt aſſurance of ſucceſs, has been unfortunately cut off by death, before he could accompliſh the journey which was neceſſary for his executing the commiſſion aſſigned him.

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Under theſe concurring misfortunes, I by no means admit that we are deprived of all reſource: on the contrary, I have the ſtrongeſt conviction ſtill remaining, that, under a proper conduct, the effects of the detachment will ſtill anſwer my moſt ſanguine hopes; and as for its ſafety, I would with pleaſure pledge my life for it.

If it was neceſſary to ſtrengthen the Preſidency of *Bombay* when the firſt idea of it was ſuggeſted, it is much more ſo now, when we had been told by the higheſt authority, that a powerful armament has been prepared in *France*, the firſt object of which was an attack upon *Bombay*; and when we know with moral certainty, that all the powers of the adjacent continent are ready to join the invaſion. The ſtrength of *Berar*, which not long ſince ſhewed itſelf ſuperior to the whole force of the Maratta Government, in the time of its greateſt proſperity, and reduced the city of *Poonah* to aſhes, is ſurely able to execute any deſign made in conjunction with ſo formidable a body of diſciplined troops as that of which our detachment conſiſts. Whether the Rajah will chuſe to engage in any ſuch deſign, muſt ſoon be known by his declarations of the receipt of the intelligence of Mr. *Elliott*'s death: in the mean time, nothing is precipitated by the reſolutions which I have recommended to the Board; it is only propoſed that the army ſhall proceed to the country of a friend, and from that ſtation either proſecute the original deſign of marching to the aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, or ſhould it then become neceſſary (of which I have no idea) to return, it may return by a ſafer and nearer route, than by retracing that which it hath already paſſed.

I ſhall

Appendix. Nos. 146 & 147.

I ſhall finiſh theſe reflections by complaining of the uncandid advantage which has been taken of the ſituation into which I have been thrown by the miſconduct of others, and particularly of Colonel *Leſlie*. At one time I am called upon to reſent the total ſuſpenſion of the operations he was ordered to perform, and to remedy the effects of his diſobedience; and at another, this ſuſpenſion, and the effects of his diſobedience, are quoted as proofs of the radical defects of the meaſure, confeſſedly defeated by his management of it. I know not what to gather from this oppoſition of ſentiment. Do the members of the Board judge him culpable in the little progreſs he has made, or do they attribute it to natural and inevitable cauſes? On this point I ſhall wait for an explanation, before I proceed to the diſagreeable duty which ſeemed to be laid on me in this day's meeting, by the concurrent ſentiments and wiſhes which were expreſſed at the laſt. As to the propoſitions themſelves, which I ſuppoſe to be the objects of theſe minutes, though dictated without premeditation, I have ſince given them all the attention they can require, and I now give my entire aſſent to them.

Mr. *Francis*—Much might be ſaid in anſwer to the preceding minute; but this is not the time for it. I only deſire it to be underſtood that propoſitions or arguments, not immediately controverted, are not therefore meant to be admitted. In general I may obſerve, that the plea of ill fortune will hardly be allowed in the extent in which it is employed, unleſs it can be proved that the events which have defeated the meaſure were ſuch as no human prudence could foreſee, and againſt which no reſource could have been provided. The validity of ſuch a plea may be examined hereafter. The Court of Directors, I am perſuaded, will find no inconſiſtency in the various opinions which I have delivered on this ſubject. I have no ground of judging of the wiſdom of meaſures in the formation of which I am not conſulted, or of the motives of ſuch meaſures, or of the execution of them, but the facts as they ariſe in ſucceſſion before me. It is far from impoſſible, that an unwiſe plan may be executed without judgment or activity. Both may be true. I have executed my duty at every ſtage of the tranſaction; firſt, by objecting to the meaſure on its own profeſſed principles, and afterwards by conſtantly obſerving and giving my opinion to the Board of the execution of it. With reſpect to the mode of ſending aſſiſtance to *Bombay*, ſuppoſing the meaſure neceſſary, the only courſe which in my opinion, and in that of the gentlemen of *Bombay* themſelves, would have been adviſable, is not ſtated by the Governor General. On this point I muſt refer the Board to our conſultation of the 29th June laſt.

But waving all conſiderations of the ſteps already taken, the queſtion before us is, what reſolution ſhall we take in the preſent circumſtances? Is Colonel *Leſlie*, after ſuch repeated condemnation of his conduct, to be continued in the command of this important expedition? I did underſtand that ſome propoſitions on this ſubject would ere now have come before us from the Governor General himſelf? Is the preſent motion to be decided by the votes of the members preſent? Mr. *Barwell*'s abſence need not have prevented his giving his opinion; and I muſt deſire that the queſtion may ſtill be left open for him, becauſe I will not take upon myſelf to interrupt any connected ſyſtem of meaſures by a temporary vote, until I can be aſſured that the principle on which ſuch vote ſhall paſs, will be adhered to. For the ſame reaſon I do not propoſe the recall of Colonel *Leſlie*.

Admitting it to be neceſſary to ſtrengthen *Bombay* againſt an invaſion, it remains ſtill to be proved by fair argument (ſupported by a clear ſtate of the march which it is intended the detachment ſhall purſue, with a reaſonable allowance for the difficulties they may meet with) that the detachment will probably arrive in time at *Bombay* to anſwer the end propoſed. No ſuch proof has yet been offered to the Board. In my opinion a much more ſafe and even expeditious method of reinforcing *Bombay* may be purſued. The enterprize againſt *Pondicherry*, if not now decided, muſt aſſuredly have failed or ſucceeded before letters from hence can reach *Madras*. A detachment from General *Munro*'s army might be ſent to *Bombay*. This is the courſe which the Preſidency of *Bombay* themſelves recommended to us as *the beſt and eaſieſt*. If ſuch a detachment muſt be replaced, the force now ſtationed in the Circars might move down towards *Madras*, and that force, if neceſſary, be replaced from hence. I throw this plan out for conſideration, becauſe it ſeems to me ſimple and eaſy of execution. I do not affirm that it may not be liable to ſome objections, but I do firmly believe that much greater will occur to any other mode of ſending a reinforcement to *Bombay*.

Governor General—I did not examine the mode recommended by the Preſidency of *Bombay* for granting them aſſiſtance, becauſe I did not think it deſerved ſo much conſideration; but as it has been propoſed by a member of the Board, it becomes me to allow it a greater degree of weight; yet I muſt beg leave to obſerve, that it is liable to every objection, and in a greater degree than has been urged againſt the preſent expedition. The diſtance from *Culpee* to *Bombay*, meaſured in a right line on the map, is exactly equal to that of *Pondicherry* from *Bombay*; but there is this difference in the two routes, the former muſt be traced along the coaſt to the ſouth, and round the country to *Anjengo*, and from thence, either by a dangerous navigation along the Malabar coaſt, or continued by land through the dominions of *Hyder Ally Khan*, the moſt powerful of all the ſovereign Chiefs of *India*; whereas the road from *Culpee* deviates but little from the right line: without purſuing this argument I ſhall refer to the map for the truth of my aſſertion, that with ſuperior difficulties the former would exceed the latter in length by one third of the diſtance, beſides the march of a body of troops from *Bengal* to replace thoſe detached from the *Carnatic*. I muſt further obſerve, that this Government cannot command the forces of the *Carnatic*; we made a trial of our influence, in default of authority, to attain this very point, and we have failed to accompliſh it; it is therefore wrong to impute to this Government a neglect of the means which it cannot command. I do not ſuppoſe that on a deliberate reflection it would be recommended by any body of men who ſhould ſucceed to the adminiſtration of the affairs of this Government, and ſhall find another plan in train which promiſed at leaſt equal ſucceſs, and which ought to be deſperate before it were abandoned for the choice of another.

When I ſpoke of my own diſappointments, and the misfortunes which attended the meaſures hitherto taken for the aſſiſtance of *Bombay*, I affixed a very different ſenſe to thoſe words from that which ſeems implied in the repetition of them by Mr. *Francis*. The detachment is at this time as capable of effecting the ends of its formation, and the meaſure itſelf is in my opinion as adviſable now, and more ſo, than when it was firſt adopted; it has met with no real misfortune, I regret only that it has not already attained the ends which it is ſtill equally capable of accompliſhing.

I ſhall now return to ſuch parts of Mr. *Francis*'s minute as regard the queſtions immediately before us. Mr. *Francis* ſays, "Is Colonel *Leſlie*, after ſuch repeated "condemnation of his conduct, to be continued in the "command of this important detachment?" I anſwer, No, if it be the opinion of the Board that he has adopted a train of meaſures, which in their conſequences muſt obviouſly tend to defeat the deſign of the expedition. I obſerved in my laſt minute, that I came prepared to give my ſentiments upon this ſubject, urged to it by the repeated calls of the Board, and by the belief that every member of it had before joined in the condemnation of Colonel *Leſlie*'s conduct, but that I heſitated to execute it, becauſe I thought I ſaw in the minutes which were

brought

brought to the Board by the members preſent, opinions which neceſſarily inferred an acquittal of his conduct; and I deſired them to declare, whether they judged him culpable in the little progreſs he had made, or whether they attributed it to natural and inevitable cauſes. Mr. *Francis* has replied to this queſtion, though not in direct terms by thoſe of the queſtion which I have above quoted. I will conclude that Mr. *Wheler*'s ſentiments alſo remain unchanged: and on theſe grounds I move, That the opinions of this Board be taken, whether Colonel *Leſlie* ſhall be continued in the command of the detachment from the 1ſt brigade, or ſhall he be removed from it? Though prepared to give my immediate vote upon this queſtion, yet I have no objection to leave it in ſuſpenſe until that of Mr. *Barwell* can be taken upon it, and the reſolution of the Board be; as I believe it will prove, unanimous.

For the reaſons properly urged by Mr. *Francis*, I alſo agree, that the queſtions propoſed by me at the laſt meeting of the Council, ſhall in like manner remain ſuſpended until Mr. *Barwell* ſhall have given his opinion upon them: indeed I think this neceſſary in point of regularity, as I recollect, that Mr. *Barwell* expreſſed himſelf prepared at that time to deliver his opinion upon them, although it was afterwards agreed, that the members of the Board ſhould deliver their minutes in writing, and his only remains to be received.

Mr. *Francis*—Colonel *Leſlie* is not at *Calpee*, nor is it now in his choice to proceed by the uſual route from thence to *Bombay*: it would certainly have been the eaſieſt, at leaſt it would have been the moſt direct: I hear there are letters from camp as late as the 17th of laſt month, and that he was ſtill at *Rajegur*. Whatever our influence or authority over the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* may be, I cannot conceive it poſſible that they would refuſe to concur in a plan for the defence of *Bombay*, when ſuch plan is propoſed to be effected without any diminution of their own force; but it is in vain reaſoning on a caſe which does not exiſt. To the queſtion now propoſed, I have no difficulty in ſaying that if a propoſition had been made by the Governor General for Colonel *Leſlie*'s removal, I ſhould have agreed to it, becauſe; waving my opinion of the ſervice committed to him, I deem it morally impoſſible that his march from *Calpee* to his preſent ſtation could have taken up the time it has done, if his attention had not been fixed on other objects, equally incompatible with our expreſs orders, and with the proſecution of his march. He has aſſumed a power with which the Legiſlature has not thought fit to intruſt the Preſidencies of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay*, and from the exerciſe of which he was particularly reſtricted by our inſtructions: after this declaration, I preſume it cannot be a doubt, whether I think Colonel *Leſlie* culpable or not: it is certainly my opinion, that he ought to be recalled; but unleſs it concurs with that of the Governor General, I will never conſent to its deciding the reſolution of the Board: my reaſons for this caution are ſufficiently obvious, but as we are likely to be unanimous on the queſtion, it is unneceſſary to enter into them.

Governor General—This caution I think unneceſſary on the preſent occaſion. I have given ſufficient indications of the part which I ſhould take in the queſtion before the Board; but I will put it beyond a doubt, by declaring it formally to be my opinion, that Colonel *Leſlie* ought to be recalled.

Mr. *Francis*—I agree with the Governor General.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree with the Governor General and Mr. *Francis*, that Colonel *Leſlie* be recalled.

Reſolved, That Colonel *Leſlie* be recalled from the command of the detachment made from the 1ſt brigade, and that he be ordered to deliver over the command of the ſaid detachment to the next ſenior officer.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd *Barwell*,
Edwd *Wheler*.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 15th October 1778. Appendix. No. 147.

Preſent; the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.

Mr. *Barwell* delivers in his opinion as follows, on the Governor General's propoſitions of the 7th inſtant.

Mr. *Barwell*—I will not prolong a debate in a degree cloſed, by commenting on the arguments offered in ſupport of the opinions of the different members; I was prepared to have approved the propoſitions from the chair at the inſtant they were dictated, ſatisfied of the juſtneſs of the political principle on which the meaſure for giving effectual aid to *Bombay*, and ſecurity to our poſſeſſions, was reſolved. Men ſee through different mediums, or may act on ſyſtem. I apprehend in either caſe it is waſte of words to attempt to reaſon them out of their opinions, and while we endeavour at conviction, we frequently do no more than offer occaſion to perplex and confound the ſimpleſt propoſition, and controverſy is endleſs.

I agree with the Governor General, and think Colonel *Leſlie* culpable in the little progreſs he has made.

I agree to the recall of Colonel *Leſlie*, and to give the command of the detachment to Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*.

(Signed) *Rich*^{d} *Barwell*.

No. 147.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to Colonel *Leſlie*, and diſpatched by this night's poſt:

To Colonel *Leſlie*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 4th September; and the Governor General has laid before us your letter to him of the 7th of the ſame month, encloſing copy of the treaty which you have entered into, in the name of the Company, with the Rajahs *Gomaun* and *Comaun Sing*. And we are informed that there are private letters received, dated the 16th and 17th of the ſame month, which mention the detachment being then at *Raje Ghur*.

In the firſt place, we think it proper to diſavow the treaty which you have taken upon yourſelf to conclude with thoſe Rajahs, and to declare it invalid.

We conſider your attempt to pledge the name of the Company to this engagement, and your interference in the domeſtic diſſentions of the Rajah of *Bundlecund* and his brother, as acts committed in direct violation of our poſitive orders, by which you were forbidden, "to involve this Government in future engagements under "any pretext whatſoever, or to ſuffer yourſelf to be diverted from the proſecution of your march by any new "object, except for the ſafety or ſubſiſtence of your "troops indiſpenſably requiring it."

If you have concluded any treaty with the Rajah of *Bundlecund*, or with his brother *Surnaut Sing*, or entered into any engagements with either, contrary to the tenor of thoſe inſtructions, we hereby alſo declare ſuch treaty and ſuch engagements to be invalid.

We have ſeen with equal ſurpriſe and concern four months and an half elapſe in effecting the march from *Kalpy* to *Raje Ghur*, a diſtance of only 120 miles; in a period which, for any reaſons with which we are acquainted to the contrary, appears ſufficient to have conducted the detachment to its ultimate deſtination.

We deemed the ſervice which you were appointed to execute of ſo urgent a nature, that we directed you to commence your march at the moſt unfavourable ſeaſon of the year. You have been informed from authority,

Appendix. No. 148.

of the danger which threatened *Bombay* from a formidable French armament, equipped in the port *Toulon* for the invaſion of that iſland, and you were in conſequence of ſuch advice earneſtly required to expedite your march; yet you have remained in a ſtate of inactivity, which is to us inexplicable on the grounds either of neceſſity or expediency.

It will afford us great ſatisfaction if you ſhall be able to juſtify this conduct, which under the preſent appearances we can as little reconcile to your duty, and the clear line which you had to purſue for the ſucceſs of the enterprize committed to your charge, as to the poſitive rules and precautions which we had laid down in our inſtructions for your guidance.

But as you have engaged yourſelf in a line of politics, which obviouſly tend to defeat the important object of the expedition, we cannot, conſiſtently with our primary duty to the Company, and the ſafety of their intereſts, ſuffer you to continue longer in a command which you have given us ſuch ſtrong cauſe to apprehend will be perverted from the ends to which it was beſtowed upon you.

We therefore command you immediately on the receipt of this letter, to deliver over the charge of the detachment to Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*, or to the officer who ſhall then be next to you in command thereof, and to repair with all convenient expedition, and by ſuch route as you ſhall judge moſt practicable to the Preſidency of *Fort William*.

You will take the firſt regiment of cavalry for your ſafe conduct into theſe provinces; and as ſoon as you have entered them or arrived within the frontier of the dominions of the Nabob of *Oude*, you will adviſe us thereof, and direct the commanding officer of that regiment to halt until he receives orders for his future deſtination, either from the Board or from the Commander in Chief.

We are, &c. &c.

Fort William,
the 15th October 1778.

Reſolved, That Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard* be immediately written to as follows:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*.

Sir,

Having thought it proper to recall Colonel *Leſlie* from the command of the detachment which was made from the firſt brigade, for the ſupport and aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, we have ordered him to deliver charge of the ſaid command immediately to you, and himſelf to repair to *Fort William*, taking with him the firſt regiment of cavalry for his ſafe conduct.

We hereby direct, that you forthwith take charge of the command of the forces from Colonel *Leſlie*, excepting the above corps of cavalry; and we inveſt you with the powers and authority formerly delegated to him for that purpoſe.

We encloſe for your guidance in this command, copies of the inſtructions originally delivered to Colonel *Leſlie*, and of ſuch further orders tranſmitted to him as ſtill remain in force. Theſe are ſo ample and ſo clear, that we have only to enjoin you to adhere to them ſtrictly, as far as they may be conſiſtent with our preſent and future orders, and to effect without loſs of time ſuch parts of them as yet remain unaccompliſhed.

We further direct, that you immediately purſue the line of march preſcribed for the detachment into the province of *Berar*; that you give the earlieſt notice of your arrival and progreſs, in the manner directed in your inſtructions, to *Moodajee Booſla*, the Chief of that diſtrict, who is in amity with the Company; that you implicitly obey all ſuch orders as you may hereafter receive from the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, for proceeding to that ſide of *India* without delay; and even before the receipt of ſuch orders, you will proſecute your march towards *Bombay* from *Berar*, if the Rajah *Moodajee Booſla* ſhall agree to join you with a ſufficient body of his troops to enable you, not only to ſtand your ground againſt the Maratta army, but in caſe of need to act offenſively againſt them.

If the Rajah ſhall refuſe or decline to reinforce you with a body of his troops to aſſiſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and you ſhall not have received any orders from that Preſidency ſubſequent to the date hereof, to purſue your march; we leave it to your diſcretion to continue encamped in the province of *Berar*, or to proceed, adviſing us immediately, in the moſt expeditious manner, of this or any other meaſure which you may reſolve upon, of your progreſs, and of every tranſaction which may be material for our information.

We think it neceſſary to direct, that you recall any detachments which may have been made from the main body of your forces; and that you be careful on all occaſions to keep them united.

We authorize you to appoint your own ſtaff officers, only recommending it to your attention not to burthen the eſtabliſhment with any poſts, which may be diſpenſed with, conſiſtently with the duty of the ſervice.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 15th October, 1778.

APPENDIX, N° 148.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 19th October 1778.

PRESENT;

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

READ a letter from Mr. *Leſlie* as follows;

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It is with the deepeſt concern I find myſelf neceſſitated to inform you, that Colonel *Leſlie* was ſeized with a ſevere bilious fever on the 27th of laſt month, which has reduced his ſtrength ſo much, that the ſurgeons have very little expectation of his recovery: The encloſed letter and tranſcripts which I now do myſelf the honour to lay before you, were given to me to prepare for diſpatch the day after the fever ſeized him, and I have been waiting a favourable intermiſſion for the Colonel's ſignature. The opportunity to this moment has not offered; and as it may be ſtill longer before the Colonel may have ſtrength to attend to buſineſs, I have preſumed to forward theſe papers to you, not only that the information appears neceſſary to your ſatisfaction, but that I deem it my duty in the office I now hold as his ſecretary, to tranſmit them to you, and hope therefore to be indulged with your approbation.

I am, &c.

Camp, *Rage Ghur*, 2d October 1778. (Signed) *Matt*[w] *Leſlie*, Sec[y].

Read the letter encloſed in the foregoing, as follows;

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In my letter of the 25th, I informed you of my ſituation to that period, and that of the 30th July would acquaint you of my ſituation and proſpects to that time, which were very flattering to my ſpeedy moving forward, but in this I was deceived. The demands of *Goman* and *Coman Sing* for their ſervices in ſupplies were ſo exorbitant, they could not be complied with. They demanded from *Surnet Sing* and *Anrood Sing* a conſiderable territory, ſuppoſed wreſted from them by their father *Hindooput*;

Hindooſtut: from me, my return to *Jeetpoor*, and diſpoſſeſs *Gudd Sing* of that fortreſs for their uſe, as it was formerly taken from them by *Gudd Sing*'s father. This threw a difficulty on my getting ſupplies, as they had all the power to the north and eaſt, and knowing their own influence (and overtures at this time made them by *Anrood Sing* and *Ballajee*) they created a number of difficulties to raiſe their own conſequence.

The inceſſant rains which fell during this month, had ſwelled the Nullas ſo much that they were not paſſable, and the roads were ſo broken and ſloughy, it was impoſſible for carriages to travel, nor could I perſuade the Banjarrahs to follow me (if I could have got ſufficient grain) till the rains ſubſided. From this period till near the middle of Auguſt, I laboured inceſſantly to induce *Goman* and *Coman Sing* to join with *Surnet Sing* in procuring me the neceſſary ſupplies, and I had the greateſt aſſurances from them it ſhould be ſo; but to my great mortification, when matters came to be adjuſted, I found *Anrood Sing*'s offers had prevailed, and they would engage in nothing without a compliance to the moſt exorbitant demands.

My indifference to treat further with them, or accept any of their propoſals, and my intended march to *Raje Ghur*, had a better effect than any ſoothing I could have given; for I had an immediate application by their Vackeels to come to agreement of friendſhip with me, independent of *Surnet Sing*; which was perfected on my arrival at this place, a copy of which I have tranſmitted to Mr. *Haſtings*.

The conſtant fall of rain for the firſt ten days of Auguſt rendered my moving from *Chatterpore* impracticable, by the route of *Gool Gunge*, had there been no force at *Reje Ghur* and the *Cane*: But as I could not move with ſo large a corps in my rear, without the utmoſt riſque of ſtarving my detachment, I reſolved the very firſt receſs of the rains to march to *Raje Ghur*, in order to remove that ſtrong force of the Bundellahs, either by croſſing the river and proceeding by the route of *Panna*, or by my motion this way make them quit their poſt on the *Cane* to cover *Panna* and *Callinger*, and leave me at liberty to purſue my route by *Gool Gunge* without moleſtation from them. I accordingly marched from *Chatterpore*, on the 15th Auguſt, as my letter of the 16th would inform you, as would my ſubſequent letters to the 24th of that month, of my ſituation down to that time.

The very heavy rains that have fallen down to this period, and the terrible condition of the weſtern roads, made it morally impoſſible for me to move, and the obſtinacy of the Bundellahs on the oppoſite ſhore of the *Cane*, prevented my attempting the paſſage of that river, but amply provided for the ſucceſs of the undertaking; to this end, boats were ſet on the ſtocks by Lieutenant Colonel *Fortnom*, and every preparation was in forwardneſs, when the *Raja Anrood Sing* ſent meſſages to requeſt an explanation, and propoſals of accommodation.

I thought terms of amity would be more conſonant to your deſires, and to the expediting my march than engaging in abſolute hoſtilities, and I acquieſced to the receiving any perſon he would ſend. *Hiera Loll* was accordingly deputed to me, and has at length adjuſted the terms of my march, together with engagements of amity now and hereafter: tranſcripts of thoſe papers I do myſelf the honour to encloſe to you, and I truſt they are ſuch as will meet with your approbation. This Miniſter is to attend my march to the boundaries of the Bundlecund territory; and I ſhall commence my march for *Saguer*, by the rout of *Gool Gunge*, to-morrow.

I have been honoured with your letters of the 31ſt Auguſt and 1ſt September. I am very much concerned that you did not deem my correſpondence with your Board from *Chatterpore* ſufficiently explanatory for the cauſe of my halt there; I requeſt your reference to the ſeveral addreſſes diſpatched to you from thence, and to this period I requeſt your reference to the fluctuating ſtate of the Miniſters and Chiefs at *Poonah*, and our intereſts in that quarter, as communicated to me by the Reſident, and the jealouſies I have been impreſſed with of the diſpoſitions of the ſeveral Chiefs, through which my route of march will be; and I do hope, on a candid conſideration of them, that you will be ſatisfied my halt at *Chatterpore*, and the ſubſequent delay here, has been eſſentially neceſſary to the ſafety of my troops, and that I ſhall be honoured with your approbation of my meaſures. Appendix No. 148.

The encloſed tranſcript of letters from the Vackeel of the Berar Chief (*Benarum Pundit*) will plainly exhibit to you the ſtate of the roads at this period: but had I made the attempt, and had I marched immediately from *Chatterpore* to *Sagur*, I do conceive I ſhould have inevitably hazarded the ſafety of my detachment. The country about *Sagur* does not abound with proviſions; the Chiefs *Goman* and *Coman Sing* were, it is true, neutral at the time, but I doubt much their inclination to have afforded me aid; and I was very certain the Miniſters of *Anrood Sing* would have taken the advantage of my advance from *Chatterpore*, to croſs a body of men, and retake that place, which was the only route by which my ſupplies could be drawn, and they would of courſe be intercepted. The machination of *Ballagee* had produced theſe difficulties; the Bundellahs declare it, and his late behaviour confirms the circumſtances.

What reception I ſhall meet with in his diſtricts I cannot ſay; he had promiſed himſelf the Bundellahs would have been able to fruſtrate my march by *Panna*, and by not coming to terms with me, that they would have co-operated with him in haraſſing my rear, and cutting off my ſupplies by the route of *Gool Gunge*; the treaty of amity with them aboliſhes this plan. My ſupplies and communication with the Vizier's dominions are ſecured, and *Ballajee* will, I hope, of neceſſity to his own intereſt, be induced to fulfil the terms of the treaty entered into with him in the perſon of his brother *Gunga Dur*. I cannot conclude this ſubject without again expreſſing my concern, if I have not been ſo explicit as you wiſhed, and can impute it only to my anxiety not to give your honourable Board any tedious details; when I was at the time affording Mr. *Haſtings* at his own particular deſire a particular journal of occurrences, and to whom I truſted for ſuch explanations as the honourable Board might expreſs a deſire to know, in addition to my addreſſes.

I will be more careful in future, that I do not ſuffer your diſpleaſure in this regard.

Your ſentiments contained in the letter of the 1ſt September, I have peruſed with attention, and will ſtrictly comply with your orders contained therein. I have had no repetition of the application, and I hope I ſhall not.

You may depend on my firmneſs and ſtrict diſcipline to ſuppreſs any revival of the affair, for though I was ſatisfied of the impropriety of it, yet it was my duty, ſituated as I am, and liable to the moſt malicious interpretations of every tranſaction in my camp, to communicate to you the circumſtances of it.

I have the honour to be,
Head Quarters, with the higheſt reſpect,
Raje Ghur, honourable Sir, and Sirs,
September 28th 1778. Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant.

A true tranſcript.
(Signed) *Matthew Leſlie*, Secry.

This letter, although not ſigned by Colonel *Leſlie*, but tranſmitted and atteſted by his ſecretary, and being in the ſame hand in which his letters have been generally written, the Board deem authentic.

Governor General—The pointed reference made by Colonel *Leſlie* to his correſpondence with me, and the perſonal reproach which ſeems to be implied in it, will make it neceſſary for me to lay the whole of his letters before the Board, which were written ſince his arrival at *Chatterpore*. I ſhall requeſt, that the members of the

Board

Appendix. Nos. 149 & 150.

Board will perüse them, and if they appear either to contain the reaſons for his long ſtay at that place, or ſince that time for his halting at *Raje Ghur*, more explicitly detailed than they have been in his letters to the Board, or any facts or circumſtances materially neceſſary for the information of the Board, I ſhall conſent either to their being recorded entire, or ſuch extracts from them only, as ſhall be judged neceſſary: as they may be voluminous I do not propoſe to enter them all; nor ſhould I have thought it either neceſſary or proper to have quoted any part of Colonel *Leſlie*'s private letters to me, unleſs they related to ſuch ſubjects as the Board had a right to know, and ſuch as it would in that caſe have been incumbent on me to have communicated to them. This diſtinction I have always made between official and private correſpondence; and the Board will recollect, that I expreſſed it very particularly on the laſt communication which I made of Colonel *Leſlie*'s letter, which contained the particulars of the treaty with the Rajahs *Gomaun* and *Comaun Sing*.

I am ſorry to inform the Board, that I have ſeen a letter from Captain *Cockerel* to Mr. *Thomas Graham*, dated *Raje Ghur*, the 4th inſtant, which mentions, that at five o'clock on that evening Colonel *Leſlie* departed this life after an illneſs of ſix days.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 149.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 22d October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

READ a letter from Colonel *Goddard* as follows;

Gentlemen,

It is with the deepeſt concern I have to intimate to you the death of Colonel *Leſlie*, who expired this evening at ſix o'clock, after an illneſs of a few days.

The command of this detachment having devolved on me, I ſhall inform myſelf fully of the inſtructions you may have tranſmitted to my predeceſſor, and immediately proceed to execute them with the moſt implicit obſervance and expedition.

I ſhall do myſelf the honour of writing to you more fully in a ſhort time, and at preſent only beg leave to obſerve to you, that as Colonel *Leſlie*, on the day his indiſpoſition firſt attacked him had iſſued an order for the army to prepare for proceeding on their march, I am in hopes to be able to proſecute the expedition without further delay.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp, at *Raje-Ghur*, October 3d, 1778. (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

Governor General.—According to the promiſe which I made at the laſt meeting in the Secret Department, I have brought with me, and now lay before the Board, all the letters which I have received from Colonel *Leſlie* ſince the month of April laſt, excepting one dated 25th July, from which I have already extracted and communicated to the Board ſuch parts as were anywiſe material, for their information, and a reference to them will be ſufficient to ſhew, that no part of the letter recites any account of his public tranſactions. Some of Colonel *Leſlie*'s letters are merely of a private nature; yet I think it neceſſary for my own juſtification to lay the whole before the Board, requeſting that the members will be pleaſed to peruſe them, and to point out any parts that may contain advices which ought to be entered on our proceedings; but if it ſhould be thought proper to record the letters at large, I requeſt that the private ones may be excepted.

I beg leave alſo to remark, that I ſubmit theſe laſt only to the private and confidential knowledge of the Board.

APPENDIX, No. 150.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 2d November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

READ a letter from Colonel *Goddard*, as follows:

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to write to you the 3d inſtant, informing you of the death of Colonel *Leſlie*, and of my expectations to proceed on my march without further delay.

Having taken a few days to receive the neceſſary reports, &c. of the ſtate of the troops, and inform myſelf fully of your intentions relative to the preſent ſervice, I left *Raje Ghur* on the 8th inſtant, and have the pleaſure to inform you, that I arrived at *Choky* this morning, I ſhall proceed to-morrow to *Gool Gunjee*, on the road to *Sagur*, through the territories of *Ballajee*, and hope in a ſhort time to reach the *Nerbuddah* river.

I beg to aſſure you that I ſhall moſt particularly comply with the inſtructions contained in your letter of the 7th July; and I hope by the prompt and ready obedience I ſhall pay to all your commands, to prove myſelf deſerving of any confidence you may think proper to honour me with.

I requeſt further to inform you, that I have been lately favoured with a letter from the honourable Select Committee at *Bombay*, covering a cypher to be uſed in my correſpondence with them; it alſo contained intelligence that *Nannah Furneſs* and *Moodaje Scindia* have detached two principal officers with a conſiderable force from *Poonah*, on the route they expect the army will march. On this ſubject permit me only to obſerve, that the preſent diſtracted ſtate of the Maratta empire, and the diviſions that reign amidſt their councils, gives ſufficient reaſon to ſuppoſe they will not be able to ſpare a body of troops of ſtrength equal to oppoſe the march of this detachment, ſhould the route of *Poonah* be judged neceſſary.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp, at *Choky*, October 11th 1778. (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

The Governor General deſires to record the following abſtract of a letter to him from Colonel *Goddard*:

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Goddard* to the Governor General; dated 11th October 1778.

I have the pleaſure to communicate to you the progreſs the troops continue to make, which I aſſure myſelf will not meet with any future interruption. This morning after performing a march of eight coſs with the greateſt eaſe and alacrity, they reached a place called *Choka*, five coſs to the ſouthward of *Chatterpore*, on the high road to *Sagur*, ſo that I have the ſatisfaction to think I have fairly bid adieu to the regions of *Bundlecund*, at leaſt for the preſent; and to the tempting prize the diviſions and family

family conteſts of its poſſeſſors offer to an invader. I have left them profeſſing amity towards each other, and reſpect and friendſhip to the Engliſh nation, whoſe powers and proweſs they have at leaſt learnt to dread. The whole country now wears a face of tranquil peace, and the army is plentifully ſupplied with every neceſſary for its ſupport and convenience. I ſhall reach *Gool Gunjee* to-morrow morning, as I mentioned before.

APPENDIX, No. 151.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 16th November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Philip Francis, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.

Governor General—It being no longer neceſſary to withhold the inſtructions to the late Mr. *Elliott*, and the ſubſequent minutes reſpecting them, from the conſultations, and it being neceſſary that the conſultations be completed for the approaching diſpatches, I propoſe that they be now ordered to be entered.

Agreed, That Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, and the minutes thereon, be recorded in this place.

APPENDIX, Nos 152 and 153.

Bengal Secret Department, Perſian Correſpondence, 1778.

Letter from *Modajee Bhoſila* to Mr. *Elliott*, 1ſt November 1778.

BY repeated and ſucceſſive letters which I have lately received from the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, I learn that he has deputed you to converſe and negociate with me on many ſecret and important views; and that you will repair with all expedition to *Naigpore*, by the route of *Cuttack*, and will make me acquainted with all matters entruſted to your charge; that it is neceſſary that I regard you as poſſeſſed of complete knowledge of all matters, of his entire confidence, and inveſted with full powers; and conſidering every thing you ſhall ſay as coming immediately from himſelf, jointly with you concert ſuch meaſures as ſhall be for our common advantage; and having agreed on them, tranſmit intelligence thereof to him. Rajah *Ram Pundit*, the Nabob Soubader of *Oriſſa*, has likewiſe repreſented to me that you are arrived in the neighbourhood of *Cuttack*, whither two of your confidential companions arrived ſome time before, and that you will ſhortly join them there.

I hope that by this time you have arrived there, and have begun your journey forward: I have accordingly ſent expreſs orders to *Ram Pundit*, by ſwift Coſſids, to receive you with every right of hoſpitality, to furniſh you with every neceſſary, and to provide you with every convenience for your journey, ſuch as coolies, bearers, palanquins, &c. and to give you whatever eſcort you may deſire, and diſpatch you hither with every poſſible expedition. I have no doubt but the ſaid *Pundit* will literally comply with my directions, and will take every means to give you ſatisfaction, and fulfil your pleaſure. I have ſtationed people from *Naigpore* to *Lamjee*, to *Chataſegur*, which is in *Bimbajee*'s country, at different places, that they may be attentive to your wants in the journey, and ſend me daily intelligence of your progreſs: on your arrival in this neighbourhood, perſons of credit ſhall be ſent to meet you. As the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* has declared you his repreſentative, and deputed you on ſo important a buſineſs, I am entirely deſirous, in every inſtance, of giving you the fulleſt ſatisfaction.

The more expeditiouſly you can travel with convenience to yourſelf, the more pleaſing will it be to me: you will therefore give me daily accounts of your progreſs. I have likewiſe written to *Bimbajee Bhoſila* to protect you againſt the dangers of the journey. Appendix, Nos. 151 & 152.

From *Modajee Bhoſila*: Received 12th November 1778.

I have been favoured with three or four letters from you, by the way of *Benares* and *Cuttack*, on the ſubject of the intimate friendſhip which has been contracted between us; the delivering up of Monſieur *Chevalier* to the cuſtody of Mr. *Elliott*, by my miniſter for *Oriſſa*, Rajah *Ram Pundit*, agreeable to your deſire intimated to him; and intimating, with regard to the affair of *Oadeypore Goſaien*, that as you know nothing of him, I ſhould pay no regard, nor place any reliance on any negociations he propoſed to form; and that I will honour Rajah *Ram Pundit* with my warm favour and regard, in return for the attention which he has paid to your deputation of Mr. *Elliott*, to which you were induced by the warmeſt friendſhip and regard, that he might form a treaty for our mutual benefit, on ſo firm a baſis, that the advantages of it might be reaped by our lateſt poſterity. Theſe letters afforded me the greateſt pleaſure, and contributed to ſtrengthen the ties of connexion already formed.

Rajah *Ram Pundit*'s conduct, in complying with what you wrote him, and delivering up Monſieur *Chevalier*, is perfectly agreeable to the directions I gave him, and highly commendable. Where ſo intimate a connexion ſubſiſts, that the friends and enemies of the one party are equally thoſe of the other, the dictates of friendſhip are to be followed; let others judge of the acts produced thereby as they will. Every degree of regard and attention ſhall be paid to him, and he ſhall meet with the reward of his good conduct. By the bleſſing of God, mine is a powerful State, where every one receives what is due to his merit; but every one cannot be made the confidant of the ſecrets of Government. This being the caſe, how ſhould I have ſuffered the *Goſaien* you allude to, to have interfered in matters of this nature. Be perfectly ſatisfied, that without your advice and approbation I never have permitted, nor will permit any one to have any concern in our affairs.

Poſtſcript.—The capricioufneſs of fortune has lately produced the moſt melancholy event; you will eaſily judge I mean that Mr. *Elliott*, after arriving at *Cuttack*, and getting poſſeſſion of the perſon of Mr. *Chevalier*, and ſetting off from thence for this quarter, and arriving in the neighbourhood of *Sumbulpore*; and writing to me by the Hircarrahs whom I had ſtationed at different routes, to provide them with every conveniency, that he was at that place, and ſhould ſhortly reach *Naigpore*; in conſequence of which I diſpatched *Mahomed Ally*, a truſty perſon, at the head of a ſtrong guard, to meet him, provide him with every thing neceſſary, and protecting him againſt the dangers of the journey, conduct him in ſafety hither; and that before *Mahomed Ally* could reach him, I ſhould receive a letter from Mr. *Farquhar*, one of his company, from *Saranagur*, that being ſeized with a malignant fever, his career had been ſtopped by the angel of death!

The concern and affliction which it gave me, that after coming ſo great a diſtance he ſhould be arreſted by death, without attaining the ends for which he undertook it, exceeds the power of language to deſcribe; and I doubt not but the news of this melancholy event equally affected you; but as there is no remedy againſt theſe unavoidable misfortunes but patience and reſignation, you will ſubmit without murmuring to the will of God.

The magnanimity and firmneſs which are the characteriſtics of exalted minds teach, that no trifling changes of circumſtance, which are in fact no more than trials, ſhould induce the Ruler of a State to relinquiſh a plan formed on mature deliberation; but that he ſhould, in ſpite of ſuch interruptions, be collected in himſelf, and continue ſteadily fixed in the purſuit of his object: ſuch

Appendix. No. 152.

conduct is truly worthy of what great minds alone are capable of. By the bleſſing of God, you, my friend, are endowed with theſe exalted ſentiments.

As the fame of our intimate connexion, the deputation of a confidential agent to form a treaty with me, and the conſtant intercourſe of letters between us, is ſpread throughout *Decan*; and I have received letters from *Pundit Purdhaun* and his Miniſters, and from the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*, deſiring information on this head, and have candidly replied, that the ties of connexion which have ever ſubſiſted between me and the Engliſh, by reaſon of the Bengal tribute, and the vicinity of our territories, are ſo firmly bound that no circumſtance has or ſhall looſe them; and advices of the tranſactions here, both public and private, have doubtleſs been tranſmitted thither from your quarter likewiſe; in a word, as the ſtandard of friendſhip which has been erected for the promotion of our common advantage, and the ruin of our enemies, has been ſeen far and wide, and the view of it has inſpired our friends with ſtrength and confidence, and produced terror and diſmay amongſt our enemies; you will take every means to confirm our friends, by not giving way to an unavailing grief for the loſs of Mr. *Elliott*, but writing immediately to Mr. *Farquhar* to form a treaty on the inſtructions given to Mr. *Elliott*, of which he is acquainted; and having concluded his negociations, whatever may be concluded by our joint deliberations, to tranſmit the particulars thereof to you, and to take no meaſure which may be an hindrance to the eſtabliſhment of a friendſhip between us, on ſo ſolid a baſis as may deſcend to our lateſt poſterity, or otherwiſe ſend ſome other perſon qualified for ſo important a truſt, on the wings of expedition, by the route of *Cuttack*, with directions on no account to be dilatory in his journey, as the buſineſs is of the moſt delicate nature, and the opportunity to perform it in is very ſhort. You need not be reminded of this.

From *Dewagur Pundit*: Received 12th November 1778.

I have been honoured with your four friendly letters with Karetahs for the Maha Rajah my maſter, which afforded me the greateſt pleaſure, as I learn from them your ſteady adherence to your friendſhip for the Maha Rajah, which muſt be productive of mutual benefit, not only at preſent, but to the lateſt time; they alſo cauſed the greateſt ſatisfaction to my maſter, and ſtrengthened thoſe friendly ſentiments he has long entertained towards you. By the bleſſing of God, the baſis of your friendſhip becomes daily more extenſive. The regarding the friends and enemies of either party as common to both, and the delivery of Mr. *Chevalier* to Mr. *Elliott* by Rajah *Ram Pundit*, in conſequence of your deſire intimated to him, are fruits of the moſt intimate friendſhip; and Rajah *Ram Pundit*, for his attention to your pleaſure, is warmly regarded by the Maha Rajah. No one has been, nor will be ſuffered to interfere, in any meaſure, in the negociations and ſecret Communications between you and my maſter, except ſome few who are the confidants of the ſecrets of Government; how then ſhould *Qodapooree Goſaien*, and ſuch like perſons, have any thing to do with them? Of this you may be perfectly ſatisfied.

After Mr. *Elliott* had arrived at *Cuttack*, and had got Mr. *Chevalier* into his hands, and quitting *Cuttack*, advanced as far as *Saranagur*, we received the melancholy news of his deceaſe by a letter from Mr. *Farquhar*; this unfortunate event filled both the Maha Rajah and myſelf with inexpreſſible grief: as there is no remedy in ſuch caſes but patience, it is our duty to ſubmit with reſignation to the decrees of the Almighty. Since the news of Mr. *Elliott*'s approach, and the conſtant intercourſe of letters between the two States has been univerſally acknowledged by all the Chiefs of the *Decan*, and the eſtabliſhment of an intimate connexion between them is known to all ranks of people, to ſuffer Mr. *Elliott*'s death to cauſe a ſuſpenſion in the negociations with which he was entruſted; and to put a ſtop to your mutual deſigns, will bring diſcredit on both States; for to form a deſign and afterwards on a ſmall alteration of circumſtances to relinquiſh it, can neither be advantageous nor honourable to either State. Since you are in welfare, every wiſh may ſtill be accompliſhed: you will therefore write immediately to Mr. *Farquhar*, who accompanied Mr. *Elliott*, to enter on the negociations on the ſame footing as you had inſtructed Mr. *Elliott*, and having concluded a treaty on thoſe grounds, to communicate the ſame to you.

The objects to be attained by this negociation depend on a mutual agreement of ſentiments; you will learn further particulars from the Maha Rajah's letters; what I have written you will regard as dictated by zeal and attachment.

From *Beneram Pundit*: Received 12th November 1778.

I have already addreſſed ſeveral ſucceſſive Arzies to you, which I hope you have received. Agreeable to your directions, I took leave of Colonel *Leſlie*, and reached *Naigpore* on the 22d Thabaun, 14th of September, where I had the honour to caſt myſelf at the feet of my maſter, and the pleaſure of a meeting with *Dewan Dewagur Pundit*.

I had a long converſation with my maſter and his Dewan on the ſubject of your virtues, and your earneſt deſire to enter into the ſtricteſt ties of friendſhip and intimacy with him, on which I dwelt very largely: my maſter expreſſed the greateſt joy, and his heart entertains no ſentiment but of the warmeſt regard towards you, and deſires to cement your friendſhip, the means of which he is conſtantly contriving; may God eſtabliſh this connexion, fraught with happineſs to mankind, on a baſis equally ſtrong as the wall of *Alexander*, that it may remain throughout all future generations: Whilſt we were in expectation of the arrival of Mr. *Elliott*, the inſtability of fortune, which is conſtantly producing ſome change in the face of affairs, brought about an event ſo melancholy as to effect the hearts of all well-wiſhers in the moſt ſenſible manner: May the Almighty preſerve your auſpicious influence over us to the end of time.

The Maha Rajah was greatly grieved at this diſtreſsful circumſtance, and made much lamentation. Your Excellency will be further informed of theſe particulars, by my brother *Biſſemba Pundit*.

The fame of the ſtrict connexion and intimate friendſhip between you and the Maha Rajah has been every where ſpread, and has convinced *Pundit Purdhaun* Peiſhwa and the Nabob *Nizam ul Mulk*, that in contracting ſuch a friendſhip, you have the moſt extenſive views; which apprehenſion has filled them with diſmay; it is therefore expedient, that you labour to confirm this belief, which is fraught with advantages to both States. The Maha Rajah regards the friends and enemies of your Government as his own, and repeatedly is heard to declare, that whoever oppoſes your Circar is his foe, and whoever is loyal to him will promote the welfare of it; of the truth of this, your own diſpoſition will furniſh you with ſufficient proof. As the Chiefs and people of the preſent time are full of ſuſpicion, they make every circumſtance a plea for exciting commotions; thus Coſſids with letters from you to the Maha Rajah are apprehended in the way in the diſtrict of *Purna* by the people of the Rajah of that diſtrict, who murdered them and ſent the letters to *Pundit Purdhaun* Peiſhwa which has excited hoſtile deſigns in them.

The rains being now at an end, and the ſeaſon of action arrived, be pleaſed to return an immediate anſwer to the Maha Rajah's letters, which fully explain all matters, that the opportunity which now preſents itſelf may not be loſt. I have been for ſome time afflicted with a fever occaſioned by the change of climate, but by the bleſſing of God, and your Excellency's, and my maſter's favours, I ſhall ſpeedily recover.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 16th November 1778.

Letter from Colonel *Goddard* to Mr. *Haſtings*.

Sir,

In conſequence of the arrival of *Balajee*'s Vackeel in camp, which I informed you of in my laſt letter, I have the pleaſure to communicate to you my expectation of eſtabliſhing terms of amity with this Maratta Chief, without having recourſe to the force of arms. The ſentiments he has expreſſed are perfectly correſpondent with my preſent inclinations for peace; and the only requeſt he has made is, that I will alter the intended route of paſſing through *Saajur*, which from every information appears to be my direct road; and he will conduct me through his country by another route. The motives he urges for ſoliciting this are ſuch as reaſon and juſtice would in general approve, and ſeems particularly directed by policy at this time, when I am anxious of removing every obſtacle, however ſmall, to the grand object I hold conſtantly in ſight, of reaching *Berar*. He has repreſented to me, that *Saagur* is the capital of his country, and a very flouriſhing city, which will be totally deſerted upon the approach of the army; and as the route he has pointed out to me will not make a difference of more than ſix or ſeven coſs, I have conſented to march by it, as a proof of my friendly intentions of the Engliſh, and their wiſhes to preſerve the country and inhabitants from ruin and violation. I have advanced two days upon this road, and am within three ſhort days march of *Maltoun*, a conſiderable place belonging to *Balajee*, after which I hope ſhortly to be at *Gunge Beſandat*, where I fall in with the road that will lead me towards the Huſſienalad Gaut, upon the *Nerbudda*. It is with pleaſure I now aſſure you of the proſpect I have of moving briſkly forward. I have a fine open country before me, in compariſon to the mountainous broken one I have paſſed; and as the cold ſeaſon is fully ſetting in, the number of ſick in the detachment, which at this change of ſeaſon, as you well know, uſed to be very numerous, will decreaſe daily. By a letter received laſt night from *Madajee*, I underſtand ſome diſpatches are arrived from *Calcutta*, which he has promiſed to forward immediately; and I expect to receive them to-morrow or next day. This circumſtance leads me to imagine, that the Board have been miſinformed reſpecting the ſituation of the detachment, and are of opinion that it is advanced nearer the place of its deſtination than it really is. Allow me to expreſs the extreme anxiety I ſhall feel till I hear from yourſelf. I do not need any incitement to call forth my every exertion on the occaſion this ſervice may preſent me; yet I cannot but anticipate the ſuperior ſatisfaction and ſpirit your letter will infuſe into me. As I am now moving faſt to the ſouthward, it will I think, become neceſſary to eſtabliſh ſome other communication than that by *Benares*, which will be attended with conſiderable delay: I therefore hope you will intimate to me your intentions on this head; and from the intelligence I can obtain, I beg leave to mention it may be eaſily done by *Chuta*, *Naugpore*, and *Rutterpore*, to *Berar*.

I am, &c.

Camp, near *Lemra*, October 22d 1778. (Signed) *Tho' Goddard.*

N° 153.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 16th November 1778.

The following propoſitions from the Governor General, and the draft of a letter to the Captain General at *Goa*, were circulated with the above letters.

Governor General—As it appears from the preceding letters that Colonel *Goddard* was likely to conduct the detachment very ſpeedily to the borders of *Berar*, and that *Moodajee Booſla* was both willing, and propoſed to join his aſſiſtance in its operations, and as the ſeaſon of the year will not admit of longer delays, but require ſpeedy deciſion and action,

The Governor General moves, That Mr. *Farquhar* may be directed to deliver over all the public papers, which were in his charge of the late Mr. *Elliott*, to Colonel *Goddard*, and that Colonel *Goddard* may be directed to carry into execution the inſtructions given to Mr. *Elliott*, and to negociate and conclude a treaty with the Rajah of *Berar*, in like manner, and with the ſame powers as if thoſe inſtructions had been originally given to him in charge. Appendix. No. 153.

That letters be written to the Select Committees of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay*, and to the Reſident at *Poonah*, adviſing them of this commiſſion, and requiring their conformity to it, in the terms of the letters written on the like occaſion, on the appointment of Mr. *Elliott* to the ſame truſt, and by the Governor General to the Rajah of *Berar*, to the ſame effect.

The Governor General alſo recommends, that a letter be written to the Captain General of *Goa*, conformable to the accompanying draft.

The Governor General, ſince writing the above, having received letters from Captain *Campbell* and Lieut. *Anderſon*, which he herewith ſubmits to the peruſal of the Board, mentioning the death of Mr *Farquhar*, the late Mr. *Elliott*'s ſecretary, he recommends that the order propoſed for Mr. *Farquhar* be directed to Captain *Campbell*, in whoſe charge it appears that Mr. *Elliott*'s effects remain; and in the caſe of his death to Mr. *Anderſon*.

I reſerve my opinion on the Governor General's propoſitions till the meeting of the Board.

(Signed) *Philip Francis.*

I agree to the Governor General's propoſitions.

(Signed) *Richard Barwell.*

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following minute on this ſubject: 16th Nov.

Colonel *Goddard*'s letter of the 22d October is a private one to Mr. *Haſtings*, therefore ſtrictly and regularly no authority of itſelf to this Board, to which he ought to have addreſſed himſelf on every one of the points which he has thought fit to communicate ſolely to the Governor. Suppoſing any meaſures which the Board may take in conſequence of the information contained in this letter, may hereafter fail, I much queſtion we ſhould be warranted in appealing to it againſt Colonel *Goddard*; for this reaſon, and becauſe the terms he makes uſe of evidently imply an opinion, that the Governor General poſſeſſes an authority independent and excluſive of the Council, I object to our receiving it as an authentic and official communication, on which the meaſures of Government can be ſafely founded; and in this place I deem it incumbent on me to declare once for all, that I object to and proteſt againſt all private correſpondence between the Governor General and commanding officer of the Company's troops, ſo far forth as ſuch correſpondence may contain orders, inſtructions, or intelligence, which ought to proceed from or be communicated to the Governor General and Council collectively, and not otherwiſe: the practiſe can anſwer no good purpoſe, and is liable to many inconveniences; it is againſt law, and in a former inſtance has been ſolemnly condemned by the Court of Directors. Suppoſing theſe objections to be over-ruled, as I conclude they will be, I proceed to conſider the letters as they ſtand, with the propoſitions founded upon them.

It appears to me, that the reaſons aſſigned by Colonel *Goddard* for departing from the high road to *Sagier* are very unſatisfactory, and I muſt own I am ſorry to ſee that almoſt the firſt ſtep he takes after the command is entruſted to him, ſhould be liable to exception. *Balajee Pundit* is the man to whoſe artifices and enmity almoſt all the difficulties and oppoſition which Colonel *Leſlie* met with have been conſtantly aſcribed; our records are filled with proofs of his perfidious and hoſtile diſpoſition towards us: yet the moment Colonel

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Colonel *Goddard* enters his country, he finds means to perſuade him that reaſon, juſtice, and good policy, ſhould oblige him to quit the direct road to *Sagier*, for fear of diſtreſſing his capital. In my opinion, *Balajee Pundit* deſerved no ſuch lenity and compliance from the commander of our army. If the expedition itſelf is to be juſtified, I apprehend that reaſon, juſtice, and good policy, ſhould have induced Colonel *Goddard* to treat this man with ſome degree of ſeverity, as a warning to others; at all events, his following a route pointed out to him by ſo ſuſpicious a guide is not to be juſtified. It appears by Mr. *Anderſon*'s letter, "that the whole of "the country, nominally ſubject to the Rajah *Beembajee*, "though in point of extent little inferior to that of his "brother, is yet by ruinous management ſo entirely de-"populated, that it ſcarcely yields him a revenue ſuffi-"cient for the maintenance of his forces, which do not "exceed 2,000 horſe and foot." Our information with reſpect to the internal ſtate of *Berar*, and the ſtrength and reſources of its ſovereign, is ſo imperfect, that excluſive of all other objections, I ſhould think it very hazardous on this account, to enter into any alliance with him: his brother, with an equal extent of country, ſeems to be little better than a beggar; and I do not know that there is any direct evidence before this Board to induce us to believe that *Moodajee Booſla* himſelf poſſeſſes much greater ſtrength or reſources, or that his country is much better governed than that of *Beembajee*.

Dewagur Pundit, in his letter received on the 12th inſtant, ſays, "that the fame of the ſtrict connexion and "intimate friendſhip between the Governor General "and *Moodajee Booſla* has been every where ſpread, and "has convinced *Pundit Purdhaun* Peiſhwa and the Nabob "*Nizam ul Mulck*, that in contracting ſuch a friendſhip "the Governor has the moſt extenſive views; which "apprehenſion has filled them with diſmay." In my opinion, their ideas of the views of this Government is not ill-founded; and as it muſt naturally excite in them the utmoſt alarm for their ſafety, it cannot but ſuggeſt to them the neceſſity of uniting in their mutual defence, and of engaging all the other Powers of *India* to join with them in oppoſing ſuch views, and to conſider the Engliſh as the common enemy of them all. A general war in *India* I think muſt inevitably be the conſequence; and this war muſt on our part be ſupported at an immenſe diſtance from our own frontier, at the commencement of a rupture with *France*, and with the apprehenſion of an invaſion hanging over us. Whatever may be the event of a war maintained under ſuch circumſtances, it deſerves to be ſeriouſly conſidered whether any degree of ſucceſs can compenſate to the Company for the immoderate expence with which it muſt be attended. We are precluded from making further acquiſitions of territory; and if we were not, I ſee nothing that victory and conqueſt can produce, but immediate and certain diſburſements, with a very uncertain proſpect of payment in reverſion.

The propoſed alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, whenever it ſhall be accompliſhed, will amount to a declaration of war with the Nizam of the *Decan*. On what principle ſuch a ſtep can be juſtified, I do not know; much leſs how it can be reconciled with the Company's fundamental policy of ſupporting that Prince againſt the Marattas. In their letter of 30th June 1769, to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, "they conſider the Nizam as one of "the few remaining Chiefs who are yet capable of coping "with the Marattas;" and expreſsly add, "that it is "the Company's true intereſt to preſerve a good under-"ſtanding with him." I conclude, for my own part, that as ſoon as he ſhall hear of the terms of our alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, he will unite his forces with thoſe of the Poonah Government, and make an irruption into the *Carnatic*.

Waving all former objections to the meaſure which the Governor General now preſumes to reſume, I object to it on the ground of the ſteps which this Government itſelf has taken, ſince the intended negociation was put a ſtop to on Mr. *Elliott*'s death. On the 7th of October we inſtructed the commanding officer to obey the orders of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, whom we at the ſame time informed, that if their plan of the 25th July ſtill ſubſiſted, or if they ſhould have formed any other plan or deſign for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, which ſhould require the aſſiſtance of the detachment, they might command it to advance. In their letter of the 11th September, they tell us they ſhall now very ſpeedily come to ſome deciſive reſolutions, and adviſe us immediately of the reſult: it is to be preſumed therefore, that when they find the detachment ſtill under their command, and that they are ſo expreſsly authorized by us to employ it in the ſervice of *Ragoba*, their deciſion will ſoon follow, and their meaſures be taken accordingly. In that caſe, and ſuppoſing the treaty with *Moodajee Booſla* to be concluded on the principles of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, the faith of the Company may be engaged on one ſide to *Ragoba*, on the other to *Moodajee Booſla*, to ſupport each of them in their pretenſions reſpectively to the ſovereignty of the Maratta State. The commanding officer, in the mean time, is left to chuſe between contradictory inſtructions, and to determine for himſelf what authority he ſhall ſubmit to, and what orders he ſhall obey.

If, notwithſtanding theſe conſiderations, which to me appear to deſerve the moſt ſerious attention, it ſhould be determined to reſume the negociation with *Moodajee Booſla*, I muſt object to our committing the conduct of it to Colonel *Goddard*; firſt, becauſe the buſineſs itſelf is of a moſt delicate nature, requiring peculiar talents and information, which the Governor does not repreſent Colonel *Goddard* to poſſeſs. On this principle at leaſt the choice of Mr. *Elliott*, to whoſe abilities I have been at all times ready to do juſtice, was particularly recommended: independent of the Governor's perſonal confidence in that gentleman, he was ſaid to have an intimate knowledge of the "political ſtate of this Government, "in relation to the other Powers of the country." It does not derogate from Colonel *Goddard*'s merit to ſay that his qualifications are not of this nature.

Secondly, becauſe I preſume that Colonel *Goddard*'s care and attention will be ingroſſed by the military duties of his ſtation; and that our loading him with an employment ſo foreign from the line of his experience and profeſſion, can only tend to embarraſs and diſtreſs him.

For theſe and other reaſons, I object to and proteſt againſt the motion.

With reſpect to the letter to the Governor of *Goa*, I am of opinion that the facts from which our application ariſes are purely imaginary. The ſuppoſed alliance between the Poonah Government and the French, on which ſo much ſtreſs has been laid for near a twelvemonth paſt, and from which ſo many important inferences have been deduced, has yet produced no one viſible effect whatſoever: for my own part, I do not believe that ſuch an union exiſts; but if it does, I cannot but deem it in the higheſt degree improbable, that a Governor of *Goa* would venture to permit a French army to land there, without expreſs orders from his Court. If he has ſuch orders, our letter to him avails nothing: if not, he muſt do it at the hazard of his head. At all events, I think, that conſidering the reſpective rank of this Government and that of *Goa*, the ſtyle of the propoſed letter is much too earneſt and ſuppliant. I know the Portugueſe, and can affirm with certainty, that this is not the way to treat with them. If the danger were really ſuch as the Governor General apprehends, another kind of language might produce a good effect.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Mr. *Wheler* delivers in the following opinion: I ſubſcribe generally to the ſentiments and opinions expreſſed in Mr. *Francis*'s minute, and particularly to that part of it which proteſts againſt all private correſpondence between the Governor General and the commanding officer being received as authentic and official information, ſo

far as ſuch correſpondence may contain orders, inſtructions, or intelligence, which ought to proceed from, or be communicated to the Governor General and Council collectively, and not otherwiſe.

(Signed) *E. Wheler.*

The Governor General's propoſitions being agreed to by a majority of the Board, Reſolved, That the following letters be written to Colonel *Goddard*, and to the Select Committee at *Bombay*:

Sir,

The unfortunate death of Mr. *Elliott* having deprived us of his ſervices in the execution of the commiſſion with which he was entruſted, and *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, by his letters on the occaſion to this Government, having expreſſed his earneſt deſire that ſome perſon may be immediately empowered to ſettle terms on which the alliance with the Company, which he ſeems ſo anxious to form, ſhould be concluded, we have thought it expedient to purſue our intention of opening a negociation with him for that purpoſe; and we are induced, by the confidence we repoſe in your ability, integrity, and zeal for the intereſt of the Company's affairs, to charge you with the execution of it; we have therefore directed Captain *William Campbell*, into whoſe hands the public diſpatches and credentials of the late Mr. *Elliott* have fallen by the death of Mr. *Farquhar* his aſſiſtant, or Lieutenant *Anderſon*, in caſe of Captain *Campbell*'s death, to deliver up thoſe documents to you; and we hereby direct and authorize you to carry into execution the inſtructions which we had given to Mr. *Elliott*; you will therefore negociate and conclude a treaty of alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, in behalf of the Company, in like manner, and with the ſame powers as if thoſe inſtructions had been originally directed and given in charge to yourſelf.

We are, &c.

Gentlemen,

We have already made you acquainted with the unfortunate event of Mr. *Elliott*'s death, and the reaſons of our delaying to take any further meaſures reſpecting his appointment, until we ſhould hear from *Berar*. The Rajah has now written us, expreſſing his ſincere concern for the loſs of Mr. *Elliott*, and earneſtly deſiring that ſome other perſon may be immediately empowered to ſettle the terms on which the alliance with the Company, which he ſeems ſo anxious to form, ſhould be concluded; we have therefore thought it expedient to purſue our intention of entering into ſuch an alliance, and have appointed Colonel *Goddard*, on whoſe ability and zeal we depend, to execute the negociation committed to the late Mr. *Elliott*; we requeſt that you will correſpond with him on any ſubject which may be material for his information therein, agreeably to our former deſire on the occaſion of Mr. *Elliott*'s appointment.

It being no longer neceſſary to withhold the inſtructions prepared for Mr. *Elliott*, and now directed to Colonel *Goddard*, from our records, we have ordered them to be entered, and herewith encloſe a copy for your information.

We are, &c.

To *Modajee Bhooſila*. To be delivered by Colonel *Goddard*. Written 18th October.

I have already informed you of the removal of Colonel *Leſlie*, and the appointment of Colonel *Goddard* to the command of the detachment of Engliſh forces on their march to *Bombay*. Colonel *Goddard* being an officer in whoſe abilities I have the higheſt confidence, and for whom I entertain the greateſt eſteem, I hope that you will favour him with your confidence and regard. He will have the pleaſure to deliver you this letter; and I requeſt that you will freely communicate with him on the meaſures taken for our common intereſt. Knowing me, &c.

To *Beneram Pundit*: Written 27th October.

I have very fully communicated to Colonel *Goddard*, who has ſucceeded Colonel *Leſlie* in the command of the Engliſh detachment, my views with reſpect to the operations of the detachment, and to the connection with the Maha Rajah your maſter. On Colonel *Goddard* I have the moſt implicit confidence, and am ſure that his conduct will be ſuch as to merit, not only mine, but the Maha Rajah's regard. You are well acquainted with his character; that he is a gentleman of the moſt liberal ſentiments, and conciliatory diſpoſition, and will repreſent him in this light to the Maha Rajah and his Dewan *Dewagur Pundit*, and introduce a friendly and confidential communication between them.

As it was impoſſible for me by letters ſo fully to explain myſelf to Colonel *Goddard* as I could have wiſhed, I have referred him to you, who from former converſations we have had together on theſe ſubjects, are intimately acquainted with all my views in ſending the detachment, and in the cloſe connection I am deſirous of forming with your maſter, for more particular information; this I requeſt you will give him, and will conſult with him on the meaſures proper to be taken, exerting all your intereſt with your maſter and his Dewan to give them effect. On your wiſdom and ſteady attachment to your maſter, which includes in it an attachment to the Company, his intereſt being ſo cloſely united with theirs, I rely for the ſucceſsful iſſue of my deſigns, which are calculated to promote our common advantages.

To *Moodajee Bhooſila*: Written 23d November.

After acknowledging the receipt of his laſt letter, and recapitulating the contents of it:

To this time I choſe to wait for the ſure knowledge of your ſentiments, though in my own mind I was perſuaded that they were exactly conformable to my own, before I ventured to fix the ultimate deſtination of the army. Your letter has ſatisfied me; and in the firm aſſurance that a connection ſo well cemented, an union of two States ſo powerful, and ſo fortunate a concurrence of time and circumſtances as the preſent, muſt, with the bleſſing of God, which ever attends meaſures concerted with prudence, and founded on juſtice, be productive of ſucceſs. I have ſent orders to Colonel *Goddard* to propoſe to you the conditions of a treaty between your State and that of the Engliſh Company, and a plan of operations to be undertaken by your forces and ours under his command, in conjunction, both founded on the inſtructions delivered to my late valuable friend Mr. *Elliott*, and he has been inveſted by me and the Council compoſing this Government with full powers for theſe purpoſes. You have now in your hands the means of binding the intereſts of your family with thoſe of the Engliſh Company by the ties of a perpetual alliance, and of exalting your name above thoſe of the moſt renowned warriors and chiefs of *Hindoſtan* and *Decan*. Seize the occaſion which God and fortune, which is but the chain of events produced by the natural effect of his prudence, have placed within your reach; and know, that gifts borne on the wings of time, paſs forward, and if neglected never return. To ſay more would imply a diſtruſt of your wiſdom and fortitude, of which, were I not aſſured, I would not adventure the concerns of my nation with yours in ſo great an undertaking.

To *Dewagur Pundit*: D°.

Containing the whole ſubſtance of the foregoing letter with the following addition:

In the whole of my conduct I have departed from the common line of policy, and have made advances where others in my ſituation would have waited for ſolicitation, as the greateſt advantages to which I can look cannot in their nature equal thoſe to which the proſperous iſſue of our meaſures may conduct the ſtate of the Maha Rajah's Government. But I know the character to which I addreſs

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dreſs myſelf. I truſt to the approved bravery and ſpirit of your Chief, that he will ardently catch at the objects preſented to his ambition, and to your wiſdom, of which, if fame reports truly, no Miniſter ever poſſeſſed a larger portion: that you will view their importance in too clear a light to hazard the loſs of them by attempting to take an advantage of the deſire which I have expreſſed for their accompliſhment. This intimation is not ſo much intended for a caution to you, as for an explanation of my conduct to thoſe who may be leſs able to penetrate the grounds of it.

APPENDIX, No. 154.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 30th November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letters from Mr. *Lewis*, Aſſiſtant to the Reſident at *Poonah*:

My laſt reſpects were dated 27th ultimo. Having received information that the *Durbar* had received ſeveral letters from *Pondicherry*, I employed a perſon to procure me copies of them, which he accordingly effected; but they being written in Perſian, and I having no perſon here who can tranſlate them, I am under the neceſſity of forwarding the Perſian copies to you.

Hurry Punt having, by partial payments, in ſome ſhape ſatisfied the principal officers of his late army, the Durbar I hear have determined on ſending him again to oppoſe *Hyder* in the *Carnatic*.

I am, &c.

(Signed) *W. Lewis.*

Copy of a Letter from the Chief of *Pondicherry* to the Peiſhwa.

Your gracious letter expreſſive of friendſhip, together with letters from *Nanah Purnaveſe* and *Hurry Pundit*, on the ſubject of the quarrel with the Engliſh, and of aid and aſſiſtance of money, troops, &c. honoured me by its arrival, and afforded me inexpreſſible pleaſure. Accordingly, agreeable to your orders, I am prepared to exert myſelf in the manner you point out, and to fulfil your pleaſure.

You will be fully informed of every particular from my letters to *Nanah Purnaveſe* and *Hurry Pundit*.

Copy of a Letter from the Chief of *Pondicherry* to *Nanah Purnaveſe*.

Your friendly letter on the ſubject of a war with the Engliſh nation, and aſſiſtance of money and troops to be afforded by *Seremunt Sahib*, and the eſtabliſhment of a factory at *Poonah* after the buſineſs of the Engliſh is brought to a concluſion, arrived, together with a letter from *Seremunt Sahib*, in a happy hour, and greatly honoured me.

Agreeably to what you write, in which you propoſe terms advantageous to me, which I delay to reply particularly to, till a fit opportunity, I proceed to ſuch points as are immmediately neceſſary.

In the firſt place, you write that the Engliſh are very unfaithful to their engagements, quarrelſome, and the fomenters of diſturbances; and that the principal actor in theſe diſturbances is *Moſtyn*, the Vackeel of the ſettlement of *Bombay*, who laid the foundation of the quarrel with the Engliſh. You ſecondly write, that they have ſet up and eſpouſed the cauſe of *Dada Ragonaut Row Jeo*, and neither have left nor do leave any act of malice unperformed: that if I will engage warmly in the buſineſs, you will ſhortly cauſe twenty lacks of rupees to be granted me from *Seremunt*'s Circar; and that when I come againſt *Bombay*, you will ſend twenty lacks of rupees, and ten ſhips filled with your Sepoys to my aſſiſtance.

Thanks to God, I have lately, agreeable to *Seremunt*'s orders and your inclination, entered upon this buſineſs, and neglect no means of proſecuting the war; and every day produces the moſt furious attacks upon the Engliſh army who are come before *Pondicherry*. A ſmart cannonade is kept up on both ſides, of which the Hircarrahs of the Circar are eye-witneſſes; and that we have deſtroyed three Engliſh grabs, and, by the bleſſing of God, ſhall deſtroy four ſhips which they have at anchor in deep water. It is neceſſary that you adhere faithfully to your treaty, and conſider me arrived at *Bombay* the inſtant we have put an end to the conteſt here.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors, dated 30th November 1778.

Secret Department.

Par. 10. The very dilatory proceeding of Colonel *Leſlie* in his march towards *Berar*, notwithſtanding our repeated orders to him on that ſubject, and his direct violation of our inſtructions by pledging the faith of the Company to a treaty of perpetual friendſhip with the Rajahs *Gomaun* and *Comaun Sing*, a copy whereof tranſmitted by him to the Governor General was communicated to the Board, made it, as we judged, incumbent on us to remove him from his ſtation, and to promote Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*, the next ſenior officer, to the chief command of the troops. This reſolution paſſed in conſultation the 12th October; and on the 22d we heard of Colonel *Leſlie*'s death, after a ſhort illneſs of four or five days. Colonel *Goddard*, who on that event aſſumed the command before the arrival of our appointment, moved from *Raji Ghur*, where the detachment was then encamped, in two days time, and to our ſatisfaction has ſince made a great progreſs in his way to the place of his deſtination.

11. In the laſt letter from Colonel *Leſlie* to the Board, which he was too ill to put his name to, a pointed reference was made to his correſpondence with the Governor General, for a full account of his proceedings: the Governor General has in conſequence laid the ſame before us, and we have cauſed ſuch parts of the letters as have any relation to public matters, to be tranſcribed for your information. A copy of them is entered after the conſultation noted in the margin. 2 Nov.

12. The importance of the command entruſted to Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*, our confidence in his experience and abilities as an officer, and the length of his ſervices to the Company, have induced us to give him the local and temporary rank of Colonel during the expedition on which he is employed; and care has been taken to declare that this is not to prejudice the rights of two Lieutenant Colonels, his ſeniors in the ſervice.

13. The freſh inſtructions we gave to Colonel *Goddard* on his appointment, were to proſecute his march immediately towards *Bombay*, if on his arrival at *Berar* the Rajah ſhould agree to join him with a ſufficient force, to enable him to do it with ſecurity and effect; but if the Rajah ſhould refuſe or decline his aid on this occaſion, we left it to the Colonel's diſcretion to purſue his route or to ſuſpend his operations, unleſs he ſhould receive poſitive orders for his guidance from the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

14. We gave notice at the ſame time of this licence to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, authorizing them to order the advance of the troops at all events, if their original plan for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, or any other plan, conſiſtent with the terms on which we expreſſed our approval of that meaſure, ſhould ſtill ſubſiſt,

or that they judged the preſence of ſuch a force immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary for the defence of *Bombay* againſt a French invaſion; but in all other caſes, to leave it to act under our orders.

15. We did not at this time intend to depute any other perſon to execute the commiſſion entruſted to the late Mr. *Elliott*, until we ſhould hear from the Rajah of *Berar*, who would, we concluded, be more earneſt to bring about an alliance, in conſequence of the accident which had fruſtrated our endeavours; and might probably either depute a Vackeel immediately to us himſelf, or propoſe terms of alliance advantageous to the Company's intereſts.

16. On the news of Mr. *Elliott*'s death, the Rajah wrote a letter of condolance, and preſſed us in ſtrong terms to ſupply his place immediately; recommending that Mr. *Farquhar*, whom he had taken as an aſſiſtant, might be empowered to execute his commiſſion, that the connection intended to have been formed between us might not be dropped. He even related a circumſtance, which proves, in our opinion, that he is ſincere in his profeſſions: A letter written to him from this Government, on the occaſion of Mr. *Elliott*'s appointment, happened to be intercepted in *Bundelcund*, and immediately tranſmitted to *Poonah*; that Durbar and Nizam *Ally* being in this manner apprized of its contents, immediately wrote to demand the real intentions of *Moodajee* reſpecting us, and obliged him in conſequence, as he informs us, to declare himſelf the firm friend of the Engliſh, and that their enemies were his enemies. Thus he is neceſſarily obliged to place ſome reliance on our attachment and ſupport.

17. On receipt of the above letter, we thought it adviſable to proſecute the plan of Mr. *Elliott*'s deputation; and that no time might be loſt in carrying his inſtructions into effect, we ordered them to be delivered up to Colonel *Goddard*, whom we have charged with the performance of that important commiſſion.

18. This meaſure having rendered it improper, as we conceived, to leave a power veſted in the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* to fruſtrate the ſucceſs of the negociation, by ordering the troops to advance before any engagements could be finally concluded, as they had dropped the plan for the accompliſhment of which the troops were originally intended, and as their orders might in other reſpects claſh with our meaſures, we thought it proper to revoke the authority conveyed to them by our letter of the 15th October, and have reſerved to ourſelves the ſole right of directing the future operations of Colonel *Goddard*. A curſory account of theſe tranſactions is all we pretend to give you in a general letter; for a more particular detail of them we muſt refer you to our conſultations noted in the margin.

19. The ſtate of our advices from *Bombay* and *Poonah*, at the date of our laſt diſpatches, will be found particularly given in the accompanying duplicate of our letter of the 17th Auguſt. We have ſince been informed, that *Moraba Furneſe*, the late Miniſter, and *Burhaba Proonder*, a Chief warmly attached to his intereſt, had been ſeized by the prevailing party, of whom *Nanah Furneſe* is nominally the head, and thrown into confinement: the Government nevertheleſs remained ſtill in confuſion, from the ambitious views of the different perſons compoſing it, and the hoſtile advances made by *Hyder Ally*, which they were preparing to repel. *Succaram Baboo* had been declared ſuperannuated by *Nanah Furneſe*, and compelled to give up his offices, and retire to his own houſe, on which guards were placed to keep a watch on his actions.

20. Mr. *Lewis* writes, under date the 27th *October*, that he had ſent away his Sepoys, and was in hourly expectation of being recalled himſelf, as the Governor of *Bombay* wrote to him, that the Secret Committee had determined to act againſt the Poonah Durbar.

21. Mr. *Lewis* has obtained copies of letters ſaid to have been written by the Governor of *Pondicherry* to the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, which we think it our duty to tranſmit tranſlations of, although we have no grounds either to credit or doubt the authenticity of them. Appendix No. 155.

22. Judging the ſervices of the Commander in Chief more neceſſary in the Nabob's dominions, for making a proper diſpoſition of the Company's forces there, in order to protect the weſtern frontier, than at the Preſidency, where a complete diſpoſition has already been formed, we directed General *Stibbert* to repair immediately to that quarter.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
30th November 1778.

APPENDIX, No. 155.

From *Siccaram Pundit*; received 5th December 1778.

I HAVE been favoured with your letter, intimating your having received repeated and certain intelligence of the arrival of a French gentleman at *Poonah*, the grant of a place to him in the neighbourhood of *Bombay*, and the formation of a friendſhip with him. Your ſurprize at ſuch meaſures, which are inconſiſtent with the treaty of ſtrict friendſhip contracted between the two States (a friendſhip fraught with mutual advantages) and carry the appearance of a diſinclination in this Government to friendſhip. Such acts are a breach of the treaty, and oppoſite to the duties of friendſhip and alliance. That the foundations of the treaty are laid on this baſis, that the friends and enemies of each State ſhould be common to the other; and that a conduct in oppoſition thereto could never be reconciled to the rights of friendſhip, and was highly improper.

My friend! in the terms of the treaty, there is no room for deviation, nor ſhall they ever be diſregarded on our part; and my friendly heart aſſures me, that you on your part will always keep this treaty preſent in your mind; regarding our friends and enemies as common. I had, before the arrival of your letter on the 18th of Summadee Ulawul (25th June 1777) cauſed the French Chief to be diſmiſſed from the preſence of my maſter, *Shemund Row Pundit Purdham Peſhwa Sahib*; but he afterwards continued ſome time at *Poonah*, to provide for the tranſportation of his baggage, which being effected, he quitted *Poonah* the 6th Jummadee Aſſanee (12th July 1777.)

You write with the pen of friendſhip, that our views and intereſts are the ſame. It is true that I regard the preſervation of the friendſhip of the Engliſh Company and King of *England* as really incumbent; but the Governor and Council of *Bombay* have not fulfilled one article of the treaty: they have to the preſent time given an aſylum to *Seremunt Ragonaut Row*, and excited diſturbances and commotions in the dominions of my maſter, *Seremunt Sahib*.

As *Tocojee Row Holcar*, *Madajee Row Sindia*, and other powerful Chiefs, have conceived aſtoniſhment and doubts with reſpect to the propriety of your conduct and good intentions, and the Governor and Council of *Bombay* will not ſettle the affair of the three lacks of rupees with the Circar, nor reſtore *Chickley*, &c. places ceded by *Futtah Sing Row*, with the collections made therein; and *Thomas Moſtyn*, the Vackeel of the Governor of *Bombay*, who came here to ſettle the matters in debate, incited by enmity and hatred, has openly declared that he has no orders from the Governor of *Bombay* to bring the diſputes to a concluſion (copy of an extract of a letter of his is incloſed, *Lalla Sereck Ram* will preſent it for your peruſal) and it is the uſual conduct of the Chiefs to contract engagements at one time, which they will not afterwards abide by; if in conſequence I ſhould

give

Appendix. No. 155.

give *Thomas Moſtyn* his diſmiſſion, it will excite your diſpleaſure.

Whilſt Colonel *Upton* remained here, all matters were ſettled; but from the day of his departure, every matter has been kept under the veil of procraſtination and ſuſpenſe.

God only knows what accuſations *Thomas Moſtyn* may write to you and the Governor of *Bombay*; but I conceive from this, that the Governor of *Bombay* in his heart wiſhes a breach in the ſettlement made and friendſhip contracted between the two States.

At the time the treaty was formed with Colonel *Upton*, he was told that he ſhould ſend for a perſon of credit on the part of the Governor of *Bombay*, and execute the treaty in his preſence; to which he made anſwer, "The "Supreme Council of *Calcutta* have from the King of "*England* authority over all the ſettlements: the acts of "the Supreme Court are valid; no one has power to "violate their orders."

The event has been, that, notwithſtanding your expreſs orders to the Governor of *Bombay*, forbidding him to give *Seramunt Dada Sahib* an aſylum in the territories of the Engliſh Company, and directing him to conclude the affair of the country of three lacks of rupees in the manner ſtipulated in the treaty, and to reſtore the country ceded by *Futty Sing Kaikwar*, with the collections made therein, and to obſerve a friendly and candid conduct towards me; yet no one ſymptom of attention to theſe orders has appeared in his conduct, but the very contrary of all this. Such being the caſe, induced by friendſhip, adopt the only mode left, by ſending a perſon in whom you may confide, who may in perſon remove the cauſes of diſpute on both ſides, and finally ſettle every matter, and give you entire ſatisfaction. On my part there ſhall be no kind of failure in or deviation from the duties of friendſhip. There is no candour to be expected from the Governor of *Bombay*; the remedy is in your hands.

Whoever may have written you that an engagement was contracted between me and the French Chief, and a place granted him by the Cirkar, in the neighbourhood of *Bombay*, it is neceſſary that you make the ſtricteſt inquiry into the matter, and bring that falſe writer, whoſe aſſertions were abſolute lies without the leaſt ſhadow of truth, to his deſerved puniſhment, to deter others by the example, from penning ſuch falſhoods, of which I am entirely innocent.

From *Ballajee Pundit*, of the ſame tenor and date.

Paper referred to in the above Letters, delivered by *Lalla Seurik Ram*.

Copy of an Extract of the purport of a Letter, in the Hindoo Language, written by *Thomas Moſtyn*, from *Poonah*, which you are to preſent on the part of the Peiſhwa, for the peruſal of *Amaud-ul-Dowla Bahadre*.

I have replied to *Balajee Jenardar*, his Highneſs's Miniſter, that I cannot come without an order from the Governor of *Bombay*; that the orders of my principal are neceſſary to enable me to come on buſineſs, and that I ſhall follow his directions.

Conſider the meaning of the above lines, and that if he makes ſuch pretences for not coming from *Poonah* to the fort of *Poorunder*, what can be effected with reſpect to the ſettlement of other matters?

From *Siccaram Pundit*: Received 7th December 1778.

At the time when ſome of the Company's Chiefs were engaged in diſputes and hoſtilities with the Chiefs of this Government, actuated by a wiſh to promote the good and happineſs of mankind in general, which ſuffered by thoſe troubles, you interpoſed your friendly mediation to remove the cauſe of complaint, and to put a ſtop to them, and deputed Colonel *John Upton* for this purpoſe, to the preſence of my maſter *Seremunt Row Pundit Purdhaun Peiſhwa Sahib*. At the time of the ratification of peace I objected to there being no perſon of rank and credit preſent on the part of the Governor of *Bombay*; to which the Colonel made anſwer, that the Governor and Supreme Council of *Calcutta* were inveſted with authority over all the ſettlements of the Engliſh Company, and that their acts were binding on the Chiefs of all the Engliſh ſettlements. On the faith of this declaration I made peace between this Government and the Company's Chiefs, and concluded a treaty; but the Governor of *Bombay* has, in every inſtance of his conduct ſince, excited troubles and commotions in violation of the ties of friendſhip; and notwithſtanding your expreſs orders to expel *Seramunt Dada Sahib* from the Engliſh Company's dominions, and to ſettle all points between the two States, in conformity to the treaty, he has performed nothing thereof; and an envoy from the King of *France* arriving here with a letter, intereſted perſons and inventors of falſhoods, conceiving it is a lucky opportunity to obtain credit to their lying reports, without examination or reflection, repreſented it to you in the manner beſt calculated to anſwer their malicious purpoſes. I call God to witneſs, that out of regard to the friendſhip and alliance of the Company and Engliſh Chiefs, I diſmiſſed the ſaid envoy, without negociating or even converſing with him. I have lately heard that ſome of your people have poſſeſſed themſelves of the fort of *Calpee*, which belongs to this Government. This meaſure is widely removed from the faith of the ſolemn treaty executed by the Engliſh.

When the Governor of *Bombay* in former times put on the maſk of friendſhip for the purpoſes of deceit, and aided the enemies of this Government, regarding you, Sir, as ſuperior to all other Chiefs, I made peace and friendſhip with you, and theſe are the fruits produced by this friendſhip.

You write, that the maintaining of friendſhip and ſtrict union between our reſpective States, is your reſolve. Is it in effect for the preſervation of friendſhip that you trouble the dominions of this Government? ſuch a mode of conduct is inconſiſtent with the maxims and uſages of high and illuſtrious Chiefs. It is mutually incumbent on us to preſerve inviolate the terms of the treaty. Should any deviations ariſe therein, they are the effects of the will, and diſpenſations of God. Farther particulars will be communicated *Seila Sonrick Ram*, the Government Vackeel. Let me conſtantly have the pleaſure to hear of your welfare.

From *Balajee Pundit*; of the ſame tenor and date as the foregoing.

From *Madhorow Peiſhwa*. Received 12th December 1778.

I have been favoured with your letter the 22d Summadee Aſſanie,) 17th July, intimating your determination to maintain the peace inviolable, and to adhere ſcrupulouſly to all the conditions of the treaty, and your having diſpatched an army for the reinforcement of the ſettlements of *Bombay*, and deſiring poſitive injunctions to all the dependants of my Government, to allow the troops a free paſſage, with other particulars; which I underſtand, and which afforded me great pleaſure.

As my friendly heart is ever deſirous of maintaining inviolate all the conditions of the treaty concluded between our States, and I am conſtantly attentive thereto, it is incumbent on you likewiſe to perſevere in the path of friendſhip. Our well-beloved Miniſters *Sacaram Pundit* and *Ballajee Pundit* have received orders to reply to every article of your letters; this they will do, and you will act agreeable thereto.

From *Sacaram Pundit*. Received the 12th of December 1778.

I have been favoured with your letter under date the 22d Summadee Aſanie (17th July) on the ſubject of the preſervation

preſervation and increaſe of the friendſhip between the two States; and intimating, that it is your fixed reſolve to maintain every article of the treaty as long as it is adhered to by *Row Pundit Purhaun*; that the troops have been ſent ſolely for the reinforcement of the ſettlement of *Bombay*; and that the commanding officer has ſtrict injunctions to obſerve ſuch a conduct in every reſpect as is conſiſtent with the friendſhip ſubſiſting. That the ſeveral letters you have lately received from this quarter, meaning from me, contain a declaration to maintain the treaty and friendſhip between us; yet, that my having hitherto evaded your requeſt, to grant paſſes for the march of the troops through the Government dominions, cauſes you great aſtoniſhment; that if I ſtill refuſe to comply therewith, you are remedileſs, and the blame will fall on me. The letter containing the above, and other particulars, which I ſhall notice before I conclude, reached me on the 4th of Shabaun (28th Auguſt) and afforded me great pleaſure.

It is univerſally allowed that there is nothing more excellent in the world than friendſhip and harmony, which are bleſſings to mankind in general. The maintenance of every article of the treaty is equally incumbent on both parties. It is not ſtipulated in any article of the treaty, that either party may ſend forces through the dominions of the other, without conſulting him before hand, and cauſe trouble and diſtreſs to the people. To what rules of friendſhip can be attributed the ſtationing of garriſons in the forts, and making collections in the country of the other party. What has happened is then agreeable to the Engliſh faith. In proof of this aſſertion, be it obſerved, Colonel *Leſlie*, the commanding officer of the forces, has kept with him *Seramunt Dada Sahib*'s Carkoon, and in conjunction with him collects money from the dominions of the Government by intimidating its ſubjects; this being the caſe, what becomes of your aſſurance before recited, that the treaty ſhould be ſcrupulouſly adhered to on your part, as long as it was maintained by my maſter *Seremunt Peiſhwa Sahib*, or what degree of credit can be given thereto?

From time immemorial, no forces of the maritime European nations have marched by land through the dominions of the Government, but the route of all the trading and European nations has been by the ocean; nor is it ſtipulated in the treaty that Engliſh detachments ſhall have a paſſage through the Government territories.

Reflect maturely on this, and then determine on whoſe ſide the blame reſts. That ſuch unlooked-for acts ſhould proceed from you, is matter of the higheſt aſtoniſhment, to think that mighty and powerful Chiefs ſhould act in direct oppoſition to the faith of their engagements. You are pleaſed to write, that if the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſhall ſtill continue to require the troops, you can in no caſe agree to recall them. The matter is briefly this:

At the time of the concluſion of the treaty, I made objections reſpecting the Preſidency of *Bombay*; to which Colonel *John Upton* made anſwer, "The King of *England* and the Engliſh Company have placed confidence "in the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, and inveſted it "with authority over all the other ſettlements: the acts "of the Council of *Calcutta* are binding on the Go-"vernment of all the Company's ſettlements." Having given this aſſurance, he prepared the form of a treaty, ſuch as the critical ſituation of the times rendered neceſſary; and you tranſmitted me a treaty conformable thereto, under the ſeal of the Engliſh Company. It was from the beginning the earneſt wiſh of the Government of *Bombay*, that no friendly connexions ſhould be eſtabliſhed between the two States, and they have ever ſince been ſtriving to overſet it; and notwithſtanding the concluſion of the treaty, they kept *Dada Sahib* with them. How then was it to be expected that they ſhould recall their troops, which were diſturbing the peace of the Government dominions? It even appears to a conviction, that they perſuaded *Dada Sahib* to the meaſures he has purſued. How then does the ſupreme authority of the Council of *Calcutta* from the King of *England* appear, ſince the Chiefs of the different ſettlements do not regard engagements contracted by you, as binding on them, but make no ſcruple to break them; and you, paying no regard to your acts, take your meaſures on the repreſentation of the Government of *Bombay*? This is indeed aſtoniſhing to the higheſt degree. Appendix. No. 156.

It is the dictate of ſound policy that you withdraw your troops to your own territories; this will be a convincing proof of the ſincerity of your friendſhip, and will ſpread the fame of your good faith throughout the univerſe.

From the commencement of the authority of the family of the Peiſhwa, they have entered into treaties with many of the Chiefs both of the eaſt and weſt, and have never before experienced ſuch a want of faith from any one; nor ever, to the preſent time, deviated from their engagements, or been wanting to the duties of friendſhip and alliance. The blame reſts with you.

From *Ballajee Pundit*; of the ſame tenor and date.

APPENDIX, No. 156.

Bengal Secret Conſultations.

Letter from *Beneram Pundit*. Received 16th December 1778.

I HAVE already tranſmitted you two Arzies, accompanied by letters from the Maha Rajah and *Dewan Dewagur Pundit*, on the ſubject of the unfortunate death of Mr. *Elliott*, under charge of Coſſids; the one by the way of *Cuttack*, the other by that of *Benares*; all which I hope you have received, and become acquainted with their contents.

Pundit Purdhaun Peiſhwa, on the news of the late Mr. *Elliott*'s deputation, ſent a Vackeel named *Baboo Ram Bade*, to the Maha Rajah, to obtain intelligence of what was going on. The ſaid *Baboo Ram*, in the preſence of *Dewan Dewagur Pundit*, has repeatedly, on the part of the Peiſhwa, talked to me of the breach of engagements, and obſtinately refuſed to liſten to conviction. *Dewan Dewagur Pundit* obſerved to him, had Mr. *Elliott* arrived, all matters would have been known. It is unneceſſary to dwell on notorious facts. The happy influence of the Engliſh fortune has at all times effected the ruin of their enemies, and will continue to do ſo in future. May the Almighty daily augment it.

It is a freſh proof of their good fortune, that on the 26th of Ramgaun, through the valour and magnanimity of the victorious Engliſh, the fort of *Pondicherry* was reduced, and the enemies of their State, to wit, the French Sirdars, all made priſoners. I ſincerely congratulate you on this happy event. The news of this victory has been conveyed hither by a letter from *Mhad Ameen Khan* to *Vikar ul Dowlah*; who, actuated by friendſhip, ſent the letter to *Dewan Dewagur Pundit*, who ſhewed it to me. All tongues are employed in ſounding the Engliſh praiſes, their power, and good fortune; which may God ſtill increaſe!

We wait impatiently for your reply to the former letters from hence, deſiring that a gentleman might be deputed in the room of the late Mr. *Elliott*. *Biſſember Pundit* will repreſent further particulars to you. The Maha Rajah and *Dewagur Pundit* are greatly rejoiced at the news of this victory. I have been ſo ill with a fever ever ſince I arrived at *Naigpore*, that I was for many days deprived of ſenſe. I am now, through your auſpicious influence, on the recovery, although ſtill very weak. In two or three days I hope to recover ſufficient ſtrength to attend the Durbar. Let not my illneſs cauſe you any uneaſineſs; for, by the bleſſing of God, every thing will go well.

Appendix. No. 157.

APPENDIX, No. 157.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 7th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

THE Governor General having delivered the following minute, it was immediately circulated with drafts of letters to *Bombay* and Colonel *Goddard*.

Governor General—As the failure of the plan on which the detachment deſtined for *Bombay* was originally formed, renders it no longer neceſſary that it ſhould act under the orders of that Preſidency, and as theſe might eventually counteract and defeat the ends of the negociation lately given in charge to Colonel *Goddard*, I move, That the powers delegated to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, in our letter of the 15th ultimo, be revoked, and that the commanding officer of the detachment be directed henceforth to obey only ſuch orders as he ſhall receive from us; and that the following letters to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, and to Colonel *Goddard*, be written accordingly.

To the Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

In our letter of the 16th inſtant we informed you, that we had thought it proper to inveſt Colonel *Goddard* with full powers to conclude a treaty with *Moodajee Booſla*, Rajah of *Berar*, on the grounds of our inſtructions to the late Mr. *Elliott*, of which we encloſed a copy for your information. As the event of his negociation is likely to cauſe a very ſpeedy and eſſential change in the deſign and operations of the detachment, and as the plan which we have choſen to ſupply the place of that originally recommended by you, has rendered it neceſſary that we ſhould retain in our hands the means of effecting it, we hereby revoke the power which we gave you in our letter of the 15th ultimo, and ſhall direct the commanding officer of the detachment to obey only ſuch orders as he ſhall hereafter receive from us.

Although the circumſtances into which we have been thrown by the failure of the plan on which the detachment was originally formed, have rendered it neceſſary to make this alteration in the controul and directions of it, our intention is not to withdraw the ſervices of the detachment entirely from the ſupport of any meaſures which you may have formed in reliance on them, if thoſe meaſures ſhall not prove incompatible with the inſtructions given to Colonel *Goddard*, and with the engagements which he may conclude in conſequence of them. We ſhall therefore leave him ſtill ſubject to your inſtructions under theſe proviſions, and requeſt that you will communicate to him ſuch points as you may judge proper to be included in the operations concerted with the Rajah of *Berar*.

Fort-William, We are, &c.
23d November 1778.

To Colonel *Goddard*, commanding the Detachment from the 1ſt Brigade.

Sir,

As we fear that your negociation with *Moodajee Booſla*, or the meaſures which you may find it neceſſary to purſue in conſequence of your engagements with that Chief, might be interrupted by the orders which you would receive from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, were we to leave the direction of your operations entirely to that Government; we think it neceſſary to revoke the order contained in our letter to you, dated the 15th ultimo, by which you were directed to obey all ſuch orders as you might receive from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*; and to forbid you to obey any orders but ſuch as you ſhall henceforth receive from us. But as it is our intention that the detachment under your command, ſhall yet act in ſupport of any meaſures which the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* may have formed in reliance on it, as far as they ſhall be conſiſtent with your preſent inſtructions, and the engagements which you may have concluded in conſequence of them, we deſire that you will nevertheleſs attend to any inſtructions which you may receive from them, provided they be not incompatible with this rule.

Fort-William, We are, &c.
23d November 1778.

The following minutes were returned on the above ſubject:

Mr. *Francis*—At laſt it is avowedly determined that the detachment ſhall not proceed to *Bombay*. For my own part, I receive this explanation of the intentions of the majority without ſurprize, and ſhall leave them to anſwer to the Company for this, as well as all the other changes and inconſiſtencies which have attended the meaſure. But it is my duty to point out to the Court of Directors, that this laſt arrangement is not juſtified by the motive aſſigned for it: no event has happened ſince the 15th of October, which ſhould induce us to believe that the plan alluded to in the Governor's minute has failed. If it has, it muſt have failed before we gave our inſtructions to the commanding officer, under that date, to concur in the ſupport of ſuch a plan; but let the plan formed in favour of *Ragoba* have failed when it may, its failure, on the Governor General's own principles, is no reaſon for countermanding the march of the detachment, or revoking the authority of the Preſidency of *Bombay* over it.—The caſe of an *immediate invaſion of Bombay by the French* was ſuppoſed and inſiſted on by the Governor General, as the ground of giving powers to that Preſidency to direct the motions of the detachment, and employ it in their defence; but the defence of *Bombay*, in caſe of an invaſion, has no connexion with a plan in favour of *Ragoba*, and is now as likely as ever it was to demand the immediate aſſiſtance of the detachment. The intimation contained in the propoſed letter to *Bombay*, "That it is not our intention to withdraw the ſervices "of the detachment entirely from the ſupport of any "meaſures which they may have formed in reliance on "them," is nugatory, and can mean nothing, ſince it is reſted on a condition that ſuppoſes an impoſſibility; viz. That any meaſures formed in favour of *Ragoba*, can be compatible with the plan and object of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions.

For this, and many other reaſons which I could eaſily ſtate, if I thought it were to any purpoſe, I diſſent from and proteſt againſt the meaſure.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

I likewiſe diſſent from and proteſt againſt the meaſure.

(Signed) *Edwd Wheler.*

Mr. *Barwell* having approved of the letters propoſed by the Governor General to be written to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, and to Colonel *Goddard*, they were copied fair, and diſpatched.

The following propoſal from the Governor General was received and circulated the 4th inſtant:

Governor General—Not having yet received advice of the arrival of the gentlemen who accompanied the late Mr. *Elliott*, at *Naugpoor*; leſt any accident ſhould have befallen them, or the papers under their charge, I move, That a copy of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions be immediately tranſmitted to Colonel *Goddard*, with another copy of the laſt letters written to him.

I acquieſce.

(Signed) *P. F.*
(Signed) *E W.*

A letter was accordingly ſent to Colonel *Goddard*, with a copy of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, as follows:

Sir,

Leſt ſome accident ſhould prevent the delivery of the original inſtructions to you which were given to Mr. *Elliott*, we think it proper to tranſmit you a copy of them, by the way of *Benares*, together with a triplicate of our laſt letter on the ſubject of them.

We are, &c.

Fort-William, the 4th December 1778. *P. Francis*, *Edwd Wheler.*

APPENDIX, No. 158.

Letter from the Governor General to *Ragonaut Row.*

I HAVE been favoured with your very agreeable letter on the ſubject, and informing me of your having diſpatched Rajah *Ram Dunkar* and *Trimbuck Dado Jee*, perſons poſſeſſed of your confidence, to make me fully acquainted with them.

The reliance you place in my friendſhip is well grounded, of which I ſhall be ever happy to give you the moſt convincing proofs.

It is matter of the higheſt concern to me, that the meaſures taken by this Government, on the plan propoſed for your advantage by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, have hitherto failed of ſucceſs; and the total ignorance in which we have ſince been kept of the ſtate of your affairs, has left me at a loſs how to act; you may however reſt perfectly ſatisfied that you are in the hands of your friends, and that I ſhall be always ready to join in any meaſure for your benefit which can be executed without any diſtreſs to my own.

Your Vackeel Rajah *Ram Dunkar* and *Trimbuck Dado Jee* are arrived, and have related to me very particularly the circumſtances relative to you and your actual condition. I am greatly concerned that ſuch able and faithful advocates were ſo lately ſent, as well as that the powerful means employed by this Government for your ſupport have received ſo little from your other friends.

The detachment of Engliſh forces ſent for the reinforcement of *Bombay* are ſtill on their march thither, where, by the bleſſing of God, they will ſhortly arrive; and I flatter myſelf that its arrival will be productive of the greateſt advantages to your affairs. I now wait impatiently for further advices from you on the ſubject of your future views, which I requeſt you will ſpeedily favour me with.

Convinced of your warm friendſhip to me and the Engliſh nation, it is with the utmoſt pleaſure I inform you, that *Pondicherry*, the principal fortreſs of our enemies the French in *India*, was reduced by our troops on the 10th of October. I doubt not but this event, which deſtroys the power of our enemies, who are likewiſe your's, will be productive of the higheſt ſatisfaction to you, and therefore congratulate you on it. Knowing me, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 159.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence, 1778.

Copy of a Letter from Maha Rajah *Moodajee Bhoſila*, to Colonel *Goddard*; dated the 23d November 1778.

I HAVE been made happy by the receipt of your agreeable letter, informing me of your arrival at *Gourdacy*, that you have quitted the territories of *Balajee*, &c. who, notwithſtanding the connexion you had formed with him, and the intercourſe of friendſhip which had been eſtabliſhed between you by letters and meſſages, oppoſed your march by ſtratagem and deceit; yet, that all his attempts to hurt you proved ineffectual, and he could carry nothing away except the camel and effects of Ram *Budder Pundit*, who ſtayed behind the baggage, and alſo received two wounds from a ſpear; that you reſerve the revenging this to another opportunity; that the Maratta cavalry are collecting on all ſides of your army, and you hear that they are alſo gathering together in the *Decan*; that I ſhould therefore take ſuch meaſures as may be moſt adviſable in theſe circumſtances; that you ſhall take your route by *Bhelſah* and *Bopaul* to the river *Nerbudder*; with other particulars, which I underſtood, and which afforded me the greateſt pleaſure. Appendix. Nos. 158 & 159.

I before, in conſequence of two letters which I received from you after the death of Colonel *Leſlie*, intimating your intention to proceed to the banks of the *Nerbudder*, and from thence to the place of your deſtination, ſent *Lalla Jadoo Roy*, who had before waited near five months there in expectation of the arrival of the army, and who was then obliged by ſickneſs and the delay of your coming, to return to *Naigpore*, together with *Shas Sing Hazzarey*, a man of credit, to *Saoty*, which *Jalook* is the Jaghier of the latter; by this time they muſt be arrived there, and will provide you with every neceſſary, and *Lalla Jadoo Roy* will advance two or three days journey to meet you, and inform you of every particular relative to the junction of the armies of the *Decan*, (to wit) thoſe of *Sindeah* and *Holcar*, and the purport of all the letters received from the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowla* ſince the commencement of Colonel *Leſlie*'s march to this quarter, and the deputation of Mr. *Elliott* to conclude with me a firm treaty and alliance, and to adviſe with me on many points of the utmoſt importance: of all theſe affairs he will give you a perfect knowledge, as it would take up too much time and paper to commit them to writing. In brief, that the operations of the army in *Bundlecund* ſhould be determined by the late Mr. *Elliott*'s joint advice and concurrence, and that Colonel *Leſlie* ſhould follow the inſtructions which Mr. *Elliott* ſhould write him from *Naigpore*, he having full powers to conduct the negotiations, and that whatever he ſhould do, be approved and ratified by all, in the ſame manner as if done by himſelf. Mr. *Elliott* being unfortunately ſtopped in the way by the angel of death, all the intended negotiations and ſchemes are ſuſpended, and muſt continue in this ſtate until the arrival of letters from *Calcutta*, or of ſome gentleman of credit to ſupply the place of the deceaſed. As the greateſt friendſhip ſubſiſts between me and the Nabob *Amaud ul-Dowla*, by reaſon of the concerns of *Bengal*, and the vicinity of our territories, I can have no objection to the army croſſing the *Nerbudder*, and entering my dominions, which lie immediately on this ſide of it; and *Lalla Jadoo Row* is ſtationed there, and will to the utmoſt of his power provide you with grain, proviſions and every other neceſſary; but actuated by the warmeſt friendſhip, which will not allow of any diſſimulation or reſerve, I judge it incumbent on me freely to communicate to you whatever I have learnt from the newſpapers, which I receive from every quarter, as well as my ſentiments on every matter which ariſes.

The late Colonel *Leſlie* after the paſſage over the *Jumna* wrote to me, that he ſhould ſhortly arrive at the *Nurbudder*, and that he hoped from my friendſhip I would not allow any neglect or delay to ariſe in the proviſion of grain, &c. neceſſaries for his army; and that from thence, he would proceed to the place of his deſtination: I wrote in anſwer, that notwithſtanding the road by this quarter was a very difficult one, if he ſhould think fit to make it his route, I would neglect no means to ſupply him and his army with proviſions and neceſſaries through my dominions; that he would then paſs a part of the Peiſhwa's dominions dependant on *Burhampore*, where I had no kind of authority.

As the late Colonel *Leſlie* marched into the territory of *Bundlecund*, and the country of *Balajee Pundit*, who holds it under the Peiſhwa, and waſted near five months in thoſe parts to ſettle the affairs of the country and regulate the Government, every moment of delay was impolitical, and greatly prejudicial to the expedition, for he ought to have marched to the *Nerbudder* without the leaſt delay, and

Appendix No. 159.

and from thence with the greateſt expedition to the place of his deſtination through the Soubah of *Burhampore*; in which caſe, he would have met with no oppoſition or moleſtation; all the Chiefs of the *Decan* being at their reſpective ſtations employed in their own affairs, ſo that he might have reached *Bombay* with the greateſt facility, without meeting with the leaſt interruption in his march thither. By his delay of five months in the Bundlecund country, and the letters of *Balajee* and others to the Government at *Poonah*, that he was creating diſturbances in thoſe diſtricts, and meditated the reduction of their territories, and then to proceed in an hoſtile manner againſt the Peiſhwa; all the Chiefs were put on their guard, and immediately ſet about raiſing and diſciplining forces, and are now watching an opportunity to employ them to advantage. The oppoſition of *Balajee*, and the armies of obſervation which attend on the ſteps of the detachment, are in conſequence of inſtructions from the Government, and large armies from *Sindeah* and *Holcar* have likewiſe been drawn together at *Poonah*; the forces of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, he being in ſtrict league with the Peiſhwa, and it being ſtipulated in the treaty between the Engliſh and the Peiſhwa, concluded by the Governor of *Madras*, that no aid or aſſiſtance ſhould be given to *Ragonaut Row*, and that their friends and enemies ſhould be common to all parties, are likewiſe engaged in the cauſe, and are ſtationed in different parts at the paſſes and Gauts in the Zella of *Berar*, under the command of able officers, waiting for the approach of the Engliſh army; that all theſe parties are on their guard and in readineſs, is entirely owing to Colonel *Leſlie*'s delay in the Bundlecund country: but all this is fruitleſs, and being paſt ſhould be forgotten.

It was my deſign on the arrival of Mr. *Elliott*, who was inveſted with full powers, to have conſulted with him, and to have formed ſuch a plan under the maſk of the Peiſhwa, as might have enſured to the troops a free and unmoleſted paſſage to *Bombay*. My plan was this, that letters ſhould be written by me and Mr. *Elliott* to *Poonah*, to the following purport: that the Engliſh are ſteady to the treaty which they contracted with the Peiſhwa, and have not the leaſt deſign to ſupport or aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*; but that they bear hatred to the French, the inveterate enemies of the Engliſh nation, and are greatly alarmed at the reſidence of a French Vackeel at *Poonah*; that if the Poonah Government has ſent away the French Vackeel, and will faithfully adhere to its treaty with the Engliſh, they alſo deem it incumbent on them ſtrictly to perform their part of it, and in ſuch caſe neither have nor will entertain any enmity to the Peiſhwa; that this detachment which is ſent to *Bombay*, is ſolely diſpatched thither from apprehenſions of the deſigns of the French againſt the Engliſh ſettlements, as war has been declared in *Europe* between the Kings of *England* and *France*; and it is therefore incumbent on them to provide for the ſafety of their poſſeſſions in this quarter.

From ſuch letters and promiſes from us, namely, Mr. *Elliott* and myſelf, I had no doubt that the Miniſters at *Poonah* would have given entire credit thereto, and regarding it as impolitic to have broken their engagements with the Engliſh without cauſe, would have replied thereto, that if the Engliſh were ſteady to their treaty, they had no objection to the paſſage of the Engliſh army to *Bombay*, to keep the French in awe. Under this maſk the detachment might have come hither, and proſecuted their march from hence to *Bombay* in ſafety and tranquillity, and my warm friendſhip and attachment to the Engliſh Chiefs would have been clearly manifeſted. I formerly intimated in my letters to *Calcutta*, the purport of what the Poonah Miniſters wrote to me, that they neither had nor would have any friendſhip or connexion with the French nation, and that the French agent came to *Poonah* ſolely for the purpoſes of trade, and that out of friendſhip to the Engliſh they had ſent him away; that I ſhould therefore write to the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* to be perfectly ſatisfied with reſpect to them, they being ſteady to their engagements. I received a reply from *Calcutta* to this letter, but to recite the particulars would ſwell this letter to too great a ſize: *Lally Judoo Roy* will therefore make you acquainted therewith, and ſhew you a copy of the letter. In a word, by the deceaſe of Mr. *Elliott*, all the deſigns before recited, as well as thoſe exiſting in the breaſts of the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* and myſelf, which could not be explained but in an interview between me and Mr. *Elliott*, are ſuſpended, and depend on further advices from *Calcutta*, which by reaſon of its great diſtance from hence cannot ſpeedily be received.

The letters received from *Calcutta* ſince the death of Mr. *Elliott*, are in ſubſtance as follows: that the deſigns and ſecret views entruſted to Mr. *Elliott*, being by his death of neceſſity ſuſpended, what is to be done to obviate the inconvenience? That *Beneram Pundit* is well acquainted with the affairs and negociations with which that gentleman was charged; that he will fully communicate to me the conditions which he the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowla* offers me, and ſuch as he requires from my friendſhip; that I will therefore inform him of ſuch points as I wiſh from him, for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a ſolid friendſhip and ſtrict union between us, as it is not his deſign to draw advantages to himſelf, without granting equal ones to me, knowing that no private friendſhip or public alliance can take firm root, without being founded on reciprocal and equal benefits; that it is on ſuch grounds he has long formed the deſign of an alliance with me; that the opportunity now preſents itſelf; that the detachment will ſhortly arrive in my dominions, and their operations will be guided by my advice; that although either of our armies are in themſelves very powerful, and the delay in the march of the detachment has not been cauſed by oppoſition of an enemy, yet that it is adviſable to ſtrengthen it with a body of my forces.

In the concluſion of the letter is this ſentence, which is the moſt material: I have now fully explained my own views and deſigns, and wait impatiently to be made acquainted with yours, on which to form my ultimate reſolutions. As to form the ultimate plan agreeable to what the Nabob *Amaul-ul-Dowlah* writes, which requires the ſettlement of points of the greateſt conſequence and matters of great difficulty, viz. the raiſing an army, providing warlike ſtores, large treaſures for the ſupport of each other, and the junction of a body of my forces, under the command of able and experienced officers, will be required of me on the arrival of a reply to my letters; and I muſt alſo write very full information on every point, and propoſe the mode of carrying our views into effect with prudence and foreſight, and the preſent is the time to form the plan, which is to be ſubſequently carried into execution, with the advice and aſſiſtance of Mr. *Anderſon*, who arrived here after the death of Mr. *Elliott*, and is well acquainted with the ſincerity of my friendſhip, and has received letters from *Calcutta* to remain at *Naigpore*, and to make himſelf acquainted with my ſentiments and views; it will therefore require a long time to tranſmit letters to *Calcutta*, and receive anſwers from thence, and firmly to eſtabliſh the propoſed union; it is not to be done at once, but requires time to regulate matters of ſuch importance.

The junction of a ſmall body of my forces with yours can produce no good effect, but will remove the veil from the buſineſs, and leave our deſigns expoſed; it will deſtroy the friendſhip which is eſtabliſhed between me and the Peiſhwa and *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, and expoſe my dominions to the ravages of the armies of the *Decan* in *Berar*, and at the Gauts; therefore wait for a reply from *Calcutta* with the opinion of the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*; and induced by friendſhip, I have made a full and unreſerved communication to you. Mr. *Anderſon* has alſo written you very fully. You will be pleaſed to adviſe me of whatever plan you may judge proper to adopt,

adopt, for an unreſerved communication between friends is highly commendable, and is approved by God.

Poſtſcript.—On the other ſide of the *Nurbudder* you will meet with bad roads and mountains difficult of acceſs, great rivers to paſs, and thouſands of Bhalahs concealed in the cavities of the mountains; although theſe cannot have any effect upon the magnanimity of the Engliſh, yet you will find great difficulty to procure proviſions: as ſoon as you get clear of the ſavages aforeſaid, you will find the armies of *Holcar* and *Sindia* ready to oppoſe you. Their plan will be to watch your motions at a diſtance, cut off your ſupplies, to watch their opportunity to attack you at a diſadvantage, and having done all the miſchief they can, to retreat to their former poſts.

Although Colonel *Leſlie* has been diſmiſſed from the command by orders from *Calcutta*, and you appointed to conduct the army with every poſſible expedition to *Bombay*; and you will doubtleſs make every exertion of zeal which ſo arduous an undertaking requires; yet every ſtep brings imminent danger, and you can only arrive at the place of your deſtination by fighting your way through, and being ſubject to fierce attacks.

I am induced by friendſhip to give you this intelligence, for my heart is pained at the apprehenſion of your experiencing any misfortune; and to return would leſſen the terror of your arms, and give diſpleaſure to Mr. *Haſtings*.

My advice is, that you write all theſe particulars to *Calcutta*, as I have already done, and wait for orders from thence in conſequence, and till their arrival continue on the banks of the *Nurbudder*. For the reſt, whatever you may judge moſt expedient. If you think it adviſable, write to the Peiſhwa, that your Chief has no idea of breaking the treaty with the Peiſhwa, and that the detachment under your command is ſolely intended for the reinforcement of *Bombay*, againſt the deſigns of the French, the inveterate enemies of your Sovereign: that if he has expelled the French Vackeel from his preſence, and has no friendſhip with them, the Engliſh on their part are ſteady to their engagements: that if ſuch friendſhip really exiſts between the Peiſhwa and your Chief, he can have no objection to the paſſage of the forces for the reinforcement of *Bombay*. That you will not in any manner aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*. This ſhall be accompanied by letters from me, which may poſſibly produce a favourable anſwer, and in the mean time you will have an anſwer from *Calcutta*.

Communicate to me your opinion in the ſame unreſerved manner as I have done to you; this will tend to the increaſe of our friendſhip.

I have ſpoken on this ſubject to *Baboo Row*, the Peiſhwa's Vackeel; who has replied, that he can conſent to nothing without the knowledge and approbation of his ſuperiors, to whom he will write if I deſire him. I therefore think it would be adviſable that you ſend me a letter addreſſed to the Peiſhwa, to the above purport, which ſhall be diſpatched with letters from me to *Baboo Row*. I ſhewed you copy of Mr. *Haſtings*'s letter on the ſubject of Mr. *James Anderſon*'s ſtaying here.—For further particulars I refer you to *Lalla Jadoo Roy*.

APPENDIX, Nos. 160 and 161.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

THE Governor General lays before the Board a letter addreſſed to him by Colonel *Goddard*, dated 16th November; and deſires in the preſent diſpatches to *England* it may be added, "that by a private letter from "Colonel *Goddard*, addreſſed to the Governor General, "we are adviſed that he was arrived at *Biſeer*, in *Bo*-"*paul*, at the diſtance of eight coſs from *Iſlamagur*, and "ten from *Bopaul*;" with any other particulars of his letter which the Board may think proper on the peruſal of it. Appendix. No. 161.

Sir,

In my laſt letter from the *Kournz*, I informed you of *Balajee*'s deceitful conduct, and the unſucceſsful attempt he had made to carry off a part of the baggage, &c. of the detachment, on the day of my leaving his territories, and entering a ſmall diſtrict belonging to a Patan Chief, which is ſituated between *Sagur* and *Bilſah* confines. I alſo expreſſed my hope, that the Chief of the latter country would comply with the requeſt I made him, of an unmoleſted paſſage through it, and ſupply me with every thing requiſite on my march, as he had ſent in a confidential man to treat with me. Through this man I received from his maſter a ſolemn engagement to conduct the troops, and furniſh proviſions for them on their route; as a pledge for the performance of which, the Vackeel was to remain in my camp.

I beg leave to enloſe you a copy of the agreement he entered into, the purport of which I have confined to my own preſent purpoſe, without involving myſelf or the Engliſh nation in any future engagements, which might prove inconſiſtent with your political views. I have the pleaſure to inform you, that by this management I have ſucceeded in the obtaining of what I propoſed. I have paſſed the confines of his country, and am arrived at thoſe of the Nawaub of *Bholpaul*, within twenty-five coſs of the *Nurbudda*. The troops of *Balajee* ſtill hover in my rear; but they encamp at too great a diſtance, and are too vigilant, for me to attempt attacking them with any proſpect of a ſurprize: they haraſs me every day on the march, and now and then pick up any baggage that ſtraggles too far from protection: they have alſo cut off ſome ſupplies of proviſion coming into camp; but they are not capable to delay me much, or do any material injury. This may appear ſtrange and inadmiſſible in a country whoſe Chief has entered into terms of friendſhip with me, but the excuſe made for it by the latter is the ſuperior force of *Balajee*; and he again urges, as a motive for his conduct, the orders he has received from the Poonah Durbar, to interrupt the paſſage of the Engliſh to the *Nurbudda* all in his power. In ſhort, I can plainly perceive that their mutual inclinations are the ſame; but that views of preſent convenience have induced the Bilſah Chief to adopt a neutrality, which is equally agreeable and ſubſervient to my wiſh of reaching the *Nurbudda* without delay, and proſecuting the grand object of this expedition. I have within theſe few days received a letter from *Moodajee Booſla*, in reply to mine from *Raje Ghur*, informing him of my intention to proceed towards his country with all expedition, and aſſuring him of my zeal and readineſs to promote his intereſts, and execute the treaty which ſhall be ultimately concluded betwixt himſelf and the Engliſh Government. He mentions with much concern the death of Mr. *Elliott*, which has ſuſpended for a while the negociation to have been carried on with you through him; and requeſts that, if I have left *Bundlecund*, I will move forward by eaſy marches to the *Nurbudda*: in the mean time, he hopes to receive anſwer to a letter he wrote you on the occaſion. The terms of his letter, and that from *Dewargur*, as well as *Beneram Pundit*, are expreſſed in as friendly a ſtyle and manner as I could have wiſhed. It alſo informs me he has ſent *Laloo Jadou Ram*, with ſome other Chiefs, to the *Nurbudda*, to meet me on my arrival there and to provide every thing neceſſary for the care of the detachment; but it is plain he would rather ſome agreement had been entered into before the arrival of the army in his territory, and that perhaps he is apprehenſive of meeting with difficulties in concluding any thing with a perſon whoſe name has not been made known to him by you.

Appendix. No. 161.

you. In all theſe particulars, I hope your letters will by this time have fully ſatisfied him; and that finding the friendſhip you honour me with, and the truſt you may chuſe to repoſe in my attention and endeavours to promote your mutual views and intereſts, he will, before my arrival, be prepared to receive me with that cordiality and confidence, ſo neceſſary to the ſucceſs of the propoſed negociation with him. *Moodajee* has ſent me a paper of intelligence relative to the Poonah Durbar, which I encloſe for your peruſal. Similar accounts have reached me from other quarters; but it does not appear, from any information I have obtained, that the force intended to be ſent towards this province has actually marched; and I am led to believe that the diſtracted ſtate of affairs at *Poonah*, and a circumſtance I alſo learn, of *Hyder Naic*'s having taken the field with a large army, will employ their attention too near the capital to admit of their detaching any conſiderable force at this diſtance againſt me. From my neighbourhood to the *Nurbudda*, I make no doubt of reaching it long before any troops could arrive, even were they detached, as talked of; and this conſideration induces me to puſh on to the river with all expedition. The Nawaub of *Bhopal* has ſent in a Vackeel to me, with aſſurances of friendſhip, and a ſupply of proviſions, through his country; ſo that at preſent I can foreſee no obſtruction to my march; for although *Balajee* declares he will follow me to the *Nurbudda*, I am convinced he cannot give me any material interruption; and I ſhall not ſuffer any project or plan whatever to divert my attention at this time from the main buſineſs. I have every reaſon to expect that the Bhopal Nawaub will furniſh the neceſſary ſupplies of proviſions; and although obliged to preſerve appearances with the Marattas, whoſe power he ſtands in awe of, I am of opinion, will not venture to take an active part on this occaſion. I am hopeful of paſſing through his country in peace and amity, only guarding againſt the invidious depredations of *Balajee*'s troops. I ſhall not fail to inform you of what may be finally concluded on with the Nawaub, and of my arrival at the *Nurbudda*; and as I have, ſince leaving *Rajigbur*, repeatedly wrote to *Moodajee*, informing him of my progreſs, I may expect to receive more particular replies from him every day, which I will immediately communicate to you, and the ſteps I may find neceſſary to take in conſequence.

I am, &c.

Camp at *Beerſea*, in *Bhopaul*, 16th November 1778; 8 coſs from *Iſlamnagur*, and 10 from *Bhopaul*.

(Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

The Governor General likewiſe lays before the Board, the copy of a letter written by *Moodajee Booſla* to Colonel *Goddard*, which the Governor lately received from Mr. *Anderſon* at *Naguepoor*, and which was delivered to him by *Dewargur Pundit*. It is dated the 23d November, and entered in the Perſian correſpondence of the Secret Department.

Read the letter.

The Governor General further reports to the Board, that he learns by letters from Mr. *Anderſon*, and by letters lately received by the Berar Vackeel, that *Moodajee Booſla* had been dangerouſly ill, inſomuch that his life was at one time deſpaired of, that he was thought out of danger when the letters were written, but advancing ſlow in his recovery. The following is an extract from Mr. *Anderſon*'s letter of the 15th November.

"The Rajah too, I am well aſſured, will not chuſe that we ſhould leave this until he ſees us, and it is not expected, from the ſituation in which he is at preſent, that he will be able to appear in public for theſe ten or twelve days. His illneſs has been exceedingly ſevere: he was for many days delirious, and they had, in utter deſpair of his life, taken him from the cott, and ſtretched him on the ground. It is now, however, ten or twelve days ſince a favourable criſis took place, and they ſeem to think him entirely out of danger, though ſtill in a very weak condition. A large tumour appeared on his neck, which has come to a ſuppuration; there remain, however, two on his body, which afflict him much. His father *Ragojee* died of a ſimilar diſorder, which has diſconcerted him much.

Paper of Intelligence ſent by *Moodajee.*

The newſpapers from the Vackeel at *Poonah*, as well as the letters from the Miniſters, contain the following particulars, which are repeated by many others, viz. That they aſſert, we neither have had or have now, any other views or deſigns than friendſhip and an adherence to treaty with the Engliſh, nor have we any connection with the French Vackeel; he came for the purpoſe of traffic; if, notwithſtanding, their forces are come to *Chatterpore*, and they make attempts within our dominions, and form further deſigns againſt us, it is incumbent on us to provide againſt them, and the armies of *Scindea* and *Holcar* ſhall be ſent into the Soubah of *Malwa:* but whilſt there is no act of enmity and diſunion on their part, no ſteps ſhall be taken by us.

Induced by the ſincereſt friendſhip, I write you without reſerve any intelligence I receive from *Poorunder*. You may depend on the truth of what my Vackeels at the different ſtations write you.

No. 161.

Mr. *Francis*—The letter from *Moodajee Booſla* being a public one from the Rajah of *Berar* to the commanding officer of the detachment, is of authority to the Board, and as I think contains matter of the moſt important information. As it is not followed by any motion from the Governor General, I beg leave to propoſe the following queſtions to the Board: firſt, Whether it does not appear to the Board, from the whole tenor of this letter, that *Moodajee Booſla* is not inclined to join Colonel *Goddard*, or to co-operate in any enterprize againſt the Poonah Government? Secondly, Whether it does not appear at this time to be the opinion of *Moodajee Booſla*, that Colonel *Goddard*'s proceeding on his march will expoſe the detachment to the greateſt difficulties and dangers? The affirmative to thoſe queſtions is on my judgment ſo clear, that I ſhall not attempt to maintain it by any other argument than a bare citation of ſome paſſages from the letter, which I deſire may be entered in this place. The Court of Directors will undoubtedly give due attention to the entire contents of it.

Governor General—To ſave partial quotations, I propoſe to Mr. *Francis*, that the whole letter may be entered.

Agreed to.

Mr. *Wheler*—I am of opinion, from the above letter, that it does appear that *Moodajee Booſla* is diſinclined to join Colonel *Goddard*, or to co-operate in any enterprize againſt the Poonah Government.

I am likewiſe of opinion, that it does appear by the letter before alluded to, that the detachment will be expoſed to the greateſt difficulties and dangers by the continuance of its march.

Mr. *Barwell*—I do not think any judgment can be formed from theſe letters of a change in the political line of conduct meant to be obſerved by the Berar State; it is ſuch as under the circumſtances of that Government relative to ours might have been expected. The queſtions now propoſed appear to me calculated to preclude that neceſſary information on which a decided reſolution muſt be taken by this Board; they lead obviouſly to ſome inſtant meaſure to commit the Government in the orders it may ſend to Colonel *Goddard* before it has heard from that officer; receiving the queſtions in this light, I muſt put my negative upon them; the affirmative, which Mr. *Francis* is pleaſed to declare to be ſo clear to his judgment, to mine requires the comment of the perſon to whoſe conduct and prudence the propoſed negociations with the Berar State have been committed, I mean Colonel *Goddard*.

Governor

Governor General—To both queſtions, I anſwer briefly—No. I will add, that whatever were the ſentiments of *Moodajee* at the time in which this letter was written, it is my belief, that we ſhall find in the event that *Moodajee* is both inclined to join Colonel *Goddard*, and to co-operate with him; and that though it is very plain from the poſtſcript of the letter, that he apprehended great dangers from the proſecution of the expedition by the detachment alone and unſupported; yet it does not therefore follow, that he entertains at this time the ſame opinion, if he ſhall have agreed to join and to co-operate with us. The papers which I have introduced on this day's proceedings were intended for record only, conceiving it to be incumbent upon me to afford the Board every information concerning the ſtate and progreſs of this important expedition. I join in opinion with Mr. *Barwell*, that the queſtions which have been propoſed are premature, if they lead to any object; and the cauſe of an unneceſſary waſte of time if they do not. On the news of Mr. *Elliott*'s death, I wrote to *Moodajee Booſla*, that I waited for his letters in conſequence of that event, to determine the future deſtination and operations of the detachment. This letter was written on the 11th of October; on the 12th November the expected letter from *Moodajee* arrived, and contained the moſt preſſing inſtances that the negociation might ſtill proceed, and that for the prevention of delay it might be committed to the charge of Mr. *Farquhar*, who had attended Mr. *Elliott* as his Secretary. On the 16th of the ſame month it was reſolved to empower Colonel *Goddard* to treat with *Moodajee Booſla* on the grounds of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions; and on the 23d letters were written to *Moodajee* adviſing him of it; therefore, from the time of Mr. *Elliott*'s death until the receipt of this laſt letter, he *(Moodajee)* and his Durbar muſt have remained in a total ſtate of ſuſpence and doubt reſpecting the deſtination and operations of the detachment, and of the intereſt which they might eventually have in both; ſo circumſtanced, it was not to be expected that they ſhould precipitately commit themſelves in ſo hazardous a connection, and the whole purport of the letter, read with this key to it, evidently means that they waited the final determination of this Government to regulate their own; that unleſs the orders from hence could enable them immediately, and without further reference, to concert ſome plan for our common operations, they ſhould decline to take any future part in our concerns but that of mediation; and that without their aid it might be dangerous to truſt to the ſtrength of the detachment alone in the proſecution of the remainder of its march to *Bombay*, neither would there be an adequate object to warrant ſuch a riſk. Perhaps the ſickneſs of *Moodajee* may have contributed to heighten the apprehenſions conceived by his Miniſter, who undoubtedly dictated the letter. Under a ſtate of ſuch uncertainty I ſhall ſuſpend my opinion until anſwers ſhall be received to the letter which I have laſt quoted, expecting that all written before the receipt of it will be from the ſame cauſes equally diſcouraging. Theſe are ſuch as might have been expected; ſuch as I ſhould have written myſelf in the ſame ſituation, in ſubſtance I mean; in expreſſion I ſhould never hope to equal that of the letter which has juſt been recorded.

The queſtions reſolved in the negative.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd. Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd. Wheler.

APPENDIX, No 162.

Letter from Governor General to *Moodajee Bhooſila*: Written the 29th December 1778.

I HAVE received from Mr. *Anderſon* a copy of the letter which you wrote laſt month to Colonel *Goddard*, and have peruſed it with the greateſt attention.

You write, that by the death of Mr. *Elliott* all your views are ſuſpended, and depend on further advices from *Calcutta*; and that by reaſon of its great diſtance, a long time would neceſſarily elapſe before all the points of a ſolid treaty between us could be diſcuſſed by letter; which delay you intimate may be dangerous to our views, and are apprehenſive may expoſe your dominions to danger. My friend, I am not ſurprized at theſe doubts; they were natural to your ſituation, and ſuch as I myſelf ſhould have entertained under like circumſtances. In my firſt letter, after the news of Mr. *Elliott*'s death, I informed you that I ſhould determine on nothing till I had heard further from you, and ſhould regulate the future deſtination and operation of the army by the knowledge of your inclination; had theſe been averſe to the proſecution of my deſigns, I ſhould probably have ſuſpended them, and recalled the detachment; but on the receipt of your letter, written immediately after you heard of Mr. *Elliott*'s death, in which you preſs me to perſevere in them by the moſt ſolid agreements, namely, that no trifling changes ſhould induce the Ruler of a State, poſſeſſed of firmneſs and magnanimity, to relinquiſh a plan formed on mature reflections; but that he ſhould, in ſpite of ſuch interruptions, which are in fact no more than trials, continue ſteadily fixed in the purſuit of his object; and add, that the fame of your friendſhip having inſpired our friends with confidence, and produced terror and diſmay amongſt our enemies, it was incumbent on me to take effectual meaſures to confirm their fortunate beginnings, by inveſting ſome perſon with authority to conclude a treaty on the inſtructions given to Mr. *Elliott*; I no longer heſitated but inſtantly obtained a formal commiſſion from this Government in my own name and that of the Council, to Colonel *Goddard*, to negociate and conclude a treaty on Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, and to concert with you a plan of operations for our mutual benefit: this of courſe removes all objections ariſing from ſuſpicion of delays. The meaſure is now made your own: I have done my part, and truſt to your fortitude and reſolution for the reſt. Since, however, delays have happened, and inconveniences may ariſe from Colonel *Leſlie* having, in contradiction to his orders, loitered away a conſiderable time in his march, I have thought proper to provide a reinforcement of two battalions for the detachment. They will march on the 4th of January, or 15th of Zehedja, without cannon, for the ſake of expedition, by the direct road of *Ramgur* and *Chittu Naigpore*, to our weſtern frontiers, and there wait your orders; if you direct them to proceed and join Colonel *Goddard* they will go, if not, they will remain there or return; for in this ſervice I ſhall do nothing without your concurrence. Major *Camac*, a ſteady and brave officer, well known to the Chiefs in that quarter, will conduct them. Let Colonel *Goddard* be made acquainted with your intentions; and write to Major *Camac* with the proper paſſports, if you approve of his proceeding.

I have engaged thus far at your deſire, even more than on my own confirmed judgment; I repeat your own words, which I have before quoted,

"It does not become great minds to relinquiſh a plan "formed on mature reflection, in conſequence of a "trifling change of circumſtances; but it is their diſ- "tinguiſhing characteriſtic to perſevere ſteadily to the "end."

Do not, therefore, diſappoint me.

Colonel *Goddard*'s inſtructions in eſſentials are poſitive. I have conſulted your intereſts even more than my own, and exact in return the ſame candour and confidence to me which I have invariably obſerved towards you. The eyes of the world are on us both; they have ſeen me ſtruggle through difficulties to the points at which with your aid I have inſured the moſt glorious ſucceſs; the termination of which, by the bleſſing of God, will afford peace and laſting ſecurity to the Engliſh dominions in *India*, and to increaſe of power, honour, and

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and immortal reputation. For the reſt I refer you to Colonel *Goddard*: confide in him as a man that poſſeſſes my confidence; and rely on his bravery and ſkill as an officer of the firſt experience and merits, and endowed with a great portion of all the virtues of a ſoldier, which you poſſeſs in a more eminent degree than any of the Chiefs of the preſent age.

To *Dewagur Pundit*: D°.

The ſame as the foregoing, except where the difference of ſituation renders a change of expreſſion neceſſary; and with this additional paragraph, which comes in after the quotation ending "Perſevere ſteadily to the end."

The encouragement you have given me in your ſeveral letters to purſue ſteadily the plan formed for our mutual benefit, but more particularly for that of your maſter; and the reputation you have gained for wiſdom, firmneſs, and reſolution, have been ſtrong motives with me to perſevere, not doubting I ſhould receive the moſt effectual aid and ſupport from the Maha Rajah, for the attainment of the beneficial objects propoſed by the plan.

APPENDIX, No. 163.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, December 28th 1778.

THE Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

As the unexpected and unneceſſary delays in the progreſs of the Bombay detachment until the death of Colonel *Leſlie*, muſt have unavoidably occaſioned a much more conſiderable dimunition of the ſtrength of the corps than could have happened, had he proceeded with that expedition which his duty required, and which it was in his power to have uſed for effecting the ſervice he was ſent upon, and as theſe contingencies will naturally increaſe with the length of the march, it is neceſſary to make proviſion for ſuch a reinforcement, as ſhall not only ſupply all preſent deficiencies, but keep up the detachment to the effective ſtrength of its original eſtabliſhment, and was judged requiſite to attain the objects for which it was formed.

For theſe purpoſes, I beg leave to ſubmit the following propoſitions to the conſideration of the Board.

1ſt. That two battalions of Sepoys be allotted for this ſervice, and ordered to proceed immediately, without their artillery, to the extremity of our weſtern frontier, and there wait the directions of Colonel *Goddard*, either for a junction with his detachment, for the protection of *Naugpoor*, or for preſerving the communication with theſe provinces, as he ſhall judge moſt conducive to the purpoſe of the expedition.

2d. That the 13th and 14th battalions of Sepoys be ſent upon this ſervice, and ordered to croſs the river on Monday next, the 4th January, and proceed directly on their march by the neareſt practicable route.

3d. That this detachment be immediately ſupplied with ſixty barrels of muſket ammunition, four barrels of flints, and treaſure to the amount of half a lack of Sunnaut rupees.

4th. That Major *Camac* be appointed to the command of this detachment.

I do not intend by this ſelection of Major *Camac*, to derogate from the merits or capacity of other officers of his rank, many of whom may be equal to him in capacity, and the general knowledge of their profeſſion; but his long and ſucceſsful ſervices in ſome of the countries through which the march of the detachment will lie; his perſonal knowledge of moſt of the Chiefs in the route; and their known reſpect for his character and abilities, together with the ſtrong attachment to him of the 14th battalion formerly under his command, peculiarly qualify Major *Camac* for the execution of this particular ſervice.

(Signed) *W. H.*

Mr. *Francis*—The Governor General's minute is founded on a ſuppoſition of a fact, which ought to be aſcertained exactly by the return of Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment. There is no direct evidence before the Board that I know of, to ſhew what loſs of men has already been incurred, or whether there has been any; until I ſee the returns of the detachment, I cannot ſee the neceſſity of reinforcing it by two battalions. On the principles of the propoſition I am to conclude, that Colonel *Goddard* has already loſt a number of men equal to the reinforcement; but I do not know that this is the fact, nor do I know on what grounds the two battalions amounting to 1,632 men are fixed upon.

Mr. *Wheler*—The majority of the Board being alone reſponſible for the ſafety of the detachment now under the command of Colonel *Goddard*, and having I preſume ſufficient reaſon to apprehend, that it is or ſoon will be reduced to a very critical ſtate, from a variety of difficulties which they have already, and muſt yet encounter, I ſhall not in this place attempt to obſtruct the propoſition now before the Board; but beg it may not be underſtood, that by aſſenting to the Governor's motion I depart in any degree from thoſe opinions or principles which have induced me to oppoſe the march and progreſs of this detachment.

Mr. *Francis*—There being no return before the Board, nor any explanation given of the actual ſtate of the detachment, I am obliged to admit a ſuppoſition, that a loſs, equal to the propoſed reinforcement, has been or is likely to be incurred. On this ground I am of opinion, that every argument which I have hitherto urged againſt the march of the army is confirmed; and that the wiſeſt thing we can do in the preſent circumſtances is to recall it. By ſending reinforcements we increaſe our expence, we hazard ſo much more of our force, and leſſen the defence of *Bengal* in the ſame proportion. How two battalions, ſent from hence at this time, can be of any ſervice to Colonel *Goddard*, I do not comprehend. The place at which we have reaſon to ſuppoſe him at preſent, is I believe ten degrees weſt of *Calcutta*; the country through which the reinforcement is to paſs is wild, ſavage, and unknown; even that part which belongs to us can hardly be ſaid to be under our dominion, and is beſides in a great degree impracticable for troops: for theſe reaſons, I object to the motion. I alſo object to the command being given to a field officer, as I think it an unneceſſary increaſe of expence; the eldeſt of the two Captains might perform the ſervice: I do not mean to derogate from Major *Camac*'s merit; on the contrary, I wiſh to detain him here, where I apprehend his ſervice will be moſt wanted.

Mr. *Barwell*—I approve entirely of the propoſition and I think it properly timed. Before Colonel *Leſlie*'s detachment advanced into the territories of the Rajah of *Berar*, this cautionary meaſure could not produce thoſe effects which muſt follow its adoption at this time. The meaſure is a very judicious one, equally if regarded as the means of keeping up the detachment to the effective ſtrength of its original eſtabliſhment, to cover its retreat, or to puſh its advance. It will certainly give vigour and influence to its operations, and that ſecurity to the domihions of the Berar Chief, as to diſpel every apprehenſion he may entertain of the hoſtilities with which he may be threatened. I entirely concur with Mr. *Francis* in opinion, that is, there is no indiſpenſable neceſſity to influence the propoſition; and if I was to proceed to form my opinion ſimply on the neceſſity of the thing, I ſhould undoubtedly vote againſt the march of theſe troops. The diſtricts of *Palamow* and *Chute Nagpore* are by no means ſavage countries, nor is that of *Bimbajee*, immediately bordering upon them, through which is the direct road to *Berar*. Major *Camac* formerly reduced

theſe

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theſe ſavage countries to the borders of the State ruled by *Bimbajee*, with his own battalion of Sepoys, and kept them in ſubjection; and I believe the force lately allotted by this Government to the latter purpoſe is limited to five regular companies, and effected to this period by three militia companies. As to increaſe of expence, this meaſure makes no alteration in the military eſtabliſhment, nor will the defence of *Bengal* in my opinion be weakened by theſe troops being placed in a judicious ſtation on the weſtern frontier, as it does not appear to me that the utmoſt weſtern ſtation that can be fixed on, can go beyond 150 miles from the north weſt point of the Midnapore province.

The Governor General—Since the objections which were made to the propoſitions introduced by me on the 16th of laſt month, among which objections I recollect that Mr. *Francis*, after having on another occaſion entered on our proceedings as authority, the extract of an anonymous letter, formally denied the authority of a letter addreſſed by the commanding officer of the Bombay detachment, to the firſt and executive member of this Government; and even proteſted in ſubſtance, if not in terms, againſt the correſpondence carried on between them; in which opinions he was ſeconded by Mr. *Wheler*; I have expected oppoſition to every meaſure propoſed, for the ſafety and ſucceſs of the detachment, as a point of courſe and the effects of ſyſtem, and have diſcontinued the practiſe of anſwering all the arguments which have been occaſionally applied to this ſubject; and indeed I have been diſcouraged from affording the Board in their collective character, thoſe lights which upon many points were neceſſary for their information; eſpecially as the correſpondence with Colonel *Goddard* has been frequently interrupted, and many of his public letters I believe loſt. I ſhall henceforth hold it unneceſſary to ſwell our proceedings with uſeleſs diſcuſſions, and ſhall confine myſelf to the ſimple recital of facts, and to ſuch comments on them only, as ſhall be neceſſary to the information of our ſuperiors. I have thought it proper to introduce this declaration in this place, that my ſilence in matters of mere controverſy might not be imputed to a wrong cauſe. On the preſent occaſion, it is neceſſary to mention ſimply as a fact, that the loſs of men ſuſtained by the detachment from its firſt marching, bears no degree of proportion to the reinforcement I have propoſed, and has in effect been inconſiderable. But whether one hundred, or ſixteen hundred men are wanted to recruit it, it is equally neceſſary that a force be ſent capable of protecting itſelf in the way, independently of the other reaſons, which have induced me to propoſe, that two battalions be employed on this ſervice.

Mr. *Francis*—I have never objected to the Governor General's laying any papers he thought proper before the Board; but I do object to our receiving private letters to him as authority to this Government. If there be any reaſon why the correſpondence of the officers commanding the detachment ſhould not be addreſſed directly to the Board, I am unacquainted with it. The fact alluded to by the Governor General, is not accurately ſtated. I did never propoſe an extract of a private letter as authority to the Board, or to be the ground of any act of theirs. It appears by the proceedings, that I repeatedly aſked if there were any returns of the ſtate of Colonel *Leſlie*'s army, or of the caſualties, which had happened on the firſt day's march from *Calpee*. Finding there were none, I gave the Board that private information, which was in my poſſeſſion. I ſtill believe it was true, at leaſt in the material part. There were at that time many private letters in *Calcutta* to the ſame effect. On the remainder of the Governor General's laſt minute, I willingly ſubmit myſelf to the judgment of the Court of Directors. Debate in this place is uſeleſs.

Governor General—I appeal to the minutes delivered in the Conſultation of the 22d June, and to the conviction which every man muſt feel in his own breaſt, that a paper of that nature, which contained information of facts alone, ſo ſolemnly given by a member of the Government, muſt have been intended for authority or ought not to have been given at all. The following words extracted from Mr *Francis*'s minute evidently mark it to have been intended for authority. What Mr. *Francis* deemed worthy of his credit, and eſpecially deſerving the conſideration of the Board, muſt certainly have been underſtood to poſſeſs that quality. "As I find there are no "public letters before the Board, to inform us of the par- "ticular circumſtances that attended Colonel *Leſlie*'s "march on the firſt day from *Calpee*, I beg leave to lay "before the Board an extract of a private letter from "camp, to which I give credit, and which I think de- "ſerves our conſideration; I underſtand there are many "private letters in town, which give the ſame ac- "counts."

Mr. *Francis*—I ſtated the letter to be a private one, and deſire that reference may be had to the whole of that day's proceedings. Whatever credit I myſelf might have given to it, I can eaſily ſhew that the Governor General did not receive it as authority; his words are, "I believe that the troops muſt have ſuffered from the "heat and want of water on the road; I did in effect "foretel it in a minute dictated at this Board; but I "believe that the anonymous extract produced by Mr. "*Francis*, is a groſs exaggeration, and calculated more "to conciliate the favour of the perſon to whom it was "probably addreſſed, than to convey a ſtrict relation of "the truth."

Governor General—I certainly did not, nor did this affect my argument; I ſpeak of authority *given*, not *admitted*. I propoſe that a letter be immediately written to Colonel *Goddard*, to inform him of theſe reſolutions, and that as much as be neceſſary be publiſhed in general orders.

Agreed to.

The following letter is accordingly written to Colonel *Goddard*:

To Colonel *Goddard*, commanding the Detachment from 1ſt Brigade.

Sir,

Deeming it expedient that a reinforcement of troops ſhould be ſent to ſupply the loſſes which you may have ſuſtained in the detachment under your command, by deaths and deſertion, and to keep up its effective ſtrength to the original eſtabliſhment, we have ordered the 13th and 14th battalions of Sepoys to march immediately, under the command of Major *Camac*, to the weſtern frontier of the Company's provinces without their artillery, and directed him to halt there, and to wait your inſtructions, either to form a junction with your detachment, or to preſerve the communication with theſe provinces, as you ſhall judge moſt conducive to the purpoſes of the expedition; and we deſire that you will correſpond with him, and tranſmit to him ſuch orders and information, from time to time, as the good of the ſervice may require.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
28th December 1778.

The following inſtructions were given to Major *Camac*, on the 14th inſtant, in conformity to the reſolutions of the Board:

Sir,

Having appointed you to the chief command of the detachment which has been lately formed at the Preſidency, and ordered to march to the weſtern frontier of *Bengal*, we direct that you take charge of the ſame, and proceed,

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proceed, agreeably to our general orders, with the troops which form this detachment. We have directed the Chief and Council at *Burdwan* to cauſe 150 draft and carriage bullocks to be preſſed, and held in readineſs to march with you from that place, as the contractor will not be able to ſupply you in proper time; you will therefore notify your approach to them, and fix a place for the delivery of the bullocks, which they may in conſequence provide for the ſervice of the detachment.

We alſo direct that you hold a conſtant correſpondence and communication with Colonel *Goddard*, or the officer in command of the detachment from the 1ſt brigade. By the laſt advices from the Colonel, dated in December, he was at *Huſſingabad*, on the ſouth ſide the *Nerbudda*, on the borders of *Berar*.

As our intention in making the preſent detachment is to reinforce the troops commanded by Colonel *Goddard*, you will obey ſuch orders as you may receive from him; he will inſtruct you either to join your force to his, or to remain at ſuch ſtation as may be thought moſt conveniently ſituated for preſerving his communication and intercourſe with theſe provinces.

You will adviſe us from time to time of your proceedings, and correſpond with us until you ſhall have formed a junction with Colonel *Goddard*, from which period you will conſider yourſelf ſolely under his orders.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
14th January 1779.

To *Beneram Pundit*; written the 30th December.

I yeſterday addreſſed letters to the Maha Rajah and his Dewan *Dewagur Pundit*, expreſſive of the concern I felt at the doubts he appeared to entertain, by his letter to Colonel *Goddard* (copy of which I have ſeen) and ſhould have written you at the ſame time, but was prevented for want of leiſure. As the Maha Rajah long ſince muſt have been acquainted with the powers given to Colonel *Goddard* to negociate and conclude all points with him, all his doubts muſt have ceaſed; and on your prudence and approved attachment to both States, I greatly depend to make ſuch repreſentations to your maſter as may induce him to join heartily in the proſecution of a plan calculated principally for his benefit, and in which we have both proceeded too far to recede, which would not only bring diſcredit on me, but would likewiſe be the cauſe of the greateſt injury to his affairs, and might end in his ruin; for he may be aſſured, that the part he has already taken, and the inclination he has ſhewn, will never be forgotten or forgiven, and that his retracting would be imputed to want of reſolution, and conſequently embolden thoſe whom he has offended to revenge it whenever an opportunity offers; whereas by a ſteady perſeverance in the meaſures propoſed, he will increaſe the power and credit of his State, and by his intimate union with the Government, will be effectually ſecured againſt the attempt of all his enemies.

From the knowledge I have of the Rajah's penetration, firmneſs, and magnanimity, I have no doubt but theſe arguments will be ſufficient to induce him heartily to join in my meaſures; and in you I truſt to give them the weight they deſerve.

To obviate every poſſible inconvenience apprehended by the Maha Rajah in the proſecution of the march of our joint forces, by reaſon of the delay which has ariſen, I have thought proper to provide a reinforcement of two battalions for the detachment, which will begin their march under the command of Major *Camac*, a ſteady and brave officer, on the 15th of Zehidja, and take their route through *Ramgur* and *Chittah Naigpore* to our weſtern frontiers, where they will wait your orders from the Maha Rajah, and will either proceed and join Colonel *Goddard*, or remain there, as he ſhall direct; as I am determined to do nothing in their ſervice without his concurrence.

For further particulars I refer you to your brother's letters, which will accompany this. Knowing your maſter's intereſt and honour inſeparably connected with ours, you will uſe your utmoſt endeavours to give a proſperous iſſue to the deſign in hand. The news of the Maha Rajah's indiſpoſition has filled me with inexpreſſible concern, and my anxiety to hear of his recovery is not to be deſcribed. May God ſpeedily reſtore to him perfect health! This is my conſtant wiſh and prayer.

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 7th January 1779.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

READ the following Letters from Lieutenant Colonel *Goddard*:

Gentlemen,

I had the honour of addreſſing you the 19th inſtant from *Heirapore*, and informed you of my hopes to meet with no interruption on my march through *Ballajee*'s territories, upon the confines of which I was then arrived. In conſequence of a particular requeſt he made me to avoid *Sagur*, the capital of his country, on account of the loſs he muſt ſuſtain by the approach of an army there, I gave my conſent, and received from him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of friendſhip, and every neceſſary aſſiſtance on my route. Determined to loſe no time in protracted negociations, which I knew muſt be the caſe if I waited to ſettle any terms with him, I ſo far confided in the profeſſions he made, as to move forward on the road he had pointed out; however, I was too well acquainted with his perfidious and treacherous character to neglect guarding myſelf effectually againſt any attempts he might be tempted to make upon the baggage of the army. The event juſtified the precaution I had uſed; for on my march yeſterday to this place, when I was leaving the confines of his country, his whole army, to the amount of about 5,000 horſe, appeared on my rear, and made repeated attacks upon the baggage and followers, in which however they were completely diſappointed and baffled. It is ſurely unneceſſary to make any particular remarks upon this conduct of *Ballajee*'s, which equally ſerves to diſplay his inſolence and treachery. After obſerving the greateſt caution and order in marching through his country, preſerving from violation the villages and inhabitants, who did not even quit their habitations on my approach; and above all, after the treaty entered into by his brother *Gungader* at *Calpee*, which ought to have been binding on him, and the conſequent reſtoration of that fortreſs, as well as his own repeated profeſſions of friendſhip made to myſelf, the impotent attack he made to plunder the followers, whom he hoped to have found unguarded and defenceleſs, is an inſtance of villainous cowardice, which ſurely deſerves the ſevereſt chaſtiſement. As I deem it of the utmoſt importance to croſs the *Nerbudda* with all poſſible expedition, I muſt forego the ſatisfaction I ſhould feel in inflicting puniſhment on him at preſent, by marching to *Sagur*, as it is 20 coſs in the rear, and in its conſequences might detain me a whole month: I ſhall not therefore, unleſs attacked by his people, proceed to further hoſtilities, againſt him. I am now arrived on the confines of the Bilſah diſtrict, a territory belonging to *Madhadjee Scindier*, whoſe Aumil has ſent a Vackeel in, with propoſals of amity and every friendly aſſiſtance from his maſter; ſo that I hope to have an unmoleſted march through his country. I beg to acquaint you, that ſome

of the bills which were drawn upon the Revenue Council at *Moorſhedabad* have been returned, as they ſay they have not received your orders to diſcharge them.

I have, &c.

Camp near *Convey*, on the Banks of the *Betwar* River, 5th November 1778. *Tho' Goddard.*

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th ultimo, inveſting me with the command and direction of the expedition ordered to *Bombay*, and requiring the return of Colonel *Leſlie* to the provinces, with the firſt regiment of cavalry. The demiſe of Colonel *Leſlie* at *Raje Ghur*, which has long ſince been communicated to you, render unneceſſary any reply to what immediately relates to him; and, as far as my own feelings are affected by the particular marks of favour you have ſhewn me, I can only aſſure you, that the grateful ſenſe I muſt ever entertain of them will call forth my utmoſt exertion in executing with fidelity the truſt you had repoſed in my zeal and attention, and proving myſelf worthy of the honourable diſtinction which you have conferred upon me. I beg to inform you, that I have detained the firſt regiment of cavalry, conceiving it would be expoſed to conſiderable danger in paſſing through the intermediate countries, from this place to the provinces; as the unſerviceable condition it is at preſent in, while it adds little to the ſtrength of the detachment by continuing with me, would however render its return impracticable, if ſent back alone, eſpecially as the troops are now far advanced on their route. In my laſt letter from *Kowry*, I informed you of the treachery practiſed by *Balajee*, and of my arrival on the confines of the Bilſah territory: in conſequence of an agreement received from the Chief of the latter, I have paſſed alſo through his country; and have the pleaſure to acquaint you with my arrival at *Bhopal*, about 18 coſs from the Gaut of *Huſſungabad*, at which place I hope to croſs the *Nerbudda* in a few days. The troops of *Balajee*, joined ſince by thoſe of the Bilſah Chief, and by others in the intereſt of the preſent Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, amounting in all to about 10,000, continue in my rear, and endeavour to haraſs me by attempts to cut off the ſtraggling baggage and ſupplies of proviſions. They have not ſucceeded in their endeavours to diſtreſs me hitherto; and the inconvenience they mean to give, has no other effect than to make me move with greater caution and ſecurity.

I have, &c.

Camp near *Bhopal*, 20th November 1778. *Tho' Goddard.*

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th October; and of the minutes of Council tranſmitted by your Secretary, appointing me to the rank of Brevet Colonel during the preſent expedition; for which diſtinguiſhing mark of your favour I beg to offer my ſincere thanks, and the aſſurances of exerting every endeavour to prove myſelf deſerving of it. I wrote you the 20th inſtant, informing you of my arrival at *Bhopál*, where I have been detained for ſome days in providing a plentiful ſupply of grain for the detachment to the *Nerbudda*, as the route to that river lies through a country full of jungles, and almoſt totally uncultivated; beſides that the approach of our army, and the fear of being plundered by the Marattas in our rear, has induced moſt of the inhabitants to move off to ſome diſtance for the ſecurity of their effects. I have found it neceſſary, particularly circumſtanced as I was upon my arrival here, to enter into an agreement with the Nawab of *Bhopál*, who has engaged to ſupply me with a ſufficient quantity of proviſions, and to furniſh boats at *Huſſungabad* for the paſſage of the troops acroſs the *Nerbudda*. Theſe friendly inclinations towards us have drawn upon him the reſentment of *Balajee* and his confederates; who have burnt and deſtroyed great part of his country on the way to this place, and ſtill threaten him with the vengeance of the Poonah Adminiſtration for thus acting in contradiction to the Peiſhwa's orders, of preventing if poſſible our march acroſs the *Nerbudda*. Appendix. No. 164.

I have therefore at his earneſt ſolicitation, and on account of the difficulties he may hereafter be expoſed to, from the amicable conduct he has adopted reſpecting us, promiſed to recommend him in the ſtrongeſt terms to the favour and protection of the Engliſh Adminiſtration; in doing which I have been careful not to involve your Government in any engagements which you might have cauſe to diſapprove of, or which might interfere with the more important objects of your political intentions, but have left entirely to your own free choice the meaſures you may deem it proper and eligible to purſue in conſequence of my repreſentation made to you. I beg to acquaint you that I propoſe marching from this place to-morrow, and proſecuting my route to the *Nerbudda*.

I have, &c. &c.

Camp near *Bhopál*, November 25th, 1778. *Tho' Goddard.*

Gentlemen,

Since the letter I had the honour to addreſs you of the 25th November, I have left *Bhopál*, and am arrived on the banks of the *Nerbudda*, at the Gaut of *Huſſungabad*.

The route to this place has been through a mountainous and rough country, where the troops have exerted themſelves with the greateſt cheerfulneſs and alacrity, in removing the ſtones and large trees which in many places had blocked up the road, and rendered it impaſſable for carriages and artillery, without the greateſt labour and difficulty. It is with particular pleaſure I can recommend to you the attention of the officers, and perſeverance of the men on this occaſion, who performed in four days, under all the difficulties I have mentioned, a march of at leaſt 46 miles. From the diſpoſition and eagerneſs they have now diſplayed, I am led to form the moſt favourable proſpect of their future conduct, and cannot but flatter myſelf with the hopes that it will be ſuch as to merit your approbation. The Nawab of *Bhopál* has literally and faithfully adhered to the engagements he entered into of ſupplying the army with proviſions through his country, and furniſhing boats for croſſing the *Nerbudda* at *Huſſungabad*, which is dependant upon his authority. He alſo prevented the troops of *Balajee* from following my route, which they repeatedly propoſed to do; and declared he would repel them by force if they proſecuted further war within his territories. In ſhort, he has acted with ſuch ſincerity and regard to his engagements made to me on this occaſion, that I am induced to repreſent to you my entire ſatisfaction with his conduct; and the uſeful aſſiſtance he has afforded at a time when the being compelled to hoſtilities muſt have detained the detachment conſiderably, and perhaps in the end have proved a material injury to the ſervice on which it was ſent: while I thus do juſtice to his ſincerity and friendſhip, let me alſo contraſt with it the treacherous and ill-adviſed behaviour of *Balajee*, who, notwithſtanding the moderate and conciliating meaſures I adoped towards him, and the pains I took to preſerve his country from violence, attempted all in his power to impede his march. I am informed that he alleges, in excuſe for his conduct, the orders of the preſent Peiſhwa. This he never communicated to me himſelf by letter, or through his Vackeel; but I have no doubt of inſtructions having been ſent him, as well as the other Chiefs on the north of the *Nerbudda*, by the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, to join in preventing the Engliſh from croſſing that river; and I know he threatened the Nawab of *Bhopál* with the vengeance of the Peiſhwa, in caſe he would not unite his forces to oppoſe our march. I beg leave further to acquaint you, that

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that the troops have this day began to paſs the river; and I hope in three days to have the detachment completely croſſed. The Berar territories commence about ſeven coſs from the *Nerbudda*, on the confines of which a confidential perſon from the Court of *Naigpore* is waiting the arrival of the troops, whoſe preſence I expect in a few days in my camp.

Camp at *Huſſungabad* Gaut, on the *Nerbudda*, December 1, 1778.

I have, &c. &c.
Thos Goddard.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 1ſt inſtant, informing you of my arrival at the *Nerbudda*, which river the whole detachment completely croſſed the following day: the cauſe of this diſpatch was owing to the diſcovery of a ford, at a ſmall diſtance below the Gaut, by which the artillery, carriages, &c. and remainder of the army paſſed over, two battalions only having croſſed the evening of the 1ſt inſtant. I ſhall remain encamped upon the ſouth ſide ſome days; and this delay, while it is neceſſary to determine the political meaſures proper to be purſued, equally ſuits the convenience of the troops; for, owing to the bad roads over which they have marched, more particularly ſince leaving *Bhopal*, all the artillery and gun carriages are much ſhattered and in want of repair, beſides the healthineſs of this ſpot, upon the high and open bank of a clear plentiful ſtream of water, conveniently ſituated for a ſupply of proviſions from the town of *Huſſungabad*, and from the neighbourhood of the Berar territories, will in all likelihood greatly recover the remaining ſick of the detachment, which upon the march from *Rage Ghur* amounted to a thouſand men, and at this time are reduced to about four hundred. *Lala Jadou Roy*, the confidential perſon ſent to meet the army, on the part of *Moodajee*, has waited on me ſince croſſing the *Nerbudda*, and has expreſſed himſelf in terms the moſt friendly and favourable to the Engliſh intereſt, which he ſays his maſter is diſpoſed to promote to the utmoſt of his power. As my arrival at this place was ſooner than had been foreſeen or expected, I ſhall halt ſome days till the particular diſpatches can arrive from the Berar Court, by which my future plan of operations ſhall be directed, which I ſhall not fail to communicate to you. I think it neceſſary to inform you, that I have not been favoured with a letter from the Select Committee at *Bombay* of a later date than the 21ſt July, which contained no particular intelligence whatever. I have not neglected to acquaint them from time to time with the progreſs of my march, and requeſted to receive their inſtructions and advice relative to the route of the detachment, as well as every information they could give of the motion of any bodies of troops in that quarter; I am therefore in expectation of hearing from them every day.

Camp on the ſouth ſide the *Nerbudda*, 5th December 1778.

I have, &c. &c.
(Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

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Letter from *Moodajee Bhoſila* to the Governor General: dated the 15th of Zekaida, 5th of December 1778; and received 2d January 1779.

YOUR friendly letter of the 19th of Ramzaun, (11th of October) informing me of your having received advice of the death of Mr. *Elliott* in his way to *Naigpore*; your concern at that event, and at the unavoidable ſuſpenſion of the negociations which that gentleman was to have conducted with me on the part of your Government; and the delay in the eſtabliſhment of a ſtrict and perpetual friendſhip between the Company's States and mine, concerning which you had exerted yourſelf ſo warmly, by reaſon that the preſent ſituation of affairs would not admit of the delay which muſt attend the deputation of another perſon from thence, without injuring the deſigns in hand; but that in your conviction of my favourable diſpoſition, from the knowledge that my intereſts and the Company's are inſeparably connected, and in the zeal of *Beneram Pundit*, whom, during the long period he reſided with you, you found ſo deſerving of your confidence, from his ſincere attachment to our common intereſts; that you communicated to him your ſentiments and views in the moſt full and explicit manner, you have a reſource for effecting the important objects of Mr. *Elliott*'s miſſion; that *Beneram Pundit* would explain to me the conditions which you ſhould require, and to which you would yield your acquieſcence; and that to him therefore you refer me for fuller information; and requeſt that I will give him an attentive hearing, as your view in the plan propoſed, and in what you have written, is to promote our common advantage, nor for the intereſt of one party only, being convinced that no public alliance or private friendſhip can be firmly eſtabliſhed without reciprocal advantages; that it is on theſe principles that you have long planned an alliance with me, the time for the accompliſhment of which is now come, for you conceive it to be equally for my intereſt as for yours, our countries bordering on each other, and our natural enemies being the ſame; that, in a word, you require nothing but the junction of my forces with yours, by which though each is ſingly very powerful, they will acquire a ten-fold proportion of ſtrength: that the delay in the progreſs of the detachment intended for *Bombay* had not ariſen from the oppoſition of an enemy, but from other cauſes improper to mention, but that it will now ſhortly arrive in my territories, and its operations be determined by my advice; that you have given directions to Colonel *Leſlie*, the commanding officer, to co-operate with the forces which I ſhall unite with his; that as you offer me the forces of your Sircar to promote my views, you in return expect the aſſiſtance of mine to effect your purpoſes; with other particulars which I fully underſtand, reached me on the 20th of Shawaul (16th November) and afforded me great pleaſure. I alſo received duplicate and triplicate of this letter; in the latter part of it you expreſs, that as you have fully made me acquainted with your views, it is neceſſary that I alſo communicate to you without reſerve the ends which I look to for my advantage in this union; that the good faith of the Engliſh to every engagement they contract, ſo long as it is obſerved by others, is univerſally known, and that it has been the invariable rule of your conduct to ſupport this character in all acts depending on you, and never to relinquiſh any deſign of importance formed on good and judicious grounds, but to perſevere ſteadily to its completion: that having thus explained to me your ſentiments and views, you wait only to know mine, and on the knowledge of theſe you ſhall form your ultimate reſolutions.

It is equally a maxim of ſincere friendſhip, of good government, ſteadineſs, magnanimity, and foreſight, that a plan formed on good and judicious grounds, ſhould be conducted in ſuch a manner as to end happily: you deſire to learn my ſentiments and views, and deferring to form your ultimate reſolutions till you heard farther from me, is the ſame thing as if you had conſulted me primarily on your firſt deſigns.

Since after the ſtricteſt ſcrutiny and reſearches into the diſpoſitions and views of the multitude, it has been determined, on proofs of mutual ſincerity and good faith, that a perpetual friendſhip and union be eſtabliſhed, it will like the wall of *Alexander*, for the happineſs of mankind, continue unſhaken till the end of time.

The having cauſed a tranſlation to be made into the Engliſh of the Hindoo books, called the *Shaſter* and *Poran*,

Poran, and of the hiſtory of the former Kings; the ſtudying theſe books, and keeping the pictures of former Kings and preſent Rulers of *Hind*, *Decan*, &c. always before your eyes, and from their lifeleſs ſimilitudes to diſcover which of them were or are worthy of rule, and poſſeſſed of good faith, from which to determine with whom to contract engagements, and what conduct to obſerve to them reſpectively; alſo the endeavour to preſerve the bleſſing of peace, till forced to relinquiſh it; the ſupporting every one in his hereditary right, and revenging the breach of faith and engagements, but on the ſubmiſſion of the offender, the exerciſe of the virtues of clemency and generoſity, by pardoning and receiving him again to favour, and reſtoring him to his poſſeſſions; the not ſuffering the intoxication of power to ſeduce you into a breach of faith; and the giving ſupport to each illuſtrious houſe, in proportion to its reſpective merits, and in matters which require a long courſe of years to bring to perfection; the forming your conduct on mature deliberation, and the advice of the Company and Council, are the ſure means of exalting your greatneſs and proſperity to the higheſt pitch: the intention of all this is to recommend univerſal peace and friendſhip in the manner following: the Almighty diſpoſes of kingdoms, and places whomſoever he chuſes on the ſeats of power and rule, but makes their ſtability to depend on their peaceable, juſt, and friendly conduct to others: it is not every one who is equal to the taſk of government, on the plan deſigned by the Almighty Ruler, and of inſuring his ſtability by a wiſe and juſt conduct: *Hind* and *Decan* poſſeſs at preſent very few enlightened, but a great multitude of weak and ignorant men; the Engliſh Chiefs, and you in a ſuperior degree, poſſeſs all the virtues above recited; who coming from diſtant iſlands by a ſix months voyage on the great ocean, by their magnanimity and fortitude, gained the dominion of many Soubahs on that continent: it is eaſy to acquire a kingdom, but to become a King over Kings and Chief of Chiefs, is a very difficult matter: the attainment of this is only to be effected by the means of friendſhip, by which the univerſe may be ſubjected: my conduct is formed on theſe principles. The preſence of *Beneram Pundit* at *Calcutta* was ſolely to effect the eſtabliſhment of the moſt intimate friendſhip, and by the bleſſing of God it has taken ſuch deep root, that through your means it has reached the ears of the Company and King of *England*; and our connection and correſpondence carried on under the veil of the vicinity of our dominions, has been diſcovered by the Poonah Miniſters and the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*; yet although they form various conjectures and doubts, and have ſent a truſty Vackeel, and written repeated letters to endeavour to find out the motives of our union, yet they remain a myſtery, as I make the plea of our ancient ties, and the junction of our territories.

I was impatiently expecting the arrival of Mr. *Elliott*, who, being endowed with an enlightened underſtanding, and inveſted with full powers from you to conduct the negociations, and determine on the meaſures to be purſued, would have eſtabliſhed the ties of perpetual friendſhip, and have ſettled every matter on the firmeſt baſis. It pleaſed God that he ſhould die on the journey; and the grief I felt on this unfortunate loſs, who would have been the means of ſettling all points between us to our mutual content, and by his negociations with me, of giving ſatisfaction to the Peiſhwa and the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*, all which have been by his death thrown back many months, is not to be deſcribed, and could only ſerve to add to your affliction. I have not yet recovered the ſhock which this event gave me, as you will learn from *Beneram Pundit*: there is no remedy for ſuch misfortunes; and it is in vain to ſtrive againſt the decrees of Providence. Had Mr. *Elliott* arrived, ſuch ſtrokes of policy would have been employed, that the Poonah Miniſters would have adhered more ſcrupulouſly than before to their engagements; and the French, who are the natural enemies of the Engliſh, would have been theirs likewiſe; and their ſuſpicions and apprehenſions, of ſupport being given to *Ragohaut Row*, which never was nor is deſigned by the Engliſh Chiefs, as I learn from *Beneram*, who had it from your mouth, and which have cauſed them great uneaſineſs, would have been entirely removed by Mr. *Elliott*'s and my joint ſecurity. Appendix. No. 165.

The Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*, who wrote you repeatedly on this ſubject, and received for anſwer, that you had no idea of aiding or ſupporting *Ragohaut Row*; that your enmity was ſolely pointed againſt the French; and that whoever aſſiſted the French were your enemies, would likewiſe by theſe means have been thoroughly ſatisfied, and your detachment would have reached *Bombay* without meeting with the ſmalleſt interruption; and had the Poonah Miniſters then acted a contrary part, I ſhould have withdrawn myſelf from their friendſhip: but by the death of Mr. *Elliott* all theſe deſigns muſt have fallen to the ground, and muſt be ſuſpended till another opportunity, and the knowledge of your ſentiments. It is a proverb, that what is deliberately done, is well done. In reply to what you write reſpecting your forming your ultimate reſolutions, I have communicated to *Beneram Pundit* whatever I judge proper and eligible, and which may promote them in ſuch a manner as may not be ſubject to any change from the viciſſitudes of fortune. For theſe points, which I have fixed on after the moſt mature deliberation, as the moſt eligible that can be adopted, I refer you to the letters of *Beneram Pundit*: if notwithſtanding you have any plan to propoſe for the reciprocal benefit of our States, be pleaſed to communicate it to me.

Poſtſcript.—To your letter reſpecting your ſending an army to over-awe the French, and to reinforce the Government of *Bombay*; and ſetting forth, that the Poonah Miniſters having broken the treaty with the Engliſh, and in oppoſition to the rights of friendſhip, received an Envoy of the French King, and granted the port of *Choul* to that nation, thereby enabling them to form an arſenal, and collect military ſtores, and of their having written to their officers to permit the French ſhips to enter their ports; all which inſtances of breach of treaty you learned from the letters of a perſon entruſted by the Poonah Government: and that it being therefore incumbent on you to take meaſures to counteract their deſigns, you had determined to ſend a ſtrong detachment for the reinforcement of *Bombay*, by the route of *Berar*; and that in conſideration of our ancient friendſhip, and the vicinity of our dominions, you requeſted that on its arrival in my neighbourhood, I would cauſe it to be inſtructed in the route; and providing it with proviſions and neceſſaries, have it conducted in ſafety through my territories, and join a body of my forces with it, which would cement and increaſe our friendſhip; and that you have, at the aſſurance of *Beneram*, fixed on this route for its march, in preference to any other. In reply to this letter, actuated by the dictates of the ſincereſt friendſhip, I waited not to take the advice of any one, but without heſitation wrote to you, that where a ſincere friendſhip exiſted, the paſſage of troops through one's country was a matter of no moment: that they ſhould proceed unmoleſted through my country. I likewiſe informed Colonel *Leſlie* of the difficulties and dangers he would meet with in the way, from dangerous mountains, extenſive rivers, &c. and alſo diſpatched *Lalla Jadoo Roy*, with a Chief of note, to the banks of the *Nurbudder*, to ſupply the detachment with proviſions as long as they were in my territory, and to treat them with all the duties of hoſpitality; where he waited ſix months, in expectation of their arrival, to no purpoſe: they loitered away their time in the Bundlecund country, contrary to every rule of policy. At that time all the Poonah Miniſters were ſeparately employed in their own private affairs, or in the war with *Hyder Naig*, inſomuch that they had no leiſure to turn their attention to the concerns of other parts, and the march to *Bombay* might

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have been effected with the greateſt eaſe: the time is now paſt; the arrow is ſhot, and cannot be recalled. As I have repeatedly written to the Poonah Miniſters, with whom I keep up a correſpondence, on the ſubject of their encouraging a French Envoy, and breaking their faith with the Engliſh Chiefs; acts highly inconſiſtent with honour and policy; the anſwer I have received from them I have communicated to you. The ſubſtance of what they ſay in their own juſtification is this: that the French Vackeel came for the purpoſe of traffick, not to negociate; yet, for the ſatisfaction of the Engliſh, they gave him his diſmiſſion: that the account of the grant of the port of *Ghoul* and an arſenal, is without foundation; and that they have not the leaſt indiſpoſition towards the Engliſh: that I will therefore write to *Calcutta*, that you may be perfectly ſatisfied reſpecting their diſpoſition. My letter did not produce the effect of ſatisfying you on the ſubject of the Peiſhwa, but your doubts ſtill remained; and, actuated by wiſdom and prudence, you determined to depute Mr. *Elliott* to me; and wrote me, that on his arrival at *Naigpore*, after he had had an interview with me, and learnt my ſentiments and views, he would, in conjunction with me, form a plan for our mutual honour and benefit, and give directions to Colonel *Leſlie* in conſequence, who would be guided thereby. The event of this gentleman's deputation is too well known; and Colonel *Leſlie* likewiſe, after engaging in hoſtilities with the Peiſhwa's officers and the Zemindars of thoſe parts, and collecting large ſums of money, died alſo. Colonel *Goddard* ſucceeded to the command, and purſued the ſame line of conduct with reſpect to the Talookdars, as his predeceſſor; and arriving at *Gorawaie* and *Goroſur*, in the territory of the Afghans, whither he was obliged to march with the utmoſt caution, being ſurrounded with a Maratta army, who conſtantly ſeized every opportunity to attack him, wrote me from thence, that he ſhould ſhortly reach the *Nurbudder*, where I would be pleaſed to cauſe grain, &c. neceſſary, to be prepared, and a party of my forces to be ready to join him. I wrote them in anſwer, that *Lalla Jadoo Roy* and *Shao Balo Hazaree* were waiting on this ſide the *Nerbudder*, which is within my territories; and that the Gaut where the troops ſhould croſs was two coſs from thence, under *Hoſhungabad:* that *Sanojee Bhoſilia* forded it at that place with his army, in his expedition to *Malwa*; and that I did not doubt it was now fordable: that he would therefore croſs his army there, and repair to *Hoſhungabad*; and that *Lalla Jadoo Roy* would exert his utmoſt aſſiduity in ſupporting them with grain and other proviſions, and treat them with every degree of hoſpitality: but that, as the road forwards was very difficult and dangerous, and thouſands of the Bala caſt were concealed in the holds in the mountains; who, though not able to oppoſe him openly, yet would do it by ambuſcades and ſtratagems, and would cut off his ſupplies of proviſions; and beyond that he would enter the Soubah of *Berhampore*, dependant on the Peiſhwa; and near four thouſand of *Sindeah*'s cavalry were waiting at the fort of *Aſſeer* the arrival of the Engliſh on the banks of the *Ganges*; ten thouſand more, under the command of *Baugrut Sindeah* and *Sindeah* himſelf, with other Chiefs, in readineſs at *Poonah*, waiting to hear the approach of the Engliſh; and moreover in *Berar*, in which the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah* poſſeſſes a ſhare with me, all the Jagheerdars, to wit, *Huſhmud Jung Behadre*, *Sellabut Khan Behadre*, and *Belool Khan Behadre*, the ſons of *Iſhmail Khan*, deceaſed, as alſo *Bullund Khan Mye*, *Bharam Jung*; and in *Newmull*, *Zuffer ul Dowlah*, *Mobarez ul Mulk Bahadre*, were in readineſs with powerful armies; and although the Engliſh poſſeſſed the greateſt magnanimity in battle, yet as every ſtep they took would be into the mouth of danger, and all the above-mentioned Chiefs would ſet themſelves to cut off and deſtroy his proviſions, and take every opportunity of attacking him where they ſaw an advantage, and of haraſſing him night and day; conſtantly ſurrounding his army with their numerous forces, the junction of a body of my forces with his would avail nothing in the face of ſuch large armies, but would only involve me in the greateſt loſſes: that neither was it adviſable for him to return, which would diminiſh the awe and reſpect in which he was held: that I would therefore write the full particulars, in the moſt explicit manner, to *Calcutta*; and that whatever you ſhould think proper to intimate to him and me in reply, it would be adviſable to abide by, and act accordingly; till which time I would recommend that he continued at *Hoſhungabad*: that I had received letters from *Calcutta*, filled with the warmeſt aſſurances of friendſhip and confidence, to the following purport, that the detachment would come into my neighbourhood, and be guided in its operations by my advice; that it is incumbent on every Chief, who enjoys the confidence of another, to give ſuch advice as may be moſt advantageous to the party repoſing truſt in him, and moſt conſiſtent with the faith of engagements, and with ſuch conduct the Almighty is well peaſed: that I had alſo written to the Poonah Miniſters my advice on the ſituation of affairs, to this purport, that Mr. *Elliott* was deputed hither to negociate with me, but dying in the journey, all the negociations entruſted to him were ſuſpended; that had he arrived at *Naigpore*, I had determined, from principles of attachment, to have removed from the minds of the Engliſh the doubts and apprehenſions which had ariſen by reaſon of the ſuppoſed encouragement of the French envoy at *Poonah*, and the agreement to ſupport that nation, the inveterate enemies of the Engliſh which had given riſe to the quarrel between the two States; by proving to them, under the ſanction of ſolemn oaths, and becoming myſelf guarantee, that thoſe reports were groundleſs, and that the Poonah Miniſters were zealous and ſteady in their engagements with the Engliſh, and on ſeveral accounts highly obliged to them; and I would alſo have taken from Mr. *Elliott* engagements that the Engliſh had no idea of affording ſupport to *Ragonaut Row*, but were reſolved to maintain their treaty inviolate, and that their apprehenſions related to the French; and that when I gave the Engliſh ſatisfaction reſpecting the French, and became guarantee, all his doubts were removed: That if it were requiſite, a freſh engagement ſhould be executed, and that he would be guarantee to it. That in brief, each party entertained a reaſonable doubt, the Engliſh that the Poonah Miniſters would join with the French, and the Poonah Miniſters that the Engliſh would ſupport *Ragonaut Row*. That when theſe ſuſpicions no longer remained, all cauſes of diſpleaſure muſt of courſe ceaſe; and that they could then have had no objection to the detachment of Engliſh forces, ſent for the reinforcement of *Bombay*, and to overawe the French, not for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, repairing thither; and to oppoſe them would in ſuch caſe have been highly improper, as Mr. *Elliott* and myſelf would have been guarantees to the engagement: that as theſe important objects have failed, in conſequence of the unfortunate loſs of Mr. *Elliott*, and depended on advices from *Calcutta*; and that the purport of all the letters I have received from thence, and of the aſſurances of *Beneram*, was, that the detachment of Engliſh forces was ſolely deſtined for the reinforcement of *Bombay*, in conſequence of apprehenſions of hoſtile deſigns on the part of the French, without the ſmalleſt deſign to ſupport *Ragonaut Row*; that it was therefore adviſable in them not to give any interruption to the march of the detachment, but to ſuffer it to march peaceably to *Bombay*; that the event muſt at any rate by theſe means be put off to a diſtant period. That the above was the purport of my letters to *Poonah*, and thoſe of *Baboo Row*, who is not merely a Vackeel, but one of the Chiefs of *Poonah*. That we muſt wait to ſee what anſwer they would give, by which time letters would likewiſe

arrive

arrive from *Calcutta*. That it was therefore adviſable that he ſhould remain at *Hoſhengabad*, preſerving the ſtricteſt watch and vigilance, as *Balajee* and *Byſajee* were lying in wait for a favourable opportunity; and that he ſhould be furniſhed with proviſions from hence to the utmoſt poſſible.

I have written thus to Colonel *Goddard*, but have not yet received his anſwer; and, induced by the ſincereſt friendſhip, I have given you this explicit information. Inform me of your ſentiments, and of the meaſures which your enlightened underſtanding points out to you, that Colonel *Goddard* may regulate himſelf thereby.

Poſtſcript.—*Baboo Row*, the Peiſhwa's Vackeel, has obſerved to me in the courſe of converſation, that his maſter has not the ſlighteſt idea of failing in his enagements with the Engliſh, or of contracting any friendſhip with the French; but that the treaty forbids the march of Engliſh forces through the Peiſhwa's dominions, and that the approach of the detachment now on its march, is an infringement of the treaty. Mr. *James Anderſon* is frequently acquainted with all the matters; nothing is concealed from him. *Ramkaund*, Mr. *Elliott*'s Paſhcur, has alſo written regarding them, from which you will receive complete information.

Poſtſcript.—Although it may be improper to repeat the ſame thing over again, yet the importance of the ſubject may plead in my excuſe. On either part a doubt ſubſiſts. The Poonah Miniſters ſuſpect that the Engliſh forces on their march to *Bombay*, though oſtenſibly for the purpoſe of oppoſing the French, are in reality intended for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*; and that the Engliſh at *Bombay*, who were not included in the treaty with the Peiſhwa, which was concluded through the Governor of *Madras* with the advice of the Chief of *Calcutta*, are deſirous of breaking with the Peiſhwa, and of ſupporting *Ragonaut Row*; and that the detachment on its march has been ſent at their requiſition. They allege, that the Chief of *Calcutta* writes to them that he is firmly reſolved to adhere to the treaty with the Peiſhwa, and that the detachment he has ſent to *Bombay* is ſolely to awe the French, without the leaſt deſign to aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*; and that ſince it is forbidden in the treaty to diſpatch troops over land, the march of the troops is a breach of it: that if it is neceſſary to ſend troops to *Bombay* to awe the French, they ought to be ſent by ſea.

The Engliſh on their part ſuſpect the Poonah Miniſters of joining the French, in conſequence of their having received a Vackeel. As the Peiſhwa formerly wrote me that he had no idea of failing in his engagements with the Engliſh; and that he had given no encouragement to the French Vackeel, who came for the purpoſes of traffic; and that he had diſmiſſed him, and therefore requeſted that I would ſatisfy you reſpecting him; I in conſequence formerly wrote all theſe particulars to you. As I have a voucher in my hands from the Peiſhwa, that he has no connection with the French, and is ſteady to his engagements with the Engliſh, I am able by this voucher to give you complete ſatisfaction on this head; but I have no voucher nor intimation from you by which I may be enabled to give ſatisfaction to him.

As he pleads a prohibition in the treaty to the march of forces over land, and likewiſe complains reſpecting the money that Colonel *Leſlie* collected in his territories, what anſwer can be made thereto?

As the times require that a conciliation take place with the Poonah Miniſters, you will conſider and determine what reply ſhall be given to theſe two points of which they complain, and by what means they may be ſatisfied; and communicate your reſolution to me, that I may write conformably thereto, and remove all doubts.

From *Dewagur Pundit*. Received 2d January 1779.

'Your friendly letter, under date the 19th of Ramzaun (11th of October 1778) intimating your having, on the news of Mr. *Elliott*'s death, entruſted the repreſentation of the points of negociation committed to the charge of that gentleman, to *Beneram Pundit*; your having delayed to form your ultimate reſolutions till you receive further advices from hence; your having appointed Colonel *Goddard* to take the command of the army in the room of Colonel *Leſlie*, who is to be conſidered as fully empowered in every point of negociation; your deſire that your army may be accompanied to *Bombay* by a body of the forces of this Government; and in concluſion intimating that Colonel *Goddard* will ſhortly arrive in this neighbourhood, and regulate his future operations for the common intereſt, by the advice and concurrence of the Maha Rajah, for which purpoſe you have written the neceſſary inſtructions to the Colonel, who will conduct himſelf accordingly, reached me on the 26th of Shawal (16th November) followed by duplicate and triplicate, and accompanied by three Karetahs for the Maha Rajah, my maſter, and inſpired me with the utmoſt pleaſure. From this letter I become fully acquainted with your ſentiments and views, and of your unchangeable friendſhip to the Maha Rajah; and likewiſe underſtand what *Biſſembur Pundit* wrote at your deſire to his brother *Beneram Pundit*.

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By the death of Mr. *Elliott*, who would have been the means of ſettling many points of the utmoſt importance, all matters were thrown into ſuſpence, and became dependant on further advices from *Calcutta*. The repetition of the grief felt by the Maha Rajah and myſelf at this unfortunate event, could ſerve no other purpoſe than to renew your affliction; there is no remedy againſt the decrees of Providence. The objects which would have been effected by Mr. *Elliott*'s magnanimity are now thrown back many months, but by the bleſſing of God, will take effect at a favourable opportunity, and your views and deſigns be fully accompliſhed. I am employed day and night in meaſures for the augmentation and perpetual duration of friendſhip between your illuſtrious States. The Maha Raja has very fully written you on the ſtate of affairs, the meaſures which the times require, and the means for the uninterrupted paſſage of the forces deſtined for *Bombay*; and of his having written in the moſt effectual terms to the Poonah Miniſters on this ſubject; and that in theſe letters he has ſolely attended to the dictates of that warm friendſhip which he feels for you, diſregarding every other conſideration; as alſo of his having unreſervedly communicated to Colonel *Goddard* his ſentiments and advice on the conduct to be purſued; from that letter, you will have complete information, for it contains the dictates of the heart, and every ſentiment of it proceeds from the trueſt friendſhip, the cleareſt behaviour, and ſoundeſt policy, and will doubtleſs meet with your approval, and produce a reply to the Maha Rajah and Colonel *Goddard*, with ſuch inſtructions as your judgment ſhall point out to you as beſt adapted to the ſituation of the times: Colonel *Goddard* has been written to, to continue at *Hoſhengabad*, which is within the dominions of this State, till ſuch time as advices are received from you, becauſe it is by no means adviſable to proceed forwards into the territory of the Peiſhwa; where no progreſs can be made without fighting, and all the Chiefs with numerous forces are waiting the approach of the Engliſh army, and taking meaſures to ſtop their receiving ſupplies of proviſions, to ſeize on all the paſſes and Ghauts, and difficult roads, but no anſwer has been yet received from Colonel *Goddard*. We muſt wait to ſee whether he will conſent to remain at *Hoſhengabad*, or determine to proceed forward, but it is certainly moſt adviſable that he ſhould continue there, which is in the territory of this State, till he hears further from you. He will be ſupplied with proviſions from hence to the utmoſt poſſible.

Byſajee and *Balajee Pundit*, Talookdars of the Peiſhwa, who conſtantly encompaſs the army, and haraſs it by daily ſkirmiſhes, and have plundered ſome of the baggage, have been written to, that ſuch conduct is highly improper,

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improper, as the detachment is intended for the reinforcement of *Bombay*; and to awe the French, not for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*; that the Poonah Miniſters will not approve of their conduct, and that they will ſhortly receive letters from *Poonah*. I have no doubt but they will pay attention to what has been written to them, and ſuſpend their hoſtilities.

Whenever the army begins its march from *Hoſhengabad*, the Marattas will inſtantly ſet themſelves in oppoſition, but by remaining in this city which is in the dominion of the Maha Rajah, they will be in a ſtate of perfect ſecurity: their artillery and the guards which they will ſtation around them, will prevent their receiving any injury. In the mean time, replies will be received from *Poonah*, and intelligence of their force, and of the deſigns of *Scindea* and *Holcar* will be learnt; in conſequence of which, a proper plan may be formed for the march of the army. Set your mind at reſt, that the Colonel will experience no inſtance of the ſlighteſt failure or inattention from this quarter, but every thing ſhall be done, and his honour ſhall be conſidered in the ſame light as our own, and his deſires paid equal attention to as our own. *Beneram Pundit* has received inſtructions to reply to the important points repreſented by him at your deſire. From his letters you will have full information.

Mr. *James Anderſon*, Captain *Campbell*, and *Ramkund*, Mr. *Elliott*'s Peiſhcur, are arrived here; agreeable to your deſire all matters are communicated to theſe gentlemen, and in conſequence of your recommendation, they have been received here with every degree of honour and attention. They have likewiſe, at our deſire, written what was judged proper to Colonel *Goddard*.

Having made themſelves acquainted with every matter, and of the Maha Rajah's candour and warm friendſhip towards you, they have written your Excellency on the ſubject, to which letters I beg leave to refer you for full information on theſe points. I impatiently wait your reply.

From *Beneram Pundit*. Received 2d January 1779.

I have been honoured with your three gracious letters, intimating your having received accounts of the death of Mr. *Elliott* on his way to *Naigpore*; your grief on that event; your not appointing another perſon in his room; your reſource for remedying the delay which had ariſen in the objects of that gentleman's miſſion; and your appointing me to the truſt of repreſenting your ſentiments and views to the Maha Rajah my maſter, and *Dewan Dewagur Pundit*, and communicating to your Highneſs their ſentiments in conſequence. The receipt of theſe letters afforded me the greateſt pleaſure.

I have made a full repreſentation to my maſter and the Dewan, of whatever I had formerly learnt from you, and of all the particulars contained in my brother's letters written at your deſire. The Maha Rajah's reply thereto was as follows:—Where a ſincere and intimate friendſhip ſubſiſts, a free and unreſerved communication of all matters, is the moſt certain means of augmenting and carrying it to the higheſt pitch; that in a word, by the delay of Colonel *Leſlie* for a term of ſix months in the Bundlecund country, a meaſure highly impolitic, the opportunity was loſt; that the Poonah Miniſters had been all engaged in their reſpective affairs, and had no leiſure to pay attention to the concerns of any other part, by which means the detachment might have proceeded to *Bombay* with the utmoſt facility, and without the ſmalleſt oppoſition. That immediately on the receipt of your Highneſs's letter, he had ſent *Lalla Jadoo Roy* to wait at the *Nurbudder*, and on the arrival of the detachment within his territories, to uſe every means to ſupply them with proviſions, and to afford them every kind of aſſiſtance; that he remained there ſix months unprofitably, and that affairs then took a different aſpect, for the Poonah Miniſters, apprehenſive of ſupport being given to *Ragonaut Row*, which never was nor ever will be thought of by your Highneſs, collected together armies, and ſtationed them in different parts. That for the purpoſe of removing their ſuſpicions, he had written to them with aſſurances, that the Engliſh detachment were repairing to *Bombay*, with the ſole deſign of reinforcing that Government, and awing the French, the natural enemies of the Engliſh, and had no other deſign in view; that they ſhould be perfectly ſatisfied on this account, and not give way to ſuſpicions, which were unworthy of credit.

There is great reaſon to believe that theſe letters will produce the deſired effect, and that ſatisfactory anſwers will be returned. The Maha Rajah and *Dewan Dewagur Pundit* have written you very voluminouſly on this ſubject; the letter of the former conſiſting of ſix ſheets of paper, from which you will have complete information.

Colonel *Goddard*, after the death of Colonel *Leſlie*, marched from *Chattapore*, and with unparalleled bravery, exceeding all deſcription, has, by daily marches, in ſpite of every poſſible oppoſition from the Talookdars of thoſe parts, to wit, *Byſajee*, *Bylajee*, and others, who have thrown every obſtruction in his way, forced his paſſage to *Bopaul*. The Maha Rajah and *Dewan Dewagur Pundit* have written to *Byſajee*, and other Talookdars to relinquiſh ſo improper and unjuſtifiable a conduct, in which, if they perſiſt, the event will prove fatal to them.

The detachment will ſoon arrive on the banks of the *Nurbudder*, this ſide of which river is in my maſter's territories. *Lalla Jadoo Roy* and *Shas Sing Hazzaree*, are at *Hoſhengabad*, on the bank of the river, and will employ their utmoſt endeavours to ſupply the detachment with proviſions, &c. and orders have been iſſued to bring proviſions to the army from every quarter. As ſoon as they arrive within the Maha Rajah's territories they will be ſecure from all oppoſition; but as the route forward is very difficult, and the hills are very ſteep and dangerous, and by the direction of the Poonah Miniſters multitudes of Bahlas and others are ſtationed in different parts to oppoſe the progreſs of the army, it has therefore been judged adviſable, and has been recommended to Colonel *Goddard*, that as the moſt intimate connection ſubſiſts between the two States, he will for the preſent encamp on the bank of the *Nerbudda*, and will be guided in his future motions by the ſituation of affairs and the reſult of the common deliberations; that it will be proper maturely to reflect on the probable event before the commencement of any undertaking; and that it is the part of wiſdom and ſound judgment, before any further ſteps are taken, to determine by what means they are to be ſupported, that no unſteadineſs may hereafter ariſe. Whatever meaſures may be adopted by mutual conſent after the arrival of the detachment at the *Nurbudder*, I will communicate to you. For further particulars I beg leave to refer you to the letters of Mr. *James Anderſon* and *Biſſembur Pundit*.

Poſtſcript.—Your gracious letter, through the channel of Colonel *Goddard*, informing me of your having appointed him to the command of the detachment, and that not being able to explain yourſelf on ſeveral points ſo fully as you could have wiſhed, you have referred him to me for particular information, has made me happy by its arrival. As the river *Nurbudder* is only eight days journey from *Naigpore*, as ſoon as the Colonel arrives there, I will repair thither, and ſtate every matter fully to him; and whatever ſhall be determined on with the Colonel's advice ſhall be carried into execution, and I will give information thereof to you.

From *Moodajee Boſila*. Received 2d January 1779.

I have had the pleaſure to receive four letters from you; two by the way of *Benares*, one by the route of *Cuttack*, and another from the hands of Mr. *James Anderſon*. You write that ſince Mr. *Elliott* is dead, Mr. *Anderſon* and Mr. *Campbell* will proceed to *Naigpore*; and that as Mr. *Anderſon* is a gentleman of worth, and acquainted

acquainted with the Perſian and Hindoſtan languages, he may be of uſe in explaining Colonel *Goddard*'s negociations; and will write to the Colonel whatever he may in conjunction with me deem proper; that he will remain with me at *Naigpore*, and will with my concurrence write you all the occurrences of this quarter. The aforeſaid gentleman, together with *Ramkund*, Mr. *Elliott*'s Peiſhcur, arrived here in ſafety, and have frequently viſited me. Mr. *Anderſon* exceeds your deſcription in worth, and in his perfect knowledge of affairs; *Ramkund* is likewiſe well verſed in affairs, and poſſeſſed of penetration and ſound judgment. I have already made, and will make them acquainted with all correſpondence which has paſſed, or may paſs between us; and alſo with Colonel *Goddard*, as well as the advices from *Poonah* and the Nabob *Nizam ul Moulk*; and I have cauſed them to tranſmit you in Engliſh and Perſian the particulars of my letters to you and Colonel *Goddard*; the affairs of this quarter; and the ſubſtance of the advices from *Poonah*; as well as the account of Colonel *Goddard*'s arrival at *Bopaul*; his being encompaſſed by the armies of *Byſajee* and *Balajee*, and of his daily ſkirmiſhes with them; and that by the bleſſing of God he will reach the *Nurbudder* in another week, and having croſſed the river will come to *Hoſhengabad*; and agreeable to my advice, founded on ſound policy, and the letters which I have deſired Mr. *Anderſon* to write to him, will encamp there, where he will be furniſhed by me with proviſions, and wait for further advices from *Calcutta*. You will receive fuller information on all theſe points from my letters under charge of the firſt Coſſids which arrive here, in which having written at large, it is unneceſſary to dwell longer on the ſubject in this place.

I have likewiſe written letters to *Poonah* to remove their ſuſpicions and apprehenſions on the ſubject of *Ragonaut Row*, aſſuring them that this detachment was proceeding to *Bombay*, for the purpoſe of awing the French, not for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, and giving them advice touching their conduct. We ſhall ſee what anſwer they return; I will communicate it to you as ſoon as it arrives; in a word, I have no other wiſh or deſign than the preſervation and increaſe of friendſhip with the Engliſh Chiefs, and of keeping on good terms with the Poonah Miniſters, which the ſituation of the times renders neceſſary; that by theſe means the detachment deſtined for *Bombay* may reach that place with facility, and experience no hoſtilities in its paſſage. Confiding in the candour and ſincerity which ſubſiſts between us, you may implicitly rely on the above aſſertions.

From *Dewagur Pundit*. Received 2d January 1779.

I have been honoured with the receipt of your friendly letters, written after the deceaſe of Mr. *Elliott*, informing me, that Mr. *James Anderſon*, a gentleman of great worth and abilities, and well verſed in the Perſian and Hindoſtan languages, will remain at *Naigpore*, and explain the advices received from Colonel *Goddard*, and will write to the Colonel whatever he may in conjunction with us deem proper, and communicate the ſame to you; that I will therefore make him acquainted with every matter, and regard him as a perſon worthy of confidence. Theſe letters gave me great pleaſure, and from your former and late Karetahs, and letters repeatedly received by the way of *Cuttack* and *Benares*, I am perfectly acquainted with your ſentiments and deſigns, the principal of which appears to be the paſſage of the detachment to *Bombay*, with the advice and concurrence of this Government, which will be attended with reciprocal advantages to both States. I have alſo explained all matters, from firſt to laſt, to Mr. *Anderſon*, and have replied fully to theſe letters without the leaſt reſerve, ſtating the moſt eligible mode for the paſſage of the army to *Bombay*, and the removal of the Peiſhwa's ſuſpicions, which the preſent ſituation of affairs renders neceſſary, without ſuffering the leaſt point to eſcape me; and to thoſe letters I muſt refer you, having on mature reflection formed your judgment on the ſeveral points contained therein, and regarding the letters from hence as dictated by the warmeſt attachment and zeal, you will return an explicit anſwer with your ſentiments and advice, that Colonel *Goddard*, who is now arrived in the country of *Bopaul*, under the dominion of the Afghans, and is daily engaged in conteſts with *Byſajee* and *Balajee*, Talookdars of the Peiſhwa, and who, by the favour of the Almighty, will reach the *Nurbudder* in another week, and in conſequence of letters from hence will encamp at *Hoſhengabad*, on this ſide the river, and under the dominion of this State, and wait there for freſh advices from *Calcutta*, may conduct himſelf thereby. In what I have written I have no other intereſt than my attachment to the proſperity of both States, and my deſire to comply with the views both of the Maha Raja and the Engliſh, and have guided myſelf by the dictates of prudence and foreſight. Appendix No. 165.

Mr. *Anderſon* and *Ramkaund* have written you a particular account of what they have ſeen and heard, and from them you will have complete information. The company of Mr. *Anderſon* and *Ramkaund* has afforded me the higheſt pleaſure, as they are perſons of diſtinguiſhed worth and underſtanding; they are both here and well, and have written to Colonel *Goddard* whatever was mutually judged proper to induce him to remain at *Hoſhengabad*: we are in expectation of the Colonel's reply thereto. The Poonah Miniſters have been written to to remove their ſuſpicions; aſſuring them that the Engliſh Chiefs have not the ſmalleſt deſign to ſupport *Ragonaut Row*, and that the detachment on its march to *Bombay* has been ſent thither ſolely from apprehenſions of the French; that they may be aſſured of this, and ſhould not obſtruct or moleſt them in their paſſage, which will inflame the diſputes to the greateſt degree.

There is little doubt but their anſwer will be as formerly, that they have not the leaſt deſign to break their engagements with the Engliſh; and if ſuch idea has been formed from the reception of a French Vackeel, it is entirely groundleſs; and that whoever has written to that effect to *Calcutta* has been actuated by falſehood; that he came for the purpoſe of traffic, and that they diſmiſſed him to ſatisfy the doubt entertained by the Engliſh; that we will therefore ſatisfy you on this head: but for the purpoſe of ſatisfying their doubts by an aſſurance that you have no idea of ſupporting *Ragonaut Row*, and that the detachment you have ſent is deſigned againſt the French, and that if the Engliſh Government of *Bombay*, who had no concern in the formation of the treaty, ſhould on this account wiſh to break the peace, and require aſſiſtance from you, no attention ſhall be paid to them, but they ſhall be diſmiſſed from their ſtations, and that a perſon of credit ſhall be given as guarantee for the performance (for without ſuch a guarantee they will never be ſatisfied.) Whatever you may judge adviſable in this caſe be pleaſed to communicate to me, that they may receive ſatisfaction.

It is my opinion that ſuch meaſures ſhould be taken as may conciliate the mind of the Peiſhwa, and till this point is effected, that Colonel *Goddard* ſhould remain at *Hoſhengabad*.

I have been induced to make theſe two propoſitions entirely by principles of the ſincereſt friendſhip to the Engliſh Chiefs, and from a view into futurity. Whatever is your opinion, be pleaſed to make it known to me. It is the duty of friendſhip to labour for the intereſt of both States: for the reſt, it remains with you.

What I have lately learnt from *Baboo Row*, the Peiſhwa's Vackeel, and the letters of the Poonah Miniſters, is as follows:—that they are firm to the treaty they have contracted with the Engliſh; that they gave no encouragement to the French Vackeel; that he came to traffic, and they diſmiſſed him; that whilſt they adhered to their

Appendix. No. 166.

engagements, the march of an Engliſh army through their territories and the collection of large ſums of money in different places, and moleſting and injuring the diſtricts and perſons of their Talookdars, were evident inſtances of a breach of treaty; what other judgment could they form of it? That ſince the treaty prohibits the march of Engliſh forces over land, to what motive are they to attribute ſuch a meaſure? That if it is neceſſary to ſend a force to *Bombay* for the reinforcement of that ſettlement, and to awe the French, they ſhould ſend it by ſea, and thereby avoid a breach of treaty: that as they have been guilty of no violation of their engagements, the preſervation of them on the part of the Engliſh is neceſſary to good faith: that the detachment muſt not therefore come by land, but be tranſported by ſea to *Bombay*, and the money taken from the Talookdars and other places, be reſtored as good faith requires. Such are the intimations which have been received from the Poonah Miniſters, with a requiſition that letters to this effect may be written from hence to *Calcutta*, and that endeavours may be uſed to confirm the treaty between them and the Engliſh Chiefs, on the terms above-mentioned, and ſatisfactory aſſurances given you, that they neither have, nor will enter into any friendſhip or connection with the French; in brief, ſuch is the purport of their late letters, and *Baboo Row* confirms the ſubſtance. Whatever you deem adviſable you will therefore be pleaſed to communicate to me without delay.

APPENDIX, No. 166.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 11th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

MR. *Francis*—I deſire that the letters received on the 2d, and recorded in the Perſian Correſpondence on the 9th inſtant, from *Moodajee Booſla* and his miniſters, may be read; and that a minute, which I ſhall ſend in circulation this evening, on the ſubject of theſe letters, may be entered in this place.

Agreed to.

The following minute from Mr. *Francis* is therefore recorded in this place:

Mr. *Francis*—I have nothing to object to the pious precepts and excellent moral inſtructions contained in this letter: whether they come ſeaſonably or not, at a time when deep plans of policy and decided acts of vigour might have been expected from our intended ally, inſtead of a general diſcourſe upon the duties of a ſtateſman; or how far ſuch a diſcourſe may with propriety be addreſſed to the chief member of this Government; are queſtions very little neceſſary to be conſidered at preſent. It is of no ſort of moment to us now, to inquire into the moral character or religious creed of this Maratta; though it might have been prudent in us to have been ſomewhat better acquainted with both, before we truſted him ſo far. From other parts of his letters, we may collect information of a more intereſting nature. If we really mean the public ſervice; if we mean to ſave Colonel *Goddard*'s army, and to provide for the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions, let us not obſtinately ſhut our eyes to the evidence before us. After examining the facts without prejudice or paſſion let us draw the natural and obvious concluſions from thoſe facts, and deavour to act firmly and conſiſtently upon both.

For my own part, the declarations contained in *Moodajee Booſla*'s letter to Colonel *Goddard*, recorded on the 21ſt December, appeared to me ſufficiently explicit: a majority of the Board however ſtill thought it neceſſary to wait for ſome farther explanations; but now I preſume that not a ſhadow of doubt can remain with any of us concerning his real ſentiments and reſolutions. The moſt material points of fact aſcertained by the preſent letters, and by which our meaſures muſt be immediately directed, are,

1ſt, That ſo late as the 5th of December, *Moodajee Booſla* does not appear to have had the leaſt idea of the extent or nature of the Governor General's views in the propoſed alliance, though we have been informed that his Vackeel *Beneram Pundit*, was perfectly poſſeſſed of the project of that alliance, from ſeveral converſations which he had had with the Governor General in *Calcutta*, and was authorized to communicate the ſame to his maſter.

2d, That whatever degree of information the Rajah might poſſeſs on this ſubject, and admitting his ignorance of the Governor's plan to be merely affected, he appears plainly to have no ſort of diſpoſition *to catch at the objects preſented to his ambition*, or to run the riſque of a rupture either with the Peiſhwa, or with the Nizam, much leſs with both at the ſame inſtant, for the ſake of any offer that we can make him. On this point his declarations are clear and decided.

3d, That ſo far from ſhewing a diſpoſition to join us againſt his countrymen, he ſays expreſsly, "That the "junction of a body of his forces with Colonel *Goddard* "would avail nothing in the face of ſuch large armies, "but would only involve himſelf in the greateſt loſſes."

4th, That it is his, *Moodajee Booſla*'s opinion, founded on reaſons, which, if he does not deceive us, are ſufficiently ſolid, that the detachment cannot proceed towards *Bombay* without the greateſt difficulty and danger, nor return without diſgrace.

5th, That ſo far from entering into an offenſive alliance with us againſt the Poonah Government, he inſiſts on the neceſſity of our coming to an immediate conciliation with them, and of our previouſly giving them ſatisfaction for the march of our army through their country, and for the large ſums collected from their Zemindars, firſt by Colonel *Leſlie*, and afterwards by Colonel *Goddard*, who, he ſays, has purſued the ſame line of conduct with reſpect to the Talookdars as his predeceſſor.

The peruſal of theſe voluminous letters will ſuggeſt many other intereſting reflections to our ſuperiors. One circumſtance in particular I think deſerves their notice: notwithſtanding the detachment was for ſome months under the orders of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, whoſe deſigns were very explicitly communicated to us; and although the commanding officer was inſtructed to cooperate with them in the plan they had formed for the ſupport of *Ragoba*; and notwithſtanding all the meaſures taken here profeſſedly originated from the communication which we received in January laſt, of certain overtures propoſed to have been made by the Miniſters for reinſtating *Ragoba*, *Moodajee Booſla* now affirms, that his Vackeel had it from Mr. *Haſtings*'s own mouth, "That it never was nor is deſigned by the Engliſh "Chiefs to ſupport *Ragoba*." The good advice contained in theſe letters is in effect the ſevereſt reflection on the levity and precipitancy of our Councils; and probably has no other meaning, but to ſhew the Governor General in what reſpect *Moodajee Booſla* holds a ſtateſman, who profeſſes *to have departed from the common line of policy in the whole of his conduct*. If we were not become the objects of his ſcorn, would our boaſted ally take ſuch a time to tell us, "That it is a proverb, that "whatever is deliberately done is well done; that it will "be proper maturely to reflect on the probable event, "before the commencement of any undertaking; and "that it is the part of wiſdom and ſound judgment, "before any further ſteps are taken, to determine by what "means they are to be ſupported, that no unſteadineſs "may hereafter ariſe?" What muſt this Maratta think of the prudence of a Government, which ſends an army a thouſand

a thouſand miles forward into any enemy's country, on the preſumption of receiving aſſiſtance on the ſpot, without any treaty previouſly concluded, without a ſingle condition agreed on; without one ſtipulation formed for the operations, for the proceeding, or for the retreat of that army; and even without knowing the general ſentiments, views, or diſpoſition of the Prince, on whoſe future ſupport we placed our dependance? I do not wonder that *Moodajee Booſla* ſhould feel no inclination to unite his fortune with ſuch a Government: but let us now at leaſt profit by his advice, as far as the circumſtances we are reduced to will admit. In the natural order of things, deliberation ſhould go before meaſures; with us, it muſt follow them.

Colonel *Goddard*'s army is now near eleven degrees weſt of *Calcutta*: we have no other way of tracing his progreſs, or aſcertaining his diſtance from us, but by obſerving, as accurately as we can, the latitude and longitude of his poſition, on a general map of *India*. If he attempts to proceed, it muſt be *into the mouth of danger*: if he retreats, it will reflect diſhonour on our arms: if he advances into *Berar*, it is againſt the advice of the Rajah, who inſiſts on his remaining where he is, and who, I preſume, will never ſuffer an Engliſh army to march into the heart of his country, eſpecially when he hears that another detachment is preparing to enter it from the eaſtward: this meaſure, ſo far from giving him encouragement to join us, muſt naturally fill him with jealouſy and diſtruſt. Without inſiſting on the faithleſs character uniformly attributed to the Marattas, theſe motives alone are ſufficient to put him on his guard againſt us; while others equally powerful may induce him to take advantage of the critical ſituation of our army, and to compromiſe his own differences with the Peiſhwa and the Nizam at our expence. At all events, I preſume it cannot be diſputed, that the ſafety of the detachment depends greatly on the good faith of *Moodajee Booſla*.

In this ſituation, we have a choice of difficulties before us. Whatever reſolution we adopt, will, I fear, be liable to ſuch objections, as will admit of no better anſwer, than that ſtill greater objections may be urged againſt any other.

We may order Colonel *Goddard*, at all events, to proceed to *Bombay*; or to move towards our weſtern frontier, through *Berar*; or to return as expeditiouſly as he can, by the way he went: I am againſt the firſt, becauſe I am convinced it cannot be attempted without the greateſt hazard to the detachment, or with the ſmalleſt probability of ſucceſs. I conſider it as one common and equally eſſential intereſt of all the Powers of *India*, to oppoſe the march of an Engliſh army acroſs the Continent; and by defeating the attempt in the firſt inſtance, to deter us from ever forming ſuch an enterprize again; *Moodajee Booſla* himſelf ſtates the danger to us, in terms which ſufficiently expreſs his opinion of the impoſſibility of ſurmounting it: with reſpect to *Bombay*, notwithſtanding all that has been ſaid of the deep deſigns of the French, that place is actually in no danger, and if it were, this is not the way of providing for its defence.

I am againſt the ſecond, becauſe it appears, that the Rajah himſelf is very averſe to letting Colonel *Goddard* come into his country, and inſiſts on his ſtaying where he is: if the army ſhould move into *Berar* without the conſent and without ſome ſtipulations previouſly determined with him, it will always be in his power to ſacrifice them to the Poonah Government, or to the Nizam, if they can make it his intereſt to do ſo. For my own part, I am very much inclined to think, that all his late delays and uncertainties are affected for no other purpoſe than to give his countrymen time to complete their preparations, and to ſurround Colonel *Goddard*: no choice then is left but to order Colonel *Goddard* to return as he went; I do not ſay, that this meaſure will not leſſen the opinion which the Powers of *India* may hitherto have entertained of the councils of this Government; it may alſo be thought in ſome degree diſgraceful to our arms; but neither is this of weight againſt other ſuperior conſiderations, nor do I apprehend, that if no direct impreſſion be made upon our army, its bare retreat will prove any thing, but the extreme imprudence of thoſe meaſures, which have left us no other option; at the ſame time, I think that proper letters ſhould be written to the Peiſhwa, to inform him of this alteration; to deſire that the army may retire without moleſtation; and to aſſure him, that we are ſincerely diſpoſed to come to a conciliation with him, and to adjuſt whatever differences may have unfortunately ariſen between his Government and ours in an amicable manner, and agreeably to the terms and principles of the treaty of *Poonah*. Appendix. No. 166.

The time which has elapſed ſince the receipt of *Moodajee Booſla*'s letter, and the critical ſituation of the detachment, make it indiſpenſably neceſſary that ſome clear and deciſive orders ſhould be immediately diſpatched to Colonel *Goddard*; I ſhall be ready to correct or alter my opinion if I ſee juſt and ſolid reaſons urged againſt it. (Signed) *P. Francis.*

Governor General—I have received Mr. *Francis*'s minute, but do not think it neceſſary or proper to reply to it. (Signed) *W. H.*

The following minutes from Mr. *Wheler* and the Governor General were returned with the above minute from Mr. *Francis*.

Mr. *Wheler*—The obſervations contained in Mr. *Francis*'s minute appear to me too ſtrong and too well ſupported, not to deſerve a reply: I have no doubt of their attracting the particular attention of the Court of Directors: at any rate, the ſituation of Colonel *Goddard*'s army makes it neceſſary, that ſome clear and deciſive orders ſhould be ſent him without further delay: I ſee by the book of Perſian Correſpondence, that the Governor General has letters from him as late as the 17th December; at that time *Moodajee Booſla* does not appear to have altered the reſolution expreſſed in his former letters, of not engaging with us againſt the Peiſhwa: if the news we have juſt received ſhould prove true, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* have ſent an army to *Poonah*, under the command of General *Carnac*, in order to reinſtate *Ragoba*, an alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* on the plan of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions becomes impracticable; the Rajah of courſe will conclude, that we mean nothing but to deceive him, or at leaſt, that we have no authority over the Preſidency of *Bombay*; but let him think as he will of the ſincerity and good faith of this Government, he will naturally make this a plea for not proceeding in any negociation with Colonel *Goddard*.

In theſe circumſtances, it becomes a queſtion of the greateſt importance to determine, what Colonel *Goddard* is to do.

I preſume, it is not meant that he ſhould remain much longer on the banks of the *Nerbudda*; and if he is to move, the object of his future operations, and the place of his deſtination ought to be clearly pointed out; this queſtion is every day embarraſſed with new facts and freſh difficulties, which no information at preſent before the Board is ſufficient to clear up. Waiting therefore for thoſe lights which I preſume the Governor General is able to give us, I ſhall content myſelf at preſent with urging the neceſſity of immediately reſuming the ſubject, and of coming to ſome reſolution on the final orders to be given to Colonel *Goddard*.

Governor General—As there is no queſtion propoſed in either of the preceding minutes, I muſt decline to bear my part in a debate of which I ſee no object.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Appendix. No. 167.

APPENDIX, No. 167.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 25th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

THE Governor General delivers in the following minute:

Governor General—The intimation given by Mr. *Barwell*, of his intention to return to *England*, in the Public Department Conſultation of the 11th inſtant, has already given currency to an opinion of an impending change in the Adminiſtration of theſe provinces; not only by the immediate conſequences which his departure would produce in the influence of the preſent Council, but by the concluſion drawn from it, that it proceeded from ſome fore-knowledge of the new ſettlement of this Government, and that it was intended as an anticipation of it: I feel myſelf exceedingly alarmed for the effects of this belief on our public meaſures; and eſpecially on one which is now at its criſis, and may receive its ultimate direction from ſuch an impulſe. *Calcutta* is unhappily become the reſort of agents, both public and ſecret, from many of the States, and even of ſome of the remoteſt of *India*. To theſe the nakedneſs of our conſtitution has been long expoſed, and the facility with which the moſt important tranſactions of the Council find their way to the public notice, enables them to ſend early and conſtant advices, modified according to their reſpective views and intereſts; or dictated, as I believe, by a concealed influence, not only of actual events as they occur, but of every rumour of every day, to their ſeveral conſtituents.

By ſuch channels it will be ſoon known, both at *Poonah* and *Naigpore*, that the powers of this Government which reſt with a majority of voices in the ſmall body compoſing it, are on the eve of devolving to the two members who have conſiderably oppoſed in every ſtage of its progreſs, the plan which has been publicly adopted for the ſupport of the Company's intereſt on the weſtern ſide of *India*; and who, it is univerſally believed, will ſeize the firſt means which are offered to them to defeat and annul it altogether. A member of this Government entruſted with the guardianſhip of the Company's intereſt, and of the honour of the Britiſh name in *India*, has not ſcrupled to propoſe, that we ſhould make an abject ſubmiſſion to the miſerable poſſeſſors of the feeble Government of *Poonah*; acknowledge our paſt faults, with a promiſe of amendment; and humbly intreat their permiſſion for the ſafe retreat of our army from *Berar*, to its own confines. If I miſconſtrue Mr. *Francis*'s words, let them ſpeak for themſelves, as they ſtand in the following extract of his minute, dated the 11th inſtant.

" No choice is then left, but to order Colonel *Goddard* to return as he went. I do not ſay, that this " meaſure will not leſſen the opinion which the Powers " of *India* may hitherto have entertained of the coun- " cils of this Government: it may alſo be thought in " ſome degree diſgraceful to our arms, but neither is " this of weight againſt other ſuperior conſiderations, " nor do I apprehend, that if no direct impreſſion be " made upon our army, its bare retreat will prove any " thing but the imprudence of thoſe meaſures which " have left us no other option: at the ſame time, I " think that proper letters ſhould be written to the " Peiſhwa, to inform him of this alteration, to deſire " that the army may retire without moleſtation, and to " aſſure him, that we are ſincerely diſpoſed to come to " a conciliation with him, and to adjuſt whatever differences may have unfortunately ariſen between his " Government and ours, in an amicable manner, and " agreeably to the terms and principles of the Treaty " of *Poonah*."

What conduct may not be expected from ſuch ſentiments, and ſo avowed, if they are allowed the acceſſion of power to give them operation, not only in the inſtance which I have already mentioned, but in every other meaſure of Government, however neceſſary or ſalutary, which has been propoſed by me or Mr. *Barwell*: this it ſhall be my care, as it is my duty, to obviate by every means within the ſlender compaſs of my ability. I do therefore conjure Mr. *Barwell*, both by that zeal which he has hitherto ſo ſteadily manifeſted for the intereſts of our common maſters, and even by the ties of a friendſhip cemented by a participation of the ſame labour and ſufferings for the public ſervice, that he will not permit the meaſures in which he has a common and equal reſponſibility with myſelf, to be expoſed to the triumph of a party; but that he will both continue to afford the ſupport of his preſence and abilities to the preſent Government, while it yet exiſts; and that he will ſuffer me to exact from him a declaration to that purpoſe, not only for my own ſatisfaction, but for that of every man, who has the Company's intereſt, or the proſperity of this ſettlement, or the credit of his country, at heart; and who, I preſume to ſay, expect this ſacrifice from him. A few months will either releaſe him from the effects of it; or bind him by freſh obligations, and ſuch as may engage his voluntary ſubmiſſion to remain; for, left as this Government has been for the laſt four years, to a ſtate of ſuſpenſe and indeciſion, it is not poſſible for it to continue ſo beyond the term of its legal exiſtence, which muſt ceaſe of courſe, even without the hand of power to annihilate it, in the month of October; and it is not probable that we ſhall be much longer ignorant of that which muſt of abſolute neceſſity be ſubſtituted in its place. If I may truſt to the intelligence which I have received from *England*, ſo late as the 10th of June, private indeed, but derived from what I deem the beſt authority, no alteration will take place at that period, which will affect either Mr. *Barwell* or myſelf.

Mr. *Barwell*—I am concerned that I ſhould have given occaſion for the minute this inſtant preſented; the declaration of my intention to depart I thought had been ſufficiently guarded to obviate any conſequences that might affect the influence of the exiſting Government. I do not mean by the declaration I have already made, to decline my aid in the ſupport of the Governor General's adminiſtration, ſo long as it ſhall continue; I have hitherto yielded it with cheerfulneſs, and do not propoſe, whatever wiſh my health may make me entertain of going to *Europe*, to decline ſharing with him in the reſponſibility of his meaſures ſo far as I have engaged in them, and conſequently ſupporting him under every diſcouraging circumſtance that may ſtand in oppoſition to my duty; I do not think myſelf at liberty to follow my own wiſhes, and every private conſideration muſt yield, ſhould the public ſervice require it: the reaſons that are aſſigned for it by the Governor General, require me abſolutely to retract the intention I have declared; I admit the force of them; and with pleaſure declare my determination to ſupport his Government, as long as the public meaſures of it ſhall require me.

Governor General—I beg leave to record my thanks to Mr. *Barwell* for his ready and honourable acquieſcence in my requeſt: it adds to the many obligations which I already owe him for his paſt ſupport, but cannot heighten the ſenſe of gratitude which I already entertain for him.

Mr. *Francis*—I ſhall leave it to the Court of Directors, who will have the whole of my argument before them, to determine, whether the paſſage quoted from it by the Governor General, will fairly bear the conſtruction he has been pleaſed to give it; paſſionate and contemptuous terms, unaccompanied with argu-

ment, will prove nothing againſt the prudence of that opinion which I ſubmitted to the Board, with an expreſs declaration of my readineſs to correct or alter, if juſt and ſolid reaſons were ſuggeſted to me for doing ſo. The Governor General gives no reaſons, nor does he propoſe any thing: yet I preſume it is not meant that Colonel *Goddard* is to be left much longer without inſtructions. It happens ſingularly that the advice which I have preſumed to give on this occaſion concurs with an opinion which I ſhould have thought would have had ſome weight with the Governor, I mean that of *Moodajee Booſla*; his former letters, which I have already referred to, were ſufficiently explicit; but even in one received within theſe few days, and written after he had ſeen and converſed with the perſon whom Colonel *Goddard* had deputed to him, and after he was perfectly apprized of the intended plan of alliance, his advice ſtill is to come to a conciliation with the Peiſhwa; he ſays, "I do not "myſelf think it by any means prudent at preſent to "enter on this buſineſs; that it is improper precipitately "to plunge into undertakings of ſuch a nature, and that "precipitation is not at preſent by any means adviſable." Theſe ſentiments of *Moodajee Booſla* I apprehend could not be influenced either by Mr. *Barwell*'s late declaration, or by the opinion expreſſed in my minute of the 11th inſtant; they appear to have been invariably his own ever ſince he had any knowledge of the Governor General's views. In ſuch a ſituation it avails but little to ſay, that any particular opinion of a member of this Government is dangerous, impolitic, or diſgraceful. *Moodajee Booſla* refuſes to act; can that fact poſſibly be denied? yet the Governor General propoſes nothing. I ſee we differ very much in our ideas of national honour; I have no idea of national honour independent of juſtice. The projects of ambition are uſually ambitious; if they are nothing but the projects of ambition, they are in my judgment always diſhonourable. To revert to that pacific ſyſtem which the Company have uniformly preſcribed to us, to endeavour to conciliate the friendſhip which we have unjuſtly or unwiſely departed from, and to return, if it be poſſible, to the terms of a treaty which we ourſelves have wantonly violated, are not acts that will ever I think, and as I feel, bring diſhonour on the Britiſh name; I am ſure they are the beſt means of preſerving our ſtrength and our real influence in *India*, and I have no doubt that they will meet with the higheſt approbation from home. As long as I am truſted with any ſhare in the office of guardian of the Britiſh intereſts and honour in this country, theſe ſhall be the principles on which I will invariably act.

For what purpoſe Mr. *Barwell* made his late declaration, or what purpoſe it is now retracted, is to me a queſtion of the moſt profound indifference; I believe it to be equally immaterial to the ſupport of the influence and authority of the preſent majority of this Board; in the language of *Moodajee Booſla*, "The arrow is ſhot, "and cannot be recalled." Since the Governor General has been pleaſed to mention his private intelligence, and the ſecurity it gives him, I ſhall beg leave to aſſure him that I alſo have private intelligence, which perhaps may be no better founded than his; but on which I for my own part place ſome dependance; that a total change in the ruling power of this Government was determined when Sir *Eyre Coote* left *England*, and I have no doubt that Sir *Eyre Coote* will give us ſome very ſatisfactory information on this point; but whether he does or not, his preſence alone muſt in the higheſt degree affect that very object which Mr. *Barwell*'s preſent declaration profeſſes to have in view.

Governor General—The reſpect which I bear for the character of Sir *Eyre Coote*, would have prevented me from introducing his name on the preſent occaſion, had I thought it any way concerned in it, and reſtrains me from anſwering the aſſurances implied in the concluſion of Mr. *Francis*'s minute reſpecting him; for the reſt, I mean not to enter into a debate with Mr. *Francis*, I had a different object, yet I think it neceſſary to ſay, that I know of no expreſſions of mine which merit the epithets of paſſionate or contemptuous; neither did I mean, or do I now think it neceſſary to anſwer his minute of the 11th inſtant with argument. I did not underſtand it to contain any ſerious propoſitions, it may be irony, it may be ſarcaſm, it may be invective; but I believe that no one who reads it will underſtand it to aim at any other object; and it was for that reaſon I have ſaid that I thought it neither neceſſary or proper to reply to it. Appendix. No. 168.

Mr. *Francis*— I hope and believe the Governor General did not mean to apply the terms I allude to perſonally to me, nor did I object to them on that preſumption.

APPENDIX, No. 168.

Bengal Private Perſian Correſpondence.

Letter from *Moodajee Bhoſila:* dated 10th Zehedja, 30th December 1778, and received 22d January 1779.

COLONEL *Goddard* having by the greateſt bravery and good management arrived in ſafety at *Hoſhengabad*, on this ſide the river *Nurbudder*, which is dependant on me; and not judging it adviſable to leave his army at that place, which is 120 coſs from *Naigpore*, and to proceed in perſon hither, deputed Mr. *Weatherſtone*, a gentleman in his confidence, to wait on me. This gentleman being accordingly arrived in ſafety, has in an interview fully informed me of your ſentiments and views; which are indeed fraught with the greateſt friendſhip and regard towards me, and with mutual advantages, the ſame which you gave in charge to Mr. *Elliott* when you deputed him to this quarter. I likewiſe ſome time ago received your obliging letter, written after the deceaſe of Mr. *Elliott*, to the following purport; that it would not anſwer to depute another perſon from thence in the ſame character with Mr. *Elliott*, which would occaſion too great delay to the affairs in hand; and that *Beneram Pundit*, who was fully acquainted with all your views and the points of negociation entruſted to Mr. *Elliott*, would therefore make me acquainted therewith; and I would inform you in reply with my ſentiments and views, by which you ſhould be enabled to form your ultimate reſolutions, namely, to form a treaty between the King of *England*, Company, and this Government, on ſo firm a baſis, that like the wall of *Alexander* it might continue unſhaken from generation to generation to the lateſt poſterity; and that our friends and enemies be in common, and reciprocal and equal advantages derived to both States. *Beneram Pundit* accordingly fully communicated every point to me. As your views are of the moſt important nature, and to carry them into execution require great preparations to be made, to wit, the aſſembling an army, forming alliances with the Decan Chiefs, preparing military ſtores, mighty treaſure, &c. all which require time, I deemed it adviſable to delay their execution for ſome time, and accordingly pointed out to you in anſwer, the meaſures I judged moſt fit and prudent. *Beneram Pundit* likewiſe wrote you very fully on the ſame ſubject. Agreeably thereto all theſe matters were ſtated to Mr. *Weatherſtone*, who, inſpired with the ſentiments of bravery and magnanimity inherent in the Engliſh Chiefs, replied, "The opportunity now pre-"ſents itſelf; the leaſt delay in the buſineſs is impo-"litic." To this he was anſwered; "The Decan is "our country, and we have a ſuperior knowledge of "the ſtate of it, and are well acquainted with the proper "ſeaſon for ſuch an undertaking. I do not myſelf think "it by any means prudent at preſent to enter on this "buſineſs; if, notwithſtanding, the Engliſh Chiefs are "of a different opinion, the firſt ſtep muſt neceſſarily "be the formation of a ſolemn treaty." Mr. *Weatherſtone*, conformably to the cuſtoms and manners of his own nation replied, "Colonel *Goddard* is inveſted with "full power to conclude this buſineſs in the room of

Appendix. No. 168.

" Mr. *Elliott*." As every one prefers his own cuſtoms and manners, and it is neceſſary before the commencement of an important undertaking, that complete confidence be eſtabliſhed, I anſwered, " The formation of " the treaty, which is to be the foundation of all the " meaſures propoſed, muſt of neceſſity be in the preſence of the Nabob (alluding to you); that had Mr. " *Elliott* arrived, ſtill the final concluſion of the treaty " would have been in your preſence, on the knowledge " of our mutual ſentiments, that ſo both parties might " have been fully ſatisfied; that I would now diſpatch " *Beneram Pundit* to *Calcutta* with the liſt of the terms " I expect, and that the Colonel ſhould likewiſe write " whatever the duties of friendſhip required; and that " after this point was firmly concluded, and I had re- " ceived a ſatisfactory anſwer from you, we would then " in concert enter on the undertaking."

Mr. *Weatherſtone* having obtained complete information on all theſe points, and of the ſincerity of my friendſhip, wrote an account thereof to Colonel *Goddard*. As you are univerſally allowed to poſſeſs the greateſt penetration and foreſight, and to exceed all others in your judgment of the propriety and fitneſs of every meaſure; and as your opinion on all occaſions receives my approbation and aſſent, I am about to diſpatch to you *Beneram Pundit*, accompanied by *Ramkund*, the late Mr. *Elliott*'s Peiſhwa, a man of underſtanding, and attached to your Government, whom I have made acquainted with all my deſigns in this important undertaking. On their arrival they will in private make you fully acquainted therewith, and you will conſider them with the greateſt attention; and having fixed and concluded on ſuch points as are moſt adviſable, and may be completely ſatisfactory to both parties, will inform me thereof, that conformable thereto the moſt judicious meaſures may be adopted.

From *Modajee Bhoſilah*: received 22d January 1779.

The late events at *Poonah* and *Bombay* are theſe: officers from *Bombay* have marched from thence with three battalions, and ſome pieces of cannon, into the Cokun country, and ſent a detachment from their army to *Bore* Ghaut, which is about 20 coſs from *Poonah*, where they have made entrenchments. The Poonah Miniſters have now diſpatched their army, which was in readineſs to march, towards *Hoſſungabad*, to oppoſe the progreſs of Colonel *Goddard* againſt the Bombay army. By theſe means there does not at preſent appear to be any force to oppoſe Colonel *Goddard*'s march to *Bombay*; but I have already repeatedly written to you my opinion on this ſubject, founded on the ſituation of the times; and have fully communicated to you whatever I have learnt of the ſtate of *Poonah*, and informed you of the tenor of the letters of the Miniſters of *Pundit Peiſhwa*, as well as what I gathered from report; and I ſhall now perform the duty of a friend, by freely ſtating to you my advice on the preſent ſtate of affairs, which is as follows: you have conceived diſpleaſure and reſentment againſt the Poonah Miniſters on account of the arrival of a French vackeel, and their negociating with him. They have written to me repeatedly on this ſubject, that they never entertained the ſligheſt idea of enmity towards the Engliſh Company, or of giving ſupport to the French: that a Frenchman came there for the purpoſes of traffic, and that even him they ſent away; and have not the ſmalleſt deſign of breaking their treaty with the Engliſh: that ſuch a conduct, while ſolemn engagements ſubſiſted, would render them deteſtable in the ſight of God and men, and be ſo ſhameful a renunciation of every religious tie, as to make them the objects of abhorrence; that I would therefore write to *Calcutta*, and clear your mind from ſuch ſuſpicions. I accordingly wrote all theſe particulars to you. I now give it you as my advice, that a perſon of credit may on the application of *Pundit Purdhaun*, with the conſent of the Engliſh Chiefs, become guarantee for both parties, that ſo all doubts may be completely removed, and an end put to all hoſtilities and contentions. That the terms of the guarantee be, that the Poonah Miniſters ſhall never form the idea of giving ſupport to the French nation, who are the enemies of the Engliſh Company; and that the Engliſh Chiefs, in violation of treaty, ſhall take no ſteps for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*; and that if either of the contracting parties ſhall infringe the engagement, the guarantee ſhall be reſponſible for ſuch breach.

Every perſon who undertakes any difficult enterprize or conteſt, ſhould firſt conſider the end thereof, and well underſtand the advantages or loſſes which may reſult therefrom; and if it appears in his judgment, after the matureſt reflection, that the advantages overbalance the loſſes, he may then purſue it.

The monarchs of former times, and Viziers, poſſeſſed of a noble ambition, made this an invariable rule in the proſecution of their conqueſts, and never deviated in the leaſt inſtance from it; on this principle, that where their object could be effected with facility and quiet, it was impolitic and uſeleſs to purſue it with labour and difficulty; knowing that none but the All-wiſe could of a certainty foreſee the event of any undertaking.

Thus it appears improper precipitately to plunge into undertakings of ſuch a nature: I am therefore deſirous that you ſhould for the preſent pretend to be ſatisfied on the ſubject of the apprehenſions which you had conceived of the French, on account of the ſupport of the Poonah Miniſters, and leave the proſecution of your private deſigns to a more favourable opportunity: this may be productive of the moſt important advantages; for it will be reported through the whole country, that the Engliſh Chiefs having conceived ſuſpicions of the Poonah Miniſters, diſpatched an Engliſh army on this account ſolely, to the Decan, and not with any view of ſupporting *Ragonaut Row*; and that the Poonah Miniſters being convinced and aſhamed of their error, has given a perſon of credit as an hoſtage, and thereby extinguiſhed the flames of a dreadful conteſt, and this would exalt your reputation and fame to the higheſt pitch: you will therefore maturely conſider the advantages and end of ſuch a conduct, and to what good purpoſes it may be turned. The opportunity is not yet paſſed. If you approve of this advice, give immediate intimation thereof to me, Colonel *Goddard*, and the Bombay gentlemen.

I have communicated all the above particulars to Mr. *Weatherſtone*, who will write to Colonel *Goddard* whatever he may judge moſt fit and proper.

From *Dewagur Pundit*. Dated 10th Zehedja, 30th December 1778, and received 22d January 1779.

Beneram Pundit, after the deceaſe of Mr. *Elliott* in his way hither, in conformity to your directions intimated to him, fully repreſented all your views and deſigns with which he had been entruſted, tending to the eſtabliſhment of a treaty between the King of *England*, the Company, and yourſelf, on the one part, and the Maha Rajah my maſter on the other, on ſo firm a baſis that like the wall of *Alexander* it might continue unſhaken from generation to generation to the lateſt poſterity; and the prudent and judicious anſwer he received, " That for the commencement of ſo important an affair " the neceſſary preparations, ſuch as the aſſembling an " army, the junction of allies from amongſt the zealous " friends of this Circar, the collecting magazines of " warlike ſtores, and the proviſion of a large treaſure, " required a conſiderable time to complete," has been already communicated to you. Colonel *Goddard* having lately croſſed the *Nurbudder*, and being arrived at *Hoſhingabad*, dependant on the Maha Rajah, not deeming it adviſable to quit his army, and repair to *Naigpore*, which is at the diſtance of 120 coſs from that city, deputed Mr. *Weatherſtone* hither. On his interview he communicated your ſentiments to the ſame effect as *Beneram*

neram Pundit had before repreſented them, and was anſwered in the ſame manner as has been written to you. Inſpired by the courage and magnanimity inherent in the Engliſh Chiefs, he replied, "This is the time, let not "the opportunity which preſents itſelf eſcape." Actuated by penetration and foreſight, I repreſented to him the ſtate of the Decan, and the neceſſity of a treaty from *Calcutta*, prior to the commencement of ſo important an undertaking, fully explaining every point to him, which he wrote to Colonel *Goddard*, who will communicate them to you.

Beneram Pundit and *Ramkund* the late Mr. *Elliott*'s Peiſhwa, a man of underſtanding, intelligence in buſineſs, and a zealous ſervant of your Government, are about to be diſpatched from hence with letters to you. When they arrive, and you have learnt all my maſter's views, and the terms he requires, you will make me happy by a reply thereto.

Poſtſcript—Certain intelligence has been lately received, that the Engliſh at *Bombay* have ſent ſome of their officers through the Cokun country to *Bhore* Gaut, which is 20 coſs from *Poonah*, and that they are making preparations to croſs, and that the Peiſhwa's army is gone againſt them: as the Poonah Miniſters deny every kind of intrigue or connection with the French, which they have repeatedly done by letters to this quarter, and the Engliſh Chiefs have no deſign to ſupport *Ragonaut Row*, of which *Beneram Pundit* has given us repeated aſſurances; to what end, therefore, are theſe ſuſpicions entertained contrary to the treaty, and which give room to the world to talk in a very improper ſtyle? If, notwithſtanding, the Engliſh have any apprehenſions left the Poonah Miniſters ſhould hereafter ſupport the French, the Maha Rajah will, agreeably to what they have deſired of him, give you full ſatisfaction reſpecting them, and in like manner will give ſatisfaction to the Poonah Miniſters, and remove the apprehenſions they have conceived, leſt the Engliſh ſhould ſupport *Ragonaut* according to the aſſurances made to him by *Beneram Pundit:* this will exalt the fame and honour of the Engliſh Chiefs throughout the world, and extinguiſh the flames of war and diſcord, of which none but the all-wiſe God can with any degree of certainty foreſee; the event and the views which you deſign to carry into execution in concert with the Maha Rajah my maſter, will likewiſe take effect at a proper opportunity: precipitation is not at preſent by any means adviſable. For more particular information on theſe points, I beg leave to refer you to the Maha Rajah's letters, where they are fully treated with.

If you approve of this advice, you will diſpatch letters immediately to *Bombay*, forbidding them to engage in a conteſt with the Poonah Miniſters, and will likewiſe write to Colonel *Goddard* and me, that in conſequence thereof, we may uſe our endeavours to remove all ſuſpicions on either ſide, and for the confirmation and duration of the treaty: this meaſure ſuits with the times, will extinguiſh the flames of diſcord in every quarter, and do you great credit in the eyes of the world.

For the reſt, whatever your enlightened underſtanding, who are endowed with the moſt diſtinguiſhed virtues, and are well verſed in every part of buſineſs, points out to you, will meet with aſſent and approbation.

APPENDIX, No. 169.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 1ſt February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

READ the following letter from *Bombay*:

Appendix, No. 169.

Gentlemen,

We have had the honour to receive your letter of the 17th Auguſt, but we have not yet heard a ſyllable of or from Mr. *Elliott*.

We were for a conſiderable time in ſuch a ſtate of ſuſpenſe ariſing from the ſlow advance of the Bengal detachment, our expectation of advices from *Europe*, and the fate of *Pondicherry*, as well as ſome difficulties we had to overcome on the part of *Ragoba*, that we could not fix upon a period when to write to you with any degree of certainty, as to the meaſures we ſhould purſue with reſpect to our plan for eſtabliſhing him in the regency of the Maratta Government; but we have now the pleaſure to acquaint you, that matters are at laſt brought to a criſis, and our forces have actually taken the field to conduct *Ragoba* to *Poonah*.

After the moſt ſtrict attention to the words and contents of your letter of the 17th of Auguſt, nothing more appeared to us to be meant, than that we ſhould not enter into any final engagements with *Ragoba*, which might be contrary to ſuch as might be concluded with, or of a hoſtile tendency to the Government of *Berar*; for if your letter was to be underſtood as containing a direction, that we were abſolutely not to undertake anything till we had received advice from Mr. *Elliott* of the reſult of his commiſſion with the Bouncello, it would have been equivalent to a prohibition of the expedition we had meditated, and which you had approved, by ſuſpending it to ſo diſtant a period, as to leave us little or no hopes of ſucceſs.

We therefore thought ourſelves warranted not only by your letter, but by the moſt urgent plea of neceſſity, to give our immediate and moſt ſtrenuous aſſiſtance for placing *Ragoba* in the office of Regent; and our lateſt intelligence from *Europe* giving us not the ſmalleſt apprehenſion of danger to this ſettlement in the abſence of our forces, preſented an opportunity ſo favourable for the execution of our plan, that we could not conſiſtent with our duty any longer forego it: but in order to guard againſt the inconvenience from our treaty with *Ragoba* claſhing with the engagements you may form with *Moodajee Bouncello*, we have by the 17th article made the neceſſary proviſion on that head.

It was on the 12th of October, when we took the reſolution for immediately carrying into execution our plan as explained in our minutes of the 21ſt of July, when Mr. *Draper* thought proper to diſſent, being of opinion the juncture was not favourable to our deſign, for which he aſſigned the following reaſons: firſt, becauſe of the expreſs conditions contained in your letter of the 17th Auguſt; ſecondly, becauſe of the reſtraint *Moraba*, *Butcheba*, and their adherents ſtill appear to be under: thirdly, becauſe of the remote diſtance of Colonel *Leſlie*'s very conſiderable reinforcement; fourthly, becauſe of the very great deficiency in our European corps, to the laſt eſtabliſhment ordered by the Honourable Company.

This packet being already ſwelled to a large ſize for an overland diſpatch, we ſhall defer ſending you a copy at length of Mr. *Draper*'s diſſent, till the firſt ſea conveyance, when it ſhall be accompanied by a copy of our whole minutes and proceedings on the occaſion.

We now tranſmit a copy of the treaty, and it will give us the moſt ſenſible ſatisfaction if the terms thereof are approved by you: a copy of the manifeſto, or circular letter, diſperſed by the troops on their landing on the continent, is likewiſe enclоſed.

The whole conduct of the expedition is entruſted to a committee, conſiſting of Mr. *Carnac*, Colonel *Egerton*, and Mr. *Moſtyn*, who are directed to correſpond punctually with you, and to adviſe you of all material tranſactions. A copy of their inſtructions is enclоſed, and of thoſe given to Colonel *Egerton*; and alſo a copy of the orders we have ſent to Colonel *Goddard*, who by our laſt accounts, dated the 31ſt October, was only advanced to *Kimlaſſy*, on the other ſide of the *Nerbudah*.

The force ſent on this ſervice conſiſts of 172 artillery, 549 infantry,

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549 infantry, and 2689 Sepoys, all officers included, beſides 500 artillery Laſcars, which we flatter ourſelves, all circumſtances conſidered, will be able to bring this buſineſs to a happy concluſion. The voice of the people, we are aſſured, is ſtrongly with *Ragoba*; nor do we think *Moraba*'s party ſo much depreſſed, but that they will be able to yeld material aſſiſtance, which with the approach of the Bengal detachment, whoſe arrival we anxiouſly expect, and the fall of *Pondicherry*, will we truſt effectually contribute to the eaſy accompliſhment of our ſcheme.

Our troops took poſſeſſion of the fort of *Bellapore* without oppoſition, and are now with *Ragoba*'s forces near the foot of the Gauts, which had before been ſecured by the grenadier Sepoys of the army, advanced for that purpoſe by a different route, under the command of Captain *Stewart*; they have hitherto proceeded without ſeeing the face of an enemy.

Mr. *Lewis* remained at *Poonah* till the very laſt moment, and left that place when recalled by us, without the leaſt moleſtation.

We ſhall immediately ſend a letter to Mr. *Elliott*, adviſing him of the concluſion and object of the treaty with *Ragoba*.

The ſlow advance of the Bengal detachment has given us much uneaſineſs; as whatever turn affairs may take at *Poonah*, we ſhall certainly require a conſiderable augmentation to our force, when we come to ſettle the neceſſary arrangements for the defence of our new acquiſitions, and provide a reſpectable garriſon for this place: their arrival would be of unſpeakable advantage to the Honourable Company's affairs on this coaſt, and place us in a ſituation almoſt above annoyance.

We expect to receive three hundred European recruits by the ſhips of this ſeaſon, including thoſe received by the *Royal Henry*, and thoſe on board the *Gatton* and *Calcutta*; and the Honourable Company acquaint us, they hope to be able to raiſe a further number, in which caſe they promiſe to ſend a ſhip purpoſely with them to this ſettlement.

We have not yet taken poſſeſſion of the ſeveral ceſſions made by the treaty with *Ragoba*. We believe it was impracticable to have ſtipulated for a territory in lieu of the northern Pergunnahs, which would have been either equal in value or in convenience of ſituation: for the productions of the Guzerat country infinitely exceed thoſe of the *Conkan*, and when we have got *Baſſein* we ſhall poſſeſs the whole ſea coaſt from *Bombay* to the river *Myhie*, with very little interruption, except the Portugueſe ſettlement of *Damaun*.

The conduct of *Hyder Ally* towards the French ſtill continues to ſhew a diſpoſition very favourable to them: he has ſent ſupplies of proviſions, and even money, we believe, to *Mahié*; and we have had intimation that he has given the French Governor there permiſſion to hoiſt his colours in the place, ſhould it be attacked by the Engliſh. It is ſaid he alſo intends ſending his fleet with ſupplies of proviſions to the French iſlands, and that his ſhips will be armed with detachments of French ſoldiers, which were ſent to him from *Mahié*, before the account arrived of the rupture with *England*.

We know not what effect our ſucceſs againſt *Pondicherry* may have on the Nabob's conduct; but we have now a gentleman under orders to proceed to his Durbar, whom we propoſe detaining until we are at ſome certainty with reſpect to the intentions of the gentlemen of *Fort Saint George* regarding *Mahié*, and the part the Nabob will take if that ſettlement ſhould be attacked.

Judging it highly improper that the French ſhould be permitted to continue a factory at *Surat*, in the very centre of our poſſeſſions, from whence the moſt important intelligence might be tranſmitted, and a dangerous correſpondence carried on with the country Powers, we have arreſted the perſon of the French Conſul, and all other Frenchmen in that city, and have removed them to *Bombay*, except the Conſul, who remains at *Surat* under an Engliſh guard; and upon his parole not to carry on any correſpondence whatever but under the inſpection of the chief.

A French officer having in charge a packet from the Miniſtry for Monſieur *Bellcombe*, has been intercepted at *Grain*, a port on the Arab coaſt, by a plan of the Company's ſervants at *Buſſora*, and arrived at *Bombay* the 3d inſtant. His diſpatches are in cypher, and not to be unravelled, though we have actually got the cypher, which was found amongſt the papers of the French Conſul; we find by the prints and private letters he brought with him, that there had been an engagement on the 27th of July, between the grand fleets under Admiral *Keppel* and the Count *D'Orvilliers*, which was not at all deciſive, though it does not appear any declaration of war had yet been made, ſo late as the 14th Auguſt; the paper which Mr. *Abraham* terms ſo in the encloſed extract being only an order to the French Admiralty to grant commiſſions for making repriſals, of which we have the honour to encloſe a tranſcript.

The Count *D'Eſtaing*'s ſquadron arrived at *Boſton* the 20th of June.

This packet will be ſent by ſea to *Anjengo*, from whence it may be forwarded to *Madras* with the utmoſt ſafety, and we ſhall deſire the gentlemen there to tranſmit it to you with all poſſible ſecurity.

We requeſt you will immediately commence ſending us our annual ſupply of money; and are with much reſpect, &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
12th December 1778.

Signed by the Secretary, by the Governor's order, who is unable to hold a pen, } *William Hornby.*

(Signed) *D. Draper.*

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secry.

APPENDIX, No. 170.

READ the following letter from Colonel *Goddard*, to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William*, dated 5th January 1779.

Gentlemen,

I ſome time ago informed you of the arrival of the detachment upon the confines of *Berar*, and that a confidential perſon on the part of the Rajah had met me after I croſſed the *Nerbudda*.

Finding that he was not empowered to enter upon the ſubject of any particular negociations betwixt his maſter and the Engliſh, by confining his converſation ſolely to the ſubject of my march towards *Bombay*, and the means of reconciling that ſtep to the Peiſhwa and Poonah Miniſters, I judged it proper alſo to be ſilent towards him reſpecting the views of your Government; and that no time might be loſt in communicating to *Moodajee*, both them and the extent of my commiſſion from you, I determined upon immediately ſending Lieutenant *Watherſton* to *Naigpore*, fully inſtructed in every point relative to this buſineſs.

From the uncertainty in which I had reaſon to be, concerning the ſentiments of that Court, and the diſtance of the Rajah's reſidence from the frontier, being above a hundred coſs, I did not think it eligible myſelf to leave the army, till I was aſſured that the intentions of that prince were perfectly favourable to the ſeveral points on which I was empowered to treat with him, and I beg to aſſure you of my entire ſatisfaction with the conduct of Lieutenant *Watherſton*, on this occaſion, who has, I am convinced, neglected nothing which was neceſſary to promote the ſucceſs of this negociation, and has ſtrictly conformed to the inſtructions I gave him.

I cannot in any reſpect tax this Court with poſſeſſing inclinations unfriendly to the Engliſh; on the contrary, I am convinced they ſee their own intereſts in maintaining a connection of amity with us, which inſtead of breaking, they

they will endeavour to improve and ſtrengthen; but in the preſent ſituation of affairs in the Decan, they find excuſes for delay, by which they were determined to be influenced.

To the former part of your inſtructions delivered to Mr. *Elliott*, concerning the terms of a defenſive alliance, they expreſſed to Mr. *Watherſton* a perfect ſatisfaction and concurrence; but as theſe in their conſequence do not require an immediate execution, and a ſpirit of peculiar circumſpection and caution ſeems to direct the preſent conduct of this Government; they propoſe to defer the final deciſion, even on this part of the treaty, till the ſeveral articles relating to it ſhall be confirmed under the ſignature of your Board, and the ſeal of the honourable Company, for obtaining which they mean to depute a perſon to *Calcutta* immediately.

The ſame reaſon they urge for delay reſpecting the former, they alſo advance as one cauſe why the latter part of your inſtructions, which relate to an alliance of an offenſive nature, cannot now be entered into by them, with any regard to their own intereſt and advantage, as the ſanction they require in the firſt place, muſt be the only foundation on which their future views can be raiſed, and becomes more neceſſary, in proportion to the importance of the object they have in purſuit.

Another obſtacle they ſtart to the immediate commencement of any active operations, is the preſent diſputes in which the Miniſters at *Poonah* are involved with the Engliſh, and the part taken by the Council of *Bombay* in favour of *Ragonaut Row*.

They have themſelves addreſſed your Government on this ſubject, and have ſolicited, as well as recommended the relinquiſhing the cauſe of the latter, and accepting terms from the preſent miniſterial party; the motive they acknowledge for acting this mediating part, is to pave the way for the advancement of their own ſchemes hereafter, in concert with the Engliſh, which they profeſs cannot be done conſiſtent with an attention to the intereſts of *Ragonaut Row*.

For theſe reaſons *Moodajee Booſla* has declined entering into any treaty, or taking any active part whatever till further accounts may arrive from *Calcutta*, by the nature of which he will then be guided; and if it ſhall be found eligible by you to adjuſt the difference betwixt the Bombay Council and the preſent Adminiſtration of *Poonah*, excluding *Ragonaut Row* from any ſhare in the latter, he will in that event cheerfully ſolicit your aſſiſtance to accompliſh his views; otherwiſe it is plain he will be induced to lay them aſide altogether; in the mean time, I can ſpeak with confidence, that his inclinations towards the Engliſh are perfectly friendly; and I have ſtudiouſly taken care to leave the negociations with him in ſuch a train, that it will be always in your power to renew them whenever you may judge it for the intereſt and honour of your Government to do ſo.

Diſappointed in my views at this Court, I have referred to the latter part of your inſtructions given to Mr. *Elliott* for his guide, and compared them with the purport of your letter to me of the 23d November laſt, in which you have thought it neceſſary to revoke the order before ſent me for obeying all ſuch orders as I might receive from the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, leſt a compliance with them might interrupt any meaſures I might find it neceſſary to purſue in conſequence of my engagements with the Rajah of *Berar*.

You have alſo ſignified to me, that it is your intention the detachment under my command ſhould act in ſupport of any meaſures which the Council at *Bombay* may have formed in reliance on it, as far as they may be conſiſtent with the inſtructions given me, and the engagements I may have concluded in conſequence of them.

By the determination of this Court, any difficulties which an attention to the latter might have occaſioned, are entirely removed; and as I conſider it further conſiſtent with the ſpirit of your inſtructions, I have thought proper to march towards *Poonah* immediately.

I am induced to adopt this ſtep in conſequence of having received letters from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, informing me that the forces from that Preſidency had actually taken the field to effect the reſtoration of *Ragoba*; that Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and *Moſtyn*, were appointed Commiſſioners for ſettling the *Poonah* Government; and requiring me to advance towards that place with all expedition, as the preſence of my detachment is neceſſary to the ſucceſs of their views. From other authentic intelligence I learn that hoſtilities are actually commenced; I am therefore led to believe, that whatever may be the reſult of your political reſolves, the arrival of the force under me in the neighbourhood of *Poonah*, will be for the intereſt of the ſervice, either to proſecute the war, or to bring it to an honourable concluſion; at the ſame time that I ſhall be ready to act, in concert with *Moodajee*, any plan that may be deemed neceſſary in conſequence of your determination. Appendix. No. 170.

I beg leave to encloſe for your fuller information, copies of the letters I have received from the Select Committee at *Bombay*; and as they are ſo earneſt and preſſing for my arrival at *Poonah*, I propoſe marching towards that quarter with all poſſible expedition; it will be however abſolutely neceſſary for me to wait the arrival of the treaſure which Lieutenant *Watherſtone* is bringing from *Naigpore*, the produce of the bills tranſmitted me in your letter of the 16th November. The Gomaſtah of *Gopaul Doſs* not being able to collect a ſum more than ſufficient to diſcharge the amount of the bill for one lack, I applied to the Rajah for the two remaining, who immediately advanced them, without any deduction or diſcount for the period to elapſe before they would become due.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

Camp near *Huſſeingabad*,
5th January 1779.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following letters to him from Colonel *Goddard*:

Honourable Sir,

I have the pleaſure to tranſmit you herewith a letter addreſſed to the Hon. Board, informing them of the delays I have met with in bringing to a concluſion the treaty they had empowered me to enter into with *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, and the reaſons aſſigned by that Chief for his paſſive conduct on this occaſion.

In order to give you a more full and complete idea of the negociation, I beg leave to encloſe for your peruſal, copies of the letters I have ſucceſſively received from Lieutenant *Watherſton*, ſince his arrival at *Naigpore*; from theſe you will perceive the determined ſentiments of that Court are, to take no active part whatever till further accounts may arrive from you, when they declare their readineſs to co-operate with the force under my command in any plan that may be fixed on for the mutual intereſt of both parties. The Rajah has himſelf addreſſed a letter to you, expreſſive of their inclination, which I have the pleaſure to encloſe you: He has alſo addreſſed you on the ſubject of the preſent diſputes betwixt the Bombay Council and the Miniſters of *Poonah*, in which the intereſt he ſeems to take in wiſhing to reconcile the difference that has ariſe proceeds entirely from motives of policy; indeed he does not ſcruple to acknowledge this to be the caſe; and I am perſuaded nothing would in reality be more agreeable to his wiſh, than to ſee the power of the Peiſhwa reduced; but he juſtly apprehends that the eſtabliſhing *Ragonaut Row*'s authority under the influence of the Engliſh would exclude him from all hopes of ever obtaining the object he has in view through their means, as an attention to and obſervance of the intereſts of both would be an impracticable taſk to our Government, and irreconcilable to themſelves. There appears no doubt of the friendly diſpoſition of the Berar Court towards the Engliſh, which

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from political motives they will ſtudy to cultivate and improve; for the vicinity of *Cuttack* to our poſſeſſions, and the conveniency of its ſituation to them, renders it an object in our eyes, of which they know we can at any time avail ourſelves. Throughout the whole of what has paſſed with the Naigpore Court ſince my arrival here, this friendly inclination ſeems fully manifeſted; and in the train in which the negociation is now left they have covered their refuſal of immediately acceding to any treaty by ſpecious arguments, which diſcover at the ſame time the trueſt confidence repoſed in our Government. I have alſo made it my particular ſtudy, nor are my endeavours I am perſuaded unſucceſsful, that ſhould you at any time hereafter find it for the honour and intereſt of the Company to proſecute an alliance with *Moodajee*, upon the eligible and advantageous plan already propoſed, it will always be in your power to do ſo with advantage and convenience to your own affairs. The Rajah ſcruples not to declare his wiſh to ſettle the Sittera ſucceſſion; and as the only Powers on whoſe aſſiſtance and friendſhip he can rely to ſupport him in this attempt he names the Engliſh and *Zuffer ul Dowla*. You will perceive by the ſubject of a converſation mentioned in one of Mr. *Watherſton*'s letters, how cloſely connected that Chief is with the *Berar* family, to whoſe views he is made privy, and is very urgent with them to ſeize the preſent opportunity offered by the friendſhip of the Engliſh for their accompliſhment.

By the encloſed letters to you from *Moodajee*, you at once ſee the plan adopted by that Prince, and the motives that influence his conduct on the preſent occaſion, which appear to be ſolely dictated by regard to political conſiderations of ſafety and convenience. Although he is exceedingly urgent to adjuſt the preſent diſpute with the Peiſhwa's Government, he frankly acknowledges his view in ſo doing is to pave the way for his own future projects; and he declares, with equal appearance of ſincerity, that theſe are incompatible with the meaſures now adopted in favour of *Ragonaut Row*. Here then we find the principal, and although others are aſſigned by themſelves, I could almoſt ſay the only obſtacle, to the ſucceſs of the negociation I was empowered to manage with *Modajee*. *The ſchemes of the gentlemen at* Bombay, *and the active part they have taken in ſupport of* Ragoba, *have deſtroyed all hopes of concluding the propoſed alliance with the Court of* Naigpore, until it may be judged expedient by you to direct the former to be relinquiſhed, in order to leave room for the entire and free adoption of the latter. The ſentiments contained in the Rajah's letter to you exactly correſpond with the opinion I have above advanced; and he further poſitively aſſures me, that when the anſwers to his letters ſhall arrive from you; when the treaty which he propoſes to enter ſhall be confirmed by the ſeal of the Company and the ſignature of your Board; and when the plan he has recommended reſpecting the diſputes at *Poonah* ſhall have taken place; he will join his forces with thoſe of the Engliſh, and aſſert his pretenſions to the grand object of his wiſh and ambition. To the inconſiſtency there appears in labouring ſo ſtrenuouſly for the intereſts of a Power with whom he means ſoon to be engaged in hoſtilities, and for whom he profeſſes to have no friendly inclination, he anſwers, by obſerving, that it is abſolutely neceſſary for his ſucceſs; and that when matters are ripe for execution, the oppoſition of the Peiſhwa will be added to a variety of other excuſes that may be framed for a rupture with that Court. This is a refinement upon policy that might almoſt lead one to ſuſpect he was not altogether ſerious and determined upon his Sittera expedition, was it not to be accounted for by the unfortunate interference of *Ragonaut Row*'s intereſt, and proved ſtill more ſo beyond contradiction by the contents of *Zuffer ul Dowla*'s letters, written by his own hand, and which *Watherſton* himſelf peruſed.

I have forwarded to the honourable Governor General and Council duplicates of the letters I have received from the Select Committee at *Bombay*; in conſequence of which, as I find war actually commenced in that quarter, I conſider it for the Company's intereſt, and conſiſtent with the ſpirit of the inſtructions of your Government, that I ſhould immediately march with the troops under me to aſſiſt and co-operate with thoſe of *Bombay*. In the mean time I hope to be honoured with your particular orders and inſtructions for my future guidance; and I beg leave to aſſure you, that in the eſtimation of a juſt and wiſe policy, whatever proportion the plan in favour of *Ragonaut Row* may bear to that intended to have been proſecuted with *Moodajee*, I ſhall exert my endeavours with the ſame zeal and ardour for the good of the ſervice, in accompliſhing the former, as if the more pleaſing and eligible taſk had been fortunately aſſigned me of effecting the latter.

The propoſed treaty with *Moodajee* would, I am perſuaded, have met with no obſtruction, had not the meaſures taken by the Bombay Council intervened to counteract it. Should it be found political or proper to put a ſtop to them, it will then be liable to no further interruption. I have referred *Moodajee* in this point entirely to your Government; he waits with impatience for the reſult of your reſolutions, and is ready to take up arms if you give the word. In the mean time the march of this detachment towards *Poonah* cannot but be attended with the moſt beneficial conſequences; and the Rajah is convinced, that let your determination be which way it will, the preſence of my force will either be of uſe in bringing the Miniſters to a proper ſenſe of their improper conduct, or to commence the operations in his favour when the favourable juncture ſhall arrive; I propoſe therefore to march from this place immediately, and move forward with all poſſible expedition. I am however neceſſarily detained three or four days, till the arrival of the treaſure coming with Lieutenant *Watherſton* from *Naigpore*. The Gomaſtah of *Gopaul Doſs* could only collect a ſufficient ſum to pay off the bill of one lack made firſt payable, ſo that I was obliged to apply to the Rajah for the remaining two, who immediately advanced them to me, taking the bills in depoſit, and without any diſcount or deduction. I think it proper to mention to you, that the Court of *Naigpore* has cheerfully and willingly afforded every aſſiſtance I found it neceſſary to require of them, except that of joining me with a body of troops, or taking any active part in the war, prior to which they ſay it is requiſite that a treaty ſhould be concluded and ratified by the ſolemn ſanction of your Board; and for this purpoſe the delay of ſome time is neceſſary. They have publicly demonſtrated their friendly ſentiments to the Engliſh, in a manner obvious to the neighbouring Powers; and the aſſurances made by the Rajah and Dewan in the ſeveral converſations with Mr. *Watherſton*, and in particular when he delivered the preſents from me in the name of your Government ſtrongly evince their ſincerity. Mr. *Watherſton*'s letter to me on this ſubject goes encloſed, together with an account of the preſents he delivered at the Court of *Naigpore*.

I have, &c.

Camp at *Huſſeingabad*, January 15th 1779. (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

Honourable Sir,

Encloſed I have the honour to tranſmit you the remaining part of Mr. *Watherſton*'s correſpondence from the Court of *Naigpore*, together with the letters from Rajah *Moodajee Booſla*, which I omitted to forward in my laſt night's addreſs.

You will perceive by the converſation related in Mr. *Watherſton*'s laſt letter, which paſſed upon taking his leave, how deſirous the Rajah is of detaining the force under my command in theſe parts till anſwers ſhall arrive from you relative to the point referred by him to your Government, and till an accommodation may have taken place with the miniſterial party at *Poonah*; on this head

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my reſolution is however taken, and I have in my former letter fully explained to you my motives for proceeding towards *Bombay*, to be in readineſs to act in ſupport of the meaſures purſued by the Select Committee, either as the Company's intereſts may require, or as it may be hereafter found conſiſtent with the orders and inſtructions you may judge it neceſſary to ſend me in conſequence of the unexpected part now taken by the gentlemen at *Bombay*.

I have alſo reconciled the preſent movement of my detachment to the Court of *Naigpore*, by informing them, their buſineſs being ultimately referred to you, as well as the final determination of the diſputes with the Poonah Miniſtry, I ſhall be ready to execute any meaſures in concert with him, which you may judge requiſite for the mutual intereſt of both parties.

In reply to what he mentioned to Lieutenant *Watherſton*, reſpecting *Huſſeingabad* and *Maundalla*, I have in a few words informed him, that the intention of your Government in ſending an army into his country, and empowering me to conclude a treaty with him in your name, was to obtain an object more important and eſſential to his intereſts than the partial ſubjection of a few ſmall diſtricts; that in particular the friendly and hoſpitable behaviour of the Nawab of *Bhopal*, to whom *Huſſeingabad* now belongs, upon the arrival of the Engliſh troops in his country, gave him a claim to their favour, and that at any rate I could not act in this buſineſs without the ſanction and authority of the Governor General and Supreme Council being firſt obtained.

I have now made known to you every thing material that has occurred during my negociation with the Rajah of *Berar*; and muſt, together with him leave the further proſecution of it, as well as the partial line you may think proper to preſcribe for my future conduct, to your final determination.

I have, &c. the honour, &c.

Camp, near *Huſſeingabad*, January 6th, 1779. (Signed) *Tho' Goddard.*

The Governor General remarks, that the letters alluded to in that from Mr. *Watherſton* to Colonel *Goddard*, of the 24th of December, are only duplicates of thoſe which have been already received direct from the Rajah.

Governor General—I did hope to have been able to lay before the Board at this meeting, ſome plan for approbation, in conſequence of the late advices from *Bombay*; but I have been prevented, 1ſt, by the neceſſity of waiting for the advices from Colonel *Goddard* now received, and 2dly, by the want of the materials which I judged requiſite for the knowledge of the Board, in deciding on the treaty concluded by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, with *Ragoba*, and on the meaſures which would be neceſſary on our part, as the conſequences of that treaty: the materials to which I allude, are our late letters to *Bombay*, eſpecially thoſe which contained the inſtructions on which they had concluded and publiſhed the treaty, as the effect of our immediate ſanction, and their advices to us reſpecting their plan of the 21ſt July appears to be that now carried into execution; I ſhall loſe no time in preparing for the inſpection of the Board, ſuch propoſitions as appear to me neceſſary on the occaſion.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

To Colonel *Goddard.*

Sir,

The Governor General and Council have adviſed us of their reſolution to remove Colonel *Leſlie*, before they heard of his demiſe, and of their having appointed you to the chief command of the detachment of forces ordered for the ſupport of this Preſidency: they have alſo apprized us of the orders they have given for your conduct on your arrival in the Berar country. Appendix, No. 170.

We congratulate you on this mark of diſtinction conferred on you by the Governor General and Council; and though we hope this will meet you well advanced on your march, in conſequence of our letters of the 13th November and 6th inſtant, yet to prevent all diſappointment, and that you may not be at any loſs in your proceedings, we judge it proper to repeat to you that our forces have actually taken the field in proſecution of the plan communicated to the Governor General and Council, for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, and that we deem it requiſite and adviſable that the army under your command ſhould move forwards towards *Bombay*.

We therefore hereby require you to advance according to our former orders, even without a junction of the troops of any Power in alliance with the Honourable Company, and we likewiſe deſire and enjoin you to conduct your march with all poſſible expedition.

The ſettlement of the Government at *Poonah* is committed to Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and *Moſtyn*, with whom we deſire you will correſpond; and we flatter ourſelves the movement of our forces will facilitate your march, in like manner as we expect the advance of your detachment will leſſen the oppoſition to our forces.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 19th December 1778. (Signed) *William Hornby*, *D. Draper.*

A true Copy.
R. Dunkley, Secy.

To Colonel *Goddard.*

Sir,

I beg leave to write you a few lines, to acquaint you with my arrival and reception at the Court of *Naigpore*: about three o'clock this afternoon, I was met about two miles from the town by *Bulwant Roy*, the Buckſhy's ſon, who was ſent by the Rajah to conduct me into it.

In the evening I waited upon the Rajah in his palace, where I was introduced to his three ſons, the Dewan, and *Bapow Row*, the Poonah Vackeel: it was full Durbar, and nothing of buſineſs was talked of: I propoſed to the Dewan, to have a meeting with him on buſineſs immediately, nay, preſſed it very much; as my inſtructions from you were poſitively to loſe no time in commencing negociations, and they were of too important a nature to admit of any delay: he has excuſed himſelf till to-morrow.

The Rajah received me very graciouſly, and mentioned in the ſtrongeſt terms, his friendſhip for the Engliſh, and his ſenſe of the proof given by our Government to theirs, in deputing you to his Court. He has recovered of his ſickneſs, which was a very ſevere one, and it is ten days ſince he received public congratulations on that account; he ſtill however appears weak; he talks, I am informed, little in general; and at this time, on account of the remains of his indiſpoſition, leſs than uſual. All buſineſs is managed by the Dewan, who has promiſed to be with me to-morrow, and to whom I will not fail to mention every circumſtance relative to the buſineſs on which I come, when you ſhall hear from me in the fulleſt, and I hope moſt ſatisfactory manner.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.

Naigpore, 19th December 1778. (Signed) *Dal. Watherſton.*

A true Copy.
R. Dunkley, Secy.

To Colonel *Goddard.*

Sir,

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, as my laſt letter informed you, the Dewan came according to his engagement, and continued near four hours, when the whole ſubject

Appendix. No. 170.

ſubject of the negociation propoſed, was fully canvaſſed. The particulars of what paſſed are as follow:

I firſt explained to him, the powers delegated to you by the Governor and Supreme Council, to conclude an alliance of friendſhip, in the name and by the authority of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, with the Rajah of *Berar*; mentioned to him the particular wiſh of our Government, and your ſtrong inclination to promote the intereſts of *Moodajee*, together with your readineſs to carry into immediate execution any plan for that purpoſe.

The Dewan expreſſed the favourable intentions of his maſter, his deſire to enter into terms of friendſhip with the Engliſh, in the warmeſt manner, and his happineſs, that an opportunity now offered of doing ſo by your arrival with full powers from *Calcutta* to treat with him.

I told the Dewan, you was yourſelf exceedingly deſirous of having a meeting with the Rajah; and as ſoon as he conſented to the alliance, would ſet o[illegible] for *Naigpore*, to ſettle the buſineſs with him in perſon; that in the mean time you had ſent me to communicate the nature, of the negociation you meant to carry on, and to obtain his anſwer, which would immediately determine your operations.

I then proceeded to ſpeak particularly to the points contained in the inſtructions given by the Board to Mr. *Elliott* for concluding an offenſive alliance with *Moodajee*; concluding that to be the object which the Board were anxious to obtain, and in particular the end you had principally in view in ſending me. It is unneceſſary to repeat the whole of the arguments I advanced on the occaſion: be aſſured, I neglected nothing that you had ſuggeſted to me, or that occurred to myſelf at the time. Indeed ſo earneſtly did I preſs their compliance with an object from its nature ſo manifeſtly tending to their advantage, that it ought rather to have been propoſed and ſolicited by themſelves, that nothing but the importance of the meaſure in its probable future conſequences, and the ſtrong wiſh of Mr. *Haſtings* to effect it, would have juſtified my earneſtneſs and importunities.

It was however to no effect; and I can aſſure you, as you will plainly perceive by their letters now writing you on the ſubject, that they are determined not to take any active part whatever with our armies.

They have a thouſand arguments to oppoſe to thoſe I urged in favour of the plan for aſſuming the dignity of Rauge of *Sittara*; they gave a long detail of the paſt tranſactions of their hiſtory, the connections which they have ſince formed, and the treaties ſolemnly entered into by them in conſequence. They then dwelt a good deal upon the regard they have ever paid to their faith, by an adherence to which they have always been proſperous and flouriſhing.

They ſay they have ſworn to an alliance of friendſhip with the preſent Peiſhwa, *Pundit Purdhaun Madhurow*, which they cannot violate; and add, that their aſſerting their pretenſions to the ſovereignty will meet with numberleſs oppoſitions; and that though victory muſt in the end crown our arms over them all; it will not be without ſhedding much blood, and at the expence of their violating the ſacred force of engagements before entered into by them. This laſt circumſtance the Dewan lays much ſtreſs on. It is plain from every ſentiment expreſſed by him, that the Rajah does not mean on any account at this time to commence a war in ſupport of his claim.

I repreſented to him the favourable opportunity that now preſented itſelf; an army on his frontier, ready to accompliſh his wiſh, the diſtracted ſtate of affairs at *Poonah*, which would prevent the Miniſtry from ſeriouſly oppoſing him, however hoſtilely inclined; and that the reaſons he had in his letter urged to Mr. *Haſtings* and you accounted for the difficulties occaſioned by Mr. *Elliott*'s death; and the delay of the detachment now no longer exiſting. All this he acknowledged; but declared it contrary to every conſideration of prudence and policy, for his maſter at this time to adopt the ſcheme propoſed: he talked of deferring it for two or three years; but could not give any particular reaſon, why it would then be more eligible than at this time. The motives by which they ſeem to be actuated, appear to me as follow:

Knowing the friendly intercourſe ſubſiſting betwixt the Engliſh and themſelves, and alſo plainly foreſeeing that a rupture with the Peiſhwa is at this time abſolutely unavoidable, they wiſh not to involve themſelves in any hoſtilities till the event of the war ſhall determine on which ſide victory will finally declare; I doubt not but they are conviced in the opinion, that it will be on ours, in which caſe they are aſſured of a friend in us; and ſhould it prove otherwiſe, beſides in the mean time ſecuring their country from the effects of war, they would have the leſs to fear from the reſentment of the miniſterial party hereafter.

The Dewan told me, that *Zuffer ul Dowla*, the Chief of *Narnull*, (at preſent independent of Nizam *Ally*) is much inclined to unite himſelf with *Moodajee*; that letters have come from him, ſoliciting the Rajah in the ſtrongeſt terms to join with the Engliſh, and aſſert his pretenſions to the ſovereignty of *Sittara*, in which *Zuffer ul Dowla* is ready to aſſiſt him with his forces: Notwithſtanding this concurrent favourable circumſtance, ſays the Dewan, the attempt cannot be made at this time; in ſhort, let what will be the motive for retracting from the ambitious projects the Rajah once meditated, it is now obvious that he has altered his views altogether, or at leaſt that he has deferred them till a future opportunity.

The Dewan did not fail to mention to me the motion of the Bombay troops towards *Poonah*, which he aſſerts to be an abſolute fact, and communicated to him by undoubted authority: *Ragonaut Row*'s adopted ſon accompanies them with a body of his father's troops; ſo that there is no doubt of the intentions at leaſt of that Government in favour of that Chief. This circumſtance, (though he did not poſitively ſay ſo) what with the general averſion in which *Ragonaut Row* is held; the particular diſputes which have of late ariſen betwixt him and *Moodajee*, when the latter was compelled to make terms with the preſent Peiſhwa and Nizam *Ally*; and above all, a conſciouſneſs that his attaining the Rauze of *Sittara* in the extent he wiſhed, under the adminiſtration of *Ragonaut Row*, would be impracticable; I ſay this circumſtance ſeems an effectual bar to the Rajah's concurrence with the plan projected for his advancement by the Supreme Government at *Calcutta*, beſides a firm perſuaſion, I am certain it will be impoſſible to diveſt him of, that however we may profeſs to favour his views, our principal and ultimate end is to favour thoſe of *Ragonaut Row*. Many parts of the Dewan's converſation, and which do not at preſent occur, to communicate minutely, were of a tendency to aſſure me beyond the need of further conviction, that every effort to perſuade the Rajah into a concurrence with the propoſed plan, would be abſolutely ineffectual.

Although there is too much reaſon to believe the report of our troops at *Bombay* being in motion, I have ſince my arrival at this Court affected to ſuppoſe it might be premature, or attempted to account for it by ſome diſpute which might have happened with the Peiſhwa and our Government there, or ſome quarrel diſtinct from *Ragonaut Row*'s cauſe; poſitively perſiſting in the intentions of the Supreme Board at *Calcutta*, to enter into and ſupport the views and pretenſions of *Moodajee*.

I was induced to be the more peremptory on this head, from the contents of the Supreme Council's letter to the gentlemen at *Bombay*, relative to Mr. *Elliott*'s embaſſy, in which they poſitively requeſt that Government to refrain from any engagements of a nature hoſtile to the actual Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, excepting ſuch as may appear abſolutely neceſſary for the defence of their own poſſeſſions.

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The neceſſity thus provided againſt by no means appearing admiſſible in excuſe for the meaſures this Court ſuppoſed have been taken in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, I have not ſcrupled altogether to doubt the inclinations for reſtoring him, having prompted the Bombay Council to take the field at this time; and having aſſerted my belief that they mean only to be in readineſs to ſupport and co-operate with us in favour of *Moodajee*'s claim.

I am to have an interview with the Rajah to-morrow, when I ſhall be able to write you more particularly.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.

Naigpore, (Signed) *Dal. Watherſton.*
20th December 1778.

A true copy.

R. Dunkley, Secy.

To Colonel *Goddard.*

Sir,

I wrote you yeſterday informing you of the ſubject of a conference I had with the Miniſter: as you deſired me to be very minute in relating every circumſtance that might occur during my ſtay at this place, I ſhall punctually communicate the ſmalleſt particular, in the courſe of which, if I mention any thing that does not immediately relate to the preſent negociation, or that ſeems to contradict the ſentiments expreſſed by the Court in any former conference, it may ſtill be of uſe to diſcover their real object, and give you a more clear and complete idea of the ſituation of affairs here.

This evening I had a private interview with the Rajah, at which his three ſons and the Miniſter were preſent, when the whole of the converſation of the preceding evening was again talked over, and the ſame ſentiments freely and clearly declared.

The Rajah has however entered more fully into his own particular views; he has acknowledged the object of his wiſh: and to prove his ſincerity in that reſpect, the Miniſter ſhewed me two letters from *Zuffer-ul-Dowla*, the Nawab of *Narnull*, in which he urges the Rajah to make uſe of the opportunity now offered by the arrival of the Engliſh troops, and poſſeſs himſelf of the ſovereignty of *Sittara*.

The Rajah talked much of his intimate connection and friendſhip with this Nawab, whom he eſteemed as his own ſon, and the deſire he had of making him alſo a friend of the Engliſh To this I anſwered in general terms, that the Engliſh would ever conſider his friends as their own.

Moodajee added, that I plainly ſaw what his views really were, but that many things were firſt neceſſary before they could be accomplished: in the firſt place, a treaty of friendſhip muſt be concluded betwixt the Engliſh Company and himſelf. I told him that was your intention, and that you was empowered to do ſo by the Governor General and Council. I then explained to him the principles upon which it was propoſed a defenſive alliance ſhould be made; to all which he gave a general conſent; but added, that the concurrence of the Council muſt be obtained from *Calcutta*, before his mind could be at eaſe, and before he would undertake the grand and important enterprize. I then read to him the Board's credentials, and explained the nature of them, pointing out the full authority with which it is cuſtomary for the Engliſh to inveſt their Miniſters when ſent to treat with any foreign Power: at the ſame time I told him, that thoſe articles which were intended to be of a permanent nature, and did not require an immediate execution, might be firſt ſettled here, and ultimately referred to the confirmation of the Board, but that what related to the immediate ſervice of the troops could not wait for this reference; and I exhorted him in the warmeſt terms to reflect upon the opportunity that now preſented itſelf, and which might not perhaps ſo readily occur to his wiſh. My endeavours were however to no purpoſe, and he has aſſured me, that he cannot now undertake the buſineſs; he is writing letters to the Governor and to you to this effect, which however will not be ready to accompany this diſpatch; I ſhall therefore forward them by ſome future opportunity. Apendix. No. 170.

In the courſe of our this day's converſation, many points moſt ſtrongly inſiſted on yeſterday were either totally omitted, or but ſlightly touched upon. The ſacredneſs of public faith was once hinted, but no regard to the Peiſhwa's intereſt at all expreſſed; on the contrary, the Rajah plainly avowed his own ambitious projects; but, as I mentioned before, declared the preſent ſeaſon for attempting them altogether improper and unfit. *Ragonaut Row* was not at all introduced into the ſubject of this day's converſation; but after all I am led to believe that the preſent apparent revolution in his favour is the principal bar to our negociation. The various excuſes urged to-day for delay are prompted ſince the conference of yeſterday, to ſoften the refuſal they think it political to give to the preſent propoſals made to them; at the ſame time they mean to keep up the friendly intercourſe they now have with our Government, and to improve it hereafter to their own advantage at a favourable opportunity.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

Naigpore, (Signed) *Dal. Watherſton,*
21ſt December 1778.

A true copy.

R. Dunkley, Secy.

To Colonel *Goddard.*

Sir,

I have now the pleaſure to tranſmit you a letter from the Rajah to yourſelf, and two from Mr. *Haſtings*, which the Rajah requeſts you will forward to *Calcutta*: their contents I have already fully explained to you in my former letters: as they exactly correſpond with the reſolutions expreſſed in the ſeveral conferences I have had at this Court, I yeſterday paid the Dewan a viſit, when every particular was again fully and minutely diſcuſſed.

Their firſt wiſh ſeems now to ſet aſide our connection with *Ragonaut Row*, the ſupporting whom the Dewan ſays he is convinced is highly impolitic, and will in the end be fully proved ſo. The abhorrence in which that Chief is univerſally held is, he ſays, no ſecret to you; and the prejudices in the Decan againſt him will not eaſily if ever be removed. There may be one cauſe why this Court is peculiarly inimical towards him, becauſe an intimate connection formerly ſubſiſted betwixt him and *Moodajee*, which has ſince ſuſtained a total change; in effecting which, policy concurred with inclination on the part of the Berar Rajah to combine with the Peiſhwa and Nizam, when he ſolemnly engaged to them never to aſſiſt or join *Ragonaut*. The principal cauſe, however, of their objection to the Bombay ſchemes is, I make no doubt, the invincible bar they foreſee they will occaſion to the accompliſhment of their own.

This conſideration furniſhes one of the moſt conſiderable objections to the negociations propoſed to have been entered into with them at this time; and another they aſſign is the unprepared ſtate in which they now are for effecting the grand object of their ambition, for which they ſay powerful alliances, a large treaſure, and numerous force, are abſolutely neceſſary.

The Dewan did not ſcruple to ſay that your detachment was unequal to ſuch an enterprize; he ſoftened this by adding, that wherever you marched, and whatever foe you attacked, you would be victorious; but that it was neceſſary to guard againſt the depredations of enemies ſo ſudden in their motions as the Marattas are, in many quarters; that it would be requiſite to leave two battalions for the protection of *Naigpore*, and two for that of *Narnull*: in ſhort he ſummed up his judgment of the matter by ſaying, twenty battalions would be requiſite, and a thouſand Europeans, for this work; the thouſand Europeans he means principally for the ſervice of the guns, for he has no idea of that duty being properly performed but by them; in this opinion I confirmed him,

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but added, a few ſkilful men would be able to manage our artillery. What they ſeem to have in view at preſent is this, the making a peace betwixt the Engliſh and the Peiſhwa through their mediation, the totally diſcarding *Ragonaut Row*, and the taking a future occaſion of aſſerting their pretenſions, when a treaty ſhould have been concluded in the manner they propoſe to the Governor.

The Dewan, whoſe influence directs every thing here, is a man of great prudence and abilities; nor does he ſeem inclined to ſuffer his maſter to enter upon this buſineſs, or riſk the ſafety of his own dominions by new projects, till he conceives every poſſibility of diſappointment is effectually obviated: the preſent ſtate of things by no means flatters or promiſes ſucceſs to the achievement.

The letter they have wrote to you is perfectly plain and pointed, as are thoſe addreſſed to the Governor. The Dewan adviſes the march of your detachment to *Poonah*, by which time the Governor may ſend orders to *Bombay* of the nature recommended in the Rajah's letter, and *Renie Ram* alſo may have ſettled the other buſineſs with Mr. *Haſtings*. He talks a good deal inconſiſtently, for he propoſed going himſelf to *Poonah*, to act as mediator on the part of his maſter, with the Miniſters there, which would be a proof of the higheſt friendſhip; whilſt at the ſame time he ought to be thinking of arming, in conſequence of Mr. *Haſtings*'s reſolves, againſt the very root of the Peiſhwa's power; in ſhort, I am, from circumſtances occurring in the courſe of converſation, well perſuaded, that however deſirous the Rajah himſelf may be, the Dewan is himſelf more lukewarm; perhaps he thinks his own honour concerned in the maintaining the treaties between the Nizam and the Peiſhwa, which he himſelf principally brought about; and there is even room to believe he may have entered into negociations of a very ſecret nature with the Miniſtry at *Poonah*, who are Brahmins like himſelf; nor do I imagine it can be his wiſh to ſee the power of the Brahmins totally annihilated, which would be the inevitable conſequence of placing a Rajepoot of the authority of *Moodajee* on the throne of *Sittara*.

Laſt night, by ſome means or other, he ſeemed to give a looſe to his ſentiments a good deal; he acknowledged you had cauſe to be offended with the reception given to Monſieur *St. Lubin* at *Poonah*, by the miniſterial party, which he deſcribed.

He ſays he brought letters from the French king, and told them in the name of his maſter, to point out in what manner they might be ſerved, as the French were ready to do ſo. He had very valuable preſents, among which was one picture of a very particular nature, and which denoted the deep addreſs and cunning with which the deſigns had been laid: it repreſented the murder of *Narrain Row*, in the moſt ſtriking point of view, and the providence of Heaven interfering (which were indeed the heads of the miniſterial party) to ſave the wife of *Narrain Row, Gungaboy*, from deſtruction, who is attempting to kill herſelf; and telling her to bring forth that child with which ſhe was pregnant (meaning the preſent Peiſhwa) who would live to revenge his father's death, and perpetuate the glories of his race.

The reception they gave *St. Lubin* was moſt gracious and attentive; he was preſented with an elephant, &c. in proportion, and liberally ſupplied with every thing, whilſt our Reſident Mr. *Moſtyn* was denied acceſs to the Durbar, and received even particular indignities.

St. Lubin ſince, or about the time of the march of our detachment, was diſmiſſed from *Poonah*, and is gone to *Nidjiff Khân*.

Dewagur deſcribes with great ſatisfaction the conduct of *St. Lubin*, who, he ſays, wept a good deal at this affecting ſtory, as did ſome of the other old Brahmins there; but *Nana Furneſe* laughed at the artifice of the Frenchman, and greatly admired the facility with which he could ſhed real tears.

Naigpore, 24th December 1778. I have the honour, &c. (Signed) *Dal. Watherſton.*

To Colonel *Goddard*.

Sir,

I have received your letter of the 21ſt, by which I find the news of the Bombay troops being in motion has alſo reached you, and before this I make no doubt it will be fully and particularly confirmed to you. This circumſtance and the determination of the Berar Court to remain at preſent inactive, which I have in my former letter ſignified to you, will of courſe make you anxious to adopt ſome plan of immediate operations.

By every thing that has paſſed ſince my arrival here, I am fully perſuaded of the friendly inclinations of *Moodajee* towards the Engliſh; I before mentioned two letters he ſhewed me from *Zuffer-ul-Dowlah*, the Nawab of *Narnul*, and informed me of the contents; laſt night he received another, he ſent it to me to peruſe.

It begins with abuſing the Government at *Poonah*, pointing out their inſolence in a gleam of proſperity, and their oppoſite conduct when apprehenſive of any misfortune, which he proves by reminding the Rajah of the threats the Miniſters had formerly made uſe of when they were victorious over the party raiſed by *Nanah Furneſe*, and comparing it with the expreſſions they now employed to prevail upon *Moodajee* and himſelf to unite in oppoſing the Engliſh, who they ſay, in breach of the ſolemn treaty they had made, are marched with an army from *Bombay* to ſupport *Ragonaut Row*; in ſhort, *Zuffer-ul-Dowlah* tells the Rajah that the behaviour of theſe people is ſolely dictated by their own private views, and adviſes him to put no confidence whatever in their profeſſions, but to join the Engliſh, who, he ſays, are able and willing to be his faithful friends: he adds a few words to the letter in his own hand writing, which are earneſtly preſſing him to make friends with the Engliſh, and to join their forces, which are come into his country: he alſo encloſes a copy of a letter from the Miniſters to the Nizam, informing him of the march of the Bombay detachment, and their taking poſt at *Bhore* Gaut; to oppoſe whom they have detached *Scindia* and *Tookajee Holcar*, with orders to puniſh their temerity; they preſs the Nizam to join them; and after talking of ſome grants of land which they had made over to him, for which purpoſe they had given orders to their Aumil, they mention their inſtructions hereafter, ſending *Scindia* and *Holcar* to aſſiſt him in puniſhing *Hyder Naig*, who they ſay is now beſieging ſome fort belonging to them.

I forgot to tell you that in *Zuffer-ul-Dowlah*'s letter he informs the Rajah that the Miniſters have wrote to him of their entering into terms of friendſhip with *Hyder Naig*: how palpably the two letters contradict each other in that reſpect. As a farther proof of the artifices to which they are obliged to have recourſe, they propoſe to the Nizam, as an inducement for his joining with them, to aſſiſt him in attacking *Arcot*. They have alſo inſtructed their Miniſter at this Court, *Bapow Row*, to demand the aſſiſtance of the Rajah; and have promiſed to ſend *Scindia* and *Holcar* with a body of troops to aſſiſt him in levying the chout of *Bengal*. They have further propoſed to the Rajah to give him an extent of country in the province of *Khendeſh*, that will yield a revenue equal to that of *Cuttack* (as they perceive he is apprehenſive of the Engliſh taking it into their poſſeſſion) and they will themſelves receive *Cuttack* in exchange, which they will maintain againſt all our efforts.

Moodajee ſees the ſituation of the Poonah Durbar, and the folly of their councils; he is reſolved firmly to obſerve a neutral part at preſent; and recommends to the Peiſhwa by no means to enter upon a war with the Engliſh, which muſt be attended with certain ruin to his Government. He avows to them his friendſhip for us, but alſo gives them to underſtand he will not fight againſt their forces; and if they commence hoſtilities againſt him, he has nothing to dread from their power, ſupported as he will be by the arms of the Engliſh.

It appears that a better opportunity than the preſent could not offer for our ſettling the affairs of this country

according to our wiſh; *Moodajee* and *Narnull Nawab* are our friends; *Hyder Naig* has for his enemies, ours; the partizans of *Ragonaut Row* will greatly divide the force of the Maratta State; and I have reaſon to think that even *Nizam Ally* will obſerve a neutrality.

I think it neceſſary to ſay ſomething about *Bapow Row*, the Miniſter at this Court from the Poonah Durbar; he has often reſided here in that character; and about eight months ago came to endeavour to prevail upon the Rajah to ſend his ſon *Ragogee* with a force to aſſiſt the Peiſhwa againſt *Hyder Naig*, which he was put off from day to day with hopes of obtaining, till the march of our detachment, and the rumour of the deſigns of our Government, gave a turn to the ſyſtem of our politics; ſince that time he has been indefatigable in counteracting our views at this Court; he is treated with a good deal of reſpect and attention, and though his aſſiduity and influence may have proved too weak to make *Moodajee* wiſh to break off his alliance with us, it has I make no doubt aſſiſted a good deal to prevent his acting hoſtilely againſt the Peiſhwa. I was introduced to him on the day of my public audience, but have not met with him ſince.

This evening I viſited the Dewan; he propoſed, when we were diſcourſing on the ſubject of our diſputes with the Peiſhwa, that this man ſhould be ſent for; but I objected talking to him formally on any point relating to public buſineſs; as a private friend of the Dewan's only, I ſhould be glad to ſee him—the motion for ſending for him was immediately dropped.

I went yeſterday, by the particular requeſt of the Rajah, to ſee his artillery; he takes much pride and pleaſure in it, and has made a number of pieces of ordnance himſelf; they are ſome of them large, and prettily ornamented; but the carriages, &c. are exceedingly clumſy, and ill conſtructed: he has four or five Europe guns, apparently old. The whole of his artillery amounts to forty; twelve of which are very ſmall, not exceeding the bore of one of our muſkets. He has ſome half Portugueze, and a few vagabond Europeans in his ſervice, who receive about 30 rupees per month.

They tell of two Frenchmen of ſome conſequence and rank that came here about five months ago; one of them died, the other is gone to obtain ſervice either with the Peiſhwa or Nizam. Extravagance is not a fault of this Rajah; and I find, though he treated the ſurviving Frenchman with ſufficient attention, and even made him ſome preſents, giving him money for his preſent ſupport, he would not ſatisfy his expectations to induce him to remain in employment at *Naigpore*; perhaps on account of Mr. *Elliott*'s expected arrival, and the negociations he was carrying on with the Engliſh, the Rajah was not deſirous of his ſtay.

However, upon the ſtricteſt inquiry, I can ſee no grounds to ſuſpect the intereſts of the French nation were any ways connected with this viſit.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.

Naigpore. (Signed) *Dal. Watherſton.*
27th December 1778.

To Colonel *Goddard.*

Sir,

In conſequence of the authority you gave me for ſo doing, I ſignified to this Government that I had in my poſſeſſion ſome preſents as teſtimonies of friendſhip from the honourable Governor General and Council, which you had hoped to have the happineſs of delivering yourſelf in perſon when you ſaw the Rajah; but as you were diſappointed in that hope, you had deſired me to preſent them in your name: he received them with many marks of ſatisfaction, and ſaid a number of things expreſſive of his attachment to the Engliſh, whoſe friendſhip he affirmed he never would relinquiſh; but that the family of *Booſla* ſhould be the ſame with the Engliſh, without diminution, to the end of time. This declaration he repeated, laying his hand upon his breaſt; adding, that he did ſo that his three ſons, who were ſitting by him, might be witneſſes of his ſentiments, and that it might make an impreſſion on their minds. Appendix No. 170.

The Dewan propoſed that the preſents intended for him might be given in preſence of the Rajah alſo; which I accordingly did, and he received them with the ſame proofs of ſatisfaction, expreſſing himſelf particularly pleaſed with the preſent of the ink-ſtand, which he placed upon his head, as a mark of the honourable diſtinction he thought done him by ſending it.

Many things were ſaid upon the ſubject of the preſents, all expreſſive of the ſatisfaction they gave; and I am particularly pleaſed that this proof of attention, ſo neceſſary in opening a negociation with any of theſe States, whoſe eſtabliſhed cuſtom it is to make that ceremony an introduction to buſineſs, has not been omitted.

I this evening obtained my audience of leave from the Rajah, at which his ſons and the Miniſter were preſent, as indeed they have always been at the ſeveral interviews I have had ſince my arrival. He repeated at this converſation the aſſurances of friendſhip, and deſire of alliance with the Engliſh, which he before expreſſed to me; and aſſigned the ſame reaſons for delaying the concluſion of the propoſed treaty with our Government, which I have communicated to you in my former letters. He reſted his hopes of every ſucceſs in his own future views upon the reſolutions which may be taken at *Calcutta*, and the anſwers which ſhall arrive in conſequence of the letters he has addreſſed to Mr. *Haſtings*, and forwarded to him through you; theſe he ſays, contain every thing neceſſary to be attended to for the accompliſhment of his wiſhes, and the ſubſtance of what he has empowered *Benie Ram* to propoſe to Mr. *Haſtings* in his name, by whom alſo he has ſent duplicates of the ſame letters.

Benie Ram Pundit is to ſet out immediately by way of *Cuttack*; but as he means to travel by daily ſtages, I do not ſuppoſe he will arrive at *Calcutta* in leſs than forty days.

In addition to the propoſals before made by this Court, relative to the troops under your command, the Rajah and Duan expreſſed a ſtrong deſire that they might not move forwards towards *Poonah*, but remain in the neighbourhood of the Berar territories till orders might arrive from the Supreme Council, in anſwer to the Rajah's letters; and in the mean time, as it would be neceſſary to make ſome proviſion for the expence that would be requiſite for their maintenance, prior to the final adjuſtment of the grand object, they propoſed that you ſhould reduce to the ſubjection and authority of the Rajah, the diſtricts of *Huſſeingabad* and *Mundalla*, over both which they advance a legal claim of ſovereignty, and which they aſſert are unjuſtly withheld from them by the preſent poſſeſſors: to effect this ſervice they propoſe ordering a ſmall force to accompany you.

Not having received any inſtructions from you on theſe points, I declined giving any particular anſwer regarding them; but as I was to ſet out for camp immediately, I promiſed to make known to you their propoſals, to which you would yourſelf immediately ſend an anſwer.

As the diſtance of this place, and the length of time I muſt neceſſarily take in conducting the treaſure to camp, will make my arrival ſomething tedious, I have diſpatched an expreſs to you with the particulars of what has paſſed, that you may be enabled to reply to the Rajah's propoſals without loſs of time, in the manner you may yourſelf judge moſt proper.

I beg leave to intimate to you one circumſtance relative to *Bapou Row*, whom in a former letter I have mentioned as Miniſter from the Peiſhwa at this Court: this man prior to my arrival, and for ſome time after, was treated with great attention and reſpect; but for ſome reaſon, which I cannot certainly learn, is now a good deal neglected, and the Dewan told me he was to return to *Poonah* in a few days; I know he remonſtrated very freely with this court for the partiality and friendſhip ſhewn by them to the Engliſh, but to no effect; and I believe ſome

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ſome altercations aroſe betwixt the Miniſter and him on theſe ſubjects, which produced the preſent rupture.

I have the honour to be,

Naigpore, Sir, &c. &c. &c.

1ſt January 1778. (Signed) *Dal. Watherſton.*

N. B. The Rajah has requeſted me to take in charge for you ah elephant, a cheeta for hunting deer, a hawk, and a kooka, which I conſented to bring with me.

(Signed) *D. Watherſton.*

APPENDIX, No. 171.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 4th February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, and *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

RECONSIDERED the advices from *Bombay*, recorded in the laſt conſultation.

The Governor General delivers in the following minute:

The following obſervations have occurred to me as worthy notice in the conſideration of the letter lately received from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and now before the Board:

On the 17th of Auguſt we received a letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated the 25th of July, informing us that they had concerted a new plan for conducting *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*. We replied on the ſame day, and authorized them to carry their plan into execution, with the following expreſs proviſions:

1ſt. That it ſhould not interfere with any engagement formed with *Moodajee Booſla* by Mr. *Elliott*, and previouſly notified to them by him.

2d. That their lateſt advices from *Europe* ſhould amount to an aſſurance that the force required for this ſervice might be ſpared without endangering the ſafety of *Bombay*, in the event of a French invaſion.

3d. That the engagements which they might form either with *Ragonaut Row* himſelf, or with *Moraba* and his aſſociates, ſhould not be contrary to thoſe concluded by Mr. *Elliott*, and notified to them, nor of a hoſtile tendency to the Government of *Berar*.

Theſe appear to have been the laſt inſtructions received by them from this Government when they reſolved on the execution of the plan, and concluded the treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, of which they have adviſed us in their letter of the 12th of December; theſe they have quoted to us as their authority, and the ſame authority has been proclaimed to the world by *Ragonaut Row* in his manifeſto.

So far the letter of theſe inſtructions could warrant the execution of their plan, independently of the circumſtances under which they were dictated; the ſubſequent change of theſe circumſtances, the period of time originally fixed and notified to us for its execution, the great lapſe of that time, and the known and actual ſtate of our political ſyſtem, it is certainly warranted by them, ſince no engagement had been formed between this Government and that of *Berar*; nor do the conditions of the treaty viſibly bear a hoſtile tendency to the Government of *Berar*; neither are they in any danger of a French invaſion.

But whether it can be juſtified under all the other conſiderations which I have enumerated, I ſhall leave to a higher authority to determine, ſince it is not my intention to propoſe that we ſhould either diſclaim or annul it; I ſhall ſimply confine myſelf to a brief recital of the tranſactions and events which have happened ſince the notifications of their deſign, and which may affect the propriety of it, conſidered relatively to the time and mode of its execution.

The time firſt appointed for the execution of the plan was the beginning of September.

On the 11th September they adviſed us, "that they had not yet taken any meaſures in the proſecution of the plan, but ſhould ſpeedily come to ſome deciſive reſolutions, and adviſe us immediately of the reſult," referring us to Mr. *Lewis* for a full information of the ſituation of affairs at *Poonah*.

The words which I have maked with lines drawn under them were too emphatical not to attract our particular notice when they were read, and obviouſly impreſſed us with the perſuaſion, that as ſo long a time had already elapſed, (for the letter did not reach us till the 2d of November) and as we had received no other advices from them, though promiſed to be immediately ſent us, of the deciſive reſolutions which were ſpeedily to follow it, no reſolutions had followed, but that the plan had proved abortive. In this opinion we were confirmed; I ſpeak for myſelf, at leaſt by the information received from Mr. *Lewis*, that the heads of the party at whoſe invitation the Preſidency of *Bombay* had formed the deſign of conducting *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*, were all either impriſoned or deprived of office and authority. I muſt add in this place, that notwithſtanding the promiſes ſo pointedly given in their letter of the 11th September, we heard no more from them till the receipt of their letter of the 12th December now before us.

Our army was at this time far advanced; the object originally preſented to it ſeemed to have vaniſhed, and none remained but the propoſed alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, which had been to this time treated as little more than a reſource, to which we looked in the event of a failure in the deſign furniſhed us by the Preſidency of *Bombay*. It was now reſolved to adopt it wholly; and to prevent our being embarraſſed by a revival of the former, Colonel *Goddard* having been empowered by our letter of the 16th November, to negociate a treaty with *Moodajee Booſla* on the ground of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions; he was by another Letter of the 22d of the ſame month releaſed from the authority of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and directed to obey only the orders of this Board, with the allowance to exerciſe his own diſcretion in complying with ſuch requiſitions from them as were not inconſiſtent with the ſpecial and ſingle commiſſion which he had now in charge.

Theſe were conſequences which the Preſidency of *Bombay* ought to have foreſeen and to have made a proviſion for them; I will venture to ſay that they did foreſee them; they knew that our army was on the way, and making quick advances, their letter mentions it; they knew that we were in treaty with *Moodajee*; they knew that we had left the negociations open for the accompliſhment of their plan, while there was a chance of its taking effect; and as they had given us every cauſe to conclude that it would not take effect, they ought to have concluded in their turn, that we had indemnified ourſelves for the diſappointment by an immediate and decided engagement with *Moodajee*, the only reſource now left us; and which in effect we had at firſt abandoned to act in the proſecution of the ſchemes which they had preſented to us, and to which the orders of the Company had required our preferable attention. They knew alſo that at the very time in which they were in treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, and preparing to conduct him to *Poonah*, the Miniſters of this Government were either in immediate treaty, or on the point of commencing it with *Moodajee Booſla*; and that we had already drawn that Prince into a declared party with our Government, by the proſpect held out to him of the credit and advantages of our alliance; under ſuch circumſtances they will poſſibly be deemed by impartial judges to have exceeded the point of duty in acting at all, and in not waiting

waiting for the reſult of the depending meaſures of their ſuperior Government: but as they had reſolved to act, they ſurely ought to have paid ſome regard to the probable ſtate of our connection with *Moodajee*, and have left an opening for his admiſſion into their engagements with *Ragonaut Row*, after our example, and in the ſame manner as our inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott* had preſcribed the junction of *Ragonaut Row* in his negociation with *Moodajee*. This precaution they wholly neglected, confining themſelves to a bare acknowledgment of any engagements which might have been actually concluded with *Moodajee* at the preciſe date of their treaty, without which the treaty itſelf would have been invalid. Thus far their conduct may have been defective; it has defeated our meaſures and expoſed us to the ſuſpicion of duplicity; but I know not how it can be remedied.

The laſt point which remains to be noticed is of greater conſequence, and merits a more ſubſtantial conſideration of it, as the remedy is, I preſume, within our power, and our duty requires that we ſhould apply it. It will be remembered that our detachment was expreſsly deſigned for the ſupport of the plan communicated to us by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in December 1777, and ſince executed in a different form. Its object was afterwards varied, becauſe we underſtood, on the authority of that Preſidency, that their plan was wholly laid aſide. They have now precipitately recalled it to its original purſuit, but have neither provided the means of indemnifying the Company for the paſt expences of the army, nor a fund for its future ſubſiſtence, although it was one of the firſt injunctions given to them, when we reſolved on furniſhing them with this aid, "That a ſpecific ſum "ſhould be required, to reimburſe the Company for the "military charges which might be incurred by their in"terpoſition." See our reſolutions of the January 1778. The 9th and 10th articles of the treaty do indeed bind *Ragonaut Row* to the payment of a ſpecific ſum, viz. two and a half lacks of rupees per month for the charges of the army and ſtores with which he was to be aſſiſted *now*, that is from the Preſidency of *Bombay* only; and the number of men compoſing this aid is fixed at 4,000, which is within 90 of the force actually employed on this ſervice. But they have not only made no proviſion for the charge of our detachment; they ſeem to have ſtudied to preclude it altogether, by the following clauſe of the 10th article, *viz.* "Which the "Governor and Select Committee agree to accept with"out further account, in full of every expence attending "the army."

I hope and believe, that however we may have differed, or may differ, on other points, we ſhall be unanimous in the reſolution to require that this defect of the treaty be ſupplied by a demand of a ſpecific ſum for the reimburſement of the paſt expences incurred by the expedition, and of a monthly ſubſidy during its continuance.

It does not appear neceſſary for this Board to expreſs either an approval or diſapproval of the treaty. It has been made under the declaration of their ſanction, and proclaimed as poſſeſſing it. The conditions have received the firmeſt and fulleſt ratification that could be given to them by the contracting parties, and cannot therefore admit of amendment or addition. It is happily conformable to the orders of the Court of Directors; and if the objects of it be ſucceſsfully proſecuted, the eſſential purpoſes of our late meaſures, which have a relation to the Marattas, will be anſwered by it, though perhaps not ſo effectually, nor ſo durable a ſyſtem of policy eſtabliſhed as might have been obtained by an alliance with *Moodajee Booſſa*, on the footing projected for it. The meaſure is paſt, and cannot be recalled; our own plan has been rendered impracticable by it, and our detachment muſt by this time be far advanced to ſupport it.—We have therefore no option. We muſt give it all the aids that can be effectually beſtowed on it.

But I do not think for this purpoſe we ſhould entirely diſarm our own Government of its powers, and leave it to the diſcretion of the Government of *Bombay*. This would be neither conſiſtent with the leſſons of prudence which we have learnt from dearly-bought experience, nor with the dignity we poſſeſs as the ſuperior State. Beſides, the near approach of the period which has been fixed for the duration of the preſent Government impoſes an additional obligation upon us to maintain inviolate thoſe rights of which we are but the temporary guardians. The defects of the preſent ſyſtem have been manifeſted by a trial of five years; and it is to be expected that the wiſdom of the Legiſlature will provide a more complete and effectual controul for the new adminiſtration of the Britiſh affairs in *India*, than that which was conſtituted by the laſt Act of Parliament.—With this conſideration in proſpect, I ſhall propoſe that Colonel *Goddard* ſhall ſtill retain his independency on the Government of *Bombay*; and that he be inveſted with powers to treat with the Adminiſtration of *Poonah*, as the Miniſter and repreſentative of this Government, on all points which regard the general intereſts of the Company, or the particular views of this Government.

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Having thus laid down the grounds of our future conduct, I ſhall now proceed to recommend the following propoſitions as dependent on them:

1ſt. That Colonel *Goddard* be directed to co-operate with the Preſidency and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and with the committee appointed by them for conducting the political and military affairs at *Poonah*, in the ſupport of the treaty concluded by that Preſidency with *Ragonaut Row*, and of the operations dependant on it.

2d. That he be confirmed in the poſſeſſion of the powers which he at preſent holds, dependant on the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and independent of the Government of *Bombay*.

3d. That he be authorized to apply for ſuch reinforcements of troops, from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, as he ſhall judge neceſſary for completing the ſtrength of his detachment, and to receive the ſame, with the condition that they be not commanded by any officer of a ſuperior rank to his own, and that the Preſidency of *Bombay* be deſired to furniſh him with ſuch reinforcements, on the conditions thus preſcribed.

4th. That he ſhall not interfere in any of the negociations or other tranſactions of the committee appointed by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, nor in any points which reſpect the treaty lately concluded with *Ragonaut Row*, or the ſeparate and immediate intereſts of that Preſidency, except only in ſuch points in which he ſhall be called upon by the Preſidency and Select Committee, or by the committee appointed for conducting the military and political affairs at *Poonah*, for his advice or aſſiſtance.

5th. That he be appointed the Miniſter of this Government at the Court of *Poonah*, with full powers to treat with *Ragonaut Row*, or ſuch other perſon or perſons as ſhall be at the head of the Maratta State, upon ſuch matters as ſhall be expreſsly given to him in charge, and to accept or conclude any engagements for the ſame on the part of the Governor General and Council; and that a letter of credence be given him to that effect.

6th. That he be inſtructed to demand from *Ragonaut Row*, or the Government for the time being, payment of the expences already incurred in the expedition undertaken by the detachment under his command, eſtimated at two lacks of rupees per month, from the 1ſt of June 1778, to the day of arrival at or near *Poonah*, and a monthly ſubſidy to the ſame amount, for the time in which it ſhall remain at *Poonah*; with the allowance of ſix months for the return of the detachment to *Bengal* from the day of its diſmiſſion; that it be left to his diſcretion to obtain the moſt complete ſecurity for theſe payments, either by aſſignments on the public treaſury, or on reſpectable Shroffs, or, on the laſt reſort, on any of the Aumils or collectors of the revenue, who ſhall

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engage to him for the ſame, but not on the collections themſelves; and that he be expreſsly forbidden to interfere, or to have any concern in the collections, or to ſuffer any perſon under his authority to interfere, or have any concern therein.

7th. That in caſe of the refuſal to comply with this demand, or of ſuch an evaſion of it as ſhall be equivalent to a refuſal, Colonel *Goddard* be directed to notify the ſame to the committee, and to the Preſident and Select committee of *Bombay*; and either to return with the detachment under his command to the province of *Berar*, or to retire to the lands ceded to the Company, and in poſſeſſion of the Government of *Bombay*, at his diſcretion; and that the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* be peremptorily required and commanded, in ſuch caſe to recall their troops from *Poonah*, and from the Maratta dominions.

8th. That the inſtructions already given to Colonel *Goddard* do remain in full force; and that he be directed to reſume the negociations with the Government of *Berar*, and to treat with it on the grounds of thoſe inſtructions, whenever an occaſion ſhall offer to proſecute them conſiſtently with the foregoing reſolutions.

9th. That the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* be deſired to appoint an agent or miniſter on the part of their Government, for the management of its ſeparate concerns with the Adminiſtration of *Poonah*, and for the accompliſhment of the treaty lately concluded with *Ragonaut Row*; that his inſtructions be limited to theſe objects, and that they themſelves be forbidden to enter into any new engagements without a previous application to us, and our ſanction obtained.

Mr. *Francis*—I ſhall give theſe propoſitions the moſt attentive conſideration; but that the Board may have the whole ſubject at once before them, I beg leave to aſk whether it be meant that the detachment under Major *Camac* ſhall proceed under its preſent orders, or be recalled? Colonel *Goddard*'s advance to *Poonah*, I apprehend, alters the ground on which that reinforcement was ſent, and makes it now impracticable to effect a junction between the two detachments.

Governor General—I think it is probable that we may find reaſons in the ſubſequent advices from Colonel *Goddard* to recall Major *Camac*; but I do not think that we ſhould too precipitately reſolve on this meaſure, as we are yet unacquainted with the reſult of the expedition undertaken by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, the event of which may render the advance of this reinforcement very eſſentially neceſſary. Colonel *Goddard* was adviſed of our reſolution to ſend him this reinforcement in our letter of the 28th December, which I underſtand from the Secretary was diſpatched on the 1ſt or 2d of January. It will probably have reached him before the end of laſt month, allowing the greateſt probable length of time for its conveyance, and his anſwer to it may be expected by the end of this month: I think it will be adviſable to wait till that time, unleſs from any intermediate intelligence we ſhall have ſtrong grounds to conclude either that the junction will be impracticable or unneceſſary. The detachment will ſtill remain within our own territories, and ready for any other ſervice, although there is no great likelihood that it will be required.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

PRESENT,

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 8th February 1779.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

Re-conſidered the minute of the Governor General, entered in the laſt conſultation.

Mr. *Wheler* delivers in the following minute:

Having on former occaſions given my opinion fully on the general queſtions, which relate to our political tranſactions with the Marattas, I hold myſelf diſpenſed from again entering into that ſubject, and ſhall therefore confine my preſent remarks to the propoſitions contained in the Governor General's minute, and upon which I am called by him to give my opinion.

I ſee no objection to the propoſition contained in the firſt article; underſtanding it to have been the original deſign of this Government, in ſending a detachment to *Bombay*, to ſupport and aſſiſt the Preſident and Council of that ſettlement, in their engagements with *Ragonaut Row*.

To the ſecond and third I object; and to every other propoſition which has for its object the giving to Colonel *Goddard* any authority, civil or military, independent of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*. I conſider it as contrary to every principle of ſound policy, that either in the conduct of war, or negociation between two States, there ſhould ſubſiſt in reality or appearance, two authorities, or two intereſts; I know of no intereſt that this Government or the Preſidency of *Bombay* can have, ſeparated from each other: and the Court of Directors order, that in our political tranſactions and negociations with the Powers on the other ſide of *India*, we make uſe of the channel and agency of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*.

To the 4th article I ſee no objection: the 5th, 6th, and 7th, I conſider already in a great meaſure as anſwered; and although I am equally deſirous with the Governor General, that the Company ſhould be reimburſed for the expence occaſioned by the march of the detachment acroſs *India*, yet I cannot conſent to the demand of it being made by Colonel *Goddard*, or to the alternative propoſed for him, ſhould that demand be refuſed. The Preſidency of *Bombay* have entered into a treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, on the part of the Company, by which we are bound, and are engaged in meaſures in ſupport of that treaty; I cannot conſent to orders which authorize an infraction of the treaty, and which may claſh with, or even totally defeat the meaſures taken in conſequence.

To the 8th article I object, becauſe I conſider any negociations or political connections with the Rajah of *Berar*, as totally inconſiſtent with the Company's policy and conſtant orders; and if this was not the caſe, the diſinclination he has already manifeſtly ſhewn to enter into any engagements with this Government, is a ſufficient warning to us not to renew our negotiations in that quarter.

To the 9th article I muſt obſerve, that during a ſtate of actual war, when circumſtances may change every day, and when the Preſidency of *Bombay* muſt act from them, according to the occaſion; I cannot conſent to ſo ſtrict a limitation, either of the object of their Miniſter at *Poonah*, or of their future negociations with *Ragonaut Row*, becauſe at the diſtance we are placed, an entire change of circumſtances may take place, and favourable opportunities be loſt, before we can be made acquainted with the events, much more give our orders in conſequence.

As far therefore as the letters and propoſed inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard* may differ from the ſentiments expreſſive above, they muſt meet with my diſapprobation, and I diſſent from them accordingly.

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following minute:

The line of conduct which I have invariably purſued with reſpect to the late political meaſures of this Government, and of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, not only exempts me from all reſponſibility for the conſequences of them, but from any obligation of deciding upon the reſpective merits of their proceedings and ours. That queſtion lies ſtrictly between the preſent majority of this

Board,

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Board, and the Preſidency of *Bombay*: I ſhall enter into it no farther than I am compelled to do by the propoſitions before us, and by the exiſting ſtate of facts.

In the conſideration of every meaſure, which I have either recommended or oppoſed, my original and conſtant object was, to preſerve the peace of *India*; to adhere faithfully to our treaty with the Peiſhwa; and not to ſuffer the Company's arms to be engaged either on this ſide of *India* or by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in ſchemes of conqueſt and ambition. In adhering to theſe principles, I believe I have been guided by the dictates of ſound policy and right reaſon; as I aſſuredly have been by the Company's fundamental maxims, and by their poſitive and repeated commands. I have it too from an authority which in the ſcale of any argument of mine, muſt be deemed particularly weighty * "that in the Company's "concerns with their neighbours and allies, the moſt ſcru- "pulous obſervance of their public engagements, and of "the rights of others, ought to be their firſt and ruling "object; for every Prince and State whoſe poſſeſſions "may ſtand within ſight of the Company's ambition, is "naturally led to apply to their own intereſts the treat- "ment which they ſee others receive from the Company "and their dependants."

* Vide Sect Conſ. 7th Auguſt 1776.

When I found my firſt and principal object no longer attainable, my next endeavour was, to preſerve if poſſible an unity of views, a conſiſtency of plan, and a general co-operation of meaſures between this Government and the ſubordinate Preſidencies. My efforts in both inſtances have been equally unſucceſsful. For the truth of theſe aſſertions, I ſhall content myſelf with referring generally to our ſecret conſultations for the laſt twelve months; but more particularly to that of the 17th Auguſt 1778; nothing has happened which had not been foretold: but ſince no reflections on what is paſt will leſſen the difficulty of our preſent ſituation, I ſhall avoid all retroſpect as much as poſſible; new facts create new queſtions, and *theſe* facts, I fear, are ſuch as exclude this immediate influence of general principles of policy and good conduct, on which alone a great State can found a ſolid ſyſtem of ſtrength, ſecurity, and duration. The arguments and events with which the Governor's preſent propoſitions are introduced, are ſtated to be the grounds of our future conduct. As ſuch, I muſt examine them, and perhaps my own ſafety may make it neceſſary on this occaſion more than any other, to ſhew how far I do or do not concur in the aſſertions or opinions which I may be obliged to ſet my name to.

1ſt. I agree with the Governor General, that the plan lately carried into execution by the Preſidency of *Bombay* was *certainly warranted* by our inſtructions to them of the 17th of Auguſt 1778.

2d. I agree with the Governor General in thinking that, conſidering the particular promiſe contained in their letter of the 11th of September, as well as the general line of their duty, the ſubordination in which they ſtand to this Government, and the attention they owe to the common intereſts of the Britiſh empire in *India*, not leſs than immediately to thoſe of their own Preſidency, they were bound to have ſent us immediate notice of the reſult of their reſolutions; and that their reſolving on an enterprize of ſuch importance on the 12th October, and not giving us intelligence of it before the 12th of December, is not to be defended, not at leaſt by any fact or argument which is yet before us.

3d. But I do not admit that any thing done or omitted by the Preſidency of *Bombay* after the 11th September, did or could warrant the reſolution taken here of abandoning *Ragoba*, and ſubſtituting an alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, in the place of the object originally preſented to us by the Preſidency of *Bombay*. That reſolution was taken here on the 11th of July. I conſider our plan as *wholly adopted* the moment Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions were reſolved on. From that time forward it never was conſidered as *little more than a reſource to which we looked in the event of a failure in the other deſign*; it then became our main and ſole object; and Mr. *Elliott* was poſitively inſtructed to conclude, even without waiting for any further orders from the Board.

It is true that on the 17th of Auguſt we authorized the Preſidency of *Bombay* to carry their own plan into execution; but I never can allow that the two meaſures could be reconciled. When their manifeſt inconſiſtency was objected to, the anſwer to that objection was, that "the reſolution of the Preſidency of *Bombay* to defer "the execution of a deſign, the ſucceſs of which could "only be inſured by immediate action, was equivalent "to a reſolution to do nothing." The Governor General then regarded their deſign in favour of *Ragoba* as improbable, yet thought *it incumbent on him to ſupport their meaſures, though againſt his belief of their taking effect*. In the event it appears, that they have adhered to their plan, and *have* carried it into execution.

4th. Whether the Preſidency of *Bombay* did or did not foreſee the conſequences which might attend their engaging in this enterprize, they have our direct and explicit authority to plead in their defence. They were not made acquainted with the contents of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, conſequently they had no direct information of the nature of our views to guide or reſtrain them in the exerciſe of that power, which our letter of the 17th Auguſt gave them. They never received any letter from Mr. *Elliott*; nor do they appear to have heard of his death on the 12th December; and admitting that they had not left an opening for *Moodajee Booſla*'s admiſſion into their engagements with *Ragonaut Row*, I know not how the example of this Government, and the inſtructions ſaid to have been given to Mr. *Elliott*, to provide for a junction of *Ragonaut Row* in his negociations with *Moodajee Booſla*, can be urged againſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*, who knew nothing of the matter. To this hour we do not know that they have ever ſeen Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions.

By their letter before us, they do not appear to have known that our army was making *quick advances*; on the contrary they expreſs an uneaſineſs at the *ſlow advances* of the Bengal detachment.

5th. In ſpeaking of our intended engagement with *Moodajee*, it is ſaid, "that in effect we had at firſt aban- "doned it to aſſiſt in the proſecution of the ſcheme which "they had preſented to us."

From the obvious conſtruction of theſe words I ſhould conclude that the alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* was the firſt object of this Government, contrary to every thing that has been profeſſed of our original motives for undertaking the expedition; but be this as it may, it does not appear that we ever abandoned *our* project to aſſiſt in the proſecution of their's. The fact, as I underſtand it, is totally new to me.

6th. I do not entirely agree with the Governor General in thinking that *their conduct has expoſed us to the ſuſpicion of duplicity*; perhaps they may think themſelves entitled to reverſe the charge, and to retort it on this Government. Neither do I admit *that*, in fact, *it has defeated our meaſures*. *Moodajee Booſla*, in his letter to Colonel *Goddard* of the 23d November, expreſſes the ſame determination not to join the detachment, or to co-operate in our views againſt the Peiſhwa, which he has done invariably ſince that time in all his letters to the Governor General; but on the 23d November he knew nothing of the proceedings at *Bombay*, nor for ſeveral weeks after; nor does he any where allude to their engagement with *Ragonaut Row*, or allege that as a reaſon for not taking part with us.

7th. Though clearly exempt from any degree of reſponſibility on account of the expence which this Government has voluntarily incurred by ſending the detachment, I am nevertheleſs as deſirous as the Governor General can be of ſeeing the Company reimburſed, though not by all or any means whatſoever: three material objections occur to me againſt the demand which is propoſed

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propoſed to be made on *Ragonaut Row*; two of theſe relate to the demand itſelf; the third to the *quantum*. I deem it unjuſt, for the following reaſons:

It is ſaid, "that the Bombay treaty has been made "under the declaration of our ſanction, and proclaimed "as poſſeſſing it; that the conditions have received the "firmeſt and fulleſt ratification that could be given to "them by the contracting parties, and cannot therefore "admit either of amendment or addition." Acquieſcing in this opinion, I can never admit that we have any right to make ſo material an addition to the treaty, as we ſhould do by inſiſting on a ſpecific ſum for the reimburſement of the paſt expences incurred by the expedition, and of a monthly ſubſidy during its continuance, conſidering that the treaty itſelf has fixed a ſpecific ſum, which the Preſidency of *Bombay* agree to accept *without further account, in full of every expence attending the army*. Neither do I think that we have an equitable any more than a conventional right, to make any ſuch demands on *Ragoba*. If he be reinſtated, it is done without the aſſiſtance of the detachment. Colonel *Goddard* was not to move from *Huſſeingabad* before the 15th of January: fifty days at leaſt muſt be allowed for his march to *Poonah*, which, ſuppoſing nothing to retard him but the length of the journey, fixes his arrival at *Poonah* to the 6th March. But the *Bombay* expedition moved from thence on the 22d November; and if it did not effect its object by the 15th January, I can only ſay from myſelf that I have very little idea or expectation of its ſucceſs. Colonel *Keating*, with a much greater force, was beaten in the field, and compelled to retire.

Suppoſing, on the other hand, the expedition to have ſucceeded, and *Ragoba* to be reinſtated; I wiſh to know on what pretence the charge of our detachment, which in the caſe ſuppoſed will have been of no ſervice to him, can be exacted of him.

My ſecond objection to the demand is, that I am convinced it never can ſucceed. *Ragoba* has no reſources equal to ſuch accumulated demands; nor if he had, is it likely, that any thing but force ſhould compel him to yield to them. To inſiſt on the demand, or to abandon him in the manner propoſed, I look upon to be as clear and direct a violation of the treaty with him, as if we ſhould determine to renounce it in terms.

My third objection to the demand is, that were it granted it would not reimburſe us the expence of the detachment. A conſiderable part of this charge muſt have commenced in march 1778; the whole of it I believe in April; but the demand is only to be made from the 1ſt June. Again, the expence is eſtimated at two lacks of rupees per month, whereas the Preſidency of *Bombay* have obtained a ſubſidy of two lacks and a half per month, though their force amounts to little more than half ours. The annexed abſtract ſhews that the actual expence of our army amounts to very near two lacks ſixty thouſand rupees a month, excluſive of the pay of the Nabob of *Oude*'s cavalry, and excluſive of the expence of Major *Camac*'s detachment, which is eſtimated at 64,600 rupees a month. I conceive we have as much right to exact the whole as any part of the expence of the armament from *Ragonaut Row*.

8th. I ſhall now give my opinion on the ſeveral propoſitions in the order in which they ſtand; premiſing only, that the ſituation we are in compels me to accommodate myſelf to events for which I am not anſwerable, and to ſubmit to facts which I cannot alter.

Suppoſing the *meaſure paſt, and that it cannot be recalled*, I acquieſce in the firſt propoſition; underſtanding, that by the word *co-operate* it is meant that Colonel *Goddard* ſhall follow the inſtructions of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, as he was originally directed to do.

I am againſt the ſecond as incompatible with the purpoſes expreſſed in the firſt, and becauſe I deem it in the higheſt degree unſafe to employ two armies on the ſame ground and in the ſame ſervice; and to place each of them under a ſeparate, an independent authority. In military operations, more indiſpenſably than in any other, the power that directs them ought to be united in one hand. Independent powers can produce nothing but claſhing councils, or ſeparate purſuits. The meaſure I believe is wholly unprecedented, and cannot be received but with the higheſt diſguſt by the Governor and Council of *Bombay*. Whether Colonel *Goddard*, under any inſtructions whatſoever from this Board, can refuſe to obey the orders of General *Egerton*, when once he ſhall be within the reach of ſuch orders, is a queſtion of the moſt ſerious and extenſive conſequence. I am of opinion that his refuſal could not be maintained without a direct violation of the articles of war, diſobedience of the injunction contained in the body of his commiſſion, and a ſubverſion of the fundamental principles of military diſcipline and ſubordination. I therefore diſſent from the propoſition, and moſt ſolemnly proteſt againſt it. If the Board ſhould now be of opinion that it is not ſafe to truſt the Preſidency of *Bombay* with the conduct of our negociations at *Poonah*, or with any authority over the troops which we ſend to their aſſiſtance, ſuch a reaſon may be valid againſt permitting them to embark in enterprizes to which we deem their councils unequal, but it will not juſtify us in purſuing a ſyſtem which naturally tends to divide and weaken our common ſtrength, and of courſe to defeat our meaſures as well as theirs.

On the ſame principles I object to the third; and hope it will be ſeriouſly conſidered, that a caſe may poſſibly happen in which a junction of the two armies may be indiſpenſably neceſſary for the preſervation of both; many probable caſes may be imagined, in which without ſuch a junction, it might be impoſſible for their operations to ſucceed.

I agree to the fourth.

I object to the fifth, not knowing what ſort of buſineſs Colonel *Goddard* can have to tranſact with the Court of *Poonah*, independent of the Council of *Bombay*; and foreſeeing, that we ſhall weaken their credit and influence with the Court of *Poonah* for no adequate purpoſe. This article conſtitutes an ambaſſador, with letters of credence and full powers—to do nothing. The propoſition is open to many other objections; but the Company's orders in the 21ſt and three following paragraphs of their letter of the 5th February 1777, are poſitive and explicit on this ſubject, and leave no room for argument.

I have already given my opinion fully on the ſubſtance of the 6th article.

Seventh. I agree to the return of the detachment to the frontiers of *Berar*, ſuppoſing that route to be the ſhorteſt that leads to the *Jumna*. But I object to our requiring the Council of *Bombay* to break their treaty with *Ragoba*, eſpecially on ſuch unwarrantable ground, as that propoſed for doing it. I mean his refuſal to comply with a new condition, not only not ſtipulated in the treaty, but expreſsly excluded by it.

I object to and proteſt againſt the eighth. In another place, the Governor General ſpeaks of the uſes to be derived from *dearly-bought experience*. We are by this time ſufficiently acquainted with the light and unſteady character, not to ſay duplicity of *Moodajee Booſla*; and as to the general queſtion no words can be ſtronger than thoſe in which Mr. *Haſtings* has heretofore expreſſed his opinion againſt an offenſive alliance with the Marattas. But waving this and all former objections to the propoſed alliance with *Berar*, the Governor General himſelf ſays, that "the Bombay meaſure is paſt, and cannot be re-"called, and that our own plan has been rendered im-"practicable by it."—Will our breaking a third treaty with the Marattas, facilitate the concluſion of a fourth? Let us conſider at leaſt what character theſe tranſactions are likely to fix upon the Britiſh name in *India*.

I acquieſce in the ninth propoſition.

My opinion of the propoſed letter to Colonel *Goddard*

is

is virtually included in the preceding obſervations. I think it neceſſary however to obſerve, that although I do not condemn Colonel *Goddard* for reſolving to march to *Poonah*, believing him to conſider it as an act of neceſſity, forced upon him by *Moodajee Booſla*'s conduct, and by the circumſtances he was reduced to; ſtill I do not think that it calls for any particular approbation and applauſe. The applauſe of Government ſhould never be beſtowed but upon clear and unqueſtionable ground, and alwavs with dignity and moderation. I think it will appear that Colonel *Goddard* has acted without orders: by our reſolution of the 23d November, the powers delegated to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* were revoked. He was then directed *henceforth to obey all ſuch orders as he might receive from us.* But he has never ſince received any orders from us, directly or indirectly authorizing him to march to *Poonah*; or to co-operate with the Preſidency of *Bombay* in the reſtoration of *Ragoba*: the Board, I am perſuaded, will conſider the conſequences of giving their applauſe without reſerve to any reſolution, however prudent or neceſſary, which a commanding officer may take without their authority. In the preamble to the propoſed letter to *Bombay*, I object to our ſaying that, *in conſequence of their operations, our meaſures have been abruptly broke off*; becauſe I am convinced, for reaſons already aſſigned, that their proceedings have really had no influence whatever on the councils of *Moodajee Booſla.*

Eleventh. It only remains for me to ſay, that I think Major *Camac*'s detachment ſhould be immediately recalled.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Extract of the Obſervations on Sir *John Lindſay*'s Letter to the Preſident and Council of *Fort St. George*, dated 18th April 1771.

We have frequently in our deliberations on this ſubject expreſſed our opinion very clearly and fully againſt an offenſive alliance with the Marattas. In this we are juſtified by the repeated ſentiments of the Court of Directors, expreſſed in their commands for ſeveral years paſt, againſt diſtant operations, and engaging in alliances with the country Powers. Theſe ſentiments of the Court of Directors, it is true, are not expreſſed in ſuch terms as naturally convey the idea of abſolute and determinate orders; nevertheleſs we ſtand in ſo unhappy a predicament that we have no ſafety but in conſidering them as ſuch: for the whole tenor and ſpirit of the diſpatches of laſt ſeaſon (as we have noticed in other inſtances) are proofs that ſentiments ſo expreſſed are quoted as abſolute orders; at the ſame time candour obliges us to acknowledge that the ſentiments of the Court of Directors on this ſubject are perfectly conformable to our own. Their orders of the 27th June laſt, received per *Dolphin*, are very poſitive and expreſs; they are as follow:

"We have only here to enjoin you to avoid, as much "as in you lies, becoming parties in any diſputes be- "tween the Powers of *India*, and to pay the moſt ſtrict "obedience to our orders for confining our views to "our preſent poſſeſſions, the peace and ſecurity of "which are the utmoſt ſcope of our wiſhes, as they "will neceſſarily tend to advance the commercial and "vital intereſts of the Company."

Theſe, if there were no other, would be very ſufficient motives to induce us to be very cautious of entering into alliances or engagements with the country Powers in general; but with regard to the Marattas, the honourable Court have very clearly in many parts of their commands expreſſed their apprehenſions of the dangers of an alliance with them, or of adopting any meaſures which may tend to increaſe their power.

Ordered, that the account referred to by Mr. *Francis* be entered after the conſultation.

Mr. *Barwell*—It is not neceſſary for me to enter into a diſcuſſion of the objections that have been urged againſt the Governor General's propoſitions; whoever will take the trouble to examine the real exiſting facts, and the reaſonings upon them, to controul the meaſures that are now propoſed to be purſued, will be impreſſed with a conviction that they are urged more upon ſyſtem than policy of State. The argument is not ſupported by the facts, theſe I have carefully weighed, and upon theſe, after the matureſt deliberation, I concurred with the Governor General in ſentiment, and with him formed and approved the propoſitions on which the ſentiments of the Board are now to be delivered; my opinion ſtill continues the ſame of the meaſures that ſhould be purſued; I in conſequence give my voice in the affirmative to the ſeveral propoſitions. Appendix. No. 171.

Governor General—I believe I ſhall make no reply, I think it unneceſſary, and I have no time. If on reading the paſt minute, I ſhould think it neceſſary to add to the debate, I ſhall take another occaſion for it.

Reſolved, that the following letter be written to *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter of the 12th December, with its ſeveral encloſures.

It was formerly a matter of great concern to us that you had ſuffered ſo many opportunities to eſcape after the concluſion of the plan which you had formed in December 1777, for reſtoring the power of *Ragoba*, without taking any effective means to carry it into execution. It now affords us equal concern and mortification that you have precipitately undertaken it, after having given us every reaſon to conclude that you had abandoned it altogether, and compelled us therefore to adopt other meaſures, which in conſequence of your preſent operations have been abruptly broken off, without intimating your deſigns to us, and affording us time to ſuſpend the courſe of our own tranſactions, or to accommodate them to yours.

You appeal to the authority contained in our letter of the 17th Auguſt, as a ſanction for concluding the late treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, and for proceeding immediately to carry it into execution. It is true that you were warranted by that letter to form ſuch engagements, and that you have literally complied with our inſtructions; but no attention appears to have been had either to the circumſtances under which they were dictated; to the length of time ſince elapſed; or to the very eſſential change which has taken place in the ſituation of affairs: we ſhall leave it to our ſuperiors to determine whether you were juſtified under every other conſideration that occurred.

On the 11th September, about the time fixed for the commencement of your operations, you informed us, "that you had not yet taken any meaſures in proſecu- "tion of the plan, but would ſpeedily come to ſome "deciſive reſolutions, and adviſe us immediately of "the reſult;" you alſo referred us to Mr. *Lewis* for full "information of the ſituation of affairs at *Poonah*." Words ſo emphatically expreſſed as thoſe contained in the above paſſage of your letter, could not fail to raiſe our expectation; and when a long period had elapſed without further advices from you, though we had received intelligence from Mr. *Lewis* of the ſeizure and confinement of *Moraba Furneſe*, and, *Buſhaba Poonder*, and of the entire depreſſion of *Ragoba*'s party, theſe cauſes ſerved to confirm us in the perſuaſion that nothing had been determined, but that your plan had proved abortive. Our army at this time was far advanced towards the Maratta country; the object preſented to it ſeemed to have vaniſhed, and none remained to eſtabliſh an influence in thoſe parts, but to effect the propoſed alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*: though till then it had been treated as little more than a reſource in the event of a failure of your deſign, we now reſolved to adopt it wholly; and to prevent our being embarraſſed by a contrariety

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trariety of orders, we thought it proper to releaſe Colonel *Goddard*, whom we had previouſly empowered to proſecute Mr. *Elliott*'s commiſſion from your entire authority, except in caſes where your requiſitions might not be incompatible with the ſpecial and ſingle truſt thus committed to him.

Theſe are conſequences which we think you ought to have foreſeen, and to have provided for them, ſince it appears that you actually did know of the quick advances made by our detachment after the death of Colonel *Leſlie*, and of the negociations commenced with *Moodajee Booſla*. We alſo conceive that you were acquainted with the effects of the alliance held out to that Chief, which had brought upon him the reſentment of *Nizam Ally* and the Marattas, and in a manner drawn him into a declared party with our Government. Under theſe circumſtances we think you might have waited the reſult of our depending meaſures, or at leaſt have paid ſo much regard to the ſtate of our probable connections with the Government of *Berar*, as to have left an opening for its admiſſion into your engagements with *Ragoba*, after the example we had ſet when we preſcribed the junction of *Ragonaut Row* to Mr. *Elliott* in his negociations with *Moodajee Booſla*, and requeſted you to inſtruct him on any points which your own ſituation might ſuggeſt. That precaution however you neglected, and confined yourſelf to a bare acknowledgment of ſuch conditions as might have been concluded at the preciſe date of your treaty, without which the treaty itſelf would have been invalid.

We ſhall here cloſe our remarks upon this ſubject; adding only, that as no conditions were finally agreed upon with *Moodajee Booſla*, and the treaty with *Ragonaut Row* has been concluded and proclaimed under the declaration of our ſanction, it remains only for us to ſupport it in the moſt effectual manner we can; we therefore approve the active and zealous conduct of Colonel *Goddard* in marching immediately towards *Poonah*, on your requiſition; and we hope that the cauſe has received timely ſuccour from the junction of this force, and credit from its approach.

It cannot however but appear extraordinary to us, that although you foreſaw the neceſſity of Colonel *Goddard*'s force to ſupport your operations, and wrote to him in the moſt preſſing manner to march to your aſſiſtance; and although his detachment was originally formed for the ſervice of *Ragonaut Row*, and our firſt inſtructions to you, dated the 2d February 1778, expreſsly enjoined, "that a ſpecific ſum ſhould be required to reimburſe "the Company for the military charges that might be "incurred by their interpoſition;" yet you omitted to make any proviſions for the expences of the detachment in your engagements with that Chief. In the preſent ſituation of things we ſhall endeavour to correct this overſight by the beſt means that occur to us; we have therefore inveſted Colonel *Goddard* with full powers to act as the Miniſter of this Government at *Poonah*, and he is furniſhed with inſtructions to the following effect:

1ſt. He is ordered to co-operate with you, and the committee appointed by you, for conducting the political and military affairs at *Poonah*, in the ſupport of the treaty concluded with *Ragonaut Row*, and of the operations dependant upon it.

2d. We have confirmed him in the poſſeſſion of the powers conveyed to him by our letter of the 23d November, and which he at preſents holds dependant immediately on us, and independent of your Preſidency.

3d. We have authorized him to apply to you for ſuch reinforcements of troops as he ſhall judge neceſſary for completing the ſtrength of his detachment; and we requeſt that you will grant him the ſame, with this expreſs condition, without which he is not authorized to receive them, that the officers whom you ſhall appoint to the command of them, may be of a junior rank to that of Colonel *Goddard*.

4th. We have forbid him to interfere in any of the negociations or other tranſactions of the committee appointed by you, or in any points which reſpect the late treaty with *Ragoba*, or the ſeparate and immediate intereſts of your Preſidency, except only in thoſe points in which you or the committee ſhall call upon him for his advice and aſſiſtance.

5th. He is appointed, as we have already obſerved, the Miniſter of this Government at the Court of *Poonah*, with full powers to treat with *Ragonaut Row*, or ſuch other perſon or perſons as ſhall be at the head of the Maratta State, upon all matters which we ſhall expreſsly give to him in charge, and to accept or conclude any engagements for the ſame on our part: he is furniſhed with a letter of credence for this purpoſe.

6th. He is inſtructed to demand from *Ragonaut Row*, or the Government for the time being, payment of the expences already incurred in the expedition undertaken by the detachment under his command, eſtimated at two lacks of rupees per month, from the firſt June 1778, to the day of his arrival at or near *Poonah*, and a monthly ſubſidy at the ſame rate for the time in which he ſhall remain at *Poonah*, with the allowance of ſix months for the return of the detachment to *Bengal* from the day of its diſmiſſion: we have left it to his diſcretion to obtain the moſt complete ſecurity for theſe payments, either by aſſignments on the public treaſury, or on reputable Shroffs; or in the laſt reſort, on any of the Aumils or collectors of the revenue, who ſhall engage to him for the ſame, but not on the collections themſelves, in which we have peremptorily forbid him or any one under him to have any concern or interference.

7th. In caſe of the refuſal of the Maratta Government to comply with theſe demands, or of ſuch an evaſion as ſhall be equivalent to a refuſal, we have directed him to notify the ſame to you and to the committee: and either to return with the detachment under his command to the province of *Berar*, or retire to the lands ceded to the Company, and in your poſſeſſion, at his diſcretion. We alſo hereby peremptorily require and command you in ſuch caſe to recall your troops immediately from *Poonah* and from the Maratta dominions.

8th. We have confirmed the inſtructions which we had originally given to Mr. *Elliott*, and on his death tranſferred to Colonel *Goddard*; they will therefore remain in full force, and he is directed to reſume the negociations with the Government of *Berar*, and to treat with it upon the grounds of thoſe inſtructions whenever an occaſion ſhall offer to proſecute them conſiſtently with the plan laid down in this letter.

We recommend that on the return of your committee you appoint an agent or miniſter on the part of your Government, for the management of its ſeparate concerns with the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, and for the accompliſhment of the different articles of the treaty which you have concluded with *Ragonaut Row*, with inſtructions expreſsly limited to theſe objects; and we think it proper to inſiſt and command, that you do not enter into any new engagements without previous application to us for our approbation, and that ſanction obtained.

We are, &c.

The following Letter to Colonel *Goddard*, containing Inſtructions for his Conduct, was prepared by Order of the Governor General, and ſent round to the other Members on Friday and Saturday.

Sir, To Colonel *Thomas Goddard*.

We have received your letters of the 4th and 6th January.

We are very much concerned that *Moodajee Booſla* ſhould have ſo far diſtruſted the powers with which you were

were inveſted, as to ſuppoſe that any engagements formed by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* could preclude the accompliſhment of a treaty with him, if ſuch had been concluded; and therefore that he declined to enter into the propoſed negociation. If a treaty had been executed by you on the preſcribed terms, it would have been our duty to enforce it in preference to any made at *Bombay*; and to have taken care that no conditions in which that Preſidency might have bound itſelf, ſhould have operated to the prejudice of our engagements; but in the preſent ſituation of things we approve and applaud the prudence and active zeal for the intereſts of the Company, which you have ſhewn in the reſolution ſo immediately taken on receipt of the requiſition from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, to relinquiſh the proſecution of the commiſſion which had been ſpecially entruſted to you, and to proceed with the detachment under your command to ſupport the meaſures in which the Preſidency of *Bombay* was actually engaged, and in which they had ſo far committed the ſafety and proſperity of their own Government, and perhaps the general welfare of the Company, as to require every aid that could be poſſibly given to them.

As the treaty concluded by the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* with *Ragonaut Row* was declared to be made under our ſanction and authority, and as we actually did grant our conſent to ſuch a treaty on the 17th Auguſt 1778, we are determined to abide by and ſupport it, notwithſtanding the total change which has ſince taken place in the circumſtances under which it was propoſed to us, and the new meaſures which we have ourſelves adopted, on the ſuppoſed failure of thoſe planned by the Preſidency of *Bombay*: but as the treaty does not provide for the expence of your detachment, although it was expreſsly deſigned for the ſupport of the plan on which the treaty was founded: and although our inſtructions to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, dated the 2d February 1778, expreſsly direct, that a "ſpecific "ſum ſhould be required to reimburſe the Company for "the military charges which might be incurred by their "interpoſition;" we think it neceſſary to rectify this omiſſion, and to inveſt you with full powers for that purpoſe, alſo to furniſh you with the following orders, to which we require your ſtricteſt obedience.

1ſt. We direct that you co-operate with the Preſident and Council or Select Committee at *Bombay*, and with the committee appointed by them for conducting the political and military affairs at *Poonah*, in the ſupport of the treaty concluded by that Preſidency with *Ragonaut Row*, and of the operations dependant on it.

2d. We do hereby confirm you in the poſſeſſion of the powers which you at preſent hold, dependant on this Government, and independent of the Government of *Bombay*.

3d. We authorize you to apply for ſuch reinforcements of troops from the Preſidency of *Bombay* as you ſhall judge neceſſary for completing the ſtrength of your detachment, and to receive the ſame; with the condition that they be not commanded by any officer of a ſuperior or ſenior rank to yours: and we have deſired the Preſidency of *Bombay* to furniſh you with ſuch reinforcements on the condition thus preſcribed.

4th. We forbid you to interfere in any negociations or tranſactions of the committee appointed by the Select Committee of *Bombay*, or in any points which reſpect the preſent treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, or the ſeparate and immediate intereſts of the Preſidency of *Bombay*; except only in ſuch points in which you ſhall be called upon for your advice or aſſiſtance by the Preſident and Council or Select Committee appointed to conduct the military and political affairs at *Poonah*.

5th. We do hereby appoint you the Miniſter of this Government at the Court of *Poonah*, with full powers to treat with *Ragonaut Row*, or ſuch other perſon or perſons as ſhall be at the head of the Maratta State, upon all matters which ſhall be expreſsly given in charge to you by this Government for that purpoſe, and to accept or conclude any engagements for the ſame on our part: a letter of credence to this effect is enclоſed. Appendix, No. 171.

We hereby enjoin you to demand from *Ragonaut Row*, or the Maratta Government for the time being, payment of the expences already incurred in the expedition of the detachment under your command, eſtimated at the rate of two lacks of rupees per month, from the 1ſt June 1778, to the day of your arrival at or near *Poonah*; and a monthly ſubſidy at the ſame rate for the time in which it ſhall remain at *Poonah*, with the allowance of ſix months for its return to *Bombay*, from the day of your diſmiſſion.

We leave it to your diſcretion to obtain the moſt complete ſecurity for theſe payments either by aſſeſſments on the public treaſury, or on reſpectable Shroffs; or, in the laſt reſort, on any of the Aumils or collectors of the revenue, who ſhall engage to you for the ſame, but not on the collections themſelves. And we expreſsly forbid you to interfere, or to have any concern in the collections yourſelf, or to ſuffer any perſon under your authority to interfere or have any concern therein.

7th. In caſe of the refuſal of the Maratta Government to comply with your demand, or of ſuch an evaſion on their part as ſhall be equivalent to a refuſal, you are to notify the ſame to the committee at *Poonah*, and to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*; and either return with the detachment under your command to the province of *Berar*, or retire to the lands ceded to the Company, and in poſſeſſion of the Government of *Bombay*, at your diſcretion. And in ſuch caſe we have peremptorily required the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* to recall their troops from *Poonah*, and from the Maratta dominions.

8th. We think it proper to declare, that the inſtructions originally given to Mr. *Elliott*, and transferred to you, do remain in full force; and we direct that you reſume the negociations with the Government of *Berar*, and treat with it on the grounds of thoſe inſtructions whenever an occaſion ſhall offer to proſecute them, conſiſtently with the following proviſions:

If *Ragonaut Row* ſhall conform to the terms of his engagements with the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and ſhall yield to the juſt and equitable demands of this Government, you muſt give, and continue to give, all the ſupport which ſhall be requiſite for the confirmation of his authority: but if he ſhall depart from the terms of thoſe engagements, and the Preſident and Council, the Select Committeee, or the committee appointed by them, ſhall declare to you that he has ſo departed from them; or if he ſhall refuſe to comply with the demands which you are inſtructed to make; or if he ſhall himſelf deſire to include the Government of *Berar* in his alliance with the Company, on the footing preſcribed by your original inſtructions; or in the event of his death, or of the failure of the plan laid for reſtoring him to the adminiſtration of the Government at *Poonah*; we ſay, in either of the caſes here premiſed we authorize you to recur to the negociations which have been ſuſpended with the Court of *Berar*, and to conclude a treaty with that Government in the manner, and on the terms already preſcribed by your former inſtructions.

However we may be reſtrained by motives of policy from proſecuting this meaſure under the circumſtances which have cauſed the preſent ſuſpenſion of it, we are by no means precluded by the terms of the treaty with *Ragonaut Row*; the pretenſions of *Moodajee Booſla* to the Rauze, or ſovereign authority of the Maratta State, exiſting independently of any connections between the Company and *Ragonaut Row*, and being alſo perfectly reconcileable with them.

Although the orders which are numbered, taken collectively as they ſtand, are of themſelves very expreſſive and clear, we have thought it neceſſary to add this explanation of the laſt, with a view to obviate any poſſible miſapprehenſion

Appendix. No 171.

miſapprehenſion of the nature and extent of the preſent treaty concluded with *Ragonaut Row*; and to recommend it to you, to keep the object of your original commiſſion conſtantly in mind, that you may be prepared to carry it into execution, in whole or in part, whenever you ſhall have it in your power to do ſo, without embarraſſing this Government in diſcordant meaſures.

Warren Haſtings.
Richd Barwell.
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

The actual expence of the Bombay detachment for three months; viz. June, July, and Auguſt, 1778, is - - - - - - - - - C R^s 7,79,328 15 7
Which upon an average of one month, is - - 2,59,776 5 2

The Expence of the Detachment under the following Heads:

Artillery,						
For three months, is - - - -	C R^s	90,118	8	—		
Upon an average of one month, is - - - - -					30,039	8 —
1ſt regiment of cavalry,						
For three months, is - - -	C R^s	80,266	13	8		
Upon an average of one month, is, - - - - -					26,755	9 11
Six battalions of Sepoys,						
For three months, is - - -	C R^s	3,45,713	2	2		
Upon an average of one month, is - - - - -					1,15,237	11 5
General Staff,						
(Under which head the paymaſter has included bullocks, and the contingencies of the gen^l ſtaff)						
For three months, is - - -	C R^s	2,63,230	7	9		
Upon an average of one month, is - - - - -					87,743	7 11
Curr^t Rupees,		7,79,328	15	7	2,59,776	5 2

N. B. The detachment of the Nabob of *Owde*'s Kandahar horſe, is ſuppoſed to be not included in the above regiment of cavalry.

(Signed) *Claud. Alexander,*
Comm^y General.

Eſtimate expence of Major *Camac*'s detachment for one month, taken from the average of Col^l *Goddard*'s detachment, and ſuppoſing the 700 drafts, with the ſupernumerary officers, equal to a complete battalion, is - - - - C R^s 57,618
General ſtaff and contingencies, ſuppoſed to be per month, - - - 7,000

Current Rupees 64,618

(Signed) *Claud. Alexander,*
Comm^y General.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 15th February 1779;—Preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.

The Governor General having delivered in the following minute in reply to Mr. *Francis*'s, which is entered in the laſt conſultation, a copy of it was ſen ſome a number in the *Shrewſbury*'s packet.

Mr. *Francis*.

I conſider our plan as wholly adopted the moment Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions were reſolved on. From that time forwrad it never was conſidered as little more than a reſource to

Governor General—I think it proper to make the following detached obſervations in reply to ſuch parts of Mr. *Francis*'s minute of the 8th inſtant, as appear to me to require it, for the purpoſe of correcting the fact miſ-ſtated, of completing the ſenſe of partial quotations, or of removing objections ariſing from principles to which I cannot ſubſcribe.

Reply.

1. To ſo pointed a denial of my aſſertions the beſt argument which can be oppoſed will be a reference to Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, and particularly the following clauſe:

" But if you ſhall have reaſon to believe that the Preſidency of

" *Bombay*

(Mr. *Francis.*)

to which we looked; in the event of a failure in the other deſign, it then became our main and ſole object.

But I never can allow that the two meaſures can be reconciled, when their manifeſt inconſiſtency was objected to. The anſwer to that objection was, "that the reſolution of the Pre-"ſidency of *Bombay* to defer the execution of "a deſign, the ſucceſs of which could only be "inſured by immediate action, was equiva-"lent to a reſolution to do nothing."

The Governor General then regarded their deſign in favour of *Ragoba* as impoſſible, yet thought it incumbent on him to ſupport their meaſures, though againſt his belief of their taking effect. In the event it appears, that they have adhered to their plan, and have carried it into execution.

I know not how the example of this Government and the inſtructions ſaid to have been given to Mr. *Elliott*, to provide for a junction of *Ragonaut Row*, in his negociation with *Moodajee*, can be urged againſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*, who knew nothing of the matter to this hour; we do not know that they have ever ſeen Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions.

By their letter before us, they do not appear to have known that our army was making quick advances; on the contrary, they expreſs an uneaſineſs at the ſlow advances of the Bengal detachment.

In ſpeaking of our intended engagement with *Moodajee*, it is ſaid, "that in effect, we "had not firſt abandoned it to aſſiſt in the "proſecution of the ſcheme which they had "preſented to us." From the obvious conſtruction of theſe words, I ſhould conclude, that the alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* was the firſt object of this Government, contrary to every thing that has been profeſſed of our original motives for undertaking the expedition.

(Reply.)

"*Bombay* have commenced any negociation, or entered into any "engagement, either for the firm eſtabliſhment of peace with the "Poonah Miniſtry, or for the reſtoration of *Ragonaut Row*, or for "any other purpoſe, which may prove incompatible with the ope-"rations which we have authorized, you will in ſuch caſe ſuſpend "your negociations until you ſhall have received authentic infor-"mation, either from Mr. *Moſtyn* or the Preſidency of *Bombay*, of the nature of the engagements either "projected or executed by them; and you will ſo conduct yourſelf as to conform to their meaſures, if "you can conſiſtently with the prior attention which you will give to our views; or at leaſt not to engage "in any offenſive plan which ſhall be contrary to that of the Preſidency of *Bombay*." In this caſe Mr. *Elliott* is not only directed to ſuſpend his own negociations on the information of any engagement actually concluded by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and to conform to it; but he is reſtricted from the proſecution of his own, on the information, and even on the belief of any negociation having been only commenced, and from engaging in any offenſive plan which ſhould be contrary to the plan of the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

How then can Mr. *Francis* ſo peremptorily affirm, that the negociation with *Moodajee Booſla* was never conſidered as little more than a reſource to which we looked in the event of a failure in the other deſign, and that it then became our main and ſole object.

2. I muſt here repeat the obſervation which I have had too frequent occaſion to make, of Mr. *Francis*'s mode of extracting, that by the ſelection of disjointed ſentences, any given ſenſe may be affixed to any words, even in the literal queſtion of them. To the firſt of theſe quotations I have no objection, but do not ſee how it applies to Mr. *Francis*'s argument.

The ſecond is highly exceptionable, as it implies and involves in it, for want of its context, a complication of the groſſeſt abſurdities, for what purpoſe I know not; for even theſe do not aſſiſt the propoſition which it appears to have been introduced to prove, namely, that the meaſures of the two Preſidencies could not be reconciled.

I ſhall beg leave to inſert my words at full length, and leave it to thoſe who may be the judges of our conteſts, to compare the ſenſe of his quotation with the genuine extract: "But though I regard "the projected deſign in favour of *Ragoba* as improbable, I ſtill "conſider it as poſſible, and in that view only propoſed the anſwer "expreſſed in the queſtion; and I have thought it incumbent "upon me to ſupport the meaſures of that Preſidency in this in-"ſtance, though againſt my own belief of their taking effect, becauſe the Court of Directors have ex-"preſsly enjoined the renewal of the engagements with *Ragoba* in the caſe of a rupture with the preſent "Government of *Poonah*."

Although Mr. *Francis* has not aſſigned any reaſon for his aſſertion, that the two meaſures cannot be reconciled, yet as it is poſſible that others may adopt the ſame concluſion, I ſhall briefly ſtate the two meaſures as they were propoſed, without any comment upon them.

That formed by the Preſidency of *Bombay* was to reſtore *Ragonaut Row* to the office of Peiſhwa or Chief Miniſter of the Maratta State; ours to ſupport *Moodajee Booſla* in his pretenſions to the Rauze or ſovereign authority of the Maratta State. Theſe offices are both univerſally acknowledged to be conſiſtent and exiſtent parts of the Maratta State; they were therefore, and ſtill continue, reconcileable to each other.

3. It is true they had not then ſeen Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, but they knew ſo much of their intended effects, as to juſtify the obſervation made in my minute that "they ought to have left an "opening for the admiſſion of *Moodajee Booſla* into their engage-"ments with *Ragonaut Row*, after our example, and in the ſame "manner as our inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott* had preſcribed the in-"ſtructions of *Ragonaut Row*, in his negociation with *Moodajee* "*Booſla*."

Our letter to them dated the 17th Auguſt, clearly implied, that we had left ſuch an opening in our inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott*, becauſe it authorized them, under certain conditions, to aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row* with a military force, and conduct him to *Poonah*; and it was not poſſible for them to ſuppoſe, that at the time when we gave them ſuch an authority, we ſhould either give or leave to Mr. *Elliott* ſuch inſtructions as in their nature would tend to annul it.

4. By their letter before us, they acknowledge their having received intelligence of the arrival of the army at *Kimbaſſy*: it is to this knowledge I have alluded in the expreſſion to which Mr. *Francis* objects, and which I think is warranted by it.

5. An alliance between the Governments of *Bengal* and *Berar*, was firſt ſuggeſted by *Shawbajee Booſla*, the predeceſſor of *Moodajee Booſla*, in the year 1773, and has been the ſubject of a continued correſpondence between the two States to the preſent time: I believe, it was alſo intimated by me on the acceſſion of the new Government, in a minute which I wrote upon the political ſtate of their Preſidency: it has been frequently mentioned in the courſe of our debates on the preſent depending meaſure.

Appendix. No. 171.

(Mr. *Francis.*)

But be this as it may, it does not appear that we ever abandoned our project to aſſiſt in the proſecution of theirs: the fact, as I underſtand it, is totally new to me.

Moodajee Booſla in his letter to Colonel *Goddard* of the 23d November, expreſſes the ſame determination not to join the detachment or to co-operate in our views againſt the Peiſhwa, which he has done invariably ſince that time in all his letters to the Governor General; but on the 23d November, he knew nothing of the proceedings of *Bombay*, nor for ſeveral weeks after, nor does he any where allude to their engagement with *Ragonaut Row*, or allege that as a reaſon for not taking part with us.

I can never admit that we have any right to make ſo material an addition to the treaty as we ſhould do by inſiſting on a ſpecific ſum for the reimburſement of the paſt expences incurred by the expedition, and of a monthly ſubſidy during its continuance; conſidering that the treaty itſelf has fixed a ſpecific ſum, which the Preſidency of *Bombay* agreed to accept *without further account, in full of every expence attending the army.*

Neither do I think that we have an equitable any more than a conventional right to make any ſuch demand on *Ragoba*.

If he be reinſtated, it is done without the aſſiſtance of the detachment. Colonel *Goddard* was not to move from *Huſſengabad* before the 15th January; fifty days at leaſt muſt be allowed for his march to *Poonah*, which, ſuppoſing nothing to retard him but the length of the journey, fixes his arrival at *Poonah* to the 6th of March.

Ragoba has no reſources equal to ſuch accumulated demands.

My third objection to the demand is, that were it granted, it would not reimburſe us the expence of the detachment.

(Reply.)

6. I knew, which Mr. *Francis* indeed could not, that the firſt change of *Moodajee Booſla*'s ſentiments aroſe from his knowledge of the deſigns which were then actually formed by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to engage in ſome active enterprize with *Ragonaut Row*: this was mentioned by *Beneram Pundit*, the Maratta Vackeel, in a letter to his brother, and communicated to me. I own it made little impreſſion at that time upon me, becauſe I had no expectation of what has ſince paſſed at *Poonah*, and thought that *Moodajee* had a more obvious and ſubſtantial reaſon for his heſitation in the ſuppoſed indeciſion of this Government. All the letters written ſince that date by *Moodajee Booſla*, the conferences held by him and his Dewan with Mr. *Watherſtone*, the opinion of Mr. *Watherſtone*, and that of Colonel *Goddard*, all combine to prove, that this was the prime if not the ſole cauſe, and I think an allowable one, of his declining to accept of the proffered engagement with us.

7. By the treaty, the Preſidency of *Bombay* are only bound to conduct *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*, and to place him in the Government, with this expreſs ſtipulation, that this done they ſhall leave him there. We have therefore a clear right to withdraw our force when theſe points are accompliſhed; and the orders iſſued to this effect, in the event of the caſe ſuppoſed, can only operate after the reſtoration of *Ragonaut Row* to the poſſeſſion of *Poonah*, and of the Government of that capital. The treaty with the Preſidency of *Bombay* doth not preclude any demand which may be made by this Preſidency for the ſpecific aid afforded to *Ragonaut Row*; and every principle of juſtice, and the univerſal practice of all States in ſimilar caſes, authorizes us to demand an equivalent for the aid which we have furniſhed to *Ragonaut Row* at his requiſition, and applied directly to his ſupport; we have ordered the demand to be made, but no other means have been preſcribed to enforce it, except to avail ourſelves of the poſſible advantage which the treaty itſelf, both in the preciſe terms and evident intention of it, gives us.

If Mr. *Francis* had objected that the means propoſed might, under certain and poſſible caſes, prove inſufficient, I ſhould have acknowledged it; but pleaded that this was a caſe of neceſſity, impoſed upon us by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and ſuſceptible only of the imperfect remedy which we have applied to it.

8. I impute the firſt revolution in the Maratta State to the influence of our detachment, although it was then ſcarcely formed.

I aſcribe the ſecond to the inaction of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and to the ſlow progreſs of our detachment.

I ſhall aſcribe a ſhare at leaſt of the ſucceſs of the operations undertaken by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, if they ſhall prove ſucceſsful, to the advance of our army, and to the other correſponding meaſures which have been taken by this Government to defeat the deſigns of the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*.

I ſhall leave the juſtice of theſe concluſions to every man's own breaſt, who knows the force of opinion on all great political events; but without reſting the equity and reaſonableneſs of our demand on this ſingle ground, I ſhall add as incontrovertible proofs that this aid was originally projected at the requiſition of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, on the behalf of *Ragoba*; that repeated requiſitions have been made for it by both; that its deſtination has been lately called by the ſame party from the other objects in which it was then engaged; and laſtly, that the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, whom we muſt regard as empowered to tranſmit the ſentiments and wiſhes of *Ragonaut Row*, have expreſsly aſſigned as a reaſon for calling the detachment to their ſupport.

9. The reſources of the Maratta Government, if united through the means of our aſſiſtance, added to thoſe which *Ragonaut Row* inherently poſſeſſes, are equal to theſe and infinitely greater demands; and ſurely we have a right to claim the firſt application of his treaſures to the diſcharge of the expence incurred on his account, if he derives the poſſeſſion of them immediately from us.

10. After having read it objected to the demand, that it was too much, I did not expect an objection immediately to follow it, that it was too little; it was not my deſign to obſerve the preciſion of an account current in the groſs ſum to be demanded as the reimburſement of a general expence: the ſum propoſed for the ſubſidy is certainly moderate, but I believe upon the whole it will prove adequate to its profeſſed object; the charge of the detachment did not properly commence until we had carried into execution the expedient adopted in July laſt, for replacing the number of effective men which had been drawn from our eſtabliſhment by this detachment, and the expence of their being confined to effectives only, bears but a ſmall proportion to the battalions which have been ſpared for this ſervice; I do not include Major *Camac*'s detachment in the expence of Colonel *Goddard*'s, nor ſuppoſed it to make a part of the preſent demand.

(Mr. *Francis.*)

Whether Colonel *Goddard*, under any inſtructions whatſoever from this Board, can refuſe to obey the orders of General *Egerton* when once he ſhall be within the reach of ſuch orders, is a queſtion of the moſt ſerious and extenſive conſequence.

(Reply.)

11. This is a very alarming declaration, and may be attended with ſerious conſequences if it ſhould reach the Preſidency of *Bombay*, which is not improbable from the facility with which the moſt important, and what from their nature ought to be the moſt ſecret tranſactions of this Government, make their way to the public notice. I know no powers which Colonel, not General, *Egerton* poſſeſſes over the officers and ſoldiers of this eſtabliſhment.

It has been uſual in all inſtances in which detachments have been ſent from one Preſidency to another to particularize in the inſtructions and orders given to the officer commanding each detachment, how far he was to obey the orders of the Preſidency under which he was to ſerve.

From the many inſtances which may be brought to prove this, I ſhall juſt mention ſuch as at preſent occur to me.

When Colonel *Clive* was ſent from *Madras* in 1757 to retake *Calcutta*, he was empowered and directed by the Preſidency of *Fort St. George* to return with his troops, or any part of them which he thought proper, when he ſhould judge it neceſſary.

When Colonel *Peach* was ſent from *Bengal* to the *Decan* in 1767, with a diviſion of the 1ſt brigade, this Preſidency not only reſerved to itſelf the power of recalling the detachment whenever they pleaſed, but ſtipulated alſo that Colonel *Peach* ſhould command this force, and any other that the Preſidency of *Madras* ſhould judge neceſſary to add to it.

Mr. *Francis* may not now perhaps recollect, that when ſo ſmall a detachment as a Lieutenant, an Enſign, and 50 men from the 1ſt regiment, were ordered to *Bombay* in 1776, under the command of Lieutenant *Taylor*; it was expreſſed, that in the event of a campaign that party was to be put under the command of a Bengal officer, Captain *Allan M'Pherſon.*

It was further agreed, that on the arrival of this party at *Bombay* they were to be put under the orders of the Governor and Council there.—This ſurely implies that it was neceſſary for us to grant an authority to the officers under this Government to obey the orders of the Government of *Bombay* before they could obey them, we might of courſe have reſerved to ourſelves the power of recalling the detachment when we thought proper.

If after this explanation any doubts ſhould remain as to our power of ſending diſcretional orders to General *Goddard*, or inveſting him with an authority over the troops of this Preſidency, ſubject only to our future inſtructions, although I am ſorry to take up the time and attention of the Board on a point ſo extremely clear, let Mr. *Francis* read over the commiſſion of an officer in this ſervice; he will there ſee that every officer on the Bengal eſtabliſhment is directed and bound to obey our orders, and the orders of his ſuperior officers, which inevitably implies officers commiſſioned by or acting under our authority only.

9th March. While the treaty of *Poonah* was depending in 1776, and there was a proſpect of our commencing hoſtilities againſt the Maratta Government, we took upon ourſelves to appoint the late General *Gordon* to command the army that ſhould be ordered to act upon the Malabar coaſt, and to appoint Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* commander of the troops that ſhould be ſent from *Bengal*, and ſecond in command of the forces that might be ordered to act againſt the Marattas.

In the firſt inſtance our orders were thus expreſſed:

"We think it incumbent upon us to *require* and *inſiſt* that you aſſign the *command* of the army to "General *Gordon*, &c."

The ſecond inſtance was expreſſed, "We ſhall direct Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to ſend the two "companies of Sepoys under the command of Captain *Wroe*, which he took with him as his eſcort to "ſtrengthen your army, and to *command* it to you that he may be appointed ſecond in command in "your army, &c."

The words uſed by Mr. *Francis* in a minute, delivered by him on this occaſion, are ſo oppoſite to the preſent debate, that I ſhall beg leave to extract them: "Neither is our recommendation of Colonel "*Upton*, in my opinion equivalent to an abſolute order; at the ſame time, I expect it will be complied "with; ſince, independent of the ſuperior authority veſted in this Council, it would be highly unreaſonable, that even on the footing of a combined army, the party from which the chief ſupport of the "common cauſe is expected, ſhould have an officer in that army on whom they can directly depend."

I object to the 5th, not knowing what ſort of buſineſs Colonel *Goddard* can have to tranſact with the Court of *Poonah*, and foreſeeing that we ſhall weaken their credit and influence with the Court of *Poonah*, for no adequate purpoſe. This article conſtitutes an ambaſſador with letters of credence and full powers—to do nothing.

12. The inſtructions expreſs in very plain terms, *what ſort of buſineſs Colonel Goddard is to tranſact at the Court of Poonah, independant of the Preſidency of Bombay.*

The 5th article empowers him to treat upon ſuch matters as ſhall be expreſsly given to him in charge; and the next expreſſes in terms the matter on which he is to treat, namely, to demand a ſpecific monthly ſum for the charge of the detachment.

I am at a loſs to conceive, on what grounds Mr. *Francis* has crowded together ſo many ſtrong and pointed terms, to expreſs his ſenſe of the futility of Colonel *Goddard*'s powers.

But I object to our requiring the Council of *Bombay* to break the treaty with *Ragoba*, eſpecially on ſuch unwarrantable ground as that propoſed for doing it, I mean his refuſal to comply with a new condition, not only not ſtipulated by the treaty, but expreſsly excluded by it.

We are by this time ſufficiently acquainted with the light and unſteady character, not to ſay duplicity, of *Moodajee Boonſla.*

13. I have ſaid, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* "ſeemed to "have ſtudied to preclude it," but I do not agree with Mr. *Francis* "that they have expreſsly excluded it," for the truth of which, I refer to the article of the treaty itſelf.

14. I know no inſtances of *Moodajee*'s conduct which can juſtify theſe charges: on the application to him, to permit the detachment to march through his dominions, and to ſupply it with proviſions, he complied inſtantly and liberally; wrote to the commanding

Appendix. No. 171.

(Mr. *Francis.*) (Reply.)

manding officer to come with ſecurity; and ſent a man of truſt with a ſtore of proviſions to his own borders, when it lay waiting for the detachment five months: on the propoſal made to him of an alliance, he acquieſced without reſerve; and when that propoſal was in danger of failing by the death of Mr. *Elliott*, he ſtrongly recommended the immediate transfer of the commiſſion to another: before the commiſſion could take effect, he received intelligence of a deſign projected, and on the eve of being executed at *Bombay*, which he judged incompatible with the propoſed engagements, or with his views in it; he therefore declined to engage further in it, until that obſtacle was removed, or until it could be undertaken on more ſolid and ſatisfactory grounds, and for this purpoſe, he had deputed an expreſs agent to receive our ultimate determination, and to explain the conditions on which he will acquieſce in it: he may have carried the principle of caution, as I think he has, to a faulty exceſs; but of levity, of unſteadineſs, of duplicity, I wholly acquit him.

Mr. *Francis* has in another place, produced contraſted paſſages of *Moodajee*'s letters, written under different ſituations, which I have explained; but he has not offered the evidence of a ſingle fact, nor I preſume can any be offered, in ſupport of the allegations which are thus harſhly pronounced againſt *Moodajee Booſla*, not by Mr. *Francis* in his own perſon only, but on the behalf of the whole Board as united in the ſame ſentiments with him.

And as to the general queſtion, no words can be ſtronger than thoſe in which Mr. *Haſtings* has expreſſed his opinions againſt an offenſive alliance with the Marattas.

* * *

15. With equal reaſon the garments which I now wear may be conſtrued to infer an inconſiſtency with declarations made by me with reſpect to the weather on the 1ſt of May laſt: different ſeaſons and circumſtances require different ſolutions of the ſame general queſtion. At the time from which Mr. *Francis* has borrowed his quotation, the Maratta empire was in its full vigour; its parts entire; its poſſeſſions extending from the banks of the *Jumna* to the walls of *Seringapatam*; and it was adminiſtered by a ſpirited and enterprizing Prince, who had demanded our aid, not as the gift of reciprocal policy, but as the right of aſcertained ſuperiority; and denounced war and ruin on the *Carnatic* if we refuſed: it was then argued, that it was impolitic to contribute to the aggrandizement of a Power already too great for our own ſafety. This was the language of the Court of Directors, and of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, reiterated to each other: it is now propoſed to aſſume an aſcendant over this no longer dreaded State; ſuch is the ſpirit of the orders given by the Court of Directors for the reſtoration of *Ragonaut Row*; and ſuch is the ſpirit of the meaſures which we had projected for the elevation of *Moodajee Booſla*.

I think it will appear that Colonel *Goddard* has acted without orders. By our reſolution of the 23d November, the powers delegated to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* were revoked. He was then directed *henceforth to obey* all ſuch orders as *he might receive from us*; but he has never ſince received any orders from us, directly or indirectly, authorizing him to march to *Poonah*, or to co-operate with the Preſidencies of *Bombay* for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*.

16. It is true that our orders of the 23d November directed Colonel *Goddard* henceforth to obey all ſuch orders as he might receive from us, and from us only; but theſe did not forbid him to comply with a requiſition of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, although delivered, as it muſt be, until the revocation of our former orders was known, in the ſtyle of authority, if it was conſiſtent with the inſtructions before given to Colonel *Goddard*; and both our inſtructions of the 15th October and thoſe of the 23d November, fully warrant the laſt movement of the detachment, the former inſtructions allowing him authority to advance, even without the order of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and the latter to aſſiſt and co-operate with them, conſiſtently with the primary objects of his commiſſion.

I ſhall conclude this minute by acknowledging, that the propoſitions were written with the immediate and perſonal aſſiſtance of Mr. *Barwell*, after the moſt deliberate and wary conſideration of them, and are at leaſt as much his original compoſition as my own, which I repeat with pleaſure, becauſe I think they will reflect no diſcredit on him; and I ſhall ever think it a credit to my labours, that they have ſo ſtrong a ſanction as his participation in them.

(Signed) *W. H.*

Mr. *Francis* in conſequence ſent in the following remarks, a copy of which were alſo incloſed a number in the packet.

Mr. *Francis*—I beg leave to offer one obſervation on the Governor General's minute recorded yeſterday, and which I deſire may accompany it as a number in the packet.

Having ſtated my objections to the command propoſed to be exerciſed by Colonel *Goddard*, independent of Brigadier General *Egerton*, his ſuperior officer in the Company's ſervice, with whom he is nevertheleſs to co-operate, it is urged in reply that, in May 1776, we directed the ſole command of the Company's troops at *Bombay*, or that ſhould be ordered to act on the Malabar coaſt, to be veſted in General *Gordon*; and that we recommended it to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to appoint Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* ſecond in command in their army. Whether theſe meaſures were adviſable or not, or whether we had a right to inſiſt on their compliance with our injunctions, are not the points at preſent in debate. The queſtion is, whether, when I object to dividing the command of troops on the ſame ſervice, and to our making an inferior officer independent of his ſuperior, ſuch objection is anſwered by ſaying, that at a former period we inſiſted on the *ſole* command being veſted in General *Gordon*, and recommended that Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* ſhould be appointed to act *under him*.

On all the other points I ſubmit to judgment, with this remark only, that I do not believe it will appear to any impartial judge, that I have ever in any inſtance miſrepreſented the ſenſe of any paſſage in the Governor General's minutes, though I do not think it neceſſary to recite all the words he makes uſe of. If the contrary be affirmed, it ſhould be ſhewn by a clear ſtatement of the amount of his meaning, compared with that which I have attributed to him, in what particular, or to what degree the one eſſentially differs from the other.

Long quotations, which nobody will attend to, ſeldom have any other effect but to leave the queſtion perplexed and undecided.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Governor General—I do not myſelf make long or full quotations, but think it incumbent on me to include in them every thing neceſſary to complete their ſenſe; and I complain that Mr. *Francis*, by a different practice, and particularly by the excluſion of intermediate words and ſentences, has totally perverted my meaning.

A compariſon of his extract from my minute of the 4th inſtant, with the complete paragraph inſerted in the ſecond paragraph of my laſt, will verify this obſervation.

(Signed) *W. H.*

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

Appendix. No. 172.

APPENDIX, No. 172.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal* to the Court of Directors in their Secret Department; dated the 1ſt February 1779.

WE have juſt received very important advices from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, and from Colonel *Goddard*, which being now under our conſideration, we ſhall defer writing on the ſubject of them until we can inform you of the reſult of our deliberations; in the mean while we encloſe copies for your information.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal* to the Court of Directors, in their Secret Department; dated the 11th February 1779.

Honourable Sirs,

In our laſt diſpatch of the 1ſt inſtant, by the *Godfrey*, we tranſmitted you a copy of the important advices which we had juſt then received from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and gave you to expect that our proceedings upon them would ſhortly follow. We have now the honour to forward a complete copy of them by the *Shrewſbury*, agreeable to our promiſe: as they are very full, and not encumbered with any foreign ſubject, we truſt that you will beſtow on them the attention which they deſerve; and therefore we ſhall take the liberty to refer you principally to them.

We ſhall not enlarge in this place upon the apparent irregularity and precipitancy of the meaſures lately adopted by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, but leave you from a peruſal of the facts to judge and paſs your opinion, whether they were fully juſtified in reſolving to undertake them on the different grounds and conſiderations that occured at the time.

With reſpect to the mode of conduct which we have reſolved to purſue on this occaſion, we think it proper to be rather more minute. The preſent treaty with *Ragonaut Row* having been formed by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, under the expreſs letter of our ſanction; and this authority having been proclaimed to the world in a manifeſto, under the Company's ſeal, it remained only for us to ſupport the engagements thus concluded, although a very principal condition, both enjoined by us in our letter to *Bombay*, dated 2d February 1778, and obviouſly ſtriking in itſelf, had been omitted; we mean a ſtipulation or proviſion for the expences of the detachment ſent from hence to the aid of *Ragonaut Row*; which was at that time advancing quickly into the Maratta country, and which has ſince actually marched towards *Poonah*, at the expreſs requiſition of the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*.

Thus circumſtanced, with an object of ſo much importance to ſecure at the Court of *Poonah*, we thought it adviſable to purſue the moſt effectual means of accompliſhing it that were ſuggeſted by the occaſion; and therefore reſolved to inveſt Colonel *Goddard* with powers to treat with that Court, and to furniſh him with inſtructions to the following effect:

Colonel *Goddard* is directed to co-operate with the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and with the committee appointed by them for conducting the political and military affairs at *Poonah*, in ſupport of the treaty concluded by that Preſidency with *Ragonaut Row*, and of the operations dependant on it.

He is confirmed in poſſeſſion of the powers conveyed to him by our letter of the 23d November, which he at preſent holds, dependant on this Government and independent of the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

He is authorized to apply for ſuch reinforcements of troops from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, as he ſhall judge neceſſary for completing the ſtrength of his detachment, and to receive the ſame, with the condition, that they be not commanded by any officer of ſuperior rank to himſelf.

We have forbid Colonel *Goddard* to interfere in any of the negociations, or other tranſactions of the committee appointed by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, or in any points which reſpect the treaty lately concluded with *Ragonaut Row*, or the ſeparate and immediate intereſts of that Preſidency, except only in thoſe in which he ſhall be called upon by the Preſident and Select Committee, or the committee appointed by them, for his advice and aſſiſtance.

We have appointed Colonel *Goddard* the Miniſter of our Government at the Court of *Poonah*, with full powers to negociate with *Ragonaut Row*, or ſuch other perſon or perſons as ſhall be at the head of the Maratta State, upon all matters which ſhall be expreſsly given to him in charge, and to accept or conclude any engagements for the ſame on our part.

We have inſtructed Colonel *Goddard* to demand from *Ragonaut Row*, or the Government for the time being, payment of the expences actually incurred in the expedition undertaken by the detachment under his command, eſtimated at two lacks of rupees per month, from the 1ſt of June 1778 to the day of his arrival at or near *Poonah*, with the allowance of ſix months for the return of the detachment to *Bengal*, from the day of its diſmiſſion; to obtain the moſt complete ſecurity for theſe payments, either by aſſignments on the public treaſury, or on reputable Shroffs; or in the laſt reſort, on any of the Aumils or collectors of the revenue, who ſhall engage to him for the ſame, but not on the collections themſelves, in which we have forbidden him, or any one under his authority, to have any concern or interference.

In caſe of a refuſal on the part of the Maratta Government to comply with theſe demands, or of ſuch an evaſion of them as ſhall be equivalent to a refuſal, Colonel *Goddard* is directed to notify the ſame to the committee, and to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and either return with the detachment under his command to *Berar*, or retire to the lands ceded to the Company, and in poſſeſſion of the Government of *Bombay*, at his diſcretion; and we have peremptorily required and commanded the Preſident and Select Committee in ſuch caſe to recall their troops from *Poonah*, and from the Maratta dominions.

We have thought it proper to confirm the inſtructions originally given to Mr. *Elliott*, and after his death transferred to Colonel *Goddard*, and to direct him to reſume his negociations with the Government of *Berar*, and to treat with it on the grounds of thoſe inſtructions whenever an occaſion ſhall offer to execute them conſiſtently with the foregoing reſolutions.

For the fuller explanation of our intentions in this article, and to obviate any miſconception of the obligation impoſed on us by the treaty concluded by the Preſidency of *Bombay* with *Ragonaut Row*, we have diſtinctly ſpecified the ſeveral caſes which ſhall authorize him to renew the negociations with *Moodajee Booſla*. Theſe are as follow:

1ſt. If *Ragonaut Row* ſhall depart from the terms of his engagements with the Government of *Bombay*.
2dly. If he ſhall refuſe to comply with our demands.
3dly. If he ſhall himſelf deſire to include the Government of *Berar* in his alliance with the Company, on the footing preſcribed by our inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott*.
4thly. In the event of *Ragonant Row*'s death.
5thly. In caſe of the failure of the plan undertaken by the Preſidency of *Bombay* for reſtoring that Chief.

Appendix. No. 173 & 174.

We have given the neceſſary directions on theſe ſeveral ſubjects to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*; and further recommended it to them, on the return of their committee, to appoint an agent or miniſter on the part of their Government for the management of its ſeparate concerns with the Adminiſtration of *Poonah*, and for the accompliſhment of the different articles of the treaty which they have concluded with *Ragonaut Row*, but with inſtructions expreſsly limited to thoſe objects; and we have alſo thought it neceſſary to forbid them to enter into any new engagements, without a previous application to us, and our ſanction obtained for that purpoſe.

We are, honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis,
Ewd Wheler.

Fort William,
11th February 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 173.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

Letter from Governor General to *Moodajee Bhoſila:* written 9th February 1779.

I DID not think proper to return an immediate anſwer to your firſt letter, becauſe it had been written on the ſuppoſition that the commiſſion which had been entruſted to Mr. *Elliott* had not been transferred to any other perſon, and that the negociations and objects of it were left in total ſuſpenſe; and as all your objections to the propoſed alliance were grounded on that preſumption, I expected that when you were informed, as you would ſoon have been after the diſpatch of that letter, that Mr. *Elliott*'s commiſſion had been transferred to Colonel *Goddard*, with full powers for carrying into execution the plan intended by it, all your objections would ceaſe of courſe, and that you would be as much diſpoſed to accept of the propoſed alliance, and to join in the meaſures projected for it, as you appeared to be in the letter which you wrote me immediately after the news of Mr. *Elliott*'s deceaſe: in this hope, however, I have been diſappointed; an unfortunate concurrence of circumſtances has cauſed a change in your ſentiments, and defeated my deſigns. By your laſt letter, and by the advices received at the ſame time from Colonel *Goddard*, I underſtand that you have given him his final anſwer, and that the ſubjects of his negociations remain ſuſpended to an indefinite time; and that the cauſe of your reluctance to enter into my views, has proceeded from the engagements which have been lately concluded by the Government of *Bombay* with *Ragonaut Row*, and the meaſures actually taken by them for replacing him in the Adminiſtration of *Poonah*. I will own that the doubts you entertained on the receipt of this intelligence were reaſonable; for I have no right to expect that you ſhould place an implicit reliance on the faith of any engagements implied by the overtures made by me to you, but not ratified by any formal inſtrument; yet I am ſorry that you entertained this diſtruſt; and do declare, that had you accepted of the terms offered you through Colonel *Goddard*, and concluded a treaty with this Government upon them, I ſhould have held the obligation of it ſuperior to that of any engagements formed by the Government of *Bombay*, and ſhould have thought it my duty to maintain it, and to defend the faith of this Government pledged for the performance of it againſt every conſideration even of the moſt valuable intereſts and ſafety of the Engliſh poſſeſſions intruſted to my charge; nor in effect was the plan propoſed to you precluded by the engagements of the Government of *Bombay* with *Ragonaut Row*, but as I conceive entirely reconcileable to it; this however has had the effect of diverting your mind from the proſecution of our mutual deſigns, and I am therefore without remedy.

You will be pleaſed to remember that the original intention of ſending an Engliſh army from this to the weſtern ſide of *India* was to aſſiſt the Government of *Bombay* in the accompliſhment of a plan connected with the actual rulers of the Maratta State, with whom they were in alliance, and ſimilar to that which they have lately carried into execution, as I informed you in my firſt letter written upon this ſubject. That plan proved abortive; but the ſame cauſes which had induced me and the members of this Government to give our ſanction to the meaſures of the Government of *Bombay*, namely, the dangerous and forward intrigues of the French at *Poonah*, ſtill ſubſiſted, with other additional motives, for proſecuting the undertaking; and I thought this a fair occaſion to afford you the moſt ſubſtantial proof of the ſincerity of the profeſſions which I had repeatedly given to you, and of cementing a laſting friendſhip between your houſe and the Company by the ſtrong connection of mutual advantages. With this view I firſt deputed Mr. *Elliott* with full powers to negociate, and to conclude a treaty between us, and to concert the operations dependant on it. His death ſuſpended this deſign, which was inſtantly renewed on the intimation given me by you of your wiſhes concurring with mine, and Colonel *Goddard* was ſubſtituted the Miniſter of this Government in his place.

To you I had unreſervedly communicated all my views, partly and indiſtinctly by letters, but very fully in repeated converſations with *Beneram Pundit*, as it would have been very improper to have truſted affairs of ſuch delicacy and importance to letters, and to the hazards to which theſe would have been expoſed in a long and doubtful journey. Your caution was ſtill greater, and was perhaps more commendable, although I may regret the neceſſity which preſcribed it; for neither your letters, nor the letters of *Beneram Pundit*, afforded me the leaſt clue to judge of your ſentiments or inclinations reſpecting the particular points of action which were to form the ſubſtance of our projected engagements; and although from your general profeſſions, and the warmth and ſincerity with which theſe were manifeſtly dictated, I had every reaſon to conclude that you approved of them, yet, without ſome aſſiſtance, common prudence required that I ſhould not precipitately abandon every other reſource, and irrevocably commit the honour and intereſt of this Government in a doubtful meaſure. Precautions were taken that nothing ſhould be undertaken by any of the Governments dependant on this, which might eventually interfere with thoſe actually concluded with you; and laſtly, that Colonel *Goddard* might be freed from all embarraſſments which might check or impede him in his negociations with you. The orders by which he had been ſubjected to the authority of the Government of *Bombay* were revoked, and he was inſtructed to give his whole attention to the treaty which he was charged to conclude with you. Due intimation of this was at the ſame time written to *Bombay*.

The paſt is paſt, and cannot be recalled; it is therefore as unneceſſary as it would be improper, to paſs a judgment on the propriety of it. With reſpect to the future, my diſpoſition and wiſhes remain the ſame; nothing is yet loſt, although the proſpect be removed to a greater diſtance. I ſhall wait for the arrival of *Beneram Pundit* for the information of future inclinations; and by this it is my deſire to be guided in the hopes that they may be ſpeedily accompliſhed to our mutual and entire ſatisfaction.

APPENDIX, No. 174.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 2d March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

MR. *Francis* having ſent in the following minute

on

on the 23d ultimo; it was circulated, and returned this morning by the Governor General, with the minute which is entered after it.

Mr. Francis, 23d February, 1779.

Mr. *Francis*—It does not belong to me to anſwer for the inconſiſtency of the meaſures purſued by this Board ſince December 1777, or to reconcile and account for the contradictory declarations with which they have been occaſionally introduced or ſupported; in every inſtance, in which I may be able to produce the Governor General's own authority in defence of my opinion, I ſhall think myſelf at liberty to make uſe of it.

The queſtions left in debate by his laſt minute, recorded the 11th inſtant, and in which I underſtand him to maintain the affirmative, are as follow:

1ſt. "Whether at the time when Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions were reſolved on, the plan propoſed by that commiſſion was not the *principal* object of this Government; or whether it was conſidered by us as *little more than a reſource to which we looked in the event of a failure in the other deſign?*"

When Mr. *Elliott*'s appointment was reſolved on in July 1778, it appears by his inſtructions, that the Bombay plan, in favour of *Ragoba*, was abandoned by this Government. In the inſtructions it is expreſsly inſerted, That "*the deſign had failed*; that *Ragonaut Row* had now "no party left; that the Preſidency of *Bombay* could "not now, under any circumſtances, afford him this "aſſiſtance; and that, thus deprived of the reſources on "which we depended, in the partizans of *Ragoba*, &c. "we were therefore deſirous of joining our forces and "our intereſts with thoſe of *Moodajee Booſla*." Even the paſſage quoted by the Governor General proves, that the junction with *Moodajee Booſla* was not conſidered by us as *little more than an eventual reſource*, but that it was then our main and principal object. On a ſuppoſition that the Preſidency of *Bombay* might have actually entered into engagements with *Ragoba*, the inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott* ſay, "you will ſo conduct yourſelf as to conform "to their meaſures, if you can, conſiſtently with the "*prior attention which you will give to our views*, remembering that a defenſive alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* being the permanent object of your commiſſion, you "are to ſuffer no conſideration whatever to divert you "from that object, &c."

Finally, the Governor General in his letter of the 9th inſtant to *Moodajee Booſla*, ſays, "I do declare, that "had you accepted the terms offered you through Colonel *Goddard*, and concluded a treaty with this Government upon them, I ſhould have held the obligation "of it ſuperior to that of any engagement formed by the "Government of *Bombay*."

2d. "Whether the two plans, *viz.* that formed at *Bombay* for the reſtoration of *Ragoba* to the office of "Peiſhwa, and that projected by us for the advancement of *Moodajee Booſla* to the ſovereign authority of "the Maratta empire, are compatible in their nature, "and may really exiſt together."

The object conſtantly aimed at by *Ragoba* on one ſide, and held out to *Moodajee Booſla* on the other, has been the actual ſovereignty of the Maratta State. It is not to be ſuppoſed, that either of them would be ſatisfied with a bare title, while the actual power was left in the hands of his rival; nor in fact was ſuch a propoſition ever made to them. But if the actual power of the Adminiſtration was their common object; it can hardly be a queſtion, whether two plans, the profeſſed purpoſe of which is to place both of them in poſſeſſion of ſuch power, can be reconciled and executed together. The Governor General himſelf ſays, That the reſolution taken at *Bombay has defeated our meaſures, and expoſed us to the ſuſpicion of duplicity*; but the affirmative of the queſtion ſuppoſes the meaſures compatible, conſequently the execution of one ought not to defeat the ſucceſs of the other. The opinion that they are really incompatible does not belong to me alone. In Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, the poſſible caſe of an engagement on the part of *Bombay*, for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, is ſtated as *incompatible with the operations which we had above authorized*, viz. in the preceding part of the inſtructions. Colonel *Goddard*, in his letter of the 6th of January, ſays, "that "*Moodajee Booſla* juſtly apprehends, that the eſtabliſhing of *Ragonaut Row*'s authority under the influence "of the Engliſh, would exclude him from all hopes of "ever obtaining the object he has in view through their "means, as an attention to, and obſervance of the intereſts of both would be an impracticable taſk to our "Government, and irreconcilable to themſelves."

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In another part of the ſame letter he tells us, that "*Moodajee Booſla* acknowledges his view is to pave the "way to his own future projects; and that he declares, "with equal appearance of ſincerity, that theſe are incompatible with the meaſures now adopted by *Ragonaut Row*."

Mr. *Watherſtone*, in his letter of the 24th of December ſays, "The principal cauſe, however, of their objection "to the Bombay ſchemes, is, I make no doubt, the "*invincible bar* they foreſee they will occaſion to the "accompliſhment of their own." The Governor General himſelf ſays, that "our own plan has been rendered "impracticable by it."

I ſubmit to judgment, whether this evidence be or be not concluſive?

3d. "Whether the Preſidency of *Bombay* were bound "*by our example*, to leave an opening for the admiſſion "of *Moodajee Booſla* into their engagements with *Ragoba* "*in the ſame manner* as our inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott* "had preſcribed the junction of *Ragoba* in his negociations with *Moodajee Booſla?*"

The Governor General affirms, "That it was not poſſible for the Preſidency of *Bombay* to ſuppoſe that at "the time when we gave them ſuch an authority, we "ſhould either give or leave to Mr. *Elliott* ſuch inſtructions, as in their nature would tend to annul it." Yet the declaration quoted from the Governor's laſt letter to *Moodajee Booſla*, plainly ſhews that ſuch a ſuppoſition, if they had formed it, would not have been unwarrantable. At all events they ought not to have been left to their own conjectures, on a point of ſuch importance. They ought to have been informed of the preciſe object of Mr. *Elliott*'s commiſſion. They would then have had no excuſe for entering into engagements, which are now ſaid to have defeated our meaſures, and to have expoſed us to the ſuſpicion of duplicity. It reſts with the Governor General to ſhew how it was poſſible for them to follow our example, and to leave an opening for *Moodajee Booſla*, in the ſame manner as our inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott* had preſcribed the junction of *Ragoba*, with his negociation with *Moodajee Booſla*, when they had never ſeen Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, nor known any thing of the plan of them.

4th. "Whether the ſupport of the plan, preſented to "us by *Bombay*, in December 1777, was not our firſt "profeſſed object in undertaking the expedition, and "whether we have ever abandoned our plan, to aſſiſt in "the proſecution of their's?"

When the Court of Directors ſhall have read the following quotations, I believe they will view with the ſame ſurprize that I do, the Governor General's preſent declaration, that the alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* was the firſt profeſſed object of this Government.

"If there are men in *England* ſo devoid of common "ſenſe as to ſuppoſe it poſſible for me to have formed "a plan, oſtenſibly profeſſed for the ſupport of *Bombay*, "but really meant as a cover for other deſigns, let them. "Whoſoever they are, or in whatever relation they may "ſtand to this Government, ſuch opinions will give me "no kind of concern."

Conſultation, 12th October 1778.

"We were called upon by the Preſidency of *Bombay* "to aſſiſt them in a plan, &c. Our aſſiſtance was only "neceſſary to ſupport it."

"The object *originally preſented* to our army, ſeemed "to have vaniſhed." "It will be remembered, that "our

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Mr. Haſtings to Moodajee Booſla, February 1779.

" our detachment was expreſsly deſigned for the ſupport " of the plan communicated to us by the Preſidency of " *Bombay*, in December 1777."

" You will be pleaſed to remember, that the original " intention of ſending an Engliſh army from this to the " weſtern ſide of *India* was to aſſiſt the Government of " *Bombay*, in the accompliſhing of a plan, concerted " with the actual rulers of the Maratta State."

If nevertheleſs, an immediate and decided engagement with *Moodajee* had in effect been firſt adopted, and afterwards abandoned by us, to aſſiſt in the proſecution of the other ſcheme, with what reaſon can it be conſidered as little more *than a reſource, to which we looked in the event of a failure in the deſign* furniſhed us by the Preſidency of *Bombay?*

I deny that we have ever abandoned the project of an alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, ſince it was firſt avowed. The proof of the contrary lies on the affirmative.

5th. " Whether the ſuppoſed change in *Moodajee* " *Booſla*'s ſentiments, is to be attributed to his know- " ledge of the deſigns lately formed at *Bombay?*"

A private letter from the Maratta Vackeel to his brother, is no evidence to this Board, if it had ever been before us. It appears that the Governor General himſelf paid no regard to it. But *Moodajee Booſla*'s letter to Colonel *Goddard*, of the 23d of November, muſt be received by us as public authority. He therein ſtates a multitude of reaſons for not engaging in the propoſed alliance. Is it to be ſuppoſed, that if he had been acquainted with the reſolution then taken at *Bombay*, he would not have added that argument to the reſt, or that he would have deſignedly omitted to juſtify himſelf by the only plea to which in truth there could be no poſſibility of reply?

6th. " Whether we have *ſtrictly* a right to inſiſt on a " farther ſubſidy from *Rogoba*, in addition to the ſum " ſtipulated and limited by the Bombay treaty?"

The twelfth article of the treaty ſays, " The Engliſh " forces are to continue with *Ragonaut Row*, until the " object of this treaty is accompliſhed, which is to place " him in the Regency of *Poonah*." But, if he refuſes to comply with the demand of two lacks a month, beyond the ſubſidy limited by the treaty, Colonel *Goddard* is commanded to retire with his detachment, and the Preſidency of *Bombay* to recall their troops from *Poonah*. The execution of theſe orders is not to wait till the objects of the treaty are accompliſhed; the demand is to be inſtantly made, and a refuſal to comply with it is to be immediately followed by the retreat of both armies. The concluſion from theſe premiſes is obvious and unavoidable.

7th. " Whether we have an *equitable* right to inſiſt on " ſuch a demand?"

We muſt wait the event, before we can determine whether Colonel *Goddard*'s army will really have contributed in any degree to the ſucceſs of the expedition from *Bombay*. That Preſidency may naturally tell us, that the motion of *their* army was the cauſe of Colonel *Goddard*'s ſecurity, ſince it evidently muſt have diverted a part at leaſt of the force that would have oppoſed him. The argument, otherwiſe equal in itſelf, preponderates clearly in favour of that party which ſtands neareſt to the common enemy, and enters firſt into action.

8th. " Whether *Ragoba*, ſuppoſing him reinſtated, " derives the poſſeſſion of his treaſures immediately " from us?"

I know of no reſources which *Ragoba inherently poſſeſſes*; for a conſiderable time paſt he has been a burthen to the Company, even for his perſonal ſubſiſtence. That he will derive the future poſſeſſion of any other treaſures *immediately from us*, is a propoſition which, I believe, the Preſidency of *Bombay* will be as unwilling to admit as *Ragoba* himſelf; they will claim the whole merit of the ſervice, and they will engroſs the reward of it. We need not yet, however, embarraſs ourſelves about a diviſion of the ſpoil. That queſtion at preſent is premature.

9th. " Whether my objection to the amount of the " demand be unfair on my own principles?"

There is an air of cavil in the remark on my objection to the amount of the demand, which perhaps might excuſe me from replying to it. Yet I ſhould be ſorry to be miſunderſtood; my meaning is, that if all objections to increaſing our demands on *Ragoba*, on the ſcore of the aſſiſtance he may derive from the march of Colonel *Goddard*'s army, be over-ruled, the demand then ſhould be proportioned to our actual expence. On any principles that will juſtify us in demanding a part, we have a right to the whole. Two lacks a month from June laſt, fall very ſhort of reimburſing the Company for the charge of this meaſure.

10th. " Whether it appears what ſort of buſineſs Co- " lonel *Goddard* is to negociate and tranſact at the Court " of *Poonah*, as ambaſſador from this Government?"

To make a peremptory demand of a ſpecific ſum of money, does not require us to veſt Colonel *Goddard* with the character and full powers of an ambaſſador, and no other object of negociation appears to be intruſted to him.

11th. " Whether we have no reaſon to charge *Moo-* " *dajee Booſla* with levity, unſteadineſs, or duplicity?"

If it be true that *Moodajee Booſla* conſtantly ſolicited an alliance with this Government, and, as I find it aſſerted by the Governor General on the 16th of November laſt, that " he was both willing and prepared to join his " aſſiſtance in the operations of the detachment;" I am entitled to charge him with levity and unſteadineſs in departing from all his former profeſſions, as he evidently did on the 23d of November, when it was impoſſible for him to be apprized of the reſolution taken at *Bombay*. With reſpect to his duplicity, I muſt leave it to others to judge from facts; in the mean time I do not deem it unwarrantable, nor is it unprecedented in the conſultations, either here or at *Madras*, to queſtion the good faith of a Maratta. How it ſtands with the Governor General's perſonal credit, or with the wiſdom of his meaſures, to maintain that *Moodajee Booſla*'s conduct has been unexceptionable, is a queſtion which I think deſerves his conſideration.

12th. " Whether the direct change of opinion admit- " ted by Mr. *Haſtings*, with reſpect to the policy of en- " gaging the Company in an offenſive alliance with the " Marattas, be juſtified by a total change of circum- " ſtances, ſuppoſed to have taken place ſince his former " opinion was delivered?"

When fundamental maxims of policy are avowedly ſet aſide, the change of circumſtances ſhould not only be clear and incontrovertible, but it ſhould be ſuch a one as warrants the adoption of new and oppoſite principles of action. I am not ſufficiently maſter of the revolutions which have happened in the Maratta empire ſince April 1771, and which in ſo ſhort a period are ſuppoſed to have produced a total alteration in its circumſtances, to enter into that part of the queſtion. Taking the facts as they are ſtated by the Governor, it ſeems to me an obvious concluſion, that, if it were dangerous for us to unite with the Marattas when their empire was entire and in its full vigour, it muſt be uſeleſs to commit ourſelves by taking any part in their diviſions, when their empire is falling to pieces of itſelf; either way, our engaging the Company's arms in an offenſive war, whether in conjunction with a part or the whole of the Maratta empire, is indefenſible, ſince it is equally contrary to the Company's poſitive, moſt ſolemn, and repeated commands.

13th. " Whether Colonel *Goddard* in marching to " *Poonah*, has not acted without orders?"

It is admitted, that on the 23d of November, Colonel *Goddard* was directed thenceforth to obey all ſuch orders as he might receive from us, and from us only. The excluſion contained in theſe terms, could only relate to the authority heretofore delegated to the Preſidency of *Bombay* and now revoked; under theſe laſt inſtructions Colonel *Goddard* could no longer obey the direct orders

of

of that Preſidency; but it ſeems he was at liberty to comply with their requiſitions. Such a conſtruction of poſitive orders I believe is unprecedented. The verbal diſtinction between orders and requiſitions, ſeems to me to be of no weight. Colonel *Goddard* has defended his conduct on much better grounds.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

The Governor General—This is not a time for ſpeculative diſcuſſion; yet I muſt defend myſelf againſt the charge of inconſiſtency in meaſures of ſuch importance to the intereſts of the Company and to the national reputation, as thoſe into which I have been forcibly drawn, not by my own option, but by the acts of others independent of me, ſince December 1777; and which are rendered yet more important to my own character by the miſerable cataſtrophe which has attended the deſign from which theſe all derive their origin. I ſhall conform to Mr. *Francis*'s arrangement of his arguments in my reply to them, and hope at leaſt to have the merit of brevity, if I am not juſtified by the motives which have impelled me to give up ſo much of my time to debate, which might be devoted to more uſeful purpoſes, and to write what perhaps no one will read.

1ſt. Mr. *Elliott*'s commiſſion conſiſted of two diſtinct and independent points; a defenſive alliance, which was to be concluded independently of any meaſures or engagements of the Preſidency of *Bombay*; and an offenſive one, which was not to take place, if any engagements ſhould have been concluded, or meaſures formed, by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, which were contradictory to it. This is clearly expreſſed in the following extract of his inſtructions, which I quote again to ſave the trouble of a reference. "But if you ſhall have reaſon to believe that the Preſidency of *Bombay* have commenced any negociations or entered into any engagements, either for the firm eſtabliſhment of peace with the Poonah Miniſtry, or for the reſtoration of *Ragonaut Row*, or for any other purpoſe which may prove incompatible with the operations which we have above authorized, you will in ſuch caſe ſuſpend your negociations until you ſhall have received authentic information, either from Mr. *Moſtyn* or the Preſidency of *Bombay*, of the nature of the engagements either projected or executed by them; and you will ſo conduct yourſelf as to conform to their meaſures, if you can conſiſtently with the prior attention which you will give to our views, or at leaſt not to engage in any offenſive plan which ſhall be contrary to that of the Preſidency of *Bombay*." There is a clear and pointed oppoſition ſtated of two deſigns; one propoſed by Mr. *Elliott*'s commiſſion, and the other by the Preſidency of *Bombay*; and it is declared that the former ſhall not be attempted in the caſe of the actual proſecution of the latter; therefore it is provided, that "at the time when Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions were reſolved "on, the plan propoſed by the Committee was not the "principal object of this Government, but conſidered "by us as little more than a reſource, to which we looked "in the event of a failure in the other deſign."

The quotation made from my letter to *Moodajee*, has no relation to the propoſition ſtated by Mr. *Francis* himſelf, which expreſsly confines it to the date and duration of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions. This ſpeaks only of engagements made by Colonel *Goddard*. The relative ſtate of the two commiſſions was clearly this:—in Mr *Elliott*'s, we conſidered the project formed by the Preſidency of *Bombay* as abortive, but in the ſuppoſition of the poſſibility of its exiſtence we gave it the preference, and therefore left the detachment under the orders of that Preſidency. In Colonel *Goddard*'s commiſſion, we ſtill conſidered that project as abortive, and deeming it indiſpenſably neceſſary to fix the deſtination of Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, then advanced to the confines of *Berar*, where it muſt either remain for the junction of *Moodajee*, and for the accompliſhment of the plan propoſed to him; or abandoning that deſign, proceed to the ſupport of that of the Preſidency of *Bombay*; we gave the preference to the former, and therefore releaſed the detachment from the orders of that Preſidency. Appendix. No. 174.

2d. It was never agreed nor propoſed, neither did *Ragonaut Row* ever require, that he ſhould be put into poſſeſſion of the ſovereignty of the Maratta State, whatever might have been the implied and ſecret object of the engagement concluded with him. He did not dare in his ejected ſtate to violate the conſtitutional forms which the Peiſhwas, his predeceſſors, in the plenitude of their power profeſſed to hold ſacred. Whether therefore he were ſatisfied or not with the "bare title" of Peiſhwa, without the uſurped powers of it, would have been no concern of mine, nor ought to have influenced the meaſures of our Government if we could have improved its relation to the Maratta State by other aids, not prohibited by our engagement with him.

The profeſſed object of the alliance with *Moodajee*, was to put him in poſſeſſion of the ſovereignty of the Maratta State, to which he had fair and legal pretenſions, and which he might have certainly held without prejudice to the rights of *Ragonaut Row* as Peiſhwa; and *Ragonaut Row* might as conſiſtently have exerciſed the office of Peiſhwa under his authority as his predeceſſors in the ſame office did before the uſurpation of *Ballagee* in 1740, which has been ſupported under all the forms and avowed rights of the conſtitution.

Therefore, the two plans, viz. "that formed at "*Bombay* for the reſtoration of *Ragoba* to the office of "Peiſhwa, and that projected by us for the advancement "of *Moodajee Booſla* to the ſovereign authority of the "Maratta empire, are compatible in their nature, and "may really exiſt together."

My aſſertion, that "the reſolution taken at *Bombay* "has defeated our meaſures and expoſed us to the ſuſ-"picion of duplicity," does not imply that the two meaſures are incompatible. The union of two diſtinct caſes may be conſiſtently ſuppoſed, although the attempt to unite them may fail, or the means ſeparately taken to eſtabliſh one may defeat or counteract the other. *Moodajee* could not truſt *Ragonaut Row*, nor commit himſelf and his fortunes in an engagement with us, which might eventually be defeated by thoſe which he ſaw formed by the Preſidency of *Bombay* with *Ragonaut Row*, and with the nature and extent of which he was unacquainted. He therefore declined it under ſuch circumſtance; ſo that in effect, the reſolution taken at *Bombay* has defeated our meaſures, becauſe he did not chuſe to be a party in it, yet it does not therefore follow that the meaſures were in themſelves incompatible. That "our own "plan has been rendered impracticable by it," which are quoted as my words, and I ſuppoſe are ſuch, meant no more, than that it was no longer practicable for Colonel *Goddard* to concert a plan of operations with *Moodajee Booſla*, ſince he had been obliged to leave him, and to march to *Poonah*, for the purpoſe of giving his ſupport to the Preſidency of *Bombay* in favour of a plan to which *Moodajee* was adverſe; yet ſurely neither is this a proof that the two meaſures were in themſelves incompatible.

3d. I preſume that the point is ſufficiently proved by what has been already ſaid upon it in my former minute, as I find nothing new in Mr. *Francis*'s preſent argument againſt it.

4th. Here again Mr. *Francis* has confounded two different and unconnected ſubjects, viz. the defenſive alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* for the mutual and perpetual ſupport of our reſpective territories, immediately bordering on each other, and an offenſive alliance for other purpoſes. The deſign of the firſt had exiſted ſince the middle of the year 1773, and a fair opportunity preſented itſelf of accompliſhing it, when the Preſidency of *Bombay* called our attention to another object. It would have been unreaſonable at ſuch a time to attempt it. It was therefore "abandoned to aſſiſt in the proſecution of "theirs." This is a ſufficient comment on the multi-

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plied quotations, which Mr. *Francis* has too exultingly produced for the "surprize of the Court of Directors."

5th. Mr. *Francis* has affirmed, that the ſuppoſed change in *Moodajee*'s ſentiments could not have been influenced by the knowledge of the deſigns lately formed at *Bombay*, becauſe it is firſt avowed in his letter to Colonel *Goddard* of the 23d November, when no ſuch deſigns exiſted.

It now appears that the treaty with *Ragonaut Row* was executed on the 24th of November, and that on the 5th of December the operations of the army for the ſupport of it were in ſuch forwardneſs, that an advanced party from it was in actual poſſeſſion of the fatal paſs of *Roorgaut*. If a month only be allowed, which is a very ſhort allowance for making the neceſſary proviſions for the expedition, and paſſing the army and ſtores to the Continent, this time was much more than ſufficient to have furniſhed *Moodajee* with a complete knowledge of their intentions. It appears beſides from Mr. *Lewis*'s letter, dated the 27th of October, that there had been formally notified to him by Mr. *Hornby*, that he had in conſequence ſent away all the Sepoys ſtationed with the Reſident, and hourly expected his own recal. The proof therefore of *Moodajee* having poſſeſſed this knowledge, no longer reſts on a private letter from the Maratta Vackeel to his brother; and for its effect on *Moodajee*'s ſentiments, his declarations, the corroborative opinions of Mr. *Watherſtone* and Colonel *Goddard*, and the plain concluſions of common ſenſe, are ſufficient evidences.

6th. The profeſſed object of the treaty is to place *Ragonaut Row* in the Government of *Poonah*; and it is a condition of it, that this being effected, our forces ſhall have liberty to leave him. This is all that is propoſed by the orders given to Colonel *Goddard*, and to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, in the event of *Ragoba*'s refuſal to repay the charges of our detachment. We have therefore "ſtrictly a right to inſiſt on a further "ſubſidy from *Ragoba*, in addition to the ſum ſtipulated "and limited by the Bombay treaty," with this ſingle alternative.

7th. The failure of the undertaking renders this a point of pure ſpeculation; I ſhall therefore leave it to be ſupported by the arguments which I have already uſed in my former minute.

8th. This too ſuppoſes a caſe no longer exiſting nor likely to exiſt; I ſhall therefore leave it.

9th. I refer to my former minute as a complete reply to Mr. *Francis*'s ſhort argument on this propoſition, as he has ſtated it, if either his reaſonings or mine on ſuch a ſubject merit ſo much attention.

10th. Colonel *Goddard* is not ſimply empowered to make a peremptory demand, but he is inſtructed in the ſeveral modes in which it may be accepted, and in the conduct which he is to obſerve in the caſe of the refuſal to comply with it. Theſe are powers ſpecifically given to Colonel *Goddard*, and whether neceſſary or not, in Mr. *Francis*'s opinion to the character of an ambaſſador, theſe ſufficiently prove that, "it appears what ſort of "buſineſs Colonel *Goddard* is to negociate and tranſact "at the Court of *Poonah*, as ambaſſador from this Go-"vernment."

11th. This quotation has been ſufficiently diſcuſſed in my obſervations on the 5th propoſition, and in my former minute.

12th. "The emphatic appeal made by Mr. *Francis* "to the Company's poſitive, moſt ſolemn, and repeated "commands," might deter me from replying, if I had no other means of defence than in ſheltering myſelf under contradictory orders of the Court of Directors; their recent commands to recur to the engagement formed by *Ragonaut Row*, are a virtual repeal of all former orders given to abſtain from hoſtilities with the Marattas, and under the circumſtances in which theſe oppoſite orders were dictated, both are mutually reconcileable, as I have proved in my former minute.

13th. Colonel *Goddard* was freed from the authority of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, but he was directed to uſe his diſcretion in certain preſcribed caſes. He might therefore comply with a requiſition from *Bombay*, or even an order, which preſented to him any of the caſes preſcribed, as in effect it did. He has not therefore acted without orders in the reſolution taken by him to march to *Poonah* on ſuch requiſition.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

APPENDIX, Nos. 175, 176, and 177.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 25th February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, and *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We have had the honour to receive your letters, dated the 15th and 20th of October, by the *Terrible*; and agreeable to the power given us in the firſt of theſe letters, we immediately ſent an order to Colonel *Goddard* to advance to this coaſt, even without a junction of the forces of any Power in alliance with us; a meaſure we thought indiſpenſably requiſite, having formed our plan with a dependance upon the ſervices of this detachment, which we always underſtood was meant for the ſupport and aſſiſtance of this Preſidency.

We were therefore much ſurprized and concerned upon receipt of your letter of the 23d November, to find the direction of the detachment taken out of our hands, at a time when we had ſuch preſſing occaſion for its ſervices; and our perplexity was much increaſed by the miſcarriage of the letter and inſtructions therein referred to, whereby we were left entirely ignorant of the object of a negociation, which we are told is likely to cauſe a very ſpeedy and eſſential change in the deſign and operations of that detachment.

All that we could do in ſuch a ſituation was to explain to Colonel *Goddard* our views in the engagement we had formed with *Ragoba*, and to ſend him a copy of the treaty that he might judge how far our meaſures were compatible with his inſtructions from you. We at the ſame time preſſed him ſtrongly to advance to this coaſt as ſoon as poſſible; and we truſt that you, Gentlemen, reflecting on our ſituation, will ſee the propriety and neceſſity of enforcing our injunctions.

We beg leave to encloſe a copy of our letter on the ſubject to Colonel *Goddard*.

Our army has not yet made any conſiderable progreſs, being on the 6th inſtant advanced but a ſmall diſtance from the head of the Ghauts. The enemy cannonade and ſkirmiſh with our troops, but avoid coming to a deciſive action, endeavouring as much as they can to haraſs them and cut off their ſupplies. In theſe deſultory attacks, Lieutenant Colonel *Cay*, the ſecond in command, has been mortally wounded, and Captain *Stewart* killed, with ſcarcely any other loſs. Colonel *Egerton*'s infirm ſtate of health has obliged him to give up the command to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, to whom we have given orders to proceed with the utmoſt vigour and activity in his operations, in order to give encouragement to *Ragoba*'s friends, who are ſlow in declaring themſelves in his favour.

It is with concern we adviſe you of the death of Mr. *Moſtyn*, who is an inexpreſſible loſs at this juncture.

We have yet no accounts of the *Aſia*, or the Indiamen under her convoy.

We have judged it adviſable to deſire the gentlemen at *Madras* to give us a latitude to detain a part of the

forces deſtined for the expedition againſt *Mybie*, after that ſervice is brought to an iſſue, if we ſhould then find ourſelves diſappointed of the Bengal detachment, or the exigence of our affairs may require their aid.

The *Royal Henry* will be diſpatched in a few days, when we ſhall tranſmit the papers mentioned in our letter of the 12th ultimo.

We are, &c.

(Signed) *Wm Hornby*,
Dl Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
the 13th January 1779.

Sir,

We yeſterday received your letter dated the 22d ultimo, and had before that received that dated the 7th.

The miſcarriage of a letter referred to in the one you encloſed from the Governor General and Council, leaves us totally in the dark as to the object of your negociation with *Moodajee Boofla*; nor while we remain in this ſtate of ignorance, can we be proper judges what points relating to this Preſidency may be neceſſary to be included in the operations to be concerted with the Rajah of *Berar*. We have as before adviſed, depending upon the ſervices of your detachment, and the aid and ſupport of the Governor General and Council, concluded a treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, and our forces are now actually in the field in conſequence of that engagement; if, therefore, the aſſiſtance of your detachment is withheld from us, we know not how deeply the honourable Company's intereſt may be affected, as the Poonah Miniſters ſeem determined to make a vigorous oppoſition. The Governor General and Council's late orders to you, appear to have been given on a ſuppoſition that the plan for your detachment, as originally formed, had failed, upon which account they had adopted another of their own to ſupply the place of ours.

Their plan we therefore conclude muſt have the ſame object with ours, which was to ſubvert a party in the Poonah Government, connected with the French in deſigns hoſtile to the Company, to prevent the French from acquiring the predominant influence in that Durbar, and to ſettle a Government at *Poonah* friendly to the Engliſh, and which would look up to their alliance for its ſupport and ſtability. We ſhall not enlarge upon the great political neceſſity of the meaſures we have engaged in, of which we doubt not you muſt be fully ſenſible; and when to the objects above recited, are added the territorial advantages gained by our treaty, the importance of the undertaking muſt appear very ſtriking.

That you may have every light we can afford, we encloſe a copy of the treaty with *Ragonaut Row*; and when our preſent ſituation is conſidered, and how eſſentially the Company is intereſted in the event of our operations, to which we think the aid of your detachment, on which we always depended, is neceſſary to enſure ſucceſs, we doubt not but the Governor General and Council will approve of your conforming to your former inſtructions alluded to in our letter of the 19th ultimo; and as we cannot ſuppoſe it poſſible that our meaſures can be incompatible with your preſent inſtructions, we moſt earneſtly preſs and enjoin you to march directly to *Poonah*, without a moment's loſs of time, inſtead of *Ziner*, as before directed.

Colonel *Egerton*'s bad ſtate of health has obliged him to reſign the command of the army in the field to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, Lieutenant Colonel *Cay* being, it is thought, mortally wounded.

It is at any rate highly proper, that your detachment ſhould be at this place before the monſoon, to ſecure *Bombay* in caſe of an attack by the French next ſeaſon, which our own force is by no means equal to oppoſe; and you muſt bear in mind that there is only an interval of little more than four months left you to perform the march before the rains let in. This conſideration is alone ſufficient to preſs you to advance with expedition, and to which we aſſure ourſelves you will be ſtrongly prompted by your zeal for the Company's intereſt, and the important ſervices you have it in your power to render on this coaſt.

We do not conceive that *Hyder*'s views can in any ſhape interfere with the march of the army under your command, and we have deſired the gentlemen at *Madras* to make a proper application to the Nizam, and to demand his neutrality in the conteſt.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *Wm Hornby*,
the 12th January 1779. *Dl Draper.*

Appendix, No. 176.

No. 176.

The Governor General lays before the Board, the following paper of intelligence received yeſterday, with a letter from the Preſident of *Fort St. George*. A letter arrived at the ſame time from the Nabob of *Arcot*, which is not yet tranſlated, but which the Governor underſtands contains a copy of the ſame intelligence which appears to have been written from his Vackeel at *Poonah*. From other intelligence tranſmitted to him by General *Stibbert*, and through other channels, he is confirmed in the belief that the news contained in this paper is but too true. Alarming as this event is, the Governor does not think it proper to propoſe any immediate meaſures to be taken in conſequence, as the Board are yet unacquainted with the ſituation of the detachment under the command of Colonel *Goddard*, from whom advices may be hourly expected, which will inform them of the plan of action which he may have formed on the knowledge of this unhappy cataſtrophe.

Although it gives me the moſt heartfelt pain to communicate ſuch news as I have juſt received from *Poonah*, yet wiſhing to give my friends the firſt intelligence, that they may be put on their guard, and take ſuch meaſures as Providence may dictate, I now encloſe you a copy of it.

I have taken every opportunity of pointing out to my friends ſuch meaſures as appeared to me proper. I encloſe you a copy of a letter containing my advice in conſequence of informations which I ſome time ago received from *Poonah*, addreſſed to the Governor and Council of *Madras*, under date the 3d December 1778, and alſo of one I wrote them with the intelligence received from *Poonah*; had they purſued my plan, the affairs there had been well ſettled. Will you, my friend, who are endowed with wiſdom, even now take ſuch meaſures as ſhall be moſt adviſable?

I did myſelf the honour to diſpatch a pair of Coſſids to your highneſs on the 11th Zehera, with the following intelligence:—That *Seremunt Ragonaut* had proceeded with the Engliſh army as far as the Gaut with hoſtile intentions; and that *Uppa Bulwant Row*, *Bhum Row Bhanſa*, and the armies of *Scindia* and *Holcar*, were marched from hence towards the Gaut to oppoſe them; theſe I hope reached you ſafely. I again diſpatched another pair on the 1ſt Zehedje, with this intelligence, that *Ragonaut* with the Engliſh croſſed the Gaut; but thoſe Coſſids being plundered at *Funderpore* returned to me. I ſent another pair of Coſſids on the 26th of the ſame month, with intelligence that the Engliſh were marching back towards *Bombay*, that is to ſay, towards the Gaut; this pair was likewiſe plundered at *Naringpore*, which occaſioned a delay in your receiving regular advices from me. I now diſpatch another pair: God grant that they may meet you in ſafety, and make you acquainted with all the particulars.

The late occurrences are theſe:—The Engliſh paſſed the Gaut, and employed a month in removing of difficulties, receiving ſupplies from behind; they entrenched themſelves within paliſadoes.

Ragonaut Row came at firſt to the Gaut, from whence he went to *Draugaut*, and having reduced two forts in the way, returned to the Gaut, from whence he marched forwards.

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forwards with the Engliſh army, conſiſting of eight battalions of Sepoys, 700 European ſoldiers, 40 pieces of artillery, a Colonel and other officers, cheſts of ammunition, and ſpecie to the amount of 40 lacks of rupees, and his own force, conſiſting of 600 horſe and two battalions of Sepoys. On the ſide of the Marattas, *Succarum Pundit* and *Nannah Purnaveſe* in concert, employed two months in preparing their armies, they employed both money and grants of jaghires to ſatisfy *Hujjerant Packa* and the other Chiefs; and although he ſhewed himſelf attached, yet the Miniſters for greater ſecurity, entered into ſtill ſtricter ties to conciliate him the more to them; and *Holcar* having been diſpleaſed by the impriſonment of his Dewan *Narroo Gunnaſe*, the ſaid Dewan was reſtored, and *Scindia* alſo employed means to induce him to eſpouſe the cauſe. After this the Miniſters aſſembled all their Chiefs, both great and ſmall, and told them to conſult together, and that whatever meaſures they jointly agreed on ſhould be carried into execution: they all with one accord made anſwer—*Had Ragonaut Row come with Marattas only, we would not have made war with him, for he was our Chief; but ſince he wiſhes to come in with an Engliſh army, who are foreigners and very powerful, with whoſe diſpoſition we are well acquainted, from their conduct in* Bengal, *and to* Sujah-ul-Dowlah *and ſeveral other Chiefs, which is notorious, how can we admit of it? Except we ſhould chuſe to ſubmit to the Engliſh yoke, and put on hats and coats; rather than ſo, it is better to die in battle!*—Theſe ſentiments, which were general, they all ratified by oaths. Afterwards *Bam Row Bhanſa*, *Rajah Pundit appa Uppa Bulwant Row*, *Sindea*, and *Holcar*, with an army of 40,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry marched to *Felgong*.

The moſt earneſt wiſh of the Bombay Chiefs was to aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*; and the news of the reduction of *Pondicherry*, the arrival of the Calcutta army at the *Nurbudder*, and *Moodajee Booſla*'s friendſhip, inſpired them with too great preſumption; in the mean time Mr. *T. Moſtyn* and *Jetoo Peetul* went from *Poonah*, and perſuaded them, that they had only to ſhew themſelves at the Gaut to be immediately joined, not only by thoſe who were already connected with them, but alſo by many other of the Maratta Chiefs; that *Holcar* would come over to them the moment they arrived at the Gaut, and would be followed by *Hujjerant*, and all the others; that by reaſon of a general defection, there was no life in the party; that the opportunity then preſented itſelf. Hearing this, the Engliſh and *Ragonaut Row* repaired to the Gaut, and after waiting a whole month not one of the Maratta Chiefs joined them, but they were informed from hence by *Sadaſhew Ramchund* and *Madho Goherna*, that if they would advance more forward there would be a general defection to them, but this was without the ſmalleſt foundation. When Mr. *Moſtyn* learnt the particulars of the meaſures taken by the Marattas, he perceived that the buſineſs was at an end, and being likewiſe indiſpoſed, he took leave of the Commander in Chief, and returned to *Bombay*, where I learn he is ſince dead.

The Engliſh quitted the Gaut and marched forwards, and the Maratta Chiefs ſet about hoſtilities after their uſual manner, and commanded the Engliſh at a diſtance, with a large cannon under the charge of *Bum Row*. The Engliſh marched two coſs a day, and halted every ſecond day, and thus in two days march arrived at *Chicklee*, which is four coſs from the Gaut. As there were many nullahs and difficult paſſes in the route, the Maratta army could not encompaſs them, but the conteſt was always on one ſide. Notwithſtanding this, the Marattas wherever they ſaw an advantageous ſpot for the purpoſe, diſcharged their cannon at them. Near *Chicklee*, Colonel *Stewart*, the Commander in Chief, was killed by a diſcharge of a grape ſhot, and was ſucceeded in the command by his nephew, who was on the ſpot.—Mr. *Carnac*, the ſecond in Council at *Bombay*, was preſent, intending, when *Ragonaut Row* ſhould be eſtabliſhed at *Poonah*, to contract engagements with each of the Chiefs, and to oblige them to ſubmit themſelves to *Ragonaut Row*, and for this purpoſe he carried the Company's ſeal with him.

On the 21ſt of Zehedjee (10th of January) the Engliſh army arrived at *Jeelgong*, ſeven coſs from the Gaut. *Siccaram Pundit*, &c. were at *Jeelgong*, and having learnt the firſt day that the Engliſh had reached *Roregong*, two coſs from them, they had ſent their baggage, &c. towards *Cumbandaree*, and retreated themſelves two coſs; the Engliſh ſuppoſed they had fled, and the Marattas wiſhed to draw them into an open plain. The day when the Engliſh arrived at *Jeelgong* an engagement was fought, in which the Marattas had near 200 cavalry killed; and the Engliſh loſt 25 European ſoldiers, including one or two officers, and 100 Sepoys. On the ſecond day the Engliſh, from the heights of *Jeelgong*, perceived that they were ſurrounded on all ſides by the Maratta forces; they halted there two days, hoping to be joined by ſome of the Maratta Chiefs, but not a ſingle man came over to them; and the intelligence they had been accuſtomed to receive from the other army was ſtopped; ſhould they wait for the Calcutta and *Booſla*'s army, they were on the banks of the *Nurbudder*, and it would require a long time to receive any news from them; in this ſituation they ſaid to *Jetoo Peetul*, "You "have brought ruin on us, who engaged thus far on the "ſtrength of your promiſes." It was the general opinion of the officers that they ought to return to *Piangaut*, it being impoſſible for them to ſtand againſt the Maratta army. *Ragonaut Row* learning this, ſent to *Sindeah* and deſired to be received by him in any manner that it could be contrived, and that even if the Marattas would make a ſmart attack upon the Engliſh, he would go over to them with his 600 horſe and two battalions. It is probable the Engliſh got intelligence of this procedure. On the 23d Zehedjee (12th January) at midnight, the Engliſh leaving their tents, &c. neceſſaries, with one battalion of Sepoys and 200 European ſoldiers, with ſeven pieces of cannon, at *Jeelgong*, ſet off ſecretly with *Ragonaut Row*, hoping by this means to deceive the Marattas, who might ſuppoſe the whole army in their camp, and that they might by this ſtratagem eſcape; they accordingly took the route of *Worgong*. *Siccaram* immediately drew up his army with the moſt conſummate ſkill, and with *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, *Scindia*, and *Holcar* marched to attack the Engliſh, who they imagined were marching towards *Poonah*, but found they had taken the route of the Gaut. As ſoon as they ſaw this, they flew to the attack of the party which had been left, and plundered the tents and money, and every thing they found there. The two battalions and the Europeans fought very bravely, but *Siccaram* led his own army to the attack, and multitudes flocked in from all quarters, in the hope of ſharing in the plunder, and the whole were deſtroyed. As the Engliſh and *Ragonaut Row* had not advanced far, they ſoon overtook and ſurrounded them in a place were there were many nullahs, ſteep rocks, and hollows, and taking poſſeſſion of all the paſſes, attacked them with muſketry from midnight till the evening of the next day; the engagement was kept up with ſmall arms, and the Engliſh were not ſuffered to advance a ſtep; the Engliſh artillery were rendered uſeleſs by the nullahs and heights, ſo that they ſtopped their fire; but the Maratta cannon, which were of a much larger ſize, kept up a continual fire upon them from a diſtance; the Engliſh had therefore no reſource. That day the Engliſh loſt 150 European ſoldiers, 600 Sepoys, and ſeveral officers, and the Marattas loſt two or three officers, namely *Gaoda*, *Suttoola*, &c. and 200 horſes and 500 Sepoys. At night the Marattas ſtopped their fire, and ſet ſtrong guards at all the poſts, after which *Siccaram Pundit*, &c. went and ſupped at *Jeelgong*. On the 24th Zehedje (13th January) at midnight, all the Chiefs went to attack the intrenchments, and began a cannonade; *Siccaram* was on foot, and having taken

care

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ment to ſecure the nulla, ſent on a party of ſkilful muſketeers to attack the Engliſh. *Nanna*, *Scindia*, and *Holcar*, were as uſual very attentive to their reſpective poſts; the Engliſh artillery did no good, and the firing was therefore ſtopped. On that day the Marattas loſt 75 men, and the Engliſh 50 Europeans and 400 Sepoys. In the afternoon a Kidmutgar of *Ragonaut Row*, and a Kidmutgar of the Colonel's brought a letter addreſſed to *Serement Row Pundit Purdhaun*, deſiring to ſend a perſon of credit to treat on ſeveral points. All the Miniſters having peruſed the letter, ordered victuals to be given to the Kidmutgars, gave them a preſent, and ſent them back with this anſwer—That they might ſend whomſoever they pleaſed, that a truce ſhould be obſerved. The Miniſters having then ſtrengthened the guards at the different poſts, returned to their tents, and continued there till mid-day of the 25th Zehedja (14th January) after dinner they went to the intrenchments, and *Sindea* fired two or three times on the Engliſh, but they did not anſwer it either by cannon or muſketry. At this time Mr. *Farmer*, a friend of your Highneſs's, with whom he ſome time ago, came out, on which *Scindea* ceaſed firing, and called him to him. Mr. *Farmer* came out, and ſpoke thus to the Miniſters—We are merchants, and have ſhed no blood in your families. *Ragonaut Row* took refuge with us, and ſolicited our aid, and we, ſuppoſing him the Chief of the Government, accompanied him. Fortune does not favour him; we are remedileſs; do you receive and ſettle matters with him; the engagements which were contracted between us are ſtill in force; whatever has ſince paſſed, forgive; in future we muſt conform to the engagements which ſubſiſt. The Miniſters anſwered, *Ragonaut Row* is one of us; where is the neceſſity for your interference in our negociations? The fort of *Shaſtee* which you took poſſeſſion of, with the wealth in it, as well as all the money you have collected from the country, you ſhall give back; you ſhall likewiſe relinquiſh *Rambooſeer*, &c. as well as the Mahals of the Rackwar *Goujerat*; and the diviſion of *Broach* which belonged to the Sirkar; you ſhall alſo reſtore the twelve lacks of rupees which the Colonel took on account of the treaty. How would you be ever able to defray the charges of the army, and the price of the horſes which have been killed? but it is neceſſary that you pay the amount of the latter. In future you ſhall conform to the engagements concluded under *Ballajee Row Pundit Purdhan*, and raiſe no diſturbance.

Mr. *Farmer* having received this anſwer, returned to his own army. During theſe negociations, 10,000 Maratta cavalry arrived at *Piangaut*, which being joined to 5,000 which had been ſent there before, deſtroyed all the guards which the Engliſh had poſted at different ſtations as far as the Gaut, and burnt their paliſades, and plundered the whole country from *Piangaut* to *Punveil*; this I heard from the mouth of *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, but cannot certainly tell if it is true or falſe. At noon of the 26th Zehedja (15th January) Mr. *Farmer* came to *Sindea*, and ſaid, I give you a ſealed carte blanche, write your own terms; I agree. *Sindea* accordingly ſent word to the Miniſters, I ſhall put down whatever you ſhall direct me, but it is improper to ſpill more blood, which would leave reſentment in their breaſts. Whatever points are neceſſary, make them agree to: when *Ragonaut Row* comes hither, every matter is ſettled; they muſt reſtore *Shaſtee*, the Goujerat country, the ſubjects of the Sircar, the Guicawar's country of four pannahs, which they took at the ſame time with *Shaſtee*, the Bengal army which is approaching ſhall likewiſe return, and give no trouble in the Sircar's territories; and all matters ſhall remain on the footing they were under *Seremunt Ballajee Row* and *Madho Row*; they ſhall reſtore the jewels pledged by *Ragonaut Row*, and make no demand for the amount, and ſhall give all the bonds and deeds entered into by *Ragonaut Row*; nor ſhall they claim any thing on the account of the expences they have been at for *Ragonaut Row*. Theſe are the terms dictated by *Sindea*, which he ſent to *Siccaram*, who held a conſultation on them with *Nanna Purnaveſe* and *Madho Row*, and ſettled them. I am endeavouring to procure a copy of it, and if I ſucceed will ſend it to your Highneſs. It was further ſtipulated, that till a treaty was received under the ſeal of the Company, and the ſignature of the General, the Council and Select Committee, and garriſons eſtabliſhed in *Shaſtee*, and the other Mahals, the nephew of Colonel *Stewart* and Mr. *Farmer* ſhould remain in their hands. The Engliſh were remedileſs; they had been three days without victuals, and both the ſoldiers and ſepoys had thrown their arms and accoutrements on the ground.

On the 27th Zehedja (16th January) the treaty under the ſeal of the Company which Mr. *Carnac* had with him, and the ſignature of four officers of the army, *Carnac*, *Egerton*, *Farmer*, and Mr. *Holmes*, was prepared and delivered to *Sindea*, who immediately ſent them proviſions; on the 28th Zehedja (17th January) the Engliſh marched from thence, and *Ragonaut Row* remained there; the Sirkar's guards are kept there. This not being a fortunate day, *Ragonaut Row* did not come to the camp, but will come at noon to-morrow, which is a lucky hour. The Engliſh repreſented that the garriſons in the Maratta forts would moleſt them in their return, and therefore requeſted an eſcort, and Rahdarry Duſtuck; a Duſtuck and an eſcort of 2000 horſe were accordingly ordered them, and they ſet out. Whatever may hereafter occur I ſhall repreſent to your Highneſs.

No. 2.

Copy of a Newſpaper from the Durbar of the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowla Buhadre*: dated the 8th Mohurrem 27th January; received at *Madras* the 16th of Mohurrem (4th February) 1779.

A pair of Hircarrahs arrived on the night of the 16th of Mohurrem; who report that *Ragonaut Row*, who might be ſaid to be impriſoned in the hands of the Engliſh, being driven to extremity, ſent a meſſage through *Sindeah* and *Holcar*, to be allowed to go to that party and make his peace; and that accordingly on the day of the engagement between the Maratta and Engliſh armies, ſeeing the ſuperiority on the ſide of the Marattas, he quitted his party with 5 or 6,000 horſe which he had with him, and joined *Sindeah*; the Marattas regarding this event as an important victory, received the force brought them by *Ragonaut Row*.

In a word, *Ragonaut Row* with his force joined with the Maratta army, and the Engliſh having ſuffered a terrible defeat, took ſhelter in the heights above the Gaut; *Sindeah* and *Holcar* are the managers of the negociations for *Ragonaut Row*, and mean to exclude the Engliſh from all the interference therein, and under the ſanction of oaths to accommodate matters between *Ragonaut Row* and the Poonah Miniſters. This account is confirmed by the Poonah Vackeel here.

No. 3.

Copy of a Paper of Intelligence from the Durbar of the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*: dated the 8th of Mohurrem (27th January) received the 16th of the ſame month (4th February).

His Highneſs yeſterday received intelligence from *Jewajee* Vackeel, of the ſeizure of *Ragonaut Row*, and peruſed the arzie containing this account, in private, and early this morning ſent for *Sämſaum ul Dowla*, *Vikhar ul Dowla*, *Sabut Jung*, and *Jewagee*, who attended him in the Dewan Kana, where he held a private conſultation with them; *Jewagee* the Vackeel preſented letters from *Poonah* written by *Kiſhen Row Mulhar* to his maſter, containing the following particulars; that the Engliſh Chiefs at *Bombay* having determined on an expedition for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, took him with them, and employed ſome time in ſettling the Cokun, and leaving him

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on the other ſide the Gaut, three or four ſmart engagements were fought on the heights of the Gaut, and then continued their march to the village of *Teelgong* on the Poonah ſide of the Gaut, when the Maratta army took poſſeſſion of all the paſſes, and cutting off all their ſupplies reduced them to the utmoſt ſtraits, and made frequent attacks on them, killing hundreds of them, and wounding great numbers, ſo as to deſtroy near half of their force, and thoſe who were ſurrounded found it difficult to ſave their lives: a detachment of the Maratta army was ſent from thence to ſeize on *Ragonaut Row*, whom they brought back with them. Another letter mentions, that when the Europeans were ſurrounded, and all their proviſions at an end, they aſked their lives, and the Marattas demanding that *Ragonaut Row* ſhould be delivered up to them, they ſent for him and delivered him up to *Sindeah*, and thoſe that remained had their lives ſpared.—Theſe are the two different accounts of the matter.

When his Highneſs had peruſed the letters and heard the account from the Vackeel, he ſaid to him, It is well, the right has prevailed in that your enemies have of their own accord delivered themſelves into your hands, but the Naig has reduced the fort of *Cheetuldurk* to great extremity, if you now take meaſures to raiſe the ſiege it will be well, otherwiſe you will loſe it in a month or two.

From the poſſeſſion of the ſingle fort of *Cotee* the Naig made himſelf ſo powerful, ſhould he be ſuffered to reduce the fort of *Cheetulburk*, it will be attended with the worſt conſequences. *Jeswajee* replied, by the favour of God, in a ſhort time we ſhall ſo completely deſolate the countries of *Sena* and *Myſore*, and *Balagaut* and *Pian Gaut* on the other ſide of the *Carnatic*, and the province of *Bengal* and city of *Calcutta*, as not to leave a ſingle cherrauk burning.

The quarrel between the Engliſh and French is not yet accommodated in *Europe*. A mighty engagement has been fought, in which the French loſt 8000 men, and their arm which had nearly reached *Burrampore*, is on its return to *Calcutta*.

The greateſt part of the day was taken up in ſuch converſations, when the Nabob diſmiſſed the Durbar.

N° 4.

Copy of a Letter from his Highneſs, addreſſed to Mr. *Thomas Rumbold*, Governor of *Madras*: written the 3d December 1778.

The friendſhip which I have borne the Company and Engliſh nation has not been equalled by any other of the Powers in *Hindoſtan*, and by the bleſſing of God it has been invariable and augmenting daily, and the proſperity or adverſity of either is conſidered as that of the other.

This is impreſſed on the minds of all the different nations and Powers in this continent, and in conſequence many of the Princes of *Hindoſtan* are deſirous, through my mediation, of obtaining the friendſhip of the Company and Engliſh nation; and whenever I have ſeen an opportunity of promoting our intereſts, I have inſtantly communicated the plan to my friends. Accordingly the peace with the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowla* was concluded with my advice and aſſiſtance; and through me the Nabob *Sellabut Jung* agreed to put the fort of *Guntore* into the hands of my friends, on condition of ſupport from them, and by the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh drive out the French. For a term of five years a civil war ſubſiſted amongſt the Marattas, and many deſperate battles were fought between *Ragonaut Row* and *Sicearam Pundit* and *Nana Purnaveſe*, the Miniſters of *Sewal Madha Row* the ſon of *Narrain Row Pundit Purdhaun*. At length *Ragonaut Row* took refuge with my friends, and the peace concluded between the ſaid Miniſters and my friends at *Poonah* through the medium of Colonel *Upton's* embaſſy, it is well known did not continue, on which ſubject it is unneceſſary to enlarge; my whole wiſhes have been lately turned to the promotion of the credit and advantage of my friends by adjuſting of this buſineſs. As it has already taken up a long time, and it appears evident that if it is not heartily proſecuted, it may ſtill be ſpun out to a very diſtant period, and the news of war having broke out in *Europe* with our enemies being ſpread abroad, many of the Chiefs of *Hindoſtan* who look with a jealous eye on the ſucceſs and power of the Engliſh, wiſh to keep up a conſtant war in this country, with a view, ſhould our enemies ſend a force into this country, to join them with their whole powers; it is therefore adviſable that my friends employ their warm endeavours, without delay in conjunction with the Poonah Miniſters, that is to ſay, *Siccaram Pundit*, &c. to eſtabliſh *Ragonaut Row* in the Chiefſhip of the Marattas, preſerving the rights of ſovereignty to the ſon of *Naran Row Pundit Punhan*, which will redound to the Company's honour; and that they ſhould endeavour to effect this by policy without employing force. As I have received a private hint on this ſubject from *Siccaram Pundit*, wiſhing, through me, to form a ſtrict friendſhip with my friends, I have thought it worthy of my friendſhip to give you information thereof; and I have no doubt that the gentlemen of *Bengal* and here, and the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, who are all united in the view of promoting the intereſt of the Company's affairs, and the tranquillity of the country, in which I heartily join with them, will judge it proper to repoſe ſo much confidence in me, as to conduct this matter through me. I can with their knowledge, and in conjunction with them, give the moſt happy iſſue to this buſineſs, and thus leave my friends at liberty to employ their whole attention againſt any enemy who may ariſe; and ſhould it be neceſſary, they may have the aſſiſtance of the whole Maratta force under *Ragonaut Row*; and it will be abſolutely neceſſary to the other Powers of *Hindoſtan*, to keep on friendly terms with them; and ſhould they have conceived any deſigns of a contrary nature, they will relinquiſh them. My ardor in this buſineſs is excited ſolely by motives of friendſhip, and a view to the intereſt of the Company and Engliſh nation, and the ſecurity of the country; any plan which my friends may adopt, by which the ſecurity and rights of the *Carnatic* are preſerved, is equally for their benefit.

I requeſt that you and the Council will do me the favour to keep this matter ſecret, as till it takes effect it ought not to become public.

N° 5.

Copy of a Letter from his Highneſs, addreſſed to Governor *Rumbold*, dated the 14th February 1779.

As you are conſtantly deſirous that I ſhould communicate to you any intelligence which I may receive from any of the Powers in *Hind* and *Decan*, I am induced thereby to encloſe you a tranſlation of a paper of intelligence which I have juſt received from *Poonah*, and copy of a newſpaper from *Hyderabad*. Although I cannot communicate ſuch news without feeling the moſt ſenſible affliction, yet I have thought it proper to inform my friends of it, that they may be upon their guard. I formerly received a hint from a perſon at *Poonah*, reſpecting the adjuſtment of this buſineſs, which I inſtantly communicated to my friends, in a letter bearing date the 3d December 1778. Had my friends at that time left the management of the buſineſs to me, I hoped to have concluded it to the honour of the Company and Engliſh nation, whoſe unalterable friend I am.

N° 1[illegible]7.

Mr. *Francis*.—As we know not what bad effects the news of this event may produce in the upper country, or what influence it may have upon the minds and diſpoſition of *Nudjiff Cawn*, of the Seiks, of the King, and any other country Powers that border on the Nabob of *Oude's* dominions, or on our own provinces, I think that

immediate

immediate orders ſhould be ſent to General *Stibbert* to put him on his guard, and to hold the troops ſtationed in *Rohilcund* and in *Oude* in readineſs to march; that he ſhould order all abſent officers to repair immediately to their poſts (the ſame to be iſſued in general orders here) and take ſuch other meaſures as he ſhall think neceſſary for covering that frontier againſt an invaſion. The Seiks have already made irruption in different parts of the Nabob's territories; and Mr. *Middleton*, in his letter of the 16th December laſt, acquaints us, that the Maratta army has joined *Nudjiff Cawn*'s camp, and that they have entered into a treaty of alliance offenſive and defenſive with him: I think it very probable that they may avail themſelves of this opportunity to endeavour to diſtreſs us; at all events, we ought to conſider it a poſſible caſe, and be prepared againſt it.

Mr. *Wheler*—I think it highly proper that this, and every other neceſſary precaution ſhould be taken without delay. I aſſent to the motion.

Mr. *Barwell*—From the general tenor of the propoſition, I expected it to contain ſome extraordinary cautionary meaſure; but I do not find upon examination of it, that any particular ſecurity is propoſed, than ſuch as the exiſting orders of the Government provide for. The propoſition points out the Nabob *Nudjiff Cawn*, as a particular object of our jealouſy, and Mr. *Middleton*'s letter, is quoted in ſupport of this ſuggeſtion. Mr. *Middleton*'s letter I conceive, intimates the direct contrary; for he ſays, "though I am aſſured of ſuch things, I think matters are nearly as diſtant from any permanent adjuſtment as ever." To found any orders we may think it neceſſary to iſſue in the preſent criſis of affairs, on ſuppoſition or ſurmiſe of diſaffection in the neighbouring Princes, can neither be juſtified by the conjuncture, nor is conſiſtent with policy. It is a treatment that muſt diſguſt them, and any movements of our army upon ſuch reaſons muſt alarm their Government and compel them to arm in their own defence. By Mr. *Middleton*'s letter, it clearly appears that the Maratta leaders were negociating with the Nabob *Nudjiff Cawn* on their own account. The invaſion of the Seiks which is alluded to, appears evidently to have been the operations of a predatory band, as little authorized by any Government as thoſe of the different bodies of Faqueers this Government has ſeen at various times committing little pillages in the very heart of *Bengal*, and which, from the extent and conſtitution of the Hindoſtan Governments, every one of its Governments is ſubjected to. I think with Mr. *Francis*, and the Governor General's minute warrants the ſentiment, that we ought to appear ſenſible of what is due both to the honour of our own Government, and what is wanting to vindicate the dignity of it.

The Governor General appears to wiſh, that whatever meaſures are determined, they ſhould not be partial, but include the whole political ſcene. In this he is certainly right; but as I can ſee no objection to decided cautionary meaſures, I think in prudence the armies on the weſtern frontiers ſhould be immediately drawn out in the field, and held in readineſs to march on the firſt orders from this Government; and that to preclude the effects of falſe alarms, it ſhould be publicly and poſitively declared that theſe extraordinary camps are not formed to act againſt any of the Powers in the neighbourhood, but are aſſembled for an emergency that may call them into the field, to give weight to the different negociations or diſputes in which we are, or may be engaged with the Marattas, and to protect our alliances.

The Governor General—I confeſs I wiſh the motion had not been made; becauſe I think it both unneceſſary and unreaſonable; and that a general plan of action or of defence ſhould be conſtituted, which we are not yet warranted, by any materials before us, to form. We are yet in the dark with reſpect to every circumſtance which ought to influence our future meaſures, nor have yet an object, except a general defence againſt poſſible, but unknown dangers. I hope that Colonel *Goddard*'s next advices will afford us all the lights that we can want with reſpect to the preſent motion; it is almoſt in terms the ſame with the inſtructions delivered to General *Stibbert* on the 2d September; theſe were expreſsly given to him for the purpoſe of guarding againſt the probable effects which might be produced by a ſuppoſed event exactly ſimilar to that which has actually befallen us; namely, the diverſion of our arms by a powerful foreign enemy. Theſe inſtructions are ſhort, I therefore deſire that they may be copied in this place, as they will ſhew better than any argument, in how little need General *Stibbert* ſtands of preſent inſtruction. Nevertheleſs, as it has been propoſed, and as I wiſh upon this occaſion eſpecially to accommodate my own ſentiments, ſo far as I may do it conſiſtent with the indiſpenſable line of my public duty, with thoſe of every member of this Board, I ſhall acquieſce both in the motion made by Mr. *Francis*, and in the additional propoſitions contained in Mr. *Barwell*'s minute.

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I cannot quit this ſubject, though I ſhall moſt reluctantly bear a part in any thing which looks like a point of controverſy, without a ſhort obſervation on the ſuggeſtion of *Nudjiff Cawn*'s connection with the Maratta Government. It certainly will be underſtood by thoſe who ſhall read Mr. *Francis*'s minute, unaccompanied by other documents, that *Nudjiff Cawn* had entered into a treaty of alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Maratta nation: the fact is, that the treaty of alliance to which Mr. *Middleton*'s letter of the 10th December alludes, meant no more than the conditions on which two independent and predatory Chiefs of that nation were treating to engage in the ſervice of *Nudjiff Cawn*. This plainly appears by a former letter of Mr. *Middleton*, dated the 1ſt December, when theſe two Chiefs compoſed their differences, which was effected by a pecuniary compromiſe; the Maratta leaders opened negociations on their own account with *Nudjiff Cawn*, the declared object of which was to obtain an eligible eſtabliſhment in his ſervice, &c. I deſire to be underſtood, I mean not to hold forth *Nudjiff Cawn* as the friend of this Government. I conſider all the Powers around us as our friends or enemies merely as their intereſt impel them; and I approve the principle of Mr. *Francis*'s recommendation, though I differ in the application of it.

Mr. *Francis*—The orders I propoſed are purely cautionary and defenſive; they are ſuch as every Government gives on ſimilar occaſions, and in no way tend to preclude or obſtruct our future adoption of any others. Why they ſhould give offence to *Nudjiff Cawn*; why he ſhould be acquainted with our reaſons for giving them; why he ſhould be diſguſted with thoſe reaſons, if he knew them; or why he ſhould pay the ſmalleſt regard to the ſuppoſed effect which meaſures neceſſary for our own ſecurity, and not tending to the offence of any other Powers, may produce in his mind, form a queſtion too confuſed and perplexed for my underſtanding to decide. I confeſs it appears wholly unaccountable to me, that objections of this nature, which clearly ſuppoſe my propoſition unneceſſary, ſhould be followed by an amendment that carries it much farther than I do. I do not agree to the amendment, becauſe I am ignorant whether the preſent diſpoſition of the two brigades can with ſafety be ſo far altered, as it would be by aſſembling them, in two camps, and becauſe we do not yet know enough of Colonel *Goddard*'s ſituation to determine what particular meaſures may be neceſſary to favour his retreat. The immediate calling in of the detachment of the two brigades, is a meaſure that ought to be decided on here, without General *Stibbert*'s opinion, and without our being thoroughly apprized of the conſequences it may be likely to produce with reſpect to the general defence of the weſtern frontier. With reſpect to the connections formed between *Nudjiff Cawn* and ſome of the Maratta Chiefs, I think it not unlikely that they might have remained dormant, or at leaſt that they would have produced no effect, in which the intereſt

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reſt of this Government would have been concerned, but the diſaſter we have ſuffered at *Poonah* makes a material alteration in every queſtion that relates to the future conduct of the country Powers; it may revive a dormant treaty, or it may give birth to new alliances againſt us. Even when General *Stibbert* was ſent to take the command in the field, the caſe of an invaſion of the Nabob's country was expreſsly ſuppoſed and ſtated; if it was a probable event at that time how much more ſo is it now? As I really do not wiſh to enter into debate at this time, much leſs into any thing that may have the air of altercation, I ſhall only offer one obſervation on a paſſage in the Governor General's minute: that is, that I do not remember at what time an event exactly ſimilar to that which has befallen us, was ever ſuppoſed poſſible by the Governor General, or by Mr. *Barwell*. The impoſſibility of any vigorous reſiſtance on the part of the Marattas, and the certainty of ſucceſs in every attempt on our ſide, have conſtantly been held out as propoſitions not to be diſputed.

Governor General—We are led into a boundleſs field of argument, which the occaſion neither requires nor warrants; the event to which I alluded was a diverſion made by a French invaſion, at that time expected, and, as I recollect, the profeſſed motive of our orders given, as above quoted, to General *Stibbert*. I hope it is unneceſſary to make a further reply to Mr. *Francis*'s minute.

Reſolved in the terms of Mr. *Francis*'s motion, with the amendment propoſed by Mr. *Barwell*

The following letter is accordingly written to General *Stibbert*.

Sir,

We have received intelligence which we deem authentic, that the detachment from *Bombay*, under the command of Colonel *Egerton*, has been defeated, and compelled to capitulate, by the Marattas: not knowing the effect that the news of this event may produce, or what influence it may have upon the minds and diſpoſitions of the country Powers bordering on the weſtern frontier, or on our own provinces, we deem it neceſſary that you immediately form two camps of the armies under your command, and that you hold them in readineſs to march on the ſhorteſt notice: and to preclude the effect of falſe alarms, the Governor General will adviſe the Vizier that theſe extraordinary camps are not formed to act againſt any of the Powers in the neighbourhood of his dominions; and we deſire that you will publicly and poſitively declare the ſame to the Vackeels of any of the country Powers that may be in your camp.

We alſo deſire that you will immediately iſſue orders for all abſent officers to repair forthwith to their ſtations.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 178.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 1ſt March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

READ again the paper of intelligence received from the Nabob of *Arcot*, and recorded on the conſultation of the 25th ultimo, containing an account of the ſurrender of the Bombay army.

Read alſo the letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated 13th January, and recorded in the laſt day's proceedings.

APPENDIX, Nos. 179 and 180.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 1ſt March 1779.

READ the following letters from Colonel *Goddard*, under date the 17th, 20th, 24th, and 26th January.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to write you the 5th inſtant, informing you of my intention to move forwards towards *Poonah*, as ſoon as the ſupply of treaſure expected from *Naigpore* might reach camp. I accordingly left *Hoſſeingabad* yeſterday, and am this day encamped at *Suiny*, a place ſituated between the countries of the Bhopal Nawab, and the Rajah of *Berar*, both of whom are in receipt of its revenue. This is two days march diſtant from *Hurdah*, a pretty conſiderable town, belonging to the Peiſhwa, and which is laid down in Mr. *Smith*'s ſurvey upon the road to *Burrampore*.

By the laſt advices from the Bombay army, they have taken poſt on the top of *Bhore* Gaut, where they are waiting for ſupplies of ſtores, and upon their arrival I underſtand they intend advancing towards *Poonah*, which is at the diſtance of fifty miles. The forces of the Miniſters are collected betwixt them and the city, but I do not find that any of the Chiefs in that party have yet declared themſelves in favour of *Ragonaut Row*; nor according to the beſt intelligence that I can obtain, is there at preſent any proſpect of their doing ſo. It is impoſſible to ſay what effect the vigorous motion and approach of this detachment may have upon their minds; but I have already explained to you the reaſons which have influenced me to move forward, and I flatter myſelf my conduct in this reſpect will meet with your approbation. In the mean time, I ſhall impatiently look for particular anſwers from your Board, to the accounts I have tranſmitted, of the ſituation of affairs here, and by the inſtructions they contain I ſhall be implicitly guided.

I think it neceſſary to repeat my certain belief of the friendly ſentiments of the Berar Chief towards our Government, which his conduct has evinced in every reſpect, except that of taking an active part with our arms; he promiſes to give every aſſiſtance in his power for furniſhing proviſions as we advance, and for that purpoſe a principal perſon belonging to him is to remain upon the confines of this country, and collect and forward the ſupplies of grain.

In obedience to your commands, I have directed the accounts of the detachment to be made out, in order that they may be tranſmitted for your inſpection; theſe being completed to the 1ſt of October, I have ſent by the way of *Naigpore*, as they were too large a packet to truſt by the public Dauks. I expect in a very ſhort time to have them made out to the 1ſt of December, when I ſhall forward them by the ſame route, conceiving it, though more tedious, to be the ſecureſt mode of conveyance.

I beg leave alſo to mention to you, that the three lacks, for which you tranſmitted me bills of exchange on *Naigpore*, notwithſtanding the expedient I was obliged to adopt, of drawing upon your Honourable Board, have only been ſufficient to clear off the troops to the end of November. A Gomaſtah belonging to *Gopaul Doſs*, of the name of *Neigecor Doſs*, has arrived in camp, where he propoſes to reſide, and promiſes to ſupply me with caſh, through the means of the different houſes eſtabliſhed by his maſter in the principal cities of the *Decan*. It is impoſſible for me at preſent to aſcertain the exact rate of remittance proper to ſettle with him, as it will always be varying with circumſtances: I ſhall however be guided by the precedent you have given me; and am hopeful my conduct in this particular will meet with your approbation. As I have not however the ſmalleſt confidence in this mode of ſupply, on account of the proſpect there is of my progreſs being hoſtile, from the oppoſition of the Peiſhwa's forces, I beg to acquaint you, that I ſhall continue to grant remittances on the provinces for money paid into the treaſury here in the ſame manner as heretofore,

till

till a certain ſupply can be provided through the means of the Gomaſtah.

This I conſider as abſolutely neceſſary, to guard as much as poſſible againſt any immediate exigency of the ſervice; and I muſt further entreat you to continue to afford me your aſſiſtance, which I conſider as the only certain reſource to which I can look for a ſupply of caſh at this period.

I have the honour, &c. &c.
(Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

Gentlemen,

It is with particular concern I have to communicate to you the death of Lieutenant-colonel *Fortnam*, this morning; a long and tedious illneſs had reduced him to the weakeſt and moſt helpleſs condition, and that event had become almoſt certain for theſe laſt ten days.

I beg to acquaint you with my expectation to arrive at *Burhanpore* in five days, it being little more than 25 coſs from my preſent encampment. I ſhall do myſelf the honour of addreſſing you again from that place, and ſhall fully communicate every material occurrence, as well as any intelligence I may be able to obtain of the operations at *Bhore Ghaut*, from which place I have received no accounts ſince I laſt wrote you.

Camp, at *Chumpore*, 24th January 1779. I have the honour, &c. *Thos Goddard.*

Gentlemen,

I have the pleaſure to encloſe for your peruſal, copy of a letter received this day from the gentlemen appointed by the Select Committee of *Bombay*, to conduct *Ragoba* to *Poonah*, and ſettle the affairs of that Government. I was in hopes of being able as ſoon as letters might arrive from that quarter, to communicate to you ſomething of importance relative to the Bombay forces, and the progreſs they had made in proſecution of their enterprize; but you will perceive by the contents of this letter, that ſo far from entering into any particular detail of their ſituation, or the plan they mean to purſue, they merely leave it a matter of doubt, whether they have not found it neceſſary to lay it aſide altogether. The change which they obſerve has taken place within the laſt two days in their affairs, and which they ſay has rendered the directions formerly ſent to me for my march to *Ziner*, in the neighbourhood of *Poonah*, now unneceſſary, would almoſt lead one to believe that they had themſelves removed every obſtacle to ſucceſs, did not the apprehenſions they afterwards expreſs, of the difficulties to which I might be expoſed in marching to *Surat* or *Broach*, prove the forces of the miniſterial party to be, in their eſtimation, ſtill very ſtrong and powerful.

I cannot help remarking upon the difference of ſtyle throughout this letter of Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, to what had been before uſed by the Select Committee, who were always moſt urgent for my proceeding to *Ziner* with all expedition, as you would perceive by the copies of their letters, tranſmitted you the 5th inſtant.

Upon the whole, I am of opinion that a proſpect of being able to effect the revolution in favour of *Ragoba* themſelves, is their motive for expreſſing ſo little anxiety about the arrival of the detachment. With reſpect to the bodies of horſe who are to infeſt and interrupt my march to *Surat* or *Broach*, they are ſo little explicit in the deſcription of them, that I am left altogether in the dark as to their number, or the names of the Chiefs to whom they may belong.

I am ſorry that it is not in my power to give you a more clear account of the ſtate of the Company's affairs near *Poonah* than the above, which muſt appear founded upon conjecture rather than a knowledge of real facts, for it is plain the encloſed letter gives no poſitive information whatever; and the teſtimony of uncertain report, which ſays, that many of the Chiefs have gone over to *Ragoba*'s party, does not ſeem to deſerve any credit; beſides that it is contradicted by the ſentiments expreſſed by Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, in their advices to me.

I am now within four days march of *Burhanpore*, and on or before my arrival at that place, I make no doubt of receiving letters from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, which will, I ſhould ſuppoſe, fully explain their preſent views and ſituation. I ſhall then be enabled to determine preciſely my own future operations, which I will not fail to communicate to you inſtantly. Appendix. No. 180.

In my letter of the 5th inſtant, I declared to you my motive for advancing from the confines of *Berar* towards *Poonah* was in obedience to what I conceived to be the ſpirit of your orders, and as eſſential to the intereſts of the Engliſh Company. Let me again aſſure you, that my future conduct ſhall be directed ſolely by an attention to theſe objects.

I have already informed you of my neceſſitous ſituation reſpecting treaſure for the ſubſiſtence of the troops; the diſtant hope I entertained of receiving a ſupply at *Burhanpore*, is now totally vaniſhed, as I learn all the principal merchants have deſerted that place, not ſo much from the fear of being treated with violence by the Engliſh army, as on account of orders ſent them by *Scindia*, to whom the city belongs, prohibiting them from furniſhing any ſupplies of money to us.

This conſideration, and the impoſſibility there appears of obviating the diſtreſs, which the low ſtate of the treaſury threatens, by any reſource to be found in this quarter, will in all probability compel me to haſten my march towards *Surat*; but on this point I cannot at preſent determine, as it muſt depend ſo much upon circumſtances, and theſe I cannot perfectly know till my arrival at *Burhanpore*, when you ſhall hear from me again in the fulleſt and moſt particular manner.

I have the honour to be, &c.
Camp, near *Piplaud*, 26th July 1779. (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

No. 180.

The Governor General—I move, that an immediate remittance by bill of ſix lacks of rupees be ſent to Colonel *Goddard*; I have had an indirect offer made to me this morning of bills nearly to that amount, from the joint agents of three capital Shroffs, on the terms on which the former bills were granted: I have not ſeen the agents myſelf, but if the Board approve the motion, I will direct them to make their application to the Secretary, the regular channel of ſuch negociations.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree to the neceſſity of this ſupply; but am of opinion, that the Shroffs ſhould either lay before this Board, or at leaſt before the Governor General, the means by which they conſider themſelves able to fulfil their engagements with us; to me it appears very uncertain whether they will be able to do it.

Mr. *Francis*—I acquieſce in the neceſſity of ſupplying Colonel *Goddard*, but I can form no idea of the means by which the remittance is to be effected. If the Shroffs undertake to remit money to Colonel *Goddard*, without knowing where he is; and if it be conſidered, that it is at this moment a matter of doubt to ourſelves, whether he be actually at *Surat* or in the territory of *Scindia*, or in *Berar*; I think it will appear that we have no ſort of ſecurity for their being able to fulfil their engagements; at the ſame time the ſum with which they are to be truſted, forms a very conſiderable object. I therefore agree with Mr. *Wheler*, in thinking that the Shroffs ought to be called upon, to inform us what meaſures they intended to purſue; and that we ſhould furniſh them with whatever lights we can concerning Colonel *Goddard*'s probable ſituation.

Mr. *Barwell*—I agree to make the propoſed remittance in the terms of the Governor's motion.

Governor General—I am afraid that the conſent given to the remittance with ſo many uncuſtomary reſervations, may have the effect of a refuſal, as it is impoſſible for the Shroffs to produce the evidence required of them, neither do I imagine that they would injure their credit by the attempt to produce it. The concern which I feel for the

Appendix. No. 181.

safety and success of Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, induced me to make the inquiries, which have produced the offers communicated by me to the Board; I am no better acquainted with the means which the Shroffs possess of discharging the bills, than any other member of the Board, nor better acquainted with their persons or characters, one only excepted. I was desired to conceal their names from the public, because I was told it might expose them to hazardous consequences. I therefore give them with the same caution to the Board, they are *Moolchund Doobee*, *Cassmeery Mull*, and *Munnoo Loll*; if the Secretary can obtain either better terms, or equal, from more creditable persons, I shall agree to them, or shall be as ready to acquiesce in any surer means of supply that shall be recommended by either Mr. *Wheler* or Mr. *Francis*. It may be necessary to add one observation on the cautionary terms which have been required, that before the bills can be delivered we must receive decided advices from Colonel *Goddard* respecting the direction of his march, after the receipt of the news of the defeat of the Bombay army, and these will of course determine the choice of the place appointed for payment of the bills. That bills should be sent, or other adequate means of pecuniary supply provided, I suppose to be a conclusion in which we are all agreed. I shall further add, that the names of some capital cities were mentioned to me where the payment should be made, if I recollect, they were *Nagpore*, *Burkunpore*, *Arungabad*, and *Surat*; but this is immaterial: the names, I suppose, will be inserted in the bills, unless they shall agree to pay them in Colonel *Goddard*'s camp, wherever it may be.

Mr. *Wheler*—I have no connection either with the Shroffs or merchants of *India*, nor would I, if I had, venture to recommend any one or more to this Board upon the present important occasion, who had not previously convinced me, that he was in the habit and course of correspondence with others, who had the certain means of paying bills suddenly drawn upon them to the amount of six lacks of rupees. A precaution of this sort cannot be the means of divulging secrets; 'tis made use of in all parts of the world by private individuals, and becomes more necessary, when the interest of the public is so materially connected with it.

Resolved, That a remittance of six lacks of rupees be made to Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, and that the Secretary do obtain bills on the most advantageous terms.

The Governor General—In our present state of uncertainty, respecting the state of the army of the Presidency of *Bombay*, and the designs which the Marattas may form, or other Powers encouraged by the supposed decline of our influence in consequence of its defeat, I should deem it very unwise and precipitate to propose any general or decided plan of operations; but I think it incumbent on us, to use the most early means for guarding our possessions and connections in those parts, which lie the most exposed to attack. The President and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* have suggested to us one scheme of defence, which will be a proper subject of consideration, when we are furnished with more recent advices, both from them and from Colonel *Goddard*. With respect to the countries, the defence of which more immediately depends on our Government, we are in no danger of an invasion except in the *Dauab*, and the more eastern parts of the Vizier's dominions. I have always held it the best policy to meet the attempts of our enemies when we have just and reasonable grounds to expect them. On this principle, I think it proper now to submit to the consideration of the Board the expediency of ordering General *Stibbert* to cause the first brigade to cross the *Jumna*, and to encamp in the most convenient station in the neighbourhood of *Allahabad*, and of the high road leading from thence to *Berar*, and to the southern parts of *Hindostan*. This, if the Board shall agree to it, will be sufficient for an immediate order. I propose this measure as the most likely to prevent any designs being formed against us, and the most ready for repelling any which may be made.

Mr. *Francis*—I will not venture at this late hour to give an immediate opinion on a proposition of such magnitude and importance, particularly under the first impressions which it has made upon my mind, and which I fear I should not be able to command; I therefore move that it shall lie for consideration, and that the Board be summoned to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock, or at a later day, to resolve upon it.

The Governor General—There is no pressing business in the revenue department. I have no objection to meet again in this at the usual hour to-morrow morning; in the mean time, as Mr. *Francis* has expressed his objections to the question proposed by me to the Board in terms so very pointed, I yield to his desire of availing himself of further time to consider the question; I hope he will also allow me the same opportunity of considering his objections, possibly they may have the same weight with me as they have with him, if they are delivered with temper, and not abruptly intruded on the instant at which our determinations are to be formed. The question which I have proposed is a subject for consideration, not a decided opinion offered for the confirmation of the Board.

Mr. *Francis*—I have never pressed the Governor General, nor any member of the Board, to give a hasty opinion on any proposition of mine; and certainly should not attempt it on an occasion which requires more than common deliberation.

The Governor General—I do not wish to press the subject; I have only requested the same measure to be dealt to me that I deal to others. Upon this particular occasion I wish, if possible, that our resolutions, on the event of which the fate of *India* may possibly depend, may be formed with that cool deliberation which they demand; and therefore that I may know the grounds of the objections which may be made to the measure now proposed, that I may come fully instructed and prepared either to support, to correct, or to join in the rejecting it; I should not at any other time or occasion be so urgent as I may now appear, but I persuade myself, that whoever reads Mr. *Francis*'s short minute immediately following my proposal, will hold me justified in my apprehensions respecting the spirit with which it is likely to be debated.

Agreed, That the Governor General's proposition lie for consideration, and that the Board be summoned to meet in this department to-morrow morning.

Warren Hastings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 181.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations.
2d March 1779.

THE Governor General delivers in the following minute:

The Governor General—My design is to propose the most effectual measures of defence, and of defence only.

I think that the most certain means of preventing an attack, will be to shew ourselves not only ready to repel but to meet it. The prevalence of opinion is ever a strong spring of action, and in this part of the world it is perhaps the strongest. The unexampled check which the English arms have sustained on the other side of *India* will not fail to create and circulate the belief that our power is declining; and every State which has any thing to hope by taking the advantage of our supposed weakness, or to fear from the resentment of our capital enemy, will be ready to rise in arms against us, unless by some vigorous exertion and confident display of our strength, we shew ourselves superior to the partial misfortune which has befallen us.

The

The neighbourhood of *Illahabad* I prefer for the ſtation of the brigade, becauſe of the conveniency which it affords of depoſiting the ſtores of the brigade as they may be occaſionally wanted: it will give vigour and weight to the operations of Colonel *Goddard*, if he ſhall return to *Berar* and proſecute his original inſtructions; and in the ſuppoſition of his retreat to our own provinces it will be a ready ſupport to him.

In the event of any deſign which may be formed againſt the immediate dependencies of this Government, it may be regarded as certain, that the countries bordering on the *Jumna* will be the firſt affected by it: theſe therefore require our firſt and earlieſt attention.

To carry into execution the queſtion which I have propoſed in its full extent, will employ ſome time; circumſtances may occur in the interim which may require a variation of the firſt intention. The firſt movements neceſſary for the brigade may be the ſame, whether it be ultimately reſolved to croſs the *Jumna*, or to wait within it: and as we may hope to be ſpeedily aided by the preſence of *Sir Eyre Coote*, I ſhall be better pleaſed to wait his arrival, than to propoſe any decided operations, for which there is not any very urgent call.

For theſe reaſons I beg leave to change the terms of my firſt propoſition, and recommend, that in addition to the orders already given to General *Stibbert*, he be directed to march the brigade towards the banks of the *Jumna*, and to chuſe ſuch a ſituation for encamping as he ſhall judge moſt convenient for defending the *Duab* againſt an invaſion; and at the ſame time to examine which part of that river will admit of his croſſing the brigade, if it ſhall hereafter be found neceſſary, with the greateſt facility. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Reſolved, in the terms of the Governor General's minute.

The following letter is accordingly written to General *Stibbert.*

Sir,

In addition to the inſtructions which we tranſmitted to you on the 25th ultimo, we think it neceſſary to direct, that you order the firſt brigade to march towards the banks of the *Jumna*, where you will chuſe ſuch a ſituation for encamping it as you may deem the moſt convenient for defending the *Duab* againſt an invaſion; and at the ſame time you will aſcertain which part of that river will admit of your croſſing the brigade with the greateſt facility, if it ſhall hereafter be found neceſſary.

Fort William, We are, &c. &c.
the 2d March, 1779.

Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* having ſent in the following minute, in reply to the Governor General's motion of yeſterday, it is now recorded.

Mr. *Francis* and Mr. *Wheler*—Having attentively conſidered the propoſition made yeſterday by the Governor General, we muſt refuſe our aſſent to it for the following reaſons, which we think it ſufficient to ſelect out of many that occur to us.

1ſt. Becauſe the meaſure itſelf ſtands in manifeſt contradiction to the Company's fundamental maxims, and would be a freſh inſtance of direct diſobedience to their poſitive commands on this ſubject.

2dly. Becauſe the ill ſucceſs which has attended the movement of Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, on a plan of the ſame nature; and the alarming ſituation to which, we have reaſon to think, he is now reduced; would leave us without a juſtification or excuſe, if we hazarded another portion of the force eſtabliſhed for the defence of our own poſſeſſions in a ſimilar attempt.

3dly. Becauſe no particular object or affirmative reaſons being aſſigned, in ſupport of a meaſure apparently ſo hazardous, we have no ſpecific grounds given us to warrant our aſſent to it.

4thly. Becauſe, whereas it is ſaid generally by the Governor, "That he has always held it the beſt policy "to meet the attempts of our enemies when we have juſt "and reaſonable grounds to expect them," we are warranted in oppoſing the principle he now profeſſes, by another drawn from the ſame authority, and, as we think, much better founded: on the 9th of July laſt, when our military ſtrength was yet unimpaired, and the reputation of our arms had ſuffered no diminution, the Governor General delivered it as his opinion, "That "great as the power is which the Britiſh nation has ac- "quired in *India*, compared with that of its rival, its "general line of action is and muſt be purely defenſive." Appendix No. 181.

5thly. Becauſe admitting that we had juſt and reaſonable grounds to conclude, that deſigns are formed againſt us by the Marattas, (which however we deem to be a ſuppoſition purely gratuitous) ſtill no argument is produced, to prove that this particular meaſure is wiſely calculated to prevent an invaſion, or to ſhew by what ſteps or operations it is likely to produce that effect.

6thly. Becauſe this meaſure appears to be a leading ſtep to the execution of ſome more extenſive plan yet unavowed. It is ſaid that *many conſequent operations may be hereafter neceſſary*; but of what nature thoſe operations are meant to be; how far they are to be carried; or to what objects they may be directed, is entirely kept out of ſight. As long as this reſerve is continued, we cannot think it ſafe or prudent, particularly after the fatal experience we have had of the diſtreſſing conſequences of a ſimilar reſolution, to commit ourſelves in any one ſtep belonging to a ſeries of meaſures, of which we do not know the real purpoſe or extent.

7thly. Becauſe, when it is declared *that we are in a ſtate of uncertainty reſpecting the fate of the army of the Preſidency of* Bombay; and when, from theſe ſuppoſed premiſes, it is concluded, that *it would be very unwiſe and precipitate, to propoſe any general or decided plan of operations*, we are equally at a loſs to reconcile that concluſion with the motion now before us, (and which appears to us to be the moſt decided ſtep that could be taken) and unable to judge for what reaſon it is ſaid that the fate of the Bombay army is uncertain. The Governor General has repeatedly expreſſed his conviction, that there could be no doubt of the truth of the intelligence from *Poonah*; and this intelligence aſſures us, that the Bombay army was totally defeated, and had ſurrendered at diſcretion.

8thly. Becauſe we are convinced, that if the object of this propoſition be to relieve or aſſiſt Colonel *Goddard*, or to favour his retreat, it is morally impoſſible that it can operate in any degree to that effect. To ſee the force of this objection, it may be neceſſary to conſult the maps, and to calculate the time which muſt intervene betweeen the criſis of any danger to which Colonel *Goddard* may be expoſed, and that at which this pretended relief can reach him. At the beginning of February his poſition muſt have been at *Brampore*, that is near twelve degrees of longitude weſt of *Calcutta*; if from thence he has made his way to *Surat*, or retreated into *Berar*, our aſſiſtance would be unneceſſary, nor in the former caſe could he poſſibly receive it; if not, the fate of his army muſt be underſtood to remain undecided, in the heart of an enemy's country, from the 1ſt of February not only to this time, but to that at which our orders for the movement of another brigade can be carried into execution, and the impreſſion of that meaſure felt at ſuch a diſtance as *Brampore.*

9thly. Becauſe admitting that ſuch a ſtep might at any other time be adviſable or neceſſary, we deem it to be uſeleſs if not dangerous at this particular ſeaſon, conſidering that the brigade cannot croſs the *Jumna* in leſs than ſix weeks, ſuppoſing the orders to be diſpatched to-morrow; and that in ſix weeks more the violent heats of April and May will be ſucceeded by the rains. But if the rains ſet in with any degree of violence, the brigade will neither be able to act, nor can they continue in camp

Appendix. No. 182.

camp without great diſtreſs: at the ſame time the river will be ſo much ſwelled, and its rapidity ſo much increaſed, that it may be very difficult, if not impracticable, to re-croſs it in any emergency.

10thly. Becauſe all our intelligence agrees in aſſuring us, that among the engagements by which General *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton* have purchaſed their ſafety; and for the performance of which thoſe gentlemen, with the remainder of their army, muſt be conſidered as hoſtages; it is ſtipulated that Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment ſhall return to *Bengal*. But if inſtead of our ratifying this ſtipulation the Marattas ſhould find their country threatened with another invaſion, what have we to expect, but that they will treat their priſoners with all the ſeverity which the laws of war and of nations entitle them to exerciſe againſt the hoſtages of a baſe and faithleſs nation, neither to be bound by treaties, nor reconciled by the unexampled lenity and moderation with which they appear to have acted towards an enemy invading their country, without the ſhadow of a provocation; and for the avowed purpoſe of overturning their Government?

11thly. Finally, becauſe by croſſing the *Jumna*, we relinquiſh the great and natural defence which all our poſſeſſions derive from the intervention of the river, and expoſe a third detachment to the ſame diſaſter which has already befallen the Bombay army, and which we have too much reaſon to fear may have befallen Colonel *Goddard*: by ſuch unconnected partial efforts the whole force of the Britiſh empire in *India* may be gradually waſted: and our army, which, if united under a wiſe and ſteady direction, we believe to be equal to every purpoſe of defence, ſucceſſively beaten, and ruined in detail.

For theſe reaſons, as well as for ſome others, which we do not think fit to declare, we object to the propoſition, and moſt ſolemnly proteſt againſt it.

(Signed) *P. Francis,*
Edwd Wheler.

The Governor General—It would lead to endleſs debate, and occaſion a waſte of time, which I ſhould deem inexcuſable in myſelf were I to reply to every part of this minute; and every part equally merits a reply. My opinions are ſo applied, that in the obvious ſenſe of them, as they ſtand in the conſtruction, I cannot avow them, and facts aſſerted for which I believe there is no voucher.

It is ſufficient that I have changed the terms of the queſtion which I propoſed, and accommodated it to the general ſenſe of the Board; every reaſoning, therefore, which can be now introduced upon it, is obſolete and unneceſſary.

APPENDIX, No. 182.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d March 1779.

MR. *Francis* delivers in the following minute.

Mr. *Francis*—I had no doubt that the peruſal of the letters read yeſterday at the Board, would have been followed by ſome propoſition from the Governor General, for orders or conditional inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard*. His ſilence on the important queſtion which thoſe letters immediately bring before us, leaves it open to me, without irregularity, to offer my own opinion upon it. In juſtice to myſelf however, I muſt previouſly ſubmit one general conſideration to the judgment of my ſuperiors.

If it were poſſible to anſwer every objection to the principle on which military expeditions of this nature are founded, and to reconcile their real or pretended object to the dictates of honour, juſtice, and ſound policy, another difficulty inſeparably belonging to the execution of ſuch enterprizes, ought for ever to deter a wiſe Government from engaging in them; it is that armies carried to ſo great a diſtance from our own territory, are in effect removed from under our command; and that we are deprived even of a timely knowledge of their operations. To ſhew the truth of this obſervation, it need only be applied to our actual ſituation: Colonel *Goddard* is at ſo great a diſtance from us, that his letters never can enable us to judge truly of the circumſtances he may be in at the time we receive them; much leſs will it permit us to ſend him aſſiſtance if he wants it; or even ſuch orders or inſtructions as we can in any degree be aſſured will properly apply to the poſition in which ſuch orders may find him. Our councils then muſt be directed in a great degree by chance or conjecture, and the motions of our army governed ſolely by the diſcretion of the commanding officer, or by the neceſſities he may be reduced to: ſuch diſcretion too he muſt exerciſe not only in the choice of means, or in the detail of military operations, but in determining the general line of his conduct, and even the choice of his objects. Colonel *Goddard*'s movement towards *Poonah*; his march to *Surat*, if he purſues it; or his retreat into *Berar*, if circumſtances ſhould leave him without any other reſource; are all of them ſteps unauthorized by our orders, and whichever of them is adopted muſt be executed without our knowledge.

If theſe reflections be well founded, it follows, that whatever orders we ſend to Colonel *Goddard* muſt be conditional, and that a latitude muſt be allowed him to accommodate the execution of them to his actual ſituation: orders given with this reſerve may, in ſome caſes, be abſolutely neceſſary for his guidance, and cannot in any caſe be productive of bad effects: at all events, he ought not to be left any longer unacquainted with the general intentions of the Board.

I move therefore, That if at the time when Colonel *Goddard* ſhall receive the preſent orders, he ſhall not have arrived at *Surat*, *Broach*, or *Bombay*; or if he ſhall have been obliged to halt at *Brampoor*, or at any other ſtation in the Maratta dominions; he do immediately retire to *Berar*, and demand a paſſage from the Rajah through his country towards the coaſt of *Orixa*; or if he ſhall have been already obliged to retire into *Berar*, that he continue his march towards the coaſt of *Orixa* and the Chicacole Circar.

I adopt the meaſure as recommended by the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, as well for the reaſons aſſigned in their letter of the 7th ultimo, as becauſe I deem it the beſt that can be purſued in our preſent circumſtances. I am alſo influenced in my choice of it by the ſentiments of Sir *Eyre Coote*, with whoſe approbation I conclude it was propoſed, if not immediately recommended by himſelf.

If the motion be carried, the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* muſt be adviſed of it, and the Governor General requeſted to write ſuitable letters to *Moodajee Booſla*, to claim the effects of the frienſhip he has profeſſed for us, and to give our army all the relief and aſſiſtance in his power.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Ordered, That this minute lie for conſideration till Thurſday next.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

Bengal Secret Conſultations the 4th March 1779;—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.

The Governor General delivers in the following minute:

Governor General—There cannot, in my opinion, be a greater inſtance of weakneſs and levity, in perſons entruſted with the conduct of great affairs, than to enter into precipitate reſolutions, involving the moſt important conſequences on the firſt rumour of diſaſtrous events. By adopting deciſive meaſures without any certain knowledge of the facts on which they are founded, a partial misfortune may be converted into general ruin.

I contend

I contend that we have not yet received ſuch authentic information as can warrant our taking an active part with ſafety. We are ignorant of the ultimate ſtate of the Bombay detachment; of the exact manner in which their enterprize terminated; of the operations which Colonel *Goddard* will have purſued in conſequence; or of the real ſituation of the Government of *Fort Saint George*: I therefore have delayed offering any propoſitions to the Board on the ſuppoſed ſtate of affairs on the other ſide of *India*, and I muſt ſtill ſuſpend my opinion on the meaſures moſt proper to be purſued until ſuch informations arrive—theſe may be hourly expected.

If Mr. *Francis*'s poſition were true, that diſtant military expeditions were in themſelves irreconcilable to the dictates of honour, juſtice, and ſound policy, *Great Britain* ought not to be in poſſeſſion of theſe provinces, nor of any other remote territory obtained by conqueſt.

A diſcretionary power to officers commanding diſtant military enterprizes, is both cuſtomary and unavoidable: Government may direct the object, and preſcribe the general means of attaining it, but the dependant operations muſt be left to thoſe with whom the executive part is entruſted; and Mr. *Francis*'s objection, that "armies "ſo far removed from our own territories are in effect "removed from our command, &c." is anſwered by the glorious ſucceſſes which attended the Britiſh arms in the moſt diſtant enterprizes during the courſe of laſt war, where the commanders were much further removed from the controul or aſſiſtance of Government, than Colonel *Goddard* is from ours.

Had the politics of *Great Britain* been confined within ſuch narrow limits, as Mr. *Francis* would preſcribe to thoſe of this Government, her power and opulence muſt have been unknown beyond the ſeas which ſurround her.

I cannot conceive why Mr. *Francis* perſiſts in aſſerting that Colonel *Goddard* is unauthorized by our orders to proceed either to *Surat*, *Poonah*, or *Broach*, or to retreat to *Berar*, as circumſtances may render either prudent or neceſſary; ſince my minutes of the 25th February and 2d March clearly prove, that we have given him ſuch authority.

Having anſwered the preface to Mr. *Francis*'s minute, I now proceed to give my opinion on the queſtion.

However urgent the neceſſity may be for the aid which the Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* require from us, it does not therefore follow that ſuch aid muſt neceſſarily be afforded by Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment; admitting the neceſſity as ſtated by the gentlemen at *Madras*, we are the judges of the means by which we can beſt relieve it; and this reduces Mr. *Francis* to the ſingle reaſon aſſigned by him in ſupport of the requiſition, viz. that it appears conformable to the ſentiments of Sir *Eyre Coote*, and was probably recommended by him. Such an argument may very well ſuit the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing an influence by party, but ought never to be urged as a motive of public conduct.

The opinion of Sir *Eyre Coote* would have as great weight with me as with Mr. *Francis*, where full information of circumſtances might enable him to decide; this cannot be the caſe in the preſent inſtance: with reſpect to our ſituation, and from the knowledge which I have of his character, I will venture to affirm, that he will not expect that the intereſts of Government ſhould be hazarded for a perſonal compliment.

I have two ſtrong objections to the queſtion:

1ſt. It is probable, from the advices juſt received from Colonel *Goddard*, that he has reſumed his negociations with *Moodajee Booſla*; and his abrupt recall at ſuch a juncture might not only deprive us of the advantages that we may expect from that alliance, but might juſtly excite the reſentment of *Moodajee*, and provoke him to oppoſe the march of Colonel *Goddard* through his country, and thus both deſigns would be rendered abortive.

2d. The propoſed route of the detachment would lie through a conſiderable part of the dominions of *Nizam Ally Cawn*. It is not to be expected from the known and avowed diſpoſition of that Prince, that he would conſent to their paſſage, nor is this a time to furniſh him with a pretext for open hoſtilities againſt us. Appendix. No. 182.

I might object to the queſtion upon Mr. *Francis*'s own principles; as during the whole line of the route which Colonel *Goddard* muſt unavoidably purſue from *Berar* to *Rajahmundry* (the only place to which he can direct his march to the northern Circars) his communications would be more difficult and precarious, and his diſtance greater from *Calcutta* than *Hoſſengabad*, his late ſtation on the banks of the *Nerbudda*.

(Signed) *W. H.*

The queſtion is put on Mr. *Francis*'s motion of the 2d inſtant, viz. "If at the time when Colonel *Goddard* "ſhall receive the preſent orders, he ſhall not have arrived "at *Surat*, *Broach*, or *Bombay*; or if he ſhall have been "obliged to halt at *Brampour* or at any other ſtation in "the Maratta dominions; he do immediately retire to "*Berar*, and demand a paſſage from the Rajah through "his country towards the coaſt of *Oriza*; or if he ſhall "have been already obliged to retire into *Berar*, that he "continue his march towards the coaſt of *Oriza* and "the Chicacole Circar."

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree to the motion.

Mr. *Francis*—The immediate object of the motion is, if poſſible, to withdraw Colonel *Goddard* from a ſituation of the greateſt danger; the future deſtination of his army, if he were once in *Berar*, would always be ſubject to the orders of the Board: without making any further reflections at preſent on the Governor General's minute, I adhere to the motion.

Mr. *Barwell*—The reaſons with which the Governor General has oppoſed the direction of Colonel *Goddard*'s march towards the northern Circars appear to me unanſwerable, and I concur with him in opinion, that any meaſures at this inſtant that may deprive us of the alliance of the Berar State, or create a miſunderſtanding between that Government and ours, is to be avoided. In objecting to Mr. *Francis*'s motion, I ſhall not enter into the propriety of affording an aid to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*; but I do not think it poſſible that aid can be given by the detachment under Colonel *Goddard*, unleſs a treaty takes place between the two Governments of *Bengal* and *Berar*.

The Governor General—Had the queſtion been propoſed in terms ſimilar to the explanation given of it in Mr. *Francis*'s laſt minute, I ſhould have given a very different opinion upon it; wiſhing equally with Mr. *Francis* for the return of the detachment to *Berar*, and equally dreading to hear of its proceeding to the other coaſt; but I ſhould have oppoſed the propoſition of ſending any expreſs orders to Colonel *Goddard* for this purpoſe, ſimply on the principle that ſuch orders could not reach him till their intended effect were paſſed.

The queſtion is reſolved in the negative.

Mr. *Francis*—It reſted with the Governor General to have adopted ſo much of the laſt motion as concurred with his wiſhes and opinion; and I ſhould have been well content to have ſeen even the firſt part of my object accompliſhed; I mean the retreat of the detachment from a ſituation of danger into the country of a friend: having this object ſtill much at heart, I will not relinquiſh it, becauſe I cannot obtain all I propoſed; I therefore beg leave to move, in the terms of the firſt part of the laſt motion, viz. "That if at the time when Colonel "*Goddard* ſhall receive the preſent orders, he ſhall not "have arrived at *Surat*, *Broach*, or *Bombay*; or if he "ſhall have been obliged to halt at *Burrampore*, or at "any other ſtation in the Maratta dominions; he do "immediately retire to *Berar*." I am inclined to think with the Governor General, that any orders we ſend now may be too late; but, ſince the contrary is not impoſſible, we ought not to leave Colonel *Goddard* without orders, which perhaps may be neceſſary to him, and which we are not abſolutely certain will be uſeleſs.

Appendix. No. 182.

The Governor General—I beg leave to ſtop the courſe of the queſtion, by an obſervation which I think may poſſibly induce Mr. *Francis* to withdraw it: the object of it is already paſſed. Our orders to Colonel *Goddard* of the 5th, and recorded in conſultation the 8th February, preciſely enjoin what is now required: I will repeat ſo much of them as appertain to the preſent ſubject: "Or in the "event of his death, or if the failure of the plan laid for "reſtoring him to the adminiſtration of the Government "at *Poonah*, we ſay, in either of the caſes here premiſed, "we authorize you to recur to the negociations which "have been ſuſpended with the Court of *Berar*, and to "conclude a treaty with that Government, in the man"ner and on the terms already preſcribed by our former "inſtructions." The plan for reſtoring *Ragonaut Row* to the adminiſtration of the Government at *Poonah* has failed; Colonel *Goddard* therefore, from the inſtant he receives certain advice of this concluſion, was under expreſs orders to return to his negociations with *Moodajee Booſla*, which neceſſarily and unavoidably implied his return to *Berar*; and from the reluctance with which he quitted the objects of that commiſſion at the call of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, we may ſafely conclude, that in this inſtance his inclinations, equally with his duty, would prompt him to return: but if the contrary ſhall have happened; if for reaſons which lie beyond the reach of our preſent conjecture, he ſhall have reſolved to proſecute his march, either to *Bombay*, *Surat*, or *Broach*, what will be the effect of the order which it is now propoſed to ſend? the diſtance from *Burampore* to either of thoſe places would ſcarcely require a month to accompliſh it, but a full month has already elapſed ſince the date of the laſt letter, in which he informs us of his reſolution to make an immediate choice of his future line, and another month at leaſt muſt paſs before he could receive any orders now ſent him, they would be therefore ineffectual for the prevention of ſuch a deſtination of his force; but other conſequences might attend it, ſince, as it is expreſſed, it would require his implicit obedience to it, though he had reached either of thoſe places, and though his return would ſubject him to the repetition of all the dangers which have been ſtated as inſurmountable in his attempt to attain them; again I repeat, why ſhould we form precipitate and decided reſolutions without a clue to guide us, when the delay of a day may furniſh us with all the knowledge on this point, at leaſt that may be neceſſary to guide us in the choice of them?

Mr. *Francis*—The Board I am perſuaded are in poſſeſſion of every argument that I could urge in ſupport of the motion. If Colonel *Goddard* ſhall have reached any of the ſettlements of the Malabar coaſt, it is expreſsly provided, that the preſent orders ſhall not operate: if they are preciſely the ſame with any which we have already given him (which however I do not admit) the repetition of them can do no miſchief; whereas in many caſes, they may relieve Colonel *Goddard* from any doubt about our intentions.

As for the reſt, I ſhall only obſerve, that I did never underſtand that Colonel *Goddard* quitted the objects of his commiſſion to *Moodajee Booſla* at the call of the Preſidency of *Bombay*: I am ſure I can prove from his letters, that he took this reſolution upon the refuſal of *Moodajee Booſla* to concur in the propoſed plan of alliance; even in one of the letters before us, he ſpeaks of the neceſſity he conceived there was of advancing towards *Bombay*, in conſequence of the delays that have ariſen in the accompliſhment of the negociation with *Moodajee Booſla*. I deſire that the queſtion may be put.

The Governor General—Colonel *Goddard*'s reaſons for the reſolution taken by him to march to *Poonah*, to which this extract is little more than an alluſion, are contained in his letter of the 5th January, in which that reſolution is firſt notified to us; theſe are his words: "Diſappointed "in my views at this Court, I have referred to the "latter part of your inſtructions given to Mr. *Elliott* "for his guide, and compared them with the purport "of your letter to me of the 23d November laſt, in "which you have thought it neceſſary to revoke the "order before ſent me for obeying all ſuch orders as I "might receive from the Preſident and Council at *Bom*"bay, left a compliance with them might interrupt any "meaſures I might find it neceſſary to purſue in con"ſequence of my engagements with the Rajah of *Berar*.

"You have alſo ſignified to me that it is your inten"tion the detachment under my command ſhould act "in ſupport of any meaſures which the Council at *Bom*"bay may have formed in reliance on it, as far as they "may be conſiſtent with the inſtructions given us, and "the engagements I may have concluded in conſequence "of them.

"By the determination of this Court any difficulties "which an attention to the latter might have occaſion"ed, are entirely removed; and as I conſider it further "conſiſtent with the ſpirit of your inſtructions, I have "thought proper to march towards *Poonah* immediately.

"I am induced to adopt this ſtep in conſequence of hav"ing received letters from the Select Committee at *Bom*"bay, informing me that the forces from that Preſidency "had actually taken the field to effect the reſtoration of "*Ragoba*; that Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and *Moſtyn*, "were appointed commiſſioners for ſettling the Poonah "Government, and requiring me to advance towards "that place with all expedition, as the preſence of my "detachment is neceſſary to the ſucceſs of their views. "From other authentic intelligence I learn, that hoſti"lities are actually commenced; I am therefore led to "believe, that whatever may be the reſult of your poli"tical reſolves, the arrival of the force under me in the "neighbourhood of *Poonah* will be for the intereſt of the "ſervice, either to proſecute the war, or to bring it to "an honourable concluſion, at the ſame time that I ſhall "be ready to act, in concert with *Moodajee*, any plan "that may be deemed neceſſary in conſequence of your "determination." Here he expreſsly declares, that his intended march to *Poonah* was occaſioned ſolely by the requiſition of the Select Committee at *Bombay*; and the refuſal of *Moodajee Booſla* is mentioned only as his juſtification in relinquiſhing the immediate object of his commiſſion to comply with that requiſition. His private letters to me are all tinctured with the ſtrongeſt marks of diſcontent and mortification at being thus defeated in his negociation by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to whoſe acts he imputes the failure of it by the ſudden diſinclination ſhewn by *Moodajee* to accept of the proffered terms of it. This however he had not abſolutely relinquiſhed, but had left it on ſuch a footing that the obſtacle of *Ragoba* being removed he might reſume it; and *Moodajee* on his part equally deſirous, in appearance at leaſt, that it might take effect, has ſent back his confidential Vackeel with powers to conclude a treaty immediatly with this Government, and did requeſt Colonel *Goddard* to wait with the army within his territories until the final reſolves of this Government could be received concerning it. As for the reſt, having ſhewn that in my ſenſe of it, the queſtion was unneceſſary, and that it might be attended with danger, it is unneceſſary to repeat that I cannot agree to it.

Mr. *Francis*—I do not doubt that Colonel *Goddard* was immediately determined to move towards *Poonah*, by the letters he received from *Bombay*, but it appears plainly, that he did not take that reſolution until after he had received *Moodaee Booſla*'s refuſal to co-operate with him on the terms of the propoſed treaty. Diſappointed in his views at the Court of *Berar*, he then, and not till then, referred to his inſtructions. This doubt, however, if there be any, may eaſily be reſolved: is it a queſtion with any members of this Board, whether, if Colonel *Goddard* had not been diſappointed in his views at the Court of *Berar*, and if he had actually concluded the intended alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, he would in that caſe have paid any regard to the requiſition from *Bombay* to aſſiſt in the reſtoration of *Ragoba*; or could

he have done it, conſiſtently with the treaty he had concluded?

The Governor General—I beg leave to diſcontinue the debate.

Mr. *Wheler*—Whether Colonel *Goddard* has or has not already received orders from this Board under preſcribed circumſtances, to return with his army into the province of *Berar*, is not the preſent queſtion: if he has received ſuch orders, the propriety of Mr. *Francis*'s queſtion is fully eſtabliſhed, for ſurely there can be no harm in repeating them; if he has not, the neceſſity of Mr. *Francis*'s queſtion is evinced, upon ground equally tenable; in either caſe, there does not in my opinion exiſt the ſhadow of an argument againſt the preſent queſtion. I therefore moſt heartily concur in it.

Mr. *Barwell*—I agree in opinion entirely with the Governor General; and excluſive of the reaſons he has aſſigned for his negative, I ſhould have an objection to the queſtion, as propoſing a meaſure which it only in fact repeats: the meaſure has already been propoſed and carried in the affirmative, in the inſtructions to Colonel Goddard on the 2d of laſt month, againſt the opinions of both Mr. *Francis* and Mr. *Wheler*, though by a new form it now appears as an original propoſition, proceeding from the diſſenting members to the firſt queſtion, included in the inſtructions above referred to.

Mr. *Francis*'s ſecond motion reſolved in the negative.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 8th March 1779.

At a Council; preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, and *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.

The proceedings of the 4th inſtant, read and approved.

Mr. *Francis*—I deſire that the Governor General's minute, entered at the beginning of the conſultation of the 4th inſtant, be read.

Read accordingly.

Mr. *Francis* records the following minute in reply to it.

While a queſtion of ſo much importance to the public ſervice was depending, I would not allow myſelf to engage in a debate, which was not likely to influence the deciſion of the Board, and could only delay it. But ſince I am convinced, that the late political meaſures of this Government, and of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, will ere long be the ſubject of a parliamentary inquiry; and that every part of our proceedings, which has occaſioned or led to the late diſaſter, will be ſubmitted to the judgment of the public; it highly concerns my reputation, if not my ſafety, that my conduct through the whole of the tranſaction ſhould be fairly repreſented, and in no inſtance miſunderſtood; for this purpoſe only I preſume to trouble the Board with obſervations on the preceding minute.

1ſt. I agree with the Governor General, in his idea of the levity and weakneſs of entering into precipitate reſolutions on the firſt rumour of diſaſtrous events. On this principle, there could be no atonement for the motion introduced on Monday laſt, to ſend another brigade acroſs the *Jumna*, but the early retraction which followed it. Our ſuperiors will judge whether the doctrine can with the leaſt colour of truth be applied to any acts of mine. The evidence of our conſultations will ſhew, that I have at all times, and in all circumſtances, equally preſſed for the recal of Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment; and that I have more than once been reproached for an unavailing perſeverance in this endeavour. In perſiſting to urge the neceſſity of the meaſure, I am moved, not ſo much by the misfortune which has already befallen us at *Poonah*, as by an apprehenſion of thoſe which are likely to follow it.

2d. Admitting that we were uninformed of the preciſe ſtate of affairs on the other ſide of *India*, it would be no argument againſt conditional orders, expreſſing clearly the ſeveral caſes in which they are and are not to operate; the ſame degree of ignorance muſt at all times attend our debates concerning objects at ſo great a diſtance. Two months at leaſt muſt elapſe, before our reſolution on any given ſtate of facts on the other ſide of *India* can reach the perſons who are to be guided by it; and in the interval a total change of circumſtances may have happened. Is it meant, that no orders ſhall be given, becauſe the nature of the caſe will not permit us to make them poſitive and abſolute? or how can we be aſſured, that any further information we may receive of Colonel *Goddard*'s ſituation a month ago, will enable us to give him inſtructions perfectly adapted to that in which he may find himſelf a month hence? Appendix. No. 182.

3d. I am ſuppoſed to aſſert that diſtant military expeditions are in themſelves irreconcilable to the dictates of honour, juſtice, and ſound policy; and that officers intruſted with the conduct of ſuch enterpriſes ought not to be allowed a diſcretionary power to judge of the means of carrying them into execution. When propoſitions ſo palpably abſurd are imputed to me, the cleareſt proof ſhould accompany the imputation. The meaning of my argument could not have been ſo totally miſtaken, if the terms in which it is expreſſed had been recited. The object before me was a military expedition through an immenſe tract of countries hardly known to us, and avowedly deſtined to conquer nations; from which we have received no injury. From this fact my inference was deduced, that if it were poſſible to anſwer every objection to the *principle* of expeditions *of that nature*; and *to reconcile their real or pretended object* to the dictates of honour, juſtice, and ſound policy, another difficulty inſeparable from the execution of ſuch meaſures, would remain in force, viz. that the diſtance of an army ſo circumſtanced, obliged us to truſt the commanding officer with an abſolute diſcretion, not only in the detail of military operations, but in the choice of his objects. In ſupport of this propoſition it need only be obſerved, that a month ago it depended ſolely on Colonel *Goddard*'s determination, certainly not on any orders of ours, whether he ſhould proceed to *Poonah*, to *Broach*, or to *Surat*, or whether he ſhould return to *Berar*.

4th. The limits I would preſcribe to the Britiſh empire in *India*, are wide enough to anſwer every wiſe and profitable purpoſe. The force of our arms ſhould now be employed in ſecuring what we have gained. All our acquiſitions may be loſt while we are endeavouring to extend them. But if maxims of an oppoſite tendency are recommended, as the foundation of a wiſer policy, ſuch maxims cannot be ſupported by the example of *Great Britain*. The diſtant dependencies of the Britiſh empire took their origin from the ſpirit of commerce and colonization, not from conqueſt; and, though it be true that our fleets have acted with honour in the moſt diſtant quarters of the globe, the ſucceſs of naval enterprizes proves nothing in favour of expeditions by land, into the heart of countries hoſtile or unknown to us. Later events have demonſtrated the inſuperable difficulty of ſuch attempts.

5th. My aſſertion, that if Colonel *Goddard* has proceeded to *Surat*, *Poonah*, or *Broach*, or retreated to *Berar*, he has acted without orders, is not anſwered by ſaying, that we ſent him orders on the 8th February; ſince they probably have not reached him at this moment: ſuppoſing theſe orders clear and to the purpoſe; and though it ſhould happen that they coincide with the reſolution he may have taken, ſtill he acts without orders, if he acts before he receives them.

6th. I do not affirm, that the aid to be given to *Fort St. George* muſt *neceſſarily* be afforded by Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, or that *we* are not judges of the means by which we are to relieve that Preſidency. Yet theſe propoſitions are ſtated as mine, and left, as they ought to be, without a reply; I ſhould indeed deſerve no anſwer, if, when I recommended a meaſure to the choice and judgment of the Board, I could forget myſelf ſo far as to aſſert or intimate that the Board were not the judges of it.

7th. When *I adopt the reaſons aſſigned by the Preſidency of Fort St. George*, thoſe reaſons become mine; and when I adviſe

Appendix. No. 183.

I adviſe a meaſure, expreſsly becauſe *I deem it the beſt that can be purſued in our preſent circumſtances*, it is clear, that I am not reduced to the ſingle argument of *its appearing conformable to the ſentiments of* Sir Eyre Coote. But as on this point I really do not underſtand the Governor General's reaſoning, I muſt leave it unanſwered.

I will not look into the heart of any man for the ſecret motives of his conduct: thoſe which the Governor General is pleaſed to impute to me, are ſufficiently anſwered by a denial. That Sir *Eyre Coote* has formed his opinion without ſufficient knowledge of our circumſtances, I for my own part do not believe; but I perfectly agree with the Governor General, in thinking "that he will "not expect that the intereſts of Government ſhould "be hazarded for a perſonal compliment."

8th. I ſee no probability for my own part, that Colonel *Goddard* has reſumed his negociations with *Moodajee Booſla*; nothing at leaſt appears in his letters of the 27th of January and 2d of February to incline us to think ſo. But let Colonel *Goddard*'s diſpoſition be what it may, there ſeems no likelihood that *Moodajee Booſla*, who refuſed to unite with us when our force was entire, and the reputation of our arms had ſuffered no diſcredit, ſhould be forward to engage at this ſeaſon, againſt a Government flushed with victory and ſtrengthened by ſucceſs.

9th. I underſtand the dominions of the Rajah of *Berar* to reach from the *Nerbudda* to the coaſt of *Orixa*; it would not be neceſſary therefore for the detachment to march through any part of the Nizam's dominions. But *if this be not a time to furniſh that Prince with a pretence to open hoſtilities againſt us*, with what conſiſtency can it be propoſed to revert to the intended alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, one of the main objects of which is to attack the Nizam, and to conquer a part of his dominions?

10th. In the laſt paragraph of the Governor's minute, I underſtand it to be aſſerted, that ſuppoſing Colonel *Goddard* to move from *Brampore* through *Berar* to the coaſt of *Orixa*, his communication with us would be more difficult and precarious, and his diſtance from *Calcutta* greater than if he were not to purſue that route. If this be not the meaning of the propoſition, I have nothing to do with it; if it be, I muſt deny it, as a matter of fact, that any march eaſtward from his preſent poſition will place him at a greater diſtance from *Calcutta*, or make our communication with him more difficult and precarious.

Warren Haſtings,
Rich. Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, N° 183.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 4th March 1779.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler.

READ the following letters from Colonel *Goddard*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I have had the honour of your letter of the 28th ultimo, informing me of the two battalions you have thought proper to ſend under Major *Camac*, to reinforce my detachment, and the orders he has received to act conformably to ſuch inſtructions as I may find it neceſſary to give him. As the route of Major *Camac* in order to join me, after leaving *Ramghur* and *Chutta Naigpore*, muſt lie through the territories of the Berar Rajah, I have wrote a letter to that Prince, informing him of this force having been detached by you, to be employed under me, for the mutual intereſts of both parties; and from the Rajah's favourable and friendly diſpoſition towards the Engliſh, I do not doubt his cheerful concurrence to their paſſage through his dominions, and every neceſſary and proper aſſiſtance on their march.

I have already related to you every tranſaction attending the negociation I was empowered by your Government to enter into with *Moodajee Booſla*, and the neceſſity I conceived there was, in conſequence of the delays that have ariſen in the accompliſhment of that buſineſs, of advancing towards the *Bombay* ſettlement; and as I am of opinion in the preſent uncertain ſtate of affairs, that ſhould I find it neceſſary to proceed beyond *Burhampore*, the effecting a junction of the force under Major *Camac* with my detachment might be attended with extreme hazard and danger; I have directed him not to advance beyond the weſtern boundaries of the Berar territories, or enter the dominions ſubject to the Peiſhwa or *Nizam Ally*, till he ſhall receive further inſtructions from me. I beg to encloſe you copy of a letter received from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, accompanying a copy of the treaty concluded on by them with *Ragonaut Row*, in the name of the Engliſh Company. The earneſtneſs with which they repeat their anxiety and ſolicitude for the arrival of the troops under me, as a meaſure neceſſary to the Company's affairs, does not ſeem to correſpond altogether with the ſentiments expreſſed by the commiſſioners, in their letter, of which I had yeſterday the honour of tranſmitting you a copy; nor indeed does the purport of the one in any reſpect throw a light upon the irreconcilable doubts a peruſal of the other had occaſioned. You will however perceive that this letter from *Bombay* bears date the 12th inſtant, and was wrote the ſucceeding day to that from the army of the 11th; of courſe the circumſtance alluded to in the latter could not then have been communicated to the Select Committee: I remain therefore in hourly expectation of full and ſatisfactory accounts from that quarter, which I ſhall no doubt receive before my arrival at *Burrampore*. I beg to acquaint you that I ſhall moſt certainly reach that city the 31ſt, the narrowneſs and difficulties of the road having occaſioned the delay of a day longer than I expected.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp at *Suvill*, 27th January 1779. (Signed) *Tho*s *Goddard*.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 26th and 27th ultimo, encloſing letters for Meſſrs. *Carnac*, *Egerton*, and from the Select Committee at *Bombay*; ſince which I have marched to *Burhampore*, the capital of *Khandeiſh*, and am encamped oppoſite the city, upon the banks of the Taplee river. I reached this place on the 30th, one day ſooner than I expected, having found it neceſſary to make a forced march through ſome broken ground and narrow defiles, in order to get ground for encampment.

Since my arrival I have been in conſtant hope of receiving ſome advices from *Poonah*, to remove the uncertainty I was under, from the ſtyle of thoſe before arrived; but except the encloſed, no letter or authentic intelligence whatever has reached me; and you will perceive, that I can derive no certain information from a peruſal of its contents.

I am ſorry that the letter alluded to of the 16th has miſcarried, becauſe the gentlemen with the army might perhaps in it have condeſcended upon a detail of particulars, which would have diſcovered to me the real ſituation of their affairs: at preſent, when I compare the two letters they have written me, with the flying report that prevails at this place, although I am left in the dark as to the manner in which matters have been ſettled, it is however manifeſt that ſome change has taken place in them; and there is great reaſon to apprehend it has been

brought about by circumſtances unfavourable to our arms.

The firſt letter, by the cautious advice it gives againſt the bodies of horſe I may meet with, to interrupt and moleſt my march towards *Surat* or *Broach*, proves that if any terms have been made, they are ſuch as were dictated by neceſſity, and a regard to their own particular ſafety, without reference to the object for which the enterprize was firſt undertaken; except perhaps, agreeing to relinquiſh the purſuit of it; and without providing in any ſhape for the probable progreſs of the detachment, I am confirmed in the belief that the gentlemen of *Bombay* have laid aſide the proſecution of their plan in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, from the name of the place at which the laſt letter is dated, as I underſtand it is a few coſs on the Bombay ſide of *Bhore Ghaut*.

The Coffids who brought this, inform me, that *Ragonaut Row* has remained behind at *Jelligong* with the miniſterial forces; that the Chiefs, after a long and obſtinate conflict, in which numbers were killed on both ſides, many of them ſubmitted themſelves to him, and promiſed to put him in poſſeſſion of the Regency at *Poonah*, if he would diſmiſs the Engliſh troops; other accounts again ſay, that *Ragoba* was taken priſoner by *Sindiah* and *Holkar*: in ſhort, ſo various are the reports that prevail, and ſo little are any of them to be depended on, from the partial channels through which I am forced to receive them, that I can fix upon no certain opinion, except that our troops are actually upon their return to *Bombay*; and that *Ragoba*'s buſineſs is either accompliſhed, or it is become unneceſſary to proſecute it further.

I have halted at this place two days, and am collecting a ſufficient quantity of proviſions, that I may be ready to adopt ſuch meaſures as ſhall be judged moſt expedient upon aſcertaining the exact ſituation of affairs at *Poonah*, which I expect muſt arrive every hour; for although the gentlemen with the army have, for reaſons which I cannot account for, thought proper to conceal from me a knowledge of circumſtances ſo neceſſary for the intereſt of the Company, and the ſafety of the detachment to be known, I do not doubt but the Select Committee will explain the whole tranſaction clearly and fully to me. In the hope of receiving this ſatisfactory account, I think it prudent to defer coming to an immediate determination; when it arrives, I will addreſs you fully.

I have the honour &c.

Camp, oppoſite *Burrampore*, the 2d February 1779. (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

To Colonel *Goddard.*

Sir,

We addreſſed you on the 16th a letter containing orders, which upon recollection we do not think ourſelves authorized to give you: you are therefore to pay no regard whatever thereto.

We are, &c.

Campoly, 19th January 1779. (Signed) *John Carnac*, *C. W. Egerton.*

A true Copy.

(Signed) *Rich. Dunkley*, Sec.

Ordered that theſe letters lie for conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated the 11th March 1779.

Preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.

Read the following letter from Colonel *Goddard*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour of writing to you the 2d inſtant, enloſing copy of a letter received from Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, ſince which I have looked with anxious expectations for accounts from that quarter, to clear up the uncertainty I had reaſon to be under concerning the event of affairs at *Poonah*; but it is with a good deal of concern I muſt ſtill repeat to you my ſurprize at their continual ſilence and reſerve; having received no other intelligence from them or the Select Committee at *Bombay*, except the unſatisfactory information contained in the letters I have had the honour to tranſmit for your peruſal. Appendix. No. 183.

Situated as I now am in the centre of the Maratta dominions, and the ſeaſon faſt approaching in which it would be extremely hazardous to keep the field in an enemy's country, I have thought it neceſſary to come to an immediate determination, and have reſolved to march towards *Surat* with all expedition. The reaſons which have induced me to take this ſtep, I beg to ſubmit to your conſideration; and I am hopeful they will appear to you founded upon a regard to the intereſts of the Honourable Company, and to the nature of the inſtructions which you have been pleaſed to give me for my guidance and direction.

Although the firſt letter received from the gentlemen with the army could not poſſibly make me acquainted with any particulars that had paſſed, it however gave me reaſon to believe, as I before hinted to you, that the troops of the miniſterial party were powerful in their eſtimation: the laſt letter, of the 19th ultimo, by being dated from *Campoly* on the Bombay ſide of *Bore Ghaut*, amounted to a proof that the Bombay forces were returning to their own ſettlements: and the different intelligence I have been able to obtain here, together with the reports made me by my own Hircarrahs from that quarter, all ſeem to confirm the belief, that a ſettlement has been made with the Chiefs of the adverſe party, by no means favourable to our arms; this opinion is further corroborated by a letter I have juſt received from *Moodajee Booſla*, informing me, that a battle had been fought betwixt the Bombay forces and thoſe of the Miniſters, in which the latter were victorious; and that having ſurrounded the Engliſh, the latter ſent a deputation to the Marattas, propoſing to deliver up *Ragonaut Row* into their hands, and promiſing to adhere to the terms of the treaty before made with *Nanah Furneſe* by Colonel *Upton*.

What I have been enumerating are all the grounds on which I can form any certain conjectures of the ſituation of affairs at *Poonah*; and as I think the intelligence ſent by *Moodajee* deſerving of particular credit, I doubt not you will concur with me in opinion, that the Government of *Bombay* muſt have ſuſtained a conſiderable check; and that the preſence of the force under me may be abſolutely neceſſary to prevent any bad conſequences that might happen to the Company's intereſt on that ſide of *India* in conſequence of it, ſhould this event be followed by an attack from the French, which you will perceive by the Select Committee's letter, may be the caſe next ſeaſon, and on that account preſs my ſpeedy march, from the inſufficiency of their own force to oppoſe it, I cannot but anticipate a probable ſuggeſtion, that my arrival may not only be the means of reſtoring the affairs of the ſettlement of *Bombay*, but of ſaving it from utter ruin.

I propoſe marching from this place to-morrow morning on the road to *Surat*; and as I ſhall uſe all poſſible expedition, I make no doubt of being able to reach it in a month, notwithſtanding the oppoſition I may expect to meet with on the road. I am ſorry however Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* were not more explicit in their firſt letters to me, as I might by this time have been conſiderably advanced on the road.

With reſpect to the negociation propoſed to be carried on with the Rajah of *Berar*, nothing can be effected in that buſineſs, till the arrival of anſwers from your Government to the letters ſent by him through me; and

Appendix. No. 184.

even admitting the certainty of their acceding to the alliance, the diſpoſal of the detachment in the mean time becomes a conſideration of importance and difficulty to determine: ſhould I wait anſwers at this city to letters I might write to *Moodajee* on the ſubject, adviſing with him upon a place to halt at till the expected diſpatches might arrive from *Calcutta*, a period of one month would in all probability elapſe; and ſhould he after all prove averſe to my remaining in any part of his territories, the hot ſeaſon would be ſo far advanced, and the rains be ſo near at hand, that even my march to *Surat*, allowing for many other circumſtances which might happen, would be rendered very inconvenient, and perhaps impracticable. I am induced to believe he would object to my continuing within his dominions, becauſe with the account he has written me of the tranſactions at *Poonah*, he has propoſed my returning to *Calcutta* by ſuch road as I ſhall find moſt convenient and eligible, without making any reference in favour of his views in concert with your Government.

In this uncertainty reſpecting the intentions of *Moodajee*; the unfavourable aſpect of affairs at *Bombay*; the probability of an attack from the French upon that ſettlement next ſeaſon; and the preſſing terms uſed by the Select Committee for my ſpeedy arrival, to guard againſt the evil conſequences of ſuch an event; I beg to repeat to you that I conſider it for the intereſt of the Honourable Company, and entirely conſiſtent with the ſpirit of your inſtructions; that I ſhould purſue my route towards *Bombay* by the neareſt and moſt practicable road, which is by the way of *Surat*.

I have wrote to Major *Camac* in conſequence of *Moodajee*'s propoſal, for this detachment to return to *Calcutta*; and the interruption the negociation with the court of *Naigpore* has met with, not to advance beyond the weſtern boundaries of the Company's provinces; but to be guided with reſpect to his remaining there or returning to *Bengal*, by the inſtructions he either has or may receive from you.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp, oppoſite *Burhampore*, 5th February 1779. (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

Poſtſcript.—Since writing the above, a letter from the Select Committee is juſt arrived, copy of which I beg to tranſmit for your peruſal: you will perceive it contains no certain intelligence of what has happened, except confirming my belief of the return of the Bombay forces, and further proving the expediency of my march towards that ſettlement. As ſoon as the particular information they promiſe to give me arrives, I ſhall do myſelf the pleaſure of communicating it to you.

(Signed) *T. G.*

To Colonel *Goddard.*

Sir,

We have juſt received your letter, dated the 3d inſtant; and concluding this will meet you on your march, we direct that you proceed ſtraight to *Surat*, inſtead of to *Poonah* or *Ziner*, as before directed.

Our army we learn is now on the return to *Bombay*; but we are not at preſent able to give you any preciſe information as to the reaſons for that meaſure, or the probable conſequences of it. We will however write you fully the moment we are able to do it with certainty.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 22d January 1779. (Signed) *W. Hornby*, *D. Draper.*

A true copy.

(Signed) *R. Dunkley*, Sec.

Warren Haſtings, *Richd Barwell*, *P. Francis.*

APPENDIX, No. 184.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated the 15th March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

MR. *Francis* delivers in the following minute:

Mr. *Francis*.—Having received no advices from the Preſidency of *Bombay* of the circumſtance or conſequence of the defeat of their army near *Poonah*, nor any direct information whatſoever of the actual ſtate of the Company's affairs on the other ſide of *India*; we are left to judge of both from appearances, and to form our meaſures on ſuch facts as are known to us, and on ſuch probable conjectures as the lights we are poſſeſſed of may ſuggeſt. It appears to me, as well from the profound ſilence which the Preſidency of *Bombay* have obſerved to us, as from their letter of the 22d of January to Colonel *Goddard*, that ſuppoſing he ſhould reach *Bombay*, they have it in their contemplation to break their laſt engagement with the Poonah Government, and to renew the war at all events. They now have nothing to loſe, not even honour; and we know not to what fatal extremities deſpair may impel them. Uniform experience entitles us to form any conjectures whatſoever, however unfavourable to them, with reſpect to their future conduct: the ſame experience, I think, obliges us to ſuppoſe the neceſſity of our guarding againſt the moſt injudicious and dangerous meaſures, that it is poſſible for them to purſue.

In this ſituation the firſt thing in my opinion to be done, is to prevent the Preſidency of *Bombay* from acting at all; I mean without our ſpecific orders and inſtructions: I therefore move, that a letter be immediately written to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to expreſs our concern and ſurprize at the profound ſilence they have obſerved to us, on the late operations and defeat of their army; and to prohibit them, in the moſt preciſe and poſitive terms, and as they will anſwer the contrary at their peril, from commencing or renewing hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, or any other Indian Princes or Powers, *except in their own immediate defence*, without our conſent and approbation firſt had and obtained.

The Governor General—It has perhaps eſcaped Mr. *Francis*, that his preſent motion has been anticipated by orders exactly to the ſame amount already paſſed, and ſent in the following clauſe of the 9th article of our inſtructions of the 4th of laſt month; "And they "themſelves (that is, the Preſident and Select Com-"mittee) be forbidden to enter into any new engagements "without a previous application to us, and our ſanction "obtained." If it be true that their deſign in favour of *Ragoba* hath failed; that they have entered into a new treaty of peace with the Maratta Government; and that they had actually abandoned *Ragonaut Row*, or ſurrendered his perſon to their common enemy, for which facts we have ſo many concurrent authorities as to leave us with ſcarce the poſſibility of a doubt of their reality; they can neither commence nor renew hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, or againſt any other Indian Prince or Power, except in their own immediate defence, without a poſitive breach of thoſe orders. The whole tenor of our letter ſtrongly expreſſes the reluctance with which we agreed to ſupport them in the proſecution of the meaſure which they had undertaken; ſo that it is impoſſible they can have miſtaken the force of this order, or overlooked it: and if, in defiance of it, and with the moſt ſcandalous breach of their own ſacred engagement ſo recently contracted, they ſhall have commenced a new war with the Marattas, they will have brought themſelves preciſely into that ſituation deſcribed by the act of Parliament, by which they will become liable to be ſuſpended from

the Company's ſervice, by the controlling power of this Government. Our letter of the 4th February, containing the order above mentioned, may by this time have been received; and I ſhall deem them accountable for every act done in contradiction to it. But the order now propoſed to be ſent cannot reach them before the month of May, at which time it will be impoſſible for them to begin any military operations, if they ſhould be ſo diſpoſed; and inſtead of preventing further miſchief may ſerve them as a plea to juſtify any acts of hoſtility, which they may have previouſly committed, in breach of our former orders. It appears therefore to me both unneceſſary and improper to ſend them any new orders to the ſame effect: let us wait a few days longer; we yet know no more of the event of this expedition than we did on the 25th of laſt month, when we received the firſt news of it: it is ſcarcely poſſible that we ſhould remain many days longer in this ſtate of ignorance and ſuſpenſe; and therefore I with ſtill to wait for materials, before we venture to iſſue orders the effect of which we cannot foreſee and which have no apparent object, in the ſituation of thoſe for whoſe guidance they are deſigned.

Mr. *Francis*—We were not informed of the diſaſter at *Poonah*, when we wrote to *Bombay*, on the 4th of laſt month; neither does the inſtructions quoted from our letter of that date, appear to me to amount, in any degree, to the meaning of my propoſition; this I think will be evident, from a bare inſpection of the terms of the two orders. They may commence or renew hoſtilities on their former plan, without entering into any new engagements. If nevertheleſs the two orders were preciſely the ſame, I think that the important event which we have heard of in the interval, and of the effects of which on the minds of the gentlemen of *Bombay*, we cannot be abſolutely certain, would authorize and oblige us to repeat them. In the preſent critical circumſtances, it is our duty even to *them*, not to leave them the ſhadow of a pretence for acting in oppoſition to our intentions. Our not ſending the orders I now propoſe will no more enforce the obligation they were under to obey former orders, than our ſending them will leſſen it. Whatever they may have done in the interval muſt be condemned or juſtified by the terms of the orders of which they were actually in poſſeſſion.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree to Mr. *Francis*'s motion.

Mr. *Barwell*—To agree to Mr. *Francis*'s motion would imply an opinion, that it had been rendered neceſſary, by a deficiency in the orders already given: that there is no ſuch deficiency is evinced by the quotation made by the Governor General from the orders of the 4th of laſt month; yet to deny my aſſent to it, I am ſenſible may expoſe me to the charge of inattention to the conduct of the Bombay Preſidency, which too much warrants the ſuggeſtion thrown out by Mr. *Francis*. Under the orders exiſting, the preſent motion is premature, and anticipates that full information on which alone the Board can maturely reſolve; and which motion, probably inſtead of appearing irregular, might have been a general vote of the Council, reſulting from the facts before them. I am againſt the motion.

Mr. *Francis*'s motion reſolved in the negative.

Warren Haſtings,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, Nos. 185, 186, and 187,

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 18th March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

RECEIVED the following letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay*.

Appendix. Nos. 185 & 186.

Gentlemen,

The preceding is a duplicate of our addreſs, dated the 13th ultimo.

We ſhall very ſhortly diſpatch a veſſel expreſs to *Bengal*, with a full account of the unſucceſsful iſſue of the late expedition; this being tranſmitted over land, to convey to you as quick as poſſible this diſagreeable intelligence. When our army had advanced to *Tellagong*, within eighteen miles from *Poonah*, and it was found, contrary to expectation, that none of the Maratta chiefs ventured to join the ſtandard of *Ragoba*, it was judged expedient by Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, that the army ſhould fall back to the head of the Gauts, to ſecure their ſupplies of proviſions, which they could not procure as they advanced, the country being entirely laid waſte by the numerous bodies of horſe that oppoſed them: the army was accordingly put in motion the 11th at night, and on their retreat were very vigorouſly attacked by the Maratta horſe, who carried off ſome of the baggage and proviſion; but after a long and warm action, were compelled to retire. This engagement having occaſioned the army to halt, *Ragoba* took that opportunity to open a negociation with *Moodajee Scindia*; and the commanding officers having given it as their opinion, that the army would not ſtand another attack, and refuſed the charge of conducting it to *Bombay*, the committee found themſelves obliged to treat with the Maratta Chiefs for an unmoleſted paſſage. They at firſt only demanded, that we ſhould give up the cauſe and perſon of *Ragoba*, which was accommodated without difficulty, as *Ragoba* had already declared his intention of putting himſelf under the protection of *Moodajee Scindia*: they then roſe in their demands, and inſiſted that we ſhould ſurrender all the acquiſitions made ſince the time of *Madarow*, and that Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment ſhould be ordered back to the Bengal provinces. This the committee declared in writing, in the moſt plain and poſitive manner, that they had no authority whatever to agree to; and that, if they did make ſuch an agreement, the Miniſters would be deceived; however, as they perſiſted in their demands, the committee after that declaration, having no alternative, did ſubſcribe a paper, containing the above conditions, and our troops accordingly returned to *Bombay*. As we cannot admit that an agreement made in ſuch circumſtances, and after ſuch a previous declaration, is of any validity, we ſhall endeavour to treat with the Marattas upon another footing; and we have directed Colonel *Goddard* to march to *Surat*, inſtead of to *Poonah*, as before ordered. We requeſt, Gentlemen, that you will ſuſpend all judgment and determination reſpecting this unfortunate affair, till the whole is fully laid before you, which ſhall be done as ſoon as poſſible; and in the mean time we remain, with reſpect,

Gentlemen, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle,
3d February, 1779.

Wm Hornby,
Jn° Carnac,
D. Draper.

N°186.

Mr. *Francis*—As it appears to me, by the preceding letter from *Bombay*, that the opinion I had formed of their intentions is well founded, viz. that they have it in contemplation to renew hoſtilities with the Marattas, and that it is for this purpoſe they have ordered Colonel *Goddard* to proceed to *Surat*; I beg leave to renew the motion which I made on Monday laſt in the ſame terms, viz. "that a letter be immediately written "to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to expreſs our concern "and ſurprize at the profound ſilence they have ob- "ſerved to us, on the late operations and defeat of their "army; and to prohibit them in the moſt preciſe and "poſitive terms, and as they will anſwer the contrary at "their peril, from commencing or renewing hoſtilities

"againſt

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" againſt the Marattas, or any other Indian Princes or " Powers, *except in their own immediate defence*, without " our conſent and approbation firſt had and obtained."

Mr. *Wheler*—I agreed to the propriety of Mr. *Francis*'s motion on Monday laſt; and I am, in conſequence of the letter now before the Board, fully convinced of the abſolute neceſſity we are under of reſtraining that Preſidency from any further act of hoſtility againſt the Maratta States.

The Governor General—As I am not aware of the extent of the queſtion, I muſt beg leave to interrupt the courſe of the votes given *upon it*, by a few previous and neceſſary obſervations. I have carefully read over that part of the letter from *Bombay*, to which the queſtion has an immediate relation, but do not find any thing in it which can warrant Mr. *Francis*'s concluſion, " that " they have it in contemplation to renew hoſtilities with " the Marattas, and that it is for this purpoſe they have " ordered Colonel *Goddard* to proceed to *Surat*." I infer the reverſe from their words; and, that their meaning may not be loſt by a diſtant reference to them, I will here quote them: " As we cannot admit, that an agree- " ment made in ſuch circumſtances, and after ſuch a " previous declaration, is of any validity, we ſhall en- " deavour to treat with the Marattas upon another foot- " ing; and we have directed Colonel *Goddard* to march " to *Surat* inſtead of *Poonah*, as before ordered." They had before mentioned, that a treaty had been extorted from their military committee, conſiſting of three articles, viz. 1ſt, that they ſhould give up the cauſe and perſon of *Ragoba*; 2dly, that they ſhould ſurrender the acquiſitions made ſince the time of *Madabrow*; and 3dly, that Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment ſhould be ordered back to the Bengal provinces. The paſſage which I have before quoted, is a diſavowal of the treaty, and a declaration that they will not abide by it; that is to ſay, that they will not ſurrender *Salſette*, *Broach*, and all their other poſſeſſions, excepting *Bombay* and *Surat*, to the Marattas, but treat with them for their poſſeſſions. It is impoſſible that their declaration can have any other meaning; becauſe, of the three articles, the firſt has had its full effect; the third has been already broken; and the ſecond of courſe is the only one which remains undecided. I think it poſſible that their refuſal to ratify it may have provoked the Maratta Government, flushed with its recent ſucceſs, to renew hoſtilities on them; but it is plain, from the terms of their letter, that it is their intention to avoid the renewal of hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, unleſs they ſhould be compelled to it, in the defence of their poſſeſſions. I muſt beg leave to aſk, whether it is the intention of the queſtion now before the Board, that the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* ſhall be directed to give up thoſe poſſeſſions? I ſhould apprehend not; becauſe we are not yet furniſhed with the authority, which the military committee poſſeſſed, to conclude treaties; and becauſe we are not in poſſeſſion of the treaty itſelf, nor of the written declaration, ſaid to have been given by the committee, diſclaiming their own authority to make it; and of courſe we are incompetent to judge how far the treaty, under the circumſtances in which it was made, was binding on the Preſidency of *Bombay*: I omit the conſideration of its obligation on ours, it being foreign from the preſent ſubject. The Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* would obviouſly apply the propoſed order, if ſent to them in anſwer to their letter, to that part of the letter only to which it had a relation; and as they have no where expreſſed a deſign of renewing offenſive hoſtilities, they would of courſe underſtand it as a prohibition to withhold the performance of that part of the treaty, on the performance of which the confirmation of the peace between them and the Marattas apparently reſted.

Mr. *Francis*—I have ſtated my opinion of the intentions of the Preſidency of *Bombay*; as I collect it from the terms of the letter before us, perhaps it may be erroneous. The preſent motion is to prohibit them from again invading the Marattas, or renewing hoſtilities againſt them, except in their own immediate defence; it goes no farther.

Mr. *Barwell*—There is no new matter before the Board. The ſhort reply made by Mr. *Francis* to the foregoing obſervations, is not to the point thoſe obſervations are propoſed to guard againſt. I muſt ſuſpend my opinion on the orders neceſſary to be reſolved by their Government, until we ſhall be fully informed. If the Preſidency of *Bombay*, upon good and ſufficient ground, ſhall refuſe to ratify that part of the act of the army committee, which gives up the poſſeſſions of the Company, I ſhall not think myſelf authorized to lay it as an injunction upon them to part with thoſe poſſeſſions. The preſent repetition of the queſtion appears to me totally unneceſſary; every cautionary meaſure has been taken by this Government, and I do not apprehend any others can be added to them, until we receive further advices.

Governor General—As Mr. *Francis*, by declining to anſwer the queſtion put to him, has left the conſtruction, which I ſuppoſed, in the words of the motion, and as that conſtruction is, in my opinion, clearly warranted by them, this alone is ſufficient reaſon for me to object to it. I have *other* objections; theſe I partly have ſtated in the opinion which I before gave on the laſt council day upon the ſame motion. The letter received from *Bombay* has indeed opened new lights upon the ſtate of their affairs, but theſe are yet too imperfect to enable us to form a true judgment of them; beſides, as I have already obſerved, it is ſcarce poſſible any orders which we can give will prove effectual. Their line muſt be decided, and its effects irrevocably paſſed, before our orders can poſſibly reach them.

Mr. *Francis*—It appears to me that my laſt minute contained a direct anſwer to the Governor General's queſtion; at leaſt I meant it ſo. A prohibition againſt invading or renewing hoſtilities againſt a people who never injured us, and who, when they had our army in their power, acted with ſuch moderation as to permit that army to return unmoleſted is evidently ſo juſt, and ſo reaſonable, that I cannot conceive it ſhould require any argument to defend it. Such prohibition, however, certainly does not include an order to the Preſidency of *Bombay* to give up any poſſeſſions, neither does it direct the reverſe. On that point I deſire to be underſtood to give no opinion whatſoever *pro* or *con*. It would be premature at this time, when we have neither a copy of the engagement before us, nor even of the commiſſion under which Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* acted.

Governor General—Not to give an opinion, is to leave the queſtion to its natural conſtruction. The Preſidency of *Bombay* have told us, that they will not give up their poſſeſſions; which in other terms is, that they will renew hoſtilities, if the Marattas inſiſt on this article to the treaty. In anſwer to their declaration, it is propoſed to forbid them to renew hoſtilities, which in this conſtruction is equivalent to an order for them to give up their poſſeſſions; for, as I have ſaid before, there is not a word in their letter to which the ſuppoſition of the renewal of hoſtilities can poſſibly apply, but their diſavowal of the treaty, and implied reſolution not to abide by it.

Mr. *Francis*'s motion reſolved in the negative.

No. 187.

Governor General.—As a conſiderable time has elapſed ſince the Board were adviſed of the reſolution taken by Colonel *Goddard* to march to *Surat*, and no reply has been yet written to him upon that ſubject, I propoſe the following.

To Colonel *Thomas Goddard*.

Sir,

We have received your letter, dated 5th of February, and approve the reſolution which you have taken to direct

direct your march to *Surat*; which, under the circumſtances deſcribed by you, and eſpecially with the ſtrong requiſition of the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, we think was a meaſure indiſpenſably neceſſary.

We have waited thus long in the daily expectation of authentic intelligence from *Bombay*, to guide us in forming the inſtructions which it might be neceſſary to give you, in the great change which has taken place in the general line of our political ſyſtem. We have at length received a letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated 3d February, which contains the firſt authentic account of the unhappy concluſion of the expedition undertaken by that Preſidency for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*. We ſend you an extract of ſuch parts of their letter as we think may be uſeful for your information.

It is impoſſible for us to conjecture, with any degree of confidence, what events may have followed the defeat of our arms; but from the reſolution expreſſed by the Select Committee to diſavow the authority by which the late treaty was concluded, and to refuſe their compliance with the terms of it, we think it probable at leaſt, that they may be engaged in further hoſtilities with the Maratta State, but of what kind we may yet remain for ſome time in ignorance; nor can we form any reaſonable concluſion of the ſituation in which you may be on the receipt of this letter. We can therefore give you no new inſtructions, but leave you to act on thoſe which you already poſſeſs; of which the following is rather an explanation than any addition to them.

As the motive and object of your march to that ſide of *India* were to afford the protection of the forces under your command to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, your whole attention in all your operations muſt be confined to that object, ſo long as the ſituation of their affairs ſhall require it, until we can furniſh you with more explicit orders; and we truſt to your diſcretion, that in the performance of this ſervice you will conduct yourſelf with the caution which the particular ſtate of our affairs on that ſide of *India* demands; and that you do not involve either yourſelf or this Government in the reſponſibility of the acts of that Preſidency, remembering that you ſtill act under the ſole authority of this Government, independent of theirs, and that of courſe you are to exerciſe your own judgment, both in the acceptance and execution of any ſervice which they ſhall require you to perform.

Fort-William, 18th March, 1779. We are, &c.

Mr. *Francis*.—I do not think that the march to *Surat* was a meaſure indiſpenſably neceſſary. Colonel *Goddard* might, I think, have retreated to *Berar*. I acquieſce in the remainder of the letter, without relinquiſhing any opinions which I have heretofore delivered.

Mr. *Wheler*.—I accede to the letter propoſed to be ſent to Colonel *Goddard*, with the reſervation pointed out by Mr. *Francis*.

Mr. *Barwell*.—I agree to the letter.

APPENDIX, No. 188.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 22d March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
} Eſquires.

READ the following letter from Colonel *Goddard*.

Appendix. No. 188.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, &c. Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 5th inſtant, informing you of my intention to proceed immediately towards *Surat*, and fully explaining my motives for ſo doing, which I flatter myſelf were ſuch as you would approve of. I rejoice much at the reſolution I then took, as it appears a meaſure abſolutely neceſſary, not only to the proſperity of the ſettlement of *Bombay*, but to its immediate ſafety. The accounts which you muſt long ere this have received from that Government, of the event of their military tranſactions at *Poonah*, will have confirmed the truth of the above opinion, and alſo render unneceſſary any particular explanation I could give of the ſtate of their affairs; beſides that except the letters already ſent you, and that which accompanies this diſpatch, every other information I could obtain has been of a private and indirect nature, and neither authentic nor particular enough to deſerve being communicated to you.

The incloſed letter from Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* was delivered me by a Vackeel belonging to the Peiſhwa *Madherow Narrain*, with another at the ſame time from his maſter, correſponding with the directions contained in the former, of returning towards the Bengal provinces. I at the ſame time received a letter from Mr. *Farmer*, forwarding that of the commiſſioners, and acquainting me, that himſelf and Lieutenant *Charles Stewart* were left in the Maratta camp, as hoſtages for the due performance of the capitulation made with the Durbar of *Poonah*, for the unmoleſted return of our army to *Bombay*.

I am releaſed from every obligation this letter of Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* might lay me under, by theirs of the 19th ultimo (copy of which has been already tranſmitted you) deſiring me to pay no attention whatever to the directions before ſent me of the 16th; and I am alſo on this account convinced, that the perſonal ſafety of the gentlemen left as hoſtages will not be affected by my march. This conſideration, added to the cogent reaſons furniſhed by an attention to the ruined ſtate of the Bombay ſettlement, which would of itſelf render the ſtep at all riſks abſolutely neceſſary to the Company's intereſts, has determined me to proſecute my intention of proceeding to *Surat* with all expedition.

In conſequence of this reſolution, I have wrote to the Poonah Durbar, that in obedience to the orders of your Government, I marched with a part of your forces to protect the Engliſh ſettlement of *Bombay* againſt any invaſion of its enemies the French; that your intentions, and the inſtructions given me for my guidance, were perfectly friendly to the Maratta State, as the whole of my conduct hitherto muſt have convinced them; and that I ſhould continue to preſerve the ſame regard to the friendſhip ſubſiſting betwixt your Government and the Poonah Adminiſtration inviolable, protecting the ſubjects of the Peiſhwa from all violence, and avoiding any act of hoſtility whatever, unleſs compelled to it by their oppoſition. I farther added, that I had now advanced to the neighbourhood of *Bombay*, according to your orders; that in obedience to them it was neceſſary I ſhould reach that ſettlement; after which I ſhould be guided by the directions your might think proper to give me.

I beg to acquaint you with my having reached the *Gul Nuddy* in four days march, which is diſtant from *Burhampore* near 40 coſs. I ſhall halt to-morrow upon the banks of it, to refreſh the troops and cattle, and ſhall proceed the next day, with the ſame expedition, towards *Surat*, which place I hope to reach by the end of this month, as it is very little more than 100 coſs from my preſent encampment.

The late loſſes ſuſtained at *Bombay*, and the check given

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given to their arms, must inevitably for some time put a stop to any military operations depending upon a plan formed by their Government; the measures to be pursued will therefore rest solely upon the resolutions you may find it necessary, for the interests of the Company, to make, in consequence of the unfortunate event that has happened; and I shall wait with anxiety for a knowledge of them, to direct my future conduct; at the same time I beg to be honoured with your full and particular instructions relative to the situation and connection of this detachment with the Government of *Bombay*, in order to prevent every possible obstruction to the public service; from a regard to which, and the honour and interest of your Administration, it shall be my fixed and constant object never to depart.

Camp near *Choprah*, upon the *Gul Nuddy*, 9th February 1779.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

To Colonel *Thomas Goddard*, commanding the Forces from *Bengal*.

Sir,

Having this day settled an agreement with the Durbar, wherein it is stipulated, that the army under your command shall be immediately directed to march back to the Bengal provinces, you will please, on the receipt of this, immediately to march back in the most convenient and expeditious manner you may think fit, and on your march no molestation is to be offered to any person, the Durbar sending with their Hircarrahs proper persons to direct the different Aumildars to supply you with whatever may be requisite.

We are, &c.

Camp at *Worgas*, near *Telligoa*, the 16th January 1779.

(Signed) *John Carnac*, *C. W. Egerton*, *Warren Hastings*, *Richd Barwell*, *P. Francis*.

A true copy.
R. Dunkley, Secretary.

APPENDIX, No. 189.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, the 23d March 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Governor General, President;
Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Esquires.
Edward Wheler, indisposed.

MR. *Wheler* having sent in the following minute just as the Council broke up yesterday, it was circulated to the different members of the Board.

Mr. Wheler's minute.

Mr. *Wheler*.—The situation to which I see the Company's affairs reduced, in every part of *India*, fills me, I confess, with the deepest anxiety and concern. On the Malabar coast, I see a war undertaken, and likely to be continued, against the Marattas, without the pretence of a provocation of any kind, and from the success of which the Company cannot, in my opinion, derive any possible advantage, none, I am certain, that can ever compensate for the immediate expence and distress which must attend it; for I am convinced that new acquisitions can answer no end, but to entail upon us and perpetuate new establishments; I need not point out the consequences of a second defeat.

To support a war at such a distance, and on such disadvantageous terms, or even to maintain the military establishment now existing on that side of *India*, is enough to exhaust all the resources of *Bengal*; from which the Company will in vain expect returns of wealth to *England*.

On the other coast, I see the Presidency of *Fort Saint George* already engaged, and likely to be more deeply involved, in military operations, on which not only the defence of the *Carnatic*, but even of their own Presidency, may depend, without a friend in reserve, or any mode of obtaining supplies of money, on which they can securely rely. *Hyder Ally* threatens them on one side, the Nizam on the other; and what reason have we to suppose, that the attempts made by these Powers will not be followed or accompanied by an invasion of the Marattas? On these circumstances, the Presidency of *Fort Saint George* apply to the treasury of *Bengal*, as to their only refuge.

In our own Government I see an expensive and useless military expedition still on foot, towards our western frontier, without an object of any kind. A marine maintained at the enormous expence of fourteen lacks a year, which never has done, nor, as far as I can judge, ever will do the smallest service. In the mean time, we are to provide against troubles in the Vizier's country, where two camps are ordered to be formed for that purpose.

We know not what particular designs may be formed by *Nudjiff Cawn* the King, or the Seiks, or what may be the views of the former in inviting *Timur Shaw* into *Hindostan*; but we know, in general, that the disposition of those Powers is not favourable to us, and that, as the power of the English, and the use we make of it, is to them an object of constant jealousy and distrust, so it is not unlikely that they may promise themselves extraordinary advantages from the invasion and plunder of these provinces. The opinion of our superiority in arms has received a check, to which we never should have exposed it. In this situation, I see no steps towards peace, no measures any where taken to recover or secure the friendship of any of the Indian Powers; but demands made upon *Bengal* from all quarters, for supplies of men and money, as if all *India* was united against us, and our resources alone were equal to every demand.

I state the general position of our affairs without exaggeration, and exactly as they strike me, in hopes that the Board will consider in the same light that I do, the necessity of adopting pacific measures, at least in some of the quarters in which we are threatened with hostility.

The letter now before us from *Fort Saint George* cannot, I think, be read without suggesting similar reflections to every member of the Board. With respect to the point on which Mr. *Francis* has delivered his opinion, though it does not come in the form of a motion, I deem it equally incumbent on me to say, that, as things are actually circumstanced, we cannot in safety or prudence refuse them a supply of money; if we do, they will either borrow at a heavy interest, or draw upon the Company; each of which may be productive of very bad consequences. At the same time, the strictest economy should be recommended to them; and this recommendation cannot be more effectually enforced, than by an assurance that we see no probability of being able to continue such supplies in future, and that they must exert their own efforts, and regulate their expences accordingly.

APPENDIX, No. 190.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal* to the Court of Directors, in their Secret Department, dated the 29th March 1779.

IN a letter from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, of the 13th January, we were informed that their army under Colonel *Egerton* had made but a slow progress towards *Poonah*, as none of the Maratta Chiefs had joined *Ragoba*; and that, in order to give encouragement to his friends, who were slow in declaring themselves in his favour, they had directed the commanding officer to proceed with the utmost vigour. This letter also advised us of the death of Mr. *Mostyn*; that Lieutenant-colonel *Cay* and Captain *Stewart* were killed in a skirmish

a ſkirmiſh with the Marattas: and that Colonel *Egerton*'s bad ſtate of health had compelled him to give up the command of the army to Colonel *Cockburn*.

Soon after the receipt of the above letter from *Bombay*, the Governor General laid before us a paper of intelligence of the moſt alarming nature, ſent by the Nabob of *Arcot*, and acquainted us that the like intelligence had been communicated to him through other channels. It informed us of the total defeat of the *Bombay* army by the Maratta forces on the 11th January. The particulars of this diſaſter were ſo circumſtantially related, and its authenticity ſo ſtrongly marked, that they did not leave a doubt in our minds concerning the truth of it.

In order therefore to guard againſt any bad conſequences which this unfortunate event might have on the minds of the country Powers, we immediately directed Brigadier-general *Stibbert* to form two camps of the firſt and temporary brigades, and to hold them in readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt notice. To preclude the effect of falſe alarms, the Vizier has been adviſed, that theſe extraordinary camps are not formed to act againſt any of the Powers in the neighbourhood of his dominions. General *Stibbert* has alſo been deſired to declare the ſame publicly to any of the Vackeels of the country Powers that may be in his camps.

At a ſubſequent meeting we iſſued inſtructions to General *Stibbert*, to order the firſt brigade to march towards the banks of the *Jumna*, and there fix on ſuch a ſituation for encamping it as ſhould appear the moſt convenient for defending the *Douab*.

A letter from the Select Committee at *Bombay* confirms in part the intelligence tranſmitted by the Nabob of *Arcot*. It ſtates that Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* had thought it adviſable to retire with the army to the Ghauts; that this being agreed on, the troops were accordingly put in motion on the 11th January; that they were immediately attacked by the Marattas, whom they repulſed; but that the officer commanding having declared that they were not in a condition to ſuſtain another attack, and having refuſed to undertake the charge of conducting the army back to *Bombay*, they were obliged to treat for an unmoleſted paſſage, which was granted on their delivering up the perſon of *Ragoba* to the Miniſters. That this ſtipulation being agreed to, the Marattas roſe in their demands, and inſiſted that all our acquiſitions ſince the time of *Mada Row* ſhould be reſtored to the Maratta Government, and that Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment ſhould be ordered back to the Bengal provinces. That with reſpect to this latter requiſition, Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton* had informed them, that they had no authority whatever to aſſent to it, and that if they did comply with it, the Miniſters would be deceived. Notwithſtanding ſuch a declaration, they perſiſted in their demands; which were at laſt agreed to. Hoſtages for the due performance of the engagements on both ſides were exchanged, and we learn that the troops are returned to *Bombay*. The Select Committee have deſired us to ſuſpend our judgment on this fatal event until a complete account thereof can be tranſmitted to us. For your further information, we muſt beg leave to refer you to our various minutes on this ſubject, and the different motions in conſequence of the intelligence received; they will appear in the conſultations noted in the margin.

We beg leave to refer to the letters from Colonel *Goddard*, recorded in the conſultations noted in the margin, for a particular account of the progreſs of his detachment, and of the ſteps taken by him in conſequence of the intelligence he had received reſpecting the diſaſter which befel the Bombay army. In his letters of the 5th and 9th February he acquaints us of his final reſolutions, in conſequence of the urgent deſire of the Select Committee at *Bombay*, to march forward to *Surat*; the reaſons which induced him to this meaſure are fully ſtated in his letters, and deſerve your notice.

Not knowing what events might have followed the defeat of our arms, and unable to form any reaſonable concluſion of the ſituation in which Colonel *Goddard* might be on the receipt of a letter from us, we refrained from giving him any new inſtructions, and left him to act on thoſe which he already poſſeſſed. We approved however of the reſolution he had taken; and, as the motive and object of his march to the other ſide of *India* were to afford the protection of the troops under his command to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, we directed him to confine his whole attention in all his operations to that object, ſo long as the ſituation of affairs might require it, and not to involve either himſelf or this Government in the reſponſibility of the acts of that Preſidency. Appendix No. 191.

APPENDIX, No. 191.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 5th April 1779.

THE Governor General lays before the Board the following minute:

Governor General's minute.

The aſſembly of the Board being now rendered complete by the acceſſion of Sir *Eyre Coote*, and the ſeaſon of the year too far advanced to admit of our waiting longer for more authentic or more circumſtantial intelligence of the ſtate of our affairs on the other ſide of *India*, to deliberate on the meaſures neceſſary to retrieve the diſgrace which the Britiſh arms have ſuſtained by the late miſcarriage of the expedition undertaken from *Bombay*, and to prevent the conſequences which may be ſtill expected from it; I ſhall now call the attention of the Board to this intereſting ſubject.

We already poſſeſs a ſufficient knowledge of the capital points on which our future reſolutions ought to turn; theſe I ſhall briefly ſtate:

An army ſent into the field for the purpoſe of effecting a revolution in the Maratta State has failed in the attempt, and been compelled to purchaſe its ſafety by ignominious conceſſions, made without authority on the part of thoſe who ſubſcribed them, and with a knowledge of the want of that authority in thoſe who exacted them. Of theſe conceſſions we only know the following; viz.

1ſt. That *Ragonaut Row*, in whoſe cauſe the enterprize was formed, ſhould be delivered up to our common enemy.

2d. That all our poſſeſſions immediately dependant on *Bombay*, excepting *Surat*, were to be ſurrendered to the Maratta Government.

3d. That the detachment under the command of Colonel *Goddard* ſhould return to *Bengal*.

The firſt of theſe conditions was performed upon the ſpot.

The ſecond remains unaccompliſhed, and the Select Committee of *Bombay* have declared to us both their diſavowal of the engagement and their determination not to yield to it.

The third condition has been already broken, by the march of Colonel *Goddard* to *Surat*.

The laſt letters from *Bombay* inform us that their army was ſafely returned thither.

By private but certain intelligence I can inform the Board, that Colonel *Goddard*, with the forces under his command reached their deſtination at *Surat*, either on or about the 26th of February.

Of the conſequences of theſe events the following conjectures may be rationally formed:

1ſt. I think it probable, for many reaſons, that the Maratta Miniſters will be content with the advantages which they have gained in the poſſeſſion of the perſon of *Ragonaut Row*, and will not be very ſtrenuous in inſiſting upon the performance of the engagements made with them by Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*. The Select Committee have informed us that they ſhould treat with them upon theſe points, and will probably have concluded a peace, on the agreement of the Marattas to relinquiſh

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linquish their pretensions, or that they have been referred to us for our decision on them.

2d. If however, contrary to this expectation, the Maratta Government shall have insisted upon the performance of the conditions of the treaty signed by Messrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, it is probable that the Select Committee of *Bombay* will have refused their compliance; that Colonel *Goddard* will have been called upon to assist with his force in their defence; and that the war has been continued to this day, since there is no apparent object on our part which could lead to a termination of it.

Or, 3dly. The Marattas may have insisted upon the performance of the engagements, and on the refusal of the Select Committee of *Bombay* have taken no instant measure to enforce the performance of them; that knowing the invalidity of these engagements, and expecting that they would not be ratified, they had exacted them only to serve as a specious subject for present negociation, and a pretext for a renewal of the war when they should be in a condition to prosecute it with a surer effect; and that with this intent they may have invited the French to unite with them in availing themselves of the advantages presented to both by our late defeat, and the decline of our influence, and to bring an armament from *Mauritius* for that purpose. We are certain that the French have a force at that island sufficient and more than sufficient for a design of that nature; and if such an occasion has been presented to them, it cannot be supposed that they would slight it, or not use every exertion to seize and improve it. It is the only employment left for their troops, and the only chance left them of regaining their influence in *India*.

A vessel sent with dispatches from *Mahé* or *Damaun*, might if it sailed in January, arrive at *Mauritius* by the middle of March. The whole southerly monsoon would be then before them, and if they had vessels ready to transport the number of troops necessary for the purpose of giving the first movement to the plan, these might be expected to arrive at the destined scene of action by the month of September next at farthest.

4thly. The divisions of the Maratta State has been superficially covered, but by no means healed, by the necessity which lately united the different parties of that State in one common cause. The loss of the person of *Ragoba* has indeed deprived us of the influence which that before gave us on the fears and passions of the present rulers; but his presence is as likely to be the cause of new contentions and new jealousies amongst themselves. *Madajee Scindia*, who is said to have the actual charge of his person, who has always supported a separate interest from that of the Government which he defends, and who is regarded as the capital instrument by which the present Administration holds its power and authority, may apply the sanction of *Ragoba*'s name, and his pretensions, to the confirmation of his own independency, and with such an advantage his ambition may be excited even to the pursuit of more extended views. But I see no present chance of our being able to recover the possession of *Ragoba*: on the contrary, he seems lost to us for ever; nor am I certain that, all things considered, we have much cause to regret it, but in the wound which the British credit may have received in the manner of his separation from us.

5thly. The conduct observed by *Moodajee Boosla*, since his knowledge of the late event, manifestly shews the impression which it hath generally made on the minds of the people of *Indostan*. Inattentive to the peculiar circumstances which have occasioned the defeat of the Bombay army, or ignorant of them, he considers it as a natural and unavoidable consequence, and a proof that any force which we could oppose to the Marattas must prove unequal to their superiority of numbers, and the rapid movements of their cavalry.

The apprehension of drawing upon himself the resentment of a Power so formidable, was the undoubted motive of the advice so repeatedly and strongly urged by him to Colonel *Goddard*, to return to *Bengal*; and influenced by the same impression he has apparently given up all thoughts of the designed alliance, which he was at one time so desirous of concluding with us; nor, great and extended as my hopes were of the advantages of such a connection, shall I think it advisable to propose the renewal of any overtures towards it. Whenever a prosperous state of our affairs, added to the apprehensions of danger impending on the Government of *Berar*, shall induce it to solicit from us the support which we have hitherto ineffectually offered to the present Ruler of it, I shall deem it advisable, under every situation of our affairs, to grant it, provided it shall not be contrary to any other engagements subsisting. For the present, I regard this State as neutral, but secretly disposed to us, and wish only to keep it so.

I shall not carry on my conjectures to other points of less importance. These are sufficient for our present purpose.

The greatest loss which we have suffered by the late disaster is in the discredit which it has reflected on our military reputation, and therefore the greatest care ought to be taken, in all our measures which have a relation to this subject, that they do not appear to betray a consciousness of weakness, or a distrust in our own powers, but rather that we feel ourselves possessed of the ability, and animated with the resolution, to support our interests and possessions against all opponents.

If peace can be obtained on such terms as may be consistent with this ruling principle, I suppose that it will be the object of our unanimous wishes; but if peace cannot be so obtained, I hope we shall equally agree in the determination to exert every power which this Government possesses, either within itself or by its influence over the other Presidencies, to efface, by a vigorous and successful war, the loss which our credit and influence have recently suffered. At all events, while we seek for peace we ought at least to be prepared for war, as the surest means, whether immediate or remote, to obtain it.

Upon these principles I beg leave to offer the following propositions to the consideration of the Board:

1st. That we invest Colonel *Goddard* with full powers, as the Minister of this Government, to treat with the Peishwa and Ministers of the Maratta State for the renewal or confirmation of the treaty of *Poorunder*, provided they will recede from the pretensions which they have acquired by their late engagements with Messrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, and that they will engage never to admit any French forces into their dominions, nor allow them to form any establishments on the Maratta coast; and that these conditions be made the alternative of peace or war. Accompanying is a draft of his instructions, No. 1.

2dly. That the first brigade, which has already been ordered to march to a station convenient for crossing the river *Jumna*, be completely supplied with ordnance, ammunition, and stores, fit for any service on which that body or a force equal to it may be destined.

I make this distinction, because it will officially rest with the Commander in Chief to recommend both the strength of this corps and the parts of which it should be composed; expressing my own hope that it may not be found necessary at any time to employ either our European infantry or artillery, but for the sole defence of our own provinces and the prescribed limits of the dominions of the Nabob of *Oude*.

3dly. That Major *Camac* be ordered to return to *Korumber*, or to any other station as convenient, near, and within our own borders, and to remain there until further orders and that he be supplied with ammunition, guns, and stores for complete battalions.

4thly. That the Commander in Chief be requested to issue the necessary orders for carrying the resolutions of the Board into execution on the two foregoing propositions.

5thly.

5thly. That a letter be written to the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, with the ſame ſubſtance with Colonel *Goddard*'s inſtructions, according to the accompanying draft N° 2.

6thly. That a letter be written to *Moodajee Booſla*, according to the annexed draft, No. 3.

7thly. That a letter be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, adviſing them of Colonel *Goddard*'s inſtructions, and requiring them to conform to them; and in the mean time to be prepared either for repelling any hoſtile attempts of the Marattas, or for any other ſervice which may hereafter be judged neceſſary, but to undertake nothing offenſively without explicit and poſitive orders from us.

8thly. That a letter be written to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, to inform them of this deſign, and, in the event of their ſucceſs againſt *Mahé*, to order all the troops which are now employed in that expedition to remain there, or otherwiſe at *Tellicherry*, and to be prepared to move on the receipt of any orders for their junction with our forces on that ſide of *India*.

Theſe diſpoſitions are propoſed as the neceſſary preparatives to any plan which we may be hereafter compelled to concert, with the aid of the other Preſidencies, in the event of a war with the Marattas alone, or joined with the French, or of an attempt ſingly made by the French on the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

The ſubſequent arrangements I leave to the Commander in Chief, to whoſe province they officially belong.

Read the following letters from Major *Camac*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to inform you of my arrival here on the 20th ultimo, which is fifteen coſs diſtant from *Burwah*; but from its apparent healthy ſituation, the goodneſs of its water, and eaſineſs of getting proviſion, is much preferable to it. Ever ſince my arrival, I have been very impatient for inſtructions for my further progreſs, but have neither heard from the Council nor from Colonel *Goddard* on that head.

I have wrote to the Colonel ſeveral times, informing him of all the particulars relative to my detachment, and requeſting his directions alſo how I am to act in reſpect to the countries which I am to paſs through.

I have diſpatched ſeveral Hircarrahs to *Bimbajee*, telling him of our friendly intentions, and requeſting him to ſend a perſon to meet me, in order to obviate my march, and to give aſſurances to the inhabitants that they have nothing to apprehend from us.

Since my arrival I have heard from report, that the treaty with *Moodajee* has not been concluded, which I am doubtful may alter the plan of my march. When I ſet out it was expected that he would forward my progreſs, and with this view it was not thought neceſſary to furniſh me with more ammunition than was ſufficient for that occaſion; I have now only forty rounds per man, and ten rounds in the pouches, with one hundred and fifteen round and grape for each of the guns; which ſtock is not more than we ought to be provided with for a ſingle action, conſidering how much ammunition the native troops uſually conſume. If, therefore, we ſhould be obliged to act ſeparately, or the countries we have to paſs ſhould be hoſtile to us, as they are ſtrong and difficult, and ſome oppoſition and ſkirmiſhing may be expected, we ought in that caſe to be provided with much more. I have thought proper to mention this to you, as the nature of the ſervice may now be ſo much changed, from the failure of the negociation with *Moodajee*.

In order that at all events I may be able to act without any unneceſſary delay, I have ventured to ſend an Indent to *Patna*, which will complete us to one hundred and fifty rounds a man, and two hundred for each of the guns, which I think is the leaſt we ought to have with us, in caſe any oppoſition is to be expected.

Two hundred of the drafts have no arms; thoſe from *Berrampore* were ſent away without any, and were moreover ſtript of their coats, though they were property, having already paid for them; and though the Council had ordered new ones to be made up in their ſtead. Appendix, No. 191.

Our march was delayed much by the badneſs of the carriage bullocks, as we got only ſeventy from *Burdwan*, which were preferable to thoſe brought from *Calcutta*; all the good ones belonging to the former place being either ſent out of the way, or hid; with this, and the deſertion of the drivers, the magazine was ſtrewed in the roads, and could never have been got on, was it not for the activity of Captain *Mayaffre*, and ſixty Sepoys placed with him, who were obliged to act the part of drivers. The guns went very well, and even outmarched the Sepoys all the way; but the diſtreſs of individuals was very great; ſervants of all ſorts extorted large ſums from their maſters, and took the firſt opportunity of leaving them; the gentlemen were forced to advance two or three months pay to their coolies and bearers, at the extravagant rate of eight rupees a man, who threw down their baggage, and left them after the firſt three or four days; it is a pity that theſe could not be brought to puniſhment, and this matter regulated for the benefit of future detachments under the ſame circumſtances.

At the range of hills which parts *Patchete* from *Naigpore*, there were two Gauts, one of Junck, and the other called *Jymarah*, through the Tamar and Boondo diſtricts; theſe I paſſed in two diviſions; and, as troops had never marched through them before, I wrote to Lieutenant *Rankins*, who was ſurveying in the neighbourhood, to go with one diviſion, whilſt Lieutenant *Cameron* accompanied the other. I embraced this opportunity, which might not again offer (becauſe of the turbulency in theſe hills) to have thoſe paſſes traced, which may be eſſential for military ſervice, and for the benefit of future detachments.

I thought it neceſſary to halt at *Jelda* three days, to get proviſions, and to get in the Gaut Wallahs, who had made ſome ſhew of reſiſtance; I was induced to this that I might not be inſulted without puniſhing them, in caſe they had the temerity to fire on us, as we had not time to throw away. On this occaſion, *Borun Sing*, who behaved ſo ill to Mr. *Daniel*, was very inſolent, but did not proceed further. For the coming in of theſe Gaut Wallahs, I am much obliged to *Purſanab Sing*, the Rajah of *Ramgur*, who came to me to *Julda*, and accompanied me through them.

Mr. *Hewitt* alſo was very obliging, and extremely aſſiduous in providing every thing we ſtood in need of; we had much occaſion for his aſſiſtance, for we might as well have come through a deſert as *Burdwan*; the inhabitants had all left their villages (as we were informed) by order of a man called *Byjonate*, who was ſent on before by the Ranny's people for this purpoſe.

We have not had twenty men deſerted ſince our march, and thoſe were all from the drafts; the Sepoys are all in very good ſpirits, and will go wherever we want them; however, it is to be apprehended that many of the followers will run away, though every means has been uſed to encourage them.

At this place we joined Captain *Crawford*'s corps, which he has already brought into very good order and diſcipline: he has ſupplied me with a vaſt addition to my Buzar, and I expect much from his aſſiſtance.

I am in eager expectation to hear from *Bimbajee*, and of the political ſtate of matters to the weſtward; when any thing material occurs, I ſhall not fail immediately to adviſe you of it.

I have, &c.

Camp at *Corambah*, in *Chuttah Naigpore*, 11th March 1779. (Signed) *Jacob Camac.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have had for ſeveral days reports of the defeat of the Bombay army, and we have had it ſince confirmed by

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by very authentic letters by way of *Patna* and *Banaras*. In this posture of affairs I was entirely without instructions for my further progress, until yesterday that a Cossid arrived from Colonel *Goddard*, with a letter for me, dated at *Asseragur* 28th of January, two days from *Boorhampore*. In this he directs me to proceed, in case *Moodajee Boosla* should give his concurrence and consent to my passing through his country, and gives me instructions for my route to *Poonah*. He acquaints me he has wrote to the Berar Prince on this subject, who will forward this letter to me with one from himself, intimating his approbation of the measure. That I am to obviate or overrule any objections he may make for detaining me, unless urged in the most pointed terms; and that in case of his refusal I am to remain at the extremity of the Company's provinces, till I receive further orders either from your Board or from himself.

Moodajee, after keeping the Hircarrahs waiting for five days, permitted them to come away without any letters for me; so that, without his approbation or disapprobation, I am now left to my own judgment. Indeed, circumstanced as we are, I should be apt to deem his silence a disapproval. *Bimbajee* too has not wrote me in answer to my letters. He holds the adjoining parts of *Moodajee*'s dominions, and though he is in a manner independent, may be cautious of taking such a measure without his brother's consent.

Undoubted news is now come, dated the 5th of February, from *Boorhaunpoor*, that the Colonel, hearing of our disaster near *Poonah*, was to march that night for *Surat*; so that if he pursues his intention, it will be in vain my thinking to join him. Had he kept his ground at *Boorhaunpoor*, or had determined on returning by *Burrar*, I should have thought it indispensable for me to march immediately to support him.

In this situation, I think it necessary to pursue a middle course, until I shall receive further lights: Colonel *Goddard* may be obliged to give up his scheme of going to *Surat*; he may obliged to return through *Nagpoor*: *Madajee* may be induced through fear, or to pay court to the prevailing side, to behave unfriendly to him. I propose therefore advancing slowly into *Ruttempoor*, professing the greatest friendship for *Moodajee* and his brother, until I hear further from them; which will be the means of keeping *Moodajee* at least at home, secure the Colonel on that side, and further his retreat, if necessary, through *Burar* into our provinces; or push on to join him, if offensive measures should be determined on. In the mean time, whilst I am moving slowly on, Captain *Crawford*, whom I shall direct to remain for some time at *Burwa*, to forward provision and keep open the communication, will escort to me the supply of ammunition, which I have indented for to *Patna*, and will then return to *Burwa*, or to his station at *Chetrah*.

Lest you should think it extraordinary that a detachment so lately come out should want ammunition, I took the liberty of mentioning it in my last. The circumstances under which it was supposed I was to proceed then, made very little requisite, and no more than a sufficient quantity for that purpose was provided. Things being now so much changed since that time, I thought it expedient that I should be completed for any contingency; and, to prevent unnecessary delay, indented to *Patna* for a sufficient quantity. I am only apprehensive that enough of musket ammunition or powder is not to be got there, and beg that you will direct whatever has been indented for may on requisition be supplied from *Burar* or *Chuna*. I beg also you will write to *Patna* to supply me with money, which we shall be soon in much want of.

Enclosed is the proceeding of a general court-martial held in this camp on the 25th of February, and which has been dissolved. I have, &c.

Camp at *Korumba*, *Chuta Nagpore*, 14th March 1779. (Signed) *Jacob Camac*.

Resolved, that the following letter be written to Major *Camac*:—

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 14th ultimo.—We desire that you return to *Korumba*, where you will encamp the detachment under your command, and there wait our further orders.

We are, &c.

Warren Hastings,
Rich. Barwell,
P. Francis.

To *Siccarom Pundit* and *Balajee Pundit*.

I have received your letter, containing various complaints of the conduct of the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, and other particulars, which I fully understand.

This letter not having been as usual accompanied by one from the Peishwa, I think it necessary to inform you of it, lest, should one have been written and miscarried in the way, there might appear an impropriety in my not returning an answer to it.

I have heard by various channels some particulars of the late events on that side of *India*, and have received some little and imperfect intelligence relative thereto from the gentlemen of *Bombay*; but, till my knowledge of those matters is more complete and authentic, I must suspend my judgment respecting the rectitude of the conduct of the members of that Government. I hear with the greatest surprize, that the Chiefs of the army from *Bombay* have made a convention with you without the authority of this Government, which you well know was indispensably necessary for an act of that nature, and that the conditions of it are very injurious to the rights of the Company and the honour of the English name. I have not yet received a copy of it; but, whatever it may be, it is incumbent on me to take the earliest occasion to disavow it, and declare it null.

This declaration ought to be unnecessary to you, to whom the like information was given in form on the deputation of Colonel *Upton*.

The past cannot be recalled; but for the future it is my firm wish, that, as I laboured before, however ineffectually, to conciliate the differences which had arisen between you and the Government of *Bombay*, and which prevented the execution of the treaty made through Colonel *Upton*, peace may be yet restored, and all past grievances buried in oblivion. For this purpose, I and the Counsellors of this Government have authorized Colonel *Goddard* to negociate and conclude with you, in the name and behalf of the Company, a new treaty, confirming that made by Colonel *Upton*, on these conditions, viz. That you relinquish all claims derived from the unauthorized act of our army, and which could not even have received the sanction of the Presidency of *Bombay*; and that you also engage never to grant the French, who are the enemies of our nation, any settlement or residency in the ports of the Peishwa, nor to admit the forces of the French into any part of his dominions, nor to form any alliance nor any connection with them, either for traffic or otherwise.

On these conditions, we offer you the friendship of the Company, and the English nation, for ever. If you reject them, we are remediless, and blameless of the consequences, whatever they may be, as peace or war depend upon your determination.

For further particulars I must refer you to Colonel *Goddard*, to whom I have granted full powers for the purposes above described, and desire that you will regard him accordingly, as the Representative of this Government, and his acts, done under this authority, as the acts of the Company, and of the English nation.

To the Peishwa in substance the same as the foregoing.

Draft

Draft of a Letter to *Moodajee Booſla.*

I have received your letters. They are long, and dictated with the ſame wiſdom and friendſhip with which all your former letters have been written: but as the great object of them all is now entirely at an end, it is unneceſſary to recapitulate the ſubſtance of them. *Beneram Pundit* is arrived, and has delivered to me the paper which you entruſted to his charge: at his deſire, in obedience to your poſitive injunctions, and the other oath which I underſtand he ſwore to perform them, the paper was delivered and opened in the preſence of *Rameaunt Moonſhy*, and read to me by him. Having fully underſtood the contents, I have returned the paper to *Beneram Pundit*, at his particular requeſt, that it might be ſent in its original ſtate to you; this alſo being, as I underſtand, a part of his inſtructions. Reſpecting the different points contained therein, they are ſuch as will not admit either of negociation or comment; I conceive them to have been intended as an implicit but deciſive anſwer upon a ſubject in its own nature ſo delicate, and rendered more ſo by the paſt interchange of our ſentiments upon it, and our known mutual wiſhes, that you apparently choſe this indirect method of declining to engage any further in it, rather than to relinquiſh it by an abrupt declaration which might have been conſtrued unſuitable to the friendſhip and cordiality which have hitherto ſubſiſted ſince ſo long a period, and which I hope will ever ſubſiſt between us, and between your family and the Company and Engliſh nation; otherwiſe it was certainly unneceſſary to have ſent a perſon honoured with ſo high a degree of your confidence as *Beneram Pundit* poſſeſſes, upon ſo long and perilous a journey, merely to give me the information which might have been expreſſed by a letter containing no more than a ſingle line. What is paſt, is paſt—of the deſign which I had formed, I ſhall totally relinquiſh all future thoughts; but of your paſt kindneſs I ſhall retain a laſting remembrance.

When I firſt wrote to you that an Engliſh army had been appointed to proceed to the other ſide of *India*, and deſired you to aſſiſt it in its progreſs, you immediately returned an anſwer expreſſing your cheerful compliance; and not contented with bare profeſſions, which are oftener the maſk of deceit than the indication of ſincerity, you wrote at the ſame time to the commander of our forces, inviting him to paſs through your country; you ſent a perſon of rank and truſt to wait on the borders of your dominions with a ſtore of proviſions for their ſubſiſtence; you cauſed them to be entertained, in the long ſtay they made in your country, with all hoſpitality, and have continued the ſame conduct to them ſince their departure.

Theſe are not complimentary or equivocal, but real and ſubſtantial acts of friendſhip; as ſuch, it is eſpecially at this time incumbent on me to expreſs the ſenſe that I entertain of them, as it is my wiſh, and ſhall be my care, to make every ſuitable return to them, whenever any future occaſion of your affairs ſhall demand it.

I have ordered Major *Camac* to remain within the borders of *Bengal*, and not to proceed any further; but have not yet determined whether he ſhall return to *Calcutta*, or join any other part of our army; this muſt depend on future contingencies.

Poſtſcript.—Since I wrote the above, I have received a letter from Major *Camac*, informing me that orders had been ſent him by Colonel *Goddard* to proceed forward and join him, provided it ſhould be agreeable to you, without whoſe inſtructions he was to take no ſtep: that for this purpoſe the Colonel had written to you, requeſting that you would either ſend a paſſport to Major *Camac*, or intimate to him your diſapproval of his proceedings; in which latter caſe he would lay aſide the deſign—That the Coſſid ſent to you by the Colonel having been detained five days at *Naigpore*, and then bringing with him no letter or inſtructions from you, he had conceived it a tacit conſent to his march, and that for private reaſons you might not chooſe to truſt it to writing; and that he was therefore marching on ſlowly.

As this meaſure is by no means agreeable to me, I have written to Major *Camac* to return within our borders. Appendix. No. 191.

Agreed to the propoſitions contained in the Governor General's minute; and

Reſolved, That the following letters be written to the Select Committee of *Bombay* and *Fort Saint George*, and to Colonel *Goddard*; and that the Governor General be requeſted to write, in the propoſed terms, to the Peiſhwa and *Moodajee Booſla.*

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter of the 21ſt February.

We wiſh that you had not apprehended the perſon of *Gazidy Cawn*, as it has the appearance of at leaſt an act of violence to him, which no pretext can juſtify, and which may furniſh occaſion for jealouſies, that at this time you ſhould be particularly careful to avoid. We muſt therefore earneſtly recommend to you, inſtantly to grant him his liberty, peremptorily inſiſting that he do immediately quit the Engliſh territories; and, if you have an opportunity, we further recommend that you forward him on his way to *Mecca.*

We have deemed it neceſſary to inveſt Colonel *Goddard* with full powers, as the public Miniſter of this Government, to treat with the Peiſhwa, and the Miniſter of the Maratta State, for the renewal or confirmation of the treaty of *Pvoondur*, provided they will recede from the pretenſions which they have acquired by the late engagements of Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, and will agree not to admit any French force into their dominions, nor allow that nation to form any eſtabliſhment on the Maratta coaſt; empowering him to conclude a treaty of peace with them on theſe conditions; acceptance or refuſal of which muſt determine the alternative of peace or war.

Our firſt object in this negociation is to obtain a peace on honourable terms: in the mean time we recommend to you to be prepared, either for repelling any hoſtile attempts of the Marattas, or for any other ſervice which we may hereafter judge neceſſary; and we do formally forbid you to undertake any offenſive meaſure without explicit and poſitive orders from us.

We are, &c.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter of the

and, in conſequence of your urgent deſire to be furniſhed with a ſupply of treaſure from hence, we have reſolved to ſend you fifteen lacks of current rupees in gold; ten lacks of this ſum we ſhall diſpatch immediately by the *Stafford*, and the remaining five lacks will be forwarded by the firſt ſafe conveyance in Auguſt: we ſhall take an early opportunity of replying to the other parts of your letter.

We have deemed it expedient to inveſt Colonel *Goddard* with full powers, as the public Miniſter of this Government, to treat with the Peiſhwa and Miniſters of the Maratta State, for the renewal or confirmation of the treaty of *Proondur*, provided they will recede from the pretenſions which they have acquired by their late engagements with Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, and that they will engage not to admit any French forces into their dominions, nor allow that nation to form any eſtabliſhments on the Maratta coaſt; and that the acceptance or refuſal of theſe conditions muſt determine the alternative of peace or war.

Having thus informed you of our deſigns, we deſire, in the event of ſucceſs in the enterprize now carrying on by your Government againſt *Mahie*, that you will order all the troops which are now employed on the expedition to remain there, or otherwiſe at *Tellicherry*, and to be prepared to move on the receipt of any orders for their junction with our other forces on the weſtern ſide of *India*, in the event of its becoming neceſſary.

Sir,

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To Colonel Goddard.

Sir,

Having under conſideration the late advices from *Bombay*, we have deemed it neceſſary to inveſt you with full powers, as the public Miniſter of this Government to treat with the Peiſhwa, and the Miniſters of the Maratta State, for the renewal or confirmation of the treaty of *Proonder*; provided they will recede from the pretenſions which they have acquired by the late engagements of Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, and will agree not to admit any French forces into their dominions, nor allow that nation to form any eſtabliſhments on the Maratta coaſt; and we empower you to conclude a final treaty of peace with them on theſe conditions; the acceptance or refuſal of which muſt determine the alternative of peace or war.

The points in which we are willing to allow you a diſcretion to relax are theſe:

1ſt. To yield up the balance which may yet remain due to the Company, of the ſum of twelve lacks of rupees, which the Maratta Government were bound, by the 6th article of the treaty of *Proonder*, to pay as an indemnification for the expences of the war undertaken in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, and for which aſſignments were taken on *Jamboo ſeer*, and muſt of courſe be relinquiſhed with this conceſſion. The ſecond point is the amount of the lands in the neighbourhood of *Broach*, ſtipulated by the fifth article of the treaty of *Proonder* to be ceded to the Company, yielding a complete rent of three lacks of rupees. The words which the tranſlation render "complete revenue," are in the original, *Jumma Cahmil*; which have been interpreted by the Miniſters, the Jumma or rent at which the lands are rated in the public account of the revenues; and the lands which were offered by them amounted to three lacks, according to their eſtimated amount, although their real produce has been ſtated to us by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to amount to no more than rupees 209,200.

We think this not a point worth conteſting, at the hazard of an object ſo important as peace, if it ſhould prove an impediment to it, and we therefore empower you to accept of the lands tendered as above.

The nature of our connection with *Ragonaut Row* being very materially changed by the ſurrender of his perſon to the Marattas, we cannot inſiſt on the literal confirmation of thoſe articles in the treaty of *Proonder* which were ſtipulated in his favour, nor, ignorant of his preſent condition, can we preſcribe any expreſs terms which ſhould be required on his behalf, but generally recommend to you to obtain ſuch proviſions for him as you ſhall judge the moſt ſuited to his preſent circumſtances, for his perſonal ſafety and ſubſiſtence, making the former an indiſpenſable engagement.

Upon the whole, Sir, our object is peace, if it can be obtained on ſecure and honourable terms. By concluding a peace on ſuch terms, you will render a moſt acceptable ſervice to the Company, and merit our higheſt approbation.

We encloſe you a letter of credence inveſting you with this power, and a copy of the treaty of *Proonder* for your more particular information.

We are, &c.

To Colonel *Thomas Goddard*, commanding the detachment from the 1ſt brigade.

We the Governor General and Supreme Council of *Bengal*, in virtue of the authority and powers veſted in us by the Legiſlature of *Great Britain*, and by the Honourable *Eaſt India* Company, to direct and controul the political affairs of all the Company's ſettlements in *India*, relying on your fidelity, prudence, and integrity, do depute, authorize, and empower you, in our names, and on behalf of the Honourable the United *Eaſt India* Company, to negociate and conclude a treaty of peace and friendſhip between the Chiefs and Rulers of the Maratta State and the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, on ſuch terms and conditions as ſhall be for the mutual honour, benefit, and ſatisfaction of both parties, and remove all the cauſe of enmity now ſubſiſting between that State and the Government of *Bombay*; and we hereby give you full powers to this effect, declaring that we will ratify and confirm whatever ſhall be ſo concluded by you in our names and in our behalf, according to the inſtructions with which you have been furniſhed for that purpoſe.

Given in *Fort William*, under our hands, and the Great Seal of the United Company, this fifth day of April in the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-nine.

Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis.

From *Madajee Bhoſila*: received 20th February 1779.

Your agreeable letter bearing date the 3d Zehedja, 23d November 1778, conceived in terms calculated to carry our friendſhip to the higheſt pitch, recapitulating the contents of my former letters, and adding, that my views and ſentiments perfectly coinciding with your's, gives a certainty of ſucceſs to our common deſigns; that you have therefore appointed Colonel *Goddard* in the room of the late Mr. *Elliott*, and given him directions to act in concert with my forces; that I will not therefore let ſlip the opportunity which now preſents itſelf of exalting my name above thoſe of the moſt illuſtrious chiefs; that I muſt not neglect the preſent moment, as an opportunity once loſt is hardly ever recovered; and adding, that a word to the wiſe is ſufficient: this letter reached me on the 20th of Zehedja, 9th February, by the route of *Cuttack*, followed by a duplicate, and afforded me the higheſt degree of pleaſure, conveying with it the proofs of the utmoſt ſincerity and warmth of friendſhip, and convincing me of the wiſdom of your plans, your magnanimity, penetration, and foreſight, which are the firmeſt ſupport of Government, and give a certain aſſurance of ſucceſs in the moſt arduous undertakings.

I likewiſe underſtand what you write reſpecting the favourable opportunity which preſents itſelf; the caſe is this:—Men of underſtanding, who are experienced in affairs and ſkilled in all the duties of Government, before they engage in any undertaking, make it their buſineſs maturely to conſider the probable event, and take their meaſures accordingly, omitting no means which the moſt conſummate prudence can dictate to enſure ſucceſs: all your letters abound with theſe ſentiments; and where both parties enter upon an undertaking upon mature judgment and foreſight, and from a knowledge of the probable event, ſuch undertaking will be crowned with ſucceſs; the ſentiments of each will meet the approbation of the other, and their views will coincide in every inſtance, and every plan be purſued which may promote the common intereſt, every deſign freely communicated, and no reſerve obſerved.

When Colonel *Goddard* had croſſed the *Nudbuddar*, and was arrived at *Hoſhingabad*, which is dependant on me, he deputed Mr. *Watherſtone* to me, and agreeable to your inſtructions informed me of his arrival, that he had received inſtructions from *Calcutta* to concert a plan of operations with me, and requeſted to be informed of my ſentiments, and that it was expedient I ſhould not let the preſent opportunity ſlip;—in reply thereto, actuated by ſentiments of the ſincereſt friendſhip, knowing that you had placed the moſt implicit confidence in me, I ſaid, "This is a buſineſs of the greateſt difficulty and delicacy; "I am perfectly acquainted with the ſtate of all the "Powers in the country, and with the affairs of the "*Decan*, which is my country; that an army was called "together at *Poonah* of 70,000 horſe, and that immediately on intelligence of the connection formed between us they would be increaſed to 100,000, and "that, actuated by a love of their country, their families, "and a regard to their fame, the Chiefs would diſregard "their lives, and make aſtoniſhing exertions to oppoſe "any attempt that ſhould be made againſt them; that "therefore to meet them in arms would require at the "leaſt

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" leaſt an army of 50,000 men from hence, in addition " to the Engliſh force, and large magazines of provi- " ſions and ſtores; that the aſſembling ſuch an army and " military ſtores would require an immenſe treaſure, and " moreover a long ſpace of time would be required to " conciliate the minds of the different Chiefs, and to " draw over the moſt conſiderable to our party; that " being now arrived at *Hoſhingabad*, and calling on me " to join him, it was impoſſible for me to comply; that " if this had been intimated to me in former letters, I " ſhould have been on my guard, and employed the " ten or twelve months which have elapſed in the nego- " ciation, in raiſing forces and collecting military ſtores; " but that all the letters I had received from *Calcutta* " were to this effect—that the detachment was ſent to " *Bombay* for an apprehenſion of the deſigns of the French, " and deſiring that on its arrival on my territories I would " take care to ſupply it with proviſions and all other ne- " ceſſaries, and ſend a ſmall party to accompany it to " the borders of my country: now that I learn this im- " portant deſign, how can I at ſo ſhort a notice carry it " into effect? Every ſtep that is taken ſhould be taken " with firmneſs, and on mature reflection; that there- " fore I thought it adviſable to ſend *Beneram Pundit* " and *Ramkund* to *Calcutta*, and to charge them with " my inſtructions reſpecting the final concluſion of this " matter; that after their arrival there, and ſettling the " points of negociation, and the receipt of letters from " *Calcutta* addreſſed to me and him, a plan of operations " ſhould be ſettled; till that time, if he choſe it, I would " have him remain at *Hoſhingabad*, and take with " him a part of my forces, &c. and reduce the fort of " *Mundilla*, which had revolted from me, and that " whatever money he collected ſhould be divided into " equal proportions between us; that if he did not " agree to this propoſal, either let him proceed to *Bom-* " *bay*, as there was now no danger from the Maratta " forces, who were all gone to oppoſe the Engliſh at " *Borgaut* in the Cokun country; that the Engliſh " from *Bombay*, with their army, were arrived at the ſaid " Gaut, and were followed by *Ragonaut Row*; that he " ſhould go thither: in a word, that he ſhould remain " wherever he thought proper, but that wherever he " ſhould fix he ſhould wait for further advices from " *Calcutta*."

Mr. *Watherſtone* having maturely conſidered and underſtood all theſe particulars, returned ſatisfied to the army.

I diſpatched copies to you by the route of *Benaras*, with letters containing the particulars of this negociation, which I hope you have before this time received; Colonel *Goddard* likewiſe has doubtleſs written you on the ſame ſubject. I have not yet heard from Colonel *Goddard*'s army, nor do I know if he will remain at *Hoſhingabad*, go towards the fort *Mondilla*, or proceed to *Bombay*; we ſhall ſee what he writes. You will give the neceſſary directions to Colonel *Goddard*.

Beneram Pundit and *Ramkund* have left this, charged with letters of commiſſions to you, and will proceed by the route of *Cuttack*; they have orders to uſe every poſſible expedition, and on their arrival will repreſent to you whatever I have given them in charge, and will make ſome important propoſitions to you; by the ſpirit of wiſdom you will diſcover, that the foundation of them is like the wall of *Alexander*, and built on the ſincereſt foundation, and will pay due attention thereto; and *Beneram Pundit* having fulfilled the purport of his miſſion, you will ſend him back without delay, that agreeable thereto I may plan the execution of the moſt important affairs. I impatiently wait your reply.

From *Dewagur Pundit*: received the 26th February 1779.

Your friendly letter, containing ſeveral *friendly* intimations and hints reſpecting your ſecret views and deſigns; the appointment of Colonel *Goddard*, on the part of the Council, to concert and adjuſt all matters, with the advice and concurrence of this Government; and briefly touching on knowledge of the ſeaſon of action, and not to let the fortunate opportunity which preſents itſelf ſlip, with other particulars of the moſt important nature, arrived in a happy hour; and by its contents, which I perfectly underſtood, afforded me the greateſt pleaſure: and Mr. *Watherſtone* likewiſe, who came here on the part of Colonel *Goddard*, made the like repreſentations, and was anſwered in the manner which the ſituation of the times, and the knowledge of the ſtate of affairs in *Decan* in general, and at *Poonah* in particular, rendered it expedient. It was therefore judged proper to depute *Beneram Pundit*, accompanied by *Ramkund*, a follower of the late Mr. *Elliott*, to *Calcutta*, and to concert the operations agreeable to the anſwers which ſhould be received from thence. This determination was communicated to Mr. *Watherſtone*, who then departed for the army encamped at *Hoſhingabad*, on this ſide the *Nubader*. Time will ſhew, whether, conformably thereto, the army halts at *Hoſhingabad*, or *Gurra Mundillah*, or proceeds towards *Bombay*; whichever meaſure is adopted, I will communicate to you. What you write of your hopes of the fortunate iſſue of your deſigns, with the concurrence and aſſiſtance of this Government, founded on your knowledge of the magnanimity and fortitude of my maſter, and my wiſdom and abilities in government, I perfectly underſtand.

By the bleſſing of God, the excellent plans you form are always built on the moſt ſolid and judicious grounds; and your magnanimity and extenſive views are without parallel in *Indoſtan* and *Decan*. And from the commencement of this undertaking I have conſtantly written and declared to the Engliſh Chiefs, the meaſures which my confined abilities and judgment pointed out to me as moſt likely to bring it to a fortunate iſſue: accordingly, with the approbation of *Watherſtone*, a letter in the fulleſt and cleareſt terms was diſpatched to you; and *Beneram Pundit*, and *Ramkund*, a follower of Mr. *Elliott*, were diſpatched by the way of *Cuttack*, charged with letters, and ſeveral points of negociation, for the final ſettlement of the ground-work of the important deſigns in hand; I doubt not but he will ſhortly arrive, and fully repreſent to you the particulars with which he is charged; and having attained the ends of his miſſion, that you will, without delay, give him his diſmiſſion, by which means it is poſſible the common deſigns may be brought to a ſatisfactory iſſue. Your reply is impatiently expected; and that this matter be ſettled on ſuch firm and ſolid grounds, that the advantages thereof may be felt by the lateſt poſterity, and the warmth and ſincerity of my friendſhip and attachment proved to a demonſtration.

For further particulars I beg leave to refer you to the Maha Rajah's letter, which is full and explicit.

From *Beneram Pundit*: received the 5th March 1779.

I did myſelf the honour to addreſs ſeveral arzies to you before I left *Naigpore*, informing you of Mr. *Watherſtone*'s coming thither, and after various conferences returning to the army; which I hope you have received.

I took leave of my maſter on the 24th Zehedja, 13th January, and began my journey, accompanied by *Salla Ramkund*, the late Mr. *Elliott*'s Moonſhey, and arrived at *Cuttack* on the 7th Juffer, 24th February. *Lalla Ramkund* is gone to perform religious ceremonies at *Jaggarnaut*, and I am detained here a little by ſome buſineſs with *Rajah Ram*, but ſhall ſhortly renew my journey, and ſoon have the pleaſure of preſenting myſelf before you, and explaining all the particulars of my commiſſion fully to you.

On the day of my arrival here I received letters from the Maha Rajah and his Dewan, to your addreſs, which I now do myſelf the pleaſure to encloſe to you: I hope they will ſhortly reach you, and make you acquainted

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with their contents. My brother *Biſſenber Pundit* will communicate to you the news from *Poonah*. At *Saranagan* I met with *Yatakee*, the ſervant whom you ſent to erect a monument for the late Mr. *Elliott*; I went two coſs out of my way to viſit the tomb of the bleſſed deceaſed, and likewiſe waited on the Chief of the Rajah *Biſhenaut Sing*, and preſſed him warmly to afford his aſſiſtance, and to ſupply neceſſaries for the completion of the monument; but, as ſtone-cutters and other artificers cannot be had in that diſtrict, and muſt be brought from *Simbulpore*, I went thither, and made it my requeſt to the Dewan *Akber*, that he would furniſh *Yattakee*, on his application, with artificers, and every thing he ſhould require for the completion of the monument. He obliged me by his promiſe of a cheerful compliance, and ſent a man to the ſpot. I have no doubt but the buſineſs will now go on briſkly, and will be ſhortly completed.

From *Moodajee Bhoſſlah*: received 5th March 1779.

I ſome time ago, after the arrival of Colonel *Goddard* at *Hoſhingabad*, and Mr. *Watherſtone*'s coming hither, the former of whom had been appointed from *Calcutta*, to act with my advice and concurrence in the deſigns projected, wrote you very fully, in repeated letters, whatever prudence, foreſight, and a perfect knowledge of the real ſtate of affairs, and the force of the armies in the *Decan*, which is my own country, pointed out to me, and likewiſe communicated to you whatever I learnt on theſe ſubjects; I likewiſe diſpatched *Beneram Pundit* and *Ramkund*, with letters full of advice and important plans for the future, by the way of *Cuttack*, who I doubt not will after ſome time arrive at *Calcutta*, and, having explained to you all the particulars with which they are charged, will form ſuch ſolid engagements as may be the foundation of a firm treaty, which ſhall deſcend to the lateſt poſterity; and that *Beneram Pundit*, having procured all the neceſſaries for carrying it into execution, may be immediately diſpatched to this quarter.

I ſent word to Colonel *Goddard* by Mr. *Watherſtone*, to write to the Bombay gentlemen, who had brought *Ragonaut Row* with a moderate army into the neighbourhood of *Poonah*, and commenced hoſtilities with the forces of *Pundit Pundhaum*, who were prepared to receive them, to ſuſpend their operations, and that he himſelf ſhould halt ſome time in the Mundilla and Guna diſtricts, by which time *Beneram Pundit* would return from *Calcutta* with deciſive and ſatisfactory anſwers, by which he ought to regulate his motions; and that this advice was founded on the ſtate of the times: in reply, he wrote me that he had written what was proper to *Bombay*, to put a ſtop to hoſtilities, and that letters from *Calcutta* having been ſent to the ſame effect, he had no doubt that they would lay aſide their hoſtile deſigns, and would act with a Samorcand policy; that he could not halt in the diſtrict of *Guna Mundilla* without orders from *Calcutta*; that he was marching to the weſtward to *Binhampore*, where he would wait in expectation of the reſult of the negociations at *Calcutta*, and the return of *Beneram Pundit*: in a word, he proſecuted this deſign in preference to all others, and marched from *Hoſhingabad*, and I have not ſince heard from him how far he has advanced.

Certain intelligence has lately been received here from *Poonah*, that ſeveral engagements have been fought between the Bombay army and the forces of *Pundit Pundhaum*, and that in the end the Engliſh inconſiderately and raſhly quitted the Gauts with *Ragonaut Row*, and deſcended into the plain, when the Maratta army of 50,000 horſe, judging it a favourable opportunity, began an engagement with them by a cannonade from their large artillery, which will throw a ball one or even two coſs diſtance, and kept themſelves ſecure behind their guns; the engagement was very hot, and in the end the Maratta army ſurrounded the ſmall body oppoſed to them, and took poſſeſſion of 3 p^s of artillery, their tents, baggage, and artillery bullocks, and killed great numbers. As all communication was cut off from the Engliſh army, they were reduced to the neceſſity of ſending an agent to treat with the Poonah Miniſters; time will ſhew what terms are agreed on, and what will be the reſult of this buſineſs; to the time when the advices came away, the Engliſh continued ſurrounded. Whatever I may hear further, induced by the ſincereſt friendſhip, I ſhall write. Doubtleſs you have received the ſame advice from other quarters. I am in all events ſteady in friendſhip.

I received two parcels of Engliſh papers from Colonel *Goddard*; one containing accounts, the other, letters for the General at *Madras*: I have diſpatched them both: you will receive the accounts, and the letters will be ſent from *Cuttack* to *Madras*.

Poſtſcript.—Since I wrote the above, certain intelligence is arrived from *Poonah*, that the Engliſh being ſtraightly beſieged by the Maratta army, they delivered up *Ragonaut Row* to the Poonah Miniſters, and have entered into engagements to conform to the treaty of *Ballajee Row*.

From *Moodajee Bhoſila*: received 6th March 1779.

Your agreeable letter, containing the joyful news of the ſucceſs of the Engliſh arms in the reduction of *Pondicherry*, the ſeat of the French power in *India*, on the 27th Ramzaun, 18th October 1778, and congratulating me thereon, afforded me inexpreſſible pleaſure; before the receipt of your letter, I had received intelligence of this happy event by the Decan newſpaper, and communicated it to Mr. *James Anderſon*, and directed *Beneram Pundit* to write to you, from whoſe letters I flatter myſelf you received this pleaſing account. I moſt ſincerely congratulate your illuſtrious Monarch, the Company, and yourſelf, on this event; may the Almighty render it joyful to you, and let it be followed by bleſſings innumerable!

From *Dewagur Pundit*: received the 5th March 1779.

Your agreeable letter, containing an account of the ſucceſs of the Engliſh arms in the reduction of *Pondicherry*, the ſeat of the French power in *India*, arrived by the route of *Cuttack*, and afforded me inexpreſſible pleaſure. The Maha Rajah likewiſe received the greateſt joy from the news of your important ſucceſs againſt your enemies the French. I ſincerely congratulate you and all the Chiefs of your nation thereon.

I have already written to you in repeated letters, whatever the ſituation of affairs pointed out as adviſable; and *Beneram Pundit* and *Ramkund* have been diſpatched to you by the way of *Cuttack*, charged with letters from the Maha Rajah, and will on their arrival explain to you all the particulars of their commiſſion. I entertain the greateſt hopes, that, actuated by wiſdom and ſolid judgment, and the dictates of ſound policy, the propoſitions to be made to you will meet with your approbation and aſſent; and that you will ſhortly diſmiſs *Beneram Pundit* with the accompliſhment of the objects of his miſſion.

From the Maha Rajah's letters you will have full information of whatever, prompted by the ſtate of affairs, was written to Colonel *Goddard*, or communicated perſonally to Mr. *Watherſtone*, as well as the advices received from *Poonah*, of hoſtilities between the Engliſh of *Bombay* and the Maratta army; the diſtreſſes of the Engliſh forces, their ſmall army having been ſurrounded by the numerous troops of the Marattas, and in the end their having been reduced to the neceſſity of ſending a perſon to treat of peace and an accommodation with the Miniſters.

I am firmly reſolved, in all events, ſteadily to purſue the dictates of the ſtricteſt friendſhip towards you, who are ſtrictly united in friendſhip with the Maha Rajah my maſter. I wait impatiently the return of *Beneram Pundit*, with the accompliſhment of the objects of his miſſion.

Poſtſcript.—The ſame as that to the Rajah's letters.

From *Dewagar Pundit*: received the 5th March 1779.

When advices, to the effect mentioned in my former letter, arrived from *Poonah*, I inſtantly diſpatched letters,

by ſwift Coſſids, to Colonel *Goddard* with the intelligence; and ſet forth that his proceeding any further towards *Benhampore* was highly unadviſable; that it was expedient, that in compliance with the advice which had been given him from hence, he ſhould halt ſome time in the diſtrict of *Guna Mundilla*, and relinquiſh for the preſent his deſign of advancing; for the Maratta forces would certainly oppoſe him in the neighbourhood of *Benhampore*. You will therefore be pleaſed to write what you judge proper, to induce him not to advance, but to concert his meaſures with us.

As the hurry and precipitation of the Engliſh at *Bombay*, and their imprudence, temerity, and diſregard to your directions ſent them from *Calcutta*, forbidding them to commence hoſtilities (which Colonel *Goddard* has aſſured me, by letter, you did ſend them) have brought affairs to this paſs, you will not be too precipitate and haſty in the proſecution of your former deſigns; ſhould they be delayed months, till a fortunate opportunity preſents itſelf, it is a matter of no moment; but it is neceſſary that the fabric be built on the moſt ſolid baſis, that it may not be ſubject to any ſhock. The form of this fabric, the baſis on which it is built, and the purpoſe for which it was intended, ſhould be kept the moſt profound ſecret till the time of action, and not truſted to a ſingle perſon, except ſuch as are entirely in your confidence, and heartily attached to you; for even walls have ears.

All the particulars have been confided to *Bala Ramkund*, who poſſeſſes wiſdom, prudence, and complete knowledge of buſineſs, and is firmly attached to your Government, and verſed in all the views and deſigns of this. He, in concert with *Beneram Pundit*, will in private fully communicate them to you.—The plan which has been formed, has been entirely built on a complete knowledge of the affairs of the *Decan*: being convinced of this, you will without delay intimate your aſſent to me, that it may be carried into execution without hurry or precipitation. Let a conſtant correſpondence be kept up between us: I am at all times, and on all occaſions, ſincerely attached to you; and whatever I write you will give implicit belief to, and, regarding it as directed by the warmeſt friendſhip, you will act agreeably thereto. Although it may appear preſumptuous in me to write in this manner to Chiefs who poſſeſs ſuch magnanimity and extenſive views, yet the ſincere and hearty friendſhip I bear takes from me the power of reſtraining my pen, and guides it as the heart dictates; what I write flows ſpontaneouſly from the heart.

Poſtſcript.—As within theſe ten months near 50 letters have been received from you, prompted by the warmeſt friendſhip, and with a view to futurity, I have, without reſerve, communicated to you continually every particular reſpecting the ſtate of the *Decan*, in which I am completely verſed; had not theſe been my motives, what elſe could have induced me to have writ to you ſo fully and clearly on all theſe matters?

Copy of a Letter from *Madajee Bhoſila* to *Beneram Pundit*: received by him at *Cuttack*.

You are fully acquainted with all my affairs, and ſentiments, and ſchemes; not the leaſt circumſtance is hidden from you: proceed with the utmoſt diſpatch to the place of your deſtination, and apply diligently to the ſettlement of the buſineſs in hand. Although I wrote repeatedly to Col. *Goddard*, to halt for ſome time in the diſtrict of *Gana Mundilla*, he has paid no regard thereto, but is marched towards *Benhampore*. I have juſt received certain intelligence from *Poonah*, that a great battle has been fought with the Engliſh of *Bombay*, who had paſſed the Gaut, and that the Engliſh were worſted, and are ſurrounded by the Maratta army, and have ſent a perſon to treat of a peace and accommodation with the Poonah Miniſters, and that *Ragonaut Row* is encompaſſed with the Engliſh; we ſhall ſee what will be the reſult. In the beginning of this buſineſs, what I ſaid from the dictates of penetration and foreſight, and a competent knowledge of the armies of the *Decan*, was diſregarded as of no conſideration; it is now come to paſs as I predicted; time will ſhew what plan Colonel *Goddard* will adopt and communicate to me. I have diſpatched letters on the ſubject of theſe events to *Calcutta*, do you repair thither with all expedition, as the moſt material point of all my deſires and plans is the raiſing Sepoys, which at the leaſt muſt amount to 50,000 choice men, under the command of country officers; and moreover firm allies and chiefs of note are requiſite to join the party, all which depend on large ſums of money; you will take effectual methods to accompliſh this material object. For the reſt, nothing, however trifling, is concealed from you; you perfectly underſtand them, and will accompliſh them all; write me an anſwer without delay. You will ſettle the plan on ſo ſolid a baſis, that it may not be ſubject to any change or ſhock, and that our mutual pains may not be thrown away unprofitably. As I have received a great number of letters from the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowla*, and have written him as many, as you know, and as you likewiſe brought a meſſage from him to me, it was for theſe reaſons that I have conſtantly written him whatever came to my knowledge reſpecting the affairs of the *Decan*, and to this I have been prompted by the moſt ſincere friendſhip alone, having had no other view in ſo doing. Exert all your endeavours for the ſucceſs of this, as is the duty of a good ſervant.

From Maha Rajah *Moodajee Bhoſilah*: received the 18th March 1779.

I have been made happy by the receipt of your agreeable letters, under date the 10th, 14th, and 19th of Zehaida, and 9th and 11th Zehedja, and perfectly underſtand all their contents. I am greatly indebted to your friendſhip for the inquiries you made regarding my health, which you heard had much ſuffered. I thank God, who has been pleaſed perfectly to reſtore it to me. The repeated account you give me of the pleaſing event of the capture of *Pondicherry*, on which I have before congratulated you, affords me the higheſt pleaſure: may the Almighty give you joy of it! With reſpect to your letter expreſſing your deſire for the eſtabliſhing of a Dauk, by the route of *Midnapore* and *Morebinge*, by reaſon of the directneſs of the road; the Coſſids who go that way repreſent it as filled with difficulties and dangers. The route of *Cuttack*, although longer, is therefore to be preferred. In the other letter you expreſs yourſelf very fully on your ſecret views and deſigns; the recapitulation of all the particulars would take up too much time; but they are in ſubſtance, that I will not ſuffer the preſent favourable opportunity to eſcape, but will concert all the operations with Colonel *Goddard*, and carry them into execution; and that by ſuch conduct our common intereſt will be effectually promoted. All this I perfectly comprehend, as I am completely maſter of the ſtate of affairs in *Decan*, which is my own country, and no particular thereof is hidden from me; I therefore explained myſelf very fully to Mr. *Watherſtone*, and alſo wrote my ſentiments to Colonel *Goddard*. I alſo diſpatched *Beneram Pundit* and *Lalla Ramkund* with letters to you, and hope that they are by this time arrived, and have explained to you all the points of their commiſſion. Your perfect knowledge in the art of government, and in the management of negociations, will, I doubt not, lead you to approve of the points which will be propoſed to you.

Since the Engliſh at *Bombay*, by their ill-judged and raſh meaſures, and by the precipitation with which they attempted to carry them into execution, have received a ſevere check from the Maratta army, and been obliged to deliver up *Ragonaut Row* to the Poonah Miniſters, and to relinquiſh *Shaſtie*, &c.; to give two hoſtages, and to return to *Bombay* under an eſcort from the Maratta army,

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army, and to conclude a treaty, ſtipulating that Colonel *Goddard* ſhould return; and, as an army conſiſting of near 100,000 horſe is aſſembled at *Poonah*, in high ſpirits and confidence, ſhould Colonel *Goddard* march on, he will undoubtedly meet with the ſevereſt oppoſition: I have therefore written repeatedly to him to return, but have yet received no anſwer, and am filled with uneaſineſs as to the event, ſhould he continue at *Burhampore*; the times abſolutely require that he ſhould return. Should you have received theſe advices at *Calcutta*, you doubtleſs have or will give him inſtructions to return: you will likewiſe direct Major *Camac*, whom you have diſpatched to this quarter, to ſtop; for in important undertakings, and matters of difficulty and danger, magnanimity and fortitude alone are not ſufficient; other points, ſuch as the aſſembling numerous forces, collecting warlike ſtores, and a large treaſure, are equally requiſite, to enable the parties to proſecute them with ſucceſs, in ſpite of all oppoſitions, otherwiſe diſgrace will be the inevitable conſequences. The preſent ſituation of the Engliſh at *Bombay* may ſerve as an example. On the arrival therefore of *Beneram Pundit* and *Ramkaunt*, having learnt the buſineſs of their deputation, and the real ſtate of affairs at *Bombay*, you will form a ſolid plan for the projected operations, which you will communicate in writing to me, or ſend both the deputies back to me, that I may warmly engage in the purſuit thereof.—Further particulars you will learn from my miniſter *Dewagur Pundit*'s letter, written with my concurrence.

Your application to me for aid and aſſiſtance is a proof of the ſincere and warm friendſhip you bear me; but every ſtep which I take in this buſineſs muſt be on mature deliberation, reflection, and on ſolid grounds, that ſo there may be no cauſe for drawing back.

From *Dewagur Pundit*: received 18th March 1779.

Your agreeable letters, accompanied by Karetahs for the Maha Rajah my maſter, the contents of which are very voluminous, and to every point of which I ſhall reply in the ſequel, arrived in a happy hour, and afforded me the higheſt pleaſure; I perfectly underſtand every thing you write. The news of the capture of *Pondicherry*, by the magnanimity of the Engliſh forces, gave me great joy: God give you joy of it!

Your kind inquiry after the health of the Maha Rajah, who you had heard was greatly indiſpoſed, is a proof of your warm friendſhip; although he was very ſeverely attacked, yet the Almighty has been graciouſly pleaſed to reſtore him to perfect health, and he has in a great meaſure recovered his former ſtrength.

As it has ever been the characteriſtic of the Bhoſila family to keep their friendſhip inviolable, and pay the moſt ſcrupulous regard to their word and engagement, and as it is my practice to communicate to every illuſtrious Chief who will place confidence in my judgment and advice, the advantages and diſadvantages attendant on any object in view, I therefore communicated to Mr. *Watherſtone*, and wrote to Colonel *Goddard*, whatever my poor judgment pointed out to me as eligible.

Benerhm Pundit and *Ramkaunt* have been likewiſe diſpatched to you with Karetahs and letters, and will fully communicate with you on all the points entruſted to them; I have no doubt that actuated by your knowledge of the art of government, by your penetration and foreſight into the probable events of any meaſure, you will approve and aſſent to all the propoſitions they will make you. As I am warmly intereſted in the buſineſs in hand, I ſhall obſerve upon all the correſpondence, and from firſt to laſt, and offer my opinion as a ſincere friend on the meaſures which policy points out for the future.

Your firſt letters treated of the diſputes in Europe between the Courts of *Great Britain* and *France*, and of the commencement of war, and of the Poonah Miniſters having received a French envoy, notwithſtanding the treaty ſubſiſting between the Engliſh and *Pundit Purdham*, their granting him the port of *Chowl*, and furniſhing him with an arſenal; your having in conſequence diſpatched a formidable detachment under the command of Colonel *Leſlie* for the ſecurity of *Bombay*, and intimating your deſire, that, in caſe they ſhould paſs this way, they ſhould be aſſiſted with proviſions and other neceſſaries, and a body of forces ſent to conduct them through theſe territories. As the ties of connection with *Bengal*, by reaſon of its vicinity, had been long formed, and *Beneram Pundit* was ſtationed with you ſolely for the purpoſe of cultivating and improving thoſe friendly ties, you were anſwered, *That* no objection would be made to your detachment marching through theſe territories, and that they ſhould be aſſiſted to the utmoſt poſſible, and accompanied to the borders by a perſon of credit.

Intelligence was given to the Poonah Miniſters, and they were informed, that, whilſt they were in a treaty of friendſhip with the Engliſh, their receiving a French Vackeel, and intriguing and forming connections with that nation, in breach of their engagements with the Engliſh, was highly improper and unjuſtifiable. The anſwer from *Poonah* was, that they had not given any encouragement to a French Vackeel; that the perſon who came there, came ſolely for the purpoſes of traffic; and that even him they ſent away, for the ſatisfaction of the Engliſh, and were ſteady at all times to their treaty with them; that we would write aſſurances of this to *Calcutta*.

Letters were accordingly written from hence to *Calcutta*, to that effect, as well as to Colonel *Goddard* and Colonel *Leſlie*, and the ſame was communicated to Mr. *Watherſtone* and Mr. *James Anderſon*. In anſwer thereto Mr. *Watherſtone* replied: "We have not the ſmalleſt "idea of giving ſupport to *Ragonaut Row*, nor any in- "tention of acting hoſtilely againſt *Pundit Peiſhwa* or the "Poonah Miniſters; but we are going from an appre- "henſion of evil deſigns, formed by the French againſt "*Bombay*, and the other poſſeſſions of the Engliſh. If "the Poonah Miniſters give aſſiſtance to the French, we "ſhall certainly commence hoſtilities againſt them." In reply to this, we ſet before him the ſtate of *Decan*, which being our country, we were perfectly acquainted with, and told him that to advance would be highly impolitic, as they would undoubtedly be oppoſed by the Maratta armies in the way; that they had better halt ſome time in the diſtrict of *Mundillah*, &c. in expectation of inſtructions from *Calcutta*. In the mean time, before Colonel *Goddard* reached *Hoſhingabad*, ſeveral letters were received from you, intimating that having ſeveral private matters to communicate, which it would be improper to commit to writing, you had therefore deputed Mr. *Elliott*, a gentleman of ſuperior underſtanding, and entirely in your confidence, to repair hither, who would fully explain the motives of his deputation, and would concert all meaſures; and ſettle all points in conjunction with us; and that, having eſtabliſhed a perpetual friendſhip between the two States, he would write you word thereof. Two or three months paſſed in expectation of Mr. *Elliott*'s arrival, and in the interim ſeveral letters, all tending to the ſame point, that Mr. *Elliott* would ſhortly arrive, and fully explain your views and ſentiments, were received from you. As that gentleman died in the journey, and the news of his deputation reached *Poonah* and *Hydrabad*, and threw both thoſe States into the greateſt apprehenſions, we received letters from both, deſiring to know for what purpoſe Mr. *Elliot* was coming hither; but, as we were totally unacquainted with your deſigns, what could we write, or what plan could we fall upon?

The Poonah Miniſters, and the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowla*, becoming daily more apprehenſive of our deſigns, letters were accordingly written to you after the deceaſe of Mr. *Elliott*, that the ſtandard of our friendſhip and union having been ſeen throughout *Hindoſtan* and *Decan*, and been the cauſe of inſpiring our friends with confidence, and our enemies with diſmay, that we ought therefore

to make our advantage of it; or in other words, that you ſhould depute another perſon in the room of the deceaſed, to conclude the negociations, that, being informed of your views, we might purſue a plan for their accompliſhment, and remove the doubts entertained by the Powers of *Decan*.

In what was written from hence "that no trifling "change of circumſtances, which are in fact no more "than trials, ſhould induce the Ruler of a State to re-"linquiſh his deſigns; and that firmneſs and ſteadineſs "in the purſuit of his object, and a ſteady adherence "thereto, was truly praiſeworthy, and the diſtinguiſhing "characteriſtic of great and exalted minds," the meaning was this—that it was not conſiſtent with the ſtatements of magnanimous and illuſtrious Chiefs to ſet aſide the treaty ſubſiſting between *Pundit Purdham* and the Engliſh for a trifling change of circumſtances, namely, that a French agent came to the Poonah Miniſters; when they would not receive him, but ſent him away. You will not underſtand it to have meant any thing elſe. Since by Mr. *Elliott*'s deceaſe in the way we were deprived of all knowledge of your views and deſigns, how could you write that ours totally coincided with yours, notwithſtanding we were totally unacquainted with them? As you repeat in all your letters that you place entire confidence in my judgment and penetration, you will therefore pay the greateſt attention to any plan which ſhall iſſue from me, conſidering it as formed on the moſt ſolid, not on a weak foundation, or liable to be ſhaken by every blaſt.

In all your letters to this time, you write that Colonel *Goddard*, when he arrived in theſe territories, would conduct himſelf by my advice. After the arrival of Mr. *Watherſtone* at *Naigpore*, I told him, actuated by my knowledge of the real ſtate of affairs in the *Decan*, the multitude of the Maratta forces, the dangers of engaging in hoſtilities with them, and the difficulty of overcoming them; the impropriety of acting precipitately in affairs of ſo important and extenſive a nature, the neceſſity of a numerous army, the alliance of the principal Powers of the country, and a large treaſure, for the accompliſhment of the deſigns; all which points muſt be provided for, and the operations clearly laid down, and every ſtep taken therein be on ſolid grounds. That from all theſe conſiderations it would be proper to depute *Beneram Pundit*, who was charged from thence to explain the objects of Mr. *Elliott*'s deputation to *Calcutta*, and that in the mean time the detachment ought not to advance further, but to halt in the Mundillah diſtrict, and ſend orders to the Engliſh at *Bombay* to put a ſtop to their hoſtilities, which were very impolitic. *Beneram Pundit* and *Ramkaunt* were accordingly ſent by the route of *Cuttack*, and having been now gone more than a month, I flatter myſelf they will ſoon arrive, and explain to you every matter entruſted to them; and that you, actuated by friendſhip, ſound judgment, and the knowledge of the art of government, will approve of their propoſals and comply with them.

Colonel *Goddard* would not conſent to halt in the Mundillah diſtrict, but wrote for anſwer, that he could not think of it without inſtructions from *Calcutta*, and muſt go on; and he is now arrived at *Burhampore*.

In the mean time, repeated advices have been received from *Poonah*, that the Engliſh of *Bombay* having paſſed *Boregaut* came into the plain, where they engaged with the Maratta army; that being ſurrounded by the multitude of the enemy, conſiſting of 80,000, their ſupplies cut off, and they ſubjected to a ſevere and conſtant cannonade, they were obliged to treat of peace, and to deliver up *Ragonaut Row*, with his family and dependants, to the Poonah Miniſters; to leave two creditable hoſtages with the army for the relinquiſhment of *Shaſtie*, &c; and to enter into a new treaty, by which they engage for their peaceable behaviour in future, and for the return of the Engliſh detachment on its way from *Hoſhingabad*; which treaty having been ratified, they returned to *Bombay*. On the receipt of theſe advices repeated letters were written from hence to Colonel *Goddard*, requeſting him not to advance, as the Maratta army, conſiſting of near 100,000 horſe, and being now freed from their apprehenſions of the Bombayers and *Ragonaut Row*, would immediately follow him and ſurround him; that it was therefore expedient he ſhould return, and on no account think of proceeding; but no anſwer has been yet received from the Colonel, and we are left in the greateſt uneaſineſs of what may be the event. In the interim, Karetahs and letters have been received from you by the route of *Cuttack*, *Midnapore*, and *Morebunge*, of *Beneras*, and alſo through the channel of Colonel *Goddard*; two letters of congratulation on the capture of *Pondicherry*; two on the ſubject of eſtabliſhing a Dauk through *Midnapore* and *Moregunge*, provided it ſhould be found ſafe and expeditious; two, containing information of your having diſpatched Major *Camac* with two battalions of Sepoys by the way of *Ramgur* and *Chutteah Naigpore*, and intimating, that on his arrival on the borders he would take advice from hence with reſpect to his proceeding to join Colonel *Goddard*; three very voluminous letters with your ſecret views, and of their coinciding with ours; and ſetting forth, that from our late letters, and the advices you received at the ſame time from Colonel *Goddard*, you perceive that delays have ariſen in the execution of your views; that you place the greateſt dependance on our hearty ſupport, and implicitly rely on the fortitude and magnanimity of the Maha Rajah, and on my wiſdom and penetration; that from ſentiments of the warmeſt friendſhip you are engaged ſo far in the buſineſs, and now require our aid and ſupport for the completion of it; that it is therefore incumbent on us not to delay it to a future opportunity, but engage warmly in ſuch meaſures as will raiſe the Engliſh * name in *Hindoſtan*,

It is neceſſary to look back and attentively conſider the circumſtances you allude to: that ſince, in the term of a full year that this correſpondence has ſubſiſted, nothing has been hinted at in your letters but the enmity of the French, and in the mean time Mr. *Elliott* was deputed hither, perſonally to explain your ſentiments, which on his deceaſe were entruſted to *Beneram Pundit*, on the ſubſtance of whoſe letters, and the anſwers from this quarter, you were to form your ultimate plan of operations; and that till that time Colonel *Goddard* was to conduct himſelf by your advice: and anſwers were immediately written in the fulleſt and moſt explicit terms, in the preſence of Mr. *Watherſtone*, from which I hope you have a clear inſight into every particular; and ſoon after *Beneram Pundit* and *Lalla Ramkaunt* were diſpatched with letters to you. And as moreover we have never failed in the performance of the leaſt duty of friendſhip, have given our advice on the meaſures propoſed, pointed out the advantages and diſadvantages to be expected, and propoſed plans for the preſent and future, which our

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* If this is meant as a quotation, it is a very imperfect if not a falſe one. The words of the letter to which I ſuppoſe it alludes, are theſe: "The eyes of the world are on us both; they have ſeen me ſtruggle through difficulties to the point, at which by your aid I have inſured the "moſt glorious ſucceſs, the termination of which, by the bleſſing of God, will afford peace and laſting ſecurity to the Engliſh dominions in "*India*; and to you increaſe of power, honour, and immortal reputation."

It may not be unneceſſary to remark, that I have compared the Perſian tranſlation of the above words with the Engliſh, and find it to be as literal as the different idioms of the languages will allow. I have alſo read it to the Governor General, who is of the ſame opinion.

(Signed) *J. H. D'Oyley*, Perſian Tranſlator.

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knowledge of the cuſtoms and of the affairs of *Decan*, and the multitude of the Maratta forces on foot, enabled us to do, pointed out the means of effecting the object in view; the neceſſity of taking every ſtep with firmneſs and ſolidity; notwithſtanding all this, and that the Engliſh at *Bombay* have by their raſhneſs and precipitation, and ill-formed meaſures, reduced themſelves to their preſent ſituation; and the Maratta army amounts to near 100,000 horſe ready for action, and the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowla Bahadre* is ſtaunchly attached to their party; yet you write confidently that we ſhould, at ſuch a time, engage warmly in the purſuit of your deſigns, and act therein in concert with Colonel *Goddard*. Whilſt we are not provided with warlike ſtores, with ſufficient forces or treaſure to meet the other party, how can we engage in this dangerous undertaking, upon the ſtrength of mere perſonal bravery alone? Or how can Colonel *Goddard* adviſe us to ſuch a meaſure? The event would be attended with diſgrace, in like manner as the expedition of the Bombayers has been. On the arrival of *Beneram Pundit* and *Lalla Ramkaunt*, all theſe matters will be made clear to you, and we ſhall receive from you ſatisfactory anſwers: you will alſo write to Colonel *Goddard* to return, and will give Major *Camac* directions to ſtop, as this is not a ſeaſon for this ſmall body to give proof of their bravery by advancing. On the arrival of *Beneram Pundit* and *Lalla Ramkaunt*, after you are acquainted with the points of their commiſſion, and have learnt the ſtate of the Engliſh at *Bombay*, you will form a ſolid plan on the moſt judicious grounds, for the completion of the important objects in view, and inform us thereof by letters, or ſend both the deputies back.

You will regard this long and explicit letter as dictated ſolely by candour and the warmeſt friendſhip, and a perfect knowledge of the affairs of *Decan*.

From the firſt arrival of Colonel *Goddard*, my ſentiments have been inviolably the ſame, and with theſe, and the products of reflection and penetration, have all my letters been filled; this was the ſubſtance of all my letters to you before the late occurrences happened at *Bombay*, and I ſhall continue without reſerve to give you my ſentiments and advice.

Poſtſcript.—Since I wrote the above, letters have been received from Colonel *Goddard* at *Burhampore*, that he has received advices reſpecting the Engliſh at *Bombay*, but that it is neceſſary he ſhould go to adjuſt the affairs of *Bombay*; that he can on no account conſent to return. As we have not been wanting in the duties of friendſhip, or in giving him good advice, if he will not take it we have no remedy.

From *Siccaram Pundit*: received 28th March 1779.

In former times *Seremunt Ragonaut Row*, inſtigated by certain villainous perſons, was guilty of acts condemned by all religions and laws, the particulars of which acts you are too well acquainted with to make it neceſſary for me to repeat them. By the ſupport of the Governor of *Bombay* he raiſed commotions in the neighbourhood of *Surat*: as ſoon as you heard of theſe improper acts, and the unjuſtifiable deſigns of *Dada Sahib*, you deputed Colonel *Upton* and Captain *M'Pherſon* to *Seremunt Peiſhwa Purdhaun*, to bring about an accommodation, which was neceſſary for the happineſs of the people, and a treaty was concluded under the ſeals of the Engliſh Company and *Seremunt Peiſhwa Sahib*; and as it is univerſally allowed that friendſhip is preferable to any thing in the world, particularly with the Engliſh nation, who are famous throughout the univerſe for their good faith and ſteady diſpoſition; and as it was believed by all the Powers of the country, that a ſincere friendſhip and union had been formed between the Engliſh Company and *Seremunt Peiſhwa Sahib*, in ſuch a manner that it ſhould be of perpetual duration in ſpite of all the attempts of our mutual enemies to deſtroy it; and as on the 14th Rujjub letters to this effect were received from you, that as long as the Peiſhwa continued to fill the Muſnud there ſhould be no failure in the engagements contracted, and that an Engliſh detachment had been diſpatched over land for the reinforcement of *Bombay*; although you muſt have known, that from the moſt diſtant period to the preſent time no Engliſh forces had ever paſſed that way overland, and that they would be oppoſed in the dominions of the Circar. But to paſs over this: your other officer of this detachment, in the firſt inſtance, on his croſſing the *Summum* took poſſeſſion of the fort of *Culpee*, in the Circar's dominions, at the inſtigation of *Ragonaut Row*'s Vackeels, whom he carried with him, and afterwards proceeded forwards in the deſign to injure the Circar's territories. In purſuit of this plan he attacked the Bundlecund Chiefs, between whom and the family of the Peiſhwa the moſt intimate friendſhip has ſubſiſted for a term of 50 years, and you engaged that our friends and enemies ſhould be common, and plundered theirs and the Circar's country. Neceſſity obliged the officers of the Circars, for the ſecurity and protection of the territories entruſted to them, to follow and obſerve the motions of the detachment. The particulars of this you muſt have heard from other quarters; but what is moſt ſurpriſing is, that the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, in concert with *Ragonaut*, have raiſed diſturbances, and ſuddenly ſent their forces to the Gauts, which are only 20 coſs from *Poonah*, and another detachment of Europeans are raiſing commotions in *Cokun*. I implicitly relied on your ſincerity and good faith, which is in the mouths of all ranks of people, otherwiſe I ſhould have diſpatched an army to *Hindoſtan*, and ſettled matters.

The Governor of *Bombay*, who was from of old the diſturber of peace and friendſhip, notwithſtanding your poſitive injunctions to ſettle all points between us, and not to afford an aſylum to *Ragonaut Row* in any part of the Company's territories, paid no attention thereto. I alſo wrote him repeatedly to fulfil the articles reſpecting the Circar, and to receive thoſe which had relation to the Company. To this likewiſe he turned a deaf ear, and in oppoſition thereto wrote you fictions mixed with ſome truth. He made uſe of the opportunity of the arrival of a French Vackeel here to confirm his repreſentations; but God knows what he wrote to you on the ſubject. I on the firſt hint from you gave him his diſmiſſion, without having any conference with him. Keep juſtice in view, and be yourſelf the judge, who was the cauſe of the troubles which have ariſen. We are now about to attack the forces which are arrived at the Gauts. The detachment ſent by land to this quarter, is in the neighbourhood of *Bopaul*. I encloſe to *Lalla Sewuk Ram*, who will deliver it to you, a Perſian copy of a letter, under the ſeals of *Ragonaut*, and the honourable General of *Bombay*, addreſſed to the Sirdars of this Government, and other Powers. You are endued with wiſdom, which has induced me to write theſe particulars. Conſider maturely on whoſe ſide the blame lies. There is no remedy againſt the decrees of Providence, and God is the diſpoſer of States and wealth. I have never deviated from the duties of friendſhip and union.

Tranſlation of a Paper delivered by *Beneram Pundit*, on the part of Maha Rajah *Moodajee Bhoſitah*.

Delivered for tranſlation the 28th March 1779.

The Almighty Creator of the heavens and the earth, the Enlightener of the ſun and moon, who ſpread out the carpet of the earth, and placed on it animals, vegetables, and mountains compoſed of the four elements; who formed the human race, and the whole univerſe, and gave beauty to the ſeven climates of the globe, ornamenting them with monarchs and illuſtrious characters, the Feeder both of the great and ſmall, agreeably to their different ſtations, is witneſs of the following propoſals, which from firſt to laſt are compounded of religion, good faith, ſincerity, candour and the knowledge and fear of God,

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and under the ſanction of his mighty name, this mutual treaty, on the conditions following, ſhall remain unſhaken from generation to generation, to the end of time.

1ſt. The Raje of *Sittara*, the ſtrong forts, places, and dependencies thereon, were reduced to ſubjection, or created by the power of Maha Raja *Savajee Bhoſila*; and it is the indiſpenſable duty of all the ſubjects or ſervants of the ſaid Raje, on all occaſions to preſerve the rights of the aforeſaid Rajah, by ſubmiſſion and obedience to the government of his deſcendants, whether by the male or female line; it is therefore incumbent on me to place on the Muſnud of the Rajah, the neareſt lineal deſcendant of that family, and to uſe all my endeavours for the ſupport of his government and power; and from the very firſt to the preſent period this conduct has been invariably purſued by my family to the illuſtrious line on the Muſnud, which is in fact the ſame family, and no ſtep has been taken, inconſiſtent with the duties of obedience and religion. Whenever there remains no lineal deſcendant of the ſaid bleſſed Rajah, by the favour of God, my family is worthy of the illuſtrious rank of the Muſnud of this Raje; the hereditary right is in no other. On this point your aid and aſſiſtance is more particularly neceſſary.

2dly. At the time when we in concert regulate the affairs of the Sittara Rajah, every chief or miniſter, who unjuſtly makes oppoſition thereto, and calls in another; as for inſtance the Nabob to his party, regarding both of them inimical, and receiving them, whatever places or territories dependant on ſuch chief (the Nabob) ſhall come into our poſſeſſion, after ſeparating the Soubah of *Berar*, which belongs to me, and relinquiſhing of the remainder, ſuch places and territories as belong to our ally in this war; what is then left ſhall be divided in equal proportions between us, and our ally ſatisfied in the manner above mentioned.

3dly. If any enemy ariſes againſt you, and on your written application, aſſiſtance is afforded you from hence; or if any one looks with an hoſtile eye on me, and at my application I receive aſſiſtance from you; in caſe of the arrival of forces to the aſſiſtance of either, it is fit that the perſon making the application ſhould defray the expence of the expedition. In the ſequel I have fixed on a mode for the regulation of this, which is, that when forces go from hence to your aid, their pay be ſettled conformably to the treaty of the Nabob *Mohabut Jung Bahadre*, viz. to every horſeman one rupee per diem, and to particular ones five rupees; to Semuldars and Sirdars according to their reſpective rank and ſtation, from 20 to 100 rupees, and even more, ſhould their rank demand it. And when your troops come to my aſſiſtance, they ſhall receive, one battalion per month, when in cantonments or fixed at any place, 10,000 R*; when in motion 13,000, beſides this, an allowance to the officer ſuitable to his rank; and whatever profits may ariſe from the operations of our joint forces, excluſive of the ſoubas or dependencies of either party, after debiting the party receiving aid, for the expence of the force afforded him, ſhall be divided in equal proportions between us; and whoever joins himſelf to us in theſe deſigns, from amongſt the Sirdars of note, with a good body of forces, we are both bound to ſatisfy him in proportion to the aſſiſtance he has brought us.

4thly. Let the ties of friendſhip and union, from generation to generation, be firmly knit and eſtabliſhed between us, and our friends and enemies common to each. Should it happen that one who is my friend ſhould be an enemy to you, I will interfere and make him your friend. In caſe the enemies of either will not hearken to propoſals of accommodation, we will form a plan in concert, and by ſome means or other bring them over to our views; firſt trying the mode of advice and gentle perſuaſion, and if that fails, by force and chaſtiſement; but in a word, the moderate way ought firſt to be tried. In like manner, ſhould any one who is a friend to you be in enmity to me, you ſhall make him my friend.

5thly. Should any one interrupt the ſettlement of the Raje, and the Nabob affords him no kind of aid or ſupport, in this caſe, after having made ourſelves fully acquainted with the merits of the caſe, we will in concert determine, whether it will be adviſable to keep on friendly or inimical terms with the ſaid Nabob.

6thly. The Soubah of *Ouſſa*, commonly called *Cuttack*, has been from ancient time a dependency of mine, and the borders of the ſaid Soubah join your territory: whenever at any time diſputes ſhall ariſe between the borderers of our territories on any trifling matter, in this caſe it is incumbent on both parties to make ſtrict inveſtigation thereunto, and whoever may be found culpable, ſhould be puniſhed by the party to whom they belong. This will tend greatly to the promotion of friendſhip and harmony between us.

7th. From the Soubah of *Bengal* the ſum of twelve lacks of rupees for the Sircar, and two lacks of rupees for Durbar charges, altogether fourteen lacks of rupees; and preſents of various kinds, were annually remitted, from the time of the Nabob *Mohabut Jung* to the time of the Nabob *Meer Mahomed Jaffier Khan*'s Government, and were regularly diſcharged to this Government: *Coſſim Ally Cawn*, in the time of his Soubadarry, fulfilled the engagement for one or two years, after which he broke through this eſtabliſhed cuſtom, and God, who rules by juſtice, brought on him the fruits of it, and the country of *Bengal* devolved to the Engliſh; on this account a Vackeel from hence has conſtantly reſided with you, and from the knowledge I have of your religious principles, good faith, uprightneſs, integrity, knowledge of the Deity, and piety, under the auſpices of which your ſhips of the greateſt burden, like the moſques of the upright, ſail over the light waves, and give you immenſe wealth, and which is even become a proverb throughout the world, I am perfectly ſatisfied that you will ſettle this matter. It is therefore incumbent on you to adjuſt this matter; and knowing the right, that you fulfil it, although weighed in the ſcales of theſe great deſigns, which are to give us territories and wealth in *Decan* and *Hindoſtan*, the tribute of *Bengal* is an object unworthy of being mentioned; but as it was acquired by my anceſtors, and is my inheritance, and it is neceſſary to preſerve this before all, and then to apply to other plans; your conſent and approbation to this is therefore neceſſary.

8thly. Let a lineal deſcendant of *Maha Rajah Chuttebutty Sewajee Bhoſila* continue on the Muſnud of the Sittara Rajah; but till the power and authority of the Raje is eſtabliſhed nothing is done. Let us therefore unite, not in appearance only, but in reality, and together with other allies, who are warmly attached to us, purſue every meaſure to eſtabliſh the Rajah firmly in the Raje; and inflicting exemplary puniſhment on every one who ſhall oppoſe or obſtruct this eſtabliſhment, let us uſe our endeavours to put the affairs of the Raje in a proſperous and flouriſhing ſituation. In this caſe, our giving ſtability to the Raje and Rajah will redound greatly to your honour, and will on my part be complying with the duties of a ſubject, in like manner as I have ever done, by an attention to the family on the Raje; and as long as any deſcendants of *Maha Rajah Chatterbutty* is on the Muſnud of *Sittara*, my religion points out to me obedience, and with ſuch conduct God is well pleaſed. As by theſe acts the Raje will owe great obligations to the Engliſh, in return for theſe kindneſſes, I will procure grants to them of ports on the ſea coaſt, ſuch as *Buſſie*, *Salſette*, and their dependencies; and moreover one or two forts fit for the complete ſettlement of the affairs of the Raje, and the eſtabliſhment of the Rajah upon *Sittara*. One half of the wealth of the opponents of theſe meaſures, and of the income of their territories, which ſhall come into our hands, ſhall be appropriated to defray the expence of the Engliſh forces, which come to ſupport the meaſures, and whoever will become our ally in this expedition ſhall be completely

Apendix. No. 191.

rewarded by both parties, and the perpetual treaty which ſhall be concluded between you and the Rajah on the moſt ſolid baſis ſhall be engraved by me on a tablet of braſs, and ſhall be returned by you under the ſignatures of the auguſt King, the Directors of the Company, and the Council; let it be ratified likewiſe by ſolemn oaths, that no deviation may ever ariſe therein. And if the Engliſh are engaged in war, the forces of *Maha Raja Chatterbutty* ſhall be ſent to their aid, and nothing demanded for the expences; and if hoſtilities break out againſt the Raje, Engliſh forces ſhall be ſent on application for its ſupport, and nothing required for their expences. As the armies of the Raje have from ancient time, made expeditions to *Hindoſtan*, and the Villaet Afghans quit their own border, which is at *Keybur* and enter *Hindoſtan*, where they have once or twice made dreadful attacks on the armies of *Decan*, and defeated them; the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh is peculiarly required to chaſtize them, and the Rajahs of *Hindoſtan*; and whatever advantages are derived from the expedition, either in wealth or territory, half of it ſhall be given to the Engliſh: I will cauſe a treaty to this effect under the ſeal of *Maha Rajah Chatterbutty* to be delivered to you, on condition that the Rajah's authority is eſtabliſhed.

APPENDIX, No. 192.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

To *Moodajee Bhoſila*. Written the 6th April 1779.

I HAVE received your letters; they are long, and dictated with the ſame friendſhip and wiſdom with which all your former letters have been written; but as the great object of them all is now entirely at an end, it is unneceſſary to recapitulate the ſubſtance of them. *Beneram Pundit* is arrived, and has delivered to me the paper which you entruſted to his charge; at his deſire, in obedience to your poſitive injunctions, and the oath which I underſtand he ſwore to perform them, the paper was delivered, and opened in the preſence of *Ramkaunt Moonſhy*, and read to me by him. Having fully underſtood the contents, I have returned the paper to *Beneram Pundit* at his particular requeſt, that it might be ſent back in its original ſtate to you; this alſo being as I underſtand a part of his inſtructions. Reſpecting the different points contained therein, they are ſuch as will not admit either of negociation or comment. I conceive them to have been intended as an indirect but deciſive anſwer upon a ſubject in its own nature ſo delicate, and rendered more ſo by the paſt interchange of our ſentiments upon it, and our known mutual wiſhes, that you apparently choſe this indirect method of declining to engage any further in it, rather than to relinquiſh it by an abrupt declaration, which might have been conſtrued unſuitable to the friendſhip and cordiality which have hitherto ſubſiſted ſince ſo long a period, and which I hope will ever ſubſiſt between your family and the Company and Engliſh nation; otherwiſe it was certainly unneceſſary to have ſent a perſon, honoured with ſo high a degree of your confidence as *Beneram Pundit* poſſeſſes, upon ſo long and perilous a journey, merely to give me the information which might have been expreſſed by a letter containing no more than a ſingle line. What is paſt is paſt; of the deſign I had formed, I ſhall totally relinquiſh all future thoughts, but of your paſt kindneſs I ſhall retain a laſting remembrance.

When I firſt wrote you that an Engliſh army had been appointed to proceed to the other ſide of *India*, and deſired you to aſſiſt it in its progreſs, you immediately returned an anſwer, expreſſing your cheerful compliance, and not contented with bare profeſſions, which are oftener the maſk of deceit than the indication of ſincerity, you wrote at the ſame time to the commander of our forces, inviting him to paſs through your country, you ſent a perſon of rank and truſt to wait on the borders of your dominions with a ſtore of proviſions for their ſubſiſtence, you cauſed them to be entertained in the long ſtay they made in your country with all the dues of hoſpitality, and have continued the ſame conduct to them ſince his departure. Theſe are not complimentary or equivocal, but real and ſubſtantial acts of friendſhip: as ſuch it is, eſpecially at this time, incumbent on me to expreſs the ſenſe that I entertain of them, as it is my wiſh, and ſhall be my care, to make every ſuitable return to them, whenever any future occaſion of your affairs ſhall demand it.

I have ordered Major *Camac* to remain within the borders of *Bengal*, and not to proceed any further, but have not yet determined whether he ſhall return to *Calcutta*, or join any other part of our army; this muſt depend upon future contingencies.

Poſtſcript.—Since I wrote the above I have received a letter from Major *Camac*, informing me that orders had been ſent him by Col. *Goddard* to proceed forwards and join him, provided it ſhould be agreeable to you, without whoſe inſtructions he was to take no ſtep; that for this purpoſe, the Colonel had written to you, requeſting that you would either ſend a paſſport to Major *Camac*, or intimate to him your diſapproval of his proceeding, in which latter caſe he would lay aſide the deſign; that the Coſſids ſent to you by the Colonel having been detained five days at *Naigpore*, and then bringing him no letter or inſtructions from you, he had conceived it a tacit conſent to his march; and that for private reaſons you might not chuſe to truſt it to writing, and that he was therefore marching on ſlowly. As this meaſure is by no means agreeable to me, I have written to Major *Camac* to return within our borders.

To *Siccaram Pundit* and *Balajee Pundit*. Written 6th April 1779.

I have received your letter, containing various complaints of the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, and other particulars, which I fully underſtand.

This letter not having been as uſual accompanied by one from the Peiſhwa, I think it neceſſary to inform you of it, leſt, ſhould one have been written, and miſcarried in the way, there might appear an impropriety in my not returning an anſwer to it.

I have heard by various channels ſome particulars of the late events on that ſide of *India*, and have received ſome little and imperfect intelligence relative thereto from the gentlemen of *Bombay*; but till my knowledge of thoſe matters is more complete and authentic, I muſt ſuſpend my judgment reſpecting the rectitude of the conduct of the members of that Government. I hear, with the greateſt ſurprize, that the Chiefs of the army from *Bombay* have made a convention with you without the authority of this Government, which you well know was indiſpenſably neceſſary for an act of that nature, and that the conditions of it are very injurious to the rights of the Company, and the honour of the Engliſh name. I have not yet received a copy of it; but whatever it may be, it is incumbent on me to take the earlieſt occaſion to diſavow it, and to declare it null.

This declaration ought to be unneceſſary to you, to whom the like information was given in form on the deputation of Colonel *Upton*.

The paſt cannot be recalled; but for the future it is my firm wiſh, that as I laboured before, however ineffectually, to conciliate the differences which had ariſen between you and the Government of *Bombay*, and which prevented the execution of the treaty made through Colonel *Upton*, peace may be yet reſtored, and all paſt grievances buried in oblivion. For this purpoſe I, and the Counſellors of this Government have authorized Colonel *Goddard* to negociate and conclude with you, in the name and on behalf of the Company, a new

treaty, confirming that made by Colonel *Upton*, on theſe conditions, viz. That you relinquiſh all claims derived from the unauthorized act of our army, and which could not even have received the ſanction of the Preſidency of *Bombay*; and that you alſo engage never to grant the French, who are the enemies of our nation, any ſettlement or reſidence in the ports of the Peiſhwa, nor to admit the forces of the French into any part of his dominions, nor to form any alliance, nor hold any connection with them, either for traffic or otherwiſe.

On theſe conditions we offer you the friendſhip of the Company, and of the Engliſh nation for ever. If you reject them we are remedileſs, and blameleſs of the conſequences, whatever they may be, as peace or war depend on your determination.

For further particulars I muſt refer you to Colonel *Goddard*, to whom I have granted full powers for the purpoſes above-mentioned, and deſire that you will regard him accordingly as the Miniſter and Repreſentative of this Government, and his acts done under this authority as the acts of this Government, of the Company, and of the Engliſh nation.

To the Peiſhwa. Written the 6th April 1779.

In ſubſtance the ſame as the foregoing.

To *Madho Row Sindeah*. Written 28th April 1779.

I have been favoured with your letter on the ſubject, ſaid to have been formed by the Bombay Government, with other particulars, which I perfectly underſtand.

I have heard by various channels ſome particulars of the events you allude to, but having yet received no authentic accounts of the motives by which the Governor and Council of *Bombay* have been actuated in the meaſures they have adopted, I muſt ſuſpend my judgment of their conduct, in which this Government had neither ſhare nor knowledge.

The aſtoniſhment I was in, to learn that the Chiefs of the Bombay army had made a convention with the Maratta Government, of a nature ſo highly injurious to the rights of the Company and diſhonourable to the Engliſh name, could only be increaſed by the information, that a Chief ſo renowned for wiſdom, and who has invariably ſhewn a deſire of friendſhip with the Company, ſhould join in accepting a treaty from perſons entirely unempowered to perform an act of that nature, and in dictating ſuch terms as it is the higheſt diſgrace to any perſons aſſuming the Engliſh name to have conſented to. Neither thoſe perſons, nor the Government they are immediately under, had any authority to form treaties with the Powers of *India* and *Hindoſtan*. This information was given in form to the Maratta State on the deputation of Colonel *Upton*; had it been otherwiſe, and the Government of *Bombay* had been in poſſeſſion of ſuch powers, where would have been the neceſſity or propriety of deputing Colonel *Upton* to ſet aſide the treaty which that Government had formed with *Ragonaut Row*, and to conclude a new one on the part of this Government, which alone of all the Company's ſettlements in *India* has the power of performing ſuch acts? In this caſe the treaty concluded by them muſt have been preſerved; but in the preſent inſtance it does not appear that the Gentlemen who ſigned the papers preſented to you at *Tellegong* had even the authority of the Government of *Bombay* for ſuch an act; ſo that it was in every reſpect an idle and ineffectual engagement. It is therefore incumbent on me to take the earlieſt opportunity of declaring to you, that the treaty you allude to is in itſelf abſolutely null and void. It is probable that you were not fully acquainted with the powers of the Engliſh Government in caſes of this nature; but thoſe on whoſe behalf you appeared are without a ſhadow or plea for complaint, ſince in accepting the convention of the Chiefs of the army they muſt have oppoſed their own certain conviction of its invalidity.

The paſt cannot be recalled, but for the future, it is my firm wiſh, that as I laboured before, however ineffectually, to conciliate the differences which had ariſen between your Government and that of *Bombay*, and which prevented the execution of the treaty made through Colonel *Upton*, peace may yet be reſtored, and all paſt grievances buried in oblivion. Appendix. No. 192.

For this purpoſe, I and the counſellors of this Government have authorized Colonel *Goddard* to negociate and conclude with the managers of the Maratta State in the name and on behalf of the Company, a new treaty confirming that made by Colonel *Upton*, on theſe conditions, viz. that they relinquiſh all claims derived from the unauthorized act of our army; an act ſo diſhonourable that I may not conſider any one as a friend who ſhall adviſe the execution of it; and that they alſo engage never to grant the French, the enemies of my nation, any ſettlement or reſidence in any of the ports of the Peiſhwa, nor to admit the forces of the French into any part of his dominions, nor to form any alliance, nor hold any connection with them either for traffic or otherwiſe.

On theſe conditions we offer the friendſhip of the Company and Engliſh nation for ever; ſhould they be rejected, we are remedileſs, and blameleſs of the conſequences, whatever they may be.

It is well known it is my wiſh, as it is conſonant to the orders of my ſuperiors, to live in peace with all the Powers of *India*, whilſt they will permit me ſo to do, and I am more particularly anxious to continue on good terms with you, with whoſe worth I am ſo well acquainted. To this, and the conſtant inclination you have ſhewn to maintain a friendſhip with the Engliſh, I truſt that you will exert your influence in promoting peace on the reaſonable terms now offered, and will effect the concluſion of ſuch a treaty with Colonel *Goddard* as I have propoſed above, and thereby enſure the reſtoration of friendſhip and harmony between the Peiſhwa and Company, and your own good name.

To *Siccaram Pundit*. Written 7th May 1779.

I wrote you ſome time ago in conſequence of the reports which I had heard of the events on that ſide of *India*, and expreſſed my ſentiments on them as fully as the imperfect intelligence I had received would admit of, declaring to you that the treaty ſaid to have been concluded between you and the Chiefs of the Bombay army, of which I had likewiſe heard, was null and void; ſince that time I have received your ſubſequent letter, encloſing me a copy of the engagement in queſtion, and the aſtoniſhment I was in to learn from the peruſal of it, that the Chiefs of the Bombay army had made a convention with you, ſo highly injurious to the rights of the Company, and diſhonourable to the Engliſh name, could only be increaſed to find that you had accepted a treaty from perſons entirely unempowered to form an act of that nature, and had dictated ſuch terms, as it is the higheſt diſgrace to any perſons aſſuming the Engliſh name to have conſented to; as you could not be ignorant that neither thoſe perſons nor the Government they are immediately under had any authority to form treaties with the Powers of *India*, ſince this information was given to you in form on the deputation of Colonel *Upton*. Had it been otherwiſe, and the Government of *Bombay* had been in poſſeſſion of ſuch powers, where would have been the neceſſity or propriety of deputing Colonel *Upton* to ſet aſide the treaty which that Government had formed with *Ragonaut Row*, and to conclude a new one on the part of this Government, which alone, of all the Company's ſettlements in *India*, has the power of performing ſuch acts? In this caſe, the treaty concluded by them muſt have been preſerved; but in the preſent inſtance, it does not appear that the gentlemen, who ſigned the papers preſented to you at *Tellegong*, had even the authority of the Government of *Bombay* for ſuch an act;

Appendix. Nos. 192 & 193.

act; ſo that it was in every reſpect an idle and ineffectual engagement, and I here repeat my diſavowal of it, it being of itſelf null and void.

Nor can you have any reaſon to complain, ſince in accepting it, you muſt have acted againſt your own conviction of the invalidity of ſuch an act.

It is well known that it is my wiſh to live in peace with all the Powers of *India*, whilſt they will permit me to do ſo. I have already informed you of the terms on which you may ſecure the perpetual friendſhip of the Company and Engliſh nation; ſhould you reject them we are remedileſs, and blameleſs of the conſequences, whatever they may be; but I make no doubt, when you reflect on the reaſonableneſs of the terms offered, you will cheerfully comply, and conclude with Colonel *Goddard* ſuch a treaty as I have propoſed, by which friendſhip and harmony may be reſtored and perpetuated between the Peiſhwa and Company, and your good name eſtabliſhed.

To *Moodajee Bhoſila*. Written the 12th May 1779.

Accompanying I have the pleaſure to ſend you a duplicate of my laſt letter, the original of which I hope you have long ago received. As the rainy ſeaſon is approaching, I have directed Major *Camac* to return into the interior parts of the provinces.

You muſt doubtleſs have heard the full particulars of the late events, which have happened on that ſide of *India*, and of the unfortunate concluſion of the precipitated and ill-conducted expedition, ſet on foot by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, of the improper convention made by the Chiefs, who accompanied the Bombay army, and of the arrival of Colonel *Goddard* at *Surat*. On theſe circumſtances I think it needleſs to enlarge or comment, any further than to inform you that this Government do not conceive themſelves bound to abide by engagements contracted by perſons who, not having even the ſanction of the Government of *Bombay* for ſuch an act, it can be regarded in no other light than a private act of individuals, and have therefore diſavowed and declared it abſolutely null. So far is ſuch an act from being binding on us, that even the Government of *Bombay* have not authority without our concurrence, to engage in any ſuch meaſure, the ſole authority in all political matters being veſted by the King and Parliament of *England* in the Governor and Council of *Bengal*.

This was made the foundation of Colonel *Upton*'s deputation, and public notice given thereof to the Miniſters, who can therefore have no right to complain of our diſavowal of a treaty, which they accepted againſt their own conviction of the inſufficiency and invalidity of it; nor can ſuch diſavowal reflect any diſcredit on our good faith, ſince no State can be ſuppoſed to be bound by the unauthorized engagement of individuals of it. As I wiſh for peace, as long as it can be preſerved with honour I have offered to the Miniſters to renew the treaty concluded through Colonel *Upton*, upon condition that they formally relinquiſh all claims founded upon the aforeſaid convention, and engage never to hold any connection with our enemies the French. If they agree to the reaſonable terms, it is well, peace and harmony will be re-eſtabliſhed, if they reject them they only will be to blame for the conſequences, for which I am now fully prepared.

As from the intimate friendſhip which has long ſubſiſted between us; and as reſerve does not become the boſom of a friend, and as the intereſts of our reſpective dominions are the ſame, I have communicated all theſe particulars for your information.

Beneram Pundit has read to me the ſubſtance of a letter which he has written to you, in conſequence of ſome converſations which have paſſed between us; and what he has ſaid reſpecting my ſentiments, entirely coincides with them. As he has been much indiſpoſed for ſome time paſt, and wiſhes to change the air for that of *Benares*; and as there are no affairs at preſent depending between us, that can make his ſtay neceſſary, I have given him my permiſſion to go thither.

To the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowla*. Written the 3d June 1779.

I ſome months ago wrote you very fully on the ſubject of the intrigues of the French with the Poonah Miniſters; the diſpatch of a detachment of Engliſh forces for the reinforcement of *Bombay*; and my determination to overlook the bad conduct of the Miniſters, and to preſerve friendſhip with them, provided they relinquiſhed all connection with our enemies the French. You are doubtleſs acquainted with the late events on that ſide of *India*, and the unfortunate concluſion of the precipitate and ill-conducted expedition ſet on foot by the Government of *Bombay*, in which this Government had neither ſhare nor knowledge, with the improper convention made by the Chiefs who accompanied the Bombay army, and with the arrival of Colonel *Goddard* at *Surat*. On theſe circumſtances I think it needleſs to enlarge or comment, any further than to inform you that this Government do not think themſelves bound to abide by engagements contracted by perſons not having even the ſanction of the Government of *Bombay* for ſuch an act; it can be regarded in no other light than a private engagement of individuals; and have therefore diſavowed it, and declared it abſolutely null. So far is ſuch an act from being binding on us, that even the Government of *Bombay* have not authority, without our concurrence, to engage in any ſuch meaſure; the ſole authority in all political matters being veſted by the King and Parliament of *England*, in the Governor and Council of *Bengal*.

This was made the foundation of Colonel *Upton*'s deputation, and public notice given thereof to the Miniſters; who can therefore have no right to complain of our diſavowal of a treaty which they accepted againſt their own conviction, of the inſufficiency and invalidity of it; nor can ſuch diſavowal reflect any diſcredit on our good faith, ſince no State can be ſuppoſed to be bound by the unauthorized engagements of individuals of it. As I wiſh for peace as long as it can be preſerved with honour, I have offered to the Miniſters to renew the treaty concluded through Colonel *Upton*, upon condition that they formally relinquiſh all claims founded upon the aforeſaid convention, and engage never to hold any connection with our enemies the French. If they agree to the reaſonable terms, it is well; peace and harmony may be re-eſtabliſhed; if they reject them, they only will be to blame for the conſequences, for which I am now fully prepared.

I have explained myſelf thus fully to you, becauſe I wiſh to preſerve inviolable the friendſhip and engagements which have ſo long ſubſiſted between you and the Company; and I am fully convinced that you, actuated by the ſame motive, will take every means for the continuance and increaſe of it.

APPENDIX, Nos. 193 and 194.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 3d May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, and *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Mr. *Wheler* at *Beercbol* for the benefit of his health.

Sir *Eyre Coote* forming military arrangements.

READ the following letters from Colonel *Goddard*.

Gentlemen,

It is with particular ſatisfaction I can inform you of the arrival of your forces under my command at *Surat* yeſterday morning. I before acquainted you, in a letter from

from *Berhampore*, with my intention of purſuing the route to that city, and my reaſons for ſo doing; which I explained afterwards more fully in my addreſs of the 9th inſtant. Theſe letters having been tranſmitted in triplicate, will, I hope, have reached you ſafe; and the conduct I have purſued on the occaſion, be ſuch as to merit your approbation.

Not doubting but the Poonah Durbar, as it was their intereſt ſo to do, would endeavour to moleſt and interrupt my march, I thought it adviſable to proceed with all the celerity in my power; and it is owing to the expedition I have uſed, that the troops reached this place without oppoſition; for the day of my arrival, I received a letter from Mr. *Farmer*, in the camp of *Mahadjee Scindia*, encloſing another from the Select Committee, which informed me of the Miniſters having detached about 20,000 of their beſt and moſt choſen horſe to ſurprize me: I therefore conceive they have been diſappointed in their views of attacking me in the heart of their own country; and will now, in all probability, to prevent an appearance of hoſtilities on their part, return without ſhewing themſelves in my neighbourhood, as no intelligence of their motions has yet reached from any other quarter.

I am happy in the opportunity now afforded me, of recommending to your notice the good behaviour of the troops in general, who have performed the march from the *Nurbuddah* to this place, with a cheerfulneſs and alacrity that gives the moſt favourable preſage of their future ſervices; in particular from *Burhampore*, which is a diſtance of near three hundred miles, we have arrived at *Surat* in twenty days, including three halting ones. I muſt obſerve to you, that I experienced, in the moſt eminent degree, the good effect of thoſe principles of moderation which had before directed me, in the aſſiſtance I received from the inhabitants on the road, who continued in poſſeſſion of their villages, and voluntarily ſupplied me with proviſions and grain. This readineſs on their part was of particular uſe at this time; becauſe although I had before my leaving *Burhampore*, collected a ſufficient quantity to ſupply the troops on the road, the rapidity of my march was ſuch, that many of the carts upon which I was obliged to tranſport it, were unable to accompany me; ſo that but for this continued ſupply I received daily, my progreſs would have been a good deal retarded, from the neceſſity there would have been of adapting my motions to the length of road they could travel.

I cannot acquaint you with the preſent views of the Bombay Government, having received no advices from them, ſince their being informed of my near approach to *Surat*; but as I have from time to time communicated to them my progreſs, I hope to hear from them every day, when I ſhall immediately make known to you their inſtructions. At the ſame time, I am flattered with the expectation of receiving your full inſtructions relative to my ſituation in command of your forces acting under this Preſidency.

I am ſorry to acquaint you with the death of Captain *William Campbell* of the fourth battalion of Sepoys, who joined the detachment by the way of *Naigpore*, reduced at that time by a diſorder he caught on the journey from *Calcutta*; but which did not deſtroy him till within a day's march of this place.

I beg to inform you, that the troops are encamped upon a convenient and healthy ſpot of ground, two miles above the city, upon the bank of the river *Taptee*.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Camp near *Surat*, (Signed) *Tho' Goddard.*
26th February 1779.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 20th ultimo, informing you of my arrival at *Surat* the preceding day, ſince which nothing material has occurred worthy of communicating.

I have received a letter from the Select Committee at *Bombay*, expreſſing their deſire to ſee me with the earlieſt convenience; on which account I purpoſe ſetting out immediately, leaving the troops encamped in the neighbourhood of this city, in order that no time may be loſt in laying before you the ſtate of affairs at this ſettlement, and coming to a reſolution upon the meaſures moſt proper to be hereafter purſued. I find it rather troubleſome to ſettle the rate of exchange with the merchants of this city, who ſeem inclined to take advantage of the preſſing want they think I am in of a ſupply of money; but as my ſituation is by no means ſo neceſſitous or without reſource as it was, I ſhall not come to any terms with them that are not very moderate and proper, which I am in expectation of being ſoon able to effect. Appendix. No. 193.

When the troops were in the neighbourhood of *Burhampore*, I received a ſum of money of *Nuggeen Doſs*, the Gomaſtah of *Gopaul Doſs*, in my camp, at the rate of 99 Naigpore rupees for each 100 ſiccas payable in *Calcutta*. The amount for which I have drawn the bill is 60,000, the exchange is 2½ per cent. dearer than what the bills you tranſmitted me on *Naigpore* were received at; and the man urges in excuſe for this increaſe, the difficulty he had in procuring even this ſmall ſupply at *Burhampore*, where his maſter has no eſtabliſhed houſe, and the advanced price he was obliged to pay the merchants for what he could collect at that place.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp near *Surat*, (Signed) *Tho' Goddard.*
the 2d March 1779.

Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing you from *Surat* the 2d inſtant, acquainting you with my intention of ſetting out immediately for *Bombay*. Owing to the veſſels not being in readineſs ſo ſoon as was ſuppoſed, and the unexpected length of the paſſage, I did not arrive at this place till the 15th. Having made the Select Committee a report of the ſtate of the forces under my command, ordered from your Preſidency for the aſſiſtance of this ſettlement, I received a letter from them informing me of the miſcarriage of a letter from you, encloſing a copy of your inſtructions to Mr. *Elliott*, which they therefore requeſted I would furniſh them with, and alſo give them ſuch information reſpecting my embaſſy at the Court of *Berar*, as might tend to diſcover to them the nature of the intended connection with *Moodajee Booſla*.

Conceiving it for the intereſt of the Company's affairs that they ſhould have as thorough a knowledge as poſſible of this buſineſs, in order to prevent their adopting meaſures which might counteract the views of your Government, I wrote them a letter in reply, of which the encloſed is a copy. I cannot at preſent acquaint you with the political ſyſtem the gentlemen at *Bombay* mean to embrace, or the plan of operations intended for the forces under my command; as far as it may reſt with me you may be aſſured of my acting conſiſtent with the inſtructions given me for my guidance, and to promote the obvious advantage and improvement of the Company's ſettlements in the weſtern quarter of *India*. It is with particular ſatisfaction I can declare to you the confidence I place in the courage and attachment of the troops under me, who are prepared and willing to carry into execution whatever may be reſolved upon. I purpoſe ſetting out to join the army at *Surat* very ſoon, when I will without loſs of time communicate to you the plan adopted for the immediate diſpoſal of the troops, and during the approaching rainy ſeaſon.

The Select Committee have tranſmitted you a particular account of the late expedition to *Poonah*, which is referred to your conſideration and deciſion, together with the ſeveral tranſactions that have occurred ſince and conſequent to that unfortunate affair. It is therefore unneceſſary for me to ſay any thing further upon this buſineſs, which they will themſelves no doubt take pains to explain

Appendix. No. 193.

explain fully to you. You will find from their relation of circumſtances that the ſituation of this Government reſpecting the Marattas is as follows: The authority by which the diſgraceful convention was concluded at *Pilligong*, has been declared illegal and inadmiſſible, and of courſe it remains uncomplied with in all its parts. The Vackeel from *Mahadjee Scindia* has been given to underſtand ſo, and has returned with this anſwer to his maſter: if the Marattas attempt to obtain a performance of the articles by force, the Committee may think themſelves juſtified in commencing hoſtilities; as I am however of opinion, notwithſtanding a report which now prevails of their having attacked a ſmall fort belonging to us called *Bancoote* or *Fort Victoria*, that the Government of *Poonah* will be ſatisfied with the advantage they have gained, and not wiſh to provoke upon themſelves a war, the conſequence of which might be fatal to their party; I do not apprehend a rupture on their ſide, unleſs actually joined by an armament of the French. The operations in this quarter will therefore depend upon the deciſion you may give, and the meaſures you may find it neceſſary to adopt for the regulation of affairs here; and I beg to aſſure you of my entire devotion to your deſire, and my reſolution to promote the views of your Government, for the honour and intereſt of the Company in their fulleſt extent, as far as lies within my power. I before took the liberty of ſoliciting your particular inſtructions relative to my connection with the Adminiſtration of *Bombay*, on which ſubject I hope to hear from you every day, as well as regarding the negociations with *Moodajee Booſla*, which continue in the ſame ſtate I formerly deſcribed to you.

I beg to acquaint you with my having drawn on you in favour of *Perwarry Doſs*, banker in *Surat*, for ſix lacks of Bengal Sicca rupees. The rate of exchange, which was the moſt favourable I could get, although I wrote to Mr. *Boddam*, Chief at *Surat*, on the ſubject ſome time before my arrival, was fixed at 95 Surat rupees for each 100 Siccas.

A young gentleman named *William Charles Alſton*, a very near relation to Lieutenant *Alſton*, of the Bengal eſtabliſhment, has ſolicited my leave to join the detachment as a volunteer, which I have permitted him to do; but without any allowances, till I can be honoured with your commands reſpecting him. As he appears to be a young man of ſpirit, and promiſes to make a good officer, I beg to recommend him to your favourable attention.

I have the honour, &c.

Bombay, March 21ſt 1779. (Signed) *Tho' Goddard.*

Gentlemen,

I am favoured with your letter of the 17th inſtant, requeſting a copy of the inſtructions given by the Bengal Government on the ſubject of an alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*, and any other information reſpecting an embaſſy at his Court, which may tend to diſcover, to you the nature of the intended connection with him.

Mr. *Ravenſcroft*, Secretary to your Committee, having acquainted me, that ſince the writing of your letter a copy of theſe inſtructions is come to hand; I do not ſuppoſe it is neceſſary for me to ſend you one. Should you however require it, I will order one to be immediately prepared, and tranſmitted to you.

As the peruſal of theſe inſtructions will fully explain to you the object of the Governor General and Supreme Council in the propoſed negociation with *Moodajee*, it would be ſuperfluous in me to enter into any particular diſcuſſion of their plan, which is ſo clearly and pointedly laid down by themſelves; what therefore remains for me to do is to relate to you, as far as may be neceſſary to influence the political tranſactions of this Government with the Maratta State, the progreſs made in the treaty; the ſituation in which it was left upon my march from the *Nurbuddah*, and how it may be conſidered to ſtand at this time.

In ſome of my letters formerly addreſſed to your Committee, and in particular in thoſe of the 3d and 10th January I obſerved, that the meaſures previouſly adopted your Government in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, had been the means of preventing *Moodajee* from acceding to the terms wiſhed for by the gentlemen of the Adminiſtration at *Bengal*, which he otherwiſe ſhewed himſelf in every reſpect diſpoſed to embrace. This ſentiment appeared through his whole conduct, while the army remained in the neighbourhood of his country; and indeed he frankly owned the intereſts of *Ragonath Row* and his own interfered too much with each other to admit of their being ſupported by the Engliſh at the ſame time. In the letters which I tranſmitted from him to the Governor General, he recommends in the ſtrongeſt terms the relinquiſhing *Ragoba*, and making peace with the Poonah Durbar; but the part he ſo warmly takes in favour of the latter, he profeſſes to ariſe ſolely with a regard to his own views in concert with us. He at the time of writing this letter, and indeed repeatedly ſince, has declared to me that he only waited for anſwers from *Calcutta*, containing a compliance with his propoſals, to renew and conclude the negociations upon the terms of alliance mentioned in the inſtructions. Theſe anſwers ought to arrive by the end of this month, when the ſincerity of *Moodajee's* declarations will be at once put to the teſt; for any objections he could now ſtart, would prove his diſinclination to the propoſed buſineſs, and the little dependance that is to be placed in him. The grand obſtacle of *Ragonath Row* is effectually removed, and indeed every leading circumſtance has happened favourable to the ambitious views of the Berar prince. The Bengal army is arrived at *Surat* ready to take the field in his cauſe, whenever the terms of alliance can be adjuſted; and though he tried by every means to prevail upon me not to advance to this ſide of *India*, I uſed every argument the ſituation of your affairs, conſiſtent with the declared object of the Bengal Government, could ſuggeſt, to prove to him the neceſſity of ſuch a meaſure, and reconcile it to his own future ſchemes and expectations.

In a letter from the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council of the 23d November, copy of which I had the honour before to encloſe for your peruſal, they begin by abſolutely forbidding me to obey any orders but what I might immediately receive from themſelves; but in order to guard as much as poſſible againſt every accident, they afterwards direct me to comply with whatever inſtructions I might receive from you (ſhould you have adopted any meaſures depending upon the ſupport of my detachment) provided they were not incompatible with the inſtructions I had received from them, or the negociations entered into with the Rajah of *Berar*.

At the time your letters reached me, with intelligence of the treaty made with *Ragoba*, and of your army having actually taken the field in conſequence of it, preſſing at the ſame time my expeditious march, the negociation with *Moodajee* had been put a ſtop to, for the reaſons I have above aſſigned; I therefore found it conſiſtent with the orders of the Supreme Board, and conſidered it every way for the intereſts of the Honourable Company, to leave the buſineſs with *Moodajee* in the train I have above deſcribed, waiting for replies from the Preſidency of *Bengal* to the reference and repreſentation made them by the Court of *Naigpore*, and to proceed with all expedition towards this ſettlement, either to aſſiſt in bringing the deſigns you had undertaken to a ſucceſsful iſſue, or to act in concert with you, in the proſecution of any meaſures that might be neceſſary to the advantage of the Company's affairs, and conſiſtent with the ſpirit of the intentions of the Bengal Government, in detaching their forces acroſs the peninſula of *India*. I was unfortunately diſappointed in my hopes of effecting the former, but I am full of confidence that my expectations

tations reſpecting the latter will be anſwered in their ampleſt and moſt deſirable extent.

Beſides the letters tranſmitted through me from the Court of *Berar*, others to the ſame purport were ſent to *Bengal*, under charge of a confidential perſon belonging to the Rajah, who before reſided there in character of his ambaſſador; another perſon of conſiderable truſt accompanied, and ſtill remains in my camp on the part of *Moodajee*, and through him I have from time to time received letters from his maſter. When the news of what happened at *Tillagaon* firſt reached him, he communicated to me ſuch particulars as had come to his knowledge, and earneſtly preſſed me not to advance. Of his own buſineſs he only obſerved, that he was waiting with anxiety for the diſpatches from *Calcutta*. I have not heard from him ſince the letter I wrote him from *Burhampore*, informing him of my determination to proceed towards *Bombay*, and that in the mean time leiſure would be given for the arrival of the anſwers from the Bengal Government.

I have endeavoured as much as lies in my power to give you in the above account an idea of the ſtate of the Berar negociation; ſhould I have omitted any thing which may occur to you to aſk; or ſhould there be any public papers relative to this tranſaction, the peruſal of which would tend to explain it more fully to you, I am ready to give every further information you may judge neceſſary.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Bombay, 19th March 1779. (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you in a letter dated the 21ſt ultimo, acquainting you with my arrival at *Bombay*, and incloſing copy of my letter to the Select Committee, on the ſubject of the negociations at the Court of *Berar*; ſince that time the gentlemen of the Committee here have received a letter from your Supreme Board, and I alſo have been made happy with your favour of the 5th February, accompanying credentials, appointing me your Miniſter at the Court of *Poonah*; this new mark of your regard and confidence fills me with ſentiments of gratitude, to which I am at a loſs to give expreſſion, and will be beſt ſhewn by the zeal and fidelity with which I ſhall exert myſelf in the execution of ſo important a truſt. I cannot however omit mentioning the ſuperior ſatisfaction it gives me to find that my conduct in proceeding to this ſide of *India* has merited your approbation; and I am full of hope that the letters I afterwards wrote you, explaining more particularly my motives for advancing on account of the ſituation of affairs here, will have made you of opinion that ſuch a meaſure was not only proper, but appeared abſolutely neceſſary to the ſecurity and preſervation of this ſettlement.

The receipt of your letter to the Select Committee, and of that to myſelf, the contents of which I communicated to them, has at length fixed their reſolves, and they have come to the determination of ſuſpending all operations, till the arrival of diſpatches from your Supreme Board, in conſequence of the repreſentation tranſmitted you of the ſtate of affairs by Mr. *Horſley*, or till you may have wrote, ſubſequent to your knowledge of the diſcomfiture at and retreat from *Tillagong*.

I have received no advices from *Moodajee* of a later date than that mentioned in my letter to the Select Committee, and am therefore in expectation of hearing from him every day, when I will immediately communicate to you the ſentiments he may expreſs, and the propoſals he may make for the promotion of the plan already ſo particularly explained to him by me. Since leaving the *Nerbuddah* I have continued to write him in the moſt encouraging terms, and at this time I have addreſſed him, forwarding letters from the Bombay Government, expreſſive of the zeal and readineſs with which they will aſſiſt and co-operate in the execution of any meaſures that may be determined upon conſiſtent with the views of the Supreme Council of *Bengal*, with whoſe intentions in favour of the Rajah they have been made acquainted, as well as with the full powers delegated to me by you, to conclude the terms of an alliance with him in your name. Appendix. No. 194.

As I conceive the ſituation of affairs in the Maratta empire to be widely different from what you had reaſon to expect it would be when your letter was wrote, I have judged it proper to defer making known to the Court of *Poonah* the powers you have veſted in me, or formally demanding their conſent to the requiſitions you have enjoined me to make, upon the ſuppoſition as I conceive of *Ragoba*'s ſucceſs, till I can be honoured with your further and particular inſtructions on this head; and this delay I am induced to uſe the more readily, as it can be productive of no real inconvenience, the period intervening betwixt the arrival of an anſwer from you, and the ſeaſon for action, leaving ſufficient ſpace to follow and perfect any meaſures you may chuſe to direct ſhould be purſued.

As the further conſideration of political matters, and of courſe, the military operations of the army, are ſuſpended till your reſolves can be communicated to us, I propoſe, during the receſs from public buſineſs, to ſet out to join the troops at *Surat*, and put them in complete readineſs for the ſervice in which I hope they may ſoon be employed. I beg to aſſure you, that I ſhall implicitly attend to the ſpirit of the inſtructions contained in your letter of the 5th February,

And have the honour to be, &c.

Bombay, April 4th 1779. (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

No. 194.

The Governor General informs the Board, that Mr. *George Horſley*, deputed from the Government of *Bombay*, is arrived.

Read the following letter from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have been ſo much taken up with a diſpatch to the Honourable Company, in conſequence of the unfortunate iſſue of the expedition of *Ragoba*, that we have not been able to ſend away before this the veſſel for *Bengal*, with the promiſed accounts for your information; but as the ſeaſon is now become ſo much more favourable for a quick paſſage, we flatter ourſelves there will be but a ſmall loſs of time by her detention.

That your information may be as complete as poſſible, and every material may be before you, to enable you to form your judgment, we have thought it the beſt method to ſend you at full length, copies of our late addreſs to the Honourable the Secret Committee, and of every paper therein referred to, which relates to the late tranſactions, or our preſent political ſituation.

We have been ſo particular in our diſpatch to the Secret Committee, in the relation of every circumſtance that can tend to your information, that any thing further we can now ſay, would only be a uſeleſs repetition; we ſhall therefore ſubmit the whole to your determination, with a firm reliance of meeting with a candid and impartial judgment, and confine ourſelves in this addreſs to what has offered ſince the date of our advices to the Honourable the Secret Committee; premiſing only, that excluſive of any general opinion or directions you may pleaſe to give, in conſequence of the papers which will be now before you, we requeſt your particular deciſion on the conduct of Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and the charge given in againſt them by the Preſident, in his minute of the 29th January.

A liſt of the papers now tranſmitted is incloſed, in which they are enumerated in proper order.

Since our diſpatch to *England*, the Preſident laid before us a plan of the meaſures which appeared to him proper to be purſued in our preſent ſituation. A copy of this paper is alſo tranſmitted under No. 3: and ſub-

Appendix. Nos. 195&196.

joined thereto is a copy of our proceedings and determination, on the day it was taken under conſideration.

We have, as you will thereby obſerve, ſubmitted the propriety of the propoſed meaſures to you, and determined to ſuſpend the execution thereof till we receive your ſentiments, which we hope you will tranſmit with all poſſible expedition: and as, in whatever political ſyſtem you may think proper to adopt for this Preſidency, you may poſſibly require information on certain points or details of local knowledge, which, as we cannot foreſee, we cannot now ſupply, we have, in order to prevent any loſs of time in correſpondence, judged it expedient to ſend round to *Bengal* a gentleman well informed in the ſtate of the Company's affairs, and the preſent political circumſtances of the Preſidency; and having made choice of Mr. *George Horſley* for this commiſſion, he now waits on you with theſe diſpatches.

We requeſt you will permit Mr. *Horſley* to be informed of the meaſures you may think proper to adopt reſpecting this Preſidency, and allow him to repreſent to you any particulars which his local knowledge may ſuggeſt, or may appear to him material to be attended to in your deliberations.

The Marattas have diſcontinued the attack of *Fort Victoria*, but we have not yet received an anſwer to the remonſtrances made to the Poonah Durbar on that occaſion, nor to the letter written to *Mhadjee Scindia*, in conſequence of the 11th reſolution ſubjoined to the Preſident's review of Maratta affairs. We however propoſe to continue temporizing with him, and to endeavour to preſerve the diſtinction between him and *Nanah Furneſe*.

We moſt heartily join with our Preſident in the encomiums beſtowed on Colonel *Goddard*, in his minute of the 30th ultimo, for his judicious and deciſive conduct in quitting the negociation with *Moodajee Bounſillo*, and his ready determination of coming to our aid, as well as the activity and military ſkill with which he performed the march. We are happy to find by your letter of February, without further date, that his conduct has alſo met with your applauſe, and we beg to be permitted to remember him, and ſolicit from you ſome diſtinguiſhed mark of your and our ſenſe of his ſervices.

We have deſired the Colonel to be preſent at all our political proceedings; and at our meeting the 31ſt ultimo, when we had aſſembled to conſider on the Preſident's motion of the 30th, he laid before us your inſtructions to him of the 5th of February, and your commiſſion as Miniſter Plenipotentiary to the Court of *Poonah*. We now, as already mentioned, ſend a copy of our proceedings on that day, to which we beg leave to refer.

On the 17th ultimo we received your letter of the 16th November, encloſing a copy of the inſtructions to the late Mr. *Elliott*, and on the 29th we received your letter of the 8th February.

It would now be quite unavailing to expreſs our regret that we had not more timely information of the extent of Mr. *Elliott*'s commiſſion, but this is a circumſtance which we hope will have its due weight, when a judgment is formed of our conduct in undertaking the late expedition at the time we did.

As the whole of our conduct will now be before you, we conſider it unneceſſary to make any reply to your laſt-mentioned letter; but we were exceedingly concerned to find ourſelves taxed at the ſame time with negligence, in letting favourable opportunities eſcape, and precipitation in embarking in the late expedition when circumſtances were not favourable. With reſpect to the latter charge, we muſt truſt to the ſtatements now tranſmitted for our juſtification; and the former being quite general, deprives us of the advantage of making a circumſtantial defence; therefore we can only ſay in general, that we acted to the beſt of our judgment, according to the ſituation of affairs and the powers given us, and that our deferring the expedition two months longer than intended, was unavoidable, on account of the unuſual ſeverity and duration of the rains, which rendered the low country between this and the Ghauts impaſſable for troops and artillery earlier than the time our forces were ſent into the field.

We have now the honour to tranſmit ſecond copies of the diſpatch from the Honourable the Secret Committee, received the 8th of February by Colonel *Capper*.

We have directed Mr. *Horſley* to touch at *Tellicherry*, to bring you the lateſt intelligence of the ſtate of the operations againſt *Mahé*.

We have the honour, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, the 4th April 1779. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 195.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 4th May 1779. Secret Depart. Tueſday.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, and *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Mr. *Wheler* at *Beercool*, for the benefit of his health.

Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent, forming military arrangements.

THE Board continue to read the papers ſent from *Bombay*, with the letter from that Preſidency, under date the 4th April. Nos. 5 and 6.

Adjourned until to-morrow morning.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 5th May 1779;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, and *Philip Francis*, Eſquires. Mr. *Wheler* at *Beercool*, for the benefit of his health: Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent, forming military arrangements. Secret Depart. Wedneſday.

The Board continue reading the papers received from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, with their letter of the 4th ultimo; viz. Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15.

Adjourned until to-morrow morning.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 6th May 1779;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, and *Philip Francis*, Eſquires. Mr. *Wheler* at *Beercool*, for the benefit of his health: Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent, forming military arrangements.

The Board continue to read the papers tranſmitted from the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, in their letter of the 4th April; viz. Nos. 16 and 17.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 196.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 24th May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, } Eſquires.

Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

Mr. *Wheler* at *Beercool*, for the benefit of his health.

THE Governor General delivers in the following minute:

The Governor General—Judging from ſome intimations which have been caſually made at the Board, in converſation upon the diſpatches lately received from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, that our ſentiments, without a previous and liberal communication of them, might differ

not

not ſo much in the judgment which we might ſeverally paſs on the occurrences themſelves, or in the conduct of the perſons by whoſe agency they were produced, as in the choice of the ſubjects which ſhould form the ſubſtance of our reply to their letter; I have thought it proper, and hope I ſhall perform by it an acceptable ſervice to the Board, to enumerate and diſtinguiſh the ſeveral points which are preſented to our notice in the voluminous papers compoſing theſe diſpatches, and which may appear to require either the inſtructions or animadverſions of the Board upon them.

As my deſign in this undertaking is to ſhorten the labours of the Board, and to obviate a difference of opinion on an occaſion which ſeems to me to demand the united and moſt reſpectable application of the power of this Government, I hope that it will be received with candour, or at leaſt that it may eſcape controverſy: if either in the ſtate of facts, in deductions from them, or in the opinion which I may deliver of the conduct to be obſerved by this Government in relation to them, I may not obtain the concurrence of every other member of the Board; I repeat, that I do not mean to offer propoſitions for their determination, but ſubjects for their ſelection.

To theſe I ſhall proceed, and arrange them in their order of time.

1ſt. The plan formed by the Select Committee of *Bombay* on the 21ſt of July 1778, in concert with *Moraba Furneſe Bucheba Proonder* and *Tuckajee Holcar*, for the reſtoration of *Ragonaut Row* to the chief Adminiſtration of the Maratta State.

2d. The ſecond plan, formed on the 12th October 1778, and engagements concluded with *Ragonaut Row*, done for his reſtoration.

3d. The inſtitution of the Poonah Committee.

4th. The conduct of the Poonah Committee.

5th. The conduct of Mr. *Carnac*.

6th. The conduct of Colonel *Egerton*.

7th. The conduct of Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*.

8th. The ſpecific charge preferred againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and the reference of the ſame to the Governor-General and Council.

9th. The march of the army from *Panwell* to *Candola*.

10th. The deſcent of the army from *Candola*.

11th. The retreat from *Tillygaung*.

12th. The ſurrender of *Ragonaut Row*.

13th. The ſecret ſtipulation with *Mhadajee Scindia*.

14th. The reſolution of the Select Committee to diſavow both.

15th. The ſuſpenſion of Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*.

16th. The promotion of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, and the other promotions and ſucceſſions. General rules for promotion publiſhed in the general orders of the and remonſtrances of the ſuperſeded officers.

17th. Plan of negociations propoſed by Mr. *Hornby* on the and agreed to by the Select Committee.

18th. Plan of operations propoſed by Mr. *Hornby* on the march.

19th. Recommendation of Colonel *Goddard*.

20th. It will be a queſtion, Whether any, and what, ſupplies of money ſhall be ſent to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and to Colonel *Goddard*?

21ſt. And laſtly, what inſtructions ſhall be ſent to both for their future conduct, whether dependant or independent of the foregoing ſubjects.

If in this catalogue I have omitted any matter of conſequence offered to our deliberation in the papers now before us, the recollection of the other members of the Board will ſupply the deficiency; theſe will at leaſt be ſufficient to ſhew how extenſive, various, and complicated a duty is impoſed on us by theſe diſpatches, if we muſt of neceſſity enter on the conſideration of all the tranſactions and events which are related in them; if we muſt paſs judgment on every inſtance of perſonal conduct, either directly or indirectly brought by them to our notice; and if we are to preſcribe rules for their conduct on every diſtinct ſubject, under every variation of circumſtances which may eventually attend it. Appendix No. 196.

If the Board ſhall judge it incumbent on them to enter into ſo laborious a diſcuſſion, I ſhall ſubmit, though reluctantly, to bear my part of it; reluctantly, becauſe it will occupy more of our time than we can ſpare from the more ſubſtantial objects; and becauſe I foreſee that it will lead to altercation amongſt ourſelves; it being impoſſible that we, who have but begun to agree in opinion on our public meaſures, ſhould all become of one mind on twenty-two diſtinct and intereſting propoſitions, and becauſe it would be unavailing and inconcluſive.

To cenſure or to commend is all that we can do, except in one ſingle inſtance; for our cenſures cannot impreſs reſtraint, nor our commendations avert the effects of paſt misfortunes, or preclude the judgment which awaits the inſtruments of them from higher authority. Our effectual authority is limited to political engagements and military operations, undertaken without our previous licenſe. The treaty or convention, or whatever name it may bear, which was concluded at *Worgaun*, certainly falls within this deſcription, and it is in our power if we pleaſe to puniſh the authors of it by a temporary ſuſpenſion; but is it neceſſary? An act ſo fatal to the intereſts of the Company, and ſo diſgraceful to the reputation of the Britiſh nation, cannot fail to excite the moſt rigid ſcrutiny into the conduct of every one concerned in it, and the cauſes which produced it, by thoſe who have the power both to judge and to puniſh, which perhaps in this caſe we have not in effect.

The charge preferred by Mr. *Hornby* againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, and referred expreſsly to us for our judgment upon it, is but a ſmall portion of a long ſeries of great apparent miſconduct, every part of which has an equal claim, and many greater, to our conſideration of them. There was no need of this reference to us, nor are we competent to receive it: the charge might have been tried by a court martial; and if the Preſident and Select Committee had deemed it neceſſary, for any cauſe not ſo properly cognizable by a court martial, or capable of proof before it, or for any other reaſon, to remove Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* from their military command, or from the ſervice, they might have removed them, and ought to have done it in ſuch a caſe, without any form of trial, by the powers veſted in them by the Company. It does not conſiſt with the dignity of this Government, to aſſume a juriſdiction which it cannot legally exerciſe, nor effectually without the conſent of thoſe who, poſſeſſing ample powers themſelves, have deſired to conſign them to us, whether becauſe they doubted the equity of their own conduct, or dreaded the reſponſibility annexed to it; and therefore ſought to lighten the weight of it by ſharing it with us; for I cannot conjecture any other probable motive for ſo extraordinary an appeal.

If in the above reflections I have expreſſed the ſentiments of the other members of this Board, nothing remains for our conſideration but the queſtion of what ſhall be done, and the review of the paſt events ſo far only as they relate to it.

We have already diſavowed the convention of *Worgaun*: would to God that we could as eaſily efface the infamy which our national character has ſuſtained by the confeſſion inſerted in it, as we can juſtify, on the ſtricteſt principles of honour, juſtice, and public faith, our refuſal to ratify the ſubſtantial parts of it!

The ſeparate agreement made with *Madajee Scindia* ſtands on very different ground: it was not a conceſſion extorted by the Maratta Government againſt its conviction of legal ſufficiency in thoſe who yielded it, but it was the price at which they purchaſed the ſafety of the army; and was ſo abſolutely their own ſpontaneous act, that it appears that the Miniſters of *Madajee Scindia* were

Appendix. No. 196.

were even corrupted to influence his acceptance of it. It is true that they had no authority to make such a compromise, and we may therefore refuse to ratify it, in strict conformity to the letter of our own law; but I doubt whether this will avail us in the opinion of the world, or we can reconcile it to the obligations of justice and honour, which were thus pledged for the retribution of the most signal (though humiliating) act of kindness that a nation could have received from the bounty of an individual; unless we can be allowed the rule of Asiatic policy, in doing to all men what we know they would under similar circumstances do unto us.

I am compelled therefore in conscience and in duty to declare, that unless *Madajee Scindia* shall have forfeited his right by any subsequent act, he is intitled to the performance of his engagement, and we ought to ratify it.

Except this be made an addition to the instructions already given to Colonel *Goddard* (and I must own that I do not think that it will contribute to their success, but the contrary) I know of no other point of immediate negociation or action that can be prescribed either to him or to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, until that commission shall have been concluded either by a definitive treaty of peace, or by a decided war.

This is not a proper time to determine on the measures which may be necessary in the case first supposed.

If the Maratta rulers shall finally reject our offers of peace, we must endeavour to make the most of a state of war; and for that purpose I cannot recommend a better plan of operations, than that which is contained in Mr. *Hornby*'s minute of the 30th March: it appears easily practicable by the force which we possess; it will yield us if successful the possession of the very lands which were the objects of our late engagements, and distress them in the means of supporting the war, by the loss of so considerable a portion of their revenue, at the same time that it will increase our own.

Whether these, or whatever others, may be the grounds of our present resolutions, I hope the Board will see with me the propriety of conveying them in such a form and temper as may give encouragement and confidence to the Presidency of *Bombay*, instead of adding to their depression. They are the immediate guardians of the Company's property on that side of *India*; and it is by their agency we must defend and support the general rights of the Company, and the honour of the British nation, unhappily involved as they appear to be in the consequences of their past miscarriages. In an emergency so critical and important, we have (as I conceive) but this alternative, either to transfer the power (if we can do it) into fitter hands, or to render it as complete and as efficacious as it can be made in theirs. To mark our want of confidence in them by any public act, would weaken theirs, in us; to load them with harsh and unoperating reproaches, would indispose them to our authority; at the same time that it would absolve them from its effect; and to bind their deliberations by absolute and undiscretional orders, might eventually disable them from availing themselves of any fortuitous advantages which the confusion of the Maratta Government is more likely to offer them than any plan which we could prescribe to them, or which they could form on the letter of our instructions. In a word, such a conduct, by inflaming the passions of men whom we are not to regard as exempt from the common infirmities of humanity, would prove the surest means of converting the powers which were still left in their hands into the instruments of opposition, and even of the defeat of the very measures which require their agency, and cannot be accomplished without it: let us rather excite them to exert themselves for the retrieval of their past misfortunes, and arm them with means adequate to that end; restricting their powers where the object is determinate, and permitting a more liberal extension of them, in cases which are too variable and uncertain for positive injunctions. Their admission of Colonel *Goddard* to a deliberative seat at their Board, and the request which they have made to us to allow of his being appointed to the chief command, if it should be vacant, of their military establishment, which would give him an effective voice in their Select Committee, present to us an occasion of their adopting the principle which I have recommended, with the most ample caution for the safe application of it. I hope and persuade myself that we have all the same opinion of Colonel *Goddard*'s merits: I for my own part have a pleasure, and will add a pride, in declaring, that though I have often traced back his conduct in my reflections to the period on which he first obtained the command of the expedition, I have not been able to detect one error committed by him, or advantage neglected, either in his military conduct, or in the line of his political negociations. His command has been alike distinguished by the spirit of enterprize and activity, qualities which he was universally acknowledged to possess, by prudence and circumspection, by a conciliatory temper, a friendly demeanour to the inhabitants of the various countries through which he had to pass, and a strict attention to the good order of the troops under his command, by a happy and ready decision in the choice of expedients, and an implicit obedience to the orders under which he acted, of which the proceedings of the Select Committee afford not the least remarkable instances: by acquiescing in the Presidency of *Bombay*, and by blending the powers already vested in him with those of the Select Committee, we shall add vigour to their resolutions, and a security against their effects, at least so far as our confidence in him may be justly placed.

The following draft of an answer to the Presidency of *Bombay* has been formed on the principles recorded in this minute; and are submitted in the form of a finished letter rather for the means of dispatch, than in the presumption of its proving exactly conformable to the opinion of the Board, on every subject which it contains, or which it may be judged advisable to comprize in it. I have not yet drawn up any letter to Colonel *Goddard*, as that will depend on what is written to *Bombay*.

To the President and Select Committee of *Bombay*.

We have received your letter of the 4th of April, with its enclosures, by the hands of Mr. *Horsley*.

We do not think it necessary to enter on the review of your proceedings, but shall confine our present inquiries to the choice of such means as may best conduce to retrieve their unhappy consequences; leaving the past to the scrutiny of higher and more effectual authority.

We must desire to decline the reference which you have made to us, of the charge preferred by your President against Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, as a point on which we have no jurisdiction, and which is cognizable only by your authority, either with the powers immediately vested in your body by the Court of Directors, or through the regular trial of a court martial.

Having already given full powers to Colonel *Goddard* to negociate and conclude a treaty of peace with the Maratta Government, and having no cause to alter the terms which we have prescribed in our instructions for that purpose; we have only to repeat, that we look to the issue of that commission as our primary object, and the termination of all our political views on your side of *India*, if it shall prove successful.

But if the Ministers shall reject the proposals which we have ordered to be made to them, and shall reduce us to the necessity of defending the rights and interests of the Company, by an open war, we cannot prescribe a better plan of operations than that which is laid down by your President in his minute of the 30th March, which in such case we authorize you to carry liberally into execution, and even to qualify it by such variations as shall not subvert the general design of it, which we

underſtand to be the reduction of ſuch countries as lie along the ſea coaſt, forming a line of territory with our preſent poſſeſſions on the continent, and defenſible againſt the incurſions of cavalry: and we further authorize and empower you, with the reſervation hereafter mentioned, to enter into any treaty or other engagement, with the Chief of the Guicawar family or others, for the above purpoſe, and on the grounds deſcribed on the aforeſaid plan; obſerving the following cautions, to which we require your ſtricteſt attention: that your engagements ſhall be offenſive only for the objects of your immediate operations, and in all other reſpects purely defenſive: that your engagements with the Guicawar family ſhall be with the head of it, and with him exclufively: that you ſhall not aſſume a mediation between the brothers, or take any part whatever in their domeſtic diſputes, further than to ſupport the party in alliance with the Company, and his poſſeſſions againſt foreign invaſion; and that you do not commit the dignity of the Company, or pledge the national faith in formal treaties with perſons of a rank or power unſuitable to ſuch a diſtinction.

We are ſenſible of the attention which you have ſhewn to our views with the Government of *Berar*, in joining the overtures lately made to *Moodajee Booſla* by Colonel *Goddard*, and in your reſolution to avoid whatever might again interfere with this negociation. We confeſs we at this time entertain little hope of his concurring with our deſigns: he will wait for proofs of our ſuperiority before he will hazard the conſequences of a decided connection with us; and every offer made to him, while he is under the influence of ſuch a policy, will but ſerve to increaſe his reſerve, as he will naturally conſtrue it to proceed from the conſciouſneſs of our inability to ſupport ourſelves without a foreign aſſiſtance; and this is an additional motive for our preferring a ſcheme of military operations practicable by our own force, and unincumbered with the weight of a timid ally. If, notwithſtanding, *Moodajee Booſla* ſhall have anſwered the letters which have been written to him by a declaration of a willingneſs to accept the proffered alliance, we ſhall leave it to be concluded under the inſtructions already given in charge to Colonel *Goddard*: if on the contrary, as we expect, he ſhall directly refuſe, or heſitate, or make new references to us, we have in ſuch caſe directed Colonel *Goddard* to break off the negociation; nor to reſume it, but on advances made to him by the Government of *Berar*, nor then, unleſs it ſhall be ſtrictly compatible with the ſtate of our other connections then ſubſiſting, and with your participation, in the manner which we ſhall preſcribe hereafter.

Although we think ourſelves ſtrictly juſtifiable, in refuſing to ratify even the ſmalleſt tittle of the treaty or convention of *Worgaun*, yet, from a fair review of your proceedings, we are compelled to regard the ſeparate agreement made with *Madajee Scindia* in a very different light: it was not a conceſſion extorted by the Maratta Government againſt its conviction of legal ſufficiency in thoſe who yielded it, but it was the price at which they purchaſed the ſafety of the army; and was ſo abſolutely their own ſpontaneous act, that it appears, that the Miniſters of *Madajee Scindia* were even corrupted to influence his acceptance of it. It is true, they had no authority to make ſuch a compromiſe, and we may therefore refuſe to ratify it, in ſtrict conformity to the letter of our own law; but we doubt whether this will avail us in the opinion of the world, or we can reconcile it to the obligations of juſtice and honour, which were thus pledged for the retribution of the moſt ſignal (though humiliating) act of kindneſs that a nation could have received from the bounty of an individual. We muſt therefore declare, that unleſs *Madajee Scindia* ſhall have forfeited his right by any ſubſequent act, he is intitled to the performance of this engagement, and we ought to ratify it.

We hope he may be prevailed upon to depart from the letter of this ſtipulation, and to accept of what he may deem an equivalent for it; and we authorize you to treat with him for ſuch a compromiſe, declaring on our behalf, that we diſavow the authority of Mr. *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton*, to execute the engagement with him, which was executed by them; but that in conſideration of the ſignal ſervice afforded us by his mediation and influence at the time in which it was made (and make, as we underſtand) the pledged condition of that ſervice, we deem it in this conſtruction equal to a formal obligation, and therefore empower you to treat with him for the accompliſhment of it, in ſuch a manner as ſhall prove ſatisfactory to him, and more conſiſtent with our national credit than the literal performance of it; but if he ſhall inſiſt on the literal performance of it, and he ſhall not have forfeited his right to it by the renewal of hoſtilities againſt us, or by any breach of Government, if any ſuch exiſts between us, we ſee no alternative; it muſt be fulfilled. Appendix, No. 196.

Although the conduct of *Madajee Scindia* may not ſeem to confirm your opinion of his diſpoſition towards us, or rather of the political neceſſity which ſeems to incline him to inſure our future alliance, yet we think the arguments which you have aſſigned for this belief ſo well grounded, and it agrees ſo well with the knowledge which we ourſelves poſſeſs of his ſtate views and talents, that we entirely adopt it, nor do we find it difficult to reconcile the demands made on us under his influence by the Miniſters, and immediately by him, for the performance of the conditions of the convention of *Worgaun* with that diſpoſition, or with the obvious ſyſtem of policy which his preſent intereſt demands.

We ſuppoſe it probable that he will avoid any direct engagement with us, till the urgency of his affairs ſhall require it, or until he can gain the advantage of the negociation, by waiting for the firſt advances to be made on your part. If from the opportunities which you have of a nearer and more intimate knowledge of his perſonal character and neceſſities, you ſhall judge this concluſion to be well grounded, it will be adviſable to treat him with the ſame temporiſing and indeterminate conduct, and purſuing the plan of military operations which we have recommended, to wait for the offer of his alliance rather than ſolicit it. Propoſing this as a general caution, we authorize you to enter into ſuch engagements with him as ſhall not be contrary to any before concluded, and which you ſhall judge moſt adviſable; making your future ſecurity, peace, and an adequate revenue, your chief and indiſpenſable objects, and the grounds of your engagements with him.

To ſum up what we have written; our firſt deſire is to obtain peace on the terms propoſed by our inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard* of the 15th April, and it is only in the event of the failure of this deſign that we have formed the ſubſequent inſtructions, or will allow of their operation.

In theſe the plan of military operations recommended by your Preſident, is to have the firſt place with its dependant engagements with the Guicawars; the next in order is the negociation with *Moodajee Booſla*; and the laſt, the propoſed engagement with *Madajee Scindia*.

The execution of the projected treaty of peace with the Poonah Miniſtry we leave to the ſole charge of Colonel *Goddard*, according to the inſtructions which we have already given him.

The negociation and treaty of alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* we alſo leave to the ſole management of Colonel *Goddard*, on the authority of his inſtructions of the 16th November, until the period of their ſuſpenſion, by the refuſal or ſuch heſitation of *Moodajee Booſla* as he ſhall deem ſufficient to warrant his declaring the negociation ſuſpended. But in the future renewal of this negociation, and in all other negociations, treaties, and plans of military operations, it is our wiſh ſo to blend the powers of your Government with our own in the direction of them, and in every formal or occaſional inſtrument which they may require for their ratification, as to

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preſerve the credit and diſtinct reſponſibility of both, and to make both the pledges for the faithful obſervance of them; for this purpoſe we need not recommend that Colonel *Goddard* be conſulted, when his preſence, or the nature of the ſubjects will admit of it, on all meaſures which have a relation to our preſent inſtructions, as you have already been pleaſed to allow him a deliberative voice in your Council, and we are happy to find that you are ſo well ſatisfied with his conduct, and his ready diſpoſition to aſſiſt in the execution of your deſigns, as to leave us little occaſion to lay down a clearer line for the employment of the forces under his command, than that which we have already deſcribed.

We have directed Colonel *Goddard* to execute whatever ſervice you ſhall think it proper to require, which ſhall not be contrary to our inſtructions, or to any exiſting engagements; a caution which we hope will be unneceſſary, but with which we do not conſider ourſelves at liberty to diſpenſe while the principal reſponſibility reſts with us; and we muſt require, that for the formal repreſentation of this Government in any treaties or other engagements which you ſhall form in virtue of theſe inſtructions, Colonel *Goddard* do affix his ſignature thereto, without which we ſhall not allow them to be complete or valid.

We very readily and cheerfully acquieſce in the deſire which you expreſs to inveſt Colonel *Goddard* with the chief command of your military eſtabliſhment whenever that office ſhall be vacant, reſerving to ourſelves the right of recalling him to our ſervice in the event of any appointment from home by which he may be ſuperſeded in the command, and your intentions in conferring it upon him be thereby defeated. As he will by ſuch a determination become a regular member of your Government, according to the inſtitutions of the Company, and have an effective voice in your Councils, we do not conſider it neceſſary that he ſhould, in that capacity, be inveſted with a greater authority than any other member of your Select Committee; and we do therefore in ſuch caſe revoke the powers which we have given him to that effect, with this ſingle reſervation, viz.

That although he will be bound by the reſolutions of the majority of the body of which he is a member, yet we require, that in order to preſerve a formal diſtinction of the powers of this Government in the inſtruments which appertain to his miniſterial agency, he do affix his ſeparate and formal ſignature to it as the repreſentative of this Government.

Sir *Eyre Coote* delivers in the following minute:

Sir *Eyre Coote*—The Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* having referred to us the deciſion upon the conduct of the field deputies and commanding officers of their expedition to *Poonah*, to place *Ragonaut Row* in the Regency of the Maratta State during the minority of *Madarow Narrain Peiſhwa*, and to remove *Nanna Furneſe*, upon account of his apparently hoſtile diſpoſitions againſt us in favour of the French, I ſhall, in as few words as poſſible, give my ſentiments upon the conduct of theſe gentlemen, in as far as the papers ſubmitted to us can lead me to the truth.

The reſolution of the 21ſt of July was ſuſpended for various cauſes until the 12th October, when it was brought before the Select Committee by a member, who was afterwards appointed Preſident of the Committee of Field Deputies, urging its very material neceſſity to the very exiſtence of the Company upon that coaſt, adding "That the Government of *Bengal* had given them full "latitude to act, and had provided them with the neceſ- "ſary reſources to do it with vigour and effect." In this the Governor concurred, and the meaſure was enacted by them, forming a majority of the Select Committee; Mr. *Draper* diſſenting. The execution thus fell to the chief, not to ſay ſole management of the propoſer. It is to theſe two gentlemen therefore that we muſt look for the degree of its ſucceſs, if it ſhall appear that their powers were ſufficient to bring it to the intended iſſue; ſhould theſe prove ample, the whole weight of all the conſequences of a failure muſt fall upon them. Theſe conſequences were, the immediate loſs of the benefits expected by a completion of the expedition, the expence of the men and money in the attempt, the diſcredit of giving up our ally, the loſs of that ally, the ſhame of an unwarrantable retreat, the blemiſh thrown upon our national honour and military reputation; not to mention the favourable juncture this misfortune may afford to the French, who certainly have a very conſiderable power at the iſlands ready to make an attempt upon our poſſeſſions, which they otherwiſe would not think of doing with any propriety, in the ſituation that their affairs are now reduced to in *India*. Theſe conſequences are therefore of the moſt ſerious nature. If theſe gentlemen had powers to prevent them, let facts, taken from their own defence, ſhew how far their conduct was ſuitable to thoſe powers, and their powers to the object.

The Governor, by whoſe vote the meaſure was adopted, remained himſelf the majority of the Select Committee at *Bombay*; the Committee for appealing to for deciſion, for granting or revoking powers, in ſhort, for the grand regulation of the whole. The propoſing member appointed Preſident of the Committee of Field Deputies, and poſſeſſing a double voice, became arbiter of the meaſures that came within the authority delegated to the Field Deputies. Theſe two gentlemen who enacted the meaſure, thus retained in their own hands the complete and ſole direction of the whole in every point, grand or minute. The Preſident of the Select Committee at home, the Preſident of the Field Deputies abroad; ſhould the one want more powers, or meet with any difficulties whatever, he had but to appeal, and have; ſhould the other perceive any thing ſhort of his wiſhes, he had but to ſay, and it could be done.

It was impoſſible to be more powerful, but at the ſame time impoſſible to undertake more reſponſibility. They began by a clear, at leaſt a dangerous purchaſe of the ſhare of this power, veſted in the Field Deputies. The meaſure for appointing Field Deputies, (for every other name to that Committee muſt be a fictitious one) was in the moſt immedite oppoſition to the Company's poſitive and repeated orders: to elude which, the ſlimſy pretence of a falſe name was adopted. They were to all intents and purpoſes a Committee of Field Deputies; an office not only forbidden by thoſe under whoſe immediate orders the Select Committee were employed to act, but an office immediately exploded and reprobated by all Governments as the moſt fruſtrating clog that can be thrown upon any military operation, a reſtraint under which no man that has any jealouſy for his own military reputation, or any regard for the intereſts of his employers, ſhould or could act under; and of all commiſſions that ever were iſſued, there never could be framed a more deſpotic one to thoſe it was granted, and more injurious and humiliating to a commanding officer than the one in queſtion. The words are, "*to conduct* and *concert* all "operations, political and military, and obedience re- "quired from all officers and ſervants." This was ſo glaring, that even Colonel *Egerton*, who made no objections to the eſtabliſhment of Field Deputies, could not avoid oppoſing it, and proteſting againſt its being iſſued in general orders, as it would in fact annihilate his command; further, he complained of this to the Preſident at *Bombay*, who ſaw it ſo ſtrongly, that he wrote to the Field Preſident as follows: "Recommending to "him upon whoſe conduct ſo much depended, to wave "publiſhing it in general orders, as the promulgation "of ſuch a commiſſion in the army might bear the ap- "pearance of ſetting up an authority in the very camp "to ſuperſede that of the commanding officer; and alſo "agreed in moſt of the objections that the Colonel made "againſt the inſtructions as well as the commiſſion, "wherein he had ſtated, that the rights given by the "Company to their commanding officers are infringed."

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The Governor added, that theſe points muſt have eſcaped himſelf and the "Field Preſident when paſſing the "orders at the Select Committee." In the anſwer that the Governor returns to the Colonel by the ſame diſpatch, he evades replying to his complaints, of which circumſtance he acquainted the Field Preſident.

Here their conduct ſtands in a ſtriking point of view; whether conſidered in its monſtrous partiality to one of two colleagues in a committee; whether in not contributing to that harmony which they confeſs needful, and had enacted in a ſeparate article of the commiſſion, for the diſpatch of the buſineſs they were ſent upon; whether in trampling upon the rights annexed by their ſuperiors to particular ſtations; or finally, whether in aiding to correct an error laid before them, and acknowledged by themſelves as an act of injuſtice, ariſen from omiſſion or ignorance, cauſing, as they are pleaſed to ſtate, diſſentions in the committee, to the detriment and delay of a public tranſaction of the moſt weighty nature. Thus confeſſing themſelves the authors of faults that they do not afterwards heſitate to charge others with, having the power to correct it, ſeeing the riſe and progreſs of the error, and its bad effect, yet evading to amend it. Nor ſimply this, for in a further letter to the Field Preſident, he expreſſes his great ſatisfaction at his concurring in the propriety of ſupporting theſe acknowledged faulty orders.

The Governor again writes to Colonel *Egerton*, "that "if any difference ſhould ariſe between him and the "Field Deputies, regarding his military rights, which "he is ſure can be but trifling, the opinion of the Field "Deputies muſt preponderate." *Sure they can be but trifling*, after having confeſſed that the commiſſion annihilate his command, and the *opinions of the Field Deputies* conſiſting in fact of the Preſident alone, to preponderate in a deciſion upon their own powers.

That ſame diſpatch he confirmed to the Field Preſident his caſting vote, and eluded filling up the vacancy cauſed by Mr. *Moſtyn*'s illneſs, "relying ſingly upon "him;" who concurs in ſupporting the full powers of the commiſſion and inſtructions againſt every attack or objection that may be made againſt them.

Under theſe inordinate powers, nothing being left to the commanding officer, except the mode of pitching tents and forming the quarter guards, ſhall the Committee of the Field Deputies be exonerated of the blame of the delays in performing a march of 24 miles in 25 days? They who had the concerting and conducting of all military operations, might have concerted and conducted a more rapid march, without ever having borne military commiſſions: they might have diſcovered that 19,000 bullocks to 2,600 men was ſomewhat diſproportionate, poſſibly little tending to accelerate the progreſs of ſo ſmall a force; which indeed could ſcarce be deemed an eſcort to ſuch an equipage. They charge Colonel *Egerton*, and ſtate, that an attack upon the enemy's guns might have been of ſingular uſe; yet, as appears by the diary, never ordered or recommended it; nor even, as they did upon other occaſions when they wiſhed to ſave appearances, induce the Governor to write a letter recommending what they wanted the commanding officer to do.

Again, they complain of apprehenſions of want of proviſions; but it does not appear they ever took active ſteps to procure any, until they propoſed the unfortunate retreat; nor could it be, as Mr. *Draper* juſtly obſerves, want of incentive that deferred their activity, for they had been witneſſes to the loſs ſuſtained by the delays at the Presidency of three friendly Chiefs, who during that time were taken from their party; and having declared that the gain of fifteen days would have brought the army without oppoſition to *Poonah*, yet had they not had power ſufficient to regulate and controul the army; the Select Committee at *Bombay* might and ought, upon perceiving the unmilitary delays in the progreſs of the troops, to have recalled or changed thoſe who appeared blameable. But now we approach to the effect of theſe extraordinary Field Deputy powers, and the uſe they were put to. Appendix. No. 196.

A deputation of the members of Adminiſtration come forth from their ſeats in Government, with a declared purpoſe of benefitting and gaining credit and territory to their employers, veſted with the higheſt, even unwarrantable, powers to ſupport theſe purpoſes; at the head of a Britiſh army, well appointed, having a Prince by the hand to ſeat him in the regency of the empire, arrived within fifteen miles, one day's march from the capital he was to govern, where it was to be ſuppoſed were many friends, who were only until their arrival reſtrained from ſtanding forth, nay ſome of whom, to the amount of 4,000 horſe, had already come over to join their own army in uncommonly elevated ſpirits, as teſtified by all its officers, having eighteen days proviſion in hand; the enemy a depreſſed though numerous rabble; the chief leader among whom they knew was only keeping up the maſk of enmity, for his ſhot were ordered to be all thrown ſhort, the council of the foe having the day before ſent ſubmiſſion to *Bombay*, offering to pay the charges of the war, and gratify the protected ally.

In this ſituation, how did they exert the powers delegated to them for the object in view.

A retreat was ordered without conſulting the commanding officer of the army, Colonel *Cockburn*; who upon receiving the order, together with Captain *Hartley*, repreſented how dangerous it would be to attempt a retreat with troops who had never been accuſtomed to it. And failing in that, Mr. *Holmes*, a civilian, joined Meſſrs. *Cockburn* and *Hartley*, and propoſed treating with the Marattas where they then were, as better terms might be expected before the enemy knew any thing of our intention to retreat: but this met with the ſame fate as a propoſal made the day before; *Ragonaut Row* who ſolicited them to defer ſubmiſſion for one day, as he was treating with his friends among the oppoſed army, and might yet ſave all; but he was anſwered, that not an hour could be granted him.

After all this, Mr. *Cockburn*'s opinion being then aſked by the Field Preſident, he anſwered, that he had not a doubt of carrying the army to *Poonah*, if ordered; but the reſolution for the retreat was not to be altered; fatal infatuation! The next day after the firſt ſtage of the retreat had been effected from *Tellagoun* to *Worgaum*, in deſpite of a fruitleſs attempt of them to prevent it, a carte blanche was ſent to the enemy, and they proceeded to give up, not only what was entruſted to their management in the preſent expedition, but they added all the acquiſitions made by the Bombay Preſidency during the reign of the preſent Peiſhwa, nay, they extend their conceſſions to this Preſidency, by ordering our troops to return; again they enter into a private treaty, of their own *free will and accord*, with one of the enemy, making further ſurrenders in conſideration of benefits ſaid to be received at his hands in the good and favourable terms of the general treaty. In the general treaty we acknowledge ourſelves to be the infringers of former treaties, although we ſet out in our manifeſto with declaring that we acted upon their infringements, and in the private treaty we acknowledge ourſelves defeated, although no ſuch defeat exiſted. In addition to this reward for ſuppoſed ſervices, they ſubmit to another humiliating act that equals the firſt: they, acting under a commiſſion in the king's name, bribe the Chubdars, the menial ſervants of the enemy, with a thouſand rupees, and others among them with 41,000 rupees, to purchaſe what they thought their own ſafety; and finally, give two gentlemen as hoſtages, for what they declare was out of their power to perform. The loſs of life or cruel ſufferings theſe hoſtages may be reduced to, they muſt be anſwerable for.

Is there any thing that we can do adequate to ſuch a caſe? The eyes of the nation are upon us; our feelings for our country's honour will be the meaſure of our own: our power extends to a removal from their ſtations;

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ſtations; removal from ſtation, ſetting loſs of character out of the queſtion, amounts only to a ceſſation of ſalary; and ſhall a mere ceſſation of ſalary be a requital for the facts here ſtated, if they ſhould prove true? No, let the acquittal or puniſhment ſuch an inveſtigation may bring on, become a national object. I propoſe that a public trial be recommended home; our martial law muſt decide upon the merits or demerits of the two commanders of the army, or ſuch other officers whoſe conduct upon this expedition may require elucidating. But nothing leſs than our national tribunals can acquit or puniſh the civil gentlemen engaged in it, who, by the exceſſive powers they took, preſerved the whole reſponſibility to themſelves.

I wiſhed to have ended here, but ſome further circumſtances remain unnoticed, not equally touching our country's welfare, but tranſactions among themſelves cloſing the above ſcene. When the Field Deputies returned to *Bombay*, the Field Preſident commenced his ſeparate juſtification, by throwing the whole blame of what had happened upon the bad conduct of the officers under them; by the delays they had cauſed in the progreſs of the troops, by the improper diviſion of the army at the retreat, and by the opinions given by them after the retreat; referring at the ſame time to their minutes of that juncture, to prove his own innocence.

To theſe points I ſhall give but a few words:

1ſt. The bad conduct in delays; it was in favour of the Field Deputies, as well as in the Select Committee at *Bombay*, to have corrected; therefore, if they were aware of the bad effects of ſuch delays, having the incentives they profeſſed for promptitude, they remain the more culpable for not altering it.

2d. Whatever the diviſion of the army may have been on the 12*th*, it is clear that the firſt ſtage of the retreat ordered, was effected, notwithſtanding the very early attack of the enemy; nor was the loſs great, conſidering the number of the foe, the length of the action, and the immediate quantity of baggage to be covered upon very unfavourable and broken ground.

3d. The opinions of the officers upon the ſtate that the fatal retreat had reduced the army to, from high ſpirits to dejection, if true, were juſtifiable; if falſe, the Field Deputies, being upon the ſpot for better information, ſhould not have been guided by them; the army was under the command of the Field Deputies.

4th. As for the defence the minute of that day affords, it appears to me to have quite a contrary tendency. It is aſſerted by Colonel *Egerton* to be an afterwork; and the language of the firſt part is ſo different from the other productions of that period, that it might with ſome afford a preſumptive proof of the truth of that aſſertion, which in fact is not fully removed by the evidence called to contradict it: however, letting this drop, for it is too trifling after what has preceded, I will only ſay, that if they really thought, as they pretend, that by continuing the retreat they might have regained ſafety inſtead of ſubmiſſion, they make themſelves doubly criminal for acting againſt their better knowledge, whilſt under no influence but their own will.

Mr. *Moſtyn*'s death, and *Ragoba*'s duplicity, have alſo been mentioned as cauſes for our failure.

Could Mr. *Moſtyn*'s death give cauſe for a retreat, declared to have been ordered upon a report of a Commiſſary of proviſions? or could *Ragoba*'s duplicity make eighteen days proviſion appear inſufficient to perform one day's march to *Poonah*? No, ſay they, but this duplicity (the bad effects of which we muſt ſuppoſe were only diſcovered the day of the retreat) cauſed him to ſtate more friends than he had, and prevented his managing thoſe he poſſeſſed to the beſt advantage. Admitting it to be true that he had miſmanaged his friends, it ſhould, when we were ſo far advanced, have produced an oppoſite effect to that of ordering a retreat; it ought to have ſtimulated us to redoubled vigour; had we marched into, and poſſeſſed ourſelves of the capital, which the commanding officer declares might have been done, there cannot be a doubt that the Chiefs who had engaged themſelves to Mr. *Moſtyn*, and many more would have joined *Ragoba*'s party. All their excuſes are equally frivolous, for the Governor himſelf is obliged to condemn and lament the retreat.

Had *Ragoba*'s friends been really ſo ill managed by him, as it is thrown out, the miniſterial party forming the whole ſtrength of the Maratta empire, would not have been ſo alarmed at the appearance of 2,600 men, as to be induced to make the ſubmiſſive offers abovementioned to the Governor. They muſt have feared a junction, and that of a very large diviſion of their party. Our backwardneſs may have made our friends ſuſpend action, but could not overſet or alter the principles or intereſted views that firſt induced them to an alliance with *Ragoba*. The Committee of Field Deputies when at *Bombay*, probably to ſupport their own conduct after what had paſſed, joined the Governor in a meaſure (Captain *Hartley*'s promotion on the 1ſt February 1779) which might at any time prove fatal to military ſervice, but more particularly at that juncture, as it could not fail giving univerſal diſcontent. It was a meaſure that muſt make every man who feels as a ſoldier ſympathize with thoſe unhappy men of real military merit, who have the misfortune of ſerving under ſuch regulations.

I muſt look upon Colonel *Goddard*'s arrival at *Bombay*, as a moſt fortunate circumſtance at this juncture; his diſtinguiſhed merits as an officer I need paſs no encomiums upon, as his actions ſufficiently declare them, and I think it abſolutely neceſſary in the preſent diſtreſſed ſituation that the military upon the Bombay eſtabliſhment are reduced to, that he ſhould have the rank given him of Brigadier General, in order to enable him to carry on the ſervice with more weight and dignity. It is not in the power of the Governor General and Council, or the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to appoint him Commander in Chief of the forces there, or to give him an effective voice in the Select Committee, as Colonel *Egerton* cannot be looked upon in any other light than Commander in Chief (though prevented from acting as ſuch) until the ſentence of a court martial or the Court of Directors, decide upon the charges laid againſt him.

Under theſe circumſtances, I have only to recommend that the Government of *Bombay* ſhall give Colonel *Goddard* a deliberate voice in their Committee; and conſult him upon all military and political points. And that we continue to him thoſe powers which he already poſſeſſes from this Government, and further inveſt him with ſuch others as we may find neceſſary for carrying on our views.

We are further called upon to give a deciſion on the meaſures which the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay* now think neceſſary to be purſued.

The reſolution of the 21ſt July is at an end, *Rajopaut Row* being no longer in our power.

Scindia holds off, and declines engaging with us, which is the more to be lamented, as his enmity, which muſt now be deeply rooted in his mind, is owing to the deceitful and unworthy treatment he has received from us. The ſervices he has rendered us, and his ſtrong attachment to the Engliſh intereſt, make it a national conſideration to ſatisfy him by an equivalent to the benefit he might have expected from the poſſeſſion of *Brouch* which cannot be ceded to him upon the claim of a grant that the Field Deputies were not empowered to make.

Moodajee Booſla's claim is held forth as proper, on account of "deſtroying the Bramin uſurpation," and reſtoring the original Ram Rajah Government, which can only tend to unite, increaſe, and ſtrengthen the Maratta State. This very conſideration, however it may weigh with the Bombay Council, would prevent me, if no better can be urged, from ever concurring in it.

Our real intereſts are to keep theirs divided, always preventing overgrowth of power in any of their parties; thus endeavouring to hold the ſcale in our own hands, we remain ourſelves in a great degree the umpire. This is the freeſt road to the ſupport of our dignity and profit,

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as well as the ſureſt means of retaining undiſturbed what we now poſſeſs.

I therefore think that at preſent we ſhould not ſeek to renew a war, but negociate with the various Maratta intereſts an honourable peace, conformably to the directions already given Colonel *Goddard* upon that head. But if by refuſing this they force us to continue hoſtilities, I muſt in this caſe ſuppoſe a junction of all their parties, and of courſe an union of all their forces; and I do not think with Colonel *Goddard*, that his detachment, conſidering the ſtate it is now in, together with the Bombay troops, are equal to enſure ſucceſs in a conteſt with the united Maratta Powers; and I need not aſk any man who is verſed in the politics of this country, what would be the conſequences of a defeat. I do not doubt he muſt concur in my opinion, that it would endanger the whole of the Company's poſſeſſions.

Colonel *Goddard* has loſt near a thouſand of his original diſciplined men, and thoſe he has recruited are raw, unformed, and in no ſhape to be depended on. He has reported to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, "that one half of his Sepoys have refuſed to receive "their pay for the month of January, unleſs that for the "month of February is at the ſame time diſcharged; and "he ſeems to think, that this has proceeded from a diſ"poſition among the men to return home, if they could "furniſh themſelves with money enough to bear their "charges to their own country: however he was of opinion, "that he ſhould be able to put a ſtop to this ſpirit on "his return to camp." "But we (ſay the Select Com"mittee) have every reaſon to fear the increaſe of it."

Whatever ſway Colonel *Goddard* may have over his troops, there is no foreſeeing how far ſuch a diſaffection may carry them, not having a body of Europeans with them to infuſe a ſpirit of emulation, or to keep them in a proper degree of ſubjection.

Our utmoſt vigour ſhall therefore be exerted to ſupport our military reputation in this country, and by one united effort, put a glorious and ſpeedy end to the war: for however uncertain the ſucceſs of war may be, we ought to leave it as little to the reſult of chance as poſſible, conſidering the great ſtake we have to riſk; for which reaſon we ſhould alſo form alliances with the country Powers, eſpecially with *Hyder Ally*, whoſe more particular intereſt it is to join us in any hoſtile attempts againſt the Maratta State; and if a war ſhould be indiſpenſably continued, I would leave it to the commanding officer, who is reſponſible to us for his conduct, to adopt Mr. *Hornby*'s plan, or not, as he may think moſt adviſable for promoting the diſtreſs of the enemy. In ſo far I may agree in it, though not, as Mr. *Hornby* expreſſes it, for the ſake of revenue; and as to the other ſimilar propoſals of ſeeking war for plunder, the honour of the nation and Company inſeparable from my own, will never permit me to ſubſcribe to.

They call upon us for thirty lacks between this and October, to ſave their poſſeſſions. While we have money or credit here, I never will let any of the Company's poſſeſſions ſuffer for the want of it; but the very motive that will induce me to ſend it, will prompt me to prevent its falling into hands that experience has proved will make ſo ill an uſe of it: therefore I will not conſent to any ſum being ſent, until I ſee it accompanied by a proper perſon, who ſhall be anſwerable to this Government that it be applied to the purpoſe for which it may be granted.

As Commander in Chief of the army, a reference upon ſo military a ſubject ſeemed to call for my particular diſcretion: this, added to the great variety of matter it afforded, and its weighty conſequences, will, I hope be ſufficient apology for the length of this minute.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Mr. *Francis*—I ought to apprize the Board that in the following minute I have not offered any opinion on the meaſures which may be proper for us to adopt hereafter, for effecting a ſolid peace on the Malabar coaſt, becauſe I looked upon that part of the general ſubject as already provided for, at leaſt diſpoſed of for the preſent, by the powers and inſtructions which we have given to Colonel *Goddard*. My reflections reply only to the facts already paſt, and which I underſtand to be referred generally to us for our judgment upon them. Appendix. No. 196.

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following minute.

Mr. *Francis*—It is needleſs at this time to enter into a conſideration of the juſtice of our quarrel with the Maratta Government, or of the extent and quality of the powers under which the Preſidency of *Bombay* have acted in violating the treaty of *Poondh*. Thoſe queſtions have been ſufficiently diſcuſſed in the Governor General's minutes and mine, before Sir *Eyre Coote*'s arrival.

The following obſervations are confined to the policy of the meaſure within itſelf, and on its own principles, and to the propriety of the means made uſe of to carry it into execution.

1ſt. It appears by the Bombay conſultations of the 10th December 1777, and by their letter to us of the 20th January 1778, that they were unanimouſly determined not to engage in any active enterprize in favour of *Ragoba*, unleſs they were ſolicited thereto by *Saccaram*, *Moraba*, *Buthaherba*, and *Tookoojee Holcar*, by a joint application under their own ſiccas and hand writing, and that this was a condition *ſine qua non*.

Yet on the 21ſt of July following they reſolved to march to *Poonah* with *Ragoba*, without having received any application from the perſons above-mentioned, or entered into any ſpecific engagements whatſoever with any of the Maratta Chiefs. After the expedition had failed, Mr. *Hornby* ſays, "It was evident, that there was not one Chief in the empire who would draw a ſword for *Ragoba*."

It follows therefore, that in undertaking to act without having previouſly ſettled terms of co-operation with ſome of the Maratta Chiefs, they departed from their own fundamental principles, and, as far as ſucceſs depended on ſuch co-operation, had no right to expect it.

2d. It further appears, by their proceedings of the 12th of October 1778, that when they took their reſolution in July, they reckoned upon the hopes of aſſiſtance from *Moraba*, *Butcheba*, and *Tucoojee Holdcar*, with 30,000 horſe; yet in October they determined to carry their plan into execution, when every expectation of ſuch aſſiſtance muſt have failed them, conſidering that the two firſt of the above Chiefs were under reſtraint, and the latter greatly ſuſpected.

3d. In July they appear to have relied on the aſſiſtance of Colonel *Leſlie*'s detachment, and to have conſidered the ſecuring a junction with him as eſſential to the ſucceſs of their plan; for which purpoſe they then ſent him orders to march to *Ziner*; yet on the 12th of October, while our detachment was ſtill in *Bundlecund* (the ſame ſtation which it occupied in July) that is at ſo great a diſtance that a junction could not poſſibly have been effected before February following, they determined to carry their plan forthwith into execution.

4th. With thoſe facts before me, I have a right to conclude, that the Select Committee, in attempting to march to *Poonah*, have acted in oppoſition to their own profeſſed principles. I mean, that whereas at firſt, and up to the 12th of October, they appear to have thought certain conditions neceſſary, as well to juſtify their engaging in the meaſure in queſtion, as to inſure the ſucceſs of it, they at laſt plunged themſelves into the execution of that plan when every one of theſe conditions had failed them.

5th. Their ignorance of the real ſtate of the Poonah Durbar, and of the reſpective power and influence of the perſons who compoſed it, is a remarkable circumſtance, and ſhould ſerve as a future caution to the Company and to this Government, againſt truſting implicitly to any intelligence we may receive from that quarter. While the plan was in agitation, it ſuited their purpoſe to re-

Appendix. No. 196.

preſent *Nana* as the moſt powerful, and, to us, the moſt formidable of all the Maratta Chiefs; that he was devoted to the French, and had engaged to put them into poſſeſſion of *Choul*. Whatever his inclinations might be, of which we have no better evidence than of the reſt, it is clear that they were miſtaken in their opinion of his power. Mr. *Hornby*, in his minute of the 19th of February, ſays, "The lead that *Scindia* has taken in the "Adminiſtration, and the condition to which he has re- "duced *Nana*, to be no more than a creature of his, were "never thoroughly known till the facts diſcovered them- "ſelves on this occaſion; yet they are to be traced in "Mr. *Moſtyn's* and Mr. *Lewis's* advices ever ſince the "reſolution effected by *Madjee Scindia's* means in June "laſt, when *Nana* fled to him." On which Mr. *Draper* obſerves, "That he cannot enough lament that we have "ſo lately become acquainted with *Scindia's* being the "principal perſon in power notwithſtanding the reſi- "dence of Meſſrs. *Moſtyn* and *Lewis* at *Poonah*."

In the execution of the meaſure, the board, I think, will ſee ſuch errors at the outſet, as might have been alone ſufficient to defeat it.

1ſt. The appointment of field deputies, under the title of a committee for concerting and conducting all military operations. The ſucceſs of military enterprizes depends upon a unity of command, without which there can be neither deciſion or diſpatch. Debate and execution cannot move together; conſtant experience has ſhewn the bad effects of field deputations. The Company, in a former inſtance, ſeverely condemned the appointment of ſome gentlemen at *Madras* on a ſimilar ſervice, and no one argument is ſuggeſted to ſhew that ſuch an appointment was neceſſary on the preſent occaſion. If the Select Committee deemed their commanding officer unequal to the conduct of an expedition of threeſcore miles, they ought not to have employed him. To place a civil authority over the immediate execution of military operations might create many miſchiefs, and could correct none.

Mr. *Hornby* himſelf ſeems to have entertained the ſame opinion of the meaſure that I do. The commiſſion given to the committee requires the obedience of all the Company's ſervants, civil and military; yet Mr. *Hornby*, in his letter of the 23d of December to Mr. *Carnac*, ſays, that "in his opinion there can be no neceſſity for pub- "liſhing it, and that the promulgation of ſuch a com- "miſſion might bear the appearance of ſetting up an "authority in the very camp to ſuperſede that of the "commanding officer, and give ideas among the troops, "as well as to Colonel *Egerton*, very different from thoſe "of the Select Committee. He confeſſes that the words "*to concert and conduct all military operations*, are too "comprehenſive; that they *eſcaped* him at the time the "commiſſion paſſed, and he thinks muſt have eſcaped "Mr. *Carnac* alſo."

Conſidering that the body of the commiſſion itſelf does not exceed a few lines, it ſeems extraordinary that the eſſential part of it ſhould paſs unobſerved by thoſe who drew it up. But, whether it eſcaped thoſe gentlemen or not, Colonel *Egerton* has ſufficiently cleared himſelf from any concern in the meaſure; before he left *Bombay* he proteſted againſt being accompanied by field deputies; the commiſſion was framed after his departure, and he proteſted againſt its being publiſhed in the army as ſoon as he ſaw it.

2d. The immoderate quantity of baggage and train of cattle which attended the army, and which is ſaid to have amounted to nineteen thouſand, ſeems to have been unneceſſary for ſo ſhort a march, and wholly inconſiſtent with the plan of an expedition which could only have ſucceeded by rapidity and ſurprize.

3d. The allowing *Ragoba* to move with a ſeparate camp, inſtead of keeping him conſtantly under the eyes of the commander in chief, ſeems to me a capital miſtake. In conſequence of it, the motions of our army were made to depend on thoſe of *Ragoba*, who kept aloof when he thought fit, and was left at liberty to negociate with the enemy for himſelf, and in caſe of a misfortune, to betray us to them.

For theſe defects in the executive part of the plan, I deem the Preſident and Select Committee entirely anſwerable.

In reviewing the conduct of the expedition,

1ſt. It appears to me, that on the face of the accounts tranſmitted to us, the only queſtionable part of Colonel *Egerton's* conduct, while he continued in the command, is the ſlow march of the army from *Panwell* to the other ſide of the Gauts, by which much time ſeems to have been loſt; yet this makes no part of the Preſident's charge againſt Colonel *Egerton*; and if it had, the trial of it ſhould have been immediately by a court martial at *Bombay*; nothing but an examination of evidence on the ſpot could determine whether the delay was unavoidable or not. It is ſtrictly a queſtion of military ſervice, and ſubject to military juriſdiction.

2d. Colonel *Egerton* reſigned the command on the 6th of January. From that time he was no longer anſwerable, as commanding officer, for any thing done in the committee; the caſting voice veſted all power in Mr. *Carnac*. On the 1ſt of January Mr. *Carnac* ſpeaks of him "as totally overpowered by fatigue, and utterly unable to move about." On the 5th of January Mr. *Hornby*, in a letter to Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, ſays, "from the accounts I receive of Colonel *Egerton's* health, "I find I muſt look even at preſent to *you*, to your zeal "for the ſucceſs of your enterprize, and to your activity, "neceſſary to inſure that ſucceſs for the accompliſhment "of all our hopes in our preſent undertaking."

3d. On the 11th January, Mr. *Carnac* ordered the army to fall back, when Colonel *Cockburn* declared he had no doubt of carrying the army to *Poonah*. At that time Mr. *Carnac's* power was not queſtioned.

4th. On the 14th January Colonel *Cockburn's* opinion was required by Mr. *Carnac*, who diſſented from it, yet gave no poſitive order for the retreat. With reſpect to Mr. *Carnac's* powers, it is to be obſerved, that when they were firſt queſtioned by Colonel *Egerton*, on occaſion of Mr. *Moſtyn's* illneſs, a deciſion in ſupport of them was given by the Select Committee at *Bombay*. Mr. *Hornby*, in his letter to Mr. *Carnac* of the 27th of December, ſays, "the deciſion already ſent concerning your "caſting vote, can leave no further doubt on that ſub- "ject. I think it much more for the advantage of the "ſervice to rely ſingly on you."

Mr. *Carnac* himſelf tells *Tookajee*, that he had the Company's ſeal and full powers. He gave full powers to Mr. *Holmes* to ſettle terms with *Madajee Scindia*; and he executed the convention as an act of the committee; in which, whether Colonel *Egerton* concurred or not, Mr. *Carnac's* voice alone was deciſive.

With all theſe circumſtances in view, it remains to be determined, whether Mr. *Carnac* is warranted in affirming, that his authority did not extend "to the giving an "order to the army to march at all events." Be that as it may, it is certain he gave no orders for the retreat after the engagement.

5th. There could be no diſobedience of an order which never was given. But if Mr. *Carnac* had even deemed his authority competent to the caſe, he could not have directed the order to Colonel *Egerton*, who had reſigned the command eight days before, and whoſe continued ſickneſs made it impoſſible for him to reſume it.

6th. It appears that Colonel *Cockburn* and Colonel *Dagon* were called upon for their opinion reſpecting the practicability of a retreat; and that they agreed in their opinion: yet, that of Colonel *Cockburn's* is publiſhed alone, and Colonel *Dagon's* ſuppreſſed at *Bombay*, and withheld from the Governor General and Council. The myſtery of this proceeding can only be cleared up by a public trial on the ſpot, when Colonel *Dagon's* evidence may be called for.

7th. The deputation of Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Holmes* to the Marattas, and the convention, are acts of the committee;

mittee; the neceſſity of which it is poſſible, and I think only poſſible, might be ſupported by the actual poſition and circumſtances of the army, if we had the means of examining *viva voce* evidence to that point. But it is impoſſible to reconcile thoſe acts to the opinion of thoſe who thought a retreat practicable; and that it ought to be attempted.

8th. On the return of the army to *Bombay*, the Preſident exhibits a ſpecific charge jointly againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, "for having refuſed "to take charge of conducting the army back to *Bom-* "*bay*." Theſe terms expreſs a direct diſobedience of orders. Were ſuch orders given, to whom were they given? and by whom were they diſobeyed? Theſe are queſtions of fact which can only be decided by a court martial. To decide them in any other manner, would, in my opinion, be equally irregular and unjuſt.

The charge once exhibited, ought t have been followed by an immediate arreſt and trial. Inſtead of purſuing that obvious and regular courſe, the Preſident holds out a menace to the parties, that if they will not decline all military duty, and ſubmit their cauſe to the determination of the Governor General and Council, he will move to ſuſpend them the ſervice; that is, unleſs two officers of the higheſt rank in that ſervice, formally accuſed by himſelf of the higheſt military offence, conſent to wave the right to a public trial, he will puniſh them without one. Many painful reflections occur on this proceeding: we ſee a charge preferred, and a trial refuſed; we ſee puniſhment ready to follow accuſation, without the intermediate ſteps which juſtice always takes on inquiry and proof: in ſhort we ſee the regular trial evaded, and the cauſe referred to a tribunal which has no juriſdiction over it; and which, if it were otherwiſe competent, could not try for want of the examination of *viva voce* evidence.

From ſuch appearances, what concluſion can ariſe in the minds of indifferent men, but that things have been done which would not bear the public eye, and that a trial is refuſed in order to conceal them; that a hope was entertained at *Bombay* of obtaining a deciſion here, which might be guided by other principles than thoſe of juſtice; and that the ſole object of the reference to this Government, was to ſave one party by a ſacrifice of the other?

Whether Meſſrs. *Egerton* and *Cockburn* are guilty, or not, or in what degree they are guilty, remains to be inquired; if under any influence of menace and authority, they really and *bona fide* evaded their claim to a court martial, they were very ill adviſed. Some allowances, however, ſhould be made for the ſituation of men ſo placed under the weight of power, and ſo treated as they were. At all events they diſavowed or retracted their aſſent to the reference long before it was made, and time enough to revert to and claim their original right, a public trial: no conditions, tending to deprive them of it, ſhould ever have been propoſed, much leſs ſhould ſuch conditions have been extorted from them by menaces.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Mr. *Francis*—I now beg leave to ſubmit ſome propoſitions purely to the conſideration of the Board, which I came prepared with, and which are conformable to the ſentiments expreſſed in the latter part of my minute. I mean, if the Board ſhould approve of them, they ſhould make part of our letter to *Bombay*.

1ſt. That we highly diſapprove of the reference made to us, to decide on the conduct of Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, over whom we have no juriſdiction, and that if we were otherwiſe competent to try the charge, the want of *viva voce* evidence to be examined upon oath, concerning many facts neceſſary to eſtabliſh the truth of it, would be an immediate bar to our proceeding.

2d. That the former charge exhibited by the Preſidency againſt Meſſrs. *Egerton* and *Cockburn* "for having "refuſed to take charge of conducting the army "back to *Bombay*," ought to have been followed by an immediate arreſt and trial It is a queſtion of fact, which could only be determined on the ſpot. Appendix, No. 197.

3d. That to prefer a charge, and to refuſe a trial, is in our judgment a proceeding wholly inconſiſtent with juſtice, and liable to many dangerous conſequences. A precedent of this nature if once permitted to paſs without condemnation, tends in the firſt inſtance to leave the character and ſafety of individuals at the mercy of men in power, and ultimately to weaken the hands of Government itſelf, by deſtroying that confidence which individuals have been taught to repoſe in the juſtice and good faith of Government, and which alone can engage them to act with ſpirit and vigour in the public ſervice.

4th. That the menace held out by the Preſident to the officers, againſt whom he himſelf had delivered a formal charge of diſobedience of orders, viz. "That if "they would not decline all military duty, and ſubmit "their cauſe to our determination, he would move to "ſuſpend them the ſervice," is in our opinion a high and arbitrary proceeding, and calls for the moſt public and ſolemn condemnation from this Board; that the claim of Meſſrs. *Egerton* and *Cockburn* to be tried by a court martial, was a claim of right, and accrued to them the moment a ſpecific charge was exhibited againſt them; that any attempts to induce men under a public charge to wave their right to a public trial, is equally inconſiſtent with the juſtice and dignity of Government; but that the intention of paſſing by all trial whatſoever, and of proceeding inſtantly from accuſation to puniſhment, ſo plainly expreſſed in the menace held out by the Preſident, is in our opinion highly criminal, and that as ſuch, we ſhall think it our duty to repreſent it to our ſuperiors.

5th. That, admitting that Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, whether ſurprized by the menaces of the Preſident, or induced by any other motive whatſoever, had at firſt ſubmitted to the conditions impoſed on them, yet having diſavowed or retracted ſuch ſuppoſed aſſent long before the reference to this Board was actually made, the advantage taken thereof was unjuſt in itſelf, and not to be reconciled to the fair and open purpoſes of public juſtice; that they were in full time to revert to their original right, and that their claim to it ought not to have been denied.

6th. That we are much concerned that ſo much time ſhould have been loſt by a uſeleſs and dilatory reference to us, of a queſtion which ought to have been tried upon the ſpot, where all the parties and witneſſes were preſent, and while the recollection of every particular was freſh in their minds: that however the right of Meſſrs. *Egerton* and *Cockburn* to a court martial is not weakened by this delay; and for this reaſon, as well as becauſe we think that many circumſtances relative to the late tranſactions at *Bombay*, and neceſſary for the Company's information, can only be brought to light by a public trial, we are of opinion that a court martial ſhould be immediately ordered for the trial of Meſſrs. *Egerton* and *Cockburn*, on the formal charge preferred againſt them by the Preſident.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis.

APPENDIX, No. 197.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 31ſt May 1779.

THE Governor General begs leave to call the attention of the Board to the following paper, which is a tranſlation of one of the enclоſures of a letter received, within theſe few days, from *Nana Furneeſe*, and appears to have been delivered in the form, and for the purpoſe, of credentials, on the part of the military committee, or

of

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of Mr. *Carnac*, repreſenting it, on the occaſion of the overture made for the treaty of peace when the army lay at *Wargaum*. As no mention is made of this letter in their diary, nor of any other of the correſpondence which paſſed between them and the Miniſters at the time in which the negociation paſſed, nor of the powers or orders given either to Mr. *Farmer* or Mr. *Holmes*, the Board will probably deem it incumbent upon them to require copies of ſuch inſtruments, and for that purpoſe to demand them from Mr. *Horſley*; or in the caſe of his not having it in his power to ſupply them, that they be required from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, as eſſential to complete the proceedings of the military committee.

Copy of a Letter from *John Carnac*, Eſquire, Commander of the Engliſh army, ſent to the Preſence, after which Peace was eſtabliſhed, bearing date the 24th of Zehidja 1192 Hegira, and ſealed with the Company's ſeal.

Having given me full and complete powers from *Bombay*, they have ſent me here: I have therefore many things to treat with you privately about; if you ſend me a letter, I will diſpatch a gentleman to your preſence, who will repreſent every matter to you, by which you will become acquainted therewith. What ſhall I write more, but to deſire that you will preſerve friendſhip and favour?

Agreed, to the Governor General's propoſition, and ordered accordingly.

Mr. *Barwell*—The long detail of facts which has been tranſmitted by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and which was ſo neceſſary for our information, contains much matter foreign to the proper objects of our diſcuſſion; for I regard not any points referred to us as proper for diſcuſſion, to which our orders cannot reach; the knowledge of them may indeed be eſſential for forming a juſt judgment of the ſtate of their Government, and in this light, and in this alone, ſhall I conſider all that is ſubmitted to us, touching the demerits of individuals; theſe appertain excluſively to the adminiſtration of the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, who certainly ought, whatever may be our opinion, to act upon their own powers: I ſhall therefore decline giving my ſentiments on any matter that belongs properly to their interior Government, and confine myſelf ſimply to the important ſubjects of peace and war, which fall under our cognizance.

1ſt. I think we ſhould wait for the effect of Colonel *Goddard*'s negociations for peace.

2d. Should theſe negociations fail, the next conſideration is, in what manner to gain the greateſt poſſible advantages to the Company from a ſtate of war?

3d. We ſhould adopt Mr. *Hornby*'s plan of military operations, and on the reluctancy of *Moodajee Booſla*, treat with *Madajee Scindia*, and direct Colonel *Goddard* to carry ſuch plan into execution?

4th. Whether we ſhall give Colonel *Goddard* a brevet of Brigadier General, a rank that will enable him to command the forces, even in caſe the ſuſpenſion of Colonels *Egerton* and *Cockburn* ſhould be remitted?

5th. Whether having diſclaimed the convention of *Worgaun*, we ſhall now gratuitouſly beſtow on *Madajee Scindia*, *Broach*, or an equivalent for *Broach*, as expreſſive of our ſenſe of his friendſhip for the ſervices he rendered our army in that convention?

To the ſecond quere, I am opinion, Colonel *Goddard* ſhould act under his preſent inſtructions, and a latitude be given him to decline further negociation with *Mhadoojee Bouncello*.

To the third quere, I am of opinion we ſhould adopt Mr. *Hornby*'s plan, and engage the Guicawar to take part in a ſtate of war; and that Colonel *Goddard* ſhould be directed to give ſuch plan effect.

To the fourth quere, I am of opinion Colonel *Goddard* ſhould be honoured with the brevet of Brigadier General, as propoſed by the Commander in Chief.

To the fifth quere, I am of opinion, we ought to expreſs our ſenſe of *Madajee Scindia*'s ſervices, and gain him, if poſſible, to our party.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 7th June 1779;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

To *Wm Bruere*, Eſquire, Aſſiſtant Secretary, &c.

Sir,

On the diary of the Poonah Committee under the 13th January, you will find that a committee was then held to deliberate relative to overtures to be made for the peaceable return of the army; and two letters are noted as having been ſent, and one received, on the ſame day (as I conclude) on this ſubject, but no copies are entered: if any were preſerved, Mr. *Farmer* carried them away with him. On the 14th January Mr. *Farmer* was ſent to the Maratta Durbar, and the meſſage with which he was charged appears on the diary under that date. An account of his negociation is contained in the letters that paſſed between him and the committee, and I know of no letters, or writing of any ſort, that have paſſed between the committee and the Maratta Durbar, from the time Mr. *Farmer* was ſent until the concluſion of the convention. Mr. *Holmes* was deputed on the 15th to *Madajee Scindia*. The reſolution to ſend him, and the powers given him, are comprized in a minute of that day. I have always underſtood, that Mr. *Farmer* and Mr. *Holmes* acted under theſe minutes as their inſtructions and authority; nor have I copies of either in any other form.

With regard to the paper you have communicated to me, as copy of a letter from *J. Carnac*, Eſquire, &c. I can only ſay, that as I am entirely unacquainted with the degree of importance or authenticity allowed it by the Board, it is impoſſible for me to judge of the neceſſity or propriety of troubling them with any remarks on it.

I am extremely unwilling to intrude unneceſſarily on the Board, yet I hope they will pardon me, if, on a ſubject ſo important as their preſent proceedings are, to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, I take the liberty to repreſent through you, that, when the Select Committee requeſted, that *I might be allowed to repreſent to the Honourable the Governor General and Council, ſuch particulars as may appear to me material to be attended to in their deliberations*, they did not expect I ſhould be refuſed all information till the reſolutions of the Board were taken, and all deliberation at an end. I believe too a different procedure was obſerved on a former occaſion. I do not ground any claims on this, though I own it gave me hopes, that with talents far inferior to thoſe of the gentlemen who laſt waited on this Government from *Bombay*, I ſhould however have found my advantages from the candour of the Governor General and Council not leſs than his. I dare ſay the ſame is meant to be ſhewn me.

Calcutta, the 7th June 1779. I am, &c. (Signed) *G. Horſley.*

Ordered, That the above letter lie for conſideration.

The Governor General delivers in the following minute:

Governor General—As objections have been made to our entruſting the Select Committee at *Bombay* with any diſcretional powers, and as it is my earneſt wiſh, that on a ſubject of ſuch importance as the preſent ſtate of affairs at that Preſidency, our reſolutions may be unanimous, I hope to qualify and accommodate the different opinions which may have been formed on this point, by an expedient to be ſubſtituted in the place of the laſt clauſe of the draft which I have offered to the conſideration of the Board.

It

It is only in the caſe of war and negociation that we have authority to confer diſcretional powers on the other Preſidencies. To deprive that of *Bombay* of all ſhare in the conduct of meaſures which we cannot execute without their aſſiſtance, might check their zeal, and thereby expoſe us to the riſk of additional miſcarriage and diſgrace.

On the other hand it is aſſerted, that the uſe which they have already made of the powers which they have been allowed to exerciſe, hath deſtroyed their claim to a continuation of them, and would render us inexcuſable if with ſuch a warning we admitted it.

The following appears to me the only expedient for avoiding both extremes, and reconciling thoſe oppoſite conſiderations; viz. "That all negociations which have "no relation to the objects of Colonel *Goddard*'s in- "ſtructions of the 16th November and 5th April, be "conducted and executed by the Select Committee, but "that no treaty concluded by virtue of this authority "ſhall be final, until it has been ratified by this Go- "vernment."

This limitation, while it precludes the evil conſequences incident to a full latitude of conduct, will ſtill preſerve to the Select Committee that reſpect and confidence from the native Governments of *India*, which are indiſpenſable to the exerciſe of the regular and conſtitutional powers veſted in them by the Company.

I cannot preſcribe a better line for the direction of their military operations, than that which I have already recommended.

A negative controul, limited to the points in which they are already bound, either by our expreſs orders, or by the obligations of public faith, is all that can be allowed to our officer, while he acts only in aid of their meaſures; nor can they complain of it as a ſevere or unreaſonable reſtriction, ſince it is in effect no more than a ſecurity for their ſtricter performance of what they ought to do without it.

Much depends upon our preſent reſolutions; much more upon their general tendency than on the rectitude or wiſdom of the ſpecific points contained in them. In effect, whatever opinion we may entertain of the integrity, knowledge, or ability of the men who have the actual charge of the Government of *Bombay*, it is on them that we muſt primarily depend for the retrieval of the loſſes which the intereſts of the Company, and the national honour, have ſuffered from the miſerable iſſue of the late ill-fated enterprize. While we debate, even while the materials which are to ſerve as the grounds of our deliberations are on their paſſage to us, the ſcene may be entirely ſhifted, and preſent a new face of affairs to the view of thoſe to whom we preſcribe in dark conjectures orders which they may be unable to execute, and which if too ſtrict may prevent them from availing themſelves of the advantages which fortune may offer to them; or they may involve them in additional difficulties inſtead of extricating them from the paſt.

Their preſent ſtate is ſuch, that without a vigilant attention to circumſtances and events as they ariſe, and a prompt application of them to their own occaſions, it will not be poſſible for them to raiſe themſelves above a degree of languid and burthenſome ſecurity. I will not add what, in my opinion, they are capable of effecting by great exertions, and a reaſonable latitude allowed them to act in, becauſe it would be impoſſible to convey that conviction to the minds of others which I feel impreſſed on my own, without hazarding conjectures on all the variety of combinations into which the ſtate of affairs preſented to us may be reſolved, and diſplaying an oſtentatious ſcheme of policy, which could yield no advantage and which it would therefore be imprudent to avow.

But whatever may be within their power, aided with the means which we have afforded them, or may yet ſupply, it is certain that we of ourſelves can do nothing; and if, either from an unſeaſonable reſentment or diſtruſt, we wholly diſable them from acting, or, which would in the event prove the ſame, allow them only to act and to think under an humiliating contract, no good conſequences can reſult from ſuch a policy; the worſt may attend it, and we alone ſhall ſtand accountable for them. Appendix. No. 197.

I will not examine whether the Select Committee of *Bombay* have or have not the power of beſtowing the chief command of their military eſtabliſhment on Colonel *Goddard* in the caſe of a vacancy, or of the continuance of the ſuſpenſion of Colonel *Egerton*: they are the moſt competent judges of the powers of their own conſtitution. I readily wave the propoſal of allowing the admiſſion of Colonel *Goddard* on their eſtabliſhment in favour of that made by the Commander in Chief, to grant him a brevet commiſſion of Brigadier General on our own, to which I give my hearty aſſent, in the perſuaſion that it would be attended with the ſame good effect.

With the propoſal which is the object of this minute, I ſubmit the following alterations in the draft which I have recommended of the letter to the Select Committee of *Bombay*; viz. 6th paragraph, the concluding ſentence, "nor to reſume it, but on advances made to him "by the Government of *Berar*; nor then unleſs it ſhall "be ſtrictly compatible with the ſtate of our other con- "nections then ſubſiſting, and with your participation "in the manner which we ſhall preſcribe hereafter," to be omitted.

14th paragraph. After the word "ſuſpended," let the following be added: "The future renewal of this "negociation we reſerve to be determined by our ex- "preſs orders, but without revoking the credentials and "inſtructions already granted to Colonel *Goddard* re- "ſpecting it. In all other negociations, treaties, &c."

15th paragraph. The concluſion of this paragraph beginning with the words, "and we muſt require," to be omitted, and the following ſubſtituted in its ſtead:

"And for the ſame reaſon we require, that all treaties "which ſhall be concluded by you in virtue of theſe "inſtructions, be referred to this Government for its "final ſanction and formal ratification of them, and "that a clauſe be inſerted in every treaty ſo concluded "to that effect,"

16th paragraph to be wholly omitted.

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following minute, and begs leave to obſerve, that it refers to the proceedings of the 24th ultimo, and not to the Governor General's minute above recorded.

Mr. *Francis*.—It is not poſſible that any member of this Board can be more weary of controverſy than I am, or more deſirous to avoid it. When the Board agreed to revert to the treaty of *Poonah*, we in effect endeavoured to reinſtate ourſelves in a poſition from which we never ſhould have departed. Without looking back to the ſteps by which that ground was loſt, I willingly joined in the attempt to recover it. I have no doubt that peace may be obtained on the terms of Colonel *Goddard*'s preſent inſtructions, provided he enters heartily into our views; provided this Government itſelf be in earneſt in the purſuit of its profeſſed object; and provided we do not ſuffer ourſelves to be entangled in the deſperate ſchemes of the perſons who now conſtitute the Government of *Bombay*, or thwarted by their oppoſition. I deem the re-eſtabliſhment of peace on the Malabar coaſt to be eſſential, not merely to the proſperity of the India Company, but to their exiſtence; the ſum total of the Britiſh intereſt in *India* is involved in this queſtion. Let a war upon the coaſt be conducted how it may, the difference between conqueſt and defeat, in my judgment, is little more than the delay or acceleration of the ruin of all our reſources; nor is it clear to my apprehenſion, which of theſe two events will ſooneſt produce the effect I expect equally from both.

Taking the truth of their own repreſentations for granted, it is not eaſy to deſcribe a ſituation more completely deſtitute of all the means of ſupporting a war, than that of the Preſidency of *Bombay*. The annexed

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account ſhews, that during the laſt five years they have received little leſs than a hundred and ſixteen lacks of current rupees, directly out of the revenues of *Bengal*, yet their bonded debt accumulates daily, and now amounts to thirty-eight lacks.

By the month of October Mr. *Hornby* ſays their finances will be utterly exhauſted. In the interval they will want a ſupply of thirty lacks. Of this ſum the Preſident propoſes to borrow twenty, but doubts the poſſibility of raiſing ſo large a ſum; and if it could be borrowed, he ſays they have no funds to pay even intereſt.

Colonel *Goddard*, in his laſt letter of the 25th of April, tells us, "that it is impoſſible in that country, and "he fears in its neighbourhood, to find men fit to re- "cruit the vacancies which have happened in his bat- "talions ſince leaving the *Jumna*." But Mr. *Hornby* himſelf tells us, and we have every reaſon to believe it is true, that the Bengal Sepoys will not ſtay at ſo great a diſtance from their native country. He ſays, that "if they were to have no cauſe of diſſatisfaction on ac- "count of their pay, there is reaſon to fear their num- "bers will every day diminiſh by their going off to their "own country." Even before the late rupture with the Marattas, and long before the diſaſter which attended it, the Preſidency of *Bombay* told us, in their letter of the 7th December 1777, that "ſince their late acquiſitions "it was become very neceſſary, and they had accord- "ingly recommended it to the Company, to augment "the European corps; that notwithſtanding they gave "every encouragement, it was very difficult to raiſe "good Sepoys on that coaſt, and that it would require "ſo much time to raiſe and diſcipline a further number "of Sepoys, ſo as in the leaſt degree to be conſidered "as effective troops, that it would be much better in "every reſpect to ſend them a reinforcement of diſ- "ciplined Sepoys, if Europeans could not be ſpared."

We ſhould do well to conſider how long we can maintain a war on ſuch a footing before we engage in it. I will not ſuppoſe the caſe of new miſcarriages. Let it be admitted, that ſucceſs and conqueſt are as certain as the moſt ſanguine expectation can imagine: it does not follow, that the objects propoſed to be obtained by them are ſuch as we ought to aim at in our preſent circumſtances, or that victory will pay its own expences. By extending our territorial poſſeſſions, we create irreconcileable enmity in the minds of thoſe Powers whom we immediately rob of their property. We fill every other Indian State with jealouſy and alarm: and the territory we acquire comes waſted and depopulated into our hands. To defend a new line of frontier, new military eſtabliſhments muſt be formed; and thoſe eſtabliſhments muſt not only be paid for out of the revenues of *Bengal*, but the very men who compoſe them, raiſed and recruited here to ſupply a ſervice, which we know they will take the firſt opportunity of deſerting.

Such, in my conception, is the ſituation in which a ſucceſsful war againſt the Marattas alone will place us. But if our ſucceſs, or the apparent proſpect of it, ſhould compel them to call in the French to their aſſiſtance; if, rather than relinquiſh their country to us, they ſhould reſolve to make it the ſeat of war, let us conſider in what manner the conteſt is then to be maintained, and to what iſſue it may lead us. Nothing leſs than the extreme and inſtant neceſſity of ſelf-preſervation can ever reduce the Marattas to ſo deſperate a reſolution, as that of inviting an European army into their country; if once they are introduced, it may be a difficult taſk to remove them: the events of war in that caſe may not be ſo clearly at our command as they are thought to be at preſent: and let it be remembered, that on thoſe events, if they are forwarded by our acts, we ſhall wantonly ſtake the fate of our empire.

The queſtion does not end here. In the preſent ſtate of things, much more than the immediate intereſts of *India* may depend on the care and economy with which we conduct the Company's affairs. A regular return of wealth from the revenues of theſe provinces is undoubtedly expected at home. The nation now perhaps looks to *Bengal*, as to its laſt and greateſt external reſource: but, if this demand upon us from home were not ſo preſſing and ſo likely to increaſe, as I think it is, it is time for us to conſider, whether there be in *Great Britain* a fundamental force equal to the tenure of unbounded acquiſitions at this diſtance from the ſeat of empire; or whether we are not arrived at a point, at which common prudence dictates to us to fix, once for all, the limits of our dominion: if my judgment were to prevail, it ſhould be our object to contract them.

Theſe general conſiderations belong properly to the opinion which I mean to give on the principal queſtions before us, and will be found applicable to the ſubject.

To avoid a uſeleſs debate at the Board, I think the firſt queſtion ſhould be put generally, and decided by a majority of votes, viz. "Whether we ſhall or ſhall not "enter into a diſcuſſion and cenſure of the late tranſac- "tions at *Bombay*?" If it be determined in the affirmative, the Commander in Chief's minute and mine, will furniſh what I deem ſufficient materials for that part of our letter. To theſe, however, the other Members of the Board may propoſe ſuch additions or alterations as they think proper.

The ſecond queſtion, I ſhould think, to be decided in the ſame manner is, "whether we ſhould declare our opi- "nion to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, that Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn* ſhould be tried "by a court martial, for the reaſons aſſigned in the pa- "ragraphs which I ſubmitted to the Board on Monday "laſt?"

The remaining queſtions brought before us by the Governor General's minute, require more care and deliberation than need be given to the condemnation of any thing that is paſt.

I think we ought, in the firſt place, to decide generally, whether we ſhall or ſhall not ſend any new inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard*, before we hear the reſult of thoſe we have already ſent: my opinion is, that we ſhould wait for advices from him, in reply to our letters of the 5th of April.

With reſpect to the propoſed inſtructions, I am againſt our engaging in, or giving our ſanction to the plan of military operations propoſed by Mr. *Hornby*.

Firſt, for the reaſon aſſigned by the Commander in Chief, in which I entirely concur, and which I beg leave to recite in his own words, viz. "As to the various "plans propoſed of ſeeking war for plunder, the ho- "nour of the nation and the Company, inſeparable from "my own, will never permit me to ſubſcribe to them." Secondly, becauſe if I thought that a war on this or any other plan, might at a future day be unavoidable, ſtill I would not, at the preſent point of time, hold out to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, the moſt diſtant idea of encouragement and eventual ſupport in the proſecution of ſuch meaſures, being thoroughly convinced from my knowledge and experience of the temper that predominates there, that it would furniſh them with means, of which I fear they might avail themſelves, to embarraſs Colonel *Goddard*'s negociations with the Poonah Durbar, and to prevent a peace. By plunging the Company into a war, it is poſſible that a hope may be entertained of recovering perſonal credit; that inſtant difficulties may withdraw the Company's attention from things already done; and that, in the courſe of events, new queſtions may ariſe in which the conſideration of former miſcarriages and former miſconduct may be loſt. But theſe are motives of action which have no relation to the public ſervice; and which neither can nor ought to have any influence over our deliberations.

Thirdly, Becauſe the motive aſſigned for not cenſuring the late tranſactions with the ſeverity they deſerve, viz. "That it would be improper to add to the depreſſion "of men by whoſe agency we muſt defend and ſupport "the rights of the Company and the honour of the

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Britiſh nation," amounts to a declaration or admiſſion, that the ſame agency which has already produced ſo much diſhonour and diſtreſs, muſt ſtill be truſted and employed in the direction and conduct of the propoſed operations; but to this I can never aſſent. I ſee wiſdom, nor firmneſs, nor union in their Councils, and I have no reaſon to believe that their diſpoſition is pacific.

Fourthly, Becauſe I ſee no ground for apprehenſion that the Marattas will renew hoſtilities with us, even for the recovery of the territory ceded to them by the convention, provided we are content to ſtand upon the defenſive. They have no general principle of union among themſelves but that of ſelf-defence. Neither party however can now act againſt the other with effect before October; in that interval a peace may be obtained, if we on our part are heartily inclined to it: at all events we loſe nothing by waiting for the reſult of Colonel *Goddard*'s negociations. If, in addition to his preſent inſtructions, it be thought adviſable to empower him to gain the friendſhip of *Madajee Scindia*, by an equitable compromiſe in lieu of the private engagements already ſettled with him, I ſhall readily agree to it, becauſe I think that, with prudent management, it may be the means of forwarding a general peace, without which I would not make any conceſſion.

I have heretofore ſtated my reaſons at large for objecting to the alliance propoſed to be accompliſhed with *Moodajee Booſla* by the deputation of Mr. *Elliott*, and Colonel *Goddard*'s ſubſequent appointment to the ſame commiſſion: the plan having failed I ſhould be ſorry to ſee it reſumed. I dread the idea of leading our Government, which is now too great to act on any but ſimple principles, into a labyrinth of Aſiatic politics. Let us be contented with what we have; let us keep the peace; let us leave our neighbours to ſettle their differences among themſelves without our interpoſition; and I am thoroughly ſatisfied that no Indian Power will ever moleſt us.

To theſe general reaſons I cannot add a ſtronger argument than that which the Commander in Chief's minute has furniſhed me. He obſerves that "*Moodajee Booſla* is propoſed, becauſe his elevation will reſtore "the old Maratta Government, and thereby ſtrengthen, "aggrandize, and unite the Maratta empire, which "very reaſon ſeeming ſo ſtrong with the Council of "*Bombay*, if no better can be given, will prevent his "ever concurring in it." Even the Governor General's opinion comes ſtrongly in ſupport of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s ſentiments and mine on this ſubject. He thinks that "*Moodajee Booſla* will wait for proofs of our ſupe-"riority before he will hazard the conſequences of a "decided connection with us." When that ſuperiority is obtained, we ſhall ſtand in no need of the connection; and if our ſcheme of military operations be not practicable by our own force, I agree entirely with the Governor in thinking, that we ſhall gain nothing by incumbering ourſelves with the weight of a timid ally.

Before we determine whether we ſhall ſend any farther ſupply of money to *Bombay* at this time, and to what amount, I deſire that the Accountant General may lay before us an account of the ſums already remitted to that Preſidency for their excluſive ſervice ſince April 1778; diſtinguiſhing the annual from the extra ſupply. Alſo a ſtate of the ſums remitted to Colonel *Goddard*, or drawn for by him ſince he ſucceeded to the command of the detachment. From theſe accounts we may be able to judge how far we are bound to comply with any new demands from *Bombay*; how long Colonel *Goddard*'s preſent funds will laſt, and at what time it may be neceſſary to make him farther remittances for the pay of his army. At preſent I will not conſent to ſend a rupee to *Bombay* for the purpoſe of carrying on war, and making conqueſts; nor will I conſent to it at any time, but under the condition inſiſted on by the Commander in Chief, that means are taken to prevent the money falling into hands which experience has proved will make ſo ill uſe of it. A conſiderable part of the money which we ſent them laſt year to defray their neceſſary expences has been given to *Ragoba* and *Scindia*, nearly to the amount of £. 50,000. The truth is, they have dreamt too long of inexhauſtible wealth from *Bengal*; under the influence of this dream, they have embarked in ſchemes of the moſt dangerous nature, and waſted the Company's property with unexampled profuſion: it is high time that they ſhould be awakened from it.

R$:	
4,00,0	Ragoba.
35,000	D° Officers.
1,1,000	Ragoba.
41,000	Scindia's Officers.
4,71,000	

(Signed) *P. F.*

An Abſtract Account of the Yearly Balance of Supplies made to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, from the 30th April 1774, to the 1ſt May 1779; after deducting ſuch Sums as have been during that Period brought to the Credit of the ſaid Preſidency on Account of Cotton, &c. and including the Amount of Salt Petre, &c. from the Commercial Department up to the 1ſt May 1778; viz.

From 30th April 1774, to the 1ſt May 1775	-	C. R$	19,13,341	14	6
30th April 1775, to the 1ſt May 1776	-	-	37,74,615	5	6
30th April 1776, to the 1ſt May 1777	-	-	19,50,726	3	7
30th April 1777, to the 1ſt May 1778	-	-	19,36,764	3	6
30th April 1778, to the 1ſt May 1779	-	-	20,01,233	9	0
Current Rupees			1,15,76,680	11	1

Errors excepted

31ſt May 1779. (Signed) *James Miller*, Act$_g$ Account^t Genl.

Governor General.—I am equally deſirous with Mr. *Francis* to avoid controverſy. This ſentiment I not only profeſs, but I will evince it by refuſing to bear a part in it. This muſt ſerve for my excuſe, if any excuſe is neceſſary, for declining a reply to Mr. *Francis*'s minute, at the ſame time that I muſt declare my diſagreement not only with its general tenor but with many parts of it, which appear to me not ſo neceſſarily to ariſe out of the ſubjects immediately before the Board, as to be the continuation of former debates.

The ſentiments which have been expreſſed, by the ſeveral members of this Board, have led us into a wide field of debate, from which it is officially incumbent upon me to endeavour to withdraw our attention to ſuch preciſe points as may bring this buſineſs to a concluſion.

In my firſt minute, I communicated all the points of conſideration which were brought before us by the diſpatches lately received from *Bombay*; leaving it to the choice of the Board which of theſe we ſhould reject, and which we ſhould ſelect for the ſubjects of our inſtructions to the Preſidency of *Bombay* and Colonel *Goddard*; and I concluded with the propoſal of a draft of a letter to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, to which I have ſince made ſome very material alterations.

I now beg leave to call the attention of the Board to the

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the motion which is thus regularly brought before them, and to requeſt that they will be pleaſed to decide upon it. The letter involves many diſtinct queſtions, which may be determined by an approbation, a diſapprobation, or an amendment of each paragraph, taken as a ſeparate queſtion. Perhaps it may be deemed more expedient to the diſpatch of buſineſs to propoſe diſtinct queſtions, and from the ſenſe of the Board collected upon theſe, to form the letter to *Bombay*, and ſuch other inſtructions as may depend upon them. I ſubmit to this mode, if the other members of the Board ſhall prefer it.

Reſolved, That the amended draft of the letter, propoſed by the Governor General to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, be entered in this place; that a copy thereof be delivered to each member of the Board; and that their opinions be collected upon every paragraph in the manner recommended in the preceding minute.

To the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

1. We have received your letter of the 4th of April, with its enclоſures, by the hands of Mr. *Horſly*.

2. We do not think it neceſſary to enter on the review of your proceedings, but ſhall confine our preſent inquiries to the choice of ſuch means as may beſt conduce to retrieve their unhappy conſequences, leaving the paſt to the ſcrutiny of a higher and more effectual authority.

3. We muſt deſire to decline the reference which you have made to us, of the charge preferred by your Preſident againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, as a point on which we have no juriſdiction, and which is cognizable only by your authority, either with the powers immediately veſted in your body by the Court of Directors, or through the regular trial of a court martial.

4. Having already given full powers to Colonel *Goddard* to negociate and conclude a treaty of peace with the Maratta Government, and having no cauſe to alter the terms which we have preſcribed in our inſtructions for that purpoſe, we have only to repeat, that we look to the iſſue of that commiſſion as our primary object, and the termination of all our political views on your ſide of *India*, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful.

5. But if the Miniſters ſhall reject the propoſals which we have ordered to be made to them, and ſhall reduce us to the neceſſity of defending the rights and intereſts of the Company by an open war, we cannot preſcribe a better plan of operations than that which is laid down by your Preſident in his minute of the 30th of March, which in ſuch caſe we authorize you to carry literally into execution, and even to qualify it by ſuch variations as ſhall not ſubvert the general deſign of it, which we underſtand to be the reduction of ſuch countries as lie along the ſea coaſt, forming a line of territory with our preſent poſſeſſions on the Continent, and defenſible againſt the incurſions of cavalry. And we further authorize and empower you, with the reſervation hereafter mentioned, to enter into any treaty, or other engagements, with the Chief of the Guicawar family, or others, for the above purpoſes, and on the grounds deſcribed in the aforeſaid plan; obſerving the following cautions, to which we require your ſtricteſt attention: that your engagements ſhall be offenſive only for the objects of your immediate operations, and in all other reſpects purely defenſive: that your engagements with the Guicawar family ſhall be made with the head of it, and with him excluſively: that you ſhall not aſſume a mediation between the brothers, or take any part whatever in their domeſtic diſputes, farther than to ſupport the party in alliance with the Company, and his poſſeſſions againſt foreign invaſion; and that you do not commit the dignity of the Company, or pledge the national faith, in formal treaties with perſons of a rank or power unſuitable to ſuch a diſtinction.

6. We are ſenſible of the attention which you have ſhewn to our views with the Government of *Berar*, in joining the overtures lately made to *Moodajee Boſla* by Colonel *Goddard*, and in your reſolution to avoid whatever may again interfere with this negociation. We confeſs we at this time entertain little hope of his concurring with our deſigns; he will wait for proofs of our ſuperiority before he will hazard the conſequences of a decided connection with us; and every offer made to him, while he is under the influence of ſuch a policy, will but ſerve to increaſe his reſerve, as he will naturally conſtrue it to proceed from the conſciouſneſs of our inability to ſupport ourſelves without a foreign aſſiſtance; and this is an additional motive for our preferring a ſcheme of military operations, practicable by our own force, and unincumbered with the weight of a timid Ally: if notwithſtanding, *Moodajee Boſla* ſhall have anſwered the letters which have been written to him, by a declaration of a willingneſs to accept of the proffered alliance, we ſhall leave it to be concluded under the inſtructions already given in charge to Colonel *Goddard*; if on the contrary, as we expect, he ſhall directly refuſe, or heſitate, or make new references to us, we have in ſuch caſe directed Colonel *Goddard* to break off the negociation.

7. Although we think ourſelves ſtrictly juſtifiable in refuſing to ratify even the ſmalleſt tittle of the treaty or convention of *Worgaum*, yet from a fair review of your proceedings, we are compelled to regard the ſeparate agreement made with *Mahdajee Scindia* in a very different light. It was not a conceſſion extorted by the Maratta Government againſt its conviction of legal ſufficiency in thoſe who yielded it, but it was the price at which they purchaſed the ſafety of the army; and was ſo abſolutely their own ſpontaneous act, that it appears that the Miniſters of *Mahdajee Scindia* were even corrupted to influence his acceptance of it. It is true, that they had no authority to make ſuch a compromiſe, and we may therefore refuſe to ratify it, in ſtrict conformity to the letter of our own law: but we doubt whether this will avail us in the opinion of the world, or we can reconcile it to the obligations of juſtice and honour, which were thus pledged for the retribution of the moſt ſignal (though humiliating) act of kindneſs that a nation could have received from the bounty of an individual. We muſt therefore, declare, that unleſs *Mahdajee Scindia* ſhall have forfeited his right by any ſubſequent act, he is entitled to the performance of this engagement, and we ought to ratify it.

8. We hope he may be prevailed upon to depart from the letter of this ſtipulation, and to accept of what he may deem an equivalent for it; and we authorize you to treat with him for ſuch a compromiſe, declaring on our behalf, that we diſavow the authority of Mr. *Carnac* and Colonel *Egerton* to execute the engagement with him, which was executed by them; but that in conſideration of the ſignal ſervice afforded us by his mediation and influence, at the time in which it was made, and made (as we underſtood) the pledged condition of that ſervice; we deem it in this conſtruction equal to a formal obligation, and therefore empowered you to treat with him for the accompliſhment of it, in ſuch a manner as ſhall prove ſatisfactory to him, and more conſiſtent with our national credit than the literal performance of it; but if he ſhall inſiſt on the literal performance of it, and he ſhall not have forfeited his right to it by the renewal of hoſtilities againſt us, or by any breach of engagement, if any ſuch exiſts between us, we ſee no alternative; it muſt be fulfilled.

9. Although the conduct of *Mahdajee Scindia* may not ſeem to confirm your opinion of his diſpoſition towards us, or rather of the political neceſſity which ſeems to incline him to enſure our future alliance, yet we think the arguments which you have aſſigned for this belief, ſo well

well grounded, and it agrees ſo well with the knowledge which we ourſelves poſſeſs of his ſtate views and talents, that we entirely adopt it; nor do we find it difficult to reconcile the demands made on us, under his influence, by the Miniſters, and immediately by him, for the performance of the conditions of the convention of *Worgaum*, with that diſpoſition, or with the obvious ſyſtem of policy which his preſent intereſt demands.

10. We ſuppoſe it probable, that he will avoid any direct engagement with us till the urgency of his affairs ſhall require it, or until he can gain the advantage of the negociation, by waiting for the firſt advances to be made on your part. If from the opportunities which you have of a nearer and more intimate knowledge of his perſonal character and neceſſities, you ſhall judge this concluſion to be well grounded, it will be adviſable to treat him with the ſame temporizing and indeterminate conduct, and purſuing the plan of military operations which we have recommended, to wait for the offer of his alliance rather than ſolicit it. Propoſing this as a general caution, we authorize you to enter into ſuch engagements with him as ſhall not be contrary to any before concluded, and which you ſhall judge moſt adviſable; making your future ſecurity, peace, and an adequate revenue, your chief and indiſpenſable objects, and the grounds of your engagement with him.

11. To ſum up what we have written; our firſt deſire is to obtain peace, on the terms propoſed by our inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard* of the 5th of April, and it is only in the event of the failure of this deſign, that we have formed the ſubſequent inſtructions, or will allow of their operation.

12. In theſe, the plan of military operations recommended by your Preſident, is to have the firſt place, with its dependant engagements with the Guicawars; the next in order is the negociation with *Moodajee Booſla*, and the laſt, the propoſed engagement with *Mahdajee Scindia*.

13. The execution of the projected treaty of peace with the Poonah Miniſtry we leave to the ſole charge of Colonel *Goddard*, according to the inſtructions which we have already given him.

14. The negociation and treaty of alliance with *Moodajee Booſla* we alſo leave to the ſole management of Colonel *Goddard*, on the authority of his inſtructions of the 16th of November, until the period of their ſuſpenſion, by the refuſal, or ſuch heſitation of *Moodajee Booſla* as he ſhall deem ſufficient to warrant his declaring the negociation ſuſpended. The future renewal of this negociation we reſerve to be determined by our expreſs orders, but without revoking the credentials and inſtructions already granted to Colonel *Goddard* reſpecting it; in all other negociations, treaties, and plans, of military operations, it is our wiſh ſo to blend the powers of your Government with our own in the direction of them, and in every formal or occaſional inſtrument which they may require for their ratification, as to preſerve the credit and diſtinct reſponſibility of both, and to make both the pledges for the faithful obſervance of them. For this purpoſe we need not recommend that Colonel *Goddard* be conſulted, when his preſence or the nature of the ſubjects will admit of it, on all meaſures which have a relation to our preſent inſtructions, as you have already been pleaſed to allow him a deliberative voice in your councils; and we are happy to find that you are ſo well ſatisfied with his conduct, and his ready diſpoſition to aſſiſt in the execution of your deſigns, as to leave us little occaſion to lay down a clearer line for the employment of the forces under his command, than that which we have already deſcribed.

15. We have directed Colonel *Goddard* to execute whatever ſervice you ſhall think it proper to require, which ſhall not be contrary to our inſtructions, or to any exiſting engagements; a caution which we hope will be unneceſſary, but with which we do not conſider ourſelves at liberty to diſpenſe, while the principal reſponſibility reſts with us. And for the ſame reaſon we require, that all treaties which ſhall be concluded by you in virtue of theſe inſtructions be referred to this Government for its final ſanction and formal ratification of them, and that a clauſe be inſerted in every treaty ſo concluded to that effect. Appendix. No. 197.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 10th June 1779;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

Sir *Eyre Coote* delivers in the following opinion on the Governor General's amended draft of the letter propoſed to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, recorded in conſultation the 7th inſtant.

Sir *Eyre Coote.*

Paragraph 1ſt. Agreed.

2d. Agreed.

3d. Agreed; provided the following addition be made:—

"To which we recommend their being immediately "brought, not upon the limited charge given in by the "Preſident, which ſolely points to one part of their "conduct, but upon a general charge for miſconduct "upon an expedition that has failed."

The words "either with the powers immediately veſted "in your body by the Court of Directors, or—" I object to, knowing but of two powers over the military veſted in any Government in *India*, ſuſpenſion and a court martial.

Paragraph 4th. Agreed.

5th. To this I object.

As a military man, I would not venture my character in giving full applauſe, or implicitly adopting Mr. *Hornby*'s plan of operations, knowing ſo little of the nature of that ſervice, when at this diſtance.

If by refuſing peace they force us to continue hoſtilities, I muſt in this caſe ſuppoſe a junction of all their parties, and of courſe a union of all their forces. And I do not think with Colonel *Goddard*, that his detachment, conſidering the ſtate it is now in, together with the Bombay troops, are equal to enſure ſucceſs in a conteſt with the united Maratta power. Our utmoſt vigour ſhould therefore be exerted to ſupport our military reputation in this country, and by one united effort put a glorious and ſpeedy end to the war; for however uncertain the ſucceſs of war may be, we ought to leave it as little as poſſible to the reſult of chance, conſidering the great ſtake we have to riſk. For which reaſon we ſhould alſo form alliances with the country Powers, eſpecially with *Hyder Ally*, whoſe more particular intereſt it is to join us in any hoſtile attempts againſt the Maratta State. And if a war ſhould be indiſpenſably continued, I would leave it to the commanding officer, who is reſponſible to us for his conduct, to adopt any part, or the whole of Mr. *Hornby*'s plan, or not at all, as he may think moſt adviſable for promoting the diſtreſs of the enemy.

It is impoſſible to preſcribe (as is here propoſed) any military operations at this diſtance, the ſcene ſhifts while we debate upon it; what we now preſcribe may be utterly impracticable when this letter arrives. It muſt therefore be left to the commanding officer upon the ſpot, who is beſt qualified to avail himſelf of the ſituations that fortune may preſent to him. I therefore object to "preſcribe this plan to be carried literally into execution."

Paragraph 6th. I have no objection to, as it is only a remark upon a former meaſure.

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Paragraph 7th. I can never agree to give up what the grantors had no power to beſtow. *Bengal* may next be given away by the next unfortunate Bombay detachment, as properly as *Broach* in this. The queſtion is not the motive upon which it was ceded, but the power: if the want of power is an objection upon the terms of the general treaty, it muſt equally apply in the other. The motive can only operate to induce us to grant ſome equivalent in the one which there is no opening for in the other; and in ſo far to the 8th paragraph I agree.

But in both theſe laſt paragraphs, I object to the conferring the management of one part of the treaty with the Marattas upon Colonel *Goddard*, and the other to the Select Committee at *Bombay*. They have finiſhed their part already, as we have too fatally experienced; what remains to be done belongs to this Government, of which Colonel *Goddard* is the repreſentative Plenipotentiary at *Poonah*. If it is thought neceſſary, let his powers be entirely revoked; but permitting others to infringe upon them, can never be good policy, or promote diſpatch.

Paragraph 9th. This I agree to, provided the negociation be conducted by the ſame agent who is to treat with the Maratta State.

10th. "*Purſuing the plan of military operations which we have recommended,*" ſeems to me but a fruſtrating concomitant with "*waiting for the offer of his alliance.*" I doubt whether this would lead him to treat with us.

Paragraph 11th. Moſt fully agreed in.

12th. To this I object, as I cannot admit Mr. *Hornby*'s plan to take place of that of the commanding officer; and ſecondly, an alliance with *Madajee Scindia* ſhould take place of that with *Moodajee Booſla*, becauſe the latter ſeems to be given up. *We have* but little hopes, and *he waits* "*till we prove our ſuperiority decidedly.*"

13th. I fully agree in.

14th. After acknowledging the conduct of that ſame Government to have been of ſuch a nature, as to leave it to a higher authority to puniſh, it would be utterly inconſiſtent to blend the reſponſibility of the acts of the two Preſidencies. To this I can never aſſent, as in the miſerable ſituation to which they have reduced themſelves, I look upon the reſponſibility of future meaſures to lie ſolely with us, which the 15th paragraph confirms.

Governor General—As the General has objected to the indefinite term "Powers," in the third paragraph, I beg leave to ſubmit to his approval the inſerting of the words "of ſuſpenſion" following it; as this correction will limit the ſenſe of the Board to the ſpecific powers poſſeſſed by them.

The General approves of the correction.

Mr. *Wheler*—There are many points in the Governor General's amended propoſitions which I would aſſent to, and ſome of the alterations made to thoſe propoſitions by the Commander in Chief coincide likewiſe with my own ideas; but taking the paragraphs ſeparately, they ſtill remain blended with a variety of propoſals which I can never aſſent to. I ſhall quote only one inſtance: the Commander in Chief's amendment of the 3d article ſtill leaves it in the power of the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, either to ſuſpend Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, or to try them by a court martial. Was I to alter this paragraph, I ſhould urge the neceſſity of a court martial, as the only means of clearing up the ſuſpicions that at preſent hang over them. For theſe reaſons, and becauſe I have been favoured with the ſight of the draft of a letter prepared by Mr. *Francis*, which coincides more fully with my own ſentiments and the principles on which I have acted, I muſt object to every paragraph of the letter now before the Board, except the fourth and thirteenth.

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following minute:

Mr. *Francis*—Having compared the Governor's amended draft of the letter to *Bombay* with the minutes in which my opinion on the different points before us is recorded, I find it unneceſſary to follow the paragraphs in the order propoſed by the reſolution, ſince there are but two in which I can entirely concur; I mean the fourth and thirteenth: nor do I ſee how it is poſſible to give a partial aſſent or diſſent to the remainder. I therefore object to the whole of the propoſed letter, except the fourth and thirteenth paragraphs.

But that the time and attention of the Board may not be any longer waſted in debates, which I think have no fixed point of view, and lead to no deciſion, and that I may not appear to condemn the plan offered by the Governor, without ſtating what I would prefer in its place, I beg leave to propoſe another draft of a letter to *Bombay*, drawn up on thoſe principles on which I think the Commander in Chief's ſentiments and mine are agreed, and preſerving the two paragraphs of the Governor's draft in which I concur.

The Board will obſerve, that I recede wholly from the idea of entering into a particular diſcuſſion or cenſure of the paſt conduct of the gentlemen of *Bombay*. In doing this, I mean to relieve the Board from a heavy taſk, not eſſential to the public ſervice, and to preclude a debate which if we were once to enter into, I fear would never end. So far forth I alſo meet the opinion of the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell*.

Propoſed Draft of a Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*.

1. We have received your letter of the 4th April, with its incloſures, by the hands of Mr. *Horſly*.

2. After peruſing theſe papers with the ſtricteſt and moſt deliberate attention, we have determined not to enter into a particular diſcuſſion or cenſure of the meaſures which have involved you in your preſent diſtreſſes. You muſt anſwer to a higher and more effectual authority than ours for the difficulties to which you have reduced the Government entruſted to your care, and for the unexampled diſhonour you have brought upon the Company's arms. We leave your conduct in the courſe of theſe tranſactions to be examined at home, as we doubt not it will be with the utmoſt ſeverity. If on our ſide it had been poſſible for us to ſelect any part of your proceedings either in the plan or execution of your meaſures, on which we could have beſtowed our approbation, we ſhould readily have done it.

3. Having already given full powers to Colonel *Goddard* to negociate and conclude a treaty of peace with the Maratta Government, and having no cauſe to alter the terms which we have preſcribed in our inſtructions for that purpoſe, we have only to repeat, that we look to the iſſue of that commiſſion as our primary object, and the termination of all our political views on your ſide of *India*, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful.

4. The execution of the projected treaty of peace with the Poonah Miniſtry we leave to the ſole charge of Colonel *Goddard*, according to the inſtructions which we have already given him.

5. Until we ſhall be adviſed by Colonel *Goddard* of the reſult of his negociations in conſequence of his preſent orders, we do not think it adviſable to bind ourſelves, even by a conditional determination, to proſecute the war on the plan propoſed by Mr. *Hornby*, or on any other. Suppoſing that our views and wiſhes, which are all directed to an honourable peace, ſhould be defeated, it is not from a partial effort on your ſide of *India* alone, that we can form any reaſonable expectation of a deciſive ſucceſs againſt the united power of the Marattas; for in the caſe of war we muſt ſuppoſe their ſtrength to be united againſt us. We will not therefore precipitate a reſolution in the conſequences of which all *India* may be involved. We ſhall wait for advices from Colonel *Goddard*, and be determined by the lights and information with which he may furniſh us.

6. Having thus diſmiſſed the conſideration of what is paſt, and deferred our deciſion on future meaſures, we come

come now to the only point in your diſpatches on which we cannot decline giving you a preciſe and formal opinion.

We diſapprove, and cannot admit of the reference, &c. &c. (in the terms of Mr. *Francis*'s propoſitions *mutatis mutandis*, with the following addition at the concluſion) " or on ſuch other charges as the Preſident " and Select Committee may think fit to prefer againſt " them for their conduct in the courſe of the expedi- " tion."

With regard to the form and extent of the charge againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, I have no objection to the terms recommended by the Commander in Chief.

Mr. *Barwell*—The reſolution of the 7th inſtant precludes the conſideration of the propoſitions made by Mr. *Francis* until the ſubject of that reſolution is diſmiſſed. I ſhall therefore, agreeably to the reſolution, proceed directly to give my opinion upon each paragraph of the letter propoſed by the Governor General to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*.

I approve of the firſt and ſecond paragraphs.

I approve of the third, and adopt the General's amendment and propoſed addition.

I approve of the fourth paragraph in the words of it.

I approve of the points in general propoſed to be effected by the inſtructions contained in the fifth paragraph, concurring with the Commander in Chief in his propoſition expreſſed as follows:—" And if a war " ſhould be indiſpenſably continued, I would leave it to " the commanding officer, who is reſponſible to us for " his conduct, to adopt any part or the whole of Mr. " *Hornby*'s plan, or not at all, as he may think moſt " adviſable for promoting the diſtreſs of the enemy." And I agree with the Commander in Chief, for the reaſons he has aſſigned, that we ought not to preſcribe this plan to be carried literally into execution, but to leave a latitude of action to Colonel *Goddard* to avail himſelf of the ſituations which fortune may preſent to him.

I acquieſce in the 6th paragraph.

The ſeventh paragraph appearing liable to the conſtruction of allowing force to one part of the convention of *Worgaum*, and denying it to another, is objectionable. I ſhould not have propoſed an amendment, but as it has ſtruck a member of the council in this light, and as I conceive it to be meant, as it has already been declared by this Government, to diſclaim entirely and completely the acts of the military committee at *Worgaum*, I would recommend that it be ſo done in expreſs terms.

With reſpect to the 8th paragraph, I concur with the Commander in Chief, that to render the negociation entruſted to Colonel *Goddard* complete, it will be proper to include in the commiſſion he holds from this Government every point that ſhall become an object of negociation between this Government and the Maratta State, touching the unauthorized acts of the Bombay Committee at *Worgaum*; and I therefore propoſe with the Commander in Chief, that Colonel *Goddard* be inſtructed to expreſs the ſenſe in which this Government is pleaſed to regard the ſervices of *Madajee Scindia* at *Worgaum*, by offering him ſuch a gratification as may be afforded him by the Bombay Government, or for means which he may poſſeſs from the operations of war, in caſe peace is not concluded upon the inſtructions he is already furniſhed with. Theſe orders to Colonel *Goddard* will properly come in the place of the inſtructions of the eighth paragraph to the Bombay Preſidency, as neceſſary information.

I agree to the ninth paragraph.

I acquieſce in the propoſition of making Colonel *Goddard* the channel of any negociation with *Madajee Scindia* in the preſent conjuncture of affairs. I would recommend that the 10th paragraph be wholly omitted as unneſſential.

I agree to the eleventh, and I agree to the twelfth and thirteenth paragraphs. Appendix. No. 197.

I likewiſe agree entirely to the fourteenth.

I agree entirely to the fifteenth.

Governor General—Whatever reſolutions may be paſſed upon the various matters which the diſpatches received ſome time ſince from *Bombay* have brought before the notice of the Board, I moſt earneſtly recommend and entreat that they will inſtantly decide upon one, on the proper application of which the proſperity of the Company certainly does, and their very exiſtence may depend. The inſtructions ſent to Colonel *Goddard* preſcribe certain clear and ſimple conditions as the alternative of peace or war. There is no latitude for a long negociation; Colonel *Goddard* is to offer peace to the Maratta Government, on its agreement to revert to the ſtate in which we relatively ſtood by the treaty of *Proonder*; to renounce its claims for the convention of *Worgaum*, and to exclude the French for ever from its dominions. If they accept of theſe terms, there is peace; if they refuſe (and they muſt either accept or refuſe) war.

Let us ſuppoſe either of theſe events to have taken place, and to conſider in what ſtate they will place us. If peace is concluded, the object of our negociation is obtained, and we have nothing left to look for but the quiet arrangement of our affairs in their former channel, to which they will revert of courſe without our interference, and the return of Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, or ſuch a proviſion made for its ſervices as may ſuit a ſtate of peace, and the neceſſary defence of the Company's intereſts againſt any probable or expected attempts of the French. Theſe are points which do not preſs for immediate deciſion or deliberation, becauſe our reſolutions upon them, whatever they were, could not be carried into effect before many months were elapſed.

But the caſe is widely different if war be the reſult of our offers to the Maratta State: in ſuch a caſe, our ſafety may depend on inſtant action, and theirs on delay. Our troops may act immediately; theirs muſt wait for their accuſtomed ſeaſon, which never commences till the expiration of the Duſerra, or the end of September; and an advantage may be ſucceſsfully, and if I may be allowed to truſt to my own judgment, I will ſay, eaſily taken of the preceding interval, to occupy ſuch poſts, or to ſeize ſuch parts of their territory as may bring great diſtreſs upon them before they are in a capacity to reſiſt; and give us ſtrength and the means of proſecuting the war, when both parties ſhall be engaged in it, proportionate to their loſs of both.

I have certain intelligence, or ſuch as I deem certain, that *Madajee Scindia* is no longer in the neighbourhood of the capital, where it was ſuppoſed he would be compelled to remain for the ſupport of his influence, but was ſome time ſince arrived with his colleague *Tuccojee Holcar*, and *Ragonaut Row*, at *Berhampore*, on his way to the eaſtern frontier of the Maratta dominions; and it is the current and general report, that it is his intention to invade the dominions of our ally, the Nabob of *Owde*, after the expiration of the rains. Whether this report be derived from any ground of authority, or held out for intimidation, or it be only the part of a plan depending on a ſeries of contingencies, or ariſe from mere conjecture; it is a concluſion which we ought to credit, ſo far at leaſt as to be upon our guard againſt it, and even to prevent it.

For theſe reaſons, I am wholly againſt the draft propoſed by Mr. *Francis*, becauſe in the event of a decided war, it will bind our own hands while thoſe of our enemies are free; and it will leave the Preſidency of *Bombay* encumbered, and oppreſſed with the weight of that very force on which we depend for its preſervation.

I will never ſuffer the object to be loſt, for which the detachment now commanded by Colonel *Goddard* was firſt appointed. It was not to aſſiſt the deſigns of the Preſidency of *Bombay* in their execution, but to ſupport them in the conſequences

Appendix. No. 197.

of it. Though the detachment was for a while diverted from its deſtination on the ſuppoſition that the deſigns of that Preſidency had either wholly failed, or was relinquiſhed, yet it has ſince reverted to it, and is now preciſely in the ſituation in which it was originally meant to place it. I will not ſay what might have been the fate of *Bombay* had not Colonel *Goddard* moſt ſeaſonably arrived for its relief.

The queſtion is now, whether it ſhall anſwer the purpoſes of its deſtination? or whether, after ſo ſucceſsful a termination of an enterprize pronounced impracticable, it ſhall be wholly precluded from anſwering the ends of its appointment, and be converted to the means of completing the ruin of the Company's intereſts, which it was provided, and is ready to retrieve? If peace has attended the negociation intruſted to Colonel *Goddard*, theſe ends are attained, at leaſt in as great a degree as we are warranted to proſecute them: if the contrary, let it be employed to promote them. It will be but an ill excuſe for our forbearance, that we waited for regular and official information, if in the interval in which our troops might enable them to avert the dangers attendant on an actual ſtate of war, or to begin it with advantage, any fatal miſcarriage ſhould befal them, and through the want of authority to act. Hitherto the inſtructions given to Colonel *Goddard*, and the letter which accompanied theſe to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, preclude the dangers of which I have expreſſed apprehenſion, ſince thoſe inſtructions and advices clearly preſcribe the circumſtances which are to place them in a decided ſtate of peace or war; and authorize them of courſe to act conformably to either ſtate. The arguments which I have uſed do not therefore ariſe from any neceſſity of giving them new inſtructions, or ſupplying the defect of thoſe which we have already given them: what I have ſaid applies ſolely to the propoſal made by a member of the Board, "to wait for advices from Colonel *Goddard*, and to be determined by the lights and "informations with which he may furniſh us," even in the ſuppoſed refuſal of the Maratta Miniſtry to accept of our offers of peace; or in other words, "to refrain "from committing hoſtilities, while we are threatened "with them and war is actually denounced againſt us."

The other propoſitions contained in Mr. *Francis*'s draft, do not appear to me to be regularly before the Board, and the day is too far advanced to enter on new ſubjects of debate.

I now proceed to the queſtions which are before the Board.

To the firſt and ſecond paragraphs of the propoſed draft, I agree; and to the third I agree, with the amendment and addition propoſed by the Commander in Chief.

To the fourth I agree.

To the fifth paragraph I agree, with the amendment propoſed by the Commander in Chief.

To the ſixth I agree.

On the ſeventh and eighth, I can never depart from the opinions which I have expreſſed in theſe paragraphs; but I ſhall not oppoſe the ſentiments of the other members which tend to the ſame concluſion as my own, though differing in their principles.

I abide by the ninth paragraph as it ſtands; and,

I agree to the tenth and eleventh.

The twelfth is of no conſequence, and may be omitted.

To the remaining paragraphs I agree.

Sir *Eyre Coote* delivers in the following minute.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—Under the fulleſt conviction of the juſt praiſe given to Colonel *Goddard*, I beg leave to propoſe, and hope it will meet with the concurrence of this Board, that we join with the Government at *Bombay* in recommending him to the Court of Directors, for the appointment of Commander in Chief at that Preſidency upon the firſt vacancy.

And in the intermediate time, "I think it abſolutely "neceſſary, in the preſent diſtreſſed ſituation that the "military upon the Bombay eſtabliſhment are reduced "to, that he ſhould have the rank given him of Bri-"gadier General, in order to enable him to carry on "the public ſervice with more weight and dignity;" and therefore propoſe that a brevet commiſſion of Brigadier General *for that ſervice* be now granted him.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following minute:

Mr. *Francis*—I have objection to our recommending Colonel *Goddard*'s conduct to the attention of the Court of Directors; but I would leave it to them to determine what reward he may deſerve. In particular I would not point out the ſucceſſion to the command at *Bombay*; becauſe I think it would look like pre-judging the event of Colonel *Egerton*'s trial, ſuppoſing he ſhould be brought to a trial in conſequence of our recommending it, of which I have ſome doubt.

The Board have already given Colonel *Goddard* the rank of Colonel on the other ſide of *India*; and I do not think that the occaſion calls for our inveſting him at preſent with a higher rank: ſuppoſing he ſhould return to *Bengal*, the rank of Brigadier General, if he once holds it, will not permit him to act again in that which belongs to him on this eſtabliſhment; and I cannot conſent to ſuperſede officers ſuperior to him, merely becauſe they have not had the good fortune to be employed as he has been.

Excluſive of theſe conſiderations, I doubt whether we have a right to beſtow the rank in queſtion. There is no inſtance within my knowledge of ſuch a rank given in *India*. The Court of Directors, as I have always underſtood, have reſerved to themſelves the power of appointing general officers in their ſervice.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

I agree, and ſubſcribe to the above opinion.

(Signed) *E. Wheler.*

Governor General—I heartily concur in both the propoſitions.

Mr. *Barwell*—I approve of both the propoſitions.

Reſolved, That a brevet commiſſion of Brigadier General be granted to Colonel *Goddard* for the ſervice on which he is now employed; which commiſſion ſhall ceaſe on his return, or on the return of the troops under his command, to either of the provinces dependant on this Government or the Government of *Owde*.

Ordered, That the Secretary do prepare a letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, conformably the foregoing minutes.

Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 14th June 1779;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

The Secretary begs leave to lay before the Board the draft of a letter to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, drawn up from the minutes of the 10th inſtant.

See page 31 Report.

Queſtion put.

Is the letter approved?

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I approve it.

Mr. *Wheler*—I do not approve of the letter.

Mr. *Francis*.—I do not approve of it.

Mr. *Barwell*—Any particular approbation of this letter on my part is totally unneceſſary. I am bound by the ſenſe of the majority to approve it. I think the queſtion irregular, becauſe it brings in a new mode on points already determined, to a ſecond deciſion. I muſt therefore take the queſtion to be, whether the

letter conforms to the reſolutions of laſt council day? I think it does.

Governor General—I approve.

Reſolved, That the above draft of the letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* be immediately copied fair, and tranſmitted to that Preſidency.

APPENDIX, Nos. 198, 199, 200, 201.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 14th June 1779.

MR. *Francis* delivers in the following minute:

I diſſent from and proteſt againſt the preceding letter, for the following reaſons, in addition to thoſe on which I oppoſed the meaſures now adopted at the time they were debated;

1ſt. Becauſe I deem it unbecoming the dignity of the Governor General and Council, and a moſt unmerited demonſtration of tenderneſs and partiality to the majority of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, with ſuch evidence of their miſconduct as we have before us, to paſs by the whole of their late proceedings without the ſmalleſt expreſſion of diſapprobation or concern; as if nothing were in queſtion, but ſome common and trifling occurence, by which neither the intereſts of the Company nor the credit of our arms had been eſſentially wounded. When the ſeparate opinions of the members of this Board ſhall appear before our ſuperiors, I doubt not they will think it an extraordinary circumſtance, that no part of the ſpirit which breathes through thoſe opinions ſhould be preſerved in the collective act of the Council:

2d. Becauſe, conſidering the claim of Colonel *Egerton*, and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, to be tried by a court martial, as a claim of right, I think we ſhould not have confined our interpoſition on this point to a cold and languid recommendation of ſuch trial; but ſhould have inſiſted upon its being granted in terms that could admit of no evaſion: much leſs ſhould we have weakened; even that recommendation, by referring to an alternative, of which the Select Committee may now avail themſelves, under colour of our authority. This, I conceive, is no time to remind them, that they have other powers veſted in them; that they are at liberty to wave all trial, if they think proper, and to puniſh the parties by an immediate and direct act of power:

3d. Becauſe, admitting it to be true, that Meſſrs. *Egerton* and *Cockburn* conſented at firſt to relinquiſh their claim to a public trial, and that they had no right to retract ſuch conſent once given; ſtill I think we ſhould not have paſſed over in ſilence the unwarrantable acts and declarations of the Preſident by which it was extorted from them. They who think leaſt favourably of the conduct of theſe gentlemen, ſhould conſider how far the precedent may be extended, and what ſecurity it leaves to the military ſervice in general againſt the arbitrary acts of a party, occaſionally prevailing in the council:

4th. Becauſe the ſeveral plans of alliance or co-operation, propoſed to be executed with the Guicawars, or with *Madajee Scindia*, or with *Moodajee Boolla*, muſt be offered and negociated after we ourſelves are actually committed by a declaration of war, and engaged in the proſecution of it. In ſuch circumſtances I conceive we ſhall treat with all or any of the above mentioned Chiefs for their aſſiſtance, under great diſadvantage. When once they ſee us engaged in a war, which at all events we muſt carry on, they will either ſtand aloof until they ſee the ſucceſs of our operations, or ſell us their aſſiſtance on terms which we ſhould not yield in any other ſituation:

5th. Becauſe no conſideration whatſoever is given to the caſe of the two gentlemen, who remain as hoſtages in the hands of the Maraттas, and whoſe lives may be hazarded by an abrupt declaration of war:

6th. Becauſe, excluſive of all other reaſons already urged againſt our precipitating the Company into a war with the Marattas, if that extremity can be avoided by any honourable means, I deem it inconſiſtent with the principle of Colonel *Goddard*'s inſtructions of the 5th of April (in which the re-eſtabliſhment of peace is profeſſed to be our object) to ſend him orders, which leave no room for accommodation, and which ought to have accompanied the inſtruction, if the Board had originally been determined not to wait for the reſult of his negociations, nor even for an anſwer to our letter. I deem it uſeleſs, even in view to a proſecution of the war, ſince in all probability the advices we expect from Colonel *Goddard* may arrive in fifteen or twenty days; and though a rupture in that interval may be forwarded, and all means of reconciliation precluded, in conſequence of the preſent orders, our troops cannot take the field before September. No poſſible advantage can therefore be gained by this precipitation, unleſs it be thought an advantage to denounce war before we are able to act, to give the enemy the earlieſt notice of our intention to invade their country as ſoon as the ſeaſon will permit:

Laſtly, I am unable to reconcile it with the opinion of every member of the Board, except the Governor General. Of Mr. *Wheler*'s ſentiments and mine, I preſume no doubt can be formed. Mr. *Barwell* ſays, he thinks we ſhould wait for the effect of Colonel *Goddard*'s negociations for peace; but if we now decide the main queſtion of peace or war, the information which Mr. *Barwell* thinks we ought to wait for, can be of no uſe to us.

The Commander in Chief, in whoſe ſentiments I have entirely concurred, declares it to be his opinion, that we ſhould not ſeek to renew a war, but negociate with the various Maratta intereſts an honourable peace: that Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, conſidering the ſtate it is now in, together with the *Bombay* troops, are not equal to inſure ſucceſs in a conteſt with the united Maratta power; yet it is with this force alone that, under the preſent orders, we are to commence a war which will aſſuredly unite the whole power of the Marattas againſt us. No meaſures previous to a declaration of war are taken to divide them; no alliance formed; no general plan of operations propoſed: in ſhort, every thing that belongs to deliberation, and which ought to prepare and lead to a deciſion, is left to follow it. But if in the outſet of the conteſt, and before any meaſures can be taken to ſupport or co-operate with Colonel *Goddard*, the army under his command ſhould be defeated, and if the conſequences of a defeat ſhould endanger the whole of the Company's poſſeſſions, as the Commander in Chief very juſtly thinks they would, on what principle ſhould we juſtify a reſolution capable of producing ſuch conſequences, from which, at the preſent point of time, no immediate advantage can be derived, and to be carried into execution by a force which the Commander in Chief thinks is not equal to ſucceſs? The terms on which we are to engage in this war are very unequal, when the utmoſt we expect from a victory is ſome acceſſion of territory on the Malabar coaſt, and when a defeat may endanger the whole of the Company's poſſeſſions.

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Mr. *Barwell*—Mr. *Francis* has very accurately quoted my words, which are, "I think we ſhould wait the effect "of Colonel *Goddard*'s negociation for peace," putting upon them the following conſtruction: "that if we how "decide the main queſtion, of peace or war, the infor- "mation which Mr. *Barwell* thinks we ought to wait "for, can be of no uſe." I beg leave to refer to the whole of the ſentiments I have expreſſed in the minute referred to; theſe are ſufficiently explanatory of the ſenſe of my words, by which I propoſed to have conveyed no other meaning, than that Colonel *Goddard*'s negociations for peace muſt have produced their effect, and if that effect was peace, it precluded the operation of any orders we might judge neceſſary on the ſuppoſition of a war. But the conſideration of meaſures in the caſe of our being in an actual ſtate of war, I did not intend (as is apparent from

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from my minute) to ſuſpend, for information to be received from Colonel *Goddard*.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 28th June 1779;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires. Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* indiſpoſed.

Read and approved the proceedings of the 21ſt inſtant.

The Secretary lays before the Board the following minute, which he has received from Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—Although I regret that I have been already induced to write more minutes ſince my arrival here than I did in all my former tranſactions in *India*, yet I find myſelf ſo particulary pointed at in the laſt paragraph of Mr. *Francis*'s proteſt of the 14th inſtant, that I cannot now avoid ſaying ſomething, in reply to the aſſertions it contains.

Colonel *Goddard* is no where, in the letter to *Bombay* or to himſelf, limited to act (in caſe he ſhould be driven to the neceſſity of continuing the war) ſolely with the body of troops that accompanied him from *Bengal*, but left moſt fully to ſuch plans, whether alliances or otherwiſe, as his judgment may direct moſt to diſtreſs the enemy: and for this purpoſe the fulleſt plenipotentiary powers are granted him; ſuch powers as will inſure peace, if peace is to be granted upon any but diſhonourable terms, and upon thoſe I hope we never ſhall accept of it.

Upon the whole, ſo far from admitting that the reply to *Bombay* is contrary to the ſpirit of my minute of the 24th May, I think it moſt completely concurring with every point in it: and I muſt ſay, that if any one letter gave me more pleaſure to ſign than another, it was the one in queſtion, as, in my opinion, none could be better adapted to anſwer the public ſervice.

However, as I do not intend now or hereafter to devote my time to controverſial writing, I ſhall leave my conduct to the deciſion of my employers, to whom alone, with my country, I am anſwerable.

Ghyretty, (Signed) *Eyre Coote*.
June the 27th 1779.

Mr. *Francis*—This is the only minute of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s which appears to be occaſioned by, or to have relation to, any thing ſaid by me. The only obſervation I ſhall venture to make upon it, and which I hope will not lead to any further debate, is, that although Brigadier General *Goddard* is not reſtricted to act ſolely with the force under his command, it appears from our letter itſelf, that we place but little dependence on any acceſſion of ſtrength which he may derive from alliances with the country Powers. With reſpect to *Moodajee Booſla*, we expreſsly ſay, "that we prefer a ſcheme of military ope-"rations practicable by our own force, unincumbered "with the weight of a timid ally." But our whole force, I mean that with which Brigadier General *Goddard* is to act, is avowedly not ſufficient to enſure ſucceſs.

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Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 31ſt May 1779;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B. Mr. *Wheler* at *Beercool* for the benefit of his health.

Received the following letter from Mr. *Horſley*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

The diſpatches I brought you from *Bombay* are very circumſtantial; yet the facts they refer to are ſo numerous, and the proceedings upon them ſo extenſive, that I cannot help fearing ſome particulars may be liable to be miſconceived. I take the liberty therefore of requeſting your permiſſion to have acceſs to your records, as far as they relate to the buſineſs I am charged with; and I hope you will allow me to repreſent to you any thing they may ſuggeſt as requiſite for your fuller information regarding the affairs of the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

The object which ſeems of the firſt importance to the Select Committee, is to eſtabliſh ſuch a degree of confidence between your Government and them, as may render the powers of both moſt efficacious for the general advantage. They aſſure themſelves that they ſhall find you equally diſpoſed to promote a ſpirit of harmony, and to aboliſh all appearances of an oppoſition of intereſts, which it will ever be their ſtudy to avoid, and which they are convinced can never really exiſt. While I am employed in cultivating ſuch ſentiments, and in removing any miſapprehenſions that might prevent or interrupt the good underſtanding between the two Boards, I know I am engaged in the manner moſt agreeable to the gentlemen whoſe commands I am charged with, and it will be in proportion to my ſucceſs in theſe endeavours, that the termination of my commiſſion will be eſteemed either fortunate for the ſervice, or honourable to myſelf.

I remain, &c. &c.

Calcutta, (Signed) *G. Horſley*.
31ſt May 1779.

The Board do not think proper to allow Mr. *Horſley* an unreſerved acceſs to all their ſecret proceedings relative to the Preſidency of *Bombay*; but ſhall avail themſelves of the reference made to them by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, to apply to him for information on any points of which their actual knowledge may be defective.

Ordered, That the Secretary do furniſh Mr. *Horſley* with copies of all letters to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, and of all the reſolutions of the Board, which have an immediate relation to that Preſidency in its Secret Department; and that he inform Mr. *Horſley* the Board will be very glad to receive from him any new lights upon the late tranſactions on the preſent ſtate of that Preſidency, which his knowledge of them may ſuggeſt, or which ſhall appear to him neceſſary; and to aſſure him, that that weight will be given to his repreſentations which is due to them.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 14th June 1779;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

Read the following letter from Mr. *Horſley*:

The Honourable the Governor General and Council.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I did hope to have been permitted to attend you at your laſt meeting, to aſſure you, that the members of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, are unanimous in wiſhing to have the line of conduct reſolved on for them by your Board, laid down as clearly as poſſible; and that whatever it may be, whether for peace or war, or negociation, on which either may depend, they are determined to give every aſſiſtance in their power for the accompliſhment of your views.

I wiſhed to remind you, that the powers of the Governor General and Council had never been diſputed at *Bombay*, which while it ſhews the ſenſe of our Government as to the neceſſity of an union between the two Boards for the ſucceſsful management of the Company's affairs at our Preſidency, I hope will not render you leſs attentive to the ſame object; but on the contrary induce you to concert meaſures for forming ſuch an union of powers and intereſts, as the moſt effectual means of promoting the ſchemes of policy you may think proper to adopt.

Could I ſuppoſe you leſs convinced of the advantage of ſuch a conduct than the gentlemen at *Bombay*, I ſhould intreat you to conſider, whether you might not defeat your own intentions by rejecting the union the

Select Committee wiſh for and deſire, on no other terms but of the greateſt deference to the lead you are entitled to take in marking the points to which the joint endeavours of the two Boards are to be directed, and the principles on which they are to be purſued.

The ſentiments of every member of the Select Committee, which I can take upon me to anſwer for in the moſt unreſerved terms, are theſe:

That your Board has an unqueſtionable right to give them directions with regard to peace, war, and negociation:

That however the opinions of the Select Committee may at any time differ from thoſe of the Governor General and Council, yet they can only promote the welfare of their ſettlement by conforming to yours.

That it is in this way only they can hope to make the moſt of peace, or carry on war to advantage:

That therefore it is for their intereſt to co-operate with you on all occaſions, whether for peace or in war.

I hope, gentlemen, I may without offence ſay, that while they acknowledge your right to direct the principles on which the political concerns of the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſhall be conducted, they are not ignorant what their own rights are as to the actual and excluſive power of their Government.

Circumſtances are now ſo entirely changed, that it is to be hoped you will not ſuffer the memory of former diſagreements to be any impediments to the confidence you may be diſpoſed to place in the Government of *Bombay*. On the firſt opening of the Council General's commiſſion, the meaſures already taken at *Bombay* in Maratta affairs, fell under your ſevereſt cenſure, both as to the principles and execution. The juſtification which the Governor and Council might have derived from ſucceſs, even if they had no other, they were debarred from by the reſolutions of this Board: in this caſe what remained for them but to defend themſelves and their meaſures as far at leaſt as argument would ſupport them? The caſe is now very different: inſtead of having taken on their own authority any meaſures which they muſt now defend, they have referred every thing to you: they have poſtponed the exertions which in their opinion their actual ſituation authorized, which were the moſt neceſſary to their own affairs, and the moſt efficacious, as they thought, for ſupporting the ſyſtem of politics they underſtood you had adopted. This they have done for no other purpoſe, but that it might not be ſaid that they had prevented this Board from making its own choice, but that they might receive directions from you grounded on the fulleſt knowledge of the preſent ſtate of affairs; and preſerve from all riſk, that union and confidence which they conſider as ſuperior to all other advantages.

Unimformed as I am, I may perhaps trouble you on ſubjects on which my repreſentations are the moſt unneceſſary; and I would wiſh very much that this might be one of them: yet the general good of the ſervice, as well as the particular intereſts and rights of the Government of *Bombay*, appears much involved in the reſolutions you may take with regard to the powers you may think proper to continue to Colonel *Goddard*, or to confer a new one on him; and in the conſiſtency with them the powers reſerved to the Government of *Bombay* by Act of Parliament and ſpecially entruſted to the Select Committee by the Court of Directors, that I ſhould think myſelf wanting in my duty, if I did not intreat to be heard whenever theſe points may come under your conſideration, and before your reſolutions on them are taken.

I remain, &c. &c.

Calcutta, June 14th 1779. (Signed) *G. Horſley.*

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Mr. *Horſley* being directed to attend, that the draft of the letter to *Bombay* may be communicated to him, is admitted and allowed to peruſe the letter.

Mr. *Horſley*—I wiſh to take the letter propoſed to be ſent to *Bombay* home with me: the great length of it, and the variety of the ſubjects on which it treats, renders me cautious of offering any thing ſuddenly for the conſideration of the Board; and the more ſo as there are ſeveral parts of it which I fear will appear to me more detrimental to the ſervice the longer I conſider them. Appendix, No. 200.

Agreed, That Mr. *Horſley* be permitted to carry the draft of the letter to the Select Committee at *Bombay* home with him.

The following letter to Brigadier General *Goddard* having been circulated and approved, it was written in cypher and diſpatched.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

The Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* have tranſmitted to us by the hands of Mr. *Horſley*, a full and clear detail of their late proceedings, with their opinions on the preſent ſtate of affairs in that part of *India*, and the propoſitions of their Preſident for retrieving the unhappy conſequences of the defeat of that enterprize.

After the moſt attentive conſideration of theſe important ſubjects, we have formed ſeveral reſolutions on the meaſures to be purſued for re-eſtabliſhing the intereſt and credit of the Company. The moſt eſſential of thoſe meaſures we have determined to entruſt to your conduct: theſe we ſhall herein deſcribe to you, and give you ſuch clear information of our views as will enable you to carry them into effectual execution.

We ſhall alſo communicate to you ſuch parts of our inſtructions to the Select Committee, as will require your acting in concert with them, either deliberately or executively, or as have any relation to the objects more immediately committed to your ſeparate charge.

We have already given you full powers to negociate and conclude a treaty of peace with the Maratta Government; and having no cauſe to alter the terms which we have preſcribed in our inſtructions for that purpoſe, we have only to repeat, that we look to the iſſue of that commiſſion as our primary object, and the termination of all our political views on that ſide of *India*, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful.

But if the Miniſters ſhall reject the propoſals which we have inſtructed you to make to them, and ſhall reduce us to the neceſſity of defending the rights and intereſts of the Company by an open war, we leave you a latitude of action, under the inſtructions of the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, to avail yourſelf of the ſituation which fortune may preſent to you: and if a war ſhould be indiſpenſably continued, we alſo authorize you to adopt any part or the whole of Mr. *Hornby's* plan, laid down in his minute of the 30th of March; or not at all, as you may think moſt adviſable for promoting the diſtreſs of the enemy.

Should this plan be carried into execution, we have laid the Select Committee under the following reſtrictions:

1ſt. That their engagements ſhall be offenſive only for the objects of your immediate operations, and in all other reſpects purely defenſive.

2d. That their engagements with the Guicawar family ſhall be made with the head of it, and with him excluſively.

3d. That they ſhall not aſſume a mediation between the brothers *Futty Sing* and *Govind Row*, or take any part whatever in their domeſtic diſputes, further than to ſupport the party in alliance with the Company, and his poſſeſſions againſt foreign invaſion.

4th. That they do not commit the dignity of the Company, or pledge the national faith in formal treaties with perſons of a rank or power unſuitable to ſuch a diſtinction.

We leave the proffered alliance with *Moodajee Boſſla* to

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to be concluded under the inſtructions already given to you of the 16th of November; but we hereby direct, that if in his anſwers to the letters which were written to him by you and Mr. *Hornby*, or in any other letters which you may have received from him at the time of the arrival of theſe inſtructions, he ſhall have either refuſed or heſitated to accept the propoſals which have been made to him, or ſhall have made new references to us, you do in ſuch caſe declare the negociation at an end, and that you do on no account reſume it without our expreſs orders.

We likewiſe hereby authorize you to treat with *Madajee Scindia*, both on the ſubject of the ſeparate and ſecret agreement made with him by the military committee at *Worgaum*; and alſo in the event of a war, if you find him diſpoſed to our alliance to enter into ſuch engagements with him as you may judge to be for the advantage of the Company, and not incompatible with any treaty before concluded.

We think ourſelves ſtrictly juſtifiable in refuſing to ratify even the ſmalleſt tittle of the treaty or convention of *Worgaum*. Although we abſolutely diſclaim the acts of the committee, and deny their validity, and will not admit of any pretenſions founded on thoſe acts, yet they cannot cancel any rights which have their baſis in eſſential and intrinſic benefits reaped by our nation: this right we muſt acknowledge to be poſſeſſed by *Madajee Scindia*; and we therefore declare, that unleſs he ſhall have forfeited it by any ſubſequent act, he is entitled to a full compenſation for any diſappointment which he may ſuffer by our denial of the acts of the committee.

You will therefore expreſs to *Madajee Scindia* the ſenſe in which this Government is pleaſed to regard his ſervice at *Worgaum*, by offering ſuch a gratification as may be afforded him by the Government of *Bombay*, or from means which you may poſſeſs from the operations of war, in caſe peace is not concluded upon the inſtructions you are already furniſhed.

Although the conduct of *Madajee Scindia* may not ſeem to confirm the opinion which the Select Committee of *Bombay* entertain of his diſpoſition towards us, or rather of the political neceſſity which ſeems to incline him to inſure our future alliance; yet we think the arguments they have aſſigned for this belief ſo well grounded, and it agrees ſo well with the knowledge which we ourſelves poſſeſs of his ſtate views and talents, that we entirely adopt it, nor do we find it difficult to reconcile the demands made on us under his influence by the Miniſters, and immediately by him for the performance of the conditions of the convention of *Worgaum* with that diſpoſition, or with the obvious ſyſtem of policy which his preſent intereſt demands.

We ſuppoſe it probable that he will avoid any direct engagements with us until the urgency of his affairs ſhall require it; or until he can gain the advantage of the negociation, by waiting for the firſt advances to be made on our part. If from the opportunities you may have of a nearer and more intimate knowledge of his perſonal character and neceſſities, you ſhall judge this concluſion to be well grounded, we direct you to treat him with the ſame temporizing and indeterminate conduct rather than ſolicit it. Propoſing this as a general caution, you will make the future ſecurity of our poſſeſſions, peace, and an adequate revenue, your chief and indiſpenſable objects, and the grounds of our engagements with him.

To ſum up what we have written; our firſt deſire is to obtain peace on the terms propoſed to you of the 5th of April: and it is only in the event of the failure of this deſign, that we have formed the ſubſequent inſtructions, or will allow of their operation. This negociation we have committed to your ſole charge.

The ſeparate negociation with *Madajee Scindia* bears ſuch a connection with the foregoing, that we have thought it neceſſary to leave this alſo to your ſole charge.

We alſo truſt entirely to your management the negociation of the treaty of alliance with *Moodajee Booſla*, on the authority of your inſtructions of the 16th of November, until the period of its ſuſpenſion by the refuſal or ſuch a heſitation of *Moodajee Booſla* as you ſhall deem ſufficient to warrant your declaring the negociation ſuſpended. The future renewal of this negociation we reſerve to be determined by our expreſs orders, but without revoking the credentials and inſtructions granted you reſpecting it.

All other negociations, treaties, and plans of military operations not herein expreſsly committed to your ſole management, we leave to be formed and concluded under the regular powers of the Government of *Bombay*; and we hereby direct you to execute whatever military ſervice the Select Committee may think proper to require of you, and which you ſhall judge practicable; provided it ſhall not be contrary to our inſtructions or to any exiſting engagements.

Notwithſtanding the excluſive powers we have granted you for the purpoſe of negociating and concluding the treaties before ſpecified, we direct you in all poſſible caſes to avail yourſelf of ſuch advice and information as the Select Committee can afford you before you determine on the execution of any treaty ſeparately committed to your charge.

We obſerve, with the higheſt ſatisfaction, the approbation which the Select Committee of *Bombay* expreſs at your conduct, and the ready diſpoſition which you have ſhewn to aſſiſt in the execution of their deſigns. It is with pleaſure that we have reſolved to join with them, in recommending you to the Court of Directors for the appointment of Commander in Chief at that Preſidency, whenever there may be a vacancy; and, in the intermediate time, we think it highly expedient, that you ſhould hold the rank of Brigadier General, in order to enable you to carry on the public ſervice with more weight and dignity, for which purpoſe we have granted you a brevet commiſſion of Brigadier General, for the ſervice on which they are now employed.

(Signed) *W. H.*

Suppoſing this letter to be conformable to that already reſolved on to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, I acquieſce.

(Signed) *P. F.*

I acquieſce under the ſame ſuppoſition.

(Signed) *E. W.*

We have directed the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, to furniſh you with a copy of the cypher in which this letter is written, and which we requeſt you will take particular care of.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Ew^d Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt June 1779.—At a Council, preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell, Philip Francis, Edward Wheler*, Eſquires. Sir *Eyre Coote* indiſpoſed.

Read the following letter from Mr. *Horſley*:

The Honourable the Governor General and Council.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Had I been permitted to wait on you, and to make my repreſentations to you on the ſubjects on which I had deſired to be heard, previous to your taking your reſolutions, I was prepared to point out to you the great and inſurmountable objections which I thought lay againſt Colonel *Goddard*'s ſeparate, independent, and plenipotentiary powers, as marked in ſuch of your letters to *Bombay* as I had then ſeen; but I could not be at all prepared for the great extenſion meant to be given to thoſe powers. Now, upon the firſt communication of the draft of your propoſed letter to the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*, for what purpoſe it is communicated, I muſt acknowledge, I am far from certain; though I ſhould flatter

flatter myſelf that I ſhould not be laid under the neceſſity, either of deſerting the rights and intereſts of the Government, by which I am entruſted, or of hazarding my opinion and arguments againſt ſuch authority as yours, if the ſervice could receive no benefit: From the hard choice I am to make, I will therefore take the liberty of ſtating ſomewhat at large, though haſtily, the general objections I conceive to be againſt the powers you wiſh to confer on Colonel *Goddard*, as well as the particular parts of the propoſed letter to *Bombay*, which ſeem to me likely to prove detrimental to the public ſervice; I ſhall flatter myſelf to meet with your indulgence in uſing that freedom which a queſtion of right requires.

However unwillingly I may enter on this queſtion, yet I perceive it may have its uſe. Upon the information of a perſon ſo inconſiderable, that no contrariety of opinion can produce diſpute, or the moſt remote appearances of oppoſition, you will be able to judge of the differences you may give riſe to by the orders you are now about to ſend to *Bombay*. What I have to offer will be allowed its own weight and importance at leaſt; and in that caſe, I may perhaps have the ſatisfaction to think, that I have contributed to move the grounds of animoſities and contention, which might have had the moſt ruinous conſequences to the ſervice.

Permit me, on the other hand to hope, that your Board will make ſome allowance for the diſadvantage the Government of *Bombay* are under, on a ſubject of ſo great moment to them. The ſame arguments from them would certainly carry a force which I cannot pretend to give them; they would probably be able to offer more and better, and ſtate them more forcibly: at preſent however the taſk can only be performed by me, and it is my duty to execute it to the beſt of my ability.

I muſt however previouſly beg, gentlemen, that you will be pleaſed to recollect, that in claiming for the Government of *Bombay* the rights they hold under Act of Parliament, as well as by the ſpecial orders of the Court of Directors, and their plain and evident intentions, I do not take upon me to ſay, what lengths the Government of *Bombay* may think proper to go in ſupport of them: I know their moderation ſo well, that I am ſure the public welfare will be their firſt and principal care, however they may think their legal rights invaded, or with whatever diſreſpect they may conceive themſelves treated.

The general objections I take the liberty of offering to your conſideration on the ſubject of the powers you propoſe for Colonel *Goddard*, ſeparate from the Government of *Bombay*, independent of it, and plenipotentiary on the ſpecial concerns of that Preſidency, are, that they are illegal; that they are inconſiſtent with other eſtabliſhed and acknowledged legal powers; that they are inexpedient, and tend to produce the moſt dangerous confuſion in the Company's affairs.

The legal power of this Government over the other Preſidencies, I preſume is all comprized in one ſhort clauſe in the regulating Act, and is defined to be that of ſuperintending and controlling in the caſes of war, peace, and negociation, by granting or withholding their conſent and approbation of the meaſures of the other Governments. They have no direct agency at *Bombay*, the executive powers of the Government there being lodged, as before the Act paſſed, in the Governor and Council. The very words, "ſuperintendance and controul," in themſelves imply an intermediate power, and in this caſe the ſuperintendance and controul is ſaid to be *ſo far, and in ſo much* as is above expreſſed, that is, *no farther and no more*. The means by which the Governor General and Council may enforce their legal orders, even in caſe of diſobedience, are marked with the greateſt preciſion; they may ſuſpend the Governor and Council from their offices: it is not ſaid they may appoint agents of their own to carry their orders into execution. Five perſons nominated in the Act are intruſted with theſe powers of ſuperintendance and controul, which are limited not only by the expreſs words of the Act, but by the abſolute neceſſity impoſed by the diſtance at which they muſt be exerciſed. Can it be ſuppoſed that while other leſſer powers are ſo exactly defined, the greateſt of all, that of transferring the power of the whole Council General to one man, and exerciſing it on the ſpot by delegation, can belong to this Board, without the ſmalleſt mention made of it in the Act of Parliament? The Governor General and Council I believe would demur to yield the civil or military Government of *Bengal*, *Bahar* or *Orixa*, to any perſon who could produce no other authority than the orders of the Court of Directors for it. Yet it is eaſy to prove that the general authority of the Court of Directors would better ſupport a claim of this ſort, than the limited authority of the Governor General and Council juſtify an extenſion of it like that now propoſed. Appendix No. 200.

The Court of Directors are bound to furniſh his Majeſty's Miniſters with all information concerning the ſtate of their revenues, and all civil and military affairs of their Governments: the Governor General and Council are directed and required to pay obedience to all ſuch orders as they may receive from the Court of Directors: and the Governor and Council of *Bombay* are directed and required to pay obedience to the orders that they may receive from the Governor General and Council on certain particular ſubjects, and to a certain defined extent and degree. I do not find that his Majeſty's Miniſters, the Court of Directors, the Governor General and Council, or the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, can of their own authority appoint ſubſtitutes or deputies to exerciſe their great truſts. The only thing ſimilar to ſuch a power in the whole Act, is the right the Court of Directors poſſeſs to authorize the inferior Preſidency to act in peace, war, and negociation, without waiting for the conſent and approbation of the Governor General and Council; and this privilege given to the Court of Directors, who are ſpecially confined in the exerciſe of it to confer this extraordinary authority only on the legal agents of the Company at the inferior Preſidencies, affords one of the plaineſt and ſtrongeſt arguments of induction that can be, that the Governor General and Council cannot take from the Governors and Councils of thoſe Preſidencies their agency in their ſeveral Governments.

In ſhort, the expreſs words of the Act give the Governor General and Council a negative in the political concerns of the other Preſidencies, and as expreſsly ſay they ſhall claim *no more*; and the evident intention is, that while *Bengal* is conſidered as the moſt valuable of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, and has a preference given it ſuitable to its ſuperior importance; no one Government is to be left to the mercy of another, the members of which have perhaps no intereſt in its welfare or biaſſes contrary to it.

Give me leave, gentlemen, in this place to remark again to you, that the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, ſo far from ſtanding on their ſtrict legal rights, where they have conceived it for the good of the ſervice to yield a greater authority to your Board than the Act obliged them to do, have ſince the firſt eſtabliſhment of the Council General conſtantly allowed you to take the lead in their affairs, and have followed your directions with regard to war, peace, and all points of policy, for which I know only two reaſons that can be given; they might eaſily hope to gain your confidence, by making this ſacrifice to that jealouſy on your part with which the preſent intercourſe between the two Boards firſt began: or from a principle of moderation (which is not entitled to the leſs praiſe on account of the little ſhew ſo humble a virtue makes in the world) they are determined to yield every thing of their own, rather than riſk any intereſt of the public.

I muſt crave your patience, gentlemen, while this very painful ſubject leads me to point at the inconſiſtency of the powers you propoſe to confer on Colonel *Goddard*, with other eſtabliſhed and acknowledged legal powers.

Such are the powers granted by the Court of Directors to the Select Committee, who are evidently thereby

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ſet above the controul of any delegate from hence. The Select Committee do not ſay they are ſet above the ſuperintendance and controul of your Board; they have acknowledged your powers, and referred to them; yet I would wiſh it to be remembered, that they are ſo far ſuperior to the ſuperintendance and controul of Colonel *Goddard*, or any other delegate from hence, that were they diſpoſed to ſtart queſtions of right and power, perhaps the ſpecial orders of the Court of Directors (a caſe provided for by the Act) might bear an interpretation of ſtill greater latitude. I hope I ſhall not be miſunderſtood; I only wiſh to juſtify myſelf, and the Government for which I act, by ſhewing from example the difference between their claims and thoſe which men of unruly tempers might aſſert.

By the ſpecial appointment of the Court of Directors, the Select Committee is empowered *to tranſact all political, military, and naval affairs, and likewiſe all ſuch as may require ſecrecy. Every perſon in the ſervice of the Company, or enjoying their protection civil or military, are enjoined implicitly to obey all orders of the Select Committee, under pain of ſuſpenſion from the ſervice, or of forfeiting the Company's licenſe and protection: and if the Select Committee ſhall think fit to ſuſpend any perſon or perſons from the ſervice, ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall not be reſtored otherwiſe than by the ſaid Committee, except by order of the Court of Directors.* By the ſeparate, independent, and plenipotentiary powers granted by you to Colonel *Goddard*, he is to tranſact the moſt important of the political, military, naval, and ſecret affairs of the Preſidency of *Bombay*: he is inveſted with the independent command of an army within the limits of that Government; and yet at the ſame time, by the orders of the Court of Directors, he is enjoined to obey implicitly all orders of the Select Committee, under pain of ſuſpenſion from the ſervice, and of becoming incapable of being reſtored but by the Select Committee, or by the order of the Court of Directors.

Theſe orders, authorized as the King's Miniſters are to require all information concerning the government of this country, we can be certain were communicated to them. Could it have eſcaped them and the Court of Directors, and the many able men whoſe hands they muſt have paſſed through, if the eſtabliſhment of a Select Committee had been ſubject to inconſiſtencies like theſe? Could it be foreſeen and ſuffered, that the Commander in Chief of all his Majeſty's forces in *India*, as well as the Company's, might by the unlucky concurrence of the contrary authorities of the Governor General and Council and the Select Committee, be rendered ſubject to the controul of any ſervant civil or military, whom you might appoint your delegate? For the abſolute inconſiſtency of theſe two appointments, the Select Committee and your Bombay plenipotentiary, appears with double force from the terms of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s appointment to the chief command of all the Company's forces in *India*; according to which, *whenever he is preſent at any of the Company's ſettlements where there is a Select Committee, he muſt have a ſeat as ſecond at any ſuch Select Committee, and a vote on all queſtions and occaſions whatever.* In conſequence of this order, I believe Sir *Eyre Coote* lately ſat at *Madras* in the Select Committee there; and I refer to yourſelves, gentlemen, whether you could then have conceived it poſſible, that he or the Board, in the powers of which his were at that time involved, could have been made ſubordinate to any perſon acting under deputed powers from hence? The reſpect due to his diſtinguiſhed rank and character, the memory of his former great ſervices, and his ſeat in the Council General, muſt no doubt add conſiderable weight to the ſentiments he might expreſs in the Select Committee; yet the actual conſtitutional rights of the Committee remain the ſame, whether he is a member or no; and while he is of the number, he is himſelf bound by the reſolutions of the majority. Now in this reſpect therefore the powers conferred on Colonel *Goddard* are greater than even Sir *Eyre Coote*'s could be, if he were on the ſpot himſelf; for as he muſt be of the Select Committee, he could poſſeſs no powers ſeparate, independent, and plenipotentiary, within the limits of their Government.

If Sir *Eyre Coote* were now at *Bombay*, Colonel *Goddard*'s military command would indeed be loſt in the Commander in Chief's; yet he would ſtill controul his General in the cabinet, if the powers he exerciſes are legal. But I correct myſelf. I believe there is no perſon in any branch of the ſervice, much leſs Colonel *Goddard*, ſo ſhameleſs as to act under ſuch powers; no one who would not carry all the wax and parchment from which he derived his authority, and lay them at the feet of the great man, to whoſe name and ſervices they were a reproach. But will a great Government, through choice, adopt meaſures which are only to be corrected by the ſenſe every individual muſt have of their inconſiſtency?

I have run through theſe two parts of my ſubject; I have choſen rather to enumerate heads of argument, than to extend my letter to a volume: by giving myſelf full ſcope, I wiſh to relieve myſelf as ſoon as poſſible from a taſk, where I find my judgment ſo much in oppoſition to the reſpect I owe you; for in ſpite of all my deference for your opinions, I muſt conclude, that as far as the Act of Parliament, and the orders of the Court of Directors, are legal obligations on your Board, in the ſame degree are the powers propoſed to be granted to Colonel *Goddard* illegal. That the ſenſe of his Majeſty's Miniſters and the Court of Directors, as far as they can be judged of from the orders to which they have given their ſanction, are on my ſide; becauſe thoſe orders are evidently contradictory and inconſiſtent upon other principles: that granting the powers propoſed to be given to Colonel *Goddard* legal (which would ſeem to me the moſt prodigal conceſſion that was ever made in argument;) yet the indecency and impropriety (pardon me the expreſſions, gentlemen) of this delegated authority, are ſo ſtriking with reſpect to the perſon who is unqueſtionably in the ſecond degree at leaſt of public truſt and authority here, and in general through him to your whole Board, as well as to another public body, which however inferior will ſtill I hope be thought entitled to ſome marks of reſpect or attention, that ſome further modification of theſe extraordinary powers, which I am yet unacquainted with, muſt be intended.

I did flatter myſelf, that in a time like the preſent, I ſhould not have ſeen ſo great an indiſpoſition as I have, from all union of powers and intereſts with us on the part of this Government. On the part of the Select Committee, I muſt declare, I do not know a ſingle inſtance, in which they have had any opportunity of expreſſing their inclination of joining themſelves to you, on your own terms, and for your own purpoſes, wherein they have been wanting. I think you cannot produce one yourſelves. However, *Bombay* muſt ſubmit: confidence and harmony cannot be brought about by the efforts of one party only. You will have all good wiſhes from our ſide of *India*, for the proſperous courſe of affairs, according to your own ſyſtem, for the ſake of the public, and we ſhall hope theſe at leaſt will give you no offence. The ſentiments of the Select Committee ſeem indeed to differ from yours (I am ſorry to ſay it) as far as things moſt oppoſite, as union and diſſention. The queſtion concerning the powers of this Government over that of *Bombay*, may be decided here in a quarter of an hour; but if the matter really comes into diſpute, the debate muſt be managed acroſs the continent of *India*, and in the mean time the ſervice muſt ſuffer. I ſhould have hoped you would have thought this a hazard, which it was worth ſome conſideration to avoid. You confide, and I can aſſure you very juſtly, that the Select Committee will make it an object of their's: perhaps they may even make no oppoſition to the powers aſſumed by your Board; yet can it be expected that they will unite thoſe they ſtill poſſeſs, cordially or confidentially with a body that treats them

with

with every mark of diſtruſt? The ſlighteſt appearance of a ſeparation of intereſts between this Government and us, will probably have the worſt conſequences. The intriguing and ſubtle character of the Marattas is well known. No people are more quick-ſighted in remarking diviſions; on the uſe to be made of which all their own politics turn. They muſt perceive the moſt evident marks of it between you and the Government of *Bombay*: they will poſſibly preſume on it; and nothing is more likely therefore than this very circumſtance, to force you into a war you ſay you wiſh to avoid. The Marattas have not forgot how they made peace on their own terms before, when they were ready to have purchaſed it with any conceſſion we could have deſired. They account for this themſelves I believe on principles very different from thoſe of moderation, on which I preſume the Governor General and Council acted.

The attention paid you by the Government of *Bombay* in the moſt eſſential points, entitle them to expect ſome marks of it from you, with regard to their conſtitutional rights. They certainly hoped, that the confidence repoſed by you in Colonel *Goddard*, and that ſhewn him at *Bombay*, which while they thought due to his merit, they flattered themſelves would have been received here as it was meant, as the expreſſion on their part of their readineſs to give their confidence to any perſon on whom the Governor General and Council had beſtowed theirs: they hoped, I ſay, that this mutual confidence in the ſame perſon which they thought perfectly well placed, would ſerve as a bond of union between the two Boards. They expected that Colonel *Goddard*'s deliberative ſeat in the Select Committee would enable them to inform themſelves conſtantly of the general ſentiments and principles of this Government from a perſon they believed well acquainted with them, more particularly and fully than they had ever yet been able; and to theſe they wiſh at all times to pay all manner of deference. But if a conduct of this ſort procures them no adequate return from thoſe with whom they have expreſſed the moſt unreſerved inclination to unite; if this Government refuſes all manner of connection with them but that of unlimited rule; if this ſuperiority is to be exerciſed with ſo little moderation, that it is to be granted away at all times, and to all perſons, I cannot tell what courſe is left for the Governor and Council, that is both ſafe and honourable for themſelves, and uſeful to the ſervice. They muſt either renounce and deſert their truſt, or they muſt engage in an oppoſition, which muſt have the moſt dangerous conſequences. The Governor General and Council I hope will do them the juſtice to acknowledge, that they forced them to this difficult alternative.

I muſt next preſume, gentlemen, to take notice of the particular parts of the propoſed letter to *Bombay*, which ſeem to me likely to prove detrimental to the public ſervice: I ſhould wiſh to leave as much as poſſible, what I have ſaid above to be applied generally to thoſe parts of the letter which refer to Colonel *Goddard*'s powers; yet I foreſee I cannot enter on particulars without returning to the ſame argument. And in the firſt place give me leave to repeat the requeſt I made you in my laſt letter, that you would pleaſe to make the directions you ſend to the Select Committee on this and all other points as clear and expreſs as poſſible; in which reſpect I own there appears ſome deficiency to my underſtanding: and I fear extremely, that whenever affairs go amiſs, the Select Committee may fall under your cenſure for counteracting your deſigns, or miſapprehending your intentions, when they may perhaps be altogether ignorant that you had ever communicated either deſign or intention.

You are pleaſed to ſay, gentlemen, (par. 5.) that in caſe of war *you leave a latitude of action to Colonel* Goddard *under the inſtructions of the Select Committee*: I think the Select Committee will be very much at a loſs, obſerving how you have diſpoſed of their whole department in favour of Colonel *Goddard*, to know what ſubjects they are on which you chuſe that they ſhould give Colonel *Goddard* inſtructions; eſpecially when in the ſame paragraph they are informed, that *you have left the latitude of action, not to them, but to Colonel* Goddard *That he is to avail himſelf of the ſituation which fortune may preſent: that it muſt reſt with him who is reſponſible to you for his conduct to adopt any part or the whole of* Mr. Hornby's *plan laid down in his minute of the 30th March, or not at all, as he may think moſt adviſable.* Appendix. No. 200.

The Governor and Select Committee will wiſh likewiſe to be informed, whether in that emphatical parentheſis which informs them, that *Colonel* Goddard *is reſponſible to you for his conduct*, your meaning is, that he is not reſponſible to them. The Select Committee may perhaps think it proper to direct Colonel *Goddard* to publiſh in his army the orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, which enjoin all the ſervants of the Company, civil and military, to obey the Select Committee within the limits of the Government of *Bombay*, and veſt immediately in them a power of ſuſpenſion, as you may have very juſtly obſerved in your letter. Leſt they ſhould do this, I muſt take the liberty to ſay, that I think it would be but common juſtice to Colonel *Goddard*, to inſtruct him what degree of obedience it is your pleaſure he ſhould pay to the orders of the Court of Directors if you expect him to diſobey them. If he receives a counterpart of your letter to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, that expreſſion implying, that *he is to be under the inſtructions of the Select Committee*, I ſhould ſuppoſe muſt be a very embarraſſing one to him.

In the laſt paragraph but one of your propoſed letter, you inform the Select Committee that *you have directed Colonel* Goddard *to execute whatever ſervice they ſhall think it proper to require, which he ſhall think practicable, and which ſhall not be contrary to your inſtructions to any exiſting engagement.* Permit me to obſerve to you, on this mark of attention to the Select Committee, that while your whole inſtructions are directed to one ſingle point, that is to ſay, to compel them to yield up their whole authority into the hands of Colonel *Goddard*; while they are removed from all charge and care of engagements either actually exiſting or likely to take place; and even refuſed all right of judging of the propriety of executing either in whole, or in part, or at all, a plan of operations propoſed by their Preſident, they cannot ſuppoſe you really mean, that they ſhall be judges of the propriety of any ſervice whatever.

I have ſaid that your inſtructions to the Select Committee are directed to one ſingle point, viz. to compel them to yield up their whole authority into the hands of Colonel *Goddard*. I think this is the light in which they muſt appear to any perſon who takes a general view of Colonel *Goddard*'s charge.

He commands an army independently of the Government of *Bombay* within their Government; of courſe he pays, augments, and diminiſhes cantons, removes, or remains with his army, at his own choice and pleaſure.

The execution and negociation of the projected treaty of peace with the Poonah Miniſtry is given to his ſole charge; that is to ſay, a treaty, every article of which relates peculiarly or principally to the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

The ſeparate negociation with *Madjee Scindia* is left alſo to his charge, though the point on which this negociation turns, is on a claim of his to a poſſeſſion of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, acquired at a time when that Government was entirely independent of this, and of which, therefore, the Governor General and Council can have no more pretenſion to diſpoſe, than of the caſtle and iſland of *Bombay*.

If in the event of war Madjee Scindia *ſhall be diſpoſed to take part with us* (I preſume both Preſidencies are included in that word) *Colonel* Goddard *is authorized to form our engagements with him.*

The negociation and treaty of alliance with Madajee Booſla *is left to the ſole management of Colonel* Goddard. In this negociation and treaty too the Government of *Bombay* is eventually intereſted in its moſt eſſential concerns.

If the Poonah Miniſters ſhall reject the propoſals which are to be made to them, a latitude of action is left to Colonel Goddard. *He is to avail himſelf of the ſituation fortune may*

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may preſent. It reſts with him to adopt any part, or the whole of Mr. Hornby's *plan of operations, or reject it altogether; and in fine, it is implied, that he is reſponſible only to your Board.*

In all other negociations, treaties, and plans of military operations, you profeſs your wiſh ſo to blend the powers of your Government with that of Bombay *in the direction of them, and in every formal and occaſional inſtrument which they may require for their ratification, as to preſerve the credit and diſtinct reſponſibility of both, and to make both the pledges for the faithful obſervance of them.*

The members of the Government of *Bombay* will know how to judge for themſelves from the example before them, in what manner the powers of the two Governments are meant to be blended. I will not venture any obſervation on a paſſage in which (far as I am removed from truſts that awake ambition) I feel all the bitterneſs of the irony.

It is a matter of the utmoſt concern to me to be obliged to offer any objection againſt a reſolution of yours, which ſeems intended to diſtinguiſh Colonel *Goddard*, for whoſe character I have the higheſt reſpect, and whoſe merits I know to be no where more ſenſibly felt, nor his honour more heartily wiſhed than at *Bombay*. But I muſt acknowledge that I am utterly ignorant of the right by which you have thought proper to diſpoſe of the rank of Brigadier General ſpecially confined to our ſettlement; and I am the more alarmed at it, becauſe I do not ſee that the acquieſcence of the Governor and Council can be ſufficient to procure ſubmiſſion to it, even if they ſhould be diſpoſed to yield pre-eminence to you, in an inſtance wherein their authority is fully equal to your own, whatever your ſuperiority may be in other caſes. The military commiſſions granted by the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, and by the Governor and Council of *Madras*, are unqueſtionably of the ſame validity as yours, and the rank they give equally eſtabliſhed in the King's Company's troops. That they or the officers of thoſe Preſidencies therefore can ſubmit to this innovation, I own I think impoſſible. Had you been pleaſed to grant your brevet to Colonel *Goddard*, without limiting it to our eſtabliſhment, I am certain the diſtinction conferred on him would have been received with univerſal approbation at *Bombay*; but as the promotion appears at preſent, it will be underſtood only as a precedent for rendering all rank in our military ſervice precarious. The like partiality will be expected to be extended in favour of every officer of your eſtabliſhment, if this innovation is ſubmitted to; and this interpretation will be the more natural, as the independent command you have given to Colonel *Goddard* over your own troops, and his preſent rank, ſuperior to that of every officer on our eſtabliſhment except Colonel *Egerton*, will make your meaſure appear quite unneceſſary, except it be to anſwer ſome concealed purpoſe. In caſe of the arrival of any officer at *Bombay* of a rank that might entitle him to command Colonel *Goddard*, but for the local rank you confer on him, I do apprehend he would not give up his pretenſions out of reſpect to Colonel *Goddard*'s brevet. The Governor and Council of *Bombay* will aſk, and I think the queſtion will deſerve an anſwer, whether you would admit the ſame right in them to give to one of their officers acting on detachment here a local rank which he did not hold in our eſtabliſhment; and if you would not, they would be glad to know on what you ground the diſtinction in your own favour? Of all the ſteps that could be taken, this appears to me that which is likely to be productive of the greateſt confuſion, animoſity, and a train of conſequences that will not admit of being tempered by the moderation of the Government of *Bombay*, which, in other caſes, may perhaps be expected to afford the ſame remedy.

The Governor and Select Committee had joined in a very earneſt recommendation to you of Colonel *Goddard*, for ſome diſtinction expreſſive of your and their ſenſe of his ſervices; I confeſs I ſhould have thought it a very ſtriking inſtance of your determination to unite with them in nothing, that a recommendation, which ſeemed perfectly agreeable to your own ſentiments, ſhould not ſeem to you even to deſerve the common civility of an anſwer, had I not been equally ſenſible that, while every diſtinction you are pleaſed to confer on Colonel *Goddard* is a ſpoil ſeized from the Government of *Bombay*, and from the ſervants of that Preſidency, it would have been extremely difficult to have made them any compliment on the occaſion, which would have looked ſerious.

Had you been pleaſed, gentlemen, from the firſt to have made the Government of *Bombay* the inſtrument in your plans of war, peace, and policy, as far as they were connected with our Preſidency, I believe you would have had no cauſe to repent it: and had you tried the force of recommendation, when there was reaſon to doubt of your authority to give orders, I am ſure you would not have found it leſs effectual. Even in the more immediate concerns of the Bengal Government, which it might be neceſſary to manage within the limits of the Bombay Preſidency, or where Bombay agents were eſtabliſhed the members of the Government, they would not have conceived you could have thought it an overſtrained mark of attention to their rank, truſt, and the conſequence neceſſary to be preſerved to them in their political connections with their neighbours, to commit the Company's intereſts to them in preference to inferior agents: but however this might be, they could hardly have expected to ſee the management of their own moſt immediate concerns wreſted from them; ſtill, I believe, they might have acquieſced with a ſort of cheerfulneſs, had this been done only by yourſelves, or in circumſtances of place and connection, which naturally threw their buſineſs into the hands of your agents. But when they ſee your itinerant commiſſions moving up and down and acroſs the continent, for no other purpoſe than to make or break treaties for them, or manage their affairs, which without preſumption they may ſuppoſe their ſituation, their experience, and their truſt, make them at leaſt as fit to manage themſelves, their right of the queſtion, I cannot ſay how far you may expect them to carry their moderation; but I think you cannot need be told what their feelings and thoſe of every man connected with them, are.

I know not what ſucceſs my repreſentations would have had; but if you had been pleaſed to have ſuffered me to be informed of the objects of your deliberations before your reſolutions were formed, I ſhould think it would have been no diſadvantage to have been acquainted how far the hopes and expectations of the members of the Bombay Government went, with regard to the meaſures you would adopt, in order to blend the powers of the two Governments.

I ſhould have repreſented to you, as I have now done, the neceſſity which I conceived there was for Colonel *Goddard* and his army being allowed dependant on the Government of *Bombay*.

With regard to the propoſed treaty with the Maratta Miniſters and the eventual alliance with *Madajee Scindia*, I ſhould have ſtated my reaſons for thinking theſe would, with moſt propriety, be committed to the Select Committee, or at leaſt, that their right to judge of the articles ſpecially relating to their ſettlement ſhould be reſpected. I am ſenſible that the event of both is important to each of the Preſidencies, and therefore that the Select Committee had no abſolute right to inſiſt on the management of them being left ſolely to their Board; and I could have informed you, that in caſe you determined not to allow the Government of *Bombay* to act for you, they were ſo well convinced of the detriment that would probably follow to the public ſervice, by employing ſeparate agents, and repoſed ſo entire a confidence in Colonel *Goddard*, that I had every reaſon to believe they would deſire him to charge himſelf with their intereſts as well as yours. Perhaps I might not have made you ſo ſenſible as I wiſhed of the difference between your ſeizing and the Select Committee yielding, but I ſhould have endeavoured it.

The management of the treaty with *Madajee Scindia*, for an equivalent in lieu of the gratification promiſed him at *Worgaum*, I confeſs, I ſhould have thought an inalienable right of our Government, as it is a ſubject of our own peculiar concern. I ſhould have wiſhed too that it might not be taken out of the hands of thoſe with whom it at preſent reſts, as *Madajee Scindia*'s diſcerning that his claim received countenance from this Government, and is treated as a matter of ſo much importance by you, will probably make him more untractable, and leſs inclined to accept of moderate terms. I ſhould have urged that there ſeemed no reaſon to doubt of the intentions of the Government of *Bombay* to act agreeably to the ſentiments of your Board, ſince in fact Mr. *Hornby* had himſelf firſt prepared the meaſure of treating with *Scindia* for an equivalent, and expreſſed in very ſtrong terms his ſenſe of the difference which ought to be made between the Durbar and him. With regard to the ceſſions promiſed to each, give me leave, gentlemen, now to ſuggeſt to you, that in my opinion ſome caution ought to be given againſt yielding any thing to *Scindia*, till it is certain whether we are to have peace or war, and what part he reſolves to take. I ſhould wiſh, therefore, very much that this matter were left open for your future determination, if you reſolve ſtill to withhold your confidence from the Select Committee; becauſe highly as I know Colonel *Goddard* to be thought of, and however well inclined I left the members of our Government to him, yet on the footing you have put things betwixt them, I think it is impoſſible they can be on good terms; and in times of ill-humour and diſſention, I obſerve that ſecrets are generally ill kept among the diſcordant parties. In this caſe it is of great importance that *Madjee Scindia* ſhould not know what you have reſolved on. I ſubmit to you theſe reaſons for thinking this treaty, if left in the hands of the Government of *Bombay*, would be managed to better advantage, and be more likely eſpecially to anſwer the end of procuring the releaſe of our hoſtages. The gentlemen at *Bombay* would beſt judge with regard to the advantage of treating there or at *Madjee Scindia*'s Durbar, and if at the latter would probably render it ſubſervient to the purpoſe above-mentioned, by employing Mr. *Farmer* in it, who I believe you, gentlemen, will think well qualified for ſuch a truſt. With regard to the negociation and treaty of alliance with *Moodajee Bouncello*, I might have acquainted you that I was perſuaded the Select Committee would be well ſatisfied to ſee them left in the hands of Colonel *Goddard*. The difference between theſe and the other ſubjects of negociation is very great. The Government of *Bombay* had never any intercourſe with the Court of *Berar*. The plan of an alliance with *Moodajee Bouncello*, was entirely your own; Colonel *Goddard* was deputed to him long before he arrived within the limits of our Government, and the intercourſe that has already paſſed between them is a good reaſon for continuing the negociation in the ſame channel. I ſhould indeed have thought that the reſpect with which public bodies commonly treat the rights of each other, would have rendered it adviſable to give ſome ſort of explanation of this kind to the Select Committee, and to have recommended it to them to have commiſſioned or inſtructed Colonel *Goddard* with regard to the particular intereſt of their Government, according to the principles you might determine on for them.

As to the plan of operations propoſed by Mr. *Hornby*, or any other that might be formed in caſe of war, I ſhould certainly have ſuppoſed they would have been left ſubject to the judgment and diſcretion of the Select Committee, whom I think you had ſeen as deſirous of receiving Colonel *Goddard*'s ſentiments on all occaſions, and of regulating themſelves accordingly, as you could poſſibly deſire. I ſhould have made no doubt either of his general reſponſibility to our Government.

I ſhould have repreſented to you the probability of the Command in chief of the forces at our Preſidency being vacated, either by the ſentence of a court martial, or by a vote of ſuſpenſion, and that the Select Committee would probably think the office too important in the preſent times and circumſtances to remain vacant, or be filled by mere chance; I ſhould have wiſhed very much that Colonel *Goddard* were left free to accept of this appointment from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, which he cannot now do, according to the ſeparate and independent powers you propoſe giving him, as they would be incompatible with his ſeat and voice in the Select Committee, which he would have of courſe, on being inveſted with the chief command of the Bombay troops.

Your letter to *Bombay* ſeems framed on very different principles; it is a flat refuſal of all union of powers and intereſts with the Government of *Bombay*. It places inſurmountable bars between the Select Committee and Colonel *Goddard*, and renders him and his army rather objects of apprehenſion and jealouſy than of hope and confidence; it ſeems to provide that the diſſentions ſhall ſpread as wide as poſſible. Every officer muſt, perhaps every private ſoldier and ſepoy may, become ſenſible of the perſonal injury offered to him in the inſtance of Colonel *Goddard*'s brevet. That ill conſequences muſt follow is no very hazardous prediction; but that they are to be expected at a time when our ſituation and ſtrength is ſuch, as to give the faireſt proſpects of honourable peace or ſucceſsful war, is a circumſtance of which I cannot but feel the aggravation; and the only conſolation I ſee, if theſe are your ultimate reſolutions, is, that when it becomes a ſubject of inquiry how ſo great an undertaking as the march acroſs the continent of *India*, though performed with ſucceſs, came to fail in all the good effects that might have been expected from it, the cauſe will be as evident as the fact. That this enterprize, by the orders now propoſed to be given, was diverted from its public purpoſes, or directed to them but as ſecondary objects. That to diſplay and flatter that ſupremacy which this Government is pleaſed to aſſume, was made the firſt; and that purſued at the expence of diviſions, by which the joint force of the Preſidencies was ruined, which were foreſeen, and might have been eaſily avoided.

I flatter myſelf you will pardon the trouble I give you. The freedom I have uſed I hope will not give offence, ſince my only inducement to it is the opinion, that it may be uſeful to the ſervice either now or hereafter, that you ſhould be acquainted with ſentiments which are not thoſe of the members of the Bombay Government only, but I believe I may venture to ſay are adopted generally on our ſide of *India*; and unleſs you received them from ſome individual ſheltered under the humbleneſs of his ſtation, I thought it probable you might ſtill remain uninformed of them, ſince it would hardly ſuit with the decorum and gravity of a public body to enter into ſo minute a diſcuſſion, particularly if they could not entertain ſome hopes of being attended to, which ſoon after the receipt of the letter propoſed to be written to *Bombay*, I ſhould think very vain ones.

I beg you to believe, that if any expreſſions have eſcaped me that you may judge at all wanting in the reſpect I owe you, they have been entirely owing to accident, and the haſte in which I have been obliged to write this long letter, for fear yours to *Bombay* ſhould be ſent before mine was finiſhed. Permit me to hope for your acceptance of the ſame apology for all other errors and inaccuracies.

I have the honour, &c.

Calcutta, 18th June 1779. (Signed) *G. Horſley.*

The Secretary lays before the Board a letter from Mr. *Horſley*, addreſſed to himſelf as follows:—

To *William Bruere*, Eſquire.

Sir,

I muſt requeſt you to return me my letter to the

Appendix. Nos. 201&202.

Honourable the Governor General and Council, dated the 18th inſtant, or that you will pleaſe to be at the trouble of making the following corrections in it before it is publicly read, which is all I want it for:

Towards the concluſion of the laſt paragraph but two you will obſerve theſe words: "That this mighty enterprize was directed to no fuller purpoſe, but as a ſecondary object." Inſtead of which I deſire to ſubſtitute the following:—"That this enterprize, by the orders now propoſed to be given, was diverted from its public purpoſes, or directed to them but as ſecondary objects."

Calcutta, June 21ſt 1779. I am, Sir, &c. (Signed) *G. Horſley.*

Agreed, That the Secretary be directed to make the propoſed alterations in the letter from Mr. *Horſley*.

No. 201.

Governor General—Although the letter to the Select Committee of *Bombay* is not entirely conformable to the line which I recommended, yet as the ſentiments which it contains come the neareſt to my own, I acquieſced in them preferably to the other opinions which were delivered upon the occaſion on which it was written; but I as little approve the arguments which Mr. *Horſley* has oppoſed to it, as I do the manner in which they were conveyed. Mr. *Horſley* has aſſumed one fact for the ground of his objections to our late reſolutions contained in the draft of the letter to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*; namely, that the inſtructions intended to be given to Colonel *Goddard*, relate to the affairs of that Preſidency, and to points of duty eſſentially and excluſively appertaining to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, which by this conſtruction is ſubjected to the controul and authority of Colonel *Goddard*.

This conſtruction is neither warranted by the ſubjects of our letter, nor conformable to our intentions. The letter propoſed to be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, comprizes two general ſubjects which belong eſſentially and excluſively to us. The firſt relates to the negociations for the renewal of the treaty of peace already concluded between us and the Maratta State, in which the Preſidency of *Bombay* has only dependant concern, and for the formation of a treaty with a Power with which that Preſidency hath not, nor ever had any connection; and the ſecond to the operations of Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, which, though deſigned for the protection and benefit of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, muſt yet in their effects involve the general intereſt of the Company to whatever purpoſes they may be applied. This force is our own, and therefore the right of directing its ſervices reſts unqueſtionably with us, and we alone are anſwerable for the uſes which are made of it. This ſingle remark appears to me to be a ſufficient reply to all the arguments contained in the long and elaborate letter from Mr. *Horſley*; and if it is conformable to the ſenſe of the other Members of the Board, it may be expreſſed as their general obſervation upon it, with the following reſolution, which I recommend. That the Secretary be deſired to inform Mr. *Horſley*, that they did not require his animadverſions upon their meaſures, although they ſhould have been pleaſed to have received from him any lights which he could have afforded them, and for which they were referred to him by the Preſident and Select Committee upon the ſubject of affairs of *Bombay*; that they have therefore thought it proper to repeal the reſolution which they paſſed on the 31ſt May, to furniſh Mr. *Horſley* with copies of all letters to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, and of all the reſolutions of the Board relative to that Preſidency in its Secret Departments; and that he has their permiſſion to return to *Bombay* whenever he has fulfilled the terms or objects of his miſſion.

Agreed to the Governor General's propoſitions; and ordered, that the Secretary do notify the ſame to Mr. *Horſley*.

APPENDIX, No. 202.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 21ſt June 1779.

READ the following letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*:—

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, and Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to tranſmit you an addreſs the 14th inſtant, which went by ſea under charge of Mr. *Raitt*, and will I hope have arrived ſafe before this can reach you. I am ſolicitous about your receiving that diſpatch becauſe accompanying it I have forwarded all the returns and paymaſter's accounts of diſburſements to the end of March, with other papers for your inſpection.

I have nothing material to communicate to you of the ſituation of affairs here, as they remain nearly in the ſame ſtate as when I wrote you from *Bombay*. If the Chiefs at *Poonah* have renewed their demands upon, or made any late propoſals to the Bombay Government, it is unknown to me, and for myſelf I have had no correſpondence with them ſince my arrival. According to the reſolutions I informed you I had thought it proper to adopt, I ſhall wait your inſtructions before I enter upon any meaſures whatever. I am in the mean time endeavouring to obtain the beſt intelligence of what is tranſacting around me, and conſulting the means moſt proper to be uſed in proſecution of the plan you may determine upon, whenever I can receive your orders.

By confirmed advices from *Poonah*, the diſſentions ſubſiſting among the leaders open a field for ſucceſsful intrigue, excluſive of any uſe that might be made of ſupporting *Ragoba*'s pretenſions, the aſſiſting which would, it is probable from paſt experience, be the means of uniting parties rather than arming them againſt each other; and indeed, in his preſent ſituation, might be altogether impolitic, although the confinement of *Siccaram*, who was always ſuſpected of partiality to the intereſts of *Ragoba*, might give reaſon to believe that *Nannah Furneſe* had removed every object of ſuſpicion, and ſtrengthened his power beyond the dread of any future oppoſition. This appearance of ſecurity is in reality moſt deceitful, for his whole dependance is placed upon the ſupport of *Scindia*; and this Chief, beſides his known reputation for cunning and duplicity, has exhibited a recent and manifeſt proof of the arts by which he means to maintain his own influence in the Government, in the part he took and ſtill takes regarding *Ragonaut Row*, whom he preſerved from *Nannah*'s reſentment, after the unfortunate iſſue of the expedition from *Bombay* had left him expoſed to the malice of his enemies, and whom he at this time retains in his own hands, to hold out *in terrorem*, ſhould he find the party to which he is at preſent engaged aſſume an independance dangerous to his own ambitious views. *Ragonaut Row* was ſent from *Poonah*, under the charge of ſome of *Scindia*'s troops, and by the laſt intelligence was within a few miles of *Burhampore*, in the neighbourhood of which it is ſaid he is to reſide during the rains. It is difficult to reconcile the conduct of *Scindia* on this occaſion, upon any other grounds than what I have above ſuppoſed; his profeſſions to *Ragoba* have been moſt fair and flattering, and he has even gone ſo far as to give him hopes of befriending his cauſe. This, however, it is plain, he means nothing leſs than doing, and while he even ſuffers them to exiſt, his only motive is politically to check the dangerous preſumption for an adminiſtration at preſent ſubject to his controul, but when circumſtances might ſo far favour at a future period as to ſet his power at defiance.

With theſe principles of diſunion ſubſiſting among the Marattas, a more promiſing occaſion than the preſent cannot offer itſelf for interfering in their affairs; and though a plan of conqueſt ſo extenſive as the ſettling their Government, or diſpoſing of the chief authority in it, might not, after the opportunity lately loſt, be

conſidered

conſidered as political, or conſiſtent with the Company's intereſt; I am aſſured that the appearance of hoſtilities on our ſide will obtain a compliance from them of any demands you may think it neceſſary to make, either of territory or money, to reimburſe the expences of your armies upon the claim eſtabliſhed by the treaty of the Bombay Government with *Ragonaut Row*, or upon any other you may chooſe to found on their former breach of faith, and the hoſtile conduct of their ſubjects on my march.

I have hazarded theſe few remarks on the ſuppoſition only of a failure in your intended negociations with the Rajah of *Berar*, whom I ſtill hope, notwithſtanding the doubtful part his fears of the Miniſters after their victory at *Julliagong* may have led him apparently to take, an attention to his own intereſt, and the dread of your juſt reſentments, will fix firm in the meaſures he once I am perſuaded propoſed to adopt. I the leſs regret my want of power at this time to be fully explicit regarding *Moodajee*'s preſent ſentiments, becauſe they muſt long ere this be clearly diſcovered to you; and ſince the return of his Vackeel, who went away inſtructed in every point neceſſary to be communicated to his maſter, I have received only one ſhort letter from the Rajah, wherein he repeats his anxious expectation of diſpatches from your Government by which his conduct will be directed. His ſilence towards me may perhaps be accounted for from the diſtance that now ſeparates us, and motives of fear leſt his letter ſhould be intercepted and fall into the hands of the miniſterial party, through whoſe country they muſt paſs.

It is neceſſary that I now ſay ſomething of the province of *Guzerat*, whoſe favourable ſituation, no leſs than fertility and extent, points it out as a moſt valuable and tempting acquiſition to the Company on this ſide of *India*. It is unneceſſary to trouble you with an account of its revenues and riches, as theſe muſt be well known to you. What I mean to explain, is the eaſe with which a conqueſt might be now made of it; and the obvious advantages will ſtrike you themſelves.

Futty Sing Guicawar, who at preſent poſſeſſes the greateſt part of the province, and ſhares it with the Marattas, although ſupported by their power, has yet but a very weak and declining authority, added to the claim of ſeniority by which an elder brother, ſtill living, diminiſhes the force of his uſurped title. Another brother, *Govind Row*, who holds *Ahmedabad* and its dependencies, has always been at variance with him, and is at this time by no means well inclined to his intereſts. This has been ſecretly intimated to me ſince my arrival. I am alſo well aware of the uſe that might be made of the Nawaub of *Cambait*. Many of the principal men of the province have beſides communicated their diſcontents and readineſs to join the forces of the Engliſh againſt *Futty Sing*. To theſe advances my replies, although tending to remove every belief of hoſtilities being intended againſt *Guzerat*, were calculated to give encouragement in the event of our troops marching into it.

From the circumſtances juſt mentioned, and other obſervations I have been able to make, I am perſuaded that the appearance of arms, without any actual exertion of their force, would be ſufficient to bring this province into the ſubjection of the Company; but ſhould it be found otherwiſe, it is ſo ſituated for the convenience of ſupplies and communication by water, that it might with eaſe be wreſted from the preſent poſſeſſor, and maintained againſt him, though the whole force of the Maratta empire was joined to his ſupport.

I beg to acquaint you, that I have received no letter from your Board of a later date than the 5th of February, which leads me to apprehend they may have been intercepted on the road.

I have the honour, &c. &c.

Camp near *Surat*, 20th July 1779. (Signed) *Tho*^{s} *Goddard.*

Ordered, That the above letter lie for conſideration. Appendix. No. 203.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd *Wheler.*

APPENDIX, Nos. 203 and 204.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d Auguſt 1779.

READ a letter from Brigadier General *Goddard* as follows:—

Gentlemen,

I have within theſe few days been honoured with the receipt of your letters of the 18th March, and of the 5th of April. A triplicate of the former, and duplicate of the latter, has only yet come to hand; I am therefore apprehenſive the originals may have met with ſome accident on the road, which has been the cauſe of your reſolutions not reaching me before. This delay cannot however be productive of any inconvenience, as you will have found by the letters addreſſed you from *Bombay*; and particularly by the contents of one wrote ſo recently as the 22d ultimo, that I had determined not to take any ſteps whatever, till I had received your final inſtructions upon a knowledge of the ſituation of affairs on this ſide of *India*, ſubſequent to the unfortunate failure of the Bombay enterprize.

As I am now fully informed of the objects you wiſh to accompliſh, I ſhall neglect no means conſiſtent with propriety and the honour of the Engliſh name, and conformable to the ſpirit of your orders, which can be conducive to reſtore that peace and good underſtanding betwixt the Marattas and the Government of *Bombay* you ſo much deſire, and eſtabliſh the alliance of that nation with the Honourable Company on a permanent foundation.

Having had no correſpondence with the Poonah Government ſince my arrival, I am the leſs able to form any certain conjecture of the conduct they will follow, when your friendly inclinations are communicated to them; but if a concluſion may be drawn from the general tenor of their behaviour ſince the ſuperiority they lately acquired, there appears ſome reaſon to ſuppoſe they will gladly embrace the opportunity now offered them of ſecuring the advantages fortune has given them, by entering into an alliance with the Engliſh.

The principal obſtacle that now ſtrikes me, will be the diſpoſal of *Ragoba*. It is not to be ſuppoſed they will conſent to reſtore him into our hands; and I do not at preſent conceive any other means by which his perſonal ſafety can be provided for. However, of this I ſhall be hereafter better enabled to judge; and I ſhall literally conform to your orders in making that an indiſpenſable engagement.

My preſent diſtance from *Poonah*, and ignorance of the real diſpoſition of the Maratta Court, rendering it improper for me to leave the army till that point is aſcertained, I have, as the only leading ſtep as I can now take, wrote a letter in the name of the young Peiſhwa; copy of which I beg to encloſe for your peruſal. I have at the ſame time addreſſed *Nanah Furneeſe*, the acting Miniſter, and at preſent poſſeſſed of all the nominal authority in the Maratta State.

I beg aſſure to you, I ſhall neglect no means of obtaining from the Poonah Court deciſive information regarding their real diſpoſition, which I will make a point of doing in time to communicate it to you, and receive your final inſtructions upon a knowledge of their ſentiments, before the ſeaſon of military operations arrives.

Should their reply be favourable to the pacific plan you have laid down, the clear time already preſcribed in your letter of the 5th April, has made me fully maſter of the views of your Government, which I ſhall conſtantly have in mind. And in the mean time I have wrote

Appendix. Nos. 204 & 205.

wrote to the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, to explain to me the ſituation in which the Proonder treaty now ſtands; and how far the ſeveral articles contained in it have been complied with.

It is at preſent unneceſſary to ſay more, than in a few words to aſſure you of the grateful ſenſe I have of the confidence you have repoſed in me, which I ſhall endeavour to evince the truth of by the unremitting ardour with which I ſhall proſecute the object you have directed my attention to.

Suffer me only to add, that ſhould obſtinacy or preſumption on one part, render my efforts ineffectual, every circumſtance in the ſituation of affairs concurs to promiſe an iſſue no leſs favourable to the intereſts of the Company by a recourſe to arms, than the mode you have adopted of negociation.

I ſhall not fail to communicate to you from time to time, the ſmalleſt occurrence of any conſequence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Camp near *Surat*, 2d June 1779. (Signed) *Tho. Goddard.*

No. 204.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Colonel *Goddard* to *Pundit Purdhan Madharow Narain Peiſhwa*; dated the 12th day of Jemmad-ul-owel, or 29th June 1779.

After the uſual addreſs and compliments, it proceeds as follows:—

At this time letters have arrived from the Governor General and Supreme Council of *Bengal*, in which they write, that friendſhip and good underſtanding has long ſubſiſted betwixt them and the rulers of the Maratta State; according to which a part of their armies under my command have marched in peace through your dominions; and differences having now ariſen betwixt your Government, and the Gentlemen of the Council at *Bombay*, they have appointed me to remove all cauſe of difference, and reſtore the harmony formerly ſubſiſting betwixt you; for which purpoſe they have made me their Miniſter, with full powers to conclude a treaty of alliance on their parts betwixt the Honourable *Eaſt India* Company and the Maratta Government, which ſhall be for the mutual intereſt and honour of both parties, and endure like the wall of *Alexander* to the lateſt generation. I ſend you encloſed a copy of the writing by which they have delegated theſe powers to me for your peruſal and ſatisfaction.

From the friendly inclinations expreſſed by my Government, and my own wiſhes to promote a good underſtanding betwixt you, I am alſo well aſſured that you, agreeable to the dictates of wiſdom, and a regard to the happineſs of mankind, will concur in the ſame amicable ſentiments, ſince it is a circumſtance famed throughout the whole world, that the Engliſh, as they are ſincere and open in their intentions, always continue firm, and perſevere in their enmities and friendſhips.

That no time may be loſt in laying the foundation of the terms of the treaty which is to unite the Engliſh and the Maratta nation, I hope you will immediately ſend to me a confidential perſon to whom I may communicate particulars.

A true tranſlation.

(Signed) *Dalrie Watherſton*, Perſian Tranſlator.

A letter was wrote at the ſame time to *Nannah Furneſe* as Miniſter, and to the ſame effect, but in more general terms, referring him to the Peiſhwa's letter for particulars.

(Signed) *D. W.*

APPENDIX, No. 205.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 8th July 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

RECEIVED the following letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*:—

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 2d inſtant, acquainting you with the ſteps I had taken in obedience to your orders of the 5th April, for negociating with the Poonah Government, which I hope will have reached you ſafe, and my conduct been honoured with your approbation.

The intention of this is to communicate to you as early as poſſible an event, extraordinary as unexpected, of which I have juſt received intelligence.

Ragonaut Row, whoſe ſurrender into the hands of the miniſterial party, ſeemed to have eſtabliſhed them ſecurely in their Government, and completed their ſucceſs over the forces of *Bombay*, has found means to eſcape from their power, and is arrived within a few miles of *Broach*; from the neighbourhood of which place he has wrote me, that, confiding in the friendſhip of the Engliſh, and truſting to me for protection, he had ſeized an opportunity of ſurprizing the party belonging to *Madjee Scindia*, who were conducting him to the northward of the *Nerbudda*, and that their leader, *Hurry Bawajee*, died a few days after of the wounds he received in the conteſt.

Upon receiving the firſt news of *Ragoba*'s eſcape, I was alarmed at the conſequences it might be productive of, to the negociation now on foot with the Maratta leaders, and apprehenſive leſt the ſhewing him any countenance at this time, might be conſtrued into an act of hoſtility, inconſiſtent with the ſentiments I had ſo recently expreſſed to them in your name. But when I came to reflect more fully on the matter, I was convinced that it not only correſponded with the ſpirit of the inſtructions received from you, touching the proviſion for his perſonal ſafety, but that it might be reconciled to the Poonah Durbar upon every principle of juſtice and humanity, and that, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, it would be of the moſt important political advantage to get poſſeſſion of the perſon of *Ragoba*, as any conceſſion made hereafter on our ſide regarding him, would be an inſtance of moderation, for which we might exact a ſuitable return, and beſides the apprehenſion of his being ſupported by us in his claims on their Government, would make the Miniſters the more eager to come to an accommodation upon terms which it would then be left to us to dictate.

I have therefore conſented to *Ragoba*'s ſolicitation, and aſſured him he ſhall find an aſylum in my camp, and perſonal ſecurity from all his enemies, and that I ſhall immediately write to you, and acquaint you of his fortunate eſcape, and receive your further orders how to act. I have not thought it neceſſary to be more particular with him till we meet; I have only cautioned him to reſtrain his people from committing any violence upon the ſubjects of the Maratta State, under the ſanction of the Engliſh name, as I ſhall not at preſent ſupport him in it.

I have not yet received an anſwer to this meſſage, but I think no time ſhould be loſt in communicating to you a circumſtance of ſo much importance.

I therefore now write you in this general manner, and ſhall defer particulars either till I ſee *Ragoba*, or till he ſhould have determined to come in to me, or throw himſelf again on the Government of *Bombay*; for although he has ſignified to me his wiſh for the former, there is no aſcertaining with certainty which ſtep he may take.

You

You may depend upon hearing from me ſpeedily.
6th June 1778. (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to Brigadier General *Goddard*:—

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 6th ultimo, both original and duplicate; but that dated the 2d, to which you refer, has not yet come to hand.

We entirely approve of the offer which you have made to *Ragonaut Row*, and direct that you continue to afford him the protection of your camp, ſo long as he ſhall continue to demand it, provided he ſhall not forfeit his right to it by any act of infidelity, or attempt to defeat the effect of your negociations, to which you will give your entire attention without regard to any other conſideration. For the reſt, we leave you to act under our inſtructions of the 5th April, in which we ſee no cauſe to make any alterations on account of this event.

Fort William, We are, &c.
8th July 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 206.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 8th July 1779.

READ the following letters from the Select Committee of *Bombay*:—

Gentlemen,

We have had the honour to receive in triplicate your letter of the 5th April, and Colonel *Goddard* having alſo announced to us your appointment of him as Miniſter from your Government, to treat with the Peiſhwa and Miniſters of the Maratta State; we ſhall, according to his deſire, give him every information in our power, that may be of ſervice to him in his negociation, and pay ſtrict attention to your orders reſpecting the commiſſion of hoſtilities.

Our diſpatch of the 4th April will have acquainted you of our having given permiſſion to *Ghazudy Cawn* to proceed to *Surat*, in order to take paſſage for *Mecca*; but we underſtand that owing to ſome difference between him and *Chillaby*, the owner of the ſhip bound to that port, he did not proſecute his pilgrimage, but ſtill remains at *Surat*. We beg leave to obſerve, that his removal to *Bombay* was perfectly ſatisfactory to him; and that upon his expreſſing a deſire to return to *Surat*, he was immediately accommodated with one of the Honourable Company's veſſels.

We learn by country intelligence, that *Ragoba* has made his eſcape from *Madjee Scindia*, in the neighbourhood of *Berhampore*.

We are, &c. &c.
Bombay Caſtle, (Signed) *Wm Hornby,*
7th June 1779. *Jno Carnac,*
D. Draper.

P. S.—Encloſed is a duplicate of our addreſs of the 4th of April.

Gentlemen,

Encloſed is a duplicate of our addreſs of the 7th inſtant; the original of which was forwarded by the *Swallow* ſloop, built for the ſervice of your Preſidency.

The intelligence of *Ragoba* having effected his eſcape from *Madjee Scindia*, has been ſince confirmed by a letter from the Chief of *Surat*, with this further circumſtance, that he was directing his courſe to that city; and a ſubſequent letter from Colonel *Goddard* informs us of his ſafe arrival within the Honourable Company's protection. As this event may be productive of very important conſequences, we loſe not a moment in appriſing you thereof; and for this purpoſe we now diſpatch the *Jappy* Snow expreſs to *Bengal*; and, at the ſame time, to forward a packet for your Honourable Board, received from Colonel *Goddard*.

We encloſe copies of the letters, above noticed, from the Chief of *Surat*, and Colonel *Goddard*. That no ſtep of ours might tend to fruſtrate the negociation you have been pleaſed to commit to Col. *Goddard*, we immediately upon receipt of the former letter, ſent directions to Mr. *Boddam* to deſire *Ragoba* to ſeek an aſylum in ſome other place, as we could not conſent to receive him under protection, even till your pleaſure was known; but we at the ſame time intimated, that if Colonel *Goddard* ſhould think proper to receive him, it was a point that muſt be determined by his own judgment, and he muſt be reſponſible for the conſequences. Appendix. No. 206.

A copy of our letter to the Chief of *Surat*, on this ſubject, is alſo tranſmitted.

The circumſtances of *Ragoba*'s eſcape are very unaccountable, and have much the appearance of connivance on the part of *Madjee Scindia*. It is ſaid he is accompanied with 4 or 5,000 men, and that he has brought all his guns with him, to the number of twenty.

We beg leave to notice to you, that one or two of your laſt letters, on political matters, have been addreſſed to the Preſident and Council, inſtead of the Committee.

If you ſhould make us any further remittances by bills on *Surat*, much time will be ſaved at this ſeaſon of the year, by ſending the bills under cover directly to the Chief and Council.

As ſeveral of our ſmall veſſels are now abſent on different ſervices, we have directed Mr. *Horſly* immediately to return the *Jappy*.

We are,
Bombay Caſtle, *Wm Hornby,*
12th June 1779. *Jno Carnac,*
D. Draper.

Letter from Colonel *Thomas Goddard*, to the Select Committee of *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

The eſcape of *Ragonaut Row* from the power of the Miniſters, and his ſafe arrival within the protection of the Honourable Company, being a matter of the utmoſt importance to the negociation with the Maratta State, entruſted to me by the Governor General and Supreme Council of *Bengal*, I think it neceſſary to communicate this event to them as early as poſſible; and as the communication by land is moſt precarious, and at the ſame time very tedious, I am induced to ſolicit your aſſiſtance to forward the incloſed diſpatch immediately to *Bengal* by water, which will, I am hopeful, by this means reach them in leſs than a month from the preſent date, the paſſage being at this ſeaſon of the year, I underſtand, very quick and expeditious.

I have, &c. &c.
Camp at *Surat*, (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*
6th June 1779.
Recd 11th following. A true copy.
Edwd Ravenſcroft.

Letter from *Rawſon Hart Boddam*, Eſquire, Chief at *Surat*, to the Honourable the Preſident of *Bombay*, with the Select Committee's Reply thereto.

Honourable Sir,

I diſpatch this Pattamar expreſs to acquaint you, that this noon I received a letter from Mr. *Bouchier*, who is now on a viſit to *Broach*, adviſing me as follows:—

" *Ragonaut Row* and his family, with *Imrut Row* and " an army of about five thouſand horſe and foot paſſed " by *Cabbeer Waik* oppoſite to the great tree at *Soiel-* " *terrah*, about one o'clock this day; he was going on " towards *Surat*, and ſent over his Hircarrahs to know " where Mr. *Gambier* was, and has wrote to him. I alſo " underſtand a letter was alſo diſpatched to you expreſs " from *Bawa Pier Ghaut* this morning. It ſeems he has " cut off *Scindia*'s Decan, who was eſcorting him to a " fort in the Malva country; and *Ragonaut Row* got in-

Appendix. No. 207.

"telligence he was to be made a priſoner, which "was the cauſe of this affair happening. It was about "fifteen days ago this happened."

I have not as yet ſeen any thing of the letter that Mr. *Bouchier* mentions to be ſent me from *Bowa Pier Ghaut*; but the Colonel has had letters from *Ragonaut Row* laſt night much to the ſame purport; and *Ragonaut Row* is expected at this place as to-night or to-morrow. I ſuppoſe he will throw himſelf under the protection of the Colonel. If he ſhould come to me, I ſhall get the Nabob to give him the gardens at *Mahomed a Baug*, and muſt requeſt you will ſend me ſuch inſtructions relative to him, as you and the Committee may think neceſſary on ſo extraordinary an occaſion.

Surat, 5th June 1779. I am, &c. &c. (Signed) *Rawſon Hart Boddam.*

Received 9th following.

To *Rawſon Hart Boddam.*

Sir,

The Preſident has laid before us your letter of the 5th inſtant to him.

We can foreſee numberleſs difficulties and inconveniences ſhould *Ragoba* be again taken under our protection, even till we could receive the orders of the Governor General and Council on the ſubject; and that it might be an inſuperable obſtacle to any accommodation being effected with the Poonah Government by Colonel *Goddard*. We therefore direct that you do deſire *Ragoba* to ſeek an aſylum in ſome other place, as we cannot, circumſtanced as we now are, conſent to receive him. But it is neceſſary to apprize you that ſhould Colonel *Goddard*, to whom the negociation is committed, think proper to receive him, it is a point which muſt be determined by his judgment, and he muſt be reſponſible for the conſequences.

The Pattamars are ordered to uſe all poſſible expedition in the delivery of this letter.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 10th June 1779.

Will. Hornby,
John Carnac,
Daniel Draper.

True copies.

Edward Ravenſcroft.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to the Select Committee of *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have received your letters of the 7th and 12th ultimo by the *Tappy*.

Brigadier General *Goddard* has adviſed us, that in conſequence of an application from *Ragoba*, he has aſſured him of receiving protection in his camp; which we entirely approve, and have directed General *Goddard* to continue to afford it to him ſo long as he ſhall demand it, provided he ſhall not forfeit his right to it by any act of infidelity, or attempt to defeat the effect of his negociations, to which he will give his entire attention without regard to any other conſideration. For the reſt, we have left him to act under our inſtructions of the 5th April, in which we ſee no cauſe to make any alterations on account of this event.

We are, &c. &c.

Fort William, 8th July 1779.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, Nos. 207 and 208.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 2d Auguſt 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

READ the following letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*:—

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to inform you in a letter of the 6th inſtant, of the eſcape of *Ragonaut Row* from the people who were placed over him by *Scindia*, and his arrival in the neighbourhood of my camp. He has ſince repeatedly ſolicited permiſſion to come and receive my protection, which I have granted him; and this morning he paid me a viſit with his adopted ſon, *Amrut Row*, a young man of about 17 years old, and *Badjerow*, a child of four years, born to himſelf ſince the adoption of the former.

I have already in general terms ſuggeſted to you the advantages which it appears to me may be derived from this unexpected event, and that you may be at no loſs reſpecting the probable conſequences it may have at this time, on account of the line of conduct I have laid down, I beg leave to aſſure you that I ſhall proſecute the negociations for peace with the ſame ardor and aſſiduity as before it happened; and that from the nature of the circumſtance itſelf, as well as the alarm it has given at *Poonah*, I have reaſon to believe the Maratta Miniſters will not only be more diſpoſed by it to adopt pacific meaſures, but will alſo be glad to accept of ſuch terms as you ſhall dictate to them.

In your letter of the 5th April, you have directed that the proviſion for *Ragoba*'s perſonal ſafety alone be made an indiſpenſable engagement, and this you did when himſelf and family were in the power of his enemies, whoſe intereſt and object it would have been to remove him. Now that the ſcene is totally changed, that affairs on this ſide of *India* are reverted to the ſame ſituation in which they were before, in the inglorious convention made at *Tilliagony*, which the Government of *Bombay* have themſelves diſavowed in the firſt inſtance, and which you alſo have directed me in your inſtructions to propoſe to the Miniſters, as a leading article that is to determine the alternative of peace or war: their relinquiſhing any claim to it appears an argument founded on reaſon and ſound policy, that we ſhould avail ourſelves of the favourable opportunity that now preſents itſelf, from the poſſeſſion of *Ragoba*'s perſon and family, but above all from the preſence of your forces under my command; and the invincible acceſſion of ſtrength it gives the arms of the Engliſh in the country, to conclude a treaty with the Maratta nation upon terms the moſt honourable and beneficial to the Company, and which from the ſuperior advantages acquired by it may enſure to them a permanent and undiſturbed poſſeſſion of their territories on this ſide of *India*.

I do not doubt, but when the intelligence of *Ragoba*'s eſcape ſhall have reached you, you will have immediately diſpatched freſh inſtructions for my further guidance.—Theſe may arrive along before the ſeaſon for military operations begins; and in the mean time, admitting the Miniſters are open to negociation, I ſhall adhere literally to the propoſals you have already entruſted me to make, uſing only the latitude you have given me reſpecting *Ragoba*, to demand ſuch conditions in his favour as the nature of his preſent ſituation will admit of, and by theſe means I ſhall be able to protract the negociation, without materially interrupting it, until I can receive your final pleaſure.

The advantageous points, which the poſſeſſion of *Ragoba*'s perſon puts it in our power to inſiſt upon, in addition to theſe you have preſcribed, appear to me,

1ſt. The payment of the debt due from him to the Company.

2dly. The reimburſement of the expences of the Bengal army; and,

Laſtly, The ceſſion in perpetuity of *Baſſein*, *Choule*,

or

or thoſe places which were agreed to be delivered up by him, in the late treaty he made with the Bombay Government.

In return for theſe conceſſions on their part *Ragoba* might relinquiſh all pretenſions to the Peiſhwaſhip, or to the direction of affairs in the Maratta State, and ſit down contented with a proviſion from the Sircar, adequate and proportioned to his rank and birth, but poſſeſſing no public poſt or employment under Government. The viciſſitudes of fortune *Ragoba* has felt, and the critical ſituation from which he has lately eſcaped, would eaſily reconcile theſe conditions to his acceptance: beſides that, if conſiſtent with the objects of your political views, he muſt of neceſſity acquieſce; he has made no particular overtures to me ſince his arrival, but has thrown himſelf entirely upon your Government, to which I have referred him for every thing, venturing at preſent to aſſure him only in your name, of perſonal ſafety and protection.

It becomes neceſſary now, that I ſhould endeavour to explain to you the circumſtances by which an event ſo extraordinary as *Ragoba*'s eſcape was effected; and as I derive my knowledge of it principally from himſelf, and the people affected to his intereſts, it may be in ſome meaſure ſuſpected of partiality; at any rate the conduct of *Scindia* on this occaſion ſeems almoſt inexplicable.

To him the ſurrender of *Ragoba*'s perſon had been made by the Committee; and he, from reaſons of policy, which I have accounted for in a former letter, took upon himſelf the management of all buſineſs with *Ragoba* afterwards. I cannot help being of opinion, that the Brahmin has proved too artful a politician for the ſoldiers, however contrary it is to the characteriſtic of the latter to be overcome by the weapons of deceit, which he is famed for practiſing ſo well.

Scindia had preſerved every appearance of ceremonious reſpect, even ſo much as to leave him the troops who had accompanied him from *Bombay*, and all his artillery except two field pieces, which he requeſted from him. With this force of his own, conſiſting of about 1500 horſe and foot, with above twenty pieces of ordnance, *Ragoba* marched from *Poonah* towards the northern Jaghiers, where *Scindia* had agreed to pay him an allowance of 12 lacks of rupees yearly, attended only by about 4000 horſe belonging to the latter Chief. Many cauſes of diſcontent aroſe upon their route to the *Nerbudda*, owing to the improper behaviour of *Hurry Bowajee*, who commanded *Scindia*'s people, and was entruſted with the conducting *Ragoba*; for on the requiſition made by the latter for his ſtipulated allowance, he put off the payment under various pretences, and failed in aſſiſting him with proviſions, forage, &c. for his troops. *Ragoba* alſo received advice, that *Scindia* had ſeized upon and put to death two of his principal Jemidars, and had detained in confinement many of his Mutteſuddies and people, contrary to a promiſe he had made, that they ſhould be ſent after him. To theſe ſeeds of reſentment on the part of *Ragoba*, he learnt that *Scindia*'s Chief, ſuſpicious of ſome deſigns, had wrote to his maſter for a reinforcement; and he further adds, that credible information had been given him of the intention of *Scindia* to confine his perſon in ſome fortreſs in the northern diſtricts. The plan therefore of his eſcape, was, I am well convinced, pre-concerted, though he pretends to ſay that accident effected it; for that on their arrival at the Gaut of *Burwa* upon the *Nerbudda*, as his artillery was conducting to the river in order to croſs, the road led near *Hurry Bowajee*'s tent, and the latter alarmed and ſuſpecting ſome treachery, ordered his people to fire, which they did; afterwards the action commenced, in which he came off victorious, and the troops of *Bowajee* fled, who was himſelf wounded, in endeavouring to make his eſcape more than a mile from where the tumult firſt aroſe, and died a few days after of the wounds he there received. I have been as particular as I could be in the detail of this circumſtance, becauſe I make no doubt it will be repreſented by the miniſterial party in the blackeſt colours they can invent, to colour perhaps, their own cruelties hereafter. Appendix. Nos. 208&209.

The conduct of *Madajee Scindia* ſtill remains a myſtery, and the little precaution he ſeems to have taken on this occaſion to ſecure the perſon of *Rogoba*, is a ſubject of great aſtoniſhment.

By accounts from *Poonah* ſince the news of this tranſaction reached them, the Chiefs are greatly incenſed with him, and have declared they muſt conſider him as reſponſible for the loſs of *Ragoba*; ſo that it is probable at any rate this event will tend to increaſe their mutual jealouſies and diſſentions, and lead to the more ſucceſsful accompliſhment of your views regarding the Maratta Government.

I beg to encloſe for your peruſal a letter I have wrote to the Peiſhwa and Miniſters on the ſubject of *Ragoba*'s eſcape.

I have, &c.

Camp near *Surat*, 12th June 1779. (Signed) *Tho' Goddard.*

No. 208.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Colonel *Goddard* to the Peiſhwa *Madhurow Narain*, dated the 28th of Jemmad-ul-awil, or the 12th of June 1779.

After the uſual addreſs, and recapitulating the contents of the former letter, it proceeds thus: "At this time *Ragonaut Row* has come to me, and from him I learn that a Sirdar from your Government had been ſent to accompany him with a force, and that on the road they fought together on account of ſome miſunderſtanding, ariſing from the improper conduct of your Sardar, who died of the wounds he received, and the people with him fled; after which *Ragonaut Row* ſet out towards *Surat*, and has encamped in the neigbourhood of my camp, where I have detained him, ſince he is a principal Sardar of your nation; and now that I am negociating with you, we can adjuſt whatever is proper and eligible reſpecting him. I am therefore anxious for the arrival of a confidential perſon from you, that our mutual buſineſs may be ſoon finally ſettled.

A letter to this effect was at the ſame time written to *Nanah Furneeſe*.

Dal. Watherſton,
Perſian Tranſlator.

APPENDIX, No. 209.

Copy of a Letter from the Chief at *Broach* to the Select Committee of *Bombay*.

I DISPATCH this expreſs to adviſe you of *Ragonath Row*'s arrival with a large party of men at *Occlaſſer* the night before laſt. He has with him his wife and ſon, and his adopted ſon *Amurath Row*, and by the beſt accounts I can get, 1800 or 2000 horſe, and 1000 muſket Sepoys. I have had a conference with him, and the account he gave me of his eſcape was, that at a place called *Chollee Mahaſu*, about 200 coſs to the eaſtward, he being then under an eſcort of 2000 of *Scindia*'s, and an equal number of *Holcar*'s people; and finding by a letter that luckily fell into his hands, that they were carrying him to a fort at *Janſee*, he had found means to bring over to his ſide *Holcar*'s people, and with their aſſiſtance had attacked and routed *Scindia*'s, and wounded the commanding officer *Govind Hurry*, who was ſince dead, and from thence had made the beſt of his way with the forces who had eſpouſed his party to this country. He ſaid that as he had once more the good fortune to eſcape from his enemies, and get to his friends the Engliſh, he hoped they would retrieve his affairs; and doubted it not, as he had received many preſſing invitations from Colonel *Goddard* to come to him. What *Ragoba*'s real intentions

Appendix No. 210.

intentions are, I have not yet been able to discover, but on the whole, think he has a great desire to go to Colonel *Goddard*, from whom he seems to expect much service; but at the same time I believe, that if he thought his business could be effectually done by your Honour, &c. without his throwing himself into the hands of Colonel *Goddard*, he would prefer much the putting the management of his affairs under your directions. I do not hear that any of the Baralhyes are in pursuit of him, nor does he seem under any apprehensions of them at present. I have offered him good accommodation at a large garden near the river, and close under our wall, for himself and a suitable number of his people; but he chuses, for the present at least, to remain with his cannon at *Occlasier*. I shall be glad to receive as soon as possible any instructions you may think necessary to be given me for my conduct as to *Ragoba*, and have the

Honour to remain, &c.

Broach, (Signed) *Robert Gambier*.
6th June 1779.

Copy of another Letter from the Chief at *Broach* to the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Enclosed is a triplicate of my letters to you, which I wrote to advise the arrival of *Ragoba* at *Occlasier*, and this intended merely to acquaint, that having received answers much to his satisfaction from Colonel *Goddard*, he is, notwithstanding all my arguments to make him remain here till I received your orders, gone to join the Colonel at *Surat*. *Ragoba* told me that he had certain advices of the Boralhyer having detached a large force to endeavour to take him, and that made him much more earnest to join the Bengal army, which he thinks all in all sufficient to protect him and destroy his enemies. I beg leave to assure your Honour, &c. that whatever I thought could conduce to the good of my employers on this occasion, I have both said and done in respect to *Dada Saheb*; and I sincerely hope his escape from the Baralhyes, and coming again into the Company's hands, will be productive of material benefit to them.

Broach, I have the honour to be, &c.
9th June 1779. (Signed) *Robert Gambier*.

Reply the same as that to the Chief of *Surat*.

True Copies.
(Signed) *Edw*^{d} *Ravenscroft*, Secr^{y}.

Copy of a Letter from Colonel *Goddard*, to the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since my letter of the 6th instant, informing you of the escape of *Ragoba* from the power of the Ministers, and his safe arrival within the Company's authority, I understand that he has visited and been received by Mr. *Gambier* at *Broach*.

As this event cannot but be intimately connected with the conduct of the negociation committed to me by the Government of *Bengal*; I am concerned at the circumstance of *Ragoba*'s having been acknowledged by any person holding so public and distinguished a station under you, because it may preclude me from pursuing any particular line I might think consistent with the instructions of my Government, and it may besides be diametrically opposite to the spirit of them, and be the means of rendering my endeavours to execute their commands in the important charge with which they have intrusted me, abortive and ineffectual.

I need not observe to you, Gentlemen, the propriety there would have been if the application made by *Ragoba*, in the first instance, had been immediately and altogether referred to me, because I am sensible you will concur in the opinion, that exclusive of the political reasons I have given above, it has a mark of respect due to the Supreme Government of *India*, that any overture from a member or subject of the Maratta empire should have been previously received by their Minister.

As I am, however, persuaded that Mr. *Gambier* must have acted on this occasion without any particular instructions from your Committee, and as it is probable he may not have been informed of the nature and extent of my appointment from *Bengal* at the Court of *Poonah*, I am led to request you will be pleased to signify it to him, and to the gentlemen composing your Council both at *Surat* and *Broach*, in order that nothing may hereafter happen from an inattention to that circumstance which might impede and counteract the interests of the public service, or to be considered as disrespectful to the character I bear of the Representative of the Supreme Council of *India* with the Maratta States.

I beg to remind you of the subject of a letter I wrote you the 24th ultimo, to which I have not yet been favoured with an answer.

I have the honour to be, &c.
Camp at *Surat*, (Signed) *Tho*^{s} *Goddard*.
9th June 1779. A true copy.
(Signed) *Edw*^{d} *Ravenscroft*, Secr^{y}.

Extract of a Letter from the Chief and Council at *Surat* to the Select Committee, dated 14th June 1779.

And yesterday afternoon the Chief received a letter from Colonel *Goddard*, copy of which is enclosed. In reply thereto, the Chief acquainted Colonel *Goddard*, that agreeable to his request, the Nabob's house at *Mahomed Baug* was ready for *Ragoba*'s reception whenever he chose to occupy it: but that as great inconveniencies might arise from *Ragoba*'s bringing with him into town any great number of followers, he desired the number might be limited to three or four hundred.

The Chief has acquainted us that *Ragoba* had himself applied to him for permission to reside at the house at *Mahomed Baug*, and that in consequence the Nabob had, at the Chief's desire, prepared it for his reception.

Copy of a Letter from Colonel *Goddard* to the Chief at *Surat*.

Ragonath Row having made his escape from the hands of the ministerial party, by surprizing and defeating a party of *Moodajee Scindia*'s people, who had been placed over him, has solicited the protection of my camp, which I have granted him in the name of the Bengal Government, till they shall be pleased to signify their pleasure respecting him; I have therefore to request your assistance in accommodating him and his family with the house of *Mahomed Baug*, belonging to the Nabob of *Surat*, in which place he has expressed a desire to reside during the rainy season, and as this has now commenced, and *Ragoba* is besides in a very indifferent state of health, which renders his remaining in tents not only uncomfortable but at present dangerous, I am anxious, an d hope the gardens may be ready for his immediate reception.

I am, &c.
Camp, (Signed) *Tho*^{s} *Goddard*.
13th June 1779.
True Copies.
(Signed) *Edw*^{d} *Ravenscroft*, Secr^{y}.

Copy of a Letter from the Chief of *Surat* to the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I was honoured with your commands of the 10th instant, last night; the Pattamars give the reasons for their not making greater dispatch, was owing to the badness of the roads from the rain.

You will have been fully acquainted by the general advices of the 14th instant, of the step *Ragonath Row* had taken in soliciting the protection of the Bengal camp, and that the same had been afforded him by Colonel

lonel *Goddard.* He now reſides at the gardens of *Mahomed Baug*, in conſequence of an application both from the Colonel and *Ragonath Row*, to procure the ſame for his family's accommodation during the monſoon, and in conſequence came into town for that purpoſe the 15th inſtant. He is now entirely under Colonel *Goddard*'s protection, with whom every tranſaction will paſs and all reſponſibility reſt. I ſhall in no reſpect interfere, but ſolely act in any good offices from the application that may be made by Colonel *Goddard.*

Surat, 18th June 1779. I am, &c. (Signed) *R. W. Boddam.*

A true copy.
(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secry.

APPENDIX, No. 210.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d Auguſt 1779.

Letter from General *Goddard*—18th June 1779.

Gentlemen,

I HAD the honour to write you the 12th inſtant, acquainting you with the eſcape of *Ragoba*, and his reception in my camp. He has at this time ſolicited me to forward an addreſs to your Government from himſelf; which I have done myſelf the pleaſure of tranſmitting to the Honourable the Governor General.

In a long conference I have had with *Ragoba* ſince my laſt, he has explained many circumſtances relative to his ſituation preceding the late event, that diſcover more particularly the views of the ſeveral parties in the Maratta State than the intelligence I before obtained from other channels leſs informed in theſe points; though at the ſame time they tend to confirm in general the opinion I have already given in a former letter, of the ſentiments of the principal leaders. He affirms, that the proſpect of a foreign invaſion is the only bond which unites *Nana Furneſe* and *Madajee Scindia*; and if that was once removed, the latter would ſoon proſecute his ambitious projects of making himſelf ſole and abſolute maſter of the Maratta State, otherwiſe they will be found to act in concert with each other. With reſpect to the ſentiments of *Tookajee Holcar*, he is aſſured of their being amicable towards himſelf, and attributes the whole of the late conduct of that Chief, to his fears of *Madajee Scindia* and the Miniſters, remarking, that *Tookajee*'s character is noted for exceſs of timidity and irreſolution.

He aſſigns as the reaſon for his chuſing to deliver himſelf into the hands of *Madajee Scindia*, the implacable enmity he knew was borne him by *Nana Furneſe*, and the neceſſity there was of his being at that time ſacrificed for the ſafety of the Engliſh army. This meaſure was, he ſays, reſolved on with the concurrence of the committee, the morning preceding that night when the fatal retreat was attempted; and as *Madajee Scindia* had attempted to ſend in a perſon next day, to treat upon the terms of a peace, he is convinced, if that ruinous ſtep had not been taken in the interim, they might have obtained conditions far more honourable and advantageous, than thoſe they were at laſt compelled to accept. It appears indeed moſt probable from the circumſtance of the troops having met with no repulſe at that time, and the joy the Miniſters would receive at being delivered from an enemy whom they could not but conſider as formidable, that the concluſion of *Ragoba* is juſtly founded.

From the ambitious deſigns of *Madajee Scindia*, *Ragoba* knew that he ſhould find in him a protector from the reſentment of the Miniſters; and here his policy was not deceived, for that Chief took upon himſelf the management and conduct of his buſineſs, and an agreement was made between them in writing, that *Ragoba* ſhould receive an allowance of 12½ lacks of rupees per annum, and ſhould be put in poſſeſſion of *Janſee*, with a tract of country in its neighbourhood, and the diſtrict of *Bundlecund*, from whence he was to draw that amount, excluſive of every expence attending the collections and government of the country. On pretence of this, *Scindia* was conducting *Ragoba* acroſs the *Nerbudda*, when he found means to make his eſcape in the manner I have deſcribed in my former letters; and for the reaſons I have alſo hinted at, that *Madajee* Scindia had broken through many parts of his agreement, by putting to death ſome and confining others of his principal officers and adherents; and that added to his own knowledge of the treachery and ambition of this Chief, *Ragoba* was credibly informed, he intended to act a perfidious part, and ſecure his perſon in the fort of *Janſee*. Indeed it is not to be doubted, but this was his intention, and however a general view of this tranſaction might give room to ſuſpect that the eſcape of *Ragoba* was connived at by him, the poſitive declarations of the former, and a minute attention to the circumſtance that attended it, removes every idea of that having been the caſe. Appendix. No. 210.

I come now to that part of the converſation with *Ragoba*, which more relates to his own particular intereſts, and the future hopes he ſtill derives from the ſupport and friendſhip of the Engliſh; before I enter upon which, it may not be improper to aſſure you, that although I wiſhed him to declare his ſentiments without diſguiſe or reſerve, I gave him no encouragement beyond his own perſonal ſecurity, and that of his family; or that might make him believe he would be aided in his pretenſions upon the ſovereignty of the Maratta States, or receive any further aſſiſtance from your Governments, than what a ſincere wiſh to reſtore peace and tranquillity to the affairs of the Decan, founded upon principles of juſtice and equity, might dictate. He began by extolling the truth and bravery of the Engliſh nation, which had raiſed them to be the Sovereigns of *Hindoſtan*; and particularly magnified the arms and councils of *Bengal*, which had been crowned with uninterrupted victory. Confiding in theſe, he had come once more to throw himſelf upon their protection, and would ſubmit to whatever fortune they might think proper to allot him; as it was from their favour and aſſiſtance alone, that he could derive any hope of future ſucceſs. He acknowledged, that when the *Bombay* troops took the field, he had aſſured that Government, that his ſtandard would have been joined by numerous partizans, which proved not to be the caſe; but in this matter he was himſelf deceived. At the ſame time he added, that he is of opinion, if the army, inſtead of retreating, had puſhed forward with vigour, many who were inclined to his cauſe, would have been encouraged to come over to him. Another reaſon he aſſigned for the backwardneſs of thoſe who ſecretly favoured him was, the tenor of the treaty made with the Bombay Government, eſtabliſhing his authority in the State, by which it was made merely of a temporary and nominal nature, while the marks of real Sovereignty, the title of Peiſhwa, and the privilege of having the Sicca ſtruck in his name, was conferred upon another. His undeterminate and unſettled ſyſtem, while it held the minds of men ſuſpended betwixt their hopes on one ſide, and their fears on the other, muſt, he ſaid, naturally deter them from declaring themſelves, however ſtrong their inclinations, till ſome deciſive blow was ſtruck to turn the balance of the former.

He talked much, but in general terms, as I did not think it proper to queſtion him particularly on that head, of the ample conceſſions he was ready to make in favour of the Engliſh, if they befriended his cauſe; and from the nature of the circumſtance itſelf, there is not a doubt, in the event of ſuch a meaſure being adopted, but the advantages would be all our own. He added a circumſtance reſpecting the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, that in his late route towards the *Nerbuddah*, a ſecret emiſſary came to him from that Prince, preſſing him to make his eſcape from *Auruñgabad* by any means in his power, and he would protect him againſt the Maratta Miniſters. The cauſe of this conduct in *Nizam Ally Cawn* is, ſome late

Appendix. No. 211.

late offence he has received from that party, who in the former war with *Ragonaut Row* ceded to him a tract of country, upon condition of his aiding them in it, and ſince getting *Ragoba*'s perſon into their hands; though they have not actually taken any hoſtile ſteps for its recovery, yet they have made known their intention of reſuming it the firſt opportunity. The policy therefore of *Nizam Ally Cawn* muſt be, to find them employment, which may divert their attention from that object, and leave him the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the country before ceded to him, by alarming their fears of being attacked from a foreign quarter; and on this preſumption, and the reſentment he may be ſuppoſed to feel for the injury intended him, *Ragoba* ventures to declare, that *Nizam Ally Cawn* will not join the miniſterial party, but be ready to act againſt them.

With reſpect to *Hyder Ally*, he has been at conſtant variance with the preſent Poonah Adminiſtration for ſome years, and has frequently aſſiſted *Ragoba* with ſums of money, for the ſupport of himſelf and family.

I have been thus minute in laying before you the particulars of *Ragoba*'s converſation, that you may be clearly and completely informed of his ſentiments, with the foundation on which he builds his future proſpects, and while you derive from their deſcription a more ample knowledge of the weak and diſtracted ſtate of the Maratta Government, adopt ſuch further meaſures as your wiſdom ſhall dictate as beſt ſuited to improve any advantage that may be derived from the late reſolution.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp, near *Surat*, 18th June 1779. (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

P. S. Since writing the above, I have received intelligence from a perſon at *Poonah*, whoſe authority I can depend upon, that the conſternation there, on account of the eſcape of *Ragonaut Row*, is exceſſive, and is augmented by ſome late conſiderable encroachments *Hyder Ally* has made upon the ſouthern boundaries of their dominions, ſo much ſo, that they are preparing to arm againſt the approach of ſo dangerous an enemy.

This is alſo confirmed by intelligence from *Bombay*, which I think it neceſſary to communicate to you, that the Peiſhwa and *Madjee Scindia* have wrote letters to that Preſidency, adviſing them of their intentions to march and puniſh *Hyder*; and expreſſing a wiſh for ſettling their mutual diſputes, and that the perſon intruſted with that diſpatch may be ſent forward to your Government. I mention this, becauſe it ſhews in how altered a ſtyle they ſpeak, from the language uſed by them after their late victory, and proves the juſt grounds of the preſent apprehenſions that fill their minds. I may now expect to hear from the Miniſters myſelf every day, and to have an opportunity of writing you in the moſt full and ſatisfactory manner: in the mean time, as the circumſtance of *Ragoba*'s eſcape may induce you to make ſome additions to the inſtructions already given, I ſhall protract the concluſion of any thing deciſive in the negociation with the Durbar, until I can hear from you; and I am of opinion it will require ſmall effort on my part to effect this, as cauſes of delay will I apprehend ſpontaneouſly and neceſſarily ariſe of themſelves.

T. G.

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Letter from *Ragonaut Row*: received the 28th of July 1779.

When I quitted *Bombay* with an Engliſh force, and the Engliſh retreated from *Tellegong* and I went to *Tocoje Holcar*, and *Madajee Sindea* at that time, I executed whatever engagements thoſe Chiefs choſe to impoſe on me, and they on their part entered into engagements with me. They gave me a country of 12 lacks and a half of rupees excluſive of the Talook of *Jhanſee* with the Selcundee and charges of the forts and Mahals, and engaged to give me a further country to the amount of 10 or 15 lacks of rupees. *Madajee Sindeah* gave me a body of his own forces, under the command of a Chief named *Hurry Bâwâjee*, through whoſe haughtineſs and diſinclination towards me many articles on that part of *Sindeah* were not fulfilled by him. For example, two of my people, one named *Raceſe Mahomed*, a Jemautdar of Gardees, the other *Curruck Sing*, a Jemautdar of Peons, whom he took from me on an engagement, that he ſhould not touch their lives, but keep them cloſe priſoners; theſe he put to death, and others of my people, whoſe liberty was ſtipulated for in the treaty, he nevertheleſs kept in confinement. Thus they were guilty of ſeveral breaches of engagements. It was my wiſh to have repaired to your preſence, but as this would have been a violation of treaty, I was obliged to decline it.

When the engagements were violated by them, in confidence of your ſteady friendſhip and regard, I chaſtiſed the troops of *Sindeah*, and by forced marches reached *Surat*, and waited on Colonel *Goddard* who is here on your part. The reſtoration of my affairs now reſts with you, and I have no doubt but you will call my faithleſs ſervants who have ruined my affairs and thrown the whole country into confuſion to a ſtrict account, and will reeſtabliſh them on a firm footing; for this purpoſe it is expedient that you iſſue orders to Colonel *Goddard* for my reſtoration.

APPENDIX, No. 211.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d Auguſt 1779.

THE following minute from Sir *Eyre Coote* having been circulated, the minutes which are entered after it were delivered by the members of the Board.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—Having lately received ſome advices mentioning preparations at the French iſlands, for a deſcent upon ſome of our poſſeſſions in *India*, particularly *Bombay*, to which I the more readily give ſome credit, knowing that that Preſidency and the Circars are the leaſt ſecured; I am induced to propoſe that the Governments of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay* be recommended to reinforce the army under General *Goddard* with the following proportion of troops, which, from the laſt returns, I think they may with propriety comply with: viz.

From *Madras*.

1	Battalion of Europeans,
3	Ditto Sepoys,
50	Artillery.

From *Bombay*.

300	Europeans,
2	Battalions of Seapoys,
100	Artillery.

As the works of *Pondicherry* are now deſtroyed, the quota from *Madras* may the more eaſily be ſpared. The troops they have at *Mahé*, 1100 Sepoys, one company of grenadiers, and 50 artillery, may immediately embark to join General *Goddard*; the reſt may be completed from the ſouthern ſtations, and will certainly be with him before any operations of the enemy can be commenced.

The forces of *Madras* and of this eſtabliſhment are, in my opinion, fully ſufficient to protect our poſſeſſions on this ſide of *India*; moreover, we are in daily expectation of a great addition to our ſtrength from Europe. I therefore alſo recommend that drafts be ſent from hence to complete the original number of General *Goddard*'s detachment.

The advantages we may expect to derive from this propoſed reinforcement will be the ſecurity of *Bombay* againſt any attack of the French, by having ſo ſtrong an army in the field, the expediting of the much deſired peace with the Marattas (if this is not already accompliſhed

pliſhed) and the rendering our force on the Malabar coaſt of ſuch reſpect as to check any deſigns which either the Marattas or *Hyder Ally* (the only country Power from whom we have any thing to dread on that ſide of the continent) may be inclined to form of taking part with our national enemies.

On the whole, I ſubmit this plan as the means which in my judgment will inſure the peace and ſafety of all our poſſeſſions; for while we have ſo reſpectable a force in that quarter where we may expect the firſt efforts of the French, we may be certain that it will confine their attention to it, and prevent them from diſturbing our more valuable territories in the other part of *India*.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Mr. *Francis*—I move that the Commander in Chief may be requeſted to inform the Board of the particulars of the intelligence he has received from the French iſlands, and the authority on which it is founded. The Board have yet no materials before them to judge of the propriety of the meaſure recommended.

(Signed) *Philip Francis.*

Mr. *Barwell*—The cautionary meaſures propoſed by Sir *Eyre Coote*, appear to me ſo well calculated for the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions, that I am induced to give them my immediate and hearty concurrence.

(Signed) *Richard Barwell.*

Governor General—I agree moſt heartily to the propoſal made by the Commander in Chief.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Mr. *Wheler*—Seen, and will endeavour to prepare my opinion againſt the next meeting of the Board.

(Signed) *Edward Wheler.*

Sir *Eyre Coote* delivers in the following minute:

I muſt own I feel myſelf not a little injured by Mr. *Francis*'s requiſition; and will venture to ſay, that a ſimilar inſtance cannot be found upon the Company's records, and that it is unknown in any ſervice for a Commander in Chief, or any general officer, to be called upon to ſupport his opinion and aſſertion, by giving up the authors of his ſecret intelligence upon which theſe may be founded. I therefore peremptorily refuſe it; and if the opinion I have given on the 27th ſhould not guide the Board in the mode of defence propoſed for *Bombay*, I hope I ſhall ſtand exonerated ſhould any fatal conſequence happen to that place.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Mr. *Francis*—Nothing can be perſonally of leſs moment to me, than whether my propoſition be carried or not. As a member of the Government, I think it my duty to oppoſe the eſtabliſhing a precedent, which I deem inconſiſtent with the forms and ſpirit of our inſtitution. Every member of this Board has an equal right to be informed of the facts or grounds on which a reſolution is taken. No ſeparate excluſive truſt is veſted in any one of us, nor is any one of us at liberty to delegate the truſt veſted in him to any one of the other members: but if, as in the preſent inſtance, I am not to know what the intelligence is on which the Board reſolves to act, nor by what authority ſuch intelligence is ſupported, I certainly am no judge of the neceſſity or propriety of the meaſures ſaid to be founded upon ſuch intelligence, and am ſo far forth deprived of the exerciſe of the truſt repoſed in me by Parliament. I did not mean however that the Commander in Chief ſhould give up his authors, if it was neceſſary to conceal them.

For theſe reaſons, which I hope will not be thought to imply diſreſpect to any member of the Board, I adhere to the motion.

Mr. *Wheler*—I muſt join Mr. *Francis* in expreſſing my wiſhes, that Sir *Eyre Coote* would be pleaſed to communicate to the Board the intelligence he has received, of preparations making at the French iſlands, and upon which he founds his preſent motion to reinforce General *Goddard*; becauſe I think, that before the Board paſs their determination on a ſubject which may affect the ſafety of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, they ought to have every information before them it is capable of. Appendix No. 211.

I entirely agree with Sir *Eyre Coote*, that it is poſſible the French may be induced to make ſome attempts on our poſſeſſions in *India*, with their forces from the iſlands; and if they have a conſiderable body of men there more than ſufficient for the purpoſes of defence, I hardly ſee any other uſe to which it can be applied.

I agree likewiſe with Sir *Eyre Coote*, that *Bombay* is likely to be the object of their attack; becauſe if they acquire that place, they will at one and the ſame time have a port for their fleet, docks, and allies in their neighbourhood, whom we have every reaſon to ſuppoſe are, by repeated provocations, made our enemies. But I confeſs it does not occur to me, how the ſending a reinforcement to General *Goddard* at *Surat*, and weakening *Bombay* itſelf, by detaching the greateſt part of the garriſon, can contribute to the ſafety of that place.

To illuſtrate this further, I need only take a view of the ſituation of *Bombay*, that of General *Goddard*'s army in reſpect to it, and the mode of attack to which *Bombay* is open. It is certain, that this attempt can only be made by ſea, and equally ſo, that the French ſhould for this purpoſe have either a ſuperior fleet to ours, or expect to find the garriſon of *Bombay* ſo weak, that it muſt fall before our fleet could relieve it from any other part of *India*. And if they do reſolve on this attack, it is hardly within the bounds of probability that we can receive any intelligence of it, or the Governor of *Bombay*, before the fleet and army are within ſight, conſequently the place will be inveſted by ſea and land before any ſuccours can be thrown into it. How the garriſon of the iſland of *Bombay* is to be relieved by troops under General *Goddard* after this event, I do not underſtand; more eſpecially as I am informed that it would be attended with great difficulty, and much time, to march the troops from *Surat* to the neareſt part of the continent oppoſite to the iſland of *Bombay*.

I conclude therefore, that the troops at *Surat* can be of no ſervice in caſe of an attack on *Bombay*; and that we ought therefore, ſo far from ſending troops to the former place, to bring down if poſſible the troops that are there into the neighbourhood of *Bombay*, for which I am told the iſland of *Salſette* is very convenient. Nor do I conceive that, even if it ſhould hereafter be expedient to act againſt the Marattas, the ſituation of our troops will be at all altered for the worſe, but rather amended.

On the ſecond queſtion, of ſending troops from the coaſt.

When I conſider the great extent of country they have to cover and defend; the ſmall number of Europeans they have for that purpoſe; the low ſtate of their finances; the neighbourhood of powerful enemies in *Hyder Ally* and the *Nizam*; and the probability of the French force being employed, either againſt the Circars, or to act in concert with the former, I am equally againſt weakening or detaching the force of that Preſidency.

On the third queſtion, of ſending drafts from hence, to complete the original number of General *Goddard*'s detachment, I ſee many, and what appear to me, inſurmountable difficulties.

Such reinforcement muſt conſiſt of native troops, Sepoys, who if prevailed on to embark, the ſeaſon of the year renders the voyage next to impracticable.

By land the difficulties are equally great: the army under General *Goddard* was near a year in performing its march, though he met with no oppoſition; I do not conceive that a detachment of drafts will be more likely to march with ſafety acroſs *India*, than General *Goddard*'s detachment, but rather that they will be expoſed to greater difficulties; in the mean time, the expence is certain and enormous, and the money muſt be drawn directly from, and ſpent out of, *Bengal*.

I am equally at a loſs to judge how the army, propoſed to be tranſported from the coaſt of *Malabar*, is afterwards

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wards to be maintained there, or by what means remittances can be effected to support such an army, and the expences of a war on the Malabar coast; but I am confident that these remittances would, if practicable, prove the ruin of the Company's valuable possessions on this side of *India*.

I am therefore equally against this, as the other propositions, and give it as my opinion, that the true and only line of policy to be observed in the present state of affairs in *India*, is, to concentre our troops on the Malabar coast to the neighbourhood of *Bombay*, which I deem the surest means of preserving that place against the attacks of the French, and that we should push whatever advantages we actually possess, to their proper objects of obtaining a lasting peace on that side of *India*.

General *Coote*—I entirely agree with Mr. *Wheler*, with regard to the situation our army should be placed in for the security of *Bombay*. When I proposed reinforcing General *Goddard*, for the defence of that valuable settlement against the French, I could not have the smallest idea, that our army was to remain where it now is; and the very mode of reinforcing it with part of the Bombay troops, is a sufficient proof that it was not my plan in any respect. The preservation of *Bombay* is the first object. The best method of defending it, I will venture to say (and appeal to the opinion of the first officers in Europe) is by an army in the field, so stationed, as to be able to give the garrison immediate succour, either by throwing fresh troops into it from time to time, or engaging the besieging enemy.

The situation that *Bombay* is now in, from the best intelligence I have received (and I may say I have intelligence that I can depend upon) is such as renders it, in my opinion, absolutely necessary that something should be done for the preservation of it; public as well as private reports from *Europe* mention a French armament being destined, and actually sailed for the *East Indies*.

By the last accounts from the *Cape*, a 74 gun ship put in there, with a greater number of sick on board than could be supposed to have arisen from her complement of men, and the report was, that they were all the sick of a squadron to which she belonged. A 74 gun ship sailed into the *Mauritius* when our cartel ship was lying off the harbour. This ship, before the man of war arrived, was under orders to go to the island of *Bourbon*, there to remain till they dismissed her; but immediately after the arrival of the 74 gun ship, a party of French was sent on board in order to assist in weighing her anchor more expeditiously, and she receiving orders from a 36 gun frigate (lying close by her, and which had been placed there as a guard upon her) to sail due north, till such time as the frigate fired a gun; she sailed 20 leagues in that direction, and, in the middle of the night, the ship fired a gun and then she shaped her course for *Madras*, so that it is very natural to suppose, at least the seafaring gentlemen whom I have conversed with on the subject, think that she was ordered to shape that course, to prevent her falling in with any French ships that might be bound for the island. When I was at the *Cape* they most undoubtedly had 5 or 6,000 regular troops at the islands; and I am well informed, that they have been since reinforced, but with what numbers I do not know; I am likewise informed, that the Duc de *Lafun*'s legion is on board the fleet which I suppose is come to *Mauritius*; part of them perhaps may be left behind at *Senegal*, for it is a part of the same fleet, if not the whole, which took *Senegal*. As to the protection of *Bombay* it can receive none but what we give it. It cannot come from Sir *Edward Hughes*, nor the forces under his convoy; they were not arrived at the *Cape* when the last accounts came away, though expected there. The troops he brings out are raw troops, and will require some time for refreshment at the *Cape*; the least that can be allowed is six weeks; they must go the outward passage and make *Ceylon*, after which they cannot get to *Bombay*, supposing them determined to make the trial, till after Christmas; therefore that settlement, in case of an attack from the French, must either defend itself, or submit to the enemy. It is my business, as the Commander in Chief in *India*, to propose such measures for the defence of the Company's settlements, and to recommend the disposal of their strength in such manner as will most effectually contribute to that end. When I have done this I have done my duty. It is with the Boards, wherever I may have the honour of sitting, to determine the propriety of my propositions.

Mr. *Francis*—The question is much altered by the explanations with which the Commander in Chief has favoured the Board. If it be intended that Brigadier General *Goddard* shall move down with his force from *Surat* to *Bombay*, and take the most advantageous position which his judgment shall point out to him for covering *Bombay* against an invasion, I approve of the idea, and join in it; but I beg leave to say, that this intention does not appear upon the face of the motion. No orders are proposed to Brigadier General *Goddard* to move from his present station, nor any general instructions recommended to him, upon the supposition that the French may appear upon that coast. From the terms of the motion, I should conclude that the reinforcement was to proceed from *Bombay* to *Surat*, and there to join General *Goddard*; understanding the motion in that sense, I must confess, I thought it liable to the same objections, which have been stated by Mr. *Wheler*; if it is not so, there can be no difference of opinion on this part of the proposition. The Commander in Chief is undoubtedly the best judge, whether the force which he means to draw out of *Bombay* will be more usefully employed for the purpose of defending that place, by joining Brigadier General *Goddard*'s army in the field, that is in a station calculated to cover *Bombay*, or by being kept in the body of the place. On this point I submit to the Commander in Chief's authority. I agree that the Madras troops now at *Mahé* shall proceed to *Bombay*, or to the neighbourhood of that place, and there join General *Goddard*, but not to *Surat*. With respect to any further detachment from the forces of *Madras*, I must declare that my opinion entirely concurs with that of Mr. *Wheler*, and that if I recede from it, it is solely from the confidence I place in the superior judgment of the Commander in Chief, who assures us that the forces of *Madras* and of this establishment, are fully sufficient to protect our possessions on this side of *India*, after making the detachmen in question to the other coast. With respect to our reinforcing Brigadier General *Goddard*'s army by drafts from hence, I am sorry that such a measure should be found necessary, because I deem it a very great addition to the weight and difficulty of maintaining a war on the Malabar coast. I should acquiesce however if the mode of conveying the drafts from this to the other side of *India* were stated and ascertained: I foresee great difficulty in the attempt; and no probability that our Sepoys, supposing them arrived at their destined station, will continue to serve for any length of time at so great a distance from home. The desertions I fear will at least keep pace with the supplies, and the operation will be endless.

Agreed to the motion of the Commander in Chief, for reinforcing the army under General *Goddard*.

Governor General—The first duty of this Board upon the subject now before us, and the first express object of the Commander in Chief in his minute, is to provide for the defence of *Bombay* in the event of an invasion from the French; so far the opinions of the Board seem to be united, and perhaps we shall agree in what I now recommend to that effect, viz. That in our advices to Brigadier General *Goddard*, we inform him of the substance of the present resolutions: that our designs in endeavouring to furnish him with this addition of strength, is to enable him to give such effectual assistance and support to the Government of *Bombay* in the case of a French invasion, as may defeat it: that therefore he must regard this as his first object,

until there ſhall be no longer any actual ground of apprehenſion from the French; and make ſuch a diſpoſition of the detachment under his command, as to inſure his co-operation with the garriſon of *Bombay*; at the ſame time that he is not to withdraw his attention from the other points which we have given him in charge. This I propoſe for that part of our inſtructions to him, which relates to the ſubject immediately before the Board. For the other ſubjects contained in his letters, theſe conſiſt chiefly in matters of information, which require no reply, but in his letter of the 12th June, there are three points propoſed by him for his negociations with the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, which require ſome order of the Board upon them. From the advantage which he conceives we have derived from the eſcape of *Ragonaut Row*, and from our having obtained the poſſeſſion of his perſon from the weak and diſtracted ſtate of the preſent rulers and partizans of the Government at *Poonah*, and from the encroachments which *Hyder Ally* has lately made upon their borders, General *Goddard* ſeems to be of opinion that the Miniſters are neither in a ſtate to ſupport a new war againſt us, nor of courſe to refuſe their aſſent to any reaſonable demands which may be made on them as the conditions of peace. The points which he propoſes to be demanded from them are theſe, viz.

1ſt. The payment of the debt due from *Ragonaut Row* to the Company.

2d. The reimburſement of the expences incurred by the expedition under his command; and,

3dly. The ceſſion of *Baſſein*, *Chowl*, and the other places which were agreed to be ceded by the laſt treaty with *Ragonaut Row*.

I do not think it neceſſary, nor would I propoſe that he ſhould be expreſsly enjoined to make theſe or any other ſpecific demands, beſides thoſe which he has been poſitively commanded to make in his inſtructions of the 5th April; neither do I ſuppoſe that theſe inſtructions can be deemed to preclude him from gaining any other advantages which a fortunate concurrence of circumſtances might enable him to obtain: in anſwer therefore to this part of his letter, I would recommend that it be written to him, that we ſtill abide by the letter of our inſtructions of the 5th of April, which are to form the rule of his conduct in all his negociations with the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*; but that if it ſhould be in his power to obtain greater advantages for the Company, and he ſhall not have concluded a treaty with that Government at the time of his receiving the preſent diſpatches, we authorize him in ſuch caſe to uſe his endeavours for that purpoſe; and particularly approve of the three points recommended in his letter of the 12th June: that we think it moſt probable, either that the Maratta Government will have accepted of the firſt offers which were made to them long before the probable receipt of this letter; or that either depending on their own ſuperior ſtrength, or expecting the arrival of a French armament, they may have refuſed to relinquiſh any part of their pretenſions derived from the convention of *Worgaum*. In the firſt caſe, it is not likely they will yield to any new demands on our part, if they have thought themſelves in a capacity to enforce their own; but in the latter we conceive it not improbable, either that a diſappointment of their expectations, if theſe ſhould not be ſpeedily realized, or the effect of their mutual jealouſies, produced by ſuch expectations, may induce them not only to wiſh for peace, but even to ſolicit it, and to offer large conceſſions to obtain it: and it is on this ſuppoſition principally, that we approve of his looking to the further acquiſition of the terms which he has recommended to us.

Mr. *Barwell*—I have already given my opinion upon the propoſition of the Commander in Chief: I did not limit that opinion to any partial object, but had in view the general intereſts of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and a final ſettlement with the Maratta Government. I approve entirely of the inſtructions now propoſed by the Governor General, which ſeems not to have omitted any point to which it is neceſſary General *Goddard* ſhould give his attention; none ſtrike me at preſent; ſhould any afterwards occur to my recollection, I leave to myſelf a latitude for extending theſe propoſed orders.

Mr. *Francis*—At a time when the French are expected to attack *Bombay*, every reaſon which heretofore induced the Board to wiſh for a ſpeedy accommodation with the Marattas, muſt acquire additional ſtrength.

I am ſorry that any circumſtance foreign from the immediate execution of his inſtructions, ſhould have engaged Brigadier General *Goddard*'s attention, or diverted it from the object we have ſo urgently recommended to him.

His reſolving to protract the concluſion of any thing deciſive in the negociation with the Durbar until he can hear from us, is unauthorized, and may be attended with fatal conſequences. If a peace be not concluded before the expected arrival of the French on the Malabar coaſt, we may be morally certain, that we ſhall then have both the French and the Marattas to contend with. The entrance into *India*, which has been happily ſhut, will again be opened to our natural enemies. The Marattas will be ready to receive and aſſiſt them; and if once they get a footing upon the continent, their being driven out again will depend upon the event of a new conteſt, in which we are far from having a certain proſpect of ſucceſs. For theſe reaſons I would direct Brigadier General *Goddard* to adhere literally to his inſtructions, and cloſe with the Marattas as ſpeedily as poſſible. As to the views now held out to us by *Ragoba*, or any new advantages ſuppoſed to be attainable by our having him with us, I would poſitively order Brigadier General *Goddard* not to engage in them on any account. *Ragoba* is a deſperate ruined man, whoſe ſituation may make it indifferent to him what terms he conſents to, or what promiſes he makes; but he has no power, and can perform nothing. In the mean time the negociation with the Durbar, which it is ſo much our intereſt to conclude, will be protracted; the French may arrive from the coaſt; the Marattas of courſe will take advantage of that circumſtance, and either refuſe to treat with us at all, or inſiſt on conditions which they would not pretend at the preſent moment. With reſpect to *Ragoba*, I would adhere to the orders given to Brigadier General *Goddard* in our laſt letter of the 8th July; viz. "We entirely approve "of the offer which you have made *Ragonaut Row*, "and direct that you continue to afford him the pro- "tection of the camp, ſo long as he ſhall continue to "demand it; provided he ſhall not forfeit his right to "it by any act of infidelity, or attempt to defeat the "effect of your negociations, to which you will give "your entire attention, without regard to any other "conſideration."

"For the reſt we leave you to act under our inſtruc- "tions of the 5th of April, in which we ſee no cauſe to "make any alterations on account of this event."

Governor General—If I have not been ſufficiently underſtood, I ſhould have thought it unneceſſary to have added an article to General *Goddard*'s preſent inſtructions, had he not himſelf ſuggeſted doubts where I think he ought to have entertained none. I have propoſed to refer him to his preſent inſtructions for the ſole rule of his conduct, and have only ſaid what I believe agrees with every member of the Board, that if he can obtain better terms in addition to thoſe we have already preſcribed, he may do it; but we do not enjoin it, nor is he to ſuffer the great object of the negociation to be ſuſpended or impeded by the proſecution of any other views. Much might be ſaid in anſwer to the other parts of Mr. *Francis*'s minute. I wiſh to avoid a debate: I ſhall therefore only briefly obſerve, that it is not with the Maratta State that Brigadier General *Goddard* has to treat, but with the partizans of a Government diſtracted and totally deprived of its conſtitutional form and powers; and that the event ſuppoſed of the arrival of a French armament, while our negociations with them were in ſuſpenſe, would

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be more likely to excite a decided diviſion among them, and to throw the principal ſtrength of the Maratta nation into our own hands, than to unite it againſt us; when it is remembered, that the firſt invitation of the French proceeded from the firſt member of the civil Government at *Poonah*; and muſt, if ever it takes place, give him an aſcendency over the men who now rule by the ſword.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree to the Governor General's propoſition, as it now ſtands explained.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I agree to the Governor General's propoſition.

Mr. *Francis*—Undoubtedly General *Goddard* will not refuſe any extraordinary advantages that may be offered to him; the danger is, that while he is purſuing them he may miſs the opportunity of concluding upon the terms already preſcribed to him.

Agreed to the Governor General's propoſitions; and reſolved, that the following letters be written to *Fort St. George*, to *Bombay*, and to General *Goddard*:

Gentlemen,

From the accounts which have been lately received of the ſtrength of the French at the iſlands, we have reaſon to apprehend that an invaſion is intended againſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*: we therefore deem it of the utmoſt importance to provide for the ſafety of that ſettlement, by reinforcing the army commanded by General *Goddard* with a reſpectable body of troops, and to direct him to grant the moſt effectual ſupport and protection in his power to the Government of *Bombay* for defeating any hoſtile attempts which may be made againſt them.

The Commander in Chief has informed us that one battalion of Europeans, three battalions of Sepoys, and 50 artillery may be ſpared from your eſtabliſhment, now the works of *Pondicherry* are demoliſhed, without any riſk or inconvenience to the ſervice; and that the reſidue of the forces under your Preſidency will be ſufficient for the protection of your poſſeſſions; beſides which, as you may daily expect a conſiderable addition of ſtrength from *Europe*, we earneſtly recommend it to you, to iſſue immediate orders to the officer in command of the forces at *Mahé* to detach from thence as great a number of men as he can ſpare at this time to join General *Goddard* without delay, and the remainder of his forces when *Mahé* ſhall be diſmantled. We alſo requeſt that you would be pleaſed to complete the reinforcement recommended by the Commander in Chief to be ſent to General *Goddard* as expeditiouſly as poſſible from the moſt convenient ſtations of your army; allowing him to fix the rendezvous.

We are, &c.

Gentlemen,

From the accounts which have been lately received of the ſtrength of the French at the iſlands, we have great reaſon to apprehend that an invaſion is intended againſt your Preſidency; we deem it therefore of the utmoſt importance to provide for its ſafety, by reinforcing the army commanded by General *Goddard* with a reſpectable addition of troops: we ſhall direct him to be prepared for the expected event, and to make it his firſt object to afford you the moſt effectual ſupport and protection in his power, for defeating any hoſtile attempts which may be made againſt you.

The Commander in Chief has informed us, that one battalion of Europeans, three battalions of Sepoys, and 50 artillery, may be ſpared from the Fort St. George eſtabliſhment; and that you can likewiſe contribute 300 Europeans, two battalions of Sepoys, and 100 artillery for this ſervice, without any inconvenience or diſtreſs to the garriſons where your army is now ſtationed. We have written to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George* on the ſubject of their ſupply; and earneſtly recommend it to you to iſſue immediate orders for your quota of the reinforcement to be aſſembled, and to join General *Goddard* at ſuch place of rendezvous as he may appoint, without delay.

We are, &c.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 12th and 18th from your camp near *Surat*.

We receive great ſatisfaction from the circumſtantial intelligence which they contain reſpecting the ſtate diſſentions, and probable views of the different parties exiſting in the Maratta Government. We do not diſapprove of your endeavouring to obtain the additional conceſſions propoſed in your letter of the 12th June; nor did our inſtructions of the 5th April (though reſtricted to certain points) preclude you from availing yourſelf of any occaſion which might be preſented to you, to exact other conditions by which the intereſt or influence of the Company might be certainly promoted, provided they did not impede or retard the accompliſhment of your original commiſſion. In this ſenſe, and with theſe proviſions, we repeat that we ſhall approve of the addition of the demands recommended in your letter of the 12th June, to thoſe which we have already preſcribed in our original inſtructions, if you ſhall not have concluded a treaty with the Maratta Government before the receipt of this letter.

From advices which have been lately received of the ſtate of the French forces at *Mauritius*, and from other concurring cauſes, we have reaſon to apprehend that an attack has been meditated againſt the ſettlement of *Bombay*: we have therefore thought it expedient to apply to the Preſidency of *Fort St. George* and *Bombay*, to reinforce the army under your command as ſoon as poſſible by detachments from their eſtabliſhments, conſiſting of the following corps and numbers:

From *Bombay*,
300 European infantry,
2 Battalions Sepoys,
100 Artillery.

From *Fort St. George*,
1 Battalion of European infantry,
3 Battalions Sepoys,
50 Artillery.

We have deſired the Select Committee at *Fort St. George* to iſſue immediate orders for the march of as great a part of their quota from *Mahé* as can be immediately ſpared, and for the others to join you when the works are demoliſhed: the remainder of the number will be detached from the moſt convenient ſtations of their army.

We mean further to recruit your corps with ſuch a number of Sepoys drafted from *Bengal*, as may be requiſite to augment it to its original complement.

Our deſign in endeavouring to ſupply you with this additional reinforcement of troops is to enable you to give ſuch effectual aſſiſtance and ſupport to the Government of *Bombay* in the caſe of a French invaſion as may defeat it; you muſt therefore regard this as your firſt object until there ſhall be no longer any actual ground of apprehenſion from the French; and make ſuch a diſpoſition of the detachment under your command, as will inſure your co-operation with the garriſon of *Bombay*; at the ſame time you are not to withdraw your attention from the other points which we have given you in charge.

We have acquainted the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*, and at *Bombay*, that you will fix the places of rendezvous for the junction of theſe troops with your army; we therefore deſire, that you will make him acquainted as early as poſſible with the ſituation which you ſhall judge the moſt convenient for that purpoſe.

We are, &c.

Approved. (Signed) *W. H.*

Mr. *Francis*—I cannot approve of the firſt part of this

this letter, for the reaſons aſſigned by me in the courſe of this debate: with reſpect to the ſecond part, I ſtill think that ſuppoſing the apprehenſion of *Bombay*'s being attacked to be founded on fact, Brigadier General *Goddard* ought to be ordered to remove from *Surat* towards *Bombay*.

(Signed) *P. F.*
E. W.
Warren Haſtings.
Edward Wheler.

The Commander in Chief having delivered into the public department a liſt of officers recommended by him to fill the vacancies in General *Goddard*'s detachment, the following minutes paſſed in conſequence.

Mr. *Francis*—I beg leave to aſk the Commander in Chief, in what manner, and by what route the drafts are to proceed to join General *Goddard?*

Sir *Eyre Coote*—By land.

Mr. *Barwell*—The queſtion aſked by Mr. *Francis* ſpeaks that ſolicitude which I feel as ſtrongly as he does for the ſucceſs of this meaſure, ſo important to the recruiting General *Goddard*'s detachment; but this ſolicitude inſtead of having influenced me to propoſe the queſtion urged by Mr. *Francis* to the Commander in Chief, has impoſed ſilence upon me. I truſt in the military knowledge of the Commander in Chief, and in the political conduct of the Governor General, to controul and influence the Indian Princes to convey the propoſed recruits to Brigadier General *Goddard*'s camp; and I make no doubt, that when the meaſure is ripe for execution, and ſuch precautions taken as to enſure a probability of ſucceſs, timely information will be given to the Government. If it ſhould become a queſtion, whether in policy or prudence the plan of ſupplying thoſe recruits is proper, I think this a very improper time to urge the queſtion propoſed by Mr. *Francis*. It allows the operation of various acts, which the want of unanimity in our councils may encourage the ill-diſpoſed to oppoſe againſt the ſucceſs of the beſt concerted military and political plan; I could therefore wiſh the queſtion might reſt upon the preſent anſwer given by the Commander in Chief, and wait the fullneſs of time for a more particular reply. I am equally concerned with Mr. *Francis*, and equally anxious for the proſperity of the Britiſh dominions, and I can ſolemnly affirm myſelf totally unacquainted with the minute parts of the plan of furniſhing theſe recruits; indeed I do not think they can have been perfectly digeſted, and where they are liable to variation from the political views of the different States through which the recruits may paſs, I ſee not the leaſt advantage at this juncture that can ariſe from an expoſition of the ſteps that ſhall be taken to enſure the junction of theſe troops with General *Goddard*'s detachment, but much miſchief: I therefore wiſh it may be left to the Governor General and Commander in Chief to communicate particulars as ſoon as ſuch communication ſhall not ſubject the meaſure to be defeated.

Mr. *Francis*—Mr. *Barwell* is at liberty judge for himſelf. In the execution of the public duties of my ſtation I ſhall be guided by my own judgment. In reply to the obſervations contained in the preceding minute, all that I ſhall ſay is, that there is no Select Committee in this Board, nor any ſeparate truſt veſted in any of its members excluſive of the reſt. I do not mean to aſk any further queſtions on the ſubject: it is ſufficient for me to know, that the party of recruits is to proceed by land. As to the poſſibility of keeping the meaſure a ſecret, I deny it: a detachment of troops cannot move from any part of theſe provinces, without its being publicly known which way they are going. I ſhall deliver in writing my opinion of the meaſure as I now underſtand it, and will not take up the time of the Board any longer at preſent.

Mr. *Barwell*—I would not be miſtaken in what I have ſaid on Mr. *Francis*'s queſtion. I never meant to aſſert that the meaſure was to be a ſecret, but that it was proper and neceſſary the means of executing it ſhould remain ſo, and remain with thoſe executive members of Government, to whoſe particular province the anſwering a vote of the Board depends. I do not ſuppoſe this Council competent to direct the Commander in Chief the particular manner an army is to be led into the field. They are reſponſible only for their reſolution, which orders that army on ſervice; he for the proper meaſures of executing that ſervice. The reſolution for the drafts is paſſed; it remains now to be executed in the moſt expeditious and beſt manner. Appendix. No. 212.

Governor General—I muſt decline taking any part in the preſent debate, meaning to offer my ſentiments upon the expediency of the meaſure to which it alludes, whenever it ſhall be brought formally before the Board, which I hope will not be till the inſtant of its execution.

APPENDIX, No. 212.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 13th September 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;
Edward Wheler, Eſquire,
and
Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.
Mr. *Barwell* and Mr. *Francis* indiſpoſed.

The Governor General propoſes the following draft of a letter to be written to Brigadier General *Goddard*, being an anſwer to the firſt part of his letter, dated the 24th June, and recorded in public department conſultation, 2d inſtant; the other part thereof, reſpecting remittances, having been already replied to.

Sir,

Although the inſtructions which we have already given you, are ſuch as would enable you to decide the event of peace or war, on the anſwer which you might receive from the Miniſters at *Poonah* to the advances which we have made to them for the renewal or confirmation of the treaty of *Poonah*; yet as we were willing to allow them as much time for their deliberations as could be ſpared from the ſeaſon of action, in caſe that contrary to our expectation they ſhould reject our offers of peace, and to leave you at full leiſure as circumſtances would admit for obtaining the object of our inſtructions by negociation; we did not reſtrict you to any ſpecific period of time for demanding their anſwer or making your declaration thereon.

We ought to conclude that by this time, or at leaſt by the time of the receipt of this letter, the Maratta Miniſtry will have accepted or rejected our propoſals, and conſequently a ſtate of declared peace or hoſtility will have enſued. But as there is a poſſibility that they may have found means to protract the negociations, and you may ſtill remain in a ſtate of ſuſpenſe, we direct you in this caſe to repeat our offers to the Peiſhwa and Miniſters, and to demand their final determination upon them in the ſpace of twenty-four hours from their being preſented; declaring at the ſame time, that you ſhall conſider their refuſal or the delay of their anſwer beyond the time, as a declaration of war, and act accordingly.

You will ſend this requiſition to *Poonah* by ſome perſon of approved fidelity and firmneſs, that the orders which you may give in conſequence of the above may be punctually executed.

For the reſt, we refer you to our former orders.

Fort William, the 13th September 1779. We are, &c.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I appprove of the draft.
Mr. *Wheler*—I object to it.

Agreed

Appendix. No. 213.

Agreed to the above draft of a letter to Brigadier General *Goddard*; and ordered that it be tranſcribed fair, and ſent to him immediately.

Reſolved, That the following letter be alſo written to *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have kept you fully adviſed of the inſtructions under which Brigadier General *Goddard* has been ordered to act in his negociations with the Poonah Government for a renewal or confirmation of the treaty of *Poonah*: and although we have every reaſon to ſuppoſe from the powers with which he is inveſted, that the reſult will have been a formal determination on war or peace with that Government before the arrival of any directions which we can now ſend him; yet it is poſſible they may have found means to protract the negociation; and as in that caſe we think they will have had full time allowed them for deliberation, if they were at all inclined to eſtabliſh an amicable connection with us, we have this day ſent injunctions to General *Goddard* to repeat our offers to the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, and to demand their definitive anſwer within the ſpace of 24 hours; declaring their refuſal or delay beyond that time, to be equivalent to a declaration of war, and that he ſhall act accordingly.

If he ſhall be reduced to this extremity, we recommend it to you to grant him every aid in your power, and to endeavour by every means that may be neceſſary to render his ſucceſs ſpeedy and effectual.

Fort William, We are, &c.
the 13th October 1779.

APPENDIX, Nos. 213 and 214.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 16th September 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Edward Wheler, Eſquire,
and
Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.
Mr. *Barwell* and Mr. *Francis* indiſpoſed.

READ the following letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Gentlemen,

I have not done myſelf the honour of addreſſing you ſince the 24th ultimo, in hopes of receiving the expected anſwers from the Poonah Durbar, which are at length arrived, and I have enclоſed copies of them to the Honourable the Governor General.

Although they breathe throughout manifeſt inclinations for peace, I think it neceſſary to prepare you for a different event, and to ſtate certain caſes that may happen; ſoliciting your particular inſtructions how I am to act under them.

When the confidential perſon ſaid to be diſpatched from the Durbar arrives, which I do not ſuppoſe will be before the end of this month, I ſhall make known to him the terms you have directed me to propoſe, as preliminary articles; to which if he conſents, on the part of his Government, every remaining point will be eaſily accommodated; however from that known practice of the Maraттas, and the delay they introduce in all public tranſactions, I have reaſon to apprehend this man will have no full powers from his court, and that of courſe he muſt refer me for an anſwer to my propoſals to the Peiſhwa and Miniſter; in which caſe it will be the latter end of Auguſt or beginning of September before I can know their final ſentiments, ſhould they then pleaſe to communicate them; though it appears to me moſt probable they will wiſh to protract the negociation by ſome evaſive reply, and attempt to amuſe us with the proſpect of a peace, till the ſeaſon is too far advanced to effect any thing material in the field.

To obviate the inconveniency this would cauſe, I have in my preſent letter to the Peiſhwa and Miniſter, propoſed to them, that ſhould the conditions I have to offer on the part of my Government be conſented to by them, they will ſignify the ſame to me, and ſettle the mode of an immediate interview betwixt the Miniſter and myſelf, as the only means by which an end can be ſpeedily and ſucceſsfully put to the preſent buſineſs. If they heartily concur in the wiſhes for a peace, it will be ſhewn by their compliance with this propoſal; and ſhould they decline it, even admitting they do not object to the terms of the treaty itſelf, it would be a mark of diſingenuity that might give the moſt ample room to ſuſpect the ſincerity of their intentions.

Although I have already requeſted your orders how I am to act, in caſe the Miniſters ſhould diſcover an inclination to amuſe with ſtudied and unneceſſary pretexts for delay, let me again entreat you will be pleaſed to give me your particular inſtructions on this head, and explain how far it is your intention, upon a conviction of their duplicity and deceit, I ſhould make known to them your juſt reſentment of their behaviour, the hoſtile part I am authorized to take, and the particular meaſures I am further to purſue, in conſequence of the political advantages that may ſuggeſt themſelves from the ſituation of affairs already ſubmitted to your conſideration.

As it may appear ſtrange, when the Peiſhwa and Miniſter have expreſſed themſelves in terms of the higheſt friendſhip to the Engliſh, and have conſented to my deſire of ſending a confidential perſon to receive my propoſals, that I ſhould ſtill entertain the idea of their views being of a hoſtile nature towards us, and be ſo particular in obtaining your conditional inſtructions for my guidance, I think it neceſſary to explain the reaſons why my ſuſpicions prevail of their inſincerity, which excluſive of the argument furniſhed by the character univerſally given the Maraттas of a cunning and treacherous nation, are principally occaſioned at this time by the intelligence I have received from moſt credible authority at *Poonah*, that the perſon ſent by the Miniſter is intended more as a ſpy to communicate to his maſter what is tranſacting, than as a Vackeel to negociate; that *Nanna* is making every poſſible preparation for war, and is ſoliciting for that end the ſeveral Powers in his neighbourhood to join againſt the Engliſh. A copy of a letter recently written from *Nizam Ally* to him, in reply to an application of the above nature, has been ſent me from *Poonah*, which I have tranſmitted to the Honourable the Governor General. I alſo underſtand that three French letters have been received through their agent *Neamut ulla Cawn* at *Poonah*, but their contents I cannot learn. All theſe circumſtances, added to the reluctances with which the Miniſter will be brought to relinquiſh the advantages claimed by the late treaty, make me wiſh to be prepared for the reverſe of what I hope may happen taking place.

With reſpect to what the Peiſhwa and Miniſter have mentioned relative to *Ragonaut Rovz*, I before addreſſed them particularly on the ſubject of his reception, copy of which letter I have tranſmitted for your peruſal: I have reaſon to think they will be far from reſenting my treatment of that Chief, from the purport of a letter this inſtant received from the Peiſhwa; copy of which I have forwarded to the Honourable the Governor General; in which, after mentioning the ill effects *Ragoba*'s arrival had occaſioned in the Sircar, and bordering upon *Guzerat*, he takes notice of the means I had uſed to induce his collectors to continue in them without apprehenſion of being moleſted, and recommends them to my further care and protection.

When I received your orders of the 5th of April to open a negociation with the Poonah Durbar, I applied to the Government of *Bombay* for every information they

could

could give me regarding the ſtate in which the treaty of *Poorunder* then ſtood, and how far the ſeveral articles of it had been complied with by the Miniſters. To this requiſition I have ſince received a full and ſatisfactory reply; and among other papers which they encloſed for my peruſal, was a copy of a letter from the Select Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors, dated Auguſt the 31ſt, 1778, and received ſince the concluſion o fthe laſt fatal expedition.

The purport of this letter being known to you, I ſhall only beg leave to remark, that as it contains ſentiments and even directions the moſt friendly and favourable for the intereſts of *Ragonaut Row*, the part I have taken in affording him protection, excluſive of the immediate political advantages attending it, will, I flatter myſelf, prove in every reſpect acceptable to you, and conſiſtent with the views of the Honourable Company.

I am alſo the more anxious to receive your orders reſpecting the terms to be ſtipulated in his favour at the preſent negociation, which I make no doubt you would wiſh ſhould be as honourable and as advantageous as poſſible.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Camp near *Surat*, the 15th July 1779. (Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

Read the ſeveral papers mentioned in the above letter as being ſent to the Governor General, which are entered in the Perſian correſpondence.

Read a letter from the Peiſhwa, and *Nana Furneſſe* the Miniſter at *Poonah*, to the Governor General, which is alſo entered in the Perſian correſpondence under date.

From *Nanna Purnaveeſe*; received 14th September 1779.

I have already addreſſed you on the ſubject of the bad conduct of the Governor of *Bombay* in non-execution of the treaty which Colonel *John Carnac*, &c. Engliſh Chiefs, of their free will and accord, inſtigated by the ſentiments of friendſhip, executed under the ſeal of the Company, and delivered to the Sircar through the channel of *Toocojee Row Holcar*, and *Madajee Row Scindeah*; and alſo ſtated to you the affair of the hoſtile conduct of the Chief of *Bauncote*, who in violation of a treaty concluded under the Government of the deceaſed *Seremunt Nanna Saib* and *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, prohibited the paſſage of the grabs of the Sirkar; and having ſeized two of them laden with grain, ſunk them at ſea, and ſent a grab of war with military ſtores againſt the fort of *Soorundurk*, belonging to the Sirkar; which having cannonaded and made war on the Sirkar, he applied by letter to the Governor of *Bombay*. I further related in this letter the particulars of the evil deſigns of *Seremunt Dada Saib*, and of his having contrived by artifice to eſcape from *Hurry Babajee*, a Chief who was ſent to guard him; and of his having taken the route of *Surat* and *Broach*, with other particulars; which I doubt not you have received and underſtand. But I ſhall now repeat, for the greater ſecurity, that *Seremunt Dada Saib Ragonaut Row*, after the concluſion of peace between *John Carnac*, &c. Engliſh Chiefs on the one part, and the Chiefs of the Sirkar on the other, and the execution of a treaty under the ſeal of the Company, came here, and agreeable to engagement ſet off for the Talook of *Janſey*; on the way upon the banks of the *Nerbudda*, diſregarding every obligation laid on him by the treaty, he by artifice got *Hurry Babajee*, who was ſent with a party to eſcort him, into his power, and changing his route, ſet out for *Surat*: this you have doubtleſs heard.

You are inveſted by the illuſtrious King of *England*, and the Engliſh Company, with the ſupreme authority. The Governor of *Bombay* ſtill continues to purſue the ſame line of improper conduct as formerly, and acts in direct oppoſition to the engagements concluded by *John Carnac*, &c. Engliſh Chiefs; notwithſtanding that all your letters, from the concluſion of peace to the preſent time declare, that no deviation ſhall take place in the common friendſhip; and that the good faith of the Engliſh, which is univerſally acknowledged, ſhall never receive a blemiſh. To what cauſe then am I to attribute the violations of treaty and bad conduct of the Governor of *Bombay*?

Appendix. No. 213.

I have lately received a letter from Colonel *Goddard* to this effect: that he has received letters from the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*; that for the adjuſtment of the diſputes which have ariſen between the Chiefs of *Bombay* and the Maratta Chiefs, to the deſtruction of that friendſhip and harmony which had ſo long ſubſiſted between the two States, to remove all cauſes of enmity, and to re-eſtabliſh friendſhip on a ſolid baſis, full powers had been given to him, that a truſty agent on the part of the Sirkar ſhould be ſent, as he has many particulars to communicate. This letter was accompanied by a copy of commiſſion given to Colonel *Goddard* under the Seal of the Company and ſignatures of the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, for my inſpection.

Be pleaſed, Sir, to conſider maturely and with equity, the cauſes of enmity between the Governor of *Bombay* and the Chiefs of this Government; they are two-fold. In the firſt place, Col. *John Upton*, your Ambaſſador, when peace was concluded, and the treaty executed, although I repeatedly pointed out to him the neceſſity that ſome perſon of credit on the part of the Governor of *Bombay* ſhould join in it, declared to me, that *Amaud ul-Dowlah* Bahadre was inveſted with the ſupreme power by the King of *England* and the Company, and that his orders were binding on the Chiefs of all the Engliſh ſettlements. Secondly, Colonel *John Carnac* Bahadre, and other Engliſh Chiefs, with the advice and concurrence of the Governor of *Bombay*, in concert with *Seremunt Dada Saib*, tranſported themſelves into the neighbourhood of *Poonah*, and were in the end obliged to return to *Bombay*, overwhelmed with ſhame for their fruitleſs attempt.

Theſe are the two points which have excited the enmity of the Governor of *Bombay*. No other cauſe has been given from this quarter; and no breach of friendſhip has taken place on our part.

The Government of *Bombay*'s preſent plan is, by a miſrepreſentation of facts, to excite doubts in your breaſt, although there is nothing in this world which I value equally with friendſhip and ſincerity of heart. I therefore requeſt that you will not give credit to the repreſentations which he may make to you with a deſign to create a breach in our friendſhip. My eyes are turned to the candour and good faith of the Engliſh nation; it is therefore incumbent on you to iſſue poſitive orders to the Governor of *Bombay*, that conformably to treaty he deſiſt from affording the Engliſh protection to *Seremunt Dada Saib*, that he refuſe him all kind of ſupport, and, agreeable to *John Carnac*'s treaty, relinquiſh all the places belonging to the Sirkar, create no diſturbances in the Government territories, and make it a point with the chief of *Bauncote*, whoſe character is univerſally infamous, that he, according to eſtabliſhed cuſtom, leave the paſſage free to the veſſels of the Sirkar.

Theſe meaſures will promote the eaſe and happineſs of the people, and augment the friendſhip between the two States.

As you are known to be poſſeſſed of penetration, juſtice, and honour, it was unneceſſary to point out theſe ſteps. I have written the above particulars merely for your information. Let your meaſures be guided by equity, and the approved maxims of Government. Fortune and empire are the gifts of God.

From the Peiſhwa; received the 14th September 1779.

Your agreeable letter, expreſſive of ſincere friendſhip, and intimating that you have heard by various channels, and have alſo received ſome little and imperfect intelligence relative thereto from the gentlemen of *Bombay*; that they have, without the knowledge or authority of the Company, engaged in meaſures deſtructive of the friendſhip and harmony

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which ſubſiſted between the two States, and concluded a treaty highly diſadvantageous; but that you cannot form a judgment reſpecting the rectitude of the conduct of the Bombay Chiefs, until you obtain more complete and authentic intelligence, that there is no alteration in your friendſhip, and that you have now inveſted Colonel *Goddard* with full powers to re-eſtabliſh the friendſhip and connection between our States, with other particulars which I underſtand arrived, and from a peruſal of it I received the greateſt pleaſure.

I have very frequently given you information of the bad conduct of the Governor of *Bombay*, and of his diſregard to the ſtipulations of the treaty. I have on every occaſion ſteadily preſerved my friendſhip and engagements with the Engliſh nation, and placed implicit confidence in the ſeal of the Company; and ſince the Chiefs of *Bombay* have, in diſobedience of orders, engaged in meaſures without your knowledge in open violation of the duties of friendſhip, why are they not brought to puniſhment by the European laws?

When *John Carnac* and others of the Engliſh Chiefs, in concert with *Dada Sahib*, lately come to this quarter, I received a letter from the Governor of *Bombay*, informing me that that meaſure was determined on with the concurrence of the Governor General, and all the members of the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*. When *John Carnac* made propoſals for peace through the channel of *Tocojee Row Holcar* and *Madajee Row Sindeeah*, and delivered to the Circar a treaty under the ſeal of the Company, a letter was received from him, declaring, that he poſſeſſed full powers from the Company's Chiefs over all matters, and, notwithſtanding their hoſtile acts, I, actuated only by ſentiments of friendſhip, gave them an eſcort, who conducted them in ſafety to *Bombay*; yet to this day the Chiefs of *Bombay* have not performed any of the conditions of the treaty, or paid any attention to their engagements. I place the utmoſt confidence on the ſeal of the Company, and the acts of the Company's Chiefs, and entertain no ſentiments but thoſe of friendſhip and ſincerity, which are qualities ſuitable to illuſtrious perſonages.

You alſo wrote that I ſhould give no place or encouragement in my territories to the French nation; on the peruſal of which I was filled with aſtoniſhment. If you are poſſeſſed of friendſhip and candour towards me, what ſhould induce me to cultivate the friendſhip of the French? When a perſon on their part came formerly here, induced by friendſhip for you, I complied with your deſire, and ſent him away. If this matter has been miſrepreſented to you by perſons who are the diſturbers of the common friendſhip, and by their falſe colouring has created ſuſpicions in your breaſt, there is no remedy; there is no alteration in my friendſhip, and your letters are filled with aſſurances to the ſame effect. Write therefore in poſitive terms to the Chiefs of *Bombay*, that they execute the terms of the treaty without the leaſt failure; that they give no protection to the enemies of the Sirkar, nor excite any diſturbances. *Dada Sahib*, who has again broken his engagements and gone towards *Surat* and *Broach*, you formerly directed them to ſhew no countenance to. I now requeſt that the moſt poſitive orders may be ſent on this ſubject to all the Engliſh Company's Chiefs, forbidding them ever to protect him with their influence.

I have received a very friendly and candid letter from Colonel *Goddard*, encloſing a copy of the commiſſion which he has received from you and the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, and deſiring that I will ſend a truſty perſon to confer with him; and I have accordingly diſpatched a Vackeel to him.

Be pleaſed to give expreſs directions to Colonel *Goddard* to carry the treaty into execution, and to give orders for that purpoſe to the Chiefs of *Bombay*, and they muſt not give an aſylum to *Dada Sahib*, it being prohibited in the treaty, nor pay attention to his repreſentations. I am at all times deſirous of friendſhip.

From *Nanna Purnaveeſe*; received 14th September 1779.

Of the ſame tenor.

Encloſures in a Letter from General *Goddard*; dated the 15th July, received the 14th September 1779.

No. 1. Copy of a Letter from the Peiſhwa *Pundit Purdhaun Sewac Madho Row Narrain*, to Colonel *Goddard*.

Your agreeable letter, full of friendſhip and candour, and informing me of your having received letters from the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, Governor General, Mr. *Haſtings*, and all the members of the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, to this effect, that between the Maratta Chiefs and the Chiefs of the Engliſh nation, who are famous throughout the univerſe for their fidelity and ſteady adherence to treaty, the bands of friendſhip have long ſubſiſted, and that they have now inveſted you with full powers for the purpoſe of confirming and giving additional ſtrength to the ties of mutual friendſhip and connection; and you therefore requeſt that I will ſend a truſty perſon on my part. This letter, together with copy of your commiſſion, I have received, and the peruſal of it affords me the higheſt pleaſure.

As I out of a regard to friendſhip, and from a reliance on the ſeal of the Engliſh Company, which the greateſt of the Chiefs of the Engliſh nation hold in the higheſt reſpect, have no other view than friendſhip and regard; you will therefore pay regard to the acts of the Company's Chiefs, and to the ſeal of the Engliſh Company which is affixed to the treaty; and thoſe individuals, who without the knowledge of the Company have diſobeyed the orders under which they acted, and engaged in improper meaſures, it is expedient to puniſh according to the European laws.

Look with the eyes of friendſhip and equity into the matter, and ſee who has been guilty of the violations of treaty, and from what motives the enemies of the Sircar were protected under the Engliſh power, quarrels raiſed, and inſults offered.

I have lately received letters from Mr. *Haſtings*, expreſſed in the terms of the warmeſt friendſhip, informing me of the powers with which you have been inveſted; and agreeable to your deſire, I am about to diſpatch a perſon of truſt to you; he will ſoon arrive: whatever you have to ſay, ſay it to him, and write in ſuch terms to the Chiefs at *Bombay*, that they faithfully perform the terms of the treaty, and not protect by the Engliſh power any inſurgents of this Government, or create any diſturbances.

I formerly wrote you that *Dada Sahib Ragonaut Row* was proceeding to that quarter, and that you ſhould not afford him the Engliſh protection; and I now repeat my deſire, that in regard to our friendſhip and intimate union, you will not, as ſpecified in the treaty, give an aſylum to *Daba Sahib*, or afford him any ſupport. Send a pair of Coſſids before to ſecure the road, and conduct my Vackeel to you. I am well acquainted with your wiſdom and penetration.

For the ſecurity and protection of my territories which lay in your neighbourhood, that the Ryots may not be diſtreſſed or alarmed on account of *Ragonaut Row*, and that weak and bad men may be prevented from joining with him, I have ſent an army towards *Goondrebarry*. I write this for your information.

No. 2. Copy of a Letter from *Balajee Pundit*, commonly called *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, to Colonel *Goddard*.

Your agreeable letter, expreſſive of ſincere regard, and intimating your having received letters from the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, Governor General, Mr. *Haſtings*, and all the members of the Supreme Council of *Calcutta*, to this effect, &c. (the ſame as the foregoing.)

No. 3. Copy of a Letter from the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* to *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, in reply.

I have received your Arzie, and underſtand its contents, to wit, that the evil-minded Engliſh, having given their protection to *Seremunt Dada Sahib*, and afforded an aſylum to the turbulent *Gauzi ul dien Khan*, and collected magazines of military ſtores, have entered the path of hoſtility with the moſt malignant deſigns; and from the invitation which you have given to me, I underſtand it to be your deſire that a formidable army of mine, under the command of one of my moſt renowned brothers, ſhould be ſent to act in concert with your forces and thoſe of *Madho Row Sewae*, againſt that puſillanimous race, and to root them out. As it is the ſeaſon of the rains, my forces, agreeable to eſtabliſhed cuſtom, have received their diſmiſſion, and are gone to their reſpective homes, and cannot be now recalled; particularly at this period, when from the exceſſive heavy rains, and the badneſs of the roads in conſequence, and the inundations of the rivers, the journey could not without difficulty be performed by Coſſids the moſt acquainted with it; I have therefore determined, that as ſoon as the rains are at an end, I will ſend a diſtinguiſhed Chief with a reſolute army, and good train of artillery, or if I find it poſſible, I will repair in perſon to you, and rouſe that bad race from their dream of ſecurity, and overthrow all their ambitious deſigns: you will therefore, depending on my friendſhip for *Pundit Purdhaun*, which is univerſally known, and regarding my intereſts as the ſame, begin your march with the forces and artillery of the Sircar, taking care to have very large cannon with you, in conjunction with *Madho Row Sindeah* and *Subahdar Holcar*, about the time when I ſhall ſet out, and contrive your marches ſo that we may meet in the Zillah of *Kajeſtabunyaud*, and then purſue ſuch meaſures as we ſhall deem adviſable. It is ſaid by *Molana Nizamee*, that when two hearts are united, they are able to break a mountain in pieces, and diſſipate the moſt numerous bodies.

For further particulars I refer you to the letters of *Sooraje Bund* and *Kiſhen Row Billaul*.

Whatever further plan you may form, make me acquainted therewith, and I will write my ſentiments thereon.

No. 4. Copy of a Letter from the Peiſhwa *Pundit Purdhaun Madho Row Narain* to Colonel *Goddard*.

I ſome time ago informed you by letter, that *Seremunt Dada Sahib*, after the concluſion of the peace between the two States, through *John Carnac*, &c. Engliſh Chiefs, ſet out from hence for his reſidence at *Janſey*, and in the way, after croſſing the *Nurbudda*, got *Hurry Babajoe*, who was appointed to eſcort him, into his power, and changing his route, proceeded towards *Surat*: this letter has doubtleſs reached you.

I have juſt learnt that he is arrived at *Surat*, and has injured and moleſted the territories of the Sirkar in the neighbourhood of *Gojeraut*; and that you hearing this, have taken meaſures to ſatisfy the Gomaſtahs of the Sirkar. As the ties of friendſhip between me and *Jelladut Jung* Bahadre are firmly knit, and you likewiſe are poſſeſſed of friendſhip and attachment to this Sirkar, and as you have likewiſe received letters from the Governor to promote the increaſe of friendſhip between us; it is therefore incumbent on you, in conſideration of this friendſhip, to provide for the ſecurity of thoſe territories, and to ſupport the Gomaſtahs of the Sirkar.

No. 214.

Reſolved, That the following reply be written to General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 24th July; for an anſwer to which we refer you to the contents of ours, dated the 13th inſtant, and to the tenor of our former inſtructions; but that you may be at no loſs with reſpect to the plan of your future conduct, we think it proper to direct, that you conform literally to thoſe orders, in all caſes where they are expreſs, and that in any other where no proviſion is made, or an option left you to uſe your own diſcretion, you adhere, as nearly as poſſible, to the ſpirit of them, without waiting the reſult of further references to us. Appendix. Nos. 214&215.

We obſerve, with ſome degree of pleaſure, the notice taken by the Maratta Government in their letters to you, of the liberal attention which you had ſhewn to the intereſts of that State, in the protection given to their Aumils in *Guzzerat*, againſt the irregularities of *Ragoba*'s dependants; and we recommend a continuation of the ſame kindneſs and moderation in all your conduct towards them.

The Miniſters have complained to us of violence offered to ſome of their veſſels, in their paſſage along the coaſt; and of an attack made on their fort of *Soorundurk*, by the Chief of *Bencoote*; for the particulars of which we have written to the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

Fort William, We are, &c.
the 16th September 1779.

Ordered, That a copy of ſuch parts of the Peiſhwa, and *Nana Furneſſe*'s letter, as relate to the oppoſition made to the free paſſage of the Maratta veſſels at *Bancoote*, and the attack of the fort of *Soorundurk*, be ſent to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*: and that they be required to tranſmit a full and clear explanation of the facts alluded to.

The following letter is accordingly written to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

In a letter which we have lately received from the Government of *Poonah*, we are adviſed of acts of hoſtility, committed in the name of the Engliſh, by a perſon ſaid to be Chief of *Bancoote*, who is accuſed of ſeizing two grabs, belonging to the Marattas, off the Malabar coaſt, and of ſending a force to attack the fort of *Soorundurk*; we encloſe an extract of the letter, as far as it relates to this complaint; and as we have not received any communication from you of the facts alluded to, which could enable us to give a ſatisfactory anſwer to it, we requeſt that you will furniſh us with an explanation of the particulars.

We are, &c.

Fort William, *Warren Haſtings*,
the 16th September 1779. *Edwa Wheler*.

APPENDIX, No. 215.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 25th October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Philip Francis, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.

Sir *Eyre Coote* gone to viſit the different ſtations of the army.

READ the following letter from General *Goddard*:

Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the honour to addreſs you the 15th ultimo, acquainting you with the letters I had received from the Maratta Government, conſenting to ſend a confidential perſon to me, whoſe arrival I expected towards the end of July. In this hope I was however diſappointed; for, by delaying a month on the road, he did not reach *Surat* until the 14th inſtant. He received his firſt audience on the 15th, and as it was my object to bring the matter to a point as ſpeedily as poſſible, for which

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which he ſeemed equally inclined with myſelf, in the ſecond conference, which happened the day following, I fully explained to him the friendly ſentiments of your Honourable Board, and the propoſals you had authorized me to make to the Poonah Government. In order to give you the cleareſt idea in my power of the ſtate of the negociation, and enable you to form a judgment of the Miniſters' inclinations, I have taken the liberty of encloſing, for your peruſal, the particulars of the converſation I had with the Vackeel, on the ſubject of my embaſſy to his maſter, which, together with a few remarks I ſhall here ſubjoin, from obſervations made on the man's behaviour and expreſſions, will, I am hopeful, convey to you the moſt full and ſatisfactory information.

I am of opinion, in the firſt place, that the miniſter is perfectly diſpoſed to make a peace with the Engliſh; but the confidence and ſpirits ariſing from his late ſucceſs againſt the Bombay troops, had, it is plain, given him hopes of obraining one, upon terms very different from what I have propoſed: and on that account he will not be eaſily reconciled to the ſacrifice demanded from him, of relinquiſhing his claim to all thoſe advantages acquired by the late convention with Mr. *Carnac*: I therefore expect, notwithſtanding the poſitive declaration I have made, of the neceſſity there is that he agrees to this preliminary article previous to the ſettlement of any treaty, that he will endeavour to ſtipulate for certain conceſſions to be at the ſame time made on the part of the Engliſh: it appears to me probable that he will demand the perſon of *Ragonaut Row* to be delivered up; but as this would be totally inconſiſtent, and impoſſible to be complied with, I ſhall abſolutely decline conferring on it, or any other point whatever, till the preliminary articles are firſt fully agreed to.

I hope the particulars I have already condeſcended upon with the Vackeel, which appear in the encloſed journal, as they were intended to ſhew the ſincere intentions of your Government, and to remove any cauſes of doubt or apprehenſion the Miniſter might have reaſon to entertain, will not be conſidered by you as in the leaſt derogatory, and prove the arduous zeal with which I have, and ſtill ſhall continue to proſecute the object of a peace, ſo ſtrenuouſly recommended in your inſtructions.

There appear two very powerful motives why the Miniſter is at this time ſolicitous for a peace; the one is acknowledged by the Vackeel in the wiſh expreſſed by his maſter to be at full liberty to oppoſe and check the progreſs of *Hyder Ally*; and the other, of no leſs force than the former, ariſes from the differences that ſubſiſt betwixt *Nana Furneſe* and *Madajee Scindia*. Though the name of the latter was not publicly introduced by the Vackeel, it was mentioned in the courſe of converſation; and he made no ſcruple of ſaying, that *Nanna* was exceedingly incenſed againſt him for his late conduct reſpecting *Ragoba*, and wiſhed for nothing more than to get him into his power. This ſpeech of the Vackeel's is corroborated by a variety of other reports; and it is certain, that *Scindia* has lately made ſome conſiderable requiſition of the Miniſter, which the other is by no means inclined to comply with. He has not either viſited *Poonah* ſince the eſcape of *Ragonaut Row*, though invited and preſſed by the Miniſter to go there.

As theſe ſeveral circumſtances all conſpire in favour of my preſent negociation, I ſhall ſo far pay attention to them in the proſecution of it, as to uſe them to proper advantage without materially interrupting or preventing the concluſion of the treaty you have entruſted to my management. It is needleſs to obſerve to you, ſince it will appear in the accompanying proceedings, that *Nanna Furneſe* is the only oſtenſible perſon who, with the name of Miniſter, ſtands forth on this occaſion to negociate on the part of the Peiſhwa and Maratta State. The authority which was before divided amongſt a number, ſeems now, ſince the confinement of *Moraba* and *Saccaram Bapoo*, to be ſolely centered in himſelf; and the only controul he has to apprehend, is from the overgrown power of *Scindia*, and the other military officers of the Government.

I have noticed in the diary now ſent you, that no overtures reſpecting *Ragoba* were made by the Vackeel on the part of his maſter, and the reaſons which occurred to me on that head. I judged it proper, in relation to this ſubject, to repeat to him what I had before written to the Peiſhwa; and to expreſs my ſatisfaction at the proſpect there now was of finally adjuſting all paſt difficulties, in an eaſy and amicable manner; but as I am hopeful of receiving letters from your Board every day in conſequence of the news of *Ragoba*'s eſcape, I was happy at his ſilence on a ſubject that ſaved me the neceſſity of making any particular declarations, and did not therefore wiſh to preſs him any further on that ſubject.

As regular Dawkes have been placed all the way to *Poonah*, I may receive anſwers to the letters now diſpatched to the Miniſters in eight days. They muſt however arrive in twelve days time; when it may be known with a degree of certainty, what the reſult of my negociations may be. In the mean time ſhould any thing occur worth communicating, I ſhall not fail to addreſs you.

I have endeavoured in the preſent addreſs, and the encloſed paper, to be as full and as explicit as poſſible. You will perceive, that after condeſcending upon particulars in the moſt ample manner, in order to ſatisfy every poſſible doubt and apprehenſion, I have propoſed to him the two preliminary articles; upon the acceptance or refuſal of which my future negociation muſt depend. Should he give his full conſent, I am perſuaded the remaining points to be diſcuſſed will be eaſily ſettled; but ſhould he, which I muſt confeſs there is ſome reaſon to ſuppoſe he may, reject the firſt of them, it will not be in my power to treat further. In this caſe you muſt be ſenſible how anxiouſly I ſhall look for the conditional inſtructions I before entreated you would furniſh me with, and how neceſſary they will be for my further guidance and direction.

I have before repeatedly addreſſed you reſpecting the ſupplies of money; on which ſubject I have not been honoured with any letter from your Board, ſince the one of the 16th February, encloſing a bill of exchange for three lacks on the Gomaſtah of *Gopaul Doſs*. Uncertain as to the event of my negociation, and foreſeeing the probable occaſion there might be of all the treaſure collected on this ſide of *India* the next cold ſeaſon, I have endeavoured to avoid being obliged to uſe any part of it towards defraying the expences of the detachment till after the rains; but I have, contrary to my inclination, been neceſſitated to receive from the Company's treaſury at *Surat*, four lacks of Surat rupees; as the merchants of this place, after the greateſt trouble and difficulty, could only furniſh me with money for bills drawn upon you in their favour, amounting to three lacks and forty-four thouſand rupees.

The rate of exchange at which theſe bills are granted, is 100 Morſhedabad Sicca rupees for 93 Surat rupees, which is two per cent. worſe than was given the merchants of this place before; and one per cent. better than *Gopaul Doſs*'s Gomaſtah received, for reaſons aſſigned in a former letter, but which is, upon the whole, when every circumſtance comes to be conſidered, as favourable as could have been expected.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Head Quarters, Camp near *Surat*, 16th Auguſt, 1779. (Signed) *Tho. Goddard.*

Subject of the Conferences betwixt Colonel *Goddard* and the Vackeel from the Government of *Poonah*, Auguſt the 15th 1779.

Lutchman Row, Vackeel on the part of the Maratta Government, having arrived, together with *Nehab Chund Mounchy*,

Mounchy, a confidential perſon, and in a manner connected with him in that embaſſy, and having received their firſt audience they produced letters from the Peiſhwa *Madhurow Narrain*, and the Miniſter *Nanna Furneſe*, addreſſed to me, and importing that they had ſent *Luckman Row*, a perſon of underſtanding, and poſſeſſing their full confidence, to whom they begged I would truly communicate whatever I wiſhed to ſay.

As the expreſſion uſed on this occaſion implied no powers to treat or conclude being veſted in them, I firſt demanded of *Luckman Row*, if his Government had employed him in the ſame ample manner the Supreme Council of *Bengal* had authorized me to ſettle and agree in their name, as they would ſee from my original credentials then produced; or if not to the extent given me, how far they were empowered to treat?

In reply to this, they obſerved, that their orders were to receive whatever I had to propoſe to them, that though they might not poſſeſs powers to agree to every point, there were ſome which they were entruſted to conſent to on the part of the Miniſter, and whatever was of a nature contrary to theſe muſt be referred to him; to which they added, more than eight days would not be required to obtain an anſwer, as Dawkes were ſtationed all the way to *Poonah*.

Willing to bring matters to as ſpeedy a concluſion as poſſible, I aſked the ambaſſador if he would enter upon buſineſs immediately, or if it was his inclination to defer it till the next meeting? It was therefore ſettled that the conferences ſhould be deferred till next day, when the buſineſs ſhould be particularly entered upon and diſcuſſed; but as in the courſe of converſation many things were generally touched upon, from which ſome judgment may be formed of what may be expected during the progreſs of the negociation, I ſhall note them down with the remarks that occur.

The Vackeel, after declaring in the name of his Government, the ſtrongeſt inclination to live upon terms of friendſhip with the Engliſh, added, that an alliance had ſubſiſted for many years between the two States; that at the time of *Narrain Row*'s being put to death by *Ragonaut Row*, and the purſuit of the latter by *Siccaram Baboo*, *Nanna Furneſe*, and other confidential Chiefs, to puniſh ſo atrocious an act, Mr. *Moſtyn*, then Reſident on the part of the Bombay Government, was left behind at *Poonah*; that he took advantage of their abſence, and was guilty of many underhand practices; and having fled to *Bombay*, the Engliſh ſeized the opportunity of the ſecurity of the Maratta Government to poſſeſs themſelves of the iſland of *Salſette*; that afterwards *Ragoba* marched to *Surat* and was joined by Colonel *Keating* with an army of the Engliſh. He obſerved, that the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, highly diſpleaſed with theſe proceedings, had ſent Colonel *Upton* to ſettle the differences that had aroſe betwixt the Miniſters and the Bombay Council.

Reſpecting this treaty he ſaid, that on Colonel *Upton*'s firſt arrival, the Miniſters told him that treaties of peace were then ſubſiſting betwixt the Maratta State and the Government of *Bombay*; let us adhere to that; what occaſion to make a freſh one? Colonel *Upton* in reply ſaid, That the treaty he would enter into with them ſhould be of ſo ſtrong and binding a nature, that it ſhould laſt to the lateſt generation. They then propoſed that ſome perſon on the part of the Bombay Government ſhould be preſent; to which Colonel *Upton* objected, ſaying, it was by no means neceſſary; that however a letter was received from the gentlemen of *Bombay*, declaring themſelves bound by whatever Colonel *Upton* might conclude on the part of the Engliſh.

Reſpecting *Salſette*, he obſerved that on demanding reſtitution of that iſland, Colonel *Upton* told them that he could not agree to that without the authority of his Government. It was ſettled therefore that a reference ſhould be made to the Governor General and Council, and both parties mutually abide by their deciſion. This man ſays, that Colonel *Upton* aſſured them in the moſt ſolemn manner that that place ſhould be reſtored.

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The above is the ſubſtance of what was mentioned by the Vackeel in the firſt day's conference. I only replied in general terms, that it was the ſincere wiſh and intention of my Government to perpetuate that friendſhip he talked of as ſubſiſting betwixt the Engliſh and Marattas; and ſince his maſter profeſſed to be directed by the ſame ſentiments, I made not the ſmalleſt doubt but we ſhould ſoon agree upon the means by which that might be effected: that what I had to propoſe was ſolely with a view to accompliſh that end, in the manner beſt calculated for the mutual honour and intereſt of both parties, totally to remove all doubts and animoſities from the minds of either, and eſtabliſh in their room the moſt perfect and good underſtanding and friendly confidence.

Little more paſſed at this time, but the Vackeel's begging leave to aſk one queſtion, which was, if the ſeal of the Company was not always to be conſidered as ſacred? adding, that all his Government deſired was, that juſtice might be done them on this occaſion. The Vackeel then took his leave.

From what the Vackeel has dropped to-day, I plainly perceive he means to lay the ſtreſs of his argument upon the following circumſtances: the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*, notwithſtanding which the Government of *Bombay* entered into a war with the Marattas, and the little ſecurity the Peiſhwa has therefore, that in caſe of a peace being now concluded, they will not again commence hoſtilities. What he alludes to, ſpeaking of juſtice, muſt be the terms of the late convention, by which the Bombayers deſervedly ſuffered.

Though I mention Vackeel, the perſon oſtenſibly ſo does not carry on the conferences. The conducting the buſineſs of this negociation is wholly left to the *Nehal Chund*, who ſeems to be a man of acuteneſs and abilities and behaves himſelf with great propriety and judgment.

Auguſt 16th 1779.

The conference of this day, after the ſeveral compliments, began with the Vackeel's reviving the ſubjects of the preceding one, regarding the detention of *Salſette*; the injuſtice of which he founded on the mode by which it had been ſurpriſed. As this, and ſome other circumſtances he was about to mention, happened previous to the treaty of *Poorunder*, when all paſt diſputes were finally adjuſted, I thought it neceſſary to ſtop his further proſecution of theſe ſubjects, by obſerving that referring thus to ancient feuds and differences, were we to indulge it mutually, would lead to an endleſs train of argument, and carry us further from the point we wiſhed to attain, an honourable peace, than we firſt ſet out; that for my own part, if I looked back to any thing it ſhould be to our former friendſhip; and that I conſidered whatever had paſſed previous to Colonel *Upton*'s treaty, to be no longer the ſubject of conſideration and debate. I then aſked him, if his Government did not think themſelves bound by the articles of that treaty? He replied, they did, till the late engagements made with Mr. *Carnac* at *Worgaum*.

I then thought it proper to open myſelf more fully to him, and explain the ſentiments of my Government, and the propoſals they had empowered me to make; which I did in the moſt ample manner, uſing the ſeveral arguments contained in the plan I had prepared for my guidance in this negociation, to prove the propriety and juſtice which dictated them, and the mutual advantage that muſt be the inevitable conſequence of their being accepted.

Regarding the propoſal of receding from the pretenſions the Marattas had acquired by the engagements made with Mr. *Carnac* at *Worgaum*, the Vackeel obſerved, that the ſeal of the Company, the ſame ſeal which had been uſed in the treaty of *Poorunder*, was in poſſeſſion of that gentleman; that he had aſſured him,

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that whatever he agreed to under the impreſſion of that ſeal, muſt be binding upon the Engliſh; and that they themſelves, ſenſible of the ſacred light in which we held it, had fully truſted to the faithful performance on our part of all Mr. *Carnac*'s engagements, conſiſtent with which belief they had been guided by the moderate conduct they had purſued.

I replied, they judged rightly of the force in which we conſidered an agreement entered into under the ſeal of the Company, from which it was never known that the Government of *Bengal* had in the ſmalleſt degree departed; that they had not done ſo in this inſtance, and they could not, conſiſtent with their own honour, the important intereſts committed to their charge, and the dignity of the Engliſh name, conſent that a treaty ſolemnly entered into and inviolably obſerved by themſelves, ſhould be ſet aſide without their ſanction and authority.

To this the Vackeel pertinently remarked, that his maſter could not help being of opinion, from what had formerly happened when the Bombay Government poſſeſſed themſelves of *Salſette*, and the arguments now uſed, that had the late attempt proved ſucceſsful, a very different judgment would have paſſed upon their conduct.

I obſerved, the Government of *Bengal* had never interfered with the Maratta affairs, previouſly to the ſettlement made by Colonel *Upton*; that of courſe the occurrences preceding that period could not be admitted in compariſon of the preſent inſtance.

I then exemplified the juſtice of the ſentiments of my Government, by ſuppoſing an inſtance of a ſimilar nature was to happen in the Maratta State, would the Peiſhwa, who had entruſted the care of his provinces to one of his Sardars, conſent to relinquiſh them to another perſon, becauſe the Chief in whom he had confided had been conſtrained to enter into an agreement for that purpoſe, from his having purſued a conduct contrary to the orders, or at leaſt without the authority of his maſter? I pointed out to the Vackeel, that the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* were ſupreme in all matters of Government, and that particularly reſpecting peace or war with the ſeveral States of *Hindoſtan*, the ſole power was veſted in them. I then told him to adviſe his maſter, if he put any value on the friendſhip of the Engliſh, to embrace the propoſal now made him; that excluſive of its juſtice and propriety, which I had fully explained, his acquieſcence in it would be the ſtrongeſt proof he could give of his wiſhing to remain on terms of amity with us; and that unleſs he did agree to it, I could not, conſiſtent with the orders and inſtructions of my Government, conſider him as a friend and ally of my nation.

His concluſive reply on this ſubject was as follows: that he acknowledged the arguments I had advanced were not without reaſon, but that by their conſequence his maſter was deprived of that juſtice which he alone ſolicited and expected; that it was true he had no cauſe of complaint againſt the Governor General and Supreme Council of *Bengal*, though their name was uſed as a ſanction to the manifeſto publiſhed by the Bombay Government and *Ragoba*; ſince, I had declared it was done with their authority: but ſtill he ſaid his maſter and the Miniſter were of opinion, that the ſeal of the Company, into whatever hands entruſted, ought to be conſidered by us as inviolable, and that the Governor General and Supreme Council of *Bengal* would ſhew the ſacred regard in which they held it, by adhering ſtrictly to the terms of the late convention with Mr. *Carnac*; ſince, although it might be attended with loſs to themſelves, it would alſo be a laſting proof of their conduct being influenced by the moſt rigid principles of juſtice and good faith.

I then repeated all the arguments I had before uſed, with aſſuring him in the end, that as my Government conſidered the propoſals they had empowered me to make, to be entirely conſiſtent with juſtice, and for the mutual intereſt and honour of both parties, I had not the ſmalleſt doubt but the Peiſhwa and Miniſter would alſo upon mature deliberation and reflection view them in the ſame light, and give their conſent accordingly; ſhould it unfortunately be otherwiſe, I was under the neceſſity of telling him that I was not empowered to treat with the Maratta State until this condition ſhould be acceded to; and requeſted he would intimate this to his maſter.

With reſpect to the ſecond preliminary article relating to the French; the Vackeel gave me every aſſurance on the part of his maſter that words could expreſs, promiſing to acquieſce in whatever might be propoſed for the ſatisfaction of the Engliſh, in adjuſting that point. He denied the connection his Government had been accuſed of holding with that nation, and juſtified their behaviour to Monſieur *Saint Lubin* in the following manner:

When the diſputes firſt commenced betwixt the Engliſh and Marattas, intelligence of it was carried to the French King, who judging this a favourable opportunity, ſent Monſieur *Saint Lubin* with letters to his maſter. The cuſtom of all monarchs, and particularly where the embaſſy came from ſo diſtant a kingdom, betwixt which and the Maratta State no enmity exiſted, ſurely intitled Mr. *Saint Lubin* to a reception. From this conſideration only, he was permitted to viſit the Durbar, and received with every proper ceremony and reſpect; but when it was known to the Miniſter that theſe circumſtances had given offence to the Bengal Adminiſtration, *Saint Lubin* was immediately diſmiſſed. The man affirms, that no part of the propoſals made by the French were attended to; that no agreement whatever was concluded; and that even afterwards, when it was certain that the Engliſh were marching from *Bombay* to ſupport *Ragoba*, and *Saint Lubin* wrote to encourage the Miniſter with promiſes of being protected by the French, his offers were rejected, and he was told in reply, that the Engliſh and Marattas were ancient friends, and though temporary differences might ariſe betwixt them, they would ſoon be reconciled, and did not deſire the interference of any foreign Power.

Notwithſtanding theſe poſitive declarations, and the ſpecious language uſed by the Vackeel, the proofs of the Miniſter's former connection with the French ſeems to be perfectly clear, and the emiſſaries of that nation have, and ſtill continue to labour very ſtrenuouſly, to prevail with the Marattas to unite with them againſt the Engliſh. But though I am perſuaded that a correſpondence is at preſent carried on betwixt them, I am ſtill of opinion that the Miniſter, finding by repeated experience the folly of truſting to their promiſes of aſſiſtance, will wiſh to depend no longer upon ſo precarious a ſupport, and readily and ſeriouſly agree to ſhake off all connection with them.

In ſpeaking of the mutual advantage that would reſult to the Engliſh and Marattas from a ſincere and firm friendſhip, the Vackeel obſerved, theſe two were the only powerful States now left in *Hindoſtan* and *Decan*, and that unleſs the Marattas were the enemies of the Engliſh, the latter would meet with no one to oppoſe their arms, nor could any other Power but the Engliſh contend with the Marattas.

On this occaſion, he ſeemed to have forgot the progreſs made, and the encroachments ſtill making by *Hyder* upon the Maratta dominions; though in the courſe of our converſation, he obviated this circumſtance, by declaring that the march of the army from *Bombay* had put a ſtop to the operations againſt *Hyder* laſt ſeaſon; but that it was the intention of the Miniſter firſt to conclude a peace with the Engliſh, and afterwards recover the country wreſted from them by *Hyder*; hinting at the ſame time a hope of being aſſiſted by the Engliſh in this buſineſs.

My reply to this was in general terms of friendſhip, intimating, that where a ſincere and firm alliance ſubſiſted

liſted betwixt two nations, they would ever conſider the enemies of one another as their own.

Although, till the aſſent of the Miniſter was given to the two preliminary articles I had propoſed, I could not treat upon the remaining part of the treaty, I judged it proper to aſſure him, that as it was the deſire of my Government to eſtabliſh an honourable and laſting peace with the Maratta State; I was convinced the points now left to be diſcuſſed would be attended with no difficulty, and that I ſhould readily agree to whatever was juſt and equitable reſpecting them.

He obſerved of *Jamboojeer*, that when aſſignments were given upon it of the twelve lacks, it was ſettled that a perſon ſhould be ſent to ſuperintend the collections of that Pergunnah on the part of the Marattas, but the Government of *Bombay* afterwards refuſed to admit him. With reſpect to this, I told him it could make no difference, as the annual amount of its revenue had been regularly carried to the account of the Maratta Circar, charged with the ſums for the payment of which it had been given over, and that it was better that no perſon had reſided at *Jamboojeer* from the Marattas, ſince differences could not but have ariſen, which were now happily avoided.

He ſaid of *Veriow*, &c. ceded to the Engliſh by the Guicawars, that *Futty Sing* had wrote, acknowledging that he had no power to grant Sunnuds of thoſe places without the authority of the Peiſhwa; that his letter had been ſhewn to Colonel *Upton*, and, according to the treaty, theſe diſtricts ought to have been reſtored.

I remarked, that as theſe letters of *Futty Sing* muſt have been produced to Colonel *Upton* previous to the ſigning of the treaty, wherein it is ſtipulated that they ſhould be given up when proofs were brought to the effect he mentions, it was plain that theſe letters were not then judged ſufficient authority, and as no further proofs had been ſince adduced, my Government conſidered the right of the Engliſh to the poſſeſſion of thoſe places legal and unqueſtionable.

It gave me a good deal of ſurprize, that both in this conference and that of the preceding day, no overture whatever was made by the Vackeel reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*, nor his name mentioned by him, but in general terms when relating circumſtances that had happened. This ſilence regarding a perſon who cannot but be the principal object of their negociation, I muſt aſcribe to the deſire of *Nanah*, and his inſtructions given to the Vackeel accordingly, to obtain a confirmation and performance of the engagements made with Mr. *Carnac*, by which *Ragoba* would again be delivered into their hands.

A true copy of the conferences.

(Signed) *R. Dunkley*, Secy.

APPENDIX, No. 216.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, dated the 28th October 1779.

At a Council; PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, and *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Sir *Eyre Coote* gone to viſit the different ſtations of the army.

READ a letter from Brigadier General *Goddard* as follows:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your two letters, of the 14th June and 8th July; the former of which, on account of the expected cypher from *Bombay* not arriving before, I did not obtain an explanation of till within theſe few days. With reſpect to the ſubject of the latter, the ſeveral letters I have had the honour to addreſs you ſince that of the 6th June to which yours is an anſwer, will have fully ſatisfied you in every part of my conduct that might have been affected by the injunction contained in it relative to *Ragoba*; and I hope you will find cauſe to approve of the line I have hitherto laid down to be obſerved towards that Chief, as conſiſtent with your pleaſure now ſignified to me. Appendix, No. 216.

Many of the political points expreſſed in your letter of the 14th June, will have been in a good meaſure diſcuſſed and explained by the contents of thoſe I have already written you. I think it neceſſary however at this time to be as full upon them as I poſſibly can, and to ſum up in one view what may have been at different times communicated to you.

To begin then with what more immediately relates to the negociation for peace. In my letter of the 10th ultimo, I gave you an account of what had paſſed at the conference, I had held with the Maratta Vackeels, the opinion I had thence derived of the inclinations of their Government, and the hopes I had of receiving poſitive anſwers to the propoſals tranſmitted to the Miniſters in twelve days at fartheſt. Twice that period has elapſed without receiving any reply whatever; this delay may have been occaſioned by artifice or deſign in the Miniſters, or it may be attributed to ſome diſturbances which I know have happened on the road to *Poonah*, and make it probable our correſpondence has been intercepted. At any rate I have thought it expedient to obviate all in my power any inconvenience ariſing from further delay, and with that view have diſpatched *Lalla Neſſaul Chund* (one of the Maratta agents, by his own deſire and concurrence) expreſs to his maſter, fully informed in every particular. He has undertaken to return in twenty days at fartheſt, ſo that I have reaſon to expect to be ſoon able to give you certain information of the event of my commiſſion at the Court of *Poonah*. In the mean time I will acquaint you with ſuch particulars as have occurred in the courſe of my negociation, from which any concluſion may with probability be drawn of the views of Government, and of its ſucceſs or diſappointment.

I before told you of my firm opinion that *Nana* was inclined to make a peace, nor have I yet ſeen any cauſe to alter that opinion; on the contrary, I am perſuaded that whatever obſtacles may be thrown in the way, will originate from *Madajee Scindia*. This Chief, notwithſtanding the ſentiments entertained of his favourable diſpoſition towards the Engliſh by the Gentlemen of *Bombay*, appears to me their moſt inveterate foe, and I ſhould expect much ſooner to ſee a particular connection with the Miniſter than with him. Their relative ſituation to each other is this: the one with the name of Miniſter, and the ſhare of authority is almoſt entirely under the controul of the other, who poſſeſſing in Jaghire, ſome of the firſt provinces of the empire, receiving a moſt princely revenue, and at the ſame time having it in his power from circumſtances to ſucceed in obtaining new demands from the Miniſter, whenever he finds it for his convenience to make them, enjoys every ſubſtantial advantage he can wiſh for, and has in reality the direction of every public buſineſs of the State. It is eaſy to ſee, in this point of view, which of them has moſt reaſon to be ſatisfied with his ſituation, and whoſe intereſt it is to wiſh or endeavour at any change. *Scindia* gave remarkable proof of the independence he has aſſumed, by keeping poſſeſſion of *Ragoba*'s perſon himſelf, although the Miniſter was earneſt for having it delivered up to him, and even offered a crore of rupees in exchange. *Nanah* may be ſaid to owe every thing to *Scindia*. It was by his aſſiſtance he roſe ſuperior to the blow that had been ſtruck at *Poonah* in the beginning of laſt year; through his means he annihilated the remaining influence of *Morabah* and *Siccaram*, and fixed himſelf alone in the ſeat

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ſeat of Government. Theſe ſervices might merit the moſt grateful return; but the ſentiments that would dictate this, do not belong to a politician, and *Nana* is one. He fears the power of *Scindia*, and it is now the only remaining check to his views of abſolute rule, he earneſtly wiſhes, and is led to entertain hopes of being able to free himſelf from that alſo. I have enumerated theſe arguments to prove that it can never be the intention or inclination of *Scindia*, while the Government exiſts in its preſent form, to wiſh for any alteration, or connect himſelf with the Engliſh in order to effect it. This is further evinced by his having never made any overtures to me ſince the power given me to treat with the Maratta State became known, and by the aſſurances given me by *Ragoba*, that he had no hope or dependance whatever in *Scindia*, who would then only be induced to take an active part in his favour when he found he either actually had or was likely to ſucceed without his aſſiſtance.

To ſuppoſe that we can offer advantages to him ſuperior, or indeed adequate to thoſe he at preſent enjoys, does not, from the above ſtatement, ſeem reaſonable or conſiſtent; and when we further reflect, that by uniting himſelf with us in admitting into the empire a rival, from whoſe jealouſy and power he would believe he had every thing to ſuſpect and fear, I am perſuaded you will be of opinion, that no ſeparate alliance can, under the circumſtances I have deſcribed, be entered into with him.

My negociation has been entirely with the eſtabliſhed Government of the Maratta State, as you will have perceived, by the accounts tranſmitted you of it; and I have underſtood the ſeparate convention with *Scindia*, and the releaſe of the hoſtages, as neceſſarily included in the Miniſters conſent to relinquiſh all claims upon the treaty of *Worgaum*. Should this preliminary article be agreed to, with the advice and concurrence of *Scindia*, it muſt take place in all its parts, and ſhould the Miniſter be inclined to comply with it, contrary to the inclination of the other, it might prove the occaſion of a rupture between the parties, in which caſe both would be equally ſolicitous for the countenance and aſſiſtance of the Engliſh.

From the circumſtances above ſtated, and becauſe the negociation with the Miniſter is ſo far advanced, I have thought it moſt conſiſtent with the object of your inſtructions on this head, not to commence any excluſive intercourſe with *Scindia*, until the anſwers which may arrive from *Poonah*, or other cauſes of convenience may point it out, for the intereſt of your affairs to do ſo; when I ſhall ſtrictly adhere to the mode you have been pleaſed to lay down for my guidance in conducting it.

With reſpect to an alliance with *Moodajee Boonſla*, the anſwers I have received to all my letters, written ſince my arrival at *Surat*, and particularly to one, informing him of the commiſſion you had been pleaſed to entruſt me with at the Court of *Poonah*, as they contain nothing but general expreſſions of friendſhip, and earneſt wiſhes for the accompliſhment of a peace with the Marattas, ſeem to warrant my conſidering the negociation at *Nagpore* ſuſpended until ſuch time as you ſhall be pleaſed to honour me with your inſtructions for its reſumal.

Permit me to repeat the declarations I have before made, of exerting myſelf in the moſt ſtrenuous degree to obtain the object you continue to hold forth as the termination of all your political views on this ſide of *India*; nor am I without hope of being able to overcome the difficulties which have preſented themſelves to counteract it; as it has been my firſt endeavour to convince the Miniſter of the ſincere wiſh you entertained of peace, and the mutual benefits that muſt reſult from it, without ſuffering him to encourage the moſt diſtant idea that you could be induced to make any diſhonourable ſacrifice for the attainment of it.

My moſt arduous taſk has been to reſtrain *Ragoba*'s followers, who after accompanying him to this place, looked for a reward of their ſervices, little in his power to give. Some of them diſperſed through the villages neighbouring to *Surat*, committed depredations upon the ſubjects; which at ſo critical a juncture as this, when every act committed by *Ragoba*'s people, though neither by his authority or that of the Engliſh, would naturally be attributed to both, might have proved of the moſt fatal conſequence to your intereſts. To obviate this evil, and to enable *Ragoba* to diſcharge the moſt burthenſome and uſeleſs, and ſatisfy the principal people, whoſe higher demands could not be cleared off altogether, I have found it neceſſary to advance him ſince his arrival in the beginning of June 50,000 rupees per month, with which ſupply he alſo ſupported the expences of his family, the whole of which are now with him.

Previous to *Lala Neſhaul Chund*'s departure, at his own earneſt ſolicitation, that he might be able to ſatisfy his maſter on the point he had moſt at heart, I judged it requiſite to inform him in general of the intentions of the Engliſh regarding *Ragoba*, as far as I thought my inſtructions warranted, and ſeemed to render neceſſary at this time for facilitating the object of peace. I aſſured him they would never conſent to any reſtraint being uſed towards his perſon: that he muſt be permitted to reſide wherever he might chooſe, with a ſufficient allowance from the Maratta State, and that on theſe conditions he ſhould not be ſuffered to carry on any improper correſpondence, raiſe any commotions in their dominions, or if he did, he ſhould forfeit the allowance from them, and the friendſhip of the Engliſh.

I had previous to your letter conſulted the Select Committee on the ſubject regarding their Preſidency in my negociation, and had received every ſatisfactory information; which circumſtance I communicated to you in a former letter. Let me now aſſure you, that I ſhall continue to avail myſelf of their advice and information, in executing the truſts ſeparately committed to my charge: and ſhould all my endeavours for peace prove ineffectual, and a war become neceſſary, I ſhall chearfully and zealouſly co-operate with them in every plan that may be determined on for the intereſt and honour of the Company, and execute whatever military ſervice they may require conſiſtent with your inſtructions, and the proviſions you have been pleaſed to make for my guidance. It is alſo with particular ſatisfaction that I can at this time take upon me to aſſure you of the prepared and ſerviceable ſtate of the troops under me, complete in military ſtores, artillery thoroughly repaired, and provided with every requiſite for taking the field, and entering upon ſervice immediately.

I have ſo often had occaſion to expreſs my acknowledgment for the diſtinguiſhing marks of your favour, that I want words to declare at this time my grateful ſenſe of the new honours you have been pleaſed to confer upon me. I am conſcious how unequal language would prove, to convey the full idea of thoſe ſentiments of gratitude you have inſpired me with: I ſhall therefore not attempt the deſcription, but truſt to the zeal, perſeverance, and undeviating attention with which I ſhall labour to promote the honour and intereſts of the Company, for your future teſtimony of my having exerted all my abilities and endeavours to merit the reward you have ſo liberally beſtowed.

Camp near *Surat*, 12th September 1779. I am, &c. &c. (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

APPENDIX, Nos. 217, 218—220.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th November 1779.

READ the following letters from Brigadier General *Goddard*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your letter of the 2d Auguſt, and feel myſelf particularly happy at the ſatisfaction

faction you expreſs in the receipt of my addreſſes of the 12th and 18th June; I beg to aſſure you that I ſhall pay the ſtricteſt attention to the additional inſtruction you have been pleaſed to give me reſpecting *Ragoba*, in my negociation with the Maratta Miniſters, and ſhall uſe them only under the latitude you have thought proper to confine me.

At preſent, on account of the anſwer to my propoſals ſent by *Nehal Chund*, the Maratta agent, not having yet arrived, the buſineſs muſt remain a few days in ſuſpenſe; and indeed from the nature of the intelligence communicated to me from *Poonah*, which I have reaſon to conſider moſt authentic, the reply I may expect to the offers already made, will in all probability be ſuch as to preclude me from the opportunity of renewing the old or making freſh demands.

I have in a former letter mentioned to you the ambitious views of *Scindia*, and the jealous apprehenſions entertained of that Chief by the Miniſter's conſiderations of mutual intereſt, have been the only bond of their union, as the one found himſelf too weak to maintain his authority without the aſſiſtance of the other; and *Scindia* again, though not daring to take the power into his own hands, derived from the weakneſs and dependance of the Miniſters ſufficient reſources to gratify his avarice and ambition in their full extent. *Nana Furneſe*, ſince the complete triumph he obtained laſt year, and the removal of the Chiefs, who before ſhared the nominal Adminiſtration with himſelf, has diſcovered an inclination to ſhake off all further ſubjection to *Scindia*, which is not unknown to the latter; ſo that it would appear an open quarrel between them is almoſt unavoidable. We muſt endeavour to trace the cauſe why this event, ſo natural to expect, has not yet happened. The cloſe connection of *Scindia* with *Holkar*, and the fear of their united forces, together with the ſtrong party the influence of theſe Chiefs has created in the State, muſt deter *Nanah* from publicly declaring his enmity; and till he does that, and the rupture becomes avowed and open, *Scindia* will not unite himſelf with the Engliſh, or take part in any reſpect againſt the preſent eſtabliſhed Government.

The ſecret wiſhes of *Nanah* ought, one would think, to have induced him to make a peace with the Engliſh at this time, which would be ſo much for his own intereſt, and not by entering into a war, give that weight to his rival which his military ſtrength muſt ever claim in time of neceſſity. It appears, however, he has taken a contrary part. He has made conceſſions to *Scindia* to bind him to his ſervice; and has prevailed on him to viſit *Poonah*, where they are in concert, making every preparation for hoſtilities, and ſettling the plan for the enſuing campaign. We muſt therefore look for another key to his conduct; and this I conceive to be the proſpect the Miniſter has of aſſiſtance from the French. The promiſes made him of the arrival of their armaments, and the confirmed belief this opinion has received from our moderate and pacific propoſals, which they it is probable attribute to our apprehenſions of being attacked by the French in combination with themſelves.

I am happy at the proſpect of the acceſſion of force you have been pleaſed to make under my command; and have, in obedience to your directions, written to the Preſidencies of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay*, fixing upon the general rendezvous at *Surat*; to which place I have entreated the former to ſend their proportion of troops with all poſſible expedition. The convenient ſituation of *Surat*, open to a communication by ſea ſo near *Bombay* that diſpatches or ſuccours may at any time be ſent to and from it, and in addition to theſe, the firm footing it gives us on the Continent, where, in caſe of the arrival of a *French* armament, the preſence of the army would be an effectual check upon the Miniſter *Goicawar* to prevent their forming a junction with the invaders, have determined me in the choice of it. And I hope you will from theſe, and another conſideration, which it is unneceſſary to mention, approve of the meaſure.

I think it proper to encloſe for your peruſal extract of a letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, on the ſubject of your reſolution of the 14th June, and of my anſwer to it. I make no doubt they either have or will make known theſe ſentiments to you themſelves; and my intention in communicating them at preſent, is principally to point out to you the fair proſpect there is, that no difference in opinion will retard or injure the public ſervice, and my fixed determination to avoid every ſubject of conteſt and contrariety of intereſt whatever.

I have only to add, that although the ſpirit of this letter may ſeem to breathe an approaching war, I would not be poſitively underſtood in that ſenſe; for although the intelligence I have received, and other circumſtances which have come to my knowledge, are ſuch as to juſtify theſe ſuſpicions, I do not think myſelf authorized to deliver a decided opinion, till I hear from the Maratta agent whom I ſent to *Poonah*; and a very few days muſt furniſh me with the knowledge to be derived from his intelligence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Camp near *Surat*, 4th October 1779. (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

Appendix. *No. 218.*

No. 218.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 13th ultimo. The letters I have from time to time tranſmitted you, giving an account of the ſituation of affairs here, and of the progreſs and proſpect of my negociations with the Maratta Miniſters, will have been ſufficient to explain to you the doubtful and uncertain ſtate in which it was found when your letters arrived. It may not however be amiſs to mention ſome further particulars that ſerve to juſtify the ſuſpicions ſuggeſted to you in my laſt letter, and which I cannot help ſtill entertaining, of the hoſtile and perfidious inclinations of the Miniſter, and at the ſame time prove the fair and ſufficient opportunities given him of preventing the evils of a war, and, ſhould he longer perſiſt in the ſame deſigning conduct, the juſt and neceſſary grounds on which we are compelled to undertake it.

I will take no notice of the authentic information, both public and private, ſent me of the hoſtile intentions of the Maratta Chiefs; it is ſufficient that I at preſent remark ſuch parts of the Miniſter's behaviour, as may lead to a diſcovery of his real deſigns. When the confidential perſons firſt arrived from him, I communicated through them without loſs of time the propoſals you had directed me to make on the part of your Government, and ſoon afterwards from an apprehenſion that by truſting entirely to an epiſtolary correſpondence, he would have it in his power to practiſe the art of delay, ſo common a part of Maratta politics, I reſolved to diſpatch *Nehal Chund*, one of the agents of *Poonah*, fully and minutely inſtructed in every point neceſſary to reconcile him to, and promote the ſucceſs of my negociations; with this I acquainted you in a former letter; the man faithfully promiſed to return himſelf, or tranſmit an anſwer in twenty days. When your letter of the 13th ultimo reached me, twice the ſtipulated period had elapſed, and in the courſe of this delay, although repeated advices had been received from the Miniſter by *Lutchmanrow*, the remaining agent, he communicated to me no information by which I could ſuppoſe the propoſals were agreed to, on the contrary, he gave me to underſtand the reverſe, by telling me, that frequent conſultations had been held upon the ſubject of my propoſals, and that particular anſwers had been prepared to each, which would be ſent by *Nehal Chund*; he had alſo at two different periods intimated to me that this man had received his audience for leave of his maſter, and would ſet off for *Surat* immediately. This declara-

Appendix. Nos. 219 to 221.

tion he repeated on the morning of the 18th to me more confidently than before; but upon my interrogating him closely, he acknowledged that he did not expect he would leave *Poonah* till after the celebration of the Dusserah, which would happen on the 19th, so that by calculation of the supposed letters, mentioning his having been dismissed, he must have afterwards remained at *Poonah* at least fifteen days.

From the manifest duplicity and artifice this behaviour of the Maratta agent discovered in his master, and from a consideration of the circumstances above enumerated, as well as of the distance to *Poonah*, being near 150 coss, the difficulty and delay to which one person would be subjected in travelling it, which might be productive of future political inconvenience; conscious also that the object you had in view would be equally well answered at the point to which matters are now brought, and which could not be known to you at the time you wrote, if I pursued a different mode of putting the sincerity and friendship of the Ministers to a test than that contained in your letter of the 13th ultimo. I adopted the following, which I hope will meet your approbation.

On the morning of the 18th instant, when *Lutchmanrow* the Maratta Vackeel waited upon me, and communicated to me the circumstances respecting *Nehal Chund*'s leave and departure, as mentioned above; I declared to him the doubts I could not but entertain of the hostile inclinations and designs of his master from the delay that unnecessarily arose in transmitting the answer to proposals by *Nehal Chund*, as well as the evasive excuses given by himself regarding it. That notwithstanding these just grounds for suspicion, the English were still ready to shew their sincere inclinations for peace, and grant every indulgence they possibly could consistent with a regard to their own honour and safety, and that therefore I would wait 15 days more, in which time he said a letter might arrive in reply to one he would dispatch that instant, at the expiration of which, if *Nehal Chund* did not arrive, or a satisfactory answer to the proposals I had transmitted by him in the name of my Government, I should consider this delay as a declaration of war, and act accordingly.

I at the same time delivered *Lutchmanrow* letters for the Peishwa and Minister, and to the same effect. The period to which I have thus limited them expires the 3d November, and as so many days yet remain to that date, I am not without the fullest hopes that the emissary *Nehal Chund* will previously arrive; at the same time, I see great reason to apprehend that the proposals I made to the Minister, if acceded to by him, will be complied with only upon conditions that it may not be in my power to give my consent to.

I shall not fail to write you upon the earliest information I can obtain relative to this business; and have the honour to be,

With the greatest respect, &c. &c.

(Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

Head Quarters, camp near *Surat*, 20th October 1779.

No. 220.

Bengal Secret Consultations, 29th November 1779.

Agreed, That the following reply be written to Brigadier General *Goddard*.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We are sorry to observe that you have made so large an allowance as fifty thousand rupees a month to *Ragoba*, or indeed any allowance. We do not think he has any claim of this nature upon the Company, and the orders we had given you respecting him were merely confined to protection. We therefore positively direct that the allowances do cease from the receipt of this letter.

If *Ragoba*'s influence is so far sunk that he cannot procure for himself the necessaries, we cannot consent to supply him with the superfluities of life, nor can we see how the Company's affairs will be benefited by an intimate connection with a man from whose influence no advantages can be derived; and we already find so many difficulties in answering the demands made upon our treasury for the necessary and unavoidable expences of your detachment, that we cannot agree to authorize any unnecessary disbursements.

We are, &c. &c.

Fort William, the 29th November 1779.

Warren Hastings,
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 219.

Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence.

Letter from Governor General to *Ragonaut Row*, 19th August 1779.

I HAVE been favoured with your two letters, and perfectly understand the contents.

The first of them I understand to have been written under circumstances which having been since totally changed, it is unnecessary to reply to it further than to inform you, that letters having been written to me at the same time, containing the same demands but in fuller terms, I have replied, in conformity to the resolutions of this Government, by a total disavowal of the convention of *Worgaum*, as made without any authority from this Government, and refused to abide by a tittle of the terms contained therein.

It will be my constant rule, as it has been the unvaried practice of the Rulers of the English Government, to adhere most rigidly to the faith of public treaties.

You must have learnt from your Vackeels here, the anxiety I was under for your personal safety from the time of the unfortunate event which put you into the power of your enemies, until the joyful tidings reached me of your safe arrival at the English camp at *Surat*. The satisfaction this news gave me is not to be expressed. I was particularly pleased that this was brought about by your own prowess and magnanimity, as well as that you made choice of the English army as an asylum. Letters have been written to General *Goddard* approving of the protection he afforded you. To him whom you will regard as myself I must refer you for further particulars. Regarding me as a sincere friend ever anxious for your welfare let me frequently have the pleasure to hear from you.

APPENDIX, No. 221.

Bengal Secret Consultations, 29th November 1779.

Extract of a Letter from the Honourable the President and Select Committee of *Bombay* to Brigadier General *Thomas Goddard*; dated September 17th 1779.

WE likewise have received advices from the Governor General and Council, dated the 14th June and 8th of July; wherein they communicate to us the line of conduct they have taken respecting this Presidency, and the powers and instructions they have given to you.

Though we think those powers an absolute infringement of the rights immediately inherent in us; yet from our regard to the public service, which must suffer injury by any contest between us and the Governor General and Council, we have determined, first making due reservation of our rights, not to oppose the operation of their orders, but shall unite with you with the same confidence and cordiality as before in promoting the success of whatever measures circumstances may render it necessary to adopt.

In

In like manner we conſider the elevated military rank they have given you, confined to the ſphere of our juriſdiction, as another point in which our rights are invaded; yet as it has taken place, we feel pleaſure in this diſtinction being conferred upon you, and congratulate you upon it.

A true copy.

R. Dunkley, Secy.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General *Thomas Goddard* to the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*; dated September 29th 1779.

Whatever may be your ſentiments regarding the reſolutions taken by the Governor General and Supreme Council, and the line of conduct they have been pleaſed to preſcribe for our mutual guidance, it affords me the higheſt ſatisfaction that no injury can thereby happen to the public ſervice, from the declaration you have made of uniting with me, with the ſame confidence and cordiality as before, in promoting the ſucceſs of whatever meaſures circumſtances may render it neceſſary to adopt. Allow me on my part to repeat the aſſurances I have already given of being wholly guided in my conduct by a fixed regard to the intereſts of the company and of your Government, and cheerfully concurring in every operation that may conduce to this uſeful and deſirable end.

I beg to offer my ſincere thanks for the congratulations you have made me on my late appointment; and on this ſubject, without preſuming to enter, in the moſt diſtant degree, into any ſort of argument on the propriety or legality of the meaſure, I cannot but obſerve, that as the flattering encomiums you were pleaſed to beſtow upon my conduct muſt have proved a powerful recommendation in my favour to the Government of *Bengal*, of which I am myſelf fully ſenſible, they ſeem alſo on this occaſion to have been influenced by the ſpirit of that paragraph reſpecting me, contained in your Preſident's minute, which in all its parts has ſo juſtly merited and received their attention and approbation.

A true copy.

(Signed) *R. Dunkley*, Secy.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 6th December 1779.

Read a letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*.

We cannot but moſt ſenſibly feel the invaſion upon the rights and powers immediately veſted in us by the Honourable Company, and thus illegally, as we conceive, tranſferred to General *Goddard*, by your inſtructions of the 14th of June; your charging him excluſively with the immediate intereſts of this Preſidency, with the power of making peace or war for us at his own choice, and with an army under his own independent command, to proſecute whatever meaſures he may think proper to adopt, are inſtances of delegated authority both unconſtitutional, and in the higheſt degree injurious to the rights abſolutely inherent in us, under the ſubordination due to you by Act of Parliament. Thoſe rights, gentlemen, being eſtabliſhed on fixed and aſcertained grounds, it is needleſs to enter into a detail or argumentative defence of them; we muſt appeal to a higher power to reſtore to us the free exerciſe of them; and in the mean time, from our regard to the public ſervice which muſt ſuffer injury in the conteſt, we ſhall not oppoſe the operation of your orders; though we ſtill hereby make a ſolemn reſervation of our rights thus violently infringed, and which are not in the ſmalleſt degree impaired or leſſened by our conceſſion in this inſtance.

As *Moodajee Bountello* is a Power immediately connected with your Government, we have no deſire to interfere in the negociation with him, further than the intereſts of this Preſidency may be affected thereby or render neceſſary, even though it may be carried on within the limits of our own authority.

We have ever treated General *Goddard* with the confidence and attention due to his ſtation and merits, and of our own motion invited him to our councils: nor ſhall we now be leſs ready to conſult with him on any meaſure that may have a relation to your inſtructions; though this does not appear very material, as he is placed independent of our reſolutions. Appendix. No. 222.

Though any diſtinction that could with propriety have been conferred on General *Goddard* would have given us pleaſure, your granting him an elevated rank, confined to the ſphere of our juriſdiction, is another of the points wherein we think our rights invaded, and may be productive of many bad conſequences, which we ſhall be very glad may not happen; our opinion of General *Goddard*'s merits, as an officer, and our reſpect for you, would no doubt have led us to entruſt to him the conduct of all military operations, had the opinion been left to us; but as he is totally independent in this point, the extenſion of power in conferring ſuch an appointment appears as inexpedient as it is unauthorized.

We ſhall to the beſt of our comprehenſion obſerve your directions in the points where any degree of agency is left to us. The reputed head of the Guicawar family is totally inſane, and diſordered in his mind; and the priority of right to the executive office of Government has been long diſputed between the two brothers, *Futty Sing* and *Govin Row*, one claiming as the elder born, the other as ſon of the wife of firſt rank; but the pretenſions of the former have been generally ſupported by the Poonah Durbar.

We have no account of the ſtate of General *Goddard*'s negociation; but we encloſe copy of a letter we ſent him at his deſire under the 3d of July, giving an account of the ſtate of the treaty of *Poorunder*, and the articles which remained unperformed.

We are with reſpect,

Bombay Caſtle, the 6th September 1779. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*.

APPENDIX, No. 222.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 29th November 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.

READ the following letter from *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We had the honour to receive your letter of the 2d Auguſt, acquainting us with your reaſons for thinking the French at the iſlands meditate an attack on *Bombay*, and requeſting in conſequence that we would detach one battalion of Europeans, three battalions of Sepoys, and fifty artillery men, from the forces belonging to this Preſidency, to join the army commanded by Brigadier General *Goddard*, whom you ſhould direct to grant the moſt effectual ſupport in his power to the Government of *Bombay*, for defeating any hoſtile attempt which may be made againſt it. Fort St. George, 20th October.

We ſhall always be led by inclination, as well as duty, to co-operate with you to the utmoſt of our power, in any plan you may adopt for the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions; but in the preſent caſe, we hope there will be no neceſſity for ſuch great ſuccour to aſſiſt the gentlemen at *Bombay*, even ſhould they be attacked, ſince we underſtand their force is very equal to their pro-

Appendix. No. 222.

tection againſt any attempt that can be made by the French in their preſent ſtate; and we are inclined ourſelves to this opinion, becauſe having written to *Bombay* in the month of July, to inform the Preſident and Council of the intelligence we had received relative to the intentions of the French, they do not in their anſwer expreſs the leaſt apprehenſion of the inſufficiency of their force; and we ſhould ſuppoſe further, that had they any doubt on this head, they would have detained the *Aſia* man of war, which was ſent from *England* purpoſely to aſſiſt in their defence, and which they allowed to leave *Bombay* in the month of Auguſt, to join the Admiral at this place.

But after all, we conceive the French at the iſlands will not be in a condition to fit out an armament againſt *Bombay*, without conſiderable ſupport from *France*; and as far as we can learn from private intelligence, their nation is too much preſſed both in *Europe* and in the *Weſt Indies*, to ſpare any reinforcements for this country.

Brigadier General *Goddard*, in a letter to General Sir *Hector Munro*, dated the 15th Auguſt, after mentioning that he is authorized to make a requiſition of the force at *Mahé* writes as follows: "At preſent it is impoſſible "for me to ſpeak with any certainty of the effect of my "negociation with the Maratta State, or whether I may "have occaſion for this reinforcement or not; but I "ſhall make it my care to have every thing prepared for "the tranſportation of the troops; I hope you will pre-"viouſly furniſh the officer who is in charge of them "with ſuch directions as may prevent any cauſe of delay "in their embarkation, ſhould circumſtances ſo fall out "as to render their junction neceſſary."

We have likewiſe a letter from our Commandant at *Mahé*, incloſing a copy of one from the Governor of *Bombay* to him, in which he writes: "Brigadier General "*Goddard* acquaints me, that he has been adviſed from "*Bengal*, that the troops under your command at *Mahé* "will be inſtructed to obey his requiſition to join his "army, ſhould he not ſucceed in his negociations with "the Marattas."

From theſe letters we ſhould conceive, that the object of the reinforcement was principally to ſupport General *Goddard*'s negociations with the Marattas, and this is certainly a matter of ſo much importance that we are diſpoſed heartily to concur with you in promoting it. We have ſent directions to Colonel *Braithwaite* to obey any requiſition that may be made by Brigadier General *Goddard* for the troops at *Mahé*, which conſiſt of one company of European infantry, one company of artillery, ſix companies of grenadier, and eight companies of battalion Sepoys. We think it proper to mention, however, that we are under ſome doubt, whether the Sepoys will voluntarily embark on this new ſervice, ſince they have been abſent from the coaſt nine months; and though they went to *Mahé* (by ſea) with uncommon alacrity, and have behaved remarkably well there, they have expreſſed an anxious deſire to return to the coaſt; and Colonel *Braithwaite* ſome time ago ſaid, that if they were detained from it much longer he was apprehenſive that a conſiderable number might deſert. We are inclined, notwithſtanding, to believe they will be prevailed on to proceed if the ſervice requires it; but ſhould they not, we have deſired the earlieſt notice may be given us, that we may replace them with an equal number which can be ſent from our northern garriſons to *Anjengo* in a very ſhort time, and embarked from thence.

As to any further reinforcement than the above, we are apprehenſive our ſituation will not admit of it, at leaſt for the preſent. The non-arrival of the fleet leaves us at great uncertainty concerning the King's troops, and the ſeaſon being now too late for the ſhips to come on the coaſt, we are at a loſs where or when to expect them. We muſt obſerve likewiſe, that the conduct of *Hyder Ally* makes it abſolutely neceſſary for us to be as much as poſſible on our guard. The language he holds in his correſpondence, and the great preparations he is making for war, manifeſt a ſtrong intention to break with the Company; and we believe he only waits a favourable conjuncture which may ſoon happen. A war with *Hyder*, let the event be ever ſo ſucceſsful on our part, would diſtreſs the *Carnatic* beyond meaſure, and prove a moſt expenſive burthen on the Company. We ſincerely hope therefore, that General *Goddard* may conclude a treaty with the Marattas and thereby free the Company from the neceſſity of engaging with the two moſt powerful States of *India* at the ſame time, which will probably be the caſe if he fail in his negociation. Should we be at peace with the Marattas, *Hyder* will be afraid to diſturb us; for, excluſive of our ſtrength, which he would then have no hopes of reſiſting, the determined enmity which the Marattas bear him, would induce him rather to court our friendſhip than to provoke us into hoſtilities; and this is preciſely the ſtate wherein only we can expect to preſerve that general tranquillity in the *Carnatic*, which is ſo neceſſary at all times, but eſpecially at this juncture.

We earneſtly requeſt you will be pleaſed to ſend by the firſt proper conveyance the five lacks of rupees which were promiſed us in Auguſt laſt, and which are much wanted to anſwer our extraordinary demands.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Fort Saint George, 30th October 1779. (Signed) *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Agreed, That the following reply be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letters, dated the 6th, 7th, and 30th October.

The Honourable Company's ſhip *Ganges* arrived the 13th, and the *General Barker* the 14th inſtant, and have brought with them the French recruits mentioned in your letter of the 6th October.

Your detention of the recruits conſigned to this Preſidency by the Honourable Court of Directors, has been a very ſerious diſappointment to us; the reaſons which you have aſſigned for this act is not ſatisfactory; a courſe of three weeks, during which the recruits were or might have been on ſhore at *Fort Saint George*, was ſufficient, with proper refreſhment, at leaſt to have put them into ſuch a train of recovery as to have fitted them to undertake the remainder of their voyage to this port; and the additional argument which you allege, namely, that you have not received any liſt of them, was and ought, as we conceive, to have been underſtood as a proof that they did not appertain to your Preſidency. Your ſcruples excited by this uncertainty, might have been eaſily removed by the reflection that you had already a number of our recruits of the laſt ſeaſon, more than equal to that of the preſent importation, and that the latter might therefore have been ſpared without any diminution of the proportion altogether aſſigned to you.

We feel this loſs the more ſenſibly becauſe it has fallen on us at a ſeaſon in which it could not be retrieved in the ordinary way for many months to come; and of this you yourſelves ſhould have been aware, when you promiſed to ſend us our full proportion of the recruits arrived and coming in the fleet, as ſoon as you were acquainted with their deſtination. This promiſe affords but too much ground for the apprehenſion that you propoſe in like manner to detain all the remaining recruits which have been deſigned for this Preſidency.

We were greatly diſtreſſed by the like detention of our recruits the laſt year; but yielded to the apparent neceſſity, which was then urged a plea for it, and confided in your promiſe to reſtore them as ſoon as the ſiege of *Pondicherry* was concluded; notwithſtanding this promiſe and our demand for them in letter of the 4th February laſt, they are ſtill withheld from us.

Our full complement of European ſoldiers is conſiderably below the proportion which it ought to bear to the native troops of this eſtabliſhment, and with all the

ſupplies which it has hitherto been in the power of the Company to ſend us, we have rarely exceeded one-half even of that complement; but if you avail yourſelves of the advantage which your ſituation puts into your hands, of intercepting our recruits on their way to us, you eventually hazard the loſs of all the Company's poſſeſſions in this country, and of their exiſtence with them.

Such a diminution of our proper ſtrength is at this time particularly diſtreſſing, and may be attended with inſtant danger; it will either impoſe upon us the neceſſity of ſupplying the deficiency by new levies of native troops, and increaſing the proportion between them and our European ſoldiery, or of leaving our means of defence indequate to the extent of our territory and connections, or the many calls to which we are become liable, for the maintenance of the Company's general political ſyſtem, and the ſupport of our part in the war with France, and the Maratta State, which we now regard as inevitable.

From theſe conſiderations, it is indiſpenſably incumbent on us to demand, in the moſt peremptory manner, and we do accordingly ſo require you, immediately to ſend us all the recruits, both of the laſt and of the preſent ſeaſon, who were deſigned by the Court of Directors for their ſervice on this eſtabliſhment, and whom you have detained; and that no doubt may remain, either of their identity or deſtination, we encloſe you authentic copies of the liſt of the military who were paſſengers on each ſhip, as far as our lateſt receipts of them. As the preſent ſeaſon will not admit of theſe being tranſported by ſea, we ſhall ſend officers by the *General Barker*, to receive charge of them, and to conduct them to *Calcutta*, either directly by ſea or by marching them firſt to *Ganjam*, as ſhall be deemed moſt adviſable; and we deſire that you will cauſe them to be delivered over to ſuch officers immediately on their arrival, and grant them every requiſite aſſiſtance for conducting the men in ſafety to the place of their deſtination.

We are ſorry that you deemed it inexpedient to furniſh the detachment under the command of General *Goddard* at *Surat*, with the reinforcement of troops which we required; but we hope that your orders to Colonel *Braithwaite*, to join him with the forces under his command, will prove effectual.

Fort William, We are, &c. &c.
29th November 1779.

Reſolved, That the officers be directed to hold themſelves in readineſs to proceed by the *General Barker*, to *Fort St. George*, there to receive charge of all the recruits belonging to this Preſidency, and to conduct them to *Fort William*, either directly by ſea, or by land to *Ganjam*, in order to proceed from thence in veſſels which will be provided for them.

Ordered, That all the officers belonging to this eſtabliſhment, who are at preſent at *Fort St. George* on leave of abſence, do return to *Bengal* by this opportunity.

APPENDIX, No. 223.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

Intelligence from *Naigpore*; dated the 21ſt of Jammadeaſſanie, 7th of July.

ADVICES from *Poonah* ſay that when the news of the near approach of *Dewajee Pundit*, the Vackeel of *Modajee Bhoſila*, was received by *Nanah Purnaveeſe*, he propoſed to go out and meet him, together with *Sewal Madho Row*. When *Dewajee* heard it, he immediately ſent a meſſage to him, deſiring that he would not give himſelf that trouble, on account of him who was at all times his ſervant. On this *Nanah* laid aſide his deſign, and ſent *Hurry Pundit Purkeah*, to meet and conduct *Dewajee* to him: *Hurry Pundit* accordingly went and met him, and on the 8th of Jemmadeaſſanie (24th June) they arrived at *Poonah*, and went to the houſe of *Naroo Pundit*. The day afterwards he waited on *Sewal Madho Row*, and was very kindly received. Appendix. No. 223.

The forces of *Sindeah* and *Holcar* purſued *Ragonaut Row* a great way, but could not overtake him; he got ſafely to *Surat*. The ſaid Chiefs ſent directions to their forces, to canton eight days journey on this ſide of *Goujeraut*, and that other forces ſhould be ſent to join them.

It is reported here, that the Engliſh forces being joined, are encamped 16 coſs on this ſide of *Surat*. There is the proſpect of hoſtilities in two or three months. Colonel *Goddard* is returned from *Bombay*, and joined the army.

We hear that *Modajee*'s Vackeel, who was with the Engliſh at *Surat*, has left them, and joined *Dewajee Pundit* at *Poonah*.

From Maha Rajah *Modajee Bhoſila*: dated the 4th Rujjib, 19th of July; received the 6th of October 1779.

I have been favoured after a long ſilence with your two agreeable letters, written after the arrival of *Beneram Pundit*, and your becoming acquainted with the particulars of the paper in his charge; and received the greateſt pleaſure from the peruſal of them. You write that they are long, and breathe forth the ſentiments of friendſhip, wiſdom, and judgment; but that the great object of them all being entirely at an end, it is unneceſſary to recapitulate the ſubſtance of them: that having fully underſtood the contents of the paper delivered to you by *Beneram Pundit*, you had, agreeably to my deſire, returned it to him; that from the contents of it you underſtand it to have been meant to convey a clear and explicit information of my intentions to relinquiſh the plan propoſed by you, which my friendſhip would not allow me to make known to you by an abrupt declaration, otherwiſe it was unneceſſary to have written volumes on a ſubject which required no more than a ſingle line: that what is paſt is paſt; and that of the deſigns which you had formed, you ſhall relinquiſh all future thoughts, but that of my paſt kindneſs in the ſervices I rendered the Engliſh army on their arrival at *Hoſhungabad*, in ſending a perſon of rank and truſt to wait for them, and in furniſhing them with proviſions and whatever they ſtood in need of, and in ſhewing them all the dues of hoſpitality, you ſhall ever retain a grateful remembrance; and that you ſhall be happy to make every ſuitable return to theſe obligations whenever any future occaſion of my affairs ſhall demand it: that you have written to Major *Camac* to remain within the borders of *Bengal*, and not to proceed any further, but have not recalled him to *Calcutta*, not having determined what part of your army he ſhall join, which will depend on future contingencies.

The pleaſing contents of theſe letters which though written under the veil of obſcurity, yet at leaſt declare your ſteady adherence to the friendſhip and connection eſtabliſhed between us, I fully underſtand.

With theſe letters there was none from *Beneram Pundit*, who is acquained with the moſt ſecret negociations between us, nor have I yet received the paper I entruſted to him; but this is of no conſequence, it will arrive.

Since on becoming acquainted with the contents of the paper I ſent you, you totally relinquiſhed your deſigns, and regarded it as a clear and explicit anſwer, and giving up all your views, confined yourſelf ſolely to the preſervation of friendſhip between us, it would be equally uſeleſs and improper in me to repeat to you my ſentiments, views, and intentions, with reſpect to future affairs, and would even carry the appearance that I was acting a deceitful part, watching my own opportunity, and promoting the cauſe of my countrymen; yet, the ſtrict ties of friendſhip, candour, and confidence, which have taken place in the courſe of our laſt year's correſpondence,

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(during which ſpace I have received more than an hundred very friendly letters from you) will oblige me to the performance of what I conceive an indiſpenſable duty of friendſhip, viz. to communicate to one's friend the conſequences which are likely to attend any particular meaſure, and the advantages or diſadvantages attendant thereon, whether ſuch friend chooſes to pay attention thereto or not.

The caſe ſtands thus: as on the deceaſe of the incomparable Mr. *Elliott* all our views remained under the veil of ſecrecy, you ſent for *Biſſember Pundit* to a private audience, and entruſted the points of Mr. *Elliott*'s commiſſion, which were of the moſt delicate nature, to him, to be written to me, and informed me, that thoſe were the ſecret matters which were intended to have been verbally communicated to me by the late Mr. *Elliott*; and that, having maturely conſidered them, I would adopt meaſures to carry them into effect, and write to you for whatever was required for that purpoſe.

On peruſing this letter in private, I perceived the moſt extenſive deſigns and views of univerſal conqueſt. In the firſt place I found it impoſſible with my pen, which is a mode the ſecrecy of which cannot be depended upon, to expreſs my aſſent or diſapprobation, and ſecondly, I conceived beyond the abilities of Vackeels to negociate an affair of ſuch importance, as the views of every perſon are enlarged or contracted according to their characters and rank in life, and therefore earneſtly wiſhed, agreeable to your intimation, to ſend my Miniſter *Dewagur Pundit* twelve days journey towards *Cuttack*, and that it might ſuit you to come and meet him, that ſo all points might be clearly ſettled in a conference without the interference or knowledge of a third perſon. As this, by reaſon of a variety of cauſes, did not take place on either ſide, I was under the neceſſity of committing thoſe important matters to writing, under the ſanction of the Mighty God, (who reads the hearts of his creatures, and from whoſe omniſcience nothing, however ſecret, can be hid) in which I paid the ſtricteſt attention to the rights of the illuſtrious family on the Rauze, and acknowledging my obedience due thereto, propoſed meaſures, which I judged indiſpenſably neceſſary for the re-eſtabliſhment of the affairs of the Rauze.

Theſe propoſals, conſidered as the production of the moſt complete knowledge in the myſteries of Government, were well worthy of approbation: it is probable that the reader of it to you did not lay the ſtreſs he ought to have done on the important objects it contained, to carry conviction to your mind; or *Beneram Pundit* did not repreſent my propoſitions to you in their real and proper colours.

What is to be done? I cannot convey my ſoul into the body of another; or perhaps, learning from the newſpapers the ill-concerted plans of the Chiefs of *Bombay*, you have ſuffered yourſelf to be led by your indignation thereat, from the paths of equanimity and ſound policy; and conſidering it is inconſiſtent with your magnanimity to accept of the aſſiſtance of your friends, you rejected the propoſitions I tranſmitted you, and regarding the expences of that plan as entirely unneceſſary and fruitleſs, determined to depend ſolely on the bravery and magnanimity of the Engliſh!

What can I ſay? or to what end ſhall I ſwell my letter, on this ſubject? Were I preſent with you, I would, from motives of the ſincereſt friendſhip, ſet the matter before you in its true light, and point out to you the imminent dangers attendant upon theſe meaſures; and you would, I am convinced, give your aſſent thereto. Had my ambition the wings of an eagle, one flight would bring us together, when every point would be cleared up.

Although the Marattas are in poſſeſſion of near 300 forts, built of ſtone, furniſhed with all kinds of warlike ſtores, and can in caſe of war collect into one body near 200,000 cavalry; beſides the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, and others alſo, who are all alarmed at the incroachments of the Engliſh into the Decan, and are waiting a favourable opportunity to repel them; and although their mode of making war, and activity is ſuch, that they will in one night gain a diſtance of 50 coſs, both eating and ſleeping on their horſes; haraſſing an oppoſing army on all quarters, and cutting off all its convoys and ſupplies, making the moſt furious attacks on it whenever they find an opportunity; retreating and returning to the charge; laying ſtratagems by pretended flight to draw parties of the enemy to purſue them, and then rallying and cutting them off, by which policy they have defeated all the Chiefs and Rajahs of *Hindoſtan*, to wit, *Sefoe Dhayeath*, *Hadah*, *Cotchouana*, and *Ranna*, &c. as alſo the powerful Ameers, in a multitude of battles, and reduced all thoſe countries to their ſubjection, and have at all times afforded their aſſiſtance to the king; yet notwithſtanding all this, the Engliſh propoſe, without having made preparations or collected the neceſſaries of war, to overcome them by a trifling effort, and to reduce them to obedience. This is really aſtoniſhing.

You write that one line was ſufficient to have given an anſwer to the propoſed deſigns, and that there was no neceſſity to have written ſo voluminouſly, that is to ſay, "your forces are arrived at *Hoſhungabad*, my troops ſhall join them, and ſhall ſettle the buſineſs."

This cauſes me real ſurprize, and the end of it would have proved a parallel to that of the plan of the Engliſh at *Bombay*.

To oppoſe a mountain, a mountain is requiſite, what effect would be produced by throwing pebbles at it? Should a perſon attempt to extinguith a raging fire, which had ſeized on a jungle of reeds, by throwing on it a handful of water, ſhould we not be induced to ſmile at his vain attempt, when nothing leſs than an ocean of water would be ſufficient? Perſons experienced in the affairs of war and ſlaughter, and ſkilled in the maxims of ancient States, make the conſiderations above recited the guide of their conduct: by the bleſſing of God you are known to have great experience in buſineſs. Regard what I have above written as dictated ſolely by warm friendſhip; and on conſidering maturely, you will approve thereof.

As I had received your letter, informing me that you had given up all thoughts of proſecuting this buſineſs, but remained firm in your friendſhip, and repeating your obligations to me, and had likewiſe got letters from Colonel *Goddard* and Mr. *Wathersſtone*, aſking my advice with reſpect to the meaſures to be adopted, which was accompanied by a letter from the Governor of *Bombay*, I judged it adviſable to diſpatch *Dewagur Pundit* to *Poonah*; which I accordingly did. He arrived there in ſafety, and had ſeveral conferences with the Prime Miniſter, *Nanah Purnaveſe*, who is a man of great wiſdom, and ſteadily attached to his word and engagements. In the courſe of theſe, he repreſented my integrity and good faith, and took an opportunity to mention in a proper manner, the apprehenſions conceived with reſpect to the French.

As letters from Colonel *Goddard*, addreſſed to *Row Pundit Purdhaun* and *Dewagur Pundit*, informing them of the powers with which he was inveſted from the Company to make peace with the Marattas, and aſking *Dewagur Pundit*'s advice, as to his future meaſures, had been received at *Poonah*, anſwers were returned thereto. The ſubſtance of *Dewagur Pundit*'s reply, and the one which he cauſed *Pundit Purdhaun* to write, you will fully learn from another letter which relates the whole, as written me by *Dewagur Pundit*.

You will therefore write to Colonel *Goddard* to make peace, a meaſure highly proper, which will be the means of eſtabliſhing tranquillity in the country, removing all cauſes of apprehenſion from the deſigns of the French, and preſerving the faith of treaty to the lateſt poſterity.

I wiſh to act as the guarantee to this treaty between *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Engliſh Chiefs, that it may be inviolably preſerved.

You

You will therefore regard all theſe meaſures which I have taken, as the moſt convincing proofs of my friendſhip and attachment to the Engliſh, and will ſend me an immediate anſwer; for which I am very anxious.

Poſtſcript.

With reſpect to what you mention of my not having given an anſwer to Major *Camac*, the caſe was this: Coſſids belonging to Colonel *Goddard*, brought a letter addreſſed to Major *Camac* from *Burhanpore*; which Coſſids requeſted a letter from me to Major *Camac*; but it being night, they departed without my leave.

This proves the ignorance of the Coſſids.

Had I received a letter from Major *Camac*, I ſhould have returned a proper anſwer to it.

What you now write, with reſpect to your having ſuſpended his march forward, is highly proper.

2d. Poſtſcript.

The note encloſed in your letter, was deſigned for the preſervation of ſecrecy, by informing me of the impropriety of communicating ſuch matters to *Ramkaunt*; but that I was the beſt judge of my own affairs. The circumſtance is this: after the deceaſe of Mr. *Elliott*, *Ramkaunt* was the only one of his followers who made his appearance before me; and as a perſon ſent by you, of whatever rank or condition, is dear to me, I regarded him equally with *Beneram Pundit*.

Actuated by ſincere friendſhip, I regard my own intereſt as beſt promoted by your advice: ſuch advice is good as is founded on the welfare and intereſt of one's friend, not on ſelf intereſt.

From *Moodajee Bhooſila*; received the 31ſt October 1779.

Your friendly letter informing me of your having recalled Major *Camac*, &c. (here follows a repetition of the particulars of the Governor's letter of the 12th of May) arrived in a happy hour; and by its contents afforded me the greateſt pleaſure.

Your unreſerved communication on the ſtate of affairs, and of your views and ſentiments, which is a proof of ſincere friendſhip, gave me the greateſt ſatisfaction, and increaſed my attachment to you.

Some time ago, on the receipt of letters from my Miniſter, *Dewagur Pundit* (whom I had thought proper before Colonel *Goddard* marched to *Surat*, to diſpatch at the deſire of the Miniſters to *Poonah*) which letters contained the particulars of the converſations he had had with *Nanna Purnaveeſe*; in which, actuated by friendſhip, he had uſed every argument to convince him of your diſtinguiſhed virtues, and particularly of your ſincerity and good faith, and of the ſteadineſs of the Engliſh nation; as well as what he heard from *Nannah Purnaveſe*, what he ſaw of the ſtate of the Maratta armies, forts, &c. and of the meaſures which appeared to him moſt eligible to be purſued in future. I ſent them, accompanied by his reply to your letter, to *Calcutta*; from which you muſt have gained a compelte knowledge of every matter. Thoſe letters were dictated ſolely by friendſhip to the Engliſh, without regard to any other conſideration.

On the receipt of your laſt letter, I diſpatched it, together with your letter addreſſed to him, to *Dewagur Pundit*: and likewiſe wrote to *Row Pundit Purdhaun* and his Miniſters, what I judged moſt expedient to induce them to adhere to the Engliſh friendſhip.

In the mean time letters were received at *Poonah*, by *Pundit Purdhaun*, *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, and *Dewagur Pundit*, adviſing them, that he had been inveſted by the Governor General and Supreme Council of *Bengal* with full powers to negociate and conclude a treaty of peace and friendſhip with the Marattas; and that as it was his wiſh to eſtabliſh a good underſtanding, and to remove every ground of quarrel and diſpute, he deſired that a perſon of truſt might be deputed from thence to negociate with him, having no doubt but that on his arrival, all matters would be amicably ſettled; that he himſelf would repair to any place that ſhould be fixed on for an interview, where every thing might be perſonally adjuſted: a letter to *Pundit Purdhaun* was likewiſe received from you, expreſſing your deſire for an amicable accommodation. All theſe letters agreed in ſubſtance with thoſe from this quarter; in conſequence of which long conferences were held between *Nanna Purnaveeſe* and *Dewagur Pundit*, on the mode of re-eſtabliſhing harmony and friendſhip; the full particulars of which you will learn from the letters of *Dewagur Pundit*. A perſon of truſt was deputed on the part of *Pundit Purdhaun* to *Surat*, to negociate with Colonel *Goddard*, and *Dewagur Pundit* wrote his ſentiments very fully to the Colonel; you will therefore write to Colonel *Goddard* ſuch inſtructions as you judge expedient to remove all grounds of diſputes and hoſtilities. The earneſtneſs and zeal with which, prompted by my friendſhip to you, I have all along acted, and ſtill act in this buſineſs, and the conſtant and unreſerved communications which I have made to you on every event, you are, I doubt not, fully ſenſible of; an equal return of confidence on your part, in communicating your ſentiments to me, will be highly advantageous; and I doubt not but you will therefore let me frequently have the pleaſure to hear from you on this ſubject, as well as reſpecting your health.

Your permiſſion to *Beneram Pundit* to go to *Benares* for the recovery of his health, was very proper. I underſtand what *Beneram* writes, and ſince I began this letter, I have received two other letters from you of the ſame tenor as your former ones, to which I have fully replied both before and in my preſent letter. *Beneram Pundit* has orders to return to you as ſoon as his health ſhall be eſtabliſhed. The recal of Major *Camac* into the provinces of *Bengal* was highly proper and expedient.

What you have repeatedly written on the ſubject of caution and profound ſecrecy, I perfectly underſtand; all men of wiſdom, and more particularly rulers of a State, will preſerve their ſecrets in an equal, nay, even in a ſuperior, degree, to their lives.

As Mr. *Elliott* died in the way, and there was no perſon left but *Ramkaunt* who was acquainted with the languages, and was in fact intelligent and well verſed in buſineſs, for which he had great abilities, I thought it adviſable to join him with *Beneram Pundit*; and to theſe two alone I communicated both verbally and by letter whatever I had to ſay to you; but except theſe two, no one has been made acquainted with any part of our deſigns, nor ſhall any one in future.

APPENDIX, No. 224.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

Tranſlation of a Letter in the Hindoſtanny Language, from *Lalla Takur Doſs*: dated the 21ſt of Shabaun, 3d September 1779; received the 12th October 1779.

I HAVE been honoured with your gracious letter accompanied by Karetahs, from the Nabob Governor and yourſelf, addreſſed to *Madho Row Sindeah*, and *Mhatah Sada Shinkur*, Moonſhey. I cauſed the Karetah to be delivered to *Pateel Sahib* by the ſaid Moonſhey: *Pateel Sahib* ſent it to *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, who returned it five days afterwards in a letter from himſelf. *Pateel Sahib* having peruſed the letter, tore it, and gave orders to prepare an anſwer.

Appe Sabajee was ſome time ago ſent from hence to *Poonah*, to receive his diſmiſſion from *Nanna Purnaveeſe* to repair to *Calcutta*; but on the arrival of *Dewagur Pundit* at *Poonah*, by his advice his commiſſion was ſuſpended. Some time afterwards *Pateel Sahib* declared it as his opinion, and that he would ſend a meſſage through *Apajee*, that *Lalla Takur Doſs* ſhould be joined in commiſſion with *Apajee*, and ſent to *Calcutta*; on this, *Mhata Sada Sinkur* ſaid, "As this meaſure will not meet with the approba-

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" tion of the rulers of the Raje, if it is reſolved to eſta-
" bliſh a firm and perfect friendſhip, let the correſpon-
" dence with the Calcutta Chiefs on this ſubject be con-
" ducted through me, who am an old and experienced
" ſervant:" *Pateel Sahib* hearing this, continued ſilent. The Moonſhey related all theſe particulars to me; and added, that his diſpoſition was ſuch, that there was no depen-dence on him; that he was puffed with pride, and an arrogant opinion of his own abilities: and that it was to be apprehended, that after propoſals ſhould be made he would not abide thereby, which would draw the greateſt diſgrace on him.

You write, that whatever acts are done by Colonel *Goddard* are valid, and will be ratified: this I underſtand. The Colonel has accordingly entered into a correſpon-dence with *Pateel Sahib* and *Nanna Purnaveeſe*; and a Vackeel is gone to *Surat*, on the part of the Peiſhwa. *Pateel Sahib*, under the influence of avarice, ſubmits entirely to the authority of *Nanna Purnaveeſe*; who has the ſole direction of affairs. The Chiefs have publiſhed a declaration, that they will make war againſt any one who ſhall enter this country.

Some time ago intelligence having been received of the arrival of an Engliſh fleet at *Bombay*, a Vackeel on the part of *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, and *Apajee* on the part of *Pateel Sahib* went with preſents to *Bombay*, where they were to continue; but have ſince returned hither with the preſents.

Colonel *Goddard* has written ſeveral letters to the Peiſhwa and *Nanna Purnaveeſe*; the two firſt to the fol-lowing effect (See *Modajee*'s laſt letters). In the third he propoſes an interview, by which all points might be ſettled, to which anſwers have been returned. If an in-terview is ſettled between the Colonel and *Nanna Pur-naveeſe*, *Pateel Sahib* will likewiſe repair to it.

Nanna Purnaveeſe is ſatisfied, that the Engliſh Chiefs would make their own terms, upon condition that they deliver up *Ragonaut Row* to him, or keep a ſtrict watch over him.

Nanna Purvaneeſe ſends frequent invitations to *Pateel Sahib* to repair to *Poonah*, who conſtantly replies, that he is coming; but the fact is, that he is employed in pre-paring a place of ſtrength for his own ſecurity, and his people have all orders to the ſame effect. After this is completed he will go to *Poonah*.

Nanna Purnaveeſe is deſirous of ſending *Pateel Sahib* to the *Carnatic*, and *Hurry Pundit* againſt *Ragonaut Row*; and although *Pateel Sahib* diſapproves of the deſigns, yet there is great reaſon to believe that *Nanna Purnaveeſe* will ſend him thither.

Goolzar Khan, formerly an officer of the Peiſhwa, but who is now attached to the intereſt of *Ragonaut Row*, has connected himſelf with the Kellahdar of *Ajeer*: has raiſed 10, or 12,000 horſe, and invaded *Khandaſe*; and levied large contributions on the villages under the Peiſhwa's government: he is alſo conſtantly augment-ing his army. In conſequence of this, *Pateel Sahib* wrote to the forces ſtationed in the neighbourhood of *Burham-pore*, who were formerly ſtationed with *Ragonaut Row*, to take meaſures to reduce *Goolzar Khan*: this body, conſiſting of 4 or 5,000 horſe, were defeated by *Goolzar Khan*: *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, receiving advice of this, diſ-patched the brother of *Bhum Row Panſa*, with 7,000 horſe and foot againſt him, who likewiſe received a de-feat. Afterwards *Baharee Rutt Sindeah*, with a good army, on the part of *Pateel Sahib*; and on the part of *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, a body of Gardies, French, &c. were ſent againſt him. In the two aforementioned engage-ments, great numbers on this ſide were killed, and *Goolzar Khan*'s people have taken poſſeſſion of their houſes, and placed guards in them. *Goolzar Khan* is making vigorous efforts to continue the war; and it is ſaid that *Ragonaut Row* has ſent a party of forces and ſome artillery to his aſſiſtance.

Baboojee Holcar is lately arrived in this diſtrict from *Hindoſtan*; levied ſeven lacks of rupees on the city of *Indorſe*; and removing all *Tocojee Holcar*'s officers, is making large contributions on the country, and raiſing forces: he is connected with *Ragonaut Row*.

It is reported that *Amrut Row*, the adopted ſon of *Ragonaut Row*, is gone on a negociation to *Bombay*.

Nanna Purnaveeſe has ſent a body of his forces to take poſſeſſion, and ſecure the ghauts and roads on the ſide of *Tellegong*.

All the Chiefs here to outward appearance are united in the ties of friendſhip: but in reality after the faſhion of *Hindoſtan*, the greateſt hatred and jealouſy prevails amongſt them all. In fact troubles exiſt in every quarter. *Hyder Naig*, *Nizam Alty Khan*, &c. as well as the Maratta Chiefs, are all making the greateſt preparations.

Dewajee Pundit, the Dewan of *Modajee Bhoſila*, lately arrived at *Poonah*, and entered into engagements with *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, with whom he is in high favour. *Dewa-jee* repreſented to *Nanna Purneveeſe*, as follows: " What
" have all thoſe men done for you, on whom you have
" expended lacks of rupees for their ſervices? Had you
" aided me with money and a body of forces, the affairs
" of the country would long ere this have been ſettled
" on the beſt footing; and the large ſums due from
" *Bengal* on account of the Chout would have been re-
" covered. I am at all times a duteous ſubject of the
" Sirkar, and the ſums above mentioned were the
" property of the Sirkar; but as you never once gave me
" the leaſt hint that it was your wiſh, we were under
" the neceſſity of entering into a ſpecious friendſhip
" with the Engliſh, and accordingly directed our Vac-
" keels to conciliate the good will of the Engliſh.

Nanna made anſwer—" Write to *Modajee* to raiſe
" troops; as whatever may happen, our intereſts are
" one; but ſhould he fear that the Engliſh in con-
" ſequence of his increaſing his forces would be diſ-
" pleaſed at him, let him write to them, to conciliate
" their friendſhip, a meaſure which I myſelf am like-
" wiſe contriving to effect."

Dewajee aſſented thereto; at the ſame time ob-
" ſerving, The Engliſh nation is a thorn in our ſide,
" replied, which it is neceſſary to get rid of." *Nanna*
" I am not inattentive thereto, and ſhall leave no means
" untried for that purpoſe."

Modajee Bhoſila has a Vackeel with *Pateel Sahib*, and a conſtant correſpondence is kept up.

Pateel Sahib, hoping to prevail on the Kellahdar of *Ajeer* to deliver up the fort for a ſum of money, means ſhortly to ſend him a Kellaat.

Of the two Surat gentlemen who were hoſtages, with *Pateel Sahib*, for the performance of the treaty, one was left at *Poonah* on account of ſickneſs; he is now arrived at the camp; he is allowed near 40 ſervants, 15 Talin-gas, and from *Pateel Sahib* has 26 horſemen to keep up his dignity.

They are both treated with the greateſt honour and attention, and are ſuffered to amuſe themſelves with hunting, in company with the horſemen. You are ac-quainted with one of theſe gentlemen by name, *Farmer*.

The Dewan of theſe gentlemen went on ſome buſineſs to *Poonah*: *Nanna Purnaveeſe* ſuſpecting that he came as a ſpy, threw him into priſon; which when *Pateel Sahib* heard, he wrote to *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, and obtained his releaſe from confinement, and return to the camp.

From the day when *Ragonaut Row* eſcaped from the hands of *Pateel Sahib*, the latter has appeared very much aſhamed, and alſo greatly apprehenſive leſt *Nanna Purnaveeſe* ſhould entertain ſuſpicions of him; and when the time of payment of the ſums ſtipulated arrives, ſhould diſpute the claim on the plea that he let *Ragonaut Row* go.

Nanna Purnaveeſe threw into priſon the private intel-ligence writer, whom the gentlemen at *Surat* ſent to *Poo-nah*; and the Engliſh in return, as ſoon as they heard it, im-priſoned a perſon who was at *Surat* on the part of *Nanna*.

Letters have been received here from *Timur Shah*'s Vackeel, at *Shajehanabad* to this effect: that *Timur Shah* at the invitation of the King *Shah Allum* is coming to

Hindoſtan to drive out the Europeans and ſettle the affairs of the country: if you are deſirous of friendſhip with him ſend an Arzie to him. *Pateel* returned for anſwer to *Timur Shaw*'s Vackeel, I am coming into *Hindoſtan*, and on my arrival will inform you of my ſentiments.

To-day being the 21ſt of Shabaun, (3d of September) a Shakka from his Majeſty, and a letter from the Nabob *Abdulaed Khan* were received. Thus much I have learnt of their contents, that Rajah *Baboo Pundit*, on the part of his Majeſty, and on the part of *Abdulaed Khan*, Rajah *Ram Cuſhmeery*, have been diſpatched with Kellaats for the Decan Chiefs.

As long as *Nanna* is at the head of affairs, *Pateel Sahib* will reply to the Karetahs you tranſmit me, with deceit and artifice; no confidence ſhould be placed in him, for he has no idea of good faith and integrity.

APPENDIX, No. 225.

Bengal Secret Correſpondence.

From *Dewagur Pundit*; received 31ſt October 1779.

ACKNOWLEDGING the receipt and recapitulating the contents of the Governor General's letter of the 12th of May.

This letter reached me in a happy hour at *Poonah*, afforded me the greateſt pleaſure, and made me acquainted with every matter.

Your unreſerved communications on the late events, and of your ſentiments, is a moſt pleaſing proof of that friendſhip which is ſo firmly eſtabliſhed between you and the Maha Rajah my maſter, and was highly proper, it having increaſed our regard for you an hundred-fold.

I have already written you volumes between the time of Colonel *Goddard*'s arrival at *Hoſhungabad*, to his departure for *Surat*; in which I touched on the improper meaſures adopted by the Bombay Chiefs for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*; the inexpediency of the march of Major *Camac*; the multitude of the forces of *Decan*; their mode of conducting war; the conjunction of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, &c. with them in their hoſtile intentions; together with my ſentiments on the meaſures you ought to adopt in future; to which I was induced by my ſteady and ſincere friendſhip for you; which alſo led me to inform you and Colonel *Goddard* of my intention to repair to *Poonah:* and after my arrival there, and having had frequent private conferences with the Miniſters, I diſpatched a letter for you to my maſter, containing a full and particular account of theſe conferences; of my unreſerved ſentiments thereon; of the real ſtate of affairs in *Decan*: and of the expediency at all events of peace and friendſhip with *Row Pundit Purdhaun*; which letter you have doubtleſs received before this time, together with letters from my maſter, and are fully acquainted with the contents. You have likewiſe undoubtedly, by this time, been made acquainted with the repeated letters of advice which, prompted by friendſhip, I wrote to Colonel *Goddard*, and the anſwers which he returned to me, to *Pundit Purdhaun*, and his Miniſters; to wit, that by letters from *Calcutta* he had been inveſted with full powers to negociate and conclude a peace with the Marattas; that he encloſed a copy of his commiſſion, and it being his wiſh to introduce a friendly intercourſe, and to remove all cauſes of diſpute or quarrel, he propoſed that a truſty perſon ſhould be ſent to negociate with him on the part of *Pundit Purdhaun*; and that in conſequence of this letter *Nanna Purnaveeſe* had diſpatched a truſty agent with letters to him.

In the mean time another letter was received from Colonel *Goddard*, ſaying, that as much time will be loſt in the journey backwards and forwards of a third perſon, he earneſtly wiſhed for a perſonal interview; and that he would repair to any place which ſhould be fixed on for that purpoſe. The Miniſters in anſwer thereto, with the advice of *Scindeah*, *Holcar*; and other Chiefs, wrote to Colonel *Goddard*, preſſing him in the moſt friendly terms to repair thither. It is highly probable, that ſhould Colonel *Goddard* come, all cauſes of quarrel and hoſtile acts contrary to treaty will be entirely removed, and all matters be conducted in future with friendſhip, integrity, and good faith; which will be productive of happineſs to the people, and of innumerable other advantages. Actuated by the moſt zealous friendſhip for you which poſſeſſes my whole heart; I employ every degree of wiſdom, penetration, and foreſight with which the Almighty has endowed me, and to which you give ſuch liberal praiſes for the accompliſhment of this deſirable end. My journey to *Poonah* was ſolely with the view of eſtabliſhing friendſhip between you and *Row Pundit Purdhaun*. Appendix. No. 225.

Your late letters to my maſter and me, in which, prompted by your friendſhip, you unreſervedly communicated to us the ſtate of affairs, and your determination to preſerve peace, as long as it can be done with honour to your Government, being ſent me from *Naigpore*, I in ſeveral private conferences with *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, preſſed the contents of them on him in the moſt forcible manner; and your letters to *Pundit Purdhaun*, expreſſing your deſire to preſerve the former treaties, arriving at the ſame time, and agreeing exactly with your aſſurances to my maſter and to me, I ſeized the opportunity of enlarging confidently to *Nanna Purnaveeſe* on the ſubject of your diſtinguiſhed virtues, your magnanimity, foreſight, and penetration; your ſkill in the myſteries of Government; your good faith, candour, and integrity; your adherence at all times to juſtice: your exemplary piety; your deliberation in reſolving in any meaſure, and your ſteadineſs in the purſuit of it; and in ſhort, on every one of thoſe great qualities which I have become acquainted with in the courſe of our correſpondence, and from the relation of the Vackeels who have paſſed between us. I alſo propoſed to him a mode of re-eſtabliſhing peace and friendſhip, from which the moſt important advantages would accrue. To this he replied,—

" It has ever been a maxim with ſkilful Rulers of States, " that the preſervation of peace and friendſhip with their " powerful neighbours, is infinitely preferable to war and " contentions; the one ſecuring peace and happineſs, " and the other bringing diſtreſs and calamity to the " people whom God has committed to their care; and " that whoever injures them, and from worldly motives " quits the paths of integrity and good faith, and there- " by plunges them into misfortune, will ſurely feel the " reſentment of God, their peculiar protector.

" Theſe conſiderations have ever kept me in awe, in- " ſomuch that I never ſuffer the treaties out of my ſight, " and daily call myſelf to an account; and I have the " greateſt attachment to all ſuch as make integrity " and good faith the rules of their conduct, and with " ſuch wiſh to be connected. The praiſes which you " give to the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, and which I " have likewiſe heard from other quarters, are due to " his virtues. But hear what I have to ſay to this ſub- " ject, and reply thereto. It is this:

" By reaſon of the vicinity of their ſettlements, and " the traffic carried on to the iſlands by boats laden with " the merchandize of all nations, the ties of friendſhip " were knit between the family of *Pundit Purdhaun* " and the Engliſh Chiefs, an intercourſe of letters and " vackeels eſtabliſhed very early, and alſo ſeveral trea- " ties concluded between them on certain conditions. " In the time of the troubles excited by *Ragonaut Row*, " when he took refuge with the Engliſh at *Bombay*, by " the deputation of Colonel *Upton*, who came from *Cal-* " *cutta* with full power to negociate, notwithſtanding the " exiſtence of ancient treaties, ſeveral articles which " may be found in the treaty were added. Of theſe new " articles then concluded reflect impartially, and declare " on whoſe ſide has the breach ariſen.

Appendix, No. 225.

" The arrival of a trader of the French nation to diſpoſe of merchandize here, was conſtrued into a deputation on the part of his nation; and letters written on " the ſubject, although there was not the leaſt truth in " the ſuppoſition or grounds for it. Notwithſtanding " this, ſolely from my deſire to oblige the Engliſh " Chiefs, I hove that merchant diſgracefully from the " Durbar, although the meaſure was quite contrary to " every maxim of Government, intending thereby to " give them complete ſatisfaction. When ſuch marks " of friendſhip were ſhewn on this part, their liſtening " to the perſuaſions of *Ragonaut Row*, and conceiving " the greateſt advantages might be derived from him, " their furniſhing him with warlike ſtores, a large train " of artillery, and a formidable army, and precipitately " advancing to *Boregaut*, and marching from thence, " ſpreading the flames of war around, can ſurely " never be reconciled to integrity and good faith: yet " notwithſtanding this, in the midſt of a furious war, " when the Bombay Chiefs made propoſals for peace, " and certain conditions being mutually agreed to, " and *Ragonaut Row* delivered into our hands, they " requeſted to be allowed to return to *Bombay* with " their followers, we furniſhed them with an eſcort for " their ſafe paſſage, and with every thing that could af- " ford them convenience, and ſhewed them every in- " ſtance of kindneſs. At the time when the Bombay " Chiefs began hoſtilities, repeated letters, with an ac- " count of theſe tranſactions, were written to *Calcutta*. " Since the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* has authority over " all the ſettlements, how could the invaſion of the " Bombay Chiefs be of their own accord?"

To this I replied—All theſe hoſtile acts were highly diſapproved by the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*; and all the meaſures adopted by the Gentlemen of *Bombay*, were contrary to the advice and inſtructions of the ſaid Nabob and his Council; and of this aſſertion the following is a proof, that the army which was arrived at *Hoſhungabad* remained on the banks of the *Nerbudda*, whilſt theſe hoſtile tranſactions were carried on almoſt in their very ſight, and never made the leaſt attempt to join the Bombay Chiefs. *Nanna Purnaveeſe* anſwered, " Had it happened that our army had been defeated by " that of *Bombay*, and all matters had ſucceeded to their " wiſh, would they or would they not have received the " higheſt commendations from the Council of *Calcutta*, " for their ſervices and the advantages they had pro- " cured? If this meaſure was really undertaken with- " out the approbation of the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* " and his Council, why does he not, ſince he has the " power of confirming and diſmiſſing in all the ſettle- " ments, puniſh the Chief of *Bombay* for his diſobedience " of orders and contempt of authority, which would carry " conviction with it? As the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* " has, in a late letter which I have received from him, " expreſſed his intention to adhere to treaty, and has in- " veſted Colonel *Goddard* with full powers to negociate " and ſettle all points in an amicable manner; and as " letters have likewiſe been received from the ſaid Co- " lonel, propoſing the renewal of engagements, and de- " ſiring that a truſty perſon may be deputed to confer " with him on ſeveral points; and declaring, that in re- " ceiving *Ragonaut Row*, he has no improper deſign, " but has done ſo ſolely from a conviction that it was for " the common intereſt, as it would prevent him from " exciting troubles in any other quarter, and offering to " repair in perſon to any place that ſhall be fixed on for " an interview, where the ſentiments of each party may " be made known and diſcuſſed, and all points amica- " bly ſettled. I have in conſequence diſpatched a truſty " agent with a friendly letter to him, and preſſed him in " the warmeſt terms to come hither;—ſhould he come, I " am ready to ſettle all matters agreeable to treaty. I " ſhall not be the cauſe of a breach of friendſhip, for I " regard the union of the two States as productive of " innumerable advantages to both. Do you write to " this effect to Colonel *Goddard*, and to the Nabob " *Amaud ul-Dowlah*."

I have accordingly written to Colonel *Goddard* and to Mr. *Watherſtone*, pointing out to them the advantage of peace, and the expediency of their repairing here; and actuated by the warmeſt friendſhip to you, I have, though highly diſagreeable to me, taken on myſelf the part of a news-writer, to make you acquainted with every tranſaction and occurrence here; and I have no doubt but you will regard it as a moſt convincing proof of my zeal and attachment to you. You will, I hope, write inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard* to re-eſtabliſh a friendly connection, to adhere to treaty, and to give no aſſiſtance to *Ragonaut Row*; for in my judgment, ſuch a friendly connection will be the cauſe of happineſs and numberleſs advantages to both parties.

1ſt Poſtſcript.

The ſum of this voluminous letter is briefly this: The ſole adviſer and manager of the affairs of *Row Pundit Purdhaun*'s Government is at this time *Balajee Pundit*; a man poſſeſſed of firmneſs beyond all the other Miniſters of this State; he is intelligent, penetrating, and true to his word; and ſo faithful an obſerver of his engagements, that he would never deviate in the leaſt inſtance from them, although by ſo doing he had a proſpect of the greateſt acquiſitions of territory or wealth, or even could he thereby enter into immediate poſſeſſion of ſuch advantages. After long conferences and arguments with him, he ſaid to me, " The " good faith of the Engliſh Chiefs, on every occaſion, " is ſo well known, that it becomes a proverb through- " out the country. The Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, who " is a perſon of integrity, truth, and upright conduct, " and poſſeſſes authority to regulate the meaſures of all " the ſettlements, and of confirming and diſmiſſing the " Chiefs of them, writes in his late letter, that he is " ſteady to the treaty concluded through Colonel *Upton*, " who had full powers from the Governor General and " Council for that purpoſe. This aſſertion ſurprizes me; " and my aſtoniſhment increaſes when I ſee the Engliſh " of *Bombay* acting in direct violation thereof; and the " ſaid Nabob taking no means to puniſh them, or to " ſhew his reſentment for their diſobedience and con- " tempt of his authority, yet writes me, that he con- " tinues firm to the treaty of Colonel *Upton*. What " can I ſay to this, or in what light can I regard it? As " the proſperity and well-being of a State depends on " a ſtrict adherence to its engagements, no advantage " will ever be gained by a Chief from the breach of " them; nor will any of his meaſures in ſuch caſe be " crowned with ſucceſs."

I replied, the Engliſh will never deviate from the treaty concluded by Colonel *Upton*. To this *Nanna Purnaveeſe* anſwered, " Colonel *Upton*'s treaty is here, con- " ſider it, and you will ſee that ſome of the conditions " of it we fulfilled, and others have been eluded, and " ſtill remain in diſpute." When the treaty was produced, I perceived that there were ſeveral points on which he had a right to demand ſatisfaction, and which appeared evident breaches of treaty; and that to leave them in their preſent unaccomplished State, would effectually prevent the eſtabliſhment of a ſincere friendſhip, it being primarily neceſſary to clear the path of all thorns and obſtructions, which being done, every matter might be ſettled to the ſatisfaction of both parties; my friendſhip to you, therefore, will not ſuffer me to expreſs my approbation at theſe points being left unfulfilled, and I ſhall therefore point out to you the ſeveral particulars to which I allude, and which are theſe ſtated by *Nanna Purnaveeſe*.

When, notwithſtanding the exiſtence of ſolemn and ancient treaties, they took the opportunity of the abſence of the Miniſter, who was gone towards *Burhanpore* to make themſelves maſters of *Salſette* by ſtrata-

gem; I would aſk, how this can be reconciled to the faith of treaty, and upon what grounds they acted?

When it was made an article in the treaty, that they ſhould not afford an aſylum to any of the dependants of the Raje, much leſs give them aſſiſtance; in what light ſhall we conſider their reception of *Ragonaut Row*; the encouragement they gave to him, and the war which they entered upon under his directions? and what can be ſaid on ſuch a ſubject?

In oppoſition to this conduct on their part, in diſregarding an article of ſuch material conſequence, that the violation of it entirely deſtroyed the treaty, and neceſſarily produced the moſt violent tumults and diſorders, I merely from a deſire to oblige the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, acted contrary to every maxim of Government, in refuſing countenance, and violently expelling from the Durbar, a creditable merchant of the French nation, who came hither to trade, although there was not the ſmalleſt mention in the treaty prohibiting Chiefs of the French Nation being received here. Let theſe two circumſtances be fairly weighed in the balance of juſtice, and ſee which ſcale predominates. Colonel *Upton*, who was inveſted with plenipotentiary powers from the Governor and Council inſerted in the treaty, that no aſylum ſhould be given by the Engliſh to *Ragonaut Row:* notwithſtanding which, the Governor of *Bombay* takes every meaſure to ſupport his cauſe, and will not diſcontinue his violation of treaty. See and conſider then, on whoſe ſide does the blame fall.

In the affair of *Shaſhtie*, which is a peculiar hereditary poſſeſſion of ours, all the acts of the Government of *Bombay* are clearly oppoſite to juſtice and good faith. As the Nabob *Amaud ul-Dowlah* is well verſed in the maxims of Government, and had we not demanded the reſtoration of it, it would have been a proof of the greateſt weakneſs and imbecility; we referred the determination of the matter to him—Let me aſk you what equity he ſhewed in the deciſion.

The Governor of *Bombay*, regarding the various treaties contracted between *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, and the Miniſters of the King of *England*, as the play-things of children, taking *Ragonaut Row* with him, repaired in an hoſtile manner to *Boregaut*; we delayed entering on hoſtilities for a full month, on the principle that the ſaid Chief would certainly, in the mean time, receive orders from *Calcutta*, forbidding him to proſecute ſo unjuſtifiable a war; but when they advanced beyond the Gauts, we were remedileſs, but we conſtantly wrote to *Calcutta* a full account of the tranſactions and events. Conſider this matter with impartiality, and declare on which ſide were the flames of war excited.

The declaration in their letters to your maſter and you, that they are deſirous to abide by and preſerve the engagements, as far as they can with honour, is highly right and commendable. As they wiſh to ſupport their own honour and dignity, by promoting the proſperity and ſucceſs of the affairs of their State, it is likewiſe equally incumbent upon them to keep in view the honour and dignity of the Raje of *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, which has ever been ſo illuſtrious, that it is needleſs to dwell on the ſubject. If the honour and dignity of both States are regarded as one, and their intereſts as the ſame, they will inviolably preſerve the faith of engagements, and promote the daily increaſe of friendſhip, and not when the circumſtances of the times ſhall render it expedient, ſpeciouſly to enter into engagements at the ſame time that they ſecretly mean to lay in wait for an opportunity of breaking them to their own advantage. As the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* poſſeſſes integrity and good faith, let him maturely conſider the above articles and be himſelf the judge; let him make compenſation for the non-performance of terms which cannot be now fulfilled, and write to Colonel *Goddard* on the advantages of an union between the States, and directing him to proſecute it; and I, on my part, am ready to join therein with the utmoſt good will.

Actuated by the warmeſt friendſhip to you, I have committed to paper whatever occurred to me in the peruſal of the treaty, what I heard from the Miniſters, and what my own judgment, free from partiality, pointed out, together with my ſentiments thereon. Appendix. No. 226.

2d Poſtſcript.

Reſpecting the recal of Major *Camac*, &c. literally the ſame as what the Rajah ſays on thoſe ſubjects.

3d Poſtſcript.

Colonel *Goddard* formerly wrote, that he was coming for the ſake of a meeting, at which all points ſhould be cleared up, and every matter finally adjuſted. In conſequence thereof, the Miniſters preſſed him in the warmeſt terms to come; in anſwer to which, *Balajee Pundit Purnaveeſe* has lately received a letter from the Colonel, that he has freely conferred on all matters with the agent who was ſent to him from *Poonah*, who has written a particular account thereof, that if he receive an anſwer thereto, and any mode of accommodation is determined on, he will repair to any place between *Surat* and *Poonah*, to have a meeting there with *Nanna Purnaveeſe*.

Nanna Purnaveeſe gave the letter into my hands, which I found to contain what I have written above. As he formerly of his own accord wrote that he would come hither in perſon to ſettle all matters, which was earneſtly wiſhed at *Poonah*, and now wrote in the manner before recited, *Nanna Purnaveeſe* ſaid to me, "it was his own "propoſal to come hither, and now he heſitates, what "is to be ſaid on this ſubject; there is no ground for "heſitation. I am of a diſpoſition abounding with can-"dour and integrity, and never violate the faith of "engagements; notwithſtanding their repeated breaches "of treaty, I am ready to accommodate matters through "Colonel *Goddard*; and will never, as long as atten-"tion is ſhewn to the honour and dignity of this family, "relinquiſh my hold of their friendſhip." From all that I have heard from the Poonah Miniſters, it appears they are inclined to peace; it is therefore incumbent on you to accommodate matters in an amicable manner.

It was my intention to have ſtaid here till after the arrival of Colonel *Goddard*, and his interview with the Miniſters, and to have ſettled all matters perſonally, by ſuch a treaty as ſhould not in future have been expoſed to the ſmalleſt deviation, and afterwards to have returned to *Naigpore*; but on the receipt of the letter from Colonel *Goddard*, which made it appear very uncertain if he would come, and at any rate that there would be a conſiderable delay; and as moreover it is a cuſtom in my family at the ſeaſon of the Duſſarah, to dedicate ten days and nights to the honour of God, and as I wiſh to pay the greateſt attention to this duty, which draws down bleſſings on me for the reſt of the twelve months, I am about to ſet out for *Naigpore:* you will therefore write to Colonel *Goddard*, if you judge proper, to purſue the line of peace, and to come hither to an interview with the fulleſt confidence and ſecurity, and will regard me at all times as your moſt warm and zealous friend.

APPENDIX, No. 226.

Copy of a Letter from *Dewagur Pundit*, *Modajee*'s Dewan, to General *Goddard*, encloſed in his Letter of the received the November 1779.

I HAVE received your agreeable letter which you diſpatched at the ſame time with your reply to *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, but which by accident did not reach me till fifteen days afterwards; and received the greateſt pleaſure from its contents.

Induced

Appendix. No. 226.

Induced by regard to you, and the intercourſe which has ſubſiſted for ſome time, I wrote to you in a ſtyle dictated by friendſhip. After which you wrote me, that in the preſent ſtate of affairs my journey to *Poonah* was a very eligible and well-judged meaſure, and highly pleaſing to you; and expreſſed your wiſh, that as I was perfectly acquainted with the negociations carrying on, and with your ſentiments, and was privy to the repreſentations made by Mr. *Watherſtone*, that I would ſtate the facts to *Row Pundit Purdhaun* and *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, and remove all doubts and ſuſpicions from their minds, being convinced that I was earneſtly deſirous of promoting peace and friendſhip between your State and that of *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, by every means in my power. You add, that the confidential agent diſpatched by the ſaid *Row* will ſhortly reach you, and that as the ſending Mr. *Watherſtone* would occaſion much delay, you had judged it beſt not to diſpatch him, but that after the arrival of the deputies, if it can be ſo managed, you will repair in perſon to this quarter, and will have a meeting with the Miniſter *Nanna Purnaveeſe* at any place which ſhall be fixed on for that purpoſe, and in my preſence ſettle the terms of a mutual peace and friendſhip. With regard to *Ragonaut Row*, you write that you have kept him with you, but not as conſidering him the enemy of this State; that your motives for detaining him have been that by ſo doing you ſhould promote the common intereſt. My friend, my coming to *Poonah* was ſolely from friendſhip and attachment to the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, and regard for you; that by my endeavours all miſunderſtandings and heartburnings might be removed, and the ties of friendſhip ſo firmly knit, as to ſtand every future ſhock. For this purpoſe all particulars were explained to Mr. *Watherſtone*, and alſo written to *Calcutta*; to repeat them would be therefore ſuperfluous.

The conduct of the negociations with the Maratta State, and of the correſpondence with *Pundit Purdhaun* and his Miniſters, for the eſtabliſhment of friendſhip and alliance; the propoſal that a perſon of truſt ſhould be deputed, and the reſolution of repairing hither in perſon after the arrival of ſuch deputy, to remove by a perſonal interview all cauſes of miſunderſtanding; the reſtoring the affairs ruined by the conduct of the Bombay Chiefs, and by that means acquiring immortal honour in the eyes of all the Engliſh Chiefs, were not acts of a common ſtamp, or to be undertaken by every one: you alone were equal to them, and by the bleſſing of God every point will be ſettled. All your plans are maturely digeſted, and conſiſtent with ſound policy, and I who am at all times your ſincere friend and well-wiſher, in my conferences with the Miniſter *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, have not forgotten the ſmalleſt tittle of your diſtinguiſhed virtues, but have placed them in the cleareſt point of view; and ſhould you come here and have an interview with the Miniſters, every matter will be ſettled in the moſt ſatisfactory manner.

No obſtacle remains, and every thing is for good faith and a ſteady adherence to treaty, as you will more fully learn from the letters tranſmitted to you from *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, and his Miniſter *Nanna Purnaveeſe*. After the arrival of *Row Pundit Purdhaun*'s deputy, you will doubtleſs determine to repair hither, that by means of a perſonal conference, all matters may be completely ſettled without the intervention of Vackeels or letters; you will ſuffer no kind of delay to ariſe, which may obſtruct the execution of a meaſure which has been already ſufficiently weighed, and is ripe for accompliſhment, and of the very firſt importance.

I ſtated to *Nanna Purnaveeſe* in the ſtrongeſt terms what you write reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*, and convinced him of the propriety of your meaſures.

A Karetah and letters from the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, addreſſed to the Maha Rajah my maſter, and to me, which were tranſmitted to *Naigpore* by the way of *Cuttack*, were ſent from thence to me at *Poonah*; the purport of which is, that he is ready to confirm the ties of friendſhip and a mutual good underſtanding with *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, in any manner that ſhall not bring diſhonour on the Engliſh Government. In anſwer thereto, with the approbation of *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, I have written what was required for the preſervation of friendſhip, and of the faith of treaty, and I doubt not but you have received inſtructions from *Calcutta*, conformable thereto. In a word, you will regard me at all times and in all places as ſincerely and unchangeably attached to you, and ready to fulfil every duty of friendſhip. May you ever enjoy peace of mind, and undiſturbed felicity!

Poſtſcript.

After I had made myſelf acquainted with the exact ſituation of affairs, and in long conferences with *Nanna Purnaveeſe* diſcovered his views, I wrote an anſwer to the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*'s letter, propoſing means for the removal of all paſt miſunderſtandings, and the eſtabliſhment of a firm and laſting friendſhip for the future, which I ſhall tranſmit to him on my arrival at *Naigpore*, with a letter from my maſter. I encloſe you copy of this letter for your information, which will give you a clear inſight into every matter. If you can, write to me frequently, and ſend your letters with expedition on the ſtate of affairs, as it will be attended with great advantages you will not neglect to do ſo. Since writing the above, letters from *Calcutta* to the ſame effect with the former ones addreſſed to my maſter and me, have been received. This is for your information.

Poſtſcript.

As ſince my arrival at *Poonah* matters have been ſo far adjuſted, that all doubts, miſunderſtandings, and ſuſpicions have been removed from the breaſt of the Miniſter, and he has diſpatched *Luchmun Row*, the ſon of *Gobind Row Purnaveeſe*, to you, with letters expreſſive of his friendly diſpoſitions, and waits impatiently for your arrival, which he looks forward to with the greateſt pleaſure, knowing that it would be the means of adjuſting all points, and of giving ſtability to the treaty, by diſregarding which the Chief of *Bombay* has thrown every thing into confuſion, and brought matters to their preſent paſs; and as he has provided a place at the diſtance of two coſs from the city, and erected tents, pavilions, and every thing neceſſary for your honourable reception there, he means to give you a meeting. I make no doubt, that laying aſide the medium of agents and letters, which only procraſtinate buſineſs, you will without delay repair hither in perſon, when all matters may be adjuſted and finally ſettled in a conference; and the ſuſpicions which the bad conduct and repeated breaches of faith on the part of the Bombay Chief have given birth to, in the mind of *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, may, by your integrity and good faith, which is founded on the good faith of the Governor *Amaud ul-Dowlah* and his Council, be entirely removed.

As my negociations have ſo far removed all obſtacles to friendſhip, that on your arrival, by the bleſſing of God it may be eſtabliſhed on the firmeſt baſis, and no doubt or ſubject of conteſt now remains, I have deſired permiſſion of the Miniſters to return to *Naigpore* to celebrate the Duſarah, as is my invariable practice, and ſhall ſhortly ſet out. Do not attribute my departure to any other reaſon than what I have aſſigned, or ſuppoſe, that after having engaged in negociations to effect a conciliation, at the time when they were nearly effected, and you on the point of coming hither, that I would quit *Poonah* except from neceſſity; my tongue is the faithful interpreter of the ſentiments of my heart, and the Miniſter *Nanah Purnaveeſe* alſo poſſeſſes the ſame diſpoſition, and ſhould you come to *Poonah* will receive you with every mark of honour and reſpect, will ſhew you all the rites of hoſpitality, faithfully adhere to his engagements, and pay every degree of attention to your

words

words, which are in fact the words of the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* and mine. He will alſo make you acquainted with his own propoſals, by which time I ſhall have finiſhed my buſineſs at *Naigpore*, and impatiently expect letters from you and *Nanah Purnaveeſe*; by theſe means both your affairs and mine may be properly executed. Be ſatisfied therefore with my departure, for whenever I may be wanted I am not far off, but ſhall be ready on notice given me by the Miniſter. Another circumſtance which renders my departure abſolutely neceſſary, is the news I have received of my wife's illneſs. I have mentioned this to remove every kind of doubt from your breaſt, and you may depend upon it. Regard me always near you.

APPENDIX, No. 227.

Extract of general Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, 14th May 1779.

Par. 1. BY the *Eagle* packet we have received your advices relative to the meaſures taken for eſtabliſhing an alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*. At preſent we ſhall only remark, that the undertaking appears to us contrary to the Company's former policy, to our engagements with *Ragoba* and *Nizam Ally*, and doubtful reſpecting any reaſonable proſpect of advantage to ariſe therefrom to the Company. Theſe are our general ideas on a ſummary view of your proceedings; but as the ſubject is important, it ſhall have an early and impartial conſideration, and our further ſentiments and orders thereon ſhall be communicated to you by the ſhips which remain to be diſpatched ſo ſoon as convoy ſhall be ready to ſail for their protection. In the mean time we encloſe a tranſcript of inſtructions ſent over land by Colonel *Capper* to *Bombay*, dated the 31ſt of Auguſt 1778, concerning *Ragoba*, copy whereof, and alſo a packet for you, were tranſmitted by the ſame conveyance, which we hope you have received; and that the injunctions contained in the letter to you of that date have been duly obſerved.

APPENDIX, No. 228.

Extract of general Letter from the Court of Directors to *Bombay*, dated 27th May 1779.

Par. 45. HAVING already acknowledged the receipt of your Secret Letter of the 29th December 1778, we have only to obſerve, that as your proceedings ſeem conſiſtent with our former engagements to *Ragoba*, and your treaty of the 24th of November conformable to that concluded with him in 1775, your conduct on the occaſion has our approbation.

46. Before the receipt of your letter we had been informed by our Governor General and Council, of the appointment of Mr. *Elliott* to treat with the Rajah of *Berar*; your letter acquaints us with the death of that gentleman, and likewiſe that the Governor General and Council did not intend to appoint any other perſon to ſucceed him, until advices from the Rajah ſhould enable them to determine concerning the expediency of the meaſure.

47. We obſerve by an article of Mr. *Elliott*'s inſtructions, that in caſe he ſhould have reaſon to believe you had commenced any negociation, or entered into engagements for the reſtoration of *Ragoba*, he was to ſuſpend his negociation until ſuch event ſhould have been verified by authentic information from you, and from Mr. *Moſtyn*; and therefore we earneſtly hope, that upon your negociation and treaty with *Ragoba* being communicated to our Governor General and Council, they would concur with you in giving full effect thereto, and deſiſt from entering into any new connections, which might ſet aſide or counteract your recent agreement with *Ragoba*. Appendix. Nos. 227 to 229.

48. We expect the greateſt economy and frugality has been obſerved in the diſburſement of money, and expenditure of ſtores, on *Ragoba*'s account; and in this ſtage of the buſineſs can only direct, that the moſt effectual meaſures be taken for procuring a certain and early reimburſement of all charges incurred by the Company, on account of your preſent undertaking in his favour.

51. We tranſmit for your information ſuch parts of our preſent letters to *Bengal*, as relate to the payment of your bond debt, and to the intended negociation with the Rajah of *Berar*.

APPENDIX, No. 229.

Extract of a Letter from the Nabob *Wallah Jah*. Received 21ſt September 1779.

THE hoſtile meaſures of *Hyder Ally Khan* towards the Engliſh, his warm attachment to the French, and his endeavours to induce the French to make war on the Engliſh, I have clearly ſeen for theſe twenty years paſt, and I have repeatedly given my friends intimation thereof, and have at ſeveral convenient opportunities collected magazines, and propoſed to my friends that we ſhould rid the country of an incendiary, who, whilſt ſuffered to remain, would ever be the cauſe of trouble, and that there would then be no future cauſe to apprehend the French intrigues in *Hindoſtan*, and the perpetual tranquillity of the country would be inſured; but the artful profeſſions of the ſaid *Khan* ſerved him as a veil to ſcreen his real deſign.

War breaking out in *Europe* between the Courts of *Great Britain* and *France*, we loſt no time in getting poſſeſſion of *Pondicherry*, which *Hyder Ally* was prevented from ſuccouring by ſeveral reaſons. At the time when the ſiege was opened, he was employed againſt the fort of *Chattuldurk*, the Chief of which was his moſt conſiderable opponent; he was alſo ſo ill with a fiſtula as to leave little hopes of life. The Maratta army was on that ſide of the river *Kiſtna*, and to crown all, it was the ſeaſon of the rains. By theſe reaſons alone he was prevented giving aſſiſtance to the French. Afterwards, when the Engliſh determined to reduce *Mhye*, he did every thing in his power to deter them from the attempt, and abſolutely forbad them to attack it, ſending publicly hoſtile meſſages and letters to them. All theſe particulars I have already written you an account of, and the Governor and Council here, and Sir *Eyre Coote*, are well acquainted therewith. *Hyder Ally* was prepared to ſupport the French; but for the Engliſh to begin hoſtilities againſt *Mhye*, not doubting but the French would be able to hold out until a reinforcement ſhould arrive from *Mauritius*, when he would join them, and throw the blame of the breach on the Engliſh. By the bleſſing of God, through the valour and activity of the Engliſh, *Mhye* was immediately reduced; and the news of the attack and reduction by the Engliſh reached *Hyder* at the ſame time. Vexed and boiling with indignation at this intelligence, he immediately marched with his veteran and numerous army againſt *Kurpah*, a dependency of the *Carnatic*, and reduced it; and throwing *Abdul Huckkeem Khan*, the Fougedar of that place, with his whole family, into a diſgraceful confinement, he ſent them to *Serungpatam*. He then ſent a numerous body of forces againſt the Zemindar of *Winkutgerry*, who is a Ryot and Aumil of mine, to demand in a haughty ſtyle a large ſum of money, who ravaged that country. As from *Mullewar* to *Pulnar* is dependent on the *Carnatic*, he ſent bodies of his horſe to infeſt the borders, and obliged the Naibs of the diſtricts to ſubmit to contributions, by threatening them with an invaſion. The Ryots being alarmed, neglected the cultivation of the lands, and numbers of them fled from their habitations.

Appendix. No. 229.

Hyder Ally waited in hopes that, provoked by these insolences, I should be induced to take some step which might give him a plea to invade my dominions; he also looked for the arrival of a French force from the *Mauritius*, with which he was determined to join and make open war against us. Being disappointed in this expectation, he expressed himself in terms of the highest displeasure to the French Vackeel, and to the French gentlemen who went to him from *Pondicherry* and *Mhye*, saying, "Your forces are not yet arrived; you have "broken your engagement with me; had I confided in "you, and commenced hostilities, the whole burden of "the war would have been left on my shoulders." It was at this time that he dispatched a French gentleman on a ship of his own to the *Mauritius*, to require forces to be sent him from thence, engaging to pay their expences. As soon as I heard of this circumstance, I made it known to my friends. This intelligence, which I first learnt from newspapers, is now confirmed by the relation of Captain *Fenwick*, who saw *Hyder Ally*'s ship at the *Mauritius*. From this it is evident, that the French forces will be received into *Hyder Aly*'s dominions, and from thence, in concert with him, will invade the *Carnatic*.

Hyder Ally, by the reduction of *Kurpah*, has encompassed the *Carnatic*, and opened for himself a road into the Circars of *Guntore*, *Ellore*, and *Rajimundery*, and by means thereof no intelligence from the other side of *Kurpah* can reach the *Carnatic* but with his permission. From several newspapers received from *Hyder Ally*'s camp, and by the letters from my officers, which mention, that large bodies of his cavalry are assembled on the borders of my country, and that they are taking every means to facilitate the march of an army, by clearing the roads; it appears clearly that his designs are hostile towards us. I have never entertained the ambition of possessing myself of another's country; my sole views, from the first, have been to secure the tranquillity of my own country, and to root out all the friends of the French, who are our enemies. The favourable opportunity which once presented itself, is lost for the present, until by the favour of God, and the good fortune of the English nation, to whom the Almighty has ever been propitious, a glorious peace is made with the French in *Europe*; it is highly expedient to preserve tranquillity in this part of the country, because my friends, by the return of *Ragonaut Row* into their protection, will once more be engaged in a war with the Marattas.

The conduct of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, in his negociations with Mr. *Hollond*, carries an unfriendly appearance, since he has positively refused to dismiss the French from his service, and, on the contrary, has settled a lack of rupees per month, for the pay of that body, together with 5000 country infantry attached to them; and, placing the greatest confidence in them, makes them the advanced body of his army. He is also desirous of contracting a friendship with *Hyder Ally Khan* and he is engaged in a strict treaty of friendship with the Poonah Ministers; and any marks of support shewn to *Ragonaut Row*, will increase his disinclination to the English. Induced thereto by the sincerest friendship, I have communicated my sentiments to you without reserve.

Postscript.

As, by the favour of God, you, my friend, and your Council, are possessed of wisdom, and a knowledge of the true interests of this country, and have invariably shewn a desire to the utmost of your power, to preserve the tranquillity of the country; and I, on my part, actuated by the sentiments of friendship, have made it my constant rule to communicate to you my sentiments on the measures most conducive to the interests of the Company and English nation, and now repeat, that since matters, are in this state, that enmity is declared with the Marattas at *Poonah*, and the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* is ready to take an adverse part, and *Hyder Ally Khan*, who bears an invincible hatred to the English, is on the eve of hostilities, and all these Powers, notwithstanding their dislike to each other, have united, for the purpose of opposing the English; it therefore appears to me advisable that a determinate system be immediately adopted. I will give you such particulars relative to these three Powers as have come to my knowledge, and you will then act as you shall deem best, to bring the quarrel with them to a happy conclusion

Peace with the Marattas will at once procure the end desired; for if this takes place, the Nabob *Nizam-ul Dowlah* will be laid under the necessity of relinquishing his enmity, and the Marattas will join the English to chastise *Hyder Ally Khan*. It is not in the power of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* to join in friendship with the English, in opposition to the Marattas, nor would an union with him, if it could be effected, prevent a war with the Marattas.

In the first place, *Hyder Ally Khan* would never enter sincerely into friendship with the English. The particulars of his hostile conduct I have frequently communicated to you, and you have also seen them. It is therefore unnecessary to repeat them afresh. An union with *Hyder Ally Khan* would only serve to augment the enmity of the Marattas and *Nizam-ul Dowlah*; if therefore a speedy accommodation is made with the Marattas, it will put an end to the designs of the two other inimical powers; of those of *Nizam ul-Dowlah*, by the awe which the junction of the English and Marattas will occasion him; and of those of *Hyder Ally* by the chastisement he will receive from their joint forces.

I have received certain advice that *Hyder Ally Khan* has sent an agent to *Poonah* to solicit the Maratta friendship, who presses the Poonah Ministers to keep up their enmity to the English, and proffers his master's zealous assistance, and offers the payment of 40 lacks of rupees to settle his former accounts, and an annual peishcush of 11 lacks of rupees, and to restore the country on the other side of the *Burmudder*, which he wrested from them. The Marattas have not yet agreed to the terms, nor have they refused. They wait, meaning if a firm peace is concluded with the English, in conjunction with them to chastise the said *Khan*, or if the English should not choose to enter into that scheme, to execute it in conjunction with *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*; but if peace should not take place, then they will through necessity agree to the terms proposed by *Hyder Ally*. I have accordingly received repeated intimations on this subject from the principal of the Marattas, to the end that I might bring about a firm friendship between them and the English, and enter into an engagement that I will join in the chastisement of the common enemy, alluding to *Hyder Ally Khan*.

I have written this for your information. I enclose you copy of a letter which I have lately received from the Nabob *Bassalet Jung*, from *Adoonie*, informing me of the distress he is under by reason of the non-arrival of Colonel *Harper* with the English forces, and the open enmity declared against him by the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* and *Hyder Ally Khan*, by reason of his connection with the English, and their having forbid him to relinquish *Murtezzanagur*, or hold friendship with the English; he also sends me copies of letters, which he has received from those Chiefs, which I likewise send to you. From these you will clearly perceive the hostile designs entertained by *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* and *Hyder Ally Khan*, against the English and *Bassalet*. The Nabob *Nizam ul-Dowlah* has therefore given the fort *Maccool* with a jaghier, in lieu of *Kurnole*, to *Rummust Khan*, the Talookdar of that place, to satisfy and induce him to come to him. The said Talookdar not being able to support himself against *Hyder Ally Khan*, agreed to the terms proposed to him, and sent off his family; he continued himself at *Kurnole* till the 26th of Rujjib, but I do not know if he is still there, or has since left it. The Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* has determined to send *Lally*, a French-

man,

han, with 6000 Sepoys, 300 Europeans, and 1000 cavalry, to *Kurnole*, and has given the ſaid Talook in jaghire to the French, which has greatly ſtrengthened their power. It is a conſtant cuſtom to ſend the troops into cantonments during the rainy ſeaſon, but this year they have not been ſuffered to depart, but kept together in a ſtate of readineſs.

APPENDIX, No. 230.

Letter to the Governor General from the Nabob *Nizam ul Mulk* Bahadar; received 3d December 1779.

AT the time when *Ragonaut Row* took refuge at *Bombay*, and the Chief of that place made preparation for his ſupport, induced by the conſideration of the ſolemn engagements which through the Council of *Madras* has been formed between my Government and the Engliſh Company, I wrote you information, that in the treaty ſubſiſting between me and the Engliſh Company, amongſt many other articles, this was one—That the enemies of this Government were the enemies of the Engliſh; and their enemies mine: and that *Ragonaut Row* in conſequence of the friendſhip and connection between my Government and that of *Row Pundit Purdhaun Madho Row Narain*, was my enemy; and therefore the protection given him in *Bombay*, and the meaſures adopted for his ſupport by the Chief of that place, was highly improper and unaccountable to me. In reply to this you wrote me, that the faith and engagements of the Engliſh Company were inimitable, and that no breach of the treaty eſtabliſhed through the Council of *Madras*, ſhould take place in any quarter; and that the Engliſh Company were in friendſhip with *Row Pundit Purdhaun* in the ſame manner as with me; and had not the leaſt idea of breaking thoſe ties on account of *Ragonaut Row*. Implicitly relying on the candour of your profeſſions, I waited to ſee the effects of them; but every ſubſequent event has been in direct oppoſition thereto, and every act of which I have been a witneſs, in breach thereof. Witneſs the endeavours uſed by the Chief of *Bombay* for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, and the vigorous exertions he has made to give them effect; the conſequences of which are well known. As it was my firm reſolve to adhere ſteadily to my former engagements, and to abide by your declarations, I withheld my aſſiſtance from *Row Pundit Purdhaun* againſt all ſolicitation, though bound by the laws of friendſhip to have afforded it to him; and before the troubles actually broke out, I wrote very fully to the Poonah Miniſters urging the ſtrongeſt arguments to them, and thereby effected the diſmiſſion of the French Ambaſſadors, who were at that time at *Poonah* endeavouring to eſtabliſh a friendſhip between that nation and *Row Pundit Purdhaun* and my Government, before they had been able to effect any thing; nor would I give any countenance to the advances which they likewiſe made to me. Yet I underſtand that notwithſtanding all this, the Chief at *Bombay* has formed new deſigns for the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*; and that the ſaid *Row*, upon expectations, has again repaired to *Surat*; and that Colonel *Goddard* who is come to *Surat* from *Calcutta*, is likewiſe joined with the Bombayer, or in the ſame deſign; moreover, Mr. *John Hollond* is lately come to me on the part of the Governor of *Madras*; and excluſive of other propoſitions of the moſt dangerous tendency, deſires that the Paiſcuſh of *Rajomundury*, and other Circars, may be totally given up by me. And it further appears to be the wiſh of the Governor of *Madras* to obtain poſſeſſion, if it can be quietly done, of the Circar of *Murtezzanagur*, which my brother *Armeer ul Oruah Sujah ul Mulk* Bahadar holds in virtue of a treaty concluded by the Engliſh Company. As the propoſitions are unreaſonable, and contrary to treaty, and cannot but be attributed to unjuſtifiable views, I have anſwered Mr. *Hollond*, that ſuch propoſitions are inconteſtable proofs of a hoſtile diſpoſition; that if it is determined to break the treaty, it matters not to me; let them prepare to carry their deſigns into execution; and whenever they think fit to take the field, that I am prepared for all events that may happen; and thank God that the breach of treaty falls on them. Mr. *Hollond* has accordingly tranſmitted an account of all theſe particulars to the Governor of *Madras*; we ſhall hereafter ſee what anſwer he will return. By the bleſſing of God you, Sir, are endowed with an enlightened underſtanding and clear penetration, and are at the head of all the Engliſh ſettlements; I have therefore judged it proper to communicate all theſe matters to you, and ſhall likewiſe write you whatever may hereafter occur. Knowing me anxious for your reply, loſe no time in tranſmitting it to me.

Appendix. Nos. 230 & 231.

APPENDIX, No. 231.

Poſtſcript of a Letter from the Nabob *Wallaw Jaw*. Received 21ſt September 1779.

AS by the favour of God, you my friend and your Council are poſſeſſed of wiſdom and knowledge of the true intereſts of this country, and have invariably ſhewn a deſire to the utmoſt of your power to preſerve the tranquillity of the country; and I on my part, actuated by the ſentiments of friendſhip, have made it my conſtant rule to communicate to you my ſentiments on the meaſures moſt conducive to the intereſts of the Company and Engliſh nation; and now repeat, that ſince matters are in this ſtate, that enmity is declared with the Marattas at *Poonah*, and the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dow'lah* is ready to take an adverſe part; and *Hyder Ally Khan*, who bears an invincible hatred to the Engliſh, is on the eve of hoſtilities; and all theſe Powers, notwithſtanding their diſlike to each other, have united for the purpoſe of oppoſing the Engliſh. It therefore appears to me adviſable that a determinate ſyſtem be immediately adopted. I will give you ſuch particulars relative to theſe three Powers as have come to my knowledge, and you will then act as you ſhall deem beſt, to bring the quarrel with them to a happy concluſion.

Peace with the Marattas will at once procure the end deſired; for if this takes place, the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* will be laid under the neceſſity of relinquiſhing his enmity, and the Marattas will join the Engliſh to chaſtiſe *Hyder Ally Khan*. It is not in the power of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* to join in friendſhip with the Engliſh, in oppoſition to the Marattas, nor would an union with him, if it could be effected, prevent a war with the Marattas.

In the firſt place, *Hyder Ally Khan* would never enter ſincerely into friendſhip with the Engliſh. The particulars of his hoſtile conduct I have frequently communicated to you, and you have alſo ſeen them; it is therefore unneceſſary to repeat them afreſh. An union with *Hyder Ally Khan* would only ſerve to augment the enmity of the Marattas and *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*; if therefore a ſpeedy accommodation is made with the Marattas, it will put an end to the deſigns of the two other inimical Powers, of thoſe of *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, by the awe which the junction of the Engliſh and Marattas will occaſion him, and of thoſe of *Hyder Ally*, by the chaſtiſement he will receive from their joint forces.

I have received certain advice that *Hyder Ally Khan* has ſent an agent to *Poonah* to ſolicit the Maratta friendſhip; who preſſes the Poonah Miniſters to keep up their enmity to the Engliſh, and proffers his maſter's zealous aſſiſtance, and offers the payment of 40 lacks of rupees to ſettle his former accounts, and an annual peiſhcuſh of 11 lacks of rupees, and to reſtore the country on the other ſide of the *Burmudder* which he wreſted from them. The Marattas have not yet agreed to the terms, nor have they refuſed. They wait, meaning if a firm peace is concluded with the Engliſh, in conjunction with them

Appendix Nos. 232 to 234.

them to chaſtiſe the ſaid *Khan*; or if the Engliſh ſhould not chuſe to enter into that ſcheme, to execute it in conjunction with *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*; but if peace ſhould not take place, then they will through neceſſity agree to the terms propoſed by *Hyder Ally*. I have accordingly received repeated intimations on this ſubject from the principal of the Marattas, to the end that I might bring about a firm friendſhip between them and the Engliſh, and enter into an engagement that I will join in the chaſtiſement of the common enemy, alluding to *Hyder Ally Khan*.

APPENDIX, No. 232.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*, to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

SINCE my addreſs of the 29th, I have received a piece of material information from *Poonah*, which I have reaſon to think may be relied upon, and therefore communicate it to you without loſs of time.

The particulars of it are, that the Miniſter and *Scindia*, in conjunction with *Hyder*, *Nizam Ally*, and *Moodajee Booſla*, mean to make a general attack upon the Engliſh, at their ſeveral ſettlements, and have entered into, and ſealed written agreements for that purpoſe.

However the probability of their executing literally a plan of this nature, may be ſuſpected, I can now ſcarce entertain a doubt of the hoſtile views of the Miniſter; and as the ſeaſon for military operations opens immediately after the Deeſſora, to which feſtival a ſhort period now only remains, I beg to repreſent the neceſſity of having the army put into a condition for inſtant and active ſervice, by collecting ſuch force as may be ſufficient, either to attack ourſelves, or to reſiſt the attacks made by them. For theſe reaſons, I requeſt to urge the expediency of bringing up the troops from *Mahé*, without loſs of time, and to propoſe that the detachment from your Preſidency be alſo ordered to join me immediately.

It will be abſolutely requiſite, to provide againſt future exigencies, that a magazine of military ſtores be prepared, as contiguous to the ſcene of operations as poſſible. I therefore hope you will give orders for collecting a ſufficient quantity at this place, as well as at *Broach*, to anſwer any demands I may find it neceſſary to make; and ſhould there be any field artillery in either of thoſe garriſons, which can be ſpared from their neceſſary defence, let me requeſt that you will be pleaſed to authorize the Chiefs to deliver them up to my requiſition, ſhould I find it neceſſary, for the good of the ſervice, at any time hereafter to have them with me.

I ſhall write more fully very ſoon: and have the honour to be, &c. &c.

Camp near *Surat*, 30th September 1779. (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

Extract of a Letter to General *Goddard.*

Sir,

We yeſterday received your letters of the 29th and 30th ultimo, and immediately diſpatched your packets for *Madras* and Colonel *Braithwaite*.

We can ſcarcely give credit to the information that has been given you of the combination formed againſt the Company's ſettlements. It may have been fabricated at the Durbar, now at this criſis of your negociation, to try what effect it may have upon your meaſures. Such artifices form no inconſiderable part of Maratta politics. But as you acquaint us you can ſcarcely entertain a doubt of the hoſtile views of the Miniſters, we ſhall be prepared to give you all the ſupport in our power, in caſe it may be requiſite.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 7th October 1779. (Signed) *William Hornby*, &c. Counſellors.

True copies.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secy to the Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 233.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

From the Nabob *Wallah Jah*. Received 17th October 1779.

I HAVE already informed you of the diſtreſſed ſtate of my own affairs, the importunities which I labour under from my creditors, and the connection of *Tulkajee* with the French, Dutch, and *Hyder Ally Khan*. It now appears by evident tokens that the preparations of the French to diſturb the tranquillity of the country are completed. The French have Vackeels with *Nizam ul Dowlah*, and *Hyder Ally Khan*, and a Sirdar at the head of a body of men with the Marattas; and by means of their connection with theſe ſeveral Powers, are employing every art to bring them into an entire compliance with their views; the Tanjoreans they are ſure of, as they are ſtrictly connected with the French, and will as ſoon as the diſturbances commence, ſupply them with all kinds of ſtores and neceſſaries. *Hyder Ally Khan* is in alliance with them to ſupport them with his troops, money, and the whole produce of his country. I alone who have from the beginning uniformly partaken of the proſperity and adverſity of the Engliſh nation remain in every ſituation their firm ally; but the injury done to my rights in the Tanjore country (on which the Company iſſued their orders without being acquainted with the real circumſtance of the caſe, and which Lord *Pigot* oppreſſively carried into execution in ſo improper a manner) has been highly deſtructive to my credit.

APPENDIX, No. 234.

Intercepted Letter from *Nejifkhan* to General *Bellecombe* without date.

I FORMERLY wrote to you the ſtate of affairs here, and tranſmitted to Mr. *Chevalier* through the channel of Mr. *Viſage* and *Roy Manick Chund*, an engagement, which I learn from Mr. *Chevalier*'s letters he received and forwarded to you. I underſtand that at that time you were at *Mahé*, and are ſince returned to *Pondicherry*. I have communicated all matters to Mr. *Viſage*, and *Roy Manick Chund*; agreeable to what they will write you, ſend an army here without delay. Now that you are returned here, it is improper to delay the commencement of hoſtilities. Be fully ſatisfied with reſpect to me, and communicate to me the affairs of that quarter. *Roy Manick Chund* is firmly attached, and acts the part of a good and zealous ſervant. Let me frequently have the pleaſure to hear from you.

Intercepted Letter from *Nejifkhan* to Mr. *Chevalier*, without date.

On the late intelligence of news from *Europe*, and that you, my friend, though deſtitute of forces in *Bengal*, had exerted ſuch bravery and execution as to eſcape ſingly from the country of your enemies, and were ſafely arrived at the place of your deſtination; I was greatly rejoiced, and offered up thanks to God. You are well acquainted with all the affairs of this quarter, any delay will now be highly impolitic. I am ready according to my engagements. You muſt form your plan without delay.

I have fully communicated on the ſtate of affairs with

Mr. *Viſage* and *Roy Manick Chund*; having, conformably to what they will write you, ſpeedily formed your plan, make me acquainted with it. *Manick Chund* is with me; write me fully by the Dawk. I am come to *Akberabad*, and have ſummoned all the Chiefs under me to repair hither, and wait only for you. Every delay is impolitic; let me have immediate advices from you.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

From the Nabob Vizier. Received 16th June 1779.

I wiſh not to dwell on the ſtrict ties of friendſhip, and the ſolemn treaties which have ſubſiſted for ſo long a time between the illuſtrious Engliſh Chiefs and my family, ſince they are ſo well known as to make the repetition of them totally unneceſſary. In fact, there is not the leaſt diſtinction of intereſts, and our ſucceſs, proſperity, and advantage are in common. On this account I conduct all the affairs of my Government agreeable to the advice and concurrence of the Engliſh Chiefs.

Copy of a letter which I have juſt received from *Litafut Ally Khan* Bahadre, and of a letter which he wrote to his Vackeel *Niſſar Ulla Khan*, I encloſe for your peruſal and information, and that of my friends *Intezam-ul Dowlah*, General Sir *Eyre Coote*, Bahadre, *Sciful Moulk*, and the other gentlemen of the Council: from their peruſal you learn the particulars depending on the favour of God, and the friendſhip of the Engliſh Chiefs. I ſuffer no thought of any one elſe to diſturb my mind; but I am perfectly ſatisfied, and at eaſe.

But you are wiſe and penetrative; reflect on the tendency of theſe accounts. His Majeſty's Miniſters have entered into a ſtrict connection with the people of the ſouth, and have perſuaded them to repair to *Hindoſtan*. They are likewiſe intriguing and laying ſchemes, with a determined reſolution to ruin my affairs and thoſe of the Engliſh Company. I am the faithful ſervant and loyal ſubject of the Circar, and hold no connection with any one. The friendſhip of the Engliſh I keep ever in view. Write me a full anſwer to every particular. Mr. *Hoſea* likewiſe writes you very fully on this ſubject.

APPENDIX, No. 235.

To Rajah *Chite Sing*. Written 25th September 1779.

I HAVE received your letter: from the contents of which, as well as from the letters of Mr. *Graham*, and the copy of a letter which you wrote to that gentleman, and which he tranſmitted for my inſpection, it appears but too clearly, that inſtead of a cheerful compliance with the requiſition of this Government in the immediate payment of the ſum of five lacks of rupees, as your ſhare of the expence of the war for the preſent year, a requiſition which the great burthen of expence under which the Company labour for the defence of the Country, renders neceſſary, and to which you, as a ſubject of theirs, are bound to contribute, have thought proper, under the plea of inability, which is well known to be futile, to endeavour to amuſe the Reſident with vague and diſtant promiſes, meaning probably to protract, if not entirely evade, payment of the ſum required of you. In a letter which I lately wrote you, I informed you in expreſs terms, that this Government neither could nor would recede from ſo reaſonable a demand; and added, that in caſe of non-compliance on your part, Mr. *Graham* was authoriſed to ſummon a detachment of our forces to enforce our orders if it ſhould be found neceſſary. This I hoped would have opened your eyes, and induced you to relinquiſh a conduct which muſt, if purſued, bring the greateſt diſadvantage on you; but ſince even this intimation of our determination has proved ineffectual, I now think it neceſſary, to inform you, that we have deſired the Commander in Chief to diſpatch Major *Camac* with the detachment under his command to *Benares*, there to wait our further orders. He will accordingly begin his march immediately, unleſs the Reſident in the mean time, from the actual receipt of the ſubſidy, ſhall inform him, that it is unneceſſary for him to proceed further; and you will be pleaſed to obſerve, that ſhould you force us to a meaſure ſo contrary to our wiſhes, the whole expence of the detachment, from the time of its march, will be required from you, excluſive of the ſubſidy for the war.

Appendix Nos. 235 & 236.

From Rajah *Chite Sing* to the Governor General. Received the 25th September 1779.

I have been honoured with your gracious letter, urging me in the ſtrongeſt terms to the payment of five lacks of rupees on account of the ſhare of the expences of the war for the preſent year, and underſtand your pleaſure. Regarding your Highneſs as my maſter, in the repreſentation which I ſent you of my poverty and abſolute inability, I had no views of preſerving my property, and deceiving you by falſe pretences; but I had really no property left but what is apparent to every body, ſuch as elephants, horſes, &c. which for the ſupport of my credit I am obliged to keep, ſince that credit is the gift of your Highneſs's bounty; but ſince you have been pleaſed to direct that I ſhould raiſe the ſum by any means I can, I regard it as the effect of my evil deſtiny, that the repreſentation of my ſituation had no weight, and ſubmit to the neceſſity of this once complying with your order notwithſtanding the greatneſs of my poverty which exceeds all deſcription. I will make good the ſum gradually by the diſpoſal of my effects, and by loans, the particulars of which I cannot fully explain to you.

Since you have honoured me, your moſt faithful and obedient, with the greateſt marks of favour and regard, even to the honouring me with the title of your ſon, I am hopeful, from the continuance of that regard, that you will in future continually keep in view my welfare and intereſt, and will be kindly pleaſed to excuſe me from ſervices which are beyond my ability to perform, on a compliance with which my ſupport, nay even life and the proſperity of the country depends.

From Rajah *Chite Sing*. Received the 16th December 1779.

Your gracious letter, directing me to pay without delay the ſum of five lacks of rupees as my ſhare of the expences of the war for this year, honoured me by its arrival and made me acquainted with your pleaſure. My protector! before the arrival of your orders I had paid 150,000 rupees to Mr. *Thomas Graham*, and immediately on the receipt I ſent the balance of 35,000 rupees to the ſaid gentleman: I was not forgetful of it for one inſtant. As the troops were ſent here I have given that gentleman their pay from the day of their march till the day that the ſum was diſcharged, which was not quite 15 days. I am hopeful, that conſidering me to be attached to you from of old, you will protect and ſupport me by your favour and friendſhip, that my honour and dignity may be increaſed by it.

APPENDIX, No. 236.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 13th December 1779.

READ the following letter from the Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Members of Council.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

I have delayed thus long addreſſing you on the ſubject of the firſt object of my buſineſs at this Court, in the hope of being able to inform you that I had ob-

Appendix. No. 26.

tained from his Excellency ſufficient ſupplies for the exigencies of the preſent year. I have had frequent conferences with him upon this ſubject, but have found him uniform and determined in a refuſal of any more tuncaws than thoſe obtained by Mr. *Middleton* prior to my having charge of this appointment. The encloſed paper N° 1, will ſhew you what they are, and for what ſervices they are granted. N° 2 is an eſtimate of the whole demands upon the Nabob for this year. From theſe accounts it will appear, that the whole amount required for the expences of the year is rupees 1,36,12,188. 12, and the amount granted, rupees 68,80,000.

I have in vain laid before him the ruinous conſequences of a diſmiſſion of any part of the troops who are now employed under the command of Britiſh officers, the certain deficiency in the collections, and the laying of his country open to foreign marauders.

I have in vain urged him on the glaring impropriety of refuſing tuncaws upon the ſame diſtricts as laſt year; and giving them to his own troops, without diſcipline, to ſupport his Government, and always ready to plunder every country to which they have been ſent. His anſwer has been invariably, that while he had the means of providing for the demands of the Company, he has never refuſed it; but he is now deprived of that ability by the drought, which has obliged him to give deductions to the amount of twenty-five lacks of rupees; and even now the Aumils are deſirous of being releaſed from their engagement, upon the plea of inability to comply with them; his family, and that of his father and grandfather, after repeated promiſes made to them and broken, are ſtill unprovided for; that he did not believe the Council meant to ſeize the expences of his table and houſehold, which was all that was now left him. When I quitted him, I declared I did not imagine the Governor would ever conſent to the reform of the new brigade, and the other preſent eſtabliſhments for his collections; that if they were not diſmiſſed, they muſt be paid and from the ſources of that country, for the protection of which they were raiſed. That I would leave him, for the preſent, to conſider the means of granting the ſupplies, in the hope of an anſwer more likely to be pleaſing to our Government. A day or two after I received a letter from him, a tranſlate of which, N° 3, I think it neceſſary to lay before you. As I have never been able to induce his Excellency to adopt any other ſentiments than thoſe he firſt declared, and have received another letter from him, expreſſing much diſſatisfaction at my urgency on a point he had determined on, and would not give up unleſs he ſhould be compelled by the Governor and Council, I have thought it needleſs to preſs him further at preſent, but at his requeſt have tranſmitted a letter from him to the Governor General, ſetting forth his diſtreſs.

In this ſituation it only remains for me to lay before you the following extract of Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*'s letter of the 5th inſtant, the day on which charge was delivered to me.

"When I have of late preſſed his Excellency for further aſſignments he has pleaded inability to anſwer the very heavy demands which will this year fall upon him on account of the drought which has unfortunately happened, to the almoſt total deſtruction of the Khurreff harveſt, and the conſequent dimunition of his revenue. I am concerned to confeſs, there are but two good grounds for this plea. The misfortune has been general throughout the whole of the Vizier's dominions obvious to every body; and ſo very fatal have been its conſequences, that no perſon of either credit or character would enter into engagements with Government for farming the country, without a very heavy deduction in the laſt year's Jumma, which his Excellency has been compelled to allow to all who have hitherto been appointed to farms; and ſome who have engaged, even under theſe circumſtances, have to my knowledge made moſt urgent applications to the Nabob and his Miniſters, to be releaſed from their obligations, and allowed to relinquiſh their farms, which they found they could not hold but at a certain loſs to themſelves.' You will be ſoon convinced, by undoubted teſtimony, and loud complaints from every quarter, of the reality of this misfortune, which has neceſſarily been the means of delaying the general ſettlement of the country, and of preventing my hitherto getting aſſignments for more than rupees 68,82,000; but how far its operation and effects precludes the Nabob from anſwering the demands upon him on public account, you will be the beſt able to judge, from the ſtatements you will obtain of his eſtimated revenue."

As it appears from the whole of this extract, that Mr. *Middleton* had met with obſtacles, from a reaſon aſſigned, which no human foreſight could prevent, I hope your Honourable Board will not imagine I have been remiſs or inattentive; nothing but a compulſive order from me, upon an undefined right, could obtain the collection of a rupee more than I have tuncaws for; and nothing but a deciſive and ſpeedy inſtruction from you, when the time elapſed, may not occaſion a material loſs in the revenue, can poſſibly procure the grants neceſſary for the current diſburſements from my treaſury.

Upon this principle it is needleſs to add that no bill from the Preſidency can poſſibly be anſwered, ſince the demands on the treaſury upon the preſent eſtabliſhment exceed the expected income; and the laſt drafts of the Honourable Board, and their order for the payment of two lacks and a half of rupees to Captain *Popham*, which has been complied with, have ſo effectually drained the treaſury, that I have not yet been able to pay the firſt brigade for October. Upon the eſtimate of the preſent year, that of the troops under the command of Britiſh officers, paid by Mr. *Wombwell*, exceeds the laſt year's, by rupees 4,25,533. 12. 6. and the exceſs of the eſtimate of the temporary brigade is rupees 8,13,559. 13. 9. The paymaſters, upon being applied to by me declare, that the reaſon of this exceſs is, that the laſt year's was only what was ſuppoſed would be the expence, and the preſent year's eſtimate is made upon the actual diſburſements of laſt year. As his Excellency did not ſtart any objections to particular articles of theſe eſtimates, but to the whole, from a want of revenue to pay them, I have not thought proper to curtail any thing. Your letter under date the 25th Auguſt laſt, has occaſioned the incluſion of the army donation, and the oſs by exchange I thought but a proper demand.

Notwithſtanding what has paſſed, I ſhould not relax in my endeavours to prevail upon his Excellency to grant the tuncaws required, but he ſeems to be unmoveable in his preſent reſolution. He is now preparing for his departure to meet the General, and I imagine will not return before the arrival of deciſive inſtructions from your Honourable Board.

I have the honour to be with reſpect,

Lucknow, 19th November 1779. (Signed) *E. Purling.*

From the Vizier. Received the 16th December 1779.

In a former letter I repreſented you all the particulars of my diſtreſſes, and delivered it to Mr. *Middleton*, and wrote to the ſame purport to Rajah *Gobind Ram*. I am confident that you and the gentlemen of the Council will attend to my honour, and I conſider my country and property as not in the leaſt ſeparate from the Company, from you and the gentlemen of the Council; at this time Mr. *Purling*, who is arrived, at the repreſentations and inſtigations of intereſted perſons, treats me in a manner never before practiſed by any gentleman who has been here. Although I repreſent to him that every thing ſhall be done to his, the Company's and gentlemen's ſatisfaction; but that ſuch a mode of negociating, to

which

which he is inſtigated by ſelf-intereſted perſons, is not proper. That he ſhould write to the Governor and Council every thing I ſay to him, and that whatever anſwer they may ſend he ſhould conduct himſelf thereby; but to this he does not agree, and acts according to his own pleaſure. I have wrote all theſe particulars to Rajah *Gobind Ram*, who will make them known to you. As I know the baſis of my Government to be founded on the favour of God, and your's and the gentlemen of the Council's protection, I hope you will ſend me an anſwer agreeable to my requeſt, keeping my honour in view; and alſo write to Mr. *Purling*, that as you and the gentlemen of the Council pay regard to my honour, he alſo muſt in like manner attend thereto, and not at the inſtigation of intereſted perſons adopt meaſures which bring diſgrace and diſcredit upon me. Should Mr. *Purling* converſe with me in the ſame manner as he did before, I cannot put up with the diſgrace, but leaving all my country under his management, will repair to you and the gentlemen of the Council.

Fort William, 31ſt Decr 1779.

J. E^{d} Colebrooke, Perſian Tranſlator.

To the Nabob of *Oude*. Written the 15th December 1779.

I have received your Excellency's letter informing me, &c. (recapitulates the contents of the letter) I have likewiſe ſeen a letter from your Excellency to Mr. *Purling*, the Reſident at your Court, to the ſame effect:—

It is a cauſe of equal concern and ſurprize to me, that you ſhould object or heſitate to grant tuncaws for the charges of an eſtabliſhment which was formed at your own particular ſolicitation for the defence of *Robilchund* and the *Doaub*, at a juncture when your ancient and natural enemies the Marattas are actually in arms, and ready to enter your dominions upon the firſt opening which ſhall be given them; nothing in my opinion will deter them from it, but the preſence of a formidable and well-regulated body of troops to oppoſe them. The dangerous conſequences of their entering your country and finding it in a defenceleſs condition, are too obvious and ſtriking for me to mention. Yet this muſt certainly be the caſe if the Company's forces allotted to its protection be withdrawn or diſbanded. You are not to imagine, becauſe you have enjoyed an uninterrupted ſeaſon of peace for ſome years paſt, that you have no enemies to interrupt you, and may therefore reſt in ſecurity without the expence of maintaining this force. On the contrary, it is to their power that you owe this tranquillity; and the neigbouring States, whoſe annual incurſions and ravages in the territories of your late father of bleſſed memory, were the cauſe of the Company's troops being firſt applied for, and ſtationed in your dominions to repel them, will not fail to diſturb you again as ſoon as this bulwark is removed, and the nakedneſs of your country ſhall invite them. Excluſive of this important conſideration, I think it proper to inform your Excellency, that I underſtand a mutual obligation between us to have been implied in the formation and maintenance of this eſtabliſhment. The Company are bound on the one hand to protect your dominions by its means, and you are bound on the other to defray the charges of it; while theſe terms are complied with on both ſides, neither has a right to complain, but you could never ſuppoſe when you applied to us to appoint this force to your ſervice, that the Company would be at the pains to raiſe and diſcipline ſo large a body of men, and to augment their eſtabliſhment by the addition of ſuch an extraordinary number of officers as were neceſſary to command them, if they were liable to be burdened with the ſole weight and expence of this force by a ſudden reſolution on your ſide to diſcharge them without previous and timely notice given to us, and our conſent received; and this too at ſuch a diſtance from the Company's poſſeſſions, as the countries in which they are now ſtationed.

I am convinced that a reſolution ſo pernicious to the real intereſts of your Government, ſo repugnant to the intimate connection which ſubſiſts between us, and ſo dangerous in the end both to your poſſeſſions and the Company's, cannot have been ſuggeſted to you by any but ſecret enemies to your State; and that on a mature conſideration of the caſe, their advice will appear to you as invidious as it does to me.

I therefore recommend to you in the ſtrongeſt manner, not only to ſhun the evil councils of ſuch falſe friends, but to diſmiſs them from your ſervice and confidence, as unworthy of both; I beg you to conſider that it is equally my inclination and intereſt to provide for the ſupport of your Government, and the defence of your dominions, againſt the power and invaſion of a foreign enemy. For this purpoſe General Sir *Eyre Coote* has thought it adviſable to viſit the different ſtations of the army in your country, and he will be conſtantly attentive to take means for your ſecurity, while your dependence is placed on the Company's alliance and aſſiſtance; but if you are determined to withdraw yourſelf from both, and to diſſolve the union which has ſo long ſubſiſted between your family and this Government, I expect that ſufficient time and notice of your intention be given to prevent our being involved in troubles from the haſty execution of it. I cannot conſent to your diſmiſſing the Company's troops at ſuch a diſtance from home, and at ſuch a criſis, nor can I at preſent agree to recal them. As much time at leaſt muſt be given to diſpoſe of this force, when you ſhall have no further occaſion for their ſervices, as was allowed for the raiſing of it; I therefore requeſt that you will attend to the repreſentations of Mr. *Purling*, who has been ordered again to apply to you in the name of this Government, for tuncaws for the neceſſary diſburſement of the current year; and although your revenues have ſuffered a diminution by the unfortunate failure of the harveſt, yet I am perſuaded that they will be ſufficient, with economy and attention, to anſwer every ſervice required from them; and that you will therefore cheerfully comply with the demand which Mr. *Purling* is ordered to make. At all events, the defence of your country is the firſt object to be attended to; and the regular payment of a well-diſciplined body of troops, is indiſpenſably neceſſary for this end. Add to this, that your engagements with the Company are of ſuch a nature as to oblige me to require, and inſiſt on your granting tuncaws for the full amount of their demands upon you for the current year, and on your reſerving funds ſufficient to anſwer them, even ſhould the deficiency of your revenues compel you to leave your own troops unprovided for, or to diſband a part of them to enable you to effect it.

APPENDIX, No. 237.

Extract of a Letter from General Sir *Eyre Coote*, to the Governor General and Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

THE day before yeſterday I encamped near *Allahabad*, where the Vizier did me the honour of a viſit; and yeſterday morning, in my way hither, I returned it, and was received by his Excellency with every mark of reſpect and diſtinction.

This morning he called here, and we had ſome general converſation, which principally turned upon the ſubject of his attachment to the Engliſh, and his readineſs to ſhew the ſincerity of it upon all occaſions.

It is to be wiſhed we had employed the influence which ſuch favourable ſentiments muſt have given us, more to the benefit of the country and ourſelves; but I fear the diſtreſſes which evidently appear on the face of the one, and the failure of revenues to the other, are not to be wholly aſcribed to the Vizier's miſmanagement.

Appendix. No. 238.

APPENDIX, No. 238.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 12th November 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;
and
Edward Wheler, Eſquire.

Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed, and Mr. *Francis* at *Houghley*.
Sir *Eyre Coote* gone to viſit the different ſtations of the army.

THE Governor General delivers in the following minute and propoſed heads of a treaty with the Rana of *Gohud* for the conſideration of the Board.

"The Governor General informs the Board, that during their late receſs he has had ſeveral conferences with the Miniſter deputed by the Rana of *Gohud*, and inveſted with full powers, on the ſubject of a treaty of alliance offenſive and defenſive, propoſed by the Rana to be concluded between him and the Company. The Governor General lays before the Board a draft of conditions which he has formed on the baſis of the Rana's propoſitions for ſuch a treaty; and which, with the Rana's letter and propoſitions, he deſires may be entered in this place for the information and opinions of the Board.

(Signed) *W. H.*

Article 1ſt. A treaty of alliance, offenſive and defenſive, ſhall be eſtabliſhed between the Engliſh Company and Maha Rajah *Ranna Lockinder* Behadre.

2d. Whenever a war ſhall actually take place between the contracting parties and the Marattas, if the Ranna ſhall require the aſſiſtance of an Engliſh force for the purpoſes hereinafter deſcribed, ſuch a force proportioned to the exigency of the ſervice ſhall be immediately ſent, on his requiſition made in writing to the commanding officer at the neareſt ſtation of the Company's troops, ſhall remain with him as long as he ſhall require it, and return, when he ſhall diſmiſs it; the expences thereof ſhall be defrayed by the Ranna, at the fixed rate of twenty thouſand Muchledar rupees of the currency of *Benares*, or any other ſpecies of rupees of the ſame intrinſic amount, for each battalion of Sepoys on their preſent eſtabliſhment, with their proportion of artillery; the payment to commence on the day when the ſaid force ſhall paſs the borders of the Company's dominions, or the dominions of the Nabob of Oude; and ceaſe on the period ſtipulated for its return to either; four coſs being allowed for each day's march.

3d. This force ſhall be employed for the defence of the Ranna's dominions againſt all foreign or domeſtic enemies, and for the enlargement of his dominions by conqueſt on the Marattas.

4th. Whatever acquiſitions in purſuance of this treaty ſhall be made of countries lying contiguous to the Ranna's dominions, or formerly appertaining to them, whether effected by his or the Engliſh troops ſeparately or in conjunction, or obtained by treaty, ſhall be ſhared in the following proportions, viz. nine annas to the Company, and ſeven annas to the Ranna. The mean amount of the groſs revenue of the Company's ſhare collected in time of peace, in the ten years preceding, after deducting the charges of collection, which ſhall be aſcertained by Aumils choſen by each party, ſhall be fixed and paid by the Ranna, as a perpetual tribute to the Company, and the lands and forts ſhall be ceded to the Ranna.

5th. In caſe it ſhall be judged adviſable to employ the combined forces of the Company and the Ranna, in any diſtant operations againſt the common enemy, beyond the borders and neighbourhood of the Ranna's dominions, on requiſition made in writing from this Government, he ſhall furniſh ten thouſand effective horſe for ſuch ſervice; and each party ſhall bear his own ſeparate expence; which ſhall continue ſeparate until the return of the combined army to the borders of the Ranna's country, or until it ſhall be again employed in the ſervices mentioned in the third article of this treaty.

6th. Whenever the Engliſh forces are employed for the defence of the Ranna's country, or for the acquiſition of territory, the ſervice to be performed ſhall be preſcribed by himſelf; but the mode of executing it ſhall be left to the officer commanding the Engliſh troops.

7th. Whenever the combined troops of the Company and the Ranna ſhall be employed in any remote operations, ſuch as deſcribed in the 5th article, the commanding officer of the Engliſh forces ſhall conſult the Ranna on the choice of the ſervice to be performed; but the ultimate deciſion, in caſe of a difference in opinion, and the mode of conducting ſuch ſervice, ſhall be left entirely to the commanding officer of the Engliſh troops, with a reſervation of the Ranna's complete authority over his own troops.

8th. Whenever peace ſhall be concluded between the Engliſh Company and the Maratta State, the Ranna ſhall be included as a party in the treaty which ſhall be made for that purpoſe; and his preſent poſſeſſions, together with ſuch countries as he ſhall have acquired in the courſe of the war, and which it ſhall be then ſtipulated to leave in his poſſeſſion, ſhall be guaranteed to him by ſuch treaty.

9th. No Engliſh factory ſhall be eſtabliſhed in the dominions of the Ranna. No perſons of any denomination ſhall be ſent into the dominions on the part of the Engliſh Company, or with the licence of the Governor General and Council without his previous conſent, neither ſhall his Ryots be preſſed for any military ſervice, nor any authority exerciſed over them, but his own.

Ordered, That the above papers lie for conſideration.

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

From Maha Rajah *Lockinder Sewae Rajah Ranna Chatter Sing Bahadre Dullar Jung*. Received 7th June.

At the time when the late Colonel *Leſlie* arrived I was honoured with a friendly letter from you, ſince which time I have been conſtantly wiſhing for the happineſs of an interview; and till I hear the pleaſing news, I cannot enjoy peace of mind. I am hopeful that, actuated by a ſincere friendſhip, you will honour me with frequent letters which will afford me a high degree of ſatisfaction. I exert myſelf in complying with whatever the gentlemen of this diſtrict deſire of me, which I doubt not you have heard from them.

Tofuſſil Hoſſein Khan, who is lately gone to your preſence, is fully acquainted with all my affairs both paſt and preſent, and has doubtleſs repreſented the particulars to you: I have now written further particulars to him, which he will relate to you.

He has full power from me to manage my affairs; and I on my part am ready to the utmoſt of my power to promote the Company's affairs. Conſidering me as inſeparably connected with them, let me have the honour to hear often from you.

Liſt of Requeſts ſent to *Tofuſſil Huſſein Khan*.

You muſt obtain an engagement under the ſeal of the Company to the following effect, and ſend it to me.

Maha Rajah *Lokinder Sewae Rajah Ranna Chatter Sing Bahadre Dulleer Jung*, who has the moſt dutiful attachment to the intereſts of the Company's Sirkar, in conſideration that the ſaid *Lokinder Bahadre* is a ſharer of the proſperity and adverſity of the Sirkar, let not at any time any moleſtation be given by the Sirkar to the places

places forming his Raje: let them be entirely exempted, and let not the Sirkar in any inſtance be diſpleaſed againſt him; and let no officer of the Sirkar ſuppoſe any diſtinction to exiſt; and on his application let them not fail to afford him aid and ſupport: let him not be oppreſſed from their factories or officers: let them ever keep in view his proſperity, welfare, and honour. Let this be guaranteed by an oath to God.

Whatever country of his Raje the late bleſſed Nabob *Sujah-ul-Dowlah* Behadre beſtowed on him, let a Sunnud conformable thereto be granted him by the Company's Sirkar, of the 56 Mahals with the forts in the diſtrict of *Gowalier*, to the junction of which to his Raje the late bleſſed Nabob had ſet his ſignature; of theſe, Sunnuds were obtained for 41 Mahals two Talooks; the Sunnuds for the remaining 15 Mahals were not prepared when the Nabob died, which cauſed the ſuſpenſion of them. I am now hopeful, that a Sunnud for the whole of the 56 Mahals may be granted me from the Company's Sirkar.

Whenever the forces of the Sirkar are employed in conjunction with my forces on an expedition on this ſide the *Jummun*, whatever countries to the banks of the *Nerbudda* ſhall fall into the poſſeſſion of the Sirkar, one half thereof ſhall be relinquiſhed to me for the expence of my forces, and the other half ſhall remain under the government of the Sirkar, and be one year kept under the Khalſa; and the collections made that year being made the ground of a permanent ſettlement, they ſhall be given over to me to make the collections, and pay them to the Sirkar. Let whatever expence may be found neceſſary for the ſupport of Tannahs, &c. be deducted; and whenever neceſſity requires the aſſiſtance of the Sirkar's forces, let them join me on my application for that purpoſe. My own forces ſhall be ſupported from my own ſhare, and no charges required from the Sirkar.

If at this time a delay muſt ariſe in the objects propoſed above, let the ſeveral Mahals in an annexed liſt, which are on this ſide the *Jummun*, in the poſſeſſion of the enemy, be granted to me; and let it be ſtipulated in the treaty, that the new Mahals which have been now beſtowed by the Sirkar, ſhall not be at all moleſted.

Calpee, Zerujee, Coneh, Bhandaer, Buncha, Gourſenaie, the Pergunnah of *Giaur*, dependent on *Sukraum*; the Pergunnah of *Cutchratah*, *Cummar Punjehautey*.

To Maha Rajah *Chatter Sing*. Written the 5th July 1779.

I have had the pleaſure to receive your friendly letter, with a liſt of articles encloſed for the formation of a treaty between us; and perfectly underſtand the contents.

I am much pleaſed with the ſentiments of friendſhip with which your letter abounds, and greatly approve of your plan; but as I wiſh to form a treaty with you on ſo firm and ſolid a baſis, as to leave no room for future explanations, I would adviſe that you ſend a perſon in whom you can confide, with full powers to conclude the treaty; or if you think proper, I will ſend a truſty perſon to you for that purpoſe. I requeſt you will ſend me an immediate anſwer, as the ſeaſon is paſſing. Knowing me, &c.

From Maha Rajah *Sewae Ranna Chatter Sing Lokinder* Bahadre: dated the 5th Shabaun, 19th Auguſt; received 23d September 1779.

After aſſuring you of thoſe ſentiments of friendſhip and regard which I bear you, and which form my greateſt happineſs, be it known to your enlightened mind, that my daily thanks are offered to the Almighty, who has eſtabliſhed this friendſhip between us.

Your agreeable letter, which I anxiouſly expected, has by its arrival afforded me the greateſt pleaſure, and by it contents completed my wiſhes. You write, that you entirely approve of the propoſals which I tranſmitted you; that I will therefore diſpatch a truſty agent without delay, who being joined with a confidential perſon on the part of your Sirkar, they may in conjunction finally ſettle all matters. This afforded me inexpreſſible pleaſure. Appendix No. 238.

As I regard your favour and regard as my firmeſt ſupport, and the warmeſt attachment to you as my higheſt intereſt, I ſhall ſtudy to the utmoſt to improve the connection ſo happily formed with your Sirkar, from the period of which I date my happineſs. The country Powers of this quarter are highly diſpleaſed with this connection; but as I am now under the auſpicious ſhadow of the Engliſh fortune, I have nothing to do with any of them; and I am fully convinced that, ſupported by your favour, any ill deſigns formed againſt me can meet with no ſucceſs.

Immediately on the receipt of your friendly letter I prepared to diſpatch a truſty agent to you; God willing, he will ſhortly arrive at your preſence, and will fully communicate all matters to you. I have alſo written briefly to *Tuffuſil Huſſein Khan*, who will inform you of the particulars.

Knowing me at all times dependent on your favour, let me be honoured with frequent letters from you, which will inſpire me with confidence, and afford me the higheſt pleaſure.

Poſtſcript.

As *Tuffuſil Huſſein Khan*, who is perfectly acquainted with my ſentiments, is at your preſence, there did not appear to me the leaſt neceſſity to diſpatch any other perſon to you; yet in compliance with your deſire, I have diſpatched *Meer Muzhir Ally*, who will repair to your preſence by the route of *Cawnpore*; but my dependence for the ſettlement of all points is on the aforeſaid *Khan*, in whom I place implicit confidence. I have mentioned this for your information.

The preſent ſituation of affairs in this quarter is as follows: *Umpajee Kinkulla* and other agents, who were in the Zilla of *Jyepore*, at the inſtigation of *Madho Row Sindeah*, the principal Miniſter at *Poonah*, have advanced to my borders, and have gained over to their party *Sewajee Uppetul*, and the other officers of *Malwa*; they purpoſe ſhortly to invade my country, and to commit hoſtilities againſt me. Having the good fortune of the Engliſh on my ſide, their attempts will, I doubt not, fail of ſucceſs; yet it is neceſſary to take means to oppoſe them, that the country may not ſuffer injury.

Whenever they have invaded my territories, they have gained nothing but ſhame and defeats, and will again be overcome. I therefore requeſt that you will write to the gentlemen in authority in this quarter, that whilſt *Meer Muzhir Ally Khan* is with you, they will afford me their aſſiſtance, ſhould I find it neceſſary to apply to them, to enable me to inflict on thoſe bad men the puniſhment of their evil conduct. At preſent they have collected but a ſmall force, and may be eaſily defeated; but ſhould they be allowed to gain ſtrength, and to begin hoſtilities, the flame of war once lighted up, may require great efforts to quench it; all I require is, that on my requiſition, a ſmall party of your forces may be ſent to join me, that an immediate end may be put to their attempts. To root out a ſhrub requires but little exertion of the ſtrength of one man, but ſuffer the ſame to take deep root, and the utmoſt efforts of an hundred will be inſufficient.

Extract of a Letter from the ſame to *Tuffuſil Huſſein Khan*.

I am greatly ſurprized that you deſire me to ſend a truſty agent; for whilſt a friend like you, zealouſly attached to my intereſt, and verſed in affairs, is in *Calcutta*, what neceſſity can there be for deſiring another perſon to be ſent? But as I did not think it adviſable to refuſe compliance to the deſire of the Nabob, and to the advice of friends, I have thought myſelf obliged to ſend a perſon, who will ſhortly arrive and inform you of the affairs of this quarter; but notwithſtanding his arrival, I leave the regulation of all matters and the whole negociations to you; you will do whatever you judge for my intereſt.

Appendix. No. 239.

APPENDIX, No. 239.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 2d December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.

CONSIDERED the Governor General's minute, entered in conſultation 12th November, with the heads propoſed for a treaty to be concluded with the Rana of *Gohud*.

Read the letter from the Rana recorded in the books of the Perſian Correſpondence as received the 7th June laſt; alſo another letter dated the 5th of Shawbaun, and received the 3d September.

Read the propoſed heads of a treaty with the Rana of *Goad*, entered in Conſultation the 12th November.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following amended draft of a treaty propoſed to be executed with the Rana of *Goad*, and deſires that it may be ſubſtituted for the former entered in conſultation the 12th ultimo, as it contained ſuch alterations propoſed by the Miniſter of the Rana as the Governor General deems reaſonable; and to the treaty in this form, the Miniſter who is now preſent declares his entire concurrence.

Articles of Agreement made and concluded at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, between the Honourable the Governor General and Council for the Affairs of the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, on Behalf of the ſaid Company, on the one part, and Maha Rajah *Luckindar Bahadur*, Rana of *Goad*, for himſelf and his Succeſſors, on the other part; viz.

Article 1ſt. Perpetual friendſhip ſhall take place between the Engliſh Company and Maha Rajah *Luckindar Bahadur* and their ſucceſſors, and an alliance be eſtabliſhed between them for the proſecution of the objects hereinafter mentioned.

2d. Whenever a war ſhall actually take place between the contracting parties and the Marattas, if Maha Rajah *Luckindar Behadur* ſhall require the aſſiſtance of an Engliſh force from the Company for the defence of his country, or for the acquiſition of territory, ſuch a force, proportioned to the exigency of the ſervice, ſhall be immediately ſent on his requiſition made in writing to the commanding officer of the neareſt ſtation of the Company's troops, ſhall remain with him as long as he ſhall require it, and return when he ſhall diſmiſs it. The expences thereof ſhall be defrayed by the Maha Rajah, at the fixed monthly rate of twenty thouſand Muckſedar rupees, of the currency of *Benares*, or any other ſpecies of rupees of the ſame intrinſic amount, for each battalion of Sepoys on its preſent eſtabliſhment, with its proportion of artillery; the payment to commence on the day when the ſaid force ſhall paſs the borders of the Company's dominions, or the dominions of the Nabob of *Oude*, and ceaſe on the period ſtipulated for its return to either, four coſs being allowed for each day's march.

3d. This force ſhall be employed for the defence of the Maha Rajah's dominions againſt all foreign or domeſtic enemies, and for the enlargement of his dominions by conqueſt on the Marattas.

4th. Whatever countries ſhall be acquired from the Marattas in purſuance of this treaty, by the troops of the Company or of the Maha Rajah, ſeparately or in conjunction, whether by war or treaty (except the fifty-ſix Mahls which conſtitute the Maha Rajah's Jaghier, and which are not now in the poſſeſſion of the Marattas) ſhall be ſhared in the following proportions; viz. nine annas to the Company and ſeven to the Maha Rajah. The mean amount of the groſs revenue of the whole, ſhall be aſcertained by Ameens choſen by each party, on the collections made in the ten preceding years; and the amount of the Company's ſhare as determined by the ſaid Ameens, after deducting the charges of collection which are cuſtomary in ſuch countries, ſhall be fixed and paid by the Maha Rajah as a perpetual tribute to the Company, and the lands and forts ſhall be ceded to the Maha Rajah.

5th. In caſe it ſhall be judged adviſable to employ the combined forces of the Company and the Maha Rajah in any hoſtile operation againſt the Marattas, beyond the borders of the Maha Rajah's dominions, on requiſition made to him in writing from this Government, he ſhall furniſh ten thouſand horſe for ſuch ſervice, and each party ſhall bear his own ſeparate expence; and if upon the return of the Engliſh forces towards their own borders the Maha Rajah ſhall have occaſion for their ſervices, and ſhall make a requiſition to retain them, from the inſtant of ſuch requiſition he ſhall pay their charge in the ſame manner as ſtipulated in the 2d article.

6th. Whenever the Engliſh forces are employed for the defence of the Maha Rajah's country, or for the acquiſition of territory, the ſervice to be performed ſhall be preſcribed by himſelf, but the mode of executing it ſhall be left to the direction of the officer commanding the Engliſh troops.

7th. Whenever the combined troops of the Company and the Maha Rajah ſhall be employed in any remote operations, the commanding officer of the Engliſh forces ſhall conſult the Rajah upon all ſervices to be performed; but the ultimate deciſion in caſe of a difference of opinion, and the mode of conducting ſuch ſervices, ſhall be left entirely to the commanding officer of the Engliſh forces, with a reſervation of the Maha Rajah's complete authority over his own troops.

8th. Whenever peace ſhall be concluded between the Company and the Maratta State, the Maha Rajah ſhall be included as a party in the treaty which ſhall be made for that purpoſe, and his preſent poſſeſſions, together with the fort *Gorvalier*, which of old belongs to the family of the Maha Rajah, if it ſhall be then in his poſſeſſion, and ſuch countries as he ſhall have aquired in the courſe of the war, and which it ſhall then be ſtipulated to leave in his hands, ſhall be guaranteed to him by ſuch treaty.

9th. No Engliſh factory ſhall be eſtabliſhed in the dominions of the Maha Rajah; no perſons of any denomination ſhall be ſent into his dominions on the part of the Engliſh Company, or with the licenſe of the Governor General and Council, without his previous conſent; neither ſhall his Ryots be preſſed for any military ſervice, nor any authority exerciſed over them but his own.

Signed, ſealed and concluded at *Fort-William* this ſecond day of December, in the year of our Lord One thouſand Seven hundred and Seventy-nine.

Mr. *Wheler* delivers in the following minute prepared in conſequence of the Governor General's former propoſitions; which he thinks equally applicable to the preſent.

Mr. *Wheler*—I think myſelf a good deal at a loſs in giving my opinion on the ſubject of the treaty propoſed by the Governor General with the Rana of *Gohud*, as I think a matter of ſo much importance ſhould not have been introduced without being accompanied with the neceſſary information, to enable the members of the Board to judge of its expediency.

The Rana of *Goad* is, I believe, almoſt a new name upon our records. I am entirely unacquainted with the ſituation of his capital, except by conſulting the map; the extent of his territory, his revenue, the force he is

able to bring into the field, and his perſonal character are points, on which I am equally uninformed; nor do I believe any Engliſhman, whoſe authority can be depended upon, has ever been within the territories of *Goad*, to aſcertain them; yet theſe are points on which the Board ought to have the moſt accurate information, before they proceed to decide on the propoſed treaty, otherwiſe they may engage in a war with the Marattas, either to ſupport or make conqueſts for a man, who has neither means nor capacity to enable him to bear any proportion in the riſk or charge which may attend ſuch a war.

Uninformed therefore as I am, I can only give my opinion on the general principle of the propoſed alliance, which is, that having for its object war, conqueſt, and increaſe of territory, I conceive it to be contrary to the true intereſt of the Company and Britiſh nation, and to the fundamental policy of the former; and in fact changes the condition of the Company here, from a commercial to a military State; that it is likewiſe in direct oppoſition to all our inſtructions, and peculiarly inexpedient at this time, when our treaſury is exhauſted, theſe provinces drained of their ſpecie; when the nation is engaged in a dangerous war in *Europe*, and the Company is threatened with a general combination of the Indian Powers againſt all their ſettlements.

How, under ſuch circumſtances, the condition of the Company is to be mended, by hiring out their troops, and making conqueſt for a petty Rajah, ſituated at ſo great a diſtance from their frontier, does not in anywiſe occur to me: I rather think that ſuch an alliance, and the meaſures propoſed in conſequence, are calculated to draw the neighbouring Marattas upon us; to expoſe our extenſive and unguarded frontier to waſte and ravage, and to involve the Company ſtill more in danger and expence, without any adequate proſpect of advantage. I am therefore againſt the treaty.

(Signed) *Edwd Wheler.*

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following minute upon this ſubject.

Mr. *Francis*,

The Rana of *Goad* is a prince, with whom the Company have hitherto had no connection, and whoſe name, I believe, is unknown to them. I myſelf confeſs to have no other information concerning him, than what I have been able to collect within theſe few days. I ſee by Major *Rennill*'s map, that his capital is ſituated in latitude 26 d. 20 m. longitude weſt of *Calcutta* 9 d. 40 m.; *Gwalior*, the place of which he wants to get poſſeſſion, is a ſtrong fortreſs in the hills, about 80 miles diſtant from *Etawa*, on the other ſide of the *Jumna*. From ſome officers who have been in that part of the country, I underſtand that the Rana is very poor; that his country is wild, rocky, and uncultivated; and that his army is little better than a rabble, ill armed and clothed, and without regular pay or diſcipline. The Governor General's motion gives us no information on any of theſe points; yet, in the conſideration of a queſtion of ſuch importance, as an immediate alliance, offenſive and defenſive, to be followed by a future guarantee of future acquiſitions, it ſeems eſſential to us to know, what are the ſtrength and reſources of the Prince with whom we are going to engage; the ſituation and extent of his country; together with the circumſtances and diſpoſition of the Powers who border upon it, and in whoſe diffeſences with him, whatever they may be, we ſhall probably become parties in conſequence of our preſent engagements.

Whether the conqueſt of *Gwalior* be the Rana's ſole and real object, or whether another expedition into *Bundlecund* may not be in fact the conſequence of our ſending troops to act with him, is in my judgment very uncertain. Colonel *Leſlie* ſet out under inſtructions, firſt to proceed towards *Bombay*, and afterwards to *Berar*. Inſtead of doing either, he marched into *Bundlecund*, took poſſeſſion of the capital, and remained there very quietly till he died. I think it not at all unlikely, that the officer who may command the expedition now projected, will follow the example of his immediate predeceſſor. There is nothing to be gained in the country of *Goad*, or its neighbourhood, whereas the Diamond country offers every temptation, it is the high road to fortune, and therefore the moſt likely to be purſued. Appendix, No. 239.

Having no authentic information before me, on the ſtate and condition of the Rana of *Goad*, I muſt draw my concluſions from the beſt I have been able to obtain; of courſe they cannot be in favour of a man ſo circumſtanced as I believe the Rana of *Goad* to be: at the ſame time I have no difficulty in declaring, that if all the facts were reverſed, it would not incline me to aſſent to the meaſure. The event of thoſe treaties in which we have hitherto engaged, does not furniſh me with any encouragement to enter into new ones, formed on the ſame principles or to follow that line of policy; I deem it unwiſe and dangerous in every ſenſe. It is inconſiſtent with the *welfare* of *Bengal* to employ our forces in diſtant ſchemes of conqueſt, whether for ourſelves, or others; it is inconſiſtent with the *ſafety* of *Bengal*, to ſend our troops beyond the *Jumna*, and much more to bind ourſelves to let them remain there at the diſcretion of any of the country Powers. The diſtance is too great, and the Rana of *Goad* too inconſiderable, to ſuffer me to ſuppoſe it poſſible that the impreſſion of any efforts of *his*, or of ours in conjunction with him, can be felt on the Malabar coaſt, or create a diverſion that can be of the ſmalleſt ſervice to Brigadier General *Goddard*.

But this, in my judgment, is not the moſt material conſideration. The extent of our preſent frontier, to ſpeak moderately and without the hazard of exaggeration, is full as great as we are able to defend; and if it were not ſo, a ſyſtem of invaſion and conqueſt is equally unnatural to the condition of the *Eaſt India* Company as a mercantile body, and to that of the territory they poſſeſs in *India*.

What ſort of concluſions muſt ariſe in the minds of men at home, who are capable of judging of ſuch queſtions, when they ſee that with all our preſent immenſe poſſeſſions, and with all the reſources which we ought to derive from them, it is neceſſary to their ſecurity that we ſhould endeavour to enlarge them.

On the ſame principle, and from the ſame cauſes on which ſuch meaſures are deemed neceſſary now, the future neceſſity of them muſt increaſe with every new acquiſition; we muſt continue to conquer as long as we continue to acquire.

They who think ſuch a ſyſtem of policy eſſential to the ſafety of the Company's actual poſſeſſions, muſt admit, that our ſituation in *India* is not only very precarious, but incapable of being fixed once for all upon a limited and ſolid foundation. But I am far from admitting that our eſtabliſhment here is of that nature, or that the meaſures in queſtion have any tendency to ſtrengthen or ſecure it.

Mr. *Wheler*'s minute, to which I entirely ſubſcribe, has anticipated a great deal of what I intended to have ſaid. I ſhall therefore only add, that the ſyſtem of which this meaſure makes a part, counteracts the fundamental principles of the Company's policy, and cannot be purſued without direct diſobedience to their poſitive and repeated orders and inſtructions to this Government, nor without overſetting a principle laid down by the Governor General himſelf; and in which I entirely concur with him, that notwithſtanding the ſuperiority of the Britiſh force in *India*, its general line of action is and muſt be *purely the defenſive*.

The terms of the propoſed treaty are liable to many difficulties and objections. I ſhall only mention one. Guarantees between Princes and States are uſually (I believe always) reciprocal. There is a manifeſt reaſon, I confeſs, for not calling upon the Rana of *Ghode* to guarantee, as regularly as he ought to do, the poſſeſſions or future

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future acquiſitions of this Government; but it is ſuch a reaſon as reduces the Rana very low, and ought to deter us from entering into any alliance with him. It may involve us in the conſtant ſupport of his quarrels with his neighbours; but it offers us no compenſation or aſſiſtance in return, ſuppoſing the Company's poſſeſſions in any other part of *India* were invaded, nor is it in his power to afford it.

Whether this be a juſt obſervation or not I need not inſiſt upon it; becauſe my oppoſition to the propoſed treaty is founded on principles which do not oblige me to canvas the particular advantage or diſadvantage of every ſpecific article contained in it.

On that general ground of argument, which Mr. *Wheler* has taken, and to which I have only added a little without improving it, I entirely diſapprove of the propoſition, and proteſt againſt it.

Mr. *Barwell*—The general object of the propoſed treaty appears to me pointed to the preſent circumſtances of our Government, and that of the Marattas. It ſtrikes me to be well calculated to give ſtrength to both the offenſive and defenſive means we hold within ourſelves, as to weaken thoſe of our immediate enemies the Marattas. In a ſtate of war with that Power, every enemy that is raiſed up to their State, is an advantage to our own plans of conqueſt; acquiſition of territory, and a deſign to engage the forces of the Company in diſtant expeditions, to which the objections of Mr. *Wheler* and Mr. *Francis* particularly point, are not meditated by the preſent treaty. It is the defence of theſe provinces, and the diſtreſs of the common enemy, that appears to me to have led to this treaty. If acquiſition of territory, or any advantage ſhall ariſe from ſuch a policy, the Company and the nation will be benefited without any of thoſe riſks that ſeem to be regarded with ſo much apprehenſion in the foregoing minutes. I agree to the propoſed treaty.

Governor General—I had no ſuſpicion that the members of this Government could be ignorant of the conſequence, much leſs of the exiſtence of the Rana of *Goad*; it was therefore unneceſſary for me to have inſtructed them on theſe points, nor was I forward to introduce a meaſure of ſelf-apparent neceſſity, with arguments which I know would be conteſted, and the meaſure itſelf of courſe oppoſed. We were upon the eve of a war with the Maratta State, a war which is no leſs the effect of the Company's decided orders, than of the meaſures of their ſervants, to which this Government has given its ſanction. From General *Goddard*'s advices, it may be almoſt poſitively concluded, that we are actually in a ſtate of war with them, and poſſibly with other Powers combined with them; had this Government remained in total inaction, had no meaſure of this kind been adopted, I ſhould have expected to have been reproached with ſuffering the Company to be drawn into a war with perhaps the firſt Power in *India*, without any alliance to ſupport it, or to obviate the predatory incurſions of ſuch an enemy. I am now reproached with forming ſuch an alliance, and on grounds which will only apply to a ſtate of perfect peace and domeſtic ſecurity; were the acquiſitions of territory, or the increaſe of revenue the object, the operations of the treaty would not be limited to the ſeaſon of war. If war has taken place, or ſhall take place, with the Maratta State, the treaty ſecures the ſupport and aſſiſtance of a powerful Prince, whoſe dominions adjoin to our frontier, and lie in one of the principal roads through which the Marattas muſt paſs to invade us; and the objects propoſed by the alliance are ſuch as are moſt likely to weaken the Maratta State, by depriving it of its reſources, and dividing its attention; at the ſame time the principal in the treaty with us, is a man on whoſe perſonal intereſts and enmity to the Maratta State, we may depend for his faithful adherence to it. He ſucceeded to his preſent poſſeſſions by the death of his father, who loſt his life and the fortreſs of *Gwalior* at the ſame time, in an engagement with the Marattas, with whom the ſon has been ever ſince in a ſtate of warfare. It is notorious, and will be probably known to many well-informed perſons at home, that the Marattas have made various attempts to reduce the preſent Rana, with numerous armies, conducted by their moſt eminent leaders, and once by *Ragonaut Row* in perſon, and have been as often repulſed with diſcredit to their Government and honour to the Rana. That he was the protector of two of the moſt important and obnoxious characters in *Hindoſtan*, *Gauzo O'Dien* and *Coſſim Ally Cawn*, are facts ſo notorious, that I cannot yet ſuppoſe any member of this Board to be ignorant of them; and theſe alone are preſumptive, but very ſtrong proofs of the power of the man whoſe State could prove an aſylum to ſuch fugitives. His perſonal abilities are equally known, they are univerſally acknowledged and proved by his actions.

I have ſaid that the objects of the treaty and the operations dependent on it, are reſtricted to a ſtate of war with the Marattas. A war in which, with reſpect to the immediate commencement of it, independent of former cauſes, they muſt be the aggreſſors by rejecting the offers of peace which we have made to them. If after all, my ſuppoſition ſhall not be realized by the event, but a peace enſue, the treaty becomes in itſelf null, being reduced to the ſimple tie of friendſhip, which alters nothing of the relative ſtate in which we are at preſent with the Rana; and all the conſequences which Mr. *Francis* concludes that it will entail upon us, which, ſuppoſe a war with the Marattas, are certainly more likely to happen from ſuch a war, if we have no ſupport, than with a proviſion to avert them. I have had ſuch frequent occaſion to complain of the unfair manner in which Mr. *Francis* quotes my words and opinions, that I ſhall make no other reply to his aſſertion of the contradiction of the preſent meaſure to my own principles, than that the expreſſion which he has quoted appertains to a different occaſion and a different object, and bears no more relation to the preſent ſubject than the diſpatch of treaſure to *Bombay* or *Surat*.

Mr. *Francis*—Neither Mr. *Wheler* nor I have profeſſed to be ignorant of the exiſtence of the Rana of *Goad*. But, when a treaty of alliance, offenſive and defenſive, is propoſed to be concluded with him, I preſume it is not enough to know that he exiſts. I for my own part ſhould have held myſelf indebted to the Governor General, as I always am, for any information he might have thought proper to give me of the circumſtances and ſituation of this Rajah. It is probable that I might have endeavoured to obtain it myſelf from other quarters, if at any period ſince my arrival in *Bengal*, I had thought it poſſible that an intimate connection of intereſts between the Company and him would ever have been propoſed. When a ſimilar treaty was in agitation with a much greater Prince, (I mean *Moodajee Booſla*) the Governor General introduced the propoſition with a very particular report of his ſituation, views, family connections, reſources, and intereſts. The lights with which the Governor General's laſt minute have furniſhed me, do not tend to eſtabliſh a favourable opinion either of the Rana's character or ſtrength. I do not wiſh to be connected with a man, who is only known by the protection he afforded to perſons ſo obnoxious to this Government and to *India* in general, as *Coſſim Ally Cawn* and *Gauzy O'Dien Cawn*. And as to the ſtrength which enabled him to give them that protection, I believe it to be purely defenſive: he is a hill Rajah: I conclude he has ſtrong holds in the mountains, and that it is not eaſy to come at him. Admitting it to be true, that at this time, and to ſupport a war which it is ſaid is the effect of the decided orders of the Company, alliances with ſome of the country Powers might be uſeful and neceſſary, it does not follow that *all* and *every* alliance deſerves that character. It is not at all unlikely, that we may find ourſelve encumbered and embarraſſed with theburthen of a

uſeleſs

uſeleſs ally. I mean to uſe the words applied by the Governor General not long ago to our connection with *Moodajee Booſla*; as I am ſure I expreſs the ſenſe of them. An offenſive union with *Hyder Ally* or the Nizam, or even with the Rajah of *Berar*, if he could be ſeparated from his countrymen, might indeed on the principles of the preſent war, be of importance to its ſucceſs. The Rana of *Goad* is too inconſiderable to be of weight in either ſcale; but if his ſtrength were greater than it is, it would not neceſſarily follow that we ſhould gain any thing by uniting it to ours. Before ſuch a junction can be effected, we muſt croſs the *Jumna*, and relinquiſh all the ſecurity and other advantages, which the intervention of that great barrier affords to all our poſſeſſions, and to thoſe of our ally. By the ſame act we divide our force, and make it difficult, if not impracticable, for the different parts of it ſo ſeparated to aſſiſt each other. Every operation we undertake on their ſide of the river, ſo far from adding to our ſtrength or diſtreſſing the enemy, is only laying ourſelves open to wounds in a quarter where, if we ſtayed within our own barrier, we might be invulnerable. We relinquiſh a ſituation of ſuperior ſtrength to meet our enemy, if we do meet him, on equal terms. I ſhall trouble the Board with but one word more. The Governor General, it is true, has often complained of unfair quotations, and this complaint, I am informed, has been echoed in *England*; but I do not admit that it has ever been made with reaſon. Let an inſtance of any moment be pointed out, and I am ready to join iſſue upon it.

Governor General—I have never made the complaint againſt Mr. *Francis* of an unfair quotation, but I have pointed out the inſtance, and proved it to be unfair. The preſent inſtance is before us. I do remember, that when we were firſt informed of a war, then ſuppoſed to be declared between *Great Britain* and *France*, I ſaid, That our part of the war muſt be purely defenſive, becauſe they had all to gain, and we to loſe. I do not know whether theſe were the words; but I am ſure that this was the ſubſtance and ſenſe of the maxim which is now quoted as a contradiction to the propoſal which I make of withſtanding a predatory enemy, already in poſſeſſion of a great part of *Hindoſtan*, by diſtant and offenſive operations. For the reſt of Mr. *Francis*'s minute, I do not think it neceſſary to reply to it, having, I think, in all our conteſts generally allowed him the laſt argument; and I think, the ſubject was ſufficiently diſcuſſed in the our preceding minutes.

Mr. *Francis*—I admit that the maxim which I have attributed to the Governor General was introduced on the occaſion he mentions; I nevertheleſs underſtood it to be a general one, at leaſt it certainly could not be confined to the caſe of the war with *France*, ſince at the ſame point of time, we ſtrongly recommended, and by aſſiſtance promoted, the ſiege of *Pondicherry*.

Governor General—Let it be added, that I, at the ſame time propoſed a meaſure which from its tendency led to the poſſibility at leaſt of an offenſive war with the Marattas, and this propoſition was made in the ſame minute in which the maxim now attributed to me was introduced; and I will venture to ſay, will not be underſtood from theſe minutes, neither from thoſe of Mr. *Francis*, or my own.

Agreed to the amended draft of the treaty.

Ordered that it be engroſſed fair, and executed

Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 14th February 1780.—Preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, and *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires. (Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed. Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.)

The Governor General lays before the Board the following minute, with a letter and encloſure from the Commander in Chief. Appendix. No. 239.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 6th inſtant, encloſing a draft of a treaty propoſed to be entered into between the Honourable Company and Maha Rajah *Lookindein*, Rana of *Gohud*; acquainting me that Captain *Palmer* is deputed to interchange the ratification, and requiring of me in the mean time to comply with any application the Rana may make for the Company's forces to act againſt the Marattas.

In reply; while I beg leave to aſſure you that the Company have no officer more diſpoſed to obey and enforce your commands, and that I ſhall punctually comply with thoſe now before me; yet as a member of the Board I muſt, in vindication of myſelf, and in diſcharge of my duty to my country and the Company, not only proteſt againſt this order, but againſt the treaty itſelf; and requeſt they may both be recorded upon the proceedings relative to this object.

My proteſt againſt the preſent order is founded upon, and limited to the immediate ſtate of our politics reſpecting the Marattas with whom hoſtilities are long ſince ceaſed, and with whom we have at this inſtant an agent negociating in behalf of our Government to eſtabliſh a firm and honourable peace.

In oppoſition to this, when the preſent order may be obeyed, we commence hoſtilities and declare war at the very moment perhaps when the treaty is concluded between us, and in a mode not as it ought to be; when we may, if obliged to renew the war againſt the Marattas by a vigorous effort upon them from all our Preſidencies, in a manner ſuitable to our military fame, and likely to put an immediate and ſucceſsful end to it: no, we muſt by this order carry it on under the patronage of a petty Prince, a tributary to *Nudjiff Cawn*, ſuppoſed not to poſſeſs above ſix lacks of revenue, and three to four thouſand troops, and commence a war at his inſtigation and pleaſure, while our own policy and intereſt leads us to aim at peace.

My exceptions to the treaty I have ſeparately ſtated in the encloſed proteſt.

But with regard to the order, I repeat and beg to be underſtood that I intend the fulleſt compliance, while I diſclaim in the ſtrongeſt manner any aſſent to the meaſure.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Allahabad, 21ſt December 1779. (Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Allahabad, 21ſt Dec. 1779.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—As a tacit reception of the treaty propoſed to be concluded with the Rana of *Gohud*, publicly ſent me by the Board, might ſubject me to a ſuſpicion of aſſenting to a meaſure, that I would upon no conſideration ſubſcribe my name to, I think myſelf obliged, in ſupport of my own character and conduct, for which alone I can be reſponſible, to give in the following proteſt againſt it.

Againſt the 1ſt Article: I do not think that an alliance, of the ſolemn nature propoſed, with a Prince of ſo low an eſtimation among thoſe of *Hindoſtan* as the Rana of *Gohud* is ſaid to be, can prove any credit to the Company, as neither his name or power can ever benefit them, but on the contrary, his weakneſs and poverty make us conſtantly bear the labour and burden of his avarice and ambition, without reaping benefit, or even reimburſement; in ſhort, raiſe him at the gratuitous expence of our blood and treaſure, not to mention the ſacrifice of our fame.

Againſt the 2d Article: I muſt obſerve, that in caſe of a war with the Marattas, which it pre-ſuppoſes, it places the moſt extraordinary and unprecedented power in the hands of a foreigner, that ever was deviſed by any Government for their own deſtruction

From the poſts neareſt to him, which are our advanced

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posts, and most essential stations, he may draw off and require what numbers he pleases, and that by a simple application to the officer commanding those particular posts, without reference to our Government: and here permit me to ask, what must be the situation of the unfortunate officer, who having established those stations for the defence of our provinces, and the rest of the army perhaps entirely relying for our security upon their being fully occupied, they are drawn off without his knowledge or consent? and if he should afterwards learn it, reinforce them; this again is liable to the same reduction. He thus remains remediless, laid open to the incursions of the enemy, without means to save his character or credit, while alone responsible.

The command of the advanced part of our army is hereby in fact transferred to the Rana, and enables him legally, and by our own consent, to become, if his interest can be gained, the most powerful and dangerous instrument against us that it is possible to construct; and how far his poverty may make him attainable to our enemies, and in how much he is therein a safe Power to entrust our lives and fame with, I leave to unbiassed reflection to determine.

Further, when once possessing our troops, without the knowledge and consent of our Government he is also enabled legally to deprive us of the power of recalling them; for they are to remain as long as he shall require it, and return when he shall dismiss them; and after all, the expence of them not even insured to us, for there is a bare promise to pay, without the least mention of security.

Against the 3d Article: It is to be observed, that the treaty swerving from its ostensibly declared object, of assisting in his defence against the Marattas, upon a presupposition of both parties being engaged in a Maratta war, now launches into a general war upon all foreign and domestic enemies; thus at once plunging us into a war with all *Hindostan*, even against our own allies, should the Rana be pleased to bring them under the other objects of his policy.

Against the 4th Article: It is extraordinary, that after our men and treasures shall have been employed, as proposed in the 3d article, against all foreign and domestic enemies; we are only to reap the benefit of acquirements from the Marattas, for the article of division is restricted to them alone. If the sword is to be drawn against whomsoever the Rana may direct, we should at least be entitled to benefit equally by whomsoever may fall under it. The perpetual tribute herein mentioned, is, like the payment of the troops, left without the shadow of security.

The 5th Article, while equally inconsistent with the rest, in oversetting the foregoing proposals, gives the Rana a pre-eminence, entitling him to an attention and consideration from us, which he is not restricted by. We give him the command of our army, which is to obey at his summons; but we are to address him and his Government, not in like manner, to command his officers to attend.

But this self-humiliation is immaterial, in comparison to a further point in this article. By the 2d article, a war is pre-supposed between the Marattas and the contracting parties, and upon our forces assisting his, he is to pay for them; but here, if it is judged expedient to employ the combined forces beyond the Rana's dominions, each party is to bear his own expences. This totally oversets the former article, for by that the combined forces of the Rana, and the Company, are to be employed either in his defence, which may be at home, or to acquire territory, which must be abroad, that is, beyond the dominions of the Rajah; and under both these descriptions we are to be paid (if we can get it) by the 2d article, and bear our own expences by the 5th. And if we are to suppose our forces not combined, in the position of the 2d article, then we are to proceed alone, wherever the Rana may direct, which to any person who may have any feeling left for our credit, is the worse option of the two. Again, by the 5th article, when the combined troops may have marched to *Oogein*, or *Indoor*, to seek the enemy and deliver battle, he may then, agreeably to treaty, leave us to stand the brunt alone; point of partial convenience to him, by which, without supposing him to betray us, (which he may also do, agreeable to treaty) our whole army may be lost. Further, when our troops are returning, which supposes a peace made, in which he is to be a party, by the 8th article he may even then stop our troops, though perhaps under the most urgent orders to defend our southern provinces; he may detain them to go amusing himself in foreign conquests, while we may be in the utmost want of them at home.

The 6th Article places the commanding officer in a very disagreeable situation, limiting his power to the mere execution, while the service required may be very dishonourable for our troops to be engaged in.

The 7th Article, of a complexion with the rest, does not omit, in whatever case it may be, to leave the Rana a complete authority over his own troops even in the midst of battle; so that by a difference of opinion they may prove the destruction of our army, instead of an aid to it.

So that by the 2d article, our troops are taken from the advanced posts, without the participation of our Government, or knowledge of the commanding officer, who stationed them for the defence and security of these provinces, and then detained against the power of recalling them; by the 5th article stopt, if under march for our own defence; and lastly, may be left unsupported even in the extremest danger, if we do not blindly follow his opinion.

The 8th Article may make the trifling object of the possession of an hereditary fort, though it must undoubtedly be obtained by our arms, an obstacle in all situations to our making peace with the Marattas; a restriction, the impolicy of which might, upon a foreign invasion, soon be felt. And here it may be observed, that *Gwalior* is not a fort belonging to his family, but the royal line.

Having now stated my objections to every article of the treaty, for the 9th has no public object in it, I can see the whole in no other light than as dangerous to ourselves, a breach of treaty to the Vizier, and impolitic in the strongest degree, without a single secured benefit. I therefore protest against the whole, and leave the consequences upon those who may carry it into force.

At the same time I must distinguish, that although I disapprove of the treaty now proposed, vesting in a foreign Prince such a command of our army as might be fatal to ourselves, and prevent any officer of reputation taking charge of it in these quarters, a power that no ally should have, yet I am ready now, and at other periods, to enter into any convenient agreement with the Rana, for co-operating with mutual benefit in time of war, without subjecting ourselves to the severe restrictions of the proposed treaty.

But any agreement with him I consider as highly improper, until we have certain information of the state of General *Goddard*'s negociation with the Marattas.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Warren Hastings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, the 17th February 1780.—Present, the Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Governor General, President; *Philip Francis*, and *Edward Wheler*, Esquires. (M. *Barwell* indisposed.)

The Governor General proposes that the following reply be written to the letter and protest from Sir *Eyre Coote*, entered in the last consultation:

Sir,

We have received a letter from you, enclosing a protest, dated the 21st December last, against the treaty concluded

cluded with the Rana of *Gohud*, which you had thought it neceſſary to make as a member of the Board, in vindication of yourſelf, and to ſend down to be recorded in our proceedings relative to that object.

The great irregularity of an abſent member's reviewing the acts of Government, and proteſting againſt them, after they have been formally and finally determined by a legal vote of the Board, obliges us to take notice of your preſent letter, and to acquaint you that the treaty with the Rana of *Gohud* became binding on the faith of the Company from the date of its execution in *Calcutta*; and that the whole Board, as well as every perſon ſubordinate to it, were obliged in duty to give it effect, ſo far as it might be their province reſpectively to bear any concern in the accompliſhment of its ſtipulations. In your preſent ſituation, abſent from our councils, we can only regard you as Commander in Chief of the army, and not reſponſible for any ſteps taken without your participation. In this light we tranſmitted a copy of the treaty to you, not for your opinion upon it, but becauſe it became neceſſary to make you acquainted with its contents, and to entruſt ſome clauſes to be carried into execution under your orders.

We ſhall be at all times willing to receive your opinion upon any meaſures which you may either think fit to propoſe, or which may be yet open to our conſideration, and to allow every degree of weight to the arguments on which it may be founded, that is due to your military knowledge, and to the reſpect which we perſonally bear to your character; but you muſt be ſenſible that, in the preſent caſe, they come too late to be attended with any effect. The impropriety of your preſent claim cannot be more pointedly ſhewn, than by the following clauſe in the concluſion of your minute: "Yet I am ready "now, and at other periods, to enter into any convenient "agreement with the Rana for co-operating with mutual "benefit in time of war, without ſubjecting ourſelves to "the ſevere reſtrictions of the propoſed treaty." This is in effect a propoſition for cancelling a treaty already executed with every formality and ſanction which could be given to it, for the purpoſe of admitting another in its ſtead, which may be propoſed by yourſelf at ſome future and indefinite period; a privilege which, if allowed, would annihilate all the powers which the Board poſſeſs of making alliances.

We do not know whether the Rana has yet made any application to you, for a detachment of our troops to aſſiſt him; but if he ſhall, we think it proper to repeat our injunctions, that ſuch a proportion as you ſhall deem ſufficient to perform the ſervice propoſed, be immediately granted; and we hope, if any requiſition has already been made to you for this purpoſe, that you will have complied with it previous to the receipt of this letter.

Fort William, 17th February, 1780. We are, &c.

Mr. *Francis*—Without departing from the opinion I delivered, concerning the treaty with the Rana of *Gohud*, while that meaſure was under deliberation, I agree in the general reaſoning expreſſed in this letter.

Mr. *Wheler* ſubſcribes to this opinion, and agrees to the letter.

Reſolved, That the letter be written accordingly.

APPENDIX, No. 240.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 6th December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.

THE following minute from the Governor General was ſent in on Saturday laſt; and agreeably to his directions circulated to the members of the Board: Appendix No. 240.

Governor General.—Having, in conſequence of a treaty, paſſed the Board for an alliance with the Rana of *Gohud*, required of his Vackeel to produce the powers with which he was inveſted for executing it on the part of his maſter, he delivered to me a paper which I ſhall lay before the Board at their next meeting, containing ſimply the Rajah's public ſeal; and which, with his letters declaring the Vackeel to be deputed for the purpoſe of concluding ſuch a treaty, are deemed ſufficient and ample authority, according to the forms and uſage of *Indoſtan*; but as the Rana has not ſet his name to the paper, and with us the ſignatures of the contracting parties are held indiſpenſable to the validity of all public engagements, I informed the Vackeel of this defect in his powers. He requeſted that they might, with the addition of his own ſeal and ſignature, be admitted for the preſent execution of the treaty; and to remove all doubt, and authenticate it according to our forms, he made me a propoſal, which I now lay before the Board, under his hand and ſeal, for ſending a perſon on the part of this Government to witneſs the Rana's final execution of it, and exchange the ratification; and I recommend it for their approbation.

(Signed) *W. H.*

Arzie from *Muzhir Ally*, Vackeel of the Rana of *Gohud*.

As I underſtand from what you ſaid, that the cuſtoms of your country require that the contracting parties ſhould ſign their names to the treaty to give it credit and validity, I am therefore hopeful, and make it my requeſt, that ſince the Rajah in his letters to you has aſſured you of the validity of my powers, you will for the preſent accept of a Furd, with my ſignature, and the ſeal of the Maha Rajah; and that a gentleman of truſt may be ſent to the Maha Rajah, that all the points which have been ſettled here may be finally concluded there in the preſence of ſuch gentleman; and that in like manner as I have repreſented many things on the part of the Maha Rajah, ſuch gentleman may obtain ſatisfaction in all matters, and ſee the Maha Rajah ſet his ſignature to the treaty. This will be highly pleaſing to the Maha Rajah, and gain me credit with you.

The following opinions were returned on the above minute and Arzee:

I agree to the propoſitions.

(Signed) *Richard Barwell.*

Mr. *Francis*—If the Vackeel be not inveſted with ſufficient powers to execute the treaty on the part of his conſtituent, we ought not to have proceeded with him ſo far as we have done: the extent of his powers ſhould regularly have been aſcertained in the firſt inſtance. For my own part, I am perfectly ſatisfied with the Rajah's ſeal, and the contents of his letters. It is not likely that he ſhould refuſe to ratify a treaty by which he is intitled and empowered to require the aſſiſtance of our forces *for the defence of his country, or for the acquiſition of territory*; without any other limitation or deſcription of the amount of ſuch force, to be ſent *immediately on his requiſition*, except that it ſhould be *proportioned to the exigency of the ſervice*, of which the Rana is to be the judge. The deputing a gentleman on purpoſe to *Goad*, to ſee the treaty ratified, is in my opinion a very uſeleſs, and I am ſure it will be a very expenſive meaſure. I am therefore entirely againſt it: I do not even know that the Rana's ſignature is wanted. The public ſeal, on both ſides, is the true authentication of their public acts reſpectively.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Agreed. *E. W.*

Reſolved,

Appendix. Nos. 241 & 242.

Reſolved, That a perſon be deputed on the part of this Government to the Rana of *Goad* for the purpoſe of ſeeing the treaty executed, and for exchanging the ratifications.

The Governor General now produces to the Board the paper mentioned in his minute above recorded, under the ſeal of the Rana of *Goad*.

Governor General—I move, that Captain *Palmer*, my military Secretary, may be deputed to interchange the treaties with the Rana of *Goad* according to the propoſal of the Miniſter, entered in the former part of this day's conſultation.

Mr. *Wheler*—It having already been agreed by a majority of this Board to ſend a perſon on the part of this Government to witneſs the Rajah's final execution of the treaty, and exchange the ratifications, I aſſent to the Governor General's motion in favour of Captain *Palmer*.

Mr. *Francis*—I ſhould have thought it would have been more eaſy and leſs expenſive, to have ſent an officer from the neareſt ſtation, but I have no objection to Captain *Palmer*.

Mr. *Barwell*—I agree.

Reſolved, That Captain *Palmer* be deputed to the Rana of *Goad* to witneſs his final execution of the treaty entered in conſultation the 2d inſtant, and to exchange the ratification with him.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 9th December 1779.—Preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, and *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires. (Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.)

The Secretary lays before the Board two drafts of the treaty with the Rana of *Goad*, engroſſed in the Engliſh and Perſian languages, and reports that *Meer Muzzer Ally*, the Miniſter of the Rana, is in waiting.

Agreed, That he be admitted.

The treaties are now ſigned by the Board and by the Miniſter of the Rana of *Goad*.

Ordered, That they be ſent to Captain *Palmer* to be ratified by the Rana in his preſence according to the former reſolution of the Board.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 13th Decemb 1779.—Preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, and *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires. (Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.)

The Governor General propoſes, that Captain *Palmer* be permitted to draw the ſame allowances during his deputation to *Goad*, as were aſſigned to Mr. *Elliot* on his deputation to *Berar*; and that Mr. *Thomas Short* be appointed Aſſiſtant to Captain *Palmer* with the ſame allowances as were granted to Mr. *Farquhar*, Aſſiſtant to Mr. *Elliott*.

Mr. *Wheler*—I have not yet conſidered the buſineſs which Captain *Palmer* is going to undertake, in the ſame light or of the ſame importance with that which was intruſted to the charge of Mr. *Elliott*; at this diſtance of time I do not perfectly recollect whether the allowances given to that gentleman were not objected to by me: however, I do not mean to revert to a former opinion upon a ſubject ſo perſonal as the preſent, though I would wiſh the allowances had been ſuch on this occaſion as I ſhould have judged ſafe to have acceded to, which, as they are now ſtated, I muſt beg leave to decline.

Mr. *Francis*—Mr. *Elliott*'s allowances amounted to current rupees 3,318 per month, thoſe of his aſſiſtant to 555, in all 3,873. I think they are much too high for the preſent occaſion, and that as Captain *Palmer* is only deputed to ſee the treaty with the Rana executed, he cannot have any uſe or employment for an aſſiſtant.

Mr. *Barwell*—I think the allowances of Mr. *Elliott* were regulated by thoſe allotted to Colonel *Upton* on his embaſſy to *Poonah*; and however large they may have appeared to the Court of Directors, I have reaſon to think, that neither Colonel *Upton* nor Mr. *Elliott* were enabled to make any conſiderable ſaving from their allowances; the circumſtances in which Captain *Palmer* is placed are nearly the ſame, and the appearance he muſt make muſt be regulated upon the ſame principle. The difference of rank between Colonel *Upton* and Captain *Palmer* can be no rule to direct the judgment on this occaſion. He is the ſervant of the Government in the ſame line as Colonel *Upton* was, and he muſt ſupport the ſame character; I therefore aſſent to the motion.

Agreed, That Captain *Palmer* be permitted to draw the ſame allowances as Mr. *Elliott*, viz. Lieutenant Colonel's pay, and double Batta per month, Sonaut rupees 1,488. Fixed ſalary 1,000, and contingencies, including Moonchies, ſervants, &c 500.

Agreed, That Mr. *Short* be appointed Aſſiſtant to Captain *Palmer* with the ſame allowances as Mr. *Farquhar*, viz. the pay and Batta of a Captain per month, Sonaut rupees 512.

APPENDIX, No. 241.

From Maha Rajah *Ranna Chatter Sing*: received 13th March.

AFTER expreſſing the earneſtneſs of his deſire to have a perſonal interview with the Governor, and lamenting the impoſſibility of his enjoying that happineſs at preſent, he proceeds thus:

This is the ſtate of my affairs. At this time a war is on the eve of breaking out between me and the Marattas, occaſioned by my having retaken a diſtrict of which they had diſpoſſeſſed me, and which they will doubtleſs endeavour to recover, in which caſe I have no other hope but in your aid. I flatter myſelf that when I find it neceſſary to apply to you, you will grant my requeſt and oblige me with an army, for the ſupport of which I will agree to ſuch terms as you ſhall be pleaſed to intimate to me.

I have given *Wully Ulla* his diſpatches, and directed him to proceed to your preſence; from him you will be informed of every particular relative to this quarter. I was ſome time ago honoured with a royal Firmaund to take poſſeſſion of the fort of *Goalear*, to which 22 Mahals are attached. Regarding this as proceeding from the bounty of the Almighty, and as a means of raiſing me credit, I, with very little trouble, reduced the ſaid fort and Mahals to my obedience, and obtained a Sunnud thereof from the Vizier of the empire. Knowing that this would afford you pleaſure, I could not omit to communicate it to you. I hope that regarding me in the light of a ſincere friend you will frequently favour me with the news of your welfare.

APPENDIX, No. 242.

To Rajah *Chatter Sing Lochbinder* Behadre; dated the 16th May 1779.

THE deſire which you expreſs of an alliance with me, gives me pleaſure; but it is impoſſible to afford you aſſiſtance at this time: I however recommend your living in terms of friendſhip with the Vizier, and conſulting him; you will favour me with frequent accounts of your health.

From the Nabob *Mobarck ul Dowlah*.

Shiek Wully Oatah, the Vackeel of Maha Rajah *Sewae Rana Chatta Sing*, the Rajah of *Gohud*, has preſented

preſented me with a letter from his maſter, and a Nuzzir of five rupees. Having peruſed it, I enclose it for your information. As I hold no connection nor correſpondence with the weſtern Chiefs, and place my ſole reliance and dependance on your favour, be pleaſed to inform me of the conduct you think it proper for me to purſue; if you would have me write an anſwer, favour me with a draft, agreeable to which I will write and deliver to the Vackeel. As he is very preſſing to be diſpatched, that he may return to his maſter, I requeſt you will oblige me with an immediate reply.

Enclosure in the above.

Letter from *Maha Ranna Swae Chatta Sing Lokindur Bahadre*, to the Nabob *Mobarck ul Dowlah*; received the 7th Zehedja.

After the uſual compliments:

I have long entertained an earneſt deſire to enjoy the happineſs of an interview with you. Language is too weak to expreſs how greatly I am deſirous of this event: May the Almighty grant the accompliſhment of this wiſh.

My ſituation is as follows: I am on the brink of a war with the Marattas, having recovered from them a place which they had formerly deprived me of; they will doubtleſs reſent this. I was formerly united in the bonds of friendſhip with your Highneſs's anceſtors, and had great hopes from the Nabob *Sajah ul Moulk Hiſſam ul Dowlah, Mier Mahomed Jaffier Khan Behadre, Mobabut Jung*. The renewal of theſe ties is greatly to be wiſhed.

I ſome time ago addreſſed a letter to the Governor Mr. *Haſtings, Jelladut Jung Bahadre*, requeſting his aid; to which he replied, That as the ſtricteſt union ſubſiſted between us, whenever I ſhould require it, orders ſhould be ſent to the Chiefs ſtationed in this quarter to aſſiſt me with their forces; I therefore beg leave to requeſt of you, who are the maſter of that country, that you will exert yourſelf in this buſineſs with the Governor, who will pay attention to your deſire. I have no doubt of his immediate compliance with your application, and that he will be kindly pleaſed to grant me the ſervices of a brigade of his forces whenever they may be requiſite. I will diſcharge whatever ſhall be fixed for the expence of the troops. I am hopeful, that regarding me as zealouſly attached to you, you will make me happy by frequent letters.

I received a royal Firmaun for the fort of *Gonwalier*, with 22 Mahuls, confirmed by a Sunnud from the Vizier. This I mention for your Highneſs's information, and for further particulars beg leave to refer you to *Sheik Wully Oatab*, to whoſe repreſentations I requeſt your credit and attention.

APPENDIX, No. 243.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 6th December 1779.

THE Governor General thinks it incumbent on him to lay before the Board the following paper of intelligence, which was encloſed in a letter to him from the Commander in Chief.

Extract of a Letter from *Futty Gurr*; 20th November 1779.

I have likewiſe juſt now received from *Goad* the diſagreeable news of the Marattas having made themſelves maſters of the fort of *Arhaund* (which I had the honour to inform you ſome time ago was inveſted) and put the garriſon to the ſword. The ſame account informs me, that they are preparing to attack another fort; and that the Rajah is by no means in a condition to oppoſe them; his troops being not only inferior in point of number to the enemy, but alſo diſpirited and ready to mutiny on account of the long arrears due to them, which he is at preſent unable to pay. In this ſituation of his affairs, the ſpeedy conqueſt of his whole country muſt be the conſequence of the enemy puſhing their advantage with that briſkneſs which the defenceleſs ſtate of it ſeems to invite. Appendix. No. 243.

Governor General—Having communicated this intelligence to *Meer Muzzer Ally*, the Rana's Miniſter, he informed me, that he had received no letters from his maſter ſince his arrival; and therefore concluded, that the danger ſtated as impending on his country from the Maratta invaſion, had been much exaggerated; but thought it probable, that the fort of *Arhaund*, mentioned in the intelligence, had been taken by the Marattas; that it was ſituated on the ſouthern extremity of his dominions, and not capable of much reſiſtance. There can be no doubt that a Maratta force has entered the territories of the Rana of *Goad*, though of itſelf not likely to be productive of any material conſequences. It appears to me to be the part of a plan, which I was lately informed, by a channel which I have hitherto experienced to be of good authority, had been concerted by the ruling Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, for the general conduct of the war againſt the Company; namely, that *Nana Furneeſe* and *Hurry Punt Furkia* were to conduct the war againſt General *Goddard*; and that *Moodajee Scindia* and *Tucoojee Holcar* were to unite their forces, and proceed immediately againſt the Rana of *Goad* to reduce his country, and afterwards enter the *Doab*, and the dominions of the Nabob of *Oude*, or into the countries dependent on *Bengal*, as the circumſtances of the times ſhould direct them preferably to either. I have ſince heard that this plan has been changed, and that all the Chiefs above mentioned had united their forces, and were preparing to march directly againſt General *Goddard*. It appears, however, equally neceſſary to guard againſt any attempts which may have been projected againſt the Rana of *Goad*, and to ſtrengthen his hands to enable him the better to act in concert with us, if that deſign, from whatever cauſe, ſhall have been ſuſpended; I therefore move, that a copy of the treaty, which it has been agreed to conclude with the Rana of *Goad*, be immediately tranſmitted to the Commander in Chief, with inſtructions to comply with any immediate requiſition which the Rana of *Goad* may make for a detachment of our forces, proportioned to the exigency of the ſervice required by it; of which he will of courſe be the judge.

Mr. *Wheler*—I am againſt the motion.

Mr. *Francis*—If the Board were diſpoſed to make a right uſe of the intelligence contained in the preceding letter, I ſhould have thought it a fortunate circumſtance that we had received it before any thing had been finally concluded with the Rana's Vackeel. The Rana of *Goad*'s ſituation, by this letter, appears to be conſiderably worſe than what it was repreſented to me: one of his forts was taken; the Marattas were preparing to attack another; and the ſpeedy conqueſt of his whole country was likely to be the conſequence: if this be the caſe, we are going to execute a treaty with a Prince who may have neither an army nor any dominions left. His army is diſpirited and ready to mutiny for want of pay, which he is unable to give them. If he cannot pay his own troops, how will it be poſſible for him to diſcharge the ſubſidy which he engages to pay for ours? Inſtead of enlarging his territories by conqueſt, which is the profeſſed object of the treaty, our firſt labour will be to recover for him what he has already loſt; and this muſt be attempted by marching a part of our army to a conſiderable diſtance on the ſide of the *Jumna*.

I do not conſider the preſent invaſion of his country by the Marattas, as belonging to or the effect of any particular plan of operations againſt the Company. He is at conſtant enmity with the Marattas; and I look upon this attack as nothing more than a continuance of former hoſtilities againſt him. At all events, we ſhall only diſtreſs ourſelves, and abandon the protection of our own frontier,

Appendix. Nos 244 & 245.

frontier, by engaging in his defence: I am therefore againſt the motion.

Mr *Barwel*—I agree to the motion. I cannot adopt the opinion, that to allow the Marattas to conquer a country ſo near to our own frontier, and extend their poſſeſſions quite up to it, will be attended with any of thoſe advantages which have been ſuppoſed as the probable reſult of our not oppoſing their progreſs. The intelligence that has been laid before the Board, rather determined me to engage our Government in the ſupport of the Rana of *Goad*, than to leave the country an eaſy conqueſt to the only enemy from whom we have any reaſon to apprehend any miſchief.

Agreed to the Governor General's motion; and ordered, That a copy of the treaty with the Rana of *Goad* be immediately tranſmitted to the Commander in Chief, with the following letter.

To Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.
Commander in Chief, &c.

Sir,

Maha Rajah Luckinder Behadur, the Rana of *Goad*, having deputed confidential Miniſters with powers to negociate and conclude a treaty of alliance with this Government and his, of which we encloſe a copy for your information, the original will be formally ſigned and ſealed by us on one part, and by the Miniſters of the Rana on the other part; but we think it neceſſary that it ſhould be likewiſe executed by the Rana in perſon, and have therefore deputed Captain *Palmer* to ſee it performed, and to exchange the ratifications with him. In the mean time, ſhould the Rana make any application to you for a detachment of the Company's forces to act againſt the Marattas, we requeſt that you will comply with his requiſitions, proportioning the number of troops to the exigency of the ſervice on which they are ſent.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 6th December 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 244.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 23d December 1779.

RECEIVED the following letter from the Commander in Chief:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Captain *Popham* has juſt informed me, that his party is ready to move, except the Candahar horſe, which were not arrived. I ſpoke to the Nabob concerning them this morning, who aſſures me they are ready to join him whenever they are demanded, and though he is a lack and a half of rupees in arrears to them, they make no objection to marching, and receive the current pay from us, provided they have ſecurity that the Nabob will diſcharge this debt in future; ſo that you will now, gentlemen, pleaſe to give your final orders reſpecting the movement of this detachment, which ſhall be followed by ſuch military inſtructions as I may find neceſſary to give. However, I wiſh ſome further accounts may come from General *Goddard*, relative to his ſituation before thoſe orders are put in execution, for if all the flying reports I hear be true, it may be neceſſary to move a great part of the troops here, in order to ſecure the junction we meditate, as Captain *Popham* ſeems ſenſible, that from delay, occaſioned by lateneſs of the ſeaſon, the deſign is too well known through the country.

Indeed, if war is to be continued with the Marattas, other and more conſequential ſteps muſt be taken, than merely the ſupplying General *Goddard*'s army from hence; and I ſhould hope the gentlemen at *Madras* have taken into conſideration before this time, the letter we addreſſed to them upon that ſubject.

I encloſe the copy of a return I have received from Brigadier General *Stibbert*, as a convincing proof that the Golandauze have no objection to enter into other corps, either as Sepoys or Laſcars; and that you have conſequently a right to expect they will enliſt with equal facility at *Calcutta*, unleſs obſtructions are thrown in the way of my orders.

Upon a careful ſurvey of *Chunar Ghur*, I find myſelf exceedingly diſappointed in it as a place of ſtrength; it is by no means ſuch, as in its preſent ſtate it can only be defended by muſketry, and that to ſo little purpoſe, that I will venture to ſay an army, well conducted, would not be ſtopped four-and-twenty hours by it; but if its natural advantages are properly attended to, it may, at a very moderate expence be made a poſt of great conſequence, where magazines of all kind of ſtores, ſo neceſſary for the ſupplying of all different ſtations, or to anſwer any exigencies in theſe diſtant provinces, might be laid up in ſecurity. Captain *Gardner* has already laid a plan before you, which I have inſpected, and would recommend to the Board, as anſwering, with ſome ſmall alterations which I mentioned to him, and he approved of, every purpoſe deſired.

The little fort at *Buxar* will become entirely uſeleſs, unleſs it is kept in repair, and as I think it a poſt of great advantage in many reſpects, I ſhould adviſe its being attended to immediately; the eſtimate is made at ten thouſand rupees, but the ſum of five thouſand would, I ſhould imagine, anſwer the purpoſe at preſent, and an allowance of one hundred rupees per month be ſufficient to keep it up afterwards. By what I have ſeen of Captain *Eaton*, who commands there, I think he might very properly be entruſted with the management of this buſineſs, as his attention to it has already been ſuch as to induce him to be at the expence of ſeveral little matters himſelf, rather than ſee them run entirely to ruin.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

Poppa Mow, near *Allahabad*, the 11th December 1779. (Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Ordered, That the 6th paragraph be referred to the Military Department, and the 7th paragraph to the Board of Inſpection.

Reſolved, That the following reply be written to the Commander in Chief:

To Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.
Commander in Chief.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your letter of the 11th inſtant. We beg leave to encloſe, for your information, copy of a letter, which we have juſt received from General *Goddard*, under date the 28th of October; and that you may be apprized as early as poſſible of his further proceedings, we have directed the Secretary to furniſh you with copies of all letters which we may receive from him, immediately on their arrival. With reſpect to the expediency of ſending Captain *Popham*'s detachment to reinforce General *Goddard*'s army, as you will be the beſt judge whether it can now reach him in time to render any effectual ſervice to the cauſe in which he will be engaged, we requeſt that you will order it, or not, as you ſhall ſee neceſſary.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edward Wheler.

Fort William,
the 23d December 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 245.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations,
23d December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler,

Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.

READ the following extract of a letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We yeſterday received advices from *Buſſora*, dated the 21ſt ultimo, encloſing extract of a letter from His Majeſty's Ambaſſador at the *Porte* to the Conſul at *Aleppo*, dated 24th of July, and copy of a paper given in by the Spaniſh Ambaſſador, on the 16th of June, to the Lord Viſcount *Weymouth*; which amounting to a declaration of war, we loſe no time in tranſmitting you this intereſting intelligence, and copies of the ſaid paper and letter.

By the ſame channel we learn that Sir *Charles Hardy*, with a fleet of fifty ſail of the line, was to oppoſe the combined fleets of *France* and *Spain*, which had not then joined, and that the latter fleet of Indiamen, conſiſting of nine ſail of ſhips, had ſailed from *Spithead* the 11th June, convoyed to a certain latitude by a ſquadron bound for *Newfoundland* under Admiral *Edwards*.

The packet from General *Goddard*, mentioned in his letter of the 20th, will be forwarded in a few days by the *Fez Allum*.

We are, &c. &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 31ſt October 1779. (Signed) *William Hornby*, and Council.

Read a letter from General *Goddard*, as follows:

Gentlemen,

I had the honour of addreſſing you the 20th inſtant, and informed you of the ſteps I had taken in conſequence of your orders of the 13th September.

The emiſſary *Nehab Chund* has however anticipated the period limited for receiving a deciſive anſwer by a few days, and this morning brought me letters from the Peiſhwa and Miniſter; the purport of which are referring me to this man for a knowledge of their final ſentiments; he has accordingly in plain and direct terms declared to me, in the name of his maſter, that he will not accede to the propoſals I had made him, or conclude peace with the Engliſh, unleſs *Ragonaut Row* is delivered up to him, and *Salſette* reſtored to the Maratta Government.

I have in conſequence of this reply broke off the negociation, as I cannot conſiſtent with your inſtructions, give my conſent to either of theſe points; and purpoſe ſetting out for *Bombay* immediately to concert with the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee the plan of future operations, upon which, as it will be neceſſary to loſe no time in coming to a determination, I hope ſoon to be able to ſend you the moſt full and particular information.

At preſent I only beg leave to obſerve, that as the Maratta Chiefs ſeem at this time to be united in Council, and as I am well aſſured that the ſentiments of *Sindia* are the moſt hoſtile of any of them; to make the overture to him as directed in your letter of the 14th June, could not, I am convinced, at this time be productive of any good conſequences; on the contrary it might be conſtrued into a conſciouſneſs of inferiority, and would, it is to be feared, be received by him with deriſion and indifference. Under theſe circumſtances I ſhall defer it until I obtain your further inſtructions, or until circumſtances in the courſe of our operations may render it expedient and advantageous; for as the connection of this Chief with the Miniſter is founded upon conſiderations of intereſt and ambition only, a door will be open for treating with him whenever he can be perſuaded it is for his political advantage to liſten to us.

I have the pleaſure to acquaint you that veſſels have been diſpatched ſome time ago from *Bombay* down the coaſt of *Malabar*, to tranſport the Malé detachment, and I have reaſon to expect being ſoon joined by the force.

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I have the honour to be. &c. &c.

(Sign 4) *Thomas Goddard.*

Head Quarters Camp near *Surat*, 28th October 1779.

Ordered, That a copy of the above letter from General *Goddard* be ſent to the Commander in Chief, and that the Secretary do furniſh him with copies of all letters which may be received from General *Goddard* immediately on their arrival.

APPENDIX, No. 246.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal* to the Court of Directors; dated 14th January 1780.

SOON after receiving a confirmed and particular account of the late unfortunate retreat of the Bombay army before the Maratta forces from *Worgaum*, which was tranſmitted to us with a copy of the letter written to you by the Preſident and Select Committee on that occaſion, we heard of the ſafe arrival of Colonel *Goddard* and his detachment at *Surat*, whither this event had induced him to proceed by direct and ſpeedy marches.

Although the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* had deputed Mr. *Horſely*, one of the covenanted ſervants on that eſtabliſhment, to us, with their proceedings, in order to explain any matters of doubt which might ariſe, or to ſatisfy our inquiries on any point of reference which we might make to him reſpecting them, we did not think proper to enter into a ſcrutiny of the conduct of that Board, or the committee appointed by them to manage the political affairs of the expedition; neither did we conſent to paſs any opinion on the charges preferred by the Preſident againſt Colonel *Egerton* and Lieutenant Colonel *Cockburn*, which were alſo referred to our judgment; but rather choſe to leave the grand point to be decided by the authority of your ultimate ſentence, on a full review of the tranſactions which had been reported to you, and to recommend a general court martial for the trial of the officers accuſed, over whom we could exercile no juriſdiction, unleſs the Select Committee ſhould think neceſſary to ſuſpend them by virtue of their own authority.

But we judged it neceſſary to enter into an immediate and ſerious conſideration of the difficulties into which this unfortunate failure had brought your affairs at *Bombay*, and to concert ſome effectual and decided plan to retrieve them. In this view we reſolved to grant full powers to Colonel *Goddard* to treat with the Maratta State for the reſtoration of peace on that ſide of *India*, and drew up inſtructions for him in conſequence; the ſum of which was, that he ſhould offer them the terms ſtipulated in the treaty of *Poonah*, provided they would agree to recede from all the claims which they founded upon the convention of *Worgaum*, and engage never to admit a French force into their dominions, nor to allow that nation to form any ſettlements on the Maratta coaſt: and the conditions thus qualified were to be made the alternative of peace or war: but Colonel *Goddard* was allowed a diſcretionary power to relax ſo far in his demands upon the Maratta Government as to remit the balance due from the Peiſhwa to the Company, on account of the 12 lacks ſettled by treaty for the expences of the former war, and to give up the difference which had been inſiſted upon between the eſtimates and real value of the country of three lacks, ceded to us by the ſaid treaty, and conteſted by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, upon the literal conſtruction of it.

Upon the arrival of Mr. *Horſely*, on the 2d of May, and after due conſideration of the materials which he laid before

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before us, we thought proper to amplify and extend the inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard*, allowing the former to remain as the baſis of his conduct, and directing him, if the conditions therein preſcribed ſhould be rejected by the Miniſters, and a war become the conſequence, to adopt the plan laid down by Mr *Hornby* in his minute of the 30th March 1779, for carrying hoſtilities into the Guzerat country, or not, as the Colonel ſhould think proper; to declare the negociation with *Moodajee Booſla* at an end, and not to be reſumed without our authority, if he ſhould decline or heſitate to accept the proffered alliance of the Company on the terms ſuggeſted to him; and to treat ſeparately with *Madajee Scindia*, if he ſhould find that Chief diſpoſed to eſpouſe the intereſts of the Company. The preſent critical ſtate of affairs at *Bombay*, induced us to commit theſe points to the ſpecial management of Colonel *Goddard* under our authority, directing him however to apply to the Select Committee at *Bombay* on all occaſions, and to avail himſelf of their advice and information, previous to the concluſion of any treaty, ſeparately entruſted to him. All other matters of negociation, treaty, or military operation, we left entirely to the Preſident and Select Committee: yet as it is impoſſible to give a complete detail of circumſtances which have employed ſo great a portion of our time in the compaſs of a general letter, we beg leave to refer you to our proceedings at large, and to requeſt your attentive peruſal of the following conſultations; viz.

5th April 1779; 12th ditto; 3d May; 24th ditto; 31ſt ditto; 7th June; 10th ditto; and 14th ditto.

With reſpect to the convention ſigned at *Worgaum* by Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, we thought it incumbent on us entirely to diſavow that obligation, as having been concluded without any authority from this Government, which the Miniſtry of *Poonah* well knew to be neceſſary to give validity to every public act; and becauſe this was even declared at the time in which it was ſubſcribed, to want the authority of the Government of *Bombay* itſelf, on which it was immediately to operate, and therefore not binding on the repreſentatives of the Company; but as ſome conſideration appears to be due, in remembrance of the perſonal amity manifeſted by *Madajee Scindia*, in his interceſſion for ſecuring the ſafe return of the Bombay army after their defeat, we propoſed that the private agreement made by the Committee with him at the ſame time, ſhould not be totally diſregarded; and if his conduct had not been ſuch as to forfeit his pretenſions to our conſideration, we authorize Colonel *Goddard* to allow him ſuch gratification, in compliance with that agreement, as he might be willing to receive, and the Preſidency of *Bombay* able to afford.

The deceitful conduct of *Madajee Scindia* has ſince ſhewn him undeſerving of this conſideration, and was diſcovered before our intentions could be imparted to him.

Ragonaut Row who has been ſurrendered a priſoner to *Madajee Scindia*, was treated by him with every exterior mark of reſpect, and placed in charge of one of his officers, to be conducted to the northern part of the Maratta dominions, where *Scindia* had promiſed to grant him a jaghire of 12 lacks of rupees for his ſupport; but *Ragoba* diſcovering on the road, that nothing was meant by this appearance of kindneſs, but a treacherous pretext to carry him off, and to throw him into cloſe confinement, at a diſtance from the capital, excited an oppoſition in the followers who were allowed to attend him, by which, and by a degree of perſonal bravery, which if credit may be given to the reports of it, chiefly contributed to his ſucceſs, he overpowered the troops of *Scindia*'s officer, and effected his eſcape to Colonel *Goddard*, at *Surat*, who received him with aſſurances of perſonal protection.

We thought it adviſable to authorize a continuance of the protection which had been granted to *Ragoba*; but having bounded our views to the reſtoration of peace, by the terms of our original inſtructions to Colonel *Goddard*, we made no alteration in them on account of this event, although we gave our ſanction to the attainment of ſome additional advantages which Colonel *Goddard* intimated his expectations of being able to ſecure from it, if the Miniſters could be brought to enter into a negociation with him; at the ſame time, to prevent his being allured by this hope, we directed, that they ſhould not be ſuffered to interfere with, or impede the general line of conduct preſcribed to him.

Colonel *Goddard* prevailed ſo far with the Miniſters, as to induce them, after repeated promiſes, to ſend a confidential agent to him to receive the overtures of peace which he had to offer on our part, and to treat with him upon them; but having protracted the negociation a conſiderable time longer than was neceſſary, and finding by the conduct of the agent, that he was only endeavouring to amuſe Colonel *Goddard*, and to waſte away the fair ſeaſon in promiſes and references to *Poonah*, while the Chiefs at that place were forming a league to oppoſe him if circumſtances ſhould require it, we thought it not prudent to temporize any longer with them, and therefore ordered, that the propoſals offered to the Miniſters ſhould be immediately repeated, and a peremptory demand made for a definitive anſwer to them within twenty-four hours of their being preſented; the refuſal or evaſion of which ſhould be deemed equivalent to a declaration of war.

We had applied to the Preſidencies of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay* about this time, to reinforce the detachment under Colonel *Goddard*, with ſuch part of the troops belonging to their eſtabliſhments, as the Commander in Chief thought could be ſpared for that purpoſe, in conſequence of intelligence received by him of a French force collecting at the iſlands, which was ſuppoſed to be intended for a deſcent upon the Malabar coaſt; the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* have agreed to furniſh their quota of men; and the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* inform us, that in the preſent critical ſituation of their affairs with *Hyder Ally*, whoſe diſpoſition they apprehend to be hoſtile to the Engliſh, they cannot ſpare the whole force required from them, but have ordered Colonel *Braithwayte*, with the troops under his command at *Mahé*, conſiſting of one company of European infantry, one company of artillery, ſix companies of grenadier, and eight companies of battalion Sepoys, to march on the requiſition of Colonel *Goddard*, for the ſupport of his army.

In the mean time we find that Colonel *Goddard* received our final orders to him, on the ſubject of his negociations, and having made a peremptory demand conformable thereto, he was anſwered by the Miniſters, that they would not agree to treat with him for peace on any other terms than the ſurrender of *Ragoba*'s perſon, and the reſtitution of *Salſette* to the Maratta Government.

Colonel *Goddard* thought it neceſſary immediately to put an end to his negociations, and to prepare for hoſtilities; in conſequence of which he proceeded to *Bombay*, to concert a plan of operations with the Preſident and Select Committee there, and to receive charge of the forces which he expected to be furniſhed with from the Bombay garriſon, and from *Mahé*, by a veſſel which had been diſpatched for them ſome time before.

By private advices communicated to the Governor General, we underſtand that Colonel *Goddard* left *Surat* on the 3d November, and was returned on the 10th December, with a reinforcement of the troops from *Mahé*, and that a detachment from *Bombay* had alſo joined his army at *Surat*.

With this united ſtrength, conducted by Colonel *Goddard*, in whoſe ſkill and experience we place the greateſt confidence, we entertain the moſt ſanguine hopes of a ſucceſsful iſſue to the preſent campaign; notwithſtanding we have reaſon to believe that all the parties in the

Maratta Government at *Poonah* are now united againſt us.

We had reſolved to recruit Colonel *Goddard*'s army, by a reinforcement of 2000 volunteers, to be drafted from the Sepoy corps on this eſtabliſhment, and had given the command of this body to Captain *Popham*, who had ſerved under Colonel *Goddard* in his late march, and was returned to this place; but as the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced, and many circumſtances have occurred to prevent the march of this reinforcement hitherto from *Cawnpore*, the place of its rendezvous, and as we underſtand that Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment is already completed with Sepoys enliſted at *Surat*, we are in doubt whether it will be neceſſary to ſend it, and have therefore left this point to the judgment and option of the Commander in Chief.

In conſequence of the encomiums paſſed by the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* on the conduct of Colonel *Goddard*, and prompted by the experience we have had of his merit and abilities in every part of his expedition to *Surat*, we beg leave to ſecond an application which they intended to make to you, ſoliciting his appointment to the chief command of the Company's forces on that eſtabliſhment. In the mean time we have thought proper to confer on him the brevet rank of Brigadier General, during the preſent ſervice; as well for the purpoſe of ſecuring him in the principal command of the troops which might be employed againſt the Marattas, as to increaſe his conſequence and authority in that important ſtation, and to diſtinguiſh and reward his merit by this mark of our attention.

The Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, in their letter to us of the 4th April, expreſs their ſenſe of Colonel *Goddard*'s conduct, and ſolicit from us ſome diſtinguiſhed mark of our and their favour towards him. This we acknowledge was a great incentive to our granting him the ſuperior rank which he now holds, being in our opinion the only effectual means we had of complying with their requeſt; and yet we could not grant it indefinitely, without injuring his ſenior officers on this eſtabliſhment, who had done nothing to forfeit our favour: we were therefore obliged to confine his commiſſion to the preſent ſervice, in which he was not likely to rank with any of thoſe officers under whom he will conſequently take place on his return to his duty at *Bengal*.

We muſt obſerve that, notwithſtanding the application from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, and the reaſons which we have aſſigned for the conſequent promotion of Colonel *Goddard*, they appear to have conſidered themſelves injured by this meaſure, as they ſay they diſallow our right to grant ſuch partial rank to any of our officers; remonſtrating againſt it as well as againſt the ſeparate powers which we thought it neceſſary to delegate on the late occaſion to General *Goddard*, to negociate with the Government at *Poonah*, as claſhing with the privileges which you have allowed excluſively to them; yet we muſt do them the juſtice to ſay, that for the benefit of the public ſervice, they have agreed to acquieſce in the rank aſſigned to General *Goddard*, and to ſupport the meaſures which he may adopt in the execution of his truſt as our public Miniſter.

In a letter which we have received from General *Goddard*, he informed us that he had granted an allowance of 50,000 rupees per month to *Ragoba* for the ſupport of himſelf and followers, without giving a ſufficient explanation of the principles and motives which induced him, to enable us to judge of the neceſſity for it; but while we found ſo much difficulty in providing means for the indiſpenſable charges of the detachment, and that he himſelf experienced the ſame difficulty in raiſing money for his drafts upon this Government, we could not but diſapprove of ſuch an addition to his expences; we therefore ordered the allowance to be immediately diſcontinued, although we think that the reſtraint which ſuch a gratuity for the time laid upon a number of licentious perſons, whoſe former neceſſities impell'd them to plunder the ſubjects of the Maratta Government for their ſupport, might have ſufficiently evinced our diſpoſition to juſtice and peace, if the Miniſters had been inclined to agree to any reaſonable terms of accommodation with us. To this we muſt add another inſtance of lenity ſhewn by General *Goddard*, and even acknowledged by the Miniſters themſelves, when on the complaint of ſome of the Amildars in the Guzerat province, he afforded them redreſs againſt the violences offered to them by *Ragoba*'s men. Appendix. No. 247.

A reference was made to us by the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* concerning the additional rank granted by them to Captain *Hartley* in conſequence of petitions from ſome of the officers who conceived themſelves aggrieved by this ſuperceſſion of them; but we declined any ſort of interference in this matter, both becauſe the caſe complained againſt was not cognizable by our authority, and becauſe direct appeals had been made to you on the ſubject.

Gauzy o-Deen Cawn, who formerly held the Vizarut of the empire under the two late Kings, having been found at *Surat* in the diſguiſe of a pilgrim was apprehended by the Chief of that place, and detained until the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* had conſulted us reſpecting the diſpoſal of his perſon. As we did not approve of any acts of violence which could neither be reconciled to juſtice or immediate neceſſity, we deſired them to releaſe this man; but to forbid his appearing within the Company's territories; which they accordingly did.

APPENDIX, Nos. 247 and 248.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 17th January 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler, } Eſquires.

Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.

THE following minutes having paſſed in circulation after the draft of the general letter had been ſent round, they are now recorded.

Minute of the Governor General—Informs the Board, and deſires that it may be notified in the general letter to the Court of Directors, that he has advices which he can depend upon, mentioning the departure of General *Goddard* from *Surat* to *Bombay* on the 3d November laſt, and that he was neither returned, nor immediately expected at *Surat* on the 30th of laſt month.

Agreed. *Edwd Wheler.*

Mr. *Francis* deſires it may be mentioned, that he is informed by a private letter of the firſt authority from *Fort Saint George*, "that it is now certain that the Ma-"rattas and *Hyder Ally* have formed an alliance."

Agreed. *Edwd Wheler.*

Governor General—That a peace may have taken place between *Hyder Ally* and the Marattas I do not doubt; my own advices confirm it; but no alliance between them can be of long duration, as it is unnatural. I am convinced from the whole tenor of *Hyder Ally*'s conduct and diſpoſition, that he will never moleſt us whilſt we endeavour to preſerve a good underſtanding with him. Theſe were lately Mr. *Francis*'s ſentiments as well as mine; and his diſtruſt of the ſame authority on the ſame ſubject I recollect to have been yet ſtronger marked than my own (ſee Conſultation 20th December).

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I therefore object to this information being given to the Court of Directors in the general letter, as only tending to alarm them without ſufficient cauſe for it.

Mr. *Francis*—The intelligence I have ſtated to the Board is of a much later date than that which the Governor General alludes to: it contains the poſitive aſſertion of a fact to which I cannot refuſe giving credit, conſidering the authority I have for it. It does not ſay any thing of *Hyder Ally*'s intentions to invade the *Carnatic*: that was the point on which I entertained the diſtruſt alluded to by the Governor; but even that diſtruſt may be removed by new facts and later advices.

Governor General—I think it proper to inform the Board, that I learn by private intelligence from *Surat* that on the 30th of Zekoida, anſwering to the 10th of December, General *Goddard* was returned to that place, and that he had brought with him the Madras detachment from *Mahé*, ſaid by this account to conſiſt of 500 Europeans and 2,000 Sepoys.

No. 248.

Intelligence from *Decan*, dated 22d Jawal, 3d November; delivered for Tranſlation 13th January.

Hemunt Pundit Pundham, *Narrain Mudlo*, *Nanna Sahib*, and *Ballagee Jenandan*, are encamped with 4 or 5,000 horſe without the town of *Poonah*, at *Garnier*, and are employed in the adminiſtration of the affairs of the country. *Hurry Pundit*, who reſides in his own houſe at *Poonah*, has every day a conference with *Nanna*. *Kiſhen Row Mullar* is returned home to *Baraminty*. *Lalla Nihalchund*, who had come hither after his conferences with the Europeans of *Surat*, *Nanna Sahib* has ſent back again to Colonel *Goddard* to *Surat*, and told him to aſſent to the payment of no ſum of money which the Engliſh ſhould demand. If they will conform themſelves to that treaty which the Europeans of *Bombay* made at the time of their defeat, and by which they agree to relinquiſh *Taſty* and the other Mahals, it is well, peace may be made; but if they will not, do you and *Luchmen Row* both come away.

Dewajee Pundit, the Dewan of *Moodajee Booſla*, is gone towards *Naigpore*, after having made this engagement with *Nanna*, that in ſix weeks he would march towards *Bengal* with a large army, and lay waſte the whole country; and at his deſire the Kella of *Hoſſungabad*, and the city of *Hooney*, dependant on the Nabob *Fizeul-Dowla Bahadre*, the Chief of *Bopaul Zdal*, have been granted to *Moodajee Booſla*, and they have given *Dewajee Pundit* a Kareta addreſſed to the Nabob *Heyat Mahomet Cawn*, the Talookdar of *Bopaultal*, directing him to deliver up the fort and city to *Moodajee Booſla*, which *Dewajee* will diſpatch to the Nabob.

Madjee Scindia is at *Kamgonge*; he has got ready about ſixty guns of different ſizes; and a large ſupply of powder and ball and other ſtores for the Tope Khana, have been ſent to *Madajee Scindia* from the Sirkar of *Heremunt*. *Sahib Tocojee Holkar* remains ſtill at *Babgoung*. The news writers in the country of *Cokem* have written to *Nanna* that the Engliſh at *Bombay* have loaded ſix veſſels with military ſtores which are lying at anchor; it is ſuppoſed that they are going to the fort of *Baſſire*: *Nanna Sahib* has accordingly put a reinforcement of about 2,000 horſe and Gardy foot, belonging to *Hurry Pundit* and *Jenanden Pundit* towards *Cokem*, to the aſſiſtance of the fort of *Baſſire*, and the remainder of the Gardy infantry he is preparing to ſend as ſoon as he ſhall have collected them.

It is now reported that the ſhips which were afloat at *Bombay* have ſailed from thence to ſome quarter.

Hurry Pundit, with the advice of *Nanna*, carried *Heremunt Sahib*, to the houſe of *Byſajee Koorſe* of the Benay country. *Byſajee Pundit* preſented clothes, jewels, &c. to *Heremunt Sahib*, who after that ſeating him behind him on his elephant, carried him to his own houſe, honoured him with a Khellaat of thanks; but *Byſajee Pundit* did not receive it; from hence it is conjectured that he will be reſtored to his former ſtation.

By the reports of the people arrived from *Surat* it has been learnt, that *Dada Sahib Ragonaut Row* and the Europeans, with five or ſix battalions and 2,000 horſe, are encamped without the town of *Surat*; *Ragonaut Row* has got a boil in his ear which continually emits pus. About 2,000 horſe and foot have been diſpatched by *Dada Sahib* towards the Pergunnah of *Dahy*, and two battalions are arrived from *Bombay* to Colonel *Goddard*, who has received from *Calcutta* the title of General inſtead of that of Colonel, and all the ſtores are brought out of the town of *Surat*; ſuch is the preſent ſtate. The news from *Surat* which comes in Maratta letters by the Dauk, *Nanna Sahib* reads in private and keeps them in his own poſſeſſion; and if it is neceſſary to give *Madajee Scindia* any information, he writes it with his own hand. He has now ſent *Anket Row Running* to learn the news of *Surat*, and has diſpatched *Kiſhen Row* and the ſon of *Aumid Row Houſſy* at the head of 400 horſe and foot, together with *Hurry Sing Row*, the Vackeel of *Hyder Naig*, and a confidential perſon on the part of *Aumil Row*, for the purpoſe of making a treaty on theſe conditions, to the fort of *Heringapatam*, where *Hyder Naig* reſides, with clothes, jewels, &c. That he is to pay for the expences of the preſent year 20 lacks of rupees, and for all other years 12 lacks; and that the country which has been taken from him will be reſtored to him: that if the Europeans ſhould come to their quarter from *Madras* or *Arcot*, he muſt obſtruct their march: that as war ſeems inevitable in their quarter with the Europeans he muſt ſend troops to their aſſiſtance; and that as ſoon as they ſhall have made a peace with the Europeans they will march in conjunction with him towards *Arcot* and *Madras*, and take poſſeſſion of the country: that whatever part of *Arcot*, &c. ſhould be taken would remain in his poſſeſſion, and that he muſt therefore, in conſideration of all this, reſtore whatever part of *Heremunt Sahib*'s country he has before taken.—We muſt ſee what will take place. *Guldar Khan*, the ſon of *Ameert Khan* deceaſed, is in the Kella of *Ranny* here with 3,000 horſe and foot. All the environs of the Kella are deſerted, and all the ſmall and large pieces of water are ſpoilt: there is a great ſcarcity of water, and the army of *Helmunt Sahib*, amounting to about 10,000 horſe and Gardy infantry, with their ſtores, have marched from the fort three coſs of this ſide, to the Nullah of the village of *Chomprah*. Once or twice ſmall parties of them went towards the fort, but ſeveral being killed and wounded, they returned. *Deeſum Mug*, the Talookdar of *Bhengar* in the neighbourhood of the Kellah of *Ahmudnagur*, having collected 1 or 200 men, was deſirous of taking *Mowajee Babba* out of the fort of *Ahmudnagur*. *Mowajee Babba* ſent ſecretly a letter to *Deeſum Mug*, which the guards getting information of, ſeized and ſent to *Nanna Sahib*, who accordingly took up and confined all the Muteſeddies and people employed by *Mowajee Babba*, and has put guards upon the houſes of *Mowajee* and all his Muteſeddies, in which there is to the amount of 20 lacks of money and goods.

It is reported, that diſputes have ariſen between *Hyder Naig* and the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*, the Soubahdar of *Arcot*. The Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan* is at *Hydrabad*; it is reported he is going to *Aurungabad*. An anſwer is preparing to the royal Shukka, which before arrived from his Majeſty to *Heremunt Sahib*. *Nanna Sahib* has wrote about 60 Maratta letters to the Chiefs of *Mangry*, who remain at home from a pique: they would not receive the letters, and ſaid that they for five years were not deficient in their duty, and had been put to great expence without ever receiving any thing from the Sirkar, and were not able to attend their duty, from want of the neceſſaries of life. On the 22d Jewal, *Nanna Sahib Cawn* invited *Byſajee Goorſe*, and preſented him with clothes, jewels, and every thing belonging to his

jaghire and former State, from the Sirkar of *Heremunt Sahib*, and has raiſed him to his former dignity.

Nanna has invited all the Sirdars of the army, and determined with them upon declaring war with the Europeans. *Gopaul Sumbajee* and *Siccarám Hurry* are dead. Whatever I ſhall further learn I will inform you.

APPENDIX, No. 249.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 17th January 1779.

RESOLVED, That the following letter be written to Brigadier General *Goddard*:

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 28th October, alſo your duplicate letter of the 10th ultimo; but as the papers to which you refer us for particulars were omitted, we remain ſtill uninformed of your intentions with reſpect to *Ragoba*, or of the immediate plan of operations which you mean to purſue, further than what we are able to collect from the letter itſelf.

With reſpect to the penſion which you have granted to *Ragoba*, and on which you deſire our inſtructions, we muſt refer you to our letter of the 29th November, for the ſenſe of our diſſatisfaction with that allowance; and we think it proper now to add the ſtricteſt injunctions, that you do not in any manner ſuffer him to become chargeable to the Company. The general indiſpoſition ſhewn towards him by the Maratta Chiefs, proves that he has little influence in that Government, and that he is not likely to bring any partizans to our aſſiſtance; we are determined therefore to ſtand forth as the principals in the war, and to maintain the character through the whole courſe of it, as the Miniſters, by rejecting the terms of accommodation which we propoſed to them, have in effect made us ſo. For this reaſon we think it neceſſary further to direct, that you do not ſuffer *Ragoba* to become of too much importance in your preſent operations, and to caution you againſt entering into any ſpecific engagements which may entitle him to a participation in your ſucceſs; unleſs he is able contrary to our preſent expectations, to afford you ſuch effectual and actual ſupport as ſhall juſtify his admiſſion to ſuch benefits.

We have received a paper of intelligence tranſmitted to us from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, which we deem it a juſtice due to you to afford you an opportunity of anſwering; we therefore encloſe a copy of it; and as the breaking off the negociation at *Poonah* is attributed to an exorbitant demand on your part, beyond the terms which we had authorized you to propoſe, we think it incumbent on us to call upon you for an anſwer; aſſuring you at the ſame time, that the declaration contained in the paper has made no impreſſion on our minds, nor tended in any degree to leſſen that confidence which we have hitherto placed in your fidelity, and which your ſervices, and our knowledge of your character, have merited from us.

The ſeaſon being too far advanced for Captain *Popham*'s detachment, which is ſtill at *Cawnpore*, to render you any effectual ſervice by marching to your aſſiſtance, we ſhall countermand our order for that purpoſe.

As it is very material for us to be regularly furniſhed with the accounts of your detachment, as well for the purpoſe of fixing and providing your ſupplies, as for entry on our books, we again deſire that you will be punctual in forwarding them to us.

We cannot comply with the laſt paragraph of your letter, dated 28th October, as the power which you ſolicit, to grant brevet rank, and to fill up the vacancies which may happen in your detachment, would not only be incompatible with our late military regulations, but tend to create confuſion in the army.

Fort William, 24th January 1780. We are, &c

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 24th July 1780.

Appendix. Nos. 249 & 250. A.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*; dated 27th May 1780.

In anſwer to the paper of Madras intelligence you have tranſmitted me, it is neceſſary to remark upon the little dependance that can be placed upon information originating from ſources ſo ill informed as the perſon who tranſmitted it from *Poonah* muſt be; and had not you been pleaſed to call upon me for an anſwer to it, I ſhould not myſelf conſider it deſerving of the ſmalleſt attention: at the ſame time, gentlemen, I muſt acknowledge with the warmeſt ſenſe of gratitude, the candid and honourable expreſſions you have made uſe of on the occaſion, from which I have the heartfelt ſatisfaction of being perfectly aſſured, that the paper you communicated to me has failed of making any impreſſion on your minds. I beg leave however, in the moſt ſerious and ſacred manner, as an officer and a man of honour, to declare to you, that I never made any demands of money from the Poonah Durbar, either publicly or privately, directly or indirectly, beyond what I was required to do, either by the expreſs letter of your inſtructions, or by an attention to the particulars communicated to me by the Select Committee of *Bombay*, relative to the *Aurora* merchant ſhip on the Maratta coaſt, very little exceeding one lack of rupees in value, and which had been previouſly admitted as a fair and legal charge upon the revenues of the Jamboofier Pergunnah, and communicated to you by the gentlemen of *Bombay*.

APPENDIX, Nos. 250, 251, and 252. A.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 24th January 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edwd Wheler*. } Eſquires.

Sir *Eyre Coote* on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.

RECEIVED the following letter from Sir *Eyre Coote*:

Gentlemen, *Lucknow*, January 6th 1780.

I am juſt honoured with your letter of the 23d ultimo, encloſing to me a copy of Brigadier General *Goddard*'s letter of the 28th of October, and giving me diſcretional powers for ordering the march of Captain *Popham*'s detachment.

It appears to me, by General *Goddard*'s letter, (the contents of which I own I feel myſelf diſappointed in, as by his correſpondence with me I had been led to a very different expectation) that a war with the Marattas is inevitable, unleſs you chuſe to comply with the terms upon which they offer you peace.

In this ſituation of affairs, I cannot but expreſs ſome uneaſineſs that the information you give me is not accompanied by your reſolutions in what manner we are to proceed; whether you hold it beſt to accede to their propoſitions for peace, to commence an active and vigorous war, or to ſtand merely on the defenſive againſt them.

The firſt or ſecond of theſe require the moſt ſpeedy determination, leſt the appearance of a French force, which we have much reaſon to expect, ſhould heighten their demands in the one caſe, or add ſtrength to the union already formed among themſelves in the other.

I hardly need obſerve to you, gentlemen, that the circumſtances we are in, both at home and here, require from us the moſt immediate, decided, and united meaſures;

Appendix. No. 251.

sures; and that in a correspondence carried on at this distance from the Presidency, it is absolutely necessary, if we would avoid delays, which may prove fatal to our affairs, that I should receive your opinions upon events of importance, as speedily as the information itself.

For want of it, in the present critical instance, I can do no more than endeavour to procure from the Vizier, and to collect together what little heavy artillery is to be met with in these quarters. Our army here is wholly unprovided with them, as well as almost every other military store.

Captain *Popham*'s detachment is ready to march. The undertaking will now be a hazardous one, and cannot be effected without moving an army across the *Jumna*, to cover and screen his motions, by calling off the powers and attention of the enemy; and it may at the same time prove a check to them in collecting the large sums they are actually employed in raising among the tributary Princes there, the amount of which I shall very soon obtain exact information of.

This, together with a well-timed co-operation on General *Goddard*'s part, to accelerate and facilitate their junction, can alone give hopes of their making good our aim.

But neither this nor any thing else can be attempted until your definitive resolutions are given as to peace, a vigorous war, or a defensive one.

General *Goddard*'s request at the close of his letter I must pointedly object to, as the granting it will undoubtedly increase that confusion in the army which I have been endeavouring to the utmost to relieve them from.

I enclose a return of the army under General *Goddard*, upon a supposition that the Madras detachment may have joined him.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

No. 251.

STRENGTH of the Army under Brigadier General *Goddard*, on a Supposition that the Detachment from *Mahé* has joined him; taken from the Returns for September 1779.

| | CAVALRY. | | | | | | | | | EUROPEAN ARTILLERY. | | | | | | GOLANDAAZE. | | | | | | EUROPEAN INFANTRY. | | | | | | | SEPOYS. | | | | | | | | |

No. 252.

Reſolved, That the following reply be written to the Commander in Chief.

To Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your letters, dated the 2d, 3d, and 6th inſtant.

We receive with pleaſure the information which you give us of the ſucceſsful iſſue of your applications to the Vizier for the neceſſary tuncaws on his revenue to anſwer the diſburſements of the troops for the enſuing year.

When we tranſmitted you a copy of General *Goddard*'s letter to us, under date the 28th of October, we ſhould alſo have imparted to you our reſolutions upon it had we formed any; but a preciſe line of conduct having already been laid down for General *Goddard* in our inſtructions to him, which provided for the event of hoſtilities, General *Goddard* having informed us, when he ſaw a war was unavoidable that he was going to *Bombay* to concert the means of carrying it on to advantage; and as the plan of his operations, whatever it might be, muſt be governed in a great meaſure by local and incidental circumſtances which we could neither foreſee nor have any timely acquaintance with, we thought it unneceſſary to take any further ſteps upon the occaſion of his letter.

We have now received a further letter from General *Goddard*, dated the 10th December, informing us of his return to *Surat* after having ſettled the plan of his future operations, for the particulars of which he refers us to papers omitted to be encloſed in this letter which is a duplicate: our ſecretary informs us that he has forwarded a copy of it to you; and in order to complete your information we now tranſmit you a draft of our intended reply.

We are of opinion that the ſeaſon is too far advanced to admit of a junction between Captain *Popham*'s detachment and the forces commanded by General *Goddard*, and that the march of this detachment to the other ſide of *India* is therefore no longer adviſable; but we think that it may be uſeful on the weſtern frontier of the Vizier's dominions, either to repel an invaſion from the Marattas, if they ſhould attempt to enter at that quarter, or to proceed againſt them on the weſtern ſide of the *Jumna* if it ſhould be found expedient to ſend a force for that purpoſe, we therefore recommend its continuing ſtill embodied.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 24th January 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 253. A.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 29th October 1779.

At a Select Committee; PRESENT,

The Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor;
John Carnac, Eſq. *Daniel Draper*, Eſq.

READ the letter from *Bengal*, dated 14th ultimo, and a letter received laſt night from General *Goddard*.

Conſiderations on the preſent ſtate of affairs with the Marattas.

We are concerned to obſerve matters appear ſo ripe for a rupture, when we are ſo little in a condition to contribute any aſſiſtance, either of men or money, towards carrying on a war. In the preſent ſituation of affairs, it is undoubtedly our buſineſs to endeavour to gain time, and to protract the criſis, which the execution of the late order muſt inevitably produce. It ſhould be conſidered that our treaſury is very low, and that we have no reſources of any kind for a ſupply, nor have the Governor General and Council given us the ſmalleſt aſſurances of any aſſiſtance from them. The laſt accounts from *Tellicherry* give us no reaſonable expectation of the arrival of the fleet in *India* before January; and in the mean time prudence requires, that we ſhould have regard to our own ſafety, from any attempts of the French, and muſt make us very cautious of diminiſhing the force of this garriſon, by giving any reinforcement to General *Goddard*; the addition of the force from *Madras* can likewiſe by no means be depended on, as we underſtand the gentlemen there have ſent an army into the field, and it is very doubtful whether they will chuſe to ſpare us a man till the fleet arrives; and Colonel *Braithwaite*, by the laſt diſpatch, acquainted the Preſident, that he had not received any orders from his ſuperiors to join General *Goddard*, without which it appears he did not mean to do it. The ſafety of Captain *Popham*'s detachment, which we learn is to march from the Bengal provinces by the way of *Agra*, ought likewiſe to be a very powerful argument againſt urging matters too faſt, as in caſe of an immediate rupture, we apprehend there would be very great danger of its being cut off before a junction could be effected; at any rate it muſt take up a very conſiderable length of time before the troops from *Madras* and *Mahé*, and Captain *Popham*'s detachment, can be collected, and put in a condition to act offenſively, which, with the ſtate of our finances, an uncertainty reſpecting the fleet, and the ſtrong body of forces on board, which would add ſuch vigour to our operations, make us clearly and deciſively of opinion, that it is not our intereſt, and likewiſe very impolitic, to precipitate matters at this juncture; and it is therefore reſolved, that this our opinion, and our reaſons for it, be immediately ſtated to General *Goddard*; and that it be ſtrongly recommended to him, if the miniſterial party will not accede to his terms, to endeavour to procraſtinate, and gain time, till we are in a better condition to proſecute an active war.

That it is our buſineſs to procraſtinate with them.

Reaſons for our opinion.

To be recommended to General Goddard, to endeavour to gain time.

It will be alſo highly proper before we come to a rupture, if ſuch ſhould be found to be inevitable, to form connections with ſome of the country Powers, and particularly the Guicawars, as well for proſecuting the war as for the better ſecurity of our northern poſſeſſions, and obtaining a body of horſe, which we imagine will be found abſolutely neceſſary.

Country Powers: neceſſity of forming connections with ſome party.

The Guicawars deemed a proper one

It is alſo highly proper that ſtocks of grain ſhould be collected and laid in at *Surat* and *Broach*, not only on account of the probability of a war, but the unfavourableneſs of the ſeaſon.

Stocks of grain to be collected at Surat and Broach.

Reſolved, That the Chiefs at thoſe ſettlements be directed to conſult General *Goddard* reſpecting the ſtock of grain for his army, and that they actually concert matters ſo as to lay in a quantity between both ſettlements ſufficient for an army of 6,000 men for ſix months. The Chief of *Surat* ſhould likewiſe ſuggeſt to the Nabob, the propriety on the above conſideration, that care ſhould be taken to prevent the city from ſuffering any want of grain, by ſome timely precautions on that head; and as ghee can be provided cheaper at *Bombay*, the Chief muſt be acquainted that article will be ſupplied from hence.

A quantity ſufficient for 6,000 men for ſix months to be laid in.

Ghee to be provided from hence.

Directions muſt alſo be ſent to *Surat* for ſalting a quantity of meat, of which we have none in ſtore.

A quantity of meat to be ſalted at Surat.

Our reaſons for wiſhing General *Goddard* to temporize and procraſtinate matters, muſt alſo be ſtated to the Governor General and Council, who, we cannot help remarking, muſt have been very well acquainted with the ſtate of our finances at the very time, when, as by their laſt letter they deſire us by every means that may be neceſſary, to render General *Goddard*'s ſucceſs ſpeedy and effectual.

Reaſons for wiſhing General Goddard to temporize, to be ſtated to the Governor General and Council.

Read the letter received the 26th inſtant from Mr. *Hoyſley* at *Calcutta*, and the advices from *Tellicherry* and Colonel *Braithwaite*.

Appendix. Nos. 252 & 253, A.

Nabob of Toll Bopall, letter from his Vackeel at Poonah laid before us.

The Preſident lays before us a letter from the Nabob of *Toll Bopall*'s Vackeel at *Poonah*, as entered in the book of Country Correſpondence.

Chriſtie, Engineer, his bill paſſed.

Paſſed, Practitioner Engineer *Chriſtie*'s bill for landing and re-ſhipping the ſtores ſent to *Mahé* by the *Aſia*, amounting to rupees 1,102. 1; the factors at *Tellicherry* having acquainted us that buſineſs was done at his charge.

Adjourned.

Wm. Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper.

Edw. Ravenſcroft, Sec^ry.

Gentlemen,

Goddard, General, letter from.

I think it neceſſary to give you this early information, that in conſequence of inſtructions received from the Honourable the Governor General and Supreme Council, to put the intentions of the Miniſters to an immediate teſt, and obtain a deciſive knowledge of their ſentiments upon the ſubject of the propoſals already made them, I think it neceſſary to declare to *Luximon Row*, their Vackeel, the ſuſpicions I cannot but entertain of the hoſtile deſigns and inclinations of his maſter, from the delay that has unneceſſarily aroſe in receiving an anſwer to my propoſals, firſt tranſmitted in writing, and afterwards fully communicated by *Lolla Nehal Chund* in perſon, who had promiſed faithfully to return himſelf, or forward the Miniſter's reply in twenty days at furtheſt; that twice that period had now elapſed; and although he (*Luximon Row*) had repeatedly amuſed me with accounts of *Nehal Chund* having received his diſmiſſion, it appeared from his own acknowledgments he had not yet ſet out, and would not in all probability leave *Poonah* till after the Duſſorah: that, notwithſtanding theſe circumſtances of ſuſpicion, the Engliſh were ſtill ready to ſhew their ſincere inclination for peace, and grant every indulgence they poſſibly could conſiſtent with a regard to their own honour and ſafety, and that therefore I would wait fifteen days more, in which time he ſaid a letter might arrive in reply to one he would diſpatch that inſtant; at the expiration of which, if *Nehal Chund* did not arrive, or a ſatisfactory anſwer to the propoſals I had tranſmitted by him, I ſhould conſider this delay as a declaration of war, and act accordingly. This paſſed the 18th inſtant, and of courſe the limited period expires the 3d of November. I gave *Luximon Row* at the ſame time letters to the Peiſhwa and Miniſter to the above effect.

A letter to the Honourable Governor and Supreme Council, with a ſmall parcel containing part of the ſurvey of my route to this place, accompanies this diſpatch, which I take the liberty of recommending to your particular care to give orders for its being ſafely forwarded to them.

I have the Honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near *Surat*,
20th October 1779.

Signed the following letters to General *Goddard*, and the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 20th inſtant.—We are concerned to obſerve that matters appear ſo ripe for a rupture when we are ſo little in a condition to contribute any aſſiſtance either of men or money towards carrying on a war. In the preſent ſituation of affairs it is undoubtedly good policy to endeavour to gain time, and to protract the criſis which the late order from *Bengal* muſt immediately produce if literally complied with. It ſhould be conſidered that our treaſury is very low, and that we have no reſources of any kind for procuring an adequate ſupply, nor have the Governor General and Council given us the ſmalleſt aſſurances of any ſupply from them. By an account from *Tellicherry* we learn, that the fleet under Sir *Edward Hughes*, was ſpoke with by a Daniſh ſhip on the 19th of May, no further advanced than the latitude of ſeven degrees north, ſo that we can have no reaſonable expectation of their arrival in *India* before the month of January; and in the mean time, prudence requires that we ſhould have regard to our own ſafety againſt any attempts of the French, and muſt make us very cautious of diminiſhing our own force by any reinforcement to your army. Any addition of force from *Madras* can likewiſe by no means be depended on, as we underſtand the gentlemen there have ſent an army into the field under Colonel *Harper*, and it is very doubtful whether they will chuſe to ſpare us a man until the arrived of the fleet. Colonel *Braithwaite* has alſo acquainted the Preſident, that he has not yet received orders from his ſuperiors to join you, without which he may perhaps not mean to do it. The ſafety of Captain *Popham*'s detachment muſt likewiſe be put to extreme hazard by an immediate rupture; at any rate it muſt take up a very conſiderable time before the different bodies of troops which are to compoſe the army can be collected and put in a condition to act offenſively, which, with the ſtate of our finances, and the diſtant expectation of the fleet with a body of troops that would diffuſe ſtrength to all our ſettlements in *India*, all together form a collection of circumſtances that make us clearly and deciſively of opinion it is our buſineſs to procraſtinate and not to precipitate matters at this juncture, and we therefore think it our indiſpenſable duty ſtrongly to recommend to you, if the Miniſters will not accede to the offered terms, not to make any immediate declaration, but, according to their own policy, to endeavour to gain time till we are in a better condition for an active war.

It will alſo be very proper before we come to a rupture, if ſuch ſhould be found inevitable, to form connections with ſome of the country Powers, particularly with the Guicawars, as well for the better proſecution of the war, as for the ſecurity of our northern poſſeſſions; and we alſo apprehend it will be found very neceſſary to engage in our ſervice a conſiderable body of horſe, which cannot be done without a large ſum of money, now abſolutely out of our power to furniſh.

In the mean time we ſhall give orders for eſtabliſhing magazines of ſtores and proviſions at *Poonah* and *Surat* for the future exigencies of the army.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
29th October 1779.

To *Rawſon Hart Boddam*, Eſquire, Chief, &c. &c.
at *Surat*.

Surat, letter to the Chief.

Sir,

From the probability of a war with the Marattas, and the unfavourableneſs of the preſent ſeaſon, we deem it highly neceſſary that timely proviſion ſhould be made to ſecure proper ſupplies of grain and proviſions for the army in the field; we therefore now direct, and have ſent the like orders to the Chief of *Broach*, that after conſulting General *Goddard* with reſpect to the preſent ſtate of his magazines, you mutually ſo concert matters as to lay in between both ſettlements a ſtock of grain and proviſions ſufficient for an army of 6,000 men for ſix months. We deſire you will likewiſe ſuggeſt to the Nabob the propriety on the above conditions, of his uſing timely precautions to prevent the city from ſuffering any want of grain.

As ghee can be provided cheaper at *Bombay* than *Surat*, that article will be ſupplied from hence.

The

The *Shark* is now returned with this diſpatch, and a letter for General *Goddard*.

We are your loving friends,

Bombay Caſtle, 29th October 1779. *William Hornby*, &c. Committee.

The ſame to the Chief of *Broach*, omitting the laſt paragraph, and recommending to the Chief to take timely precautions for preventing the town from ſuffering any want of proviſions.

Saturday, 30th. Received from the factors at *Buſſorah* a copy of the declaration delivered by the Spaniſh Ambaſſador at the Britiſh Court to the Secretary of State, Lord *Weymouth*; which amounting to a declaration of war, it is judged neceſſary immediately to diſpatch advice thereof to the Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Madras*, and to Sir *Edward Vernon*, and to the ſubordinate ſettlements.

Sunday, 31ſt. Signed the following letters to the Governor General and Council, the Select Committee at *Madras*, Sir *Edward Vernon*, and the Reſident at *Anjengo*, and circular letters to the ſubordinates, all encloſing copies of the Spaniſh manifeſto.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

Governor General and Council, letter to. We now encloſe a duplicate of our laſt letter, dated the 7th inſtant, and have ſince received your favours of the 16th Auguſt and 14th September.

General *Goddard* has alſo received your inſtructions correſponding with the laſt-mentioned, and has adviſed us of his proceedings in conſequence; which if the Poonah Government is not pacifically inclined, muſt bring on a criſis much ſooner than we are prepared to meet it. We have explained ourſelves fully on this head to General *Goddard*, and ſtrongly recommended to him not to precipitate matters, but to endeavour to gain time, and defer any declaration until we are in a better condition for an active war; the good policy of which we are perſuaded you will be convinced of, when you have attentively conſidered the circumſtances we have ſtated to General *Goddard* in our anſwer to his letter, of both which copies are encloſed, and to which we beg leave to refer.

In our laſt letter we mentioned the ſtate of our finances, which was too minutely explained in the Preſident's minute of the 30th March; and although we flatter ourſelves you have already taken meaſures for ſupplying us, we have not received any aſſurances to this effect; and prudence requires we ſhould be at an abſolute certainty on this important point, before we engage in meaſures that will require the moſt ample reſources: at leaſt we have done our duty in giving the real ſtate of the caſe to General *Goddard*, with whom at laſt the determination will reſt; aſſuring you at the ſame time, that ſhould he find himſelf reduced to the extremity of recurring to hoſtile meaſures, we ſhall grant every aid our means will admit, conſiſtent with a proper regard to our own ſafety, to render his ſucceſs ſpeedy and effectual.

We yeſterday received advices from *Buſſora*, dated 21ſt ultimo, encloſing extract of a letter from his Majeſty's Ambaſſador at the Porte to the Conſul at *Aleppo*, dated the 24th of July; and copy of a paper given in by the Spaniſh Ambaſſador on the 16th of June to the Lord Viſcount *Weymouth*; which amounting to a declaration of war, we loſe no time in tranſmitting you this intereſting intelligence, and copies of the ſaid paper and letter.

By the ſame channel we learn that Sir *Charles Hardy*, with a fleet of 50 ſail of the line, was to oppoſe the combined fleets of *France* and *Spain*, which had not then joined; and that the latter fleet of Indiamen, conſiſting of nine ſhips, had ſailed from *Spithead* the 11th of June, convoyed to a certain latitude by a ſquadron bound for *Newfoundland*, under Admiral *Edwards*.

The packet from General *Goddard*, mentioned in his letter of the 20th, will be forwarded in a few days by the *Faz Allum*. Appendix. No. 253. A.

We are, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 31ſt October 1779. *William Hornby*, &c. Committee.

To the Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident, &c. Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

Fort Saint George, letter to. The Governor General and Council have acquainted us of their reſolution to form a reſpectable army on this coaſt, and of the quota of troops to be furniſhed from your Preſidency, of which you have been duly adviſed by them; and we wait your advices on the ſubject. But as we underſtand the forces at *Myhie* are intended as a part of the proportion to be contributed by your Preſidency, and as matters with the Marattas appear to converge faſt to a rupture, we have, on General *Goddard*'s repreſentation of the neceſſity of having his army put into a condition for inſtant and active ſervice, ſent down a ſufficient number of tranſports to bring up the forces, ordnance, and ſtores from *Myhie*, and hope Colonel *Braithwaite* will have been furniſhed in time with proper orders from you for complying with our requiſitions.

The fortifications of *Bombay* having lately been conſiderably augmented with ſeveral new works, we were much in want of cannon for them; and obſerving by a return ſent us by Colonel *Braithwaite*, the conſiderable quantity of ordnance taken at *Mahé*, we judged it a very good opportunity for ſupplying our wants, and ordered them to be tranſported to *Bombay* on the Company's veſſels, which will alſo ſave the very heavy expence of freighting them round to *Madras*; and we hope be ſatisfactory to you.

We yeſterday received advices from *Buſſora*, dated 21ſt ultimo, encloſing extract of a letter from his Majeſty's Ambaſſador at the Porte to the Conſul at *Aleppo*, dated 24th of July; and copy of a paper delivered by the Spaniſh Ambaſſador on the 16th of June to the Lord Viſcount *Weymouth*, which amounting to a declaration of war, we loſe no time in tranſmitting you this intereſting intelligence, and copies of the ſaid letter and paper.

By the ſame channel we learn that Sir *Charles Hardy*, with a fleet of 50 ſail of the line, was to oppoſe the combined fleets of *France* and *Spain*, which had not then joined; and that the latter fleet of Indiamen, conſiſting of nine ſhips, had ſailed from *Spithead* the 11th of June, convoyed to a certain latitude by a ſquadron bound to *Newfoundland*, under Admiral *Edwards*.

We encloſe packets for the Governor General and Council and Admiral *Vernon*, and requeſt the former may be forwarded with all poſſible expedition.

We have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 31ſt October 1779. *William Hornby*, &c. Committee.

To Sir *Edward Vernon*, Rear Admiral of the Blue, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in *India*. Vernon, Admiral, letter to.

Sir,

The two paragraphs from the preceding letter to *Madras*, contain the intelligence from *Europe*.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 31ſt October 1779. *William Hornby*, &c. Committee.

To

Appendix. No. 253. A.

Goddard, General, letter to.

To Brigadier General, *Goddard*.

Sir,

(The ſame as the preceding letter to Admiral Sir *Edward Vernon*.)

William Hornby,
31ſt October 1779. &c. Committee.

To Mr. *John Torleſſe*, Reſident at *Anjengo*.

Anjengo. Letter to the Reſident.

Sir,

We diſpatch this boat expreſs with a packet for the Preſidency of *Madras*, which we deſire you will forward thither with all poſſible ſafety and expedition.

We are
Your loving friends,

Bombay Caſtle, *William Hornby*,
31ſt October 1779. &c. Committee.

Circular Letter to the Subordinates.

Circular letter to the ſubordinates.

We yeſterday received advices from *Buſſora*, dated the 21ſt ultimo, encloſing the extract of a letter from his Majeſty's Ambaſſador at the Porte to the Conſul at *Aleppo*, dated the 24th of July; and copy of a paper delivered by the Spaniſh Ambaſſador on the 16th June to the Lord Viſcount *Weymouth*, which amounting to a declaration of war, his Excellency has in conſequence left the kingdom, and our Ambaſſador at the Court of *Madrid* is ordered to withdraw without taking leave. We think it material to loſe no time in tranſmitting this intelligence.

And we are your loving friends,

Bombay Caſtle, *William Hornby*,
31ſt October 1779. &c. Committee.

November.

Monday 1ſt. Brigadier General *Goddard* arrived from *Surat*.

Tueſday 2d. At a Select Committee; preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *John Carnac*, and *Daniel Draper*, Eſquires.

Goddard, General, meets the Committee;

General *Goddard* having arrived laſt night from *Surat*, now meets the Committee, and acquaints them of the declaration he ſent to the Poonah Miniſtry, in conſequence of the laſt order from *Bengal*, as already adviſed in his letter of the 20th ultimo; but before he could receive the Durbar's anſwer thereto, *Neal Chund*, whom he had formerly diſpatched to *Poonah*, with his terms, returned from thence on the 27th ultimo, with letters from the Peiſhwa and the Miniſter, the purport of which was ſimply to acknowledge receipt of the propoſal written and ſent by *Neal Chund*, and referring to him for an anſwer as being fully informed of their ſentiments, which he was to communicate.

informs us of the ſtate of his negociation.

Terms upon which the Marattas will make peace with the Engliſh.

That *Neal Chund*, in anſwer to the overtures made to the Durbar, plainly declared, That his maſter would not make peace with the *Engliſh*, unleſs *Salſette* was relinquiſhed, and the perſon of *Ragonath Row* delivered up: that upon theſe conditions, and theſe only, he was ready to agree to the propoſals that had been ſent to him, and declared in the moſt pointed terms, that unleſs the above conditions were agreed to, there was no further occaſion for negociation.

Diſmiſſes the Maratta Vackeel;

General *Goddard* alſo acquaints us, that being at ſome diſtance from *Surat* when he received this anſwer, he did not give the Vackeel his diſmiſſion till the next day, but acquainting him he was going upon an excurſion into the country, promiſed to ſend his reply to *Surat*, which he accordingly did, and immediately took ſhipping for *Bombay*, to conſult with us upon the meaſures to be purſued.

takes ſhipping for Bombay.

Lays before us a return of the army, which is in good condition for ſervice.

General *Goddard* then lays before us a return of the army at *Surat*, which appears to be very complete and healthy; and he aſſures us it is in an excellent condition for immediate ſervice, and well ſupplied with proviſions for the preſent.

He alſo acquaints us, that he diſpatched immediate advice of the ſituation of affairs to the Governor General and Council.

The committee of opinion that we ſhould endeavour to gain time, and to protract hoſtilities, unleſs obliged thereto.

Although by this ſtate of the caſe it appears, that a war with the Marattas is inevitable; yet for the reaſons aſſigned in our laſt conſultation, we are ſtill of opinion it is neceſſary to endeavour to gain time, and protract any declaration or acts of hoſtility until matters are more advanced, unleſs they actually commence hoſtilities againſt us. The letter in conſequence to General *Goddard*, of the 29th, which he has not yet received, is now read to him, together with the account of the rupture with *Spain*, and our recommendation to obſerve temporizing meaſures for the preſent, is ſtrongly repeated to him.

Temporizing meaſures recommended to General Goddard.

Braithwaite, Colonel, a requiſition ſent for the troops under his command.

To prevent as far as poſſible any diſappointment in the junction of the troops from *Mahie*, it is reſolved immediately to ſend a poſitive requiſition to Colonel *Braithwaite* to embark the troops on the veſſels ſent down to receive them, or he muſt be reſponſible for the conſequences. A letter to this effect is now ſigned and diſpatched from the council table.

Madjee Scindia averſe to any accommodation with the Engliſh.

General *Goddard* acquaints us, that he found *Madjee Scindia* ſo averſe to any accommodation, and ſo much inclined to hoſtile meaſures, that he did not think proper to commit the honour of the Company, by making any overtures to him.

The meaſures neceſſary to be purſued conſidered.

The meaſures to be purſued being conſidered, we are of opinion that the firſt ſtep ſhould be to endeavour to open a negociation with the Guicawars, on the grounds mentioned in the Preſident's minute of the 30th of March, and with the reſtrictions contained in the letter from the Governor General and Council of the 14th of June. *Futty Sing* made propoſals to us on thoſe grounds in the year 1772, which it was not then convenient for us to accept, but we hope we ſhall now find him inclined to renew the negociation upon aſſurances of being ſupported againſt the Poonah Government.

Reſolved, That we meet again to-morrow morning, to proceed on the more mature conſideration of this important buſineſs.

Adjourned.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secry. *D. Draper*.

To Colonel *John Braithwaite*.

Braithwaite, Colonel, letter to.

Sir,

Matters are now come to that extremity, that a war with the Marattas is really inevitable: and it is abſolutely neceſſary that the army under General *Goddard* ſhould be put into the moſt reſpectable ſituation to enable us to carry it on with vigour and advantage, and to prevent the poſſibility of the Company's arms being expoſed to any diſhonour, or their ſettlements to the incurſions and depredations of ſo numerous an enemy. We therefore find ourſelves under a neceſſity to prevent as far as we can a diſappointment in the junction of the forces from *Mahé*, to inform you that the Company's ſervice abſolutely requires their aſſiſtance at *Surat*; and to ſend you this poſitive requiſition, immediately to embark them on board the tranſports ſent down to receive them, in order that they may proceed to *Surat* without the ſmalleſt loſs of time, to join the army under General *Goddard*; and if you do not think proper to comply with the requiſition, you muſt be reſponſible for the conſequences.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, *William Hornby*,
2d November 1779. &c. Committee.

Wedneſday 3d. At a Select Committee;—preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *John Carnac*, Eſquire, *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire. General *Goddard* preſent.

Met to reſume the ſubject of yeſterday's conſultations.

General *Goddard* lays before us a letter as entered hereafter, on the preſent ſtate of affairs with the Marattas, which is attentively read and conſidered.

Artillery detachment under General Goddard to be completed to a full company.

Reſolved, That the artillery detachment with General *Goddard* be immediately completed to a full company by two Gallivats under orders for proceeding to *Surat*.

Conſideration of the meaſures to be purſued deferred till advices arrive from Colonel Braithwaite.

As we may certainly expect to hear from the coaſt in a very few days, whether Colonel *Braithwaite* means to join General *Goddard*'s army, it is reſolved to defer any further conſideration till that time, as the only queſtion now ſeems to be, whether immediately to commence hoſtile meaſures, or to purſue a temporizing conduct till matters are more advanced; and our determination on this queſtion, as well as the quota of troops to be furniſhed by us, will in a great meaſure be guided by our advices from Colonel *Braithwaite*.

Adjourned.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secr.

Gentlemen,

Goddard, General, letter from.

The Miniſter of the Maratta nation having refuſed to liſten to the moderate and equitable terms of accommodation propoſed to him by me on the part of the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council, except upon conditions diſhonourable and deſtructive to the intereſts of the Company, and thereby diſappointed and rendered ineffectual their pacific intentions, and my endeavours to promote the ſucceſs of the commiſſion with which they had been pleaſed to honour me, I think it neceſſary to loſe no time in communicating this important circumſtance to you, in order that proper and effectual meaſures may be concerted for carrying on the war into which we are thus neceſſarily and involuntarily compelled.

You are already fully informed of the nature of the propoſals I was inſtructed to make, and the immediate alternative of peace or war that was to be the conſequence of their being refuſed or accepted: I ſhall therefore only mention to you in a few words, the anſwer I have received to them, which is perfectly pointed and conciſe, and from the complete diſgrace with which a ſubmiſſion on our part to the conditions it preſcribes (eſpecially as I had previouſly explained to the Miniſter the impracticability of acceding to them) would overwhelm us, carries a convincing proof that his inclinations are altogether hoſtile; and even juſtifies the apprehenſion, that were we to give our preſent conſent to them, ſuch acquieſcence would only ſubject us to more inſolent and diſhonourable demands. The terms which he inſtructed *Neal Chund*, the emiſſary I before informed you had been diſpatched to *Poonah*, to ſtipulate as the only conditions on which peace would be concluded betwixt the Engliſh and Maratta nations, were, "to relinquiſh *Salſette*, and deliver *Ragonath Row* into our hands." It is unneceſſary to make any remarks upon theſe propoſals, neither of which could admit of a moment's thought or deliberation. I therefore acquainted the Vackeel that I was not authorized to recede from my firſt demands; that I ſincerely regretted my efforts to ſettle all paſt differences had proved ineffectual; but that I muſt, according to the inſtructions I had received from my Government, break off the preſent negociation.

You ſee, gentlemen, by the above relation, that this buſineſs is now brought to a criſis; the meaſure of war was neceſſarily involved in the Miniſter's refuſal, and in propoſing to him the alternative, the choice he would make muſt of courſe become our own. The queſtion therefore now, is not, whether we ſhould conclude a peace, or enter into a war with the Maratta State? but we are to determine in what manner, and by what means, this war into which we are thus involuntarily compelled, can be carried on with the greateſt advantage to ourſelves, and moſt effectually to diſtreſs the enemy. To depart from the terms at firſt poſitively and ſolemnly propoſed, or to attempt to delay and temporize at this juncture, would, I am perſuaded, be a meaſure equally as inglorious: they would conſtrue every advance into timidity, or a conſciouſneſs of weakneſs; and inſtead of being lulled by it into ſecurity or forbearance, would become more preſumptuous and ſpeedy in their operations.

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The neceſſity of the war being thus eſtabliſhed, it is perhaps ſuperfluous to point out ſuch conſiderations as might be judged ſufficient to deter us from entering into it, was it a matter where our own free choice was left to decide; but I will briefly mention one objection, and that indeed the only one that appears to me to preſent any difficulty or to deſerve our preſent attention, which is the apprehenſion that we ſhall not be able to furniſh the neceſſary ſupplies of money for defraying the expences of a war. This is a circumſtance deſerving of our moſt particular care and deliberation. The heavy loſſes which the Company have already ſuſtained in the unſucceſsful attempts to ſupport *Ragonath Row*, ought, it is certain, to make us careful of involving them in new troubles and new expences; but here I muſt repeat that the preſent war is not a matter of choice but of neceſſity. The Government of *Bengal* have been ſincere and urgent in their deſires and propoſals for a peace, which I have zealouſly exerted myſelf to promote; but the Maratta Miniſter, deaf to every reaſonable term of accommodation, aims at the annihilation of all our power and ſovereignty on this ſide of *India*, and compels us to take up arms, not only in defence of our rights and of juſtice, but to ſecure our very exiſtence as an independent nation on this coaſt, and it may be added in its ultimate conſequences throughout *India*.

This leſſon which we are taught by the incumbrances entailed upon us by paſt failures, ſeems alſo to inſtruct us, that we ſhould not neglect the firſt opportunity that preſents itſelf of relieving ourſelves from them; and this I am of opinion the Marattas have of their own accord offered, I may ſay forced upon us. The trifling and unequal force the French at preſent have in *India*, and the certain accounts we have from *Europe* to make us believe they cannot now be reinforced, ſecure us from any apprehenſions of being interrupted in our operations by them this ſeaſon, and ſeems indeed to furniſh one very principal reaſon why we ought to loſe no time in ſtrengthening and firmly eſtabliſhing ourſelves during the courſe of it. The troops which will ſoon be collected at *Surat*, muſt be ſuperior to any ſervice that can poſſibly be required of them, and equal to the moſt complete and abſolute ſucceſs. But the Bengal army, together with the detachment under Colonel *Braithwaite* at *Mahé*, and ſuch proportion of troops from this ſettlement, as you may judge it expedient and conſiſtent with the mere ſafety of the iſland to detach, will be found able to execute any plan of operations that may be immediately reſolved upon, and againſt the whole force of the Maratta empire. Theſe, it is to be hoped, may reach *Surat* before the latter end of November; and as I have taken every proper precaution, and given the neceſſary inſtructions for ſupplying a magazine of all ſorts of proviſions, there will be nothing to prevent the army from taking the field at the expiration of that month. The only material difficulty therefore which ſeems to occur, is the article of money before mentioned; and this I am led to believe is not without remedy. You muſt know, that except four lacks of rupees which I received from your treaſury at *Surat*, I have ſubſiſted the troops under my command, by money received from the merchants at *Surat*; and in my own camp, for bills drawn upon the Government of *Bengal*. This, it is true, has been obtained upon terms not the moſt moderate, and it is probable may become ſtill higher hereafter; but the loſs ſuſtained thereby is ſurely a trifling conſideration, when put in competition with the important intereſts of the Company now at ſtake; and I do not doubt, ſhould the exigency of affairs require it, being able to ſupport my troops from the ſame ſource

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three months longer, eſpecially as I can adopt the expedient of paying a conſiderable part of the officers allowance by bills upon the Bengal treaſury.

I am not however without hope of the arrival of a large ſum of money in ſpecie very ſoon; as the Governor General and Supreme Council informed me, in a letter dated the 2d of Auguſt, they intended to ſend round 15 lacks; and there is no doubt, when they underſtand we have been compelled to enter into hoſtilities, and a repreſentation made them of the neceſſitous ſtate of affairs, they will exert every means to aſſiſt us in the proſecution of a war, the ſucceſs of which will ſo amply indemnify and compenſate for preſent inconveniences.

Theſe, with the money you can at preſent ſpare from your own treaſury, and the loans which may be made from individuals who at preſent enjoy the protection of your Government, are the obvious reſources that may conveniently and juſtly be uſed till the operations of a war, in purſuance of the plan that may be adopted for ſecuring a country and revenue, ſhall have opened a ſurer and more extenſive field of ſupply; and to accompliſh this moſt effectually and as early as poſſible, ſeems, as affairs are now ſituated, to be the grand and primary object.

Having thus made ſome general obſervations upon the preſent poſture of affairs, which I hope will appear to you juſt and proper, I ſhall venture to lay before you ſuch propoſals as appear to me moſt ſuitable and conſiſtent to be purſued: premiſing only, that as my views on this occaſion will be directed to what I conceive to be the true intereſts of the Company, and the object of the Bengal Government, as contained in the inſtructions they have given me for my government, I ſhall moſt cheerfully and zealouſly concur with, and aſſiſt in executing, any plan you may ultimately determine upon, provided it comes within the limits preſcribed in their letter to your Committee and to myſelf of the 14th of June.

I have before me four letters from the Hon. Governor General and Supreme Council under the following dates, April 5th, June 14th, July 8th, and Auguſt 2d. The firſt only conveys their original inſtructions for concluding a peace, and does not at preſent demand our conſideration; the ſecond contains proviſional inſtructions in the event of a failure in my negociations, which, circumſtanced as affairs now are, require our ſerious and deliberate attention.

They have been pleaſed in it, ſhould the Miniſter by rejecting their propoſals render a war indiſpenſably neceſſary, to leave me a latitude of action, under the inſtructions of your Government, to avail myſelf of the ſituation which fortune may preſent, and have further authorized me to adopt any part or the whole of Mr. *Hornby*'s plan laid down in his minute of the 30th March, as I may think moſt adviſable for promoting the diſtreſs of the enemy.

The reſponſibility with which they have charged me on this occaſion, is motive of ſingular ſatisfaction; becauſe convinced within my own breaſt of the knowledge and experience of the Honourable the Preſident, which dictated the plan he propoſed, I have from the firſt inſtant of its being communicated to me, conſidered it as the moſt wiſe and effectual meaſure that could be adopted, without remarking on it more particularly, the advantageous ſituation of *Guzerat* to the Company's ſettlements on this ſide of *India*; the facility with which it might be conquered and retained; the reſources of men and money we ſhould derive from its poſſeſſion, and from which the enemy would by theſe means be cut off, are ſufficient arguments to eſtabliſh its wiſdom and propriety. It is not however enough to expreſs any ſimple aſſent to it at this time; circumſtances have ſo varied ſince its firſt formation, that I doubt not the Honourable Preſident will himſelf find many points that could not be foreſeen at that period now meriting his attentive conſideration.

In the firſt place, let it be obſerved, that Mr. *Hornby*'s propoſals were made in a ſituation widely different from the preſent one; a few months only remained of the dry ſeaſon, and the approaching monſoon, when it might be ſuppoſed all military operations muſt be at a ſtand, would effectually prevent the Maratta Government from giving any vigorous oppoſition to our meaſures, and leave us full leiſure to eſtabliſh ourſelves in the poſſeſſion of the *Guzerat* without interruption. The caſe is now entirely altered in this reſpect, and ſhould we extend our arms into that province, we may be aſſured of having the whole, or a very conſiderable part of the Maratta force to cope with. My motive in making this obſervation at preſent, is merely to point out the neceſſity there now appears, ſhould it be judged expedient to make *Guzerat* the ſcene of action, of employing all the troops which can poſſibly be ſpared on that ſervice, and leaving to ſome future opportunity the reduction of *Baſſein*, which, though a certain, might prove at preſent a tedious conqueſt, and muſt, in the event of more important ſucceſs, become an eaſy acquiſition hereafter.

The moſt material change, however, which has occurred, and which calls for our principal conſideration, is the eſcape of *Ragonath Row* from the miniſterial party, and his having again demanded and received the protection of the Engliſh. I ſhall begin my remarks on this ſubject with communicating to the Committee ſuch parts of the inſtructions I have received from the Government of *Bengal* relating to this circumſtance, as may lead to diſcover the meaſures which would be moſt acceptable to them on this occaſion.

Their firſt letter, dated 8th July, in reply to mine, informing them of my having complied with his ſolicitation to take the aſylum of my camp, has been already explained to you: in it they approved entirely of the offer I had made him; and directed me to continue to afford him protection as long as he ſhould continue to demand it; provided he did not forfeit his right to it by any act of infidelity, or attempt to defeat the negociation, to which they enjoined me to give my entire attention, without regard to any other conſideration.

In the laſt letter of ſo late a date as the 2d of Auguſt, they expreſs the ſame fixed determination and wiſh for peace; and in anſwer to ſome conceſſions I had ſuggeſted as likely to be obtained from the favourable opportunity afforded us by the poſſeſſion of *Ragoba*, they write as follows:

"We do not diſapprove of your endeavours to obtain the additional conceſſions propoſed in your letter of the 12th June; nor do our inſtructions of the 5th of April, though reſtricted to certain points, preclude you from availing yourſelf of any occaſion which might be preſented to you to exact other conditions, by which the intereſt or the influence of the Company might be certaintly promoted; provided they do not impede or retard the accompliſhment of your original commiſſion. In this ſenſe, and with theſe proviſions, we repeat that we ſhall approve of the addition of the demands recommended in your letter of the 12th June to thoſe which we have already preſcribed in our original inſtructions, if you ſhall not have concluded a treaty with the Maratta Government before the receipt of this letter."

It is now neceſſary to obſerve to you what theſe conceſſions were which I was in this limited degree authorized to obtain: they were the ceſſion of *Baſſein* as agreed to be given to the Company in the treaty with *Ragonath Row*, and the payment of a ſum of money to defray the expence of our armies. I have been however precluded from every opportunity of endeavouring to ſucceed in theſe demands, by the preſent refuſal of the Miniſter to accede to the propoſals originally tranſmitted him; and as theſe were intended in the event of my negociation for peace proving effectual, ſince that has failed, another field for political advantage may perhaps preſent itſelf.

I beg to obſerve, that the Honorable Governor General and Supreme Council in their inſtructions to me,

have

have made no proviſion, or drawn any line reſpecting *Ragoba*, they wiſhed to be followed, ſhould a war become neceſſary. There is however no doubt but any plan now fixed on which may tend to diſtreſs the enemy and promote the intereſt of the Company, will meet with their approbation and ſupport; and with this conviction, and with this object in view, I ſhall venture to hazard the following conjectures and opinion, both with regard to the general meaſures to be purſued, and the particular attention that ought to be paid to *Ragonath Row*'s pretenſions.

The Honourable the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors have in their letter, dated 31ſt Auguſt 1778, of which you encloſed a copy for my peruſal, ſignified in the ſtrongeſt terms their predilection in favour of the cauſe of *Ragoba*, and their pleaſure that it ſhould be effectually ſupported by their ſervants in *India*, the principles upon which they adopted theſe ſentiments are in the higheſt degree juſt and political; as by placing the Adminiſtration of *Poonah* in the hands of *Ragoba*, a perſon indebted to us for his elevation, and depending upon our aſſiſtance in a great meaſure for being preſerved in his authority, we ſhould be ſure of a party in that Durbar friendly to the intereſt of the Engliſh; and beſides particular advantages to which we ſhould be at preſent intitled, our poſſeſſions on this ſide of *India* would attain an undiſturbed conſequence and ſtability in future; added to this, the countenance and protection continually afforded by this Government to *Ragonath Row*, furniſhes another argument from its propriety and conſiſtency, why the ſame meaſures ſhould if poſſible be now adopted. It remains therefore to be conſidered, whether the means that offer themſelves for accompliſhing this end are ſuch as to give us reaſonable hopes of ſucceſs.

The grand point in which we ought to be well informed, is the degree of conſideration *Ragoba*'s cauſe is held in by the Chiefs of the Maratta State, and the real grounds he has to expect being joined or abetted by them, ſhould we again declare in his favour. The experience of the late campaign, if it does not eſtabliſh an abſolute proof, evinces beyond a doubt that they are by no means ſanguinely attached to his intereſt; and from my own obſervation ſince the arrival of the Bengal army at *Surat*, and even ſince his eſcape to, and reception with it, when it might be ſuppoſed thoſe who ſecretly wiſhed well to his affairs might have been encouraged to hint their favourable inclinations, I am led to believe no change has been ſince wrought in their ſentiments.

But what ought to carry the greateſt weight is, the candid declaration made by *Ragoba* himſelf, who acknowledges that he has no hopes of being joined by any of the Maratta leaders till they ſhall ſee his affairs in ſuch a train through our means, as to be aſſured of ſucceſs without them. This is in fact promiſing expectations of a moſt vague and indeterminate nature, and amounts to little more than that, when we ſhall effectually overcome every difficulty, neceſſity will compel them to acquieſce. Reſpecting *Holcar*, whoſe inclination he affirms to be ſecretly favourable, his diſpoſition is naturally ſo timid, and he is ſo much under the direction and influence of *Scindia*, that no dependance is to be placed on him. In ſhort, the general ſtate of parties ſeems to be this, that however much they may diſpute and differ among themſelves, they would be found to unite in oppoſition to any attempts of *Ragoba* to recover a ſhare in the adminiſtration of affairs.

From this general view, it would appear that in our endeavours to reinſtate him, we muſt truſt entirely to our own force for effecting it. It is probable a number of needy adventurers would flock to our ſtandard, and mercenaries might be collected from all quarters and with the aſſiſtance of theſe, or indeed without it, we might be aſſured of victory; but it is eaſy to ſee what little progreſs muſt be made in eſtabliſhing *Ragoba* firmly in the Government under ſuch circumſtances, without a Chief of any name or conſequence in the State to give weight to the confederacy.

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I am far from meaning by theſe remarks to exclude *Ragoba*'s intereſts from a ſhare in our political ſyſtem, but I cannot help being of opinion it will be more for our advantage at preſent to look forward to the reſtoration of *Ragoba* at ſome future period when circumſtances may render it more favourable, than by immediately ſetting out with that project riſk another failure, which could not but be productive of the moſt ruinous conſequences to the Company's affairs.

The plan therefore I would propoſe to be purſued reſpecting *Ragoba*, is to hold out to him the hopes of firmly eſtabliſhing him in the Government of the Maratta State, as our grand and ultimate object; that in the mean time it is neceſſary for us to ſecure to ourſelves ſome firm and ſolid eſtabliſhment of territorial poſſeſſion on the Continent, from which we may derive reſources for the more important ſervices to be effected hereafter, when it ſhall be found that matters are ripe for their execution. The immediate advantages we muſt derive from purſuing a ſyſtem of this nature are obvious: a reimburſement of the expences we have already incurred, and a fund for future exigencies will be at once provided; and from not having our hands tied down by any poſitive engagement with *Ragoba*, we ſhall be at liberty to adopt ſuch meaſures hereafter as circumſtances may render wiſe and expedient: either to make an honourable and advantageous peace with the Miniſter, and upon conditions favourable to *Ragoba*; or ſhould it be found that our ſucceſſes have encouraged the partizans of the latter to declare themſelves, and win over any of the Maratta leaders to his party, which it is by no means improbable may be the caſe, to aſſert at once his claim to the ſovereignty, and eſtabliſh him in it.

The principal difficulty which ſeems to preſent itſelf, is to reconcile the ſyſtem I have propoſed to *Ragoba*.—He has been long accuſtomed to conſider himſelf as the principal in all the wars entered into by the Engliſh with the Maratta nation; and there is no doubt would expect to be put in poſſeſſion of whatever countries we might conquer from them. Many arguments however might be uſed with him, among which the following, in addition to thoſe above-mentioned, could not, I ſhould imagine, fail to have conſiderable weight: the heavy debts he has contracted to the Company, by which they have embarraſſed their own affairs in endeavours to ſerve him, that have hitherto proved ineffectual, render it neceſſary for their own ſafety, and to ſupport the war they are now about to be involved in entirely upon his account, to poſſeſs themſelves of a reſource of revenue not only to relieve them from the weight of former expence, but to furniſh a ſupply for future exigencies.—On this juſt pretext we may urge the abſolute neceſſity of retaining in our hands the collections of the diſtricts acquired by our arms till the concluſion of the war; the more ſo, as the Marattas have made themſelves the aggreſſors, by refuſing the moderate and reaſonable terms we offered them, and will of courſe conſider us as principals on the occaſion. A ſufficient and ample allowance may at the ſame time be made to *Ragoba*, for the ſupport of himſelf and family; and he may be permitted to invite ſuch Chiefs as are well inclined towards him, and collect his ſeveral adherents and followers diſperſed through the country; a work which muſt neceſſarily require a delay on his part of a few months.

From all theſe conſiderations I am clearly of opinion, that no new poſitive engagement ſhould be at preſent entered into with *Ragonath Row*; that the cauſe aſſigned for our hoſtilities with the Maratta Miniſter, ſhould be the encouragement they have given and ſtill give to the French, with whom we are at variance, and their rejecting the friendſhip we had proffered them upon conditions equally honourable and advantageous to both nations, which have compelled us involuntarily into a war;

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war; that our inclinations are perfectly friendly to the Maratta State, and that our intentions are to remove from the Adminiſtration thoſe who by their evil counſels and conduct have promoted its ruin, and aſſiſt in eſtabliſhing it upon a ſolid, firm, and regular baſis.

The line to be purſued reſpecting *Ragoba*, and the principles of our difference with the Maratta State being once determined, the point next to be conſidered is the particular plan of operations proper to be immediately entered upon; and here I beg to repeat my entire approbation of and aſſent to that contained in the Honourable Preſident's minute of the 30th March, as far as it relates to the active employment of our forces to the northward. With this view I would propoſe, that authority ſhould be given me to conclude a treaty with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, in the name of your Government, upon the principles and with a due regard to the reſervation contained in the inſtructions of the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council of the 14th of June.

The immediate object of our operations in the *Guzerat* ought to be the poſſeſſing ourſelves of the ſhare of that province now ſubject to the Peiſhwa, and which *Damulgie*, the anceſtor of the preſent Brodera Prince, was compelled formerly to relinquiſh. This point might eaſily be reconciled to *Futty Sing*; and it would be even proper to make its attainment ſubſervient to his intereſt, which would be the caſe if we relieved him entirely from all dependance on or fear of the Poonah Government, and admitted him to a participation of the ſpoils we might take from them in the *Guzerat*. The moſt eligible mode of making the partition of the province betwixt the Engliſh and *Futty Sing*, ſo as to connect our poſſeſſions and place them in the moſt ſecure and defenſible ſtate, might be hereafter adjuſted.

Should *Futty Sing* heartily concur in this meaſure, the taſk of politics as well as war will then become very eaſy; and ſhould he, which from his ſituation and character I do not however think at all probable, refuſe to enter into any engagements with us, the army ought to march towards *Brodera*, and compel him to take a deciſive part immediately; for it appears abſolutely neceſſary, that he prove himſelf on this occaſion a firm and active ally, or experience from us the ſeverity of puniſhment due to a determined foe.

The Nawab of *Cambait* and ſeveral neighbouring Rajahs, as mentioned in the Honourable Preſident's minutes, will be of courſe aſſiſting according to their abilities, and be conſidered accordingly; the former as the natural and inveterate enemy of the Maratta State, will heartily exert his ſlender means to promote the common cauſe: I call them ſlender, from the reduced and ruinous condition into which his country is at preſent fallen: I do not however doubt they might be made of uſe, from the influence he muſt poſſeſs in that part of *Guzerat*, were we to countenance and ſupport him, and deliver him from the inroads and ravages of the freebooters, who overrun and deſtroy his territory; but of this, future circumſtances muſt be the rule to judge by and direct. Should it, gentlemen, be objected, that in the above propoſals I have laid down no fixed and determinate object as the ultimate point to which our endeavours ſhould be directed, I acknowledge the remark to be juſt; and it is upon theſe very principles I have grounded the expediency of ſuch ſyſtem, becauſe our hands will be left free from all embarraſſing ties, and we ſhall be at full liberty hereafter to reſolve and act as occaſion may ſuggeſt. In the mean time the advantage immediately reſulting is obvious and certain; and while we are eſſentially ſerving our own intereſts, we ſhall proportionably diſtreſs and injure the enemy: one argument in favour of the political plan I have laid down, ſeems alſo to ariſe from the attention which ought to be paid to the original views of the Government of *Bengal* at the Court of *Berar*. Though in the preſent ſuſpended ſtate of my negociation with *Moodajee Bouncello*, it can only be eſteemed a ſecondary conſideration; yet ſhould no other poſitive engagement obtain a decided preference at preſent, ſome future period may render the renewal of it expedient and politick. I well know the intimate and cloſe connection of the Naigpore prince with the miniſterial party: and I am alſo aware of the abhorrence and enmity he is actuated with againſt the cauſe of *Ragoba*. I cannot believe he would chuſe to riſk a rupture with the Engliſh, by openly aſſiſting *Nana*, nor would we perhaps have much to fear from the efforts of his power if he did; but of this I am perſuaded, that by a direct declaration in favour of *Ragoba*, we at once deſtroy all hopes in future of *Moodajee*, and render him irreconcileably inimical to our intereſts; whilſt there is every reaſon to believe, if we enter into a war upon the principles I have adviſed, he will not only continue to act an entire neutral part, but in the event of our ſucceſs, be once more ſolicitous to treat, and enter into an alliance with us.

Another argument which ſuggeſts itſelf in favour of my propoſal, and which indeed might be urged with great propriety to *Ragonath Row*, as one cauſe of our not chuſing to march immediately to place him in the Adminiſtration of *Poonah*, is the proſpect we have of being called upon to defend our own ſettlements againſt an invaſion of the French. This proſpect, we have reaſon to believe, is very diſtant and indeed ſcarcely to be apprehended at all; but as it is however a poſſible caſe, we cannot too much guard againſt a circumſtance which might, by claiming our attention, interfere with any operations in which we might be employed, and occaſion a failure in our poſitive engagements with *Ragoba*, ſhould any ſuch exiſt.

A third, and which is the laſt reaſon I ſhall now mention, may be drawn from a conſideration of the ſtate of parties within the Maratta State. An account of the riſe and eſtabliſhment of the Peiſhwa authority under the race of Bramins; the ſyſtem of their government, and its preſent diſtraction; a deſcription of the ſeveral officers of ſtate, and of the principal diſunion now exiſting in it, from the jarring intereſts of the principal of them and the Bramin leaders, are ſubjects that have ſo often come under your attentive deliberation, as to render it entirely ſuperfluous for me to make any remarks upon them at preſent; I ſhall, therefore, ſuppoſing theſe circumſtances to be eſtabliſhed facts, of which no further proof is neceſſary, proceed to delineate as preciſely as poſſible, what I conceive the preſent ſentiments of the parties, and trace from conſiderations of their reſpective intereſts, the manner in which they may be differently affected by our preſent reſolves.

I have not the ſmalleſt doubt, indeed I have it from very good authority, that the principal difficulty in adjuſting the late differences with the Maratta Court has originated with *Scindia*. The wiſh of *Nana Furneſe* to have concluded a peace with the Engliſh, is not by any means to be attributed to his friendly ſentiments for us, but to intereſted conſiderations of his own, as it would have left him at leiſure to purſue the ſchemes I am convinced he has in agitation, of deſtroying the influence of *Scindia*, and rendering himſelf ſupreme and independent. From the ſame motives, for he is no ſtranger to the deſigns of the other, *Scindia* would exert all his endeavours to deſtroy the effects of my negociation, as the means not only of ſecuring his own perſonal ſafety, but of preſerving to him that unbounded ſway he has acquired by his late ſervices, and which he will be aſſured of retaining, while his aſſiſtance is wanted to carry on the war with the Engliſh; I cannot help therefore being of opinion, that *Scindia*, as long as he can maintain his preſent influence in the State, where he poſſeſſes all the power, without the invidious name of authority (which latter indeed he could never hope to obtain) will not be induced by any offers we could make him, or any bribe or proſpect we could hold out to his acceptance,

far

far inferior as it muſt be to the ſolid greatneſs he now enjoys, to come over to, or make any ſeparate treaty with us.

Should the labour of a peace be improved by the Miniſter to the firm eſtabliſhment of his own independence; or ſhould circumſtances ſo turn out, as to give a dangerous ſuperiority over *Scindia*, the latter might perhaps find it his intereſt to court our friendſhip and aſſiſtance; but of this the war affords no proſpect; and it appears to me at preſent a more probable expectation, that the Miniſter ſhould wiſh to unite himſelf with us to cruſh *Scindia*, than that the latter ſhould chuſe to connect himſelf with ſo powerful, and of courſe in his eſtimation, dangerous an ally as the Engliſh, while he is able effectually to maintain himſelf without their aſſiſtance. From theſe few remarks it is plain, that the Miniſter and *Scindia*, however much united in the ſame common cauſe, have mutual ſources of diſcontent, which may break forth on ſome future occaſion; and it will then prove a fortunate policy, if we are not prevented by pre-exiſting engagements, from chuſing to ſide with that party, whoſe connection will be productive of the moſt eſſential and important benefits.

I begin in this place to obſerve, that as the orders from the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council did not reach me till after the diſpatch of the propoſals to *Poonah*, and when I might expect every day to receive an anſwer, I did not think it expedient to make known to him their favourable ſentiments till its arrival; and from the obſervations above mentioned, and the knowledge I have of his diſpoſition, I do not think it conſiſtent with policy, or the dignity of the Engliſh name, to make any overtures to him at preſent, as I am perſuaded they would be received with indifference and contempt. I ſhall therefore be guided in my conduct towards him, by circumſtances, which fortune may hereafter preſent in the courſe of our operations.

It remains now, that I ſay ſomething reſpecting the foreign States who may be moſt affected by, or affect our operations. *Moodajee* has been already mentioned. The only two beſides of conſiderable conſequence enough to deſerve attention are *Nizam Ally* and *Hyder Ally*. Both theſe princes have availed themſelves of the opportunities preſented by our diſputes with the Marattas, and the diſturbed ſtate of their Government, to diſmember from thoſe parts of the Peiſhwa's dominions that lie neareſt their own, conſiderable towns and provinces, the revenues of which they now collect themſelves. The former has ſucceeded by negociation, and the latter by force of arms; ſo that it may be ſuppoſed, the one from the ſacrifices peaceably yielded to him, has entered into terms of the ſtricteſt alliance with the Miniſter; and the other, it is well known, is now actually at war with him, although reports have been induſtriouſly ſpread by the latter and his creatures, that the terms of a peace have been mutually ſettled betwixt them.

The ſituation of *Hyder* therefore appears entirely favourable to our views; for it is not to be doubted, however much he may avoid forming any particular connections with us, but he will immediately liſten to the dictates of enmity and his own intereſt, and embrace the opportunity given him, by our engaging the attention of the Maratta Government in this quarter, of proſecuting his ſchemes againſt them to the ſouthward. I am not ſufficiently informed of the ſentiments of this prince, to judge how far it would be practicable for us to form any engagements with him on this occaſion for our mutual intereſts and the diſtreſs of the common enemy; but could it be effected, I am of opinion it would be attended with ſtriking advantages. You, gentlemen, whoſe affairs have frequently called upon you to negociate with him, and who, from your immediate connection and interference of intereſt with each other, muſt have derived many opportunities of informing yourſelves minutely of his ſentiments, will be beſt able to decide on this point.

Reſpecting *Nizam Ally*, I have only further to remark, that notwithſtanding the little reaſon there is to ſuppoſe he will chuſe to unite himſelf with us, I alſo believe he will not take an active part againſt us, or join his troops with the miniſterial forces, but obſerve the ſame wiſe, prudent, and temporizing conduct he has done on former occaſions, and avoid becoming an acceſſary to the war to either party. Appendix. No. 253. A.

I have thus, gentlemen, ventured to give you my ideas of the ſtate of affairs, and to ſuggeſt the line of the political conduct which appears to me moſt expedient for the honour and intereſt of the Company, and beſt ſuited to improve preſent circumſtances to future advantage. I have not entered into a diſcuſſion of the particular plan of operations to be purſued, any further than expreſſing my opinion, that it ought to be immediately confined to the *Guzerat*, as it is ſo clearly explained and provided from the Honourable Preſident's minute of the 30th of March. There is one obvious advantage which preſents itſelf from thus drawing the attention of the Marattas to this diſtant quarter, an opportunity may hereafter be found with a part of the force left at *Bombay*, when all poſſibility of the arrival of the French is removed, of ſeizing and maintaining the paſs of *Condola*, and by that means preſerving a communication betwixt *Bombay* and the entrance into the *Decan*, which, from its vicinity to *Poonah*, will fill the mind of the Miniſter with the moſt alarming fears; and from the eaſe with which an army can at any convenient time fall upon the capital, be attended with moſt conſiderable benefit in the courſe of the war.

I have only to add, that as I have thus freely expreſſed my own ſentiments, it would give me ſingular ſatisfaction if they meet with your concurrence and approbation; at the ſame time permit me to repeat the declaration I have made in the former part of this addreſs, that whatever plan may be ultimately formed, upon principles eſteemed more uſeful and beneficial, I ſhall heartily and zealouſly concur in promoting it, according to the inſtructions given me by the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council for my rule and guidance.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient ſervant,
Bombay, *Thomas Goddard.*
3d November 1779.

At a Select Committee; preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *John Carnac*, Eſquire, *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire. Wedneſ. 10th

The Preſident lays before us the following minute, containing his ſentiments of the conduct proper to be obſerved by the Committee at this juncture:

Preſident, his minute.

The Preſident having reflected with the moſt ſerious attention on the preſent critical poſture of affairs with the Marattas, and our preſent circumſtances, together with the very limited powers now held by the Select Committee, thinks it neceſſary to offer to their conſideration ſuch remarks as in his opinion are pertinent, and proper for forming the conduct to be purſued at this juncture.

In the firſt place, he would wiſh to have it clearly recorded on the proceedings, and deſires a vote may be accordingly paſſed, that the war now impending, without entering into the neceſſity or good policy of it, is not a meaſure of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, but the iſſue of a negociation carried on under the diſtinct and ſeparate orders and inſtructions of the Governor General and Council, through an agent of their own appointment, and is not to be prevented or avoided by any efforts the Select Committee can make; all powers relative to negociation, peace, or war, having been removed

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from and taken out of their hands. The war, therefore, whether approved or condemned, is not to be imputed to this Committee; neither will they be in any manner reſponſible for the ſucceſs of it; the Governor General and Council having expreſsly acquainted the Select Committee, that Brigadier General *Goddard* is reſponſible to them for his conduct.

After thus diſclaiming all reſponſibility, both as to the meaſure of war and the ſucceſs of it, our undoubted duty to the Company, and a juſt and honourable conduct with reſpect to the gentlemen of the Supreme Council, call upon us to contribute our aſſiſtance moſt zealouſly and cordially, to bring it to as ſpeedy and advantageous a concluſion, both with the forces of this Preſidency, and with ſuch advice and recommendation to Brigadier General *Goddard*, as our experience and knowledge may at any time ſuggeſt. According to the relation we now ſtand in to Brigadier General *Goddard*, whatever we have to offer to him can only amount to advice or recommendation; and the Preſident imagines the Select Committee will admit the propriety of acting conformably to that relation, more eſpecially as it will be ſtrictly conſiſtent with and diſclaiming all reſponſibility. It muſt too be conſidered, we are not warranted by the Governor General and Council to give him expreſs orders for his conduct; ſince, according to the reſpective powers now held by the Select Committee and Brigadier General *Goddard*, any orders we might give are no further binding than according to his own conſtruction of them; and it would be therefore ineffectual and needleſsly hazarding the dignity of this Government, to aſſume any ſuch power.

The ſteps now immediately neceſſary to be purſued, appear to be to determine the quota of troops we can afford to reinforce Brigadier General *Goddard*'s army, and to tranſport them to *Surat* without delay.

In ſettling this point, the Preſident recommends, that our garriſon ſhould not be ſo much weakened as to encourage the enemy to inſult us in our home poſſeſſions, or even to place them above the fear of offenſive meaſures from hence; the apprehenſion of which may be eaſily encouraged and kept up, and will favour the operations of the army to the northward.

To furniſh Brigadier General *Goddard* with the neceſſary powers for treating with the Guicawars, and effecting a ſettlement with the Guzerat province, according to my plan laid before the Select Committee, dated 30th March laſt, and the inſtructions from the Governor General and Council of the 14th June: it ſhould be recommended in the ſtrongeſt terms to uſe his utmoſt endeavours to effect this in an amicable manner, which *Futty Sing*'s character, and his true intereſt, give hopes may be accompliſhed without recourſe to hoſtile meaſures.

The Preſident would be happy if it was in the power of the Committee to contribute equal aſſiſtance of money as of forces. He is concerned to obſerve, that ſo far as our expectations carry us, we ſhall ſcarcely receive ſufficient for the unavoidable monthly expences; the uſual annual ſupply from *Bengal* we have not received any aſſurances of: but the Preſident muſt believe the Governor General and Council will make a point of furniſhing money adequate to carrying into effectual execution, meaſures reſolved with their concurrence, and warranted by their authority; more particularly too, from conviction of our inability to contribute any aſſiſtance whatever in this reſpect.

The Preſident thinks it not improper, here to urge the advice and recommendation conveyed from the Select Committee to Brigadier General *Goddard* the 29th ultimo, to defer as long as poſſible commencing hoſtilities, and this among other conſiderations, as bearing a particular relation to the ſecurity of the reinforcement under Captain *Popham*. Brigadier General *Goddard*, on conferring on this point, delivered a very different opinion, and expects by immediate action to facilitate the junction of Captain *Popham*.

The Preſident however remains in his former ſentiments, and propoſes to continue to recommend to Brigadier General *Goddard* to delay the commencement of operations ſo long as the conduct of the Marattas admit or countenance this meaſure. The importance of the ſecurity of the detachment under Captain *Popham* is great indeed; and its junction of ſuch moment, as to promiſe abſolute ſucceſs in the operations propoſed, which might be doubted, at leaſt as to extent and immediate benefit, ſhould a junction not in due time be accompliſhed.

The object of ſafety to the march of Captain *Popham* is alone ſufficiently important to recommend the obſervance of meaſures productive of that deſirable end; but there is ſtill another very powerful conſideration claiming the like meaſure of delay, and that is the harveſt in the Guzerat province, which will be better ſecured the longer hoſtilities are avoided. Duly attending to the preſent great ſcarcity of grain, together with our pecuniary wants, and the port of *Mangalore* being ſhut againſt the exportation of rice, it muſt be allowed to be a momentous object, and highly meriting the moſt deliberate conſideration of Brigadier General *Goddard*, together with the ſmall proſpect there is of receiving the troops that are under the command of Colonel *Braithwaite* at *Mahé*, excluſive of thoſe ordered to be ſent from *Madras* by the Governor General and Council. It is probable that General *Goddard* may be able to face any force the Marattas may bring againſt him in the field with the force he has, and what we ſhall furniſh him with from hence; but that is not all that is to be looked for, it is the protection of ſuch countries as he may take poſſeſſion of, which I apprehend his army will be unequal to, as it will conſiſt of little more than half what the Governor General and Council intended it ſhould, for want of the arrival of the abovementioned troops.

General *Goddard* now coming in, the Preſident's minute was again read, and alſo the letters received ſince our laſt meeting from *Tellicherry* and Colonel *Braithwaite*.

Draper, Daniel, Eſq. his opinion.

Mr. *Draper* concurs in the Preſident's minute; except that he thinks it would be more conformable to the recommendation he propoſes ſhould be given General *Goddard* for deferring and delaying the bringing matters to a criſis, that no further force ſhould be immediately ſent off the iſlands with the General, but only that the number of troops ſhould be ſettled and kept in readineſs here, to be ſent up whenever he may acquaint us it is abſolutely neceſſary; as Mr. *Draper* concludes, that the ſending any forces from hence will be immediately known at *Poonah*, and conſtrued into an actual preparation for commencing hoſtilities: that ſuch a conduct would, in his opinion, be likewiſe more conformable to the advices tranſmitted to the Governor General and Council under the 31ſt ultimo, and were drawn up exactly agreeable to our minutes of the 29th, and which he now again approves and confirms, as being a true ſtate of affairs at the time. He likewiſe is of opinion, that what ought ſtill further moſt ſtrongly to weigh with us for deferring bringing matters to a criſis for ſome time longer, is the great probability, from the advices now before us, of the Company's being involved in a war with *Hyder Ally* as well as the Marattas, which Mr. *Draper* conceives the Governor General and Council had no idea of when they gave their laſt orders to General *Goddard* for demanding the alternative of war or peace.

Carnac, John, Eſq. his opinion.

Mr. *Carnac* is of opinion, that the ſtate of affairs is totally altered ſince our reſolution of the 29th ultimo, as we were then only under the apprehenſion of a war, whereas we are now to eſteem ourſelves as abſolutely engaged in one with the Maratta State, from the anſwer given to General *Goddard* by their Vackeel, who in conſequence received his diſmiſſion. Mr. *Carnac* therefore thinks it our indiſpenſable duty to do every thing in our power to procure to General *Goddard* as reſpectable a

force as our circumſtances will admit of, to meet the enemy, and to proſecute the war with vigour, ſhould they enter our territories, which it is probable they will in a few weeks: that we have already experienced the bad effects of dilatory and procraſtinating meaſures, to which, in Mr. *Carnac*'s opinion, the unfortunate iſſue of the late expedition to *Poonah* is principally to be attributed. Mr. *Carnac* is perfectly ſenſible that we are very ill in condition to meet a war, but that we have no option, and are forced into it; and that he has no idea, but the gentlemen who have thus forced us into it, will take care that we are furniſhed with proper means to carry it on. Mr. *Carnac*, though he allows we are deficient in reſources, does not think we are wholly deſtitute of means at leaſt for a preſent ſupply. That the Nabob and ſome of the Government officers at *Surat* muſt be poſſeſſed of large ſums of money; and that they ought to be plainly told, that as they enjoy the protection and countenance of the Company, it is their duty to aſſiſt them in time of neceſſity. Mr. *Carnac* therefore propoſes, that the Chief ſhould endeavour to prevail on them to advance ſuch ſums as they may be able, at the Company's intereſt and on their ſecurity, which are terms that cannot in reaſon be conſidered as any hardſhip, or attended with any riſk to the lender.

Vote, diſclaiming all reſponſibility in the preſent war, and its conſequences.

The reſolution of diſclaiming all reſponſibility both as to the meaſure of the war itſelf, and the ſucceſs of it, unanimouſly paſſed by the Committee.

Quota of force to be ſent with General *Goddard* conſidered.

The quota of force to be ſent with General *Goddard* being next conſidered, the ſtate of our garriſon is examined; when all circumſtances being attended to, we are of opinion, that excluſive of the artillery already ſent, we cannot with prudence ſpare a larger number than 200 European infantry, and a force in Sepoys, equal to two battalions, which muſt be ordered to be held in immediate readineſs.

200 infantry and 2 battalions of Sepoys to be ſpared.

Goddard, General, powers authorizing him to treat with Futty Sing, to be prepared.

Powers and inſtructions for General *Goddard*, agreeable to the Preſident's plan of the 30th of March, and the letter from *Bengal* of the 14th of June, muſt alſo be prepared: And,

Chief of Surat, inſtructions reſpecting borrowing money to be drawn out.

Inſtructions to the Chief of *Surat*, reſpecting borrowing money from the Nabob and Government officers.

Information regarding the French.

Some information collected from the gunner of the *Warren* reſpecting the ſtate of the French at *Mauritius*, is now laid before us by the Preſident, as entered hereafter, and muſt be tranſmitted to the other Preſidencies, and to Admiral Sir *Edward Vernon*.

Adjourned.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secry. *Willm Hornby*, *John Carnac*, *D. Draper*.

Wedneſday 18th.

At a Select Committee; preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *John Carnac*, Eſquire, *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire. General *Goddard* preſent.

Carnac, John, Eſq. lays ſome hint before us reſpecting the Guicawars.

Mr. *Carnac* lays before us, ſome hints of the plan of conduct, in his opinion proper to be obſerved with the Guicawars, with reſpect to the province of *Guzerat*, as entered hereafter.

Letter from General Goddard laid before the Committee.

General *Goddard* likewiſe lays before us, a letter, requeſting the line of conduct to be obſerved, may be determined as entered hereafter.

Further reaſons for wiſhing General Goddard to defer hoſtilities.

The conſideration of this ſubject being accordingly reſumed, it is agreed that our reaſons for wiſhing General *Goddard* to defer hoſtilities, muſt be ſtated to him when he proceeds to join the army; and the Preſident now reads to us an extract of a letter from the Chief of *Surat*, dated the 13th inſtant, acquainting him, that the crops will be gathered about a month and an half, or two months hence; and that if hoſtilities are commenced before that time, it will occaſion ſuch deſtation and deſtruction of the country, as greatly to diſtreſs the inhabitants of that city and adjacent country. If, when theſe points are ſtated to General *Goddard*, he ſhould ſtill judge it eligible, or find it neceſſary to enter upon immediate action, the determination muſt reſt with him; as we by no means intend to lay any reſtraint upon him in this point, but only according to the principle we have laid down, to give him our ſentiments of the conduct in our opinion moſt expedient to be obſerved.

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The line of conduct propoſed by General Goddard reſpecting Ragoba, approved.

The line of conduct with reſpect to *Ragoba*, as laid down in the General's letter of the 3d inſtant, is approved; and we entirely concur with him, that it will be better for the preſent to avoid entering into any engagements with him, or to appear as avowed ſupporters of his pretenſions, hoping the General will be able to ſatisfy *Ragoba*, and convince him of the neceſſity of our acting upon the plan we have adopted.

No time to be loſt in opening a treaty with Futty Sing.

We do not however mean that any time ſhould be loſt in opening the negociation with *Futty Sing*, which the General muſt be deſired to commence as ſoon as poſſible, upon the plan mentioned in the Preſident's minute of the 30th of March. For this purpoſe he muſt be furniſhed with proper credentials and copies of the treaty entered into at *Brodera* with *Futty Sing*, and of the propoſals made by his agent to Mr. *Price*, for an alliance with the Company, in the year 1772; and it muſt be very ſtrongly recommended to him, to effect the ſettlement of the Guzerat province in an amicable manner.

The footing upon which to put our forces in the field being conſidered, the queſtion is put to General *Goddard*, whether he can take upon him to reduce the Bengal troops to the footing of the Bombay troops, with reſpect to field allowances? when he abſolutely declared, that he cannot venture upon ſuch a ſtep juſt at the point of entering upon ſervice; and ſtrongly recommends to us to put the Bombay detachment upon the ſame footing as his troops, as ſo very ſtriking a diſparity muſt occaſion great jealouſies and heart-burnings, which will be very detrimental to the ſervice: the Committee, upon conſideration thereof, are fully convinced of the force of the General's reaſoning, and the juſtice of making no diſtinction in the forces of the ſame maſter, employed in conjunction upon the ſame ſervice; and it is therefore unanimouſly agreed, to allow Bengal batta to the Bombay detachment ordered to join General *Goddard*'s army; but it muſt be clearly explained to the army, that this indulgence is not to be conſidered as a precedent, and will not be allowed except when acting with the Bengal troops.

George Green appointed Commiſſary. Lewis, Wm, Paymaſter. Warden, F. and Hull, J. W. permitted to accompany General Goddard.

Mr. *George Green* is appointed Commiſſary of ſtores and proviſions to the Bombay detachment, and Mr. *William Lewis*, Paymaſter; and General *Goddard* being deſirous of taking with him Meſſrs. *Francis Warden* and *James Watſon Hull*, the Committee conſent thereto.

A commiſſion for holding courts martial on the Bombay detachment to be prepared.

A commiſſion muſt be given to General *Goddard* for holding courts martial on the Bombay troops.

The Paymaſter and Commiſſary muſt make their drafts on General *Goddard*, for the expence of the Bombay detachment.

It being judged neceſſary to ſend Major *Hopkins* into the field with the European infantry, and his battalion of Sepoys being *in conſequence* taken from him; it is reſolved, to grant him the full appointment of that rank, and to give him a commiſſion to take rank from the 21ſt of July 1775, when he was firſt appointed to act as a Major.

Read the letters from *Tannah* and *Fort Victoria*, when the Preſident acquaints us, he will order the *Prahm* up Tannah river the enſuing ſpring, and that immediately upon receipt of the letter from *Tannah*, two companies of Sepoys had been ſent to *Gorabunder*; a Gallivat muſt alſo be ſent immediately to *Fort Victoria*.

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As many troops muſt be ſent up by the *Revenge* as we can find embarkation for, and General *Goddard* will proceed himſelf with the laſt diviſion, which will be ſent up as ſoon as poſſible.

There being a balance due to the agent for the cloathing made for the Bengal detachment, amounting to rupees 7,292. 1. 15. Ordered, that the ſame be diſcharged; and that Preſidency debited accordingly.

Adjourned,

Wm Hornby,
Jno Carnac,
D. Draper.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secry.

Mr. *Carnac*'s minute.

As the province of *Guzerat* is now likely to become ſoon the ſcene of action of the forces under the command of General *Goddard*, the moſt feaſible mode of its reduction becomes a natural conſideration.

Our entering into hoſtilities againſt the Guicawars would, it is to be feared, rouſe the jealouſy of the great Jaghiredars, and be the means of cementing a ſtrong bond of union amongſt them; and although we ſhould ſucceed in the conqueſt of the whole province of *Guzerat*, which I have no doubt would in time be effected, yet the ſecuring its frontier only towards *Mahé* and the *Decan*, would ſubject us to the neceſſity of having always there a conſiderable detachment, not to mention the force that is conſtantly required to make good the collections in a country where no attention is paid to any claims but thoſe ſupported by the ſword. A junction with *Futty Sing*, the preſent leader of the Guicawar, ſeems therefore to be the moſt adviſable plan; and could this be brought about we ſhould have only to eject the Poonah garriſons from *Amidavad*, and a few other places ſcattered thinly over the country, little capable of reſiſtance. To *Futty Sing* might be ceded in principality the eaſtern provinces, forming a frontier towards the *Decan* and *Malva*, which would become a barrier on that ſide to the part of *Guzerat*, which might be taken as the Company's portion, and which would have for its other boundaries, the *Myhie* to the ſouth eaſt, and the rugged countries towards *Merwar* and *Cutch*, and the ſea, to the weſt.

As the whole weight of the Decan arms could not be reſiſted by *Futty Sing* alone, he would neceſſarily have occaſion for the aſſiſtance of a part of our forces, which while employed for his ſecurity, would be effectually promoting our own, both as acting againſt the common enemy, and being a powerful check on his conduct.

Could the gaining over of *Futty Sing* be accompliſhed, making him *bona fide* an ally, and enabling him at the ſame time, without too much ſubjection to ours, to ſhake off the Maratta yoke, would, if not conciliate the principal Jaghiredars, at leaſt render them leſs alert in the common cauſe, and might have a conſiderable effect upon *Madjee Scindia*; who, as he would then become our neighbour, we ſhould be better able to reduce his power, and to keep him within due bounds.

A fair opportunity offers for an opening with *Futty Sing* from the difference which has lately ariſen between *Futty Sing* and *Nannah*, regarding the Jaghire given by him to *Sacaram Bapoo*, and which, ſince his confinement, is claimed by the Poonah Government.

The baits we have to offer to induce *Futty Sing* to connect himſelf with us, are of ſo tempting a nature, that if managed with addreſs, they can ſcarce fail of having effect on him. The procuring for and guaranteeing to him an independent principality; the uſe of our troops in his ſupport and defence; the enabling him to rely as little as he may chooſe on the Poonah Durbar, in alienating him from which we gain an uſeful aſſiſtant towards ſubverting that power from which we have the moſt to fear; ſome intimations to him reſpecting *Govind Row*'s claims, which unleſs he agrees to co-operate with us, we ſhall be neceſſitated to maintain, may operate upon his fears.

It appears to Mr. *Carnac*, that the Nabob of *Cambay* may be uſefully employed in conciliating to our Government the Powers on the northern ſide of the *Myhie*, the *Cattawar*, *Cutch*, &c. who groan under the oppreſſion of the Bramin tyranny. As we have long experienced the favourable diſpoſition of the Nabob towards the Engliſh, it would be good policy to afford him our aſſiſtance ſo as to enable him to ſet up for himſelf, and wholly to ſhake off the Maratta yoke.

16th November 1779. *John Carnac.*

Gentlemen,

The ready attention which you have paid to every application of mine for promoting the good of the public ſervice, calls for my moſt ſincere and hearty acknowledgments; and I beg to expreſs to you in the moſt particular manner, the warm ſenſe I entertain of the ſpirited and deciſive conduct you have purſued, in the reinforcement of troops which you have at preſent afforded me. Permit me further to declare, that I cannot but conſider this compliance as the moſt happy preſage of future fortune; and by continuing to receive the ſame ſteady and reſolute ſupport from your Government, I aſſure myſelf that my endeavours to execute whatever plan may now be reſolved upon, will be crowned with ſucceſs. Goddard Gen. letter from.

In my addreſs to you of the 3d inſtant, I gave my ſentiments at large of the preſent ſituation of affairs, and meaſures I thought moſt expedient to be followed; I now beg leave to add a few words. There appears to be no doubt at preſent remaining of the abſolute neceſſity of the war itſelf; the point now to be determined is, in what manner this war is to be carried on—Whether we ſhould act offenſively or defenſively? Whether we ſhould move to diſtreſs the enemy, and poſſeſs ourſelves of reſources immediately, or wait inactive to be inſulted and attacked by them in our camp?

Were there any hopes of an accommodation with the Maratta Miniſter, from the knowledge I have of the ſincere deſire of the Bengal Government for peace, and the advantages that might attend it, I ſhould be the laſt to precipitate matters, or recommend a commencement of hoſtilities on our part; but it is now too late to negociate, and even this object of peace can only be obtained by our acting with vigour and reſolution.

The fair and reaſonable propoſals made to the Miniſter; the alternative of peace or war, openly and generouſly left to his option, and his imperiouſly preferring the latter by rejecting the terms that were offered him, and preſuming to impoſe diſgraceful ones upon us, amply juſtify our conduct, in being the firſt to unſheath the ſword; I ſhould have ſaid, render it a duty we owe to the honour of our inſulted country, and the intereſts of the Company, to ſhew our reſentment of ſuch behaviour, by avenging upon the earlieſt occaſion. Every circumſtance alſo of political concern unites in commendation of our entering upon immediate action. We ſhall, by poſſeſſing ourſelves of a tract of country, open the ſources of preſent wealth, and provide for future ſupplies, and by theſe means proſecute the war with anticipated advantages, while our enemies will be intimidated; and thoſe whoſe inclinations are wavering or ſecretly diſpoſed to our intereſts, will derive courage from the early ſucceſs and vigour of our meaſures.

A moſt material advantage that ſtrikes me from this mode of conduct, is regarding the intended connection with *Futty Sing*; for if we attack him while under the impreſſion of his preſent fears, it would not be difficult to bring him over to our views, either by negociation or force; or ſhould even the former not ſucceed, it will be an eaſier taſk to accompliſh by the latter at this time, than when joined or ſupported by the force of the miniſterial party.

To all theſe arguments, as a further motive of encouragement to enter upon vigorous and active meaſures without delay, I am happy it is in my power to acquaint you, that ten lacks of rupees are coming round

from

from *Bengal*, for the expences of the army, five lacks in ſpecie, and five in bills. Theſe I have reaſon to believe from the nature of my information (which though not from the Supreme Board collectively, is wrote me by Sir *Eyre Coote*) muſt have left *Bengal* long before this time; and it is not to be doubted, when the certain accounts of war are communicated to them, they will take the neceſſary ſteps for affording every effectual aid towards the proſecution of it.

Reſpecting Colonel *Braithwaite* I cannot help being of opinion, but when your letters which accompanied the veſſels ſent to tranſport his detachment arrive, and he reflects upon the importance of the public ſervice that now calls for his aſſiſtance, he will not heſitate a ſingle moment in forwarding it to *Surat* as expeditiouſly as poſſible, and I expect being joined by that force ſome time in the month of November; ſhould he not arrive ſo early, it need not I think be any impediment to entering upon action as ſoon as the troops of this Preſidency join, becauſe I am convinced the army under me will then be ſufficiently ſtrong for the ſervice to be performed, and I ſhall always have it in my power to favour and effect his junction with the main body. I cannot help alſo being of opinion that our operations will tend to facilitate the progreſs of the reinforcement coming from *Bengal*, under the conduct of Captain *Popham*; as the diviſion it muſt cauſe will not give the Marattas leiſure to attend to his motions, nor will they think it ſafe to our forces by detaching any conſiderable number of men to oppoſe, and interrupt his march.

Having thus mentioned the ſeveral arguments which forcibly ſtrike me for entering upon immediate hoſtilities, I am induced to hope they will meet with your concurrence and approbation, and that you will furniſh me with the neceſſary inſtructions and powers, both regarding the general plan, and the particular object of the operation to be at preſent purſued, previous to my ſetting out to join the army, which I wiſh to be able to do in two or three days, as my preſence there is abſolutely neceſſary upon many accounts; and the appearance of backwardneſs and want of vigour, which my too long abſence will carry with it, might alſo be productive of diſagreeable conſequences.

The points regarding which I am moſt ſolicitous, are the mode of treating with *Futty Sing*, conſiſtent with the treaty now ſubſiſting betwixt the Honourable Company and him, and the line of conduct to be purſued reſpecting *Ragonath Row*. On theſe two ſubjects I have already ventured to give you my ſentiments; and I have only to repeat, that I ſhall cheerfully and zealouſly concur, and exert myſelf in ſucceſsfully accompliſhing your views relative to them and the other objects of the preſent expedition, as far as lies in my power. This declaration I conſider as ſufficient for me to make; and doubt not its being fully ſatisfactory at this time. In obſerving upon the former part of the Honourable Preſident's minute of the 10th inſtant, regarding the powers that have been given me by the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council, and the relation in which I ſtand to the Government, the ſincerity of my preſent aſſurances will I hope be fully apparent from the conſiſtency of my future conduct with them; and I truſt no differences or miſconception in points that are not ſtrictly eſſential to the ſucceſs of the buſineſs in hand, will ever ariſe to interrupt that harmony and good underſtanding that has hitherto marked the councils and reſolves of this Committee in the meaſures concerted for the common cauſe in which we are embarked, and which cannot fail, under the ſame circumſtances, of being brought to a happy and glorious iſſue.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Bombay, 15th Nov. 1779.

Wedneſday. The firſt battalion proceeded with the *Revenge*, and the boats under her convoy for *Surat*, to join the army, and remainder of the 5th battalion for Broach garriſon,

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Thurſday. Signed our inſtructions to General *Goddard*, and credentials for his negociating with *Futty Sing*, in the name of this Government: alſo inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* in command of the Bombay detachment, and to the Commiſſary and Paymaſter thereof; likewiſe letters to *Surat*, and to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, all entered in the order now ſpecified.

To Brigadier-General *Goddard*.

Sir,

Goddard, Gen. his inſtructions. The ſtate in which affairs with the Marattas now ſtand, ſince the anſwer returned by the Miniſter to your propoſals for a pacification; your diſmiſſion of the Vackeel in conſequence; and the intermediate declaration made by you to the Durbar, in obedience to the inſtructions from the Governor General and Council, dated the 14th of September; together with the military preparations, which we learn from all quarters are making at *Poonah*, leading us to conclude a war with that State inevitable, we have at ſeveral meetings, to which you have been invited, conſidered with the moſt ſerious attention, the conduct proper to be obſerved in our preſent circumſtances, as well as the object to which the efforts of our force may with moſt advantage be directed, whenever it ſhall be judged expedient to commence operations; in order that we might aſſiſt you with our beſt advice for the benefit of the common cauſe on this very intereſting occaſion.

The powers you had under the Governor General and Council, make it proper to acquaint you that we do not conſider the war now impending as a meaſure of this Government, nor ourſelves in any manner as reſponſible for the ſucceſs of it. We do not ground this poſition on any opinion we have formed relative to the neceſſity or good policy of the war, which is a queſtion we ſhall not enter into; but on the principle, that as the negociation was opened and concluded under the ſeparate and diſtinct inſtructions of the Governor General and Council, who have expreſsly acquainted us the principal reſponſibility will reſt with them, and as you are in conſequence made reſponſible to them for your conduct in the operations of the war, we ſhould under ſuch circumſtances be wanting in juſtice to ourſelves, if we did not diſclaim all reſponſibility, both as to the meaſure of the war itſelf, which is the iſſue of that negociation, as well as the ſucceſs of it when commenced; the officer intruſted with the conduct of the operations being reſponſible to another juriſdiction.

After this previous explanation it is equally proper to aſſure you, that we ſhall, according to our duty to the Company, and from motives of juſtice and honour with reſpect to the Bengal Government, contribute our aſſiſtance moſt zealouſly and cordially to bring the war to a ſpeedy and advantageous concluſion both with the forces of this Preſidency, and with ſuch advice and recommendation to you as our knowledge and experience may at any time ſuggeſt, or you may require from us. In this confidence you may take your meaſures, and depend upon every aid and ſupport in our power to afford.

We have, as you have been before acquainted, diſpatched a ſufficient number of veſſels to bring up the forces and ſtores from *Mahé*, and a poſitive requiſition to Colonel *Braithwaite* to embark them thereon, and to join the army under your command; but from his lateſt advices are uncertain whether he may think himſelf at liberty to comply therewith, or whether he may not receive contrary orders from his ſuperiors at *Madras*, who appear to be on the eve of a war with *Hyder Ally*. We have alſo determined, in addition to the detachment of one hundred artilleny men before ſent, to reinforce you with a body of 200 European infantry, the firſt battalion of Sepoys, and a battalion of drafted Sepoy grenadiers, which is the utmoſt our eſtabliſhment will afford at

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this time, and the laſt embarkation of this force will now accompany you on the *Revenge*, and other veſſels, to join the army at *Surat*.

Though we have thus done our utmoſt to put your army into the moſt reſpectable ſituation, we ſtill continue to think it will be more adviſable to endeavour to gain time, and to protract any determination or acts of hoſtility till we are in a better condition to meet the war, provided the motions of the enemy will in prudence permit; and we accordingly ſtrongly recommend to you, to obſerve temporizing meaſures for the preſent. Our reaſons for this recommendation have been fully explained to you in our letter of the 29th October, before we knew of your diſmiſſion of the Maratta Vackeel, and alſo perſonally at the council table; and when ſummed up, conſiſt in the uncertainty we are under of the junction of the troops from *Mahé*; the great diſtance of Captain *Popham*'s detachment; the hazard to which any immediate acts of hoſtility may expoſe that very conſiderable reinforcement; our ſituation in point of money, which totally diſables us from giving you any aſſiſtance in that reſpect, or even bearing the expences of the Bombay detachment in the field; the deſtruction of the harveſt in the Guzerat province, the firſt ſtep the enemy will probably take on your putting the army in motion; and the diſtreſs ſuch a meaſure will produce to the country and the Company's ſettlements, as well as the effect it will have on the ſupplies to the army; all which objections it appears to us may in a great meaſure be removed in a few weeks, and the army enabled to take the field with much greater advantage, by the nearer approach of Captain *Popham*'s detachment; perhaps alſo the arrival of the troops from *Mahé*, and the ſupplies of money that may ſoon be expected from the Governor General and Council, and the magazines of grain that may be ſecured after the harveſt is collected.

But if after conſideration of the reaſons above ſtated you ſhould ſtill judge it eligible, or find it neceſſary to enter upon immediate action, the determination muſt reſt with you, as we by no means intend to lay any reſtraint upon you in this point; but only according to the principle we have laid down for our conduct, to give you ſuch advice as in our opinion is moſt ſuitable to preſent circumſtances, and moſt conducive to the benefit of the common cauſe.

Whenever the objections now exiſting may be removed, and circumſtances may be ſufficiently favourable for commencing operations, we entirely agree with you in the opinion expreſſed in your letter of the 3d ultimo, that the grand and primary object ſhould be to ſecure a country and revenue which would afford a certain and extenſive field of ſupply for the exigencies of the war, and we hope for the future emolument of the Company. In this light we regard the plan laid before us by the Preſident the 30th of March laſt, of which you have ſo fully teſtified your approbation; and we accordingly then recommend to you to adopt and carry it into execution, ſo far as relates to the ſettlement of the Guzerat province, in concert with *Futty Sing*, and the reduction of the Maratta poſſeſſions adjoining to *Surat* and *Broach*, which we truſt will effectually anſwer the great ends abovementioned, and tend materially to diſtreſs the enemy.

We do not, however mean, that any time ſhould be loſt in opening the negociation with *Futty Sing*, which may be immediately commenced; and we hope you will be able to convince him, how much it will prove to his intereſt to unite with us in the ſettlement of the Guzerat province; nor from the advantage which a coalition with him will afford to your future operations, and the Company's poſſeſſions in that quarter, can we doubt of your exerting your utmoſt addreſs to bring this point to bear by an amicable compoſition, rather than by an exertion of your force. For this purpoſe it ſhould be clearly explained to *Futty Sing*, that we mean no injury to him, but only to take into the Company's hands the Poonah ſhare of the revenues held in participation with him, and thereby to diſtreſs our enemies, with whom we are at war; that it is our wiſh to be on the moſt friendly terms with him; and that we have fully empowered you to make an amicable and equitable ſettlement with him of the province of *Guzerat*, upon terms of mutual advantage and ſecurity to him from all future dependance and exactions by the Poonah Durbar, or grounds for diſpute with the Honourable Company.

We accordingly herewith deliver your credentials, under the ſeal of the Honourable Company, authorizing you, in behalf of this Government, to negociate, and conclude a treaty with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, whom we conſider as the head of that family, the elder brother, *Seajee*, being diſordered in his mind, and having no concern in matters of Government. It is, however, neceſſary we believe his name ſhould be inſerted in any engagement you may form with *Futty Sing*; and alſo a clauſe, reſerving the final ſanction and ratification of ſuch engagement to the Governor General and Council, agreeable to their inſtructions of the 14th of June.

The grounds of the engagement to be formed with *Futty Sing*, muſt be our ſupporting and defending him in poſſeſſion of his ſhare of the Guzerat province, independent of the Poonah Government; and his engaging to ſupport us in the ſhare now held by that Government. To make this ſettlement as convenient as poſſible to the Honourable Company, and to *Futty Sing*, and to avoid the continual differences which muſt ariſe from both parties having an intereſt in the ſame places; we recommend to you to propoſe to *Futty Sing*, to make an abſolute and ſpecific partition of the territory between him and the Honourable Company, according to the proportion of the revenues now reſpectively held by him and the Marattas; and each party to have the diſtinct and ſole Government and poſſeſſion of the diviſion which may be allotted to them in the new ſettlement.

The propoſed mode of partition, and the revenues drawn by the Poonah Circar, and the Guicawars, from the province of *Guzerat*, are deſcribed with all the accuracy our preſent knowledge will allow, in the Preſident's minute of the 30th of March; a copy of which has been already put into your hands, and will ſerve in general as your guide in the diſcharge of this part of your commiſſion; the general outlines of the partition are,

The Company to be put in poſſeſſion of the Guicawar diviſion of the country ſouth of the *Tappy*, their ſhare in the revenue of the city of *Surat*, and ſuch other lands as may nearly make up an equivalent to the Maratta poſſeſſions north of the *Myhie*, which will be guaranteed to *Futty Sing*.

It is to be obſerved, that the diſtricts between the *Myhie* and the *Tappy*, as far eaſtward as *Brodera*, *Dubhoy*, *Zinnore*, and *Verſavee*, which make part of the Preſident's plan, will be held by the Company as acquiſitions gained from the Poonah Circar, to which they ſolely belonged, except *Coral*, ceded by *Futty Sing*, in 1775, and for which the Guicawars are not entitled to any conſideration; theſe diſtricts will be taken notice of in the ſequel of this letter.

You may alſo ſtipulate with *Futty Sing*, that we will ſupport him in withholding the tribute of 27 lacks per annum, now paid to the Poonah Circar for his Jaghire in the province until a final treaty of peace is concluded between the Company and that Durbar, in which you may aſſure him his intereſt will be carefully attended to, if he cordially unites in the ſettlement now propoſed to him.

If you ſhould find it practicable, we recommend to you to obtain from *Futty Sing* the ceſſion of *Zinnore*, which lies very commodiouſly for completing our line of northern territory, in which we apprehend you will find but little difficulty, as a conſiderable ſhare is collected for the Poonah Circar; and this place was once before ceded by *Futty Sing*, in the year 1755, but then relinquiſhed for reaſons which had weight at the time.

There

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There being alſo ſome villages of *Futty Sing*'s intermixed with the Broach Pergunnah, we recommend it to you to get them ſecured for the Company in the propoſed treaty of partition—the gentlemen at *Broach* can inform you of the particulars.

In conſequence of the exchange propoſed to be made with *Futty Sing*, ſhould he requeſt the Company's aſſiſtance for putting him in poſſeſſion of the territories of the Poonah Circar, north of the *Myhie*, we conceive ourſelves authorized by the Governor General and Council's letter of the 14th June, to make a ſtipulation for affording him ſuch aſſiſtance, which we accordingly empower you to accede to in our behalf; obſerving the following caution to which they have enjoined us to pay the ſtricteſt attention, ſhould this plan be carried into execution, viz. that the engagement you may enter into ſhall be offenſive only, for the object of our immediate operations, and in all other reſpects purely defenſive.

As *Govind Row* has always ſhewn himſelf well diſpoſed to our intereſt, and in order to preſerve the country from the continual depredations occaſioned by the contention between the two brothers, we could have wiſhed in the arrangement with *Futty Sing* to ſecure a ſatisfactory proviſion for him; but the Governor General and Council have expreſsly forbad us to aſſume a mediation between them, or to take any part whatever in their domeſtic diſputes, further than to ſupport the party in alliance with the Company and his poſſeſſions againſt foreign invaſion; and not to commit the dignity of the Company, or pledge the national faith in formal treaty with a perſon of rank or power unſuitable to ſuch a diſtinction. If this point can be accommodated without deviating from the above reſtriction, we think the Company will derive honour and advantage from it.

The Nabob of *Cambay* likewiſe deſerves our attention in the ſettlement of the northern country, part of which was formerly wreſted from his dominions, and from his enmity to the Marattas, and attachment to the Company, may be made of uſe to you in your operations; we therefore recommend to you, to procure for him ſuch ceſſion of territory as you may find practicable.

The Company's ſervants at the northern ſettlements will be directed to give you ſuch information as you may require, of the intereſts and connections of the country Powers in their neighbourhood.

We have not at preſent any thing further to offer on the ſubject of the propoſed alliance with *Futty Sing*; but in the courſe of the negociation ſhall give you any other information that may occur, or that you may deſire from us. But as ſuch materials may be of preſent uſe to you, we herewith deliver copy of the treaty made with *Futty Sing* in 1775; alſo of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*, containing an hiſtorical account of the Guicawar family; a copy of ſome propoſals made by *Futty Sing* in the year 1772 to Mr. *Price*, the Chief of *Surat*; and an account of the diſtricts formerly annexed to *Surat*, under the name of *Autoveezy*, the reſumption of which makes a part of the plan above recommended to you.

As ſoon as you may judge it expedient to commence operations, we recommend to you to proceed in the reduction of the Maratta poſſeſſions ſouth of the *Tappy*, and their Pergunnahs of *Ulpar*, *Hanſood*, *Occlaſeer*, *Deſborah*, *Ahmood*, *Dubhoy*, and *Verſavee*. The diſtricts above alluded to lying between the *Tappy* and the *Myhie*, care ſhould be taken not to moleſt the Guicawars choties, and collectors; and in the reduction of theſe places, the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* will be directed to afford you every aſſiſtance you may deſire, and to receive charge of them from you when reduced, according to their reſpective ſituation; that is, the places north of the *Tappy*, except *Ulpar* and *Verſavee*, will fall under charge of Broach Chiefſhip; and thoſe ſouth of that river, with *Ulpar* and *Verſavee*, under charge of *Surat*.

Theſe places we apprehend will be reduced without much difficulty; and by that time you will be able to diſcover *Futty Sing*'s diſpoſitions towards the propoſed ſettlement, and to determine your future operations.

We entirely concur with you in the plan propoſed in your letter of the 3d ultimo to be purſued reſpecting *Ragoba*, and avoiding any poſitive engagement with him for the preſent. We truſt, that ſeeing the neceſſity of the ſyſtem we have adopted, he will be reconciled to it; and conſidering how deeply the Company is already involved on this account, will allow the juſtice of our ſecuring ſome means of reimburſement and reſource for future ſupply, before we can avowedly aſſert his pretenſions; and more eſpecially when he conſiders, as you obſerve, that we ſhall enter this war as principals. We alſo further approve this way of proceeding, as we may expect orders reſpecting him from the Governor General and Council, when they are apprized of the ſituation of affairs.

Lieutenant Colonel *James Hartley* proceeds in command of the Bombay detachment, and we have directed him to put himſelf entirely under your orders, as per copy of his inſtructions encloſed. A return of the force under his command will be delivered you by himſelf.

Mr. *George Green* is appointed Commiſſary of ſtores and proviſions to the ſaid detachment, and Mr. *William Lewis*, paymaſter; and as it is not in our power to furniſh money for the expences of their department, we have directed them to make their drafts on you.

As *Samuel Richardſon*, one of the principal ſurgeons of our hoſpital, and ſurgeon-major of the garriſon, proceeds in charge of the hoſpital for the Bombay detachment, Mr. *Durham*, as ſurgeon of the artillery, and Mr. *Clugſtone*, as ſurgeon of the infantry, Mr. *Tootney* will now act as an aſſiſtant ſurgeon with Mr. *Green*, now proceeding: and they are all put under the orders of Mr. *Richardſon*, the ſurgeon-major.

In conſequence of your deſire, we have permitted Meſſrs. *Warden* and *Hull* to accompany you to the army.

We now encloſe a commiſſion, authorizing you to appoint and confirm general courts martial, and a blank warrant for a Judge Advocate.

However averſe we may be to entail expence upon the Company, yet as you have acquainted us, that you cannot take upon you to reduce the Bengal troops to the ſame footing with the Bombay troops, in reſpect to field allowances; and as ſo conſiderable a diſparity muſt occaſion great jealouſies and diſcontent, and be very detrimental to the ſervice, we muſt admit the juſtice and neceſſity of making no diſtinction between the forces of the ſame maſter, employed in conjunction upon the ſame ſervice; and therefore are entirely of opinion, that the Bengal batta ſhould be allowed to the officers of the Bombay detachment, ordered to join the army under your command. We deſire, however, it may be clearly explained to the troops, that this is not to be conſidered as a precedent, and will not in future be allowed, except when acting in conjunction with the forces of the Bengal Preſidency.

A Company's ſeal is herewith delivered to you; and heartily wiſhing you ſucceſs, we remain,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 2d December 1779.

William Hornby, &c. Committee.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Goddard, Gen. his credentials for concluding a treaty with Futty Sing.

Sir,

We the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*, in virtue of the powers veſted in us by the Honourable the Court of Directors, and having the ſanction of the Governor General and Council at *Calcutta*, relying on your fidelity, prudence, and integrity, do authorize and empower you, in the name of this Government, and in behalf of the Hon. United *Eaſt India* Company, to negociate and conclude a treaty of alliance and friendſhip with

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with *Futty Sing Row Shamsher Bahadur*, and to make with him an amicable and equitable settlement of the province of *Guzerat*, on such terms as shall be for the mutual honour, benefit, and satisfaction of both parties, and we hereby give you full powers to that effect; declaring that we will ratify whatever agreement shall be concluded by you in behalf of this Government, and which will likewise be confirmed and ratified by the Governor General and Council, according to the instructions herewith delivered to you.

L. S.

Given in *Bombay Castle*, under our hands, and the Great Seal of the United Company, this second day of December, in the year one thousand seven hundred and seventy-nine.

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Edward Ravenscroft, Secr.

To Lieutenant Colonel *James Hartley*.

Hartley, Lieut. Col. instructions to him.

Sir,

Having appointed you to the command of a detachment of the troops of this Presidency, consisting of 100 artillery, 200 European infantry, and 2 battalions of Sepoys, with which we have resolved to reinforce the army under General *Goddard*, and the last embarkation now proceeding to *Surat*, we direct that you likewise take passage on one of the vessels ordered for the accommodation of the forces; and on your joining the army, to put yourself and detachment under the orders of General *Goddard*, to whom you will deliver a return thereof.

Mr. *George Green* is appointed Commissary of stores and provisions, and Mr. *William Lewis*, Paymaster, to the Bombay detachment; and as it is not in our power to furnish money for the expences of their departments, we have instructed them to make their drafts on General *Goddard*.

Mr. *Samuel Richardson*, one of the principal surgeons of the hospital and surgeon-major of the garrison, proceeds in charge of the hospital, Mr. *Durham* as surgeon of the artillery, and Mr. *Clugstone* as surgeon of the infantry; Mr. *Tooney* will now act as an assistant surgeon with Mr. *Green* now proceeding; and they must all be put under the orders of Mr. *Richardson* the surgeon-major.

The Bombay detachment will be put on the same footing in point of batta as the Bengal troops; but this indulgence is not to be construed into a precedent, or expected, but when acting in conjunction with the forces of that Presidency.

To enable you to discharge the duties of your command with satisfaction, we have thought proper to allow you a staff, consisting of an aid-de-camp, Secretary, and Brigade Major; and are

Your loving friends,

Bombay Castle, 2d December 1779.

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

To Mr. *George Green*.

Mr. George Green, his instructions.

Sir,

Having appointed you Commissary of stores and provisions to the detachment of forces commanded by Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, for the reinforcement of the army under General *Goddard*, we direct that you take upon you the charge of that department, and proceed on the *Revenge* to join the army at *Surat*.

As we are unable to furnish money for the charges of the detachment in the field, you must make your drafts on General *Goddard* for such sums as you may require in your department.

We are your loving friends,

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Castle, 2d December 1779.

To Mr. *William Lewis*.

Lewis, Wm his instructions.

Sir,

Having appointed you Paymaster to the detachment of Bombay forces under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, for the reinforcement of the army under Brigadier General *Goddard*, you will accordingly take upon you the charge of that office, and proceed on the *Revenge* to join the army at *Surat*.

General *Goddard* will supply you with money for the expences of the detachment, on whom you will accordingly make your drafts.

We are your loving friends,

William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Castle, 2d December 1779.

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Bengal Secret Consultations, 24th February 1780.

THE 1st of January 1780, General *Goddard* wrote the following letter to *Bengal*, viz.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 14th October, enclosing copy of your instructions to Captain *Popham*, and a bill of exchange for Bombay rupees 1,927. 4. 3. which shall be negociated in the manner you are pleased to direct.

When I last had the honour of addressing you, I expressed my intention of putting the army in motion in a very few days. This design I have found necessary to carry into execution on account of the circumstances which have occurred in the course of my intended negociation with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, that tend to raise doubts of his inclinations being friendly towards the English, and justify a belief that he wishes only to gain time, until an army from *Poonah* may be sent to his assistance, to unite his forces with theirs against us. I have already informed you of the powers delegated to me by the Government of *Bombay*, to conclude a treaty on their part with *Futty Sing*; the object and nature of which will be fully explained to you by the several papers I had the honour to enclose for your perusal in my letter of the 10th ultimo, I accordingly communicated to *Futty Sing* through the medium of the two confidential people whom I had sent to attend me, the proposals of the English, in terms calculated to give him every confidence in, and assurances of, their sincerity, if he truly and heartily entered into their views; and at the same time, to convince him if he acted on this occasion with duplicity and deceit, he must expect to be treated by them as an enemy.

The period requisite for a reply, which I requested he would send without loss of time, had elapsed many days, when at last my own Hircarrahs returned with a letter from *Futty Sing*, in which he took no notice whatever of the proposals that had been made him, nor referred me to his Vackeels for further information. He only repeated the common professions of friendship and regard for the English, and assurances of his intentions to maintain the ancient alliance mutually subsisting between them inviolable. The Vackeels themselves, when questioned upon the cause of this doubtful and improper delay; would answer me only with the most obvious subterfuges and evasions; my Hircarrahs also informed me, that the night before their departure from *Brodera*, *Futty Sing*'s capital messengers had arrived from *Poonah*, with letters

from the Miniſter and *Scindia*, exhorting him not to unite with the Engliſh; and promiſing to ſend an army immediately to his aſſiſtance. I further learn, that *Futty Sing* is augmenting his own ſtrength, and calling in troops from all quarters to join his ſtandard; and is at preſent two coſs from his capital, at the head of an army, which may conſiſt of about ten thouſand men.

Notwithſtanding all theſe ſuſpicious appearances, I am far from relinquiſhing the proſpect of bringing over *Futty Sing* to become an ally in the preſent war; nor ſhall I treat him as an enemy, until he gives me certain proofs that the proffered friendſhip as actually required by him, famed as he is for treachery, even above the perfidious ſtamp that marks the whole of the Maratta race; it is neceſſary to take every political precaution againſt his deceit, and bring his conduct to an immediate poſitive teſt; ſo that by marching towards him I ſhall obtain the deſired object of winning him to a decided declaration in our favour; or ſhould he be refractory, and adverſe to our meaſures, accompliſh a ſtroke that muſt be of the moſt beneficial conſequences in the commencement of the war, before the ſuccours from *Poonah* ſhall arrive to his aſſiſtance. From this laſt place, my advices mention, that a few bodies of horſe have been already detached, and that the main army is expected ſoon to follow.

Let me repeat, that induced by the ſeveral reaſons above related, I have put the troops in motion, and this morning croſſed the *Tapty* river, on the north bank of which I am at preſent encamped. I have the pleaſure further to acquaint you, that moſt of the Pergunnahs belonging to the Poonah Government, ſouth of the *Myhie* river, have been taken poſſeſſion of in the name of the *Eaſt India* Company, and delivered over to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, to be collected in the neighbourhood of whoſe reſidencies they are ſituated. The inhabitants, accuſtomed to a change of maſters, ſeem to embrace the dominion and protection of the Engliſh, with an unuſual joy and alacrity, and no doubt, anticipate the proſpect of being delivered from the oppreſſion of their tyrants.

The only principal diſtrict now remaining on this ſide of the *Myhie* is *Dubhoy*; and as that contains a fortreſs, and is within 12 or 13 coſs of *Brodera*, it will be ſubjected upon the arrival of my army, for the march of which this pretext alone would be a ſufficient point of direction, and furniſh a juſt reaſon to ſatisfy *Futty Sing*.

I ſhall continue to communicate to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, every occurrence regarding the preſent ſervice, and receive ſuch inſtructions and information from them as may aſſiſt in promoting the ſucceſs of it, according to the rules you have laid down for my guidance.

The ſeveral papers encloſed in my letter of the 10th ultimo, will have fully explained to you the object of our preſent plan, and furniſhed ample grounds for you to tranſmit us inſtructions for our future direction, conſiſtent with the political views you may find it proper ultimately to form; to which I ſhall pay the ſtricteſt attention and moſt implicit obedience.

The point on which I am moſt ſolicitous to know your pleaſure, relates to *Ragonaut Row*. I have already apprized you of the difficult taſk I knew I ſhould find in reconciling the meaſure now adopted by us, to the high hope with which his mind was filled; nor was I deceived in my expectations. I however conſidered it as an object of the higheſt political importance at preſent, and what was likely in the end to crown the war we are engaged in with the moſt complete glory and benefit, to keep him in good humour and dependance upon us; and ſpared no arguments for that purpoſe; and I have the ſatisfaction to tell you that I have ſucceeded to my wiſh. I pointed out to him the juſt and good policy of ſecuring to ourſelves ſome certain fund for reimburſing paſt heavy expences, and ſupporting the charges of the preſent war in which we were involved, and conſidered by the Miniſters as principals, ſolely from our friendſhip and regard to him; but at the ſame time aſſured him, that as the Engliſh had invariably and long protected him, and exerted themſelves for his intereſt, it was ſtill their wiſh to reſtore him to the ſtation and guandeur to which his birth entitled him, whenever circumſtances might render ſuch an attempt favourable, or a party in the State declare themſelves decidedly in his favour.—He acknowledged the propriety of what I had ſaid, and profeſſed an entire confidence in the favourable intentions of the Engliſh to accompliſh his wiſhes; but he obſerved, that unleſs ſome increaſe was made him to his allowance on a part of the conquered Pergunnahs ceded for his uſe, thoſe who ſecretly favoured his intereſts would be doubtful of deſign to ſerve him; and beſides would want the chief inſtrument of reward in proſpect to join his ſtandard. In anſwer to this I repeated my former arguments, adding, that the ſucceſs of our army, while he remained under our protection, would be ſufficient to bring over thoſe who were really well affected to him; that he might in the mean time take every conſiſtent and neceſſary ſtep to encourage his partizans in the State; and that if any reſpectable party ſhould ſtand forth, the inſtructions which I expected to receive from your Government regarding him, would arrive in time to execute the plan you might deem beſt calculated for the honour and benefit of himſelf and the Engliſh nation. Appendix. No. 254. A.

On the ſubject of money, although he pleaded the neceſſity of an addition to ſupport thoſe who might flock to his ſtandard, I would promiſe nothing; I only told him, that when the ſeveral leaders, his partizans, with a ſufficient force ſhould join him, it would then be time to provide a fund for their ſubſiſtence. The ſufficiency of theſe arguments, though it did not altogether convince, yet he ſeemed to acquieſce in—they were contrary to his ſentiments and ideas of his own greatneſs and ſtation; and men find it difficult to reconcile to their choice, what militates againſt their favourite ruling paſſion, which I believe among the Bramins may be confined to two, avarice and pride.

The infirm and ſickly condition of *Ragonaut Row* prevents his accompanying the camp at preſent, but he ſent his adopted ſon *Omrat Row*, with about two thouſand horſe and foot; theſe he expects will daily increaſe on the march, and will look to be ſubſiſted; to afford them ſome encouragement is the only teſt by which we can try *Ragoba*'s cauſe, therefore beg leave to propoſe ſome queſtions both on this ſubject and in what relates to the buſineſs of *Ragoba* altogether: your directions, and the knowledge of your pleaſure regarding which will be very uſeful and neceſſary for my guidance.

1ſt. Is it your wiſh to adopt and take active meaſures in favour of the cauſe of *Ragoba*, if circumſtances ſhould hereafter render it favourable, by an overthrow of the miniſterial forces, or by a declaration of a ſtrong party in the State in his favour?

2d. In the event of a ſucceſsful war, if no conſiderable party makes its appearance, is it your intention to aſſert his claim?

3d. What are the expreſs limitations you think it neceſſary to lay me under with regard to the two foregoing points?

4th. With regard to money for the ſubſiſtence of his troops, I beg to receive your inſtructions, how far and under what reſtrictions it is your pleaſure he ſhould be aſſiſted; and as it is requiſite to keep him in hopes, and at the ſame time ſacrifice as little as poſſible to that end, what advances in money, and what ceſſions of conquered country ariſing from the ſucceſsful operations of a war, you may think it adviſable to give or admit him to a participation of, till the abſolute proof of his real weight and influence in the State can be obtained.

I have mentioned the above circumſtances which ſuggeſt themſelves to me; and as no doubt others will occur to you as neceſſary on this important occaſion to be provided

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vided for, I hope to receive your full particular inſtructions as early as poſſible.

I beg to acquaint you, that no part of the Madras reinforcements have yet joined me. Colonel *Braithwaite*, the officer in command at *Mahé*, writes me that he had ſhipped off the artillery and Europeans of his detachment for *Surat*, as the natives to whom the choice had been left by the Select Committee of *Madras*, of returning home or ſtaying to ſerve on this coaſt, had to a man preferred the former. The Colonel ſince writes me, that on account of ſome troops belonging to *Hyder Ally* being in motion towards *Tellicherry*, he has found it abſolutely neceſſary to re-land the Europeans and ſtores, ſo that I have no proſpect of being ſoon joined by any of the *Mahé* forces, nor have I received any advices from the Madras Government, by which I can form a judgment when the troops coming immediately from that Preſidency may arrive.

I am alſo in the ſtate of ignorance reſpecting Captain *Popham*'s detachment as when I laſt wrote you, none of the Hircarrahs whom I ſent to meet him and bring me intelligence having yet returned; ſo that I have reaſon to ſuppoſe that he has not yet croſſed the *Jumna*.

I beg leave to repreſent to you my ſituation with reſpect to caſh: I have received part only of the bills tranſmitted me for five lacks in your letter of the 6th September, and there is no news of the *Britannia*. This Government, as you would perceive by their letter to me of the 2d of December, have not been at all aſſiſting to the charges of the war, for which they urge the very impoveriſhed and neceſſitous ſtate of their own circumſtances. The junction of the detachment from *Bombay* has occaſioned an increaſe of expence, and this, added to the delay in the arrival of the five lacks in time, has entirely exhauſted the treaſury, and left me without any reſource for the ſubſiſtence of the army, than that of drawing bills upon your Government, which I have done upon the moſt favourable terms I could poſſibly obtain, to the amount of between four and five lacks. I hope you will be pleaſed to approve of my conduct in this particular; and as I can have no certain dependance even upon the expedient of drafts, and the ſum I am at preſent poſſeſſed of is barely ſufficient to pay off all the troops for November, including December's pay, I hope you will take ſuch meaſures for the ſupply of this neceſſary and indiſpenſable article as you may find moſt ſpeedy and effectual.

I have honour to be, &c.

(Signed) *Tho' Goddard.*

Head Quarters, camp near *Cuttore*,
North Banks of the *Tappee*, 1ſt Jan. 1780.

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Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 14th February 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor, General, Preſident;
Philip Francis, } Eſquires.
Edward Wheler, }

Mr. *Barwell* indiſpoſed.
Sir *Eyre Coote* on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.

READ the following letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*.

Gentlemen,

We yeſterday received a letter from Colonel *Braithwaite*, giving an account of his proceedings in conſequence of our orders to him for evacuating *Mahé*, and ſending the detachment to *Surat*: a copy of this letter we tranſmit for your information, and you will perceive by it the diſagreeable ſituation of affairs at *Tellicherry*, and the reaſons which induced Colonel *Braithwaite* to remain there with the whole detachment to act in defence of that ſettlement; we wiſhed the Europeans had been ſent at all events to *Surat*; but ſtill we cannot blame Colonel *Braithwaite* for uſing his diſcretion, in a caſe where one of the Company's poſſeſſions was to be defended againſt an actual and powerful attack; the part taken by *Hyder Ally* in fomenting theſe diſturbances, and marching a large body of his troops to take poſſeſſion of the ruins of *Mahé*, on account of its proximity to *Tellicherry*, ſhew no very favourable diſpoſition towards us, and might well warrant the conjecture formed by Colonel *Braithwaite*, that he would probably aſſiſt the Nairs in their attempt upon that factory. There is however reaſon to fear from what Colonel *Braithwaite* writes, that the gentlemen of *Tellicherry* have imprudently provoked hoſtilities by interfering in the country diſputes, and giving protection to people obnoxious to *Hyder* and the Nairs. If ſo, they have certainly been very culpable, and we hope their ſuperiors will inſtantly take meaſures to promote an accommodation, for we are ourſelves averſe from engaging our troops in ſo unjuſtifiable a quarrel. We made it a part of our inſtruction to Colonel *Braithwaite* during his command at *Mahé*, to have no interference directly or indirectly with any Powers or Chiefs beyond the limits of his authority; and he appears to have ſo ſtrictly conformed to our orders in this reſpect, that we do not believe he has had the ſmalleſt ſhare in any of the tranſactions which may have given riſe to the preſent troubles.

The moment we heard of theſe diſturbances, and the conſequent detention of our troops at *Tellicherry*, we came to the reſolution of ſending, at all events, immediately from hence, a reſpectable reinforcement to join General *Goddard*'s army at *Surat*; and ordered a complete battalion of Europeans, a company of artillery, and a battalion of Sepoys, to be held in readineſs to embark at a moment's warning. His Majeſty's ſhip *Sea Horſe* being here, we applied to Captain *Panton* for his aſſiſtance on this occaſion, and we have taken up the *Horſendor*, a country ſhip, as a tranſport; theſe two veſſels, which are all we have at preſent, will receive the battalion of Europeans and company of artillery, and ſail with them in five or ſix days at furtheſt, directly for *Surat*: the battalion of Sepoys we ſhall embark upon the *Besborough* and *Britannia*, which we underſtand may be hourly expected from *Bengal* on their way to *Bombay* or *Surat*; we ſhall alſo hold a battalion of Sepoys more in readineſs to the ſouthward, to embark from *Anjengo*, ſhould there be occaſion for them; and we have ſent directions to Colonel *Braithwaite* to forward the Europeans with him, by the firſt opportunity, to *Surat*, unleſs circumſtances ſhould have materially changed ſince he wrote laſt; that is to ſay, unleſs *Hyder* ſhould have openly taken ſuch a part in the attack of *Tellicherry* as to render it abſolutely neceſſary for the Europeans to act in its defence.

This exertion, we aſſure you, is the utmoſt we are capable of making in the critical ſituation of our affairs with *Hyder*, and it is ſuch, that ſhould a powerful invaſion take place, we muſt act entirely upon the defenſive, and look chiefly to the care of our garriſons; nevertheleſs, in the preſent ſtate of affairs on the other ſide of *India*, we conceive it to be our duty to ſacrifice much to promote the object of peace, and we hope and truſt that the conſiderable reinforcement we are ſending to General *Goddard*, may enable him to accompliſh it upon ſafe and honourable terms.

We are, &c.

(Signed) *Tho' Rumbold*, &c. Council.

Fort St. George,
31ſt December 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 256. A.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 24th February 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident;
Philip Francis, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent with the army.

READ the following letter from Bombay Secret Committee.

Gentlemen;

Having been fully engaged in a diſpatch of conſiderable length to the Honourable Company, it has prevented us ſending you an account of the reſult of Gen *Goddard*'s negociation, or the meaſures reſolved upon in conſequence; and which was the leſs material, as that gentleman acquainted us he had himſelf fully written on the ſubject; but a ſafe convevance now offering by ſea to *Anjengo*, we take the opportunity of tranſmitting by that route to *Madras*, copies at length of letters delivered to us by General *Goddard* during his continuance at *Bombay*: of a letter of inſtructions and credentials we delivered him on his departure to join the army; and of a ſubſequent correſpondence; which explain ſo fully our preſent political ſituation with reſpect to the Marattas, that it is needleſs to ſay any thing in addition, further than to confirm our aſſurances in the letter to General *Goddard* of the 3d inſtant, that we ſhall moſt zealouſly ſupport him in the vigorous proſecution of the war upon the principle therein laid down, though without any ſhare in the reſponſibility.

We have already in our letters of the 7th and 13th of October repreſented to you the reduced ſtate of our finances, and our preſſing demands for money. Since the month of September laſt, we have advanced General *Goddard* no leſs than ſix lacks of rupees; a moſt heavy deduction from our limited income, only made equal by ſupplies from your to our ſtated expences, and for which of courſe we muſt be proportionably unprovided. We were the more induced to make the laſt advance of two lacks, that he might not be under the neceſſity of taking up money at *Surat* for bills on your Government, which we were apprehenſive from your letter of the 14th October might be the means of defeating your endeavours to procure remittances both from the army and this Preſidency, and thereby adding to our preſent difficulties. In order to raiſe a fund for our immediate exigencies we have given directions for a loan being made at *Surat*, which the Chief acquaints us will not amount to more than five or ſix lacks of rupees; out of which, the beforementioned advance of two lacks is to be deducted, and with our ſmall ſtated receipts, the expences of this Preſidency, and alſo of the Madras detachment at *Tellicherry*, are to be defrayed till we receive ſupplies from you. We will not pretend to ſay what reſources we may find from the ſucceſs of the meaſures committed to General *Goddard*; but whatever future advantages they may produce, it would not be prudent to place much dependance upon them for any conſiderable immediate relief, and we therefore truſt you will have taken meaſures for ſending us our uſual ſupply hitherto received in part of this ſeaſon, and that you will make allowance alſo for the extraordinary demands we may be expoſed to in the preſent ſituation of affairs.

APPENDIX, No. 257. A.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 31ſt December 1779.

WE had the honour to addreſs you on the 30th of April by your ſhip, the *Royal Admiral*, and the ſame time tranſmitted a triplicate of our addreſs, dated the 27th of March, diſpatched to *England* expreſs by the *Betſy* ſnow. Appendix Nos. 256 & 257. A.

The moſt material political tranſaction communicated in the laſt mentioned addreſs, was our reſolution to the Governor General and Council, the determination of the meaſures to be purſued with reſpect to the Poonah Government, and to refer to their deciſion a plan propoſed to us by the Preſident for the line of conduct that appeared to him beſt adapted to our then circumſtances; a copy of which was tranſmitted by the *Royal Admiral*.—Juſt at the time this plan was laid before us, the letter was received from the Governor General and Council, dated the 8th February; and came at the ſame time under our conſideration at a meeting to which we had invited Colonel *Goddard*, who then laid before us credentials given him by thoſe gentlemen to act as their Miniſter at the Court of *Poonah*, on certain points independent of our controul; and alſo acquainted us, that as in the event of the failure of our plan for the reſtoration of *Rageba*, he was directed to reſume the negociation with *Moodajee Bouncello*, he ſhould forthwith take the neceſſary ſteps for that purpoſe; and requeſted that aſſurances might be given to the Rajah on our part of the full ſupport and concurrence of this Government, in any meaſures which might be concerted between them; which we accordingly complied with.

As our engaging in any meaſures hoſtile to the Poonah Government, might afford *Moodajee* a pretence for breaking off the negociation, if he was not ſeriouſly inclined to an alliance with the Company, and might interfere with the views of the Governor General and Council, with whom we were truly deſirous of acting in concert upon ſome ſettled and aſcertained plan; theſe were the conſiderations that impelled us to the above reſolution, and which we have judged it neceſſary to recapitulate in this addreſs, to preſerve connection in the account of our proceedings, in caſe our advices by the *Royal Admiral* ſhould have miſcarried.

We alſo in our ſaid addreſs ſtrongly recommended Colonel *Goddard* to your moſt favourable notice; and ſolicited ſome diſtinguiſhed mark of regard from you for his judicious and deciſive conduct in quitting the negociation with *Moodajee Bouncello*, and his ready determination of advancing to our aſſiſtance, as well as for the activity and military ſkill with which he conducted ſo difficult and dangerous a march through a country never before traverſed by the Company's troops.

Remaining therefore in expectation of directions from *Bengal* to fix our meaſures, we on the 20th of May received a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 5th of April, after advice had reached them, of the failure of the expedition; in which they acquainted us, that they had inveſted Colonel *Goddard* with full powers, as Miniſter of that Government, to treat with the Peiſhwa and Miniſters of the Maratta State for the renewal or confirmation of the treaty of *Poorunder*; provided they would recede from the pretenſions they had acquired by the late treaty at *Worgaum*, and would agree not to admit any French force to their dominions, nor allow that nation to form any eſtabliſhment on the Maratta coaſt; empowering him to conclude a treaty with them on thoſe conditions, the acceptance or refuſal of which was to determine the alternative of peace or war.

The Governor General and Council further ſignified to us, that their firſt object in this negociation was to obtain peace on honourable terms; and in the mean time they recommended to us to be prepared either for repelling any hoſtile attacks of the Marattas, or for any other ſervice which they might hereafter judge neceſſary; but they formally forbad us to undertake any offenſive meaſure, without explicit and poſitive orders from them.

Colonel *Goddard* commenced his negociation upon theſe

Appendix. No. 257. A.

theſe grounds; and we gave him every neceſſary information to aſſiſt him in the conduct of it, furniſhing him with extracts from your commands of the 7th of May, and a copy of thoſe of the 31ſt of Auguſt 1778. Before his negociation was brought to any point, a very unexpected circumſtance happened, which may produce very important effects on the political ſyſtem of this Preſidency.

Ragoba, ſince his ſeparation from our forces at *Tellagaum*, had remained under charge of *Mhadjee Scindia*; who, though deſirous of retaining poſſeſſion of his perſon for purpoſes of political advantage, treated him with every external mark of reſpect, and even left him his artillery and moſt of the forces he had brought with him from *Bombay*, to accompany him on the march to the place deſtined for his reception. *Scindia*'s Duan, with 4,000 horſe, was appointed to eſcort him; and his intention appears to have been to carry him into the diſtant provinces in his own direction and diſpoſal. In this ſcheme he was however baffled; for upon their arrival at the *Nerbedah*, and preparing to croſs that river, *Ragoba* found an opportunity of executing a plan, no doubt previouſly concerted, for his eſcape; and an action enſuing, which we are informed was commenced by *Scindia*'s horſe, upon ſome ſuſpicion of *Ragoba*'s deſign, *Scindia*'s troops were totally routed and diſperſed, and the Duan himſelf mortally wounded.

Ragoba, immediately after the action, made the beſt of his way to *Occlaſeer*, near *Broach*, with about three or four thouſand horſe and foot and his guns, to the number of twenty. After remaining there a ſhort time, he joined Colonel *Goddard*'s camp near *Surat*, the 15th of June, having previouſly requeſted permiſſion to come in, together with his family, and receive the protection of the camp; which the Colonel acquainted us he judged proper from political conſiderations, ſo far as it extended to their perſonal ſecurity, to grant him in the name of the Bengal Government, till he could receive their pleaſure regarding him.

The Governor General and Council were immediately adviſed of this event, by a veſſel diſpatched expreſs; but on the firſt intimation we received of *Ragoba*'s eſcape and deſign to put himſelf under our protection at *Surat*, we reſolved, in order that no ſtep on our part might tend to fruſtrate the negociation they had been pleaſed to commit to Colonel *Goddard*, to direct the Chief to deſire him to ſeek an aſylum in ſome other place; and we at the ſame time intimated, that as the Colonel muſt be the beſt judge how far the Company's taking *Ragoba* under protection, might interfere with the preſent views of the Governor General and Council, it would reſt with him to act in this point according to his own judgment; and he muſt be reſponſible for the conſequences. The execution however of this order was ſuperſeded by *Ragoba*'s making application in the firſt inſtance to Colonel *Goddard*; and he has ſince, at the Colonel's deſire, had a habitation aſſigned him in the city of *Surat*.

It was not till the 29th of Auguſt, that we received from the Governor General and Council their reply to the diſpatches ſent them by Mr. *Horſley*, relative to the failure of the late expedition and the plan propoſed by the Preſident. This was conveyed to us in a letter, dated the 14th of June; in the preamble of which they acquainted us they ſhould decline all review of our paſt proceedings, and confine themſelves to the choice of meaſures that appeared to them beſt calculated to retrieve our affairs.

Theſe meaſures, ſtriking at the very exiſtence of our rights, and the power eſpecially entruſted to us, and being in our opinion abſolutely inconſiſtent and incompatible with the avowed object of them, namely, peace with the Maratta Government, ſuperadded to their directions being conveyed in terms ſo intricate and liable to miſconſtruction, that it would be very difficult to give a faithful abſtract, make us deem it very material to ſend you a copy of it at full length by the preſent diſpatch.

Mr. *Horſley*, who was allowed acceſs to this letter before it was diſpatched from *Bengal*, ſet before the Governor General and Council, in a very able and maſterly manner, the general objections which lay againſt the extenſive powers they had conferred on General *Goddard*, as well as the particular parts of the letter which ſeemed likely to prove detrimental to the public ſervice; we have therefore accompanied this letter with a copy of Mr. *Horſley*'s on the ſubject, in which you will find he has diſtinguiſhed the powers of the two Governments with the utmoſt accuracy, and aſſerted our right with becoming ſpirit, and unanſwerable ſtrength of argument.

You may believe we felt moſt ſenſibly this invaſion upon the rights and powers immediately veſted in us by you, and thus illegally transferred to Brigadier General *Goddard*, on whom the Governor General and Council have thought proper to confer that rank for the ſervice on which he is now employed. Their charging him, to our entire excluſion, with the immediate intereſts of this Preſidency; with the power of making peace or war at his own choice; and with an army under his own independent command, to proſecute whatever meaſures he may think proper to adopt; are inſtances of delegated authority, both unconſtitutional, and in the higheſt degree injurious to the rights abſolutely inherent in us, under the ſubordination due to the Governor General and Council by Act of Parliament. This conduct is directly repugnant to the ſentiments you expreſſed on their interference with the rights of this Government, though in a much more limited degree, in the inſtance of Lieutenant Colonel *Upton:* and without intending the ſmalleſt reflection on General *Goddard*, but only as an obſervation naturally ariſing from the caſe itſelf, we muſt remark, that by their uniting in a military man, poſſeſſed of the uncontrolled command of an army, the charge of a negociation, the powers of making peace or war, and of conducting that war himſelf, and planning the operations in any manner he may think proper, they have formed a truſt of ſuch an oppoſite and diſſimilar nature, and ſo much at variance with profeſſional principles, that in the diſcharge of it a bias, though perhaps imperceptible to the agent, muſt prevail in favour of military meaſures; and that choice will the more juſtly excite ſurprize, as the Governor General and Council have repeatedly expreſſed, that their predominant wiſh is for peace; and that they look to the iſſue of this negociation, if it ſhall prove ſucceſsful, as their primary object, and the termination of all their political views, on this ſide of *India*.

We alſo obſerved with concern, as a circumſtance that muſt tend to the diſadvantage of your affairs, the little inclination manifeſted by the Governor General and Council, of acting on any terms of union or concert with us, which we had ſo anxiouſly wiſhed for, and in the hope of which, though the neceſſity was imminent, we had deferred fixing upon our meaſures, without their previous concurrence; but as we have had nothing in view but your intereſt, and the good of the ſervice, which muſt ſuffer injury in any conteſt between the two Governments, and eſpecially on points of ſuch a nature as our preſent cauſe of complaint, we came to a reſolution not to oppoſe the operation of their orders, or of General *Goddard*'s power, and to unite with him cordially and confidentially in the common cauſe, ſtill making reſervation of our rights thus violently infringed, and declaring them not to be conſidered as in the ſmalleſt degree impaired or injured by our conceſſion in this inſtance.

We flatter ourſelves you will approve the reſolution we have taken, conſidering our circumſtances, and the bad conſequences that muſt have followed from an oppoſition to General *Goddard*'s powers; between which and the line of conduct we have taken, there appeared no alternative. The confuſion an oppoſite conduct muſt have produced, ſo raſhly hazarded by the Governor General and Council, will we truſt be a ſtrong recommendation

commendation of the moderation we have ſhewn, and evince our diſpoſition to contribute our beſt ſervices for the advancement of your intereſt, even to the injury of our own rights and privileges; but at the ſame time that we make this ſacrifice to the public ſervice, we look up to your juſtice and authority to reinſtate us in the free exerciſe of the powers conſtitutionally inherent in us, and to prevent all future infringements of them, which alone can reſtore to this Government the weight and conſequence of which it has been ſo unjuſtly and impolitically deprived, or enable your delegates here to carry on your affairs with any degree of honour to themſelves, or advantage to the Company.

Though any diſtinction that could, with propriety, have been conferred on General *Goddard* would have given us pleaſure, and we had recommended him to the Governor General and Council for ſome mark of their favour, we could have no idea of their rewarding him at the expence of the rights of this Government, by giving him a local rank, confined to the proper ſphere of our own juriſdiction. It requires no arguments to prove, that they have no right to grant ſuch a commiſſion, the validity of which we are apprehenſive might be diſputed, in caſe of the arrival of any officers, ſuperior in rank to General *Goddard*'s ſtanding upon the Bengal eſtabliſhment; and as there would be no poſſible doubt but that officer, with his former rank, and in the ſtation he held, would have been intruſted with the chief command of the army in the event of a Maratta war, had the option of ſhewing him this mark of confidence been left to us, and we had it not even in our power to ſuperſede him in the command, had we been ſo inclined; their conferring ſuch an appointment appears therefore quite inexpedient, and an unneceſſary uſurpation of power, unſupported by any legal authority veſted in the Governor General and Council.

Thoſe gentlemen in a ſubſequent letter, dated the 8th of July, acquainted us that they have entirely approved the protection granted to *Ragoba*, and that they have directed General *Goddard* to continue to afford it to him ſo long as he ſhall demand it; provided he ſhall not forfeit his right to it by any act of infidelity, or attempt to defeat the effect of the negociation to which General *Goddard* was to give his entire attention: without regard to any other conſideration for the reſt, they left him to act under their inſtructions of the 5th of April, in which they ſaw no cauſe to make any alteration on account of that event.

To give you an idea of our political ſituation with reſpect to the Marattas, we muſt principally take our accounts from General *Goddard*'s letters, as no degree of agency being left to us, we can give you no direct account from ourſelves. The firſt information of any conſequence relative to his negociation was contained in a letter, dated the 10th of September at the camp near *Surat*, from whence he carried it on, in which he acquainted us, that his propoſals were communicated to the Miniſter by letters diſpatched expreſs the 19th of Auguſt; but from what cauſe he knew not, either a ſtudied delay on his part, or by reaſon of ſome diſturbances on the road, no anſwer had been received. That to obviate as much as poſſible any further inconvenience from delay, he had diſpatched the Aſſiſtant to the Maratta Vackeel, who attended him, expreſs to *Poonah*, with the terms on which he was authorized to conclude a peace, and had limited his return to twenty days, which he had faithfully promiſed to do.

He inferred from this account the uncertainty of the event of his negociation; and obſerved, as he had reaſon to apprehend, (notwithſtanding his poſitive declarations he would never conſent to grant any) that the Miniſter would demand ſome conſiderable conceſſions on our part, in return for their ſacrificing all claims derived from the convention of *Worgaum*, it was a very probable circumſtance that we might be compelled to take up arms. At the ſame time he remarked, that he had hitherto received nothing from the Miniſter, but the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of friendſhip for the Engliſh, and that the profeſſion of his emiſſary promiſed only the moſt favourable iſſue to the negociation. Appendix No. 257. A.

You will doubtleſs obſerve, that when we have mentioned the Poonah Adminiſtration with any relation to perſon, we have made uſe of the ſingular number, the reaſon of which is, that *Nannah Furneeſe* is at preſent the ſole Miniſter, *Sacaram Bappoo* being, as we underſtood, under confinement through his means.

General *Goddard* in the ſame letter writes: "Should "however a war become neceſſary, the ſeaſon is ſo far "advanced, and ſo little time can hereafter be ſpared "for deliberation, that it will be expedient to conſult "and to determine upon ſome plan of operations as "early as can be done with convenience." He alſo aſſured us of his zeal and readineſs to promote any views he might have formed for the honour and intereſt of the Company in general, or the particular advantage of this ſettlement; and requeſted we would communicate ſuch parts of them as we might judge proper at that time, that he might be fully prepared to aſſiſt and co-operate in their accompliſhment.

He accompanied this letter with indents for ſtores of all kinds to complete the army for ſervice, which we immediately furniſhed from our own magazines.

In our anſwer we acquainted him, that if he found his negociation likely to break off, we were of opinion it would be more adviſable for him to come down to *Bombay* to conſult with us reſpecting the plan of operations in ſuch caſe to be purſued, and which would thereby be determined with more expedition and accuracy than by letter. In the mean time we ſent for his conſideration a copy of the Preſident's minute of the 30th of March; obſerving only to him, that that plan was concerted without any relation to *Ragoba*, who was then in the power of *Mhadjee Scindia*.

At this period we received a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated 2d of Auguſt, acquainting us, that from accounts lately received of the ſtrength of the French at the *Mauritius*, they had great reaſon to apprehend an attempt was intended againſt this ſettlement; they therefore deemed it of the utmoſt importance to provide for its ſafety, by reinforcing the army under General *Goddard* with a reſpectable addition of troops, and ſhould direct him to be prepared for the expected event, and to make it his firſt object to afford us the moſt effectual ſupport and protection in his power.

That the Commander in Chief had informed them, one battalion of Europeans, three battalions of Sepoys, and 50 artillery, might be ſpared from the Madras eſtabliſhment; and that we could likewiſe contribute 300 Europeans, two battalions of Sepoys, and 100 artillery, for that ſervice, without any inconvenience or diſtreſs to the garriſon; they had therefore written on the ſubject to the Select Committee at *Madras*, and they earneſtly recommended it to us to iſſue immediate orders for our quota to be aſſembled to join General *Goddard* at ſuch place of rendezvous as might be appointed, without delay.

General *Goddard*, immediately after this information reached him, acquainted us under the 29th of September, that in his opinion, *Surat* was the moſt eligible rendezvous for the army; and requeſted that veſſels might be inſtantly diſpatched to bring up the troops from *Mahé*, which were to compoſe part of the quota to be furniſhed from *Madras*; and that our quota might be in readineſs to join him whenever it might be judged expedient from circumſtances to put them in motion.

In the ſame letter he acquainted us he had not received any advices from the Maratta agent he had diſpatched to *Poonah*; but would as ſoon as poſſible adviſe us of the reſult of his journey.

We will not enlarge upon the inconſiſtency of detaching any part of our garriſon to join General *Goddard*'s army at *Surat*, for the avowed purpoſe of protecting this iſland

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from invaſion, but proceed to acquaint you, that in his next letter, dated the day after the one laſt noticed, and received at the ſame time, he related a material piece of intelligence he had juſt received from *Poonah*, which he ſaid he had reaſon to believe might be relied on; the particulars of which were, that the Miniſter and *Scindia*, in conjunction with *Hyder Ally*, *Nizam Ally*, and *Moodajee Bouncello*, meant to make a general attack upon the *Engliſh*, at their ſeveral ſettlements, and had entered into formal agreements for that purpoſe.

General *Goddard* further obſerved, that however the probability of their executing literally a plan of ſuch extent might be ſuſpected, he could then ſcarce entertain a doubt of the hoſtile views of the Miniſter; and ſtrongly repreſented the neceſſity of having the army put into a condition for inſtant and active ſervice, by collecting ſuch a force as might be ſufficient to attack or to reſiſt the attacks of the enemy. For theſe reaſons, he again urged the expediency of bringing up the troops from *Mahé*; and propoſed, that the detachment from this Preſidency ſhould be ordered to join the army immediately.

In conſequence of this requiſition, and intelligence of the hoſtile intentions of the Miniſter, we reſolved to diſpatch with the utmoſt expedition a ſufficient number of veſſels to bring up the forces and ſtores from *Mahé*; the fortifications of which were nearly demoliſhed, except ſome few works for the mere protection of the garriſon; but at that time (being the 6th of October) we did not judge it prudent to detach any part of our garriſon, until the ſeaſon might be ſo far advanced, as to put it out of the power of our enemy's fleets to come upon us by ſurprize, which would be the caſe by the time the troops might arrive from *Mahé*, and in the interval our preparations would be in forwardneſs.

Our veſſels ſailed from *Mahé* the 17th of October, and on the 22d, we received a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 14th of September, in which they acquainted us, that as it was poſſible the Poonah Government might have found means to protract the negociation, and as in that caſe they would have had full time for deliberation, if they were at all inclined to eſtabliſh an amicable connection, they had therefore ſent injunctions to General *Goddard*, to repeat their offers to the Durbar, and to demand their definitive anſwer within the ſpace of twenty-four hours, declaring their refuſal or delay beyond that time to be equivalent to a declaration of war, and that he would act accordingly.

If General *Goddard* ſhould be reduced to this extremity, they recommended to us to grant him every aid in our power, and to endeavour by every means that might be neceſſary, to render his ſucceſs ſpeedy and effectual.

Theſe orders reaching General *Goddard* before they arrived with us, we on the 29th received a letter from him, acquainting us, that in conſequence thereof he had declared to the Maratta Vackeel in his camp, the ſuſpicions he could not but entertain of the hoſtile intentions of his maſter, from the delay that had unneceſſarily aroſe, in ſending an anſwer to the propoſals ſo long before tranſmitted to him, to which an anſwer had been faithfully promiſed in twenty days; that twice that period was then elapſed, and the Vackeel had repeatedly amuſed him with accounts of the agent before mentioned to have been ſent to *Poonah*, having received his diſmiſſion—it appeared from his own acknowledgments, he had not then ſet out, and would not in all probability leave *Poonah* till ſome time after: he had however declared to the Vackeel, that notwithſtanding theſe circumſtances of ſuſpicion, the Engliſh were ſtill ready to ſhew their ſincere inclination for peace, and that therefore he would wait fifteen days more; in which time an anſwer might be received from *Poonah*, to a letter the Vackeel would that inſtant diſpatch; at the expiration of which period, if the agent did not arrive, or a ſatisfactory anſwer to the propoſals tranſmitted by him, he ſhould conſider the delay as a declaration of war, and act accordingly. This paſſed the 18th of October, and the limited term was to expire the 3d of November.

We beheld with concern matters verging ſo cloſe to a rupture, when we were ſo little in a condition to meet the war: our treaſury was very low; we had no adequate reſources; nor had the Governor General and Council given us any aſſurances of aſſiſtance of money from *Bengal*; General *Goddard* had ſhortly before drawn four lacks from the Surat treaſury, which was the utmoſt we could ſpare; and we had juſt received advice by private letters, of the loſs of the *Stafford* in *Bengal* river, with a conſiderable ſum for the ſervice of his army; we had no reaſonable expectation of the arrival of the fleet in *India* before the month of January, an event which would diffuſe ſtrength to all your ſettlements, and give confidence to our meaſures; nor could we expect till then to receive the quota of troops from *Madras*, that Preſidency having, as we learnt from private advices, ſent an army into the field under Colonel *Harper*; the object of which, having no information from them, we do not underſtand, but have heard it was with an intention to take poſſeſſion of *Guntoor*, ceded by *Bazalet Jung*, in which he had been oppoſed by an officer of *Hyder Ally*'s, ſtationed at *Cuddapa*, lately ſubdued by him; and that they were on very doubtful terms with that Nabob. Colonel *Braithwaite* likewiſe did not ſeem to intend to join the army with the forces from *Mahé*, until he received orders from *Madras*; and we further knew from undoubted authority, though not directly from the Governor General and Council, that a ſtrong detachment, conſiſting of 49 artillery, 2,000 Sepoys, and 750 horſe, was to march from the Bengal provinces under the command of Captain *Popham*, the ſafety of which might be put to extreme hazard by an immediate rupture with the Marattas: all which conſiderations, and the time it muſt neceſſarily take up before the different bodies of troops that were to compoſe the army could be collected and put in a condition to act offenſively, made us clearly of opinion, that it was right policy to endeavour to gain time, and to protract the criſis which a literal execution of the orders from *Bengal* muſt immediately produce; we therefore on the ſame day, the 29th October, diſpatched a letter to General *Goddard*, ſtating the above reaſons, and ſtrongly recommending to him, if the Miniſter did not accede to the offered terms, not to make any immediate declaration, but according to their own policy, to procraſtinate and protract, till we were in a better condition for an active war, if a rupture ſhould at laſt be found inevitable.

Before our letter could reach *Surat*, General *Goddard* himſelf arrived here in a gallivat on the 1ſt of November, and perſonally acquainted us, that before any anſwer could arrive from *Poonah* to the declaration he had made to the Maratta Vackeel, in conſequence of the laſt order from the Governor General and Council, the agent formerly diſpatched thither with his terms, as mentioned in the 19th paragraph, had returned with letters from the Peiſhwa and the Miniſter, the purport of which was ſimply to acknowledge the receipt of his propoſals, and to refer him to the agent for an anſwer, as being fully inſtructed and informed with their determination, which he would communicate.

That in a conference with the agent on the ſubject he had in anſwer to the propoſals made to the Durbar, plainly declared, that the Miniſter would not make peace with the Engliſh, unleſs *Salſette* was relinquiſhed, and the perſon of *Ragonaut Row* delivered up: that upon theſe conditions, and theſe only, he was ready to agree to the propoſals that had been ſent to him; and declared in the moſt pointed terms, that unleſs they were agreed to, there was no further occaſion for negociation.

General *Goddard* gave the Vackeel his diſmiſſion the next day, and immediately embarked for *Bombay*, to conſult with us upon the meaſures to be purſued. He gave us his ſentiments very fully on the ſubject, ſtrongly

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urging vigorous and deciſive meaſures; and the Preſident alſo propoſed to us, a plan of conduct to be obſerved in our preſent circumſtances, on which we ſeverally gave our opinions; but as a detail of particulars would lead us to a length much beyond the limits of an over-land addreſs, we ſhall, as moſt material, adviſe you only of the reſult of our deliberations, and of the meaſures finally determined.

From the above ſtate of the caſe, and the military preparations we learnt from all quarters were making at *Poonah*, we were of opinion, that a war with the Marattas was inevitable, and that it would become our duty to afford our utmoſt aſſiſtance to carry it on with vigour, when no longer to be avoided; of which we were neither competent judges, nor able in any manner to controul the event; the negociation, as well as all powers relative to peace and war, being taken off our hands: but without entering into any queſtion of neceſſity or good policy, we judged it neceſſary to mark it clearly on our proceedings; and we requeſt it may be fully underſtood, that the war now impending is not a meaſure of the Select Committee of *Bombay*; and that whether it is approved or condemned, we do not conſider ourſelves as reſponſible either for the meaſure itſelf, or the ſucceſs which may attend it. Our reaſons for this poſition are founded on the principle, that as the negociation was carried on under the ſeparate and diſtinct inſtructions of the Governor General and Council, who have expreſsly acquainted us, that the principal reſponſibility will reſt with them; and as General *Goddard* is in conſequence made reſponſible to them for his conduct in the operations of the war, we ſhould be wanting in juſtice to ourſelves, if we did not diſclaim all reſponſibility both as to the meaſure of the war itſelf, which is the iſſue of that negociation, as well as the ſucceſs of it when commenced; the officer entruſted with the execution being reſponſible to another Power. We are alſo of opinion, that after thus diſclaiming all reſponſibility, whatever we might have to offer to General *Goddard* in the courſe of ſervice, could only amount to advice or recommendation; neither were we warranted by the Governor General and Council to give him direct orders for his conduct; ſince according to the reſpective powers now held by this Committee and General *Goddard*, any orders we might give are no further binding than according to his own conſtruction of them; and that it would therefore be ineffectual, and needleſsly hazarding our own conſequence to aſſume any ſuch power.

The grounds upon which we ſhall act being thus aſcertained, and which we clearly explained to General *Goddard*, we beg leave to aſſure you, that according to our duty to the Company, and from motives of juſtice and honour, with reſpect to the Bengal Government, we ſhall contribute our aſſiſtance moſt zealouſly and cordially to bring the war to a ſpeedy and advantageous concluſion, both with the forces of this Preſidency and the beſt advices and information in our power to give to General *Goddard*.

In order to make his army as reſpectable as poſſible, we immediately, upon the General's acquainting us of the negociation being broken off, ſent a poſitive requiſition to Colonel *Braithwaite* to embark the forces at *Mahé*, upon the veſſel ſent down to receive them, and to join the army at *Surat* without delay; making him reſponſible for the conſequences of a non-compliance: and we determine forthwith to complete the artillery detachment to 100 men, and further to reinforce the army with a body of 200 European infantry and two battalions of Sepoys, one of which conſiſted of drafted grenadiers, which force we put under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, and was the utmoſt our eſtabliſhment could afford at this time; they were ſent up to *Surat* as we could procure conveyances, the laſt embarkation accompanying General *Goddard*, who on the 3d inſtant proceeded on the *Revenge* to join the army, when we delivered him a letter of advice for his conduct, the heads of which were as follow:

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We repeated our reaſons before-mentioned, for thinking it more adviſable to endeavour to gain time, and to protract any farther declaration or any acts of hoſtility, provided the motions of the enemy would in prudence permit; and we again ſtrongly recommended to him, to obſerve temporizing meaſures for the preſent; but we likewiſe obſerved, that if after conſideration of our reaſons he ſhould judge it eligible or neceſſary to enter upon immediate action, the determination muſt reſt with him, as we by no means intended to lay any reſtraint upon him, but only to offer him the advice in our opinion moſt ſuitable to preſent circumſtances.

Whenever the objections now exiſting might be removed, and circumſtances might become ſufficiently favourable for commencing operations, our ſentiments then entirely coincided with General *Goddard*'s upon the plan of action to be purſued; this will be to ſecure a country and revenue capable of affording an extenſive field of ſupply for the exigencies of the war, and we hope for the future emolument of the Company; and the Preſident's plan of the 30th of March, ſtriking us both in this light, and General *Goddard* aſſuring us his force was fully equal to the undertaking, we have recommended to him, as his firſt object to carry it into execution, ſo far as relates to the reduction of the Maratta poſſeſſions adjoining to *Surat* and *Broach*, and the ſettlement of the Guzerat province, in concert with *Futty Sing*.

We however deſired him to loſe no time in commencing a negociation with *Futty Sing*, and to endeavour to convince him of the advantage which will enſue to him from uniting with us in the ſettlement of the province upon the propoſed plan; recommending ſtrongly to the General to uſe his utmoſt addreſs to bring this point to bear, by an amicable compromiſe rather than by an exertion of force.

For this purpoſe, we deſired him to explain clearly to *Futty Sing*, that no injury was meant to him, but only to take into the Company's hands the Poonah ſhare of the revenues held in participation with him, and thereby to diſtreſs our enemies with whom we are at war; but that it is our wiſh to be on the moſt friendly terms with him; and that General *Goddard* was fully empowered to treat with him for an amicable and equitable ſettlement, upon terms of mutual advantage and ſecurity to him from all future dependance on the Poonah Government, or ground for diſpute with the Company.

The grounds of the engagement to be formed with *Futty Sing* will be our ſupporting and defending him in poſſeſſion of his ſhare of the Guzerat province independant of the Poonah Government, and his engaging to ſupport the Company in the ſhare now held by that Government. To make this ſettlement as convenient as poſſible, and to avoid the continual differences which muſt ariſe from both parties having an intereſt in the ſame places, it will be propoſed to *Futty Sing* to make an abſolute and ſpecific partition of territory, according to the proportion of the revenues now reſpectively held by him and the Marattas, and each party to have the diſtinct and ſole government and poſſeſſion of the ſhare which may be allotted to them in the new ſettlement.

The propoſed mode of partition is to put *Futty Sing* in poſſeſſion of, and guarantee to him, the Maratta poſſeſſions to the northward of the river *Mahie*, and for him to make over to the Company the Guicawar diviſion of the countries ſouth of the *Tappy*, their ſhare in the revenues of *Surat*, and ſuch other lands as may nearly make up an equivalent to the countries to be guaranteed as above to *Futty Sing*. When a ſettlement is made on theſe terms, and the Maratta garriſons expelled, the Honourable Company will receive poſſeſſion of the diſtricts anciently annexed to *Surat*, and particularized in an account entered in the Select Committee's diary, under the 6th May 1772.

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It is alſo to be ſtipulated with *Futty Sing*, that we will ſupport him in withholding the tribute of 27 lacks per annum, which he now pays to the Poonah Circar for his Jaghires in *Guzerat*, until a final treaty is concluded between the Company and that Government, and that his intereſts will be carefully attended to therein, if he cordially unites in the propoſed ſettlement.

Theſe are the general outlines of the intended ſettlement; beſides which, we recommended as leſſer points to General *Goddard* to attend to the intereſt of the Nabob of *Cambay* and *Govind Row*, ſo far as he could, conſiſtently with the inſtructions from the Governor General and Council, dated the 14th of June, and alſo to ſtipulate with *Futty Sing* for the ceſſion of ſome few villages he ſtill retains in the Broach Pergunnah, and of another diſtrict adjoining thereto.

Whenever it ſhall be determined no longer to obſerve temporizing meaſures, General *Goddard* will proceed in the reduction of the Maratta poſſeſſions adjoining to *Surat*, and the Pergunnahs between the *Myhie* and the *Tappy*, comprehending the country in *Guzerat*, ceded to the Company by the treaty with *Ragoba*, taking care not to moleſt the Guicawars cheties and collectors, in their ſeveral ſtations. The object of his future operations will be determined by the reſult of his negociation with *Futty Sing*, whom we moſt ardently wiſh he may be able to detach from his connection with the Poonah Government, and to fix him in an alliance with the Company, which will be attended with the grand advantages of giving ſecurity to your northern poſſeſſions, and depriving the enemy of the aſſiſtance of a powerful ally.

Another moſt powerful recommendation of the propoſed plan, is the neceſſity of continuing the army in the Guzerat province, until a junction is effected with Captain *Popham*'s detachment, which we learn is to march by the way of *Agra* and *Azmere* to *Amedavad*; and we hope before hoſtilities are commenced, will have made conſiderable progreſs, ſo as to be rendered ſubſervient to the execution of the plan by the reduction of the countries to the northward of the *Myhie*, which are to be guaranteed to *Futty Sing*, while the poſition of the army under General *Goddard* will facilitate their approach, and take up the chief part of the enemy's attention: we have yet no accounts of the ſituation or motions of that detachment.

The line of conduct to be purſued reſpecting *Ragoba* was likewiſe ſeriouſly conſidered, when we concurred with a recommendation from General *Goddard*, not to enter into any poſitive engagement with him at preſent, or appear as the avowed ſupporters of his pretenſions, but to look forward to his reſtoration at ſome future period when circumſtances may be more favourable. General *Goddard* will however hold out to him the hopes of firmly eſtabliſhing him in the Government of the Maratta State, as our grand and ultimate object, and we hope will be able to reconcile him to the ſyſtem we have adopted, by repreſenting to him in its true light how indiſpenſable it is for us to ſecure ſome firm and ſolid eſtabliſhment of territorial poſſeſſion and revenue, before we ſhall be in a condition to proſecute any other plan more immediately tending to his advancement.

General *Goddard* acquainted us that he had found *Madjee Scindia* ſo averſe to any accommodation, and ſo much inclined to hoſtile meaſures, that he did not think proper to commit the honour of the Company, by making any overtures to him, according to the inſtructions from the Governor General and Council.

You have now before you the ſtate of matters when General *Goddard* left *Bombay*; and we have the ſatisfaction to acquaint you that we received his warmeſt acknowledgments for the ready ſupport and aſſiſtance afforded him by this Government, and the harmony and good underſtanding mutually obſerved in our deliberations, from which he drew the happieſt omens of ſucceſs, nor ſhould we omit to acquaint you that he at the ſame time gave us notice of his having received advice of ten lacks of rupees being remitted from *Bengal* for his army, half in ſpecie and half in bills, and a packet containing bills has been lately forwarded to him, but we know not to what amount.

Your affairs at *Tellicherry* are in a diſagreeable ſituation, and particularly embarraſſing to us at this juncture. The Prince of *Cherrika*, of whoſe unfavourable diſpoſition to the Honourable Company repeated mention has been made in our late advices, has at length in conjunction with the young King of *Cartenaddue*, openly commenced hoſtilities, and entered Tellicherry diſtricts with a conſiderable force. The enemy had poſſeſſed themſelves of ſome adjoining hills, in conſequence of which, the Reſident and factors thought it neceſſary, on the 1ſt ultimo, to deliver over the keys of the fort to the commanding officer, and to leave to his direction the meaſures for repulſing the enemy, who, though they appeared numerous, your ſervants acquainted us they were not under any apprehenſions for the ſafety of the fort or your property.

Several ſkirmiſhes and attacks of poſts happened in the month of November, and the enemy gained ſome ground, when our officers finding *Tellicherry* garriſoned, not equal to the taſk of diſlodging the enemy, made application to Colonel *Braithwaite*, who accordingly, after completing the deſtruction of *Mahé*, brought in his whole force and took upon him the command of the fort the 1ſt inſtant.

It is not material at this time to enter fully into the cauſes which may have induced theſe Malabars to act in this hoſtile manner, but Colonel *Braithwaite* is ſtrongly of opinion their conduct is principally influenced by *Hyder Ally*, and he even expects they will be joined by a body of the Nabob's troops which had taken poſſeſſion of the ruins of *Mahé*, it is ſaid with an intention to fortify it again. A more confidential communication on the part of the gentlemen at *Madras* would enable us to form a better judgment of the foundation of Colonel *Braithwaite*'s opinion; but we, however, have the ſtrongeſt hopes the reſpectable force now in *Tellicherry*, will be able effectually to defeat and diſlodge the enemy, and Colonel *Braithwaite* has aſſured us his moſt active efforts will be exerted for that purpoſe. The Preſident has likewiſe written to *Hyder Ally*, and we hope by his anſwer to be able to judge with ſome certainty of his intention. This event has delayed the junction of the forces from *Mahé* with General *Goddard*'s army, but the veſſels have brought up to *Bombay* the ordnance and ſtores taken there. We have no advice from the gentlemen at *Madras* reſpecting the remainder of the quota they were deſired by the Governor General and Council to furniſh for the army under General *Goddard*; and we only learn from Colonel *Braithwaite*, that they had directed the Europeans of his detachment, conſiſting of one company of artillery, and one of infantry, in the whole not 100 men, to be ſent up to the army with one battalion of Sepoys.

Monſieur *Picot*, late Chief of *Mahé*, having requeſted our permiſſion to take paſſage to *Europe* in a Portugueze ſhip bound from *Goa* to *Liſbon*, we conſented thereto, as there was no probability of a ſhip being diſpatched from this place for ſome time, and the charge of ſupporting him and his ſuite would thereby be put an end to; we allowed him 12,000 rupees for the whole expence to be incurred on that account, and took his parole to return to *France* according to his capitulation. We were afterwards acquainted by Mr. *Briſtow* with the directions he was commiſſioned by the Deputy Chairman to ſend to the different Preſidencies reſpecting the return of French priſoners, which we ſhall duly obſerve.

The only letter we have received from General *Goddard* ſince his arrival at *Surat*, is dated the 15th inſtant, in which he acquainted us, that having made every neceſſary arrangement, he expected ſoon to inform us of

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the troops being in motion; that he had opened the negociation with *Futty Sing*, and communicated his propoſals, to which he expected an anſwer in a few days, though as the ſucceſs thereof would rather be advanced than retarded by the movement of the forces, he ſhould not remain inactive on account of any delay in *Futty Sing*, but enter upon military operations whenever circumſtances might render it convenient, obſerving the moſt ſcrupulous attention to the preſervation of the country belonging to the Guicawars.

The General being very preſſing for a further ſupply of money till his remittances arrive from *Bengal*, which the Governor General and Council acquaint us under the 14th of October, they ſhould find means to furniſh without allowing him to draw upon them, we agreed to advance him two lacks more out of a loan of five to ſix lacks we had been under a neceſſity of empowering the Chief of *Surat* to raiſe there for our own immediate expences; and having applied on this occaſion to the Nabob, the ſum offered by him was ſo trifling, that we did not think it proper to accept it.

By letters from *Tellicherry* of the 20th inſtant, we do not find Colonel *Braithwaite* had taken any ſteps for diſlodging the enemy, but had been engaged in a long correſpondence with your ſervants. Major *Cotgrave* had juſt arrived from *Madras* to relieve him in the command.

APPENDIX, No. 258. A.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors in their Public Department; dated the 14th January 1779.

THE drafts made upon us by General *Goddard* ſince his arrival at *Surat*, have amounted to ſicca rupees 32,49,090. 7. 1.; beſides which, we have ſupplied him by bills 5 lacks, in ſpecie by the *Britannia* 8 lacks, and by the *Besborough* 2 lacks.

The great diſadvantage ſuffered by the Company in the low rate of exchange obtained by General *Goddard* for his bills, ſome of which were drawn at 93, and none higher than 95, Surat rupees for 100 Calcutta ſiccas, induced us to put a ſtop to his power of drawing; and to adopt the remittance of bullion, as a preſent mode of ſupply, which may enable us to bring back the exchange ſomewhat nearer to its original ſtandard.

The united demands upon us from *Bombay*, General *Goddard*, and the different offices here, for the neceſſary charges of our own eſtabliſhments, added to the total loſs of 5 lacks in the *Stafford*, have ſo far dried up our immediate reſources, that we have been obliged to refuſe any further compliance with the application of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* for caſh, and to excuſe ourſelves from ſending the balance, being 5 lacks, which remained to complete the ſupply of 15 lacks promiſed to them in March laſt.

APPENDIX, No. 259. B.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors; dated the 3d March 1780.

Par. 16. WE find by letters received from General *Goddard*, ſince his return to the command of the army at *Surat*, that the plan which he has adopted with the concurrence and aſſiſtance of the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, is to open a negociation, and conclude a treaty of alliance and ſupport with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, to engage him in which he is to be rendered independent of the Poonah Government, and the Guzerat country is to be divided with him, the Company retaining that ſhare of the revenue now paid to the Marattas, and releaſing *Futty Sing*'s proportion from all the claims formerly made upon it; there being no object either to invite or juſtify an immediate attempt on the capital itſelf, the ſucceſs of which, though more ſplendid, would be acquired with greater hazard, and yield no ſubſtantial advantage, nor ſo near a proſpect of terminating the war, as the plan which has been adopted. Appendix. No. 258. A. No. 259. B.

17. In conformity to this plan, offers were tranſmitted by General *Goddard* to *Futty Sing*; but whether from doubt of their ſincerity, or dread of the reſentment of the Maratta Chiefs, he endeavoured to protract or avoid any determination upon them, by evading to acknowledge the receipt of them in letters which he afterwards wrote to General *Goddard*; as the ſubject of thoſe letters was confined barely to profeſſions of friendſhip and attachment which he bore towards the Engliſh.

18. Thus ſituated, General *Goddard* thought it adviſable to force him to an immediate declaration of his intentions, by marching the Engliſh army directly towards *Broderà* his capital. The troops have accordingly croſſed the *Tappy*, and were under march on the 1ſt January to the northward.

19. In the preſent plan of operations, *Ragoba* is excluded from any poſitive ſhare in the ſucceſs of the war: he has been informed, that the revenue which will be collected from *Guzerat* is a neceſſary fund for the ſupport of the army which may hereafter be employed to further his views in the Maratta Government, when a party ſhall have been made ſufficiently ſtrong to enable him to purſue them with advantage. In the mean while, being drawn into the preſent war as principals, we have reſolved to act as ſuch, and ſupport it ourſelves; allowing *Ragoba* no direct participation in the conqueſts which may reſult from it. On this principle we have forbid General *Goddard* to enter into any engagement with him whatſoever, or to ſuffer him to become chargeable on the Company, but to confine his connection with him to perſonal protection only. This will leave us at liberty to purſue ſuch line of conduct with regard to him as may hereafter be thought expedient. General *Goddard* himſelf, before he could have received our final orders, had cautiouſly avoided any participation of intereſts with him, and reſerved an opening to adopt any other meaſures that might be reſolved on; but we are ſorry to ſay, that ſuch an univerſal indiſpoſition ſeems to prevail towards *Ragoba*, either from the character which he bears, or the ſuppoſed conſequence of his pretenſions, that we muſt fear an open declaration in his favour would only multiply our enemies, and draw upon us the oppoſition of perſons naturally averſe to his intereſts, who might not otherwiſe interfere in our diſputes with the Marattas; a nearer alliance with him would therefore, we apprehend, be detrimental to our views and burthenſome to the Company.

20. General *Goddard* has been reinforced by a detachment from *Bombay*, conſiſting of

100 Europeans artillery,
1 Battalion Sepoys,
1 Ditto drafted grenadier Sepoys.

21. The troops expected from *Mahé* had been prevented from joining him by diſturbances within the limits of the Company's territory at *Tellicherry*, which required their immediate preſence and aſſiſtance, and obliged Colonel *Braithwaite* to repair to and take the command of that garriſon, in order to prevent his being attacked by the Nairs, ſubject to the Prince of *Cherickee*, with whom the Company's troops ſtationed at *Tellicherry*, had previouſly had ſome ſkirmiſhes, in ſupport, as Colonel *Braithwaite* writes, of the protection given by that factory to the King of *Cartinada*, who is at variance with the other Chief, and has an army drawn out to oppoſe him.

22. The Preſident and Select Committee, on hearing that the force intended for the ſuccour of General *Goddard* was thus diverted from its deſtination, reſolved to grant him a military aid immediately, from their own

Appendix. No. 251. B.

eſtabliſhment, and ordered 1 battalion of Europeans, 1 company of artillery, and 1 battalion of Sepoys, to be embarked without delay for *Surat*, and 1 battalion of Sepoys more to be in readineſs at *Anjengo*, if their ſervices ſhall hereafter be required.

23. The Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* likewiſe inform us, that they have ordered Colonel *Braithwaite* to ſend the Europeans under his command to join General *Goddard*, unleſs *Hyder Ally* ſhall have taken part in the diſputes of his tributary dependants, and conſequently given orders for hoſtilities to be committed on the Company's factory at *Tellicherry*.

24. General *Goddard*, expecting to receive a reinforcement of the Madras troops, has mentioned his intention of keeping open the communication for a junction with his army, to be formed by the way of *Surat*.

25. He likewiſe mentions, that the collections of the countries adjoining to *Surat* and *Broach*, over which the power of his arms extended, had been delivered to the charge of the Company's civil ſervants there, and that the people appeared to be very well ſatisfied with their change of maſters.'

APPENDIX, No. 251. B.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

From *Moodajee Bhoſila*; received 19th January 1780.

THE letters and numberleſs meſſages which have paſſed between us in the courſe of one year, cannot be conſidered as ſimple letters of compliment and friendſhip; but every letter may be looked upon as a record, ſince they have contained remarks on the acts of Government, and every affair both the moſt inconſiderable and of the greateſt conſequence; the declining and adopting every deſign; and the pointing out with caution and foreſight conditions in every affair which required prudence and circumſpection; together with your ſtrict attention to truth, which has never admitted of the ſmalleſt deviation; and your impartial juſtice, before which, from the reſolute firmneſs of your mind, the weighty mountain and the light ſtraw are of equal balance; and repeated remarks of the affairs of *Bengal*, which muſt all have certainly been underſtood by you.

Of three of your letters, containing the whole of your deſigns and the ſituation of your quarter, one on your apprehenſions from the reception of a French Vackeel in the territories of *Pundit Purdhaun*, and your having no confidence in his actions and thoſe of the rulers of *Poonah*; on your deſire in conſequence of ſending an army with a chief in your confidence for the protection of *Bombay*, and that a perſon ſhould be diſpatched to ſupply the army with proviſions and other neceſſaries, who conducting them to *Hoſhungabad*, might diſmiſs them in ſafety from my territories: and the third written after the death of Mr. *Elliott*, on your having committed to *Beneram Pundit* every thing that had been entruſted to the deceaſed; his ſetting off with *Ramkaunt* with my anſwers; his arrival at *Calcutta*; and your being made acquainted with the contents of all my letters on theſe ſubjects, were received.

What I underſtand by your letters, although they ſeem to contain much, is in few words, that you conſider my deſigns as inconſiderable, and do not approve of my views. I have therefore laid aſide my intentions for ſome time, and dropped the proſecution of them; but I am nevertheleſs ready, at all times, to perform the duties of our ancient friendſhip and connection; and from the open and friendly intercourſe between me and Colonel *Goddard*, I am prompted to aſſiſt him with my advice and counſel. By the bleſſing of God, when it ſhall be neceſſary, I will adviſe in the beſt manner. But you have ſaid in moſt of your letters, that every one thinks his own opinion beſt. Thus Colonel *Goddard*, contrary to my advice, marched towards *Surat*; and the Chiefs of *Bombay*, without caution and circumſpection, and without your permiſſion, marched into the territories of *Poonah* to the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*; but their projects did not ſucceed, and *Ragonaut Row* put himſelf under the protection of *Sindeah*; and the Chiefs of *Bombay* having for their own ſafety made a new engagement in the room of the treaty of Colonel *Upton*, returned to their own territories. The Engliſh of *Bombay*, in this quarrel and open hoſtilities, in which they were worſted, were guilty of many breaches of faith towards the Miniſters of *Poonah*, and did not regard the treaties which all Rulers of States pay the greateſt attention to, and without any conſideration of their honour and dignity, acted contrary to prudence and to your directions, as you informed me in a great number of letters, and as Colonel *Goddard* alſo wrote to me.

From my knowledge of the ſtate of affairs, and from the exerciſe of our friendſhip which has been kept up for upwards of a year, by a mutual communication of the ſituation of things, and of the moſt inconſiderable as well as important matters, I diſcover three things in your letters and thoſe of Colonel *Goddard*; one, that the Bombay Chief ſupported *Ragonaut Row* without any authority from you: the other, that you have dropped your great deſigns, but are reſolved to keep up our former friendſhip; and the third, what you mention in all your letters, that every one thinks his opinion the beſt. The firſt is fact, that whatever the Chief of *Bombay* has done has been contrary to your advice, who are alone able to adviſe: and the ſecond, that in every ſituation you will maintain our friendſhip, is alſo to be depended on: and the third, that every one thinks his own opinion the beſt, is a common proverb, but it is not however the notion of wiſe men, who never have any connections with powerful States, except thoſe of peace and friendſhip. This you muſt have written in your diſpleaſure, upon hearing of the Bombay Chief having acted ſo imprudently, but you cannot conceive it to hold good in every inſtance.

The 2d article, which is worthy to be followed, you ſhould maintain: but that friendſhip which is kept up and openly ſhewn by letters only, and which when wanted, does not exert itſelf; ſo far from being of any advantage, may bring the greateſt detriment. My maxim on the contrary is this, that with whomſoever I enter into alliance, although there ſhould be innumerable diſadvantages in it, I never turn myſelf aſide from it. My advantageous connection with *Pundit Purdhaun*, and the friendly connection of letters with you, which you commenced upwards of a year ſince, are equally firm.

The arrival of Colonel *Goddard* with his whole army, ſtores, artillery, &c. on the borders of my territories; his remaining there two months; the intercourſe of preſents between us; my ſending, when neceſſary, proviſions and every thing which he deſired; that Mr. *Watherſtone*, who came here with few attendants, departed with the money for his bills on *Benares*, with oxen, and every article which he deſired of me; that two gentlemen of your confidence who were with Mr. *Elliott* ſhall remain here two months; all this you cannot conſider as ſmall matters. For although I perceived the danger of expoſing myſelf to the reſentment of the people of *Decan*, who are maſters of large armies, powerful reſources, treaſures, forts, and ſtrong places, notwithſtanding what my apprehenſions from them might be, I, from the duty of friendſhip towards you, reſolved to take upon me the worſt of their reſentment, in conformity to the proverb which ſays; "You muſt not with your open eyes throw yourſelf into a whirlpool; but ſhould you find yourſelf in one, you muſt not give yourſelf up to your apprehenſions."

Reflect maturely upon what I write; for from what can ariſe my expoſing myſelf to deſtruction, by not obeying the ſummons, and not performing what might be expected

pected from my ancient connection with *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, except from my friendſhip for you, although there are no immediate advantages to be drawn from it?

At preſent that I have received a Karetah from you, in which like a honey bee which contains both ſweetneſs and a ſting, you drop your great deſigns, but reſolve to preſerve the duties of our friendſhip, and finiſh by ſaying, that every one thinks his own opinion the beſt; in conſequence of my apprehenſions, I laid aſide the ſting and adopted the ſweetneſs, and accordingly diſpatched *Dewagur Pundit* to *Poonah*, and ſent this meſſage by him to the Miniſters of *Poonah*: "I am a branch of the illuſtrious family of the Raje; you are the rulers of all matters belonging to it: if you chuſe to keep up friendſhip and connection with me, I will continue attached to you; but I have not need of the aſſiſtance of the Raje; for, from of old I have been cloſely connected with the Soubahs of *Bengal*, and with one, who has the ſupreme direction over all the countries, and who from his wiſdom and ſuperior prudence is faithful to his word and ſtrict to his engagements. That peace may be firmly eſtabliſhed between us by treaty, you muſt entertain no thoughts of war, ſince none of thoſe advantages which are to be acquired by peace can be found in diſſenſions and hoſtilities."

Dewagur Pundit after his arrival at *Poonah* had many conferences in free and unbiaſſed terms, either by fear or partiality with the Engliſh gentlemen; and for three months was employed in oppoſing both openly and in private, the demands of the Miniſters, in ſuch a well reflected manner, that if you had a perſon there to have ſeen and heard it, he would certainly have written it to you, and you could not have diſbelieved it. *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, who is the chief Miniſter, is poſſeſſed of ſuperior wiſdom and prudence, is well adviſed, of ſtrict truth, and in his attention to his treaties, like a leaf which trembles at the leaſt wind, he has dreaded the ſmalleſt innovation in them, from the time of *Ballajee Biſhennaut*, till the treaty of Colonel *Upton*, and from that time till the formation of the new treaty which was made with the Bombay Chiefs, by *Pundit Purdhaun*, through the means of *Sindeah*, after the breaking out of the war and the arrival of *Ragonaut Row*. He made *Dewagur Pundit* acquainted with all the former tranſactions and the preſent ſtate of affairs, and ſhewed him all the treaties which had been made, and deſired him to ſee on what ſide the breach of faith was, and which part was guilty of infractions: and yet, ſaid he, they declare that they ſtick to their engagements. *Dewagur Pundit*, after diſcovering the ſituation of affairs, wrote repeated letters to Colonel *Goddard*, adviſing him to be cautious and prudent in his proceedings, and to keep in view the conditions of the treaty, which he muſt know to be an hundred times better than war and hoſtilities, and wrote alſo in the ſame terms to you, and diſpatched thoſe letters together with Rhautahs from me from *Naigpore* to *Calcutta*. You will doubtleſs have underſtood all theſe particulars, which were dictated by the ſincereſt friendſhip, but I have been for this long time to the preſent inſtant in expectation of your anſwer to them.

Repeated letters are received from Colonel *Goddard*, by *Pundit Purdhaun* and *Dewagur Pundit*, at *Poonah*; the firſt to acquaint them, that as he had many ſecret things to communicate, they ſhould ſend a confidential perſon to him, to whom he might impart every circumſtance, and ſettle with the terms of the treaty. *Nanna Purnaveeſe* in compliance with this, diſpatched, with the advice of *Dewagur Pundit*, a perſon in his confidence to *Surat*:

He was not yet arrived there when a ſecond letter was received from the Colonel, that as it would be a long time before the arrival of the agent, he was therefore determined to come in perſon with all expedition by the *Dauk* to the neighbourhood of *Poonah*, and have a perſonal conference: that he had been appointed to the ſole management of the negociations with *Pundit Purdhaun*, and that the ſole deſire was to ſettle to mutual ſatisfaction the terms, that ſo all diſputes and differences might be ended, and the treaty faithfully obſerved by both parties: that they ſhould be aſſured that there was no other reaſon for his keeping with him *Ragonaut Row*, who had come of himſelf to *Poonah*, than to preſerve the treaty and friendſhip ſubſiſting with *Pundit Purdhaun*, and to prevent the diſputes from proceeding further. *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, in anſwer to this, wrote himſelf, and made *Dewagur Pundit* write, that nothing could be more adviſable; that his houſe was the Colonel's, and that he ſhould come without delay, as they were anxiouſly expecting him; that they had erected for his reception a tent and pavilion without the town. Appendix No. 251. B.

About this time letters were received from Colonel *Goddard*, that he did not aſſent to the treaty made by the Bombay Chief, but that both ſides muſt conform themſelves to the treaty executed by Colonel *Upton*: Karetahs likewiſe for me, and letters from *Dewagur Pundit*, were received at the ſame time from you, as alſo for *Pundit Purdhaun* and *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, that you had no inclination for war, but were reſolved to maintain the treaty of Colonel *Upton*: that you could not aſſent to the new engagements entered into by the Bombay Chief, or agree to any thing by which the honour and dignity of the Government might be impaired.

When *Dewagur Pundit* had, agreeable to that, repreſented every thing that was to be expected from his friendſhip, *Nanna Purnaveeſe* brought out the treaty of Colonel *Upton*, and ſaid to him, "See what a number of "conditions of this treaty even have not been complied "with; and in the inſtance of *Ragonaut Row*, they have "infringed every treaty, by giving him a place of re"fuge with them, which is forbidden by numberleſs "articles: in giving up *Jeiſpore* and *Salſette*, &c. Ma"hals, belonging to *Gojeraut*, what numbers of excuſes "have they not made. But without mentioning the "enmity and reſentment which they have conceived "againſt us, for ſending back their army in ſafety "to *Bombay*, they have again received *Ragonaut Row*, "and are buſily employed in preparing for war; tell "me now on which ſide the greateſt attention to "treaty is ſhewn?" *Dewagur Pundit* having made a copy of many of the articles of Colonel *Upton*'s treaty, ſent it with letters directed for your quarter, to *Naigpore*, which were diſpatched by the way of *Cuttack*, with Karetahs from me, containing cautious and prudent reſolutions, dictated by foreſight and long reflections, and by my friendſhip and affections, by which the good adminiſtration of affairs, and the ſecurity of the people are eſtabliſhed, and in which no duty of my friendſhip was forgot; doubtleſs after their arrival all their contents were made known to you. This is the fourth month ſince my diſpatching thoſe letters, but as yet I have received no anſwer to them, that, in conformity to that, the negociations might be ſet on foot.

Upon the arrival of the confidential perſons from *Pundit Purdhaun*, at *Surat*, and their having a meeting with Colonel *Goddard*, he laid aſide his former intention of going to *Poonah*; and ſent back one of the agents of *Pundit Purdhaun* to *Poonah*, with this meſſage, that they muſt pay for the expences of his quarter one year's kiſt, for the Mahals of *Gojeraut*, which they gave the year after the formation of Colonel *Upton*'s treaty, and of which at preſent, ſince the making the new treaty, there appears to be one year's kiſts due by the accounts; and that they muſt reſtore all *Ragonaut Row*'s money or effects, which may be in their poſſeſſion, and allot him a place for his habitation, and diſcharge the pay due to his followers; together with many other articles which would be too prolix to be written. *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, upon hearing all theſe particulars, ſaid to *Dewagur Pundit*, "Do you hear what meſſage they have ſent?

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" you may recollect what they before uſed to write, and " how they have ſince acted."

As from the time of the death of *Narain Row*, for the ſpace of four years, the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, has been, from his heart, attached to *Punait Purdhaun*, and agrees with him in every reſolution both for war and peace; and as the Miniſters of *Poonah* conſult the Nabob in every matter, even of the ſmalleſt moment, and will ſupport him with all their power, they have therefore written to him every thing that has taken place with Colonel *Goddard*, and the conference of *Dewagur Pundit*; and the Nabob has wrote in anſwer, that Mr. *Hollond* was arrived from *Madras*, for the purpoſe of negociating with him; but that in the affair of *Shinkakull Rajebundry*, and the dependency of *Arcot*, which by the treaty belongs to him, what that gentleman ſays, is contrary to the treaty; that he had ſaid to Mr. *Hollond*, and wrote to *Madras*, whatever was proper to be ſaid in anſwer, and would wait the event of the negociation; and that he ſent letters to *Calcutta*, that they ought to conform to the conditions of the treaty with *Pundit Purdhaun*, and with him, and not infringe them in the leaſt, but that he did not expect to receive a ſatisfactory anſwer. That which ever way theſe matters may end, they ought to be ready for either peace or war; that this muſt be done by collecting troops, and preparing quantities of all kinds of ſtores: that as the Engliſh are ſituated on three ſides of them, they alſo ſhould oppoſe the Engliſh on the three ſides, and gain over *Hyder Naig* to their aſſiſtance: that in the tranſactions with the three quarters (whatever might be expected from the Engliſh, whether war or peace) they ought to proceed in this manner, to chuſe out one perſon from ſeveral (either *Pundit Purdhaun*, or himſelf, or the Bhoſilas) to whom they might commit the negociations for peace with the Engliſh, on the three ſides, and not remain obſtinate in their demands, as by ſo being, peace would be delayed. That ſuch was his advice, and the only one he could give; but that they were the maſters, to follow it or not.

Upon the arrival of theſe letters to the Poonah Miniſters, of which tenor there were alſo letters for me and *Dewagur Pundit*, *Nanna Purnaveeſe* ſaid to the Pundit, that he knew of no better advice; and that he had been thinking of the ſame himſelf, and was employed in negociating a ſtrict alliance with *Hyder Naig*, and in raiſing troops, and collecting military ſtores: that it was likewiſe neceſſary for him *(Dewagur Pundit)* to raiſe troops and defend the third ſide; for that as he was ſo cloſely connected with him, whenever their power, or that of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, ſhould be in danger, his country and power would not be ſafe from the attacks of the Engliſh. *Dewagur Pundit* replied to him, that the branches of the illuſtrious family of the Raja, who were ſupported under the ſhadow of the Muſnud of the Raje of *Pundit Purdhaun*, had no other employment but to aſſiſt him with all their power. That in conformity to the reſolution before mentioned, he would collect troops, and take charge of the ſide he ſpoke of, and would employ himſelf in negociations with the Engliſh gentlemen agreeable to the treaty. *Nanna Purnaveeſe* anſwered, if negociations can be carried on through you, agreeable to the treaty, and be brought to a determination, it is well; but let it not be in ſuch a manner, that while the Engliſh are putting you off with excuſes and delays, they ſhould be raiſing troops, and of a ſudden break out in hoſtilities, whilſt I am off my guard and not ſuſpecting it. You muſt therefore employ yourſelf buſily at home in theſe matters, and ſettle in whatſoever manner the circumſtances ſhall require.

As your anſwers have been late in coming, and the conferences with Colonel *Goddard* are at a ſtand; *Dewagur Pundit* not thinking adviſable to carry theſe matters any further without your permiſſion, after he had procured his diſmiſſion, came by long journies to *Naigpore*, and repreſented to me all the particulars above written.

I have in the mean while received frequent letters from the Nabob *Nizam Ally* and *Pundit Purdhaun* to get ready my troops and march them out. Accordingly my ſon *Jemmajee Booſla* on the Duſs are encamped; and after having got together ſtores for the cavalry and other neceſſaries, was ſent towards *Andery*, with counſellors of known wiſdom and experience, that remaining ſome time at the ghaut of *Andery*, he may collect the troops of the Duſs Sirdars, from moſt of whom Vackeels have come offering their ſervices, till anſwers to my letters ſhall arrive from *Calcutta* and from Colonel *Goddard*.

As in this our intercourſe of friendſhip, you have written letters of equal length with thoſe of the news writers; and as our connection and alliance is well known to *Pundit Peiſhwa* and the Nabob, and all the Decan people; and it is a ſaying with them, that the Engliſh and *Booſla* are as one: from the arriving of Colonel *Goddard* at *Hoſhungabad*, and his remaining there two months from my advice; from the conferences of *Dewagur Pundit* at *Poonah*, and his ſending frequent letters with my opinion on the beſt terms to be ſettled upon by the Miniſters with the Engliſh, and adviſing them to peace: and as our friendſhip cannot be carried any further; and the connection between the family of the Raje and *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Nabob, which is able to laſt from generation to generation, cannot be dropped; I am therefore deſirous, that through my mediation peace may be eſtabliſhed with you, by *Pundit Peiſhwa* and the Nabob, at any rate, and by you with theſe two Chiefs, and that on the ſettling the negociation, a treaty may be made between you on ſuch ſolid grounds as to admit of no breach of promiſe, but may ſerve for ever the peace and ſecurity of your ſubjects. Whenever the negociations on the part of the two Chiefs ſhall be tranſacted through me, I have no doubt of ſucceeding in making peace between you. Having maturely reflected and reſolved in your mind my communications to you, which have been greater and more unreſerved than what is thought neceſſary in friendſhip, and which I made for your information, you will without doubt adopt whatever is moſt likely to promote friendſhip, and to preſerve the treaties exiſting, without my pointing it out to you; and for ſuch conduct a reward is to be expected from God.

I accordingly requeſt you would write to me explicitly, agreeable to my former letters, in which I incloſed you papers reſpecting the treaty of Colonel *Upton*, whether the negociations are drawing to a concluſion, and whether the conditions with the Nabob can be ſettled; that in conformity to that, peace may be made with *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Nabob; and that you will write to Colonel *Goddard* whatever you think adviſable in this matter, that he may apply himſelf with my friendly aſſiſtance to the eſtabliſhment of peace, and not go in the leaſt aſide from the tenor of the treaty, of which none but the wiſe are able to judge. You muſt reflect maturely on what I have written, which is the dictates of my heart; for what purpoſe I have written it: not for my own advantage, but ſimply from my friendſhip. I have no doubt but this will gain me your good will, and that you will not forget theſe proofs of my friendſhip, but remove my anxiety, by favouring me with an anſwer. In ſhort, as long as *Ragonaut Row* ſhall remain with the Engliſh, no concluſion or repoſe from theſe diſputes and miſunderſtanding can take place: but his ſtay will be an endleſs ſource of quarrels and breaches of treaty. On the contrary, the delivering him up to *Pundit Purdhaun* is extremely adviſable, and will be the means of preſerving the treaty, and of keeping the rights of all ſides entire.—But one word to the wiſe is ſufficient.

From *Dewagur Pundit*, dated the 21ſt Likaida, December 1779; received the 29th January 1780.

Before this I wrote you frequently from *Poonah*, in my anſwers to your letters, whatever was moſt adviſable

after

after my interviews and repeated conferences with *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, and my diſcovering and being witneſs to the faith and ſtrict attention to treaties in all the Miniſters, and the firmneſs and courage of the Generals, ſuch as *Madajee Row Sindiah*, *Tocojee Holcar*, and other Chiefs of note, and that the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah* was as one in all the intereſts and concerns of *Pundit Purdhaun*, and that all the Chiefs and Zemindars both of the hills and low countries, from the river *Nurbudda* to the banks of the *Shoor*, who inhabit the ſix Soubahs of *Decan*, and the Talookdars of the *Carnatic*, who are ſettled in that large tract of country, are attached from the bottom of their hearts to the illuſtrious houſe of the Raje and the family of *Pundit Purdhaun*, in ſuch a manner, that if hoſtile intentions ſhould be diſcovered from any quarter, or any inclination for war, or breach of faith and treaty appear in any one, we ſhould all join with *Pundit Purdhaun*, and, as if in defence of our own poſſeſſions, bring our quota to the war; not like the friendſhip of thoſe who only court the world. You wrote in anſwer, that you had not the ſmalleſt inclination to break the treaty, and that what was done by the Bombay Chief, aroſe from his imprudence and raſhneſs; that in whatever brought no detriment to the honour and dignity of your nation, you would preſerve every tittle of your treaties, and maintain your friendſhip; that you had given Colonel *Goddard* the ſole power of making peace. Theſe anſwers I received ſeverally, and alſo letters from Colonel *Goddard*, full of profeſſions of his inclinations for peace, and of his having given *Ragonaut Row* a place of refuge with him ſolely for this purpoſe, that he might keep the peace with *Pundit Purdhaun* inviolate, by preventing him from taking refuge any where elſe, and raiſe commotions there; that it was neceſſary a confidential agent ſhould be diſpatched to him, to whom the greateſt ſecrets might be imparted, and peace concluded with him. Agreeable to this, a perſon of truſt was diſpatched to him from *Poonah*, who was not yet arrived when a ſecond letter was received from the Colonel, that many delays would be occaſioned by the going and coming of the agent, and that there were many ſecrets of ſuch a nature as not to be properly communicated except in a perſonal conference; that he was therefore greatly deſirous of a meeting with the Miniſter, and that if they would ſignify their approbation he would come.

The Miniſters being greatly pleaſed with this offer wrote that they ſhould receive the moſt ſincere ſatisfaction from his arrival, and pitched a tent for him without the town, and remained in the tent anxiouſly expecting his arrival, and I myſelf wrote him letters full of the moſt friendly aſſurances, to inform him of the pleaſure which his arrival would give; indeed, his coming hither was moſt adviſable, as he could have added ſtrength to the peace and friendſhip, and removed all cauſes of miſunderſtandings, confirmed the treaty for ever, and relieved them from all apprehenſions for the ſafety of their country and poſſeſſions.

On the arrival of the agent from hence, Colonel *Goddard* diſpatched in a Dauk palowkeen one *Neal Chund*, an agent who had been ſent from hence with the agent to this quarter with Karetahs from him, who on his arrival at *Poonah* delivered theſe Karetahs of Colonel *Goddard*, containing every particular; and ſaid, in the preſence of *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, *Madajee Row Sindeah*, myſelf, and other perſons, whatever Colonel *Goddard* had verbally committed to him; the ſubſtance of which was, firſt, that they muſt make good whatever appears by his accounts to be deficient in the performance of Colonel *Upton*'s treaty: ſecondly, that as at the time of making peace, Mahals to the yearly value of three lacks of rupees, dependent on *Gougeraut* for the Jaghier of the Kaikwars were made over to the Engliſh, it was neceſſary that they ſhould have been delivered over to us at that time, but as they were not ſurrendered till a year after, three lacks of rupees are due for one year's collections: thirdly, that as there are not three lacks of rupees collected from thoſe Mahals, but a deficiency of 96,000 rupees ariſes, they muſt make out the account, and ſend the difference; that reſpecting *Ragonaut Row* they muſt grant him a diſtrict to ſupport his expences, in the ſame manner as it was given him by the former treaty; and that the ſaid *Row* ſhould be permitted to reſide wherever he may think proper; together with many other particulars on the ſame ſubject, which would be too voluminous, were all repreſented to us by *Neal Chund*. After hearing the whole of the meſſage from that quarter, *Nanna Purnaveeſe* and *Madajee Row Sindeah*, turning to me, ſaid "You inſiſt that the words of the Engliſh gentlemen are to be depended on, and that they have no intention but that of maintaining their treaties. You have now heard what kind of meſſage they have ſent, and are alſo acquainted with what they before wrote. Colonel *Goddard* firſt determined to come here, and has now laid aſide that reſolution; and with reſpect to *Ragonaut Row*, whom he declared that he kept with him for good reaſons, and not from any enmity to us: and in the Mahals, which by the papers of the Sircar are ſettled at three lacks of rupees, they pretend that there have been deficiencies, and demand the balance from us, and require of us ſeveral lacks of rupees: ſuch conduct cannot be agreeable to God. With reſpect to a French merchant who came here, they wrote ſo many angry letters, and accuſed us of ſo many breaches of the treaty, that we diſmiſſed him contrary to the cuſtom of the Durbar. *Ragonaut Row*, from whom commotions and loſſes have ariſen, they have again given a refuge to under their protection: and after the concluſion of the war, we on the contrary made this agreement with the Bombay army that they ſhould return in peace to their own territories." It is a proverb, "that if you do juſtice, although you ſhould throw it into water, it will be favourably received by God." But ſince affairs are come to this paſs, this we have determined by the advice of *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, upon preparing for war with the three quarters; and *Hyder Naig* is likewiſe attached to us.

I then ſaid to *Nanna Purvaneeſe*, that as yet anſwers to our negociations were not arrived from *Calcutta*; and that, as I had no doubt but that they would be ſuch as would tend to peace, what reaſon could he have for preparing for war? He anſwered me, that it was adviſable for every one to be prepared at home, and not, while the others are collecting every thing neceſſary for war, for him to be unſuſpecting and unprepared; but that ſhould anſwers tending to peace be received, he would readily agree with them. After learning all theſe particulars, I took leave of *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, and arrived by long journies at *Naigpore*, where I paid my reſpects to the Rajah my maſter, and informed him of all my conferences with the Poona Miniſters, and of their having determined, according to the advice of *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, to carry on war with the four quarters, and of *Hyder Naig*'s being attached to them; and alſo made him acquainted with the contents of all Colonel *Goddard*'s letters, which you will learn from the Rajah's Kawtahs, where he has written them without the leaſt reſerve. My only wiſh is, that a peace and treaty may be made between you and *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, through the mediation and under the guarantee of the Rajah my maſter, agreeable to the former treaty, before war ſhould break out with the four quarters; and that *Ragonaut Row*, who is the cauſe of all theſe miſunderſtandings, may be delivered up to *Pundit Purdhaun*. This would be a hundred, nay a thouſand times better than war and hoſtilities. Attend with mature reflection to theſe particulars.

Before this, numberleſs letters on this ſubject have been written to you, and at preſent nothing has been omitted in the Rajah's letters. You will make yourſelf thoroughly acquainted with them, and will be aſſured that they were dictated ſolely by friendſhip and good will towards you; and will ſend an anſwer without delay, and write to Colonel *Goddard* whatever you may think

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think advisable; since a word once spoken, and an arrow shot away from the bow, cannot be recalled. I am a sincere well-wisher to you, and for this reason alone have written all these particulars to you.

From the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*: received 19th January 1780.

Your gracious letter under date the 25th Shawaul, 6th November, to this purport, that the Governor and Council of *Madras*, had deputed Mr. *John Hollond* to *Hydrabad*, to explain to me those points which might tend to the strengthening our friendship; after having informed you of it, and that whatever that gentleman has mentioned further than what may tend to this end, is contrary to the intentions and permission of the Council, that you have therefore directed the Governor and Council of *Madras* to attend particularly to this matter; and that you have written to Mr. *Hollond* to put a stop to his negociations till he shall receive explicit letters from *Madras*; was delivered me by that gentleman; and from the contents of it I received great satisfaction.

The friendship and faith to their treaties in the English Company, have been from the beginning the admiration of all the rulers; and I, after the conclusion of the treaty in 1182, (1768) from my own experience found this maxim, of the whole world to be true. At the time of your coming to the Governor in that quarter, and the superintendance of the affairs of all the English settlements; and of your writing to me that you had learnt from all quarters, and by the actual situation of affairs the firmness of our friendship, you were made particularly acquainted with the negociations which with the approbation of the Governor and Council of *Madras*, had been entered upon between the Company and this quarter. I also gained information of the situation of all matters from Colonel *Upton*, when on the breaking out of *Ragonaut Row*'s quarrel with the Sirkar, he came here in his way to *Poonah*, to settle the negociation between *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, *Madho Row Narrain*. But of late how so many evident infringements of the treaty should occur, is matter of the greatest astonishment to any one who reflects on the former alliance, and the established custom of the country.

Whatever I discovered on the subject of *Ragonaut Row*, I formerly wrote to you, and now enclose you a copy of it; and you wrote to me in answer, that all the negociations and transactions of the English Company were the same, and that no alterations or infringement should ever be made in the treaties entered into by the Governor and Council of *Madras*; but whatever has since happened contrary to this declaration, is not of consequence to be repeated, since *Ragonaut Row* is now, in the same situation in which he was formerly.

Mr. *Hollond*, upon his arrival here, requested of me, contrary to all right, to annul the small tribute for *Rajemundery* and the other Sirkars, for which formerly I received from that quarter lacks of rupees; the particulars of which I before informed the Company in an enclosed paper, and for which since I have not received altogether the tenth part of what I formerly did; and the Governor and Council of *Madras*, have by violence seized on the Sircars of *Murtezzanagur*, which by the treaty belonged to my brother *Ameel ul Omrah*, *Sujah ul Mulk Bahadre Bissalet Jung*. Reflect now what can be concluded from such conduct, except a breach of the treaty. I accordingly wrote to you on the 2d Rejjab and the 2d Ramzaum, all these particulars by two Hircarrahs with a copy of my former letter. As your answer was late in arriving, and in the mean while the violences of the Governor and Council of *Madras* increased, I was on the eve of revenging them as was proper, when your letter arrived: and on the perusal of the explicit contents of it, I put a stop to my preparations. If what you write is from your heart, and the Governor and Council of *Madras* will remain strict to the treaty and alliance, and give over all further demands to have the tribute to the Sircar annulled, and will relinquish possession of the Sircar of *Murtizzanagur*, it is well; if they will not, I have nothing of more consequence than the preserving and defending my country, and the spark of dispute and enmity will be raised to a flame: that I have overlooked and connived at the provocations which have been given me, and which I before informed you of, was owing to my desire to preserve the treaty, not to my inability to revenge myself. By the blessing of God I am prepared, and am in no want of assistance; for the Rulers of *Poonah*, whose dignity and exalted state of power is owing to my protection and assistance, are attached to me, and would support me to the utmost: and *Modajee Bhosila* is my ally, and is as one with the Rulers of *Poonah*; and *Hyder Naig*, who entertains enmity against the English Company, having lately entered into a treaty with the Poonah Ministers, agrees with us in all matters.

Do you, who are prudent and foreseeing, and able to determine on the right plan, reflect maturely upon these circumstances, and consider attentively in your mind, that it is from this new line of conduct of the English Company, that the foundations of enmity have been laid in the whole country of *Hindostan*; and should your views be hostile, which appearances seem to point out as immediately impending, let not the time be lost in fruitless pretences; but whatever is proper to be written, do you write to the Governor and Council of *Madras*, without delay.

Further particulars will be made known to you by the letters of Mr. *Hollond*, who, agreeable to your orders, remains silent until the arrival of explicit directions from *Madras*.

My views and sole desire, which you request of me to write to you, are, that no infringements be made in the treaties between me and the Company; and that our friendship and alliance may remain firm and stedfast.

Knowing my anxiety, write without delay, answers to my former and present letters.

From *Nizam Ally Khan*; received 24th February 1780.

I have received your letter to this purport, that in your former letters you had said, that your Government had never any intention of supporting *Ragonaut Row*, but that every event has since appeared contrary to it. That in fact, what you write in your former letters, was strictly true; but that since from a concurrence of circumstances in that quarter, which you could by no means foresee, so as to prevent them, the Governor and Council of *Madras* had joined with *Ragonaut Row*, and taken steps for his assistance, the event of which is well known: but that the present disputes of your Government have no connection with *Ragonaut Row*, but have arisen from their want of foresight, presumption, and pretensions to which they have not the least right, and which cannot be agreed to without disgrace and dishonour: that you have given them notice that you are ready to stick to the conditions of the treaty made by Colonel *Upton*; but they have not complied with this; that peace and war depends upon them, and not on you, and that one of the two must be already determined on: that you have been desirous of a peace, but if contrary to your inclination, war should be begun for your own defence and from necessity, it is agreeable to the customs of all nations, and to common prudence, that every one who can be of assistance to you, should be made a friend of; that in this view, *Ragonaut Row* also may become your ally, but that no such connection shall be formed, as may produce any detriment to the Sirkar, or the smallest deviation in the treaty which has been long established.—All these particulars I perfectly understand.

I know that *Ragonaut Row* has taken refuge with the English Company, and that they will not chuse to deliver him up. His father and grandfather were brought up, supported, and protected by my family; and all the country of *Decan*, as far as the banks of the *Nerbudda*, was under this Sircar: after the death of the late Nabob, the deceased *Asoph ul Dowlah* committed the

same

ſame innovations that have now happened in the country, of the Marattas; by this, great injury was done to the Sirkar. At that time the Marattas, while *Ballajee Row* was ſtill alive, and when their limits extended in *Decan* and *Hindoſtan*, as far as the boundaries of *Attuck*, and they had great authority in it, waged war with this Sirkar, and during the life of the late *Aſoph ul Dowlah*, poſſeſſed themſelves of many countries; after that, while *Madho Row*, and *Ragonaut Row* tranſacted the affairs of the Pundit Purdhauny, in conſort, *Madho Row* attempted to confine *Ragonaut Row*, who flying, unattended, arrived at *Kojeſtabuniand*, at the Preſence, and gave to the Preſence Sunnuds of relinquiſhment of the country, and the city of *Burhanpore*, and of the fort of *Aſhier*, &c. Chiefs were ſent with an army, from the Preſence, with *Ragonaut Row*, who begun hoſtilities with *Madho Row*, defeated his army, and eſtabliſhed *Ragonaut Row*, who got *Madho Row* into his power. Of the engagements and Sunnuds for the relinquiſhment of the country, which he had made, he broke moſt of the articles; on which account war took place between him and the Preſence, and my victorious army conſumed *Poonah* with fire. A little after this, *Madho Row*, by treachery, confined *Ragonaut Row*; by which means, after the death of *Madho Row*, *Narrain Row*, his younger brother ſucceeded to him, whom *Ragonaut Row* by treachery put to death, and aſſumed the government; he having begun, in appearance, negociations of alliance with the Preſence, and having, under preſence of war with *Hyder Naig*, aſſembled a large army, and by frequently declaring to the Preſence, that he was marching againſt *Hyder Naig*, having gained entire confidence to his aſſurances, of his going to war with *Hyder Naig*, which ſet at eaſe, with reſpect to any hoſtile intentions in him, while the Chiefs and the army of the Preſence, who had returned to their habitations, were not aſſembled to oppoſe him; of a ſudden he began hoſtilities againſt the Sirkar; at that time I, with what ſmall number of troops attended on me, marched to the fort of *Buder*, and approached near *Ragonaut Row*; the war laſted for about a month, when he finding that my victorious army was invincible, ſurrendered himſelf up to me, and entered into a new engagement, and then turned towards *Hyder Naig*. The inſtant he had departed, he forgot every letter of his engagement, and marched againſt *Hyder Ally*, ravaging the country of the Sirkar in his way. The Miniſters of *Poonah* united themſelves with the Preſence, and on account of the treachery and want of faith in *Ragonaut Row*, an engagement was made with them, and they were aſſiſted by the Preſence; at that time *Row Pundit Purdhaun* was not born, his birth happened ſoon after, and a treaty of alliance took place with the Miniſters. I then drove *Ragonaut Row* from the country, and I have always before been ſteadfaſt to the treaty, and am reſolved to remain ſo for ever.

You write that no detriment ſhall come to the Sirkar from *Ragonaut Row*. At the time that the limits of the Marattas extended as far as the boundaries of *Attuck*, when there was no diſputes in their country, and their power was entire, at that time he could cauſe no injury, and he was always reduced, and kept in ſubjection to me; ſince God is the protector and ſuccourer of my Government at preſent, that he is driven out of this quarter, and can effect nothing in that quarter; what injury can ariſe from him to the Sirkar? You write that you are ready to abide by the treaty of Colonel *Upton*; the Marattas alſo declare that they are ſteady to Colonel *Upton*'s treaty, and remained perfectly at eaſe that no breach would ariſe from the Engliſh; but that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* uniting with *Ragohaut Row*, broke the treaty and engagements, and approached within 12 coſs of *Poonah*, the event of which is well known; that the breaches and innovations in the treaty of Colonel *Upton* came from your ſide, and that ſuch being the caſe what dependance can they have on Colonel *Upton*'s treaty, or in future upon any other new engagements; for theſe reaſons the Marattas are reſolved that by any means *Ragonaut Row* muſt be delivered up to them; that they may be at eaſe as to their Government; the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, in open breach of the treaty formerly made by Colonel *Upton*, taking *Ragonaut Row* with them, approached within 12 coſs of *Poonah*; they after that delivered him up, and made a new engagement, and have now received him again under their protection. Should they yield up theſe points, and ſhould the Company act again in the ſame manner as before, this would be contrary to all policy. How long ſhall I, neglecting the guarding the adminiſtration of my own country by night and day, watching this enemy. While I am thus employed in obſerving him, how can I attend to the management of my interior concerns. It is therefore neceſſary for me firſt to remove this cauſe of apprehenſion. I have had many proofs of the treachery and bad faith of *Ragonaut Row*. Since the Miniſters of *Poonah* have united themſelves with me, and have made a treaty with me; ſhould I now break that treaty, what dependance would the Engliſh Company have upon my obſerving the engagements which I have with them. You write that the friendſhip between the Engliſh Company and the Preſence daily increaſes, and that no detriment ſhall ariſe to the friendſhip between us, ſo as to prevent our intereſts being united. Reflecting on this, I have told Mr. *John Holland*, that as it would certainly be a diſhonour for the Engliſh to deliver up *Ragonaut Row* to the Marattas, I will procure for him a Jaghire in the Sirkar, on the footing, that he is with the Engliſh, which will remove our mutual objections. In the time of the late Nabob, our order was obeyed through all *Decan* and *Hindoſtan*, as far as the limits of *Attuck*, and their riches and warlike ſtores were very conſiderable. The late Nabob employed himſelf a long time in reducing *Ragonaut Row*, but from his great power, was unable to effect the expulſion of him. The Nabob died, and war was carried on a long time againſt him by the Sirkar to ſuch extremities, that *Poonah* was deſtroyed by fire. I can ſee nothing can be done except the reduction of him by the bleſſing of God; you are wiſe, and will ſee that it is adviſable that this cauſe of apprehenſion ſhould be removed.

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From *Moodajee Bhoſila*; received 24th February 1780.

Before this I have ſent ſucceſſive Karetahs to you containing all particulars, by the way of *Cuttack*; and alſo by the route of *Benares*; but as yet I have not received an anſwer to any one of them; and Colonel *Goddard* likewiſe has delayed ſending replies to my letters. As our friendſhip requires that we ſhould be explicit in our communications on all points, I have therefore written what was proper to *Beneram Pundit*, who is at preſent in his own houſe at *Benares* for the recovery of his health, and directed him to repair immediately to *Calcutta*, and having made you acquainted with all the particulars written to him to procure an anſwer, and diſpatch it to this quarter; and to remain in future at your Preſence, that he may write me whatever you ſhall inform him of as adviſable and as being your deſire. As our correſpondence is of ſervice to keep up our friendſhip and alliance, it is neceſſary that you delay no longer to write an anſwer to my letters, which are all dictated by friendſhip, prudence, and foreſight: you are wiſe and prudent, and will pay proper attention to them.

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Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

To the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn*; written 17th February 1780.

CONSIDERING you as a friend of the Engliſh Company, both in virtue of the engagements which have been formed between you and them, and by the contiguity

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guity of your country to the borders of that of the Nabob *Wallah Jah*, their ancient friend and ally, I have long desired to write to you; but I have been hitherto prevented, partly from a consideration of the distance and uncertainty of the place and state in which you might be on the receipt of my letters, and principally by reason of the intercourse which subsisted between you and the President of *Madras*, which was in effect the same as if it existed with us, since we are the servants of the same master, and entrusted, though in a different degree, with portions of the same common interests. But some reports which have been lately and successively conveyed to me, have induced me to address you immediately on the behalf and in the name of this Government, for the purpose of removing any false appearance or conceptions which might disturb the good understanding which it is my desire, and which I believe to be equally yours, to perpetuate between us.

It has been variously suggested at one time, that you proposed to invade the *Carnatic*; at another, that you had actually commenced hostilities; and lastly, that you had entered into combinations with the Rulers of the Maratta State at *Poonah*, and other Powers, against the English Government, and against their ally the Nabob of the *Carnatic*. I have given no credit to these reports, because I confide in your wisdom, that you will never suffer any illusion to draw you from the line of your true interest. It is not your interest to make the English your enemy: it is their interest, and equally their inclination, to preserve your friendship; but suspicions and mutual jealousies often create enemies by the very cautions which they excite on both sides. And thus two States, whose dominions border upon each other, are often drawn into a war against the interests and wishes of both. Therefore, and to prevent such consequences, I write to you, that being fully and certainly informed of the sentiments and intentions of this Government towards you, you may form your own accordingly.

You are well informed, that by the regulations and commands of the King of *England*, the determination of peace and war with any of the English Governments in *India*, depends on the Superior Council of *Bengal*. Of that Council I am the Chief; and I now in that character in the first place declare to you, that nothing hostile to your person or Government is intended, nor shall be undertaken by any of the English Governments, as the aggressors; and in the second, to request that you will acquaint me with your intentions respecting the conduct which we are to expect from you, that we may act accordingly.

I had an opportunity when I was nearer to you than I am at present, of obtaining a knowledge of your character. I know that all your measures are dictated by a wise and well-formed policy, united with a regard to justice and public faith, and the courage of a soldier, who has ever shewn himself superior to the arts of deception; I shall therefore wait with impatience for your answer, in the assurance that it will afford me the complete satisfaction which I require.

To prevent the consequences of delays I have written this, and shall dispatch it to you by express Cossids. But if it is your wish to improve the connection between you and the Company by nearer ties, I will either send a person properly empowered and entrusted to you for that purpose, or receive one so qualified from you, whichever mode you shall most approve. In the mean time, &c. &c.

APPENDIX, No. 253. B.

Bombay Select Committee Consultations, 25th January 1780.

Tuesday 25th. RECEIVED the following letters from General *Goddard*.

Goddard General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

I am favoured with your letter of the 27th ultimo, enclosing extracts of Colonel *Braithwaite*'s letters to you; by which I find he is determined not to join me with any part of the Mahé detachment. The event will hereafter prove upon what grounds he has founded his opinion of *Hyder*'s intentions being hostilely bent against us: and it will be also left to decide how far the interests of the Company are most essentially served, by staying to watch the motions of a suspected enemy only or assisting in the operations of a war actually carrying on by the English nation against the whole of the Maratta empire.

My letter of the 30th ultimo would explain to you the appearance of affairs respecting *Futty Sing* in which no change or event from which to form more certain conjectures of his real designs, has since taken place. One of his officers, with about 3,000 followers, has stationed himself in the Pergunnah of *Ahmood*, and detached a small party of 300 men into that of *Desbara*, which has caused a temporary suspension in the taking possession of these two districts by the Chief of *Broach*. The man himself pretends that the motives of his stay are to receive some money from them, promised by the late Poonah collectors on account of assistance he gave them in quelling some recent disturbances. I have sent word to *Futty Sing* to withdraw his people from these Pergunnahs immediately; but a sufficient time has not yet elapsed to judge whether he means to comply, or not; at any rate they will be evacuated on the approach of the army.

I crossed the *Tappey* the 1st instant, as I informed you I would, and halted three days on the north side of it, to put every thing in proper order. I yesterday put the army in motion, and have this morning passed the *Kein Nuddy*; in two days more I expect to reach *Soncleterrah* on the banks of the *Nerbedah*.

I am obliged to you for the credit you have given me upon your Chief of *Surat* for two lacks of rupees, which the most absolute necessity will too soon compel me to make use of; because, but for the expedient of passing bills on *Bengal*, I should have found it impossible to subsist the army till this time. In order to enable me to avoid having recourse to this mode, which the urgency of the service only induced me to adopt, and which I have continued to follow with the utmost repugnance, I must place my present dependance upon the further aid of your Government, which I trust you will afford me in the most effectual manner you possibly can; and for this end, beg to repeat the request contained in my last letter, of permitting me to draw on your treasury in favour of individuals, the amount of which may remain deposited in it, and bonds granted by you in the usual form. This mode of negociation will furnish me with a most useful resource, without diminishing your treasury; and at the same time you will establish such rules and limitations respecting it, as you may judge requisite and proper.

I hope in a few days to be able to inform you more decisively of what may be expected from *Futty Sing*; and have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,
Thos Goddard.

Gujurram, on the Keim Naddy Camp, 6th January 1780.

Goddard General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

I have the pleasure to inform you of my having crossed the *Nubeddar* yesterday at the Ghatt of *Bowa Pur*. I found it necessary to halt a few days at *Selecleturrut*, to give time for conducting the four eighteen pounders and military stores from *Broach*, which joined me safe under escort of a battalion of Sepoys, I had sent over the river at *Serecleturrut* the day of my arrival at this place.

It is with pleasure I can communicate to you the prospect I have reason to believe there now is of adjusting every point to your wish, and for the interest of the Company, with *Futty Sing*. I have exerted every endeavour

deavour to effect this alliance, becauſe of the important advantages it will immediately ſecure to the Engliſh in *Guzerat*, and of the future favourable conſequences they muſt derive from it in the grand conteſt they are now entering upon with the Maratta Government. The leiſure allowed by the inactivity of the Miniſter, which has, I conceive, been principally occaſioned by the diſputes betwixt him and *Scindia*, has proved very convenient to the ſettlement of the Guzerat province, which I hope may be finally concluded before any conſiderable body of troops can arrive from the *Decan*. For this reaſon, as the effect it muſt have had upon *Futty Sing*, in inclining him to take a more ſpeedy and deciſive part upon the occaſion, the early movement of the army towards *Dubhoy* and *Brodua* became a point moſt neceſſary and eſſential to the good of the ſervice. He has promiſed to ſettle every thing on my arrival at the former place, from whence I ſhall be able to addreſs you more fully, as the ſincerity of his preſent profeſſions will then be put to the teſt, and till that can be done no certain judgment is to be formed of the real deſigns of a man ſo famed for treachery and deceit as *Futty Sing* is reported to be.

As you will ſo ſoon hear from me again I ſhall conclude at preſent, and have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Bowa Pier Ghatt,
North of the *Nurbedah*,
16th January 1780.

Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

In my letter of the 16th inſtant, I informed you I ſhould march towards *Dubhoy* the 18th: at which place I arrived yeſterday; and having ſummoned *Ballagee Ragonath*, the perſon who held it on the part of the Poonah Government, with a garriſon of above two thouſand men, to ſurrender the place, and received a refuſal, I immediately made the neceſſary preparations for beſieging it. The place of attack being fixed upon, a battery of three 18 pounders, within 200 yards of the wall, was completed by this morning, at day-break; when I found the enemy had evacuated the town which I have taken poſſeſſion of in the name of the Company, and congratulate you upon this acquiſition to your territorial poſſeſſions in *Guzerat*. The inhabitants, many of whom remained in the place, ſeem perfectly well diſpoſed to obey and live under the protection of the Engliſh Government; and as the fortifications, though inſufficient to reſiſt a regular European attack, might, with a ſmall force, be defended againſt a conſiderable body of country troops, the poſſeſſion of it muſt confer ſtability and ſecurity upon your territories on this ſide, and in the event of an accommodation with *Futty Sing*, from its vicinity to *Brodera*, prove a check and reſtraint upon his future conduct. I have wrote to Mr. *Gambier*, your Chief at *Broach*, to ſend proper perſons to ſettle and collect the revenues of the country, and ſhall afford him every further aſſiſtance neceſſary for this purpoſe.

I am happy at an opportunity of mentioning to you the ſatisfaction I received from the ſkill and aſſiduity of Major *Spaeth*, the chief engineer, in conſtructing and completing the battery with ſo much expedition. Lieutenant *Charles Reynolds*, who acted under him, and ſhewed himſelf exceedingly alert and active in his duty, received a wound in his thigh, from a matchlock, which however I am hopeful will not prove any way dangerous.

I have not heard from *Futty Sing* ſince my laſt of the 16th inſtant. I expected the return of his Vackeels, with every thing finally ſettled and agreed to, the day of my arrival here, or this day at fartheſt: as they may yet arrive in the courſe of it, or to-morrow morning, I ſhall defer ſaying more upon the ſubject of *Futty Sing*, till I can write you with an abſolute certainty.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters, *Dubhoy*,
January 20th 1780.

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Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

I had the pleaſure of informing you yeſterday of the treaty concluded betwixt the Honourable Company and *Futty Sing Guicawar*, and now encloſe you a copy of the original treaty, the exact counterpart of which is in the poſſeſſion of *Futty Sing*, which I hope will meet with your approbation. By the laſt article, it is provided that two copies of this treaty ſhall be forwarded by your Government to the Honourable Governor General and Council, for their confirmation and ratification; which I take the liberty of requeſting you will be pleaſed to do by the earlieſt opportunity.

I have thought it requiſite to retain the original treaty at preſent with me, as in the courſe of the campaign occaſions may offer to render the immediate producing it uſeful and neceſſary to the good of the ſervice; and the authenticated copy I now ſend, will be ſufficient fully to anſwer the preſent purpoſe of your and the Bengal Government.

I have from time to time communicated to you the progreſs of my negociation, and the difficulties I met with in the courſe of it to bring it to a ſucceſsful iſſue, which, from a conviction of the real and ſolid advantages ariſing to the Company by a connection with *Futty Sing*, I have ſeriouſly and aſſiduouſly laboured to effect. It is unneceſſary to point out to you, who have ſo exact and perfect a knowledge of the province of *Guzerat*, the particular advantages of country and revenue acquired and ſecured to the Company by this treaty whoſe dominion in *Guzerat* I conceive now to be fixed upon the moſt firm and unſhaken baſis; as the only Power, beſides the Engliſh, who can have any legal or juſt claim to the poſſeſſion of country, is equally intereſted with them to exclude the Maratta Government from all ſhare of participation in it whatever; and although the alliance with *Futty Sing* may not bring any very material acceſſion of military force to the Company, the influence it muſt have upon the minds of the Maratta leaders renders it a favourable and fortunate circumſtance at the commencement of the preſent war, and effectually provides many prevailing arguments of right and juſtice, ſo neceſſary to reconcile the ſentiments and opinions of men in all changes of Government, to the form that may be introduced and eſtabliſhed.

In conſequence of what you mentioned reſpecting the neceſſity you ſuppoſed there might be of inſerting the name of *Seajee* in any engagement formed with *Futty Sing*, I propoſed that he ſhould alſo be mentioned, but was told, that ſince the concluſion of the former treaty betwixt *Ragoba* and *Futty Sing*, through the mediation of the Engliſh Company, the Sunnuds of Rajah had been made out in the ſole name of *Futty Sing*, and ſent him from the Court of *Sittara*. To avoid however every poſſibility of diſpute hereafter, I have conſidered *Futty Sing*, as he certainly now is, the head of the family, and made his engagement with the Honourable Company in the name of the whole of the Guicawars.

According to the wiſh you expreſſed of ſecuring a ſuitable proviſion for *Govind Row*, I hinted your inclination to *Futty Sing*; but found, if I ſucceeded in that point, I muſt have poſitively inſiſted upon it; and as in doing ſo, I muſt have deviated from the orders of the Honourable Governor General and Council, wherein they expreſsly forbid the aſſuming any mediation betwixt the two brothers, to which you have alſo deſired me to pay particular attention, I rather choſe to deſiſt from further ſolicitation on that ſubject, by recommending a reconciliation betwixt them, as a circumſtance that would be much to his honour and advantage, and give great ſatisfaction to the Engliſh.

It was with a good deal of reluctance that *Futty Sing* could be brought to conſent to the ceſſion of *Zinnore*, and ſtrongly pleaded for having the Pergunnah of *Dubhoy* in exchange given up to him; but knowing the importance of both theſe places, and particularly the latter,

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to the Company, I tried every argument to induce him to comply; in which I at laſt ſucceeded, by proving to him the real and advantageous compenſation he would reap from the preſent treaty with the Engliſh. This is a point I have endeavoured to perſuade him into a firm belief of, through the whole negociation, well knowing, that to ſecure the faithful and ſtrict adherence of any perſon to the engagements he may have entered into, it is a material object to convince him they are for his intereſt. The earneſtneſs expreſſed by *Futty Sing*, to be put in poſſeſſion of *Dubhoy*, clearly ſhews that he conſiders that place in the important point of view it deſerves; and is apprehenſive of its being in the hands of ſuch formidable neighbours as the Engliſh.

I ſhall ſhortly write you of the particular plan I mean to follow, in effecting what remains to be executed reſpecting the ſettlement of the province; and ſhall take leave at preſent, by repreſenting to you the neceſſity there appears at this criſis, of augmenting the number of troops on your eſtabliſhment, to maintain the flouriſhing ſtate of the Company's affairs in this quarter, and to defend and protect the Company's acquiſitions from any future alarm or depredation of their enemies.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Baroda*
Beſſwamuntry Nuddy,
27th January 1780.

Copy of the treaty entered into with Futty Sing.

Treaty between the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and *Futty Sing Row Guicowar Shemſeer Bahaudar*; concluded at the village of *Candeela*, in the Pergunnah of *Dubhoy*, January the 26th 1780.

The Miniſters of the Maratta State having refuſed to accept of the reaſonable terms of accommodation offered them by Brigadier General *Thomas Goddard*, in the name of the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, and by their obſtinate perſeverance in hoſtile intentions againſt the Engliſh, compelled them to take up arms in defence of their own rights and poſſeſſions, the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, with the ſanction and approbation of the Honourable the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, have appointed and authorized Brigadier General *Goddard*, to ſettle and conclude a treaty of laſting peace and alliance betwixt the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company on one part, and *Futty Sing Row Guicowar Shemſeer Bahaudar*, for and in the name of all the Guicowar family, on the other; and the following are the articles of convention mutually entered into.

Article 1ſt.—The Engliſh and *Futty Sing Row* agree to a league of defenſive alliance, and to protect each other againſt all foreign enemies whatever.

Article 2d.—The Miniſters of the Maratta State by repeated violations of treaty, as well as their late conduct having drawn on themſelves the juſt reſentment of the Engliſh, having alſo by undue acts of oppreſſion, proved themſelves the enemies of *Futty Sing*; for theſe reaſons, and becauſe the moſt firm and ſincere friendſhip has long ſubſiſted betwixt the Honourable Company and *Futty Sing*, the contracting parties mutually agree to enter immediately into an offenſive league, excluding the Government of *Poonah* from all ſhare of country in the province of *Guzerat* whatever.

Article 3d.—The Engliſh agree to ſupport and defend *Futty Sing* in poſſeſſion of his ſhare of the Guzerat province, and *Futty Sing* is to aſſiſt and ſupport the Engliſh in poſſeſſing themſelves of and maintaining the ſhare now held by the Government of *Poonah*.

Article 4th.—In order to accompliſh this ſervice, as a firm friendſhip is now eſtabliſhed betwixt the Engliſh and *Futty Sing*, the latter agrees to join the Engliſh with 3,000 horſe according to cuſtom, and as many more as he can poſſibly raiſe, to act in conjunction with them during the preſent war, whenever they ſhall call upon them to do ſo.

Article 5th.—As the preſent mode of partition betwixt the Poonah Government and *Futty Sing* is attended with great loſs and inconvenience from the diſputes that muſt ariſe from the interference of the officers of each in collecting the revenues of the ſame places, and that lay interſperſed with one another, it is agreed upon that a new ſettlement of the province of *Guzerat* ſhall take place for the mutual benefit and convenience of both parties, the expreſs object of which will be an abſolute and ſpecific partition of the whole territory betwixt the Honourable *Eaſt India* Company and *Futty Sing*, according to the proportion of the revenues now reſpectively held by him and the Marattas.

Article 6th.—*Ahmedabad* and its dependencies, that is to ſay, the country to the north of the river *Myhé*, now poſſeſſed by the Poonah Government, to be allotted to *Futty Sing*; in lieu of which the Engliſh are to be put in poſſeſſion of the Guicowar diviſion of the country ſouth of the *Tappey*, known by the name of *Attaveezy*, and their ſhare of the revenues of *Surat*.

Article 7th.—The Engliſh will give ſuch aſſiſtance of force as *Futty Sing* may require to conquer and put him in poſſeſſion of the Poonah ſhare of the country to the north of the *Myhé*.

Article 8th.—The final partition and ſettlement of the Guzerat province being made, each party is to have the diſtinct and ſole government and poſſeſſion of the diviſion allotted him, and to hold his ſhare independent of, and unconnected with the other, except when united for their common defence againſt a foreign enemy, which they mutually and in the moſt ſolemn manner agree to do; and this partition and ſettlement mutually agreed to, is to be binding upon them and their poſterity for ever.

Article 9th.—*Futty Sing* having requeſted that the Engliſh ſupport him in withholding the annual tribute hitherto paid by him to the Poonah Government, it is ſtipulated that the Honourable Company will do ſo, till a final peace ſhall be concluded betwixt them and the Poonah Government, in which the intereſts of *Futty Sing* ſhall be carefully and equally attended to with their own.

Article 10th.—In conſideration of the advantage that will ariſe to *Futty Sing* from the above article, and as a proof of his ſincere regard and friendſhip for the Engliſh, he agrees to cede to them the diſtrict of *Zinnow*, and the villages ſituated in the Broach Pergunnah now belonging to him; both which are to remain for ever in the poſſeſſion of the Company.

Article 11th.—All the countries and places made over to the Engliſh in this treaty by *Futty Sing*, are to be delivered into their hands, and the collections accounted for to them from the day that *Futty Sing* is put in poſſeſſion of the city of *Ahmedabad*, and no demands of collection for any paſt time is to be made in them by *Futty Sing*.

Article 12th.—It is agreed, that two copies of this treaty be immediately ſent to the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, for their approbation, and to be by them tranſmitted to the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, under whoſe ſanction it is concluded, in order to receive their final

confirmation

confirmation and ratification; after which, one copy ſo authenticated, is to remain with the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and another with *Futty Sing*.

A true Copy.

Thomas Goddard.

A true Tranſlation.
Dalhouſe Watherſtone,
Perſian Tranſlator.

The Seal of the Company.

This treaty was ſigned, ſealed, and delivered to the contracting parties by each other, in preſence of us, who have hereunto ſigned our names.

Signed { *John Cockerell*, Q^r Mr Genl.
Edwd Heard, Adju^t Genl.

N. B. A copy of this treaty was alſo written in Perſian, and the articles reſpectively placed oppoſite the Engliſh ones, and ſigned as follows:

Thomas Goddard. The Seal of the Company. Futty Sing his Seal. *Futty Sing*'s Signature.

GOVIND GOPAUL,
the Rajah's Duan.
ROLAGEE SCINDIA,
married to the daughter of *Seajee*, *Futty Sing*'s brother.

Wedneſday the 9th of February 1780.

Signed the following letters to General *Goddard*, and the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*.

Goddard, General, letter to.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 26th and 27th ultimo, and very ſincerely congratulate you on the ſucceſs of your negociation with *Futty Sing*.

We entirely approve of the terms of the treaty you have concluded with him, which promiſe to accompliſh the great purpoſe of extending the Company's poſſeſſions ſouth of the *Mahié*, and of uniting the Guicowars to us by the ſureſt tie, that of our common intereſt. *Futty Sing*, we flatter ourſelves, will be thoroughly ſatisfied in receiving by your means ſuch acceſſion of territory as is ſtipulated for him north of the *Mahié*, and in being relieved from the heavy tribute formerly exacted from him by the Poonah Government.

We ſhall be glad to receive the particular plan you propoſe to communicate hereafter, with regard to what remains to be executed for the ſettlement of the province: by the 5th article of the preſent treaty, we obſerve that this remains open to future adjuſtment; and indeed it would have been impoſſible for you at ſo ſhort a warning, to have entered into all the details which will be neceſſary to the partition of the province between the Company and *Futty Sing*, according to the proportion of revenue held reſpectively by him and the Poonah Government; it was therefore neceſſary to reſerve this for a definitive treaty, which after ſettling the grand outlines, as marked in the abovementioned article, may be completed at greater leiſure.

In order to ſupply you with the neceſſary materials for this purpoſe, we have directed the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, and the Reſidents of *Jamboojier* and *Cambay*, to ſend you the beſt accounts they can procure of the ſeveral Pergunnahs and diviſions of the Guzerat province, with all the extracts they are capable, the particular value of each to the Poonah Circar, *Futty Sing*, the Nabob of *Surat* and *Cambay*, and the Graſſias or other Rajahs. We flatter ourſelves likewiſe, that at *Ahmedabad* you will be able to procure very authentic and particular information on this ſubject from the perſons who have been employed in the collections, as well as from *Futty Sing* himſelf; which latter may have its uſe, though it cannot certainly be relied on altogether, on account of his private intereſt to procure as advantageous a bargain as poſſible in the ſettlement of the propoſed exchanges. Appendix. No. 253. B.

The reſident at *Cambay* has been long in that part of the country, where our information is at preſent moſt imperfect; and as you may perhaps find him uſeful in proſecuting your inquiries on this ſubject, we have given him orders to attend you, ſhould you judge it proper to ſend for him.

We flatter ourſelves you will find leiſure for the final adjuſtment of this very eſſential part of your negociation. As ſoon as you may have reduced *Ahmedabad*, *Futty Sing*, on the proſpect of ſo noble an acquiſition, will probably be diſpoſed to ſettle exchanges with a more liberal ſpirit than can uſually be expected from a Maratta, in treating on a matter of this ſort, which will ſave you both much trouble and time.

We concur with you in regard to the neceſſity of augmenting the number of troops on our eſtabliſhment for the protection of the new acquired countries, and ſhall ſhortly determine on the meaſures to be taken for this purpoſe.

We ſhall take the earlieſt opportunity of tranſmitting a copy of the treaty with *Futty Sing* to the Governor General and Council agreeable to your deſire.

We think it neceſſary to acquaint you, that by the laſt advices from Major *Cotgrave*, at *Tellicherry*, dated 21ſt ultimo, he informs us, that he was finiſhing the lines of that place with all expedition, and which he hoped would be completed in ten or twelve days, when he propoſed embarking for *Surat* on the *Eagle*, with the company of European artillery and company of infantry, leaving the grenadiers and twentieth battalion of Sepoys for the defence of the place, which in his opinion would be fully ſufficient againſt their preſent enemy.

We encloſe copy of an extract of news juſt received from our Reſident at *Anjengo*, and by advices from *Tellicherry*, we learn that our honourable maſters ſhip *Hawke*, which imported at *Anjengo* the 24th ultimo from *Great Britain*, on the 16th of the ſame month off *Ceylon*, ſpoke with his Majeſty's ſhip the *Seahorſe*, and other ſhips in company, both of which were bound to this coaſt with troops from *Fort Saint George*, and which we ſuppoſe are thoſe mentioned in the extract of news.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 9th February 1780.

William Hornby, &c. Committee.

Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

I have been favoured with your letter of the 11th inſtant, and communicated to Mr. *Richardſon*, as you deſired, the reſolution you had taken reſpecting his reference; I at the ſame time indulged him with the choice of returning to his duty in this army, if he would comply with the general regulations I had found it neceſſary to eſtabliſh for the hoſpital department; and received through Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, his anſwer, copy of which I have encloſed for your peruſal.

It is matter of concern to me that Mr. *Richardſon* ſhould thus perſiſt in oppoſing an authority which you have been pleaſed to give as your opinion is veſted in me, for the internal regulation of this army, and which I am conſcious of having exerted for the good of the ſervice. The application he has made for a general court martial will, I make no doubt, appear to you moſt ſtrange and improper. He has not been accuſed of miſconduct; I have even thought proper to overlook his former diſobedience of orders, in declining to act under the regulations I had eſtabliſhed, on account of

the

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the reference made to your Government; and however his preſent behaviour might juſtly deſerve the ſeverity of that ſtrict inquiry he ſolicits, from the diſregard ſhewn to your authority, in thus perſiſting to diſpute the legality and propriety of my orders, I have, from a regard to the preſent ſervice, declined bringing him to a trial here, and given him permiſſion to repair to your Preſidency, to anſwer to you for his conduct; which I beg leave to repreſent has in this freſh inſtance, as well as through the whole of the buſineſs, been highly unjuſtifiable and unmilitary.

Having experienced on my march to the *Nerbudda* the inconvenience that aroſe from tranſporting a quantity of ſtores which were in charge of the Commiſſary of your troops, and which were altogether unneceſſary to the ſervice; I directed them to be ſent to *Broach*, and delivered over to your Commiſſary there, by which means a very conſiderable reduction has been made in the expence, and the army eaſed of a heavy incumbrance. In proſecution of the ſame plan of economy, ſo eſſentially requiſite at this time, when the Company are engaged in an important and expenſive war, I have alſo regulated the Bombay hoſpital department conformable to thoſe of the Bengal army, which are ſufficiently ample for every purpoſe of the ſervice, and have reſtricted the Commiſſary's charges, as nearly as poſſible, to the ſame eſtabliſhed ſtandard. From a conviction of the further convenience it would be of to the ſervice, as well as the diminution of expence, if the officers of your troops were permitted to carry their own camp equipage, inſtead of proceeding upon the former expenſive plan, I have taken upon me to grant the allowance for that purpoſe; but their tents are furniſhed by the Honourable Company. The advantage which the Company will derive from theſe regulations make me aſſured of their meeting with your ſanction and approbation, which I hope you will be pleaſed to favour me with.

The charge of the Bombay hoſpital by the departure of Mr. *Richardſon*, devolves upon Mr. *Durham*, the ſenior ſurgeon nominated in your letter to me; but Mr. *Grant Clugstone*, conceiving he has a prior claim of rank to him, has delivered me an addreſs to you on the ſubject, which I have now the honour to encloſe to you, and beg to receive your determination upon it.

I ſhall, agreeable to your deſire, ſend the papers relative to the Dutch intrigues to Mr. *Boddam*, who will forward them to you.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp, near *Broda*,
30th January 1780.

Friday 24th.

Signed the following letter to General *Goddard*, giving cover to an abſtract of the revenues of *Guzerat*; alſo a letter to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

Goddard, General, letter to.

Having received advice from the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, of your having reduced the city of *Ahmedabad*, we moſt ſincerely congratulate you on your ſucceſs, hoping ſoon to receive the particulars from yourſelf.

Since our letter of the 9th inſtant, we have been favoured with yours of the 30th ultimo; and entirely agree with you, that Mr. *Richardſon*'s application for a court martial was very improper, after the reference made to us at his own deſire, and the opinion we had given on the ſubject; and we have made known to him our ſentiments of his conduct.

We ſhall always give our warmeſt approbation of every reduction you can make in the expences of the army conſiſtent with the good of the ſervice; on which principle the regulations you have eſtabliſhed reſpecting the Bombay detachment have our entire ſanction.

We requeſt you will ſignify to Mr. *Grant Clugstone*, as our determination on his claim, that the Honourable Company's orders give him no pretenſions to the charge he now ſolicits, nor to any higher rank on the liſt of ſurgeons, until a vacancy ſhall happen in the Bombay hoſpital. He ought to conſider himſelf ſufficiently favoured in having the next ſucceſſion in preference to ſo many of his ſeniors; and if, as he ſtates in his letter, the Company's appointment was grounded upon a miſconception of his rank and pretenſions, his argument operates againſt himſelf.

In conſequence of your recommendation for augmenting our military eſtabliſhment, we have determined forthwith to raiſe two additional battalions of Sepoys; but as you muſt be a perfect judge of the ſubject, we ſhall be glad to be favoured with your opinion of what force will be neceſſary for the protection of our new acquiſitions.

Since we wrote you on the 9th inſtant, we have received an account from Mr. *Boddam*, of the revenues reſpectively collected by the Poonah Government and the Guicawars from the province of *Guzerat*. By this account it appears, that the ceſſions already made to the Company by the late treaty, are much inferior in value to the territories northward of the *Myhie*, the poſſeſſion of which is to be ſecured to *Futty Sing*. And to explain this the more clearly, we now tranſmit an abſtract of the account, arranged in diviſions, diſtinguiſhing the reſpective values of the Pergunnahs belonging to the Peiſhwa and the Guicawars, and their ſituation, with reſpect to the rivers *Tappey*, *Nerbedah*, and *Myhé*, by which you will at once diſcover the amount in which, by this account, the Company's ſhare falls ſhort of *Futty Sing*'s. We will not anſwer its being altogether accurate; but we tranſmit it to you as containing the beſt light we are able to afford to aſſiſt you in the new ſettlement, which, according to the 5th article, ſtill remains to be made of the general province, not doubting but you will exert your utmoſt efforts to ſecure ſuch a further tract of country, between the *Nubedah* and *Tappey*, or *Nubedah* and *Myhé*, as will make the Company's diviſion fully equal to *Futty Sing*'s, to which they have the ſtronger claim for relieving him from the heavy tribute before paid to the Poonah Circar.

The importance of ſecuring the friendſhip of *Hyder Ally* during the preſent war with the Marattas, or even his neutrality, and other conſiderations, regarding the ſtate of affairs on the Malabar coaſt, and the Company's commerce in his dominions, have led us to determine on ſending a gentleman to his Durbar commiſſioned to treat on theſe points; to which we have been the more encouraged by a late letter the Preſident has received from him. We have appointed Mr. *Horſley* for this commiſſion, and ſhall communicate to you as ſoon as poſſible ſuch information as he may be able to obtain reſpecting the Nabob's diſpoſition towards us, and what expectations may be reaſonably formed from him with reſpect to the material objects before mentioned.

The Chief of *Surat* having been invited to take poſſeſſion of *Gogo*, we have given him an authority for that purpoſe, when circumſtances may be convenient, as it will be a very deſirable acquiſition to the Company. You have already had notice from him of this affair, that you might regulate yourſelf in your negociations; and Mr. *Malet* can give you any information you may want reſpecting this place, and the importance of it to the Company.

The remainder of the battalion of Europeans from *Madras*, is arrived here on the *Hawke*; and we ſhall forward him to *Surat* as ſoon as the *Revenge* returns into port from *Fort Victoria*. We likewiſe ſoon expect the Europeans from *Tellicherry*, and a complete battalion of Sepoys from *Madras*.

The gentlemen at *Madras* expreſs much anxiety to us

for

for a ſafe and honourable peace with the Marattas; to enable you to effect which they have ſent ſuch a large force to this ſide of *India*. They apprehend much danger and embarraſſment from a combination between the Marattas, *Hyder Ally*, and the *Nizam*; and even acquaint us, the two latter have actually conducted an offenſive alliance againſt us, and that the latter is ready to join upon the firſt ſignal.

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We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,
Bombay Caſtle, 24th February 1780.
William Hornby, &c. Committee.

A General Account of the Revenues of *Guzerat*, as collected by the Peiſhwa and Guykwars; diſtinguiſhing the Diſtricts according to their ſituations from the rivers *Tappey*, *Nubedah*, and *Myhie*.

South of the Tappey.

Peiſhwa Share.		Guykwar Share.	
Parneyra	27,000	Chowraſſee, 17 villages.	
Boodſur	6,200	Jaghire to Siccaram Bapoo	169,800
Bowanee	8,800	Balliſer	104,000
Bulſar	85,000	Murdu	56,000
Parchde	107,000	Kannidge	88,500
Soopah	51,000	Tembah	46,400
Sabone	30,900	Conode	46,400
Ballore	30,000	Beara	14,000
Bamdu Cuſbah	7,900	Chowkey at D°	18,000
Wanſdal, Chout on it	7,000	Tillanu	103,000
Durrumpore D°	9,000	Norvſanu Cuſdah	14,200
Surat, Chout on it	42,000	Gundavie	89,000
Chowkies ſouth of the Tappey	83,000	Billimora	8,000
		Mowah	55,400
	494,800	Mulivanah	12,000
		Anarvil	12,000
		Wuſſentpore	18,900
		Antapore and Ranu Amba	22,500
		Soongur	42,000
		Mootah Cuſbah	9,800
		Surat Chout	42,000
			971,900

Between the Tappey and Nerbedah.

Peiſhwa Share.		Guykwar Share.	
Ulpar	316,000	Goſlah	42,000
Hanſood	85,000	Buſſore	85,000
Occlaſeir	78,000	Turhſhar	7,700
Nundavie, Chout on it	65,000	Sevangea Hittana	51,000
		Raju Piplia	30,000
	5,44,000	Chaikeys between the Nubedah and Tappey	65,000
			280,700

Between the Nerbedah and Myhie.

Peiſhwa Share.		Guykwar Share.	
Dubhoy	200,000	Zinnore	81,000
Ahmood	125,000	Chandde Cundally	12,500
Deſbara	35,000	Brodah	11,34,000
		Wagora Coolies	22,000
	360,000	Safoolu Gehat Coolies	86,000
		Tilluck, Wara, and Neckora D°	40,500
		Sunkera Baderpore Coolies	75,000
		Mea Gaum Chout from the Rajah	40,000
			14,91,000

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North of the *Myhie*.

Peiſhwa Share.		Guykwar Share.	
Pitlad, half ſhare	700,000	Pitlad	618,000
Dundooka	100,000	Dehliah	410,000
Mamedabad	100,000	Neriad	225,000
Challa Bejelby	100,000	Moonda	89,500
Bar Mavarra	50,000	Mater Kira	81,000
Kallicottah	50,000	Kuny	185,000
Verum Gaum	100,000	Bejapore	100,000
Godrah Taſtah	100,000	Bamegur	100,000
Dus Coſs, or diſtrict within ten coſs of Ahmedabad	100,000	Biſſanagur	100,000
		Puttan	300,000
Ahmedabad city	300,000	Dus Coſs of Ahmedabad	100,000
Mullock Guny Cattywar, according to the force employed therein	10,00,000	Collections of the city of Ahmedabad	210,000
		Mulluck Guny, according to the force, but reckoned	500,000
	27,00,000		30,18,500

N. B. A village in the Parchde Pinguinah, was given to *Saccaram Waſſo Deſſoy*, its name *Aumil Sar*; and is not mentioned above, valued at R^{s} 10,000.

ABSTRACT of the foregoing.

Peiſhwa's Share.		Guykwar's ſhare.	
Diſtrict ſouth of the Tappey	494,800	Ditto	971,900
		Aumil Sar. See N. B.	10,000
			981,900
Ditto, between the Tappey and the Nerbedah	544,000	Ditto	280,700
Ditto, between the Nerbedah and Myhie	360,000	Ditto	14,91,000
Ditto, north of the Myhie	27,00,900	Ditto	30,18,500
	40,98,800		57,72,100
Peiſhwa's ſhare	40,98,800		
Guykwar's ſhare	57,72,100		
Total revenues	98,70,900		

Tueſday 14th. Received the following letter from General *Goddard*, and one from the Chief of *Surat*, encloſing ſundry grants to the Honourable Company from *Futty Sing*.

Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

I have been favoured with your two letters of the 24th and 26th ultimo; and have had the ſatisfaction to make known to the army the ſentiments you have been pleaſed to declare in the latter. I may not anſwer ſo fully to the ſeveral points expreſſed in the former as they deſerve, for which the active ſervice in which I am at preſent engaged will I hope be accepted as an apology.

In a letter which I had the honour to addreſs you the 1ſt inſtant, acquainting you with my intentions of marching the day following, I took the liberty of obſerving that it would be politically prudent, at this juncture, to wave a diſcuſſion of ſuch points as might appear to you requiſite to ſettle in a final adjuſtment of the partition of *Guzerat* with *Futty Sing*, as the grand outlines of his agreement with the Honourable Company being effectually ſecured, the taſk of providing for the leſs important intereſts of our ſettlement with him would become hereafter perfectly eaſy, and to urge them at preſent could not be productive of any real or adequate advantage. Reſpecting the ſtatement, which you have been pleaſed to ſend me, of the revenues of *Guzerat* as ſhared by the Peiſhwa and Guicawar, but which, you add, you do not anſwer for its being altogether accurate, I beg to aſſure you that from the moſt exact information I have received, it is exceedingly erroneous and incorrect: I ſhall take an opportunity of laying before you an exact and ſatisfactory ſtatement of the collections of the province for your more particular information very ſoon; at preſent only permit me to obſerve, that the eſtimate made of the Peiſhwa's ſhare of the diſtricts to the north of the *Myhie;* exceeds the proper value by at leaſt fifteen lacks of rupees. I ſhall mention three inſtances in which they are greatly exaggerated. Firſt, reſpecting *Pitlad*; the whole amount of which may be reckoned at ſix lacks: ſecond, the city of *Ahmedabad*, whoſe collections amounted to about three lacks, and little more than half belonged to the Poonah Circar: thirdly, the revenue mentioned under the name of *Mulluckgurry*, the real value of which depended upon the force employed, and was never valued to the Peiſhwa at more than three lacks. If to theſe deductions be added the expences neceſſary to collect the revenues from the Zemindars, as well as to protect the country from the inroads and depredations of the Cottywars and other freebooters, it will be found that the real value of the Pergunnahs ceded to the Engliſh,

liſh by *Futty Sing*, excluſive of the convenience and advantage of their ſituation, is equal, if not ſuperior, to that guaranteed to him by the Company in lieu of it.

As you have been pleaſed to expreſs your wiſh to receive my opinion on the propoſed augmentation of your military eſtabliſhment, I ſhall do myſelf the honour of communicating it to you, and every idea that may ſtrike me as eligible on the ſubject, very ſoon; begging you will accept of the reaſon mentioned in the firſt part of my letter as an excuſe for not writing you fully upon it at preſent.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp at *Fazilpore*,
7th March 1780.

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Bombay Select Conſultations, the 25th February 1780.

Friday 25. RECEIVED the following letter from General *Goddard*, adviſing the reduction of *Ahmedabad*.

Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

That no time might be loſt in communicating to you the fortunate intelligence of the reduction of *Ahmedabad*, the capital of *Guzerat*, I diſpatched a ſhort note to Mr. *Gambier*, the Chief of *Broach*, the inſtant of the troops entering the place, requeſting he would immediately tranſmit an account of it to you; which I hope you will have received. Permit me to congratulate you moſt ſincerely, upon an event ſo honourable to the Britiſh arms, and ſo favourable to the intereſts of my Government.

On the 10th in the morning I arrived before the city, and wrote to the Maratta Governor, *Rago Pundit Tatwa*, deſiring him to deliver up the place to me: with this demand he affected an intention of complying, but his conduct was entirely the reverſe of any ſuch intention, for the troops from the walls fired upon ſuch of the camp people as approached them, and endeavoured to do all the miſchief in their power. In his excuſe the Pundit alleged, that the Aral and Scindy Jemautdars, who garriſoned the place, had large arrears due to them, and would not be induced to give it up till a ſum of money was agreed to be paid them, and that they kept his perſon in confinement, becauſe he was unable to ſatisfy them. There was, I believe, ſome foundation for this aſſertion: theſe Arabs and Scindys had arrears due to them from the Poonah Government, they were hired mercenaries, and it was in all probability a matter of indifference to them what Power's ſervice they entered into; they would therefore gladly have accepted their arrears, upon condition of being continued in the garriſon of the place; but I am convinced they never would have permitted the Britiſh troops to be put in poſſeſſion, or have evacuated it themſelves, if required to do ſo, becauſe they had, from a reſidence of many years, been conſidered as the legal eſtabliſhed militia of the city, and from the ſucceſs with which they had always heretofore oppoſed the efforts of the moſt numerous armies, none of whom could ever conquer the place, as well as the ſtrength of their own garriſon, which conſiſted of at leaſt 6,000 Arab and Scindy foot, beſides 2,000 horſe, they were inſpired with a degree of ſelf-confidence and aſſurance that their arms were invincible, and the city impregnable to our force. Finding therefore all my efforts to obtain poſſeſſion of the place by any other means ineffectual, I made the neceſſary preparations for beſieging it; and on the 12th, at one o'clock P. M. opened the batteries againſt it, which continued to play till the 13th in the evening, when the breach being practicable, I formed an intention of ſtorming next morning; but from motives of humanity and compaſſion, as the city was extenſive and populous, and I well knew the undiſtinguiſhing ſlaughter that almoſt unavoidably attends the fury of entering a city by ſtorm, I deferred the attack one day, in hopes that the enemy might accept the mercy I had proffered them: in this hope I was however deceived; and accordingly this morning gave orders for an aſſault, which ſucceeded to my utmoſt wiſh. The enemy fled from their works, after having endeavoured, without effect, to oppoſe the fierce onſet of the grenadiers, who, with their officers, diſtinguiſhed themſelves in a moſt remarkable degree; and I beg leave to recommend their conduct to your notice and approbation, and generally that of the whole army during the ſiege. Near three hundred of the enemy fell near the breach and about the gateway, beſides others who were killed and wounded after entering the place; and what makes the enterprize particularly fortunate, conſidering the deſperate reſiſtance of the enemy, and the difficulties we had to encounter, is the little loſs on our ſide with which it was achieved. This circumſtance I conſider as a bleſſing, on which I beg leave to congratulate you, and alſo on the honour which the Britiſh arms have acquired, by the moderation and mercy, ſo ſtrikingly marked in their conduct, after getting poſſeſſion of the place, for not above two of the inhabitants were wounded, which might have been the effect of accident entirely; and many who were in arms, upon ſubmitting and delivering themſelves up, had their lives ſpared them.

Lieutenant Colonel *Parker* having received a wound on the 14th, which I have the ſatisfaction to acquaint you is not by the faculty deemed dangerous, I committed the conduct of the attack to Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, and I am happy at an opportunity of teſtifying the high ſenſe I have of his merit and gallantry as an officer, from the whole of his behaviour on this occaſion. While I expreſs my warmeſt approbation of Major *Spaeth*'s ſkill and aſſiduity, I am concerned at the ſame time to inform you of his being wounded by a ſabre in ſeven places, which he received in aſſiſting with his people and materials to fill up the ditch for the paſſage of the grenadiers; I cannot at preſent ſpeak with any certainty upon the nature of his caſe. I am very ſorry to give you the diſagreeable intelligence that Captain *Gough* has this evening expired of the wounds he received in the ſtorm this morning. Mr. *Wright*, a volunteer of your eſtabliſhment, was killed by the accident of the burſting of a ſhell on the 13th inſtant. The names of the ſeveral gentlemen who have received wounds, all of which I have reaſon to hope are not dangerous, are as follow: Lieutenants *Caldwell* and *Prole*, of the engineers; Lieutenant *Stuart*, ſurveyor; Lieutenant *Long*, of the artillery; and Lieutenants *Mackintoſh* and *Croſsly*, of the infantry, and two volunteers.

I cannot help taking this opportunity of recommending to your favourable notice the conduct of Mr. *Fraſer*, who acted as a volunteer during the ſiege, and accompanied the forlorn hope on the ſtorming party: let me hope that the proofs of courage he has ſhewn, will at my inſtance be an inducement to reſtore him to your ſervice with his rank. Mr. *Clanſey*, who was ſome time ago unfortunate enough to loſe your ſervice, and has ſince been admitted to the Bengal eſtabliſhment, where he is now an enſign, ſolicited an opportunity for wiping away any ſtain that might have been thrown on his character, which I am happy to aſſure you he has effectually done by his gallant conduct in mounting the breach with the forlorn hope. Enſign *Heirn*'s behaviour, who carried the grenadier colours, merits particular mention; he followed the forlorn hope with the colours, and having mounted the breach, ruſhed to the gateway amidſt a number of the enemy, and planted them in triumph.

The volunteers of your eſtabliſhment were in the trenches during the whole of the ſiege, and marched foremoſt

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foremoſt to the ſtorm. Let me hope that you will find it conſiſtent to give ſome promotion as a reward for their good behaviour. Serjeant *Hugg*, who led the forlorn hope, diſplayed extraordinary marks of bravery; and as he is well educated and very deſerving, I hope I do not intrude too much on your indulgence, by ſoliciting he may be appointed a cadet.

The troops have taken a number of ſtandards from the enemy in aſſaulting the breach, which I propoſe ſending to your Government to be hung up as trophies of the conqueſt of *Ahmedabad* by the Britiſh arms, either in the church at *Bombay* or your armory, as you may think moſt proper.

The return of the killed and wounded not being ready for this diſpatch, I ſhall ſend it by the next opportunity, when I will addreſs you particularly: at preſent I am taking meaſures to protect the city and encourage the inhabitants.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble ſervant,
Head-quarters, *Ahmedabad*, 15th February 1780. *Thomas Goddard.*

Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 15th inſtant, informing you of the reduction of *Ahmedabad* by the Britiſh arms; and now beg leave to encloſe you a return of the killed and wounded, from the commencement of the ſiege till the period of its concluſion.

Since my laſt I have received authentic and undoubted intelligence that *Scindia* and *Tockajee Holcar* had paſſed the Gaut of *Caſſubarry*, and were encamped the 5th inſtant at *Arrahpore*, which is reckoned about 60 coſs from *Broderah*. *Scindia* had ſent off all his heavy artillery to *Burhampore*; and with ten or twelve light field pieces, and about 1,500 horſe, was himſelf advancing towards *Guzerat*. Should not the intelligence of the fall of *Ahmedabad* put a ſtop to his progreſs, which I hope it may not, I do not doubt being ſoon able to give you a good account of him; at any rate I ſhall keep a ſtrict watch over his motions, and be prepared to receive him: unleſs, which is alſo reported, the Miniſter is ſending another army to his ſupport, I can ſcarcely think he would venture into the *Guzerat* with ſo ſmall a force as he has at preſent with him. It is however pretty evident, that the ſuppoſed animoſity betwixt thoſe Chiefs is leſs confirmed and violent than what we had reaſon to believe from former reports; though at the ſame time *Scindia* it is well known has not been ſatisfied by the Miniſter reſpecting the demands he made upon him, and will therefore moſt probably be the readier to act upon his arrival the part he may find moſt for his own intereſt.

I ſhall not fail to communicate any new intelligence I may receive;

and have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble ſervant,
Ahmedabad, 18th February 1780. *Thomas Goddard.*

Return of the Killed and Wounded at the Siege and Attack of *Ahmedabad*, 15th February 1780.

Mogul regiment of Cavalry,
Killed 1 rank and file.

Artillery,
European, wounded 1 Lieutenant, 3 rank and file.
Native - - Ditto - - - - - - 2 Ditto.

Bengal Infantry,
Killed 1 Jemidar, 9 rank and file.
Wounded 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants, 1 Subedar, and 29 rank and file.

Bombay Infantry,
European, killed 1 volunteer, 1 drummer.
- - - - wounded, 1 Lieutenant, 3 volunteers, 1 ſerjeant, 5 rank and file.

Sepoys { Killed 2 rank and file. / Wounded 2 Jemidars, 23 rank and file.

Engineers,
Wounded 1 Major, 2 Lieutenants.

Laſcars,
3 wounded, 2 killed.

Bildars and Coolies,
5 wounded.

Beeſties,
2 wounded,

Total. 17 killed, 89 wounded.

Liſt of Officers killed and wounded.

Killed, Mr. Wright, Volunteer.

Wounded.
Bengal Infantry,
Lieutenant Colonel Parker.
Captain Gough, ſince dead.
Lieutenant Mackintoſh.
- - - - - Duncan Steward.
- - - - - Dury.

Engineers,
Lieutenant Caldwell.
- - - - - Prole.

Wounded.
Bombay,
Major Spaeth, Field Engineer.
Lieutenant Long, Artillery.
Lieutenant Croſsley, Infantry.
Meſſrs. Boya, Kelley, and Teallen, Volunteers.

(Signed) *Thomas Goddard*,
Brigadier General.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have had the pleaſure to receive your letters of the 15th and 18th inſtant, with the return of the killed and wounded at the ſiege of *Ahmedabad*. Goddard, General, letter to.

The reduction of this important place, in ſo ſhort a time, with ſuch inconſiderable loſs, and againſt ſo obſtinate and formidable an enemy, will reflect the higheſt honour on the Britiſh forces, and the officer under whoſe command they have ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed themſelves. And we ſend off this diſpatch purpoſely to convey our warmeſt approbation of the conduct of the army during the ſiege; and particularly of the officers and men engaged in the aſſault, not only for their gallantry in the attack, but for the moderation and humanity they diſplayed after getting poſſeſſion of the place, which entitles them to every mark of applauſe in our power to beſtow; and we therefore beg our thanks may be particularly given to them in public orders, as well as to the army in general.

We ſhall ſhortly reply to the other points in your letter of the 15th; and are with much eſteem,

Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Bombay Caſtle, 26th February 1780. *William Hornby*, &c. Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 255. B.

Received the following letter from General *Goddard*. Friday 10th.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 15th ultimo, ſince which Goddard, General, letter from.

which I have been favoured with your letter of the 9th. I am happy at the ſentiments of ſatisfaction you therein expreſs on the ſubject of the treaty with *Futty Sing*; in the concluſion of which, independent of immediate benefits of territory and revenue, I had principally in view the grand object of the preſent war, and ſecuring an uſeful and laſting alliance with a Power, whoſe affairs being inſeparably connected with our own, would effectually bind him to our intereſts in the proſecution of it; and who from ſituation, as well as policy, would become an uſeful and faithful ally to the Engliſh Company. This point I conceive, as far as human prudence and foreſight can judge, is now completely attained. *Futty Sing* ſenſible of the preſent power and ſtrength of the Engliſh, feels himſelf through their means raiſed to a ſtate of greatneſs and independance from which he muſt immediately fall, if deprived of their ſupport and aſſiſtance. The terms upon which he has been treated with were thoſe of the ſtricteſt impartiality and moderation, and the exchange of country made with him was proportioned to the ſhare he before held, and to that of the Peiſhwa's given him in lieu of it. Of theſe circumſtances he is himſelf fully ſenſible; and I only mention them now as arguments, that he muſt from intereſt as well as inclination be ready to unite heartily with us in defence of the province, and in proſecution of the war againſt the common enemy. The period calling upon him to do ſo ſeems now arrived, as my former letters will have already acquainted you; for *Scindia* and *Holkar*, notwithſtanding the various reports, firſt of their diſputes with the Miniſter, and afterwards of their intentions to march to the Malva province, are I underſtand advancing with an army rumoured to be about 40,000, towards *Surat*: I propoſe moving with all expedition to oppoſe them; and have ſent off to *Cambait* the heavy artillery, with a quantity of the moſt weighty and cumberſome ſtores, which might have proved an impediment to the rapidity of my march, to be tranſported from hence by water to *Surat*.

In purſuance of the engagements made with *Futty Sing*, I have put him in poſſeſſion of the city and collections of *Ahmedabad*, and have received from him, in the name of the Honourable Company, grants for the ſeveral Pergunnahs ceded to them, which I have tranſmitted with the neceſſary papers to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach*, in order that they may take poſſeſſion of them in your name, and begin to collect the revenues from the 28th of February, the day on which *Futty Sing* received the government of *Ahmedabad*, agreeable to what is ſtipulated in the 11th article of the treaty. The grants are four in number, one for the Chout of *Surat*, another for the country of *Autweezy*, a third for the villages in the Broach Pergunnah, and a fourth for *Zeimore*; the two former I have ſent to Mr. *Boddam* at *Surat*, and the two latter to Mr. *Gambier*.

With reſpect to what you mention regarding the points yet remaining to be ſettled with *Futty Sing*, it will be political to defer any attention to or adjuſtment of theſe to a future opportunity, when the grand objects of the war are ſufficiently ſecured to leave full leiſure to enter into the details of particular intereſts; the ſettlement already made, generally provides for the equal partition of the provinces, in a proportion drawn from the ſhares before poſſeſſed by the Peiſhwa and Guicawars; and to advance any further claims at preſent, might only tend to alarm and excite the apprehenſions of *Futty Sing*, prejudicial to our views at this critical juncture; that the points about which we may be ſolicitous, would if attained be ſerviceable. In order to render eaſy the diſcuſſion of ſuch buſineſs as may hereafter require to be ſettled, and generally to conduct the affairs of your Preſidency at the Court of *Futty Sing*, I have propoſed to him that an Engliſh gentleman ſhall in future remain there in the character of Reſident, to which he has cheerfully aſſented, and has addreſſed the honourable Preſident accordingly; this meaſure I beg leave to recommend as beſt calculated to preſerve a mutual good underſtanding betwixt the Engliſh and *Futty Sing*, and ſecure to them an uſeful and decided influence in his affairs, which may be improved as circumſtances ſhall hereafter render eligible; and I have only to requeſt at preſent reſpecting this appointment, that as the nature of *Futty Sing*'s engagements with the Engliſh will neceſſarily connect him particularly with me in the operations of the preſent war, you will give directions to your Reſident to receive ſuch orders and inſtructions from me as I may find it requiſite to give him in purſuance of the objects that may have been planned and concerted with you. Appendix. No. 255. B.

From the ruined and deſolate ſtate of this city, and the hopes that by proper encouragement the trade and manufacture, for which it was once ſo famous, might revive and flouriſh, I have ſettled with *Futty Sing*, that the Engliſh ſhall eſtabliſh a factory at *Ahmedabad*; this cannot fail to produce great commercial advantages, as there is no doubt but moſt of the trade would ſoon paſs through our hands from the influence we ſhould poſſeſs in the place, and the ſuperior confidence which the merchants and natives would place in us, to induce them to put themſelves under our protection. If the plan ſhould meet your approbation, it remains with you to make ſuch arrangements and regulations for its proper execution, as your experience, and knowledge of the Company's commercial intereſts in this part of *India* may ſuggeſt.

I am obliged to you for the permiſſion you have given the Reſident at *Cambait* to come to my camp, ſhould I judge it proper to require his attendance, and beg to aſſure you that in every part where I could have wiſhed to receive information, I have found extremely ready and capable of giving me ſatisfaction.

I have already mentioned my intentions of marching towards *Surat* with all expedition; and in order to remove every obſtruction to the rapidity of my motions, I ſhall leave the ſick and wounded of the army behind at *Ahmedabad*; I have alſo thought it eligible to leave a ſmall detachment of eight companies of Sepoys drafted from the eight battalions, and two guns here, under the command of Major *Fullarton*: theſe are in poſſeſſion of a ſtrong poſt within the city, formerly the reſidence of the collector, who reſided at *Ahmedabad*, on the part of the Guicawar. The weight which the preſence of this force, and in ſo reſpectable a poſt, will give to the Engliſh in the eyes of the inhabitants, and the decided influence it will ſecure to them againſt the deſigns of any Governor who may command in the place on the part of *Futty Sing*, will be of the greateſt preſent benefit to them, and render eaſy the future accompliſhment of their views reſpecting it.

It is with pleaſure I can inform you, that in conſideration of the Nawab of *Cambait*'s long and ſteady attachment to the Company, your recommendation of his intereſts, and the commercial benefits which he might be enabled to derive from any increaſe of influence at *Cambait*, I have obtained from *Futty Sing*, as a voluntary act and proof of his reſpect for the Engliſh, a relaxation in the chout, formerly collected by the Maratta Government, and which by his late agreements with us was become his rightful claim.

The ſacred light in which I ſhall ever conſider engagements under the ſanction of the public faith prevented me from too peremptorily inſiſting upon a point which might ſeem to be an innovation of them, or requeſting an entire acquittal of the Nawab's chout; and the Nawab will have ſufficient reaſon to be grateful to the friendſhip of the Engliſh, for the partial indulgence he has obtained through their means, which exempts him from the payment of any chout within the city of *Cambait*, reſerving only to *Futty Sing* the collections levied in the Pergunnahs.

The paper ſpecifying this releaſe, I have encloſed to Mr. *Malet*, the Reſident, and have confided in his local experience and information to propoſe ſuch advantages in commerce, and ſecure ſuch a decided influence to the Company with the Nawab as may be found conſiſtent

Appendix. No. 256. B.

and practicable: I ſhall immediately forward to you the reſult of what he may communicate to me in reply on this ſubject.

By intelligence juſt received, I learn that a body of 6,000 horſe have croſſed the *Nubedah* at *Bowapeer*; I ſhall march from this place to-morrow morning, and ſhall give you from time to time information of my progreſs.

I have the honour to be, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Ahmedabad,
1ſt March 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 256. B.

Letter from Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, 7th March 1780,

Governor General and Council, ether to.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council, at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

Our laſt addreſs was dated 31ſt January, of which a duplicate is encloſed

We have ſince had the pleaſure to receive advice from General *Goddard* of having come to an accommodation with *Futty Sing*, and a copy of the orginal treaty. Agreeable to the laſt article, we now forward two copies for the confirmation and ratification of your Government; the articles being inſerted in Perſian in the copy to be delivered to *Futty Sing*.

We alſo now tranſmit a continuation of our correſpondence with General *Goddard* ſince the date of our laſt letter with an abſtract of the revenues of the Guzerat province, ſubdivided according to the boundaries of the different diſtricts, and the ſhares reſpectively held by *Futty Sing*, and the Poona Government. We requeſt your particular attention to what we have urged to General *Goddard* in our letters of the 9th and 24th ultimo, reſpecting the further ſettlement and diviſion of the province, and the great diſproportion of the ſhare at preſent allotted to the Company; not that we doubt of the General's moſt zealous efforts to ſtipulate for a more adequate diviſion, but that you may likewiſe ſee the neceſſity which is ſuggeſted to us by our knowledge of *Futty Sing*'s character, of not giving the treaty your implicit ratification as final and definitive, but guarding it with a reſerve, providing for a new and equitable ſettlement of the province, according to the 5th article.

After the concluſion of the treaty, General *Goddard* loſt no time in moving with the army to put *Futty Sing* in poſſeſſion of the country to the north of the *Myhie*, being accompanied by that Chief with a body of his forces. He arrived before the city of *Ahmedabad* on the 10th inſtant, which he found garriſoned with at leaſt ſix thouſand Arabs and Scindy foot, beſides two thouſand horſe, and after ſome fruitleſs negociation with the Maratta Governor proceeded to beſiege the place. The batteries were opened on the 12th, and continued to play till the 13th in the evening, when the breach being practicable, the General had formed an intention of ſtorming the next morning, but from motives of humanity deferred the attack one day, in hopes the enemy would ſurrender upon terms. Being however diſappointed in this hope, on the morning of the the 15th he gave orders for the aſſault, which he acquainted us ſucceeded to his utmoſt wiſh; the enemy being unable to maintain their works againſt the vigorous attack of the grenadiers, who with their officers, diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the moſt remarkable manner. Lieutenant Colonel *Parker* having been wounded on the 11th. the conduct of the attack was committed to Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, of whoſe gallantry and merit as an officers the General teſtified a high ſenſe, from the whole of his behaviour on the occaſion. Near three hundred of the enemy fell in the breach, whilſt on our ſide the loſs was inconſiderable, as will appear by the encloſed return. We are however concerned to mention that Captain *Gough* of your eſtabliſhment died the ſame day of the wounds he received in the ſtorm, and that Major *Spaith* of the Bombay engineers was very dangerouſly wounded, and we have juſt heard he is ſince dead.

We beg leave to congratulate you on the reduction of this important place, which enables us immediately to fulfil the Company's engagement with *Futty Sing*, and entitle them to the poſſeſſion of the places ceded to them by the treaty. Our laſt letter from General *Goddard* was dated the 18th inſtant; when he was employed in taking meaſures to protect the city and encourage the inhabitants, but we are impatient to hear of his having brought matters in that quarter to a concluſion with *Futty Sing*, as the late motions of the Maratta forces appear to make his preſence neceſſary more to the ſouthward.

A body of horſe, ſaid to conſiſt of about 20,000, under the command of *Madjee Scindia*, and *Tookajee Holkar*, have arrived within about twelve coſs of the paſs of *Soargur*, near 40 coſs from *Surat*; Mr. *Farmer*, who continues with *Madjee Scindia*, wrote the Chief under the 21ſt ultimo, that he learnt they were to remain in that quarter until ſomething was ſettled by negociations intended to be ſet on foot with General *Goddard* and *Ragonath Row*. It was alſo ſurmiſed that a ſurprize was intended, to plunder the city of *Surat*, and ſeize the perſon of *Ragoba*, but the ſeaſonable arrival of Colonel *Brown*'s detachment from *Madras*, places us above all apprehenſions of any attempt of that nature, and will make a moſt reſpectable addition to the army under General *Goddard*, who does not doubt of ſoon being able to give a good account of the enemy.

A body of about 5,000 Maratta horſe, under the command of the miniſterial officer, has alſo approached *Surat* from the ſouthward, on which account the detachments placed at the ſeveral diſtricts which had been taken poſſeſſion of, have been recalled into garriſon, and the country muſt neceſſarily be expoſed to ravage till General *Goddard* returns to the ſouthward.

In our letter of the 2d January we acquainted you, that the Preſident had written to *Hyder Ally* on certain points of his conduct; and we have now the pleaſure to encloſe a copy of his anſwer, and of another letter ſent him by the Preſident in conſequence. When theſe papers were laid before us, the neceſſity of ſending a gentleman to *Hyder* was repreſented to us in a ſtrong light by the Preſident in a minute be delivered in upon the occaſion, a copy of which is likewiſe encloſed; and the propoſal entirely coinciding with our own opinion, and being ſtrictly conſonant to the ſentiments of the Honourable Company expreſſed in their lateſt commands, we have appointed Mr. *Horſley* to this commiſſion, on which he will ſhortly proceed; and he will be inſtructed punctually to communicate to you every material information he may be able to obtain reſpecting *Hyder*'s diſpoſitions towards the Company, and expectations from them in caſe he can be induced to join in our views againſt the Marattas. It will likewiſe, in theſe times, be of eſſential importance to compoſe the troubles on the Malabar coaſt; and at any rate it will be a capital advantage to obtain ſome preciſe knowledge of the views and proceedings of a Power of ſo much conſequence in the political ſyſtem of *India*, neither of which points can be effected but by ſending a gentleman directly to his Durbar. This meaſure having before met with your concurrence when propoſed to you in the year 1778, and the exigency being ſo preſſing as not to admit of any loſs of time, we propoſe diſpatching Mr. *Horſley* as ſoon as the proper paſſports arrive from the Nabob.

Our lateſt advices mention that *Scindia* and *Holcar* were to croſs the *Nubedah*, the 29th ultimo, and to puſh on into *Guzerat*, and we conjecture General *God-*

daid would leave *Ahmedabad* about the firſt of this month to meet them. We doubt not the General will either bring them to action or oblige them to quit the province, unleſs their views ſhould be to come to an accommodation, of which their conduct has not much the appearance. Colonel *Brown* with his detachment, conſiſting of one battalion of European infantry, and one company of artillery, is now at *Surat*, and the enemy between him and our army; nor do we know what orders General *Goddard* has given reſpecting them; but ſhould he want them to join him before he reaches *Surat*, a junction may be effected without danger, by tranſporting them by ſea, if neceſſary, to any convenient poſition.

We are, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Wm Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
7th March 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 257. B.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 6th April 1780.

Extract of a Letter from General *Goddard* to the Preſident: dated Camp at *Pittoul*, 24th March 1780; received yeſterday.

I am now about to ſpeak to you on a ſubject which appears to me of the utmoſt conſequence to the intereſts of the Company in the preſent ſtate of affairs, and in which, before I can take any ſtep, it is neceſſary to receive the ſanction of your Government. The want of proper management in regulating the revenues of *Futty Sing*; his own weakneſs and impolicy; and the fluctuation of power that attends a deſpotic reign, added to the general corruption and avarice which pervades every part of our adminiſtration, governed by the narrow views of Maratta policy, which ſeek only the gratification of the preſent moment, has reduced him to the moſt extreme diſtreſs and poverty. He has repeatedly, and at different times, ſince he firſt accompanied me to *Ahmadavad*, repreſented his ſituation in this reſpect, and the hopes he had of finding relief from his neceſſities in the friendſhip and aſſiſtance of the Company; but till this period, as circumſtances did not before this period render the opportunity ſo favourable, and the riſk was not ſo imminent, his troops have continued pretty ſilent: they now clamorouſly demand the payment of a part of their arrears; and unleſs they can be ſatisfied in ſome meaſure, the moſt alarming conſequences are to be apprehended. It is not the abſence of theſe troops that would be any way prejudicial, but the effect it muſt have, not only on the enemy, but on the mind of *Futty Sing*, and in his intereſts who deſerves every conſideration as an ally of the conſpiracy, who has proved himſelf ſo, and riſked the enmity of his former friends on their account: he has urged me repeatedly to aſſiſt him with five or ſix lacks of rupees, for which he is ready to give ſecurity and aſſignments upon his own Pergunnahs, ſhould he fail in repaying it at the promiſed period. To a man thus in poſſeſſion of country there can be no riſk in lending money; on the contrary, the greateſt political benefit may be derived, and claims eſtabliſhed through his kingdom, which the Company might hereafter aſſert at pleaſure. Should our own neceſſities be urged as a reaſon why we cannot avail ourſelves of his preſent diſtreſs, they may furniſh a cauſe why we might not aſſiſt him to the extent he wiſhes; but ſtill we ought to exert ourſelves all we can upon the occaſion; and beſides it may not be neceſſary to pay the whole amount at preſent, but to give ſecurity for its being paid at the expiration of one or two months: if this plan meets with your approbation, which I have reaſon to hope from every circumſtance it will, let me beg you will ſend authority from your Committee to ſettle it on the moſt advantageous footing for the Company, the amount to which you think it neceſſary to limit me; and alſo give directions to your Chief of *Surat* and *Broach* to advance ſuch proportion of money for this buſineſs as you may deem moſt conſiſtent with their views and means. Appendix No. 257. B.

Signed the following letter to General *Goddard*: Thurſday, April 6th 1780.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have duly received your letters of the 24th and 27th ultimo, with thoſe antecedent thereto, ſince your departure from *Ahmadavad*.

The equivocal and myſterious conduct of *Madjee Scindia*, leaves us much at a loſs as to his real views and intentions; but whatever may be the active and vigorous meaſures you have purſued, we think they cannot fail having a good effect, and haſtening a deciſion, which, as the ſeaſon advances faſt, we moſt ardently hope will ſpeedily be produced, that you may be at liberty to employ the army to more advantage than watching the motions of *Madjee Scindia*.

In the preſent ſituation of affairs, and whilſt *Futty Sing* is actually in the field as our auxiliary in the war, it ſeems to us not neceſſary to ſend a gentleman to his Durbar reſident on the part of this Government; but when it may be judged a convenient time for ſettling the point yet remaining to be adjuſted, this meaſure can then be adopted. In the mean time Mr. *Malet* may be employed on any occaſional buſineſs with *Futty Sing*, in which you may judge his aſſiſtance neceſſary, as his ſituation at *Cambay* will enable him to attend at the ſhorteſt warning, and his knowledge of the language and politics of the country fully qualify him for the employment.

Neither do we as yet judge it expedient to make uſe of the privilege you have obtained for the Company of eſtabliſhing a factory at *Ahmadavad*.

As Mr. *Farmer*'s application has been referred to the Governor General and Council, we cannot take upon us to decide upon it.

We are very ſenſible of your attention and trouble in giving us your thoughts ſo fully on the propoſed augmentation of our military ſtrength, from which we doubt not to derive very eſſential advantage and information, in the arrangement we ſhall now very ſpeedily make.

The Preſident has laid before us an extract of your letter to him on the ſubject of a propoſed loan to *Futty Sing*.

Whatever benefit or good conſequences might be expected from our compliance with this propoſal, we can aſſure you with the utmoſt truth, the thing is in itſelf utterly impracticable in the preſent ſtate of our finances; you cannot but be ſenſible, in what difficulties it involved us to ſpare the ſums which we have ſupplied for the ſervice of the army; and our wants now preſs ſo hard upon us that we can hardly raiſe money for the payment of our garriſon and other indiſpenſable occaſions, much leſs can we anſwer this unforeſeen demand: and ſhould we even attempt to raiſe the ſum by a loan, or in any other manner, the ſcarcity of ſpecie would alone inevitably prevent our attempt ſucceeding; even could we entertain a thought of diverting any money we could obtain to any other object than the preſſing exigencies of this Government.

We requeſt you will continue your directions to Major *Fullarton* to enliſt ſuch recruits as he may be able for this Preſidency, upon the ſame footing as the other Sepoys upon this eſtabliſhment.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Willm Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
6th April 1780.

Appendix. Nos. 259 & 260.

APPENDIX, No. 259.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 14th March 1780.

Thurſday 16th. RECEIVED the following letter from General *Goddard*:—

Goddard Gen. letter from.

Gentlemen,

I wrote to you from *Fazilpore*, acquainting you of my having croſſed the *Myhie*, on the ſouth bank of which I remained encamped the 7th inſtant; and on the 8th marched to this place, on the *Beſwamuntry Nuddy*, within two miles of *Broach*. I have yet met with no ſort of attempt to moleſt the followers of the camp from *Scindia*'s troops: nor have they, by any act ſince quitting the neighbourhood of our Pergunnahs, teſtified a hoſtile diſpoſition in their maſter towards the Engliſh; on the contrary, he has himſelf, as far as was in his power, endeavoured to evince his own friendly inclinations, by releaſing voluntarily and unaſked, Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Stewart* from their confinement, and diſmiſſing them to my camp, where I have the pleaſure to inform you they arrived ſafe the evening of yeſterday. He at the ſame time deputed *Appajee Subajee* to deliver them over to me, with letters from himſelf and *Holkar*, ſetting forth the proofs he had formerly given of his friendly intentions to the Engliſh at *Worgaun*, he having perſiſted in the ſame ſentiments towards them, till the preſent period; which was ſufficiently manifeſted in the treatment he had given Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Stewart*, during their reſidence in his camp, and particularly in the liberty he had now granted them to return; and that he wiſhed to know whether our inclinations were of a hoſtile or friendly nature towards the Peiſhwa and himſelf, as from our conduct hitherto, he had reaſon to believe the former? In anſwer to this, I told *Appajee Subajee*, that his maſter could not be a ſtranger to the diſpoſition of the Engliſh to live in terms of peace and amity with the Peiſhwa's Government; that to this effect, I had made fair and equitable propoſals of accommodation to the Miniſter, which had been rejected by him; and that in conſequence of this refuſal, the Engliſh had been compelled to enter upon a war, in defence and vindication of their own rights and honours; that their quarrel was with the Miniſter, to whoſe obſtinate and pernicious councils the evil that might befal the Maratta State in the courſe of this war, muſt alone be attributed; that they had no cauſe of enmity againſt *Scindia* whatever, but on the contrary were conſcious of the favourable diſpoſition he had always ſhewn to their intereſts; and if he continued to prove himſelf their friend, were ready to teſtify their ſenſe of his ſervices, and unite in any plan that might be propoſed and adopted for their mutual benefit.

After converſing ſome time, the Vackeel told me that his maſter was equally with us the enemy of *Nanah Furneeſe*; ſince, notwithſtanding he was indebted for all his preſent greatneſs and ſecurity to the powerful aid of *Scindia*, who had confined both *Siccaram* and *Moraba*, he had acted with the blackeſt ingratitude, and had leagued with the Booſla and Nizam againſt *Scindia*. He dwelt much upon the power of his own maſter, and the inferior light in which the Miniſter ought to be conſidered, being in fact entirely ſubject to the controul and direction of *Scindia*. He concluded with declaring, that the inclinations of the Engliſh and *Scindia* were, he found, reciprocally friendly to each other, and hoſtile towards *Nanah*; and requeſted I would upon theſe grounds make ſuch propoſals to his maſter as might be conſiſtent with the views, and conducive to the intereſts of both parties.

I plainly perceived from the converſation of this man that his drift was to obtain from me the firſt overtures towards a particular connection with *Scindia*, either with a view of giving his maſter a ſuperiority in the courſe of the negociation, if he was ſincere in the friendly wiſh he then expreſſed, or if he meant to deceive, to draw ſuch a diſcovery from me as might be of ſervice to his own deſigns: I therefore contented myſelf for the preſent with obſerving, in addition to what I have above mentioned, that it would be a circumſtance perfectly agreeable to the Engliſh, if *Scindia* heartily united with them againſt the Miniſter; and that with reſpect to the future ſettlement of the Government of *Poonah*, as he muſt be the beſt judge how it might be effected in the moſt eligible and beneficial manner, I wiſhed to receive his ſentiments upon the ſubject, to which I would reply with candour and ſincerity.

Senſible how important a firm alliance with *Scindia* would be to the intereſt of the Company at this juncture; and how deciſive with reſpect to the object of our preſent operations, as well as on account of the line of conduct the Honourable the Governor General and Council recommended me to purſue regarding this Chief; I have at the ſame time given him every proper encouragement to unite himſelf with the Engliſh, and in general terms held forth to him the honour and advantage he muſt ultimately derive from ſo conſiderable and diſtinguiſhing a connection. The Vackeel has this morning ſent off to his maſter the particulars of what paſſed; and I expect to receive an explicit anſwer to-morrow, from which I ſhall be able to form a more certain idea of his real views, and what plan muſt ultimately be reſolved upon regarding him. I beg to aſſure you, that I ſhall not be ſeduced by the ſhining advantages this alliance offers, to place any implicit confidence in his profeſſions, but ſhall act in the negociation with the utmoſt circumſpection and deliberation, and guard, as far as human prudence and foreſight can determine, againſt every poſſibility of deceit.

Permit me to requeſt that you will favour me as early as poſſible with your ſentiments on the conduct proper to be purſued regarding this Chief; and in the mean time believe that I ſhall be guided by an invariable attention to the objects contained in the general plan concluded with you for the ſucceſsful concluſion of our preſent conteſts with the Maratta empire. I ſhall not fail to give you the earlieſt information reſpecting this buſineſs in my power.

And have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp on the *Biſwamuntry Nuddy*, 10th March 1780.

N. B.—I forgot to mention above, that *Scindia* and *Holkar*, the day after my arrival here, moved off with their whole force to a place about 18 miles diſtant from my camp, and eight from *Pawn Gur*.

T. G.

APPENDIX, No. 260.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 24th March 1780.

Gentlemen,

Since my letter of the 10th inſtant, which informed you of the arrival of Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Stewart* in my camp, and the converſation I had held with *Apajee Subaiee*, who accompanied them on the part of *Scindia*, I have entertained hopes of being able to communicate to you ſomething deciſive with regard to the negociation ſet on foot by that Chief; but notwithſtanding the expected anſwers have arrived, I am ſorry it is not in my power to ſatisfy you further on this important point.

Goddard Gen. letter from.

Theſe anſwers from *Scindia* and *Holcar* were delivered me laſt night by the Vackeel, and contained only general declarations of their own friendly ſentiments, and the ſatisfaction they had derived from my aſſurances of the favourable inclinations of the Engliſh towards them; requeſting further, that as the buſineſs to be mutually adjuſted was of the moſt important nature, I would ſend a confidential perſon to their camp, fully informed of the views

views of the Engliſh, with whom they might come to a final ſettlement and determination. After the proofs ſo recently given by *Scindia*, of his wiſh to preſerve the good opinion and friendſhip of the Engliſh, I could not with any propriety have heſitated to ſhew him this mark of my confidence, had it appeared neceſſary to the ſucceſs of our negociation, or even calculated to promote it in any degree; but, excluſive of a certain conviction in my own mind to the contrary, I further conſider that the deputing a perſon to him at this time would carry the appearance of being too eager in making overtures which might be conſtrued in an unfavourable light; and was beſides particularly improper, from the circumſtance of *Scindia*'s having correſponded with me under the ſeal of the Peiſhwa; and that ſince the refuſal of the Miniſter to accede to the terms I had propoſed, all propoſals for accommodation ought to be firſt made by their Government.

I therefore declined ſending any perſon immediately from myſelf to *Scindia*, but in ſuch a manner as to avoid impreſſing him with a belief that my diſſent aroſe from any motives of diſtruſt, or a want of alliance on his honour or ſincerity; and have given *Apajee Sabajee* leave to return to his maſter, empowered to offer every general aſſurance on the part of the Engliſh, of the proper ſenſe they have of his ſervices, and their wiſh to continue on terms of amity with him; if by his conduct he will give them an opportunity of proving their friendly diſpoſition and deſire to promote his intereſts, in conjunction with their own. *Apajee Sabajee* ſet out this day for his maſter's camp, which is about ten coſs diſtant, with a promiſe of returning the day after to-morrow; to which period, I have thought it neceſſary to limit him, as *Scindia* will have ſufficient leiſure to deliberate fully upon the meaſures he wiſhes to propoſe, and at the ſame time an excuſe for further delays be avoided. I have conſented, however much againſt my inclination, to the delay hitherto practiſed, from the probability there appears of ſucceeding in this negociation, and the certain and deciſive advantages an union of intéreſts with *Scindia* will give us in the preſent war. Since croſſing the *Mybé* his army has alſo remained perfectly quiet in the neighbourhood of *Paun-Ghur*, and the Company's Pergunnahs do not experience the effects of their ravages and depredations. My next will, I flatter myſelf, give you that certain and poſitive intelligence I am ſo deſirous of conveying to you.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble ſervant
Thomas Goddard,

Camp near *Baroda*,
13th March 1780.

Goddard. Gen. letter from.

Gentlemen,

On the 10th inſtant I had the pleaſure of acquainting you with the ſafe arrival of Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Stewart* in my camp, ſince which I have received a letter from the former, copy whereof accompanies this. In conſideration of the circumſtances under which theſe gentlemen became priſoners in the camp of *Madjee Scindia*, the hardſhips they muſt have undergone during their confinement, not ſo much on account of any actual ſeverity they may have met with, and of which indeed they do not complain, as from the idea that their lives were become forfeited to the capricious pleaſure of a perſon who might think himſelf juſtified in adopting the harſheſt meaſures; I conceived a particular happineſs in ſeeing them enter my camp in ſafety; and I conſidered this conduct in *Madjee Scindia*, in voluntarily delivering up their perſons, as moſt fortunate to themſelves, and highly honourable to the Engliſh name.

I ſhould therefore have been exceedingly happy to relieve Mr. *Farmer* from the inconvenience he ſays he has ſuffered in his private fortune, on account of the money he found neceſſary to advance to procure his enlargement, and to which, I beg leave to add, he appears to me very well entitled; but as in my inſtructions from the Honourable Governor General and Council, I received no orders on the ſubject of the releaſe of theſe gentlemen, nor was any proviſion made for the circumſtance that has now happened, and which indeed they could not foreſee; I have been under the neceſſity of declining to comply with his requeſt myſelf, but have, as he further ſolicited, referred and ſtrongly recommended his caſe to the conſideration of the Bengal Government. Appendix. No. 260.

I ſhould be wanting in juſtice to Mr. *Farmer*, did I not avail myſelf of the preſent opportunity to teſtify, in the ſtrongeſt and moſt public manner, my ſenſe of his attention to the Company's intereſts, as ſtrikingly proved in the danger to which he expoſed himſelf, by tranſmitting me at different times from the camp of *Madjee Scindia* advices of the ſtate of affairs there, and of the movements of his army, together with ſuch other uſeful intelligence regarding the intentions of the ſeveral Maratta leaders, as could come within his knowledge; I am for this reaſon further induced to recommend his caſe to your particular attention, and, as he has repreſented to me the extreme inconvenience he muſt ſuffer in his private affairs from the delay of the payment of the ſum he has advanced, to hope you will deem it conſiſtent with your own ſentiments of Mr. *Farmer*'s merits to afford him immediate relief from his preſent embarraſſments, without waiting for the reſult of the reference I have thought it neceſſary to make to the Government of *Bengal*.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near *Baroda*,
15th March 1780.

Copy of a Letter from Mr *William Gamul Farmer* to General *Goddard*.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

It had been long ago propoſed to me to be deputed to you in order to endeavour at an accommodation between you and *Scindia*; but the mode was, that Mr. *Stewart* ſhould be left as a ſecurity for my return, which was in fact doing nothing effectual as to our releaſe; becauſe in the event that no accommodation took place, we ſhould have remained juſt where we were. I perceived that they had it really in mind to depute ſomebody, and they alſo wiſhed that I ſhould go with this perſon. On this ground I held out, that if *Scindia* would permit me to go, I would endeavour the moſt in my power to effect the buſineſs to his ſatisfaction. I further obſerved, that if to the ſervices on which he founded certain claims, he added the full and ample releaſe of Mr. *Stewart* and myſelf, it would be an act that, added to his treatment of us, would give him great calls on the gratitude of the Engliſh, and go very far to convince them that he looked to a laſting connection with them. This ſuggeſtion I was told was a very good one, and that it would be made uſe of; but it was inſinuated to me that I knew the Miniſters of *Scindia*'s Durbar were obliged annually to make large preſents to their Chief; and that the only reſources they had were the opportunities of rendering ſervices to people in affairs they might have at the Durbar; that the releaſe of Mr. *Stewart* and myſelf was one of theſe opportunities; and that I muſt reflect, that as the agreements we were hoſtages for were of no leſs value to *Scindia* than the ſum of twelve lacks per annum, at any other period than the preſent, he might perhaps inſiſt on ſome pecuniary compenſation for himſelf; and that then as the amount might be beyond my abilities to ſatisfy it, we had little proſpect, if the preſent moment paſſed by, of any thing better than a very

Appendix. No. 260.

very tedious confinement; that it would therefore be wiſe in me not to let ſlip this opportunity of extricating ourſelves from a very diſagreeable ſituation. There ſeemed to me a great deal of reaſon alſo in this argument, and knowing that it was impoſſible to effect a buſineſs of this kind without previouſly ſecuring the Miniſters, I accordingly begun treating, on the footing that the ranſom would be entirely at my own expence, as I had formerly taken care to have them convinced that the Company would not pay a rupee towards it. They began by talking of a lack, then 75,000, from which I brought them down to half a lack; and after much diſcuſſion I finally concluded for 35,000, to be paid to the different Miniſters of *Scindia*'s Durbar, part on our receiving our public diſmiſſion, and the remainder on the ſafe delivery of Mr. *Stewart* and myſelf into your hands; there was then no kind of difficulty; the buſineſs was taken up on the footing I had pointed out; and we have once more the happineſs of being reſtored to the ſociety of our own countrymen.

When we became hoſtages for the treaty of *Worgaum*, as far as I could then perceive it was deemed a meritorious ſervice, and I believe no one thought that we were to be left expoſed without conſideration as ſacrifices to the reſentment of the Marattas. I truſt therefore, that in the opinion of every man the expenſe of our releaſe ſhould be borne by thoſe for whoſe intended benefit we did expoſe ourſelves to what we have already ſuffered. On this footing it may perhaps happen, that in the event I have acted for the benefit of the Honourable Company; for ſhould no accommodation take place, and I had not embraced the opportunity of the preſent moment, it would poſſibly hereafter have been requiſite to have made ſome pecuniary compenſation to *Scindia* himſelf, and in that caſe the preſent ſum is trifling to what would have been demanded; as it has been heretofore hinted to me, that if my employers did not intend to comply with the treaty, they ought in juſtice to ſet on foot ſome endeavours for our releaſe, and that for the value of five or ſix lacks to *Scindia* and his Miniſters, the buſineſs might be effected. If I could have paid ready money it would have been poſſible to have accompliſhed this buſineſs for a leſs ſum, but it was only in my power to pay a part, and for the reſt I have paſſed ſuch obligations, and given ſuch ſecurity as will render my private fortune anſwerable for the payment; and I have alſo left my Dewan and another perſon there as further ſecurity. I have thus, Sir, taken the liberty to ſubmit the whole tranſaction to you; and conclude by requeſting that you will enable me, from the public caſh, to ſatisfy theſe obligations.

Having underſtood that the Honourable Governor General and Council have veſted you with the entire and uncontrouled conduct of all affairs on this ſide that may have any relation with the Marattas, I thought that the foregoing could with propriety only be addreſſed to you; and I have been rather fuller than perhaps might at firſt appear neceſſary, in order to ſave you the trouble of explaining the juſt ground on which my requeſt is founded: I muſt alſo aſſure you, that bad as our ſituation would probably have been on the event of hoſtilities with *Scindia*, I would gladly have been content to have expoſed myſelf to the worſt, ſooner than bring any expence on the Honourable Company; but from what I heard of the general apprehenſions relative to the fate of Mr. *Stewart* and myſelf, I thought that being freed from theſe apprehenſions, you would alſo be freer to take every opportunity againſt *Scindia*, without any burthen to your private feelings; and further, that in caſe by the events of war any Chief ſhould fall into your hands, whoſe abſence would diſtreſs him or *Holkar*, that advantage might be loſt by the exchange that you might be induced to make of them for us; and I know perfectly that the capture of certain Chiefs would diſtreſs them, becauſe without their Sirdars, the men would either refuſe to act, or moſt probably altogether diſband themſelves.

I beg leave to conclude by obſerving, that I make no claims on the Company for all that I have ſuffered both of body and mind, during a tedious confinement in the Maratta camp, nor for the hazard it is certain I have undergone; that my life was not made anſwerable by the Marattas for the failure of thoſe engagements for which I pledged it in their hands. I ſimply requeſt, that to theſe ſufferings and theſe hazards may not be added a loſs which would go far to conſume all I have been labouring for in this climate during a courſe of near 18 years, devoted to the ſervice of the Honourable Company.

I am, with great reſpect,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
humble ſervant,
Will. Gan^l Farmer.

Cmp near *Broderah*, 10th March 1780.

A true copy.
R. Dunkley, Sec^y.

Gentlemen,

Goddard Gen. letter from.

The expected propoſals on the part of *Madjee Scindia* have at length been made me through *Abajee Sabajee*, who yeſterday brought me letters from his maſter, filled only with general expreſſions of friendſhip, and referring me for particulars to his man. He accordingly, after repeating *Scindia*'s enmity to the Miniſter *Nana Furneeſe*, and his wiſh to unite with the Engliſh in removing him from the Adminiſtration, and ſettling it upon a plan more conſiſtent with the intereſt of both parties, made me the following propoſal:—That formerly when *Ragoba* was at *Tellaugaum*, after the return of the Engliſh army to *Bombay*, an agreement had been entered into betwixt him and *Scindia*, and written engagements mutually exchanged for its performance, wherein the former conſented to relinquiſh all claims to any ſhare in the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, and to retire towards *Jeney*, where he ſhould receive an allowance from the Peiſhwa's revenue of twelve lacks of rupees per annum; that the Sicca ſhould continue to be ſtruck in the name of the young Peiſhwa *Maderow Narrain*, and that *Bajerow*, the ſon of *Ragoba*, ſhould be appointed his Duan; but that as he was too young to tranſact the buſineſs of the office himſelf, being only four years of age, the care and management of it ſhould be left entirely to *Scindia*, by which means the ſole controul and direction of the Government would come into his hands. This plan *Scindia* propoſed ſhould now be purſued, that *Ragoba* ſhould immediately go himſelf to *Jeney*, and young *Bajerow* accompany him to *Poonah*, in order to fix the Adminiſtration in the manner above mentioned. This was the amount of what *Scindia* had authorized *Sabajee* to propoſe, without any reſervation or other clauſe whatever; and as it appeared plain his only drift was to get *Ragoba* and his ſon into his own power, by which means he meant to aggrandize himſelf in the State, without regard to the intereſts of the Engliſh, and perhaps through their means to make his own terms with the Miniſter, I have thought it proper to diſmiſs the Vackeel with this pointed and poſitive anſwer, that the Engliſh cannot, conſiſtent with their honour, nor ever will, agree to put any reſtraint upon *Ragoba*, or compel him to leave their dominions, where he has received an aſylum, againſt his own conſent: that however much they might be induced to unite in the propoſed ſettlement, they muſt be perfectly ſatisfied reſpecting the ſafety of young *Bajerow*, and every thing muſt be quietly ſettled at *Poonah*, before his preſence would be expedient, or even neceſſary there; and that admitting the Engliſh did agree to aſſiſt in putting the power of the State into the hands of *Scindia*, it was neceſſary that he alſo ſhould, on his part, and in the name of the Peiſhwa, conſent to the performance of certain conditions favourable to their intereſts, as well in conſideration of the important advantages he was to receive through their means, as to compenſate for the heavy expence of the wars, which formerly and in particular at this time, they had been involuntarily compelled

compelled to wage with the Maratta State. With this anſwer I this morning diſmiſſed *Abajee Sabajee* to his maſter; and as in explaining fully my ſentiments to him, and giving him to underſtand I could not conſent to any that were of a diſhonourable nature, I at the ſame time uſed every endeavour to convince him of my ſincere inclination towards an accommodation; if his deſign is really to unite with the Engliſh, it will be at once proved by the conduct he adopts on receiving my anſwer. One circumſtance which tends to eſtabliſh a belief of his hoſtile intentions, and which I think proper to mention to you is, that he wrote to *Govind Row*, the diſaffected brother of *Futty Sing*, who has long reſided with the Sundarvaree Rajah, inviting him to his camp, and promiſing to put him in poſſeſſion of the Guicawar ſhare of *Guzerat*; and I this evening learn that he has actually arrived and been received by *Scindia*.

I propoſe halting to-morrow, when I ſhall determine upon the ſteps it will be neceſſary to follow, and immediately inform you.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near *Baroda*,
17th March 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 261.

Bombay Select Conſultations, April 1780.

Monday 3d. RECEIVED the two following letters from General *Goddard*:—

Goddard, Gen. letter from.

Gentlemen,

Agreeable to the intention expreſſed in my former letter, I have, in conſequence of your deſire, taken the liberty of ſending my opinion on the ſubject of the propoſed augmentation of your military eſtabliſhment; in doing which, I have further preſumed to lay before you, ſuch plan for the complete regulation of your army, as appears to me calculated to anſwer the uſeful, and at this time, neceſſary purpoſe of increaſing your military ſtrength, and at the ſmalleſt additional expence poſſible. I have endeavoured to be as full and as explicit as I could, in order to ſatisfy every doubt, and remove every difficulty, which muſt unavoidably ſuggeſt itſelf in the firſt introduction of a change, ſo entire and important as the arrangements I have now propoſed in every department will occaſion in your ſervice. If any points yet remain to be explained, I ſhall eſteem myſelf happy at an opportunity of elucidating to your ſatisfaction; and I beg leave only to add, that as I ſhall conſider it moſt fortunate and honourable to me, if the thoughts I have expreſſed in the incloſed papers meet with your approbation, ſo I do not doubt being freely excuſed for the trouble I may give you in the peruſal of them, if they ſhould not be found to anſwer the good and uſeful purpoſes for which they were intended.

In my laſt letter, I informed you of the diſmiſſing *Scindia*'s Vackeel, and my intention to move towards him. I have accordingly advanced to a place called *Pittoul*, on the banks of the *Biſwanuntry Nuddy*, and about eight miles to the eaſt of *Brodra*. On the day of my arrival here, I found *Scindia* had ſent his camp equipage, buzar, baggage, &c. for ſecurity to the neighbourhood of *Paungbun*, and himſelf with the greateſt part of his army, unincumbered with any ſort of baggage whatever, had taken poſt at the diſtance of about twelve miles; the remainder of his troops he had diſperſed in different bodies round himſelf, and on the road leading to my camp, ſo as to be effectually guarded againſt every poſſibility of a ſurprize, which he is much afraid of, and which I have ſtudied all in my power to obtain an opportunity of attempting with any proſpect of ſucceſs; but on account of the diſpoſition above deſcribed, hitherto to no effect. I am anxious to accompliſh this, becauſe from the nature of his army, and the mode of war he practiſes, I can neither approach near enough to attack him ſuddenly to advantage, nor will he riſk the hazard of meeting me openly in the field. If I advance, he will certainly retreat; and to think of purſuing him beyond his preſent encampment, would not be the means of bringing on a deciſive action, nor could it be attended with any real or ſolid benefit, proportioned to the inconvenience of expoſing the Company's and *Futty Sing*'s poſſeſſions in the *Guzerat*, to the inroads and depredations of a ravaging enemy, from which they are at preſent entirely free. I think it neceſſary to mention to you, that ſince the diſmiſſion of *Scindia*'s Vackeel, I have received no ſort of meſſage or overture from him whatever; and that notwithſtanding the reports, and the general belief of an enmity ſubſiſting betwixt him and the Miniſter; the agents of the latter reſide in his camp, and I am credibly informed, letters are conſtantly paſſing and repaſſing betwixt them; from all theſe circumſtances, I am confirmed in the conjecture which *Scindia*'s late conduct ſuggeſted, that the ſhew of his animoſity againſt *Nana Furneſe*, was an entire pretext to deceive the Engliſh, and get the perſons of *Ragoba* and his ſon into his hands, for purpoſes merely for his own advantage, and attaining the accompliſhment of his views with the Miniſter. I ſhall write you very ſhortly, and have the honour to be,

Appendix. No. 261.

Gentlemen,
Your faithful and obedient ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near *Pittoul*,
four coſs from *Brodra*,
24th March 1780.

P. S.—In conſequence of the intention expreſſed in your former letter, of raiſing two new battalions immediately, I gave orders to Major *Fullarton*, commanding the detachment at *Ahmadavad*, to entertain ſome Sepoy recruits, of which numbers were offering themſelves; and as I have reaſon to believe that country the beſt nurſery for ſoldiers on this ſide of *India*, I take the liberty of further propoſing that you will allow me to authorize Major *Fullarton* to enliſt ſuch number as you may judge requiſite to complete the augmentation propoſed to take place in your military eſtabliſhment.

Thomas Goddard.

Gentlemen,

Goddard, Gen. letter from.

My letter of the 24th inſtant informed you particularly how affairs were ſituated reſpecting *Scindia*, in which ſtate they remained without any alteration till this morning, when it became requiſite to move ground on account of a ſcarcity of water at the former encampment; I accordingly determined upon marching to this place, which was about five miles diſtant, and upon my approach, found a large party of the enemy's horſe had occupied the village of *Camloud*, cloſe to which it was neceſſary to encamp. As I advanced nearer, their numbers continued to increaſe, till obtaining a more diſtinct view, I perceived their whole army had collected in its neighbourhood, covering a ſpace of at leaſt three miles in extent, on the right and left, and the rear of the village. I therefore immediately ordered the line to form, and advanced in order of battle to the village, which, after firing a few rockets, they precipitately abandoned; but as their army ſtill ſhewed themſelves upon the plain in front, diſpoſed to annoy the troops, I thought it neceſſary, for the eaſe and convenience of the camp, to diſperſe them, and accordingly ordered a few diſcharges of the artillery, which had the deſired effect, and they immediately fled with the loſs of ſome men and horſes, nor have they ſince appeared to give me any diſturbances.

I cannot exactly aſcertain their preſent ſituation, any farther than that their guns and baggage are moved to a conſiderable diſtance out of reach, and where it would neither be conſiſtent with good policy to follow them, nor could it be attended with any immediate advantage,

Appendix. Nos. 262 to 264.

as they would contrive to carry them to a ſtill greater diſtance as they advanced. I ſhall obtain every neceſſary information reſpecting the enemy, after which I ſhall determine upon the ſteps proper to be taken, and give you inſtant intelligence.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your faithful and obedient ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp, *Kimlade*,
27th March 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 262.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 8th April 1780.

Gentlemen,

Goddard, Gen. letter from.

IN my letter of the 27th ultimo, I communicated to you the circumſtances that happened the day of my arrival at this place; ſince which time nothing of any conſequence has occurred, till this morning, when finding the enemy would neither venture to come to a fair and deciſive action themſelves, nor put it in my power to attack them with all the advantage I could have wiſhed, having ſent their guns and ſtanding encampment at too great a diſtance in their rear for me poſſibly to overtake them; I came to the reſolution of diſlodging their army from the poſt they then occupied with their horſes and arms, only about ſix miles from my camp, and marched myſelf for that purpoſe at two o'clock with a part of the army, leaving the remainder at the former ground, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*. The force I took with me conſiſted of 200 Europeans, ten grenadier companies of Sepoys, the 4th and 7th battalions of *Bengal*, and the 8th battalion of Bombay infantry, together with 2 twelves, and 10 ſix pounders of artillery: I alſo took with me the regiment of Mogul cavalry and Candahar horſe. Theſe I divided into two lines, giving the command of the rear line to Major *Hopkins*, which conſiſted of two battalions of Sepoys, with the cavalry divided on either flank. Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* and Major *Forbes* were ſtationed to the front line.

The ſituation in which I knew the enemy to be poſted, the care they took to prevent being ſurprized, and the eaſe and expedition with which they would be able to move off upon the firſt alarm being given, gave me no hopes of coming upon them unprepared, and ſurprizing them effectually; but the objects I principally had in view were to induce them to venture an action with only a part of the army oppoſed to their whole force; to drive them from the poſt they then occupied; or if they fled without reſiſtance, to prove the manifeſt ſuperiority of our arms in the moſt ſtriking and honourable manner. I am happy to inform you, the event has far exceeded my expectations; I approached much nearer to their camp, without being diſcovered by any of their ſmall out-poſts, than I could have conceived poſſible, and a little before day-break came upon their grand guard, conſiſting of ſix or ſeven thouſand men, and commanded by *Parajee Punt* and *Baghretty Scindia*, which I paſſed through without diſcharging a ſhot, determined to reſerve my fire till I came to the main body under *Madjee Scindia* himſelf. This being a mile and a half in front, I did not reach till about ſunriſe, when their whole army was in motion, and the action immediately commenced. Seeing the inferiority of our force, and preſuming upon their own numbers, they advanced with much appearance of courage and reſolution, but were received by ſo warm and well-directed a fire from our artillery, that they were obliged to give way, and in the ſpace of about an hour quitted the field entirely. In order to diſlodge a large body of the enemy, who were very troubleſome to the troops by firing matchlocks and rockets from behind the cover of ſome buſhes on the right flank of the line, I ordered the regiment of cavalry and the Candahar horſe to advance; which ſervice they performed with equal ſpirit and ſucceſs, and having drove them to the plain, gave an excellent opportunity for the artillery to fire upon them as they retired.

After remaining two hours upon this ground, and the Marattas not daring to make their appearance again, I ordered the troops to return to camp, which they did without any further moleſtation from the enemy, or any party of their horſe ſhewing themſelves in the rear. From this circumſtance, and the effect which it was plain our artillery muſt have had among them, I am perſuaded the enemy muſt have ſuffered conſiderably; I cannot at preſent aſcertain it exactly; but the reports of the Hircarrahs who are come in, make the numbers who fell very conſiderable, beſide thoſe who were carried off wounded.

We have ſuſtained no loſs on our ſide, except among the Candahar horſe, of whom fifteen were killed and wounded in charging the enemy as before related, which they did very gallantly; one Mogul trooper is wounded, and alſo one Sepoy by a matchlock ball. I ſhall ſhortly inform you what effect the action of this day has upon *Scindia*'s operations, and beg leave to conclude at preſent by expreſſing to you my ſatisfaction at the ſteady, uniform, and proper behaviour of Major *Hopkins*, who had charge of the rear line, during the whole of the engagement.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your faithful and obedient ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp at *Kimloul*,
3d April 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 263.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 24th April 1780.

Minute reſpecting the Return of the Bombay Detachment.

Goddard, Gen. no account received of his moving to the ſouthward. Concern to be expreſſed to him at the little proſpect that appears of Baſſein's being reduced before the ſeaſon cloſes. Bombay not to be left deſtitute during the rains.

AS the approach of the monſoon is now ſo near, and we have received no information of General *Goddard*'s moving to the ſouthward, our concern muſt be expreſſed to him, at the little probability there appears of his accompliſhing the moſt material object of our wiſhes, the reduction of *Baſſein* before the cloſe of this ſeaſon; and it muſt be ſignified to him, that at any rate if he does not move down himſelf, it is abſolutely and indiſpenſably requiſite for the ſafety of this place, that the Bombay detachment ſhould be returned into garriſon before the rains; as it would be the height of imprudence to ſuffer this ſettlement to remain in its preſent deſtitute and defenceleſs ſituation, at a ſeaſon when no ſuccour could be afforded us in caſe of any attempt from the French. The return of our detachment muſt for theſe reaſons be inſiſted on, and the Chief at *Surat* muſt be directed to provide boats for their embarkation immediately on their arrival from the army.

Our detachment therefore to be called away.

APPENDIX, No. 264.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 30th April 1780.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Goddard, Gen. letter to.

Sir,

OUR laſt letters from you are dated the 3d and 4th of this month.

We obſerved with much pleaſure the advantage gained over the enemy in the action of the 3d, but are impatient to hear from you what effect your ſucceſs may have had on *Scindia*'s operations; and what plan you propoſe purſuing, which, as the ſeaſon grows late, it is of conſequence for us to be informed of as early as poſſible.

The poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, conſidered in every point of view, is an object of ſo much importance to the Company, that we cannot help expreſſing our anxiety at the probability there appears of this ſeaſon elapſing, and *Baſſein* ſtill unſubdued. The danger of ſuch a fortifi-

cation

cation ſo contiguous to our poſſeſſions, remaining in the hands of the enemy in this time of an European war, and the advantage and ſecurity the acquiſition of it would give to this Preſidency, make us very earneſt in our wiſhes not to leave the reduction of this place to the hazard of future accidents or circumſtances; nor can we think that any other object can claim a preference to your attention, or bring the campaign to a more honourable and advantageous concluſion. The Preſident has acquainted us, that he wrote to you ſome time ago on this ſubject; and the rule we have laid down for our conduct will not permit us to withhold our advice on ſo very material an affair; but ſhould you not intend to move to the ſouthward before the cloſe of the ſeaſon, a due attention to the ſafety of this place, which you muſt be ſenſible is now in a very deſtitute and unprovided ſituation with reſpect to troops, makes it abſolutely and indiſpenſably requiſite that the Bombay detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* ſhould be returned into garriſon as ſoon as poſſible, before the monſoon ſhuts up the communication by ſea; as it would be the height of imprudence to ſuffer this place to remain with ſuch a ſlender force for its defence, at a ſeaſon the moſt favourable for a ſudden attack, and when no relief can be afforded in caſe of any attempts from the French; if therefore your operations for this ſeaſon ſhould be confined to *Guzerat*, the weighty reaſons above recited, we doubt not, will convince you of the neceſſity of immediately complying with our requiſition for the return of our detachment, a meaſure we cannot diſpenſe with, and ſhall accordingly depend on your ordering it to *Surat* to be embarked for *Bombay*, whilſt the weather will permit; on which head we ſhall give the neceſſary orders to Mr. *Boddam*.

The number of our Europeans, and the preſent diſpoſition of them, will not, we think, for the preſent, admit of our carrying into execution the alterations propoſed by you with reſpect to them, in any manner that will prove of advantage to the ſervice, adequate to the great increaſe of expence; but we have determined immediately to raiſe ſeven additional battalions of Sepoys, in order to complete our eſtabliſhment to fifteen battalions, which will be formed of the ſtrength and model propoſed by you; and we ſhall ſoon adviſe you of the particular arrangement we propoſe making of them.

We have appointed Captains *Weſt*, *Waddington*, and *Mr Culloch*, now ſerving under you, to command three of the new battalions, and hope to hear of Major *Fullarton*'s ſucceſs in raiſing recruits at *Ahmedabad*.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Wm Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
30th April 1780

APPENDIX, No. 265.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 8th April 1780. At a Select Committee;—Preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire.

READ the letter from *Tannah* received yeſterday.

The village of Culwa and Bellapore fort, to be taken poſſeſſion of.

As we may both take and keep poſſeſſion of the village of *Culwa*, without difficulty or danger, it being entirely under the command of the guns of Tannah fort; and as our being eſtabliſhed there will command an extent of ſhore on the continent, and leave an opening for our getting ſupplies of grain and proviſions, by removing the Maratta Chowkees to a greater diſtance; likewiſe, as our taking poſſeſſion of Bellapore fort will anſwer the ſame purpoſe in a much more extenſive degree, and give us the entire command of the Maratta ſhore, from *Tannah* to *Bellapore*, a ſpace of near 12 miles; it is agreed to take poſſeſſion of both theſe places as ſoon as poſſible, and the Preſident will give the neceſſary orders, with the utmoſt ſecrecy, which is abſolutely neceſſary to be obſerved; and it is moſt probable, that in the execution of theſe meaſures, large quantities of grain will be immediately ſecured, which will prove a very timely ſupply in the preſent ſcarcity of that article. Appendix. Nos. 265 & 266.

Tannah, no batta to paſs from Salſette to Baſſein.

The Chief and factors muſt not permit any batta to paſs to *Baſſein*; by which means it will remain in the country, and there will be the better chance of obtaining it for our own inhabitants.

APPENDIX, No. 266.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 13th April 1780.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Tannah*, and one from Captain *Campbell* to the Chief and factors.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that in conſequence of orders from the Honourable the Preſident to the Chief, Captain *Campbell*'s detachment took poſſeſſion of Parſeek fort early this morning. Encloſed is copy of his letter juſt now received. A ſmall party of Sepoys has alſo taken poſſeſſion of *Culwa*.

The Major and Engineer will go over this afternoon to examine *Parſeek*, and report to us what is neceſſary to be added to the fort, and what garriſon is requiſite for its defence.

We ſhall be able to furniſh your Honour, &c. with further particulars, we hope ſhortly.

We are, &c. &c.

John Halſey,
Gregory Page.
Lewis Cokran.

Tannah,
12th April 1780.

To *John Halſey*, Eſquire, Chief, &c. Factors at *Tannah*.

Gentlemen,

Copy of Captain Campbell's letter to the Chief and factors at Tannah.

At day-break this morning we arrived here, and marched up to the water gate, which we were obliged to break down, though the people within made no reſiſtance, but kept the gate faſt. There was not a ſhot fired from the fort, and there were in it but 15 men as I learn, four of whom we have laid hold of, and I ſend them to you, a Havildar and three Sepoys.

This fort is a miſerable place, would ſcarce contain forty men; but from its ſituation might defend itſelf with thirty men, againſt I think any number, unleſs it were knocked all to pieces. I have poſſeſſion of the church above the fort and keep a picquet there.

I think it would be impoſſible to bring guns againſt the fort, I have brought our field pieces up the hill between the church and fort.

There is no village here, and the troops muſt be proviſioned from *Tannah* for any thing I can yet ſee.

I wait your directions for my further conduct.

There are ſix ſmall guns mounted in the fort, but they appear to me to be unſerviceable.

I ſend two boats that were found here; in one there are ſome copper pots.

I have no colours for this place but my battalion colours, therefore requeſt one may be ſent here.

I have the honour to remain,
with reſpect, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Richd Campbell.

Parſeek Fort,
12th April 1780.

A true copy.
Lewis Cokran, Secy.

Received the following letter from *Tannah*, and ſigned one in reply to that ſettlement:

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Tannah, letter from.

The fort of *Parſeek* being in our poſſeſſion, the directions from the Honourable the Governor ſeem to be fully accompliſhed. The inquiry after the Sircars batta appears to us proper; but we requeſt your Ho-

Appendix. No. 266.

nour, &c. orders, whether we are to seize the grain in the Autgams, or any other place in the possession of the Marattas, without which we do not think ourselves authorized so to do. We also wish for your directions as to the other villages near *Bellapore*, that we may, if they are put under our orders, make the necessary inquiries with respect to batta, &c. as we have already done to the villages near us.

We are with respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient
humble servants,

Tannah, 13th April 1780.
John Halsey,
Gregory Page,
Lewis Cokran.

To *John Halsey*, Esq. Chief, &c. Factors at *Tannah*

Tannah, letter to.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter dated yesterday.

The batta belonging to the Sirkar, which may be in the Autgams, or near to *Parseek*, you have our directions to seize, carefully avoiding to injure the property of private persons, but giving every encouragement to export their batta hither.

You will make the strictest inquiries respecting the quantity of batta laid up by the Marattas in your neighbourhood, and send us your report as soon as possible; at the same time informing us of the state of the country between *Culwa* and *Bellapore*.

We are your loving friends,
Bombay Castle, 14th April 1780.
Wm Hornby, &c. Committee.

Sunday.

The following five letters were received by the President from Captain *Lendrum* respecting the capture of *Bellapore* and *Panwell*, and are entered for the information of our honourable employers.

Letter from Captain Lendrum to the President.

Honourable Sir, 12th April 1780. 7 o'clock.

I have sent Mr. *Read* with the flag of *Bellapore*, which I surprised at four o'clock this morning: I took it by escalade. The bamboo ladders exactly answered. I had only one European wounded; and killed two of the enemy. Mr. *Read* mounted the ladder which I placed for him; nothing could be a completer surprise; there were three Europeans in the fort that got off, to my great concern. I have sent to the inhabitants, and given them protection, as you was pleased to order.

I shall wait here with the whole of the men, until I have your orders.

With the greatest respect, I am,
Honourable Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
John Lendrum.

P. S. I had Mr. *Burchall* from *Tannah* with me, who was at the escalade, and one of them that did it.

2d letter from Captain Lendrum to the President.

Honourable Sir,

I embarked last night with about 300 men, and arrived here at day-break. Finding the enemy was apprized of our coming, by the taking of *Bellapore*, having an advanced picquet at the Bunder, I was obliged to wait for the two 6 pounders being landed. As soon as the men were formed, about 200 of the Poonah Guardees, that is, disciplined Sepoys, advanced within 400 yards, and from an eminence kept up a continual fire from matchlocks and ginguls. Having the guns with me, I advanced on them to about 250 yards, gave them two round shot, which dispersed them; they retired 300 yards, and then stood and fired; I pushed after them, but on account of the marshy grounds, I could not get the guns up fast enough to give them grape; besides, the Lascars are great poltroons, I could not get them on fast enough. I advanced to the Pagoda, near the large tank, and gave them another shot, which dispersed them. At this discharge of the gun, the arm of the axle-tree snapped off short at the linchpin, and the gun became useless; the axle very improperly is made of black wood; I shall get the axle-tree repaired here. I had not one man killed from their irregular fire; nor could I seize them although I sent a party round the village of *Panwell* to the southward, hoping to intercept them. I have taken post at the Pagoda, where Captain *Carpenter* and I will put it in such a state of defence, that I am in hopes it cannot be forced without cannon. There are many inhabitants in *Panwell*: I have not permitted one of them to be plundered or molested.

Yesterday a man left this place on our taking *Bellapore*, for more troops. Now this is so near *Poonah*, I make no doubt both men and guns will be furnished against us; and having good advice here, that there is not, nor did not come down, any force worth mentioning to *Bundy*, as was reported; and considering the great force in *Tannah*, if you would be pleased to order me one or two companies of Sepoys from *Salsette*, that I may give Captain *Carpenter*, for *Bellapore* is very thin, only 95 men under the command of Lieutenant *Marshall*, which is not enough for the fort. The necessary expenditure of cash I will supply for the hire of Biggarees, &c. &c. until I receive your orders. I shall this evening load all the boats I brought up with me with batta, and send to your Honour to *Bombay* to-morrow. Next springs I hope you will have received a plentiful supply by the merchants from hence, for there is a great store that belongs to them here. The rents of this Pergunnah are chiefly paid in money, which have been mostly paid. The galivat will be well up the river this tide. The inhabitants are apprehensive that you will not retain *Panwell*, which makes them uncertain about returning. I beg you will please to order ten barrels of powder to *Bellapore*; and as I presume that place will be kept, also six 4 or 6 pounders, iron, with their carriages, to mount there.

With the greatest respect,
I am, Honourable Sir,
Your humble and
obedient servant,
John Lendrum.
Panwell, 13th April 1780. 4 o'clock, P. M.

3d letter from Captain Lendrum to the President.

Honourable Sir,

I have received your Honour's commands of the 13th, and now send Mr. *George Hutchinson* agreeable to them; the other Cadets I will collect and send also, and the Lascars; but I hope to have your orders regarding *Panwell* this next flood, as I sent an express at 3 o'clock P. M. the 13th; *Panwell* is the capital of a large Pergunnah, not in any manner dependant on *Bellapore*; it will require a good force to remain in it; there is a great quantity of batta in store. I shall not put any in the boats until I have your orders, either to evacuate it or maintain it. I have wrote to Lieutenant *Marshall*, to deliver the goods to the Vanjairahs, and let them carry them to *Bombay*. At my taking *Bellapore*, I gave these people centinels to protect their effects, and I believe they have not lost any part; I have sent and inquired after the goods of any of the Bombay merchants here, but none can be found, for most of the people went off the day before yesterday, when they found *Bellapore* was taken. There is batta belonging to some of them here, which the Subedar had detained; it can't be well removed until the springs, for the Shybars at the town will not float until then. I shall examine the river that runs E. N. E. up to *Tullaja*, which I believe is about six miles from *Bellapore*. There are 82 villages in Bellapore Pergunnah; the revenues I believe is about one lack, or 1½ lack of rupees annually: the parts most exposed, are those villages between *Tullaja* and *Parseek*, for the river runs no higher than a little above *Tullaja*; I shall have the Sircar's book examined, and send a particular list to your Honour.

Mr. *Halsey* has wrote to me to guard a pass over the hills called *Silcaum*, near *Bellapore*, to the north, which I shall do as soon as I return from hence as I propose leaving

leaving Captain *Carpenter* in charge of this poſt, with as great a force as I can, provided I have your orders for maintaining it.

With the greateſt reſpect,
I am
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
John Lendrum.

Panwell,
14th April 1780,
3 in the morning.

4th letter from Captain Lendrum to the Preſident.

Honourable Sir,

This moment I have received your Honour's letter of the 14th, and ſhall act accordingly. The poſt at the Pagoda I am fortifying with breaſtworks and embrazures, and requeſt you will pleaſe to order me ſix bricklayers here, and the three pounders or four pounders that Captain *Carpenter* wrote your Honour for. I hope theſe ſprings I ſhall ſend away 100 boats with batta belonging to ſeveral people here and at *Bombay*. The tides are ſo low that I cannot get the boats up until tomorrow to the Bunder; I am ſending away all the merchants things that were detained here, I aſſure your Honour nothing was taken from them.

I am not apprehenſive but I will always be able to retreat; the Company of Sepoys will be a great reinforcement for me; I do not think I ſhall want any more, *Bellapore* is in no danger; I ſhall viſit it myſelf occaſionally.

I beg you will pleaſe to order ſome here for batta, not too long ones, on account of the ſhoal water.

Pray let the ſix pounders be left at *Bellapore*, with ſome grape and round ſhot for them, and alſo rammers and ſpunges for them; and ammunition likewiſe for the guns you pleaſe to ſend to this place.

There are only ſix Shybars here, and many of the people have left them.

With the greateſt reſpect,
I am
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
John Lendrum.

Panwell,
14th April 1780.
P.M.

P. S. I beg you will pleaſe to order me a pair of Hircarrahs to procure intelligence.

5th letter from Captain Lendrum to the Preſident.

Honourable Sir,

Nothing extraordinary has happened ſince yeſterday, except laſt night, ſome people firing at our boats as they paſſed from hence to *Bellapore*, at the mouth of this river, joining to the Bellapore river. The galivat is coming up to the Bunder; an armed boat will protect theſe if you will pleaſe order one here, and I will ſtation her near the village *Belpara*. There are reports of ſome horſe collecting, their number I cannot aſcertain with any certainty. The Sepoys from *Tannah* are not yet arrived.

I ſend 16 ſmall boats laden with batta, to the care of Mr. *Martin*, on account of the merchants: I cannot prevail on them to go themſelves, or ſend it but through me; they are ſo intimidated by the ſtrict order from *Poonah*, I muſt give them bills on Mr. *Martin* for the amount. The Bundar is ſo bad, I cannot get away the other boats. I hope you will pleaſe to ſend me ſome boats, for I am afraid *Panwell* will be burnt; and on account of its great extent, I can ſcarce hope to protect it if the enemy advance.

I ſhall appoint Captain *Carpenter* Commiſſary of ſtores and proviſions for this detachment, if you will pleaſe to approve it.

The firing laſt night was on the 12 men I detached from *Bellapore* to *Shabajee*, but no damage done.

With the greateſt reſpect,
I am
Your obedient
humble ſervant,
John Lendrum

Panwell,
15th April 1780,
at 9 P.M.

P. S. I have juſt now accounts of a number of horſe having deſcended the Ghauts, and an advanced party appeared cloſe to us.

Appendix. No. 266.

Signed the following letter to *Tannah*:

Gentlemen,

Tannah, letter to.

We have received your letter dated yeſterday. We approve of your giving repairs to *Parſeek* fort to the amount mentioned in your letter, and acquieſce for the preſent in the garriſon allotted for that fort.

If the four boats are loaded with Sircar's batta, they muſt be taken poſſeſſion of for the benefit of the Honourable Company; but if private property, the proprietors muſt be directed to bring it to *Bombay*, to diſpoſe of it at this market; and this rule you muſt obſerve with reſpect to any batta that may be found in the Autgaums, or in any other place.

And here we muſt admoniſh you of the purpoſe for which our troops have been ſent to the Continent, and of the neceſſity there is of activity and diſpatch in ſecuring all the grain within your reach, before the enemy can come and deſtroy it. As to the Autgaums, they may be maintained with the ſmalleſt force, and are at all times at our command; they need not however be neglected, but we think the moſt ſervice for the troops, and not to be delayed, is for them to proceed up to *Callian*, and to eſtabliſh a ſtation and collection of grain there, in the ſame manner as the party from *Bellapore* have done at *Panwell*; and this we direct to be done as ſoon as poſſible, unleſs you ſhould judge it not practicable without too much riſk to the troops, which we think by proper meaſures may be rendered very inconſiderable.

We are
Your loving friends,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
20th April 1780.

Tannah, letter from.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your commands of the 14th inſtant.

The engineer has been called upon to give his opinion of the ſtate of Perſeek fort, and if any repairs were abſolutely neceſſary: encloſed is a copy of his letter. It ſeems eligible that this place ſhould be maintained with a ſmall garriſon, and as it can be made very defenſible with ſuch a one, for the trifling expence of 500 rupees, we have directed the engineer to give it what repairs he ſays is abſolutely requiſite, which we flatter ourſelves your Honour, &c. will approve.

The commandant of the troops having delivered it as his opinion, that one European ſubaltern, one Subedar, three Jemidars, ſix Havildars, ſix Naiques, and one hundred Sepoys, with one bombardier, five matroſſes, and 12 Laſcars, will be ſufficient for the preſent defence of Perſeek fort; we have in conſequence of the orders contained in your letter of the 14th, directed Captain *Campbell* to leave the above detachment at *Parſeek*, and march with the remainder of his force to the Autgaums, and other villages in the neighbourhood, in ſearch of the Sircars batta. He is deſired carefully to avoid injuring private property, but to give every encouragement to the inhabitants.

Advice having been received by the Chief from the other ſide, that a ſmall party of horſe and foot were ravaging the villages in the Bellapore diſtrict, he deſired the Major to ſend a detachment over, to prevent them from coming, at leaſt on the weſt ſide of the diſtrict, but he ſaid he could not ſpare a man; we have therefore directed him to recal a company of Sepoys from the outpoſts, who with forty of thoſe at preſent at *Culwa*, will we hope be ſufficient to protect the villages on this ſide the hills.

Ten boats, containing about 70 morahs of batta (two of which have been before mentioned to your Honour, &c.) that were proceeding to *Baſſein*, were brought into our Bunder ſome days ago. We requeſt your orders what is to be done with it.

The

Appendix, No. 267.

The large floating battery not being of any uſe in her former ſtation now that we have *Parſeek*, ſhe has been ordered to lay off the mouth of Bundy river,

We are,
With the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
John Halſey,
Greg. Page,
Lewis Cokran.

Tannah,
19th April 1780.

Copy of a Letter from the Engineer at *Tannah* to the Reſident and Factors.

Gentlemen,

Agreeable to your orders I went this morning with the commanding officer, Major *Weſtphall*, to examine the fort *Perſeek*, ſituated on the right ſhore of Callian river, and I have now the honour to inform you, that the walls of the fort are here and there not above eight or ten feet high from the ground to the embraſures and to the creſt of the parapets, which ſubjects thoſe parts to be eaſily eſcaladed: others, particularly thoſe which ought to command the brow of the hill, are ſomewhat too low, and therefore commanded from the hill before them. The embraſures are much damaged and too confined, and require therefore more opening; a good many loop holes ought alſo to be made, and the banquets repaired, &c. Thoſe little alterations and repairs, abſolutely requiſite, if only a ſmall garriſon of 50 men ſhould be intended to be kept there, will not admit of a regular eſtimate, but cannot, as I imagine, come to above 500 rupees, including the boat hire for bringing the chunam, bricks, and other materials from *Tannah* to Perſeek fort. I have nothing more to add, but that I am, with reſpect, gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
T. Sartorious,
Lt of Engineers.

Tannah,
13th April 1780.

A true copy.
L. Cockran, Secy.

APPENDIX, No. 267.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 12th February 1780.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Fort Victoria*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed your Honour, &c. the 25th ultimo.—A few days ago, fifteen hundred to two thouſand Maratta Sepoys came from *Poonah* to this neighbourhood; they are collecting ſtores, &c. and from circumſtances their deſign appears to be againſt this place. I requeſt that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to ſend the gunners and artillery Laſcars with the field pieces as ſoon as poſſible.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Geo. Dick.

Received the following letter from *Fort Victoria*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I encloſe a duplicate of my addreſs to your Honour, &c. under the 10th inſtant.

Dulop's fleet arrived this morning at *Sevendrog*, and every information ſays they are to act jointly with the troops againſt this place. I requeſt that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to ſend the additional reinforcement immediately.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
George Dick.

Fort Victoria,
13th February 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Your commands of the 28th January per *Drake* came to hand the 9th inſtant, and the packet for General *Goddard* was immediately forwarded to him. By the lateſt advices from him, dated the 5th current, they were then on their march from *Pitlatt*, about 25 coſs from *Ahmedabad*, which capital they expected to reach the 8th or 9th at fartheſt. Surat. letter from the Chief.

The three field pieces and howitzers have been landed, and the General duly acquainted of their arrival; alſo the Ghee, and the boat diſpatched on to *Broach* agreeable to your directions; and in conſequence of General *Goddard*'s requeſt, I have taken charge of the conſignment of treaſure for the ſervice of the army brought by the *Britannia*.

A party of Maratta horſe having come up from *Baſſein*, I have been neceſſitated to withdraw our people placed in the *Tannah* at *Verſaul*, it being a place entirely open, and not capable of being defended, as otherwiſe they would in all probability have run the riſk of being cut off, as the town is ſituated three miles from the landing place, and it would have been almoſt impoſſible for them to have retreated, had the enemy got between them and the ſea-ſhore. They are aſſembling near *Polners*, to about 3 or 4,000 horſe and a few foot, under *Gunniſs Punt*, and another officer. Of the above circumſtance I have duly adviſed General *Goddard*, and at the ſame time repreſented to him the abſolute neceſſity of his ſending as ſpeedily as poſſible a ſuitable force to protect the ſouthern Pergunnahs as well as thoſe adjacent to this place, otherwiſe great riſk there is of their being plundered and entirely ravaged by the enemy, from our inability to ſend into the field any proper force to prevent the ſame.

The General having forwarded to me the intercepted letter from the Dutch Chief to the Poonah Miniſter, as alſo the Vackeel's letter that gave cover to it, I now tranſmit the ſame to you, having, agreeable to your directions, taken exact copies of the ſame. I alſo encloſe the tranſlates, made by the General's interpreter, of both thoſe papers.

I am, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Rawſon Hart Boddam.

Surat,
12th Feb. 1780.

Received the following letter from *Fort Victoria*: Tueſday 29

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed your Honour, &c. the 23d inſtant, per the *Revenge*. The Marattas have collected all their troops at *Tarlee* and *Sevendrog*, about 12 hours march from hence; and they being daily expected here, I requeſt that your honour, &c. will be pleaſed to ſend the gunners and field pieces as ſoon as poſſible, the guns here, in their preſent condition, being unſerviceable.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
George Dick.

Fort Victoria,
26th February 1780.

Received the following letter from *Fort Victoria*: Friday 17th

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I addreſſed your Honour, &c. the 25th ultimo, and 16th inſtant. *Dulop*'s fleet was ſeen yeſterday off *Anjenevall*, by one of my own people, ſtanding to the northward; he has been expected ſome time at *Sevendrog*, and the troops at *Farlee* only wait his arrival; they are in readineſs; and there being no doubt of their immediate hoſtile intentions againſt this place, I requeſt that your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to ſend the gunners,

and

and a reinforcement of Sepoys directly; eighty to ninety recruits are ready.

I am, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
George Dick.

Fort Victoria,
12th March 1780.

Saturday 18th. Signed the following letter to *Fort Victoria*:

To Mr. *George Dick*, Reſident at *Fort Victoria*.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral letters to that dated the 12th, on the ſubject of the expected attack, and the required reinforcements.

By the Bombay grab, which ſailed the 13th inſtant, we ſent you the gunner's field pieces, and the ſtores mentioned in your indent, amounting, as per the incloſed invoice, to rupees 1,855. 2. 11. and this is all the ſupply that we can ſpare or think neceſſary.

We are your loving friends,
Wm Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
18th March 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 268.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 25th February 1780.

RECEIVED the following letter from Col. *Brown*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour of acquainting you of my arrival here the 21ſt inſtant, with ſix companies of European infantry and a company of artillery from the coaſt, amounting to 472 non-commiſſioned rank and file.

In conſequence of the preſſing neceſſity urged by the Governor General and Council at *Bengal*, the gentlemen of the Committee at *Fort Saint George* were induced to put on board the above number of men on the *Seahorſe*, *Horſenden*, and *Morning Star*, beſides two companies which I found myſelf obliged to ſend on board the *Hawke*, as they were ſo crowded on the *Horſenden* as made me apprehenſive for their health; which two companies Captain *Cotton* promiſed Captain *Panton* and me to return to the *Horſenden*, when we ſhould arrive off the port of *Bombay*; inſtead of which he, apparently by deſign, left us off *Ceylon*, and we have not ſeen them ſince; I therefore requeſt you will be pleaſed to diſpatch them with all expedition on their arrival; and ſhould Captain *Durand*, who commands them, be in want of money during the ſtay there, I beg you will order him to be ſupplied, and take his bill on me for the amount.

It was the earneſt wiſh of the gentlemen at *Madras*, that the detachment at *Tellicherry* ſhould join me as ſoon as poſſible, for which purpoſe they ſent the neceſſary orders to Major *Cotgrave*; but as it is impoſſible for him to comply therewith, without you aſſiſt him with a conveyance, I hope you will ſpeedily enable him to do it.

In addition to the above two detachments I am in daily expectation of receiving another battalion of Sepoys from *Pondicherry*.

I have the honour to encloſe you a letter from the Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

I am, honourable Sir, and Sirs,
With the greateſt reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
George Brown.

Surat,
23d February 1780.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, 6th April 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire. (Mr. *Carnac*, indiſpoſed and abſent.)

Surat, letter from. Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Our laſt addreſs, of the 17th ultimo, waited on you by the *Drake*.

We have the honour to acquaint you, that the Madras troops under the command of Colonel *Brown* marched from hence the 21ſt ultimo, to join General *Goddard*'s army; and that in conſequence of an application from the General to the Chief, they were accompanied by a detachment from this garriſon of 500 Sepoys, which was to proceed with them to Soncleterrah Ghaut, and which the Chief informs us, will be back again in a few days.

Appendix. Nos. 268 & 269.

Encloſed we ſend for your notice, copies of four letters which have lately paſſed between us and the Dutch; and an addreſs from the Dutch Directors and Council to the Honourable the Preſident and Council.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
R. H. Boddam,
Thomas Day,
Charles Bourchier,
Daniel Crokatt,
Daniel Seton,
Samuel Gambier.

Surat,
2d April 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 23d April 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Our laſt addreſs is dated the 2d inſtant. We have the honour to acquaint you that our honourable maſters ſhip the *Besborough* arrived at this bar yeſterday, with a detachment on board her from *Madras*, conſiſting of five companies of Sepoys, under the command of Captain *John Walker*; which the Honourable the Governor and Select Committee of *Madras* acquaint us, is a reinforcement for the army under the commmand of General *Goddard*. Five companies more are on board the *Atlas* and *Grafton*, but the *Besborough* parted company from theſe veſſels off *Cochin*.

Surat, letter from.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
R. H. Boddam,
Thomas Day,
Charles Bourchier,
Daniel Crokatt,
Daniel Seton,
Samuel Gambier.

Surat,
18th April 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 269.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 2d January 1780.

To Major *Cotgrave*.

Sir,

COLONEL *Braithwaite* has acquainted us of your having arrived to relieve him in the command of the Madras detachment, and we conclude this will find you in charge of the forces at *Tellicherry*.

That gentleman had alſo propoſed to us to ſend a ſufficient force from hence to relieve the Madras detachment from the charge of *Tellicherry*, which is an abſolute impoſſibility, as we have detached every man we could ſpare to reinforce the army under General *Goddard*; we however hope that your detention at *Tellicherry* will only cauſe a temporary delay to your proceeding to the northward, and that your active efforts to diſlodge the enemy, will be ſo ſucceſsful, as to admit of your quitting your preſent charge, and leave you at liberty to purſue the purpoſe for which you were ordered to this coaſt. We think it expedient to ſuggeſt to you, that if a vigorous effort ſhould be found neceſſary to diſlodge the enemy, and your preſent force not be judged adequate, the battalion deſtined to relieve the 20th, may be brought up to *Tellicherry* before the latter is ſent down to *Anjengo*, which will give you an addition of force not to be reſiſted by the enemy, and when the ſervice is effected, the

Appendix. No. 269.

20th may be returned, and you can proceed with the remainder to join General *Goddard*.

We have alſo hopes of ſome good effect from a repreſentation that has been made to *Hyder Ally* of the conduct of his tributaries.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
2d January 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 23d January 1780.

Letter from *Tellicherry*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Our laſt addreſs of the 1ſt inſtant was tranſmitted you the ſame day per expreſs boat, duplicate of which is encloſed.

Major *John Cotgrave* having communicated his intentions to the Reſident of proceeding on the *Britannia*, with the companies of artillery and infantry of the Madras detachment, to join General *Goddard*'s army, which ſtep we were of opinion might at this juncture prove highly prejudicial to the Honourable Company's affairs here; we in conſequence thereof wrote him a letter, copy of which is encloſed, acquainting him therewith, and requeſted he would remain here ſome time longer, but to which he has not replied.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your obedient ſervants,
Richard Church,
Samuel Stedman,
Michael Firth.

Tellicherry,
5th January 1780.

N. B. The above letter being a duplicate, did not encloſe the addreſs of the 1ſt inſtant.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We addreſſed you laſt the 5th inſtant, by our honourable maſters ſhip *Britannia*, duplicate of which is now encloſed.

On the 16th ultimo, the *Mahundy Savoy*, commanded by *Antonio Perez*, laying in *Mangulow* roads, was boarded and taken by eight French, and four Portugueze ſailors, belonging to the ſmall French ſnow at *Goa*, (noticed before to your Honour, &c.) commanded by Captain *De la But*, and who had come from thence to *Mangulore* in a ſmall boat, under pretence of protecting their Captain, who had been at *Mangulore* for ſome time paſt on his return to *Goa*. We learn that the above veſſel was carried to the latter place, where the Government on finding in what manner ſhe had been ſeized, took her under its protection, and confined the crew. It is alſo ſaid that Captain *De la But* is alſo confined at *Mangulore*, for being privy to the capture.

Sadir Cawn is expected ſhortly at *Callicut* from *Seringpatam*; notwithſtanding the Nabob's troops have been in poſſeſſion of *Mahé*, we do not find any new works have been made at that place.

There has been no alteration in our military operation ſince the *Britannia* left this place; the Nairs ſtill continue on the hills and in the poſts around us, as they ſeem determined not to quit us for ſome time, the Reſident on the 5th inſtant wrote a letter to the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, (copy of which is encloſed) acquainting him of the Prince of *Cheuka*'s proceedings.

A few days ago a fiſhing boat from *Bombay* was taken by one of *Hyder*'s gallivats, off *Mangulore*, and ſent into that place.

We are, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Richard Church,
Sam[l] *Stedman*,
Mich[l] *Firth*.

Tellicherry,
11th January 1780.

Copy of a Letter from the Reſident and Factors at *Tellicherry*.

To Major *John Cotgrave*, Commander in Chief of the Forces at *Tellicherry*.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your letter in reply to ours of yeſterday's date.

As you have been pleaſed to communicate to the Reſident your intentions of proceeding upon the *Britannia* with the companies of artillery and infantry of the Madras detachment, to join General *Goddard*'s army, agreeable to the orders you have received from the Honourable the Select Committee at *Madras*, we think it incumbent on us, in the preſent ſtate of our affairs, to requeſt you will remain here for ſome time longer.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Rich[d] *Church*,
Samuel Stedman,
Michael Firth.

Tellicherry,
4th January 1780.

A true copy.
Mich[l] *Firth*, Secretary.

Copy tranſlate of a Letter from the Reſident at *Tellicherry* to *Hyder Ally*.

After compliments:

In the month of October laſt, the Prince of *Cherika* entered the province of *Randaturah*, and deſtroyed the villages with fire and ſword: I ſent our linguiſt to him to inquire the reaſon of his conduct; who anſwered him, that he came to deſtroy our villages by your order; and a ſhort time the Prince came and attacked *Tellicherry*.—But as I knew of no war between you and the Honourable Company, I therefore write you this letter to acquaint you of the conduct of the Prince, and to deſire you will ſend him orders not to act ſo contrary to the friendſhip which ſubſiſts between you and the Company. All this ſeaſon we have not had any rice from *Mangalore*. I hope you will give orders for its being exported here as uſual.

A true copy.
Mich[l] *Firth*, Sec[y].

Bombay Secret. Conſultations, 31ſt January 1780.

Copy of a Letter from the Reſident and Factors at *Tellicherry*.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General and Council, at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In a letter received from our ſuperiors at *Bombay*, dated the 2d inſt. we are directed to adviſe your Honour, &c. of the preſent ſtate of affairs at this place, not doubting but that they now fully acquaint you with the cauſe of our troubles with the neighbouring Powers, tributaries to the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

The forces of the Prince of *Cherika* and King of *Cartinadue*, ſtill continue ſtrongly intrenched on different hills and poſts in the Honourable Company's diſtricts, the commanding officer finding it impoſſible, from frequent attempts, to diſlodge them with our preſent force. Whether the enemy only intend to bring us to an accommodation upon their own terms, if poſſible, or have more extenſive views, we cannot ſay; but underſtand, that *Sadur Cawn*, the Nabob's Governor of *Callicut*, is expected from *Seringapatam* with a large force to ſettle the troubles on this coaſt, and in particular our diſputes with his maſter's tributaries.

The Honourable the Preſident of *Bombay* has wrote a letter to the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, repreſenting the conduct of his tributaries towards the Honourable Company; we therefore hope that it will have a proper effect, though the extraordinary conduct of his officers at *Mangulore*,

and

and other poſts, give us reaſon to think that *Hyder* has ſecretly hoſtile intentions againſt the Company.

We are, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Rich[d] Church,
Samuel Stedman,
Mich[l] Firth.

Tellicherry,
15th January 1780.

A true copy.
Mich[l] Firth, Sec[y].

February.

Wedneſday. 2d February.

Received the following letter from Major *Cotgrave* at *Tellicherry:*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have been honoured with the receipt of your letter of the 2d inſtant.

I ſhould be extremely happy was it in my power to effect the ſervice your Honours require of me; but it is now too late; the enemy being ſo ſtrongly ſituated as not to be diſlodged without the loſs of more men than can be ſpared at this juncture. I have already made attempts on two of their fortified hills, one of which failed; and I am convinced, by the obſtinate reſiſtance we met with, that to ſubdue them would require a much greater force than we can bring againſt them, even ſhould the other battalion arrive from *Madras*; the extraordinary ſituation of this country putting the beſt diſciplined troops in the world ſcarcely on a par with theſe people. I am as faſt as poſſible completing the lines, which I hope will be in ten or twelve days, when I ſhall embark for *Surat* on the *Eagle*, with the Company of European artillery and company of infantry, leaving the grenadier battalion and the 20th battalion for the defence of the place, which in my opinion will be ſufficient againſt the preſent enemy.

I am with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble ſervant,
John Cotgrave.

Tellicherry,
21ſt January 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 6th March 1780.

Tellichery. Conſiderations reſpecting Major Cotgrave, and the troubles there.

Read the laſt advices from *Tellicherry*.

We ſhould have been happy, had circumſtances permitted of Major *Cotgrave*'s quitting *Tellicherry*, to join General *Goddard* with the European force under his command, which not being very conſiderable, a temporary detention there can have no very material effect upon the General's operations; more eſpecially ſince the arrival of the very ample force under Colonel *Brown* at *Surat*, while the Major's quitting *Tellicherry* until the troubles are in ſome train of being adjuſted, might greatly endanger the ſafety of that ſettlement, or give an unfavourable turn to the negociations which appear likely to be opened with the enemy. For theſe reaſons we approve of the factors oppoſing their departure, and Major *Cotgrave* muſt be deſired not to quit *Tellicherry* with the Europeans till ſome accommodation has taken place; but the moment it can be done with propriety, we ſhall give our free conſent to his joining General *Goddard*, and the Reſident and factors will be then directed to ſend away the Madras forces as expeditiouſly as poſſible, in order to reduce the heavy expence of that garriſon. In the mean time we muſt be of opinion, that Major *Cotgrave*, by continuing at *Tellicherry* in defence of that ſettlement, will perform a more acceptable and real ſervice to the Company; than any aſſiſtance he could afford to the army in *Guzerat*.

Major Cotgrave's conduct diſapproved of;

Reſpecting the general orders iſſued by Major *Cotgrave* the 5th ultimo, and complained of by the Reſident and factors, we are of opinion he has greatly exceeded the powers veſted by the late regulations in military commanding officers under his circumſtances, and aſſumed an authority which can in no degree be ſuppoſed neceſſary for the defence of the ſettlement, to which object alone his powers are confined. While we are pleaſed with the moderation and conciliatory conduct obſerved by the Company's civil ſervants at *Tellicherry*, we cannot but obſerve with diſapprobation and diſpleaſure, the proceedings of the military commanding officer, ſo contrary to the true conſtitution of the ſervice, and which can produce no other effect but jealouſies and diſcords detrimental to the common cauſe. Theſe irregularities again recal to our obſervation the bad conſequences of the inattention of the Government at *Madras* in ſending to this coaſt a military force not ſubordinate to our authority; which muſt be ſtrongly repreſented to the Company, that no ſuch proceeding may be permitted in future, and in the mean time, our diſapprobation muſt be expreſſed to Major *Cotgrave* of the conduct he has purſued.

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Reflections on the bad conſequences ariſing therefrom.

The factors to have permiſſion to land from the *Besborough*, two lacks and a half of rupees, out of the five lacks expected from *Bengal* on that ſhip: having no other method of ſupplying them to the amount they require; and left the ſhip ſhould have paſſed their port, 50,000 rupees will be immediately ſent from hence on a veſſel which will be ordered for that purpoſe. The Reſident at *Onore* muſt alſo have permiſſion to land one lack of rupees from the *Besborough*.

The factors to have permiſſion to land two and a half lacks from the Beſborough.

Tellicherry, 50,000 rupees to be ſent down immediately.

The Reſident at Onore, to have permiſſion to land one lack from the Beſborough.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 7th March 1780.

Thurſday 9th.

Received the following letter from Colonel *Brown:*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the officers who arrived yeſterday in the *Revenge*, I am much concerned to find that the Reſident at *Tellichery* has given poſitive orders to the Captains of all ſhips which anchor there, not to receive any of the Madras troops on board; by which behaviour, the ſervice here will be much impeded, and the officer commanding there is deprived of the power of putting his orders into execution. I am therefore again obliged to trouble you, requeſting that you will be pleaſed to ſend orders down to the Reſident, that no farther obſtacles may be thrown in the way of their embarkation.

Brown, Colonel, letter from.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Geo. Brown.

Camp near *Surat*,
4th March 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 13th March 1780.

To Colonel *Browne*.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your letter of the 25th ultimo, and 2d and 4th inſtant.

We have given orders for the rice and water caſks to be landed from the *Horſenden*; and when the amount is aſcertained, ſhall adviſe you thereof.

We ſhould have been very glad, had circumſtances permitted, of Major *Cotgrave*'s quitting *Tellicherry*, with the European infantry and artillery under his command; but their force is not ſo conſiderable, as to allow us to think that a temporary detention there can have any material effect on the operations of the army in *Guzerat*, eſpecially ſince the arrival of the reſpectable force under your command; whereas his quitting *Tellicherry* till the troubles are in ſome train of being adjuſted, might endanger the ſafety of the ſettlement, or give an unfavourable turn to the negociations which appear likely to be opened with the enemy. For theſe reaſons, we have approved of the conduct of the Reſident and factors, in oppoſing Major *Cotgrave*'s intentions of withdrawing the Europeans from *Tellicherry*; and we cannot doubt but Major *Cotgrave* will ſtand juſtified for a delay in the execution of his orders, which ariſes from the neceſſity of his

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his not quitting an important ſettlement of the Company's under his charge for defence, and with an enemy actually before it carrying on an attack.

We ſhall leave no means untried to compoſe the troubles at *Tellicherry*; and the moment it can be done, will do our utmoſt to expedite the junction of Major *Cotgrave* and his party, with the detachment under your command.

We have had intelligence of the Select Committee at *Madras* having engaged ſhipping to bring round the battalion of Sepoys to this coaſt, and their arrival with you may be ſoon expected.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,

Bombay Caſtle, 13th March 1780.

W. Hornby, &c. Committee.

To Mr. *Richard Church*, Reſident, &c. Factors at *Tellicherry*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letters of the 25th and 28th of January, and 2d, 9th, 11th, and 21ſt ultimo.

Having diſpatched a ſhort letter to you by a boat, under the 6th inſtant, we now encloſe a duplicate thereof.

The European force under Major *Cotgrave*, is not ſo conſiderable, that a temporary delay in their joining General *Goddard*, can have any material effect on his operations; eſpecially ſince the arrival of the reſpectable reinforcement under Colonel *Brown*; whereas their quitting *Tellicherry* at this juncture, might greatly endanger the ſafety of the ſettlement, or give an unfavourable turn to the negociations which appear likely to be opened with the enemy, and which we moſt ardently wiſh may terminate in an accommodation. Upon theſe grounds we approve of your conduct in oppoſing Major *Cotgrave*'s intention of withdrawing the Europeans, as circumſtances ſtood at the date of your laſt advices; but the moment it can be done with propriety you will ſignify your conſent to Major *Cotgrave*'s proceeding to *Surat* according to his orders, and return the Madras Sepoys to *Anjengo*, with the utmoſt expedition, as the expence of your garriſon is at preſent almoſt inſupportable.

We are of opinion that Major *Cotgrave*, in the orders you complain of, as recited in your letter of the 9th ultimo, has much exceeded the powers, veſted by the late regulations in the commanding officer, in ſuch circumſtances, and aſſumed an authority which can in no degree be ſuppoſed neceſſary for the defence of the ſettlement, to which object alone his powers are confined.—We ſhall by this opportunity, ſignify to Major *Cotgrave* our diſapprobation of his conduct; and we approve of your moderation on the occaſion. We muſt take notice of your omiſſion in not ſending a copy, at length, of the general orders of the 5th ultimo, though mentioned in your letter of the 9th to be forwarded with the other papers.

The Reſident ſhould certainly have anſwered the Nabob *Hyder Ally*'s letter, and kept up the correſpondence with him; as your taking no notice of this letter may give diſguſt, and the Reſident's having wrote to him was no reaſon for your diſcontinuing a correſpondence with him. The Nabob's anſwer to the Preſident, ſo far as it related to the Tellicherry affairs, was much to the ſame purport as his letter to Mr. *Church*, and in other points was expreſſive of attention to this Government; but as the moſt effectual method of coming to a right underſtanding with the Nabob, and aſcertaining his real diſpoſition towards the Company, as well as bringing the troubles at *Tellicherry* to a concluſion, we have reſolved to ſend Mr. *George Horſley* on a deputation to him, who will be inſtructed to make a proper repreſentation on the conduct of his tributaries, and to endeavour to obtain ſuch orders as may reſtore tranquillity; and as in the courſe of the diſcuſſion of this ſubject, he will have occaſion for the moſt ample information, we direct that you immediately forward to him at *Onore*, a full account of the origin and cauſe of the preſent troubles, and that you correſpond with him on all parts, relating to our ſettlement, in which the exerciſe of the Nabob's influence may be requiſite.

The *Eagle* arrived here the 7th inſtant with Mr. *Petrie*.

We have, as before adviſed, given you authority to land two lacks and a half of rupees from the *Besborough* out of the promiſed ſupply from *Bengal*, and though it muſt be attended with loſs to the Company, we can find no other mode of ſupplying you to ſo large an amount: but in caſe the *Besborough* ſhould have paſſed *Tellicherry* before the receipt of this order, we now ſend you, by the *Morning Star*, a ſupply of 50,000 rupees for your immediate expences, and ſhall furniſh you with the remainder of the ſum required in the moſt expeditious manner, which we ſhall be very glad to ſee appropriated to the purchaſe of pepper, inſtead of being expended in military charges.

We cannot give any orders about the works at *Tellicherry* till we receive what Mr. *Dacer* has to offer further upon the method of putting them into a more compact ſtate of defence.

We encloſe a copy of our letter of this date to Major *Cotgrave*, and an invoice of the treaſure and ſtores on board the *Morning Star* for your ſettlement, the whole amounting to ..... rupees.

After landing the conſignments of the *Morning Star* you will return her to the Preſidency immediately.

We are your loving friends,

Bombay Caſtle, 13th March, 1780.

W. Hornby, &c. Committee.

To Major *Cotgrave*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 21ſt January, and ſhould have been very glad, had circumſtances permitted of your quitting *Tellicherry* with the European detachment, in order to join the army under General *Goddard*; but their force is not ſo conſiderable, that a temporary ſtay there can have any material effect on his operations, eſpecially ſince the arrival of the reinforcement under Colonel *Brown*, whereas your quitting *Tellicherry* till the troubles are in ſome train of being adjuſted, might greatly endanger the ſafety of the ſettlement, or give an unfavourable turn to the negociations which appear likely to be opened with the enemy. For theſe reaſons we think it proper you ſhould not quit *Tellicherry* with the Europeans, till ſome accommodation has taken place; but the moment it can be done with propriety, we ſhall give our conſent to your joining the army under General *Goddard*; and in the mean time we muſt be of opinion, that your continuance at *Tellicherry*, in defence of that ſettlement, will recommend you more to your ſuperiors, and be a more acceptable and real ſervice to the Company than any aſſiſtance you can afford to the army in *Guzerat*.

The Reſident and factors have made a repreſentation to us upon the ſubject of the general orders iſſued by you the 5th ultimo, in which we likewiſe think you have much exceeded the powers veſted by the late regulations in a military commanding officer in your circumſtances, and aſſumed an authority which can in no degree be ſuppoſed neceſſary for the defence of the ſettlement, to which object alone your powers are confined. While we are pleaſed with the moderation and conciliating conduct obſerved by the Company's civil ſervants at *Tellicherry*, we cannot but obſerve with diſapprobation and diſpleaſure the proceedings of the military commanding officer, ſo contrary to the true conſtitution of the ſervice, and which can produce no other effect but jealouſies and diſcords detrimental to the common cauſe.

You can have no ground of apprehenſion, that any cenſure will revert to you for any delay in joining General *Goddard*, that may be occaſioned by the neceſſity of your not quitting one of the Company's ſettlements, under

your charge for defence, and with an enemy actually before it carrying on an attack.

We ſhall leave no meaſure untried to accommodate the troubles at *Tellicherry*, on which ſubject letters have paſſed between our Preſident and the Nabob *Hyder Ally*; and we find ſome overtures have been made to Mr. *Church*; but as the moſt effectual method, we ſhall inſtantly depute a gentleman to the Nabob himſelf, who will have particular inſtructions to make it his firſt object to ſettle all diſputes with his tributaries at *Tellicherry*. The Reſident and factors having mentioned in one of their late letters that you had written to us on the ſubject of a large indent for ſtores, which we received under cover of a letter from Colonel *Braithwaite*, but without any notice or advice from him; we think it neceſſary to acquaint you that no ſuch letter has been received from you.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,
W. Hornby,
Bombay Caſtle, &c. Committee.
13th March 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 5th April 1780.

Signed the following letters to *Tellicherry* and *Fort St. George*.

To Mr. *Richard Church*, Reſident, &c. Factors at *Tellicherry*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letters of the 9th, 14th and 15th ultimo.

We have already acquainted you in our letter of the 13th ultimo, of the only effectual method that has occurred to us, of reſtoring tranquillity to your ſettlement; but Mr. *Horſley* has not yet been able to proceed on his deputation, owing to the Nabob not having ſent the proper paſſports.

As by the reſolute meaſures you have purſued, Major *Cotgrave* has been prevented from quitting *Tellicherry*, and a continuation of the ſame conduct, and our letter of the 13th, will probably make him deſiſt from all thoughts of that nature; we ſee no occaſion to ſend you a reinforcement of artillery ſolicited in your letter of the 9th ultimo; and we now write to the Preſidency of *Madras*, deſiring them to revoke their orders for his joining General *Goddard*, and to put him under the orders of this Government.

We direct that you ſend up as ſoon as poſſible the ſhybars now lying at *Tellicherry*, upon a heavy freight, as if circumſtances ſhould happily permit of your returning the Madras Sepoys to *Anjengo*, we conclude you will find no difficulty in providing other means of tranſportation.

As it will be utterly impoſſible for us to ſend any further ſupply of money to *Tellicherry* this ſeaſon; and if your preſent balance is expended in purchaſes of pepper, there will be no means left of defraying the expences of the troops now there for your defence, which may be attended with the moſt alarming conſequences; we muſt, however unwillingly, direct that if you ſee no immediate proſpect of the troubles being accommodated, you reſerve the whole of your preſent balance of caſh for the payment of your garriſon, and diſcontinue your purchaſes of pepper.

We are your loving friends,
Bombay Caſtle, *Wm Hornby*,
5th April 1780. &c. Committee.

To the Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

As it is not impoſſible but the troubles of *Tellicherry* may prevent Major *Cotgrave* from quitting that ſettlement before the rains, we requeſt, for the good of the ſervice, and to prevent the confuſion and embarraſſment which will continue to ſubſiſt whilſt he has the ſanction of your orders for withdrawing from a diſagreeable ſtation to a more eligible ſervice, that you will revoke your orders for his proceeding to join the detachment under Colonel *Brown*, and put him under the orders of this Government; aſſuring you that we will expedite his junction with Colonel *Brown* as ſoon as circumſtances will permit of its being done with any degree of propriety. Appendix. No. 270.

Incloſed is copy of a letter we lately found it neceſſary to write to Major *Cotgrave*, whoſe ſubſequent conduct has increaſed the neceſſity of the meaſure we have above recommended to you.

The interruption to our communication with the Continent, in conſequence of the rupture with the Marattas, having cauſed a very alarming ſcarcity of grain on this iſland, we earneſtly requeſt you will if poſſible ſupply us with 20,000 or 30,000 bags of rice, as early as you may be able, after receipt hereof, diſpatching the veſſels on which you may lade it, by the ſouthern paſſage; in which caſe a ſupply will arrive in time to be of the moſt eſſential ſervice to this ſettlement, and prevent much diſtreſs.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,
Bombay Caſtle, *Wm Hornby*,
5th April 1780. &c. Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 270.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 23d April 1780.

Received per *Besborough* the following letter from *Madras*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter of the 2d January, with the papers of intelligence.

If *Hyder Ally* has taken, or means to take, any part in the diſputes with the Nairs, we apprehend it muſt be from ſome provocations, real or pretended, that have been given him by the gentlemen of *Tellicherry*, in which we are the more confirmed by our letter from Colonel *Braithwaite*; we have no ſubject of difference with him here that could induce him to take ſuch a part, and we particularly ordered Colonel *Braithwaite* when at *Mahé*, to interfere in nothing relating either to *Hyder* or the Nairs. *Hyder*'s conduct at preſent depends very much on the tranſactions with the Marattas; a peace with them would have kept him in awe, and delivered us from every idea of troubles from that quarter; but it will be difficult to ſay what line he will purſue, now that the negociation with the Marattas is at an end, and hoſtilities commenced; for we ſuppoſe it muſt be known to you, that a treaty has been concluded between the Marattas and him, with a view of increaſing our difficulties; and that the Nizam has been from the beginning of theſe diſputes directed ſolely by the influence of the preſent Powers at *Poonah*.

You expreſs your wiſhes, that at this time we may be full and unreſerved in our political correſpondence; hitherto we are not ſenſible of having omitted to give you every information that was neceſſary, and our duty to the Company will certainly incline us to continue theſe communications without reſerve. Upon this principle we deem it expedient to give it as our opinion, that a war at this time may unite againſt us all the principal Powers of *India*; and when it is conſidered, that we have an *actual war* to ſuſtain againſt the two greateſt Powers of *Europe*, we think a peace with the Marattas is ſafer and more deſirable upon almoſt any terms, than troubles which threaten ſo many dangers, and for our own part, ſetting

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aſide the evils which preſent themſelves from war at this juncture, we do not ſee from whence the Company are to derive reſources ſufficient to manage undertakings of ſuch great magnitude.

For theſe reaſons we ſincerely hope, that every conſiſtent endeavour will be uſed to bring about a peace; and we flatter ourſelves from your exertions joined to thoſe of General *Goddard*, that an event ſo much to be wiſhed may ſpeedily take place. We ſhould have been obliged to you if you had acquainted us with the terms that were propoſed to the Marattas, and the terms on which they were willing to come to an accommodation. Theſe particulars would have been very ſatisfactory, and we requeſt you will communicate them to us as ſoon as poſſible.

You will have been informed by our letter of the 3d ultimo, a duplicate whereof is now tranſmitted, what reinforcement we had determined to ſpare General *Goddard*'s army. A complete battalion of Europeans and a company of artillery went to *Surat* by the *Sea Horſe*, *Horſenden*, and *Morning Star*, and we ordered the battalion of Sepoys we propoſed ſending to be embarked on the *Beſborough*, *Atlas*, and *Duke of Grafton*, for *Surat*.

Should Captain *Montgomery*, by proceeding in conſequence of our orders directly to *Surat*, be unable to fulfil his engagements exactly to the time with reſpect to the delivery of his ſhip to you, we requeſt and hope that ſuch failure may be no detriment to him, as the public ſervice only will be the occaſion of it.

We have the pleaſure to acquaint you that Sir *Edward Hughes*, with ſix ſail of the line, arrived here the 18th ultimo, together with ſeveral of the Company's ſhips as per liſt encloſed, and a battalion of His Majeſty's 73d regiment.

We are, gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,
Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
H. Munro,
C. Smith.

Fort Saint George,
4th February 1780.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 29th May 1780.

To the Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your letters of the 4th and 8th February and 18th March.

Your wiſhes cannot be more ardent than ours for a ſafe and honourable peace with the Marattas, nor will any endeavours be wanting on our part, to promote ſo deſirable an event; but as matters now ſtand, we have no direct agency in the meaſures now purſuing, the Governor General and Council having reſerved the conduct of this war entirely in their own hands.

General *Goddard* received his powers for the late negociation with the Poonah Government, from the Governor General and Council, who acquainted us they had commiſſioned him to treat of the renewal or confirmation of the treaty of *Poorunder*, provided they would recede from the pretenſions they had acquired by the convention of *Worgaum*, and agree not to admit any French force into their dominions, nor allow that nation to form any eſtabliſhment on the Maratta coaſt; and that the acceptance or refuſal of theſe conditions, was to determine the alternative of peace or war.

In anſwer to theſe overtures, General *Goddard* acquainted us, that the Durbar declared in plain terms they would not make a peace with the Engliſh, unleſs *Salſette* was reſtored, and the perſon of *Ragoba* given up; and that on theſe conditions, and theſe only, they would agree to the other terms propoſed to them by General *Goddard*.

We have called upon the commander of the *Atlas* reſpecting the two deſerters, but have not yet received his anſwer.

We are, Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient ſervants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
29th May 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 271.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 29th April 1780.

Copy of General *Goddard*'s Plan for the Military Eſtabliſhment of *Bombay*.

THE opportunity which the Select Committee have afforded me in their letter of the 24th of February, to lay before them my ſentiments upon the preſent ſtate of their military eſtabliſhments, and the moſt eligible plan for increaſing them, has given me the greateſt pleaſure, and I can only lament that I have not the means immediately of affording you my opinion, ſo fully as I could wiſh, on ſo important a ſubject; I ſhall however generally obſerve, it is my recommendation that your military eſtabliſhment ſhould undergo a reformation in all its branches; and to this end, I have put together ſome remarks on the means of a general arrangement, which ſhall be compatible with the preſent ſtate of your ſettlements, and which I truſt will prove ſufficient for the requiſite exigencies of the ſervice. I have for your more ready information on theſe points, ſeparated the different departments into diſtinct heads; and believe me I ſhall be happy if they produce the benefit that is propoſed.

Artillery Department.

The utility of this corps, and its very reſpectable advantages, are too obvious, to make any comments thereon at all neceſſary. I would recommend the augmentation of it to the ſerious attention of the Committee. The ſtability of your poſſeſſions is intimately connected with the degree of perfection to which this corps can be ſupported; the greateſt caution therefore will be neceſſary in the formation and completing of it; and due regard ſhould be had to the characters of the men, their ſize, and nation. It has long been a regulation in the corps at *Bengal*, that no foreigners are admitted into it.

Propoſed that the corps of artillery for the ſervice of the Preſidency of *Bombay* be formed into a battalion, to be compoſed of ſix companies; each company to conſiſt of the following ſtrength.

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Strength of a Company of European Artillery.

	Commissioned Officers.												
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fire Workers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers and Fifers.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Matroſſes.	Total, including Non-commiſſioned Officers, &c.
One company of artillery - - -	-	-	1	1	3	3	6	6	4	12	24	52	104
Complete ſtrength of the battalion	1	2	6	6	18	18	36	36	24	72	144	352	624

That there be a Lieutenant Colonel Commandant to the battalion, and two Majors, as mentioned in the ſtrength; and that the Staff of the battalion conſiſt of a Brigade Major, one Adjutant, and one Quarter Maſter, with fixed monthly allowances, both for the field and garriſon: the non-commiſſioned Staff to be regulated according to the uſage of the ſervice. That on a company or more being detached from the battalion an officer receive the temporary appointment of Adjutant and Quarter Maſter for the duration of the ſervice, with the uſual allowances.

Laſcars for the Service of the Ordnance and Ordnance Stores.

Unacquainted with your preſent eſtabliſhment of Laſcars, or the mode by which you provide them, I can only recommend in general terms, that this corps ſhould be formed on a fixed eſtabliſhment; that they ſhould be incorporated into companies, clothed, and paid, under the ſame regulations as propoſed for the Sepoy corps, and placed under the direction of the commandant of artillery, who will on every occaſion of the ſervice detach them with the artillery, in ſuch proportions as the nature of the ſervice to be executed ſhall require.

European Infantry.

I recommend that this corps be formed into a regiment, to conſiſt of two battalions, each battalion to be formed of one company of grenadiers and eight battalion companies; but as I am aware of the inability of the preſent ſtate of the ſettlement to effect this plan, one of the battalions might be completed upon the propoſed eſtabliſhment, until the Honourable the Court of Directors ſhall enable the more full execution of it.

	Commissioned Officers.									
	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Private.	Total, including Non-commiſſioned Officers, &c.
Propoſed ſtrength of a grenadier company - -	-	-	1	4	-	6	6	4	64	80
Of a battalion company - - - - - - - - -	-	-	1	1	2	4	4	2	50	60
A battalion conſiſting of 1 gren^{r} and 8 batt^{n} companies - - - - - - - - - - -	1	1	9	12	16	38	38	20	464	560

The Staff of a Battalion to be
1 Adjutant,
1 Quarter Maſter.
Non-commiſſioned Staff, as uſual.

I have recommended that each battalion ſhall have a Lieutenant Colonel and a Major; and it is underſtood that your ſenior military officers, or the Commander in Chief, be conſidered as the Colonel of the regiment.

The complete ſtrength of the regiment will then be as follows, according to the aforegoing propoſed eſtabliſhment.

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The Regiment of European Infantry.

	Commissioned Officers.										
	Colonel Commander in Chief.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drums and Fifes.	Private.	Total, including Non-Commiſſioned Officers and Private.
Total	1	2	2	18	24	32	76	76	40	928	1120

Sepoys, or Native Infantry.

As pride in the natives ſeems more the adherent of family or of religion, than the effect of conſtitutional virtue, from which paſſion alone we can hope to remove the natural prejudices under which they are bred, ſo as to impreſs them with that deference and grateful reſpect and attachment to our ſervice, which has hitherto ſupported the ſtability of the Company's poſſeſſions to this period; I cannot but view the confined limits of the poſſeſſions attached to *Bombay*, as a great misfortune in the advancement of the Sepoy corps to the perfection they might otherwiſe have acquired. I will hope, that the extenſion of your poſſeſſions in the courſe of the preſent ſervice, will open a field for the ambition and abilities of your military, which will do them credit in their profeſſion.

The maintenance of theſe poſſeſſions will naturally require an augmentation of your native battalions: but as it is my wiſh to propoſe the means of increaſing your military force with as little increaſe of expence as poſſible, I ſhall ſubjoin to the propoſed eſtabliſhment ſome remarks, that I truſt will tend to the reduction of your preſent current charges.

I would recommend that your eſtabliſhment of native troops be formed ſolely on one plan, without partiality or diſtinction. Two good ends I propoſe by this; the firſt, and moſt material is, that by this mode your military force will be united and connected, and will acquire an habitual confidence in each other; the ſecond is the advantages of command being thus impartially diſtributed to your military commanders by ſeniority, or tour of command, emulation will be excited, and your troops, by frequent changes with each other to the different parts of your poſſeſſions, will extend your influence, and that they will comply with willingneſs and confidence, on any exigency that may require their acting at either extremity, without danger of deſertion or diſguſt.

I would propoſe, that on the arranged plan being put in practice, your corps of Topaſſes, local Sepoys, and temporary military of every denomination, now requiſite in your ſubordinates to aſſiſt in the branches of collection and traffic, be ſeverally diſcharged, as an expence that is not only more burthenſome than regular Sepoys, but whoſe want of ſubordination and diſcipline might rather tend to tarniſh the credit of your arms on occaſion of ſervice, than to afford them ſupport; and I truſt you will be of opinion with me, that the propoſed eſtabliſhment of native battalions provides for the ſecurity of your poſſeſſions, and will admit of a very eligible army being readily drawn together at a very ſhort notice. The marine battalion may have its uſes and advantages; and as I do not deem myſelf a competent judge of them, I ſhall only obſerve, that the corps ought to be diſtinct from the regular troops: the officers to command and ſerve in it, may be ſelected from the army liſt; conſidering this duty a retirement for ſuch whoſe wounds or other infirmities have rendered them incapable of a more active line of employ.

I have formed the eſtabliſhment of native troops upon the following plan for the defence of the line of your poſſeſſions, viz.

Eſtabliſhment of Battalions of Native Infantry.

N° of Battalions.	Stations.
4	To garriſon the iſland of *Bombay*, and to furniſh the requiſite detachments to the ſouthward.
3	For the iſland of *Salſette* and its dependencies.
3	For the defence of *Surat*, and its dependant Pergunnahs of *Parnulla*, *Oorpear*, and the eaſtward frontiers of the acquired lands upon the *Taptee*, or the *Attawiſſee*.
3	For the garriſon of *Broach*, its dependencies of *Jamboſies*, *Ahmood*, *Oclaiſeer*, and the Gauts of *Suckleturat*, and *Bowahpeirah*.
1	Garriſon of *Dubay*.
1	Extra ſervices in the *Guzerat*.
15	battalions.

I propoſe that theſe battalions be formed upon the eſtabliſhment here ſubjoined. They appear to be too unwieldy upon their preſent ſtrength, and it becomes more difficult to keep up the ſame degree of ſubordination, diſcipline, and appearance, than might be effected with a more compact body, by the charge being more divided; I cannot offer a more deciſive argument for the utility of this reduction, than that ſome very able military characters have, on mature conſideration, deemed it expedient, and as much recommended it: I therefore propoſe that the battalions be formed of the following ſtrength, to be compoſed of two grenadier companies, and eight battalion companies.

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	European Commiſſioned Officers.		Serjeants.	Drums and Fifes.	Native Warrant.		Trumpeters.	Non-warrant and Private.			Total Rank and File.	Staff Effective.					
	Captains.	Lieutenants.			Subedars.	Jemadars.		Havildars.	Naicks.	Sepoys.		Commandant.	Adjutant, as Subedah.	Doctors Native.	Writers.	Watermen.	Artificers.
Propoſed ſtrength of a grenadier company	-	-	-	2	1	2	1	6	6	84	96	—	—	—	—	—	—
Of a battalion company	-	-	-	2	1	2	1	6	6	64	76	—	—	—	—	—	—
A battalion of 2 grenadier and 8 battalion companies	1	6	11	20	12	20	12	60	60	680	800	1	1	3	3	10	9

I recommend that there be attached to each battalion of Sepoys, two ſix pounder field pieces, braſs ordnance, and that for their care two European gunners and twenty native Laſcars be alſo attached to the battalions reſpectively; it being remembered, that the Sepoys are to work the guns.

I think it expedient that the native infantry be brigaded, and recommend it as a meaſure that will give conſequence to the eſtabliſhment, and promote a great ſpirit of emulation in the corps.

I propoſe that the eſtabliſhment of fifteen battalions be formed into three brigades, of five battalions each; that a field officer of the rank of Major be appointed to the command of each brigade, and that there be a Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of the eſtabliſhment of native infantry; that a Brigade Major be appointed to the corps, and that each brigade have an adjutant and a quarter maſter. When a battalion or more ſhall be detached, the temporary appointment of Adjutant and Quarter Maſter ſhall be given to one of the officers, with the uſual allowances. You will perceive I have reduced the eſtabliſhment of European officers to a battalion, and that it is provided they ſhall be Lieutenants, the ſenior of their rank in the army, unleſs when there ſhall exiſt exceptions to wave this right. It is a known fact, that the benefit to be expected from the European officers, can only reſult from their knowing and being known to their men.

The conſtant fluctuation and changes, attendant on the promotion of enſigns to Lieutenants, muſt fruſtrate this intent, and the ſervice ultimately ſuffers. It is therefore I adviſe, that Lieutenants be the ſubalterns rank, to be attached to the Sepoy corps, and that removals from battalions be never admitted but on very ſufficient reaſons.

Another point I recommend to the attention of the Committee. It is, that officers holding eſtabliſhed ſtaff employments, be ſtruck off the effective ſtrength of their corps, and their vacancies filled up. It is a public injury to the ſervice, that any poſt ſhould become a ſinecure, and it is a partial injury to the army, by the ſevere check it muſt conſequently give the emulation.

I do not mean to infer by this reduction of European officers, that ſix are fully equal to the ſervice of a battalion. Whenever the ſtate of your army will permit, I am perfectly of opinion it would be eligible to augment them again to ten, or one to a company; but my arguments for their being all of the rank of Lieutenants, will be worthy your attention.

Having in the aforegoing drawn the outlines of the mode for augmenting your military eſtabliſhment, I ſhall proceed to lay before you ſome remarks on the means of reducing the attendant charges on your army diſburſes, wherein your heavieſt expences have heretofore been incurred; and I promiſe myſelf in the event you will find that the mode I have to recommend for the charges of this augmented force, will bear no comparative proportion to the preſent expence of your military eſtabliſhments: I have included the Commandant and Adjutant as two extra Subedars, upon the ſtrength of the battalion: it is highly neceſſary that the rank of Subedar ſhould be annexed to the poſt of Adjutant, in order to give the office weight in the corps; and the perſon holding that poſt, is generally conſidered the firſt for promotion to the rank of Commandant.

Commiſſary's Department.

I have had ſo much occaſion to interfere in this branch of your military diſburſe, but I muſt make my obſervation on the office as full as poſſible, for the information of the Select Committee, from the mode I found to be the practice; I could not poſſibly form to my own opinion, a limit to the attendant charges of this office, and at length I was neceſſitated almoſt to annihilate the duty of the poſt, rather than involve the Company in expences which could neither be confuted nor reſtricted upon the principles under which they would have been incurred. It appeared to me, a poſt without any form, without any regularity; a poſt, which the greater profuſion and waſte of ſtores, the greater the emolument of the Commiſſary, and neither authority or voucher was to be collected for theſe iſſues. To effect the deſired check to theſe charges, I muſt here remark on the two moſt principal points under which they are incurred.

1ſt. The mode of your victualling your troops, &c.

2d. The furniſhing of ſtores to your army, victualling troops, &c. and cattle.

Your preſent regulations of victualling the native troops, artificers, labourers, &c. impreſſed in the Honourable Company's pay, I moſt earneſtly recommend to the Committee to aboliſh: and that in lieu thereof, a monthly allowance, proportionate to the value of proviſions, be made to all native troops, Laſcars, labourers and artificers (to be ſtyled additional pay or batta) which

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ſhall be drawn from the Paymaſter monthly, in a ſeparate roll, and iſſued to the people with their ſubſiſtence. A difference muſt be allowed between the batta of field and garriſon, as an inducement to your troops and labourers to bear the additional fatigue and expence of the field with alacrity and eaſe.

It will be difficult to aſcertain how far this alteration in the victualling department will cauſe a decreaſe of expence; a reaſonable judgment may nevertheleſs be formed, by recurring to the *firſt expence of the purchaſe of a month's proviſions, the charge of cattle neceſſary for its tranſportation with an army, the pay of ſervants in charge of it, its loſs of quality and quantity by carriage, and the poſſible loſs by an enemy.* Theſe ſeveral charges accumulated and united would form the compariſon, but it is needleſs to go further than one reflection, *i. e.* the monthly ſum to be allowed the people will be leſs than the original purchaſe of the proviſions for a month.

With reſpect to the victualling your European ſoldiery, I would adviſe, that in caſe of ſmall detachments they ſhould be allowed their victualling money, and provide themſelves, as moſt acceptable to the ſoldiery, and leaſt troubleſome: but when the major part of a corps is together, either in the field or garriſon, it would be preferable to victual them; not however by the preſent mode practiſed at your Preſidency, but by contract, as is the cuſtom of the Bengal army. The contract to engage to ſupply each man a certain daily ration of ſpirit, of wholeſome butcher's meat, and rice, or bread or biſcuit, at a certain monthly charge; the contract to be formed under reciprocal penalties, between the contractor and the Company; to be renewable annually or at two years, as may be moſt convenient; by this mode the returns of the corps aſcertain the propriety of the contractor's charges; and all expences of ſervants, riſks, tranſportation of proviſions, &c. in the execution of this office, is at the ſole charge of the perſon who contracts; the Company experience but one charge, and which cannot be abuſed. The contract for draft and carriage cattle, camels, carts, &c. neceſſary to the ſervice, is generally given to the victualling contractor, and they are provided at fixed monthly rates; theſe are muſtered monthly, and the bills audited by the Commiſſary of Muſters. The number of cattle are ſupplied on indent, by the authority of the reſpective commanders of detachments; and all cattle deemed by him inſufficient, are rejected occaſionally, and muſt be replaced.

Supplies of Stores.

This department ought to be regulated under the the moſt poſitive ſtrictures. I do not in this comprehend all ſtores whatever requiſite in an army; I only allude to articles of ſtores which are not provided in a grand magazine, which are procurable almoſt in every country market, and which are very ſuddenly and caſually wanted in the courſe of a ſervice. The regulations I recommend for this office are, that the Committee form a plan to affix prices for the various articles of ſtores which can be wanted in the different departments of the army, ſpecifying the rates they ſhall be charged for in *Bombay, Salſette, Surat, Broach*, and in the field; the Commiſſary to be allowed 15 per cent. upon theſe allowed prices; and they ought to be formed ſo as to exceed ſomewhat the average prices of thoſe articles at the afore-mentioned ſettlements.

The indents made to the Commiſſary, properly authorized by the ſignature of the ſenior military officer, become the vouchers for his charges.

The Commiſſary may provide his ſtores when and where he pleaſes; the ſervice has nothing to do with them till they are iſſued upon indent. This plan aboliſhes the preſent practice of their being purchaſed and carried at the charge and riſk of the Company.

And the arguments I have before aſſerted on the article of proviſions, will hold with equal force in this department, by the enhanced valuation all articles will bear in the courſe of a few months, from the charges, tranſporting, and decay incident thereto.

The poſt of Commiſſary of Muſters may be annexed to that of Commiſſary of Supplies; but it is inconſiſtent he ſhould have any charge of public ſtores.

The Commiſſary of Ordnance is the proper perſon to have the charge of public ſtores, under the inſpection of the ſenior officer of artillery.

Hoſpitals.

Were the conveniencies of the ſick to bear the leaſt proportion to the expences the Company have been at on this ſide of *India*, under the head of hoſpital charges, I might have taken more leiſure in the alterations I directed for the regulations of this department, in the troops furniſhed from your Preſidency to reinforce this army. It was my endeavour to provide for every reaſonable and neceſſary indulgence to the ſick ſoldiery, both European and native, and by theſe regulations I recommend your field allowances to be fixed.

Poſſibly theſe allowances may admit of ſome deduction in your garriſons; of this you, gentlemen, muſt be the moſt competent judges, and can frame your alterations by the current prices the requiſite conveniencies may bear at thoſe garriſons ſeverally; I can only add, that the allowances are equal to every poſſible want of the ſick, and leave a handſome emolument to the chief of the faculty for their aſſiduity in the care of them. The returns of your ſick, and the hoſpital reports, become the vouchers and check to the ſurgeon's charges: theſe charges become leſs intricate, and conſequently are not only moderated but aſcertained. The carriage of the ſick is the next point in conſideration: the number of doolies to be allowed will depend on the ſeaſon of the year, and the nature of the ſervice; the controul of this muſt reſt with the military officer. Six bearers are allowed to each doolie; their monthly pay I have fixed at 8 rupees each bearer; and it is provided that they ſhall be muſtered monthly with all other ſervants in the pay of the Honourable Company. This charge becomes aſcertained, and leſs liable to abuſe, than the mode heretofore followed. The article of pay to bearers, might, I think, under the direction of your Board, admit of a reduction in the courſe of time; but the advanced wages which ſervants of every denomination have been accuſtomed to, upon your troops taking the field on this coaſt, made even this pay to appear moderate, compared with the terms private gentlemen were obliged to comply with.

It is only neceſſary to remark further on this head, that the ſick Europeans are victualled by the ſurgeons, but no interference is admitted in the victualling of the native ſick; the ſurgeon conſequently receives the diet money of the ſick Europeans from the contractor, and reimburſes himſelf the expence of their maintenance; the ſurgeon draws from the Company the ſum of fifteen rupees *per* month for every ſick European, which includes all charges of ſervants, hoſpital cloathing, and buzar or country medicines, excepting when quilts are requiſite, which are ſupplied by the Company.

The charge to the Company for native ſick is at the rate of four rupees *per* month each, no other contingency allowed. The ſum of ten rupees *per* month is allowed for every native, Sepoy, or follower, that may be wounded; all Sepoys in the hoſpital with common diſorders have a deduction made from their pay, of one anna one pice *per* day, which is accounted for by the captains of corps to the ſenior ſurgeon, to defray the expence of ſervants, &c. and prevent men lingering. Europe inſtruments and medicines are ſupplied and carried by the Company.

I have

I have now I think gone through the general lines of the reform I wiſh to recommend to you; I flatter myſelf that when you are enabled to draw the compariſon of your military diſburſe; upon the preſent regulations and thoſe now propoſed, you will find a conſiderable deduction upon the augmentation of your forces, and that you will be enabled to form an accurate idea of the ſubſidy that will be annually requiſite for the maintenance of your forces in the field or garriſon.

Thomas Goddard,
Brig^r General.

Preſident's Minute reſpecting the Augmentation of the Army.

General *Goddard* having furniſhed us with his opinion of the augmentation to be made of our military force, I think no time ſhould be loſt in raiſing and forming the new battalions that are wanted to complete the propoſed eſtabliſhment of Sepoys.

The number of our Europeans, and the preſent diſpoſition of them, will not for the preſent admit of carrying into execution the alteration the general propoſes with regard to them, in any manner that will prove of advantage to the ſervice, adequate to the great increaſe of expence. As we have reaſon likewiſe to expect to hear ſhortly from the Honourable the Court of Directors, in reply to our repreſentations of laſt year, on the ſubject of the ſtate of our army, and may conclude that they have taken meaſures for aſſiſting us with field officers of experience and ability, I think we ſhould not be precipitate in making promotions to that rank, nor in determining on general arrangements which may render ſuch promotions neceſſary, if they can with propriety be deferred.

I ſhall accordingly propoſe for the preſent, to carry into execution no more of General *Goddard's* propoſed plan than relates to the raiſing of the new battalions, and modelling thoſe now in the ſervice. Excluſive of the Topaz and marine battalions, we ſhall have occaſion for ſeven new raiſed battalions to complete our eſtabliſhment, according to the General's recommendation, to 15 battalions of Sepoys, which will be formed of the ſtrength and model propoſed by General *Goddard* as near as may be, if the other members of the Committee concur with me in the neceſſity of the augmentation and approbation of the General's propoſal regarding the form of our battalions.

With the above mentioned ſtrength once completed, I make no doubt we ſhall be able to maintain all our new acquiſitions in *Guzzarat*, as well as *Baſſein* when reduced, which I ſtill flatter myſelf may be effected either before the cloſe of the preſent ſeaſon, or at the very firſt opening of the next. This object accompliſhed, our views in my opinion ſhould be merely defenſive, and our military expences reduced as much within the compaſs of an ordinary peace eſtabliſhment as poſſible, by which means alone we can hope to render our acquiſitions of any value to our employers.

Upon this ſubject it will be neceſſary to communicate our ſentiments both to the Governor General and Council, and to the Select Committee at *Madras*, informing them of the augmentation we have reſolved to make of our troops, and our hope that they will, when complete, be ſufficient, for the defence of ſuch territory as will be anſwerable to the Company's expences on this ſide of *India*. It muſt be pointed out to them how abſolutely neceſſary it is to reduce the preſent military charges within more bounds than they can be brought to while the troops of their Preſidency are acting with ours: that nothing but the moſt preſſing exigence therefore can make us wiſh to detain them, and they may reſt aſſured of our returning them as ſoon as the ſtate of our affairs under our management will permit, if their ſtay or return depends on us: that though there has yet been neither concert nor communication between the three Governments on this important ſubject, and the newneſs of our ſituation leaves us much at a loſs with regard to the plan of conduct the gentlemen of *Bengal* and *Madras* may think of, for relieving our honourable maſters from their preſent burthens on this ſide of *India*; yet we have thought it our duty to put our military eſtabliſhment, with the advice of General *Goddard*, on ſuch a footing, as will render the neceſſary meaſures for the reduction of the military charges, practicable as far as depends on us.

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True copies,
Edwd Ravenſcroft, Sec^y.

Preſident's propoſal agreed to.

Agreed, according to the Preſident's recommendation, to defer the alterations propoſed by General *Goddard*, reſpecting our European corps and the promotion of field officers, as we have great reaſon very ſhortly to expect orders from the Honourable Company in anſwer to our advices of laſt ſeaſon, and that therefore it is unneceſſary at preſent to lay General *Goddard's* plan before the Board, as we at firſt intended, according to our minute of the 4th inſtant. A copy thereof muſt however be forwarded to the Honourable Company by the *Hawke*, and it muſt be brought on our diary under this date.

The augmentation of the Sepoy eſtabliſhment deemed immediately neceſſary.

But the augmentation of the Sepoy corps being immediately and indiſpenſably neceſſary, it is reſolved, that ſeven battalions be forthwith raiſed upon the model recommended by General *Goddard*; and in order to expedite the levies, that the officers be now appointed to command them; and accordingly Captains *Weſt*, *Samber*, *Lendrum*, *Bowles*, *Hayes*, *Wadington*, and *Macculloch*, be appointed to command the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th battalions, reſpectively; which are to be formed by dividing the old battalions fairly and equally, incorporating the locals at *Surat* and *Broach*, and completed with new levies which already are in great forwardneſs in conſequence of former orders. Two of the new battalions muſt be formed at *Surat*, and two at *Broach*.

To be increaſed to 15 battalions. Manner of forming the new battalions.

Our ſentiments reſpecting the military, to be communicated to Bengal and Madras.

Our ſentiments on the ſtate of our military eſtabliſhment and expences muſt alſo be communicated to the Select Committee at *Madras*, and to the Governor General and Council, as propoſed to us by the Preſident.

Adjourned. *W. Hornby.*
D. Draper.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Sec^y.

APPENDIX, No. 272.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 30th April 1780.

WE had the honour to write to you fully in detail upon the political affairs of this Preſidency, under the 31ſt of December and 16th of March; and the ſhip *Hawke* being now diſpatched for *England*, we tranſmit copies of our addreſſes of theſe dates, with our diary in this department, from the 1ſt of May 1779 to the 30th of April 1780; which will fully illuſtrate every part of our advices ſince the diſpatch of the *Royal Admiral*.

We alſo ſend by this ſhip a complete ſecret diary for the year 1778.

The advices from General *Goddard*, conveyed in our addreſs of the 16th of March, tended to give us hopes of a favourable concluſion to the negociation opened with *Madjee Scindia*, which however were ſoon deſtroyed by his ſubſequent letters. The anſwers from *Scindia* and *Holcar* to the explicit declaration made to them by General *Goddard*, through *Scindia's* Vackeel, conſiſted only of general profeſſions of friendly ſentiments, and were cloſed with a requeſt to ſend a confidential perſon to their camp, fully informed of the views of the Engliſh, with whom they might come to a final ſettlement. This was declined by the General for the reaſons explained in his

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his letter referred to on the margin, but in ſuch a manner as to avoid impreſſing a belief that his diſſent aroſe from any motives of diſtruſt or want of reliance on *Scindia*'s ſincerity; and he gave the Vackeel leave to return to his maſter, empowered to offer every general aſſurance on the part of the Engliſh, of the proper ſenſe they had of his ſervices, and of their wiſh to continue on terms of amity with him, if by his conduct he would give them an opportunity of proving their friendly diſpoſition and deſire to promote his intereſt in conjunction with their own. The Vackeel promiſed to return in three days from *Scindia*'s camp, which was at the diſtance of ten coſs; and the General judged it neceſſary to limit him to that period, as *Scindia* would have ſufficient leiſure to deliberate fully upon the meaſures he might have to propoſe, and at the ſame time an excuſe for further delays be avoided.

The expected propoſals on the part of *Madjee Scindia* were at length made on the 16th of March, after the negociation had been open ſeven days, and were conceived in the following terms: "That formerly, when "*Ragoba* was at *Tellaugam*, after the return of the "Engliſh army to *Bombay*, an agreement had been en"tered into between him and *Scindia*, and written en"gagements mutually exchanged for its performance; "wherein the former conſented to relinquiſh all claims "to any ſhare in the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, and to "retire towards *Jancy*, where he ſhould receive an al"lowance from the Peiſhwa's revenue of twelve lacks "of rupees per annum: that the Sicca ſhould con"tinue to be ſtruck in the name of the young Peiſhwa "*Maderow Narrain*; and that *Bajerow*, the ſon of *Ra*"goba, ſhould be appointed his Dewan; but that as "he was too young to tranſact the buſineſs of the "office himſelf, being only four years of age, the "care and management of it ſhould be left entirely to "*Scindia*. This plan *Scindia* propoſed ſhould now be "followed: that *Ragoba* ſhould immediately go himſelf "to *Jancy*, and young *Bajerow* accompany him to "*Poonah* in order to fix the Adminiſtration in the man"ner above-mentioned." This was the amount of what *Scindia* had authorized the Vackeel to propoſe, without any reſervation or other clauſe whatever. And as it appeared plainly, his only view was to get *Ragoba* and his ſon into his own power, by which he meant to aggrandize himſelf in the State, without regard to the intereſts of the Engliſh, and perhaps through their means to make his own terms with the Miniſter, the General thought proper to diſmiſs the Vackeel with this expreſs and poſitive declaration, that the Engliſh could not, conſiſtent with their own honour, nor ever would, agree to put any reſtraint upon *Ragoba*, or compel him, againſt his own conſent, to leave their dominions, where he had received an aſylum: that however much they might be diſpoſed to unite in the propoſed ſettlement, they muſt be perfectly ſatisfied reſpecting the ſafety of young *Bajerow*, and every thing muſt be quietly ſettled at *Poonah*, before his preſence could be even neceſſary there: and that, admitting the Engliſh did agree to aſſiſt in putting the power of the State into the hands of *Scindia*, it was neceſſary he alſo ſhould on his part, and in the name of the Peiſhwa, conſent to the performance of certain conditions favourable to their intereſts; as well in conſideration of the important advantages he was to receive through their means, as to compenſate for the heavy expence of the war, which formerly, and in particular at this time, they had been involuntarily compelled to engage in with the Maratta State. With this anſwer the Vackeel was diſmiſſed; and as the General, in explaining his ſentiments, and giving him to underſtand that he could not conſent to any terms that were of a diſhonourable nature, at the ſame time uſed every endeavour to convince him of his ſincere inclinations towards an accommodation. The conduct he adopted on receiving his anſwer, amounted to a proof that he had no real deſign to unite with the Engliſh; but the General then began to entertain a belief of his hoſtile intentions, from the circumſtance of his having invited *Govind Row*, the diſaffected brother of *Futty Sing*, to his camp, and promiſed to put him in poſſeſſion of the Guicawar ſhare of *Guzerat*.

After the diſmiſſion of the Vackeel, the General received no ſort of meſſage or overture from *Scindia*, and acquainted us that notwithſtanding the reports and general belief of an enmity ſubſiſting between him and the Miniſter, the agents of the latter reſided in his camp, and he was credibly informed letters were conſtantly paſſing and repaſſing between them; from all which circumſtances, he was confirmed in the conjecture, which *Scindia*'s late conduct had ſuggeſted, that the appearance of animoſity againſt *Nanah Furneeſe* was merely a pretext, to deceive the Engliſh, and to get the perſons of *Ragoba* and his ſon into his hands, for purpoſes of his own advantage.

He therefore put the army in motion, and advanced to a place called *Pittoul*, about eight miles to the eaſtward of *Brodera*. On his arrival there, he found that *Scindia* had for ſecurity ſent his camp equipage, buzar, baggage, &c. to the neighbourhood of *Paunghur*, a ſtrong fort belonging to him, about thirty miles to the eaſtward of *Brodera*; and himſelf with the greateſt part of his army, unincumbered with any ſort of baggage, had taken poſt at about the diſtance of twelve miles; the remainder of his troops he had diſperſed in different bodies on the road leading to our camp, ſo as to be effectually guarded againſt every poſſibility of a ſurprize, which he ſeemed much afraid of, and which the General ſtudied all in his power to obtain an opportunity of attempting with ſome proſpect of ſucceſs. In his letter of the 24th March, he expreſſed much anxiety to accompliſh this point, becauſe from the nature of *Scindia*'s army, and the mode of war he practiſed, our army could neither approach near enough to attack him ſuddenly to advantage, nor would he run the hazard of a general engagement in the field. As our army advanced, he retired; and to purſue him, the General was of opinion would not be the means of bringing on a deciſive action, nor be attended with any real or ſolid advantage, proportioned to the inconvenience of expoſing the Company's and *Futty Sing*'s territories to the inroads and devaſtations of a ravaging enemy.

On the 27th the General found it neceſſary to change his ground, and advanced to a village called *Camloud*, above five miles diſtant from his former encampment, and found the whole army of the enemy collected in the neighbourhood of that village; but after a ſlight cannonade, they retired with the loſs of ſome men and horſes.

The enemy ſtill continued to purſue the plan of keeping their guns and baggage at a conſiderable diſtance out of reach, where it could be attended with no advantage to follow them, as they would continue to move them to a greater diſtance as our army advanced.

The General at laſt finding the enemy would neither venture to come to a fair and deciſive action, nor put it in his power to attack them with all the advantage he could have wiſhed, came to the reſolution of diſlodging their army from the poſt they occupied with their horſes and arms only, about ſix miles from his camp, and marched himſelf for that purpoſe, at two o'clock in the morning of the 3d inſtant, with a part of the army, leaving the remainder on the former ground, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*. The force he took with him conſiſted of 200 Europeans, ten grenadier companies of Sepoys, two battalions of Bengal, and one of Bombay Sepoys, with two twelves and ten ſix pounder pieces of artillery, and the regiment of Mogul cavalry and Candahar horſe. The whole were diſpoſed in two lines, the rear commanded by Major *Hopkins*, and Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* and Major *Forbes* were ſtationed to the front line; and though the precautions taken by the enemy gave him no hopes of ſurprizing

prizing them effectually, the objects he principally had in view, were to induce them to venture an action with only a part of the army oppoſed to their whole force, to drive them from the poſt they then occupied, or if they fled without reſiſtance, to prove the manifeſt ſuperiority of our arms, in the moſt ſtriking and honourable manner.

The event he acquainted us far exceeded his expectations. He approached much nearer to their camp without being diſcovered, than he conceived poſſible, and a little before day-break came upon their grand guard, conſiſting of ſix or ſeven thouſand men, which he paſſed through without diſcharging a ſhot, determined to reſerve his fire till he came up with the main body, commanded by *Madjee Scindia* himſelf. This being a mile and a half in front, he did not reach till about ſun-riſe, when their whole army was in motion, and the action immediately commenced. The enemy ſeeing the inferiority of our force, advanced with much appearance of courage and reſolution; but they were ſo well received, that they were obliged to give way, and in the ſpace of about an hour, quitted the field entirely. In order to diſlodge a large body which annoyed our right flank from behind the cover of ſome buſhes, the General ordered the Mogul and Candahar cavalry to advance, which they performed with great ſpirit and ſucceſs; and having drove the enemy into the plain, gave an excellent opportunity for the artillery to fire upon them with execution as they retired.

The enemy's loſs on this occaſion is ſaid to have been conſiderable, while on our ſide it fell entirely upon the Candahar horſe, of whom fifteen were killed and wounded in charging the enemy. The General has expreſſed his ſatisfaction at the ſteady, uniform, and proper behaviour of Major *Hopkins*, who had charge of the rear line, during the whole engagement.

We have received no further accounts from the General of his operations ſince this action, but we underſtand the armies were nearly in the ſame poſition the 20th of this month, and that he was joined by Colonel *Brown*'s detachment on the 14th. We have for ſome time been very impatient to hear what effect his ſucceſs has had upon *Scindia*'s operations, and what plan he propoſed purſuing, which as the ſeaſon grows late, it is of conſequence for us to be informed of, and is what the General promiſed, for we wiſh to ſee the army employed to more advantage than in watching the motions of *Madjee Scindia*.

After waiting ſome time in this expectation, we ſet forth to the General the importance of poſſeſſing ourſelves of *Baſſein*, and expreſſed our anxiety at the probability there appeared of this ſeaſon elapſing, and *Baſſein* ſtill remaining unſubdued. We are exceedingly earneſt not to leave the reduction of this place to the hazard of future accidents or circumſtances, eſpecially in the time of European war; and have offered our opinion to General *Goddard*, that no other object can claim a preference to his attention, or bring the campaign to a more honourable and advantageous concluſion. The Preſident had before written on the ſame ſubject, which we flatter ourſelves will have its due weight, and that General *Goddard* will be able to make ſuch a diſpoſition of the force under his command, lately reinforced with a battalion of Sepoys from *Madras*, as effectually to protect your poſſeſſions in *Guzerat*, and undertake the ſiege of *Baſſein* at leaſt on the very firſt opening of next ſeaſon, in which the troops in *Bombay* and *Salſette* can materially aſſiſt, and enable him to leave ſuch a force as the enemy cannot withſtand, for the ſecurity of your northern poſſeſſions.

Should he however not be able to move to the ſouthward before the monſoon, we have wrote to him moſt preſſingly immediately to return the Bombay detachment under Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* into garriſon, as it would be highly improper to leave this place with no more than our preſent force for its protection during the rains, when no immediate relief could be afforded from the army to the northward. Appendix. No. 272.

In the preſent ſituation of affairs, and whilſt *Futty Sing* is actually in the field as an auxiliary in the war, we did not think it neceſſary to ſend a Reſident to his Durbar on the part of this Government, which we acquainted you in our addreſs of the 16th ultimo had been propoſed to us by General *Goddard*; but when it may be a convenient time for ſettling the points ſtill remaining to be adjuſted, this meaſure ſhall be adopted. In the mean time Mr. *Mallet*, the Reſident at *Cambay*, will be employed on any occaſional buſineſs, for which his knowledge of the language and politics of the country fully qualify him.

We tranſmit under No. 4, a copy of the late treaty with *Futty Sing*.

The General ſome time ago ſtrongly urged to the Preſident, to make a loan of ſix lacks to *Futty Sing*, on the Company's account; which, whatever might be our opinion of the advantage or expediency of ſuch a meaſure, the ſtate of our finances would not permit us to entertain a thought of.

General *Goddard* has tranſmitted to us a repreſentation, made to him by Mr. *Farmer*, reſpecting a ſum of money, to the amount of rupees thirty-five thouſand (35,000) which he found it neceſſary to advance, to procure his enlargement from *Madjee Scindia*; and the General gives his opinion, Mr. *Farmer* appears very well entitled to the repayment of this money: but as he had no inſtructions from *Bengal* on the ſubject, he had, according to Mr. *Farmer*'s requeſt, referred and ſtrongly recommended his caſe to the conſideration of that Government. The General gave ſtrong teſtimony of Mr. *Farmer*'s attention to your intereſt, by tranſmitting, with much hazard to himſelf, ſuch uſeful intelligence as he could collect in the enemy's camp; for which reaſon, and as a delay in the payment was an inconvenience to him, the General recommended to us to afford him immediate relief: but as he had himſelf referred the affair to the Governor General and Council, we thought it moſt proper to wait for their determination, and ſend a copy of his letter, under No. 5, for your notice.

The extent of country acquired by the treaty with *Futty Sing*, and the Maratta pergunnahs that have been reduced, neceſſarily requiring an augmentation of our military eſtabliſhment for their defence, and a proper diſpoſition to be made for that purpoſe, we conſulted General *Goddard* on theſe points; who accordingly ſent us a plan for the augmentation and regulation of the army in all its branches. He therein ſtrongly recommends, that a Major and two companies be added to the battalion of artillery; gives his opinion, that the infantry eſtabliſhment ſhould be completed to two battalions as ſoon as poſſible; that the Sepoy eſtabliſhment ſhould forthwith be increaſed to fifteen battalions, excluſive of marines: and that all irregulars and locals ſhould be diſcharged. Theſe fifteen battalions he propoſed ſhould be divided into three brigades, with a Major to each, and a Lieutenant Colonel to command the whole; and for your more full information we tranſmit a copy of the plan at length, under No. 7.

When this plan came under conſideration, the Preſident laid before us a minute on the ſubject, which ſtands on our proceedings under the 29th inſtant; and we agreed with him in opinion, that the ſtate of our European eſtabliſhment will not, for the preſent, admit of our carrying into execution the alteration propoſed by the General with reſpect to them, in any manner that will prove of advantage adequate to the great increaſe of expences; and as we may with reaſon expect to hear ſhortly from you, in reply to our repreſentation laſt year on the ſtate of our army, and may conclude you have taken meaſures for ſupplying us with field officers of experience and ability, we further agreed with the

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Preſident, not to be precipitate in making promotions to that rank, nor in determining on general arrangements, which might render ſuch promotions neceſſary.

We accordingly reſolved for the preſent, to carry into execution no more of General *Goddard*'s plan than raiſing ſeven new battalions of Sepoys, and modelling thoſe now in the ſervice according to the ſtrength propoſed by him: but without forming them into brigades. The new battalions will be formed at *Bombay*, *Surat*, and *Broach*, as may be moſt convenient; and the large bodies of irregulars at the two latter places, will be incorporated into them. Major *Fullerton* has alſo been directed ſome time ago to entertain recruits at *Ahmedabad*, and levies have been formed at *Bombay* in proportion for this increaſe; ſo that the new battalions will ſoon be in great forwardneſs.

With this ſtrength once completed, we hope to be able to maintain our new acquiſitions in *Guzerat* as well as *Baſſein* when reduced; and we can aſſure you, is no more than what appears to us really neceſſary, as we have not yet been in a condition to take poſſeſſion of the valuable ceſſions made by *Futty Sing* adjacent to *Surat*, deſcribed by the name of *Autaveezy*, for want of a ſufficient force; having hitherto been able only to afford one battalion of Sepoys for *Surat*, whereas three will now be the leaſt that can be diſpenſed with. We have in theſe levies extended our views no further than to form a proper peace eſtabliſhment, ſufficient for the defence of your poſſeſſions, which muſt in the end devolve upon us; and we ſhall have ample means of defraying the expence, when matters were ſettled. We were clearly of opinion it was highly expedient to carry this meaſure into execution without delay; as, if the war continued, General *Goddard* will not be able to ſpare us any part of the force under his command to garriſon our new acquiſitions, the benefit of which would be conſequently loſt to the Company; or if an accommodation takes place, we ought to have a proper force in readineſs for our own defence, as our firſt wiſh would be to ſend back the Bengal and Madras troops, which are maintained here at an almoſt unſupportable expence; but which cannot be done, unleſs we make proper proviſion for that event.

We cannot pretend to ſay to what extent the Governor General and Council carry their views in this war; but if we were convinced that the French would not make any further efforts to retrieve their affairs in *India*, we ſhould be of opinion, that after eſtabliſhing ourſelves in *Baſſein* and the Company's ſhare of *Guzerat*, which will afford a revenue equal to our expences on this ſide of *India*, our views ſhould be merely defenſive. Poſſeſſion, and a reſpectable force to repel any invaſion, will be a better ſecurity for the peaceable enjoyment of our acquiſitions, than any treaty, even if the Marattas could be brought to acknowledge our title by any formal engagement; and as in the courſe of a few months, we may hope our views in point of territory may be accompliſhed, and a force eſtabliſhed equal to its defence, we propoſe ſtating our ſentiments on the ſubject to the Governor General and Council, and the great importance of reducing the military charges ariſing from this war within more moderate bounds than they can be brought to whilſt the troops of the other Preſidencies are acting with ours; and that, as nothing but the moſt preſſing exigency could make us wiſh to detain them, they may be aſſured of our returning them as ſoon as the ſtate of affairs under our management will permit, if their ſtay or return is left to our option; having put our own military eſtabliſhment on ſuch a footing as will render the neceſſary meaſures for relieving the Company from this heavy burthen practicable, ſo far as depends on us.

We cannot quit the ſubject of the army, without once more preſſing you to exert every poſſible means to complete our very defective eſtabliſhment of European infantry to two battalions; and to provide for an increaſe of two companies to the battalion of artillery, which General *Goddard* ſo ſtrongly recommends, and will become neceſſary, as guns muſt be attached to the Sepoy battalions in the different pergunnahs, and we are averſe to inſtructing the natives in the practice of artillery.—About eight hundred recruits will reſtore our eſtabliſhment to a reſpectable footing, and effectually enable us to ſupport our plan of ſelf-defence, without ſubjecting you to the enormous expence of reinforcement from the other Preſidencies.

In order to get footing on the continent, and thereby to open a larger avenue for ſupplies of grain for this iſland, we lately ſent detachments to ſurprize the forts of *Perſick* and *Bellapore*; the former oppoſite *Tannah*, and the latter near the extremity of *Caranja*; which was completely done, and we thereby obtained a preſent conſiderable ſupply of grain, and the command of ſome rivers, which will afford a conſiderable ſource of ſupply in future. The pergunnah of *Bellapore* is, from ſome advantages of ſituation, eaſy of defence, and eſtimated to produce a revenue of near a lack of rupees; and being ſo ſituated as to give ſecurity both to *Salſette* and *Caranja*, from any petty incurſions of the Marattas, we look upon it as a conſiderable acquiſition.

We know not in what manner to account for the conduct of *Hyder Ally*, in not having yet given any anſwer to the propoſal made him by the Preſident, of ſending a gentleman to confer with him. The gentlemen at *Madras* expreſsly acquaint us, in a letter dated the 4th of February, that they have no ſubject of difference with him, but deliver ſentiments reſpecting provocation ſuppoſed to be given him by your ſervants at *Tellicherry*, which are plainly imbibed from Colonel *Braithwaite*'s repreſentations, who can certainly have acquired no more than a very ſuperficial knowledge of the ſtate of affairs there; we ſhall however require them to clear up this matter very particularly. But the gentlemen at *Madras* in the ſame letter tell us, that *Hyder Ally*'s conduct depends very much on the tranſactions with the Marattas; that a peace with them would have kept him in awe, and delivered them from all apprehenſions from that quarter; but that it will be difficult to ſay what line he will purſue now that hoſtilities are commenced with them, on account of the treaty in force between him and the Marattas, and the influence of the Poonah Miniſters in the Court of the Nizam.

The laſt letter from *Tellicherry*, entered on our diary under the 27th inſtant, gives us ſome hopes of ſeeing an end to the troubles there, by a treaty between the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, and the King of *Cotiole*; but any thing we can ſay on this head will be no more than mere conjecture, until we can obtain ſome more direct knowledge of the Nabob's diſpoſition towards us.

APPENDIX, No. 273.

Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, 25th July 1780.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Gentlemen,

1. WE now diſpatch the *Mercury* packet to the gulf of *Perſia*, to afford a convoy, and for any diſpatches you may have forwarded by the way of *Buſſorah* for this Preſidency, or any of your other ſettlements in *India*, and that may arrive there after the departure of the *Ranger* and *Eagle*; it being very material that at this critical time every order and intelligence from *Europe* ſhould reach us with all poſſible expedition.

2. We addreſſed you at length by the *Hawke*, under the 30th of April, in continuation of our advices, dated the 16th of March, tranſmitted under the care of Mr. *William*

William Petrie. Theſe diſpatches gave you a full account of the treaty concluded by General *Goddard* with *Futty Sing*; of the attack and reduction of *Ahmadavad* by the Company's forces, and the ſurrender of it to *Futty Sing*, according to the treaty; of the march of *Madjee Scindy* and *Tookajee Holcar* into the province of *Guzerat*; and of General *Goddard*'s fruitleſs negociation with *Scindia*; and of the military operations that enſued when the overtures towards an accommodation had proved abortive.

3. Though this campaign does not produce any deciſive advantages, the manifeſt ſuperiority of our arms was evinced in the moſt ſtriking and honourable manner. and your poſſeſſions depending on *Surat* and *Broach* were effectually protected from the incurſions of the enemy, General *Goddard* having confined his operations moſtly to the eaſtward of *Brodera*, belonging to *Futty Sing*.

4. The ſeaſon for action being nearly elapſed, nothing material happened between the grand armies after the date of our addreſs of the 30th of April; and ſhortly after General *Goddard* diſpoſed his forces in cantonments, at the moſt convenient ſtations for covering your poſſeſſions during the rains. The General has lately written us, that *Scindia* and *Holcar* have certainly retired to their capitals; and hopes it will be a grand object to detain them in their own provinces, while we purſue our ſchemes oppoſed ſingly by the forces of *Nanna Furneſſe*. He had ſuggeſted to the Governor General and Council the idea of cauſing a powerful diverſion to be made on both the ſides of *Malwa*, which, he was of opinion, would effectually anſwer that purpoſe.

5. After the ſeparation of the armies, a detachment was employed with much ſucceſs and advantage under the command of Lieutenant *Welch*. He ſurprized and totally routed a body of the Poonah forces, which had made an inroad from the ſouthward into the diſtricts adjoining to *Surat*, now devolved to the Company by the late treaty with *Futty Sing*, taking their camp, baggage, and artillery, with a conſiderable loſs of men on their ſide. He next reduced the fort of *Purenulla*, and two other forts, which are repreſented as acquiſitions of importance, from the ſecurity they will afford to our new poſſeſſions ſouth of the river *Tappy*, to which they will ſerve as a formidable barrier, giving us clear poſſeſſion of the country to the very border of the Portugueze diſtricts of *Damaun*, which now alone ſeparate the ſouthern frontier of your Surat province from the diſtrict of *Baſſein*.

6. The Chief of *Surat* has acquainted us, that he has frequented the Company's tannahs in the ſeveral diſtricts heretofore annexed to the city of *Surat*, and until lately poſſeſſed by the Poonah Government and *Futty Sing*; and that he hopes to collect a conſiderable revenue therefrom the enſuing ſeaſon.

7. The large force the enemy had in *Guzerat*, until the retreat of *Scindy* and *Holkar*, and the danger and bad policy of leaving our new acquiſitions and *Futty Sing* expoſed to their depredations, made General *Goddard* judge it neceſſary to delay the attack of *Baſſein*; the reduction of which we had once hoped would have cloſed the campaign. It will, however, if nothing unforeſeen happens, be the firſt object of his operations, after the breaking up of the monſoon; and we have, as more fully mentioned in our addreſs by the *Hawke*, offered our opinion to the Governor General and Council, that the reduction of this place ſhould be the termination of our views in point of territory, and the future operations of the war become defenſive; that is, ſhould have no further object than to eſtabliſh and confirm the Company in poſſeſſion of their new acquiſitions under this Preſidency.

8. In our preſent predicament we have not that direct information to afford, which you might expect from us, of the extent to which this war is meant to be carried, or the further meaures that may be intended in proſecution thereof, for the attainment of peace; the Governor General and Council not having communicated with this Government on theſe objects: but being firmly fixed in our opinion above expreſſed, which points out the moſt eligible ſtep that can be purſued in the preſent ſituation of affairs, next to obtaining a firm and permanent peace, and very anxious to relieve the Company from the enormous expence of the Bengal army, we reſolved on the meaſure already minutely explained to you, and now only briefly repeated, of immediately forming a force upon this eſtabliſhment, equal to the defence of our own poſſeſſions, which muſt at any rate in the end devolve upon us. This is the only meaſure that can make it practicable to relieve you from this heavy burthen of military charge, and enable us to diſpenſe with the aid of the Bengal and Madras auxiliaries, the expence of which we foreſaw muſt be an inſupportable drain upon the Bengal treaſury. For this purpoſe we are now raiſing ſeven additional battalions of Sepoys, and have ſtated our ſentiments fully to the Governor General and Council, that, if they concur with us, meaſures may be taken for the return of the foreign troops as early as may be judged prudent; though as our European eſtabliſhment is ſo very imperfect or incomplete, we have recommended, that the battalion of Madras infantry, and the detachment of artillery may be continued on this coaſt, which, added to the troops of this eſtabliſhment, will effectually enable us to ſupport our plan of ſelf defence. Appendix. No. 273.

9. In our addreſs by the *Hawke*, we wrote preſſingly for a ſupply of eight hundred recruits, for our infantry and artillery, and thirty-ſix pounder field pieces for the Sepoy battalions, which we earneſtly requeſt may be ſent out as ſoon as poſſible; and alſo a ſupply of ſeamen for our cruizers, which are now almoſt entirely manned by Laſcars.

10. We judged it prudent before the monſoon to recal into garriſon the detachment we had ſent to reinforce General *Goddard*, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, which, as well as the footing we had gained on the Continent, were mentioned in our addreſs by the *Hawke* Shortly after date thereof, Captain *Campbell* with a ſmall detachment was ſent to take poſſeſſion of the town of *Callian*, in which he was ſoon after attacked by a large body of the enemy; who had, from *Madjee Scindia*, come down the Gauts, and forced one of our poſts defended by two companies of Sepoys, who were diſperſed, and three officers killed, one taken priſoner, and three pieces of cannon taken. The enemy elated with this attacked *Callian* with great vigour, which was defended with much gallantry by Captain *Campbell*, and reinforcements being ſpeedily ſent over, and the arrival of the detachment from the northward enabling us to detach a ſufficient force to meet the enemy in the field, Colonel *Hartley* ſoon drove them with diſgrace and loſs out of the country, and we have ſtationed a reſpectable force in *Callian*; from the poſſeſſion of which we hope to derive conſiderable advantages in the operations againſt *Baſſein*, and we truſt it will otherwiſe prove a beneficial acquiſition.

11. We have the moſt alarming apprehenſions of the difficulties we ſhall experience the enſuing ſeaſon for want of money; having lately received a letter from the Governor General and Council, acquainting us, that their own diſtreſs will put it out of their power to make additional remittances equal to the ſupport of this Preſidency, and the pay of the large army under General *Goddard*; and therefore deſiring that every acceſſion of income which may ariſe to the Company from the ſucceſs of that army, may be ſet aſide, and appropriated excluſively to that; and thus cutting off the principal reſource we had dependence on for our immediate exigencies. We have only the hope, that when they receive our propoſal for the reduction of theſe intolerable military charges, and ſee the ſtrong meaſure we have actually taken, to make it practicable, which of courſe will require an extraordinary proviſion for the preſent, they will

Appendix. No. 274.

will at leaſt leave us in poſſeſſion of our own reſources; and, encouraged by the proſpect of ſome end to ſuch heavy drains, that they will make a vigorous effort to give ſucceſs to our plan, and exonerate us from the charge of maintaining ſuch ruinous auxiliaries.

12. The Governor General and Council have propoſed ſome alterations in the ſettlement of the Guzerat country made with *Futty Sing*, which it is not neceſſary at preſent to determine upon, or to trouble you with the detail.

13. The Governor General and Council having acquieſced in Mr. *Farmer*'s claim, noticed to you in our laſt addreſs, we have reimburſed him the amount of the charge he ſtated, for effecting the releaſe of himſelf and Lieutenant *Stewart*, under this Preſidency.

We have the honour to be,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient humble ſervants,
Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
25th July 1780.

Poſtſcript.—The Preſident has received an account that the fort of *Vingorla*, where the Company had a ſmall garriſon, has been treacherouſly taken by the *Boundcello*, and that the Reſident at *Onore* had been apprized by *Hyder Ally* of his intent of ordering him away from that ſettlement, and directed him to ſettle all his accounts and concerns.

Wm Hornby,
John Carnac,
D. Draper.

APPENDIX, No. 274.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 12th June 1780.

READ a letter as follows from Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 28th ultimo, informing you of the tranſactions with *Madjee Scindia*, and the ſituation I found myſelf in reſpecting that Chief, who with an army reported to be forty thouſand ſtrong, had entered the Guzerat province, and upon my approach had moved off towards *Pawen Ghur*, a fortreſs belonging to himſelf, ſituated betwixt the provinces of *Guzerat* and *Malva*. I had advanced from *Baroda* in hopes of bringing him to an action, or in the event of his declining it, and moving off on my approach, which proved to be the caſe, of manifeſting to the world the acknowledged ſuperiority of our arms, and impreſſing the Maratta nation with the belief and thorough conviction of their inability to contend with us.

On the 3d inſtant I marched with a part of the army to ſurprize *Scindia*, and drive him from a poſt he occupied about ſix miles in front with his fighting men only, for he had uſed the precaution of ſending off to a remote diſtance his artillery, baggage, and incumbrance of every ſort, as my former letter adviſed you. The particulars of this enterprize I laid before the Commander in Chief, the 4th inſtant, and as they will have been communicated to you by him, it is unneceſſary to trouble you here with a recapitulation. It is ſufficient to obſerve, that as I remained a conſiderable time upon the ground which the enemy had abandoned, giving them full leiſure to endeavour to retrieve their diſgrace of being defeated by ſo ſmall a part of my force, and afterwards rejoined the army without their daring to move towards me, or offer me the ſmalleſt moleſtation on my return; the triumph of our arms has been as complete and decided, as could have been expected or wiſhed for. On the 16th Colonel *Brown*, with the Madras Europeans arrived in camp; and on the 19th, convinced, from the extreme precaution and vigilance of the enemy, as well as the diſpoſition they had made of their force and followers, that any attempt to ſurprize them a ſecond time would be ineffectual, I determined upon advancing with the whole army to the ground then occupied by them, which they abandoned at my approach without any oppoſition, except firing a number of rockets, which fortunately did no damage. Owing to the ſeaſon of the year, and the ravages committed by the Marattas, the country for near twenty miles round was an entire deſert, and even the branches of ſuch trees as might have afforded nouriſhment to the cattle, were moſtly ſtripped of their leaves; I was therefore under the neceſſity of ſending to a conſiderable diſtance for forage, and of detaching a ſtrong party for the protection of the people, who were to bring it into camp. On the morning of the 22d Captain *Campbell*, with the 1ſt and 5th battalion of Bengal Sepoys, proceeded on their duty, and were attacked about twelve miles from my camp by *Scindia* and *Holcar* in perſon, with near 20,000 of their beſt horſe. The enemy advanced with great appearance of reſolution, and ſo near as to receive the fire of two grenadier companies, which threw them into a good deal of confuſion, and being at the ſame time warmly plied with grape from two ſix pounders, they ſoon fled with a good deal of loſs, and did not venture to renew the attack, but continued hovering in large bodies, at a conſiderable diſtance, all day.

A very near relation of *Tuckajee Holcar*, who was intruſted with the principal management of his affairs, fell among the ſlain. Captain *Campbell* appears to have behaved with great coolneſs and intrepidity on the occaſion, as well as the troops under him; and having effected the ſervice on which he was ſent, returned to camp early next morning without any loſs. This ſtriking proof of our ſuperiority has effectually completed their diſgrace; and they have not ſince that period ſhewn themſelves in any numbers, but have retired cloſe to *Parvenghur*. I have ſince moved back to within ten miles of *Baroda*, where I am at preſent encamped; and as the rainy ſeaſon is ſo near at hand, I purpoſe taking ſuch meaſures, as, from a proper attention to circumſtances, may appear beſt calculated for the ſafety and protection of our new acquiſitions, and the general tranquillity of the province, of which I ſhall not fail to give you immediate information.

You will perceive that my operations ſince the conqueſt of *Guzerat* have been chiefly defenſive; I have endeavoured to render them otherwiſe, as far as an attention to the proper line of policy, and the reaſons I have in a former letter aſſigned for not purſuing *Scindia* into the Malva province, would permit, by drawing him if poſſible to an action, but to no purpoſe; at the ſame time I doubt not you will approve of the ſteps I have been neceſſitated to take, which though not attended with the glare of additional conqueſt, have effectually ſecured thoſe valuable acquiſitions already made to the Company; and put them in a condition of ſupporting the war with every advantage, and furniſhed reſources in a great meaſure adequate to the extraordinary expences that may be requiſite for its proſecution.

I ſhall ſoon write you very particularly upon the political ſtate of affairs, as well as the military arrangements and diſpoſitions of the army I may find it neceſſary to make for the public ſervice, and have the honour to be, &c.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Camboull*,
26th April 1780.

(Signed) *Thos. Goddard.*

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 24th Auguſt 1780;—at a Council; preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire.—(Mr. *Francis* indiſpoſed. Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.)

Read

Read the following letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 27th ultimo, acquainting you with the enemy's forces having deſiſted from further attempts to make any impreſſion upon the Guzerat province, and that, from every intelligence I could learn, it was *Scindia*'s intention to relinquiſh the country altogether, and march either towards *Ugein* or the *Decan*. A few days ſubſequent to the date of that letter, my Hircarrahs brought me certain accounts of *Scindia*'s having moved with his whole army towards *Ugein*. Theſe reports have been ſince confirmed, and it is now generally and confidentially believed, that he has laid aſide the deſign it was ſuppoſed he had formed, of viſiting the *Decan*, and purpoſes to paſs the rainy ſeaſon at *Ugein*. *Holkar* has accompanied him, and will reſide at *Indore*, a principal city in the neighbourhood of *Ugein*, and the chief reſidence of his family.

In conſequence of the departure of *Scindia* from the neighbourhood of *Guzerat*, and the near approach of the rains, which did not admit of any delay, I re-croſſed the *Nerbuddah*, and directed my march to *Surat*; where I arrived, with the greateſt part of the army, the 8th inſtant. But as a report prevailed, and indeed carried with it great appearance of probability, that *Scindia* meant to have a conſiderable body of horſe in the neighbourhood of *Pawanghur*, I thought it requiſite, in order to provide for the ſecurity and defence of the diſtricts of *Broach* and the other Pergunnahs dependant on that collectorſhip, almoſt all of which are ſituated north of the *Nerbuddah*, to ſtation a force for their protection on that ſide of the river; and have therefore poſted two battalions of Sepoys at *Zinnore*, one of the Pergunnahs ceded by *Futty Sing* in the late treaty, only ſeven or eight coſs from *Dubhoy*, which will effectually ſecure all the country between the *Mahé* and *Nerbuddah* rivers from any ſudden attack or inroads of the enemy, who indeed can enter it from the eaſtward, that is, from *Pawanghur*, during the rains.

Since my arrival at this place, the detachment under Lieutenant *Welch*, with whoſe ſucceſs againſt *Gunneſe Punt*, one of the Maratta leaders, I have already made you acquainted, has effected a very material piece of ſervice, and completely eradicated every trace of the Maratta power in this neighbourhood, and deſtroyed every the moſt diſtant hope he could have of giving further diſturbance to our new poſſeſſions, except by ſending a large army into the *Guzerat*, which will not, I apprehend, in the future operations of the war, be at all convenient, or even practicable for them to do.

The enterprize I allude to, is the taking of *Parneiro*, a fort ſituated upon a high hill, about thirty coſs from *Surat*, upon the ſea coaſt. It was defended for two days by a garriſon, conſiſting of about 400 men, who finding Lieutenant *Welch* had with immenſe difficulty and perſeverance, and by his ſteady and good conduct, with the loſs only of two Sepoys, brought up two pieces of battering cannon to within a proper diſtance of the walls, which he had made a breach in, thought proper to capitulate and ſurrrender the place into the hands of the Engliſh.

Lieutenant *Welch* has ſince made himſelf maſter of two inferior forts, called *Arzen Ghur* and *Under Ghur*.—The former has a diſtrict of one lack of rupees lying around and dependent on it. They are both built upon hills, and defenſible, with a very ſmall force, againſt any number of Marattas. They are within three coſs of each other, and about ſix from *Paineiro*, and they were conſtructed, as report ſays, by the Marattas, to ſerve as a check upon the encroachments of the Portugueze, who have a ſettlement, called *Damaun*, on the ſea coaſt, at the diſtance of four or five miles from them.

Theſe acquiſitions have put the Engliſh in entire poſ-

ſeſſion of the ſea coaſt from *Combair* to *Damaun*, comprehending a tract of near 150 miles. *Baſſein* only remains to complete the conqueſt of the whole to the north of *Bombay*. I mentioned in my laſt letter, obſtacles that had prevented my undertaking that enterprize, on which I had fixed my mind, and that muſt ſtill delay its execution for ſome months, at the expiration of which, as every previous neceſſary preparation will be made, the taſk of reducing *Baſſein* will be eaſy and expeditious. The fall of this place may, I conceive complete your views of territorial acquiſitions on this ſide of *India*, and make the Company maſters of a tract of country, capable in their hands of becoming an inexhauſtible ſource of power and wealth, from the commercial advantages and capability of improvement in trade and manufactures it poſſeſſes, and which, from its convenient ſituation, may be maintained and defended at a ſmall expence of men and treaſure.

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By poſſeſſing *Baſſein*, which appears eſſentially requiſite to the proſperity and ſafety of this ſettlement, the ghauts and paſſes in its neighbourhood leading into the *Decan*, muſt be at all times commanded by us; and the terror this would excite in the Government of *Poonah*, from their vicinity to that capital, would create (more than any other conqueſt or advantage we could gain) a ſerious inclination in the Marattas to accommodate the preſent difference, and upon terms of honour and benefit to the Company. This, notwithſtanding the paſt ſucceſs of our arms, and the diſappointment all their efforts to interrupt their progreſs have hitherto met with, they will not at preſent conſent to at any rate; they would never agree to cede *Baſſein* to us; without which I repeat my opinion, the Company's affairs on this ſide of *India* cannot be conſidered as placed upon a firm and flouriſhing baſis. From this powerful conſideration, I do not think it political or expedient to make any overtures to the Poonah Government for peace, which would not be productive of the wiſhed-for effect, till *Baſſein* is ſecured, and our army has poſſeſſion of the ghauts, ready to fall upon the capital of the empire, we ſhall be in a condition to inſiſt upon ſuch terms as may be judged fully conſiſtent with our honour and intereſt, and adequate to the heavy expences we ſhall have incurred in proſecuting the war.

Affairs cannot arrive at this ſtate till next October, long before which I hope to receive a particular relation of your ſentiments, and the inſtructions you may deem it proper to give, in conſequence of a thorough knowledge of circumſtances, and of the ſituation of affairs at the concluſion of the campaign. Convinced upon the moſt ſure and ſolid grounds, that a pacification cannot be brought about during the rains, I ſhall venture to give you my ideas at large of the mode by which it appears to me the war ought to be proſecuted next ſeaſon, and the which from a ſurvey of the political ſtate of the Maratta nation; promiſe to contribute to its ſucceſs.

In the negociation opened with *Scindia* in March laſt, particulars of which have been laid before you, the chief object of his concern ſeemed to be, and I am perſuaded was, the diſpoſal of *Ragoba*. That point once ſettled, he affected to declare, the remaining ſubjects of conteſts between the Engliſh and Maratta nations would be without difficulty adjuſted. It muſt not be implied from this aſſertion of *Scindia*'s, that admitting the obſtacle of *Ragoba* removed, a peace could have been concluded; becauſe it is evident, from the hopes he muſt at that time have entertained, either of his arms proving ſuperior to ours in the field, or of being able to draw over to his intereſts our new ally *Futty Sing*, which would have gone near effectually to deſtroy the fruits of all our labours in *Guzerat*, that he would never have been induced then to liſten to terms which even at this period of bad ſucceſs and diſappointment in all his projects, there is not any reaſon to believe would be accepted. My principal motive for mentioning the above circumſtances, is to

point

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point out the important light in which *Ragoba* is and muſt ever be conſidered by the Marattas, and how material the poſſeſſion of his perſon muſt prove to promote the views and intereſts of the Company, and bring about a happy concluſion of the preſent war.

Here I do not, in any ſhape, mean to recommend the abſolute, or even conditional re-eſtabliſhment of *Ragoba* in the Government of *Poonah*; what I contend for is the manifeſt and ſtriking advantages we muſt infallibly derive from his preſence with us; and this poſition I found upon the following reaſon: that the juſt and fair claims *Ragoba* poſſeſſes to the principal direction of the Adminiſtration, will ever make the preſent party apprehenſive of his intention to aſſert them; and that the certain conſequence of his ſucceſs, in ſpite of the moſt ſecure or ſolemn engagements in force, might to enter into, would ultimately prove their ruin and deſtruction. It is the ſame of all the principal Chiefs of the State, who have been more or leſs inſtrumental in reducing him to his preſent abject condition, during a ſpace of ſix years.

This argument, while it evinces the imprudence and bad policy of attempting to force a ruler upon the Maratta leaders, whoſe cauſe none of them are inclined, or if inclined, are however afraid to eſpouſe, points out all at once the utility, and even neceſſity, of retaining in our own hands a man who muſt ever be a terror to them, and whoſe forbearance they would wiſh to purchaſe at any expence from that power whoſe ſtrength they muſt be ſure, if exerted in his favour, would prove too dangerous to their intereſts and ſafety. I am therefore clearly of opinion, that the ſame line of conduct hitherto adopted reſpecting *Ragoba*, ſhould continue to be purſued; that is, no formal or expreſs engagements ſhould be entered into with him; but we ſhould leave ourſelves at liberty to purſue ſuch plan regarding his diſpoſal, as circumſtances might hereafter render eligible and convenient. His pretenſions to ſovereignty ſhould be in no degree ſupported, and we ſhould continue to afford him a ſafe and certain aſylum in the Company's dominions, whenever the war ſhall terminate: his intereſts, at leaſt as far as they relate to perſonal ſafety, &c. proviſion for himſelf and family, ought to be attended to, and included in the general plan of peace.

This line of conduct reſpecting *Ragoba* being adopted, the next object is the mode of proſecuting the war; which, as it is a meaſure at preſent of conſiderable neceſſity, the more heartily and vigorouſly it is entered into the ſooner we may expect it will be brought to a period. I have already hinted the manner in which I propoſe to commence the military operations, by taking *Baſſein*, and poſſeſſing myſelf of the neighbouring paſſes that lead into the *Decan*. Here it is probable the fears and anxieties of the Miniſter may bring the war to an immediate concluſion: ſhould they not, the point next to be conſidered, is, whether you would chuſe to purſue it upon an offenſive plan, and penetrate into the *Decan*, and ſeize upon the capital, or confine your operations to the defence of the territories lying between the ghauts and the ſea ſhore, comprehending *Guzerat*, and all the track along the ſhore from *Cambay* to *Bombay*.

The determination of this point will however depend a good deal upon circumſtances: if *Scindia* continues at *Ugein* till the cloſe of the rains, which I now conceive will be the caſe, a powerful diverſion might be made in that quarter, to prevent his paſſing to the ſouthward of the *Nerbudda*, to ſuccour *Nanah Furnefe*, and I would venture to pronounce, as far as human probability and reaſon may preſume, that without *Scindia*'s-aid, the Miniſter would be immediately compelled to terms, and enter into any engagements that might be required of him. This is no chimerical idea, for beſides *Scindia* and *Holkar*, there remain only two Chiefs of conſequence in the State, *Nanah* and *Hurry Punt Furkia*, and I do not believe that any foreign Power will draw upon himſelf the future enmity of the Engliſh, by openly declaring his party, and marching to their aſſiſtance.

In the event of ſuch powerful diverſion being made to the northward, *Scindia* will find too much employment at home to have leiſure to raiſe any diſturbance in *Guzerat*; and indeed the Sepoy force, which may very well be ſpared in that province, acting with the troops of *Futty Sing*, which it may not perhaps be convenient to carry with me to the ſouthward, will prove ſufficient for its ſecurity and defence, againſt a very large body of the enemy, ſhould any conſiderable army (which in the plan above mentioned appears ſcarcely practicable) be ordered to enter it.

What I have above mentioned comprehends almoſt every thing that occurs to me, both with reſpect to the preſent political ſtate of affairs, and the advantages we may expect to derive from it in the courſe of the future operations of the war. The four leading men now in the empire, and indeed in whoſe hands all power is placed, are *Nana*, *Hurry Punt*, *Scindia*, and *Holkar*; theſe, notwithſtanding the cauſes of diſpute that may be ſuppoſed to exiſt, from the former conceiving that no uſeful or meritorious ſervice has been performed by the laſt; and *Scindia* again arrogating a merit derived him by the others, and claiming rewards to which he will not conſent, will, I am perſuaded, be found cordially to unite in oppoſition to the Engliſh.

As the rains are now but little advanced, I truſt I ſhall receive a full and particular reply to this letter long before their concluſion, that is late in Auguſt or early in September; and I earneſtly entreat you will tranſmit it me as expeditiouſly as poſſible, that I may be completely maſter of your object and inclinations before the opening of the campaign, and act accordingly.

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 20th April: my laſt letter will fully have replied to what you are pleaſed to direct reſpecting *Ragoba*; and you will perceive I have, permit me to ſay, contrary to my own inclinations and opinion, thought it neceſſary to comply with your poſitive inſtructions for withdrawing *Ragoba*'s allowance, in its fulleſt extent and without any limitation.

I am truly ſorry at the directions you have been pleaſed to give reſpecting the regiment of cavalry, whoſe uſeful and even neceſſary ſervice I have experienced on many occaſions, during the late campaign, both in protecting the parties that were ſent out to forage near the camp, and in keeping off the pendaries and other ſmall bodies of the enemy's horſe, who approached its environs, as well as covering and defending the baggage on the line of march; on all theſe ſervices, and whenever I found it neceſſary to employ them, they have behaved with credit to themſelves and ſatisfaction to me.

The ſucceſs againſt *Gunneſe Punt* was entirely their own. The battalion that accompanied them could not poſſibly have reached his camp before the alarm muſt have been given, and the enemy have eſcaped unhurt, to moleſt and haraſs the country by future depredations. From all theſe circumſtances, and the inconveniencies that might attend the diſmiſſing of a corps at this diſtance from home, that has ſerved with credit from the commencement of the expedition, by the damp it might throw upon the ardour of the reſt of the troops, added to the unfavourable conſequences it might be of regarding the enemy, who from repeated proofs I know entertain a high opinion of their ſkill and diſcipline, I have deferred the execution of your orders reſpecting this regiment, until I can receive your further inſtructions, in which I flatter myſelf you will approve and authorize its continuance in the ſervice.

I ſhall not fail to obſerve the rule you have laid down for my direction, with regard to detaching any part of your forces for the defence of the country ceded to *Futty Sing*, independent of the general plan of the campaign. My reaſon for not fixing a ſubſidy for the expence of the troops left in *Ahmedabad*, was, that I conſidered this meaſure as coming under that predicament; and that in the infancy of a war, before the affections and diſpoſitions

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of men had been properly put to the teſt, I thought it a point of political convenience and expediency, to guard as much as poſſible againſt every unfavourable conſequence that might ariſe from any change of ſentiment or party.

I ſhall, as far as poſſible, comply with your wiſhes reſpecting the Fort Saint George detachment: the reinforcements that have at this time joined me from that Preſidency, conſiſt only of one company of European artillery, ſeven of infantry, and one battalion of Sepoys.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

Head Quarters, Camp
near *Surat*, 20th June, 1780.

Ordered, That the above letter be ſent in circulation, for the peruſal of the members of the Board.

Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 275.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 24th July 1780.

READ a letter from *Bombay*, as follows:

Gentlemen,

We encloſe a duplicate of our laſt letter, dated the 29th ultimo, and of the correſpondence with General *Goddard* therein forwarded.

Our lateſt letter from him is dated the 7th ultimo, when he was preparing to make a diſpoſition of his forces, for the protection of the diſtricts adjoining to *Surat* and *Broach* during the rainy ſeaſon; but we underſtand he has ſince been under the neceſſity of deferring the execution of his intentions, by the ſudden appearance of the enemy on his line of march.

You will obſerve from General *Goddard*'s advices, that the cautious plan of conduct adopted by the enemy put it totally out of his power to effect any thing deciſive this campaign; and rendered it neceſſary, in his opinion, to defer the attack of *Baſſein*, the reduction of which we are very anxious may become an early object of his operations.

The extent of country acquired by the treaty with *Futty Sing*, and the Maratta Pergunnahs that have been reduced, neceſſarily requiring an augmentation of our military eſtabliſhment for their defence, we conſulted General *Goddard* on this point, who accordingly ſent us a plan for the augmentation and regulation of the army in all its branches; a copy of which is encloſed. He therein ſtrongly recommended, that a Major and two companies ſhould be added to the battalion of artillery, and gave his opinion, that the European infantry ſhould be completed to two battalions as ſoon as poſſible; and that the Sepoy eſtabliſhment ſhould forthwith be increaſed to fifteen battalions, excluſive of marines, and all irregulars and locals diſcharged. Theſe fifteen battalions, he propoſed, ſhould be divided into three brigades, with a Major to each; and a Lieutenant Colonel to command the whole.

When the plan came under conſideration, the Preſident laid before us a minute on the ſubject (a copy of which we think it neceſſary to tranſmit to you); and we agreed with him in opinion, that the ſtate of our European eſtabliſhments could not for the preſent admit of our carrying into execution the alterations propoſed by the General in reſpect to them, in any manner that would prove of advantage adequate to the great expence that would be incurred thereby; and as we may with reaſon expect to hear ſhortly from the Honourable Company, in reply to our repreſentations laſt year on the ſtate of our army, and may conclude, they have taken meaſures for ſupplying us with field officers of experience and ability, we further agreed with the Preſident, to make no immediate promotions to that rank, and not to determine on any general arrangements which might render ſuch promotions neceſſary. Appendix. No. 275.

We accordingly reſolved for the preſent to carry into execution no more of General *Goddard*'s plan than raiſing ſeven new battalions of Sepoys, and modelling thoſe now in the ſervice according to the ſtrength propoſed by him, but without forming them into brigades. The new battalions will be formed at *Bombay*, *Saſſette*, *Surat*, and *Broach*, and the large bodies of irregulars at the two latter ſettlements incorporated into them. Major *Fullerton* has alſo been directed to entertain recruits at *Ahmedabad*, and levies had been made at *Bombay* in preparation for this increaſe; ſo that the new battalions will ſoon be in great forwardneſs.

With this ſtrength once completed, we hope to be able to maintain all our new acquiſitions in *Guzerat* as well as *Baſſein*, when reduced; and we judge it to be no more than really neceſſary for that purpoſe, as we have not yet been in condition to take poſſeſſion of the valuable ceſſions made by *Futty Sing*, adjacent to *Surat*, for want of a ſufficient force.

General *Goddard* gives his opinion, that the propoſed eſtabliſhment will admit of a very eligible army being drawn together; and will provide for the ſecurity of our poſſeſſions, the defence of which muſt in the end devolve upon us; and we were clearly of opinion, it was highly expedient to carry this meaſure into execution, without delay; as, if the war is continued upon an extenſive plan, General *Goddard* will not be able to ſpare any part of the force under his command to garriſon the new acquiſitions; the benefit of which muſt conſequently be loſt to the Company: or if an accommodation takes place, we ought to have a proper force in readineſs for their defence; as our firſt wiſh would be to ſend back the Bengal and Madras troops, in order to relieve the Company from the moſt heavy expence which muſt be incurred by their ſervice on this coaſt; but which cannot be done, until we put ourſelves in a condition to defend our poſſeſſions without their aſſiſtance.

We cannot pretend to ſay, to what extent you may carry your views in this war, which perhaps may depend on the efforts the French may make in *India*; but in our opinion, after *Baſſein* is added to our other acquiſitions, the Company's views in point of territory ſhould be terminated, as we ſhall then be maſters of a revenue equal to the expences of this Preſidency, and our military operations become defenſive; that is, ſhould have no further object than to eſtabliſh and confirm us in our poſſeſſions: you muſt be the beſt judges of your ability to ſupport the expence of the army under General *Goddard*; and whether you have any other object in view adequate thereto. But if you ſhould reſolve on any meaſures to relieve the Company from this heavy burthen, we are preparing with the utmoſt expedition to put our own army on ſuch a footing as will render them practicable, ſo far at leaſt as depends on us. Our greateſt difficulty will be, the deficiency in our European corps, which we particularly requeſt you will attend to in your arrangements; and we hope the reinforcements received this ſeaſon at *Bengal* and *Madras*, will enable you to ſupply even this deficiency; the moſt ready method of doing which will be, to tranſfer the private and non-commiſſion officers of the Madras detachment, now with General *Goddard*, to this eſtabliſhment; which we hope that Government will now be in a condition to ſpare.

We have ſtrongly recommended to General *Goddard*, to take meaſures for the protection of the northern diſtricts, during the approaching monſoon, as the reſources we may expect from them the enſuing ſeaſon will entirely depend on the degree of protection he can afford to them. We have for ſome time paſt experienced conſiderable difficulties for want of money, when the ſupplies from *Bengal*, by the *Britannia* and *Betborough*, arrived very ſeaſonably to our relief; which we ſhall manage

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nage with the utmoſt care, as at this time of the year we have no other reſource; and until affairs are in ſome manner ſettled, we muſt ſtill look to you for further aſſiſtance. We are therefore under the neceſſity of requeſting, that you will continue making us remittances as ſoon as poſſible, to at leaſt the uſual annual amount, as our revenue receipts muſt be conſidered in ſome meaſure as precarious; and we have, as above-mentioned, thought it for the general intereſt to increaſe our own immediate military expences.

We have thought it neceſſary to take poſſeſſion of ſome places in the *Conkan*, adjacent to *Bombay* and *Salſette*, to prevent the enemy from ſtraightening our iſlands too much for ſupplies of grain. We are now maſters of the forts of *Bellapore* and *Perſick*, and the town of *Callian*, which command a conſiderable tract of country in the diſtrict of *Baſſein*; but in the courſe of this ſervice, one of our poſts was forced, with the loſs of three pieces of cannon. On the return of the Bombay detachment, which, you will find by the encloſed correſpondence, we judged it proper to recal from the army before the rains, we ſent over Colonel *Hartley* with a more conſiderable force, who attacked and routed the enemy in their camp, and obliged them to retire ſome coſs.

In order to prevent as far as we can an apprehended ſcarcity of grain, we have ſent round two of the Company's ſhips to *Madras*, for cargoes of rice; and we requeſt you will encourage the exportation of that article from *Bengal* for the ſervice of this Preſidency.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 6th June 1780. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 276.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 24th July 1780.

RECEIVED a letter as follows from General *Goddard*:

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acknowledge your two letters of the 24th January and 23d March.

A period of more than three months has elapſed ſince I addreſſed you in a letter dated February 17th, upon the ſubject of the allowance granted to *Ragoba*, ſetting forth the reaſons which induced me to conceive it for the intereſt of the Company, and even neceſſary to the future ſucceſs of our conteſt with the Maratta State that *Ragoba* ſhould be ſupported by us until the final ſettlement of the preſent diſpute.

I have waited with the utmoſt anxiety for your reply to that letter, in hopes it might arrive before the concluſion of this campaign, when alone I conſidered it would be adviſable to withdraw the allowance from *Ragoba*, by which his troops then actually in ſervice with me were ſubſiſted; but finding by the earneſtneſs expreſſed in your letter of 24th January, that your ſentiments regarding *Ragoba* were not in any reſpect altered, I thought it adviſable, in order to comply with your wiſhes, and at the ſame time to act in a point of ſo much importance to the Company with as much regard to their true intereſts as poſſible, to communicate the whole of the circumſtances to the Honourable Select Committee of *Bombay*, and conſult with them upon the meaſures proper to be adopted in the preſent ſtate of our affairs here. They have in anſwer concurred in the expediency and neceſſity of attaching *Ragoba* to us during the war, and the impracticability of doing ſo, without allowing him a maintenance; but they have recommended that it ſhould be reduced. This plan of reduction in its fulleſt poſſible extent I meant accordingly to have followed; but receiving a confirmation of your fixed intentions that this allowance ſhould be entirely withdrawn, by the reference made in your letter of the 23d March to the inſtructions formerly ſent me on the ſubject, I have determined implicitly to obey them, and ſhall not advance *Ragoba* a ſingle rupee beyond the preſent month, for which he has already received.

With reſpect to *Ragoba*, in the conditions propoſed to be ſtipulated in his favour, I adhered literally to the terms made by Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, except adding that his perſonal ſafety ſhould be effectually ſecured, and that he ſhould be at liberty to reſide in whatever place he might chuſe, the Company becoming guarantees for his pacific behaviour, and engaging not to afford him any aſſiſtance, or even protection, ſhould he attempt to raiſe diſturbances in the Maratta State.

I come now to reply to your letter of the 23d March; and it is not without the moſt ſenſible pleaſure and ſatisfaction I perceive the approbation you are pleaſed to declare of the treaty concluded with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, which the tenor of my paſt letters, and the preſent ſituation of our affairs in this quarter, will have already pointed out, and now proves to have been productive of all the good conſequences I promiſed to the Company in concluding it; and which I have already fully explained to you. I have communicated to *Futty Sing* your favourable ſentiments regarding him, for which he is exceedingly grateful, and anxiouſly looks for the arrival of the letter you mentioned would be written him by the Honourable Governor General, but which I fear may have met with ſome accident on the road, as it is not yet come to hand.

My former letters will have apprized you of the expectations formed from the diviſions ſuppoſed to ſubſiſt among the Maratta Chiefs engroſſing their attention too much to allow them leiſure to offer any oppoſition in the courſe of the preſent campaign, having proved deceitful; *Scindia* has, I am convinced, always acted in concert with, and under the influence of *Nana Furneſſe*, and there is reaſon to believe, will continue to do ſo; ſenſible from the beginning of his inſufficiency to contend with our arms, his aim ſeems to have been, the preventing us from extending our conqueſts into any other part of the Maratta dominions. In this he has ſucceeded ſo far, that although it was an object I had much at heart, to reduce *Baſſein* before the commencement of the rains I have found it abſolutely neceſſary to confine my operations this campaign to the defence and ſecurity of the Company's new acquired poſſeſſions in *Guzerat*, and the entire excluſion of the Marattas from all ſhare or participation of its revenue.

I have now the happineſs to acquaint you, that my endeavours for the purpoſe are fortunately accompliſhed; and that *Scindia*, unable to make any impreſſion upon the country, remains quiet in the neighbourhood of *Pawan Ghur*; and by the beſt intelligence I can learn, means ſhortly to relinquiſh it entirely. Whether he intends to direct his courſe to *Ugein*, or return to the *Decan*, I cannot poſitively aſſert; various reports are circulated; and though I am myſelf of opinion that he will find his preſence requiſite at *Poonah*, where the Miniſter muſt feel his authority in rather a tottering and precarious ſtate, having lately diſcovered a confederacy, formed by many principal men in favour of *Siccaram Pundit*, and ſeized upon ſome of the ringleaders, yet I believe he will detach a ſtrong force towards *Ugein*, in order to oppoſe the progreſs of our troops, who in conjunction with the Rajah of *Ghode*, have, it is reported, entered the northern parts of the Malva province. A ſhort period will now determine his deſign. At preſent I am well aſſured, he will not in any material degree moleſt us in the poſſeſſion of our new conqueſts. It is however probable, and my intelligence gives me cauſe to apprehend, he may leave a body of horſe upon the confines of the province, to make inroads into the diſtricts of *Broach*, *Jamboſeer*, *Zinnore*, &c. and interrupt the Ryots in the

cultivation

cultivation of their lands. This evil I ſhall be able eaſily to remedy, by ſtationing a ſmall force for their protection.

I beg now to give you a ſhort detail of the military operations ſince my laſt: finding every effort ineffectual to bring *Scindia*'s army to an action, and judging it improper to expoſe the troops to unneceſſary hardſhips and difficulties, by remaining in a country where not only forage was to be procured with great hazard and trouble, but there was even a ſcarcity of water, I marched back to *Baroda* on the 5th inſtant, at which place I might form my future plan at leiſure; and on the 8th, in compliance with a requiſition from the Government of *Bombay*, I detached the reinforcements from that Preſidency, who arrived at *Surat*, and embarked for *Bombay* the 15th inſtant.

I alſo put the whole army in motion on the ſame day, and on the 9th, proceeded to *Carwan* on the road to this place, when I received intelligence of *Scindia* with his whole force having advanced to the neighbourhood of *Dubhoy*: I therefore thought it neceſſary to check his career, and once more drive him from the country, and accordingly marched back to the *Dahder Nuddy*, upon the oppoſite bank of which *Scindia* lay. He retreated to his former encampment the ſame day, and not thinking it neceſſary or proper to purſue him, I continued upon the ground he had quitted, till the 14th, when I moved towards the *Nerbudda*.

The enemy's troops have now entirely evacuated the diſtricts belonging to the Company, and it is with the greateſt pleaſure I can communicate to you two ſucceſsful enterprizes, which cloſed the ſcene of our operations in the field, and have been attended by the moſt beneficial conſequences to the Company, particularly the latter, both by the ſplendor of the action, and the peaceful ſecurity it has given to the new acquired Pergunnahs.

A body of about 6,000 horſe, under the command of *Boghretty Scindia*, and *Parajee Punt*, two principal Maratta officers, had advanced to the *Nerbubba*, within ſix or ſeven miles of *Zinnore*, which is four miles above my camp, and where I had before ſtationed Major *Forbes*, with two battalions of Sepoys, for its defence and protection, being the principal town of the diſtrict of that name. The deſign of this force in coming ſo near, was merely to watch my motions, and plunder and deſtroy the country. Circumſtances appearing favourable, I ordered Major *Forbes*, on the 22d inſtant, to march and ſurprize them; which ſervice he effected, coming upon them at day-break in the morning. The enemy had little or no baggage of any kind; what they had, together with a few horſes and ſome grain (the fruits of their rapine) fell into our hands. A few only were killed, as they precipitately made off, and ſoon after they joined their main body under *Scindia*, where they have ever ſince continued.

The ſecond action above alluded to was performed by Lieutenant *Welch*, whom on the 17th inſtant I detached from this place, with the regiment of cavalry, the Candahar horſe, and the ſeventh battalion of Sepoys, towards *Surat*, in order to drive *Gunneſſe Punt*, an officer belonging to the miniſterialiſts, who with a body of about 4,000 horſe, 300 foot, and three field pieces, was then encamped at a place called *Badouly*, out of the Pergunnahs of *Surat Atareeſſy*, which he had for ſome time paſt kept in awe, and greatly infeſted.

On the 22d at night, Lieutenant *Welch* moved from the village of *Cuttore*, near the ground where the army was encamped laſt rains, in the neighbourhood of *Surat*, in order to ſurprize *Gunneſſe Punt*; and proceeded with his detachment till half paſt two in the morning, when, calculating the remaining diſtance, he found it would be impoſſible to reach the enemy's camp with the whole till after day-light; in which time they would take the alarm, and eſcape. He therefore came to the ſpirited and enterprizing reſolution of puſhing forward with the cavalry only; and at four o'clock entered the camp almoſt undiſcovered. The enemy fled in the beſt manner they could, and in their hurry could carry nothing off. The guns, from which they had been able to fire only one diſcharge, their tents, bazars, and every thing they had, fell into our hands. One hundred of the enemy were found killed upon the ſpot, and near twenty wounded; beſides more, which, when Lieutenant *Welch* diſpatched his letter ſoon after the action, he ſuppoſed muſt have ſuffered from their own guns having been turned and fired upon them in their flight. Appendix No. 278.

On our ſide, one Duffadar of cavalry, and one Candahar were killed, and two troopers wounded.

I have ſince certainly learnt, that *Gunneſſe Punt* died a day or two after, of the wounds he received; and that three other principal men ſuffered with him.

This action has been as deciſive as it was poſſible to be; and I beg to expreſs my entire ſatisfaction with, and approbation of the ſpirited and well-judged conduct of Lieutenant *Welch*, together with the undaunted bravery and firmneſs of the troops, of which only the cavalry were engaged, and who have, on this occaſion, rendered moſt eſſential and important ſervices.

The conſtant and uniform ſucceſs our arms have met with during this campaign, and the diſappointment the Marattas have experienced in their endeavours to make any impreſſion upon, or wreſt from us our new conqueſts, cannot but convince them of the unprofitable and ruinous conteſt in which they are engaged, and incline them to wiſh to put an end to it; but however much they may deſire peace, I fear they are not ſufficiently humbled to grant it upon terms ſo honourable and advantageous as we have a right to expect.

Knowing the earneſt wiſh you have to bring the war to a ſpeedy concluſion, I ſhall readily liſten to and encourage every overture the Maratta Government may make for that deſirable end; and I beg to aſſure you, that no effort ſhall be wanting on my part to accompliſh your views on this occaſion.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

Camp, near *Bowater Gaut*, *Nerbudda* River,
27th May 1780.

Note. There is no Appendix numbered 277.

APPENDIX, No. 278.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 23d March 1780.

RESOLVED, That the following reply be written to Brigadier General *Goddard*:

Sir,

In our laſt letter to you, dated the 24th January, we informed you of the receipt of your's of the 10th of December, without the enclоſures which it referred to for our information. The original, containing thoſe enclоſures, has never come to hand; but their place has been ſupplied by advices from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, from whom we received copies of your inſtructions, and of the previous correſpondence between you which had led to them.

We entirely approve of the plan which has been adopted for conducting your operations in the Guzerat country. This meaſure appears to us the more judicious, becauſe it not only promiſes immediate advantage to the Company and credit to their arms, but ſeems the moſt likely method to lead to a ſpeedy and advantageous peace.

We have now before us your letters of the 1ſt and 29th of January, with a copy of the articles of agreement concluded with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, the conditions of which meet with our entire approbation and concurrence, and ſhall be ratified in courſe, when the treaty which you give us to expect from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, ſhall be tranſmitted

Appendix. No. 279.

to us in form for that purpoſe. In the mean time, the letter which will be written by the Governor General to *Futty Sing*, will be ſufficient to ſatisfy him of our ſentiments with reſpect to the treaty.

As we underſtand from different quarters that the troops of the Maratta Chiefs had not quitted their capital at the date of the lateſt advices from thence, and that the differences which had taken place amongſt the Miniſters were likely to engroſs all their attention for ſome time to come, we think it improbable that you will meet with any oppoſition in the courſe of your preſent campaign; and there appears to us to be no difficulty in ſecuring the peaceable collections of the revenue ariſing from your new acquiſitions, during this and the ſeaſon of the rains; but we expect that every effort will be exerted to recover them in the enſuing campaign; and we hope, that you will not only be prepared to make the moſt effectual reſiſtance in ſuch caſe to the attempts of the Marattas, but that you will do all in your power to ſecure the quiet poſſeſſion of theſe countries in perpetuity to the Company, adviſing us of the meaſures which you may judge it neceſſary to adopt for that purpoſe.

By our laſt letter you will have been furniſhed with our directions reſpecting the penſion which you had granted to *Ragoba*: for the reſt, we obſerve with pleaſure, that you have anticipated our wiſhes, in your conduct towards that chief. We are more confirmed by your advices, and by every other circumſtance which has come to our knowledge, in our opinion, that no real advantage or ſupport can be derived from an open connection with *Ragoba*. We therefore repeat our injunctions, that you enter into no engagements whatſoever with him.

We have already forbid you to take any part in the family diſputes which ſubſiſt between *Futty Sing* and his brother, except as a mediator. We obſerve, that you have taken this line for your conduct; and approve of your purſuing it, if you ſhall ſee a probability of reſtoring them to harmony; but by no means to uſe any kind of authority to effect it.

Fort William, 23d March 1780. We are, &c.

Meſſrs. Francis and Wheler.

Mr. *Francis*—I acquieſce in this letter, deeming it conformable to the plan of meaſures heretofore reſolved on, and now in execution; but without taking any ſhare in the reſponſibility that may belong to thoſe meaſures.

(Signed) *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*.

APPENDIX, No. 279.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 29th April 1780.—Preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.

READ the following letter from General *Goddard*.

To the Governor General and Supreme Council.

Gentlemen,

Since my laſt, which I had the honour to addreſs you on the 29th ultimo, encloſing a copy of the treaty concluded with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, I have marched to *Ahmedabad* the capital of *Guzerat*, where I arrived the 10th inſtant, in the morning. The Governor on the part of the Poonah Government, refuſing to obey the ſummons I ſent him to deliver up the place to the Britiſh arms, I was conſtrained to lay ſiege to it; and on the 12th, at ten o'clock P. M. opened the batteries againſt the walls, which were ſufficiently breached the 13th in the evening, to have ſtormed next day; but from a wiſh, dictated by motives of humanity, that the enemy, ſeeing the folly of reſiſtance, might have ſubmitted upon honourable terms, and prevented that ſcene of ruin to the inhabitants, which I had too much reaſon to apprehend, by carrying ſo large and populous a city by ſtorm, I put off the attack: in this hope I was however diſappointed, and finding that the enemy only meant to amuſe me by ſubterfuges and excuſes, till the ſuccours they expected from *Poonah* might arrive; and indeed confiding in their own numbers, and the frequent repulſes which powerful Chiefs and armies had received before the place, to imagine themſelves invincible by our force, I gave the orders for ſtorming on the 15th in the morning; which I have the happineſs to acquaint you, ſucceeded to my wiſh in every point. A number of the enemy fell in the aſſault, few of our own men ſuffered, when compared with the reſiſtance they met with, and the difficulties they had to ſurmount; and to their chief honour, the victory was not ſtained with any act of cruelty to the inoffenſive unarmed inhabitants; but on the contrary, many of thoſe who were actually in arms, had their lives ſpared, upon ſubmitting themſelves to mercy. I have laid before the Commander in Chief, the particulars of the troops good behaviour, and have alſo tranſmitted him a return of the killed and wounded.

Permit me to congratulate you upon this ſucceſs of your arms, which cannot fail to ſtrike a terror into the enemy, equal with the confidence with which it has inſpired our own men, and be attended with the moſt eminent advantages in the proſecution of the war with the Maratta State.

By the lateſt advices, I underſtand they have at laſt put their forces in motion; a body of ten thouſand horſe are reported to be on their way from *Poonah*, to enter the country lying to the ſouthward, by one route, and *Scindia* and *Holcar*, with about two thouſand horſe, had actually, the 5th inſtant, three days marched from the gaut of *Coſſerbory* into the Kandeiſh province, and were advancing through part of the Malava diſtrict, by the fort of *Pawengheer*, towards *Ahmedabad*. It is probable, the accounts of the reduction of this place may induce them to alter their intended route, and remain within the limits of *Malava*, to look after their own Jaghiers, which lie moſtly in that province: this indeed may have been originally the chief motive of their march from the *Decan*; for although it now plainly appears, the ſuppoſed animoſity between the Miniſter and *Scindia* is of a leſs violent and irreconcileable nature than it was once ſuſpected to be, the latter has not, I am certain, received full ſatisfaction for the demands he formerly made; and will in all probability be ready to adopt ſuch a line of conduct as he may think beſt calculated to ſerve his intereſts. Should I be able, by encouraging any diſpoſition of this nature in him, to improve it to the advancement of *Ragoba*'s cauſe, I ſhall gladly embrace the opportunity; but at preſent I ſee no grounds to found ſuch a hope, and only mention it as a circumſtance that may happen, and which I mean to make every poſſible uſe of.

While employed in the ſiege of this place, I was honoured with your letter of the 29th of November; and cannot find words to expreſs the concern I feel at the diſapprobation of my conduct in the ſtrictures you have paſſed upon the meaſures I ventured to adopt regarding *Ragonaut Row*, in giving him a monthly allowance for his ſupport, as I am conſcious of having conſulted, to the beſt of my judgement, the intereſts of the Company on that occaſion; and although I had not received your expreſs directions and authority for what I did, of having acted in a manner I conceived ſtrictly conſiſtent with the ſpirit and meaning of the orders which you had given me; I will intrude upon your indulgence and patience, by explaining the motives by which I was influenced.

In your firſt inſtructions, dated the 3d of April, you were pleaſed to direct, that in the treaty I was empowered to conclude with the Maratta Government, the ſafety of *Ragonaut Row* ſhould be made an indiſpenſable engagement; and further recommended, that I ſhould endeavour to obtain a ſuitable proviſion for his ſubſiſtence.

ence. Theſe were your ſentiments at a time when *Ragoba* was in the hands of his enemies; and the very perſons with whom you had empowered me to treat were delivered from the principal object of their fears, in poſſeſſing that inſtrument ſo dangerous to their own exiſtence, while under our protection; but whoſe fate they would then diſpoſe of as they pleaſed. Under theſe circumſtances, the difficulty of obtaining any conceſſions in his favour muſt have roſe in proportion to the ſecurity in which the Miniſters found themſelves placed, from any attempts he could make to ſubvert their authority: this I conſidered; and at the ſame time reflected, that if the Maratta Durbar was ſincere in his wiſh for peace, the proviſion you had authorized me to require in favour of *Ragoba* would be agreed to without any difficulty; after promiſing his perſon ſhould remain ſafe from violation, the charge of his maintenance became a neceſſary duty incumbent upon their own Government, and one which it was probable they would cheerfully take upon themſelves.

When *Ragoba* therefore was ſo fortunate as to eſcape from the hands of the Miniſters, and once more find a ſecure and certain aſylum with the Engliſh, I had every reaſon to hope, that the propoſals I had before made in his favour, and in which no alteration became neceſſary, except that he might be at liberty to reſide where he thought proper, would have found a ready acceptance with the Court of *Poonah*: I accordingly, moved to it by his diſtreſs and needy ſituation, as well as the conviction that by ſo doing I proceeded upon ſure political grounds, made him an allowance for his ſupport, till I could receive your further inſtructions, If I exceeded in the ſum fixed upon, it fell infinitely ſhort of what *Ragoba* himſelf ſolicited, and was only half of what the Maratta Government did agree to allow him when in their hands; ſo that I made no doubt, upon the ſettlement of peace, they would have readily conſented to reimburſe the expence. Upon the whole, my inducements for granting this allowance to *Ragoba* may be comprized in the following:

Firſt, The ſtate of diſtreſs in which he implored it, for the ſubſiſtence of himſelf and family.

Second, The ſtrong claims he poſſeſſed upon the Company, from the connections and friendſhip ſo long ſubſiſting between them.

Third, The conſideration, that if a peace with the Maratta State was practicable, a reimburſement of this charge became a natural and certain conſequence.

Fourth, If the negociation proved ineffectual, the preſence of *Ragoba* with us muſt become of the greateſt political benefit, either in improving the advantages which the ſucceſsful operations of war might offer, or in ſtipulating the future conditions of a peace with the Maratta State.

Previous to the receipt of your letter, I had made the advance for this month. I have communicated to you many circumſtances ſince your letter dated November 29th, which may probably have effected ſome alteration in your ſentiments from what they were at the time you wrote; and we may hope hourly for an anſwer to my advices of the war, the plan propoſed to be followed, and the meaſures that were already taken for its proſecution; all which is moſt particularly explained in my letter of the 1ſt of January. I expect to know your final pleaſure regarding *Ragoba*, before it becomes neceſſary to make him any further advances; or that at moſt, he can receive only one month's payment more, till I am honoured with your particular commands. I have thus candidly, and without reſerve, explained to you the motives of my conduct, on this occaſion; and I truſt they will meet with your indulgent conſideration and approbation. I ſhall write to you in a few days, reſpecting *Scindia*'s motions, and whatever elſe material may occur.

Head Quarters, Camp at *Ahmedabad*, 17th Feb. 1780.

I have, &c.
(Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

Letter from *Ragonath Row*; received the 30th April, 1780.

Knowing it to be incumbent on our friendſhip, to inform one another of all occurrences which happen on either ſide, and to communicate any advice and counſel which may appear to us to be moſt conſiſtent with the preſent circumſtances, I now write to you, that as I am conſcious all increaſe of dignity and power in the Engliſh, adds equally to my honour and diſtinction, I therefore adviſed General *Goddard*, as the circumſtances demanded it, to gain over to himſelf the cavalry of thoſe chiefs whoſe friendſhip I could depend upon, having been ſtrictly united with them before the breaking out of the war; that a ſmall ſum would perſuade them to come over with their whole force; that if he ſhould not approve of this advice, it would be neceſſary for him to raiſe more or leſs horſe himſelf. I have explained this by word of mouth to the General, and alſo by letters; but he has not as yet raiſed any cavalry, the whole ſtrength however is on his ſide. He has now, on his way to *Gojeraut*, entered into a ſtrict alliance with *Futtah Sing Row Gackwar* to join armies with him, and has taken the town of *Ahmedabad*. All particulars of this you will learn from the General's letters; I am totally unacquainted with the negociations and articles which have paſſed between him and *Row Gackwar*. At this time *Sindeah*, *Holcar*, and other chiefs, are marched from the diſtance of eleven or twelve coſs from *Surat*, towards *Ahmedabad*. By the bleſſing of God, and the good auſpices of the Company, no neglect will happen on the part of the General, in the proſecution of the war. I am daily praying to the Almighty, that in the time of hoſtilities, the want of horſe may not be attended with bad conſequences. The courage of the Engliſh is ſuch, that they are certain of being victorious. I have written to *Rajah Ram Winkar* and *Turnetk Dadajee* the particulars of the march and victory of my horſes, which they will make you acquainted with.

APPENDIX, Nos. 280 and 281.

No. 280.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 20th April 1780.

AGREED, That the following anſwers be written to General *Goddard*:

Sir,

We have had the pleaſure of receiving yours of the 17th February, and the Commander in Chief has tranſmitted to us a copy of yours to him, of the ſame date, both containing an account of the reduction of *Ahmedabad*.

This ſucceſs has equalled the hopes which he had conceived from the former and uniform experience of your activity and good conduct. We deſire you to accept our thanks, and to offer them in our name in public orders, to the officers and men of the ſeveral corps which compoſed your army at the ſiege of *Ahmedabad*, for the firmneſs and gallantry which they diſplayed during the ſiege, and in the ſtorm of that city; particularly to thoſe officers whom you have mentioned in your letter to the Commander in Chief, as having in a more remarkable manner diſtinguiſhed themſelves on this occaſion. The opinion which we have ever entertained of the bravery of our own troops required no new inſtance to ſupport or increaſe it; but we obſerve with an uncommon ſatisfaction, the part which you had aſſigned to thoſe of the *Bombay* eſtabliſhment, and the ſpirit with which they performed it; a circumſtance which of itſelf cannot fail to retrieve our national character, and to prove, that there is no ſervice of which the diſcipline and courage of our forces is not capable, with the advantage of an able commander.

We

Appendix. Nos. 281 & 282.

We hope that the enemy will be now convinced of the decided ſuperiority of our arms, and that you will be able to accompliſh the object which we have invariably in view, an honourable and advantageous peace; ſuch a ſervice, we ſhall eſteem of more importance, nor leſs honourable to you, than the moſt ſplendid operations in the field. We authorize you to accept of any propoſals which may be made to you for that purpoſe, which may be conſonant to our former inſtructions, and warranted by the preſent ſtate of the war; and even to make overtures for peace on ſuch conditions, if you ſhall have any reaſonable grounds to believe that they will be immediately accepted, and not employed to amuſe and deceive; in the mean time, we rely on your activity for the proſecution and improvement of the advantages with which your campaign has been ſo happily begun. We reſerve the other ſubjects of your letter for a ſeparate reply.

We are, &c.

Fort-William,
20th April 1780.

Sir,

We now tranſmit you our ſentiments on the ſubject of your letters of the 29th January and 17th February, which have not been replied to. We are much concerned to obſerve that your conduct, which has been ſo deſerving in general of our warmeſt approbation, ſhould, in ſome inſtances be leſs ſatisfactory to us. Our orders concerning the penſion you had granted to *Ragoba*, were poſitive and peremptory, and we expected you would literally have obeyed them; but we are concerned to find by your letter of the 17th of February, that you even intended to advance him 50,000 rupees for the month of March. We now therefore repeat our orders, and poſitively direct, that not a rupee ſhall be advanced in future from your treaſury for the ſupply of *Ragoba*. We informed you in our letter of the 24th November 1779, that it was with the utmoſt difficulty we were enabled to furniſh ſupplies for your neceſſary and unavoidable expences; and we ſtill hope, that on re-conſidering this part of our letter, you have determined to pay a ſtrict obedience to our orders.

We are pleaſed to obſerve that you have propoſed to make certain regulations for the diminution of your expences; your example and determined reſolution to check every unneceſſary charge, will, we hope, produce the deſired effect.

Our reſources are no longer equal to the payment of your army without draining *Bengal* entirely of its ſpecie; nor can any acquiſition on the other ſide of *India* compenſate for the diſtreſs which a continuance of the war, at the preſent expence, would bring upon the Company: we therefore moſt earneſtly recommend to you to obſerve the ſtricteſt economy in your future diſburſements; and we ſhall point out to you ſuch ſavings as we think may be made without injury to the ſervice. The firſt regiment of cavalry is kept up at a very heavy expence; which, we think, has not been compenſated by any ſervices which it has performed, or to be expected from it in future: we therefore authorize, and poſitively direct you, to reduce this regiment.

The Commander in Chief has communicated to us your letter of the 4th March, by which we find that Major *Fullerton*, with eight companies of Sepoys, was in garriſon at *Ahmedabad:* we direct, if this has not been already done, that *Futty Sing* be called upon to fix a ſubſidy for the full expence of theſe troops, and of any other of our forces which may be detached for the defence of the countries ceded to him, independent of the general plan of the campaign. We wiſh you to return a part or the whole of the *Fort St. George* detachment, as ſoon as the ſeaſon will permit and you can diſpenſe with their ſervices, as the whole expence of theſe different corps will fall upon this Government, which is (as we muſt repeat) unequal to ſo accumulated a charge.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
April 20th, 1780.

No. 281.

As the ſucceſſes which have attended the operations of the army under the command of General *Goddard*, now afford us a better grounded expectation than we have entertained, of being able to terminate the war by an honourable and advantageous peace; or in the event of its continuance, of proſecuting it with advantage to the Company, by ſuch an extenſion of territory as may either compenſate for the paſt expence, or furniſh the means of a future negociation; and as it is neceſſary, both with reſpect to the length of time which will be required for the operation of any plan which we may concert for either of the above ends, that we ſhall enter upon the conſideration of it as early as poſſible, even before the cloſe of the preſent ſeaſon; Reſolved, That we addreſs the Commander in Chief, and requeſt to be favoured with his preſence and aſſiſtance, informing him that we ſhall ſuſpend further operations on this ſubject, till his arrival.

The following letter is accordingly written to Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Sir,

As the ſucceſſes which have attended the operations of the army under the command of General *Goddard*, now afford us a better grounded expectation than we have hitherto entertained, of being able to terminate the war by an honourable and advantageous peace; or in the event of its continuance, of proſecuting it with advantage to the Company, by ſuch an extenſion of territory as may either compenſate for the paſt expences, or furniſh the means of a future negociation; and as it is neceſſary, both with reſpect to the length of time which will be required for the operation of any plan we may concert for either of the above ends, that we ſhould enter upon the conſideration of it as early as poſſible, even before the cloſe of the preſent ſeaſon, we requeſt to be favoured with your preſence and aſſiſtance at our Councils; and at the ſame time beg leave to inform you, that we ſhall ſuſpend our deliberations on this ſubject until your arrival.

We have the honour to be, &c.

Fort William,
20th April 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 282.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 29th May 1780.

At a Council;—Preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires. (Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.)

READ the following letter and encloſure from Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to encloſe you an extract of the laſt letter I have received from General *Goddard*, which I take the liberty of laying before you as it contains ſentiments entirely conformable to what I have already ſtated to you, regarding the mode of carrying on the preſent war; though I did not want ſuch a confirmation of my former ideas upon this ſubject.

General *Goddard*, now declares himſelf confined to the defence of the territory newly acquired, which, as I foretold, was a neceſſary conſequence of the plan adopted. I

cannot

cannot, therefore avoid reiterating my propoſals of ſome vigorous meaſures being taken from theſe quarters, as ſoon as the ſeaſon will admit. This appears to me the more preſſing, as I find ſince I have left the Board, that we are become principals in the war, and the preſent plan promiſes nothing but an endleſs, ruinous expence.

I therefore beg leave to repeat, that while I recommend the moſt vigorous exertions, it is only with a view to accelerate a peace; which, in the preſent ſtate of politics at home, would be, in my opinion, the happieſt event that could happen to us.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Lucknow, 5th May 1780. (Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*, dated 28th March 1780.

My laſt gave you a very particular information of the ſituation of *Scindia*'s forces, which he was then collecting from all parts of his country to accompany him into *Guzerat*; ſince which time he has been joined by 5,000 horſe from *Eugein*, and it is reported that another conſiderable body is on its march towards him; *ſo that the northern provinces of the Maratta State, which are moſtly belonging to himſelf and* Holkar, *muſt be now greatly expoſed, and open to invaſions from our upper provinces, by the way of* Gohud *and the extenſive provinces of* Ajmere, the principal Rajah of which, the Marwar Rajah, is I believe, by no means well diſpoſed to the intereſts of *Scindia*. I have no poſitive proof of this being the caſe; having had no correſpondence or other communication with him whatever, ſince my arrival on this ſide of *India*; but it is a circumſtance generally believed, and has its foundation in former diſputes and animoſities, and I mention it to you, among other incidents, to give you an opportunity of judging how far it may be practicable; *as it would certainly be of advantage to the operations of the war on this ſide, to cauſe a powerful diverſion to be made on the other, which could not fail to diſtreſs and divide their attention exceedingly.*

Having no object to induce me to penetrate into *Malwa*, but on the contrary, riſking the moſt material intereſts of the Company, by leaving the province of *Guzerat* and the ſea coaſt to the inroads either of an European or Indian enemy; I can only at preſent watch the motions of *Scindia*, to prevent him from overrunning and deſtroying the country; and, if poſſible, ſeize ſome favourable opportunity of attacking him; which, as it is his only care to avoid, I ſhall find ſome difficulty to effect.

A true extract,
(Signed) *William Tierney*,
Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

Ordered, That it lie for conſideration.

Read another letter as follows, from the Commander in Chief:

Gentlemen, *Lucknow*, 11th May 1780.

1ſt. I have been honoured with your letters of the 20th April.

2d. Previouſly to the receipt of them, I was making every diſpoſition and preparation to avail myſelf of the firſt ſwelling of the waters, to leave this place; the intenſe heat of the ſeaſon not permitting any other mode of travelling, however deſirous I may be of ſetting out. Indeed, were I to attempt it during the droughts, it would not at all haſten my arrival at the Preſidency, as at preſent many places of the river are not navigable for my boats: I ſhall therefore anxiouſly await the commencement of the rains, to embark.

3d. With regard to my opinion upon any preſent plan to be adopted for the proſecution or termination of the Maratta war, my idea remains invariably the ſame, that it is our intereſt to procure, as ſoon as poſſible, an honourable peace. But as things ſeem to be now circumſtanced, I ſhould think it can only be attainable by proſecuting the war with vigour, ſupported by every poſſible exertion from theſe quarters. But ſhould there in the mean time between this and my arrival, any new circumſtance occur, unknown to me neceſſarily prompting other meaſures, my opinion can without delay be required; and will certainly be given with that impartiality and candour which I truſt ever has and ever will accompany it. Appendix No. 282.

4th. I muſt at the ſame time obſerve, that whatever reſolutions you may deem proper, or find to be neceſſary, no military movements can be made from the frontier ſtations until ſome of the deficiencies in ſtores are ſupplied, and thoſe repairs completed which I informed you in my letter of the 21ſt of March our artillery ſtood ſo abſolutely in need of. This I beg leave once more to recommend, as an object of the firſt attention; and with the ſpeedieſt orders given for that purpoſe, and all the diligence which can be uſed in executing them, I do not imagine it can be rendered fit for ſervice before the commencement of the next ſeaſon, proper for opening a campaign.

5th. In reply to the opinion you require, upon diſbanding the cavalry, I can only ſay, that after having, with much trouble and great expence, brought them to a degree of perfection, I muſt think it would be an imprudent meaſure to deprive ourſelves of their ſervices, at a time when they may be moſt eſſentially neceſſary to us. And my opinion of their uſefulneſs at this time is ſuch, that I had rather reduce the eſtabliſhment of Sepoys, to furniſh the means of increaſing their numbers, than be enabled to raiſe more Sepoys by their diſmiſſion. The inference drawn in their diſfavour, from what has occurred in General *Goddard*'s army, cannot properly affect their credit; as when that ſervice was undertaken the corps were but juſt raiſed, were ill appointed, and ſtill worſe mounted; ſo that no immediate benefit could be expected from them. The Candahar horſe, on the contrary, were old ſoldiers, thoroughly diſciplined, and well mounted. In reſpect to the preſent inability of the Nabob's finances to ſupport the expence, it might perhaps be worthy of your conſideration, whether it would not be a more ſalutary meaſure to inquire into the cauſe of thoſe deficiencies, and apply proper remedies to the evil, than to give up uſeful eſtabliſhments upon a ſuppoſed want of power to maintain them? For if, with an immenſe addition to his revenue, he is unable to keep up a much ſmaller number of troops, upon leſs and better regulated pay than his predeceſſor did with much fewer reſources, there muſt be improper management ſomewhere.

6th. I ſome time ago wrote to Colonel *Pearſe* upon the propriety of forming the volunteers into a ſeparate company in the artillery, to remain under his management, that he might be enabled to judge of their merits before they were finally diſpoſed of. I find Colonel *Pearſe* had not received that letter before he made his report to the Board, which you have referred to me; and from that circumſtance, I take it for granted you will agree to the plan.

7th. I am juſt informed of the death of Mr. *Kirkman*, paymaſter to the ſecond brigade. I therefore beg leave, gentlemen, to recommend Mr. *Tierney* to ſucceed to that poſt, whoſe integrity and abilities I know, and can anſwer for; and ſhould my requeſt meet with your concurrence, I am perſuaded he will fill it with honour to himſelf and ſatisfaction to the public.

8th. Was I inclined to enter into diſagreeable diſcuſſions, ſome points in your letter would afford me ſufficient matter for them; but as they can only tend to diſſipate the time and attention due to the public welfare, it is by no means my intention to touch upon them. And allow me once more to aſſure you, gentlemen, that it is not my wiſh to arrogate, as to myſelf, any powers inconſiſtent with the double offices I hold, as member of the Board and Commander in Chief, or which do not come pointedly within the Act of Parliament and orders of the Company. The utmoſt of my ambition is to co-operate with

Appendix. Nos. 283&284.

you in every measure of public benefit, and to be enabled by that means successfully to support the honour and interest of the nation in this part of the world, at a time when the event of affairs at home may render these possessions of still more essential consequence to us, than we have yet had occasion, valuable as they really are, to estimate them at.

I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Ordered, That the fourth paragraph of this letter be sent to the Board of Ordnance; that the sixth and seventh paragraphs be considered in the Public Department; and that the remaining parts of it do lie for consideration.

APPENDIX, No. 283.

Bengal Secret Consultations, 20th April 1780.

Letter from the Commander in Chief to Captain *Popham.*

Sir,

THE Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council having entered into a treaty with the Rhanah of *Ghohud*, he has in consequence thereof demanded from me a body of troops to be sent to his assistance against the Marattas. I therefore order you to march with the whole detachment under your command to *Etawd*, there to remain for the present agreeable to the following instructions.

I have explained to the Rhanah of *Ghohud* the necessity there is, from intelligence I have received relative to the strength of the enemy, for his ordering 10,000 cavalry to join you immediately on your crossing the *Jumma*; but should the Rhanah not be able to send so large a body of cavalry, and that you think from the intelligence which you receive, a less number may suffice, so that the Marattas, against whom we are now supposed to have commenced hostilities, cannot impede your joining the Rhanah's army, you will then use your own discretion in effecting the proposed junction, supported even by a less number of cavalry than the ten thousand which I have required to join you.

As you are placed by the treaty under the command of the Rhanah of *Ghohud*, I can give you no instructions how to act; further than that you will support the dignity of the service to the utmost of your power; and for your guidance, I think it necessary to give you a copy of the treaty entered into with the Rhanah of *Ghohud*: I herewith enclose it. My instructions are, that you do not on any account cross the *Jumma* till the Rhanah has sent the ten thousand horse, or such a number as you think sufficient to cover the junction of your detachment with the Rhanah's army.

You must be certain that a sufficient force is ready to join you on the other side of the *Jumma*, previous to your crossing your detachment.

Lucknow, February 10th 1780. I am, &c.
(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

A true copy,
Wm Popham.

To Captain *Popham*,
Commanding a detachment of the army,

Ordered, That the Paymaster General do transmit to the Paymaster of Captain *Popham*'s detachment, the necessary instructions for adjusting the subsidy to be paid by the Rhanah of *Ghohud*, to the proportion that the estimated expence of that detachment bears to that specified in the treaty.

Agreed, That the following letter be written to Captain *Popham.*

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 12th February. It is our orders, that you demand from the Rhanah the regular and punctual payment of the subsidy at every period at which it shall become due; and as the corps which compose your detachment differ considerably in their strength and form from regular battalions, we have directed the Military Paymaster General to transmit the necessary instructions to the Paymaster of your detachment, for adjusting the amount of the subsidy accordingly, of which you will apprize the Rhanah, to prevent his entertaining any improper suspicions on this account.

Fort William, 20th April 1780. We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 284.

Bengal Secret Consultations, 15th May 1780.

READ the following letter from the Commander in Chief.

Gentlemen,

In consequence of information received this day from Captain *Popham*, respecting the detachment under his command, its situation, and the alarming probability of our arms being disgraced, by not being able to carry the point undertaken, I think it necessary to make you acquainted immediately with the circumstance. The Rana of *Ghod* by virtue of those extensive powers vested in him over our troops by treaty, has carried our arms across the *Scind* into the Maratta district of *Cutchoowagaar*, and by false information held out to Captain *Popham*, of the strength of *Lahaar*, induced him to appear before and attack that strong hold.

The detachment was not equipped for sieges. Four battalions and their guns was the extent of the Rana's requisition, to drive the Marattas out of his districts, where they were found extending the ravages of war, both by fire and sword. Captain *Popham*'s detachment, formed of cavalry, European artillery, and Sepoys, answered in force superior to his the Rana's demands; and the Marattas quitting *Ghod* on their approach, evinced they were equal to the original service meant to be performed.

It is of the greatest moment to us in this country, not to suffer even our own ambitious views to lead us to undertake any military measure but what we are almost sure of carrying. Our acknowledged superiority is to be preserved only by adopting well-digested plans, executed with invincible force and rapidity. We should not attempt offensive enterprizes, but when found political interest dictates the measure, and where success is certain. If our enemies are accustomed to see the crown of victory disputed, doubtful where to fix the fatal error, will some day or other leave us to lament the sad consequences of our weak ambition; and in searching for universal power, we shall risk disadvantageously the extensive possessions we are now so happily masters of. The being obliged to abandon a service in which we are once embarked, is a defeat in the fullest extent of the word. In the present instance, we have been reduced to the disagreeable alternative of either forfeiting our honour by a breach of treaty, or by subscribing to the Rana's ill judged plans, risk a disgrace to our arms; a circumstance which must necessarily place the military officer commanding on service of the kind, in a situation truly distressing; and shew us to the different Powers in the East, in colours which we have been unaccustomed to appear in.

It is not sending a small detachment to *Ghod*, to cover that alien district from desolation, will bring the Maratta war to a conclusion. If an offensive and decided war is to be carried on with the Marattas, a more general and extensive scale of action should be pursued.

What are the plans of Government on this most interesting point, I am ignorant of; or how our country will approve the want of confidence, (to call it by no harsher epithet) of your Government towards their military

litary Commander in Chief, in this time of danger, I know not; but certain it is, I have not been acquainted with either the deſigns of Government, or my opinion aſked on the military operations to be purſued.

My letter of the 6th of January, addreſſed to your Board, ſtated queries, deſiring information of what was meant to be the adopted line; the reaſonableneſs of the requeſt led me to ſuppoſe that the neceſſary information would not have been withheld from me; but to my aſtoniſhment the ſubject is unanſwered.

On the 13th inſtant I received a letter from the Rana, purporting that he has left his own country to be plundered by the Marattas, gone into that of our enemy's, and deſiring that an indent forwarded from Captain *Popham* for a field battering train, might be complied with. The buſineſs mentioned which the ſupply of ſtores was deſigned to aſſiſt, is the ſiege, or rather blockade of *Gwalior* during the enſuing rain.

The attacking *Gwalior* with that detachment, is totally repugnant to my military ideas, for many reaſons. It is reported to be a place of conſiderable ſtrength; and for that detachment, or any other, to attack it while the Marattas are in force and unbeaten in the field, would be abſolutely madneſs: a covering army, would be indiſpenſably neceſſary to keep the communication for ſupplies open to our troops before the place, and to awe and hinder the Marattas from haraſſing and impeding the beſiegers: theſe are conſiderations that ought to militate againſt attempting, with ſo weak an armament, either the attack of *Gwalior*, or penetrating too far into the enemy's diſtricts. The difficulties before the mud fort of *Lahaar* are convincing arguments of the folly, under the preſent circumſtance, of attacking *Gwalior*. But I was obliged to refuſe complying with the Rana's deſires, and Captain *Popham*'s indent alſo, on other inſurmountable grounds: our inability rendered it impoſſible to furniſh the material article of ſtores expreſſed in the indent; viz. two eighteen pounders and one mortar of ten or eight inches. There is not a gun of that calibre, or mortar of ſize, either at *Futty Ghur* or *Cawnpore*; nor could I have ordered them from *Chunar*, without diſmantling the garriſon; the ſituation there is much below the common exigencies of that garriſon, and the contin e nt wants to be guarded againſt at the brigade field ſtations.

The ſituation of our ſtores I have explained to you fully in my letter of the 21ſt ultimo. Though this is a ſubject of the firſt conſequence, I have not received any anſwer to that letter.

My public accounts ſay, that the Rana is ſo beſet with black chiefs and Sirdars, whoſe opinions are hoſtile to our intereſts, and that they work ſo powerfully on the Rana's mind, that he is both puſillanimous in his own councils, and irreſolute in executing what is recommended him by us.

I foreſee the buſineſs of *Ghod* to be beſet with diſgraceful difficulties: but ſincerely hope I ſhall be miſtaken in the conſequences I have at preſent reaſon to apprehend.

Captain *Popham*'s account that *Gongador* of *Culpee*, *Luchmun Pundit* of *Jaaſie*, with the Dettiah Rajah, are expected to join the Marattas againſt us with about ten thouſand horſe and ſome guns, is to be conſidered; his repreſentation of the utility of ordering ſome of our battalions to the aſſiſtance of the Sumpter Rajah, I do not think myſelf authorized by any means to attend to. Any reinforcement for the immediate aſſiſtance of the Ranah, required by him, I ſhould comply with, in conſequence of the ſpirit of the treaty; but as to ordering other detachments to ſecond his objects, by making a diverſion in another quarter, I muſt wave entering ſo deeply into his politics, without the poſitive order of Government; nor can I ſuppoſe it to be your ideas, that the Company's troops are to be divided and ſubdivided into ſmall detachments ſent to protect the territories and fight the battles of the petty Rajahs of *Indoſtan*. Had it been thought adviſable by Government to have ordered a reſpectable army to have croſſed the *Jumma*, and penetrated into the enemy's dominions, during the laſt cold ſeaſon, I may venture to affirm that the war would at this minute have borne a more favourable aſpect than it now preſents; and that the expence of the armament could have been ſecured from the enemy's country, with many other advantages obtained, both for the credit and emolument of the Company. Appendix No. 285.

Uninformed of your plan of politics, and no latitude given me to execute what might appear to me proper at a time of exigency, I ſhall, while up the country, confine myſelf to guarding our own diſtricts from inſult and invaſion. As to the ſcene on the other ſide of the *Jumma*, your poſitive orders and the Rana of *Ghod*'s demands for troops and ſtores that can be procured and ſpared, ſhall alſo be attended to without delay; though the plan of action ſeems to me very unequal to the critical ſituation of affairs, or to the dignity of that character which the Britiſh arms have ſupported in *India*, with ſo much ſplendor and reputation, to the preſent period.

Permit me the honour, &c.

Lucknow, (Signed) *Eyre Coote*.
21ſt April 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 285.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 15th May 1780.

READ another letter as follows, from the Commander in Chief.

Gentlemen,

I have the pleaſure of confirming the account of the capture of *Lahaar*, which I mentioned to you in my letter of the 1ſt inſtant. That fort, by advices this day received from Captain *Popham*, I am informed was carried by aſſault on the 21ſt ultimo. I encloſe you a copy of Captain *Popham*'s letter, alſo one from Captain *Palmer* of the ſame date. Sir Eyre Coote, 3d May.

The exemplary behaviour of both officers and men, who performed this piece of ſpirited ſervice, I have the greateſt pleaſure in communicating to your Board, and in recommending Captain *Popham* and his deſerving detachment to your countenance and notice. But though I have the higheſt ſenſe of the military conduct of Captain *Popham*, during the whole of the expedition, and of the intrepid coolneſs of all the officers and men who have been employed under him; yet I muſt remark, that nothing could warrant the deſperate attack obliged to be made on the fort of *Lahaar*, where ſo many brave men have ſuffered, but the diſgraceful alternative that preſented itſelf, the being reduced to abandon a ſervice in which they were embarked, and on the ſucceſs of which, once begun, the credit of our arms in a great meaſure depended.

They were obliged to ſtorm the fort, without having it in their power to take off its defences. I ſincerely hope we ſhall in future know the value of ſuch troops too well, to permit them to be oppoſed to forts under ſuch diſadvantages.

I lament the loſs of two very promiſing officers, who led the forlorn hope, and I recommend Mr. *Odell* (the volunteer ſo particularly mentioned, who had juſt joined the detachment by permiſſion from me) to be appointed Cornet of cavalry in the room of Cornet *Gardiner*, killed on the breach, and whoſe poſt Mr. *Odell* is reported to have filled on the ſpot with ſuch gallant propriety.

I have the honour, &c.

Lucknow, (Signed) *Eyre Coote*.
3d May 1780.

Ordered, That the encloſures in the above letter be entered after the Conſultations.

Read the following letter from Captain *Popham*.

Gentlemen,

Appendix. No. 285.

Gentlemen,

It is with great pleaſure I have now to congratulate you on the capture of Lahaar fort, the capital of *Cutchoogur*, which was taken yeſterday forenoon by ſtorm. At eight o'clock the ſpringing of one of our mines threw down a great part of the curtin, and at ten the fire of our batteries made as practicable a breach as the weight of our field pieces could effect; on which a detachment under the command of Captain *M'Lary* advanced to the aſſault. The two leading officers fell, Lieutenant *Logan* and Cornet *Gardiner*, before they got to the top of the breach; the aſſailants however puſhed up through an extreme heavy fire, and drove the enemy from the outer rampart to the citadel, a ſtrong poſt ſurrounded by a wall flanked with towers; ſome of our troops followed through the gateway, ſome mounted the wall, and after a great ſlaughter, the remains of the garriſon (which had conſiſted of upwards of five hundred fighting men) reduced to the Kelladar and a few dependants, intreated for quarter, which was granted.

The intrepidity and ſteadineſs of the troops gave me entire ſatisfaction, but as theſe were moſt eſſentially promoted by the conduct and activity of Captain *Mayaffre*, commanding officer of artillery, Lieutenant *Cameron*, field engineer, and Captain *M'Lary*, it is my indiſpenſable duty to recommend the merit of theſe officers to your notice. I muſt alſo further preſume to point out that Mr. *William Odell*, a volunteer in this detachment, ſignalized himſelf at the head of the ſtorming party, in a manner which proved him highly deſerving of immediate admiſſion into the ſervice, and any other mark of your favour conſiſtent with his ſituation. Permit me now, gentlemen, to ſolicit once more the benefit of your inſtructions for my conduct in general, wherein it may be imperfectly pointed out, or totally neglected in the treaty, at preſent its ſole guide; but particularly reſpecting conqueſts that may be made by the troops under my command.

Pardon me if I ſeem pointedly urgent in this requeſt, which can only flow from an animated deſire of executing the ſervice with the charge of which I have been honoured, in a manner invariably conſiſtent with your intentions.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Camp, *Lahaar*, 29th April 1780. (Signed) *Wm Popham.*

The Governor General lays before the Board a return of the killed and wounded of Captain *Popham's* detachment at the ſtorm of fort *Lahaar:*

Ordered, That it be entered after the conſultation.

Reſolved, That the following letter be written to the Commander in Chief:

Sir,

We have now to acknowledge the receipt of your letters to us in this department of the 21ſt ultimo, and 3d inſtant.

21ſt April. The firſt of theſe letters requires a minute and particular reply. Beſides its general tendency, and, as it appears to us, its ſtudied object, to depreciate the alliance which we have lately concluded with the Rana of *Gohud*, we find two charges contained in it, ſo ſerious in their nature, and ſo pointed in their appeal, that as we feel ſo we cannot help expreſſing the deepeſt concern, nor leſs ſurprize that you ſhould have thought yourſelf warranted to produce them before you were certain of the grounds on which they were formed. The charges themſelves we ſhall reduce to ſtated propoſitions, and ſeparately reply to them.

The firſt is, that we have engaged Captain *Popham's* detachment in a ſervice to which it is unequal.

The ſecond, that we have wholly withheld from you the information of our plans for the conduct of the Maratta war; and in particular, that we have neglected to anſwer a letter addreſſed by you to us, dated the 6th January laſt, "deſiring" as you term it "information "of what was meant to be the adopted line."—The firſt of theſe charges is not directly expreſſed, but too ſtrongly and evidently implied by the whole tenor of your letter, to admit of our putting any other conſtruction on the expreſſions which mark it with that tendency.

You ſtate the inequality of the detachment to the ſervice on which it has been employed, as the conſequence of the extenſive powers veſted in the Rana of *Ghod* by the treaty, "in virtue of which he has carried our arms "acroſs the *Scind* into the Maratta diſtricts, and by "falſe information held out to Captain *Popham*, of the "ſtrength of *Lahaar*, induced him to appear before "and attack that ſtrong hold;" which you repreſent in other parts of your letter as impracticable, and thereby likely to prove the occaſion of our immediate diſgrace, and in its conſequences, of our utter ruin. You ſtate, that the detachment was not equipped for ſieges, though conformable to the requiſition made by the Rana, and equal to the original ſervice expreſſed in it. We will repeat your words, that we may not unintentionally miſrepreſent them.

"Four battalions and their guns was the extent of the "Rana's requiſition, to drive the Marattas out of his "diſtricts, where they were found extending the ravages "of war both by fire and ſword."

"Captain *Popham's* detachment formed of cavalry, "European artillery, and Sepoys, anſwered in force ſu"perior to his the Rana's demands; and the Marattas "quitting *Gohud*, on their approach, evinced they were "equal to the original ſervice meant to be performed."

Hence it appears that you have conſidered the Rana as inveſted with the power of preſcribing the ſtrength of the party required for his aſſiſtance, as well as the ſervice to be performed by it; that you conformed to the ſubſtance, though not to the letter of his requiſition; that you appointed a detachment more than equal to the ſtrength preſcribed, and equal to the literal terms of the ſervice aſſigned to it, but unequal to the ſervice on which he did employ it; this you impute to the extenſive powers veſted in him by the treaty, or in other words (for the inference is inevitable) to the Board who made the treaty.

We entirely agree with you in opinion, that the detachment is not equal to ſuch ſervices as that on which it has lately been employed, though ſucceſsfully; but cannot admit this as a conſequence imputable in any reſpect to the treaty concluded with the Rana of *Gohud*.

By the 2d article of the treaty, it is ſtipulated, that "if the Rana ſhall require an Engliſh force, from the "Company, for the defence of his country, or for the "acquiſition of territory, ſuch a force, *proportioned to "the exigency of the ſervice*, ſhall be immediately ſent on "his requiſition made in writing to the commanding "officer of the neareſt ſtation of the Company's troops." And the 3d article declares, that "this force ſhall be "employed for the defence of the Rana's dominions "againſt all foreign or domeſtic enemies, and for the "enlargement of his dominions by conqueſt on the "Marattas."

It was far from our intention to allow the Rana a right to determine the ſtrength of the detachment that ſhould be ſent to his aſſiſtance; and it was as far from our conception, that he could be a competent judge of ſuch a ſubject; this was the proper conſideration and province of the officer to whom the requiſition was made: ſuch is the neceſſary conſtruction of the treaty itſelf; or if it could have admitted a doubt, our letter to you of the 6th of December, which conveyed to you the firſt information of the treaty, and our ſubſequent letter of the 17th of February, contain ſo clear and decided an explanation of it, that we cannot help expreſſing our ſurpriſe, that you ſhould ſtill miſunderſtand it; we will quote both paſſages at large.

"In the mean time, ſhould the Rana make any ap- 6th December.
"plication to you for a detachment of the Company's
"forces

forces to act againſt the Marattas, we requeſt that you "will comply with his requiſition, *proportioning the num-* "*ber of troops to the exigency of the ſervice on which they* "*are ſent.*"

11th Feb. "We do not know whether the Rana has yet made "any application to you, for a detachment of our "troops to aſſiſt him; but if he ſhall, we think it pro- "per to repeat our injunctions, that ſuch a portion *as* "*you ſhall deem ſufficient to perform the ſervice propoſed*, be "immediately granted; and we hope, if any requiſition "has already been made to you for this purpoſe, that "you will have complied with it previous to the receipt "of this letter."

We have marked in the above quotations, the words which expreſsly refer to your judgment, the relative ſtrength of the detachment to the ſervices which it was to perform; nor in whatever terms the Rana's application was worded, could that warrant a deviation from ſuch clear injunctions, and from the rights and obligations of a formal treaty.

It is true that the Rana's demand, as you have ſtated it, preſcribes the expulſion of the Marattas from his country, as the only ſervice to be performed by the detachment; and to this you aſſert it to have been equal, though not equipped for ſieges. But we underſtand that the territory of *Gohud* contains a multitude of fortreſſes, ſome of which were, or might be in the poſſeſſion of the Marattas; and therefore required that the detachment ſhould have been equipped for ſieges, to enable it to perform the ſervices aſſigned to it, the expulſion of the Marattas from that country; and your inſtructions to Captain *Popham*, by enjoining his obedience to ſuch further demands as the Rana might make in virtue of the treaty, did in effect extend the operations of the detachment beyond the line to which you underſtand it to have been limited; even to remote and offenſive hoſtilities, if the Rana required them, and the ſtrength of the detachment was equal to them.

You will permit us therefore to remark, either that the operations of the detachment ſhould have been reſtricted to its original and profeſſed deſign, until it ſhould have been fitted for more difficult ſervices, or it ſhould have been immediately qualified for them. We mean not to retort, but to repel the cenſures which have been caſt upon us. In deference to your ſtation and profeſſional knowledge, we contented ourſelves with requiring your conformity to the treaty, leaving the mode and detail wholly to your choice and direction; and we ſo cautiouſly avoided every act which might be deemed an encroachment on your department, that we have not even to this date conveyed any inſtructions to Captain *Popham* for his military conduct, little expecting to be reproached by you with the inſufficiency of your own meaſures, in the proſecution of the ſervice which we had thus generally and liberally entruſted to your charge.

We now proceed to your ſecond charge, to which our reply ſhall be as ſhort as concluſive.

The plans formed by this Government for the conduct of the war, in which we might eventually be, and in which we have ſince been actually engaged, with the Marattas, were debated and concluded by the members of this Government, aſſiſted by yourſelf in perſon, nor have ſince undergone any alteration or addition, except in the treaty of alliance formed with the Rana of *Gohud*, with which you have been duly and fully acquainted. We have not therefore withheld from you the information of our plan for the conduct of the Maratta war. And to your letter of the 6th January we returned a full and explicit anſwer, in ours of the 24th of the ſame month. As a proof of this aſſertion, we ſhall here ſubjoin copies both of your letter to us, and ours to you, of the preceding dates; and with them cloſe the ſubject; expreſſing our regret that we have been reduced to the neceſſity of ſaying ſo much upon arguments of a tendency ſo foreign from the intereſts of the ſervice, the duties of our ſtations, or the reſpect to which we are entitled by them, whether as equal members of the ſame Adminiſtration, or as your ſuperiors in the actual relation which ſubſiſts between us.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, dated the 6th, and received the 20th January 1780.

Gentlemen,

I am juſt honoured with your letter of the 23d ultimo, encloſing to me a copy of Brigadier General *Goddard*'s letter of the 28th October, and giving me diſcretional powers for ordering the march of Captain *Popham*'s detachment.

It appears to me, by General *Goddard*'s letter, (the contents of which I own I feel myſelf diſappointed in, as by his correſpondence with me I had been led to a very different expectation) that a war with the Marattas is inevitable, unleſs you chuſe to comply with the terms upon which they offer you peace.

In this ſituation of affairs I cannot but expreſs ſome uneaſineſs, that the information you give me, is not accompanied by your reſolutions in what manner we are to proceed; whether you hold it beſt to accede to their propoſitions for peace, to commence an active and vigorous war, or to ſtand merely on the defenſive againſt them:

The firſt or ſecond of theſe require the moſt ſpeedy determination, leſt the appearance of a French force, which we have much reaſon to expect, ſhould heighten their demands in the one caſe, or add ſtrength to the union already formed among themſelves in the other.

I hardly need obſerve to you, gentlemen, that the circumſtances we are in, both at home and here, require from us the moſt immediate, decided, and united meaſures; and that in a correſpondence carried on at this diſtance from the Preſidency, it is abſolutely neceſſary, if we would avoid delays which may prove fatal to our affairs, that I ſhould receive your opinions upon events of importance as ſpeedily as the information itſelf.

For want of it in the preſent critical moment, I can do no more than endeavour to procure from the Vizier, and to collect

Copy of a Letter to Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, dated the 24th January 1780.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your letters, dated the 2d, 3d, and 6th inſtant.

When we tranſmitted you a copy of General *Goddard*'s letter to us, under date the 28th of October, we ſhould alſo have imparted to you our reſolutions upon it, had we formed any; but a preciſe line of conduct having been already laid down for General *Goddard*, in our inſtructions to him, which provided for the event of hoſtilities, General *Goddard* having informed us, when he ſaw a war was unavoidable, that he was going to *Bombay* to concert the means of carrying it on to advantage; and as the plan of his operations, whatever it might be, muſt be governed in a great meaſure by local and incidental circumſtances, which we could neither foreſee nor have any timely acquaintance with, we thought it unneceſſary to take any further ſteps upon the occaſion of his letter.

We have now received a further letter from General *Goddard*, dated 10th December, informing us of his return to *Surat*, after having ſettled the plan of his future operations; for the particulars of which he refers us to papers omitted to be encloſed in this letter, which is a duplicate. Our Secretary informs us, that he has forwarded a copy of it to you, and in order to complete your information, we now tranſmit you a draft of our intended reply.

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together what little of heavy artillery is to be met with in these quarters. Our army here is wholly unprovided with them, as well as almost every other military store.

Captain *Popham*'s detachment is ready to march. The undertaking will now be a hazardous one, and cannot be effected without moving an army across the *Jumna*, to cover and screen his motions, by calling off the powers and attention of the enemy; and it may at the same time prove a check to them in collecting the large sums they are actually employed in raising among the tributary princes there, the amount of which I shall very soon obtain exact information of.

This, together with a well-timed co-operation on General *Goddard*'s part, to accelerate and facilitate their junction, can alone give hopes of their making good our aim; but neither this nor any thing else can be attempted, until your definitive resolutions are given, as to peace, a vigorous war, or a defensive one.

General *Goddard*'s request, at the close of his letter, I must pointedly object to, as the granting it will undoubtedly increase that confusion in the army which I have been endeavouring to the utmost to relieve them from.

I enclose a return of the army under General *Goddard*, upon a supposition that the Madras detachment may have joined him.

Fort William,
the 15th May 1780.

Minutes on the letter to Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Mr. *Francis*—On the principles of the treaty concluded with the Rana of *Gohud*, I think the observations contained in the former part of this letter are just.

In the latter part, containing a reply to the second charge brought against the Board by the Commander in Chief, I entirely concur. Supposing the Board to place the most implicit confidence in the Commander in Chief, and to be ever so desirous of availing themselves of his advice, I do not see how it is possible to concert political measures, or plans of military operations, which in their nature require secrecy as well as discussion, at so great a distance as that of *Calcutta* from *Lucknow*.

Mr. *Wheler*—I approve of the above letter to the Commander in Chief, as far as it may not appear in any part of it to contradict the opinions which I have before delivered on the treaty concluded with the Rana of *Gohud*.

Agreed, that another letter be also written to Sir *Eyre Coote*, as follows:—

To Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Sir,

We cannot but exceedingly lament the loss of those brave officers, whose example animated the advancing party at the attack of the fort of *Lahaar*, and of the men who fell on that occasion. We attribute these losses solely to the circumstance of Captain *Popham*'s detachment not being provided with battering cannon, to destroy the defences of the fort; and must therefore request that you will order under a proper escort two eighteen pounders from *Chuna Ghur*, with their proportion of ammunition and stores, to join Captain *Popham*, whenever you shall receive advice from him, that he is required by the Rana of *Gohud* to perform any service which shall render them necessary.

Fort William, We are, &c.
15th May 1780.

Agreed, That the following letter be written to Captain *Popham*:—

To Captain *Popham*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 29th April, informing us of the capture of the fort of *Lahaar* by storm, on the 28th of the same month.

We with pleasure assure you of our entire approbation of your conduct, and desire that you will in public orders return our thanks to the officers under your command, and in particular, to Captains *M'Clarey* and *Mayaffre*, and to Lieutenant *Cameron*, for their gallant behaviour in this service, and to the troops in general, for their spirited, steady, and soldier-like conduct, both on this occasion, and during the whole course of the present expedition.

The Commander in Chief has transmitted to us an account of the successful attack which was made by Captain *Bruce* on the enemy's camp, on the morning of the 16th of April; the regularity and spirit with which this enterprize appears to have been conducted, has impressed us with a high opinion of Captain *Bruce*'s abilities as an officer, and of the discipline as well as bravery of the troops which he commanded. We desire that you will express to Captain *Bruce* our approbation of his services, and return our thanks to him and his party, in public orders, for their gallant behaviour on this occasion.

We have read with pleasure your report of Mr. *Odell*'s good behaviour, and as a reward to his merit, we have appointed him a cornet of cavalry, in the room of Mr. *Gardiner*, to rank as an ensign in the general line of the army, from the 28th ultimo.

Much as we are pleased with the gallantry of our troops at the assault of the fort of *Lahaar*, we cannot but exceedingly regret the loss of those brave officers, whose example animated the advancing party, and of the men who fell on that occasion. We attribute these losses solely to the circumstance of your not being provided with battering cannon, to destroy the defences of the fort, and we have therefore requested the Commander in Chief to order two eighteen pounders, with their proportion of ammunition and stores, to join your detachment under a proper escort, whenever he shall receive advice from you, of your being required by the Rana of *Gohud* to perform any service which shall render them necessary.

We desire that you will deliver over to the Rana the fort of *Lahaar*, with the possession of the duties of *Cutchoocagaar* dependant on it, and that you will appoint a person duly qualified in conjunction with one nominated by him for the same purpose, to ascertain the amount of the revenues yielded by the district of *Cutchoocagaar*, from the accounts of the actual collections, employing such checks as your own judgment shall dictate, to prevent any collusion in this inquiry; and for this purpose also, we desire that you will cause exact copies to be taken of the original accounts, and transmit them to us, with your report of the amount deduced from them.

Fort William, We are, &c. &c.
the 15th May 1780.

We are of opinion, that the season is too far advanced to admit of a junction between Captain *Popham*'s detachment and the forces commanded by General *Goddard*, and that the march of this detachment to the other side of *India* is therefore no longer advisable. But we think that it may be useful on the western frontier of the Vizier's dominions, either to repel an invasion from the Marattas, if they should attempt to enter at that quarter, or to proceed against them on the western side of the *Jumna*, if it should be found expedient to send a force for that purpose. We therefore recommend its continuing still embodied.

We are, &c.

A RETURN

Appendix, No. 285.

A RETURN

Of the Killed and Wounded of the different Corps of the Detachment of Drafts, under the command of Captain *Popham*, during the Siege and at the Storm of *Fort Lahaar*, April 30th, 1780.

	Captain wounded.	Lieutenant killed.	Lieutenant wounded.	Cornet killed.	Matroſſes wounded.	Subadars killed.	Subadars wounded.	Jemadars killed.	Jemadars wounded.	Havildars killed.	Havildars wounded.	Naicks killed.	Naicks wounded.	Sepoys killed.	Sepoys wounded.	Laſcars wounded.	Total killed and wounded.
Artillery Draft	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3
1ſt Battalion Sepoy ditto	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	34	-	42
2d Battalion Sepoy ditto	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	2	2	-	-	9	35	1	54
3d Battalion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
4th Battalion	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	1	4	15	-	24
	1	1	1	1	1	-	3	1	4	2	4	-	1	17	85	3	125

(Signed) *Wm. Popham*, Captn Commanding.

Received the following letter from Sir *Eyre Coote*:—

Gentlemen,

I have before me your three ſeparate letters, of date the 15th May. That which is in anſwer to my letters of the 21ſt March, 26th April, and 1ſt May, it ſeems neceſſary only to acknowledge the receipt of; but as the other two can be conſidered in no other light than as an abſolute attack on me in my military character, I think it neceſſary to reply to them minutely, under different heads.

I flatter myſelf the whole tenor of your charges will be ſo eaſily confuted, that I ſhall have only to refer to your former orders, to the treaty with the Ranah of *Ghode*, and his requiſition for troops in conſequence of the ſaid treaty, to prove that I acted up to the ſpirit, as well as to the letter of the mandates of Government.

In order to be more diſtinct, I ſhall firſt take up the ſubject of that letter, which is in anſwer to mine of the 21ſt April. Notwithſtanding the deep concern and ſurprize you are pleaſed to expreſs at my venturing to produce before your Board thoſe ſentiments, which as they are to be found in the letter alluded to, it becomes unneceſſary here to repeat; yet I moſt undoubtedly think, that I am warranted, not only to make you acquainted with my ideas on the paſt and preſent, but alſo with my opinion on what is likely to happen. If a member of Government, who is at the head of the Company's army, is to be denied this moſt neceſſary mode of contributing his exertions for the good of his employers, the advantages they can derive from his ſervices are limited indeed.

Your firſt argument is thus expreſsly worded:—"That I have accuſed the Board of having engaged Captain *Popham*'s detachment in a ſervice to which it was unequal." Acknowledging however, that I have not directly expreſſed the charge, but that it is too ſtrongly and evidently implied by the whole tenor of my letter, to admit of your putting any other conſtruction on the expreſſions which mark it with that tendency; ſuch concluſions drawn from what I have not ſaid, but what you ſuppoſe my meaning, I ſhall wave a reply to. My other real avocations oblige me to avoid entering on ſuch an ideal detail. I did and do again ſtate, that the detachment was not equipt for ſieges; and that the Ranah of *Gohud* never even hinted by requiſition or otherwiſe, to me, that they were meant to be employed on ſuch undertakings. No mention was made of attacking forts, or the neceſſity of a battering train declared, till the 11th of April, at which period the detachment had for ſome days inveſted *Lahaar*.

It was impoſſible to ſuppoſe that the Ranah requiring heavy cannon on the 11th April, could mean them for the reduction of *Lahaar*, an enterprize already begun; the concluſion would have been too ridiculous, when it is explained that the neareſt heavy guns to that fortreſs could not have reached the detachment in leſs than two months (and for the truth of this, permit me to appeal to your own knowledge, that there is not a ſingle piece of battering cannon with the field brigades.) No, his declared object in demanding a battering train then, was to attempt *Gwalior* during the enſuing rains: that requiſition of the Ranah's I immediately informed you of; and as I have now only received your inſtructions in conſequence of it, no time has been loſt on my part.

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The purport of the Ranah's letter to me, previous to my ordering Captain *Popham* on that ſervice, were, that his country was over run with the Marattas; not a word mentioned of their being poſſeſſed of any of his ſtrong holds, but deſcribing them as a body of horſe, plundering and laying waſte his diſtricts. The ſoldier on ſuch an application naturally equips the force to repel ſuch an enemy as lightly as poſſible; and does not burthen them with a battering train, which would inevitable counteract their very deſign, diſpatch and celerity of march in the field.

The Ranah's idea of quitting his Ghode diſtrict, croſſing the *Scind*, and appearing before *Lahaar*, was ſudden; and the public intelligence that ſuch was his intention, was immediately followed by accounts, that the army was before the place.

The Ranah did deceive Captain *Popham*, and the fort was found much ſtronger than reported, otherwiſe it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe an officer of character could have depended on ſix pounders, for taking off the defences, or breaching ſuch walls. Another ſtrong reaſon might alſo before have been given for my not encumbering the detachment with any thing but light field artillery, even had it been in my power to do it; I could not imagine that the Ranah was ſo totally defenceleſs in ordnance, but that his forts and ſtrong holds could have ſupplied a few pieces of battering cannon.

I mean not to make any remarks on the treaty with the Ranah of *Gohud*, but it is abſolutely neceſſary to point out what ſeems required by you, gentlemen, for my juſtification. In order to prove that I have complied as far as reſted with me, both with the letter and ſpirit of it, I need no other evidences than the ſecond article of the treaty which you quote; your explanation of what was your intention and meaning, apparent or concluſive, in ſuch ſecond article; and your own orders, by letters dated 6th December and 17th February, to ſhew, that I complied in full with the word and ſpirit of all and every act of Government laid down for my guidance. The Ranah made his demand for troops on the 5th February, and explained what ſervice the troops were deſigned for; I accordingly uſed my judgment, in ſending ſuch a detachment immediately as I thought ſufficient to perform the ſervice propoſed. But the Ranah's hidden plans which he meant to adopt after the junction of our detachment with him, I could neither foreſee or am anſwerable for. My orders to Captain *Popham* were diſcretionary, with a copy of the treaty for his guidance; all others that I could have given him muſt have impeded rather than furthered the ſervice. I muſt obſerve, that when any force demanded by the Ranah, and ordered by the Commander in Chief, has at length joined the army of the former, the Commander in Chief, at a diſtance from their operations, cannot be anſwerable for the mode of carrying on that ſervice; nor can the term of *the Company's commanding officer*, ſo often made uſe of in the treaty, have in like inſtances any reference to the Commander in Chief of the forces; the ſenſe will not admit being ſtrained to ſuch a meaning. The explanation of *the Company's commander officer then*, is the officer who abſolutely *heads* the detachment; for on ſervice to be performed againſt an enemy, who are there to-day and gone to-morrow, it would ſeem ſtrangely inconſiſtent in me, to tie up their operations, by making them wait my authority for their different movements; I might with equal expectation of ſucceſs, iſſue my orders from *Calcutta* as from hence, ſince it takes ten days at leaſt to get an anſwer to a letter from them.

You ſay that "the operations of the detachment "ſhould have been reſtricted to its original and profeſſed "deſign, until it ſhould have been fitted for more diffi- "cult ſervices, or, it ſhould have been immediately "qualified for them." I repeat again, that the firſt intimation I had of the intended attack of *Lahaar*, was immediately followed by a ſecond, that the troops were before the fort; and would you have adviſed, after the place had been inveſted and attacked ten days (the neceſſary time for my orders reaching them, in conſequence of the information received) that the ſiege ſhould have been raiſed, and the troops ordered to retire? The ſervice, hazardous and precarious as it was, appeared preferable to ſuch meaſures. The Ranah, I muſt own, has been very moderate in his demands of aſſiſtance, when his powers, by treaty, are conſidered. And in anſwer to your inference drawn on the quotation of my letter, that I ſeem to have miſtaken the ſenſe of the 2d article: and that I ſuppoſe the Ranah is inveſted with the power of preſcribing the ſtrength of the party required for his aſſiſtance; you muſt permit me to ſay, thoſe are by no means my ideas; that part of the 2d article which is in point, will not admit of two conſtructions; but that I may be thoroughly underſtood, the ſenſe and meaning of the article alluded to I take to be as follows: that let the Ranah's views and deſigns be ever ſo unlimited, if he makes a demand for troops, artillery, &c. and ſpecifies the ſervice meant to be performed, and the Commander in Chief is of opinion, that the operations mentioned cannot with advantage be carried on without even our whole force in theſe parts, every man and ſtore ought, *by faith of treaty*, inſtantly to move at the requiſition of the Ranah of *Ghode*. The ſervice to be attempted depends upon the Ranah's will, muſt be particularly ſpecified by him, and the troops capable of undertaking ſuch ſervice with advantage, is the Commander in Chief's detail.

To your candour I ſubmit the above, and expect from your juſtice, that you exonerate me from that reproach ſo unmeritedly caſt on me.

The truth is, the Ranah of *Ghode* appears veſted with powers which he has already miſapplied, in withholding, his real deſign from the Commander in Chief, and demanding troops for one ſervice when it is evident he meant them for another.

Your reply to what you term my ſecond charge againſt you, viz. That you have withheld from me the information of your plans for the conduct of the Maratta war, and that you have not anſwered in full my letter to you of the 6th of December ſtates, that there has been no alteration or addition to what paſſed in Council on that ſubject when I was preſent at the Board, except the treaty with the Ranah of *Ghode*; and that your anſwer of the 24th January, was a full one to mine of the 6th December. To the firſt part I undoubtedly ſubſcribe, that if no alteration had taken place you conſequently could not inform me of any; I ſhall only obſerve, that when I left the Board, a treaty of peace with the Marattas was in agitation, and looked forward to as likely to be effected, though the neceſſary preparations for war were ſtill carrying on; but when I had the honour to addreſs you on the 6th December, the proſpect of peace, from the terms demanded of us, ſeemed to be thrown to a diſtance, and in conſequence of that material change in our ſituation, it was, that I put to the Board thoſe eſſential and reaſonable queſtions, Whether your Supreme Board meant to purſue the line of peace or war? and if the latter, whether it was to extend to the operations of a vigorous one, or the more confined ſcale of defences? And in reſpect to your aſſertion, that theſe were fully anſwered in your letter of the 24th January, I muſt beg leave to differ with you in opinion; at leaſt I cannot ſee it in that light.

To your third letter, wherein you attribute our loſſes before *Lahaar* ſolely to the circumſtance of Captain *Popham*'s detachment not being provided with battering cannon, to take off the defences of the fort, I ſhould think it neceſſary to anſwer moſt circumſtantially, had I not already ſpoken fully, and I hope ſatisfactorily upon it, in my reply to your ſecond letter; and as I am clear, from what I have already ſaid, that our ſuperiors will allow the force of the reaſons advanced by me, and exculpate me from all blame on that head; ſo alſo am I induced to believe, that your Board will no longer hold

me chargeable with either miſinterpretation of orders, or any omiſſion in the equipment of the detachment required and ſent for the aſſiſtance of the Ranah of *Ghode*.

I am ſorry I have been obliged to be ſo prolix upon the above ſubjects; but what I owe my own military character, which is dearer to me than life itſelf, rendered it neceſſary that I ſhould not ſubmit to undeſerved accuſations, or permit avowed charges to remain unanſwered.

I have ſent the neceſſary order to the commandant of the garriſon of *Chunar* to hold two eighteen pounders, their ammunition and ſtores, in readineſs to proceed, whenever Captain *Popham* ſhall acquaint me that he is required by the Rana of *Ghode* to perform any ſervice that ſhall render them neceſſary.

Lucknow, 11th June, 1780. I have the honour, &c. (Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Ordered, That this letter lie for conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 286.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 29th May 1780.

THE Governor General delivers in the following minute and propoſitions:

No 3, in Mr. Francis's packet

The Governor General.—The Commander in Chief has repeatedly declared, that the detachment now at *Ghode*, under the command of Captain *Popham*, is unequal to the ſervices in which it has been employed, and of courſe much more unequal to that in which the Rana is deſirous of engaging it. Such has alſo been the declared opinion of the Board; it is in its preſent form, as has already been obſerved, irreconcileable with the treaty concluded with the Rana of *Ghode*, which apportions the rate of ſubſidy which he is to pay for ſuch military aid as is afforded him by this Government to battalions of Sepoys on their preſent eſtabliſhment.

It will be recollected, that Captain *Popham*'s detachment was formed for a very different ſervice from that in which it is now employed; conſiſting of 2000 drafts, 40 European artillery, a ſmall party of horſe, with four light ſix pounders and a howitzer; this force was extremely well calculated for the ſervice originally intended to have been performed by it, and as ill calculated for the preſent. Inſtead of four regular battalions of 800 rank and file each, with eight guns, the Rana has been furniſhed with four weak corps of 600 men each, four guns and a howitzer, and a body of horſe, which he neither wanted nor applied for, and which he will probably object to admit into the account of his ſubſidy.

On the requiſition from the four Captains who command the drafts in *Gohud*, to be permitted to increaſe their preſent corps to battalions, the General obſerves to us, "that thoſe Sepoy drafts are ſupernumerary to the "eſtabliſhment; and preſumes Government has do idea "of augmenting their number, by completing them to "the ſtrength of four regular battalions." For theſe reaſons, and from a deſire to contract our expences by every reaſonable means, I ſubmit to the Board the following propoſitions:

1ſt. That Captain *Popham*'s detachment be relieved by four regular battalions of Sepoys, with their guns, &c. Three battalions from *Cawnpore*, and the battalion of light infantry at *Chackye*.

2d. That Captain *Popham* when relieved ſhall march to *Cawnpore*: the Sepoys to be incorporated into ſuch of our battalions as may be in want of men, the cavalry to join their corps; the artillery to be diſpoſed of as the Commander in Chief ſhall judge proper; and the officers belonging to the army in *Guzerat* to join it by ſuch routes as they ſhall judge moſt practicable.

3d. That the ſtaff officers of Captain *Popham*'s detachment ſhall be ordered to do duty, and to hold their preſent appointments, in the detachment which ſhall relieve them. Appendix No. 286.

4th. That the battalion of light infantry, commanded by Captain *James Browne*, be ordered to march immediately to *Gohud*.

5th. That Major *Camac* be ordered to proceed immediately to *Gohud*, or whereſoever the detachment may be which is to relieve Captain *Popham*, and to take the command of it.

6th. That the bullocks attached to the guns of the battalion and ſtores, and the eighteen pounders ordered to join Captain *Popham*'s detachment, be furniſhed by the contractor, from his preſent eſtabliſhment.

7th. That as a conſiderable time will be loſt, if the reſolutions of the Board reſpecting Major *Camac*, and the battalion of light infantry, are carried into effect through the official channel of the Commander in Chief, who did not propoſe leaving *Lucknow*, until the commencement of the rains;

Agreed, That the orders to Major *Camac* and Captain *Browne* be immediately ſent from the Board, and iſſued in general orders.

8th. That a copy of theſe reſolutions be immediately tranſmitted to the Commander in Chief; and that he be requeſted to iſſue the neceſſary orders for forming the detachment at *Cawnpore*, which is to relieve Captain *Popham*'s.

I ſhall now beg leave to offer a few remarks on theſe propoſitions.

By relieving Captain *Popham*'s detachment with four regular battalions, we ſtrictly comply with the terms of the treaty, and the Rana's requiſition. It will prove a reduction of our expences, as the battalions now propoſed for this ſervice are at preſent upon a war eſtabliſhment, and the ſubſidy will, or ought to defray every expence of the detachment.

By employing Captain *Browne*'s battalion on this ſervice, we render a corps formed for active ſervice of real uſe: at preſent it is in cantonment, as the purpoſes for which it was originally raiſed have been long ſince accompliſhed, and the diſtricts to which it principally appertained, have been placed under the controul of the collector of *Boglepore*. Captain *Crawford*'s corps, which by the regulations is to be completed to the ſtrength of a battalion, (which it may by a part of the drafts ordered now to be relieved from *Gohud*) will be fully ſufficient for the protection of *Ramgur*, and the Jungulterry of *Chackye*.

With reſpect to Major *Camac*, I ſhall briefly obſerve, that I have recommended him for the command of the detachment which is to be employed in *Gohud*, becauſe he belongs to the brigade which is to furniſh the principal force of which it will conſiſt; becauſe I know him to be peculiarly qualified for a ſervice of this nature, to which ſuch requiſites are eſſential, and becauſe I believe that the other members of the Board entertain a ſimilar opinion of him.

Agreed to the propoſitions recommended by the Governor General; and that the following letter be written the Commander in Chief;

To Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 5th, 11th, and 15th inſtant.

We agree with you in opinion, that the detachment now at *Gohud*, under the command of Captain *Popham*, is not equal to the ſervice on which it has been employed, and yet leſs to that in which the Rana is deſirous of engaging it.

For theſe reaſons, and from a deſire to contract our expences as much as poſſible, we have reſolved, firſt, that Captain *Popham*'s detachment be relieved by four

Appendix. No. 286.

regular battalions of Sepoys, with their guns, &c. viz. three battalions from *Cawnpore*, and the battalion of light infantry at *Chackye*.

Second. That Captain *Popham* when relieved, ſhall march to *Cawnpore*; the Sepoys to be incorporated into ſuch of our battalions as may be in want of men; the cavalry to join their corps; the artillery to be diſpoſed of as the Commander in Chief ſhall judge proper; and the officers belonging to the army in *Guzerat* to join it by ſuch routes as they ſhall judge moſt practicable.

Third. That the ſtaff officers of Captain *Popham*'s detachment ſhall be ordered to do duty, and to hold their preſent appointments, in the detachment which ſhall relieve them.

Fourth. That the battalion of light infantry commanded by Captain *James Browne* be ordered to march immediately to *Gohud*.

Fifth. That Major *Camac* be ordered to proceed immediately to *Gohud*, or wherefoever the detachment may be which is to relieve Captain *Popham*, and to take the command of it.

Sixth. That the bullocks attached to the guns of the battalions and ſtores, and to the 18 pounders ordered to join Captain *Popham*'s detachment, be furniſhed by the contractor from his preſent eſtabliſhment.

And we deſire that you will be pleaſed to give the neceſſary inſtructions for carrying theſe our reſolutions into immediate effect; but as a conſiderable time would be loſt were the orders to Major *Camac*, and to Captain *Browne* commanding the battalion of light infantry, to paſs through you, we have directed our Secretary to communicate them immediately to thoſe officers.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 12th June 1780.

Extract of the Governor General's Minute.

By the propoſed plan of operations, the ſubſidy which we have hitherto received from the Rana of *Gohud*, will ceaſe: all that we can require of him will be to join our forces with the quota of his troops ſtipulated by the treaty; it will therefore become neceſſary to provide a military fund for the payment of this detachment. I propoſe to the Board, that as the ſeaſon is now approaching in which our demand upon Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, for the payment of his annual contribution towards the expences of the war, ſhould be made, we do immediately inſtruct our Reſident of *Benares* to apply to him for the ſum of five lacks of rupees, which ſum I propoſe ſhall be appropriated ſolely to the payment of Major *Camac*'s detachment.

If the Board agree to this plan, it will be neceſſary to make ſome alterations in our late orders, and theſe I ſhall reduce to diſtinct propoſitions.

1ſt. That the order for the return of Captain *Popham*'s detachment be countermanded.

2d. That the Sepoy drafts of that detachment be immediately formed into three regular battalions.

3d. That the three ſenior Captains now with the detachment, be appointed to the command of theſe battalions; and that the Commander in Chief be requeſted to iſſue the neceſſary orders for completing them with ſubaltern and native officers.

4th. That to complete theſe battalions with their proportion of ordnance, two ſix pounders be added to the guns now with Captain *Popham*'s detachment.

5th. That theſe battalions be added to the detachment already ordered to be put under the command of Major *Camac*, and the whole formed into a ſeparate corps during the continuance of the preſent ſervice.

6th. That in addition to the guns attached by the regulations to each battalion of Sepoys upon ſervice, two twelve pounders, the howitzer now with Captain *Popham*'s detachment, and two cohorns, be ordered to join Major *Camac*'s detachment.

7th. That the Board of Ordnance be requeſted to iſſue orders for ſupplying Major *Camac*'s detachment with the above mentioned ordnance, and the proportion of ammunition and ſtores agreeable to the eſtabliſhment, either from *Cawnpore*, or either of the military ſtations contiguous to it.

8th. That a Brigade Major and an Aid de Camp be added to the ſtaff of Major *Camac*'s detachment, in conſequence of the additional ſtrength of it.

9th. That the Secretary be directed to draw out inſtructions for Major *Camac* from the preceding minute.

I entreat the Board to give me their ſupport in the proſecution of this plan. If they have been from its commencement averſe to the war; let them join with me in proſecuting it with vigour to its ſpeedy termination. If they conſider themſelves as free from the reſponſibility of it, let them allow me to acquit myſelf of mine. I wiſh I could venture my life upon the conſequences: I know the man who is to conduct it; and am certain that if the deſign is practicable, he will execute it to its fulleſt effect; nor am I fearful of the inference which this declaration may draw upon me for the future event of it.

Ordered, That the opinions of the different members of the Board be taken upon this ſubject in circulation.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 19th June 1780.

At a Council;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.—(Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent.)

READ, and approved the proceedings of the 12th inſtant.

Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler* having delivered in the minute which follows on the 15th inſtant, it was immediately ſent to the Governor General.

Minute from Mr. *Francis* and Mr. *Wheler*.

15th June 1780.

Mr. Francis packs.

Convinced as we are of the indiſpenſable neceſſity of bringing the preſent war, if poſſible, to a ſpeedy concluſion, we ſhall heartily join in the ſupport of every meaſure which appears to have peace for its object, and which carries with it any reaſonable proſpect of ſucceſs. On this principle, we agree with the Governor General, that it may be adviſable to avail ourſelves of the favourable diſpoſition of the Berar Government, and to invite the the Rajah's Dewan to come for that purpoſe to *Calcutta*. The motives aſſigned for his late conduct, and for the march of a body of his troops to *Cuttack*, are plauſible at leaſt, and appear to be confirmed by the delays with which it has been attended, and by their preſent inactivity. The deſire he profeſſes of becoming the mediator of peace between us and the Marattas ſeems likely to be ſincere, becauſe we believe it to be founded in the conſideration of his own intereſt, and becauſe it is conformable to the language which he has uniformly held to us. We do not mean to ſay, that evidence of this nature is to be implicitly depended upon; but it is now ſo eſſentially our intereſt to ſecure the friendſhip of *Moodajee Booſla*, or at leaſt to prevent his acting againſt us, that we ſhould think it imprudent to diſcover any doubt of his ſincerity. It cannot be very difficult to maintain the appearances of the moſt perfect confidence in his good faith, without ſuffering it to miſlead us, or neglecting any of thoſe precautions which our ſituation dictates, and which are never more neceſſary perhaps than in the midſt of ſecurity.

We

We therefore agree wth the Governor General in this part of his minute: but we find with extreme concern, that it is impoſſible for us to give our aſſent to the ſubſequent propoſition. The reaſons for which we object to it, ſhall be ſtated briefly, without reviving former arguments, or reflecting on any thing that is paſt. Taking our ſituation as it ſtands, we declare it to be our moſt deliberate opinion, that a peace is indiſpenſably neceſſary to ſave the India Company and every intereſt connected with theirs, from the greateſt diſtreſs, if not from certain ruin; and that at whatever diſtance this object may be, it is not practicable for us to continue the war on any terms, without a very conſiderable reduction in the expence of conducting it. In the former of theſe opinions we have never varied; in the latter, we are aſſured of the Governor General's concurrence. On this general ground, we object to the propoſed meaſure.

1ſt. Becauſe it reverſes a reſolution very lately paſſed with the unanimous approbation of the Board, for recalling and reducing Captain *Popham*'s detachment; the extra expences of which, beyond our regular eſtabliſhment, amounting to CR^{s} 91,332 a month would be ſaved, and their place ſupplied by four regular battalions.

2d. Becauſe by the propoſed plan of operations, the ſubſidy to be paid by the Rana of *Gohud*, and of which we believe no part has hitherto been received, is to ceaſe; and our reſources ſo far forth diminiſhed.

3d. Becauſe at a time, when it is admitted that the war cannot be continued without a very conſiderable reduction of expence, we cannot, conſiſtently with that principle, engage in a meaſure which ſuppoſes the contrary to be true; and which in our judgment leads to an addition of expence, which we cannot limit when once it is begun, and which we are very ſure this Government is not in a condition to ſupport. We have ſeen into what enormous charges we have been drawn by the detachment under General *Goddard*, the ſtrength of which does not exceed that propoſed to be placed under Major *Camac*: we have ſeen the expence of a detachment of only two thouſand draſts under Captain *Popham*, ſwelled to more than ninety-one thouſand rupees a month; and we firmly believe it to be an evil inſeparable from diſtant military operations in this country, that the charge of them can neither be limited nor controlled. We do not mean to diſpute the propriety of the Governor's perſonal confidence in Major *Camac*; but in our minds, ſuch implicit confidence cannot exiſt without experience, much leſs in oppoſition to that with which the conduct of ſimilar expeditions has already furniſhed us. In this obſervation we allude only to the expence that attends them. Appendix. No. 286.

4th. Becauſe the propoſed anticipation of the demand of five lacks from the Rajah of *Benares*, and the ſole appropriation of it to this ſervice, is no relief of expence, or increaſe of reſource, ſince the above five lacks make part of our general eſtimate of reſources for the ſervice of the current year; and if applied to any ſervice not provided for in the ſame eſtimate, will leave a deficiency which muſt be made good out of ſome other fund.

5th. Becauſe it appears to us, that the ſtate of our treaſury is not in any degree equal to the exiſting and increaſing demands which preſs upon this Government: The apparent balance on Monday laſt, including the depoſit in the New Fort, without which we ſhould conſider ourſelves as totally unprovided for meaſures of immediate defence, if ſuch ſhould become neceſſary, amounted to no more than current rupees 42,69,453. Deduct the depoſit in the New Fort, and let the account be ſtated as it will then ſtand, and as it ought to ſtand:

Cr.	CR^{s}.
Remainder, after deducting the ſum in the New Fort	6,13,453
Balance or actual debt againſt the Treaſury	31,35,453
	37,48,906

Dr.	CR^{s}.
Depoſits of private property	14,87,958
Amount of orders unpaid	20,86,949
Bills drawn by General *Goddard* unpaid	1,73,999
	37,48,906

This view of our ſituation undoubtedly leads to other important concluſions: that to which we mean to confine it at preſent is, that we are in no condition to undertake new expences; nor if our treaſury were better ſupplied than it is ſhould be think it prudent to expoſe ourſelves to the demands of another expedition, in the plan of which we ſee no eſſential difference from that which ſtill exiſts under General *Goddard*.

6th. Becauſe, admitting that all the preceding objections on the head of expence could be anſwered or removed, we are not ſatisfied that the plan itſelf would either end where it profeſſes to be directed, or that this is the ſeaſon in which it ought to be attempted on its own avowed principles. The declared purpoſe of the expedition is to invade *Mhadjee Scindia*'s country, and to attack his capital, *Ugein*, in order to divert him from the war in *Guzerat* to the defence of his own territories. We underſtand and admit the force of this argument; though in our judgment overbalanced by other conſiderations, independent of which we ſhould only object to the time choſen for the expedition, and to the unneceſſary charge of keeping up Captain *Popham*'s detachment. If it be meant to withdraw *Mhadjee Scindia* from the War in *Guzerat*, and to diſtract his force and attention from that country to his own, it ſeems to us that the attempt ſhould be made as ſoon as poſſible after October when General *Goddard* might be at liberty to co-operate with it, and to favour its ſucceſs by a ſimilar diverſion on his ſide; not in the midſt of the rains, when General *Goddard*'s army is in cantonments, and unable to take the field. The manifeſt advantage of having the two armies acting in concert, and dividing the attention of the enemy between them, would be loſt, if they were not both in the field at the ſame time. But this and every other objection to the meaſure, is in fact removed by the inſtructions which immediately follow it; and which, in our opinion, are wholly inconſiſtent with the firſt propoſed object. Major *Camac* is to be entruſted with "a diſcretionary power to remove the force which the Maratta Government poſſeſſes in *Culpee* or *Bundelcund* (and which is ſaid to be the only obſtacle to the main deſign) by any means, either by negociation or force." If it be true, as we are ſure it is, "That the Maratta power in that country is not very conſiderable, and that they who poſſeſs it are diſaffected to the Government on which they depend," ſuch a power can form no obſtacle to the execution of the main deſign; nor can we ever admit of the validity of ſuch a pretence for invading *Bundelcund*, which we conclude would be the firſt, if not the only effect of the expedition. At all events, the latitude given to Major *Camac* leaves him at liberty to purſue whatever plan he thinks proper; but if, inſtead of proceeding towards *Mhadjee Scindia*, the march of this detachment

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detachment ſhould once be directed by the oppoſite route to the capital of *Bundelcund*, he will naturally conclude, that the poſſeſſion of this country is our true and only object; of courſe he will have no apprehenſions for the ſafety of his own.

For theſe reaſons we are of opinion, that the reſolution of the Board of the 29th May, for the recal and reduction of Captain *Popham*'s detachment, &c. ſhould not be ſuſpended.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*
Edwd Wheler.

The Minute which follows having been ſent by the Governor General to the Secretary on Saturday, and having been circulated and agreed to, the propoſed orders were accordingly iſſued.

Governor General's Minute.

No. 5, in Mr. Francis's packet.

The Governor General—The majority of the Board having rejected all the propoſitions which were contained in my minute of the 12th inſtant, excepting the ſixth and ſeventh, which do not appear to have been included in their exception to the general propoſitions, I now beg leave to repeat them; and as it appears from the accompanying letter from Captain *Browne*, that he has left his field pieces and tumbrils behind him, I ſhall propoſe,

1. That Captain *Browne*'s battalion, on its arrival at *Cawnpore*, be completed with its proportion of field pieces, ammunition and ſtores, from the ordnance at that ſtation.

2d. That in addition to the guns attached to the battalions of Major *Camac*'s detachment by the regulations, two twelve pounders, the howitzer with Captain *Popham*'s detachment, and two cohorns, be ordered to join it.

3d. That the Board of Ordnance be requeſted to iſſue orders for ſupplying Major *Camac*'s detachment with the above-mentioned ordnance and their proportion of European artillery and Laſcars, ammunition and ſtores, agreeable to the eſtabliſhment, either from *Cawnpore* or the military ſtations contiguous to it.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings,*

Agreed.

(Signed) *E. Wheler,*
P. Francis.

No. 6, in Mr. Francis's packet.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following draft of inſtructions, which he propoſes to be given to Major *Camac*.

Inſtructions to Major *Camac*.

1ſt. Having appointed you to the command of a detachment, ordered to be formed of four battalions of Sepoys, three of which are to be furniſhed from the army ſtationed at *Cawnpore*, and the fourth, the battalion of light infantry, commanded by Captain *James Browne*; we direct you to proceed to *Cawnpore*, or to the ſtation of that detachment, wherever it may be, and to conduct it without loſs of time into the dominions of the Rana of *Gohud*, there to relieve the corps now under the command of Captain *Popham*, in that quarter.

2d. The Rana of *Gohud* having, in virtue of a treaty lately concluded between him and this Government, required the aid of a military force, on the part of this Government, for the defence of his country againſt the Marattas, who had invaded it, Captain *Popham* was appointed to this ſervice; and to this you now ſucceed. We therefore direct that you comply with ſuch requiſitions as ſhall be made to you by the Rana, for this and for ſuch other conditions as he is entitled to demand by the treaty, and ſhall be practicable with the force under your command.

3d. Whenever the Rana ſhall have no further ſervice for the detachment, and ſhall diſmiſs it in the manner preſcribed by the treaty, and no occaſion ſhall preſent itſelf for the employment of the detachment, in promoting the general ſucceſs of the war in which we are engaged with the Maratta State, you are forthwith to return with it into the dominions of the Nabob of *Oude*, and there wait for further orders; and if before you march into *Gohud*, you ſhall receive an intimation from him in writing, that he ſhall not require the aſſiſtance of your detachment, you will in like manner ſuſpend your march, and wait for further orders.

4th. But as the firſt deſign of this Government in the alliance lately formed with the Rana of *Gohud*, was to diſtreſs the Maratta State, by a diminution of their power, revenue and influence, and by uniting with other Powers in enmity with them, to divert and weaken their operations; and as the Maratta dominions which lie contiguous to *Gohud*, appertain to *Mhadjee Scindia*, and *Tuccojee Holcar*, the two principal rulers of that State, and the leaders of the army, employed to oppoſe General *Goddard*; we authorize and inſtruct you, in caſe you ſhall deem it practicable and expedient, to carry the war immediately into that quarter; requiring from the Rana the proportion of cavalry ſtipulated by the treaty to be furniſhed by him for ſuch a ſervice, or in caſe of his inability, whether from the ſeaſon of the year or from whatever other cauſe, to fulfil this condition in its complete extent, to require and accept from him ſuch other aid in furniſhing proviſions, and in forming magazines of grain, and other means of ſubſiſtence and communication, as you ſhall judge equivalent to it.

5th. For your guidance in maintaining the relation of your command to the Rana of *Gohud*, we herewith deliver to you a copy of the treaty executed with him; and we require and enjoin you to conform to it with the moſt ſcrupulous and literal exactneſs.

6th. If any caſe ſhall occur, for which we have not provided by theſe inſtructions, and which ſhall not be contrary to them, we empower you to act therein according to your own judgment; in all other, theſe inſtructions are poſitive, and muſt be implicitly obeyed.

Ordered, That theſe inſtructions lie for conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

22d June, 1780.

Read the following minute from Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, in reply to the propoſitions made by the Governor General, and entered in the laſt conſultation, containing inſtructions to Major *Camac*.

Minute from Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*.

The firſt, ſecond, and third paragraphs of the propoſed inſtructions to Major *Camac*, being conformable to the treaty concluded with the Rana of *Gohud*, we acquieſce therein. But we think it ſhould be added, that before our troops depart from the Rana's country, the full account of the ſubſidy due for their pay, ſhould be demanded and received.

But we cannot conſent to veſt Major *Camac* with the powers mentioned in the 4th paragraph, viz. "to carry "the war immediately into the dominions of *Tuccojee* "and *Scindia*, if *he* ſhall judge it practicable and expe- "dient; and to accept of ſuch other aid from the Rana "of *Gohud*, as *he* ſhall judge equivalent to the body of "ten thouſand horſe, which the Rana is obliged by the "treaty to furniſh." The latitude given in the firſt article, leaves it in effect to Major *Camac*, to carry the Company's arms wherever he thinks proper. The ſecond empowers him to annul the moſt important, and apparently the moſt uſeful article of the treaty. In both inſtances, the Government relinquiſhes its controul over a meaſure, which may lead us much farther than we are aware of; and be attended with the moſt ſerious conſequences. We have already obſerved, that an attempt to invade *Scindia*'s country, if adviſable, ſhould be made at a time when General *Goddard* can co-operate with it, and ſupport it: this cannot be done till towards the concluſion

cluſion of the rains, conſequently there is time ſufficient to concert a plan of operations with the Rana of *Gohud*, and to aſcertain what aſſiſtance may be depended on from him. The Board will then have proper materials before them, to enable themſelves to judge, how far it may be ſafe or expedient, to embark in the meaſure, ſuppoſing that a peace, which is our firſt object, ſhould not be effected in the interim.

For theſe reaſons, we cannot aſſent to the propoſitions contained in the 4th paragraph. We acquieſce in the 5th.

The powers mentioned in the 6th ſeem to fall under the ſame obſervations which have occurred to us on thoſe contained in the 4th.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*
Edward Wheler.
Warren Haſtings,
Philip Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

No. 9. Mr. Francis's packet.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following Minute.

Governor General—Two minutes have been lately delivered by Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, bearing their joint ſignatures, in anſwer to propoſitions made by me to the Board.

It is not my intention to follow theſe minutes through every aſſertion of facts, and every deduction of argument; I ſhall only reply to ſuch points as have a relation to my preſent purpoſe, which is ſtill to inſiſt on the neceſſity of carrying the war into the diſtricts appertaining to *Mahdajee Scindia*, and to this I entreat the Board to give me their attention.

Except the article of expence, I can ſcarcely collect the objections which are made to it.

It never was my intention to employ Major *Camac* in an invaſion of *Bundlecund*, nor ſuffer, if it were attempted on the grounds of his inſtructions, ſuch a waſte of the time required for the firſt and eſſential object of his operations.

The ends propoſed by this expedition are two immediate. 1ſt. To divide the Maratta ſtrength, and divert it from General *Goddard*; 2d. to make the principal agent of the war, the principal ſufferer by it. And one ultimately peace. To this it is objected, that "the manifeſt advantage of having two armies acting in concert, and dividing the attention of the enemy between them, would be loſt if they were not both in the field at the ſame time." This is by no means a fair concluſion, becauſe it ſuppoſes the enemy to keep the field, and our principal army to be inactive: the reverſe is the moſt probable; and my purpoſe will be equally anſwered, whether both remain in quarters, and Major *Camac* be ſuffered to proſecute the plan aſſigned him without oppoſition; or whether the whole force of the enemy be directed againſt him, and General *Goddard* left at liberty to act in the proſecution of his. The rainy ſeaſon is no impediment to our troops, but a great one to the Maratta, which conſiſt only of cavalry, and if the meaſure which I have propoſed, be even now agreed to, I ſhould hope to bound it with that ſeaſon, or to effect every material purpoſe of it within the rains.

The deſign of the propoſed inſtructions to Major *Camac*, has been miſunderſtood, and the intended ſenſe of it inverted. It is not meant "to give Major *Camac* "a latitude to carry the Company's arms *wherever he* "*thinks proper*;" but to order him to carry the Company's arms to a preſcribed ſcene of action, *unleſs he thinks it improper.*

The objection made to the expence is a material one; but a vigorous exertion cannot be made without expence, nor can the war be either concluded honourably, or proſecuted ſucceſsfully, without ſuch an exertion.—Feeble meaſures and advances for peace will but add to the ſtrength and preſumption of our adverſaries, diſcourage our friends, and perhaps induce them to become parties againſt us. The reſources of this Government, exhauſted as they are, and withheld from it by its internal imbecility, are yet equal to every probable contingency of the preſent war, if it is conducted on a conſiſtent plan, and that not varied by deſultory votes of Council, on every meaſure required for its proſecution. Appendix. No. 286.

I muſt here take notice, that the expence of Captain *Popham*'s detachment has been greatly over-rated. It is aſſerted, that the expence of a detachment of only 2000 drafts under Captain *Popham*, has been ſwelled to more than 91,000 rupees a month, and in another place, this ſum is ſtated as a fixed amount. The truth is, that the expence of this detachment has exceeded its due bounds; yet not in the degree imputed to it, which would be indeed enormous. The detachment beſides the two thouſand drafts (they are in fact 2,400) conſiſts of artillery and cavalry. The monthly expence of the whole was on a medium about 82,000 rupees; of this ſum

the cavalry alone produce	12,811
and the artillery - -	8,300
making both together -	21,111

And this ſum deducted from the total, leaves 61,000 rupees for the drafts, including the ſtaff and contingencies of four battalions into which they were formed, though their number was equal only to three.

The part which this Government has hitherto borne in the war, is mine, and has been made excluſively mine, the other members having repeatedly diſclaimed their ſhare in the reſponſibility attending it. It is hard, that while they load me with the weight of ſuch a charge, they ſhould bind my hands, and deny me the means of ſupporting it.

If Mr. *Francis* (I am compelled to ſpeak thus plainly) thinks that he can better and more effectually conduct the war, to the termination of which we both profeſs to aim at; and that he can in honour deprive me of the right which I claim to dictate the means of accompliſhing it, let him avowedly take the lead; but if I am to be charged with the conſequences of it, or if the right which I claim be juſtly mine, let him allow me to poſſeſs and exerciſe it. It is impoſſible to combine the principles of enterprize and inaction in the ſame general meaſure, and as impoſſible for his ſentiments and mine to be brought into agreement on the ſubject of the Maratta war. I have in vain laboured to accommodate them by a ſtudied attention to his opinions in every meaſure which I have ventured to propoſe in the courſe of the laſt fifteen months, and have reſtrained myſelf from urging others, which however proper and neceſſary for the occaſion, extenſively conſidered, were inconſiſtent with the actual ſtate and temper of this Government.

I now revert to my propoſition, and requeſt the Board to re-conſider their objections to the inſtructions which I have propoſed to be given to Major *Camac*. I have not the preſumption to expect that they will be influenced by any reaſonings which I have uſed, having had too much experience of the inſufficiency of official argument, to overcome a decided, and much leſs a confederate oppoſition. But as the expence which will attend the meaſure which I have recommended is the only formal objection made to it, I hope I may be allowed to remove it, by offering to exonerate the Company from it, and to take it upon myſelf. That this propoſition may not be miſunderſtood, and that I may not bind myſelf by engagements which may exceed my power to fulfil them, I will explain myſelf.

The regular pay and batta of the troops which are to form Major *Camac*'s detachment conſtitute no part of the expence of it, ſince theſe would be the ſame in their amount although the battalions remained in their original quarters. Neither ought the ſuſpenſion of the ſubſidy to be charged to the expedition, ſince it is probable, and I regard it as certain, that the Ranah having no further call for our aid within his country, for the ſole defence of it, will be glad to be relieved from the expence attending it; and becauſe it is propoſed in the laſt of the

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the minutes of Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, to withdraw it. The contingencies of the detachment are therefore the only expence that can be reaſonably charged to the expedition: theſe I rate far below two lacks of rupees; that ſum I offer to contribute to this diſburſement. I have already depoſited it within a ſmall amount in the hands of the Sub-treaſurer, and I beg that the Board will permit it to be accepted for that ſervice.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Ordered, That the foregoing minute lie for conſideration.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings,*
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 29th June 1780.

Thurſday.

At a Council;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.—(Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent.)

The Governor General—In my minute of the 19th inſtant, I propoſed that a Major of Brigade and an Aid de Camp ſhould be added to the ſtaff of Major *Camac*'s detachment, then propoſed to conſiſt of ſeven battalions. Although it has been ordered by the Board, that it ſhall conſiſt of only four battalions, and it ſeems to be the determination of the Board to confine its operations to a very limited ſcene, ſtill it has been repreſented to me by Major *Camac*, as indiſpenſably neceſſary to enable him to execute with proper effect the functions of his command, that he be allowed a Brigade Major and Aid de Camp; and I move, that they be allowed; and that Lieutenant *Hicks* be appointed to the former ſtation, and Lieutenant *Kennon* to the latter.

Agreed to.

The minute which follows having been ſent to the Secretary on the 27th inſtant, it was immediately forwarded to the Governor General.

Minute from Meſſieurs *Francis* and *Wheler*.

No. 10. Mr. Francis's packet.

After an attentive conſideration of the Governor General's Minute delivered in to the Board yeſterday, we adhere to the reaſons which have induced us to withhold our conſent to the propoſed expedition into *Malva*. To this, for the preſent, we ſhall only add the following ſhort remarks, in reply to ſome aſſertions in the Governor General's minute, which appear to us to be gratuitous.

1ſt. The actual expence of Captain *Popham*'s detachment for the months of November, December, and January laſt, is ſtated by the Commiſſary General at current rupees 2,73,996; (vide his letter recorded on the 1ſt of May) and we have no reaſon to think that the expence has decreaſed ſince the detachment has been on ſervice.

2d. We know not to what paſſage in either of our minutes the Governor General alludes, when he ſays, "That it is propoſed in the laſt of the minutes of Meſſieurs *Francis* and *Wheler* to withdraw the aid granted "to the Rana of *Gohud*." Notwithſtanding our original diſapprobation of the treaty, and though none of the good effects which were promiſed from it appear to us to have been accompliſhed, we have not propoſed to depart from the conditions by which this Government has been bound to the Rana. All we inſiſt on is, that the ſubſidy ſhould be paid. The Governor General has not informed us, whether any part of it has been diſcharged. It is ſaid, that the rainy ſeaſon is no impediment to our troops, though a great one to the Marattas. The ſame opinion was inſiſted on at the time when Colonel *Leſlie* marched, and when the Governor's confidence in him was not inferior to that which he now repoſes in Major *Camac*, and which we do not mean to ſay is ill founded. But Colonel *Leſlie*'s letters contain repeated declarations of the impoſſibility of marching amidſt the torrents of rain with which the country was deluged. On this point our conviction remains unaltered. They who have not ſeen the rains of *India* can have no idea of their violence, nor how entirely the whole ſurface of the country is changed by them.

In a few days we mean to record our ſentiments more at large on the remainder of the Governor's minute, and on the general ſituation of this Government. We could have wiſhed indeed, that the Governor's plan had been more completely before us than it is, that we might have been able to compare the whole of the object with the whole of the means. Peace, he declares, is his ultimate object; but he has not given us even a general idea of the terms on which he would make it; he has not intimated to us what would be the final extent of his demands on the Marattas, or what conceſſions he would make to them. Before this point is fixed, we have no ſolid baſis, either for action or deliberation: the firſt may be indefinite and unconnected, as it hitherto has been; the ſecond muſt be guided from day to day by events. In this uncertainty we cannot preſume to decide whether his object be or be not attainable; but we promiſe to enter into the conſideration of it with the utmoſt candour, and with all the attention which ſuch a ſubject deſerves when it is laid before us.

27th June 1780. (Signed) *Philip Francis,* *Edward Wheler.*

Ordered, That the above minute lie for conſideration; and that the Secretary be directed to prepare a draft of inſtructions to Major *Camac*, in conformity to the different minutes of the members of the Board recorded on this ſubject.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 13th July 1780.

At a Council;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire.—(Mr. *Francis*, indiſpoſed. Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the army.)

The Secretary begs leave to lay before the Board the following minute from Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, delivered to him on Tueſday the 4th inſtant, which he immediately circulated to the Governor General.

Minute from Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, 29th June 1780.

No. 11. Mr. Francis's packet.

In our minute of the 27th, we meant only to give an immediate anſwer to the propoſition before us. We ſhall now enter more particularly into the reaſonings and aſſertions with which it was introduced. The terms and tendency of the Governor General's minute make this taſk, however painful it may be, eſſentially neceſſary for the information of thoſe who are to judge of our conduct, and of courſe, to our own reputation and ſafety.

The Governor General ſays, that, "except the article of expence, he can ſcarcely collect the objections made to the meaſure:" And again, "that the expence is the only formal objection to it." Yet ſome pains are taken to anſwer another, which attacks the meaſure on its own principles, and which undoubtedly muſt have been felt by the Governor General, or he would not have attempted to remove it, by ſuppoſing a fact ſo material to the queſtion, as that our principal army is not in cantonments and inactive; and that it muſt not continue ſo to the end of the rains. The truth is, that General *Goddard*'s army, or the major part of it, is actually in cantonments at *Surat*; and we hear that he himſelf is at *Bombay*. Laſt year he did not take the field until December; perhaps he now might move a month ſooner; but we are ſatisfied, as well by his own letters, as by every

information

information we have been able to obtain, that it is impoſſible for him to act before November. That the rains would be no impediment to our infantry, incumbered with baggage, tents, ſtores, ammunition, and a train of artillery; but that it would be a great one to a body of Maratta cavalry; ſeems to us a moſt extraordinary propoſition. Hitherto it has been contradicted by experience, and we find no arguments advanced to ſupport it. If one of the objects of the expedition be to divide the Maratta ſtrength, and to divert it from General *Goddard*, it is eſſential to that object that General *Goddard*'s army ſhould be at the ſame time in the field, otherwiſe the Maratta force is not divided; nor can there be a diverſion on one ſide, unleſs ſome operations exiſt on the other, in favour of which the diverſion is to be made. But we ſay that General *Goddard*'s army is in cantonments, and muſt remain inactive till November; conſequently the undivided force and attention of the Marattas, if they think it neceſſary, may be turned entirely to Major *Camac*.

The ſecond object is ſaid to be to make *Madajee Scindia*, "the principal agent of the war, the principal ſufferer by it." Hitherto we have been told that *Nana Furneſe* was the chief, moſt attached to the French intereſt, and moſt hoſtile to ours; and that *Scindia* was diſpoſed to cultivate our friendſhip; and it muſt be confeſſed he gave us a proof of it, which ought not to be forgotten, when he ſuffered the *Bombay* army to retire from *Worgaum*. Admitting nevertheleſs, that we ought now to conſider *Scindia* as our principal opponent, it does not follow that this expedition, in the way it is planned, will be the cauſe of much diſtreſs to him, if any. In our opinion, *we* are much more likely to ſuffer by it than he is. If every material purpoſe of it is to be effected within the rains, what can they be, but to make a haſty incurſion into his country, to plunder it, and to leave it? If General *Goddard* were in motion at the ſame time, we ſee a poſſibility, in ſpeculation at leaſt, that *Scindia* might be diſtracted between them, and prevented from turning his whole force, or the principal part of it, to the defence of his dominions. As this is not the caſe, Major *Camac* muſt act without the ſupport of a diverſion on the other ſide, againſt whatever force *Scindia* may think fit to bring againſt him. They who are unacquainted with the geography of *India*, can know nothing even of the diſtance from our frontier to *Eugene*, the capital of *Malwa*, much leſs of the difficulties that are likely to attend ſuch a march. The diſtance, however, is evidently ſo great, that in caſe of a check we ſee no likelihood of ſecuring a retreat. But if, whether with or without an immediate repulſe, the retreat of the detachment ſhould be cut off, we know what the conſequence muſt be; another body of troops will be called for, and the neceſſity of ſending them inſiſted on, to ſupport the firſt meaſure, or to diſengage us from the effects of it. No man can ſay to what diſtreſs and difficulties a ſeries of ſuch ſteps may finally lead us. It may happen, that while we are ſtripping *Bengal* of the force which ought to be reſerved for its defence; while we are ſending our beſt troops, and our beſt officers, on theſe diſtant expeditions, theſe provinces may be invaded from different quarters, and our eſtabliſhment hazarded where it ought to be our principal care to render it ſecure. In our opinion, nothing eſſential to the intereſts of the Company and of the nation in *India* can be loſt, as long as *Bengal* is ſafe; but if this country ſhould once be in danger, or if, by the loſs or waſte of its reſources, it ſhould no longer be able to ſupport itſelf, and to return a regular tribute to *Great Britain*, no conqueſts or acquiſitions in any other part of *India* will ever compenſate, in the ſmalleſt degree, for the diſtreſs to which *Bengal* may be reduced, and for the conſequences that muſt attend it at home. The ſuppoſition of ſuch a caſe will not appear wild or unwarrantable to thoſe who have a perfect view of our ſituation. We are much afraid that it is little known, and leſs underſtood in *England*.

The war with the Marattas, at more than two years after its commencement, and after every rupee we had reſerved in the treaſury, or have ſince been able to collect, has been ſpent in the ſupport of it, is at this day as far from a concluſion as ever. New expectations are propoſed to anſwer the ſame effects which were promiſed from former meaſures of the ſame nature, and as it appears to us with no better proſpect of ſucceſs; of ſuch ſucceſs at leaſt as would be likely to make any further efforts unneceſſary. Appendix No. 286.

The Governor General talks of friends who may be diſcouraged, and who perhaps may be induced to become parties againſt us; we wiſh that the names of theſe friends had been mentioned. We do not know that this Government has a ſingle friend or ally in *India*, in the true ſenſe of friendſhip and alliance, which ſuppoſes the power of giving aſſiſtance, and a diſpoſition to give it.

The condition to which we have reduced the Vizier's country, makes that connection rather a burthen than advantage to this State. We have now to defend the extended frontier of a ruined country, which at preſent barely pays the troops that defend it; and which according to all appearance, will not do even that much longer. As for the Vizier himſelf, he is a cypher, and has no choice.

The Rana of *Gohud* is too inconſiderable to be mentioned; and if he were more powerful than he is, it is plain enough that either his original purpoſe is anſwered, or that he has other reaſons for being weary of the preſence of our army. Though the Board have not heard from Captain *Popham*, we conjecture from what the Governor General has let fall, that the Rana intends to diſmiſs Captain *Popham*, and that he will not require Major *Camac* to come into his country.

On the other hand, we ſee the principal Powers of *India*, either armed, or ready to arm againſt us. The Marattas have united, as we foreſaw they would do, in the common defence of their country. *Hyder Ally*, their natural enemy, has concluded an alliance with them, the effects of which, though hitherto ſuſpended, are not averted. We know, by many proofs, what his diſpoſition is towards us; and we ought to conclude, ſince it is a caſe againſt which we ought to be provided, that he means to act againſt us at the firſt favourable moment; that is, when our arms may have ſuffered another check, or when our ſtrength and reſources may be exhauſted by a continuance of the preſent war.

It is true, our endeavours have hitherto ſucceeded in preventing the *Nizam* from taking an open part with our enemies. It depends on the gentlemen at *Madras*, whether the conceſſion we have thought proper to make him ſhall take effect or not; if it ſhould, we have ſtill no poſitive ſecurity that he will be contented with it, or that his other claims upon the Company will not furniſh him with a pretence for joining our enemies, whenever he ſees an opportunity of doing it to advantage. His diſpoſition towards us, and the confidence he repoſes in his own ſtrength, may be plainly collected from his declarations to Mr. *Hollond*.

The Rajah of *Berar* ſeems lately, if not originally, to have adopted that ſort of policy which leaves it open to him to be guided by events, and to purſue any courſe he thinks proper. We have no ſecurity that it will be favourable to this Government. He profeſſes to wiſh for an accommodation between us and the Peiſhwa: he offers his mediation, and apparently to ſupport his offers, he ſends a conſiderable army to the frontier of theſe provinces. The ſtrength of this army is unknown to the Board; various reports ſtate it from 20 to 30,000 horſe. Againſt their future operations we ought to be as carefully provided as if we had no dependance on their friendſhip. We ought to treat them as friends, but we ought to be prepared againſt them as enemies:

In this ſituation we can never admit, *that the reſources of this Government, exhauſted as they are, and withheld from it by its internal imbecility, are yet equal to every probable contingency of the preſent war*; on the contrary, we think that

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that the preſent war, in whatever manner it may be conducted, is liable to contingencies, to which all our reſources, if they were yet unimpaired, would not be equal, and that in our preſent circumſtances we have no choice.

We deny that this war has hitherto been conducted on a conſiſtent plan, or any plan at all; of which we need not give a more deciſive and ſtriking proof, than that the expedition under Colonel *Goddard* did not co-operate with that from *Bombay* againſt *Poonah*; that the authority formerly given to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, over that army, was withdrawn in favour of another meaſure, of which they had no information; and that General *Goddard*'s final march to *Surat*, was merely matter of accident, and abſolutely contrary to the Governor General's wiſhes and intentions.

On the 4th March 1779, he declared, "he wiſhed "equally with Mr. *Francis*, for the return of the detach- "ment to *Berar*, and equally dreaded to hear of its pro- "ceeding to the other coaſt."

But if the reverſe were true, and if the war had really been conducted on a conſiſtent plan, we deny that it has been varied by deſultory votes of Council on every meaſure required for its proſecution. We do not know, or believe, that there is a ſingle inſtance of any queſtion concerning the war being carried againſt the opinion of the Governor General, except that now immediately before us; and even this we preſume was not in contemplation with the Governor a month ago, when the reſolution was taken for recalling and reducing Captain *Popham*'s detachment with common conſent, and as we thought with the Governor's entire ſatisfaction.

It is not denied, "that feeble meaſures, and advances "for peace may give ſtrength and preſumption to our ad- "verſaries, and diſcourage our friends; or that the prin- "ciples of enterprize and inaction are not to be com- "bined in the ſame general meaſure." But we do not admit that theſe general propoſitions are applicable to our ſituation. Our opinion is that we are in no condition to continue the war on any terms which ſuppoſe the continuance of the preſent expence, or even with a conſiderable diminution of it. Whether our reſources be exhauſted, or whether they be withheld from us, it is equally true that there is no money in our treaſury. We hope, that in ſuch critical circumſtances, it will not be propoſed to take the depoſit out of the New Fort. We know not how near we are to the extremity for which it was provided; but, even ſuppoſing our immediate wants were relieved by that little ſupply, let us conſider where it would leave us, after diſcharging the inſtant demands upon the treaſury. Our former ſtatements ſhew what a very inconſiderable portion of it would remain in our hands, while the credit and advantage of poſſeſſing ſuch a reſerve in ſpecie, againſt an extraordinary emergency, would be loſt: in effect, we ſhould publicly avow, that the diſtreſs, againſt which the depoſit was reſerved, had actually fallen upon us.

We never meant to propoſe feeble meaſures, which neceſſarily defeat themſelves; nor yet do we approve of vigorous meaſures in the ſenſe in which vigour has been hitherto underſtood, becauſe we are convinced that this Government is unable to ſupport them; and that, if they could be ſupported a ſhort time longer, they would not bring us nearer to our object. Before the commencement of the war, we foreſaw and foretold the principal conſequences that would attend it; we now judge of it by its effects, which we hope will be conſidered, though every other ſort of argument ſhould continue to be diſregarded: we have ſeen the event of two years military operations, and of a ſucceſſion of enterprizes, which in point of effort and expence, were as vigorous as any thing we could now undertake.

The expedition to *Poonah* ended in a diſgrace, which, but for the generoſity or forbearance of the Marattas, might have left *Bombay* defenceleſs. We know not the expence of this meaſure, but we believe the Company will find it enormous.

The march of the army under Colonel *Leſlie* had all the appearances of an active and vigorous reſolution; and has produced as much ſucceſs as could reaſonably be expected: it has conquered an open country, which at ſome future day, and if ever the promiſed collections from it ſhould be made, is to return thirty lacks a year to the Company. Againſt this acquiſition, the permanent expence of an increaſe of eſtabliſhments to regulate and defend it muſt be placed, and the value of the remainder compared with the charge of the expedition. The Company will then know, at what price they have acquired a new territory on the Malabar coaſt. At the end of February laſt, the ſums remitted to this detachment alone, amounted to almoſt ſeventy-ſix lacks of current rupees, and we are convinced, that we are much within bounds in computing, that a crore of rupees will not clear it to the end of October.

The march of a detachment from the coaſt, and of another from *Bombay*, to ſtrengthen General *Goddard*, has yet produced no effect that we know of, but to raiſe their pay on a level with that of the Bengal troops, which of itſelf is no ſlight inconvenience.

The detachment under Major *Camac*, which was ordered about the beginning of laſt year to join Colonel *Goddard*, after coſting the Company CR^s. 4,36,793, returned without effect.

Many advantages were promiſed from the treaty with the Ranna of *Ghode*, particularly that of dividing the ſtrength and attention of the Marattas. If it has really produced that or any other effect, that deſerves the name of an advantage, or that can be placed in compariſon with the expence of this meaſure, we wiſh to ſee it ſtated. We are informed by the Commiſſary General, that the total expence of Captain *Popham*'s detachment to the end of April laſt, amounted to CR^s. 5,55,953; at this rate the preſent expence muſt amount to CR^s. 7,41,271.

With theſe diſcouraging experiments in our view, we are called upon to embark in another enterprize, for the avowed purpoſe of ſupporting that of General *Goddard*. Yet the Governor's expectations of ſucceſs from this new effort, cannot be greater than thoſe which he profeſſed to entertain of the former. Even after the delay in *Bundlecund*,* he always conſidered Colonel *Leſlie*'s detachment *as capable of accompliſhing the ends of its formation*, and profeſſed the ſtrongeſt conviction *that under a proper conduct, the effects would ſtill anſwer his moſt ſanguine hopes.*

* Vide Secret Conſultations, 12 Oct. 1778.

It is true, that the part which this Government has *hitherto* borne in the war, belongs to the Governor, and that we have no ſhare in the reſponſibility attending it; but it is equally true that in the future meaſures of this Government, we *muſt* take our part. We cannot transfer the reſponſibility, though we might relinquiſh the powers incident to our ſtations; in many caſes, we may find ourſelves compelled not to interrupt the operation of acts already reſolved on againſt our opinion, eſpecially when the Government or its repreſentatives, are once engaged in the execution of them. In ſuch circumſtances we have no choice; but a defence of this ſort will not apply to new meaſures or new plans, which cannot be reſolved on without our conſent; for theſe and their conſequences, we muſt of neceſſity be anſwerable, jointly with the Governor, therefore cannot diveſt ourſelves of the right of judging of both. If on the preſent occaſion, we are miſtaken in our judgment, it will not add to the load with which the Governor General may be charged; we rather think he derives a viſible advantage, from the part we are forced to take in this queſtion: there is no difficulty in diſplaying the poſſible benefits which might have reſulted from a meaſure untried, while the burthen of proving that ſuch benefits were unattainable, together with the ideal loſs of them, will be thrown upon the oppoſite party.

We have as little faith as the Governor can have, in the ſufficiency of official argument, to overcome decided opinions; what we have ſaid, is meant to ſtand for our vindication at home: we heartily wiſh it might have more weight than we fear it will have in this place; we

wiſh

wiſh to co-operate heartily and ſincerely with the Governor General in effecting a peace on reaſonable terms; means of negociation are in his power, which are not within ours; to accompliſh a peace ourſelves, againſt his inclinations, we know to be impoſſible, till our hopes very nearly amounted to conviction, that we were all agreed on this point, and that the ſeaſons of the rains, in which hoſtilities muſt ceaſe on both ſides would have been employed in effecting a pacification. On this principle we conſented to the propoſition for accepting the mediation of *Moodajee Booſla*. We wiſh to know if any and what ſteps have been taken in conſequence. As this meaſure has no connection with the propoſed expedition, we hope it will not be deſerted. Without making improper advances to the Marattas, other means might be taken to the ſame end; but we are perfectly ſenſible that none can ſucceed in which the Governor General will not take an active part. If after all, a formal peace is not to be obtained, we do not think it follows, that a defenſive war muſt neceſſarily be continued. A general outline of the plan we allude to, has been ſuggeſted to the Governor General: we do not think it adviſable to enter into it in this place, but we are ready to ſubmit our thoughts to him on the ſubject, whenever he thinks proper.

(Signed) { *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*.

Mr. *Francis*—I beg leave to add a few words to the preceding minute, in reply to the perſonal appeal made to me, by the Governor General; I perſuade myſelf he would not propoſe an alternative to me, which he thought I could not accept of with honour, but as I underſtand it, there is no point of honour in queſtion; I think it belongs to the Governor General to propoſe and recommend ſuch meaſures as he thinks fit, to the approbation of the Board, and circumſtanced as we now are, it muſt be ſome very eſſential conſideration that can induce me to oppoſe him; I would neither attempt to take that lead out of his hands, nor yet engage implicitly to ſubmit to his opinions. Every view to my own eaſe and happineſs would incline me to wiſh, that the conſtitution of the Government permitted him to dictate, or to reſolve and act without me; but I am veſted with a public truſt, from the duties of which I cannot be exempted, while I hold the ſtation that creates it.

I believe the Governor General yielded to my opinion, in reſolving to recal and reduce Captain *Popham*'s detachment; but this was a conceſſion to which he did not adhere: "That he ſhould have laboured to accommo-"date his ſentiments to mine, by a ſtudied attention to "my opinions, in every meaſure which he had ventured "to propoſe, in the courſe of the laſt fifteen months," is a fact with which I declare moſt ſolemnly I was utterly unacquainted.

(Signed) *Philip Francis.*

The Secretary having prepared a draft of inſtructions for Major *Camac*, drawn up from the minutes of the Board, and circulated by order of the Governor General to the other members, for their approbation, as he thought it irregular in him to take any part in them, they were returned ſigned.

Agreed. *Edwd Wheler.*

Mr. *Francis*—I have already agreed to ſuch of the inſtructions to Major *Camac*, propoſed by the Governor General, as were conformable to the treaty with the Rana of *Gohud*, and to the unanimous reſolution of the Board of the 29th May; the draft now in circulation appears to me to correſpond therewith, and I therefore agree to it.

(Signed) *Philip Francis.*

The inſtructions being agreed to by Meſſrs. *Francis* and *Wheler*, they were copied fair, ſigned, and diſpatched as follows:

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To Major *Camac*.

No. 7. Mr. Francis's picket.

Sir,

Our Secretary has already notified to you your appointment to the command of a detachment, ordered on ſervice with the Rana of *Gohud*; this detachment is to be formed of three battalions of Sepoys from the ſecond brigade, ſtationed at *Cawnpore*; the battalion of light infantry commanded by Captain *James Browne*, and a party of artillery, to conſiſt of half a company of Europeans, and half a battalion of Laſcars.

In addition to the guns attached to the above battalion, by the regulations of the army, we have ordered that your detachment ſhould be ſupplied with two twelve pounders, a howitzer, two cohorns, and a proper quantity of ammunition and ſtores.

We direct that you immediately proceed to *Cawnpore*, or to the detachment, wherever it may be, and forthwith conduct it into the dominions of the Rana of *Gohud*, there to relieve the corps under the command of Captain *Popham* in that quarter.

The Rana of *Gohud* having in virtue of a treaty lately concluded between him and this Government, required the aid of a military force on our part, for the defence of his country againſt the Marattas who had invaded it, Captain *Popham* was appointed to this ſervice, and to this you now ſucceed; we therefore direct that you comply with ſuch requiſitions as ſhall be made to you by the Rana, for this and for ſuch other conditions as he is entitled to demand by the treaty, and you ſhall deem practicable with the force under your command.

Whenever the Rana ſhall notify to you, that he has no farther ſervice for the detachment under your command, and ſhall diſmiſs it in the manner preſcribed by treaty, and no occaſion ſhall preſent itſelf for the employment of it, in promoting the general ſucceſs of the war in which we are engaged with the Maratta State, you are to ſignify to him in writing your intentions to depart from his country, demanding the full amount of the ſubſidy that may be due; which having received; you will immediately return with your detachment, into the territories of the Nabob of *Oude*, and there wait for further orders; but in caſe of a refuſal on his part to diſcharge the ſubſidy, agreeable to the terms of the treaty, we deſire that you will immediately ſignify the ſame to us, and not depart until you receive our anſwer.

If before your march into *Gohud* you ſhall receive an intimation from the Rana that he ſhall not require the aſſiſtance of your detachment, you will in like manner ſuſpend your march, and wait our inſtructions.

For your guidance in maintaining the relation of your command to the Rana of *Gohud*, we herewith deliver to you a copy of the treaty executed with him, and we require and enjoin you to conform to it with the moſt ſcrupulous and literal exactneſs.

The Commiſſary General having drawn out an eſtabliſhment for your detachment, which meets with our approbation, we tranſmit it to you; deſiring at the ſame time that you do not, on any account, ſuffer the ſmalleſt alteration or deviation to be made in it.

We are, &c.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
13th July 1780.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 20th July 1780.

At a Council;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire. (Mr. *Francis* indiſpoſed. Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent.)

The Governor General—On Monday the 13th inſtant I had prepared a minute on the ſubject of the late debates relative to the detachment ordered on ſervice under

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Major *Camac*; but was induced to withhold the delivery of it, by the proſpect which was then held out to me of an accommodation of our differences; and did underſtand that an agreement had taken place, that all the minutes which had paſſed on this ſubject ſince the 19th of June ſhould be withdrawn: I am ſince informed that this is diſavowed by Mr. *Francis*. I am obliged to mention this circumſtance, otherwiſe unneceſſary for public record, to account for the late delivery of my minute, for which I deſire that a place may be left on this conſultation, as it might perhaps be deemed improper to introduce it in the temporary abſence of the perſon whom it immediately concerns.

The Governor General—Notwithſtanding the ill ſucceſs which my former motions have met with relative to Major *Camac*'s detachment, I muſt again revert to the propoſition made by me to the Board on the 19th ultimo, for the extenſion of the powers to be given to Major *Camac*, in the manner expreſſed in my propoſed draft of his inſtructions, delivered in on that day: and I accordingly now move, that thoſe inſtructions be granted to him.

I have little to ſay in addition to the former arguments which I have urged in ſupport of the principal meaſure preſented in them, but that it appears to me more neceſſary at this time to create ſuch a diverſion by the declaration lately made by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, or at leaſt too ſtrongly implied to admit of a doubt of its intended conſtruction, in his letter recorded in the laſt conſultation. Every accumulation of difficulty requires an additional exertion. For the ſame reaſon I move, that the order for reducing Captain *Popham*'s detachment be repealed; and that it be formed into three regular battalions, to be commanded by the three ſenior Captains now with that corps: but as I underſtand the Commander in Chief left *Lucknow* on the 6th inſtant, and is proceeding with all poſſible expedition to the Preſidency, I do not think it neceſſary to follow this motion with any propoſal for the diſpoſition of this corps until his arrival.

Mr. *Wheler*—No arguments are uſed by the Governor General in his late propoſition, in addition to thoſe ſtated in his former minutes upon this ſubject, to induce me to alter my opinion reſpecting the firſt inſtructions to Major *Camac*: I muſt therefore adhere to it. I confeſs the Governor General's ſecond propoſition is accompanied with a forcible argument. Times of war and public calamity are certainly not the times for diminiſhing our military force; more eſpecially as we have every reaſon to believe (both from the late declarations which *Hyder Ally* has made to this Government, and alſo from the particular meaſures which that Chief has lately purſued in relation to us) that an open rupture betwixt him and the Company is not very diſtant.

I therefore readily coincide with the Governor General in repealing the order for the reduction of Captain *Popham*'s detachment, and that it be formed into three regular battalions, to be commanded by the three ſenior Captains now with that corps.

The above propoſitions being reſolved in the affirmative, the following inſtructions are iſſued to Major *Camac*:

To Major *Jacob Camac*.

Sir,

Having appointed you to the command of a detachment ordered to be formed of four battalions of Sepoys; three of which are to be furniſhed from the army ſtationed at *Cawnpore*, and the fourth the battalion of light infantry commanded by Captain *James Browne*, we direct you to proceed to *Cawnpore*, or to the ſtation of that detachment, wherever it may be, and to conduct it without loſs of time into the dominions of the Ranah of *Gohud*, there to relieve the corps now under the command of Captain *Popham* in that quarter.

The Ranah of *Gohud* having in virtue of a treaty lately concluded between him and this Government, required the aid of a military force, on the part of this Government, for the defence of his country againſt the Marattas, who had invaded it, Captain *Popham* was appointed to this ſervice; and to this you now ſucceed. We therefore direct that you comply with ſuch requiſition as ſhall be made to you by the Rana for this and for ſuch other conditions as he is entitled to demand by the treaty, and ſhall be practicable with the force under your command.

Whenever the Rana ſhall have no further ſervice for the detachment, and ſhall diſmiſs it in the manner preſcribed by the treaty, and no occaſion ſhall preſent itſelf for the employment of the detachment in promoting the general ſucceſs of the war in which we are engaged with the Maratta State, you are forthwith to return with it into the dominions of the Nabob of *Oude*, and there wait for further orders. And if before your march into *Gohud* you ſhall receive an intimation from him in writing, that he ſhall not require the aſſiſtance of your detachment, you will in like manner ſuſpend your march, and wait for further orders.

But as the firſt deſign of this Government in the alliance lately formed with the Rana of *Gohud*, was to diſtreſs the Maratta State by a diminution of their power, revenue and influence, and by uniting with other powers in enmity with them to divert and weaken their operations; and as the Maratta dominions which lie contiguous to *Gohud* appertain to *Madajee Scindia* and *Tuccoojee Holcar*, the two principal rulers of that State and the leaders of the army employed to oppoſe General *Goddard*, we authorize and inſtruct you, in caſe you ſhall judge it practicable and expedient, to carry the war immediately into that quarter, requiring from the Rana the proportion of cavalry ſtipulated by the treaty to be furniſhed by him for ſuch a ſervice; or in caſe of his inability, whether from the ſeaſon of the year, or from whatever other cauſe, to fulfil this condition in its complete extent, to require and accept from him ſuch other aid in furniſhing proviſions and in forming magazines of grain and other means of ſubſiſtence and communication, as you ſhall judge equivalent to it.

For your guidance in maintaining the relation of your command to the Rana of *Gohud*, we herewith deliver to you a copy of the treaty executed with him; and we require and enjoin you to conform to it with the moſt ſcrupulous and literal exactneſs.

If any caſe ſhall occur for which we have not provided by theſe inſtructions, and which ſhall not be contrary to them, we empower you to act therein according to your own judgment. In all others theſe inſtructions are poſitive, and muſt be implicitly obeyed.

The Commiſſary General having drawn out an eſtabliſhment for your detachment, which meets with our approbation, we tranſmit it to you, deſiring at the ſame time that you do not on any account ſuffer the ſmalleſt alteration or deviation to be made in it.

Fort William, 20th July 1780. We are, &c.

Reſolved, in the terms of the propoſition, viz. That the Sepoy drafts, compoſing the detachment under the command of Captain *Popham*, be formed immediately into three regular battalions, of the ſame ſtrength as thoſe attached to the brigades; and that the three ſenior Captains now ſerving in that detachment be appointed to the command of them.

Reſolved alſo, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to iſſue the neceſſary orders for carrying into immediate execution the above reſolution.

The Governor General—Not having yet received any poſitive advices tending to aſcertain the deſtination of the Maratta army lately ſent from *Naigpore*, and now at *Cuttack*, and deeming it neceſſary to make ſome early proviſion for guarding againſt their incurſions into theſe provinces, from which they are only diſtant a few days march, I move, that the firſt battalion of Sepoys for duty at the Preſidency be ordered to proceed to *Jellaſore*, or to ſuch place as the commanding officer may deem

moſt eligible for the purpoſe of ſecuring the boats on the *Souban Rika*, ſhould they attempt to croſs that river; and to watch their motions. I do not mean this as a force ſufficient to repel any attempts that may be made by this army, but a neceſſary and ſufficient precaution for the preſent.

The above propoſition being agreed to, it is,

Reſolved, That the battalion firſt for duty at the Preſidency be ordered to be held in readineſs to march at a moment's warning; and that the commanding officer of the firſt brigade be directed to iſſue the neceſſary inſtructions to the officer commanding it, to march to *Jellaſore*, or to ſuch ſtation as may be deemed moſt eligible for the purpoſe of watching the motions of the Marattas, and of ſecuring the boats on the *Souban Rika*, ſhould they attempt to croſs that river.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 287.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 7th September 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident; *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire, and Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B. (Mr. *Francis* indiſpoſed.)

THE Commander in Chief delivers in the following minute:

Sir *Eyre Coote*—In my minute of the 4th inſtant, I remarked that accounts received from Brigadier General *Goddard* mentioned he ſhould, on opening the enſuing campaign, find his army ſufficient in force, with the aſſiſtance he was led to expect from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to undertake advantageouſly thoſe operations that ſeemed neceſſary to be attempted on that ſide of *India*, provided we made a diverſion from our upper ſtations, favourable to his movements, in order to call off the force of the Maratta Chiefs, who have hitherto oppoſed him.

One of my principal objects is, to act from this country, in ſuch a manner as will anſwer the above purpoſe, and that upon a plan which will be attended with the leaſt expence to the Company.

I recommend therefore, the keeping up for the preſent the corps of drafts that have acted with ſo much ſpirit under Major *Popham*, and who, from their ſervices during their late campaign, may be juſtly ſtyled approved troops; and upon conſideration of the ſubject, I propoſe to the Board the following query: Whether, inſtead of being ordered to join Brigadier General *Goddard*, to whom by our laſt intelligence ſuch a reinforcement is no longer neceſſary, provided we act with vigour from hence, Major *Popham* may not, with the troops now under his command, be more advantageouſly employed, in conjunction with Major *Camac*'s detachment on this ſide of *India*?

By attacking the poſſeſſions of *Moodajee Scindia*, and *Tookajee Holkar*, two of the moſt powerful Chiefs, now oppoſed to Brigadier General *Goddard*, which have hitherto been left unmoleſted, and from whence they have obtained their principal money reſources, we ſhould oblige them to withdraw their forces from the Malabar ſide, to the protection of their own territories.

Major *Camac*'s and *Popham*'s detachments conjunctively will, I ſhould ſuppoſe, be equal to this ſervice, as well as to any further offenſive operations in ſuch diſtricts, as it may be thought proper to employ them: but when ſeparate, Major *Camac*'s corps cannot be ſufficient to anſwer theſe purpoſes, as a ſtrong garriſon from it muſt be left in *Gwalior*, for the defence of that fortreſs; after which there will remain with him at moſt only three battalions.

In keeping up Major *Popham*'s corps, I would not recommend the burthening the eſtabliſhment with an addition of European officers, but adviſe the letting them continue in the form of battalions of drafts, not as regular battalions on the eſtabliſhment; appointing ſome additional officers to thoſe already with them, to act only for the preſent, and who may be taken from ſome of the brigade ſtations, where their ſervices can be beſt diſpenſed with.

Appendix. Nos. 287 & 288.

The three captains with Major *Popham*'s corps, to remain, commanding the battalions of drafts they are at the head of. Three captains from the European regiments to be ordered in their ſtead, to act with their battalions under Brigadier General *Goddard*; and the vacancies of captains occaſioned hereby, not to be filled up in the European regiments. Thus the eſtabliſhment of officers will not be increaſed, (the European battalions in their preſent incomplete ſtate can ſpare officers for the ſervice) Brigadier General *Goddard*'s army will find themſelves very materially affected by co-operation in their favour, and by a force that can from its ſtrength act with great advantage on this ſide of *India*; and the corps of drafts will thus be rendered, I think, of more real utility, than by carrying into execution the original deſign of that body's joining General *Goddard*'s army.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Mr. *Wheler*—The propoſition now made by the Commander in Chief, bears ſo exact an affinity to that contained in the Governor General's minute of the 12th June, that I ſee no reaſon to depart from the opinion which I have already given, regarding the relief of Major *Popham*'s detachment.

Agreed to the propoſitions made by the Commander in Chief; and,

Reſolved, That the orders of the 20th July laſt, directing the formation of the detachment, under the command of Captain *Popham*, into three regular battalions, be ſo far reſcinded, that the three battalions compoſing the detachment be conſidered as battalions of drafts, and to act for the preſent as three battalions not upon the eſtabliſhment.

Reſolved, That ſo many additional officers as may be wanted for this corps, be appointed from ſome of the brigade ſtations, to act with it for the preſent.

Ordered, That the detachment under the command of Major *Popham* do not proceed to *Cawnpore*, after the arrival of the detachment under the command of Major *Camac* in the territories of the Rana of *Gohud*, but make a part of the force under the command of Major *Camac*.

Reſolved, That the vacancies occaſioned in the command of the Sepoy battalions, ſerving with Brigadier General *Goddard* in the weſt of *India*, by the appointment of three of their commanding officers to do duty with Major *Camac*'s detachment, be ſupplied for the preſent, by the appointment of three captains of the European regiments to command the vacant battalions during the abſence of Captains *Clode*, *Maclary* and *Bruce*, upon other ſervice.

Reſolved, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to iſſue the neceſſary orders for carrying the above reſolutions into immediate execution.

APPENDIX, No. 288.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 3d July 1780.

Recorded, 20th July 1780.

Governor General.

WHY Mr. *Wheler* has thus repeatedly choſen to join his name to Mr. *Francis*'s in the minutes lately delivered by them to the Board, I can neither conjecture, nor ſeek to know. I can eaſily conceive Mr. *Francis*'s intention in obtaining this aſſociation. But as the rectitude of theſe acts in Mr. *Francis* is to be judged upon very

Appendix. No. 288.

very different principles from thoſe, in which he has a common concern with Mr. *Wheler*, I ſhall conſider them ſolely as his, and reply to them accordingly: indeed I have no doubt of their being all the entire compoſition of Mr. *Francis*. They are not the leſs his, by this apparent diviſion of the property; and his name affixed to them gives me the right of regarding them as entirely his.

I did hope that the intimation conveyed in my laſt minute would have awakened in Mr. *Francis*'s breaſt, if it were ſuſceptible of ſuch ſenſations, a conſciouſneſs of the faithleſs part which he was acting towards me; I have been diſappointed, and muſt now aſſume a plainer ſtyle, and a louder tone. In a word, my objections do not lie to the ſpecial matter of his minutes, to which I ſhall ſeparately reply, but to the ſpirit of oppoſition which dictated them. I have lately offered various plans for the operations of the war; theſe have been ſucceſſively rejected. As I have ſucceſſively amended and endeavoured to accommodate them to Mr. *Francis*'s objections, I had a right to his implicit acquieſcence. I have laſtly propoſed a ſervice, requiring immediate execution, and I have freed it from the only objection formally made to it.

In anſwer he ſays, that he adheres to the reaſons which had before induced him to withhold his conſent; and compoſedly invites me to lay before the Board a complete detail of the plan for conducting the war; a comparative ſtate of the whole of the object, with the whole of the means of attaining it; and the final extent of my demands on the Marattas, or what conceſſions I would make to them: and he promiſes to enter into the conſideration of theſe points, with the utmoſt candour. If his deſign in this inquiry was ſimply to gain information, I might refer him to the large and confidential diſcuſſions, in which I have laid all my views open to his, with all the grounds on which they were formed. If his purpoſe was to enable him to form a more clear or competent judgment of the plans which I have propoſed, its object would be loſt in the time required for the deliberation.

But in truth I do not truſt to his promiſe of candour; convinced that he is incapable of it, and that his ſole purpoſe and wiſh are to embarraſs and defeat every meaſure which I may undertake, or which may tend even to promote the public intereſts, if my credit is connected with them. Such has been the tendency, and ſuch the manifeſt ſpirit of all his actions from the beginning: almoſt every meaſure propoſed by me has for that reaſon had his oppoſition to it. When carried againſt his oppoſition, and too far engaged to be withdrawn, yet even then, and in every ſtage of it, his labours to overcome it have been unremitted: every diſappointment and misfortune have been aggravated by him, and every fabricated tale of armies devoted to famine and to maſſacre, have found their firſt and moſt ready way to his office, where it was known they would meet with the moſt welcome reception. To the ſame deſign may be attributed the annual computations of declining finances, and an exhauſted treaſury; computations which though made in the time of abundance, muſt verge to wrath at laſt, from the effect of a diſcordant Government, not a conſtitutional decay. To the ſame deſign ſhall I attribute the policy of accelerating the boded event, and creating an artificial want, by keeping up an uſeleſs hoard of treaſure, and withholding it from a temporary circulation.

I am aware of the anſwer which will be made to theſe imputations, and I will anticipate it. Mr. *Francis* may ſafely deny them, for they are incapable of poſitive evidence: he may complain of the injuſtice and indecency of aſſuming the interpretation of his thoughts, and aſſigning intentions to him, upon the reality of which he alone can pronounce with certainty: he may claim an equal right to recriminate upon me, and to paſs the ſame free judgment on the motives which have influenced my public actions. Againſt ſuch concluſions, I truſt that my character will be ſufficient to defend me, unleſs ſome known inſtance of it can be produced, as a warrant for them; and ſuch I am certain do not exiſt, either known or unknown.

My authority for the opinions which I have declared concerning Mr. *Francis*, depends upon facts which have paſſed within my own certain knowledge. I judge of his public conduct by my experience of his private, which I have found to be void of truth and honour. This is a ſevere charge, but temperately and deliberately made, from the firm perſuaſion that I owe this juſtice to the public and to myſelf, as the only redreſs to both, for artifices of which I have been a victim, and which threaten to involve their intereſts with diſgrace and ruin. The only redreſs for a fraud for which the law has made no proviſion, is the expoſure of it. I proceed to the proofs of my allegation.

In the latter end of the month of February laſt Mr. *Francis* concluded with me an engagement, of which one article alone is neceſſary to the preſent occaſion. It is as follows:

"Mr. *Francis* will not oppoſe any meaſures which "the Governor General ſhall recommend for the pro- "ſecution of the war in which we are ſuppoſed to be "engaged with the Marattas, or for the general ſupport "of the preſent political ſyſtem of this Government. "Neither will he himſelf either propoſe or vote with any "other member who ſhall propoſe any meaſure which "ſhall be contrary to the Governor General's opinion "on theſe points."

By the ſanction of this engagement, and the liberal profeſſions which accompanied it, I was ſeduced to part with the friend to whoſe generous and honourable ſupport ſtedfaſtly yielded in a courſe of ſix years, I am indebted for the exiſtence of the little power which I have ever poſſeſſed in that long and diſgraceful period, to throw myſelf on the mercy of Mr. *Francis*, and on the deſperate hazard of his integrity. It was impoſſible to afford a ſtronger demonſtration of the good faith with which I entered into this accommodation, nor of my confidence in his, than thus conſenting to deprive myſelf of the means of breaking the engagement on my part, and of preventing the breach of it on his; and ſurely this difference in our relative ſituations ought to have impreſſed him with a ſenſe of what he owed to the delicacy attending it, and have made him dread even an approach towards the preciſe line of his obligations, by the ſlighteſt advantage taken of my inability to repel it; and how much more ought it to have reſtrained him from the direct tranſgreſſion of it?

I muſt now revert to the article of Mr. *Francis*'s engagement which I have recited above, and to the minutes lately delivered at the Board under the ſignatures of Mr. *Francis* and *Wheler*. On theſe I reſt the proofs which I have promiſed of the charge herein preferred againſt Mr. *Francis*.

If it ſhall appear on a fair compariſon of theſe evidences, that Mr. *Francis* hath faithfully adhered to his engagements, I have wrongfully accuſed him: if on the contrary, it ſhall appear, that in violation of this engagement, *he has oppoſed any meaſures which I have recommended for the proſecution of the war in which we are engaged with the Marattas, or for the general ſupport of the preſent political ſyſtem of this Government; or that he has either himſelf propoſed, or joined with another member in propoſing a meaſure, contrary to my opinion on theſe points*, my charge is eſtabliſhed; I wiſh to avoid a repetition of the terms of it.

W. H.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th September 1780;—preſent, the Governor General, Mr. *Francis*, Mr. *Wheler*, Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Mr. *Francis*—The main queſtion between Mr. *Haſtings* and me can be referred to no other teſt but the public

public opinion of our reſpective characters: I appeal cheerfully to that teſt, and am ready to abide by the event of it. On the point in iſſue, I can only declare, as I do now in the moſt ſolemn manner, that I never was party to the engagement ſtated by Mr. *Haſtings*, or had a thought of being bound by it. In one of our converſations in February laſt, he deſired me to read a paper of memorandums, among which I preſume this article was inſerted: I returned it to him the moment I had read it, with a declaration that I did not agree to, or hold myſelf bound by the contents of it, or to that effect; from that time I have never ſeen the paper, I never had a copy of it, nor have I a poſitive recollection of any thing it contained. The agreement I meant to enter into with reſpect to the Maratta war was, to proſecute the operations actually exiſting on the Malabar coaſt, which, ſince the campaign was begun, and General *Goddard* had already taken the field, I thought ſhould be puſhed as vigorouſly as poſſible. I have no direct evidence to produce in ſupport of this declaration; but I imagine it will be ſtrengthened in ſome degree by the following conſiderations: it is not ſaid that the plan of another expedition from the upper country into *Malva*, or any other part of the Maratta dominions on that ſide of *India*, had ever been ſuggeſted to me. The reſolutions of the 29th May laſt, formed on the Governor General's own propoſitions, conſtitute as I think a ſtrong preſumption, that up to that period the Governor General had not had that meaſure in contemplation, or that he muſt then have abandoned all thoughts of it. On that day it was unanimouſly reſolved, that Captain *Popham*'s detachment ſhould be recalled and reduced; and that he ſhould be relieved by four battalions under Major *Camac*. In this arrangement nothing appears to have been in the view of the Board but to diminiſh the public expence without departing from the terms of the treaty with the Rana of *Ghode*. Our letters of the 20th April to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to Brigadier General *Goddard*, and to the Commander in Chief, expreſs the unanimous opinion of the Board, *that our reſources were no longer equal to the payment of General* Goddard's *army without draining* Bengal *entirely of its ſpecie; and that no acquiſition on the other ſide of* India *could compenſate for the diſtreſſes which a continuance of the war at the preſent expence would bring upon the Company*. This indeed has been invariably my opinion; but the Governor concurred in it, and drew up the letters himſelf. The evidence I appeal to, is public and authentic. It is not for me to determine how far it ought to be deemed concluſive. The obſervations which I muſt now proceed to offer on ſome paſſages in the Governor General's minute, ſhall be as ſhort and moderate as I can make them. I mean to lead the reflections of others, from fair preſumptions to probable concluſions, which is all that the caſe will admit of; and by no means to engage myſelf or the Governor in any further controverſy.

1. I am not acquainted with the Governor General's plan for carrying on the war, from what funds it is to be ſupported, or on what terms he would make peace. It ſeems to me, that the demand from two members of the Board was regular and in its place. A very few words would have been ſufficient to tell us what were to be the final objects of the war. I would not venture to ſtate the looſe diſcourſes of a private converſation, if I recollected them, on a ſubject of ſuch very great importance; nor can I agree, *that the object of the queſtion would be loſt in the time required for deliberation.*

2. The Governor General's minute of the 28th of laſt month, and the letter from the Board of Trade of the 22d, are ſufficient to ſhew that my annual computations of declining finances and an exhauſted treaſury were well founded. Every department of the public ſervice is; and has been for ſeveral months, in arrear. As to the depoſit in the new fort, it was placed there at my motion; but long after Colonel *Monſon*'s death, and with the Governor's conſent and approbation. In the ſecret conſultation of the 21ſt of May 1778, he ſpeaks of it as a fund *which we have appropriated for our own extraordinary occaſions*, and which we ſhall not break in upon for any other ſervice. I cannot conceive that I am hoſtile to Mr. *Haſtings* in adhering to the opinion which I have conſtantly and uniformly delivered on this ſubject. Appendix No. 288

3. The evidence of the charge againſt me is drawn from a paper written by the Governor himſelf, of which I never had a copy; though from the manner in which the quotation is introduced it might naturally be taken for an article in ſome formal treaty between us. This is ſaid to be *the proof of his allegation*; that is, the charge and the proof ſtand on the ſame ground. In another place, he admits that *his imputations are incapable of poſitive evidence*. I ſubmit to judgment, whether it even be preſumptive, except of his own thoughts or intentions, which I do not mean to queſtion. How would he receive, or how would he anſwer an accuſation againſt himſelf no better ſupported than this?

I ſubmit to judgment, whether the engagement, as ſtated by Mr. *Haſtings*, does not prove too much againſt me. Under the terms of it, I muſt have conſented to the march of every battalion on the Bengal eſtabliſhment to the Malabar coaſt, if Mr. *Haſtings* had thought fit to propoſe it, or to any other meaſure whatſoever, without exception or limitation, which he might have recommended for the ſupport and continuance of the war, from the date of the agreement. I at once renounce all my former declarations and opinions, and all choice, will, and judgment for the future. Some men perhaps may think me capable of ſuch an act; I hope and believe they are not many: but no man who knows any thing of the world, will think it poſſible that I could ſacrifice myſelf in ſo groſs a manner without ſome ſecret adequate compenſation, if any compenſation could be equal to it. On this head I have no other evidence to appeal to, and I deſire no better than Mr. *Haſtings* himſelf. If any thing was done or propoſed by me for my advantage, directly or indirectly, or if any thing was done or propoſed for the advantage of any other perſon whatſoever beyond what was publicly known and avowed (I mean the reinſtatement of *Mahomet Reza Cawn*, Mr. *Fowke*, and Mr. *Briſtow*, in conformity to the Company's orders) I call upon him to declare it. That of Mr. *Briſtow* was the only point of the three which I yielded to ſuſpend until the month of October, or until the firſt advices of the ſeaſon from the Court of Directors. In the actual ſituation of affairs here, and with the alarming and calamitous accounts we had then lately received from *England*, I thought ſome agreement between Mr. *Haſtings*, Mr. *Wheler*, and myſelf, was eſſentially neceſſary to the public ſafety: I therefore met Mr. *Haſtings* with a ſincere diſpoſition to come to an agreement, and to forward it by every poſſible facility on my part. During the whole courſe of the tranſaction nothing of any moment was ſaid or done without Mr. *Wheler*'s knowledge and participation.

With reſpect to Mr. *Barwell*'s departure, and the inferences drawn from it, it is a ſubject of which no man at home can judge ſo well as they who are on the ſpot, and ſee what paſſes. The little I ſhall ſay of it is offered as matter of opinion, not evidence. I believe it, for inſtance, to be the opinion of many well-informed perſons in this ſettlement, as it is now firmly my own, that Mr. *Barwell* was determined to go home laſt ſeaſon at all events, and that the *Swallow* was kept for ſeveral months on purpoſe for him. If ſo, Mr. *Haſtings* gained ſomething, and could loſe nothing, by his agreement with me. But as Mr. *Barwell*'s going home was never demanded by me, nor ever entered into the agreement, I have no concern in Mr. *Haſtings*'s motives for conſenting to it.

If I deſerved the character attributed to me, I ſhould not acknowledge as I do the force of an argument deduced by Mr. *Haſtings* from the defenceleſs condition in which he was ſuppoſed to be left by Mr. *Barwell*'s departure. It is ſuch an argument as can only be felt by a man

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a man of honour. I admit the principle laid down by Mr. *Haſtings*, as far as it can be urged with any colour of reaſon or juſtice. Whether I have departed from it or not, is a queſtion of fact. Let it only be obſerved, that ſuch a principle is as liable to be abuſed on one ſide, as to be violated on the other. Puſh the inferences from it as far as they will go, and who does not ſee that a tyranny may be created by it over the mind of a man of nice ſenſibility, and fearful of reproach? With ſuch a weapon, ſo exerciſed, Mr. *Haſtings* would poſſeſs a power which he aſſuredly never had while Mr. *Barwell* was in the country.

The whole of this unfortunate queſtion between Mr. *Haſtings* and me, muſt ſome time or other appear before the public. I do not wiſh to prejudice the mind of any man againſt him. My conduct perhaps may be condemned on other ground; but I do not ſee how it can be fairly imputed to baſe or intereſted views. The cauſe which I have hitherto endeavoured to maintain, is not mine; I have no greater perſonal concern in it than any other member of the community. After all, what is it to me more than to any other man, whether there be a Maratta war or not, or in what manner it is conducted?

P. Francis.

Conſultation, September 11th, 1780. Secret Department.

Mr. *Wheler*—It is not without ſome pain, that, in obedience to the dictates of my judgment I beg leave to refer to the Governor General's minute of the 3d July, in order to offer a few remarks upon the introductory point which alone has relation to me. If the Governor General does not in that part leave it to be imagined that I have profeſſed ſentiments which were not my own, he at leaſt takes it for granted that there is ſomething extraordinary in the junction of my name with Mr. *Francis*'s in the opinions we have delivered reſpecting the Maratta war. To this inference I deem it my duty to object. It is not in my apprehenſion perfectly in accord with that freedom which eſſentially belongs to every gentleman who is entruſted with a ſeat at this Board, namely that of delivering ſuch opinions as he judges proper, and in the manner moſt agreeable to himſelf. The minutes to which I have ſubſcribed were the reſult of my own reflections, and the only opinions I have entertained on the ſubject, of the Maratta war. So long as I deliver opinions thus genuine, it is a queſtion of no moment in what form they are preſented. If my actions or private diſcourſes have been contrary to my public opinions, then and then only is there any ground given for queſtioning the ſincerity, or diminiſhing the credit of them. I have thought alike with Mr. *Francis* on a particular ſubject, and therefore we have ſubſcribed to the ſame opinions, and I hope that ſo often as I have the pleaſure of agreeing in ſentiment with the Governor General, he will give me credit for following the dictates of my judgment only, believing that I ſhall join in no opinion contrary to my own ſentiments, or inconſiſtent with my own honour. I beg leave to remind the Governor General, that this is no new language with me, having ſpoken clearly to the ſame purport before.

Whatever difference of ſentiment may ariſe between the ſeveral members of this Government, in diſcharge of the great truſt repoſed in them (and differences will ſometimes unavoidably happen) it ſhall always be my ſtudy and endeavour to preſerve candour and moderation in our councils. No other temper I am certain can extricate us from our preſent difficulties, or bring us heartily to unite in one object the good of the public.

E. Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 13th November 1780.

Preſent; the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.—(Lieutenant General, Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent.)

The following minute from the Governor General having been received on the 5th inſtant, it was circulated for the peruſal of the members of the Board:

5th November 1780.

Governor General—I have ſuffered Mr. *Francis*'s minute of the 11th September, to lie thus long unanſwered, becauſe other cares of a ſtronger obligation have required and have engroſſed the whole of my attention; and I now revert to it with reluctance, as to a neceſſary, yet unavailing duty. To paſs in utter ſilence the aſſertions of Mr. *Francis*, would be implicitly to admit their credit; nor can I enter on their refutation without appearing to claim the public notice to an argument of a private concern, for ſuch it may be deemed in the preſent ſtate of it, though originating from a very different ſource. I ſhall therefore begin by ſtating the original queſtion on its proper ground, and ſhall proceed as briefly as poſſible to free it from the falſe colourings which may have been thrown upon it.

Let it be remembered that I am a ſervant of the Company and of the public, and entruſted with the intereſt of both. In that character I have charged Mr. *Francis* with having uſed very unjuſtifiable means to deprive me of the power which I poſſeſſed of fulfilling that truſt. My charge is leſs a complaint againſt him, than a vindication of myſelf. This is a general ſtate of the queſtion. The particular inſtance relating to it is, that Mr. *Francis* has broken an engagement on his part, to allow me the entire and unconditional exerciſe of that truſt, and to ſupport me in it. This I affirm, and he denies.

What that engagement was, I have expreſſed in terms in my minute of the 3d July. Mr. *Francis* in anſwer declares, and "in the moſt ſolemn manner, that he never "was party to the engagement ſtated by me, or had a "thought of being bound by it."

What can I ſay to ſuch a declaration, but to declare on my part, and in as ſolemn a manner, that Mr. *Francis* was a party to the engagement which I have ſtated? This I now do moſt ſolemnly declare; and may God be judge between us!

The manner in which it was concluded I will now relate. About the month of January laſt, Sir *John Day* propoſed to me an accommodation with Mr. *Francis*, and offered his mediation to effect it, judging himſelf to be the beſt qualified for ſuch an office by the relation in which he ſtood of a common and equal friend to both. I cheerfully accepted the offer; but apprized him that there was one preliminary condition which I ſhould exert as indiſpenſable, namely, that Mr. *Francis* ſhould agree to depart from his oppoſition to the political meaſures propoſed by me, and allow me, without exception or qualification, to preſcribe the mode of conducting the Maratta war. This point was a long time conteſted by Mr. *Francis*, but was at length adjuſted finally in this manner: that Mr. *Francis* ſhould not oppoſe me, nor yet charge himſelf with the reſponſibility of any propoſal made by me, which had any relation to the war; but ſupport it by his vote, as the reſult of a general meaſure which he had originally diſapproved, and which he now left, with the reſponſibility properly annexed to it, to its original contriver.

This point being thus ſettled, I drew it up in writing, on a ſmall piece of paper, in the words which I have already quoted, with other propoſitions, of which ſome had, and others had not received our final and mutual agreement.

This paper, with ſome apology, I ſhewed to Mr. *Francis*, deſiring him to read it attentively, and to inform me, whether he agreed to the conditions as I had expreſſed them, or to point out his exceptions. To the firſt article, which is that of the preſent queſtion, he replied haſtily, and with every appearance of ſatisfaction, that he entirely agreed to it, adding among other expreſſions, as I well remember, that his meaning plainly was not to avail himſelf of Mr. *Barwell*'s departure from

the Council, to oppoſe me in any political point which he could not have carried had Mr. *Barwell* continued.

The other articles received ſome variations, and were all finally regulated at the ſame meeting. Of theſe, as they do not relate to the queſtion before me, I ſhall take no farther notice. For the truth of this narrative, I appeal to Sir *John Day*, to whom I daily communicated what paſſed on this buſineſs, and to Mr. *Barwell*, to whom I in like manner related the daily progreſs of it. They will both atteſt that my relation of it at the time was exactly ſuch as I now repeat it. It is impoſſible to ſuggeſt a motive which I could have had to deceive them at ſuch a time, and on ſuch a ſubject, and as impoſſible that I myſelf ſhould be deceived, when I took ſuch ſure means to aſcertain it. Yet Mr. *Francis* affirms, "that he "returned the paper to me the moment he had read it, "with a declaration that he did not agree to it, or hold "himſelf bound by the contents of it."

But if I underſtand Mr. *Francis's* minute in its general tenor, it is intended to convey a total diſavowal of his having entered into any engagement whatever with me. He ſpeaks of "the agreement "which he *meant* to enter into with reſpect to the Maratta "war." He ſays that "he thought ſome agreement be-"tween Mr. *Haſtings*, Mr. *Wheler*, and himſelf, was "eſſentially neceſſary to the public ſafety, he therefore "met Mr. *Haſtings*, with ſincere diſpoſition to come to "an agreement, and to forward it with every facility on "his part." Yet in no part of the minute, neither in the context of theſe paſſages, where it might be expected, nor in any other place, can I find an expreſſion that indicates an acknowledgment that any agreement did actually take place, although ſuch was his meaning, although he thought it neceſſary to the public ſafety, and met me with ſo ſincere a diſpoſition to forward it by every facility on his part. If Mr. *Francis* does not deny the agreement, why are theſe qualifying expreſſions uſed to evade it? if he means to deny it, what poſſible reaſon can be aſſigned for its not having been concluded, or for ſuch a repugnance on my part to ſecond a diſpoſition ſo favourable on his, when the conſequence of my ſuffering Mr. *Barwell* to depart without ſome adjuſtment, would be a total annihilation of my influence and participation in all the acts of this Government?

But that there did exiſt ſome engagement between us, I appeal to Mr. *Wheler*, "without whoſe knowledge and "participation," Mr. *Francis* affirms, that "nothing of "any moment was ſaid or done during the whole courſe "of the tranſaction;" I appeal to every individual of the ſettlement for the notoriety of it, which is beyond the conviction of all evidence.

Mr. *Francis* has attempted to prove, that the agreement which he meant to enter into with reſpect to the Maratta war, was to proſecute the operations actually exiſting on the Malabar coaſt, and no more, by arguments drawn from my own propoſitions. Theſe might prove my ſenſe of an agreement actually concluded, but are no evidence of his intention on a point which was never brought to an iſſue. But in effect they prove nothing. My propoſition of the 29th of May, was the ſubſtitute of one much more extenſive, which I had formed for the relief of Captain *Popham's* detachment, by four regular battalions under Major *Camac*, and for the employment of Captain *Popham's* corps on another ſervice. At Mr. *Francis's* inſtance I omitted the latter clauſe, and yielded, very reluctantly I own, to recal and reduce Captain *Popham's* corps. This was by every opinion, judged unfit by its conſtruction and equipment for the ſervice, and I was glad to obtain, almoſt at any rate, the quiet concurrence of the Board to its exchange for a better. It is poſſible that at that time I might not have had in view the immediate proſecution of the expedition againſt *Malva*, nor is this material, either to the engagement which I affirm Mr. *Francis* did conclude with me, or to the agreement which he ſays he meant to enter into, ſince the proſecution of the war againſt the Marattas was the general object of both, and the means of courſe included in it. But that I certainly had this plan in contemplation, and that I had conſidered it as a decided meaſure, long before the period of my ſuppoſed coalition with Mr. *Francis*, will appear from the treaty concluded with the Ranah of *Ghode*, of which it forms an expreſs and principal ſtipulation. To remove all poſſibility of doubt on this head, I will quote the article itſelf, which relates to it. Appendix. No. 288.

Article 5th. "In caſe it ſhall be adjudged adviſable "to employ the combined forces of the Company and "the Maha Rajah in any hoſtile operations againſt the "Marattas, beyond the borders of the Maha Rajah's do-"minions, on requiſition made to him in writing from "this Government, he ſhall furniſh ten thouſand horſe "for ſuch ſervice, and each party ſhall bear his own ſe-"parate expence; and if upon the return of the Eng-"liſh forces towards their own borders, the Maha Rajah "ſhall have occaſion for their ſervices, and ſhall make a "requiſition to retain them, from the inſtant of ſuch re-"quiſition he ſhall pay their charge in the ſame manner "as ſtipulated in the ſecond article. But it ſhall not be "required of the Maha Rajah, nor be in the power of "this Government, to detach or employ his troops be-"yond the furtheſt borders of *Oogein* and *Indoor* without "his ſpecial conſent."

Hence it appears, that the plan for an expedition into *Malva*, of which *Oogein* is the capital, did conſtitute a part of the general meaſures adopted and in force for the proſecution of the Maratta war, and muſt have been neceſſarily comprehended, equally in the agreement which Mr. *Francis* meant to enter into with me, and in that which I underſtood him to have entered into. When I propoſed the execution of it, other circumſtances had recently occurred. General *Goddard* had ſolicited us to make ſuch a diverſion in his favour, and the Commander in Chief had paſſionately recommended it as the only means of bringing the war to a ſpeedy termination.

That I regretted the expence of the war, that I ſaw no object in the continuance of it that could compenſate for the diſtreſſes of it, and that of courſe I anxiouſly wiſhed to accelerate the concluſion of it, is certain; and this was an additional excitement to me to uſe every exertion for that end, knowing that many lacks effectually diſburſed with ſuch a purpoſe was a ſaving, compared to an indefinite ſeries of defenſive operations, ſpun out by feeble and ſcanty ſupplies.

Having already far exceeded the limits which I had preſcribed to my reply, I ſhall paſs with ſpeed through the remaining and leſs material parts of Mr. *Francis's* minute.

The engagement, as I have ſtated it, was conformable to my opinion of the obligation of Mr. *Francis's* public office, independent of any private compact. In his ſituation I ſhould have gone yet further. Having acquitted myſelf of my duty in oppoſing a great public meaſure which I had diſapproved until it had been too far advanced for recal, and would admit of no reſource but in a ſpeedy proſecution of it to its ſpeedy termination, I ſhould have deemed it criminal to continue the oppoſition; I ſhould have deemed it inſufficient even to withhold it by a negative acquieſcence, but ſhould have given as active a ſupport to the meaſure in ſuch a ſtate of it, as if it had my original approbation, leaving the formation of the depending operations, and the reſponſibility of the whole, to the original author. Such was my declaration at the time; perhaps Mr. *Francis* will remember it; and on ſuch principles my own conduct has been regulated in more than one inſtance of my public life.

Mr. *Barwell's* departure depended on the iſſue of the negociation between Mr. *Francis* and me. It was undetermined to the laſt moment of the *Swallow's* final diſpatch.

This Mr. *Francis* certainly knew, for I myſelf mentioned it to him, and by the advice of Mr. *Barwell*. It

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is a fact which does Mr. *Barwell* credit, and I have therefore no ſcruple in revealing it.

5th Nov. 1780. (Signed) *W. Haſtings.*

At Mr. *Francis's* deſire the following minute, dated the 27th of November, in reply to the preceding from the Governor General, is entered in this place, with the papers annexed to it.

Mr. Francis's minute, dated 27th November.

Mr. *Francis*—The preceding paper leaves the main queſtion where it ſtood, nor is it to be decided by any human tribunal.

In my former minute I did not appeal, as I might have done, to the teſtimony of ſeveral gentlemen of the firſt rank and credit in this place, for the ſenſe which I uniformly expreſſed to them, of my engagement with Mr. *Haſtings* reſpecting the Maratta war; partly becauſe ſuch evidence, however it might eſtabliſh my declarations, would not be concluſive to the truth of them; but much more, becauſe I was unwilling to introduce the names of gentlemen whom I reſpect, into the diſcuſſion of ſuch a tranſaction, or to make them parties in any ſhape to a queſtion of this nature. The ſame motives prevail with me ſtill.

Admitting that the means taken by Mr. *Haſtings*, to aſcertain his ſenſe of what paſſed between us, were proper on his part, and neceſſary to prevent his being deceived, it was equally neceſſary that I alſo ſhould have the ſame ſecurity, and that I ſhould have been furniſhed with a copy of the paper, by which I was ſuppoſed to be bound, otherwiſe one of the contracting parties remains excluſively poſſeſſed of the only exiſting evidence of the terms of the contract. In me it would have been irregular to demand a copy of a paper, by which I did not deem myſelf bound.

No argument or evidence is requiſite to prove what never was diſputed. I neceſſarily admit the exiſtence of an engagement, when I declare the ſenſe in which I made it; by uſing terms that referred particularly to my own meaning or intentions, my purpoſe was to avoid the uſeleſs offenſive language of contradiction, in a public minute, which had no object but to explain and defend my own conduct. This being ſaid, the obſervations founded on the equivocal import of a word, or on a general miſconſtruction of my meaning, require no reply.

From the fifth article of the treaty with the Ranna of *Gohud*, it can only be inferred that, when the treaty was formed in the beginning of November 1779, the poſſibility of an expedition beyond the borders of his dominions was ſuppoſed, in which the Ranna was to join and aſſiſt, if we required it. This might have been one of the diſtant objects in contemplation, when the treaty was conſtructed. But it ſtill remains a queſtion whether it was, or was not relinquiſhed by Mr. *Haſtings*, in the interval between that period, and the month of February following.

Reaſoning ſtrictly from the treaty, I was not obliged to conſent to the march of Major *Camac*'s detachment in the form in which it was propoſed. The eventual execution of the project of an expedition beyond the borders of the Ranna's dominions, according to the terms of the treaty, was united with the condition of his furniſhing a body of 10,000 horſe, for ſuch ſervice; but by the inſtructions propoſed to be given to Major *Camac*, it will appear that this aſſiſtance was not expected from him.

In the third article of the inſtructions, it is ſuppoſed that the Ranna may diſmiſs the detachment, or that before its march into *Gohud*, the major might receive an intimation in writing, that he did not require its aſſiſtance. In the former caſe Major *Camac* is to return into *Oude*; in the latter, he was to ſuſpend his march, and wait for further orders.

By the 4th article, Major *Camac* is directed "to require from the Ranna his proportion of cavalry ſtipulated by the treaty; or in caſe of his inability, whether "from the ſeaſon of the year, or from whatever other "cauſe to fulfil the condition in its complete extent, to "require and accept from him ſuch other aid in furniſhing proviſions and in forming magazines of grain, and "other means of ſubſiſtence and communication, as "Major *Camac* ſhall judge equivalent to it."

Admitting therefore that according to the treaty, an expedition into *Malva* had conſtituted a part of the general meaſures adopted and in force for the proſecution of the Maratta war; my aſſent to it could not be ſeparated from the condition expreſſed in the treaty itſelf, viz. that the Ranna ſhould furniſh 10,000 horſe for that ſervice; but by the plan of Major *Camac*'s inſtructions, this condition is relinquiſhed, and ſome other demands propoſed in the place of it, from which I imagine no great advantage was expected.

I have not ſeen any letter from General *Goddard*, in which he ſolicits the Board to make a diverſion in his favour. The only one in which he takes notice of the advantages to be obtained by a diverſion to the northward, was dated the 20th June, and received the 24th Auguſt laſt, conſequently could make no part of an argument in ſupport of a meaſure, propoſed and debated here in the beginning of June; nor was it ever mentioned that I know of, before this time, as it naturally ſhould have been when the meaſure was under deliberation. An extract of that part of his letter is annexed. No. 1.

In an agreement of this kind, the ſtricteſt preciſion of dates ſhould be obſerved, and the facts ſtated in the order in which they happened. On this principle I join iſſue with the Governor General, and affirm, in his own terms, that when he propoſed the execution of the meaſure (that is on the 12th of June laſt) General Goddard had not ſolicited us to make ſuch a diverſion in his favour. The fact, if it exiſts, is capable of immediate and direct proof.

But let it be admitted, that he had done ſo; that his opinion or requeſt had been before us on the 12th of June, and that it ought to have had a conſiderable weight in the choice of meaſures neceſſary to ſupport him, ſtill it could only have weight at the time when we received it. It is undoubtedly juſt, and not natural, that General *Goddard*'s advice and recommendation on ſuch a point, ſhould have influenced Mr. *Haſtings*'s judgment. On this principle I have a right to conclude, that in January and February laſt, when I converſed and engaged with Mr. *Haſtings* on this ſubject, he had no idea of another expedition from the upper country to ſupport General *Goddard*, becauſe he could not then have entertained ſuch an idea, without contradicting the expreſs opinion of General *Goddard*, as it ſtood before us. I appeal to General *Goddard*'s letter to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, dated 3d of November 1779, and recorded in our conſultation of the 24th of February, and to his letter to us of the 10th of December 1779, received here the 20th of January laſt, from which the extracts annexed to this minute are literally taken No. 2.

With this knowledge of General *Goddard*'s ſentiments it now remains to be accounted for on any probable ground, why Mr. *Haſtings* at the latter end of February ſhould have entertained a thought of ſupporting General *Goddard*'s operations by another expedition from hence, when he had it from General *Goddard* himſelf, that the troops under his command *muſt be ſuperior to any ſervice that could poſſibly be required of them, and equal to the moſt complete and abſolute ſucceſs.* No. 3.

Whatever plan of operations the Commander in Chief might have recommended from *Lucknow*, it certainly did not meet with the Governor General's concurrence; whether Sir *Eyre Coote* approved of that which was adopted, is a point on which I am not ſufficiently informed, to ſpeak with certainty, but I am entitled to conclude generally, from the ſtrong and pointed term of his proteſt againſt the treaty with the Rana of *Gohud*, that no meaſures built on that foundation were likely to meet with his approbation. The following paſſage is in point, as it expreſſes his opinion of an expedition into *Mahé*

Mahé, in conjunction with the Rana, on the principles of the treaty. "Again, by the 5th article, when the "combined troops may have marched to *Oogein*, or "*Indoor*, to ſeek the enemy and to deliver battle, the "Rana may, agreeably to treaty, leave us to ſtand the "brunt alone—a point of partial convenience to him, "by which, without ſuppoſing him to betray us (which "he may alſo do agreeably to treaty) our whole army "may be loſt."

Other obſervations on the Governor General's minute occur to me, but as the remainder of it is not eſſential to the main queſtion, they may better be omitted.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Referred to in Mr. Francis's minute.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard* to the Governor General and Council, dated 20th June 1780. Received 24th Auguſt.

If *Scindia* continues at *Ugein* till the cloſe of the rains, which I now conceive will be the caſe, a powerful diverſion might be made in that quarter, to prevent his paſſing to the ſouthward of the *Nerbeddah* to ſuccour *Nana Furneſſe*; and I would venture to pronounce, as far as human probability and reaſon may preſume, that without *Scindia*'s aid the Miniſter would be immediately compelled to terms, and enter into any engagements that might be required of him. This is no chimerical idea; for beſides *Scindia* and *Holcar*, there remain only two chiefs of conſequence in the State, *Nana*, and *Hurry Punt Fakier*; and I do not believe that any foreign Power will draw upon himſelf the future enmity of the Engliſh, by openly declaring his party, and marching to their aſſiſtance.

In the event of ſuch powerful diverſion being made to the northward, *Scindia* will find too much employment at home to have leiſure to raiſe any diſturbance in *Guzerat*; and indeed the Sepoy force which may very well be ſpared in that province, acting with the troops of *Futty Sing*, which it may not perhaps be convenient to carry with me to the ſouthward, will prove ſufficient for its ſecurity and defence againſt a very large body of the enemy ſhould any conſiderable army (which in the plan above-mentioned appears ſcarcely practicable) be ordered to enter it.

Referred to in Mr. Francis's minute.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard* to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, dated the 3d November 1779.

The trifling and unequal force the French at preſent have in *India*, and the certain accounts we have from *Europe* to make us believe they cannot now be reinforced, ſecure us from any apprehenſions of being interrupted in our operations by them this ſeaſon; and ſeems indeed to furniſh one very principal reaſon why we ought to loſe no time in ſtrengthening, and firmly eſtabliſhing ourſelves during the courſe of it. The troops which will ſoon be collected at *Surat*, muſt be ſuperior to any ſervice that can poſſibly be required of them, and equal to the moſt complete and abſolute ſucceſs. But the Bengal army, together with the detachment under Colonel *Braithwaite* at *Mahé*, and ſuch proportion of troops from this ſettlement as you may judge it expedient and conſiſtent with the mere ſafety of the iſland to detach, will be found able to execute any plan of operations that may be immediately reſolved upon, and againſt the whole force of the Maratta empire.

Referred to in Mr. Francis's minute.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard* to the Governor General and Council, dated 10th December 1779. Received 20th January 1780.

I have been thus particular in deſcribing this detachment, that you may know the exact force I ſhall have under my command, and how fully ſufficient to anſwer any ſervice that may be required of them.

With reſpect to the troops from *Mahé*, for the remaining quota to be furniſhed by the Madras Preſidency I have yet received no intelligence; I do not expect even to be joined by any part of them previous to the commencement of operations; at leaſt their junction is ſo uncertain, that no account can at preſent be made of the acceſſion of their force; nor indeed will this circumſtance be of any material conſequence for ſome time, as the ſtrength of the army now under me is ſufficient to accompliſh the ſcheme of conqueſt at preſent propoſed, and the Madras reinforcements, if ſent, muſt arive ſoon enough to aſſiſt in proſecuting any more important views that may be hereafter found convenient and practicable. Appendix. No. 288.

The following Minute from the Governor General was delivered in Reply to the above from Mr. *Francis*.

Governor General—I muſt be careful not to ſuffer myſelf to be drawn from the point which is directly in queſtion, the engagement which I affirm to have paſſed between Mr. *Francis* and myſelf; this I repeat, that it may not be forgotten: viz.

"Mr. *Francis* will not oppoſe any meaſures which the "Governor General ſhall recommend for the proſecu- "tion of the war in which we are ſuppoſed to be en- "gaged with the Marattas, or for the general ſupport of "the preſent political ſyſtem of this Government: "neither will he himſelf either propoſe, or vote with "any other member who ſhall propoſe, any meaſure "that ſhall be contrary to the Governor General's opi- "nion on theſe points."

Mr. *Francis* admits that ſome engagement did exiſt between him and me, but denies the terms of it; and I do again moſt ſolemnly affirm, that they were literally ſuch as I have quoted them in my minute of the 3d July, and ſuch as I have here repeated. The paper which I ſhewed to Mr. *Francis* was not intended as a ſecurity, nor have I ever alluded to it as ſuch. My ſecurity was in his honour, on which I implicitly relied; nor did I commit the terms of the engagement to writing for any other purpoſe than to guard againſt the miſapprehenſions to which an agreement, formed and concluded in converſation only, was liable; and his anſwer ſatisfied me: I regarded it as equivalent to the moſt binding, legal inſtrument. As to my own ſenſe of its obligations, I gave the fulleſt proof by the immediate performance of my part of it; but were the engagement otherwiſe than I have repreſented it, and did it even bear the limited ſenſe which Mr. *Francis* has aſcribed to it, yet I have affirmed, that Mr. *Francis* was equally bound by it to yield his aſſent, (his negative aſſent, for more I claimed not) to the meaſure which I propoſed in June, of a diverſion in the province of *Malva*, ſince it formed a part of the meaſures projected and actually exiſting before the engagement took place: in proof of this, I have quoted the 5th article of the treaty with the Rana of *Gohud*, which ſtipulates that he ſhall aſſiſt us, if required, in an expedition againſt the province of *Malva*. I do not underſtand Mr. *Francis*'s diſtinction, when he ſays, that from this article, "it can only be inferred, "that when the treaty was formed in November 1779, "the poſſibility of an expedition beyond the borders of "his dominions was ſuppoſed, &c. &c." The condition was poſitive and expreſs, and conſtituted as eſſential an obligation of the treaty as either of the other two points which compoſed it, and which may be equally ſaid to infer the like poſſibility, ſince the caſes ſuppoſed by either could not exiſt with the other two. But Mr. *Francis* forgets the purpoſe for which I have appealed to the 5th article of the treaty with the Rana of *Gohud*, which was to prove "that the plan of ano- "ther expedition from the upper country into *Malva*, "or any other part of the Maratta dominions on that "ſide of *India*, had been ſuggeſted to him, and that I "had had that matter in contemplation," which Mr. *Francis* in his minute of the 11th of September denies.

Appendix. No. 289.

I have proved that I had it in contemplation, and that it had been ſuggeſted to Mr. *Francis*, ſince it was an article of a treaty concluded and executed two months before the date of my engagement with Mr. *Francis*, debated and paſſed at the Board, and executed by him.

" But (Mr. *Francis* adds) it ſtill remains a queſtion, " whether it was, or was not relinquiſhed by Mr. *Haſtings*, " in the interval between that period and the month of " February following?"—To this I cannot reply, for I do not know how this became a queſtion, ſince nothing leſs than my formal renunciation of it could poſſibly make it one, and I am certain I never did renounce it.

The ſubſequent reaſonings of Mr. *Francis* on the additional clauſe of the 5th article, do not appear to me to have any relation to the ſubject; I therefore paſs them. I have not time to examine the whole of General *Goddard*'s correſpondence received before the 12th June; but the following extracts from Sir *Eyre Coote*'s letter to the Board, dated the 5th May, and of General *Goddard*'s letter to him, dated the 28th March, and encloſed in the former, contain ſuch ſtrong and pointed evidence of the ſentiments of both, reſpecting the general expediency of a diverſion in favour of General *Goddard*, that any further ſearch for acceſſory proofs is unneceſſary.

" To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, &c. &c. and Members of the Supreme Council.

Gentlem e,

I have the honour to encloſe you an extract of the laſt letter I have received from General *Goddard*, which I take the liberty of laying before you, as it contains ſentiments entirely conformable to what I have already ſtated to you, regarding the mode of carrying on the preſent war; though I did not want ſuch a confirmation of my former ideas upon this ſubject. General *Goddard* now declares himſelf confined to the defence of the territory newly acquired, which as I foretold, was a neceſſary conſequence of the plan adopted. I cannot therefore avoid reiterating my propoſal of ſome vigorous meaſures being taken from theſe quarters, as ſoon as the ſeaſon will admit. This appears to me the more preſſing, as I find ſince I have left the Board, that we are become principals in the war; and the preſent plan promiſes nothing but an endleſs, ruinous expence. I therefore beg leave to repeat, that while I recommend the moſt vigorous exertions, it is only with a view to accelerate a peace, which in the preſent ſtate of politics at home would in my opinion be the happieſt event that could happen to us.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Lucknow, 15th May 1780. (Signed) *Eyre Coote*."

" Extract of Brigadier General *Goddard*'s Letter, dated the 28th March 1780.

My laſt gave you a very particular information of the ſituation of *Scindia*'s forces, which he was then collecting from all parts of his country, to accompany him into *Guzerat*, ſince which time he has been joined by 5,000 horſe from *Ugein*; and it is reported, that another conſiderable body is on their march towards him; *ſo that the northern provinces of the Maratta State, which are moſtly belonging to himſelf and* Holkar, *muſt be now greatly expoſed, and open to invaſions from our upper provinces, by the way of* Gohud, *and the extenſive provinces of* Ajmeze, the principal Rajah of which, the Marwar Rajah, is I believe by no means well diſpoſed to the intereſts of *Scindia*: I have no poſitive proof of this being the caſe, having had no correſpondence or other communication with him whatever ſince my arrival on this ſide of *India*, but it is a circumſtance generally believed, and has its foundation in former diſputes, and I mention it to you, among other incidents, to give you an opportunity of judging how far it may be practicable, *as it would certainly be of advantage to the operations of the war on this ſide, to cauſe a powerful diverſion to be made on the other; which could not fail to diſtreſs and divide their attention exceedingly.*

Having no object to induce me to penetrate into *Malva*, but on the contrary, riſking the moſt material intereſts of the Company, by leaving the province of *Guzerat*, and the ſea coaſt, to the inroads either of an European or Indian enemy, I can only at preſent watch the motions of *Scindia* to prevent him from overrunning or deſtroying the country; and if poſſible, ſeize ſome favourable opportunity of attacking him, which as it is his only care to avoid, I ſhall find ſome difficulty to effect.

A true extract.

(Signed) *Wm Tierney*,
Sec^y to the Commander in Chief."

In compliance with the rule preſcribed by Mr. *Francis* I have been careful to annex the dates to the preceding extracts; and for greater preciſion will repeat them, with the facts ſtated in the order in which they happened.

General *Goddard*'s letter to Sir *Eyre Coote* is dated the 28th March, and was recorded in our conſultation of the 29th May. My minute, which contained the firſt propoſition of the expedition, was dated the 12th June.

Mr. *Francis* will now permit me to quote his words for their application to the cloſe of this argument: " On this principle I join iſſue with the Governor Ge- " neral, and affirm in his own terms, that *when he pro-* " *poſed the execution of the meaſure*, (that is on the 12th " June laſt) *General* Goddard *had not ſolicited us to make* " *ſuch a diverſion in his favour.* The fact, if it exiſts, " is capable of immediate and direct proof."

The preceding extracts are an immediate and direct proof of the fact.

I do not anſwer the remainder of Mr. *Francis*'s minute, becauſe it proves nothing but that my opinion of the meaſures neceſſary to be purſued for the proſecution of the Maratta war, varied according to the variations and contingencies of the war; which I admit; ſtill inſiſting, in the words of my laſt minute, that this is not material either to the engagement which I affirm Mr. *Francis* did conclude with me, or to the agreement which he ſays he meant to enter into, ſince the proſecution of the war againſt the Marattas was the general object of both, and the means of courſe included in it.

APPENDIX, No. 289.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt Auguſt 1780;—preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings* Governor General, Preſident; *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire. (Mr. *Francis* indiſpoſed.)

READ the following letter from Captain *Popham*:

Gentlemen,

Since I had the honour to addreſs you of the 8th ultimo, I have been endeavouring by purſuit to oblige the enemy to quit the Rana's country. They have learnt vigilance to ſecure them from ſurprizes by night, and the diſtance they keep from us have excluded every poſſibility of attack by day; however, as we advance their forts ſurrender to the Ranah, and probably from their terror and alarm they will ſoon retreat, for the rainy ſeaſon, to ſome diſtant place of ſecurity.

I have received from the Adjutant General, a copy of the Board's reſolutions for the relief of the detachment, and ſhall accordingly prepare for that event; by uſing every means in my power to prevent ſo extraordinary a change in the face of an enemy, from hurting the public ſervice. With a hope that it may not be deemed a deviation from the high reſpects in which I hold the pleaſure of the Board, permit me to remark, that nothing

thing could equal my aſtoniſhment at this meaſure, but the regret and diſappointment I profeſſionally feel in being withdrawn from the campaign immediately after receiving moſt honourable marks of your approbation. Such proofs of your perfect ſatisfaction, gentlemen, that myſelf, my officers, and indeed the whole army, could not but conſider as omens of your intentions to employ us in the proſecution of a ſervice we had ſucceſsfully began. But as my conduct has not been deemed unworthy of your good opinion, I ſhall ſtill retain hopes of my ſervices being demanded on ſome future active occaſion, and exerted to a happier iſſue.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Camp, *Rhabut*, 4th July, 1780. (Signed) *W. Popham.*

Letter from Captain *William Popham* to the Governor General and Council; in general Letter 26th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, and Council.

Gentlemen,

I yeſterday had the pleaſure of congratulating you on the capture of *Gwalior* by the detachment under my command. Excluſive that it is my duty to ſubmit my conduct in every reſpect to the judgment of Adminiſtration, I flatter myſelf that a detail of the diſpoſition of ſo fortunate and honorary an enterprize will be both pleaſing and ſatisfactory.

This place, gentlemen, having been pronounced, and with juſtice, by the Princes of *Hindoſtan*, as far as their knowledge in military matters extended, to be impregnable, and being ſo ſituated as to render an examination of it which could be abſolutely relied on, a ſervice of danger and uncertainty, I have for a long time balanced in my mind the moſt eligible mode of attack. In order to gain this information, after ſecuring the new conqueſt of the Cutchwagaar diſtrict, I marched to *Ripore*, a village about five coſs diſtant from *Gwalior*. My ſpies were then continually employed in ſearching for a part of it fit for eſcalading. After many and dangerous trials they at length brought me advice that one part only bore the appearance of practicability: their deſcription of it reduced my hopes to a poſſibility of ſucceſs. The fort is nearly three coſs in extent, built on an exceeding high rock, ſcarped for the moſt part all round, and garriſoned by a thouſand men. The part that the guides propoſed our aſcent by, was where the ſcarp was about ſixteen feet high; from hence to the wall a ſteep aſcent of about forty yards; and the wall to be eſcaladed, about thirty feet in height. I took the reſolution immediately. The object was glorious, and I made a diſpoſition to prevent as much as in my power, in caſe of a repulſe, that the loſs we ſhould ſuſtain might not tarniſh the honour of the attempt.

I formed the detachment for the ſervice, without any aſſiſtance from our ally.

On the 3d at midnight, Lieutenant *Cameron*, the field engineer, having prepared ladders and every other requiſite for ſcaling, with great diſpatch and ſecrecy, I ordered the party for the attack to be formed. Captain *Bruce*, whoſe abilities are well known to you, at the head of two companies of grenadiers and light infantry, commanded by Lieutenants *Wilſon*, *Archibald Scott*, *Allen*, and *Patterſon*, led the van of the party. They were followed by myſelf, with twenty Europeans under Lieutenant *Legortwood*, and two battalions of Sepoys, under the command of Lieutenants *Ford* and *Hamilton*; Captain *Maclary* with his battalion, two guns, and the cavalry, received orders to march at two, in order to cover our retreat in caſe of a premature diſcovery; or, in the event of ſucceſs, to prevent *Ambajee*, with his troops, from eſcaping. The camp was left ſtanding, under charge of Captains *Mayaffre* and *Clode*, with a battalion.

At break of day the van arrived at the foot of the ſcarped rock: where wooden ladders were immediately placed, and the troops aſcended to the wall, when the ſpies climbed up and fixed the rope ladders; the Sepoys then mounted with amazing activity: the guards on the alarm aſſembled to the plain in order to diſlodge the aſſailants, but our fire ſoon repulſed them with great loſs, and the detachment pouring in very faſt, we puſhed on to the body of the place. The greateſt part of the garriſon had however taken advantage of the time employed in forming the troops, and quitted the fort with precipitation. The conqueſt was now complete; at ſun-riſe, or a little after, we were maſters of the ſtrongeſt hold in *India*. Many priſoners, and ſome of note, ſuch as *Peer Khaun Keladar*, and ſome particular friends of *Babajee*, are fallen into our hands. The latter was mortally wounded in the attack, and killed himſelf with a dagger in going out of the fort.

I cannot conclude, gentlemen, without again recommending to your notice the tried conduct and valour of the officers and men under my command, which has ſhone conſpicuouſly on this occaſion.

I have the honour to be,

With the greateſt reſpect,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient and very humble ſervant,

(Signed) *William Popham.*

Gwalior, 5th Auguſt 1780.

Atteſted to be a true copy.

E. Hay, Secretary.

Appendix. No. 289.

Bengal Secret Perſian Correſpondence.

From the Rana of *Gohud*: received 5th September 1780.

Yeſterday the 2d of Shabaun, by the aſſiſtance and b eſſing of God, the fort of *Gwalior* was conquered. I was confident from your former favours that all my wiſhes would be brought to a happy iſſue; and from the beginning of my life to this time this was my moſt ardent deſire, that by ſome means I might be reſtored to my habitation, and thus gain additional honour in the ſight of my contemporaries; and accordingly I am now in peaceable poſſeſſion of my houſe, and have ſucceeded in my wiſhes. What can I now return you equal to this favour, except my life? this debt will remain for my lateſt poſterity and deſcendants to pay.

As I had no confidence in my army, on account of their being lately raiſed, and as I knew ſecrecy and caution to be neceſſary, I therefore had delayed ſending them; but upon the receipt of your orders to *Toffuzzit Heſſein Khan*, directing him to give me ſatisfaction that this place will not be retained by the Sirkar, on that ſame day I receive complete ſatisfaction that you had in conſideration of my attachment entered into a treaty with me, and had made known your friendly intentions to *Meer Muzhir Ally Khan*; and I knew that my dignity would increaſe daily, and that I ſhould be exalted in power. Agreeable to your orders, keeping this a ſecret from even my relations; I ſent to Captain *Popham* thoſe people in my ſervice who were acquainted with the fort of *Gwalior*, that they might procure an eaſy entrance for the gentlemen into the fort. Captain *Popham* ordered theſe men to take ſome of his people with them, and ſhew them the fort.' That ſame night they accordingly took two Hircarrahs of the Sirkar with them, and went near the fort, and at their return gave great ſatisfaction to the Captain, telling him that they would affix ladders to the fort and ſlay any of the Chokidars who might be awake and on duty. Captain *Popham* having approved, I ſent all the rope ladders which were in readineſs, and I and my people by the bleſſing of God executed

Appendix. Nos. 290&291.

executed every thing which we had promiſed, and conducted the Captain ſafely into the fort by the upper road, and the fort was thus taken. In all five of the enemies were killed, and two of my people were wounded; they arrived at the fort two Gurries before midnight. I have been making great rejoicings that the Engliſh have beſtowed on me a houſe, and deſign entering it in a day or two.

All the Rajahs of *Hindoſtan* are now convinced of your favour to me, from your having reſtored to the right owner his right, after thirty years diſpoſſeſſion. I will leave my people there, and proſecute the war till not one man is left on this ſide of the *Nurbudda*. I have now nothing left to hope for, my country will now be cultivated. All the Rajahs now direct their hopes towards you, and are in readineſs at all times. I ſhall remain fixed in my attachment, and have forgot the diſtreſſes and anxieties which I before ſuffered, and which your favour has now renewed.

APPENDIX, No. 290.

Copy of the general Letter from *Bengal*, 26th Auguſt 1780, to Court of Directors, encloſing Copy of a Letter from Captain *Popham* to Governor General and Council.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

THE departure of a Daniſh ſhip from hence to *Europe*, at this time, affords us an opportunity of informing you of the capture of the important fortreſs of *Gwalior*, poſſeſſed by the Marattas in the country of our ally the Rhana of *Ghede*. It was taken by eſcalade on the 4th of this month, by a detachment of the Company's troops under the command of Captain *William Popham*. For particulars relative to this event, we beg leave to refer you to the encloſed copy of a letter written to us by Captain *Popham*, under date the 5th inſtant, and think it neceſſary to add only, on the general occaſion of it, that it has completed the expulſion of the Marattas from the territories of our ally, who before had ſuffered in a ſevere degree by the ravages they were committing, and to whom it had been ſome loſs of credit that the Marattas, his conſtant enemies, ſhould be poſſeſſed of the principal fort in the heart of his dominions.

We have the ſincereſt pleaſure in tranſmitting you intelligence of a capture ſo favourable to the intereſts of the Company, and ſo diſtinguiſhing to the honour of their arms; and we doubt not that the ſpirited and well-judged conduct of Captain *Popham*, and gallantry of the officers and men under his command, will appear to you, as they do to us, deſerving of the higheſt commendation. We have reſolved for the preſent, that the fort of *Gwalior* ſhould remain in the poſſeſſion of our troops, as during the continuance of the war in which we are engaged with the Maratta State, the ſafety of the acquiſition might be hazarded if it were left to be protected by the Rana's.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble ſervants,

Fort William, the 26th Auguſt 1780.

Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler,
Eyre Coote.

APPENDIX, No. 291.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 9th October 1780.

READ the following letter from Major *Popham*:

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th ultimo. It is always matter of the higheſt ſatisfaction to me to find my conduct honoured with the approbation of Government; but the teſtimony you have now given of your good opinion, cannot fail of inſpiring the breaſt of every individual of the detachment with the deepeſt ſenſe of gratitude and reſpect, the moſt dutiful aſſurances of which, we truſt, will not be unacceptable to you gentlemen.

Your having thought proper to retain this fortreſs as a Britiſh poſt, it becomes a part of my duty to point out that the great extent of the fortifications, and of the Shiher Punnah, under its immediate protection, require at leaſt a garriſon of 50 or 60 European artillery, a battalion of Laſcars, and ſeventeen or eighteen hundred Sepoys, merely for the duty of the works without a capacity of detaching a man on any occaſion.

The various uſes to which the fort may be applied, particularly in the preſent war, will however recompenſe amply for this, or even a greater expence; and you may be perſuaded, I will neglect no means of convincing our ally of the attention of Government to his ſecurity, in this your reſolution; and I make no doubt he will coincide with the wiſdom of a meaſure which covers his dominions from invaſion, and inveſts him with the tranquil poſſeſſion of the fruits of our late fortunate campaign.

I have the honour to be,
Gwalior, 12th September 1780. (Signed) *Wm Popham*.

Perſian Correſpondence, 1780.

To the Ranna of *Gohud*: written 7th September 1780.

I received your letter, informing me of the taking of *Gwalior* by Captain *Popham*, with the aſſiſtance of your troops; and this intelligence gave me the greater pleaſure, as from your long ſilence on that ſubject I began to fear that ſome delays had ariſen in the execution of a plan, when the preſent ſituation of affairs required the greateſt expedition. The conqueſt of this fort being an object on which I had long fixed my wiſhes, the delays which ſeemed to have happened gave me ſome apprehenſions that you might have conceived doubts and ſuſpicions reſpecting the future diſpoſition of the fort after it ſhould be taken; and I accordingly aſſured you through the letters of *Rahmut Ulla Khan* and your Vackeel, that this Government entertained no ideas contrary to their former promiſe on this head.

I now find that the conduct of Captain *Popham* has given you apprehenſions of the ſincerity of our intentions in this point. The caſe is this: you yourſelf are well acquainted with the importance of this place to us both, during the preſent war with the Marattas, and muſt be well convinced that the retaining poſſeſſion of it is of the utmoſt conſequence in the future opperations againſt our enemies in that quarter, I muſt therefore requeſt that you will ſuffer it to remain in our poſſeſſion till the final concluſion of the preſent war with the Marattas; declaring to you at the ſame time, that as ſoon as peace ſhall have taken place with them, the fort of *Gwalior* ſhall be delivered up into your hands. It is yours, it is your right; nor have this Government any idea of alienating it. In the mean while this letter will remain with you as a voucher, if any is neceſſary when it is expreſsly provided by the treaty between us that it ſhall remain in your poſſeſſion for ever, and that it ſhall not be given up to any other Power upon any conditions or terms whatever.

APPENDIX, No. 292.

Extract of *Bengal* Conſultations, 4th September 1780.

Extract of the Commander in Chief's Minute.

CAPTAIN *Popham*'s well-judged and ſucceſsful diſpoſition againſt the important fort of *Gwalior* has given us a very ſtrong poſt in that quarter. Our poſſeſſing it is an object of the utmoſt conſequence during the operations of the preſent war; and for this able-performed ſervice of Captain *Popham*'s, I muſt beg leave to recommend, what I am clear this Board will be as ready in agreeing to, as I am in propoſing; viz. that Government will confer the rank of Major on Captain *Popham*, for his late ſervices. But though I recommend this attention to be paid to Captain *Popham*'s merit, do not let it be underſtood that I have an idea of propoſing the ſuperſeding of two worthy officers on his account. I find Captain *Popham* the third effective Captain on the liſt of the army, the two above him are Captain *Jones* and *Kyd*; theſe I alſo recommend to be made Majors ſenior to him. The vacancy occaſioned this laſt week by the deceaſe of Lieutenant Colonel *Wilding*, makes fair room on the eſtabliſhment for one of the three above-named Captains to be made Majors, ſo that in fact there will be but one ſupernumerary made to enable us on this occaſion to come down in the promotion to Captain *Popham*; and I muſt remark, that at this time of actual ſervice, the number of Field officers on the eſtabliſhment is very inadequate either to the exigencies of our detail, or to the quota of troops conſtituting the Bengal army.

My recommendations in regular order ſtand thus; Major *Alexander Hannay*, the oldeſt Major on the eſtabliſhment, I recommend to be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, vice Lieutenant Colonel *Benjamin Wilding*, deceaſed,

Captain *William Jones* to be made a Major vice Major *Hannay* promoted as above; and that Captain *Robert Kyd* and *William Popham* be alſo promoted to the rank of Majors.

Calcutta, 4th September 1780. (Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Reſolved unanimouſly, That the Board do agree to make the promotions recommended by the Commander in Chief; and that, as a laſting teſtimony of the high ſenſe which the Board entertain of the merits and ſervices of Captain *Popham*, a clauſe be inſerted in the body of his commiſſion, expreſſing that it is granted as a reward, and as an honourable teſtimony of the high ſenſe they entertain of his military ſervices, it not being in the regular courſe of ſucceſſion.

APPENDIX, No. 293.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 11th September 1780.

READ a letter as follows from Major *Popham*.

Gentlemen,

Herewith I have the honour to tranſmit you a return of the ordnance, ſtores, &c. taken in this fort.

Since the conqueſt of *Gwalior*, the Marattas poſſeſſed of the nighbouring country have entirely deſerted it and retired, ſome to *Seronge* and *Belerah*, others more weſtward. They have even quitted *Superee*, a part of the Narwar Rajah's territory, but for ſome time paſt held by them.

A ſtrong detachment marched now into *Serange* might probably be a means of bringing *Scindia* to propoſe advantageous terms to our Government. That Chief is greatly alarmed and diſtreſſed at the fall of this place.

I have the honour, &c.

Gwalior, 23d Auguſt 1780. *William Popham.*

APPENDIX, No. 296.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 15th May 1780.

THE Board think it proper to remark, that they are precluded from deputing another miniſter at this time to the Court of *Hydrabad*, for the following conſiderations:

Firſt, That although it would be of very eſſential advantage to poſſeſs ſuch means of removing or preventing every occaſion of jealouſly or diſſatisfaction in the mind of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, or of affording us a timely knowledge of their effects; yet this is not of itſelf a proper object, nor ſuitable either to the intereſts or dignity of our Government to be avowed, and we can propoſe no other which might ſerve to give a ſpecious colour to ſuch an appointment.

Secondly, Becauſe the idea which would be publicly ſuggeſted by it, of a confidential connection with that Government, might tend to alienate from us that of *Berar*, which by a natural oppoſition of intereſts, is and ever muſt continue in a ſtate of variance with it, either open or concealed; and thus it might prove the means of forcing the Government of *Berar* to the ſide of our enemies, at a time in which it poſſibly is wavering in the choice of the party which it may finally be compelled to eſpouſe.

APPENDIX, No. 297.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 12th June 1780.

THE Board deeming the reſidence of Mr. *Hollond* at the Court of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* eſſentially and indiſpenſably neceſſary;

Agreed, That a letter be immediately written to him, confirming his appointment of Reſident at that Court on the part of this Government.

And as it is incumbent upon this Board to indemnify Mr. *Hollond* by every means in their power from the effects which he has unjuſtly ſuſtained by the reſentment of the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, for his obedience to the inſtructions tranſmitted to him in conſequence of thoſe he had received from *Fort Saint George*, which were notified to this Board by that Preſidency; and becauſe the Board are of opinion that Mr. *Hollond* was the means of preventing a breach of the alliance ſubſiſting between the Company and the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*;

Reſolved, That the circumſtances of this tranſaction be particularly related to the Court of Directors, and that it be ſtrongly recommended to them, either to reſtore Mr. *Hollond* to the ſervice and to his ſtanding on the Madras eſtabliſhment, or that he be transferred with his rank to this.

APPENDIX, No. 298.

Bengal, Secret Conſultations, 11th September 1780.

READ the following letter from Mr. *Hollond*, Reſident at the Court of his Highneſs *Nizam Ally Khan*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I was honoured on the 13th ultimo, with your orders of the 12th June; and immediately made known to his Highneſs the Nizam, your reſolution regarding the reſtoration of the Mortazanagur Circar to his brother *Bazalut Jung*. His Highneſs, on my declaring to him theſe your intentions, expreſſed great ſatisfaction; and on my mentioning your deſire of receiving his moſt poſitive aſſurances, that he would not ſuffer any debarkation of men or ſtores, belonging to the French, or the enemies of the Engliſh nation, at the port of *Mootapillee*, he very readily engaged to give every ſatisfaction you might deſire on

Appendix. No. 299.

that head; I accordingly propoſed to him to ſign a paper writing to that purport; to which he gave his willing aſſent. His Highneſs took this occaſion to mention his expectation of having the collections alſo of the Mortazanagur Circar reſtored to him, and deſired to know what was your intention regarding the peſhcuſh and the arrears? I told him, with reſpect to the latter, that as you had declared to him your intention of adhering to the treaty of 1768, in which I was aſſured you were perfectly ſincere, it would, I hoped, prevent any uneaſineſs, from any little delay that might happen in the actual payment of what was due; that the war now on our hands with the Marattas, and a poſſibility, as his Highneſs himſelf had ſuggeſted, of a rupture between *Hyder Ally* and the Company, made it unadviſable at preſent to diminiſh our treaſure; and that I hoped he would acquieſce in the reaſonableneſs of what I now ſaid to him. That as to the Guntoor Collections, the ſubject had not been mentioned to me by you, but that in any event there muſt be conſiderable accounts to ſettle before it could be known whether any thing, or what would be due on that head. His Highneſs, after hearing what I had urged, and after declaring his confidence in the aſſurances I had made him, did not think proper at that time to preſs the matter any further.

Upon receiving on the 23d ultimo, the Governor General's letter to the Nizam, and my credentials encloſed to me under date the 26th June, by Mr. *Bruere*, I again waited upon his Highneſs, ſhewed the renewed credentials, and delivered the letter; which he ſaid contained what I had before declared to him.

Upon my informing his Highneſs of your having reappointed me Reſident at his Court he again expreſſed his ſurprize at the meaſure you had lately adopted, of ordering me away; and made ſome inquiries relative to thoſe peculiarities in our Government, that had occaſioned a ſtep which appeared to him ſo extraordinary; obſerving, that the appointment of a Company's ſervant to tranſact buſineſs under your Government ſeemed to him a ſmall act of authority, in compariſon of the other more momentous affairs, with which, as it appeared, you were entruſted; he obſerved, that he ſhould ſtill have had reaſon to be under ſome uncertainty, with reſpect to the efficiency of your authority, had it not been for the aſſurances you had now given him, relative to the immediate reſtoration of the Guntoor Circar, which afforded him every reaſon to be perfectly ſatisfied on that head.

I am, &c.

Hydrabad, Aug. 12th, 1780. (Signed) *John Hollond.*

APPENDIX, No. 299 and 300.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 12th June 1780.

READ the following letters from *Moodajee Boofla* and *Dewagur Pundit*.

From *Moodajee Boofla*: received 2d June 1780.

Your agreeable epiſtle (every letter of which was filled with friendſhip, and every line of which informed me completely of your favourable deſigns) by which you acquaint me, that *Beneram Pundit* explained fully to you all the particulars contained in the letter of my Miniſter *Dewagur Pundit*, and that you had been long anxious for that explanation; and that when you had attentively reflected and conſidered on the contents of the letters, you converſed in private with *Beneram Pundit* on the ſubject of them, and that I ſhould learn all the particulars from his letters, and from yours to my Miniſter; arrived in a happy hour, and gave me inexpreſſible pleaſure.

At the end of your letter, you write a few lines in your own hand, that your final reſolution in your affairs is delayed till you can receive my opinion and advice; this has exceeded every thing which you had written before. I have learnt all the particulars of your private conference from the letter of *Beneram Pundit*. God be praiſed, that after two years I ſtill receive from you ſuch letters as no friends, however intimate and pure their connection, ever before wrote. You are truly in every inſtance a complete friend, and write ſuch anſwers and reſolutions as are becoming your friendſhip. Had a Kareta to the purport of the preſent letter been received while the Miniſter was ſtill at *Poonah*, many things might have been done. At preſent, that in conſequence of the meaſures of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cavon Behadre*, armies are marching from all quarters towards the Engliſh territories, and that General *Goddard* is engaged in open war with *Scindia*, and that the execution of all theſe matters is delayed till a proper ſeaſon, and as the rains are now approaching, we can wait to ſee what anſwer will be returned from the Miniſters at *Poonah* to the advice which I have written to them, and which I will inform you of as ſoon as received.

As all my deſires tend to keep up the friendſhip with you, and as you are diſtinguiſhed from among all the Engliſh for prudent counſels, and knowledge in all matters, prudence and foreſight, attention to treaties, ſtrict friendſhip, and a complete knowledge of the rights of old connections, for declining all intercourſe with oppreſſive and tyrannical Chiefs, and for attending in all caſes to the voice of juſtice and right, by the bleſſing of God, all affairs will be ſettled. All theſe particulars are mentioned more fully in the letters from my Miniſter to you, and to *Beneram Pundit*, from which you will learn them fully. I am hopeful that you will favour me with letters containing the ſtate of your health.

From *Dewagur Pundit*. Received 2d June.

Your gracious letter, which notwithſtanding the apparent ſhortneſs and conciſe manner of it, in reality contained the beſt and moſt ſolid advice, and the greateſt knowledge of all matters, and expreſſions of the firmeſt friendſhip and affection for the Rajah my maſter, and of favour to me, with other remarks incumbent on your friendſhip, informing me, that *Beneram Pundit* being arrived in *Calcutta*, had ſhewn you my letters, and had fully explained all the contents to you; that you had had a private converſation with the ſaid *Pundit*, of which I ſhould learn all the particulars from his letters; that I may be well aſſured that you have ſo firm a dependance on the friendſhip of this quarter, that in every matter where the intereſt or views of this country are concerned, you will be guided by our advice, notwithſtanding your own deſigns ſhould be thus delayed; arrived in a happy hour, and gave me great ſatisfaction. On the back of it was written in your own hand, that I ſhould learn all particulars from the letters of *Beneram Pundit*, and the execution of your deſigns is delayed till you receive my advice and opinion. From this writing in your own hand, I received great encouragement in my duty, and the letter of *Beneram Pundit*, which was doubtleſs written agreeable to your directions, has made me acquainted with all your deſigns and intentions. Agreeable to the former cuſtoms of *Bengal*, and the preſent firm ſtate of our friendſhip, notwithſtanding the hoſtile deſigns of all quarters, which not only prevent an intercourſe and correſpondence by letters and meſſages, but have interrupted and deſtroyed the peace and friendſhip which has ſubſiſted for many years with the people of *Decan*, and have occaſioned many conſiderable difficulties, which would take up much time to enumerate, and which may eaſily be learnt by you; I have continually written in ſuch a manner, by the directions of the Rajah my maſter, both in what I wrote after the arrival of Colonel *Goddard* at *Horſhungabad*, and of Mr. *Watherſtone* at *Naigpore*, and after it was thought adviſable and proper that I ſhould go to *Poonah*, and undertake ſecret and open negotiations with the Miniſters of *Poonah*, on ſeveral matters relating

relating to the Engliſh, and in writing about the ſituation of all affairs, however inconſiderable, in adviſing you to obſerve the rules of peace, and to remain ſtedfaſt to your treaties, like the branches of a large river, of which one runs towards *Calcutta*, and the other to *Surat*; that is to ſay, that I have written in this manner to both ſides, and this not for my own advantage, but ſolely from my friendſhip to the Engliſh gentlemen, to procure the eaſe of the people, and the final ſtop to all diſputes and miſunderſtandings, and a peaceable reſt to all the countries, towns, and villages, in ſuch a manner as no other perſon can ever have written. But as no explicit anſwer was received from any quarter, on which a treaty might have been founded, through the mediation and guarantee of the Rajah my maſter, being remedileſs, I took leave of the Miniſters of *Poonah*, and returned to *Naigpore*, and in conſequence of the meaſures of the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah Behadre*, who before wrote to all quarters, to demand troops of them, I inſtantly began aſſembling the troops, and raiſing new forces on the ghaut *Lakenwara*, on the banks of the river *Ganges* in *Decan*; and remained employed in that buſineſs, for near three months; but my friendſhip and good wiſhes lead me to write the ſituation of all affairs, in a full manner, to *Beneram Pundit*, in a Hindoſtany letter, and to direct him to return from *Benares* to *Calcutta*, and explain all the particulars to you, and procure a ſpeedy anſwer to them, thinking that till that time, the troops would remain inactive and preparing their ſtores, &c. But when, from the great diſtance, your anſwer was late before it arrived, and as the Poonah Miniſters, from their foreſight into theſe affairs, entered into a league with *Hyder Naig*, and *Scindeah* and *Holcar* met the Engliſh army in *Guzerat*, upon the repeated calls of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowla*, and the meſſages of *Pundit Purdhaun*, it became neceſſary to march the army from *Lakenwara* towards *Sumelpore*, which is 300 coſs, and even more diſtant from it, and at this time Rajah *Khundajee Bhoſla* has undoubtedly reached *Sumelpore*, and even paſſed beyond it. Accordingly, immediately upon receiving your Kareta and letter, and learning the contents of what you wrote in your own hand writing, and of the letters of *Beneram Pundit*, to which you referred me, I wrote to the Miniſters of *Poonah* whatever I thought proper and adviſable towards the confirming and ſtrengthening their friendly intentions. Now that General *Goddard* and *Scindeah* are in the neighbourhood of each other with their forces and are on the eve of hoſtilities, we muſt wait to ſee what overtures will come from that quarter, after they ſhall learn the events in that diſtrict, upon which their whole attention is engroſſed; I will write them to you without the leaſt reſerve or omiſſion. Before any letters written in your own hand were received here, the activity and diligence which I ſhewed in bringing about theſe matters, it is needleſs to mention, and would be only vain boaſting; but now that I have received this explicit letter, in which from your confidence and faith in me you refer the ſettlement of all matters entirely to this quarter, how is it poſſible that I can be guilty of the ſmalleſt negligence in them? On the contrary, I will exert myſelf in them as far as my ſtrength and life will go, and even further. Had this poſtſcript in your own hand given me this degree of ſtrength and ſatisfaction before, every thing would certainly have been ſettled.—At preſent alſo, by the bleſſing of God, who aſſiſts and befriends all who pay ſtrict regard to truth, faith, and engagements, every thing will end well.

Poſtſcript.—What you write to induce the Rajah to undertake theſe negociations to this purport, that the determination in your affairs is delayed for the counſel and advice of this quarter, and that it matters not whether your deſigns are delayed by it: the caſe is this, that this expreſſion is as ſecret and difficult to be underſtood as it ought to be; but what I can diſcover it is neceſſary ſhould be written plainly and without reſerve, and is as follows: that when the Rajah for theſe two years has been pointed at by all perſons high and low, like a flag or the new moon, on account of his friendſhip for the Engliſh gentlemen, and has come into the meaſures of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, and agreed to raiſe an army and ſend his ſon towards *Bengal* ſuch a length of way, he has taken upon himſelf the expences of the troops, which for the ſole pay amount to four lacks of rupees per month, and amount in the year to a crore of rupees, not ſolely from the hopes of having them paid by the Miniſters of *Poonah*, but from his fixed obedience to the family of the Rajah, and reſolution to keep up the ancient treaties ſubſiſting with them, from their having reſided at the ſame place, and from the proximity of their territories, and their agreeing in all matters. All the hopes which he has of being eaſed of theſe expences, and of gaining other advantages, are from your friendſhip and alliance, and the rights of this quarter are firmly obſerved by you. The Rajah my maſter has written all theſe matters fully in anſwer to *Beneram Pundit*'s Hindoſtany letter. You will conſider them to be written agreeable to my maſter's and my directions, and will not be diſpirited in any of your great deſigns; but having peruſed them with the greateſt attention, ſend a ſpeedy anſwer to them, as I am in great anxiety for the arrival of it. As the friendſhip between the family of *Boſſla* and your Highneſs is increaſed to ſo great a degree, I am hopeful that you will frequently favour me with letters containing the ſtate of your quarters, and the nature of your deſigns, and conſider me as one whoſe hopes are in your favour.

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Second Poſtſcript.—As in the preſent ſcarcity of good men you admit of no equal either in courage, ſpirit, reſolution, and magnanimity, or in your knowledge of mankind, or in prudence and foreſight, or in the faithful obſervance of treaties and engagements, or in the attention to the rights of friendſhip, or in ſkill in diſcovering what is right or wrong, conſiderable or inconſiderable in the affairs of Government, or in the keeping ſtrict to the rules of care and caution, and of juſtice, I am therefore greatly deſirous of ſettling a ſtrict intimacy with *Pundit Purdhaun*, and with his permiſſion to repair to the Preſence by the road of *Mundela* or *Ballaſore*, and to have an interview with you to make you acquainted with all the attachments and good wiſhes which I have for you, and to draw from that fountain of knowledge and prudence ſuch counſels as may be the means of ſettling and bringing to an iſſue all deſigns, and may give me ſatisfaction and eaſe of mind in many matters. I am hopeful that you will ſpeedily favour me with an anſwer, granting this my requeſt; and may the Almighty grant, that it come to paſs!

A true copy.
(Signed) *G. F. Cherry.*

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No. 300.

The Governor General delivers in the following minute:

The Governor General—The members of the Board having been furniſhed with copies of the letters which have been written by *Moodajee Boſſla* and his Dewan to *Beneram Pundit*, their Vackeel or Miniſter at this Government, containing, in a very long detail, the motives and views of the Government of *Berar*. Theſe I think improper to be entered on our records, but I recommend them to the attention of the Board in their conſideration of the conduct which we are to obſerve towards that Government.

From the declaration made in theſe letters, and from other advices, it appears that urged by the demands of the Adminiſtration at *Poonah* and the menaces of the Nabob *Nizam ul Mulck*, the Rajah hath levied a conſiderable force, ſaid to conſiſt of 50,000 horſe, oſtenſibly deſtined to co-operate with the Peiſhwa, by invading *Bengal* and the dominions of our ally the Nabob of *Oude*. That one diviſion of 30,000 horſe commanded

by

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by *Chimnajee Booſla*, the Rajah's ſecond ſon, has been accordingly diſpatched to our frontier by the road of *Cuttack*, and has been ſome time ſince arrived in the neighbourhood of that city, where it is propoſed that it ſhall canton during the rainy ſeaſon.

The Rajah and his Dewan both profeſs the moſt ſteady attachment to the Company, and a reſolution to preſerve the peace and good underſtanding which have ſubſiſted between that Government and the Engliſh ſince the period in which the latter firſt obtained a ſhare in the political concerns of theſe provinces.

Theſe profeſſions have been repeated in all their letters, and ſanctified by the moſt ſolemn atteſtations. However ſuſpicious ſuch voluntary proteſtations may generally appear, there can be no valid reaſon for refuſing a certain degree of credit to them on the preſent occaſion, as they are perfectly conſiſtent with what we know to be the intereſt of the Booſla family, and with the conduct which it has invariably obſerved towards the Government of *Bengal* from the acceſſion of *Tamoojee* to the preſent time. Its natural enemies are the Chiefs whoſe dominions border immediately upon the diſtricts of *Berar*, and lie in many places intermixed with them; that is to ſay, the Peiſhwa, *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and *Mhadajee Scindia*. The Company cannot be regarded in the ſame light, becauſe the line of country which joins their poſſeſſions to *Berar* is ſo wild and uncultivated that no cauſe of competition can ariſe reſpecting it, and the territories of each in thoſe parts yield little advantage to the proprietors. The claim of the Berar Government to the chout of theſe provinces is ſo antiquated that though it might be revived as a pretext, it could never operate as an inducement to invade them, on any other principles than thoſe which are the grounds of original conqueſts; nor could ſuch an enterprize be formed without great and certain hazards, a length of hoſtilities, and a proportionate expence (to which the reſources of *Berar* are inadequate) and the expoſure of its own internal poſſeſſions to the ambition and rapacity of its neighbours.

The habits of a long intercourſe of friendſhip, and the benefits which are mutually and equally derived by both Governments from a continuance of the ſame degree of union, may likewiſe be aſſumed as arguments of the favourable diſpoſition of that Government towards this, even under the preſent appearances. Yet the contrary, notwithſtanding the ſtrong grounds which appear for this concluſion, may be the caſe; and even with the beſt intentions, the ſteps through which the Berar Government, in the accommodation of an oſtenſible plan to its own ſecret wiſhes, may be inſenſibly led, may terminate in hoſtilities againſt us.

From the whole of this review it appears to be the proper policy of this Government to conſider and treat that of *Berar* in the character which it profeſſes, but to guard againſt the poſſibility of its becoming hoſtile to us.

This policy at the ſame time fortunately coincides with the preſent views of that Government, and may be made to promote them. The Rajah and his Miniſter have from the beginning expreſſed the ſtrongeſt deſire to become the mediators of peace between us and the Marattas; and this deſire is more ſtrenuouſly urged in their laſt than in any of their former letters, which may be accounted for on good grounds, for it is certainly their intereſt to be the inſtruments of bringing the war to a termination, by means which muſt enhance their conſequence, and relieve them from certain difficulties and expence. The Rajah informs us that he has written to the Peiſhwa and offered his interceſſion to accommodate matters with us, confiding in the aſſurances given him by this Government, of its willingneſs to agree to peace through his mediation, and to his guarantee for the maintenance of it; and has propoſed that his Dewan ſhall come to *Ballaſore* or *Benares* with credentials and full powers from the Peiſhwa to negociate and conclude a treaty of peace: let us avail ourſelves of this favourable diſpoſition; let his mediation be accepted, and his Dewan invited to come for that purpoſe to *Calcutta*. I am firmly of opinion, that peace can only be accompliſhed by this or ſome other mode that ſhall put the negociations for it within the reach and immediate controul of this Government. The ſeat of war is not the ſoil adapted by nature for the growth of peace; yet while every means are employed to promote this end, we muſt not ſlacken in thoſe which may give us an advantage in the war, if our hopes of a ſpeedy termination of it ſhould be fruſtrated: on the contrary, this ſeaſon and theſe hopes require a redoubled exertion on our part in the proſecution of the war, as a neceſſary concurrence with the meaſures which we may take for the concluſion of it.—For this reaſon I recommend that the order lately paſſed for the reduction of Captain *Popham*'s detachment be ſuſpended; that the Sepoys of the detachment be immediately formed into three regular battalions, and added to the detachment allotted to Major *Camac*. Let it be given in inſtructions to Major *Camac*, if he ſhall find it practicable, to march this detachment, in conjunction with the forces which the Rana by his treaty will be obliged in ſuch a caſe to furniſh, directly to *Oogein*, the capital of the territory dependant upon *Mhadjee Scindia*. This cannot fail to divert him from the war in *Guzerat*; and by bringing it home to his own intereſts, which have hitherto been wholly exempted from it, induce him to be an equal ſolicitor for peace, to which at this time he appears to be the only impediment. In effect, all advices confirm the information contained in the Berar letters of the oppoſition of *Scindia*'s wiſhes to thoſe of the Miniſter in this particular inſtance: the only obſtacle to this deſign is the force which the Maratta Government actually poſſeſſes in *Calpee* and *Bundlecund*. A diſcretionary power ſhould be given to Major *Camac* to remove this by any means, either by negociation or force, which he ſhall judge neceſſary, and which ſhall not be likely to detain him from his main object. From all the intelligence which has been lately received from that quarter, this appears to be no difficult work, as the Maratta power in that country is not in itſelf very conſiderable, and thoſe who poſſeſs it are diſaffected to the Government on which they depend. The purpoſe of undertaking this expedition and its motives may be communicated to *Moodajee Booſla*; he cannot diſapprove it, nor is it likely to give ſuch offence to the Miniſter of *Poonah* (whoſe jealouſy of *Madajee Scindia* is well known) as to excite in his mind any new objection to a pacification.

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Letter from *Dewagur Pundit*; received 13th September 1780.

YOUR letter dated the 1ſt Rejeb, containing an explicit explanation of your ſentiments and your wiſhes reſpecting peace, &c. friendſhip with *Pundit Purdhaun* and his Miniſters; that you had always been inclined to peace, but you could not think of entering into one upon the faith of a mere piece of paper, unleſs ſtrengthened by ſome ſtrong and binding tie; that now conſidering the well-known attachment to faith, adherence to engagements, and ſteady friendſhip which have always diſtinguiſhed the Bhoſila family, and have been tried for twenty years by your Government, you have placed the moſt implicit confidence on the guarantee of the Maha Rajah; that you did not enter into the preſent war from your own wiſh, but that the failure of an expedition from *Bombay* without your knowledge, which brought the honour of the Engliſh and their ſafety into danger, made it neceſſary for you to ſend General *Goddard* to their aſſiſtance, for the ſupporting of your dignity and the ſecuring your poſſeſſions; that as by the

favour

favour of God the General's expedition had ſucceeded, you can accede to the bringing about an accommodation between the Poonah Miniſters and the Engliſh Company through my mediation, on ſuch terms as may be for the honour and intereſt of the Company. That on this head you need not ſay any thing, but that as the Maha Rajah had made a voluntary offer of his mediation, his juſtice and friendſhip will prevent him from liſtening to any overtures which it would not become you to receive. That whenever the Maha Rajah ſhall have obtained ſatisfactory anſwers from the Miniſters of *Poonah*, and their credentials to treat with you, through my intervention, you will be happy to meet me, for the purpoſe of making a treaty under the guarantee of the Maha Rajah, and that without a perſonal communication you cannot explain yourſelf further; honoured me, by its arrival in a happy hour, together with a Karetah for my maſter; and gave me great pleaſure by its contents, which informed me of all your ſentiments, and of all matters without reſerve. Theſe particulars were likewiſe fully underſtood by the Maha Rajah my maſter.—Before this, three letters and Karetahs arrived addreſſed to the Maha Rajah, containing important matters, and having this written in your own hand, that you had given full powers to this quarter for theſe negociations; and had entruſted the controlling of all points to this ſide, and would agree to every thing, even ſhould it occaſion loſſes to yourſelf and advantages to this quarter; that therefore we ſhould act in ſuch manner as ſhould ſeem beſt to us. In conformity to this, every thing which was thought adviſable and tending to the advantage and proſpect of peace, was written to the Miniſters: in anſwer to this, it was written from *Poonah*, that this matter was of the higheſt importance; and that the negociation reſpecting the former, preſent, and future treaties, could not be undertaken upon ſo vague a letter, till every particular was fully diſcuſſed. It was neceſſary that we ſhould write to you all the articles of the former treaties, which have been forgot and broken through, and write them after we ſhould receive an explicit anſwer from you: that as you are reſolved to abide by the articles of the treaties, they likewiſe have always been ſtedfaſt in this obſervance of treaties, and know not the ſmalleſt advantage in war and diſputes. In conſequence of this, knowing it to be unadviſable to commit all theſe matters to writing, I have diſpatched to your quarter *Bejy Ram Pundit*, a man of confidence, an inhabitant of *Benares*, and a relation of *Beneram Pundit*, with letters, and Karetahs, and memorandums of the articles which have been broken and omitted, which the Poonah Miniſters had wrote down; and have verbally committed to the ſaid *Pundit*, many particulars of our ſentiments on all points of this buſineſs, and the many advantages of friendſhip and obſervance of treaties, together with the evils and loſſes attending diſputes and war, which he will doubtleſs, directly after his arrival, explain to you in a full and particular manner through the intervention of *Beneram Pundit*; and I am convinced that your juſtice and love of truth, together with your prudence, foreſight, and extenſive political knowledge, will lead you to approve of his repreſentations, and to give an explicit and ſatisfactory anſwer to them.

After the departure of *Bijy Ram Pundit*, what was written in anſwer to the letters of *Beneram Pundit* which you had cauſed to be written by him, and at the beginning and ending of which you added a few Perſian lines, purporting, that on account of the ſickneſs of your Moonſhey, you had delayed replying to my letters, but that you would ſoon diſpatch an anſwer; and that in the mean while, I ſhould conſider the Hindoſtanny letter of the *Pundit* as written with your approbation, and conveying your ſentiments; will have been underſtood by you. At preſent that this letter from you with a Karetah for the Maha Rajah has been received; although it contains your reſolution of making peace and friendſhip with the Miniſters of *Poonah*, yet two or three ſentences in it have given me great reaſon to think, namely, that by the favour of God, the expedition of General *Goddard* has ſucceeded, and that you can therefore enter into a peace upon ſuch terms as may be for the intereſt and honour of the Engliſh Company; and that we will not liſten to any overtures from the Miniſters of *Poonah*, which it will not become you to accept of, becauſe in your former letters, you beſtowed on this ſide in your hand writing, the ſole and full powers of managing theſe negociations; and in your preſent letter, although you ſtill keep your firm reſolution of making peace, yet it may be ſeen that you reſtore more in your own hands, and diminiſh the powers granted to this quarter. It is however of no conſequence, for while a negociation of great conſequence in which the political affairs of the country, the eaſe and ſecurity of the inhabitants, and the protection of the poſſeſſions are concerned, is in agitation, till it has been adjuſted and properly cleared up and ſettled, the events and conſequences of it, and the open and hidden parts are well conſidered, and the granting powers, and the beſtowing unlimited authority, or the reſerving the deciding power, we maturely weighed, and after that the matter is determined, agreeable to what prudence, foreſight, and wiſdom requires, I am in all caſes your true well-wiſher and ſincere friend; and never did, nor ever ſhall, by any doubts in this point, forget my faith and promiſes, or omit to write you on all ſubjects, or neglect your intereſts and advantages, but am firm and ſincere in my attachment. Before this I wrote you long and frequent letters on the ſubject of peace and friendſhip, and procured full powers from you to act in this buſineſs, and I now write again, and requeſt that you will give what I write room in your breaſt; it is as follows: When I went the ſecond time to *Poonah*, I told *Nanna Purnaveeſe* plainly, that he muſt not conſider the advantages they had gained over the people of *Bombay* as a victory, nor imagine the loſs which the Chief of *Bombay* had ſuffered, to be a defeat of the Engliſh; that this matter would be of long continuance, and that the conſequences of it would be a long war, which would cauſe the deſtruction and devaſtation of the confines of both countries; that as the Engliſh poſſeſſed ſtrong places, ſuch as *Madras*, *Pondicherry*, *Sinkacool*, *Rajebundy*, and other ſtrong forts in the *Decan*, well ſupplied with proviſions, and military ſtores of powder, ball, cannons and muſkets, and other powerful ſupplies; and beſides, that whilſt their power and authority extended over many ſoubahs, and countries of *Hind*, while their courage and bravery were ſo great, and their treaſures and reſources ſo extenſive, and while ſo many Powers were attached to them from their hearts, it was the moſt adviſable to ſettle this matter upon peaceable and friendly terms. *Nanna Purnaveeſe* replied, that he had not ſtepped out of the line of peace and faithful obſervance of treaties; that whatever had happened proceeded from the Chief of *Bombay*; that whenever he, contrary to expreſs engagements, had taken *Ragonaut Row* with him, and had croſſed at *Bhore Gaut*, and arrived within four coſs of *Poonah*, the hoſtile beginning of the Engliſh obliged him likewiſe to riſk an open attack, and that he accordingly did what was incumbent on him; that notwithſtanding this, he is ſtill ſtedfaſt to the treaties, and that I might judge which ſide had been guilty of breaches in their engagements. That they openly aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*, which is expreſsly forbidden by the treaty, and that he left it to me to judge. At that time letters from *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, containing profeſſions of friendſhip and peace, and aſſurances of his abiding by his treaties, were ſent, together with letters from me to General *Goddard*, and perſons of truſt were diſpatched for the purpoſe of negociation; and beſides this, what was proper to be written was written to *Calcutta*; but however, in this matter the will of God was done, and ſtill takes effect. The ſhort of all my former attempts is this, that from my ſpeaking the truth, which in the time of victory feels bitter, *Nanna Purnaveeſe* would not conſider the conſequences and future

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ture events of what had happened. All theſe matters, together with the whole particulars of the *Decan*, with which I am better acquainted than any one elſe, I from my old and firm friendſhip wrote to you fully; namely, the victories of the Maratta army in *Hindoſtan*, and their conqueſts in that country, as far as the river *Sindah*, on the borders of *Cabill*. That although from the revolutions of worldly affairs, which are continually ſhifting, the private concerns of *Pundit Purdhaun Peiſhwa* ſhould ſuffer from his not acknowledging the rights of *Ragonaut Row*; yet that in caſe of neceſſity, they can bring two lacks of horſe into the field, where they conſider it a victory to be able to fly off and return again, and never to expoſe themſelves within the reach of cannon, but to remain watching for favourable opportunities, by which conduct they always effect their views, and have been able to poſſeſs themſelves of ſo large a tract of country, that they poſſeſs about 300 ſtrong forts; that they have gained over *Hyder Ally* to be equally united with them as the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah*; that therefore to perſiſt without cauſe in an open war with them, was a reſolution of ruining the country and poſſeſſions; that it was therefore adviſable to keep ſtedfaſt to the treaties, and to deſiſt from aſſiſting *Ragonaut Row*, which was an open breach of them, and to give me full powers to effect a reconciliation. Although General *Goddard*, conſiſtent with the honour of the Engliſh gentlemen, ſuffered many difficulties during four months that he oppoſed the numerous armies of *Sindeah* and *Holcar*, and never made any ſhew of friendſhip, and never once in his anſwers to the meſſages of *Pundit Peiſhwa*, did he ſeem inclined to effect a peace, yet you, from your great political knowledge and true wiſdom, in anſwer to the letters of this quarter, dictated by the moſt ſincere friendſhip and attachment, have till this time continued to write letters of the higheſt ſentiments of affection and friendſhip, and were never from the beginning inclined to this war; but it is certain that General *Goddard*'s march from *Hoſhungabad* was abſolutely after the defeat of the Bombay Chief, neceſſary for the defence of the honour of the Engliſh, and for the ſecurity of their poſſeſſions; for this purpoſe, from which the greateſt advantages are to be derived, I ſhall exert myſelf to the utmoſt of my power, and even further, as long as I have life; and the Maha Rajah will take care to inſure and guarantee it; but it is equally of no effect to ſpeak the truth to either ſide; for till the light of the ſun ſhines clear and bright, the violence of war will never ſubſide, and till the negociation of approvals and refuſals, of denials and aſſents in many points, takes place between you, the wiſhes and concerns of both ſides cannot be effected.

Immediately on the receipt of your letter, I diſpatched to *Poonah*, *Jadaſeo Pundit*, who was here entruſted by *Pundit Peiſhwa*, together with letters, containing the points which can be aſſented to, and thoſe which will be refuſed; and informing them that if they wiſh to make peace, it muſt be on thoſe terms, and that they muſt inveſt me with complete powers, in which caſe every thing may be equally balanced on both ſides, and neither ſcale have leſs or more weight than the other. After his arrival at *Poonah*, he will explain to them every matter, both of conſequence and inconſiderable, and whatever can be ſettled there, immediate intelligence ſhall be given you; by that time anſwers will have been received from *Bejy Ram Pundit* who has been ſent to your quarter, entruſted with all our ſentiments, and in conformity to his letters, whatever ought to be determined ſhall take effect.

General *Goddard* writes about his own victories, and *Sindeah* and *Holcar* in their letters talk of their ſtrength and ſucceſſes: which of theſe accounts are we to ſuppoſe true, and which falſe? Wherever there is war there is falſhood, and nothing but loſſes and diſadvantages are to be expected from it: in my opinion, neither are thoſe victories victories, nor are thoſe defeats defeats. When the roots of both ſides remain ſtill firm in their own poſ-

ſeſſions, like the wall of *Alexander* what has been derived from theſe victories and defeats? The buſineſs is with the root not the top. As you have in this matter mentioned the honour and credit of the Engliſh, and have written that we will not liſten to any thing from the Poonah Miniſters which you cannot aſſent to; ſir, the reputation and honour of the Engliſh gentlemen is firmly eſtabliſhed and ſpreads every where, and General *Goddard* to repair the ſmall loſs of the Bombay Chief, ſhewed the greateſt courage, ſkill and activity in the war, and brought the water which had left its banks back into its bed. There now therefore remains nothing more to be done by war, and the honour and courage of the Engliſh has been publiſhed to every one; and beſides the Maha Rajah, from his great friendſhip and affection for the Engliſh, regards their reputation and honour more than his own life; and conſidering his own honour is connected with and dependant on it, how therefore can he ever liſten to any thing which will be improper for your aſſent? Or how can I who am loaded with your favours and friendſhip ever ſuffer it? But as you have now determined upon peace, under the guarantee of this quarter, it is therefore incumbent on the guarantee to conſult the advantage of both ſides in his negociation, and whatever may be done by either part contrary to the treaties and engagements, firſt he ought to forbid it, and afterwards reprove them for their conduct; and when he can bring them to a perfect agreement, then to add this guarantee to it, and to ſecure the duration of it. To be ſecurity between powerful and warlike Chiefs is not in the power of every one, but requires a perſon of great ſtrength. The whole efforts of this quarter will be neceſſary to terminate the negociation; you have therefore done wiſely in committing this office of guarantee to ſo powerful a Chief as the Maha Rajah, for by his means every point will be properly adjuſted. This quarter therefore is not backward in ſpeaking and writing the truth to either ſide; but conſiders that in ſo doing friendſhips with both ſides and their general reputation is increaſed. In a word, what you write reſpecting the honour of the Engliſh, will in every negociation be our chief care; but this is ſtill vague, nor have you ſufficiently explained it: as it is incumbent on this quarter, in the character of guarantee, to attend equally to the honour of both ſides, it is neceſſary that you write plainly in what points you conſider the honour of the Engliſh concerned. Before this, in your letters to the Miniſters of *Poonah*, you wrote that you were ready to aſſent to every thing which was conſiſtent with the honour of your Government, and that you would abide by the treaty of Colonel *Upton*, and that the new engagements were entered into without your knowledge; I have therefore entruſted with *Bejy Ram Pundit* a memorandum of ſuch articles in the treaty of the Colonel which have been broken by the aſſiſtance afforded *Ragonaut Row* and by the affair of *Shaſtie*, &c. This he will deliver to you, and you will, after peruſing it, perceive whether it is true or falſe. If it is true, then you muſt determine upon conforming to them, and upon extinguiſhing the flames of diſcord with the water of peace. The negociations which will at this time take place reſpecting the country of *Gojeraut* and the aſſignments made by *Futtah Sing Guicowar*, &c. for the expences of the new-raiſed followers and the large ſum of money which General *Goddard* collected in the plunder of the town and villages, a ſeparate memorandum of them has been likewiſe given to *Bejy Ram*, which when you have peruſed, and determined on what is to be done, you will write to me. Thus every matter is on the point of being ſettled, and will ſoon be adjuſted by a perfect reconciliation under the guarantee of the Maha Rajah, when the friends and enemies of both ſides will become the ſame; the greateſt benefits will be derived from the accommodation, and the loſſes of both ſides turned into advantages. You muſt therefore write to General *Goddard* whatever is adviſable, and ſend orders to the Chief of *Bombay*, who has

invaded the diſtrict of *Cokun*, where he is daily engaged in hoſtilities with the army of *Pundit Purdhaun*, to deſiſt from theſe proceedings, which during a negociation for peace are very improper. As ſoon as I receive your explicit anſwer in theſe points, and when I ſhall have informed the Poonah Miniſters of it, I will then begin my journey to your quarter, and have the ſatisfaction of an interview with you, which has long been my moſt earneſt wiſh, and in perſon make known to you many particulars and views which cannot be committed to writing.

As from the diſtance between us it requires two months for the Coſſids to go and return, and as there are ſtill two months to the end of the rainy ſeaſon, it is adviſable that you loſe no time in ſending a full and explicit anſwer.

For further particulars I beg leave to refer you to *Beneram Pundit*, to whom I have written more fully, and from whoſe repreſentations you will have complete information, As I am a ſincere well-wiſher to you, and entertain no other thoughts but thoſe of the moſt ſtedfaſt friendſhip and attachment to you, you will therefore conſider to have been dictated by my great affection to you, all that I have above written, without the ſmalleſt reſerve, and knowing that I have given you full intelligence of every matter, reflect on it, and determine according to juſtice.

Poſtſcript.—In anſwer to what you from your great friendſhip write, of the reports of our enemies reſpecting the army which is arrived at *Cuttack*, where a ſtrict intimacy has been effected, and all diſtinction removed, how can any thing be done to be pointed at by the enemies? ſet your mind at eaſe, I will give you timely information of any thing that may be determined on.

From *Modajee Bhoſila*; received 13th September 1780.

Your letter of the 1ſt Rejeb, to the following purport, &c. arrived on a happy day, namely, the 1ſt Shabaun, which ſhew with a light, giving increaſe to friendſhip, and which brought me the completion of my wiſhes and deſires. This letter, after firſt giving me the ſincereſt ſatisfaction, informed me of your intentions for peace, and your reſolutions for the negociations with the Poonah Miniſters, in conſequence. The happy conjunction of thoſe two days, which is a moſt bleſſed occurrence, and does very ſeldom happen, brought with it theſe lucky events, namely, the ſettling of every matter agreeable to my wiſhes, and cauſed ſuch additional verdure in the garden of our friendſhip, that the fragrant odour of it has in every breath, given new life to my ſoul; God grant that it may be daily increaſed, and for ever ſupported by a more intimate and affectionate connection. As our mutual friendſhip is publicly known through all the Soubahs of *Bengal*, from our long intercourſe of letters, and as all the inhabitants of *Decan* talk of the friendſhip of the Engliſh for this quarter, and from that, entertain ſuſpicions of me, my heart is therefore at all times, and in all ſituations, conſulting and wiſhing for your intereſts and advantage, and I continually write in the moſt unreſerved manner every thing which appears to me adviſable; and you likewiſe are firmly reſolved to do whatever is proper and neceſſary for the maintaining this excellent intercourſe, as may be plainly and clearly diſcovered from the contents of your anſwers; and although the triplicate Karetahs lately received contain many and long particulars with this view, yet the ſhort of them can be collected from the poſtſcript, written at the foot in your own hand, by which you give me full powers in theſe negociations, and in which you write, that although the effecting and ſettling this treaty ſhould be to your damage, yet ſhould it be for the advantage of this quarter you will agree to it. When friendſhip and alliance ſubſiſts upon ſuch intimate terms, and the chief and full authority is intruſted to one ſide, the loſſes of one ſide become the loſſes of the other, and the advantages of both ſides are the ſame. Notwithſtanding the difficulties I have brought on myſelf, by raiſing and keeping up this new army, the cauſes of which are well known to you, yet all my views in bearing them, are from your friendſhip and juſtice. What now appears to be the moſt adviſable policy, is the making and maintaining peace and alliance between the Engliſh and *Pundit Purdhaun*, the advantages and conſequences of which I have before this written to you at large in many letters; and before the arrival of your laſt letter, I ſent to *Calcutta Bejy Ram Pundit*, with a liſt of the omiſſions and breaches in the former treaty and in that of Colonel *Upton*, and doubt not but that upon his arrival he will through the intervention of *Beneram Pundit*, explain every particular to you; and that you from your great prudence and knowledge will attend to and approve of them, and will be convinced, that there is nothing in this world to compare to friendſhip and unity; as ſoon as this important matter is determined between two powerful States, the eaſe of the people, and the ſecurities of the cities and towns is inſured, and all the poſſeſſions of both ſides are protected from damages: I have therefore no doubt but that you will ſend me an explicit anſwer, and that from your wiſdom and foreſight you will approve of every thing that I ſaid to my miniſter *Dewagur Pundit*, after I had fully informed myſelf of the contents of your letter which the ſaid *Pundit* has written to you in an unreſerved manner, and will be able to diſcover whether they were dictated by true friendſhip, or by mere politeneſs. As the office of guarantee in this important buſineſs is committed by you to me, it is therefore incumbent on the guarantee to write the plain and open truth to both ſides, and to bring both with equal weight into the ſcales of friendſhip; for where the guarantee does not attend equally to the intereſts of both parties, no point can be ſettled properly; it was therefore neceſſary for my Miniſter, to write all matters at large, and it is equally neceſſary and adviſable, that a full, and explicit anſwer be returned to it as ſoon as poſſible. For the well ſettling and adjuſting of all theſe points, I have ſent to *Poonah Sadaſio Pundit*, a confidential perſon, who reſided here intruſted with all the concerns of *Pundit Purdhaun*; we ſhall ſee what he will be able to effect, of which immediate information ſhall be given you. A memorandum of all the omiſſions and breaches in the articles of Colonel *Upton*'s treaty, has been committed to *Bejy Ram Pundit*, who on his arrival will preſent it to you; and a note of ſuch negociations as will take place reſpecting the Talooks and Tannahs of *Gojeraut*, the affairs of the Guicawars, the accounts of the new troops raiſed on both ſides for this war, and the invaſions and devaſtations of the Bombay Chief in *Cokun*, were he has taken ſeveral places is incloſed in the letter to *Beneram Pundit*, who will preſent it to you for your peruſal and approbation; when you will write a full and explicit anſwer to the preſent and former memorandums, that no miſunderſtanding may remain, but that all diſputes may, by the refuſing and granting of all points, be changed into a firm and laſting friendſhip. In all my proceedings in this matter, I have had no other view, but the proving my friendſhip and affection for you, and I conſider the honour and reputation of the Engliſh, the ſame as my own; but in the caſe of a guarantee, the honour and credit of the other ſide is likewiſe to be attended to in the negociations, without which, nothing can be ſettled properly; whenever theſe points are determined by you in a ſuitable manner, it will be highly adviſable and proper for *Dewagur Pundit* to go immediately to *Calcutta*, for the purpoſe of preparing the treaty, and of acquainting you with many of my views, which are entirely and ſincerely tending to your intereſts and honour. As there are two months to the end of the rains, the ſooner an anſwer can be received the better; and it is neceſſary that General *Goddard* and the Bombay Chief receive poſitive orders to deſiſt from the hoſtilities they have commenced in the diſtrict of *Cokun*. In ſhort, I have no view or intention in what I have written, but the performing

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performing the duties of friendſhip, and the conſulting your intereſts and advantage; of this be well convinced. For further particulars, I refer you to the Hindoſtanny letter of *Beneram Pundit*.

Poſtſcript. The ſame as the one to *Dewagur Pundit*'s letter.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Dewan *Dewagur Pundit* to *Beneram Pundit*: written the 14th Shabaun, (16th Auguſt) received the 13th September 1780.

Your letter diſpatched the 29th Jemadiaſſanie (3d July) and received the 25th Rejib (28th July) the contents thereof fully explaining and particularizing your conferences with the Governor General, written by his order, and ſigned by him, I clearly underſtand, and have communicated the ſtate and circumſtances of every matter, very particularly, to *Bejy Ram Doby*, and ſent him to you after his arrival; he will acquaint you with his commiſſion. You write me, that the indiſpoſition of the Governor's Moonſhey and the want of a Karetah, has occaſioned the delay of the letter to the Preſence, but that you have at length diſpatched it, ſigned in Perſian and Engliſh; nevertheleſs, the Karetah containing the Governor's letter to the Maha Rajah, with one to me, did not arrive till eight days after the receipt of yours, and there was no letter from you with it. The Governor's letter is very particular, and the purport of it is, that peace and amity with the Peiſhwa is neceſſary; but does he expect it is to be done by a piece of paper? he ſays, was I fully authorized on the part of the Peiſhwa to ſettle this buſineſs, he ſhould be very happy, for he is well convinced I would propoſe nothing that would not be acceptable to him, and propoſe the Rajah to be the mediator and guarantee, and to make peace with the Peiſhwa, but how pleaſing ſoever the words of Engliſh gentlemen may be, they ſhould be open and undiſguiſed. My friend, we are continually writing an abridgement of real facts, under the veil of particular arrangements. If the miniſters of *Poonah* will write, and give me leave to go to *Calcutta*, fully authorized to confer on the terms of peace, then ſhould I arrive there, and any evaſions or diſputes ſhould ariſe, it would be difficult for me to ſhew my face here again. Hitherto I have ſeveral times been mediator between the Sirdars of the empire, and by the bleſſing of God, peace has been eſtabliſhed, ſo as to ſatisfy all parties, and as yet thank God, I have never been reproached, nor my name abuſed, neither have I had any contention or diſpute afterwards. Between the Maha Rajah and the Governor the tree of friendſhip and concord flouriſhes; but in future the root of friendſhip and unity might be more firmly fixed, and with poſterity might be immoveable, and the Engliſh and the deſcendants of the houſe of *Bhoſila* might be united by ties of friendſhip with one heart and one ſoul. If by the will of God the advantages of ſuch a friendſhip ſhould on my arrival be clearly ſeen and underſtood, and the Governor ſhould be perfectly deſirous and fully inclined to obtain them, I would then firſt ſtrengthen the root of our own friendſhip, and after that thoroughly cleanſe the mind of *Pundit Purdhaun Row* of hatred and rancour, and confirm the agreement by the oaths and faith of each party, and in ſecurity thereof the Maha Rajah ſhould be guarantee; but if I ſhould arrive at *Calcutta*, and any evaſive and deceitful diſcourſe ſhould ariſe, then what advantage can there be in my taking ſo long a journey, although I am thoroughly convinced in every reſpect that the Governor would not deviate from the main buſineſs, nor permit me to be hereafter reproached; but becauſe the Chiefs of the Bhoſila family are famous for keeping faith and fulfilling engagements, ſo that in whatever they may ſay or write there is no deceit or ambiguity, and it being certain that the mind of the Governor is diſpoſed to peace, my name and reputation ſhould be alſo eſtabliſhed. Therefore as the letters of the Governor are inveloped in myſteries, I am under doubts and apprehenſions. It may be I may return in diſgrace; and at this time whatever reputation and friendſhip I have acquired, ſhall I throw it to the winds? I have for this reaſon been thus particular, that preliminaries being ſettled, our conferences may not be fruitleſs, but effectual and to the purpoſe: when I can be certain of that my going to *Calcutta* will be highly fit and proper.

Firſt Preliminary. Colonel *Upton* having concluded a treaty at *Poonah* let that be obſerved and confirmed. If the treaty which the Bombay gentlemen entered into after the battle of *Worgaum* appears to have been forced from them, yet ſurely that with Colonel *Upton* was voluntary, the Bombay gentlemen not having adhered to that, the blame of perfidy and breach of faith lies on them, and they are the cauſe of war, which has loaded each ſide with the immenſe expence of near a crore of rupees. This year General *Goddard* and *Scindia* have been fighting for three months: but what advantage has either obtained? Ruin and devaſtation has been the conſequence to both; it is to the gentlemen of *Bombay* that the cauſe of theſe diſputes and contention muſt be imputed. But let what is paſt be forgot; now it is prudent and adviſable for both ſides to ſtop the current of diſſention, that the Maha Rajah being the mediator and guarantee, may reſtore peace and thereby give eaſe to mankind and ſatisfaction to the Creator; and a firm friendſhip and union being eſtabliſhed, the enemies of both ſides ſhall be confounded. I am a warm friend to both parties; and when I ſay this, God is witneſs of my ſincerity. It is true General *Goddard* has this year taken *Ahmadabad*, and by the attack of *Brodrah* has brought over *Futty Sing Guickwar*, one of the ancient Sirdars, on the ſide of the Peiſhwa, to join him; he has alſo ſubdued *Guzzerat*, and the gentlemen of *Bombay* have taken *Kolean* and two or three other places in the province of *Kocun*. At the time then, when overtures for peace may be attended to by *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Governor, with a ſincere view to a reconciliation, theſe places ſhould be given up, and reſtored to *Pundit Purdhaun* in the ſame manner he before poſſeſſed them; the chout ſhould be collected from the city of *Surat* as before, and whatever Jaghires belong to the Sirdars of the Preſence (Peiſhwa) or others in the province of *Guzzerat*, ſhould be reſtored them, and what remains after that, ſhould be equally divided by *Pundit Purdhaun* and General *Goddard*, and one half given to *Futty Sing* and the other to *Gobind Row Guickwar*, that the honours of the Guickwars may be preſerved, and the promiſe of General *Goddard* fulfilled.

Second. In reſpect to *Ragonaut Row*, *Pundit Purdhaun* ſhould conform to the ſtipulations made for him by Colonel *Upton*, and if any doubt ſhould ariſe that they will not be adhered to, one of the principal Sirdars ſhould be ſecurity for the performance thereof. Let God be witneſs, that nothing ſhall be intended contrary to the terms of the treaty, and let *Ragonaut Row* deſiſt from perfidy.

Third. For theſe two years paſt the expence of the Engliſh army has been very great; ſo has alſo the expence been on the other ſide, of *Pundit Purdhaun*: let there be no demand on either ſide for reimburſing this expence, but let *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Engliſh gentlemen recover their heavy expence by uniting themſelves and jointly attacking their enemies; then whatever countries they may conquer from the enemy after leaving the Jaghires free, what ſhall remain, let them equally divide it like brothers, and reimburſe themſelves. Surely both *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Engliſh gentlemen will readily agree to this.

Fourth. The Governor agreeing to the firſt propoſition, let him write a letter to me under the teſtimony of his faith; and encloſing letters to the gentlemen of *Bombay* and General *Goddard* to this purport, that they ceaſe hoſtilities becauſe of the approaching peace and amity

amity which is about to take place by means of the Maja Rajah; that *Dewan Dewagur Pundit* is ſent by *Pundit Purdhaun* to *Calcutta*, to eſtabliſh and confirm the reconciliation, and that they ſtir not from the places where they now are; then, when I ſhall arrive at *Calcutta*, I may with pleaſure aſſiſt to eſtabliſh friendſhip and unity to the ſatisfaction of both parties; and the General, *Pundit Purdhaun*, and *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, having a friendly meeting, may ſtrengthen the foundation of friendſhip, and whatſoever ſhould be determined on between the Governor and me in our conferences, the General ſhould conform thereto.

Fifth. After I ſhall have been a month with the Governor in *Calcutta*, he ſhall permit me to depart, and ſhall ſend an Engliſh gentleman of quick penetration and ſound judgment with me, that when we arrive at *Poonah* he may deliver up *Ragonaut Row*; according to the terms of the treaty with Colonel *Upton* and General *Goddard*, *Pundit Purdhaun*, and *Nanna Purnaveeſe* ſhall have a meeting at *Poonah* in his preſence, and fixing their ſeals to the treaty, it ſhall be witneſſed by ſome of the Chiefs in ſuch manner as ſhall be preſcribed, after which he may return.

Sixth. The gentlemen of *Bombay* having taken in the province of *Kocun*, *Kolean*, *Belapore*, *Argingur*, and *Indergur*, and having ſubdued ſome other places, theſe ſhall be given up, but *Salſette* having been ſix years in the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh gentlemen, it would ſhow a more ſincere deſire for friendſhip, were they to give this up alſo.

Make theſe conditions known to the Governor General immediately, and ſend me a proper anſwer with all expedition.

If the Governor ſhall be inclined to agree to the terms of the treaty made by Colonel *Upton*, then let letters confirming this agreement be ſent under the pledge of an oath, that my going to *Calcutta*, and the Maha Rajah's being guarantee may be effectual, but if he ſay, how can the Engliſh gentlemen agree to theſe conditions? it may be ſo; yet they are poſſeſſed of excellent wiſdom, penetration, and foreſight, and can ſee what is beſt for the good of mankind: they will therefore certainly agree, and the friendſhip and alliance will remain firm as the baſis of the earth to the end of time. There is no deceit in this; when theſe preliminaries ſhall be ſettled I ſhall go to meet the Governor. My friend, may your health and intereſt daily increaſe.

Though I am a ſtranger in the *Decan*, and not the principal miniſter in the ſervice of the Maha Rajah, yet at this time it happens that I ſhould be choſen to go to *Calcutta* to eſtabliſh friendſhip; this is an extraordinary piece of fortune. When I ſhall arrive in the preſence of the Governor, the army which is in *Cuttack* ſhall be recalled, and the plan which is the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan's*, will be laid aſide.

In the Dewan's own hand.

The Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan* having ſettled the plan of operations, has wrote ſeveral letters to the *Pundit Peiſhwa*, to *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, and *Scindia*, and they have wrote to the Rajah, that according to the plan laid down he ought to invade the Engliſh dominions, and give no reſpite to the *Decan*, in making preparations for war; and they urge this convincing argument, that his giving a free paſſage through his dominions has been the cauſe of all theſe evils. As every one has liſtened to the advice of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, it was neceſſary for us alſo to ſend an army to *Cuttack*; but it is of no conſequence, for like the waters of the ocean, it has not gone beyond its juſt and proper bounds. When peace ſhall be eſtabliſhed between the Governor and *Pundit Purdhaun*, this expence to us ſhall alſo be removed: this is the true ſtate of our mind, and for this reaſon we ſhew ſo much anxiety and unſteadineſs: we are deſirous that peace may be eſtabliſhed between the Governor and *Pundit Purdhaun*, that we may be relieved from theſe importunities; to effect this, *Shadaſeo*, the *Pundit Peiſhwa's* Vackeel, is ſent to *Poonah*, and *Bejy Ram* diſpatched to *Calcutta*. Whatſoever we may receive from *Poonah* you ſhall be particularly adviſed; for that it is certain there are many who will obſtruct the accompliſhment of the treaty and who will endeavour to prevent its taking place, but the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah Bahadre* is poſſeſſed of foreſight: in whatſoever manner he may be inclined to peace, it muſt be approveable. Let it be manifeſt that I am a ſincere friend. Appendix. No. 301.

From *Modajee Bhoſila*: received 21ſt September 1780.

Your agreeable letter, and the duplicate and triplicate of it, informing me, that you had, upon the repreſentations of *Beneram Pundit*, given orders for the furniſhing the army at *Cuttack* with proviſions, and that whatever elſe they might have occaſion for ſhall be ſupplied them and that you conſider that army as your own, arrived in a happy hour, and gave me the moſt ſincere ſatisfaction. This act of yours I conſider to have proceeded from the greatneſs of your friendſhip, and the ſincerity of your heart; and the many offices and duties which have mutually taken place between us in the progreſs of this great concern may be conceived and comprehended in the mind, but cannot be deſcribed in writing; and when friendſhip is carried to this pitch, the armies of both ſides become truly the ſame in the opinion of both. It is at all times the duty of both ſides to conſider as the ſame their mutual concerns, and to acquaint one another with every particular; but at preſent that our friendſhip and connection is arrived at ſo intimate a ſituation, how can any thing be concealed from either ſide according to the verſes of *Huzzut Jamy*. Although a hundred coverings ſhould be laid over the muſk, yet the ſcent of it will force its way through the hundred coverings. For this reaſon I have taken upon my ſhoulders, and hold aloft, the ſtandard of friendſhip of you and the Engliſh nation, and what is more, I ſtyle myſelf by the name of *Amaud ul Dowlah*.

I have ſent to *Poonab Sadaſeo Pundit*, a perſon in the confidence of *Pundit Peiſhwa* who reſided here as his Vackeel, and I have charged him with many and important points in the negociations for peace with the Engliſh. I am now waiting in expectation of his anſwer, and will inform you of it immediately.

As from of old you had a friendſhip and alliance with the family of *Pundit Purdhaun*, it is neceſſary that you at all events and in all ſituations keep it up with *Madho Row Narrain*, who is the youthful remains of that family, and a ſingle orphan to whom by all religons protection and friendſhip is commanded. The friendſhip, intimacy, and agreement in all matters, and the keeping concealed no ſecrets, ſentiments, or views of either ſide, and the other friendly offices which you have done, induced me, and ſtill induce me to conſider you and the *Pundit Peiſhwa* in the ſame light.

At preſent that I have ſtyled myſelf *Amaud ul Dowlah*, what is left to be done? It is accordingly neceſſary for you to inform me of all points, however inconſiderate, of your future advantages and diſadvantages, without the ſmalleſt reſerve. On this ſubject I have many and long converſations with my Miniſter *Dewagur Pundit*, who has written them fully to *Beneram Pundit*, which I requeſt you will attend to.

As I have already written 6 or 7 propoſals to you, the moſt adviſable of all is this, That a peace ought by all means to be eſtabliſhed with *Pundit Peiſhwa*, and after this has been ſettled, *Dewagur Pundit* ſhall be ſent to you, entruſted with many negociations, who will in perſon explain to you all my ſentiments, at which time whatever ought to be determined on ſhall be done. For the preſent be convinced that I have written theſe preliminaries for peace and alliance ſolely from my regard to friendſhip, which is at all times firm and ſtedfaſt. Loſe no time in anſwering theſe points to ſet my mind at reſt. The future management of every thing depends upon your anſwer.

Appendix. No. 301.

Poſtſcript.—With reſpect to the aids required for my ſon, whatever *Beneram Pundit* ſhall repreſent to you, you will undoubtedly comply with.

From *Dewagur Pundit*. Received 21ſt September 1780.

The triplicate as well as duplicate of your agreeable letter, informing me that you had, in conſequence of the repreſentations of *Beneram Pundit*, given orders for the army which is arrived at *Cuttack* to be ſupplied with proviſions from your own provinces, and for them to be furniſhed with every other neceſſary that they may deſire, and that you look upon that army to be your own, arrived in a happy hour. The contents of it were properly peruſed and underſtood by the Maha Rajah, and I received the ſincereſt pleaſure and ſatisfaction from the many marks it contained of your friendſhip. What this quarter has to this day done in ſupport of their friendſhip and alliance, and the many friendly offices you have done them, can be conceived and comprehended in the mind, but are not reducible to writing. At preſent that the inclinations and wiſhes for peace which before were only on one ſide, are now plainly reciprocal. Thanks be given to the Almighty for it.

When General *Goddard* arrived at *Hoſhungabad*, and by the advice and ſolicitations of this quarter remained there two months: when people of truſt were ſent to ſee that he was properly ſupplied with proviſions and all other neceſſaries; when two confidential perſons of Mr. *Elliott*'s train came here, and Mr. *Watherſtone* likewiſe arrived at *Naigpore*, to negociate many matters, and to procure ſeveral neceſſaries, ſuch as bullocks to draw the cannon, and to get money for his bills of exchange; when this quarter, notwithſtanding that the Vackeels of *Pundit Peiſhwa*, and the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan* were preſent, aſſiſted and procured the completion of all that gentleman's objects; and when in the points and negociations entruſted to Mr. *Elliott*, which after his deceaſe were committed to *Beneram Pundit* and General *Goddard*, karetahs and letters were written you with the greateſt caution, foreſight, and circumſpection, which, together with a memorandum of our views and ſentiments, were ſent by the way of *Cuttack*, under charge of *Beneram Pundit*, and letters were written to the General deſiring him by all means to ſtay at *Hoſhungabad* till the receipt of anſwers from *Calcutta*, and the General paying no regard to our advice departed for *Surat*, and an anſwer was received from *Calcutta*, that you had for the preſent ſuſpended your views, but were ſtill, and would continue in all times firm in your friendſhip to the Maha Rajah, and that on all occaſions of neceſſity, aſſiſtance ſhould be afforded when affairs had come to this paſs, that we had loſt one ſide, and had not gained the other, that is to ſay, that from our friendſhip and connection with the Engliſh, we had become obnoxious to the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah* and *Pundit Purdhaun*, and you had given this explicit anſwer.

As to the delays in furniſhing aſſiſtance, and executing engagements and treaties, at that time you yourſelf well know the difficulties we were brought into, and I ſeeing none but the Poonah Miniſters inclined to the putting an end to the hoſtilities, being remedileſs, went to *Poonah*. In the mean while were received accounts of the defeat of the Bombay army, ſo that whether I was inclined or not, I was abſolutely compelled to go to *Poonah*; for had you written a full anſwer to the memorandum ſent you, and had you afforded the proper aſſiſtance, or had not General *Goddard* marched towards *Surat* what occaſion ſhould I have to go to *Poonah*? On the contrary, I ſhould in that caſe have ſent for Major *Camac*, who was arrived in the dependencies of *Jetteeſſgurra*. I ſhould have aſſociated to myſelf many friends, and ſhould by their aſſiſtance have ſettled every thing according to your wiſhes; ſo that the Decan people could never have attempted to oppoſe me. As the opportunity was loſt, and the arrow had been ſhot from the bow, it is impoſſible to recal it, and it is equally uſeleſs to talk of it.

After my arrival at *Poonah*, having ſeen and made myſelf acquainted with the changes and revolutions of the world, and the occurrences of time, and keeping in view my friendſhip for you, and alſo upon receiving letters from you to this purport, that you would do whatever was conſiſtent with the honour of the Engliſh, that you were ready to abide by the treaty of Colonel *Upton*, but that any thing which had been agreed to was without your knowledge, the attachment and friendſhip I ſhewed and the good ſervices I did the Engliſh in my negociations, are well known to you from my frequent letters. The putting away the new treaty which had been entered into by the Bombay army after their defeat, the beginning negociations agreeable to your orders reſpecting the former treaties, the writing continually to General *Goddard* and to *Calcutta* about peace, the ſettling conformable to his letters a meeting between him and the Poonah Miniſters, and making *Ballajee Jenardun* fix his tent without the town for this purpoſe, and the ſending confidential perſons to *Surat* to confer with the General, all theſe matters were entirely effected by the exertion of my friendſhip and attachment. When General *Goddard*, after firſt writing about peace, afterwards contradicted it, and prepared himſelf for hoſtilities, and in *Poonah* likewiſe all the ſupplies neceſſary were in readineſs, and *Scindia* and *Holcar* were ready with their utmoſt expedition, and by the propoſals and advice of *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* the plan of a war in the four quarters was determined on, and *Hyder Naig* likewiſe has become an intimate ally, at that time, on account of our propinquity to the Soubahs of *Bengal*, it was determined by the plan of the ſaid Nabob, that this quarter ſhould ſend an army towards thoſe provinces. From a regard and knowledge of political matters, we agreed to this plan, and accordingly raiſed 30,000 new horſe, and were brought to great diſtreſs by the expences of them. In this matter two different things were to be obſerved, one the keeping upon terms with *Pundit Purdhaun*, which nothing but his being near us, and his country bordering upon ours, renders neceſſary, and the other the maintaining a ſtrict and intimate connection and friendſhip with you; for it is as difficult to ſupport an appearance of friendſhip with *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, and at the ſame time to keep our connections with you entire, as it is to unite fire and water. Notwithſtanding open war and hoſtilities had commenced between General *Goddard* and *Scindia* and *Holcar*, and repeated meſſages were received from *Pundit Peiſhwa*, hurrying us to march towards *Bengal*, we however diſpatched the army in ſo ſlow a manner, that they might be able to reach *Cuttack* at the commencement of the rains, and they are now ſtationed in the province of *Oriſſa*.

Bejy Ram Pundit has been diſpatched to you reſpecting the buſineſs of peace with the Peiſhwa, and has charge of a memorandum of Colonel *Upton*'s treaty, by which you mean to abide, that peace and alliance may at any rate be eſtabliſhed with *Pundit Peiſhwa*, and that you may put a ſtop to the preſent hoſtilities. As many and great loſſes and diſtreſſes have been brought on us, as by the raiſing and keeping up a new army, in caſe peace ſhould be made, ſomething muſt be done by *Pundit Peiſhwa*, ſomething by the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, and ſomething by the Engliſh gentlemen, to make good the expences of them.

As at this time a karetah and letters have been received to this purport, that you before had not the ſmalleſt intentions or thoughts of war with *Pundit Purdhaun*, and have none ſtill, but that from the defeat of the Engliſh of *Bombay*, hoſtilities had been determined on for the defence of the honour of the Engliſh nation, and for the protection of their poſſeſſions: that General *Goddard* had been victorious; that you could not give the faith of a treaty and engagement to a mere piece of paper till the ſtrong ties of the guarantee of ſome powerful chief is added

added to it; that as you have the greateſt confidence in the Bhoſila family, and are acquainted with them for twenty years, you agree to any thing guaranteed by the Maha Rajah, but that we will not liſten to any propoſals from the Poonah Miniſters which are improper for you to aſſent to; that we will do every thing which is conſiſtent with the honour of the Engliſh; that when I have received from the Poonah Miniſters powers for theſe negociations, you will be much rejoiced if I come to *Calcutta* for the ſettling the baſis of a treaty, when our ſentiments may be explained in perſonal conference without any witneſs. For this reaſon, *Sadaſeo Pundit*, a perſon of truſt who reſided here on the part of *Pundit Peiſhwa*, has been ſent to *Poonah* charged with the explaining all points, and the receiving their aſſent or denial on all points of theſe negociations, of which no part is concealed from or unknown to me. I have no doubt but that within this week he has reached *Poonah*, and has explained every thing committed to him, and will write me the anſwer which he finds them to have reſolved upon. We ſhall ſoon ſee what they will determine, and what anſwer they will write. As we now received your triplicate letter, accompanying a karetah for the Maha Rajah, about your having given orders for the furniſhing the army arrived at *Cuttack* with proviſions from your dependencies, and containing many other particulars, ſuch as conſidering that army as your own, and as you have plainly in many inſtances ſhewed your knowledge of the virtues, courage, and great qualities of Rajah *Chumnajee Baboo*, whom you from your friendſhip and unanimity, and for the maintaining the rights of alliance, were equally ready and reſolved to aſſiſt as the Maha Rajah himſelf can be; our friendſhip is thus carried to the higheſt pitch, and nothing further is left to be done in it; the reputation, honour, and name of both ſides are now of equal weight, and we are even two bodies in one ſoul, and the army arrived at *Cuttack* is in reality yours. But according to that verſe of *Hafiz*, how can that remain a ſecret which is mentioned in the durbar? In the ſame manner from the coming of General *Goddard* to *Hoſhungabad*, and the unreſerved correſpondence of letters between us, the friendſhip of this quarter for the Engliſh was proclaimed among all the inhabitants of *Decan*, &c. both friends and enemies; and your affection for the family of *Bhoſila* was publicly ſpoken of in your council, and among all your friends and foes; and was believed by every one. Whatever can happen from this intimate connection will give pleaſure to our friends and grief to our enemies; but nothing can happen which may rejoice our foes, and diſtreſs our allies. To this reaſon, not thinking it conſiſtent with the ſincerity and openneſs of friendſhip to keep the ſecrets and ſentiments any longer concealed in our mind, but exalting the ſtandard of our alliance with the Engliſh in the eyes of all *Decan*, we told *Sadaſeo Pundit*, the Vackeel of *Pundit Peiſhwa*, every thing which was proper, and ſent him to *Poonah*. We muſt now wait for his anſwer; and we have through *Bejy Ram Pundit* ſent you a memorandum of the articles of Colonel *Upton's* treaty, which have been omitted and broken, at the ſame time adviſing you to give up the aſſiſting of *Ragonaut Row*, and to remain ſtedfaſt in the articles of the former treaty; and beſides this, a paper of ſuch articles which will now be propoſed reſpecting the dependencies of *Gojeraut*, together with karetahs and letters, have been delivered to the ſaid *Pundit*, with which he has been diſpatched to your preſence, and which, when you receive, will, I doubt not, explain all matters to you.

As we have at this time received your triplicate and karetah and letter, reſpecting the orders you have given for furniſhing the army arrived at *Cuttack* with proviſions, and that you conſider that army as your own, it becomes neceſſary for the Maha Rajah to remove the covering which had been kept over the eyes of his friends; to make public to all ranks of people his ſentiments and deſigns, and even to ſtyle himſelf in *Naigpore*, *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*; to exert himſelf as far as his life and power carry him in effecting what the honour of the Engliſh and your wiſhes require; to keep ſecret and concealed from you no point, but to write and ſpeak plainly his opinion and advice; and on my part it is now incumbent on me to give proofs in all events of the ſincerity of my obedience and attachment. Although many matters have ariſen which ſeem difficult and hard, and which no one but thoſe who are entruſted with the ſecret can underſtand, yet when you ſhew ſo much favour and affection to Rajah *Chumnajee Baboo*, the ſon of my maſter, and conſider him as much as your own life, it becomes immediately my duty to lay before you every thought and idea which my attachment and friendſhip to you may have given birth to. Theſe it is adviſable that you keep concealed in your breaſt, which is the ſafe receptacle of ſecrets, and that you ſuffer no one to be acquainted with them but thoſe who are entruſted with your other ſecrets, otherwiſe it will bring great difficulties on us. It is the abſolute duty of all true and ſincere well-wiſhers, in any difficult ſituations to keep no views or opinions in any matter concealed from their maſter, although they plainly ſee that by diſcovering them they will bring inevitable dangers on themſelves. This is in fact ſporting with their own lives; but it is at the ſame time incumbent on his protector to exert himſelf in every thing which may prevent the other's ſecret offices from being diſcovered, and from his attachment and ſervices being the cauſe of his deſtruction; to keep the ſecrets made known to him as carefully as he would his own life, to do whatever is proper to be done, or elſe to remain perfectly ſilent, and not to ſay that ſuch a one has written me this, I am accordingly employed in this matter, and have got authentic particulars of it, at the ſame time ſhewing what his friend had written him. You are ſuperiorly ſkilled in the knowledge of all political concerns, and from this you will, without doubt, keep all you learn with the moſt careful circumſpection.

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APPENDIX, No. 304.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 4th September 1780.

THE Commander in Chief delivers in the following minute:—

4th September 1780.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—It has never ſince my firſt entering upon public life, fallen to my ſhare to deliberate on a buſineſs of ſuch extent and importance as the preſent criſis of the Company's affairs in *India*. And unequal as I find myſelf to the taſk of deviſing means in my own mind ſo well approved as to leave me without a doubt of their extricating them from the more than common difficulties in which they are at preſent involved; nevertheleſs do I find myſelf called upon equally by a regard for the intereſts of my nation and my employers to ſuggeſt ſuch meaſures as in my judgment appear beſt calculated to repel thoſe evils which have already fallen upon the Company's poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic*, as well as to avert, if poſſible, the further calamities with which their intereſts in general are threatened.

I am well aware of the very great diſadvantages under which I ſhall here give my opinions; I mean the expectations entertained from this quarter, both by the Company and the nation, of reſources to ratify thoſe conditions, unavoidable on a renewal of the charter. But whilſt not in poſſeſſion of theſe reſources, and whilſt the very ſpring from whence they are ſuppoſed to flow, and I truſt they may ſtill at a future period be derived, is itſelf in danger; I flatter myſelf I ſhall ſtand exculpated in the eyes of my king, my country, and my employers, in recommending the adoption of meaſures, for the ſecurity of ſo important an object to all, however oppoſite they may be to the immediate hopes of the public.

In the preſent exigency of our affairs, with no money in our treaſury, excepting the war depoſit in our new fort, and which I have been taught to underſtand the demands

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demands againſt us, both from the civil and military eſtabliſhments, have nearly if not entirely mortgaged, added to the knowledge we have, that our receipts of revenue are barely adequate to defray our preſent diſburſements, it behoves us to conſider in what manner the extraordinaries attendant upon the extenſive wars we are now engaged in are to be ſupplied.

I know of no other mode than to endeavour to borrow money on bond, and at the ſmalleſt intereſt procurable. This is a ſtep which indiſpenſable as it appears to be in the preſent ſtate of our finances, I would not heſitate to adviſe in a like critical conjuncture of the Company's intereſts, even allowing that there were no calls for its immediate diſburſement.

In all well-regulated Governments, it is a leading maxim to act in ſuch manner as may tend to intereſt as many of the community as poſſible in its welfare and ſucceſs. A natural love of the laws and religion by which they are governed, binds the ſubject to the intereſts of his country; but in this, where every action of a native's life is influenced by ſelfiſh motives, and the more powerfully in proportion to the magnitude of the pecuniary object, and totally devoid as they muſt be of any further attachment to us than what ariſes from the neceſſity of our protection, it would appear to me, there is no more certain method of enſuring their good wiſhes and ſupport to the cauſe of the public, than by inducing them to place as much of their property as poſſible under the ſecurity of our Government. In doing this we alſo diveſt them of thoſe means, which in caſe of invaſion of a foreign enemy, might either through accident, or by their free-will contributions, be inſtrumental to our deſtruction. The reputation too of having a large treaſury would operate in the moſt favourable manner upon the minds of our adherents, by the confidence it would give them of our ſuperiority, at the ſame time that it would damp the minds of our enemies, by the very great diſtance at which it would place all their hopes of ſucceſs.

For the preceding reaſons, ſo thoroughly am I convinced of its being an eligible policy, I ſhall, juſt for the ſake of drawing a compariſon between the two points, as they mutually affect the Company's intereſts, make the following ſuppoſition:

We have already got a conſiderable ſum of money in our treaſury, ſay two crores; our ſituation in every other reſpect the ſame as at preſent, which every impartial obſerver muſt allow is far from being a ſafe one; but by drawing into our treaſury a further ſum of two crores of rupees, I not only provide againſt the evils which threaten us, but give to our Government, by attaching to its intereſts a number of the moſt opulent of its ſubjects, a form of ſtability which nothing but the moſt unforeſeen and unexpected accident ſhall be able to ſhake. Our affairs render it neceſſary to ſupport this policy for two years; it has not however happened in the courſe thereof, that we have had occaſion to ſpend even a rupee of the borrowed ſum, which we ſhall admit was taken up at five per cent. Our buſineſs is finiſhed, the tranquillity of the country reſtored, and we pay it back with a premium of twenty lacks; a ſum which ſurely when brought againſt the great points we had ſecured by it, will hardly be thought deſerving our conſideration; and in the event of our ſpending any part of the principal, the argument in favour of the meaſure is ſtill ſtrengthened, as the neceſſity for it more plainly appears.

The hoſtile operations of *Hyder Ally*, the very great ſtrength of his army, the want of money at *Madras*, are ſubjects that demand our moſt ſerious conſideration, whilſt they leave us no alternative, but that of all others the leaſt deſirable—a war; to proſecute which, the moſt ſpeedy and vigorous meaſures ought to be adopted.

In the firſt place, a ſum of money adequate to the emergency of the occaſion, ſhould be ſent to *Madras*, provided they are not able to furniſh themſelves by the method they are now purſuing, of raiſing money upon the Company's bonds; and that there may be as little delay as poſſible in furniſhing this ſupply, if neceſſary, I would recommend its being taken from the war depoſit in the new fort, as being a fund apparently provided for ſuch exigencies.

The particular manner in which our troops on the coaſt are diſtributed in garriſons ſituated at a diſtance from each other, and the communication between them partly cut off by *Hyder*'s cavalry, may render it a ſervice of no leſs difficulty than danger to aſſemble an army ſufficiently ſtrong to riſk an engagement with the very formidable force he is reported to have now in the field. I feel this circumſtance with the more ſenſible regret and concern, as the diſtance from hence puts it beyond a poſſibility to give any aſſiſtance that could afford immediate relief. However, in order to lighten the burthen, and to give ſpirit and confidence to ſuch operations as the Madras Adminiſtration from their own diſcernment and local obſervation may find it expedient to purſue againſt *Hyder* (for to their own conduct it muſt in a great meaſure now be left) as well as to awe the Nizam from attempting any thing againſt the Circars, to deter *Hyder* from turning his views towards theſe northern dominions, and to be in readineſs to act in concert with what force may now be in the Circars againſt the French, who, as they are at this time expected, may attempt a landing on that coaſt; I ſay, for theſe moſt important purpoſes, I would recommend a ſufficient army being formed to the ſouthward; but to the good effects of this ſalutary meaſure I cannot help obſerving that I perceive a very powerful obſtacle, and which I ſhould be happy to ſee removed, I mean a Maratta army on the confines of *Cuttack*, and now laying in conſiderable force on our borders. As they have had no enemy to oppoſe, and as we have as yet neither made or threatened to make any encroachments upon their territories in that quarter, I ſhould be glad to be informed of the cauſe and purpoſe of their being there, the more eſpecially, as I have been told that for upwards of eleven years paſt, they have never once ſhewn themſelves in thoſe parts.

To this query it may be anſwered, that as they have been there for ſome months, and have offered us no harm, they are our friends. As a military man, I muſt declare that the circumſtance itſelf in the effects it produces diſproves the allegation. Were they invited into their preſent ſituation by us, or did they come to ſuppreſs any diſturbances that had ariſen there? If neither of theſe has been the caſe, they muſt be an army of obſervation leagued with thoſe who wiſh no good to our affairs, and have proved more injurious to our political intereſts, than if they had abſolutely entered our territories, in which caſe we could immediately have applied the remedy, but as they have conducted themſelves, they have by forming a barrier on our frontier, in the high road of communication with our poſſeſſions on the coaſt, encouraged, covered, and given ſpirit and confidence to *Hyder Ally*'s tranſactions in the *Carnatic*, whilſt they have on the other hand ſerved as a check, and deſtroy every favourable effect that might have reſulted from our operations, and ſo alarmed and intimidated our inhabitants, that there is not a man amongſt them of any rank or denomination with whom I have converſed, and I have had full opportunity in coming down the country to learn their ſentiments, who has not expreſſed his fears of their coming into this country; and in ſuch caſe pointed out his own defenceleſs ſtate, and the dependence he had upon us, as holding the only power to afford him protection; under the influence of theſe apprehenſions many are preparing, and ſome I am informed are actually removing their property and families to places which appear to them more ſecure. With ſuch incontrovertible evidence of the prejudice done to the eaſe and happineſs of our ſubjects by the continuance of this force at *Cuttack*, is it poſſible that I ſhould ſo totally overlook my duty to the public, both in my civil and military capacity, as not to be anxious to diſburthen our affairs of a weight which may impede

impede every operation we wiſh to carry on, either offenſive or otherwiſe?

It is therefore my opinion, that under whatever authority they may be, an immediate application ſhould be made for them to retire, as their remaining where they are diſturbs the peace of our provinces. This requiſition will ſoon diſcover the reality of their intentions towards us: and in order that we may not ſuffer ourſelves to be further injured by delays, a time ſhould be ſtipulated for receiving an anſwer; ſhould this be denied us, our own ſafety and intereſts will dictate to us how to act.

I muſt further point out the neceſſity of covering the province of *Babar*, which now lies open and expoſed to the incurſions even of ſmall parties of the enemy; for this purpoſe I recommend the giving immediate orders for completing our two regiments of cavalry, and calling them down as ſoon as the ſeaſon will admit, for its protection.

I do not apprehend at this time any danger to the Vizier's provinces, as the troops ſtationed in thoſe parts, when properly arranged will, excluſive of our cavalry, be more than ſufficient to prevent the Marattas from entering them.

It ſhould, however, be ſtrongly recommended to the Vizier, to be attentive to the keeping up a reſpectable body of horſe, and the Reſident directed to urge the neceſſity of their being regularly and punctually paid.

As theſe are the outlines neceſſary to be firſt conſidered, I ſhall not take up the attention of the Board further at preſent, but reſerve what I have ſtill to propoſe until the detail of the buſineſs ſhall be entered upon.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Governor General—I could not ſuffer a greater mortification than that which I have undergone, from the neceſſity impoſed on me of propoſing the queſtion now before the Board, and I did intend to have contented myſelf with entering ſimply my aſſent to it. But the Commander in Chief has ſupported it by an argument drawn from the wants of the people of theſe provinces, and eſpecially their more wealthy inhabitants, which I think deſerving a more particular attention, as it proves not only the propriety of opening our treaſury for the mutual relief of this Government and the country itſelf, but of extending this meaſure without any limitation. I think it proper both to add my concurrence in this opinion, and to extend the reaſoning on which it is founded to the other conſequences which are deducible from it.

The ſlighteſt cauſes will be ſufficient to excite a general alarm among the people, who having no criterion to judge of the truth or probability of public rumours, and being by nature timid, will therefore be ready to believe ſuch as portend public danger.

The immediate effect of ſuch apprehenſions will be a ſolicitude in every perſon poſſeſſing property to ſecure it by ſuch ſimple and rude means of concealment as cuſtom alone has taught them, by conveying it to the woods or hills, or by ſhifting it from place to place, as their fancies may ſuggeſt to them the hopes of greater ſafety in one than another; by depoſiting it with a heavy tax in the foreign European ſettlements; by tranſporting it altogether beyond the bounds of the provinces; or laſtly, by the more frequent and eaſy expedient of burying it in the earth. Each of theſe means will create an irretrievable loſs of the current ſpecie, and a ſtagnation of the remainder. Both theſe conſequences will fall heavily on the revenue, and add to the diſtreſſes of Government at a time when it can leaſt bear a failure in its collections. To open the public treaſury as a repoſitory for the wealth of the country, if they have a confidence in the Government itſelf, of which I own there is room for doubt, may prevent the application of ſuch dangerous reſources, and thus not only ſecure the attachment of the people by affording them the moſt ſubſtantial protection. I give my aſſent to the queſtion.

The other ſubjects of the General's minute being of a different nature and wholly unconnected with the queſtion immediately before the Board, I ſhall conſider as diſtinct queſtions. Appendix, No. 304.

The firſt is "That a ſum of money adequate to the "emergency of the occaſion be ſent to *Madras*, pro"vided they are not able to furniſh themſelves by the "method they are now purſuing of raiſing money upon "the Company's bonds; and that there may be as "little delay as poſſible in furniſhing this ſupply, if ne"ceſſary, that it be taken from the war depoſit in the "new fort, as being a fund apparently provided for "ſuch exigencies." As the terms of the queſtion do not require or admit of an immediate conſideration of it, and we have already provided two modes of remittance, which though not ample, will prove a ſufficient relief to the immediate wants of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, I hope the General will conſent to ſuſpend the final determination upon it until the approach of the period in which his propoſal, if approved, muſt be carried into execution. In the mean time we may hope to be informed of the ſtate of that Preſidency with relation to its wants, its reſources, its diſpoſitions for repelling the pretended or actual invaſion whichever it may prove, and the other diſtinct ſervices to which they may propoſe to apply the ſums afforded them by this Government.

Theſe provinces, already very much exhauſted, will not bear greater drains, nor can any thing ſhort of extreme neceſſity juſtify it in repeating them. It is therefore at leaſt reaſonable to expect that they will furniſh us with previous information upon the points which I have enumerated; nay, it may ſo happen, that by the neglect of this precaution, we may furniſh them with the means of employing the Company's arms in an unnatural and deſperate oppoſition, even to the authority of this Government, which was appointed for their controul, and to whoſe protection they muſt finally owe their exiſtence.

On this occaſion I muſt remind the Board of the demand which was made to them ſo long as the 12th of June laſt, for the reſtitution of the Cirkar of *Guntoor* or *Mortezanagur* to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and of the repetition of that demand in our letter of the 24th ultimo. Their ſilence will juſtify us in crediting the reports, which though not of official authority, have doubtleſs reached every member of this Board. That the forces of that Preſidency, which were ſent to take poſſeſſion of the Circar of *Mortezanagur*, ſtill continue there in defiance of our orders, and that the management of it had been aſſigned in form to the Nabob of the *Carnatic*. Hence I draw a ſtrong ſuſpicion, that they will not eaſily be induced to reſign it, and this is an additional and very powerful inducement with me to defer the conſideration of the preſent queſtion until we know whether the Preſidency of *Madras* will yield to our authority, or compel us to uſe the means with which we are conſtitutionally armed for that purpoſe to ſupport and enforce it; if ſuch ſhall be, as I truſt it will, the reſolution of this Board.

The ſecond propoſal introduced in the minute of the Commander in Chief is, "that in order to lighten the burthen, and to give ſpirit and confidence to ſuch operations as the Madras Adminiſtration from their own diſcernment and local obſervation may find it convenient to purſue againſt *Hyder*, as well as to awe the Nizam from attempting any thing againſt the Circars; to deter *Hyder* from turning his views towards theſe northern dominions, and to be in readineſs to act in concert with what force may now be in the Circars againſt the French, who, as they are at this time expected, may attempt a landing upon that coaſt, a ſufficient army be formed to the ſouthward." To the proſecution of this meaſure, the Commander in Chief juſtly obſerves, there is one powerful obſtacle in the ſituation of the forces of the Rajah of *Berar*; their poſition at *Cuttack* being directly in the road which our troops muſt paſs to effect the pro-

Appendix. No. 304.

poſed junction with thoſe of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, and their vicinity to our borders having intimidated the people of the country, and impreſſed them with the dread of an invaſion, the General is led to propoſe, that immediate application ſhould be made for them to retire; and he ſupports his opinion on this point, by obſerving that ſuch a requiſition will ſoon diſcover the reality of their intentions towards us. Though the fact itſelf, ſtated without the antecedent circumſtances which have produced it, will juſtify the reaſonings of the Commander in Chief, I yet perſuade myſelf that when he is acquainted with all the particulars and gradations of it, he will not only change his ſentiments, but agree with me in opinion that it will be better policy in this Government to wait a ſhort time for the knowledge of the intentions of the Government of *Berar*, than by any premature act impel it to a decided choice, which may prove hoſtile to us, whether its preſent inclinations are yet fluctuating, or, as I believe them to be, determined in our favour.

Referred to under Appendix 302.

I am pleaſed that the General has furniſhed me with this occaſion to lay before the Board the true ſtate of the ſubject; and I requeſt I may be indulged with a patient attention while I deliver it, which I ſhall endeavour to do in as ſuccinct a manner as poſſible.

The Board will well remember (nor ought it to be forgotten) the ready and effectual aſſiſtance which General *Goddard*'s detachment repeatedly received from the Government of *Berar*.

On the firſt formation of that corps, an application was made to *Moodajee Booſla*, to permit it to paſs through a part of his dominions; he inſtantly and cheerfully complied, and unſolicited wrote to Colonel *Leſlie*, who then commanded the detachment, inviting him to proceed, and offering him both a free paſſage and the means of ſubſiſtence; at the ſame time he cauſed a large ſtore of grain to be provided on his borders, where it lay ſix months waiting for his arrival. General *Goddard*'s letters contain acknowledgments of the hoſpitality with which he was received, and treated during his long continuance at *Hoſungabad*, and the liberal manner in which *Moodajee Booſla* advanced the money due on his bills when General *Goddard* formed the reſolution of marching to the relief of *Bombay*, though againſt his repeated and urgent remonſtrances. Theſe were ſpontaneous acts and ſubſtantial proofs of his friendſhip; and whatever policy may have dictated them, their obligation on this Government is the ſame, and has acquired an increaſed force by the knowledge which we now poſſeſs of the effects ſince produced by it on that Government. It has expoſed it to the reſentment of the Poonah Government, for having been inſtrumental to all the conſequences occaſioned by the march of our troops to the other ſide of *India*.

May I be permitted to add, as a proof of the notoriety of the diſpoſition of the Government of *Berar* to ours, the facility with which Mr. *Elliott* obtained the ſurrender of Mr. *Chevalier* at *Cuttac*, ſince nothing but a certain knowledge of that attachment could have induced the Naib to have conſented to an act which on a different ſuppoſition would have proved of ſo much danger to himſelf.

What has ſince paſſed, notwithſtanding external appearances, will fully juſtify the belief that its diſpoſition is ſtill the ſame.

Whatever movements of whatever tendency have been made, have been previouſly and confidentially communicated to this Government.

The Dewan was early diſpatched to *Poonah* to negotiate a peace with General *Goddard*: in this attempt he failed; but he communicated to me, and ſtill more largely to *Beneram Pundit*, his Miniſter at this place, every circumſtance that happened during his ſtay there. It was from him as I recollect, that I firſt heard of the confederacy planned by the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and formed in conjunction with him, the Miniſter at *Poonah*, *Maddajee Scindia*, *Hyder Ally*, and *Moodajee Booſla*, againſt the Company.

He was called upon by the Miniſter, with the command of the Peiſhwa, to furniſh his quota of troops for the common cauſe, and was threatened by *Nizam Ally Cawn* and *Madajee Scindia*, that they would invade and lay waſte his country if he refuſed. He was totally unprepared to reſiſt two ſo formidable enemies, having diſbanded his troops, and reſerving only a peace eſtabliſhment. He was obliged therefore to temporize, conſenting to enter into the general confederacy, but ſtill claiming the privilege of mediation. The part aſſigned him was to ſend an army during the courſe of the laſt ſeaſon to lay waſte the provinces of *Bengal*. With this requiſition he complied, but at the ſame time informed me, that he ſhould continue ſuch means to delay as ſhould prevent the army from approaching our borders till the cloſe of the fair ſeaſon, which would be a plea for not entering upon immediate action; that in the mean time he ſhould be able by the next ſeaſon to raiſe ſuch an army as would effectually eſtabliſh his own independency, and qualify him to act according to the dictates of his own judgment. Theſe declarations have been literally verified, for we have ſeen this body of troops ſpin out a march to four months, which might with eaſe have been accompliſhed in two, and arrive at the place of their deſtination at the commencement of the rains. Theſe though Marattas, and part of them pindaries or plunderers by profeſſion, have remained as quiet as if cantoned at their own capital. Every letter received from the Court of *Berar* is filled with the moſt ſolemn aſſurances of actual friendſhip, and its reſolution to maintain it under every circumſtance.

I now lay before the Board the two laſt papers of advice which have been received from *Naigpoor*. The firſt of theſe, which is a letter from *Dewagur Pundit* to *Beneram Pundit*, mentions that *Sedaſhew Pundit*, the Reſident of the Peiſhwa at *Naigpore*, a man of high rank and truſt, had been diſpatched to *Poonah* with a repetition of the propoſal expreſſed in the moſt peremptory terms, that credentials ſhould be immediately ſent to *Dewagur Pundit* to treat with this Government for peace, and that the Dewan was making every preparation to ſet out for *Bengal* on the inſtant of the arrival of an anſwer from *Poonah*. This being the actual ſtate of that Government in its relation to ours, and no occaſion calling us to an immediate deciſion, I hope the Board will agree with me to ſuſpend it to the period within which we may reaſonably expect to be informed of theirs.

I for my own part am morally certain that it is the earneſt wiſh and ambition of the Government of *Berar* to become the mediator and guarantee of a peace between this and the Government of *Poonah*; and it is my firm belief, that if it ſhall fail of this purpoſe, and be compelled at length to take a decided part in the war, it will rather unite with us than ſubmit to act with its natural enemies, the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, *Mhadajee Scindia*, and the Poonah State, its conſtitutional ſuperior.

With reſpect to any requiſition made to the commander of the forces at *Cuttack* for their removal, it can be of no effect, becauſe he acts under poſitive orders, and is perhaps as little acquainted with the real deſtination of his troops as are the members of this Government. Such an application might indeed be made to *Moodajee* himſelf; but this is now unneceſſary, as the next advices muſt amount virtually to the ſame effect as any that could be expected from it.

Letter from *Dewagur Pundit* to *Beneram Pundit*.

On the 24th Rejeb I received your letter dated the 29th Jemadiaſſanie, together with an Arzie for the Preſence, and a letter to the Dewan *Sahib*, and became acquainted with all particulars, and made known fully every point which you mention to my maſter and the Dewan. What you ſaid to the Nabob *Amaud ul Dowlah*, reſpecting

reſpecting the arrival of our victorious army at *Cuttack*, was very proper and adviſable. The Dewan *Sahib* greatly praiſed your conduct, and ſaid, that if the Sirkar had any people of equal wiſdom and attachment to what you have ſhewn in your good and prudent management of this matter, every thing would be well and properly ſettled, and his Highneſs, upon hearing all theſe particulars, expreſſed ten times more regard and favour for your wiſdom than he had done before. All theſe you will learn from *Beneram Pundit*, who ſet off the day before your letter arrived, and who will deliver you the Khellaat and Serpaitch for the Duſſara, and receive your thanks for it; and will be able to inform you about the bill of exchange for 1000 rupees which was before ſent to *Ram Bhedar Pundit* at *Surat*. In all the views and intentions of this quarter you are truſted with entire confidence; continue therefore to exert yourſelf to the utmoſt of your life and ſtrength to execute the wiſhes and orders of our maſter to his ſatisfaction, and be convinced that the Dewan *Sahib* is in every inſtance favourable and well inclined to you. I who am your firm friend, will write to you every thing which I ſee with my own eyes, or which may be communicated to me either in public or private. The army which is arrived at *Cuttack* was ſent there in purſuance of a plan of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and of the advice of the Miniſters of *Pundit Purdhaun*. This has been fully explained in the karetahs written to that quarter, and not the ſmalleſt occurrence or particular requiſite in the duties of friendſhip has been omitted. I cannot therefore conceive what could be his intentions of telling you, that ſo large an army was not neceſſary for the ſettlement of *Cuttack*. Where all diſtinction has been taken away, every thing ſhould be the ſame to both parties. Every circumſtance which has happened in this quarter, has been written to that ſide, without reſerve. The army, after its departure from hence, arrived at *Cuttack* at the beginning of the rainy ſeaſon, in ſix months. Conſider this likewiſe, that all theſe delays were ſolely owing to the ſincere friendſhip entertained for the Engliſh. If the friendſhip for the Engliſh gentlemen, and the long intercourſe of letters with them, the arrival of General *Goddard* at *Hoſhungabad*, the ſtationing of a Vackeel with them, for the providing of proviſions, &c. the coming of Mr. *Watherſtone* to *Naigpore*, the paying from the Sirkar the bills of exchange of the Mahajuns, had not been known to them, it would not have been neceſſary for the army to be levied and ſent to that quarter, and ſuch difficulties and expences incurred for the payment of the ſoldiers. In an intercourſe of friendſhip, all theſe difficulties and expences are eaſily borne by firm friends. The explaining all this to the other quarter, is incumbent on you: of this, you will learn all particulars from the Hindoſtanny letter of the Dewan *Sahib*, who before has written and ſtill writes with the greateſt affection and attachment for the Engliſh gentlemen. On the arrival of *Bejy Ram Doboy* at that quarter, not the ſmalleſt article of all the views, intentions and dangers of this quarter will be unknown to you, and you will then repreſent and explain to the Nabob every thing which ſhall appear to you of uſe and adviſable. The proverb which you mention, by the Nabob's orders, that whoever by the ſtrength of his arms attempts to ſwim in a river, when a large wave comes he loſes his power of moving, and is carried away at the pleaſure of the waters without it being poſſible to affirm what will become of him: the Maha Raja upon hearing this proverb ſmiled, and immediately without any previous thinking ſaid, what the Nabob mentioned was very proper and applicable; but that, by the bleſſing of God, the river was unable, notwithſtanding its violence and the fury of its waves, to go beyond its banks, but is always fixed in its determined boundaries. That the authority, greatneſs, power and ſtrength of the gentlemen were like a river that has large waves; but that from their great and ſtriking virtues and their piety and *love of God*, they never go beyond the boundaries fixed by their treaties and engagements: that if at any time in their intercourſe of friendſhip, events and circumſtances, and the common revolution of affairs, which are never fixed, any difficulties ſhould come upon their friends, they, like a river which ſupports upon its water the great weight of large ſhips, take upon themſelves the weight of them, and depoſit them ſafely on the ſhore; that the Nabob has now approved of what he had ſo often written in all his letters to that quarter, and has in ſome of his karetahs written orders to that purport, and will continue in the ſame intention. Secondly, the Nabob has mentioned another proverb, which you have wrote as follows, that the Governor of *Bombay* had undertaken a matter without his advice, which had rendered neceſſary every thing which has ſince been done; but that as this quarter is deſirous of ſeeing peace brought, and as he is reſolved to follow the advice of this quarter, he will therefore make over to the Rajah the power of *Solomon*'s ſeal. In anſwer to this his Highneſs ſaid, that when the Nabob, from his friendſhip and confidence in him, entruſts him with the power of *Solomon*, he himſelf muſt be like the ſeal and inſcription, as the power of *Solomon* was entirely derived from the inſcription; that when he is made mediator and guarantee by both parties in the intended peace and reconciliation between the Engliſh gentlemen and *Pundit Purdhaun*, and when he gets into his hands written powers from the Nabob, his authority will then be complete; and that this authority, from the diſtinguiſhed character of his illuſtrious family, will be productive of great advantages: that he will keep poſſeſſion of this ſeal of *Solomon* in the manner that is requiſite; and will, agreeable to the repreſentations, after the arrival of *Bejy Ram Dooby*, give an explicit and final anſwer: in a word, I have written every thing which his Highneſs ſaid, in anſwer to the two proverbs; for the reſt, I refer you to the Dewan's letters, and you will act agreeable to them, and will write every thing, either public or ſecret, which occurs in that quarter. You will alſo conſider the effecting a true and perfect reconciliation of the Maha Rajah to be the moſt neceſſary of all meaſures, and that after the terms of the treaty of peace ſhall be ſettled, it will be adviſable for the Dewan to be admitted to an interview. You will keep up a correſpondence with *Raja Chimna Baboo* and *Bowanny Pundit Buckſhy*; and will write the ſtate of affairs, and your advice and opinion on all matters.

Appendix. No. 304.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Dewan *Dewagur Pundit* to *Beneram Pundit*, dated 26 of Shabaun.

On the 25th Rajib I received your letter, dated the 27th Jemmadieaſſanie, and underſtand the contents. I perfectly comprehend what the Nabob *Amaud O'Dowlah* ſaid to you, which you mention in your letter. To this time, three letters have been ſent from this quarter, and a fourth is now diſpatched; from them you will have learnt particulars. What you ſaid to the Nabob *Amaud O'Dowlah*, reſpecting the furniſhing proviſions, and what he told you in anſwer, namely, that there could be no exception againſt furniſhing proviſions, &c. but that he could conceive what were the views of ſo large an army at *Cuttack*; that God forbid any other intentions except friendly ones ſhould be entertained, and that of this you muſt be ſecurity, and what you, keeping in view the directions and orders of our maſter, repreſented in anſwer; the particulars of all theſe matters, both what was written in your hand for my private information, and what was in the letter of the Moonſhy of *Bowanny Pundit*, are fully underſtood by me. The Nabob *Amaud O'Dowlah* is ſuperiorly wiſe and foreſeeing, and knows the proper meaſures and advice in all matters. You muſt explain to him that this army has been ready ever ſince the Duſſarah, and that if any hoſtile thoughts had exiſted they would have been ſent by the road of *Mundella* to *Chutta*,

Appendix, No. 304.

Chutta Naigpore, from whence they would have paſſed into *Azeemabad*. But as it is now ſix years that friendſhip has been ſtrongly cemented with the Nabob through your mediation, God is witneſs that I have watched and guarded it as I would my honour and poſſeſſions; of this you muſt be fully convinced. How can a powerful friend that has been acquired be loſt? Had not our whole deſires been fixed on friendſhip, how could Mr. *Anderſon* have come to *Naigpore*, and Colonel *Goddard* to *Hoſhungabad*, and have remained there three months? or would Mr. *Watherſtone* have been invited to *Naigpore*? or ſhould we have ſent *Jadoo Row* and *Sewo Sing*, and have perſuaded Colonel *Goddard* to ſtay three months at *Hoſhungabad*? At that time you were at *Naigpore*, and were an eye witneſs to every thing I mention. Although it is abſurd to repeat theſe points ſo often, yet as you have written on this ſubject, I have therefore mentioned them. The Nabob ought to reflect with an eye of juſtice, on the largeneſs of the army at *Cuttack*, the difficulties, expences, and loſſes with which it has loaded the Sirkar; let him conſider that the coming of Mr. *Anderſon* and Mr. *Watherſtone* to *Naigpore*, the remaining of Colonel *Goddard* at *Hoſhungabad*, the attack and hoſtilities begun by the Bombayers againſt *Pundit Purdhaun*, and raiſing battalions here by Mr. *Watherſtone*, and the negociations reſpecting theſe battalions, and the purchaſing of all articles which he had occaſion for, in *Naigpore*; all theſe circumſtances, the Vackeels of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan* and *Pundit* wrote to their conſtituents; you yourſelf were here at the time, and know all this to be true, as you were an eye witneſs. Theſe events were the original cauſe of our preſent difficulties, the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, having fixed upon a plan, brought into this dilemma, promiſing to march in perſon towards *Checkacool* and *Rajebundery*, and obliging us to go towards *Bengal*, while *Scindia* and *Holcar* were to have proceeded to *Surat*. When *Nana Furneſſe* and *Hurry Pundit Umteah* and *Scindiah* came from their own habitations to *Poonah*, to examine into this plan, and conſult on the beſt meaſures, from the proof of Mr. *Watherſtone*'s having been at *Naigpore*, they accuſed me of every point, which as I above ſaid, all the Vackeels had written to their conſtituents, and pointed at me with their fingers; to all this I ſingly ſubmitted. In an intercourſe of friendſhip, ſhould ſuch difficulties, diſtreſſes, and abuſe fall on a perſon? it is of no conſequence, the ſhame of it is on the friends. No neglect was ever committed by this quarter, the diſpoſition of the Maha Rajah my maſter, and of all this family, is fixed in obſerving their word, and in preſerving friendſhip, nor is he ever wanting in fulfilling any thing which he promiſes, either verbally, or by writing, nor backward in performing his engagements. Never was any anceſtor of this family accuſed of neglect or breach in his promiſes; with whomever they had entered into oaths and engagements of friendſhip, or had a proſpect of effecting an alliance, they never admitted any thoughts different from that, as it would bring a ſtain upon the lateſt poſterity. Of this you are well informed; and although by ſending this army we have brought a great weight upon us, yet, by the bleſſing of God, I am firm in my attachment, and hope for its increaſe. This you muſt explain in a proper and convincing manner to the Nabob *Amaud O'Dowlah*, that the Maha Rajah is a firm friend, and that I conſider them both as one: of this God is witneſs!

The Nabob in greatneſs and diſtinction admits of no ſecond, and in foreſight, prudence and wiſdom, is ſo far above all praiſe, that in this age no one can be found to approach him. This is my preſent moſt earneſt wiſh, that at all events I may once be able to ſee the Nabob with my own eyes, and may either in *Benares*, *Balaſore*, or in *Calcutta*, it matters not which, be made happy by one month's reſidence near the Nabob, and may in perſon effect a ſincere reconciliation between the Nabob and *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, that no interruption may ever in future happen in it; but that they may be united in their mutual intereſts, and that having next made a treaty on the part of the Maha Rajah, I may return.—This is my earneſt deſire. It is abſurd to repeat this ſo often; but in this there are three conſiderable opponents: firſt the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, who upon learning this will take hoſtile reſolutions; ſecondly, *Scindia*, who is the moſt confidential Miniſter of *Pundit Purdhaun*, and in whoſe hands at preſent all the political affairs are lodged; ſo that the Poonah Miniſters were obliged to give him intelligence of what I inform them reſpecting my wiſh to go to *Calcutta*; and thirdly, the weight of expences and difficulties from this army. But my whole deſire and view is, to ſecure the peace of the people; and if between the two Chiefs a firm reconciliation and alliance ſhould take place, and the people of the two countries acquire eaſe and ſecurity, how can my diſtreſſes remain, as the peace and happineſs of the whole world is fixed in my mind? The inhabitants of it cannot remain in difficulties, nor can friends deſire it. After the receipt of your letter to *Nana Furneſſe* and *Hurry Pundit Tupteah*, for their private information, to the following effect; that they muſt try to perſuade the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan* and *Scindeah*, of the neceſſity of my going to *Calcutta*. I before this gave you notice of what the letters from *Poonah* contained, which you will have learnt; and I have now diſpatched *Bejey Ram*, from whom nothing is kept ſecret; after his departure, as ſoon as *Taram Reek* arrived and delivered me your letters, knowing it to be unadviſable to delay anſwering them, I immediately wrote all particulars, and the Moonſhy of *Bowanny Pundit* has wrote every matter in anſwer to the letters, which you will ſoon learn.

Poſtſcript.—During three months, continual hoſtilities were kept up between General *Goddard* and *Scindia* and *Holkar*; at laſt, when the rainy ſeaſon commenced, the General retired to *Surat*, and *Scindia* and *Holkar* went towards *Oogein* and *Indore*. The gentlemen of *Bombay* making an invaſion in the diſtrict of *Cokan*, ſeized upon three or four magazines, and took poſſeſſion of their whole contents, and committed divers other devaſtations; and the army with *Serement Pundit Purdhaun* ſent into the ſame diſtrict is employed in oppoſing them with various ſucceſs. At preſent that I have written to *Poonah* for their approbation of my going to *Calcutta*, and am myſelf deſirous of going thither, what can be thought of theſe violent hoſtilities ſtill ſubſiſting in *Cokan*? The Nabob, at the beginning, ſaid, that he did not approve of the engagements of the Bombayers, and could not aſſent to them; what therefore can I effect? It is therefore neceſſary, that before you receive letters from hence, adviſing you of the Poonah Miniſters having aſſented to my journey to that quarter, you do ſo; that General *Goddard* and the Bombayers receive directions to remain inactive, at that time it will be proper for me to begin my journey.

In the Dewan's own hand writing.

I have written to *Poonah*, to *Nana Furneſſe* and *Hurry Punt Tanteah*, and for greater ſecurity propoſe ſending to *Poonah Sadage*'s Pundit, who is equally truſted as myſelf, and reſides here as Vackeel from *Pundit Purdhaun* to the Maha Rajah, who is truly and firmly attached to this Sirkar, and is a ſincere friend of mine. After his arrival I do not doubt but that I ſhall receive ſuch letters from *Poonah* as I could wiſh, reſpecting my journey; as ſoon as I receive them I will, after celebrating the Duſſora, take *Sadajee Pundit Dadda* and my Moonſhy with me, and go by the road of *Cuttack*. I expect to receive their letters before the end of Sawan, or middle of Bhagdom, and immediately I will prepare all the neceſſaries for my journey, and before I ſet off I will write to you by the way of *Benares*. In that letter I will mention that you muſt procure orders from the Nabob *Amaud O Dowlah* to General *Goddard* and the gentlemen of *Bombay*, to put a ſtop to all hoſtilities; in this you muſt exert yourſelf and bring it about. It is now eight months that the

army has ſuffered much from the ſcarcity and dearneſs of proviſions, nor do the Boephanils bring enough. It is neceſſary, abſolutely neceſſary, that you repreſent this to the Nabob. If the Boephanils can be ſent to the army of *Baboo Sahib Seeva Bahadar*, it is a duty of friendſhip, and ought to be done. I am friend to the Nabob; the *friend*, the *friend*; of this convince him, and give entire ſatisfaction on this point: you muſt gain me one interview with him, as it is my moſt ſanguine wiſh. The Nabob himſelf laſt year expreſſed a great deſire for an interview; may God grant that it be happy! I am anxious for the receipt of letters from *Poonah*.

Reſolved, That the treaſury be immediately opened for loans of money at the eſtabliſhed rate of intereſt, being 5 per cent. and that public notice thereof be given accordingly.

Ordered, That the Sub-treaſurer do ſubjoin to his weekly abſtract of treaſury, the ſum received into the treaſury during the courſe of the preceding week, and the diminution of the depoſits during the ſame period.

Agreed, That the other ſubjects of the Commander in Chief's minute lie for conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 18th September 1780.

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following minute in conſequence of that from the Governor General recorded on the 4th inſtant.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I agree with the Governor General in the propriety of deferring to ſend further ſupplies for the relief of the Preſidency of *Madras* until the Adminiſtration there ſhall have adviſed us on thoſe points which the Governor General has ſtated, and which are ſo very neceſſary for our information, in order to guide us as to the nature of the aſſiſtance to be given them.

From the effect which the Governor General apprehends might be produced in the conduct of the Berar Court towards this Government by the formation of an army to the ſouthward, and in conſideration of the further arguments he has ſtated in proof of *Moodajee Boosla*'s friendly diſpoſition towards us; and becauſe the ſeaſon when our troops can move with facility is not yet arrived, I agree with him to ſuſpend the immediate execution of that meaſure, and to wait further intelligence as to the intentions of the Government of *Berar*. At the ſame time I muſt beg leave to recommend that every neceſſary preparation be made for the adoption of ſuch a ſtep the moment it may be found expedient; and in ſhort, that every precaution be taken to ſecure the Company's poſſeſſions from any ſudden ſurprize in thoſe quarters where it is moſt to be apprehended, and which may operate to the prejudice of the collections. In this particular, the province of *Bahar* appears firſt to demand our attention, as well becauſe of its being more expoſed to the danger of an incurſion by the Marattas, as that it is leſs protected than any of the others.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

The Board agree with the Commander in Chief in the ſentiments expreſſed in the above minute, and refer it to him to take ſuch precautions, and to paſs ſuch orders, as may be immediately neceſſary to guard againſt the event of an invaſion.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 10th Auguſt 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire.—(Mr. *Francis* indiſpoſed. Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent.)

The Secretary having with the aſſiſtance of Brigadier General *Stibbert*, commanding officer of the firſt brigade, prepared orders and inſtructions to the commanding officer of the battalion lately ordered on duty towards the banks of the Subenreka river, now lays them before the Board for their approval. Appendix, No. 364.

Sir,

Being in command of the 3d battalion of Sepoys and artillery, lately ordered upon ſervice, you are directed to march with them from *Midnapore* (after the arrival of the troops at that place, whereto they have been directed to proceed in boats by water) to *Jellaſore*; you are then, or at ſuch other place adjacent as you may ſee moſt convenient, to take poſt with your detachment, and be ready to repel any invaſion or incurſions that may be attempted by the Maratta army aſſembled at *Cuttack*, into the Company's provinces at the gaut acroſs the river *Subenreka*, called *Rajegaut*, on the great road leading from *Ballaſore* to *Jellaſore*, &c. or at any other gaut or fords in the neighbourhood or contiguous to it. Inſtructions to Captain M'Pherſon.

You will uſe ſuch means as may be in your power to obtain the moſt early and beſt intelligence from time to time of the motions and deſigns of the enemy; and as their forces are ſaid to be numerous, it is ſtrongly recommended to you to be ſtrictly upon your guard againſt any ſurprize, and to take the neceſſary precautions for the ſecurity and defence of your detachment, in caſe of your being attacked by a ſuperior body of troops, till you can be reinforced from *Midnapore*, or the Preſidency. Theſe precautions your own experience will beſt point out to you, as well as the meaſures moſt proper to be purſued for effecting the ſervice in general on which you are employed.

You are immediately upon receiving advice of the enemy's making any movements from *Cuttack* towards *Ballaſore*, with their army or any part thereof, to ſend out parties and ſeize upon all the boats on the *Subenreka* above or below *Jellaſore*, as far as *Pipley*, and the ſea ſhore, which might be uſed by them in croſſing that river, as it is broad, and as the tide ſets in ſtrong at *Pipley*, and it is ſaid there are no fords for ſome coſs above that town; by ſecuring the boats, and ſtationing a guard of a company of Sepoys there, you will it is conceived effectually prevent any troops from croſſing, and inroads being made by them at that part; the road leading thereto, and that to the gaut near *Jellaſore* being, as it is reported, the principal by which they can effect an entrance on that ſide of the country. But this you will be the beſt able to examine into and determine after your arrival. All that is further recommended to you is, that you do not divide your force for the protection and defence of any ports unleſs it be abſolutely neceſſary, or on any account whatever, as far as it can be poſſibly avoided.

You are to report to the Commander in Chief all intelligence of conſequence, which you may receive reſpecting the enemy, as well as all occurrences of your detachment: you are to make ſimilar reports to Lieutenant Colonel *Blair*, commanding the troops at *Midnapore*, with whom you are alſo to co-operate; and you are to obey any orders that he may give you, which are neceſſary for the good of the ſervice, and the general defence of the provinces and diſtricts which you are ſtationed to protect.

Fort William,
the 10th Auguſt 1780.

Approved the above inſtructions, and ordered that they be copied fair, and ſent by the Secretary to Brigadier General *Stibbert*, to be by him iſſued to Captain *Macpherſon*.

Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

Appendix. Nos. 305 & 306.

APPENDIX, No. 305.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 22d June 1780.

THE Governor General informs the Board that he has received advice of the arrival of *Chimnajee Booſla*, the commander of the army of *Berar*, in the province of *Oriſſa*, at *Cuttack*. By intelligence communicated ſome time ſince to the members of the Board, they have been informed of the diſtreſs which this army had actually ſuſtained, and of the greater difficulties which it was likely to incur from the want of proviſions, and of the order which *Beneram Pundit*, the Vackeel or Miniſter of the Berar Government, had received, to apply to this Government for aid in procuring their future ſupply: that application has accordingly been made by the Vackeel; and as it appears to be the general ſenſe of the Board, that we ſhall conſider the Government of *Berar* as friendly to this; and as it is entitled to ſome return for the hoſpitality which it afforded to our army under the command of General *Goddard*, for many months before its arrival within the frontier of *Berar*, and during its reſidence in it, the Governor General recommends, that orders be iſſued to the provincial Chiefs and Councils of *Burdwan* and *Calcutta*, and the collector of *Midnapore*, to permit ſupplies of grain, proviſions, and other neceſſaries, to paſs to the Maratta army at *Cuttack*, and to aſſiſt their agents in procuring them; and that he himſelf may be authorized to inform the Berar Vackeel, that the Board have thought proper to iſſue ſuch orders.

Mr. *Wheler*—Placing a much greater confidence in the opinion which the Governor General has formed of the friendly intentions of the Rajah of *Berar*, and which I conclude he has collected from his long intercourſe with the Vackeel of that Chief, than from any evidence of them which I can gather from the proceedings, or from the correſpondence with him, I accede to the preſent motion.

Mr. *Francis*—I think that we ought to continue to treat the Berar Government as friends, without neglecting to have a ſtrict eye upon their motions: if their intentions be hoſtile to us, they will ſoon be diſcovered; in the mean time I think it may be proper to give them this proof of our friendly diſpoſition towards them: the ſupplies may be ſtopped at any time. I therefore agree to the motion.

The Governor General—My opinion of the diſpoſition of the Berar Government towards this, has been fully expreſſed and explained in my minute of the 12th June. I repeat, that I believe it to be perfectly friendly; but I muſt add, that it will depend upon the conduct of this Government towards it, whether it is to prove in the end our friend or our enemy.

Agreed to the Governor General's propoſition.

The following letter is accordingly written to the provincial councils of *Calcutta* and *Burdwan*, and to the collector of *Midnapore*.

Mr. *David Anderſon*, Chief, &c. Calcutta Committee.

Gentlemen;

To the Calcutta Committee of Revenue.

A large body of troops belonging to the Berar Rajah, and commanded by *Chimnajee Booſla*, being arrived in the neighbourhood of *Cuttack*, we authorize and direct you to permit ſupplies of grain, proviſions, and other neceſſaries, to paſs to *Cuttack* for their uſe, and to aſſiſt their agents in procuring them.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 22d June, 1780.

The ſame to *Burdwan*, and to the Collector of *Midnapore*.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 17th July 1780.

Read the following letter from the Calcutta Committee of Revenue:

Calcutta Committee.

We have been honoured with the receipt of your orders of the 22d of June, and have iſſued Perwannahs to the Naibs and Zemindars of *Hidgelee* and *Tumlook*, directing them to permit ſupplies of grain, proviſions, and other neceſſaries, to paſs to *Cuttack*, for the uſe of the troops of the Berar Rajah at that place, commanded by *Chimnajee Booſla*, and to aſſiſt his agents in procuring them.

We ſhall take care that proper attention is paid to our Perwannahs.

We are, &c.

(Signed) *D. Anderſon*, and Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 306.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Dewagur Pundit* to *Beneram Pundit*: received 21ſt September, 1780.

CONFIRMING what has paſſed in all former letters without the deviation of an iota, I write with my attention limited by them alone, and without reſtraint by the fear of any one.

The Governor wrote the Maha Rajah that he looked upon the army under *Chumnajee* as his own. There is now nothing wanting to the completion and extent of their friendſhip; therefore every thing, good and evil, muſt meet with the moſt unreſerved communication: when you have well underſtood the contents of my letter, you will lay it entirely before him.

The times require that a peace be made with the Maratta Adminiſtration, and that, in whatever mode it may be, a treaty and agreement take place between them. If this is not now effected, confuſion and warfare muſt be carried to the greateſt lengths and extremities. I write, appealing to God and the friendſhip now eſtabliſhed. This diſpute muſt be ended.

Although many impediments are attempted to be thrown into my way, to prevent my hoped for meeting with the Governor, and have ſent *Sadaſeo Pundit* to *Nanna Purnaveeſe* and *Hurry Punt Purkia*, well aſſured that the anſwers from *Poonah* will prove agreeable to my wiſhes, and enable me to accompliſh them. I have therefore ſent encloſed, the heads of the treaty concluded with Colonel *Upton*, and memorandums of the claims regarding *Guzerat*, *Ahmudabad*, *Cokun*, *Surat*, and the Guicawars, &c. You muſt lay them without diminution before the Governor, aſk his definitive and ſolemn anſwer, and ſend it to me. This is the advice, and moſt neceſſary to be followed.

The Maha Rajah will never drop the Pornagor. They promiſed *Gurrah* and *Mundela*, and have not performed it, but this remains upon them. Notwithſtanding this, it is proper and right that peace ſhould be brought about between them and the Engliſh, by me, that I may on this ſide of the Marattas, have a claim upon their gratitude, for the after performance of many unfiniſhed claims between them and the Maha Rajah. And on the ſide of the Engliſh, I ſhall enhance our friendſhip with them. An agreement ſubſiſted between the predeceſſors of the preſent Maratta Government, and thoſe of the Maha Rajah, and ratified when *Ragojee Bhoſila* went to *Poonah*, by my placing him in their arms, and they promiſing never to deſert him. Upon this ſcore therefore, our fidelity is due to them in every form. When at ſundry times we have been diſtreſſed, they have helped us. I therefore hope now in return to aſſiſt them. A meeting between

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me and the Governor is abſolutely neceſſary to conclude this buſineſs.

In Repetition.

The Maha Rajah, like all others of the Bhoſila family, is not ſelf-intereſted. Wherever they place their friendſhip, they do not heſitate to ſtake their lives, much leſs their fortunes, provided either can ſerve to cement and anſwer the ends of friendſhip. You have ſeen all this yourſelf, and know it from your own knowledge.

Inform the Governor the Nabob *Zuffer ul Dowla Donſah*,* is at *Nuzmull*, and is ſoul and body united with the Maha Rajah. You ſaw the letters which came from him, at the time General *Goddard* was at *Hoſſhungabad*, and Mr. *Waterſtone* came to *Naigpore*; eſtabliſh the truth therefore with the Governor. *Zuffer ul Dowla* has 12,000 gardies, 2,000 coffrees, 6,000 horſe, and 40 guns, with and under him, and is devoted to us: the Governor probably knows this: it is no ſecret to the Marattas, and *Nizam Ally*. A friendly letter from the Governor to him, would be of great uſe. God enlighten you in this path, that every thing may be underſtood by the Governor, for if the whole of this is not only not underſtood, but does not meet with his warmeſt concurrence, a world will be loſt.

I look up to the Governor as my own maſter, and ſpeak only for his welfare. This is true to the leaſt tittle.

If an oſtenſible letter from the Governor to *Scindia* be written, referring to me as an agent, I can then come to your quarter.

Again in Repetition.

Every thing has been moſt fully explained to you in former letters, but for certainty I repeat the heads. I was at *Poonah* when the army under *Chumnajee* was propoſed and recommended by *Nizam Ally Khan*, to the Government of *Poonah*, to be ſent into *Bengal*. Letters were then paſſing between *Scindia* and *Goddard*, about peace, but being interrupted and broken off by the means of *Nizam Ally*, he then carried the ſending of our army to *Bengal*. I took my leave of *Poonah*, and came to *Naigpore*. On the day of the Duſſara, *Chumnajee* took the field (now one year) and arrived at *Cuttack*, not till the laſt of Jeyt, as before explained, and unneceſſary to repeat. On the day of the departure of the army, 35 lacks in money, 3 lacks in cloths, and 14 elephants, were given to the chief of it. Diſtreſs of proviſions much injured them upon the road. Upon their arrival at *Cuttack*, they experienced the ſame. Yet ſo ſtrong is our friendſhip with the Engliſh, particularly with the Governor, that we never treſpaſſed their bounds, *and never will*; God is my witneſs to this. The Governor has permitted grain to be ſent to them, it muſt have taken place of courſe; the merchants muſt certainly have carried it, but there is no money with the army. According to the loweſt calculation, 4 lacks per month is the leaſt that can defray their exigencies. It is adviſable between us *as friends* that this army return in Poos and Maug. Sixteen lacks ſhould be ſent for their aſſiſtance, twelve of it *ſecretly*, to *Bowanny Pundit*, that he may be able to repreſs the army, and keep them under controul. This is ſpeedily neceſſary. Let not the Governor apprehend that this money will thereby be thrown away, for the Bhoſila and Engliſh intereſt will then be but one, and much benefit muſt flow from this. To bring this about is neceſſary, extremely neceſſary, I do not write for myſelf. This is the advice to be followed, moſt certainly, or the army will be no longer governable. Save us from this diſgrace. All my hopes are upon you. If the army remains till Poos and Maug, the fear of the Engliſh will be upon all, and therefore this ought to be effected.

APPENDIX, No. 307.

Appendix. Nos. 307 & 308.

Bengal Perſian Correſpondence.

To *Chumnajee Baboo*.

13th October 1780.

HAVING received repeated letters from *Moodajee Booſla*, reſpecting the ſtate of the army under your command; and regarding it on account of the long intimacy which has ſubſiſted betweeen our two Governments, as my own; I have for this reaſon diſpatched *Biſſembeer Pundit*, the brother of *Beneram Pundit*, to you, and have furniſhed him with ſuch aids as were in my power, which he will deliver to you. As he is fully acquainted with all the circumſtances of my affairs, and of my long fixed attachment to the Maha Rajah, and to the houſe of *Booſla*, he will ſerve in the place of a longer letter, and to him I refer you for all the particulars.

APPENDIX, No. 308.

Letter from the Governor General, 29th November 1780.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

YOU will be informed by our conſultations of the 26th June of a very unuſual tender which was made by me to the Board on that day, for the purpoſe of indemnifying the Company for the extraordinary expence which might be incurred by employing the detachment under the command of Major *Camac* in the invaſion of the Maratta dominions, which lie beyond the diſtrict of *Gohed*, and drawing the attention of *Mahdajee Scindia*, to whom that country immediately appertained, from General *Goddard*, while that of the General was employed on the reduction of *Baſſein*, and in ſecuring the conqueſts made by your arms in *Gujerat*.

I was deſirous to remove the only objection which had been, or could be oſtenſibly made to that meaſure, which I had very much at heart, as may eaſily be conceived from the means which I took to effect it. For the reaſons at large which induced me to propoſe this diverſion, it will be ſufficient to refer to my minute recommending it, and to the letters received from General *Goddard* near the ſame period of time. The ſubject is now become obſolete, and all the fair hopes which I had built upon the proſecution of the Maratta war to its termination, in a ſpeedy, honourable, and advantageous peace, have been blaſted by the dreadful calamities which have befallen your arms in the dependencies of your Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, and have changed the object of our purſuit from the aggrandizement of your power to its preſervation. My preſent reaſon for reverting to my own conduct on the above-mentioned occaſion, is to obviate the falſe concluſions, or purpoſed miſrepreſentations which may be made of it, either as an artifice of oſtentation, or as the effect of corrupt influence by aſſuring you, that the money, by whatever means it came into your poſſeſſion, was not my own; that I had myſelf no right to it, nor would nor could have received it, but for the accidental means which were at that inſtant afforded me of accepting and converting it to the property and uſe of the Company; and with this brief apology I ſhall diſmiſs the ſubject.

Something of affinity to this anecdote may appear in the firſt aſpect of another tranſaction which I ſhall proceed to relate, and of which it is more immediately my duty to inform you.

You will have been adviſed by the repeated addreſſes of this Government of the arrival of an army at *Cuttae*, under the command of *Chimnajee Booſla*, the ſecond ſon of

* A diſaffected and powerful Jaquidar of *Nizam Ally*'s.

Appendix. No. 309.

of *Moodajee Boosla*, the Rajah of *Berar*. The origin and deſtination of this force have been largely explained and detailed in the correſpondence of the Government of *Berar*, and in various parts of our conſultations: the minute relation of theſe would exceed the bounds of a letter; I ſhall therefore confine myſelf to the principal facts. About the middle of the laſt year a plan of confederacy was formed by the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, by which it was propoſed, that while the army of the Marattas, under the command of *Mahdajee Scindia* and *Tuckobjee Holkar*, was employed to check the operations of General *Goddard* in the weſt of *India*, *Hyder Ally Cawn* ſhould invade the *Carnatic*, *Moodajee Boosla* the provinces of *Bengal*, and he himſelf the Sirkars of *Rajahmundry* and *Chicacole*.

The Government of *Berar* was required to accept the part aſſigned it in this combination, and to march a large body of troops immediately into *Bengal*. To enforce the requiſition on the part of the ruling members of the Maratta State, menaces of inſtant hoſtility by the combined forces were added by *Mahdajee Scindia*, *Tuckoojee Holcar*, and *Nizam Ally Cawn*, in letters written by them to *Moodajee Boosla* on the occaſion. He was not in a ſituation to ſuſtain the brunt of ſo formidable a league, and oſtenſibly yielded. Such at leaſt was the turn which he gave to his acquieſcence in his letters to me, and his ſubſequent conduct has juſtified his profeſſions. I was early and progreſſively acquainted by him with the requiſition, and with the meaſures which were intended to be taken, and which were taken by him upon it. The army profeſſedly deſtined for *Bengal* marched on the Duſſerra of the laſt year correſponding with the 12th of October; inſtead of taking the direct courſe to *Bahar*, which had been preſcribed, it proceeded by varied deviations and ſtudied delays to *Cuttac*, where it arrived late in May laſt, having performed a practicable journey of three months in ſeven, and concluded it at the inſtant commencement of the rains, which of courſe would preclude its operations, and afford the Government of *Berar* a further interval of five months to provide for the part which it would then be compelled to chuſe. In the mean time letters were continually written by the Rajah and his Miniſters to this Government, explanatory of their ſituation and motives; propoſing their mediation and guarantee for a peace and alliance with the Peiſhwa; and profeſſing, without any ſolicitation on our part, the moſt friendly diſpoſition towards us, and the moſt determined reſolution to maintain it. Conformably to theſe aſſurances, and the acceptance of a propoſal made by *Moodajee Boosla* to depute his miniſter to *Bengal*, for the purpoſe of negociating and concluding the intended treaty of peace, application had been made to the Peiſhwa for credentials to the ſame effect: at this inſtant the fatal news arrived of the defeat of your army at *Conjeveram*. It now became neceſſary that every other object ſhould give place, or be made ſubſervient to the preſervation of the *Carnatic*; nor would the means requiſite for that end admit of delay. Peace with the Marattas was the firſt object. To conciliate their alliance and that of every other Power in natural enmity with *Hyder Ally*, the next meaſures were immediately taken (as our general advices will inform you) to ſecure both theſe points, and to employ the Government of *Berar* as the channel and inſtrument of accompliſhing them. Its army ſtill lay on our borders, and in diſtreſs for long arrears of pay, not leſs occaſioned by a want of pecuniary funds than a ſtoppage of communication. An application had been made to us for a ſupply of money, and the ſum ſpecified for the complete relief of their army was ſixteen lacks. We had neither money to ſpare, nor in the apparent ſtate of that Government, in its relation to ours, would it have been either prudent or conſiſtent with our public credit, to have afforded it; it was nevertheleſs my decided opinion, that ſome aid ſhould be given, as well to contribute the neceſſary relief, as to indicate a confidence upon our part, and a return for the many inſtances of ſubſtantial kindneſs which we had within the courſe of the laſt two years experienced from the Government of *Berar*. I had an aſſurance that ſuch a propoſal would receive the acquieſcence of the Board; but I knew that it would not paſs without oppoſition, and it would have become public, which muſt have defeated its purpoſe. Convinced however of the neceſſity of the expedient, and aſſured of the ſincerity of the Government of *Berar* from evidences of ſtronger proof to me than I could make them appear to the other members of the Board, I reſolved to adopt it, and take the entire reſponſibility of it upon myſelf. In this mode a leſs conſiderable ſum would ſuffice: I accordingly cauſed three lacks of rupees to be delivered to the miniſter of the Rajah of *Berar* reſident in *Calcutta*, which he has tranſmitted: two thirds of this ſum I have raiſed by my own credit, and ſhall charge it in my official accounts; the other third I have ſupplied from the caſh in my hands belonging to the Honourable Company. I have given due notice to *Moodajee Boosla* of this tranſaction, and explained it to have been a private act of my own, unknown to the other members of the Council. I have given him expectations of the remainder of the amount required for the arrears of his army, proportioned to the extent to which he may put it in my power to propoſe it as a public gratuity, by his effectual orders for the recal of the troops, or for their junction with ours.

I hope I ſhall receive your approbation of what I have done for your ſervice, and your indulgence for the length of this narrative, which I could not comprize within a ſmaller compaſs.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful, obedient,
Fort William, and humble ſervant,
Novr 29th, 1780. *Warren Haſtings.*

APPENDIX, No. 309.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 17th July 1780.

READ another letter as follows, from Mr. *Hollond*, encloſing one from *Hyder Ally Cawn*, which is entered after it:

Honourable Sir,

I herewith encloſe *Hyder Ally Khan*'s anſwer to the letter which I forwarded to him on the 11th March. The hircarrahs inform me that they were detained twelve days by *Meer Sahib*, Governor of *Cudapah*, who at laſt ſent them forward with two of his own hircarrahs and a duſtuck; that upon your letter being delivered to *Hyder* he expreſſed himſelf, as they heard from *Hyder*'s hircarrahs, in terms and looks of anger and reſentment; that there was a report at *Syringapatam* where *Hyder* then was, of his intention of ſetting out ſoon to invade the *Carnatic*; that his troops under *Meer Sahib*, Governor of *Cudapah*, had plundered ſome parts of *Venentagharry* the country of *Bungan Yachem Naick*, tributary to the Nabob *Walaw Jau*, and had carried off from thence 1,500 women.

Hydrabad, I am, &c.
June 16th 1780. (Signed) *John Hollond.*

P. S. The latter part of the news I had heard here previous to the arrival of the hircarrahs, who returned this morning.

From *Hyder Ally Khan*; received 14th July 1780.

I have received your agreeable letter, and underſtand the contents, which gave me inexpreſſible pleaſure: I was before well convinced, that the treaties and engagements of the Engliſh are inviolable; but whenever a new Governor arrives, he will not conform to the agreements of the Council, but acts as he pleaſes, making many innovations in the eſtabliſhed friendſhips. Firſt, the engagements which *Wallah Jah Bahadre*, and the Chiefs of the

Company

Company entered into at the time of the ſiege of *Chunapilly*, were never fulfilled; and ſecondly, it was agreed between us, under the ſtrongeſt engagements, that whenever I ſhould require aſſiſtance in a neceſſary war, it ſhould be immediately furniſhed from that quarter, and that as often as they could demand ſuccours, they ſhould be ſent from hence. Accordingly before this, when I was engaged in hoſtilities againſt ſeveral enemies, notwithſtanding that I had not the ſmalleſt occaſion for it, yet to try the ſtrength of their friendſhip and alliance, I deſired aſſiſtance from them: but they pleaded various excuſes, and in many other inſtances, acted in direct breach of the engagements. What dependance therefore can be placed on the engagements and treaties of the Chiefs of the Company? Do you however act as ſhall ſeem beſt to you.

A true copy.
(Signed) *Edw. Colebrooke*,
Perſian Tranſlator.

APPENDIX, No. 310.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated 25th September 1780.

THE Governor General delivers in the following minute:

Governor General. Governor General—This is not a time either for long deliberation at home, or the formal and tedious proceſs of negociation abroad. The calamity which has befallen us upon the coaſt, and the alarming ſuperiority which *Hyder Ally Cawn* has acquired in the *Carnatic*; the deſpondency of the Government of *Fort Saint George*; the conſternation and diſtruſt which ſeem to have ſpread themſelves among all thoſe who are ſubject to its authority; its utter want of preſent means and reſources; the diminution of their military ſtrength, and its declared inſufficiency for the war which it is to ſuſtain; and above all, the authentic information which we have received, of a great naval and military armament prepared by the Court of *France*, and deſtined beyond all doubt to co-operate with *Hyder Ally*, demand the moſt inſtant, powerful, and even hazardous exertions of this Government, to avert the event portended by ſo many concurrent difficulties. To this point every other conſideration muſt now give place. Without further preface, I propoſe the following reſolutions:

1ſt. That the ſum of fifteen lacks of rupees be immediately ſent to *Fort Saint George* in ſpecie, and laden for that purpoſe on the Honourable Company's ſhip the *Duke of Kingston*, and the other veſſels which are now on the point of ſailing for *Madras*.

2d. That the treaſure depoſited in the new fort, including the moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the general treaſury, to be applied to the preceding purpoſe, and other exigencies of this Government.

3d. That a large detachment of European infantry and artillery, be immediately ſent to *Fort Saint George* by the *Duke of Kingston*, and the other veſſels which are now on the point of ſailing for *Madras*. To this propoſition, as a neceſſary and eſſential part of it I muſt add the following, viz. That the Commander in Chief be requeſted, and I do for my own part, make it my moſt earneſt and particular requeſt, that he will proceed himſelf immediately to the coaſt, and take the command of the army on that eſtabliſhment.

(The Commander in Chief will pardon this formal and official ſolicitation. I know the ardour of his zeal for the public ſervice, and that this principle will of itſelf impel him to be wherever it ſhall moſt require his preſence; but I think this a caſe in which it would mark too great an indifference to the public welfare, and too cold a ſenſe of the utility of his ſervices, to leave the offer of them to his unſolicited opinion. I make no ſcruple to avow, that although I am convinced that the danger impending on our intereſts in the *Carnatic*, might be eaſily repelled, even with the force which it already poſſeſſes for its defence; yet I cannot place any reliance upon it, unleſs it ſhall be properly applied and conducted; that I do not think it has been properly applied, nor expect that it will be properly conducted, unleſs Sir *Eyre Coote* will at this criſis ſtand forth, and vindicate in his own perſon the rights and honour of the Britiſh arms. I mean not to compliment his military experience; and above all the high eſtimation in which his name is held by the world, and eſpecially by that part of it where it was principally acquired, mark him as the only poſſible inſtrument to retrieve our paſt diſgrace, or to preſerve the Britiſh intereſts and poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic* from utter ruin. Appendix No. 319.

Our armies which have been ſo long formed to the habits of conqueſt, will not eaſily recover from the impreſſion of the dreadful reverſe which has lately befallen them, nor be brought to act with the former confidence under unſucceſsful commanders. The addition of numbers will not relieve their apprehenſions, and will but contribute to oppreſs the hands which have been already proved too weak to ſuſtain the weight of an imperior charge.)

4th. That an immediate offer of peace be made to the Maratta State, in the mode and on the conditions following; viz. That as the Miniſters of that State have profeſſed a deſire for peace, which has been equally the wiſh of this Government, even from the commencement of the war; and as the attainment of it ſeems to have been hitherto impeded by the difficulty of managing a negociation between the principals ſituated at ſo great a diſtance from each other; to preclude all further delays, we do at the ſame time offer peace, and bind ourſelves to the obſervance of it on their acceptance and ratification of the following conditions; viz.

1ſt. That all acquiſitions made by our forces in the courſe of the war, and retained in our poſſeſſion as the property of the Company, ſhall be delivered up and reſtored to the ſame footing as that on which it ſtood before the commencement of the war; but that ſuch as have been conquered and ceded in virtue of formal treaties ſhall remain, and be confirmed to the perſons to whom they were ſo ceded; and the treaties concluded with them remain firm and inviolate.

2d. That a proviſion be made for the maintenance of *Ragonaut Row* during his life; and that he ſhall be permitted to reſide where he pleaſes, excepting *Bombay* or any place nearer to *Bombay* than *Surat*, but ſhall receive no aſſiſtance from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, nor from any other Preſidency of the Company; nor, if he ſhall chuſe any of the Company's Preſidencies or ſettlements for the place of his reſidence, ſhall he be permitted to reaſſert his pretenſions to the adminiſtration of the Maratta State, without the entire and univerſal conſent and requiſition of all the members of the State, who are included as parties in this treaty.

3d. That the Peiſhwa and rulers of the Maratta State ſhall agree to an alliance, offenſive and defenſive, with the Company, againſt the French and *Hyder Ally Cawn*, and ſhall immediately employ their forces in conjunction with ours in the invaſion of his dominions, and in the proſecution of ſuch operations againſt him, as the circumſtances of the war, and the judgment of thoſe who have the conduct of it on both ſides, ſhall determine; and if in the courſe of it any acquiſitions of territory ſhall be made, theſe ſhall be equally ſhared between the parties to this engagement, in ſuch manner as ſhall be moſt ſuitable to the ſituation and contiguity of the places or dominions at this time reſpectively held by them.

4th. That if the Peiſhwa will not agree to the propoſed alliance, peace be nevertheleſs concluded, each party retaining what it hath acquired, or that a ſuſpenſion

Appendix. No. 310.

a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities ſhall take place on both ſides during one year from the date of the treaty, for the purpoſe of negociating the terms of a future and perpetual adjuſtment.

5th. That the treaty ſhall be concluded with the mediation and guarantee of Rajah *Moodajee Booſla*, who ſhall be a ſubſcribing party to it, and ſhall bind himſelf and his ſucceſſors to the faithful obſervance and ſupport of it.

6th. That the treaty ſhall be ſealed, ſigned, and ſanctified, by the reſpective parties to it, with the moſt ſolemn oaths preſcribed by their reſpective religions.

7th. That one copy of the treaty executed in manner above preſcribed by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, being received by the Peiſhwa or his Miniſters, two copies or counterparts thereof ſhall be in like manner executed by the Peiſhwa and principal rulers of the Maratta State and *Moodajee Booſla* as the guarantée to it in the manner above mentioned, and ſhall be tranſmitted, one to the Government of *Bombay* and the other to General *Goddard*, or to the officer commanding the detachment ſent from *Bengal*, that all hoſtilities may immediately ceaſe on both ſides, and each provide for the due execution of the treaty: but until the treaty ſhall be thus ratified on the part of the Peiſhwa, it ſhall not be binding on the Governor General and Council, neither ſhall it be binding, unleſs it ſhall be ſo ratified within two months after the receipt of it.

5th. That a letter be written to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and a ſimilar order to General *Goddard* and Major *Camac*, requiring and commanding them immediately to ſuſpend all hoſtilities and military operations on the receipt of a requiſition in writing to that effect, and a notification from the Peiſhwa, that the like order has been given on his part to the officers commanding his armies; and that the Peiſhwa be adviſed of theſe orders, that if deſirous of peace, he may make the ſaid requiſition and notification accordingly.

6th. That the treaty being executed by the Governor General and Council, in the manner ſpecified by the 6th and 7th articles of the 4th reſolution, it be forwarded to *Moodajee Booſla* with two blank copies of it; that if he ſhould approve of it, it may be previouſly ratified on his part as guarantee, and tranſmitted with the treaty executed by this Government to the Peiſhwa for his ratification, in the manner preſcribed by the 6th and 7th articles of the 4th reſolution.

This is all that I propoſe as immediately neceſſary. The Commander in Chief will offer ſuch a plan for the diſtribution of our troops and other military arrangements, as appertain to his ſeparate province.

Other ſubſidiary meaſures may be the ſubject of future deliberation.

Agreed, That the conſideration of the foregoing propoſitions be deferred until the next meeting.

The Board adjourn till to-morrow morning, at 10 o'Clock.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 26th September.—At a Council; preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

THE Board met agreeable to adjournment.

The Secretary lays before the Board the following letter from the military Paymaſter-general.

To Mr. *Edward Hay*, acting Secretary to the Supreme Council. Military Paymaſter-General.

Sir,

In anſwer to your letter of this date; I have to inform you, that all the Europeans at the Preſidency are paid to the laſt day of this month; the engineers to the 31ſt of laſt month; and all the artillery Laſcars, Sepoys, and artificers, to the 30th of June; Captain *Allen McPherſon*'s battalion ſent on command, to the 31ſt of July. No. 24. Mr. Francis's packet.

It is impoſſible for me to ſay to what period the troops at *Surat*, and Majors *Camac* and *Popham*'s detachment are paid, and by the lateſt advices there were no arrears due to the troops at *Cawnpore*, *Futty Ghur* and *Berhampore*.

There is now due to me from the treaſury, a balance of Auguſt eſtimate,

Cur^t Rup^s	6,13,264	11	2
The whole of September	11,46,292	2	1
Total Cur^t R^s	17,59,556	13	3

I am, &c.
(Signed) *Claud Alexander*,
Mil^y P. Mr General.

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following minute on the propoſitions recorded by the Governor General on yeſterday's proceedings. No. 23. Mr. Francis's packet.

Mr. *Francis*—I am earneſtly deſirous of giving every aſſiſtance and relief to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, that prudence and a due regard to our own ſafety will admit of; our endeavours to provide for the ſecurity of the Company's other poſſeſſions in *India*, ſhould always be guided and limited by the fundamental principle laid down for us by the Court of Directors in our general inſtructions, *to make the ſafety and proſperity of* Bengal *the principal objects of all our deliberations and reſolutions*: and I truſt that the Board will not loſe ſight of this principle in the preſent debate.

1ſt. I ſee many objections to the Governor General's firſt propoſition. The ſum of 15 lacks in ſpecie is much too great for this Government to ſpare from its own preſſing occaſions, nor do I think that ſo great a ſum ought to be truſted at once to the gentlemen of *Madras*, if our treaſury were full. If we ſupply them gradually and with moderation, it is probable they may apply our money with œconomy to the ſervice for which we intended it; if not, I very much fear it will not only be miſapplied but waſted. Before we part with any thing, we ought to look into the ſtate of our own treaſury, and ſee what ſupplies can be afforded from it, conſiſtently with the immediate demands, and other indiſpenſable ſervices of this Government.

We had yeſterday an apparent balance of 44 lacks of current rupees, including 4,65,196 bills receivable; 1,26,990 unſtated treaſure, and depoſits of private property to the amount of C. R^s 16,51,653: this is our actually exiſting fund. The Paymaſter-general's immediate demand on this fund is for 17 lacks 59,556; other orders unpaid amount to C. R^s 15,91,441. The civil ſervice I believe is univerſally in arrears. The artillery Laſcars, the artificers, and all the Sepoy battalions, except one, are three months in arrears. On the firſt day of next month, the Paymaſter General will call upon us for C. R^s 5,47,000, excluſive of any bills that may be drawn by General *Goddard* and Major *Camac*; put theſe demands together, and ſee in what ſtate we ſhall be left when they are ſatisfied, as ſome of them at leaſt muſt be without delay: in effect we have no fund to meet our moſt preſſing expences; nor do I ſee by what means it will be poſſible to create ſuch a fund as our ſituation requires. Before we have a conſiderable ſum in hand, I would not undertake to ſend large ſupplies to the other Preſidencies. For theſe reaſons, I think that the preſent ſupply to *Fort Saint George* ſhould not exceed half the ſum propoſed, nor could any

thing

thing but their preſſing neceſſities extort even this ſum from me in the preſent ſtate of our treaſury.

2d. If it depended on me, I would rather take meaſures to increaſe the depoſit in the new fort, than proclaim our diſtreſs to all *India*, by taking away the reſidue now left there. It is a dreadful conſideration, that a Government ſuch as this ſhould not at all times have a reſerve of 20 or 30 lacks in ſpecie at its command.

3d. On the firſt part of the 3d propoſition I muſt ſubmit to the judgment of the Commander in Chief, Whether a *large detachment of European infantry and artillery can be ſpared* with ſafety from the defence of *Fort William*, and of theſe provinces? It is not aſcertained by what conveyance they are to be ſent. The *Kingston*, it is ſaid, may be ready in ten days; but this is the only ſhip now under orders for ſailing; and it is to be feared that even ſhe will arrive on the coaſt at a time when it may be very difficult, if not impoſſible, to land the ſtores or men. I deem this to be a point of very great conſequence, and hope the Board will attend to it, as the Governor General declares, that he is convinced, that the danger impending on our intereſt in the *Carnatic* might be eaſily repelled, even with the force which it already poſſeſſes for its defence, if properly conducted.

I concur in the requeſt propoſed to Sir *Eyre Coote*; but I do not ſee the ſame neceſſity for ſending a reinforcement of troops.

4th. I agree to the fourth paragraph, with the following reſervations, viz. That all acquiſitions whatever, on the Malabar coaſt, made by us ſince the laſt rupture with the Poonah Government, ſhall be reſtored: I would not continue the war for the ſake of keeping *Futty Sing* in poſſeſſion of any part of *Guzerat*. With reſpect to the Rana of *Gohud*, I would ſecure him, if poſſible, in the poſſeſſion of whatever is properly his own dominions; but I would keep *Guilior*, which is a royal fortreſs, and not his, to be made uſe of in our accommodation with the Marattas; that is, I would exchange it for *Baſſein*, and garriſon it until that point can be accompliſhed. I agree to the article reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*; except, that he ſhould not be permitted to reſide at *Bombay*: and, if he could be removed entirely from that coaſt to ſome other reſidence, I think that one principal cauſe and inſtrument of future quarrel with the Marattas would be thereby removed.

On the 3d and 4th articles of the 4th propoſitions, I am of opinion, that we ought to make peace with the Marattas at all events; becauſe I deem it a caſe of indiſpenſable neceſſity, which ſuperſedes all other conſiderations: it is, undoubtedly, much to be deſired that they ſhould join with us againſt *Hyder Ally*; but, in our preſent circumſtances, it is of itſelf a point of ſo much conſequence, and will give us ſo great a relief to put an end to the war with the Marattas, that I think it ought not to be embarraſſed with any conditions which they can reaſonably refuſe. All they deſire as I underſtand is, that we ſhould reſtore them their property: they are content to ſit down with the heavy loſſes and diſtreſſes they have ſuffered in the courſe of our different invaſions of their country. I ſhall not object to the mode propoſed for obtaining a ſpeedy determination of the queſtion, whether the Marattas will accede to our propoſal or not? The Governor General knows better than I do, what dependance is to be placed in the zeal and friendſhip of *Moodajee Booſla*. For my own part, I fear delays, and am inclined to think, that if Major *Popham*, or ſome other officer from that quarter, were ſent to *Poonah* with the treaty in his hand, it would be the ſhorteſt courſe, and the moſt likely to ſucceed.

I ſubmit to the Board, whether, in caſe the Marattas ſhould not join in an offenſive alliance with us, it would not be proper to inſert an article in the treaty, to provide for the free paſſage of General *Goddard*'s army through their country, and its return home, ſuppoſing we ſhould at any time think fit to demand it? I have not mentioned the recal of Major *Camac*'s detachment, nor any thing that relates to the arrangement of the troops for the defence of theſe provinces, eſpecially to the ſouthward towards *Cuttack*; as I underſtand theſe points have been duly attended to by the Commander in Chief, in whoſe care and judgment I confide, I think it would be proper to recommend it to Sir *Eyre Coote*, to inſiſt on the reſtoration of Mr. *Hollond* to his rank in the Company's ſervice, from which he was diſmiſſed by a moſt arbitrary and unjuſt reſolution of a majority of the Select Committee formed by the caſting voice of the Preſident. It was an indignity to this Government which we ought to riſe at, as well as an injury to Mr. *Hollond* which we are particularly bound to repair, ſince it was drawn upon him by his compliance with our inſtructions: I need hardly add, that, in the preſent juncture, his ſervices at the Nizam's Court may be turned to the moſt advantageous account. An offenſive alliance with this Prince ſeems to me one of the firſt objects to be aimed at; and with ſome conceſſions, which in effect would coſt us nothing, I ſhould think it might eaſily be accompliſhed.

Appendix. No. 310.

But there ſtill is another point which I deem eſſential to the ſucceſs of every meaſure we take for the defence of the *Carnatic*, and which I muſt again beg leave to bring into view. I mentioned it yeſterday in diſcourſe; and if we are unanimous I ſhould have no ſcruple to record my opinion of it. If we are not unanimous, the ſubject had better not be mentioned.

Theſe ideas are thrown together, I confeſs, with much leſs care and deliberation than the importance of the ſubject of them demanded: the ſhortneſs of the interval ſince the cloſe of yeſterday's council obliges me to defer entering into many other important conſiderations which are ſuggeſted to me by a general view of our ſituation.

I beg leave to annex an abſtract ſtate of our Treaſury, with the preſent and immediate demands upon it.

State of the Treaſury, 25th September 1780.

Whole balance C. R^{s} - -	44,12,895	10	6
Deduct depoſits of private property	16,51,653	15	1
Orders to the Mr Paymaſter-general, unpaid - - - - -	17,59,556	0	0
Deduct the civil eſtabliſhments, unpaid - - - - -	15,91,441	0	0
Demand of the Mr Paymaſter-general for the 5th of next month	5,47,000	0	0
Public Offices for October, eſtimated	2,60,000	0	0
	58,09,650	15	1
26th September.			
Ordered this day to *Madras* -	15,00,000	0	0
Curr^{t} Rupees -	73,09,650	15	1

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

The Governor General—As the principal part of the reſolutions which I had propoſed for the preſent deliberation of the Board, depends on the reliance which I had placed on the diſpoſition of the Government of *Berar*, I requeſt that the Board will permit *Beneram Pundit*, the miniſter of that Government, to attend them, and anſwer ſuch queſtions as may be put to him, for the purpoſe of ſatisfying all doubts which may remain reſpecting the credit which is to be given to the propoſitions of that Government. He is now waiting, if the Board ſhould think proper to order his attendance.

Ordered, That *Beneram Pundit* be deſired to attend the Board.

The Miniſter, *Beneram Pundit*, attends the Board accordingly. Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, being in waiting, is called in to interpret between the Board and *Beneram Pundit*.

The Governor General—With the permiſſion of the Board, I will propoſe the firſt general queſtion to be put to *Beneram Pundit*.

Queſtion,

Appendix. No. 310.

Queſtion. The Board deſire to be informed, generally, of the diſpoſition and intentions, of your maſter, the Rajah of *Berar*, reſpecting this Government, and that of the Peiſhwa, in ſuch points as have a common relation to both.

Anſwer. To the Peiſhwa, my maſter is bound by his faith and his religion; to this Government, by a ſtrict friendſhip. The Rajah's deſire is to become the inſtrument of effecting a reconciliation between the Peiſhwa and this Government.

Queſtion. If we ſhall employ him as the inſtrument of peace and the mediator between us and the Peiſhwa, and the terms that we may offer ſhall be ſuch as his maſter ſhall approve, will he in ſuch caſe be the pledge to us for the concurrence of the Peiſhwa? or, in caſe he cannot anſwer for that event, and our offers ſhould be rejected, the treaty be broken off, and the war continued, what part will your maſter take in ſuch a caſe? Will he preſerve his neutrality between us? or, will he take a part actively as our friend, or as our enemy?

Anſwer. The Rajah is willing to pledge himſelf, that in caſe he ſhould be employed as the inſtrument of peace and the mediator between the two Governments, and the terms propoſed by the Company ſhall be approved by him, that they will be accepted by the Peiſhwa; if they are not, the Rajah himſelf will become the Company's ally, and aſſiſt the Company to the utmoſt of his abilities.

Queſtion. You have ſaid, that the Rajah of *Berar* is bound to the Peiſhwa by his faith and religion; and you now ſay, that if the Peiſhwa will not ratify his approbation of our propoſals, he will be our ally: how can he be in any caſe our ally, if he is bound to the Peiſhwa by his faith and religion?

Anſwer. If the terms propoſed by the Company be reaſonable, and rejected by the Peiſhwa, a breach of faith is on the Peiſhwa's ſide, and my maſter will be juſtified in becoming the Company's ally. The Rajah has written to me, that in caſe the Peiſhwa rejects, he will quit his, the Peiſhwa's cauſe, and become the Company's ally.

Queſtion. In the anſwers which you have given, have you ſpoken from authority, or from your own belief only?

Anſwer. I have ſpoken from the authority of my maſter's letters. I am an ambaſſador.

Queſtion. If your maſter is ſo deſirous of friendſhip with the Engliſh, what occaſion is there for keeping up a large army at *Cuttack*, which he muſt do at a great expence?

Anſwer. My maſter is obliged to keep up appearances, in conformity to a plan by *Nizam Ally Khan*.

Queſtion. With whom is that plan concerted?

Anſwer. With the Peiſhwa, with *Nana Furneſſe*.

Queſtion. Is the Rajah party to that agreement between the Nizam and the Peiſhwa?

Anſwer. He is not. When *Dewagur Pundit*, the Dewan of Rajah *Moodajee Booſla*, was at *Poonah*, letters were received from *Nizam Ally Khan*, by him and *Nana Furneſſe*, declaring, that as the Rajah his maſter was the means of introducing the Engliſh army into *Decan*, *Nizam Ally* and *Nana Furneſſe* had forwarded a plan, in which he muſt take a part, and that he muſt march an army to invade *Bengal*.

Queſtion. When did *Chimnajee Baboo*, commander of the army at *Cuttack*, receive his diſpatches?

Anſwer. The army marched in the day of the *Duſſorah*, and arrived at *Cuttack* at the end of *Byſac*. *

Queſtion. In the poſtſcript of the laſt letter written to the Governor General by the Rajah, he refers the Governor General to you, concerning aids to be given to *Chimnajee Booſla*: what were the orders which you received upon this ſubject?

Anſwer. The Rajah writes to me, that a ſupply of 16 lacks of rupees will be needful; but that 12 lacks at all events will be indiſpenſably neceſſary. This money will not be loſt; it will be made good from the acquiſitions that will be made by the united operations of the Company's and Rajah's troops.

Queſtion. Were this Government to comply with ſuch a requiſition, what ſecurity or pledge has it, or can it have, that the army for whoſe benefit it is intended will unite with us, or that it will not act againſt us?

Anſwer. The reputation of the family of *Booſla* is of long ſtanding. It is not poſſible that the Rajah could ſacrifice or riſk it, or violate his faith for a conſideration of 12 or 16 lacks of rupees.

Queſtion. Would you yourſelf take upon you to be anſwerable for the fidelity of your maſter in ſuch a caſe?

Anſwer. My maſter writes that he is the firm friend of the Engliſh; to the truth of which God is witneſs. On the faith of this declaration I can venture to pledge myſelf for my maſter's fidelity.

Queſtion. Do you think this aſſurance a ſufficient voucher for this Government acting in truſt for the intereſts of the Company, and of the King of *England*?

Anſwer. Yes, I think it is. The Rajah himſelf has written to the Governor General, and pledged his faith. I pledged my faith.

Queſtion. Will you be perſonally anſwerable to this Government, that the force now at *Cuttack* will in no caſe enter our provinces, if not provoked by hoſtilities on our part?

Anſwer. My maſter's faith is in my hands, and pledged to me. On the ſtrength of that I can venture to be anſwerable, that the force now at *Cuttack* will in no caſe enter the Company's provinces, if not provoked by hoſtilities on their part.

Queſtion. If that be the caſe, can your maſter have any objection to the removal of the force from *Cuttack*, if this Government ſhould think it neceſſary? The poſition of it at *Cuttack* gives alarm to the people of theſe provinces.

Anſwer. He will have no objection, if this Government deſire they ſhould be removed.

Queſtion. Will you be anſwerable, that if we deſire to ſend a reinforcement to our ſettlement on the coaſt, their paſſage ſhall not be oppoſed or interrupted by the army now at *Cuttack*, or otherwiſe by the Rajah?

Anſwer. I will be anſwerable that they ſhall not be oppoſed or interrupted by the army now at *Cuttack*, or otherwiſe by the Rajah.

Queſtion. Is the Rajah at this time ſtronger in force, or richer in revenue, than he was a year and a half ago, when General *Goddard* was at *Hoſhungabad*?

Anſwer. He is not richer in revenue, but has more troops.

Queſtion. What force had the Rajah on actual eſtabliſhment at the time when General *Goddard* was at *Hoſhungabad*?

Anſwer. He had 5,000 horſe belonging to his own houſe, and 10,000 the property of the Ridey, and 7,000 Patna Jaghierdars.

Queſtion. What is his preſent ſtrength?

Anſwer. I do not know my maſter's preſent force at *Naigpore*; but I know that 30,000 horſe are at preſent at *Cuttack*.

Queſtion. Are the whole of the 30,000 horſe at *Cuttack* paid by your maſter, or is any number of theſe paid by the Miniſters at *Poonah*?

Anſwer. They are entirely under my maſter's orders, and have no connection with the Miniſters at *Poonah*.

Queſtion. Are there not 5, or 6,000 horſe in the army at *Cuttack*, called Poonah Wallahs, or denominated from *Poonah*?

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* The day of the Duſſorah, laſt year, was in the 5th of Cautic, which anſwers to the 19th October 1779. The laſt day of Byſac 1187, anſwers the 11th May 1780.

Anſwer.

Anſwer. There are men who have come from *Poonah*, who may be called Wallahs; but they are all the Rajah's ſervants.

Queſtion. If *Hyder Ally Cawn* ſhould have entered into an alliance with the French King, and have received from him ſuch an aſſiſtance of ſhips of war and ſoldiers as would give him a ſuperiority in the war in which he is engaged with the Engliſh in the *Carnatic*; how do you underſtand that ſuch an event would intereſt the Peiſhwa, and the other rulers of the Maratta State?

Anſwer. The Peiſhwa, and the other rulers of the Maratta State could not be pleaſed with ſuch an event, as they would have every bad conſequence to expect from ſuch an acquiſition of power and ſtrength to *Hyder Ally*, who is their natural enemy, and has already conquered their country as far as the *Kiſtna*, and with ſuch an acceſſion of ſtrength would not ſtop there.

Queſtion. In the third of the requiſitions ſtated by *Dewagur Pundit* on the behalf of the Peiſhwa, it expreſſed, that no demand for the reimburſement of expences ſhall be made on either ſide; *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Engliſh gentlemen ſhall recover their heavy expences by uniting themſelves and jointly attacking their enemies: who do you underſtand to be meant by the term enemies?

Anſwer. *Hyder Naig*: there is no other enemy.

The Board proceed to conſider the Governor General's propoſitions, delivered in his minute recorded yeſterday.

Firſt, "That the ſum of fifteen lacks of rupees be "immediately ſent to *Fort Saint George*, in ſpecie, and "laden for that purpoſe on the Honourable Company's "ſhip the *Duke of Kingſton*, and the other veſſels "which are now on the point of ſailing for *Madras*."

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I agree to the propoſition.

Mr. *Wheler*—I am of opinion that we cannot furniſh from our preſent funds ſo large a ſupply as 15 lacks of rupees; neither am I fully convinced that the Preſidency of *Madras* is in immediate want of it. I am therefore for dividing the ſum propoſed to be ſent into equal ſhares, remitting the half of it by the ſhips now deſtined to carry the Company's troops, and the remainder after the change of the monſoon.

Mr. *Francis*—My opinion on the Governor General's ſeveral propoſitions is contained in my minute which I have already recorded.

The Governor General—I agree to the queſtion. I ſhould be glad to join with the other members of the Board in forming any means for reſtricting the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* to the application of this money ſolely to their military charges.

Reſolved, That the ſum of 15 lacks of rupees be immediately ſent to *Fort Saint George*, in ſpecie, and laden for that purpoſe on the Honourable Company's ſhip the *Duke of Kingſton*, and the other veſſels which are now on the point of ſailing for *Madras*.

Read the Governor General's 2d propoſition, viz.

2d, "That the treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, "including the moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced "in the general treaſury, to be applied to the preceding "purpoſe, and other exigencies of this Government."

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I agree to the propoſition.

Mr. *Wheler*—I conſider the depoſit of treaſure now in the New Fort, to have been made for the purpoſe of defraying ſuch extraordinary demands as this Government from time to time might become ſubjected to, either from the effects of war, or other public calamities. I underſtand that a moiety of the original depoſit hath already been replaced in the general treaſury, with a view of applying the ſame to our preſent exigencies; and I do not believe we ſhall be enabled to defray the preſent unſatisfied and growing demands upon our treaſury, without the application of the remainder, or without every other poſſible meaſure of exertion; I am, therefore for applying it agreeable to the terms of the queſtion.

Reſolved, That the treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the general treaſury, to be applied to the purpoſe mentioned in the foregoing reſolutions, and to the other exigencies of this Government. Appendix. No. 310.

Read the Governor General's 3d propoſition; viz. N^d 25. Mr. Francis's minute.

"That a large detachment of European infantry and "artillery be immediately ſent to *Fort St. George* by the "*Duke of Kingſton* and the other veſſels, which are now "on the point of ſailing for *Madras*; and that the "Commander in Chief be requeſted to proceed him-"ſelf immediately to the coaſt, and take the command "of the army on that eſtabliſhment."

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following minute:

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I cannot help feeling in the higheſt ſenſe the diſtinguiſhed terms in which the Governor General has ſolicited me to undertake the immediate command of the forces on the coaſt of *Coromandel*; nor am I leſs ſenſible of the honour done me by the other members of this Board, by their having joined in a requiſition ſo much to my credit.

I ſhould do injuſtice to thoſe motives which actuated my return to *India*, and to the expectations which both my king and my country formed from it, did I not on this occaſion expreſs the readineſs with which I now conſent to undertake a ſervice, on the ſucceſs of which the honour and intereſts of the Britiſh nation are ſo materially concerned. And I flatter myſelf I enter upon the arduous taſk with a degree of zeal and fortitude equal to what I did many years ago in a ſimilar conjuncture of the affairs of both the Company and the nation in that part of *India*, and that my efforts will be crowned with ſucceſs. At the ſame time I ſcruple not to confeſs that I feel myſelf embracing the road to honour and glory under a diſadvantage which I did not then experience, a diminution of perſonal activity, which the addition of years has involuntarily entailed upon me.

The other difficulties which I have to encounter in taking upon me the command of an army, diſheartened and diſpirited by the late unfortunate defeat by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, the Governor General, has ſufficiently elucidated; it only therefore is left for me to add the further conſideration of my having to overcome an enemy, who can bring treble the number of our forces into the field, and who, from their late conduct, appear to be in higher diſcipline than any we have yet encountered among the native Powers of *Hindoſtan*.

Whilſt the ſteps which are neceſſary to be taken for the ſecurity of our poſſeſſions here, and for the relief of our diſtreſſes at *Madras*, from their nature oblige us to relinquiſh the proſecution of the offenſive war which we had commenced againſt the Marattas from this ſide of *India*; I agree entirely in opinion with the Governor General, that orders ſhould be ſent, in the manner and on the principle he has pointed out, for a ceſſation of hoſtilities in the reſpective quarters on the other ſide of *India*, and that propoſals for peace, and an offenſive and defenſive alliance, on the terms he has ſtated, ſhould be immediately offered to them. I cannot help looking upon the preſent ſeaſon as one favourable for that purpoſe, as I conceive the late victory *Hyder Ally* has obtained over us, added to his conduct in latter years, whereby he has evinced a diſpoſition to encroach upon the Maratta dominions, will render them extremely jealous of his power, and induce them rather to wiſh for a connection with us, than to act in concert with him againſt us.

The very accurate and juſt deſcription which the Governor General has given, of the danger that at preſent impends the intereſts of the Britiſh nation in *India*, I am perſuaded will have the ſame influence upon the mind of every other member of this Board as it has had upon mine, and tend to produce that freedom of deliberation, concord, and unanimity in our councils, ſo neceſſary for the public good. In full confidence that no other view can exiſt amongſt us, I with the greater

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chearfulneſs undertake that part of the ſervice which falls to the lot of the ſtation I fill; and relying on the ſupport of this Board therein, moſt readily repoſe my military character and credit in their hands.

See Reference, to App. 312.

In conformity to the requeſt made at the cloſe of the Governor General's minute, I now deliver in a ſtate of our force in this eſtabliſhment, and of the diſpoſition propoſed to be made of it, for the protection of theſe provinces, and for the relief of *Madras*.

Commander in Chief.

The preſent ſtrength in troops at the upper ſtations at and above *Chunagur* is as follows:

2 Regiments of cavalry,
3 Companies of artillery.
Captain *Mayaffer*'s detachment of D°,
1 Regiment of Europeans, ½ batt^n,
Company of rangers,
21 Battalions of Sepoys.

Propoſed diſpoſition of ſaid corps:

Gwalior to be garriſoned with 3 battalions of Sepoys,
Captain *Mayaffer*'s detachment of artillery and the company of rangers,
The four remaining battalions at preſent with Major *Camac* to return, and the detachment of cavalry with him to join the 2^d and 3^d regiments.
Daranaghur, one battalion of Company's Sepoys,
1,000 of the Vizier's infantry, and ſent ſuch a number of *Fyzulat Cawn*'s troops as may be thought neceſſary.

An army to be formed at *Allahabad*, or in any central poſition thought moſt eligible, of the following troops:

2 Companies of artillery,
2^d Regiment of Europeans.
10 Battalions of Sepoys,
1,000 of the Vizier's Candahar or beſt horſe. If 1,000 cannot be obtained, as many as can poſſibly join.

N. B. From the above two companies of artillery, the ſmall detachments at *Dananagur*, and *Chunar Gur* to be ſupplied.

Chunar Gur, one battalion of Sepoys as uſual.

Bahar province, the two regiments of cavalry to be ordered down there, to be joined by four battalion of Sepoys, the third company of artillery from the field, and 1,000 horſe, if they can be procured from the Rajah of *Benares*. Boggah battalion to make one of the 4 battalions for this ſervice.

Thus the troops at the upper ſtations to be diſpoſed of for the preſent; and there will then remain 3 battalions of Sepoys from the before-named number of 21 battalions, for other ſervices; our force with ſaid 3 battalions included at and below *Berhampore* will then be,

Artillery 6 companies, and the remainder of Captain *Mayaffer*'s company. Firſt and third regiment of Europeans, and 18 battalions of Sepoys,

To be employed as follows:

At *Berhampore*, covering the city, or ready for any ſervice that might occur, } One company of artillery, One battalion of Europeans, and, Four battalions of Sepoys.

Madras detachment.

The proceeding of the troops by land or ſea for this ſervice, ought to be determined by the part the Maratta force at *Cuttack* mean to take. If they are friends, our armament for the coaſt might proceed by land; but if they are hoſtile to our cauſe, as one of the firſt objects is to aſſiſt the Preſidency of *Madras* as ſoon as poſſible, the detachment for that ſervice ſhould proceed by ſea; but whether the Sepoys can be brought voluntarily to embark, is by no means a certain point. If the embarkation could be adopted, the detachment ſhould conſiſt of

2 Companies of artillery,
1 Battalion of 3^d regiment completed to 300 rank and file, and,
4 Battalions of Sepoys.

This is on a ſuppoſition that the Cuttack forces are in oppoſition to us, in which caſe 4 battalions at leaſt will be wanted on the Midnapore ſide, with the preſent detachment of artillery there, and the chain of troops as above ſtationed will be able to oppoſe the enemy whenever they attempt entering the provinces: there will alſo then remain for the immediate protection of *Fort William* and this quarter,

3 Companies of artillery,
1 Regiment of Europeans,
6 Battalions of Sepoys;

But if it can be proved that we have no oppoſition to apprehend from the force at *Cuttack*, I then recommend that the army for the aſſiſtance of *Madras* ſhould proceed by land; viz.

2 Companies of artillery,
1 Battalion of Europeans, 300 rank and file,
8 Battalions of Sepoys, with a light field train.

They would arrive by land in the *Carnatic*, at this ſeaſon of the year, as ſoon as by embarkation, even if the Sepoys would without heſitation embark: for ſuch a force as mentioned could not with ſafety proceed by ſea from hence till late in November or December, when the height of the N. E. monſoon will be abated on the coaſt.

From the movement by land the different country Powers, will alſo be awed, the Nizam particularly kept in check, and *Hyder*'s troops oppoſed if they ſhould again make the Circars their object. If this mode is adopted, as it is on the ſuppoſition that the Marattas at *Cuttack* are not inimical, the upper ſtations will not then want ſuch a powerful chain of troops for their defence; and from the connected poſition of the different bodies of troops ſtationed as before mentioned, any part of them when wanted on exigency, can be drawn down for the protection of *Bengal* in general, or of the Preſidency in particular. If the 8 battalions were to proceed to *Madras* by land, there would be no occaſion for four battalions at *Midnapore*, two would be ſufficient for the ſervice required there, and theſe might be drawn from *Berrampore*, that the force at the Preſidency might not be weakened.

The independent corps at *Chittagong*, and Ramgur light infantry, are not included in the above diſpoſition of the troops; they are ſuppoſed occupying their preſent poſts; as well as the corps of militia, at their different ſtations.

Calcutta,
September 27, 1780.

The Governor General—The ſeaſon of the year, and the marſhy ſtate of the roads through which an army muſt paſs from hence to the *Carnatic*, eſpecially through the diſtricts of *Midnapore*, *Jellaſore*, and the whole province of *Oriſſa*, will render it impoſſible to march an army by land, until late in the month of November. We have not ſhipping to tranſport the requiſite number of Sepoys by ſea; neither if we had would it avail us. The remembrance and tradition of the paſt ſufferings of thoſe who have been tranſported by that mode of conveyance, would be an inſuperable objection on the part of the Sepoys themſelves, eſpecially at this ſeaſon. I muſt beg leave, therefore to change the terms of the queſtion, and ſubſtitute for, "what we would wiſh to do," "what we can do." I ſhould agree with the General, and do agree with him, in the propoſition of ſending a conſiderable reinforcement of Sepoys, as well as Europeans, to *Madras*; but this muſt reſt for a future reſolution: and I mean to add on another day, a freſh motion to that effect.

For the preſent queſtion, I propoſe, from the terms of the General's minute, that two companies of artillery with their complement of Laſcars, and one battalion of one of the regiments of infantry, completed to 300 rank and file, be immediately embarked, as many as can be on board the *Duke of Kingston*, the reſt on any of the ſhips offered for that purpoſe by Mr. *Fergusſon*.

Agreed, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to proceed himſelf immediately to the coaſt, and to take the command of the army upon that eſtabliſhment.

Reſolved, That two companies of artillery with their complement of Laſcars, and one battalion of one of the regiments of infantry, completed to 300 rank and file, be immediately embarked for the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, as many as can be on board the *Duke of Kingston*, and the reſt on any of the ſhips offered for that ſervice by Mr. *Fergusſon*.

Ordered, That returns be made to the Commander in Chief, of the number of ſhips offered by Mr. *Fergusſon*, and of the number of men that each ſhip can carry.

Agreed to the diſpoſition of the troops propoſed by the Commander in Chief; and ordered, that a copy of it be ſent to Brigadier General *Stibbert*, after the departure of Sir *Eyre Coote*, that he may iſſue the neceſſary orders for carrying the ſame into execution when the ſeaſon will permit.

Adjourned till to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 27th September 1780; —preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*.

The Board having met agreeable to adjournment, reſumed the conſideration of the Governor General's propoſitions, contained in his minute of the 25th inſtant.

Read the Governor General's 4th propoſition, and the 1ſt article of the propoſed treaty included in it; viz.

"That an immediate offer of peace be made to the "Maratta State, in the mode, and on the conditions "following; viz.

That as the Miniſters of that State have profeſſed a deſire for peace, which has been equally the wiſh of this Government, even from the commencement of the war, and as the attainment of it ſeems to have been hitherto impeded by the difficulty of managing a negociation between the principals ſituated at ſo great a diſtance from each other, to preclude all further delays, we do at the ſame time offer peace, and bind ourſelves to the obſervance of it, on their acceptance and ratification of the following conditions, viz.

Firſt, "That all acquiſitions made by our forces in "the courſe of the war, and retained in our poſſeſſion "as the property of the Company, ſhall be delivered "up and reſtored to the ſame footing as that on which "it ſtood before the commencement of the war; but "that ſuch as have been conquered and ceded to others "in virtue of formal treaties, ſhall remain and be confirmed to the perſons to whom they were ſo ceded, and "the treaties concluded with them remain firm and "inviolate."

Governor General.—In the firſt article of the treaty which I have recommended to be offered to the Peiſhwa, it is propoſed that all acquiſitions made from the Maratta State, and appropriated to the Company in the courſe of the preſent war, ſhall be reſtored and nothing reſerved to the Company but what it poſſeſſed and was intitled to by the treaty of *Poorunder*; but as there are ſtrong grounds to expect that *Baſſein* may by this time, or before the notification of our intentions to the Peiſhwa can be made, be in our poſſeſſion; and as the poſſeſſion of that place has long been an object of the Company, and may be rendered of much more importance to them, and eaſier of defence than any other territory which we poſſeſs on the continent, at a diſtance from the ſeat of our Government, on that ſide of *India*, although greatly inferior in point of revenue; and as *Baſſein* is a part of the patrimony of the Peiſhwa himſelf, and upon that account the more likely to prove an impediment to the concluſion of the treaty, unleſs an option be left to the Maratta Government to be reinſtated in the poſſeſſion of this place, if its conſent cannot be obtained to the ceſſion of it on ſuch terms as we may offer as an alternative; I would recommend, that a further clauſe be added to this article, that if the fort of *Baſſein* ſhall have been conquered by our forces, and ſhall have been in our poſſeſſion before the final ratification of the treaty, an option ſhall be given to the Peiſhwa, either to receive back the fort of *Baſſein* in the manner ſtipulated by the preceding part of this article, and that the fort with its dependencies ſhall be ceded to the Company for ever; and all the poſſeſſions and rights which were ceded to the Company by the 5th article of the treaty of *Poorunder*, ſhall be reſtored to the Peiſhwa in lieu thereof; that is to ſay, that the poſſeſſions of the Company dependent on *Bombay*, ſhall be limited to the iſland of *Bombay*, the iſland of *Salſette*, and the other ſmaller iſlands, which were obtained by treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, the fort of *Baſſein* and its dependencies, the city of *Surat* and its dependencies, ſubject as before to the chout, and the entire property of the city and Pergunnah of *Broach*, together with the trading factories which were eſtabliſhed before the commencement of the war. It is neceſſary that I ſhould remind the Board, that the diſtrict of *Baſſein* was eſtimated by Mr. *Tayler*, in his letter of the 29th October 1775, at 4 lacks annual revenue; and that the ceſſions which by the foregoing clauſe I have propoſed to yield up in lieu thereof, do amount by the ſame eſtimate to 14,59,000 annual revenue:

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That is to ſay, the Pergunnahs of

Orpad	3,50,000
Jambooſeer	4,00,000
Occlaſeer, in part	75,000
Corial	50,000
Chicky	1,00,000
Veriow	28,000
Amrood	1,50,000
	11,53,000

to which muſt be added the right acquired by the Company by the 5th article of the treaty of *Poorunder*, to a further territory of 3 lacks, hitherto unadjuſted, but reduced by our inſtructions to General *Goddard*, to the ſum of rupees 2,09,000. I will add, that I regard the diſtrict of *Baſſein* eſtimated but at 4 lacks, as of much greater value to the Company than the remote and ſcattered Pergunnahs of *Guzerat*, were their real value equal to it, or even much greater. It will reduce our dominions, on that ſide of *India*, to a compact and defenſible compaſs; free from expenſive eſtabliſhments of collectors of revenue; from diſputes of boundaries and other competitions, which private intereſt will be too apt to excite with the collectors of the adjacent lands, and other ſimilar occaſions for future diſturbances; from new military eſtabliſhments more proportioned to the diſtance of relief than the worth of the territory which they are to protect; and multiplied accumulations of expence on every approach or ſuggeſtion of future invaſion.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I agree to the firſt condition propoſed by the Governor General, in his minute of the 25th inſtant, with the additional clauſe to it now propoſed.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree alſo to both.

Mr. *Francis*—I entirely agree in the general principles laid down in the Governor's laſt minute; they are the ſame which I have invariably profeſſed, and of courſe I ſhall be at all times ready to ſupport any plan that is founded upon them.

Reſolved in the terms of the Governor General's 4th propoſition before recited, with the amendment ſince propoſed.

Conſidered

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Conſidered the 2d article of the propoſed treaty included in the Governor General's 4th propoſition, viz.

" That a proviſion be made for the maintenance of " *Ragonaut Row* during his life: and that he ſhall be " permitted to reſide where he pleaſes, excepting at " *Bombay*, or any place nearer to *Bombay* than *Surat*; " but ſhall receive no aſſiſtance from the Governor " General and Council of *Bengal*, nor from any other " Preſidency of the Company; nor, if he ſhall chuſe any " of the Company's Preſidencies or ſettlements for the " place of his reſidence, ſhall he be permitted to reaſſert " his pretenſions to the adminiſtration of the Maratta " State, without the entire and univerſal conſent and " requiſition of all the members of the State who are " included as parties in the treaty;"

Agreed to.

Conſidered the 3d and 4th articles of the propoſed treaty included in the Governor General's 4th propoſition; viz.

3d. " That the Peiſhwa and rulers of the Maratta " State ſhall agree to an alliance, offenſive and defenſive, " with the Company, againſt the French and *Hyder Ally* " *Cawn*; and ſhall immediately employ their forces in " conjunction with ours, in the invaſion of his do- " minions, and in the proſecution of ſuch operations " againſt him as the circumſtances of the war, and the " judgment of thoſe who have the conduct of it on both " ſides, ſhall determine: and if in the courſe of it any " acquiſition of territory ſhall be made, theſe ſhall be " equally ſhared between the parties to this engagement, " in ſuch manner as ſhall be moſt ſuitable to the ſitua- " tion and contiguity of the places or dominions at this " time reſpectively held by them:"

" 4th. " That if the Peiſhwa will not agree to the " propoſed alliance, peace be nevertheleſs concluded, " each party retaining what it hath acquired; or, that a " ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities ſhall take place on both ſides, " during one year from the date of the treaty, for the " purpoſe of negociating the terms of a future and per- " petual adjuſtment;"

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I agree.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree.

Mr. *Francis*—My opinion is already given in my minute.

Agreed to the 3d and 4th articles.

Conſidered the 5th article: viz.

" That the treaty ſhall be concluded with the media- " tion and guarantee of Rajah *Moodajee Booſla*, who " ſhall be a ſubſcribing party to it, and ſhall bind him- " ſelf and his ſucceſſor to the faithful obſervance and " ſupport of it;"

Agreed to.

Conſidered the 6th article; viz.

" That the treaty ſhall be ſealed, ſigned, and ſancti- " fied by the reſpective parties to it, with the moſt ſolemn " oaths preſcribed by their reſpective religions;"

Agreed to.

Conſidered the 7th article.

" That one copy of the treaty, executed in the manner " preſcribed by the Governor General and Council of " *Bengal*, being received by the Peiſhwa or his Miniſters, " two copies or counterparts thereof ſhall be in like " manner executed by the Peiſhwa and principal rulers " of the Maratta State, and Rajah *Moodajee Booſla* as " the guarantee to it, in the manner above-mentioned, " and ſhall be tranſmitted, one to the Government of " *Bombay*, and the other to General *Goddard*, or to the " officer commanding the detachment ſent from *Bengal*, " that all hoſtilities may immediately ceaſe on both ſides, " and each provide for the due execution of the treaty. " But until the treaty ſhall be thus notified on the part of " the Peiſhwa, it ſhall not be binding on the Governor " General and Council, neither ſhall it be binding, unleſs " it ſhall be ſo ratified within two months after the re- " ceipt of it;"

Agreed to.

Read the Governor's General's 5th propoſition.

" That a letter be written to the Preſident and Select " Committee of *Bombay*, and a ſimilar order to General " *Goddard* and Major *Camac*, requiring and commanding " them immediately to ſuſpend all hoſtilities and military " operations, on the receipt of a requiſition in writing to " that effect, and a notification from the Peiſhwa that " the like order has been given on his part to the officers " commanding his armies; and that the Peiſhwa be ad- " viſed of theſe orders, that, if deſirous of peace, he " may make the ſaid requiſition and notification ac- " cordingly;"

Reſolved in the terms of the propoſition.

Read the Governor General's 6th propoſition.

" That the treaty being executed by the Governor " General and Council in the manner ſpecified by the " 6th and 7th articles of the 4th reſolution, it be for- " warded to *Moodajee Booſla* with two blank copies of it; " that if he ſhould approve of it, it may be previouſly " ratified on his part as guarantee, and tranſmitted with " the treaty executed by this Government to the Peiſhwa " for his ratification, in the manner preſcribed by the " 6th and 7th articles of the reſolution;"

Reſolved accordingly in the terms of the propoſition.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Ed Wheler.

Secret Department, Monday.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 2d October 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

The proceedings of the 25th, 26th, and 27th ultimo, read and approved.

The Governor General lays before the Board the following draft of a treaty with the Peiſhwa, formed on the reſolutions of the 27th ultimo. He thinks it incumbent upon him to add, that he had finiſhed it before he received the information of Mr. *Francis*'s intention of bringing on the queſtion, which has taken up the time of this meeting in their public department, becauſe under ſuch a diſcouragement, he doubts whether he could have undertaken it, and becauſe he now entertains doubts of its proving effectual.

Draft of a treaty with the Maratta State, preposed by the Governor General.

We the Governor General and Council appointed for the management of all affairs of the Engliſh nation and Company, in the province of *Bengal* and its dependencies, do, in the name of the ſaid Company, and for ourſelves, and for all the governments, ſervants, and miniſters of the ſaid Company, and of the Engliſh nation in the empire of *Hindoſtan*, offer peace and friendſhip to the Peiſhwa and Rulers of the Maratta State, on the following conditions of a treaty, to which we have previouſly affixed our ſignatures and the ſeal of the ſaid Company, declaring it to be binding on our part from this day and for ever, provided the Peiſhwa ſhall ratify it on his part in the manner hereinafter ſtipulated, but in every other caſe to be from this time and for ever void.

1ſt. All ſorts, cities, and territories, which have been or ſhall have been acquired at the time of the final execution of this treaty, by the Engliſh arms ſince the commencement of the preſent war, that is to ſay, ſince the month of January 1779, and which did formerly belong to the Maratta State (excepting the city of *Ahmedabad*, and the diviſion of the province of *Guzerat*, which have been confirmed and guaranteed to Rajah *Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, by a treaty concluded between him and the Honourable Engliſh Company, and the fortreſs of *Gwalior*, which has been in the like manner granted and guaranteed by treaty to the Rana of *Gokud*) ſhall be immediately reſtored to the Peiſhwa, and delivered into the charge of ſuch perſons as ſhall be appointed by him to receive them, without any plea of delay or reſervation of right whatever; and it is hereby underſtood and declared,

declared, that the city of *Ahmedabad* and diviſion of *Guzerat* aforeſaid, ſhall be allowed to remain in the poſſeſſion of *Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, and that the fortreſs of *Gwalior* ſhall remain in like manner the property of the Rana of *Gohud*, conformably to the faith of the treaties concluded with each; the obligations of which are, in all events, and under all circumſtances, perpetual and unalterable.

2d. If the fort of *Baſſein* ſhall have been taken by the Engliſh forces, and ſhall be in their poſſeſſion at the time of the final ratification of this treaty, we offer and agree to give in exchange for the perpetual ceſſion and grant of the ſaid fort and its dependencies, all the lands and rights which we have acquired by virtue of the 3d and 7th articles of the treaty of *Poorunder*, and of the treaty formerly concluded by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* with *Rajah Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, and to confine all the poſſeſſions of the Company which are adjacent to thoſe of the Maratta State, to the iſlands of *Bombay* and *Salſette*, and the other ſmaller iſlands adjacent, the fort and dependencies of *Baſſein*, the city of *Surat* and its dependencies in the manner in which it was before held by the Company, and the entire poſſeſſion and property of the city and pergunnah of *Broach*, together with the factories of commerce which were eſtabliſhed before the commencement of the war; but if this offer, which is ſolely made from the deſire of peace, and for the prevention of future diſputes and competitions ſhall not be approved on the part of the Peiſhwa, then the fort of *Baſſein* ſhall be reſtored conformably to the general tenor and obligation of the preceding article, and the ceſſions made by the treaty of *Poorunder* ſhall remain as before.

3d. A proviſion ſhall be made for the maintenance of *Ragonaut Row* during his life, equal to that ſtipulated in the 11th article of the treaty of *Poorunder*, with the exception of that part of it which reſpects the place of his reſidence. This ſhall be left to his option, except that he ſhall not be permitted to reſide in *Bombay*, nor in any of the places dependent on the Company nearer to *Bombay* than the city of *Surat*; he ſhall receive no aſſiſtance from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, nor from any other Preſidency of the Company, nor if he ſhall chuſe to reſide in any ſettlement of the Company under the limitation aforeſaid, ſhall he be permitted to reaſſert his pretenſions to the adminiſtration of the Maratta State, without the entire and univerſal conſent and requiſition of all the members of that State, who are included as parties in this treaty.

4th. The Peiſhwa and Rulers of the Maratta State ſhall agree to an alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Company againſt *Hyder Ally Cawn*, and ſhall immediately employ their forces in conjunction with ours, in the invaſion of his dominions, and in the proſecution of ſuch operations againſt him as the circumſtances of the war, and the judgment of thoſe who have the conduct of it on both ſides, ſhall determine; and if in the courſe of it any acquiſition of territory ſhall be made, theſe ſhall be equally ſhared between the parties to this engagement, in ſuch manner as ſhall be moſt ſuitable to the ſituation and contiguity of the places or dominions at this time reſpectively held by both.

5th. If the Peiſhwa will not agree to the propoſed alliance, peace ſhall be nevertheleſs concluded, each party retaining what it hath acquired; or a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities ſhall take place on both ſides during one year from the date of the treaty, for the purpoſe of negociating the terms of a future and perpetual adjuſtment.

6th. Whereas Rajah *Moodajee Boojla* has offered his mediation and guarantee for the furtherance and future maintenance of a reconciliation between the Peiſhwa and this Government, and we have been induced principally by his earneſt and repeated perſuaſions and ſolicitations, to make theſe liberal advances on our parts to effect it: we do therefore conſent and agree to accept of his guarantee, and have for that purpoſe, and for the further prevention of delays, cauſed this treaty to be tranſmitted firſt to him, and we deſire that he will be pleaſed to ſubſcribe thereto a declaration, witneſſed by the principal miniſter of his State, and ſanctified by the moſt binding oath of his religion, that he doth conſent and engage to become a party to this treaty, and the guarantee for the faithful obſervance of it; that he will be the common friend of the other two parties ſo long as it ſhall continue inviolate, and the enemy of that which ſhall firſt commit any infringement upon it, until a ſufficient atonement ſhall be made by the party ſo aggreſſing.

7th. This treaty being received by the Peiſhwa, it is expected that his ſeal and ſignature, and the ſeal and ſignatures of *Ballajee Row*, *Nannah Furneeſe*, and of ſuch other perſons as conſtitute the efficient Adminiſtration of the Maratta State, ſhall, within the ſpace of five months, from this date be affixed in due form to two counterparts of the ſame, and that they ſhall bind themſelves, or be otherwiſe bound, in ſuch manner as the rights and inſtitutes of their religion will allow, to the faithful obſervance thereof; after which the treaty executed by us ſhall remain with the Peiſhwa, and the other two ſhall be forwarded, one to the Governor of *Bombay* and the other to General *Goddard*, or the officer who ſhall be in command of the army of the Company which has been ſent by us into that quarter, that all hoſtilities may immediately ceaſe on both ſides, and each provide for the due execution of the reſpective parts of the treaty. Unleſs the treaty ſhall be ratified in the manner and within the time preſcribed by this article, it ſhall not be binding on our part, but be from this time and for ever void.

We the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, for and on behalf of the Honourable Engliſh Company, in teſtimony of our ſincerity, and as a ſolemn pledge for the due obſervance of this treaty in all and every of the conditions and reſervations therein ſpecified, have hereunto ſeparately as well as collectively, ſet our hands, and cauſed the ſeal of the ſaid Company to be affixed, hereby binding the Company, ourſelves and ſucceſſors, in the name of God, and by the faith of our holy religion, to the true and ſtrict obſervance thereof.

Sir *Eyre Coote*—I approve of the draft of the treaty with the Peiſhwa, as laid before the Board by the Governor General.

Mr. *Wheler*—I approve.

Mr. *Francis*—I agree.

Agreed to the draft of the treaty laid before the Board by the Governor General.

Ordered, That the ſame be copied fair, that a counterpart of it be made in the Perſian language, that it be ſealed with the ſeal of the Company, and ſigned by the members of this Government.

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APPENDIX, No. 311.

To *Moodajee Boojla*: written 12th October 1780.

I HAVE received your letter, &c. &c. all of which I fully underſtand, and have imprinted it on my mind. You inform me, that you have aſſumed my name as your own; nothing could be more gratifying to my wiſhes, to my credit, or my friendſhip. Remember this, I ſhall ſet a value upon it, as upon the higheſt title of honour, and ſhall conſider not only our union as complete, but that of our two States, as connected by principles of everlaſting durance. There are inſtants in which the minds of men are irradiated by the divine influence, and when the ſecrets of futurity are imperfectly diſplayed to your perception: God knows whether it is from ſuch our inſpiration, that I exult in the hopes that the chronicles of theſe nations will tranſmit to the remoteſt poſterity our names together, recorded in the ſame page, and connected with events not leſs illuſtrious in your achievements than important to the intereſts of mankind. If ſuch

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ſhould prove the conſequence of our connection, remember with how conſtant and unremitted a perſeverance I have laboured to improve and perfect it during the courſe of ſeven years ſince it firſt began: nor have your inclinations or actions been wanting to promote the ſame end.

At your repeated inſtance I conſented to enter into an early accommodation of peace with the Peiſhwa, and rejoiced at the offer of your guarantee for the faithful and effectual maintenance of it: and I have been long waiting in anxious expectation of a meeting with your Dewan *Dewagur Pundit*, whom you had intimated your deſign of deputing to me with credentials and full powers, both from yourſelf and the Peiſhwa, to negociate and conclude it. But in the correſpondence which has paſſed between us, ſo much time has elapſed that the ſeaſon for action has already commenced, and the operations of war may be drawn into indefinite lengths, and produce ſuch variations in the ſtate of each party as may defeat the purpoſes of negociation; and beſides this, a new ſcene has opened, which requires a new train of meaſures and a different principle of action.

You will doubtleſs have heard of the ſudden irruption which the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn* has made in the *Carnatic*, and of the conſequence with which it has been immediately attended, through the want of exertion and failure of preparation to oppoſe it. At the ſame time we learn from undoubted authority, that in conſequence of an alliance long ſince concluded between him and the King of *France*, a large armament of ſhips of war and land forces has been diſpatched from the ports of *France* to join him, and are at this time either arrived, or are daily expected. The objects of this alliance are to proſecute his deſigns, in the execution of which he has been ſo long engaged, on the Maratta State, and thoſe of the French on the *Carnatic*.

It is equally the intereſt of this Government, of the Peiſhwa, of his friends and adherents, and of all *Hindoſtan* and *Decan*, to oppoſe attempts of ſo dangerous a tendency. The differences between the Peiſhwa and the Company have prevailed againſt my inclination from the beginning; of that you are a witneſs, and of the early deſire which I manifeſted to accommodate them: their continuance can produce no poſſible good to either party, and muſt be attended with much evil to both. The laws of nature, and the principles of true policy, require that they ſhould be upon terms of mutual friendſhip, ſince they want nothing from each other but peace; and united, may dictate peace to all nations in *India*.

On theſe grounds, and to prevent further delays, I have precluded the formal and tedious proceſs of negociation, and in conjunction with the counſellors of this Government, have at once formed and executed a treaty, which require only your guarantee and the final ratification of the Peiſhwa to conclude it. The terms are nearly the ſame you yourſelf have propoſed, and they are ſuch as it is the intereſt of the Peiſhwa to accept, if peace and the ſafety of his State be the real objects of his Miniſters. I ſend it to you encloſed with this, and with it two counterparts, intended for the ratification of the Peiſhwa: to each of theſe papers I hope you will add your ſanction in the forms and manner propoſed, and forward them all with the letters accompanying them to the Peiſhwa *Nanna Furneeſe*, to whom they are directed.

This is enough for the preſent. The plan of operations I intend ſhortly to write you in another letter; and if you continue in the intention of deputing your Dewan *Dewagur Pundit* to this quarter, than which nothing can be more agreeable to my wiſh, every thing which will not admit of a diſcuſſion by letter may be adjuſted to our mutual and complete ſatisfaction.

P. S. Regarding the expences of the Cuttack army, *Beneram* will write you the particulars. It is neceſſary you ſhould ſend immediate orders to *Chumna Baboo* to act in conjunction with our troops, whenever, and in any manner, we may find it expedient to call upon him. If this cannot be done, he muſt be ordered to withdraw his troops to *Naugpoor*, as their ſituation ſo cloſe to our borders cannot but have an unfavourable appearance in the eyes of people who are not acquainted with the real motives for their being ſtationed there; or with the friendſhip which ſubſiſts between this and the Berar Government. In my next I will inform you of the plan of operations it is intended to purſue, and the part it is expected you will take in it.

To *Dewagur Pundit*: written 12th October 1780.

Your friendly letter reached me the 13th September, and I clearly underſtand the contents. *Beneram Pundit* has alſo communicated to me the ſubſtance of two letters which he has received from you, the latter whereof, being written in the Perſian language, he ſubmitted in the original to my peruſal. Theſe are too long, and the ſubjects too important, to be abſtracted; but I have conſidered and reconſidered them, and every ſyllable of their contents is imprinted on my mind. *Beneram Pundit* knows how little time I have to ſpare; but he alſo knows that I have employed many hours, even days, in conſidering upon all theſe points, and upon the means of facilitating and expediting our mutual intentions. I have alſo explained to the Council all theſe matters, and in conjunction with them have reſolved on ſeveral points and meaſures of which it is neceſſary you ſhould be informed.

The ſeaſon being now arrived for acting, will not admit of time for negociation. This Government has no object in the war with the Peiſhwa; nor can it, any more than the Peiſhwa, gain any thing by it. I was forced into it, and from the beginning have ſought peace, as you well know, you being at *Poonah* and acquainted with the inſtructions given to General *Goddard* for that purpoſe. Our reputation had ſuffered the greateſt diſgrace, and the Company's ſettlements brought into danger, by the failure of an ill-adviſed expedition, ſet on foot by the Governor and Council of *Bombay*. It became neceſſary for this Government to exert its power and reſources in endeavouring to repair the diſgrace which had thus been brought on our reputation, and to preſerve the Company's ſettlements.

The credit of the Engliſh name has happily been reſtored; the danger which threatened the Preſidency of *Bombay* removed; all therefore that I wiſhed for has been accompliſhed, except peace. And why ſhould I deſire to ſee the Company involved in a war with the Maratta State, whoſe territories lie every way upon our borders, and are as it were a ſcreen between us and others, who are our profeſſed and irreconcileable enemies?

Hyder Ally Cawn has invaded the *Carnatic*, and by the ſame improvidence which had nearly ruined the Company's affairs at *Bombay*, he has been ſuffered to ravage that country, while by the diſſipation of our army he has prevented its junction and cut off a part of it. The ſame obligation which claimed our interference at *Bombay*, now demands our utmoſt exertion in defence of the *Carnatic*. Thus, from no impulſe or act of my own, from no intereſts of this Government, you ſee me again drawn forcibly into a participation of troubles, only the lot of others, but which falling on the intereſts of the Engliſh nation, which are generally under my charge, I am compelled to take the ſame part in them as if they had been excited by me.

Hyder Ally Cawn, from former connections with the French, our everlaſting enemies, and from the war which has ſubſiſted ſo many years between him and the Peiſhwa, is alike the common and natural enemy of both. He has been incited in the invaſion of the *Carnatic* by a league concluded by him with the King of *France*, in conſequence of which a large maritime and military force is now on its way, and perhaps at this time

time actually arrived at ſome of the parts of his dominions. I have no doubt that by the bleſſing of God, which has always ſupported the Engliſh nation, the ſpirit of its rulers and people which has ever riſen in proportion to the danger ſurrounding it, will bear them ſingly through their preſent difficulties with conqueſt and glory; and their reſources are very great; yet it is the part of wiſdom and foreſight to make every poſſible proviſion againſt impending difficulties, and to leave as little as poſſible to the power of fortune, to which Providence in its diſpenſations is often pleaſed to leave human affairs. Should it happen, (which God forbid) that this combined force ſhould prevail over our forces in the *Carnatic*, let it be conſidered what an accumulation of power this will give to *Hyder Ally Cawn*; and, whether the Peiſhwa in the preſent diſtracted ſtate of his Government would be able to withſtand it, ſhould he, as he certainly will, reſume his former hoſtilities againſt the Peiſhwa's Government. His arms have been employed for theſe ſix or ſeven years againſt the Peiſhwa, and with ſuch ſucceſs, though unaſſiſted with any other alliance, that he has poſſeſſed himſelf of the Maratta dominions to the banks of the *Kiſhena*; and the ſtrong fortreſs of *Merrick* has been the ſole obſtacle to his further progreſs. But the capture of fortified places is to Europeans the work of art, and reducible to certainty. In the event which I have ſuppoſed, every thing is to be dreaded in the dominions of *Decan*, whether appertaining to the Peiſhwa or to *Nizam Ally Cawn*; and neither the known bravery of the Chief of *Berar*, nor the wiſdom which is known to have ever regulated his councils, can exempt him from a ſhare in the common lot. For all theſe powerful and united reaſons, it is neceſſary that the Peiſhwa, the Raj.h of *Berar*, and the Engliſh, ſhould enter into a ſtrict friendſhip and combination, and exert all their ſtrength to repel this ambitious invader. This Government is ſafe; armed by its reſources and the unconquerable defences which nature has provided for it, its ſeas, rivers, woods, and mountains, the imbecility of the nations which ſurround it on its north and eaſt borders, and its contiguity to your country, which covers it with the ſhield of friendſhip, it can have nothing to apprehend; but it can not be an unconcerned ſpectator of the dangers which threaten its remote dependencies, or its connections; therefore it is that I have repreſented to you all theſe things in ſo ſtrong a light.

You have frequently offered your mediation and guarantee between the Engliſh and the Peiſhwa, and have preſſed me in the moſt urgent terms to conclude a peace. I have not only conſented to it, but have alſo offered it on ſuch terms as I conceive will be moſt agreeable to you, to him, and to his Miniſters. Theſe I intended to have reſerved for a negociation and perſonal diſcuſſion with you, and had repeatedly ſignified my wiſhes to you on this ſubject in former letters, but the preſent occaſion will not admit of this delay; I have therefore taken my decided reſolution, and have formed a treaty on the ground of your advice and ſolicitations, in which, giving up all the advantages we have obtained by the war, I have placed every thing nearly on the ſame footing it was at the commencement of the war. This treaty executed by this Government in all the neceſſary forms I now ſend you, with a letter requeſting you will add your ratification and guarantee to it. I alſo ſend you two blank treaties to be executed by the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, to which I requeſt you will previouſly add your ratification and guarantee The letter I have written to the Peiſhwa I encloſe with this, and as it is neceſſary you ſhould be informed of the contents, I ſend a copy of it for your peruſal: you will ſend this letter with the treaty. I rely on your friendſhip and influence to render this meaſure effectual, and to obtain the immediate ratification of the treaty in its preſent form without any deductions or additions on the part of the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, becauſe that would be productive of delays and defeat my purpoſe in ſending them in their complete conſtruction; and I have for this reaſon made conceſſions, to which I ſhould never have ſubmitted in the progreſs of a deliberate negociation: and remember, it is by your deſire and at your repeated inſtances, and from the impulſe of my friendſhip to you, which exceeds every conſideration but that of my public duty, that I have conſented to a peace on theſe terms, and have made theſe advances to obtain it. If peace on theſe terms ſhall be accepted, it is well; if, added to peace, the propoſed alliance ſhould take place, it will be better, and every party will find its account in it: if neither of theſe can be obtained, which my firm reliance on your friendſhip and ſincerity will not allow me to doubt, I have done my duty, nor ſhall have ought to reproach myſelf with for the conſequences, which I ſhall cheerfully wait, not doubting but by the bleſſing of God all will turn out well. Appendix. No. 311.

When theſe matters ſhall have been diſcuſſed and ſettled with the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, I ſhall be very happy to receive the viſit you have ſo long intended me, and I doubt not but the interview will be ſatisfactory to us both, and tend to our mutual advantage: for other particulars I refer you to the letters of *Beneram Pundit*.

P. S. The ſame as that to *Moodajee Booſla* in the foregoing letter.

To the Peiſhwa: written 12th October 1780.

Two years have now elapſed ſince the preſent war, which has brought conſiderable loſſes on both nations, firſt took place. God is witneſs that this was never of my ſeeking, but that on the contrary, although from a concurrence of circumſtances I have been reluctantly drawn into it, my ſole thoughts have been ever employed on the means of preventing its continuance, and I have reaſon to believe that your wiſhes have equally tended to this view, the ſole bar to which has been the difficulty of managing a negociation between the principals ſituated at ſo great a diſtance from each other. With a view to remove theſe obſtacles, Maha Rajah *Moodajee Booſla* has offered his mediation and guarantee to any treaty we may reſolve upon, and has propoſed to ſend his Miniſter *Dewagur Pundit* for the final reconciling of all differences, but as this laſt ſtep would require a proceſs of deliberation, during which the preſent hoſtilities, far from ſubſiding, might by ſome unforeſeen accident and occurrences be drawn into an indefinite length, I have taken the reſolution of making the firſt advances myſelf, and have drawn up a treaty, executed under the ſeal of the Company, and the ſignatures of the Council, and confirmed by the moſt ſolemn oaths, which I have forwarded to *Moodajee Booſla*, that it may be by him ratified as guarantee, and tranſmitted to you for your final ratification. In this treaty I have reſtored and ſurrendered every thing, except what is ſecured by former treaties, to *Futty Sing*, the Ranna of *Gohud*, and have left nothing for future diſcuſſion; and I deliver up every thing in my power, reſerving to myſelf only my honour and my faith to prior engagements. Should the terms of this treaty meet with your acquieſcence you will ratify it in the manner therein provided, and the one executed by us will then remain with you, that the preſent hoſtilities may immediately ceaſe, and the ſubjects of both nations regain their former eaſe and ſecurity. Be aſſured that my continual endeavours have been exerted to promote the attainment of this deſirable end, and to root out all differences and miſunderſtandings.

To *Ballajee Pundit:* written 12th October 1780.

Having taken into conſideration the deſire of peace which the Miniſters of the Maratta State have profeſſed, and which it has been equally the wiſh of this Government to promote, provided the attainments of it could be procured on terms by which neither the Company's credit and honour ſhall be affected, nor former treaties actually

Appendix, No. 311.

actually exiſting infringed; I have been induced from theſe circumſtances, added to others which it will be unneceſſary to mention, to propoſe a treaty of peace to be concluded between the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and the Peiſhwa and Rulers of the Maratta State, on certain conditions, mutually binding upon both parties. With reſpect to the war itſelf, I muſt obſerve in the firſt place, that it was not originally of my ſeeking, and even from the commencement of it to this period, my endeavours have been exerted to prevent its continuance; but the difficulty of managing a negociation between the principals, ſituated at ſo great a diſtance from each other, has hitherto been a bar to the accompliſhment of this end. With a view however to remove every obſtacle that has been in the way, Maha Rajah *Moodajee Booſila*, in ſeveral letters which I have received from him, has been very ſolicitous and preſſing for peace, offering his mediation and guarantee to the execution of any treaty we might reſolve upon, and propoſing at the ſame time to depute an ambaſſador on his part for the final ſettlement and reconciling of differences. But this laſt ſtep would require a proceſs of deliberation too formal and tedious, eſpecially in the preſent moment, which ought to be that of deciſion and action. I have therefore connected the whole of this ſubject into one point of view, weighing the good conſequences that might be derived from the mediation and guarantee of Maha Rajah *Moodajee Booſila*; the immediate neceſſity of putting an effectual ſtop to the depredations and ambition of *Hyder Ally Cawn*; and the obvious utility not only in regard of preſent intereſt, but future permanence and proſperity to the Maratta State, by making common cauſe with the Engliſh, and cementing a cloſe and compact alliance with them, offenſive and defenſive, againſt the French and *Hyder Ally Cawn*, at this time united in alliance, drawn up a treaty with the ſeveral articles to be obſerved, and the particular reſervations to be excepted, and have inſerted the name of Maha Rajah *Moodajee Booſila* as a ſubſcribing party, to the end that when it ſhall be properly executed by the Governor General and Council, it may for the greater diſpatch be forwarded to *Moodajee Booſila*, with two blank copies of it, that it may be previouſly ratified on his part as guarantee, and tranſmitted to the Peiſhwa for his ratification in the manner eſpecially ſet forth and preſcribed.

I ſhall now refer you to the treaty itſelf, perſuaded that you will find the terms of it liberal, equitable, and fair, preſerving the faith of treaties inviolate, and conſulting as much as may be the ſafety, honour and advantage of every party ſubſcribing to the engagement. Under theſe circumſtances I doubt not of your chearful and ready acquieſcence, together with a determination upon no pretence whatever to break or evade the treaty, or to deviate, in the ſmalleſt inſtance, from the ſtipulations therein named and provided for.

To *Madajee Scindia*: written 12th October 1780.

From a concurrence of circumſtances not in my power, I have been driven into a war with the Maratta State infinitely againſt my inclination; as I think it our mutual intereſts to unite conſtantly againſt all other enemies, inſtead of quarrelling ourſelves, I have been from the firſt perpetually aiming at a peace, and finding all attempts to negociate to have been conſtantly baffled and vain, I have now determined to put an end to the conteſt, at leaſt on my part, and have to that end ſent a treaty to the Peiſhwa, ready executed, and only wanting his ratification. The treaty is to give up every thing I have gained by the war, excepting what has been ceded by agreement to *Futty Sing Guicawar*, and the Ranna of *Gohud*, ſo that I ſhall remain without the leaſt benefit from the war, while I have in neceſſary form addreſſed myſelf upon this occaſion to the Peiſhwa and the Miniſters, I cannot overlook, in a matter of ſuch moment, one, whoſe perſon forms ſo material a ſupport to the Maratta State; and truſt you will think my terms too reaſonable to withhold your concurrence.

While as an enemy I may regret the Maratta arms being conducted by ſuch courage and ability as have always been conſpicuous in your conduct, yet I cannot as a man withhold my eſteem for the virtues and wiſdom you have diſplayed; as a tribute to thoſe, receive this letter; and as I have experienced you a powerful opponent, ſo let me know you are an able abetter.

To *Moodajee Bhooſla*—15th October.

On Thurſday the 12th inſtant I diſpatched, by the way of *Benares*, a letter to you, with a treaty executed conformably to your deſire, on the part of this Government with the Peiſhwa, propoſed for your ſignature as guarantee, and to be afterwards forwarded with two copies for his ratification of the latter, with other papers. Of all theſe a duplicate packet is preparing to be ſent to you by the ſame road. I early apprized *Beneram Pundit* of my intentions reſpecting theſe particulars, and promiſed to encloſe his letters in my packet; but as much time has been conſumed in preparing it, and I was impatient with the delay, I forgot to give him notice in time, which is the cauſe that his letters did not accompany mine: at his requeſt therefore I write this for explanation. I have given him a copy of the treaty which he will ſend you; although I hope you will before have received the original. I ſee him daily, and as I keep nothing ſecret from him, his letters and mine will afford you a complete ſtate of the affairs of this Government.

The day before yeſterday General Sir *Eyre Coote* embarked with a large detachment of European infantry and artillery for *Madras*, deſtined for the war againſt *Hyder Ally Cawn*, of which he will take the conduct. You cannot be a ſtranger to his name and reputation. It was to his bravery and military ſkill that we owe the preſervation of the Company's intereſts in the *Carnatic*, and the extirpation of the French from that country in the laſt war between that nation and ours; and, by the bleſſing of God, I truſt he will be the inſtrument of retrieving the loſſes which we have recently experienced in that quarter. He is a Counſellor of this Government, and the Commander in Chief of all the Engliſh military forces in *India*. I will add, that he is in his heart my friend, and therefore your's. Encloſed is a letter from him to you. I requeſt that you will favour him with your letters, and ſend him expreſs notice of what you ſhall have reſolved and done reſpecting the guarantee of the treaty, and of the part which you propoſe to act in the propoſals which I have ſubmitted to you, with your advice for the aſſiſtance of his conduct in the great affairs of which he has charge. In this you will confer a kindneſs on me.

To *Dewagur Pundit*—15th October.

Of the ſame tenor as the foregoing, and aſſigning as a reaſon for the General's not having written to him, that his letter to Maha Rajah was from the ſhip, and that in the hurry of departure he probably forgot to accompany it with one for him.

To the Peiſhwa—17th October 1780.

On Thurſday the 13th inſtant, (month of Shawal) I diſpatched a letter to you with a treaty completely executed on the part of this Government, and two copies of it propoſed for your ratification of them through the channel of Maha Raja *Moodajee Booſla*, which I hope you will have received. Leſt any accident ſhould have befallen this packet in the way, I have thought it proper for the greater certainty to ſend you a duplicate of it through the ſame channel.

General Sir *Eyre Coote*, who is Commander in Chief of all the Engliſh forces, and a Counſellor of this Government, embarked on Friday laſt for *Madras*, taking with him a large force of European ſoldiers and artillery

for

for the war of the *Carnatic* againſt *Hyder Ally Khan*. By the bleſſing of God all the troubles there will ſoon be removed by his known military ſkill and the bravery of our troops, who want only the preſence of an able commander to lead them to conqueſt.

Having propoſed to you an alliance with the Company againſt our common enemy *Hyder Ally Khan*, and perſuaded that the wiſdom of your Miniſters will dictate to you the policy of an immediate combination of your forces with ours, for the early prevention of his deſigns, which are ſolely founded on an enmity to you, as thoſe of the French, his allies, are to us; I requeſt that ſo ſoon as you ſhall have ratified the treaty which I and the Counſellors of this Government have offered for your acceptance, if you ſhall have approved it, you will immediately cauſe letters to be written to Sir *Eyre Coote* to adviſe him thereof, and of whatever elſe may be neceſſary in conſequence thereof.

May God advance the progreſs of our friendſhip and of your proſperity.

To *Ballajee Pundit*—17th October.

On Thurſday the 13th of this month Shawal I diſpatched a letter to you with a treaty completely executed on the part of this Government, and two copies propoſed for the ratification of it on your part, through the channel of Maha Rajah *Moodajee Booſla*, which I hope you will have received. Leſt any accident ſhould have befallen this packet in the way, I have therefore for the greater certainty, thought it proper to ſend you a duplicate of it through the ſame channel.

Let not the novelty of this propoſal either ſurprize you or render you averſe to the ratification of the treaty; I have acted on this occaſion both as the neceſſity of yours and of our affairs has required, as I have found them too urgent for delay; I rely on your wiſdom to review this action in its proper light.

Hyder Ally Cawn, who is more your enemy than ours, has with a large army invaded the *Carnatic*, and from the neglects and miſmanagement of that Government has gained ſome ſignal ſucceſs. The French, our natural enemies, are daily expected with a conſiderable armament, naval and military, deſtined to act in conjunction and in alliance with him. Their object is the conqueſt of the *Carnatic*; his, as you muſt know, the reſumption and proſecution of his deſigns againſt the dominions of the Peiſhwa: it is therefore your intereſt equally at leaſt with mine, to provide againſt the effects of ſo formidable a combination. Therefore, relying on the concurrent policy of our reſpective States and on your wiſdom, to which it will be obvious, I have reſolved on this uncommon meaſure; I have performed my part, the reſt depends on you.

General Sir *Eyre Coote*, who is Commander in Chief and a Counſellor of this Government, embarked laſt Friday for *Madras*, taking with him a large force of European ſoldiers and artillery for the war of the *Carnatic* againſt *Hyder Ally Khán*. By the bleſſing of God all the troubles there will be ſoon diſſipated by his known military ſkill and the bravery of our troops, who wanted only the preſence of an able commander to lead them to conqueſt.

Having propoſed to you an alliance with the Company againſt our common enemy *Hyder Ally Khán*, and perſuaded you will approve the policy of an immediate combination of our forces for the early prevention of his deſigns, I requeſt, that as ſoon as the treaty ſhall have been ratified on your part, which the Counſellors of this Government have offered for your acceptance if you ſhall have approved it, you will cauſe letters to be written immediately to Sir *Eyre Coote* to adviſe him thereof, and of whatever elſe may be neceſſary in conſequence thereof.

May God advance the progreſs of our friendſhip and of your proſperity.

To Maha Rajah *Moodajee Booſla*—17th October. Appendix. Nos.

On Thurſday the 13th inſtant of this month Shawal, I diſpatched to you a large packet with ſundry letters and papers, of which I now ſend you duplicates, leſt by any accident the originals ſhould have miſcarried by the way. Having peruſed them, I requeſt you will be pleaſed to forward thoſe intended for the Peiſhwa and *Ballajee Pundit* without loſs of time. 313 & 314.

I alſo ſend a duplicate of my laſt letter to you.

APPENDIX, No. 313.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 2d November 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.—(Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent.)

AGREED, That the Governor General be requeſted to write to the Nabob Vizier, recommending to him to require from *Fyzoola Cawn* the quota of troops ſtipulated by treaty to be furniſhed by the latter for his ſervice, being 5,000 horſe, to be put under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel *Muir*, commanding at *Futtigur*. Fyzoola Cawn to furniſh his quota of troops

Agreed alſo, that the Governor General be requeſted to write to the Rajah of *Benares*, requiring him to furniſh ſuch part of his cavalry entertained in his ſervice, as he can ſpare for the ſervice of this Government; and to inform what number he can ſupply. That a letter be written to Mr. *Francis Fowke*, directing him to make the ſame requiſition of the Rajah; and at the ſame time, to obviate any jealouſy which the Rajah may conceive that this may be converted to a permanent impoſition upon him, by aſſuring him, that the Board will require the ſervices of theſe forces no longer than while the preſent war laſts; after which they will be returned. Rajah of Benares to ſupply a part of his cavalry for the ſervice of the Company.

Agreed, that the following letter be written to the Reſident at *Benares*:

Sir,

On receipt of the intimation conveyed to us in your laſt letter of the 18th ultimo, orders were iſſued to countermand the march of the troops which were appointed to proceed to *Benares*, in conſequence of the delays uſed by the Rajah in the payment of his ſubſidy. To Mr. Francis Fowke, Reſident at Benares.

Deeming it juſt and proper that the Rajah ſhould be deſired to afford every aſſiſtance in his power to this Government, to whoſe protection and ſupport he owes all that he poſſeſſes, the Governor General has been requeſted to write to him to furniſh ſuch part of the cavalry entertained in his employ as he can ſpare for the ſervice of the Company; but as ſome jealouſy and apprehenſion may ariſe in the Rajah's mind, that his aid may be converted to a permanent impoſition on him, we think it neceſſary that ſuch fears ſhould be obviated, and direct you therefore to aſſure him that we ſhall require the ſervices of this force no longer than during the continuance of the preſent war, after which it will certainly be returned.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
2d November 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 314.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 30th October 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.—(Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent.) Secret department, Monday.

THE proceedings of the 26th inſtant read, and approved.

Appendix. No. 318.

Read the following letter from Brigadier General *Stibbert*, enclosing an address to Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* from Major *Brisco*.

Brigadier General Stibbert, 28th October.

Gentlemen,

The enclosed letter from Major *Brisco*, who commands the detachment posted at *Damagur*, being addressed officially to Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, I opened it yesterday on its being presented to me. As it contains some information by no means uninteresting at this juncture, I have judged it proper to lay it before you.

The season approaching when the upper *Rohilcund* will be considerably exposed to the inroads of the Seicks, or other adventurers from the western side of the *Ganges*, owing to the great number of fords which lead across that river in the dry months, I purpose reinforcing Major *Brisco* by a battalion from *Futty Ghurr* (three battalions having till lately been always stationed there) unless the Board should offer any objection to the measure. However, when the extent of country, and numerous ghauts to be defended by the Daranagur detachment, is considered, I flatter myself, gentlemen, that you will agree to this expediency. I presume that on a perusal of the Major's letter, the necessity of pressing both the Vizier and *Fyzoola Khan* to contribute effectually to the protection of the *Rohilcund* will not fail to appear to the Board.

I have the honour, &c.

Fort William, 28th October 1780. (Signed) *G. Stibbert.*

Enclosure in General Stibbert's letter from Major Brisco to Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote.

Sir,

I had the honour of addressing you twice on your way down to the Presidency, respecting this station, and I now beg leave to give you every intelligence of my transactions in the protection of *Rohilcund*.

The river *Ganges* is already fallen so very low, I am under the necessity of sending large detachments to guard the ghauts and passes of the river, as the Seicks and Goodiers, (enemies of this country, the nabob Vizier's dominions) are beginning to cross the *Ganges*, and committing depredations in *Rohilcund*. The troops I have detached in consequence will prevent them.

The Goodiers are an enemy in possession of the country on the opposite side the *Ganges* to *Rohilcund*, and are constantly very troublesome. The Seicks are a people who inhabit a country a great way to the northward of this, bordering on *Timur Shaw*'s territories; and as they are a set of freebooters, they are generally at war with some of the neighbouring Powers, and frequently make visits, and want to invade *Rohilcund*; and if it were not for the detachment at *Daranagur*, they would in a very short time lay waste the whole country, and only wait an opportunity.

The Seicks and Goodries are mostly horsemen, and are a good deal like the Marattas, in that they commence hostilities wherever they go, and have made several attempts on *Rohilcund* at different times, three or four years back; however, at present there are no very large body of them assembled on these frontiers; there are only parties of them scattered about. But the Seicks at times can collect a very large army together, thirty or forty thousand men.

I have information that *Neizop Cawn* is tampering with the Seicks, and using endeavours to form a treaty with them. I do not know what designs *Neizop Cawn* may have, but he is making great preparations for war. &c.

On my being appointed and taking the command at *Daranagur*, I was not honoured with any instructions from you regarding the Nabob at *Rampore*, *Fyzoola Cawn*'s troops. I have only five hundred of his horse, and the Nabob in his agreement with Government is obliged to keep up five thousand troops for assisting in the defence of *Rohilcund*. A few months ago three battalions were stationed here with Colonel *Muir*, besides a body of the Nabob *Fyzoola Cawn*'s cavalry; and they were well employed, and had enough to do in protecting the country from invasion. The command is greatly reduced. One battalion taken away, and *Fyzoola Cawn* has not afforded more than five hundred men since I have been here, which is a great deal too small a force from him, as I acquainted you in my former letters two battalions were too small to command *Rohilcund* from invasion. I want a larger detachment from the Nabob.

I understand you intended ordering the Nabob to furnish fifteen hundred men when you recalled the battalion; and it is absolutely necessary that he should, as they are very much wanted on the frontier station where I have my detachments.

I hope to be honoured with your directions relative to *Fyzoola Cawn*'s troops, as soon as convenient. I wait the honour of your instructions.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) *H. Brisco.*

Ordered, That the above letters lie for consideration until our next meeting.

P. Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 318.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, 9th October 1780.

THE Governor General lays before the Board the following draft of a letter to Brigadier General *Goddard*, in reply to those which have been received from him, under date the 27th May, 20th June, and 15th July, and which are yet unanswered.

Sir,

To General Goddard.

We are to acknowledge the receipt of the several letters which you have written to us under date the 27th May, 20th June, and 15th July.

The candid manner in which you have justified your conduct in your observations on the paper of *Madras* intelligence, transmitted to you with our letter of the 24th January, is to us convincing also of the falsehood of it; and we desire you to be assured that in sending this paper to you, and requiring your answer to it, we were actuated by no motive but that of affording you an opportunity of exculpating yourself from charges which might have some weight with the public, those sense which we have always entertained of your good conduct would not permit of their having any weight with us.

The successful enterprizes of which you have advised us of detachments under the command of Major *Forbes* and Lieutenant *Welch*, and particularly of those under the latter, did not come to our knowledge without heightening the favourable opinion which we before entertained of the merits of these gentlemen, and have not passed without leaving the impression which they deserve with us. We desire that you will present our thanks to Major *Forbes* and Lieutenant *Welch*, for their gallantry and good conduct on the occasions recited in your letter of the 27th May and 20th June, as well as to the officers and men under their command. The services performed by the regiment of cavalry and by the officers in command of it, call for our particular acknowledgments; and it is our order that you make the same known to them on the receipt of this letter.

Our orders to you of the 20th April, for the reduction of the regiment of cavalry, were founded on our belief that it was not of that use to your operations which was intended by our appointment of it, to make part of your detachment. You had not to that time made any mention to us of services performed by it, though you had particularly observed on those of the Candah's horse, and we saw not sufficient reason to maintain

maintain an uſeleſs corps, which could not be ſupported but at the heavieſt expence. It has given us the greateſt ſatisfaction to find ſuch ample reaſon for entertaining an oppoſite opinion of the uſe to be derived to the public ſervice from this regiment, and we chearfully abandon our former ſentiments concerning it for others more favourable, which we take up in lieu of them and under the impreſſion of its utility, as a reward to a body of our troops, which inſtead of diſmiſſion merit encouragement; and on your recommendation we revoke our orders of the 20th April for diſbanding the regiment of cavalry with your detachment, and conſent to its continuance in the ſervice.

We adhere to the orders which we ſent to you reſpecting your demand on *Futty Sing*, for payment of the expence of the troops ſtationed in *Ahmedabad*, and we not only now confirm them, but direct that before *Ahmedabad* be delivered up to *Futty Sing*, you claim and receive from him, in behalf of the Company, full payment of the expence of the troops employed for its defence, from the time that they were left there, as well as any extra expence incurred by the Company in the capture of it.

Our commands for the entire reduction of the allowance granted to *Ragoba*, were ſo ſtrict and poſitive, that we cannot but be in ſome degree aſtoniſhed at the liberty you have taken, under any circumſtances, to grant him a ſtipend from your treaſury; but we at the ſame time confeſs that the reaſons which you have adduced to the juſtification of your conduct are very powerful; and if they do not entirely acquit you for inattention to our repeated orders on this ſubject, they yet go far to ſupport you under it; they are ſuch too as, including conſiderations which were not before us when our orders were ſent to you, now induce us to approve of the reduced allowance which you have granted to *Ragonaut Row*: you will be pleaſed to aſſure him that the orders which we gave for the reduction of his ſtipend, did not ariſe from any diſregard to his rights or to his claims to our ſupport; that he may depend on our protection during the war in which we are involved with the Peiſhwa, and on our regard for his perſonal ſafety and intereſt, ſo far as it may be in our power to provide for him after it; but we are certain that he cannot be ſurprized at our inability to ſupply him ſo largely from our treaſury, as the uſeleſs and idle expence of an Indian Prince might demand from it; that the war in which we are engaged is burthenſome to the Company, and highly ſo; and that during the continuance of it, it is incumbent on this Government to be as frugal in their diſburſements as the occaſion renders poſſible; but that we willingly allow the ſum of ten thouſand rupees for his monthly ſupport, and have given you directions to iſſue it to him, hoping that it will anſwer every neceſſary expence.

With reſpect to the plan of operations for the campaign, which we muſt now ſuppoſe to have been ſome time commenced, we muſt leave it to your judgment, guided and aſſiſted by the opinion and advice of the gentlemen at *Bombay*. We have only one poſitive order to tranſmit to you; viz. that if the French land an army on the coaſt of *Malabar*, you employ the troops under your command for the defence of *Bombay*, and render every aid in your power to that Preſidency. You know our general intentions, and we approve of the ſentiments delivered in your late letters; but at this diſtance we cannot venture to give orders for any plan of operations for the forces under your command, ſince on your receipt of it a new and unforeſeen cauſe may prevent you from adopting it: you muſt not therefore wait for our inſtructions; we leave you to act for the general benefit of the Company under the advice of the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*; and to be guided by circumſtances as they may preſent themſelves.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
9th October 1780.

Mr. *Francis*—There are ſome parts of this letter in which I cannot concur. I have not altered my opinion with reſpect to the regiment of cavalry; and in regard to *Ragoba*, I am of opinion not only that our repeated orders ought to have been attended with inſtant and literal obedience; but that, excluſive of the expence, it is not prudent in us to furniſh *Ragoba* with a ſubſiſtence. We ſhall aſſuredly be burdened with him as long as he receives it; and while he is with us, he will always be a difficulty and an obſtacle in the way of peace. Appendix. No. 320.

Having already in diſcourſe ſubmitted my opinion to the Board, of the object to which General *Goddard*'s army ſhould be directed as ſoon as an alliance or peace with the Marattas ſhall leave him at liberty to act, and finding that it concurs with the views and opinions of the Governor General, I ſhall omit to ſay what I was prepared to ſay on that ſubject; I think that no time ſhould be loſt in ſuggeſting it to General *Goddard*, and inſtructing him to prepare himſelf eventually for the execution of ſuch a ſervice the moment it can be undertaken.

APPENDIX, No. 320.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 5th June 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.

THE Governor General informs the Board, that having himſelf examined the copy of the treaty concluded with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, and compared the Engliſh counterpart with the Perſian original, and it appearing to him that they differ conſiderably both in form and ſubſtance, he thought it proper to cauſe an accurate and literal tranſlation of the latter to be made for the information of the Board, and employed Mr. *D. Anderſon* (with whoſe knowledge of the Perſian tongue the Board are well acquainted) in this ſervice. He now lays before the Board the office copy of the treaty, with Mr. *Anderſon*'s tranſlation, and deſires that they may be entered in oppoſite columns in the conſultations, by which their agreement or diſagreement will be moſt apparent. Beſides the general diſagreement between the Engliſh and Perſian tranſcripts of the treaty in the copy received from General *Goddard*, the Governor General begs leave to call the attention of the Board to the 5th, 6th, and 10th articles in particular, as he apprehends that in their preſent form, they are liable to many ſubjects of contention. The 6th and 10th articles making the exchange of ſpecific diſtricts expreſs conditions of the treaty, may admit of a conſtruction which would deprive the Company of the benefit intended by the 5th, which ſpecifies, that in any new partition, the original amount of the whole of each reſpective ſhare ſhall be preſerved; by which the Board have underſtood, that whatever partition had taken place, or ſhould hereafter take place, between the Company and *Futty Sing*, the final diſtribution ſhould be ſo ordered as to place each party preciſely in the ſame ſituation with reſpect to the value of the poſſeſſions allotted to each. That for example, if the poſſeſſions lately held by *Futty Sing* in *Guzerat* did amount in their yearly revenue to 57,71,200 rupees, and the Peiſhwa's ſhare of the ſame province to 40,98,800 rupees, the lands ultimately appropriated to each ſhould yield thoſe ſums to each reſpectively; but, as this partition is ſtated as a future and eventual conſequence of a requiſition on the part of the Company, and the profeſſed object of it to prevent diſputes by the intermixture of the lands appertaining to each for want of proper boundaries, it may be doubted or diſputed that the lands which originally appertained to the Peiſhwa on the north of the river *Myhie*, and eſtimated by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to yield a yearly revenue of 27,00,000 rupees, and which were given up to *Futty Sing* in exchange

Appen. X. No. 325.

change for the poſſeſſions expreſſed in the 6th and 10th articles, amounting by the ſame eſtimate to 10,62,900 rupees, are included in the proviſion made by the 5th article. The Board will therefore probably think it both prudent and equitable to put this point beyond a diſpute, and to inſure to the Company the right which they undoubtedly poſſeſs, by the general tenor of the treaty, to that ſhare, or an equivalent which was originally poſſeſſed by the Peiſhwa, and to which they are entitled as ſtanding in his place.

The 5th article contains a technical expreſſion of a ſimilar ambiguity with that of *Jumma Khamil*, which has occaſioned ſo much diſpute in the treaty of *Poorunder*, and an inaccuracy in the conſtruction which might likewiſe ſerve as a pretext for future cavil. On both theſe points the Governor General has thought proper to conſult Mr. *Ducarel*, ſuperintendant of the Khalſa records, with the aid of the Naib Canongoes, the proper official judges of the firſt, and of the latter only as being neceſſarily conſulted upon the firſt, and competent to decide upon it by their general knowledge of the Perſian language. Mr. *Ducarel*'s report is as follows:

Calcutta, 5th June 1780.

Mr. Ducarel to the Governor General.

Honourable Sir,

Agreeable to your commands, I have examined the 5th article of the treaty between *Futty Sing Guicawar* and the Honourable Company, as expreſſed in the Perſian language, and ſubmitted it to the Canongoes *Gunga Govind Sing* and *Seuce Narain Muſtofy*, for their opinion of the exact meaning conveyed by the words *az* Company—*kefil mokurrurry*, and *amdanni muaffuch mamool*.

They agree with me in opinion, that the word *az*, which ſignifies from or by, is a miſtake, put in place of the word *beh*, to, which alters the whole meaning of the above 5th article, requiring the Company to give what it is intended they ſhould receive.

The Canongoes are farther of opinion, that the words *kefil mokurrurry*, and *amdanni muaffuch mamool* (the literal meaning of which is, fixed collections and receipts agreeable to eſtabliſhed uſage) reſpecting the actual collections, and not a Jumma or demand which, though eſtabliſhed by law or uſage, may not be realized: but they think that the addition of the words *receipts agreeable to eſtabliſhed uſage* (which they apprehend were not neceſſary) may leave room for throwing the charges of collection into the ceſſion, or including them as a part of the produce of the lands to be ceded.

I have the honour to be,

(Signed) *G. G. Ducarel.*

By this letter it will appear, that it is at leaſt neceſſary to give a reviſion and correction to the treaty before it can be ratified.

Treaty between the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company and *Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, *Shemſeer Bahadar*, concluded at the village of *Candeela*, in the Pergunnah of *Dubhoy*, January the 26th 1780.

The Chiefs of the Engliſh Company and *Futty Sing Row Sena Khaſs Kheel*, *Shumſhere Bahadar*, at the village of *Candeela*, in the diſtrict of *Dubhoy*, on the 19th of the month of Mohirrim, 1193 Hegyra, correſponding to the year 1180 of the æra of *Adel Shaw*, or 1836 of the *Sumbut*, have, with mutual conſent and inclination, ſettled and entered into this treaty.

The Miniſters of the Maratta State having refuſed to accept of the reaſonable terms of accommodation offered them by Brigadier General *Thomas Goddard*, in the name of the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, and by their obſtinate perſeverance in hoſtile intentions againſt the Engliſh, compelled them to take up arms in defence of their own rights and poſſeſſions; the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, with the ſanction and approbation of the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, have appointed and authorized Brigadier General *Goddard* to ſettle and conclude a treaty of laſting peace and alliance betwixt the Honourable the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company on one part, and *Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, *Shemſeer Bahadar*, for and in the name of all the Guicawar family, on the other; and the following are the articles of convention mutually entered into:

Whereas the Miniſters of *Poonah* not having liſtened to propoſals which were reaſonable and ſuitable to the times, the Supreme Council of *Calcutta* ſent General *Goddard* with full powers into this country: and General *Goddard* having alſo ſent every propoſal to the Miniſters of *Poonah* that could tend to terminate the diſpute and promote the welfare of both parties; but they not agreeing thereto, bound their loins with enmity, and intriguing with the enemies of the Engliſh, entertained treacherous deſigns in their minds; wherefore it became neceſſary for the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company to ſettle affairs with them: and the Gentlemen of *Bombay* having approved of the propoſitions and meaſures of the Supreme Council of *Calcutta* are empowered to form a treaty of alliance with *Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, *Sena Khaſs Kheel*, *Shumſhere Bahadar*, and all the Guicawars; and accordingly the ſaid *Row* and General *Goddard* have agreed together on the following articles:

Article 1ſt.

The Engliſh and *Futty Sing Row* agree to a league of defenſive alliance, and to protect each other againſt all foreign enemies whatever.

1ſt. A treaty between the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company and *Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, *Shumſere Bahadar*, is concluded under ſolemn engagements, that the friends of the one ſhall be the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one the enemies of the other: if any one ſhall invade the territories of the Engliſh, it ſhall be incumbent on *Row Shumſhere* to puniſh him; and if any one ſhall paſs into the country of the ſaid *Row*, the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall uſe their endeavours to repel him. In this let no deviation happen.

Article 2d.

The Miniſters of the Maratta State, by repeated violations of treaty, as well as their late conduct, having drawn upon themſelves the juſt reſentment of the Engliſh; having alſo, by undue acts of oppreſſion, proved themſelves the enemies of *Futty Sing*; for theſe reaſons, and becauſe the moſt firm and ſincere friendſhip has long ſubſiſted betwixt the Honourable Company and

2d. Whereas the Miniſters of *Poonah* have repeatedly violated the treaty, which under the ſtrongeſt engagements they entered into with the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company; and whereas they have committed various acts of hoſtility towards the Engliſh, and having alſo bound their loins with enmity againſt *Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, *Shumſhere Bahadar*, have greatly oppreſſed him; wherefore it has become neceſſary for their honour to check and reſent the injuries which have been committed by the Miniſters of *Poonah*:

it

and *Futty Sing*, the contracting parties mutually agree to enter immediately into an offenſive league, excluding the Government of *Poonah* from all ſhare of country in the province of *Guzerat* whatever.

Article 3d.

The Engliſh agree to ſupport and defend *Futty Sing* in poſſeſſion of his ſhare of the Guzerat province, and *Futty Sing* is to aſſiſt and ſupport the Engliſh in poſſeſſing themſelves of and maintaining the ſhare now held by the Government of *Poonah*.

Article 4th.

In order to accompliſh this ſervice, a firm friendſhip is now eſtabliſhed betwixt the Engliſh and *Futty Sing*; the latter agrees to join the Engliſh with 3,000 horſe, according to cuſtom, and as many more as he can poſſibly raiſe, to act in conjunction with them during the preſent war, whenever they ſhall call on him to do ſo.

Article 5th.

As the preſent mode of partition betwixt the Poonah Government and *Futty Sing* is attended with great loſs and inconvenience from the diſputes that muſt ariſe from the interference of each in collecting the revenues of the ſame places and that lay interſperſed with one another, it is agreed upon that a new ſettlement of the province of *Guzerat* ſhall take place for the mutual benefit and convenience of both parties; the expreſs object of which will be, an abſolute and ſpecific partition of the whole territory betwixt the Honourable *Eaſt India* Company and *Futty Sing*, according to the proportion of the revenues now reſpectively held by him and the Marattas.

Article 6th.

Ahmedabad and its dependencies, that is to ſay the country to the north of the river *Myhi*, now poſſeſſed by the Poonah Government, to be allotted to *Futty Sing*, in lieu of which the Engliſh are to be put in poſſeſſion of the Guicawar diviſion of the country ſouth of the *Tappey*, known by the name of *Attaveiſſe*, and their ſhare of the revenues of *Surat*.

Article 7th.

The Engliſh will give ſuch aſſiſtance of force as *Futty Sing* may require, to conquer and put him in poſſeſſion of the Poonah ſhare of the country to the north of the *Myhi*.

Article 8th.

The final partition and ſettlement of the Guzerat province being made, each party is to have the diſtinct and ſole Government and poſſeſſion of the diviſion allotted him, and to hold his ſhare independent of and unconnected with the other, except when united for their common defence againſt a foreign enemy, which they mutually and in the moſt ſolemn manner agree to do. And this partition, and this ſettlement mutually agreed to, is to be binding upon them and their poſterity for ever.

Article 9th.

Futty Sing having requeſted that the Engliſh ſupport him in withholding the annual tribute hitherto paid by him to the Poonah Government, it is ſtipulated that the Honourable Company will do ſo till a final peace ſhall be concluded betwixt them and the Poonah Government, in which the intereſts of *Futty Sing*

it is therefore at preſent agreed, that having removed the Government of the Miniſters of *Poonah* from the country of *Guzerat*, we will conquer and poſſeſs ourſelves of the whole country of *Guzerat*, and the Soubah of *Ahmedabad*, and make ſuch an arrangement that the Miniſter ſhall not be able to receive or collect a ſingle daum from that country. Appendix No. 320.

3d. The ſhare of the country of *Guzerat* belonging to the Guicawar ſhall be continued and kept entire, and the ſhare of the Miniſters of *Poonah* ſhall be enjoyed by the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company, and *Row Shumſhere Bahadur* ſhall ſupport and aſſiſt the Chief of the Engliſh Company in taking it, in ſtationing tannahs or garriſons, and in keeping poſſeſſion of it. And the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall not fail to ſupport and aſſiſt *Row Shumſhere Bahadur*.

4th. As it is of particular importance to ſettle the country, and as a treaty of union is eſtabliſhed betwixt *Row Futty Sing Shumſhere Behadur*, and the Engliſh; *Row Shumſhere Behadur* engages that he will ſupply for the preſent war three thouſand horſe as uſual; and further, as many more as he can, at the requiſition of the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company, and will perform all that is incumbent on a conjunction of intereſts.

5th. Whereas in the diviſions held by the Guicawar and the Miniſters of *Poonah* reſpectively, by reaſon of the double government which exiſt in the ſame town, and the vicinity of their villages to one another, diſputes and quarrels daily take place, the collection of the revenues of the country is impeded and prejudiced, and the Ryots are diſtreſſed; the Engliſh Chiefs are for theſe reaſons deſirous of ſettling a new partition, ſo that a treaty having mutually taken place, no difference may ariſe: and with a view to the intereſt and welfare of both, a portion of country, equal to the ſhare held at preſent by the Miniſters of *Poonah*, according to the eſtabliſhed collections and cuſtomary receipts of revenue, ſhall, after the conqueſt of theſe diſtricts, be given in exchange to the Company, it is intended that there ſhall not be a daum difference.

6th. The city of *Ahmadabad*, together with the Pergunnah, that is to ſay, the whole of the country laying on the other ſide of the river *Myhi* which is now poſſeſſed by the Poonah Government, ſhall be conquered and given to *Row Shumſhere Bahadur*; and in exchange for it the Pergunnahs of *Surat*, *Attaveiſſee*, and the chout of the city of *Surat*, ſhall be allotted to the ſhare of the Chiefs of the Company.

7th. Whenever *Row Shumſhere Behadur* ſhall require troops to conquer the country comprehended under the ſhare of the Miniſters of *Poonah*, and laying on the other ſide of the river *Myhi*, they ſhall be ſupplied by the Engliſh Company.

8th. After the partition of the country of *Guzerat* is effected, each party ſhall have the ſole government in the diſtricts allotted to their reſpective ſhares, and ſhall have no dependance on one another, except when any perſon ſhall paſs into the country of *Row Shumſhere Bahadur*, in which caſe aſſiſtance ſhall be brought by the Engliſh Company: and if any one ſhall invade the ſhare of country allotted to the Engliſh Company, *Row Shumſhere Behadur* ſhall afford ſupport and aſſiſtance. And this partition of the country of *Guzerat*, which hath with mutual approbation been ſettled betwixt *Row Shumſhere Behadur* and the Chiefs of the Company, ſhall perpetually remain and be continued to their reſpective deſcendants and ſucceſſors: in no reſpect ſhall it be broken through by either.

9th. Agreeable to the repreſentation of *Row Futty Sing Behadur*, the money which he annually ſends to *Poonah* muſt not be ſent; he muſt keep it with himſelf. Whenever any negociation for peace ſhall take place with the Miniſters of *Poonah*, the intereſt and welfare of *Row Shumſhere Behadur* ſhall firſt be diſcuſſed. The intereſt of *Row Shumſhere Behadur*, and the intereſt of the Company, are one and the ſame.

Appendix. No. 320.

shall be carefully and equally attended to with their own.

Article 10th.

In consideration of the advantage that will arise to *Futty Sing* from the above article, and as a proof of his sincere regard and friendship for the English, he agrees to cede to them the district of *Zinnore*, and the villages situated in the Broach Pergunnah, now belonging to him, both which are to remain for ever in the possession of the Company.

Article 11th.

All the countries and places made over to the English in this treaty by *Futty Sing* are to be delivered into their hands, and the collections accounted for to them from the day that *Futty Sing* is put in possession of the city of *Ahmedabad*; and no demand of collection for any past time is to be made in them by *Futty Sing*.

Article 12th.

It is agreed that two copies of this treaty be immediately sent to the Honourable President and Select Committee of *Bombay* for their approbation, and to be by them transmitted to the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, under whose sanction it is concluded, in order to receive their final confirmation and ratification; after which one copy so authenticated is to remain with the Honourable President and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and another with *Futty Sing*.

10th. As the above article is for the advantage of *Row Futty Sing Shumshere Behadur*, he, from the friendship and regard which he bears towards the Chiefs of the English Company, shall make over to the Company the district of *Zinnore*, together with the villages of *Broach*, which are at present in his possession.

11th. All the pergunnahs and villages above mentioned shall be delivered over to the Chiefs of the Company from the day on which the city of *Ahmedabad* is delivered over to *Row Shumshere Bahadur*. From the day on which possession is taken of the city of *Ahmedabad*, the revenues of the above pergunnahs shall be enjoyed by the Chiefs of the English Company; and after the Chiefs of the English Company shall have obtained possession, no claims of collection shall be made on account of the time past in these pergunnahs.

12th. It is agreed that two copies of this treaty, written fair, shall be sent from hence, first to the gentlemen of *Bombay*, and by those gentlemen from *Bombay* to *Calcutta*. As the gentlemen of both places have written regarding *Row Shumshere Behadur* in the same terms, having perused this treaty they will return it under their seals, so that one shall remain in the possession of *Row Shumshere Behadur*, and the other will be deposited amongst the records of the Company with the gentlemen of *Bombay*.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

A true translation.

The Seal of the Company.

(Signed)
Dalhousie Watherstone,
Persian Translator.

This treaty was signed, sealed, and delivered to the contracting parties by each other, in the presence of us, who have hereunto signed our names.

(Signed) *John Cockerell*,
Quarter Master General.
Edwd Heard,
Adjutant General.

This treaty under the seal and signature of the contracting parties, is delivered to each other in the presence of the under written Sirdars.

(Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

The Seal of the Company.

Futty Sing's Seal.

Futty Sing's Signature.

(Signed) { Govind Gopal, the Rajah's Duwan, and Rolajee Scindia, married to the daughter of *Seajee*, *Futty Sing*'s brother.

Ordered, That the Governor General's minute, and the different translations of the treaty, be sent in circulation for the perusal and consideration of the members of the Board.

The above papers having been sent in circulation, they were returned with the following minutes:

Mr. *Francis*—I think that for the reasons assigned by the Governor General, the formal ratification of the treaty should be delayed.

Mr. *Wheler* agrees.

Resolved, That the ratification of the treaty be delayed.

The Governor General proposes that the following alterations be made in the treaty; and that the secretary, with the assistance of the Persian translator, do prepare a new draft conformable to these alterations, and lay it before the Board for approval.

Governor General's proposed corrections of the treaty with Futty Sing.

Preamble. To be rendered conformable to the original English.

Article 1st. Right in the Persian; but instead of "pass "into," write "invade."

2d. Right in the Persian; instead of "for "their honour," write "for our mu- "tual honour."

3d. To be enjoyed by the "Company," instead of, "Chiefs of the English Company." Omit, "in stationing tannahs or garri- "sons;" add at the end, "in the de- "fence and maintenance of his share."

4th. Right in the Persian.

5th.

5th. Right; but the language of the Perſian to be corrected according to Mr. *Ducarel*'s report.

6th. Inſtead of "allotted to the ſhare of the "Chiefs of the Company," write, "allotted to the ſhare of the Engliſh "Company."

To be added, "Whatever difference "may ariſe in the revenue of the "reſpective ſhares by this exchange, ſhall be adjuſted according to the preceding article."

7th. Right.

8th. For "any perſon ſhall paſs," ſay "when "any enemy ſhall invade;" and inſtead of "if any one ſhall invade," ſay "if "any enemy ſhall invade." Inſtead of "the Chiefs of the Company ſhall perpetually remain," ſay "the Engliſh "Company ſhall perpetually remain." The reſt right.

9th. Right.

10th. With the ſame addition as to the 6th article.

11th. Inſtead of "ſhall be enjoyed by the "Chiefs of the Engliſh Company," ſay "ſhall be enjoyed by the Engliſh "Company."

Inſtead of "after the Chiefs of the "Engliſh Company ſhall have obtained poſſeſſion," ſay "and from "that day."

12th. To be conformable to the original Engliſh.

The Board approve of the propoſed alterations, and order that a new treaty be prepared accordingly.

As the Board in their late inſtructions to General *Goddard* have empowered him to annul the interchange which has been made by the 6th and 10th articles of the treaty with *Futty Sing Guicawar*; and as theſe and every other deviation from the original partition is provided for by the 5th article;

Agreed, That two drafts be formed, each duly ratified by the ſeal of the Company and ſignature of the Governor General and Council, one ſtanding in the original form with the preſcribed corrections, the other the ſame, but with the omiſſion of the 6th and 10th articles: that they may be ſent to Brigadier General *Goddard*; and that it be left to his diſcretion to obtain the ſignature of *Futty Sing* and the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, adding his own to either, and delivering the other to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to be cancelled and returned to this Board.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 26th June 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.—(Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent.)

The Secretary informs the Board, that in obedience to their orders of the 5th inſtant, he has prepared two drafts of the treaty with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, in the manner preſcribed by thoſe orders; and now lays before them that of the two drafts, in which the treaty ſtands in its original form, agreeable to the tranſlation made by Mr. *Anderſon*, with the corrections reſolved on by the Board, but with the omiſſion of thoſe numbers in the original which formed the 6th and 10th articles.

Treaty between the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company and *Futty Sing Row Guicawar Shemſeer Bahader*, concluded at the village of *Candula*, in the Pergunnah of *Dubhoy*, January the twenty-ſixth, one thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty. Appendix. No. 320.

The Miniſters of the Maratta State having refuſed to accept of the reaſonable terms of accommodation offered them by Brigadier General *Thomas Goddard*, in the name of the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, and by their obſtinate perſeverance in hoſtile intentions againſt the Engliſh, compelled them to take up arms in defence of their own rights and poſſeſſions; the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, with the ſanction and approbation of the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, have appointed and authorized Brigadier General *Goddard* to ſettle and conclude a treaty of laſting peace and alliance betwixt the Honourable the *Eaſt India* Company on one part, and *Futty Sing Row Guicawar Shemſeer Bahader*, for and in the name of all the Guicawar family, on the other; and the following are the articles of convention mutually entered into:

Article firſt.—A treaty between the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company and *Futty Sing Row Guicawar Shemſeer Behader*, is concluded, under ſolemn engagements that the friends of the one ſhall be the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one the enemies of the other: if any one ſhall invade the territories of the Engliſh it ſhall be incumbent on *Row Shemſeer* to puniſh him; and if any one ſhall invade the country of the ſaid *Row*, the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall uſe their endeavours to repel him. In this let no deviation happen.

Article ſecond.—Whereas the Miniſters of *Poonah* have repeatedly violated the treaty, which under the ſtrongeſt engagements they entered into with the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company; and whereas they have committed various acts of hoſtility towards the Engliſh, and having alſo bound their loins with enmity againſt *Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, *Shemſeer Bahader*, have greatly oppreſſed them; wherefore it has become neceſſary for our mutual honour to check and reſent the injuries which have been committed by the Miniſters of *Poonah*: it is therefore at preſent agreed, that having removed the Government of the Miniſters of *Poonah* from the country of *Guzerat*, we will conquer and poſſeſs ourſelves of the whole country of *Guzerat*, and the Soubah of *Ahmedabad*, and make ſuch an arrangement that the Miniſters ſhall not be able to receive or collect a ſingle daum from that country.

Article third.—The ſhare of the country of *Guzerat* belonging to the Guicawar ſhall be continued and kept entire; and the ſhare of the Miniſters of *Poonah* ſhall be enjoyed by the Engliſh Company; and *Row Shemſeer Bahader* ſhall ſupport and aſſiſt the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company in taking it, and in keeping poſſeſſion of it; and the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company ſhall not fail to ſupport and aſſiſt *Row Shemſeer Bahader* in the defence and maintenance of his ſhare.

Article fourth.—As it is of particular importance to ſettle the country, and as a treaty of union is eſtabliſhed betwixt *Row Futty Sing Shemſeer Bahader* and the Engliſh, *Row Sheemſeer Bahader* engages that he will ſupply for the preſent war three thouſand horſe as uſual, and farther, as many more as he can, at the requiſition of the Chiefs of the Engliſh Company, and will perform all that is incumbent on a conjunction of intereſts.

Article fifth.—Whereas in the diviſions held by the Guicawar, and the Miniſters of *Poonah* reſpectively, by reaſon of the double government which exiſts in the ſame town, and the vicinity of their villages to one another, diſputes and quarrels daily take place; the collection of the revenues of the country is impeded and prejudiced; and the Ryots are diſtreſſed; the Engliſh Chiefs are for theſe reaſons deſirous of ſettling a new partition, ſo that a treaty having mutually taken place, no difference may ariſe; and with a view to the intereſt and welfare of both, a portion of country equal to the ſhare held at preſent by the Miniſters of *Poonah*, according to the eſtabliſhed collections and cuſtomary receipts

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of revenue, shall after the conquest of these districts be given in exchange to the Company. It is intended that there shall not be a daum difference.

Article sixth.—The city of *Ahmedabad*, together with the Pergunnahs, that is to say, the whole of the country laying on the other side of the river *Mahé*, which is now possessed by the Poonah Government, shall be conquered and given to *Row Shemseer Bahadar*; and in exchange for it the Pergunnahs of *Surat*, *Attaveesee*, and the chout of the city of *Surat*, shall be allotted to the share of the English Company: whatever difference may arise in the revenue of the respective shares by this exchange shall be adjusted according to the preceding article.

Article seventh.—Whenever *Row Shemseer Bahadar* shall require troops to conquer the country comprehended under the share of the Ministers of *Poonah*, and laying on the other side of the river *Mahé*, they shall be supplied by the English Company.

Article eighth.—After the partition of the country of *Guzerat* is effected, each party shall have the sole government in the districts allotted to their respective shares, and shall have no dependance on one another; except when any enemy shall invade the country of *Row Shemseer Bahadar*, in which case assistance shall be brought by the English Company; and if any enemy shall invade the share of country allotted to the English Company, *Row Shemseer Bahadar* shall afford support and assistance. And this partition of the country of *Guzerat*, which hath with mutual approbation been settled betwixt *Row Shemseer Bahadar* and the English Company, shall perpetually remain and be continued to their respective descendants and successors: in no respect shall it be broken through by either.

Article ninth.—Agreeable to the representation of *Row Futty Sing Bahadar*, the money which he annually sends to *Poonah* must not be sent, he must keep it with himself: whenever any negociation for peace shall take place with the Ministers of *Poonah*, the interest and welfare of *Row Shemseer Bahadar* shall first be discussed. The interests of *Row Shemseer Bahadar* and the interests of the Company are one and the same.

Article tenth.—As the above article is for the advantage of *Row Futty Sing Shemseer Bahader*, he, from the friendship and regard which he bears towards the Chiefs of the English Company, shall make over to the Company the district of *Zinnore*, together with the villages of *Broach*, which are at present in his possession: whatever difference may arise in the revenue of the respective shares by this exchange, shall be adjusted according to the fifth article.

Article eleventh.—All the Pergunnahs and villages above-mentioned shall be delivered over to the Chiefs of the Company from the day on which the city of *Ahmedabad* is delivered over to *Row Shemseer Bahader*. From the day on which possession is taken of the city of *Ahmedabad*, the revenues of the above Pergunnahs shall be enjoyed by the English Company, and from that day no claim of collection shall be made on account of the time past in these Pergunnahs.

Article twelfth.—It is agreed, that two copies of this treaty be immediately sent to the Honourable President and Select Committee of *Bombay*, for their approbation, and to be by them transmitted to the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, under whose sanction it is concluded, in order to receive their final confirmation and ratification; after which one copy so authenticated is to remain with the Honourable President and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and another with *Futty Sing*.

Approved the drafts; and ordered that a fair copy of them be made in duplicate to receive the signature of the members of the Board, and to be sealed with the seal of the Company.

Agreed, that when the treaties shall have been signed, and the seal of the Company been affixed to them, they be transmitted to Brigadier General *Goddard*, with the following letter:

Sir,

We have for some time past had under consideration a copy of the treaty concluded by you on the 26th of January last with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, and transmitted to us by the President and Select Committee of *Bombay* in the English and Persian languages for our ratification.

On a comparison of the English counterpart of this treaty with the Persian, they appeared to us to differ so considerably both in form and substance, that we determined to remove the doubts which we had on this point, by employing some person in whose knowledge of the Persian language we had entire confidence to make an accurate and literal translation of the Persian transcript.

This translation having accordingly been prepared, we are compelled to observe that the former was very erroneous, and failed essentially in its conveyance of the sense of the Persian copy.

The Persian draft also, is not without objection. In part of the fifth article the meaning is entirely perverted, by a mistake made in the use of the word *az*, signifying *from* or *by*, instead of *beh*, signifying *to*; which if permitted to remain would have obliged the Company to give what it is intended they should receive: and in another part of the same article we have made an alteration in the terms, in order to prevent future cavil, with respect to the true value of the cession made to the Company by *Futty Sing*.

We have been induced to amend the Persian articles in a few other instances; and for a knowledge of them, as well as the alterations in the English copy, we refer you to a comparison of the new treaty accompanying this letter, with the treaty now in your possession. In our letter of the 15th May you were informed of our sentiments on the 6th and 10th articles of the treaty, and directed either to require the consent of *Futty Sing* to annul the exchange stipulated therein, and to give up the possession of the districts which formerly appertained to the Peishwa on the north of the river *Mahé*, and which were ceded to him by you, and to receive back the districts of *Zinnore* and *Dubhoy*, originally the Guicawar's share on the south of the *Tappey*, ceded to him by you in like manner; or allowing the exchange to continue, to assign and deliver over to the Company possession of an additional portion of land yielding a revenue equal to the difference produced by that exchange, in the manner prescribed to you by the President and Select Committee of *Bombay*, in their letter of the 24th February; or to enter into a specific engagement for a subsidy payable in ready money equal to that amount.

Adhering still to the orders above quoted, relative to the 5th and 10th articles of the treaty, and as the required deviation and every other that we might think it advisable to make from the original plan of our engagement is sufficiently provided for by the 5th, we have caused two drafts of the treaty to be prepared and sent in duplicate, ratified by the seal of the Company and signature of the members of this Government, in one of which the articles which formed the 6th and 10th numbers are omitted, and in the other included with the prescribed corrections; and we leave it to your discretion to obtain the signature of the President and Council of *Bombay*, and of *Futty Sing* to either of them adding your own to that which may receive their concurrence, and returning the other cancelled to the President and Council of *Bombay*, to be sent back to us.

Fort William. We are, &c.
26th June 1780.

Ordered, that a corrected copy of the treaty be prepared and sent with the following letter to the President and Select Committee at *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

Gentlemen,

In your letter of the 7th March, the receipt of which we acknowledged on the 15th of laſt month, you informed us that you had forwarded two copies of the original treaty concluded by Brigadier General *Goddard* with *Futty Sing*, for the confirmation and ratification of this Government.

We here think it proper to obſerve, that one copy only was received, with a Perſian tranſcript affixed to it; and that the paper itſelf was unauthenticated.

A compariſon of the Engliſh and Perſian copies of this treaty ſuggeſted to us ſo many defects and errors in the former, that we have been obliged to cauſe a new tranſlate to be made of it: and as we alſo found ſome expreſſions in the Perſian draft to be faulty and ambiguous, and if allowed to remain, likely to produce many ſubjects of contention between the Company and *Futty Sing*, we have thought it neceſſary to prepare a new treaty in the Engliſh and Perſian language, the former conveying a juſt ſenſe of the meaning of the latter, and the latter ſo expreſſed as to prevent, as far as we are able, any cavil or diſpute hereafter with *Futty Sing*, ariſing from the terms of it. A corrected copy of the treaty goes enclоſed.

In our letter of the 15th May, written in reply to your's of the 7th of March, we informed you of our concurrence in your remarks on the exchange of diſtricts ſtipulated in the 6th and 10th articles of the treaty, and of the orders which we had in conſequence ſent to General *Goddard* reſpecting it. To theſe orders we ſtill adhere: and as the required deviation from the 6th and 10th articles, and any other which we might think it adviſable to make from the original plan of our engagement, is ſufficiently provided for by the 5th, we have cauſed two drafts of the treaty, prepared in conformity to the alterations which we deemed neceſſary in the Engliſh tranſlate, and in the terms of the Perſian copy, to be ſent in duplicate under the ſeal of the Company and ſignature of this Government to Brigadier General *Goddard*, in one of which the articles which formed the 6th and 10th numbers are omitted, and in the other included; and we have directed him to obtain your conſent, and that of *Futty Sing*, to either of them; affixing his own ſeal to that which is agreed to, and cancelling the other, which he is ordered to tranſmit to you; and we requeſt, that on your receipt of it you will be pleaſed to return it to us.

Fort William, We are, &c.
26th June 1780.

P. S. Since writing to you laſt, under date the 16th ultimo, we have had the pleaſure to receive your letters of the 31ſt March and 21ſt April, with their enclоſures.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 15th May 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.

Agreed that the following reply be written to the above letter:

To General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have received from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* a copy of your correſpondence with them to the 24th of February.

It appears by their laſt letter in this correſpondence, that in the late treaty with *Futty Sing*, you have ceded to him diſtricts which they eſtimate at the annual revenue of 27 lacks of rupees; but that in return there was only yielded to the Company the poſſeſſion of a country eſtimated at ten lacks ſixty-two thouſand nine hundred; by this a difference of 16,37,100 ariſes, which appears to be an entire loſs to the Company. We are only able to account for an exchange which has occaſioned ſuch a diminution in the original value of our portion of the province of *Guzerat*, by ſuppoſing that your knowledge of the character of *Futty Sing* might ſuggeſt to you the expediency of having ſome check over him; and that the fort and diſtrict of *Dubhoy*, from its contiguity to *Brodera*, might appear to you a deſirable poſſeſſion for the Company on this account. But uninformed as we are of the other circumſtances on which the comparative advantages of the ceded diſtricts may depend, it ſeems to us, that excluſively of the difference of revenue, the exchange made muſt rather prove diſadvantageous to the Company, as we gain for lands lying at a diſtance, and rendered in a degree inacceſſible to the Marattas by the interpoſition of three capital rivers, a diſtrict immediately bordering upon theirs, and at all times open to their incurſions. Appendix. No. 320.

This conſideration we believe did not occur to you; but as it appears to us deſerving of your attention, we deſire that you will reconſider that part of the treaty with *Futty Sing* to which it belongs, and avail yourſelf of any advice reſpecting it which you may receive from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, whom we have requeſted to aſſiſt you with it.

Such being our opinion of the exchange of the lands ſtipulated in the treaty;

We think proper to direct, 1ſt, That you either require the conſent of *Futty Sing* to annul this exchange, and to give up the poſſeſſion of the diſtricts which formerly appertained to the Peiſhwa on the north of the river *Mahé*, and which were ceded to him by you, and to receive back the diſtricts of *Zinnore* and *Dubhoy*, originally the Guicawar's ſhare on the ſouth of the *Tappy*, ceded to him by you in like manner; or, 2dly, allowing the exchange to continue, to aſſign and deliver over to the Company poſſeſſion of an additional portion of land, yielding a revenue equal to the difference produced by that exchange, in the manner preſcribed to you by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* in their letter of the 24th February; or, 3dly, to enter into a ſpecific engagement for a ſubſidy payable in ready money equal to that amount.

The treaty has been tranſmitted to us by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* for our ratification, and we ſhall return it to them in a few days properly confirmed, but guarding it with a reſerve providing for a new and equitable ſettlement of the province of *Guzerat*, according to the fifth article.

We are now to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th March, covering a copy of your correſpondence with the Select Committee at *Bombay*, in regard to your negociations with *Scindia*. We are entirely of your opinion, that the object of *Scindia* is to ſecure the perſon of *Ragoba*, an event which muſt of courſe add to his aggrandizement in the Maratta State, and give him an entire controul over the Miniſters; inducements ſufficiently powerful to prompt him to keep *Ragoba* under his ſeparate charge.

We approve of the general principle implied in your replies to *Scindia*'s propoſals; but at the ſame time we deſire you to bear in mind, that our obligations to *Ragoba* are but little more than negative, being confined entirely to the preſent protection of his perſon, and a future proviſion for his ſubſiſtence: and theſe points being ſecured, we poſitively direct, that no conſideration of the ſuppoſed rights or intereſts of *Ragoba* be ever a bar or obſtacle to a peaceable accommodation with the Maratta State. The proviſion ſtipulated for him in the treaty of *Proondur*, is in our opinion adequate to his rank and wants, and places him in a ſtate of ſafety and independence; and we expect and ſhall require his conſent to ſuch a proviſion as was then made for him: upon this principle we ſhould have approved of the offers made to you by *Madjee Scindia* for the reſidence of *Ragoba* at *Jaunſee*, with ſuch a proviſion for his ſubſiſtence, if that fortreſs and its dependency, or ſuch portion of it as was equal to the clear revenue intended to be appropriated to his

Appendix. No. 321.

his uſe, were aſſigned to him abruptly, and independently of any other controul. We think proper to give you this explanation of our ſentiments, that you may conform to them in future, on any occaſion that may preſent itſelf to bring the war to an honourable concluſion.

We have in all our late letters informed you of the difficulty we had found in making the large remittances of caſh which we had ſent to *Bombay* for the ſupport of that Preſidency, and to *Surat* for the ſupply of your army: we are alone unequal to ſo great a charge upon our income; and have therefore in our letter to the Select Committee of *Bombay* of this date, deſired them to appropriate the acceſſion of revenue which may immediately ariſe to the Company from the operations and ſucceſſes of your army, excluſively to that expence. We truſt that you will be able to ſecure from the ravages and incurſions of the enemy the diſtricts which you may have obtained; and that the collections will equal the eſtimate made of them, at leaſt during the rainy ſeaſon, in which they will be leſs liable to interruption; and for ſuch further ſums as you may indiſpenſably want, we authorize you to draw bills upon us at par; but we poſitively prohibit them on any other terms.

Fort William, 11th May 1780. We are, &c.

APPENDIX, Nos. 321 and 322.

No. 321.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 2d October 1780.

READ the following letter from Brigadier General *Goddard:*

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 15th May.

In anſwer to what related to the partition of the territory made with *Futty Sing*, I ſhall endeavour to explain the circumſtance you have alluded to as clearly as I poſſibly can; and do not doubt being able to effect that point to your entire ſatisfaction.

After the expreſs declaration contained in the fifth article of the treaty with *Futty Sing*, where it is provided that a new and equitable ſettlement of the province of *Guzerat* ſhall take place, it would have been in me a proof of an unpardonable inattention to the intereſts of my country and the Honourable Company, could I have ſuffered them to be ſo materially injured as the ſuppoſed difference of the value of the lands mutually ceded, admitting that ſettlement to be juſt, would prove it to be the caſe: nothing but the ſtrongeſt conſiderations of political expediency could have juſtified ſuch a ſtep; and had ſuch exiſted, I ſhould have deemed myſelf highly culpable in withholding from you in the firſt inſtance every minute information upon a point of ſo much importance. I acknowledge however that the neceſſity for making ſuch a ſacrifice never did exiſt; and I alſo affirm that the preſent partition of country, as far as my knowledge of the reſpective value of each ſhare, drawn from the beſt authority and information I could procure, enabled me to judge, it was not only made in an equal and juſt proportion, but from many conſiderations greatly to the benefit and particular advantage of the Company, excluſive of the general conveniences, and, when it was formed, deſirable object of the alliance itſelf.

I could have wiſhed the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* had deferred tranſmitting you their letter to me of the 24th February till they received my anſwer; that both might have been ſent at the ſame time, in order to prevent any partial impreſſion, and by having the matter more fully ſtated, enable you to decide with more certainty and preciſion upon the ſeveral circumſtances of it. They will no doubt have corrected this, by ſubmitting it to your conſideration as ſoon as it reached them, but leſt they may have neglected to do ſo, I beg leave to tranſcribe for your peruſal, ſuch part of my letter to the Honourable Select Committee of *Bombay*, of the 7th of March, as relates to the ſubject in queſtion, and to which I further beg leave to obſerve, they have never thought it neceſſary to ſend any reply.

It was as follows:

"Reſpecting the ſtatement you have been pleaſed "to ſend me of the revenues of *Guzerat*, as ſhared "by the Peiſhwa and Guicawar, but which you do "not anſwer for being altogether accurate; I beg to "aſſure you, that from the moſt exact information I re"ceived, it is exceedingly erroneous and incorrect. I "ſhall take an opportunity of laying before you an "exact and ſatisfactory ſtatement of the collections of "this province, for your more particular information, "very ſoon; at preſent only permit me to obſerve, that "the eſtimate made of the Peiſhwa's ſhare of the diſ"tricts to the north of the *Myhie*, exceeded the proper "value by at leaſt fifteen lacks of rupees. I ſhall men"tion three inſtances in which they are greatly exagge"rated; firſt, reſpecting *Pitlad*, the whole revenue of "which may be reckoned at ſix lacks, three only of "which are accounted for to the Peiſhwa: ſecond, the "city of *Ahmedabad*, whoſe collections amounted to "about three lacks, and little more than half belonged "to the Poonah Circar. The revenue mentioned under "the name of *Muluckgeery*, the real value of which de"pended upon the force employed, and was never valued "to the Peiſhwa at more than three lacks; if to theſe "deductions be added the expences neceſſary to collect "the revenues from the Zemindars, as well as to protect "the country from the inroads and depredations of the "Cottywars, and other freebooters; it will be found "that the real value of the Pergunnahs ceded to the "Engliſh by *Futty Sing*, excluſive of the conveniences "and advantage of their ſituation, is equal if not ſupe"rior to that guaranteed to him by the Company in lieu "of it."

The facts being as above ſtated, and the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* not having yet thought proper to controvert or weaken their force by any objection to the argument I had uſed, I cannot help remaining fixed in my former opinion, that the exchange of territory made by *Futty Sing* was equitable, and proportioned to the claims of each party, and calculated to promote the true intereſts of the Company.

I ſhall however, in obedience to your commands, further conſult with that Government on the ſeveral points you have mentioned relative to this treaty: and as the expreſs and declared intention of its formation was, excluſive of its general and political object of uniting with *Futty Sing* againſt the common enemy, to poſſeſs ourſelves of the full and undiminiſhed ſhare of the province formerly belonging to the Peiſhwa, ſhould any thing yet be wanting to the complete attainment of that end, I ſhall moſt earneſtly and zealouſly aſſiſt in contributing to its accompliſhment.

I cannot quit the ſubject entirely without venturing a few words upon what you are pleaſed to obſerve reſpecting the local advantage ariſing to the Company from the exchange of territory made with *Futty Sing*. This meaſure was ſtrictly conformable to the plan propoſed and recommended to me by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*; and I muſt confeſs, from many reaſons, it then did and ſtill does appear to me the moſt advantageous mode of participation that could be followed.

If the lands to the north of the *Myhie* are further removed from the main power of the Marattas than thoſe we gain, and rendered difficult of acceſs by the interpoſition

ſition of three capital rivers; they are alſo ſeparated, and in a manner unconnected with the Company's former poſſeſſions; and in caſe of an attack, the ſame obſtructions of rivers, together with the diſtance, would unite to prevent our being able to furniſh the neceſſary aſſiſtance for their defence, except at an increaſed expence, and at extreme hazard and inconvenience, as all the country we do hold to the ſouthward would in ſuch caſe be left entirely expoſed to the inſults and inroads of the enemy; beſides, the entrance into the northern diſtricts is, at the ſeaſon for military operations, always open to the Marattas by the province of *Malva*; and whenever they have meant ſeriouſly to make an attack on *Guzerat*, it has always been by beginning their efforts to the northward.

I ſhall on this point alſo, in conformity to your directions, avail myſelf of any advice the Government of *Bombay* may give reſpecting it, and at preſent take leave of the ſubject of *Futty Sing*, by expreſſing my ſincere wiſh, that as the treaty with that Chief was entered upon by me after the matureſt deliberation and attention to every collateral circumſtance, poſſible benefit or diſadvantage to the Company; and as I promoted it with ardour, from a conviction of its great utility, which has ſince been proved, on the eve of an important and dangerous war, no deficiency in the means of attaining theſe objects, or cauſe of alteration may be adduced, by which the public faith, or my private character, may ſuffer the moſt diſtant ſhadow of reflection.

The letters which I have from time to time addreſſed you ſince that of the 28th of March, will have fully confirmed the accounts then given of *Scindia*'s inſincerity and duplicity of conduct, and the impoſſibility of deriving any ſolid advantages from a connection with that Chief, or even of forming one, but upon terms the moſt diſgraceful and unprofitable. That his principal object is to get the perſon of *Ragoba* into his own hands, is obvious; but notwithſtanding the fair openings given him in the courſe of his negociation with me, he never availed himſelf of them to offer conceſſions to the Engliſh adequate to ſuch a ſacrifice on our part, or even in the ſmalleſt degree calculated to inſpire us with an inclination to make it.

No. 322.

The idea conveyed in your injunctions relative to *Ragoba*, has been the ground of my treatment of that Chief hitherto, of the plan laid down for the proſecution of the war laſt ſeaſon, and of my ſubſequent conduct towards *Scindia*; I ſhall continue to make it my invariable rule; and I truſt, that the honour and dignity of the nation may ſtill be preſerved unblemiſhed; and it will never be neceſſary to relax in it towards him.

It is always with the moſt real concern and the ſtrongeſt repugnance imaginable, that I am compelled to deviate in the ſmalleſt tittle from the ſtrict letter of your inſtructions. With theſe ſentiments, if I at any time do depart from it, nothing but the expediency of the caſe, and a regard for the public good, which I know to be paramount in your breaſt to all other conſiderations, could juſtify me to myſelf, or furniſh any ſhadow of excuſe to you. Should my judgment unfortunately err, I have ſo often experienced your candour and indulgence, that I know you would pardon the error of the action itſelf from the goodneſs of the intention which led to it.

When I wrote to you laſt, I informed you that I had entirely withdrawn the allowance granted to *Ragoba*; this was my determination; and in communicating to him the neceſſity of ſuch a ſtep, I endeavoured to reconcile it to him in terms the beſt calculated to remove every idea of its originating from any alterations in the friendly ſentiments of your Government towards him; and at the ſame time to convince him of the political juſtice and propriety which dictated it. He pleaded his poverty, and entire dependance on us, with the ſtrongeſt force of language; but as he had no other argument to make uſe of than his neceſſities, he was compelled to acknowledge the reaſonableneſs of your decree, and only ſolicited me to lay before you the diſtreſsful ſtate to which he was reduced. A few days after that, I learned that ſome jewels belonging to *Ragoba* had been offered for ſale in the city, and that he had diſpoſed of ſome golden female ornaments. He ſhortly after renewed his ſolicitations; he deſcribed to me his extreme diſtreſs in the moſt moving manner, informing me of his attempt to ſell the few remaining jewels left of his family; but that, availing themſelves of his neceſſities, the merchants refuſed to buy them but at a third of their value; declared that he was unable to furniſh the neceſſary ſubſiſtence for himſelf and family; and concluded, after expreſſing his grateful ſenſe of the many favours he had received from the Engliſh, and his regret at the inadequate return it had been, and was then in his power to make them, by frankly declaring, that as by his continuance at *Surat* he muſt inevitably experience the want of even the common neceſſaries of life, it would be expedient for him, in order to ſave his family from periſhing, to direct his courſe to ſome other quarter; and requeſted me to adviſe him in what manner he ſhould conduct himſelf in theſe trying and difficult circumſtances. This was the ſubſtance of his converſation. Appendix. No. 322.

As I was ſenſible of the truth of his repreſentations, I felt myſelf greatly embarraſſed how to act. To the feelings of humanity, I found united in his favour, many conſiderations of political convenience and neceſſity, all which I have taken the liberty of laying before you on former occaſions; but at this time they received an additional weight, as I know from good authority, that both the Miniſter and *Scindia* had their engines at work, and were endeavouring by the moſt fair and ſplendid offers to bribe him into a confidence of their good diſpoſition towards him, and avail themſelves of the diſſatisfaction they knew he muſt feel from finding that we conſidered ourſelves as principals in the war, without admitting him into any participation of the territories acquired by its ſucceſs. From all theſe conſiderations, I thought it an expedient and adviſable meaſure, which from its good policy, and I may add neceſſity, would meet with your approbation, to relax from the entire reducing of *Ragoba*'s allowance before reſolved upon; and as he had, from the firſt intimation given him, diſmiſſed almoſt all his dependants, preſerving ſuch only as could not decently be diſpenſed with, to allow him monthly, for their bare ſupport and the ſubſiſtence of himſelf and family, the ſum of ten thouſand rupees, till I might receive your final and deciſive ſentiments for my further guidance; for be aſſured I ſhall not in the ſmalleſt degree depart therefrom.

I have troubled you with this minute detail, that you may be clearly informed of every circumſtance, and by that be enabled fully to diſcover the reaſons which operated with me on this occaſion; the force of which I truſt you will admit; and in this confidence I chearfully ſubmit myſelf to your judgments.

Permit me to acknowledge, with the deepeſt ſenſe of gratitude, the honourable marks of diſtinction conferred on me by the approbation you have been pleaſed to convey of my conduct, in your letter of the 19th of May, which came to hand at the ſame time with that of the 15th. I can only repeat what you have ſo often indulged me with an opportunity of ſaying, that it ſhall be my conſtant and unwearied ſtudy to make the ſole return in my power for ſuch unlimited goodneſs and confidence, by exerting myſelf on all occaſions to promote the intereſts of the Company, and the honour and ſucceſs of your Government; and that my future actions will, I truſt, prove to you the exiſtence of thoſe ſentiments in my breaſt, which language would in vain attempt to deſcribe.

My letter of the 20th ultimo fully explained the ſituation of affairs in the Maratta State, reſpecting which I have received no new material information; nor has, I believe, any change whatever taken place. I look with anxious

Appendix. Nos. 324 & 325.

anxious expectation for your reply to that letter, and your ſentiments on the plan of operations for the enſuing campaign, therein recommended and propoſed. The deſcription I then gave of our new acquiſitions, of which the Company now remain in full and peaceable poſſeſſion, and muſt, until the concluſion of the rainy ſeaſon, will, I hope, make good your expectations of revenue from that reſource; but it is unneceſſary to remark to you, how uncertain and precarious any dependance on their produce muſt prove during the war. When the period of military operations in the field arrives, and from the entire want of reſources in this Government, I muſt rely ſolely upon your wiſdom and vigour for the future ſupport of the army.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Head Quarters, Camp near *Surat*, 15th July 1780.

(Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*
Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edw. Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 324.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 4th September 1780.

Minute of the Governor General, 28th Auguſt 1780.

WHEN I took charge of this Government, under the former ſyſtem of it, I found it loaded with a bonded debt of one crore and one lack of rupees, which amount, in a very ſhort time after, grew to one crore and twenty-five lacks; it was my good fortune and happineſs to ſee this enormous debt wholly reduced, and a ſum accumulated in our treaſuries, which, as I recollect, amounted at one time to two crore and twenty-one lacks of rupees. Since that time our expences have been increaſing, our means declining (I will not in this place enumerate the cauſes of both) and it is now my hard lot, and a painful duty impoſed on me by the neceſſity of the times, to propoſe that we ſhould again have recourſe to the means of ſupplying our growing wants, and provide againſt the multiplying exigencies not of this State only, but of the other Preſidencies, whoſe exiſtence muſt depend upon our care of them, by taking up money at intereſt. The ſum I do not propoſe, becauſe I think it ſhould not be limited. The ſubject is itſelf of too much importance for a precipitate deciſion. I deſire only to ſubmit it at this time to the conſideration of the Board; and requeſt, that the other members of it will be pleaſed to contribute their opinions upon it, hoping that it may be reſumed, and a final concluſion drawn upon it, at our next meeting in this department.

W. H.

APPENDIX, No. 325.

Conſiderations upon the preſent political State of the Company in *India*; written at *Madras* in January 1780.

THE meaſures lately purſued at *Bengal* and *Bombay* in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, having drawn on the Company the reſentment of the Maratta State, given offence to *Nizam Ally Cawn*, who is in friendſhip with that State, and a declared enemy to *Ragonaut Row*, and opened the way to a rupture with *Hyder Ally*, by promoting peace between him and the Marattas, and leaving him at liberty to execute the threats which he has denounced againſt the *Carnatic*; it is become a matter of ſerious importance with the Company, to conſider how they may beſt avert the evils that ſurround them, and what line of conduct it may be proper to adopt, for eſtabliſhing their affairs in future upon a ſolid and permanent footing.

It was hardly poſſible to have imagined a more difficult, dangerous, and unjuſt enterprize, than that of ſupporting *Ragonaut Row*'s pretenſions to the regency at *Poonah*; and if the meaſure itſelf be examined without the leaſt regard to the unfortunate conſequences that have happened, it will be found diametrically oppoſite to the wiſe maxims laid down by the Company for the conduct of their ſervants, and in its nature liable to all the difficulties we now experience from it*.

Ragonaut Row at the time he was firſt taken under our protection, was a fugitive without friends or party. His ambitious views upon the Maratta Government had been accompliſhed by the treacherous murder of his own nephew *Narrain Row*, then Peiſhwa; after this action, he ſeized the chief power into his own hands; but ſuch was the horror which his crimes had excited, that a general confederacy ſoon appeared againſt him in favour of the infant ſon of *Narrain Row*, and he was driven from the Maratta dominions, and forced to fly for ſafety to the territories of the Company.

In this ſituation, and under theſe circumſtances, the Government of *Bombay* eſpouſed his cauſe, and waged war againſt the prevailing Powers at *Poonah* to replace *Ragonaut Row* in his uſurped authority. The Company's arms were not ſucceſsful, but by the timely interpoſition of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, a treaty of peace was made with the minor Peiſhwa and Miniſters at *Poonah* †; in which it was agreed that *Ragonaut Row* ſhould have an annual ſtipend for his maintenance from the Maratta Government, in conſideration of the Company's withdrawing their protection from him, and taking no further part in his concerns.

By this firſt ſtep in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, there ſeems to have been a manifeſt deviation from what the Company had preſcribed as a fundamental rule of policy to be obſerved by all their Preſidencies, viz. "to engage "in no offenſive wars or alliances with any of the country "Powers, nor interfere in any diviſions which might lead "to the interruption of the public tranquillity." But, excluſive of theſe wiſe precautions, there were other circumſtances that ſhould have weighed ſtrongly againſt this particular meaſure; and firſt, the injuſtice of taking part in the domeſtic troubles of a State, without being called upon by the ruling Power, or having received the leaſt injury to provoke our reſentment, cannot but be admitted in this caſe with peculiar force, as the party in whoſe favour we acted was marked by a crime of ſuch a nature, as ſhould, *with us*, have effectually deſtroyed his right, if he had ever poſſeſſed any. Secondly, this meaſure, as might have been foreſeen, was likely to be treated by the Nizam as a breach of the Company's engagements with him of 1768, by which it was ſtipulated, that the enemies of the one ſhould be conſidered as the enemies of the other; and the Nizam had declared *Ragonaut Row* to be his inveterate enemy; and expreſſed his intention of aſſiſting the Powers at *Poonah* againſt him. Thirdly, the ſupport of this Chief had a direct tendency to diſengage the Marattas from their wars with *Hyder Ally*, to which the Company had for ſeveral years owed the tranquillity of their poſſeſſions on the coaſt of *Coromandel*.

Such were the obvious inconveniences attending the proceedings of the Government at *Bombay*. As to the advantages expected from the alliance with *Ragonaut Row*, it may be ſafely affirmed, that nothing was or could be propoſed of ſufficient importance to juſtify it under the circumſtances above deſcribed.

No ſooner was the treaty of *Poonah* concluded by the

* This judgment may ſeem harſh, ſince the meaſure has been countenanced by the Court of Directors; but I perſuade myſelf that all the circumſtances relative to it have not been ſtated, or at leaſt not fairly ſtated, to them by their ſervants, otherwiſe they would have conceived inſurmountable objections to every part of the deſign.

† The 1ſt March 1776.

means of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, than *Ragonaut Row*, from an apprehenſion that the place appointed by that treaty for his future reſidence was not ſafe, fled to *Bombay*, and again claimed the protection of that Government; which was openly granted to him: "*Ragonaut Row*," ſay the gentlemen at *Bombay* *, "has "refuſed to accept the terms ſtipulated for him by "Colonel *Upton*, thinking his life would be endangered "by putting himſelf ſo entirely in the power of his "enemies, and has claimed our protection, which we "eſteemed ourſelves bound by every tie of *honour and* "*humanity* to grant him; and this the Miniſters pretend "to term an infringement of the treaty;" and well they might. What, becauſe *Ragonaut Row* had thought proper to reject the conditions made in his behalf, and to fancy the Miniſters at *Poonah* would not afford him the ſecurity they had promiſed, was it the part of a Company's Government to protect him againſt the ſuperior obligations of a ſolemn treaty? Where was the *honour* of ſuch a conduct? *Humanity*, indeed, if it were at all concerned in this caſe, might have been employed in attempting by fair and perſuaſive means to ſtrengthen his ſecurity; but upon what principle could we pretend to remedy a defect or omiſſion in the treaty, by breaking a poſitive ſtipulation of it?

The Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, who were the makers and guardians of this treaty, appear not to have diſavowed the protection given to *Ragonaut Row*, for it was continued in the moſt open manner from April 1776 to the month of November or December 1777, when, in conſequence of ſome diviſions in the Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, ſaid to have been favourable to *Ragonaut Row*, a new plan was eagerly formed at *Bombay* for ſupporting his pretenſions. This meaſure had the expreſs ſanction of the Governor General and Council, who approved it ſo much that they propoſed to join a body of their own troops to favour the operations from *Bombay*; ſix battalions of Sepoys, one company of native artillery, and about a thouſand or fifteen hundred horſe, were ordered about the end of February 1778, to march acroſs the peninſula for that purpoſe. In the mean while the gentlemen at *Bombay* were not ſo active as might have been expected. The ardour with which they had begun, appeared ſuddenly to have abated. Some difficulties aroſe that had not been foreſeen or provided for; they wrote a letter to ſtop the march of the Bengal troops which were on their way to join them; afterwards they deſired the troops might ſtill advance, without propoſing any object or plan of operations for them; and at length, to cloſe theſe inconſiſtencies, while the troops were advancing they undertook the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row* with their own force only. The event of this expedition is too diſgraceful to be touched upon; ſuffice it to ſay, that with the experience we had already purchaſed in the former attempt, with all the probable conſequences to be apprehended from this freſh provocation of the Maratta State, and of the Nizam, to renew the enterprize in favour of ſuch a man as *Ragonaut Row*, and with the force of a ſingle Preſidency, ſeems to have been a ſtrain of imprudence that could only be exceeded by the choice of the time for ſuch an expedition, which was after the commencement of a national war, when the ſtrength of every Preſidency was likely to be called forth againſt the common enemy, and when *Bombay* itſelf was ſuppoſed to be in danger of an inſtant and powerful attack from them.

Let it be remembered too in this place, that the whole of the proceedings concerning *Ragonaut Row*, from the firſt alliance with him in 1775 to the late unfortunate cataſtrophe, were carried on without ever conſulting with the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* upon the propriety of any one meaſure, although from the ſituation of the Company's poſſeſſions on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, it be certain that their intereſts were more involved in that quarter than in any other; and had the Governments of *Bengal* and *Bombay* only waited to hear the objections which could have been urged againſt their proceedings from *Fort Saint George*, it is not impoſſible but that things might have taken a more favourable turn. Appendix. No. 325.

The ill ſucceſs of the laſt expedition in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row* has thrown the Company upon the very brink of thoſe dangers which were reaſonably to be apprehended from it. The Government at *Bengal* having refuſed to ratify the treaty by which the Bombay army was ſuffered to eſcape from the hands of the Marattas, freſh terms were propoſed. Theſe have now been in diſcuſſion four or five months without producing the deſired effect; though by every information I can learn, the Marattas are well diſpoſed to an accommodation upon the footing of the treaty of 1776, which is even more than can be expected from them, conſidering their ſucceſs: but it is ſaid that General *Goddard*, who is negociating with them, inſiſts upon a very large ſum of money to defray the expences of our meaſures in behalf of *Ragonaut Row*; and this, as they obſerve (with juſtice) is a demand of ſo extraordinary a nature, that they can by no means come into it. In the mean time, to ſtrengthen themſelves as much as poſſible in caſe of a rupture, they have, even during our negociation, actually concluded a treaty of peace and alliance with *Hyder Ally*, in order to engage his aſſiſtance againſt us; and the Nizam is heartily diſpoſed to enter into the combination.

Whatever be the event of theſe appearances, allowing, as I hope will be the caſe from the great moderation ſhewn by the Marattas, that the cloud which hangs over us ſhall be diſperſed, ſtill it muſt be confeſſed that our ſituation will be unpleaſing enough; for, beſides the expence, the danger, and the diſgrace into which we have ſucceſſively fallen, it is certain that the country Powers have but a very indifferent opinion of our public faith; and ſo inconſiſtent has been our conduct with reſpect to *Ragonaut Row*, that the Marattas themſelves, who bear the character of *moſt faithleſs*, declare they can place no confidence in any of our engagements, and call us a moſt deceitful people. If ſuch then have been the effects produced by our political tranſactions, it is high time ſurely to correct our ſyſtem, to ſcrutinize rigidly into paſt meaſures, and to mark ſtrongly thoſe parts wherein we have acted imprudently or with inattention to our treaties, that ſo we may avoid the ſhame of ſuch imputations in future, and recover that ſacred regard to public faith which ſhould accompany us in every part of the world, and if poſſible be the more attended to where it will do us moſt honour, among the Powers of *India*.

In order to aſſiſt in this neceſſary retroſpect, as far as my judgment and materials will permit, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew from our principal treaties and engagements, what objects have been propoſed or attained by our political conduct; whether thoſe objects have been conſiſtent with the true intereſts of the Company, or the plans laid down for the government of their affairs; and laſtly, in what points our preſent treaties appear defective, that we may by degrees, if it be thought neceſſary, rectify ſuch errors as ſhall be found ſtill to exiſt in them.

With reſpect to our treaties in general with the country Powers, ſuppoſing we act upon the ſtrict principles of public faith, it is evident that we lie under a great diſadvantage, ariſing from a contrary diſpoſition in the natives, who are ſwayed only by the views of intereſt or ambition, and who, notwithſtanding they are conſtantly reminding us of our engagements to them, certainly do not ſuffer the leaſt ſcruple of faith to come in competition with their deſigns, when it ſuits their convenience

* Letter from Bombay to the Preſident and Council of *Madras*, 15th April 1776.

Appendix. No. 325.

to execute them. I mean not to infer from this that we ought to be leſs mindful of the treaties we make with them; but that we ſhould be extremely cautious of concluding any treaties at all; and that when we do make them, we ought to confine ourſelves ſimply to engagements of *peace and friendſhip*, and not enter into articles which we cannot perform without embarraſſment, nor evade without a breach of faith. To illuſtrate my opinions of ſuch treaties, I ſhall recite a remarkable fact, which, as it is deſcriptive of the principles of every one of the native Powers, will ſerve better perhaps than a whole volume of reaſoning upon the ſubject.

In the year 1766, the Preſident and Council of *Madras* concluded a treaty of friendſhip and alliance with *Nizam Ally Cawn*; by one article whereof it was agreed, that the Company ſhould furniſh that Prince with a body of troops whenever he ſhould require it, to ſettle the affairs of his Government. The Nizam at that time meditated a powerful attack on the dominions of *Hyder Ally*, in conjunction with the Marattas; and it appears by the negociation of the treaty, that our aid of troops was to be firſt appropriated to this ſervice. The Engliſh army accordingly marched and joined the Nizam's forces in the beginning of 1767. He carried it along with him into the heart of *Hyder*'s country; and then, without even giving the Government of *Madras*, or the commanding officer of the troops acting with him, the leaſt intimation of his deſign, he ſold a peace to *Hyder* for a ſum of money; ſaid, he had no further occaſion for our troops, and left them to return home in the beſt manner they were able, through an enemy's country: but as if this act of treachery were yet incomplete, he ſoon after found a pretence to quarrel with us; and having firſt involved us upon his own account in a war with *Hyder*, he joined his troops to thoſe of our enemy, and attacked us with as much inveteracy as *Hyder* himſelf. This extraordinary proceeding raiſed a flame which was not extinguiſhed in leſs than two years, and its progreſs was marked with nothing but devaſtation, expence, and ruin, both to the Company and the Nabob of the *Carnatic*. The reflection of the Court of Directors upon the conduct of their ſervants on this occaſion, was juſt enough: "The general alliance," ſay they, "with the "Soubah and the Marattas, produced the effect we ſhall "always expect from alliances among Powers uncontrolled "by the law of nations, or any principle to eſtabliſh "good faith among them *."

In examining our principal treaties with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, *Hyder Ally*, and the Marattas, it will appear that they all originated in propoſals and ſchemes of our own, tending to the further aggrandizement of ourſelves or our neighbours, and comprizing meaſures of ſuch a nature as were calculated only to involve us in the wars that followed them. But this was not the only inconvenience ariſing from our ill-judged treaties: the wars we were involved in could not be cloſed without new treaties and engagements, which contained the ſeeds of future wars; ſo that for the laſt fourteen years the Company have been proceeding in a perpetual round of treaties, wars, and negociations; and are now plunged into ſuch a multiplicity of engagements, that there is no ſafety but in returning, if it be practicable, to the point from whence they ſet out, and there endeavouring to fix themſelves. Theſe obſervations, however ſtrange they may ſeem, will be verified in the following ſhort hiſtory of our treaties.

Our firſt treaty with the Nizam was concluded at *Hyderabad* the 12th November 1766, and deſerves particular conſideration. We had in the year 1765 obtained the Mogul's phirmaunds, or grants, for the five northern Circars; *Ellore*, *Rajahmundry*, *Muſtaphanagur*, *Cicacole* and *Guntoor*, as a free gift, without tribute or tax of any kind. As theſe extenſive diſtricts were then in the poſſeſſion of the Nizam, who certainly could not be pleaſed to have them thus abſcinded from his Government, it was thought adviſable to obtain his conſent to our enjoyment of them; not from any apprehenſion of his power, which was too weak to have reſiſted any attempt to poſſeſs ourſelves of theſe countries by force; but from a deſire of accommodating our rights as much as poſſible to his inclinations, that ſo we might be ſecure from the diſturbance which he was capable of giving to us in the collection of the revenues. This was an advantage that merited ſome ſacrifice; and if it had been purchaſed by the payment of a ſum of money, in the way of friendſhip, or by any other means conſiſtent with the Company's honour, and the tranquillity of their poſſeſſions, the meaſure muſt undoubtedly have been approved. But in the treaty that was made on this occaſion, ſuch conceſſions were granted, as will appear aſtoniſhing for ſo ſmall an object. In the firſt place, the Company's right to the Circars under the Mogul's phirmaund was given up, and the Nizam's grant taken in lieu of it. 2dly. The Company were made to pay five lacks of rupees annually to the Nizam for the Circars of *Rajahmundry*, *Ellore* and *Muſtaphanagur*, and for thoſe of *Cicacole* and *Guntoor*, as ſoon as they ſhould be put into their hands, two lacks each; in all nine lacks of rupees per annum, which was ſuppoſed to be as much, if not more, than the Nizam ever received from them before they were granted to us. 3dly, The Circar of *Guntoor*, which was included in the Mogul's phirmaund, was allowed to remain as a Jagueer with the Nizam's brother, and to revert to the Company only at the deceaſe of that Prince. 4thly. The Nabob *Mahomed Ally Cawn* was in this treaty releaſed by the Nizam from all demands, paſt, preſent, and to come, on account of the *Carnatic*, for five lacks of rupees †, while the Company were taxed with a tribute of nine lacks of rupees per annum for the five Circars only. 5thly. To crown all, the Company were obliged to aſſiſt the Nizam with a body of troops to ſettle the affairs of his Government whenever he ſhould require it; an article of itſelf worth all the Circars put together, not only from its probable, but its actual conſequences; ſince we became inſtantly embroiled by it in a war with *Hyder Ally*, the moſt ruinous we had ever engaged in, and productive of treaties which have ſince created nothing but riſk, embarraſſment, and loſs of reputation ‡.

In this war, as I have already mentioned, our new friend and ally, to whom we had made ſuch ample conceſſions, was guilty of that conſummate piece of treachery which I have before noticed, and which ended in his joining *Hyder* againſt us. But our arms proving ſucceſsful in the beginning of the war, he detached himſelf from *Hyder* with the ſame facility that he had ſeparated from us, and having made overtures of peace, a new treaty of friendſhip and alliance was concluded with him in February 1768.

The conteſt ſtill continued between the Company and *Hyder Ally*, until the month of April 1769, when the Government of *Madras* entered into a treaty with that

* Letter from *England*, 25th March 1768.

† When the Mogul granted the Circars to the Company, he gave the Nabob a phirmaund to hold the *Carnatic* independent of the Soubah of the Decan, and this being a meaſure which muſt have diſpleaſed the Soubah, at leaſt as much as the grant of the Circars to the Company, I cannot help thinking it ſtrange, that the Nabob ſhould have obtained his conſent and a releaſe from all demands on the *Carnatic*, for 5 lacks of rupees, at the time the Company were ſacrificing ſo largely for the quiet poſſeſſions of a few diſtricts. It would ſeem as if we had been made to pay for the Nabob and ourſelves too.

‡ The Court of Directors ſeverely, but with great juſtice, condemned the whole of this treaty, in their letters to *Fort Saint George* on the 25th March, 5th April, and 13th May 1768. Theſe letters deſerve much praiſe, as containing the moſt ſenſible reflections on the paſt conduct of their ſervants, and the wiſeſt maxims in my opinion that could poſſibly be laid down for the future government of their affairs.

Power,

Power, which though it reſtored peace to the *Carnatic*, proved the ſource of much future embarraſſment and loſs of reputation to the Company; ſo that after a war that laid waſte the *Carnatic*, and coſt £. 600,000 ſterling, with the lives of a conſiderable number of men, for all which no ſort of equivalent was obtained, either in territory or money, our political ſituation became more intricate and perplexing than ever.

Having made ſo unfortunate an end of our firſt ſtep in offenſive treaties, the dictates of prudence certainly forbad us to engage in any further ſchemes of the like nature; and yet, ſcarcely had the Company been allowed time to recover from the ruinous effects of the war with *Hyder Ally*, when their Government at *Bombay* brought them into freſh troubles; firſt, by ſeizing on the iſlands of *Salſette* and *Caranja*, belonging to the Marattas (without any provocation that I could ever learn) and then, by engaging in the ſupport of *Raganout Row*, and entering into an open war with the Marattas in favour of that Chief's pretenſions. The motives which induced the Government at *Bombay* to embrace this laſt meaſure, will be beſt explained by the following extract of their letter to *Madras* on the occaſion; and by reciting the 4th article of their treaty with *Ragonaut Row*.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, to the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, dated 10th April 1775.

"Your honour, &c. we make no doubt are perfectly "well acquainted with the diviſions at preſent ſubſiſting "in the Maratta empire. *We have deemed it for the "intereſt* of our honourable employers, to embrace the "cauſe of *Ragonaut Row* againſt his enemies, the miniſ- "terial party; and our army, to the number of 2,500 "men, have in conſequence proceeded to *Cambay* to his "aſſiſtance. And though his affairs, owing to his miſ- "carriages a ſhort time before our forces ſet out, do not "wear *the moſt favourable aſpect*, yet we hope when our "forces ſhall join the remainder of his army, they will "be quickly retrieved," &c.

Extract of the 4th Article of the Treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, dated 6th March 1775.

"The Honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bom- "bay*, in behalf of the Honourable Company, and *in "conſideration of the undermentioned grants and ceſſions* "made by *Ragonaut Row* to the Company, do hereby "engage and agree, ſo ſoon as theſe articles of agree- "ment and treaty are fully ratified on the part of *Rago- "naut Row*, to aſſiſt him with a ſtrong body of forces, "with proper guns and warlike ſtores, and a field train "of artillery, which are to join his army and act in con- "junction with his forces againſt his enemies, the mini- "ſterial party, &c."

Such were the grounds of our firſt alliance with *Ragonaut Row*; which having immediately led to all the conſequences ſtated in the former part of theſe reflections, it becomes unneceſſary in this place to examine more particularly than I have already done, the reaſons aſſigned for abrogating the treaty of *Poonah*, and concluding a ſecond offenſive alliance for reſtoring *Ragonaut Row* to the Government; the riſe, progreſs, and reſult, of theſe tranſactions, are ſufficiently known and felt.

But as if the meaſure of our experience were not yet full, while matters at *Bombay* were in ſuch a ſtate, that it was yet doubtful whether the laſt treaty with *Ragonaut Row* would take place, the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* formed the ſcheme of an offenſive and defenſive alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*, Chief of a Maratta province, bordering on the territories of *Bengal*. When we ſee thoſe gentlemen whom the Legiſlature hath appointed to ſuperintend over our wars and treaties, moving by themſelves in a ſphere of action which requires ſo much ability, as well as dignity and propriety of conduct; we ſhould be naturally inclined to expect ſome inſtances of peculiar ſkill in negociation; of great diſcernment in tracing and conſulting the true intereſts of the Company; and of the moſt ſtudied attention to the faith of former exiſting treaties. Let us ſee how far their conduct may have anſwered ſuch expectations. Appendix. No. 325.

We muſt remember here, that after the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* had given the Preſidency at *Bombay* a power of concluding the ſecond treaty with *Ragonaut Row*, which was to place him in the adminiſtration at *Poonah*, there ſuddenly appeared an unaccountable ſlackneſs in the meaſures of that Preſidency, ſufficient at leaſt to alarm the Governor General and Council, who had ſent a conſiderable body of troops acroſs the country to ſupport thoſe meaſures. Finding themſelves deceived in their hopes of a more vigorous conduct on the ſide of *Bombay*, and their troops being now advanced into the Maratta countries, as far I believe as the borders of the Berar province, it became requiſite to ſeek ſome expedient for ſaving their credit in the part they had taken. This apparently gave riſe to the negociation which it was propoſed to open with the Rajah of *Berar*; and the meaſure was quickened by a circumſtance that ſhould in reaſon have delayed it—the advice received at that time of our rupture with *France*.

Moodajee Booſla, Rajah of *Berar*, is in fact no more than a vaſſal of the Maratta Government, and owes the ſame allegiance with all the other Chiefs ſcattered through that wide empire. Such a man at firſt ſight would not appear a fit ſubject to raiſe to the dignity of an ally; and therefore to remedy this defect, it was diſcovered that he had ſome diſtant pretenſions to the ſovereignty of the Maratta State; diſtant indeed, or extremely unavailing, ſince they were never advanced or ſupported (at leaſt ſo I learn) until the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* took that office upon themſelves.

With this man then, it was propoſed to enter into an alliance of a more extenſive and important kind than any which appears in the annals of the Company. The agent employed on this occaſion, was firſt inſtructed to make it defenſive, then conditionally to extend it to offenſive; objects of ſuch a nature as would have involved the whole peninſula in a flame.

"If," ſay the gentlemen at *Bengal* in their inſtructions to their Miniſter, "from Mr. *Moſtyn*'s* advices, or the "information you can obtain on the ſpot, you are aſſured "that the Preſidency of *Bombay* have not entered into "any new engagement either with *Ragonaut Row*, or any "other party among the Marattas, which may claſh with "the tenor of the following inſtructions: if you ſhall "at the ſame time underſtand, either that a French force "is actually arrived at *Poonah*, *or is expected*; *or that the "Chevalier St. Lubin*† *is ſtill there*; or, if you are con- "vinced from other circumſtances, of the exiſtence of "the engagements which we ſuppoſe to have been form- "ed between him and the Miniſters; *or even if no cir- "cumſtance ſhall have come to your knowledge that may "afford you cauſe to doubt it*; in theſe caſes we authorize "you to make an offer to *Moodajee Booſla*, to unite with "him in a *direct and open war* with the miniſterial party "of *Poonah*." Such a latitude *to cloſe* in a meaſure of the firſt importance, without waiting even for the ſanction of his ſuperiors, and upon information wherein the negociator might be very much deceived, with all his diligence, was never before, I believe, given to any public Miniſter; at leaſt, when the ſtake was ſo great as that which was to be hazarded by this treaty.

But after all, what was the object of theſe bold and offenſive meaſures? There had for ſome time been at the Court of *Poonah*, a French agent, whoſe commiſſion was not certainly known; but it was ſuppoſed, from ſome

* The Company's Reſident at *Poonah*.
† A ſuppoſed agent with powers from the Court of *France*.

Appendix. No. 325.

doubtful intelligence, that he had made an agreement on the part of the French nation, to ſupply the Marattas with troops and ſtores. Allowing the fact, was this a ſufficient reaſon for plunging us into a diſtant war, againſt a powerful nation, before we knew the extent of thoſe ſupplies, to what objects they were directed, or what calls we might have for our armies in defence of our own ſettlements? Beſides, were it not unreaſonable to the laſt degree, to imagine that the French had either the means or the will to extend their influence at *Poonah* to any alarming length, while their own eſtabliſhments in every part of *India* were abſolutely ſtarving for want of ſupplies of all kinds, and in danger of ſinking under the firſt attempts that might be made upon them?

The imprudence of the propoſed alliance and union with the Rajah of *Berar*, appears in a much ſtronger light ſtill, if we conſider the motives intended to be offered as an encouragement to engage him in our meaſures. The *Bengal* agent was inſtructed at his diſcretion to enter into an expreſs treaty for ſupporting *Moodajee Booſla*'s pretenſions to the ſovereignty of the Maratta State: and he was authorized likewiſe, if *Moodajee* ſhould preſs it, to engage our aſſiſtance for the recovery of ſome conqueſts made from him a few years ago by *Nizam Ally Cawn*; adding thereby a new enemy to the number already upon our hands.

But what contributes more than any thing I have yet mentioned, to give this whole proceeding a peculiar air of wildneſs, is, that at the very time it was in agitation, the Government at *Bombay* had authority from *Bengal* to conclude an engagement for aſſiſting *Ragonaut Row* in his pretenſions to the Government at *Poonah*. There was alſo at that time an exiſting treaty of friendſhip with the actual Power in the Maratta State (which that people in general conſidered as the legal one) conſiſting of the minor Peiſhwa and his Miniſters. And we had likewiſe a treaty of ſtrict friendſhip and alliance with the Nizam, made in 1768, which was directly ſtruck at by the propoſed meaſure of aſſiſting the Rajah of *Berar* in an offenſive war againſt him. Here then appears to our view the ſtrangeſt ſcene of politics that can well be conceived. Various and contending claims. Intereſts and pretenſions raiſed by our abſurd and contradictory engagements; and all of them ſupported occaſionally by our ſhifting from one to another, as our ſuppoſed intereſt leads, without regard to treaties, and in direct oppoſition to the fundamental orders and maxims of the Compan*.

Having now given my opinion of treaties in general with the country Powers, and attempted to ſhew, by a deduction from our principal treaties, that the only misfortunes ſuſtained by the Company in *India*, have been occaſioned by a train of very imprudent and offenſive meaſures, I ſhall proceed with great confidence to lay down the following poſitions; firſt, that all ſorts of engagements, offenſive and defenſive, with the native Powers of *India*, are dangerous and inconſiſtent with the views of a trading Company, as leading them frequently into meaſures much beyond their real ſtrength; and diverting thoſe reſources, to the purpoſes of war, which are intended for the purpoſes of commerce. Secondly, that the Company have already, or might have with very little more expence, a force ſufficient in itſelf to protect all their poſſeſſions from inſult, without any foreign alliance whatever; and that if they cannot depend upon their own force for this ſecurity, it were better to give up what they cannot themſelves defend, than call upon a country Power to aſſiſt them.

In theſe ſentiments I think all reaſonable men will agree, who reflect how little we have gained, and how ſeverely we have ſuffered, by our paſt alliances. It has been too much the fault of the Company's ſervants in *India* to conſider the Company as a great Power, whoſe extenſive poſſeſſions made it expedient for them to take an active part in the politics of the country; and to aim at preſerving a balance among the neighbouring States; an idea which led them at once, as we have ſeen, from the ſolid and immediate intereſts of the Company, in purſuit of diſtant objects which preſented nothing but inſecurity and danger.

The Company themſelves very juſtly obſerved to their ſervants, upon the treaty with the Nizam in 1766†, "If it had not been for the imprudent meaſures you "have taken, the country Powers would have formed "a balance of power among themſelves, and their di"viſions would have left us in peace:" and again‡, "Conſcious of our own ſuperiority in *India*, it ſeems "to be our proper line of conduct to obſerve a ſteady "neutrality till ſuch time as our own dignity and inte"reſt call upon us to interfere, and then a favourable "moment ſhould be ſeized, &c. The diſſenſions among "the Indian Powers can only ſerve to augment our "conſequence: and while we ſhew our ſtrength, and "keep it up, we ſhall be courted equally by all parties; "the moment we take a ſide we make enemies of all "but one."

To correct the imperfections which pervade the preſent ſyſtem, and to extricate the Company from the difficulties in which their wars and treaties have involved them, will certainly be a work of time; but it ſhould be an object continually preſent with them, and accompliſhed by degrees, as opportunities may offer: for I do maintain, that the only way to a permanent ſafety is, to retreat back to their former limits, to entrench themſelves within their own power, and confine their views ſolely to the *preſervation and defence* of what they have already acquired, without ſuffering any temptation, however great, to lead them farther§. *I would even propoſe that a ſevere penalty ſhould be inflicted upon any of their ſervants who ſhall tranſgreſs theſe bounds.* The Company, in their letter to *Madras* of the 13th May 1768, ſay, "The Dewanny of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Orixa*, "with the poſſeſſions we hold in thoſe provinces, are the "utmoſt limits of our views on that ſide of *India*; on "the coaſt, the protection of the *Carnatic*, and the "poſſeſſion of the Cirkars, free from all engagements "to ſupport the Soubah of the *Decan*, or even without "the Cirkars, preſerving only influence enough over "any country Power who may hold them, to keep the "French from ſettling in them; and on the Bombay "ſide the dependencies thereof, the poſſeſſions of *Sal*"*ſette*, *Baſſein*, and the caſtle of *Surat*; the protection "of theſe is eaſily within the reach of our power, and "may mutually ſupport each other without any country

* When I ſpeak of the meaſures of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, I believe I ought to except Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, two of that Council, who as far as I can learn, have been uniform and conſiſtent in oppoſing the conduct of the majority. This majority till very lately conſiſted only of the Governor General and another member; ſo that all, or moſt of the important tranſactions I have mentioned muſt have been determined by the caſting voice of the Governor General: nothing can afford a more convincing proof of the faultineſs of our ſyſtem, than that the fate of the Company's extenſive empire ſhould in any circumſtances depend upon the judgment of two, and deciſion of one ſingle individual.

† Letter from the Company, 25th March 1768.

‡ Letter from the Company to the Select Committee at Madras, 10th April 1771.

§ The charters granted to the Company have no tendency to enable the Company to enter into offenſive wars; and great circumſpection is neceſſary in the alliances they enter into with the Indian Powers, leſt the aſſiſtance they afford under ſuch treaties ſhould give juſt cauſe of umbrage and reſentment to European Powers, and kindle the ſparks of a new war in Europe. We never thought that an offenſive or defenſive alliance with an Indian Prince againſt all the world, was warranted by the Company's charter or the laws of nations. In caſe of attacks, the India Company have a right not only to repel invaders, but to obtain ſatisfaction for injuries they may have ſuſtained. Letter from the Court of Directors to Madras, 25th March 1768.

" alliance whatever. If we paſs theſe bounds we ſhall " be led on from one acquiſition to another, till we ſhall " find no ſecurity but in the ſubjection of the whole; " which, by dividing your force, would loſe us the " whole, and end in our extirpation from *Indoſtan*."

" You will obſerve by the whole tenor of theſe diſ- " patches, that our views are not to enter into offenſive " wars in *India*, or to make any further acquiſitions be- " yond our preſent poſſeſſions. We do not wiſh to " enter into any engagements which may be productive " of enormous expences, and which are ſeldom calcu- " lated to promote the Company's eſſential intereſts; " on the contrary, we wiſh to ſee the preſent Indian " Powers remain as a check one upon another, without " our interfering: therefore we recommend to you ſo " ſoon as poſſible to bring about a peace upon terms of " the moſt perfect moderation on the part of the Com- " pany; and when made, to adhere to it upon all future " occaſions, except when the Company's poſſeſſions *are* " *actually attacked*; and not to be provoked by freſh " diſturbances of the country Powers to enter into new " wars."

I propoſe now to point out the defects ſubſiſting in the preſent treaties of alliance with the country Powers; and which I wiſh to be remedied as occaſion may offer, without expoſing the Company to any imputation of breach of faith. And firſt I ſhall name as defects, all articles in general which may be conſtrued into *offenſive or defenſive engagements:* for I am ſatisfied, excluſive of the dangers and inconveniences I have before recited, that the Company may, in another reſpect, be ſaid to make very bad bargains whenever they conclude ſuch treaties: for what advantage can they expect in either offenſive or defenſive operations that regard themſelves by a junction of the troops, or rather rabble of a country ally, with their own regular and diſciplined forces? and, on the contrary, what advantages may not ſuch an ally expect from their aſſiſtance in any undertaking whatſoever? In another view likewiſe the difference is equally ſtriking; the loſs of European officers and ſoldiers to the Company is an hundred-fold greater than the loſs of natives can be to any ally; and this is a circumſtance of no ſmall moment in the eſtimate of ſuch bargains.

Our treaty with *Hyder Ally*, made at *Madras* in April 1769, contains an article of defenſive alliance, which has ſince been productive of infinite embarraſſment to the Company's ſervants.—It is the ſecond article, which runs in theſe words, " In caſe either of the contract- " ing parties ſhall be attacked, they ſhall, from their " reſpective countries, mutually aſſiſt each other to " drive the enemy, out &c." At that time *Hyder* had reaſon to apprehend a powerful attack on his country from the Marattas, and propoſed the above article with a view of engaging our ſupport. The Company's ſervants were aware of the deſign, and endeavoured all in their power to evade it; but as *Hyder* would come to no accommodation on any other terms, it was thought expedient to yield in the then ſituation of affairs: and the article was inſerted accordingly. Every thing that was foreſeen ſoon after happened: the Marattas invaded *Hyder*'s country upon all ſides: *Hyder* claimed aſſiſtance from us in terms of the treaty: excuſes were made, under the pretence that it was neceſſary to wait for orders from the Company: the Nabob too ſeemed extremely averſe to our joining *Hyder*; and went ſo far as to propoſe that we ſhould even aſſiſt the Marattas againſt him. The King's Miniſter Plenipotentiary, who was then at the Nabob's Court, ſupported theſe opinions, and ſtrongly preſſed the Government to adopt them, which was a little remarkable, conſidering that this officer of the crown was ſent out, as he himſelf declared, to ſupport *the honour of the Company and the Nation*; and to enforce it particularly in the obſervance of treaties. However, notwithſtanding the pains taken by this gentleman, and by his ſucceſſor in office, to inſtigate the Company's ſervants into a war againſt the man whom they were bound by treaty to aſſiſt, they were too firm to be moved, and this firmneſs deſervedly gained them the applauſe of their maſters; though it would have been ſtill more commendable, if circumſtances had permitted them, to carry it a little further, by ſending ſuccours to *Hyder* agreeably to their engagements: but the Nabob's averſion to the meaſure was certainly a great obſtacle; and indeed, without his hearty ſupport and concurrence, nothing of this kind could well have been attempted.

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The Company in their letter to the Select Committee at *Madras*, dated the 10th April 1771, ſpeak of this defenſive alliance in the following terms:

" We cannot but conſider the defenſive alliance (with " *Hyder*) as a ſource of infinite evils; and we hope that " no temporary conſideration will in any future time " induce our ſervants to embarraſs us with claims, the " fulfilling of which may tend to wound our commer- " cial intereſts, and endanger the public tranquillity; " and the refuſal whereof may in any degree be con- " ſtrued as an impeachment of our honour."

With reſpect to the treaty with the Nizam, concluded in February 1768, there are ſome defects for which it ſeems difficult to account; ſince the Government at *Madras* could not plead the ſame political neceſſity for embarraſſing the Company with claims that operated in the caſe of their treaty with *Hyder*. They had juſt obtained a deciſive advantage in the war, and by marching a detachment of troops towards the Nizam's capital, had in a manner compelled him to ſue for peace. This was the time therefore to get rid entirely of thoſe inconvenient articles in their former treaty of 1766, which had brought them into ſo many difficulties; and this ſeems indeed to have been their profeſſed intention at the beginning of their new agreement: but before they reach the end of it, they loſe ſight of the object and ſtipulate freſh articles of the ſame tendency, though not quite ſo impolitic as thoſe of 1766. Thus in the 5th article they ſaddle the Company with an annual peiſcuſh, or tribute, for the northern Circars, which now by that treaty is riſen to the enormous ſum of five lacks of rupees per annum: and in the 6th article it is ſaid, that, " The Company, and the Nabob *Waw Law Jaw*, " willing however to ſhew their voluntary attachment " to the Soubah, will always be ready to ſend two bat- " talions of Sepoys, and ſix field pieces, manned by " Europeans, whenever the Soubah ſhall require them, " and the ſituation of their affairs will allow, &c."

The Nizam has not yet indeed made any demand of the aſſiſtance above ſtipulated; but when he does require it, the Company may probably be as much embaraſſed as they were by the claims of *Hyder*; and if they comply with ſuch a requiſition, they may again ſee the ſame troubles that followed their compliance with the like article in the treaty of 1766.

As to the peiſcuſh, there is at this time nearly the amount of three years, or 15 lacks of rupees, due to the Nizam; and the non-payment of it for ſo long a term has excited apprehenſions in his mind, that we mean to withhold it altogether; though in fact the deficiency has been occaſioned by an unexpected failure in our receipts from the Circars, and by the great expences of the war, which has diſabled us from making the neceſſary payments. This ſtipulation however is in itſelf not only burthenſome, but diſgraceful; and by being inſerted in a public treaty, without any reſervation whatever, the non-payment of it ſubjects us to the charge of a breach of faith.

The propoſed treaty with the Rajah of *Berar*, ſhould it have taken place, or be ſtill intended, either in whole or in part (of which I am not able to learn) will inevitably create embarraſſment without end. A defenſive alliance, even with ſuch a man, under all the circumſtances I have mentioned, would be full of danger, without producing one ſingle advantage to the Company. The country Powers are not capable of diſtinguiſhing

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between a *defenſive* and an *offenſive* treaty: and were we to *defend* the Rajah of *Berar* with our troops againſt the attack of any other Power, we ſhould unavoidably make an enemy of that Power, juſt as effectually as if we had entered into an *offenſive* war, to deſpoil him of his poſſeſſions, or overturn his Government. As to any advantage that might be expected on our ſide by introducing ten or twenty thouſand Maratta horſe into the provinces of *Bengal* to defend them in caſe of an invaſion, I am humbly of opinion, that any ſtipulation of this kind were better let alone; for excluſive of the pay of ſo large a body of cavalry, which muſt be provided for, it is to be feared that ſuch defenders would do more miſchief than any invaders we could poſſibly be troubled with*.

Having thus pointed out what I conceive to be great imperfections in the ſubſiſting treaties with *Hyder Ally* and the Nizam, and in the propoſed alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*, I ſhould proceed alſo to examine our engagements with *Ragonaut Row* and with the Maratta State; but as theſe will probably undergo conſiderable alterations in the event of a new treaty upon the ſettlement of the preſent differences, it may be proper only to obſerve in general, that the Marattas have always been conſidered as the worſt allies that are to be found among the Indian States. Although they have appeared to ſome advantage in their late tranſactions with us, they certainly have themſelves no idea of abiding by any public engagement longer than it may be for their intereſt ſo to do. In wars, their ſole object is devaſtation and plunder; and in this reſpect they make ſo little diſtinction between friends and enemies, that it is almoſt as dangerous to act with them as againſt them.

Should the ſyſtem, which I have ventured to recommend, of *a perfect neutrality*, be diſapproved, and the Company think it neceſſary to proſecute the idea adopted by their ſervants, of taking part in the diſputes of the country Powers; the ambitious deſigns of the Marattas point out *Hyder Ally* as the perſon to be ſupported againſt them, becauſe he is the ſole Power of any conſequence remaining, who has not ſubmitted to their yoke, and becauſe his country is ſituated between their poſſeſſions and the *Carnatic*; and ſhould it ever fall into the hands of the Marattas they would probably become very troubleſome neighbours, both to the Nabob and the Company. This ſupport, however, *if it be given at all*, ought not I think to be expreſſed in the common form of a defenſive alliance, which may leave it in his option to call for our aſſiſtance whenever he is attacked, but rather promiſed in theſe general terms: "That "while he remained in peace and friendſhip with the "Company he might be aſſured we ſhould never join "his enemies againſt him, and that if he be at any time "in danger of being overpowered by them, we ſhall "then give him aſſiſtance as far as our circumſtances "and ſituation may permit;" or if this be going too far, let it be a general inſtruction to the Company's ſervants, without pledging themſelves at all, to give him aſſiſtance in caſe they ſee him at any time in danger of being totally ſubdued by the Marattas, leaving the quantum and nature of it to their diſcretion.

I have now gone through all that I have to ſay on the ſubject of foreign treaties and alliances. Our *home* politics, in which I include the engagements ſubſiſting between the Company, and ſuch Princes as are cloſely united with them in friendſhip and intereſts, form a diſtinct branch, which is conducted upon principles very different from thoſe of our foreign alliances, though as yet without any regular ſyſtem whereby the preciſe nature and extent of theſe engagements can be aſcertained, or any line drawn for the Government of thoſe in whoſe hands the preſervation of them is inrruſted.

The firſt and moſt diſtinguiſhed of our connections, is that which has been long formed with the preſent Nabob of the *Carnatic*. The cauſe and progreſs of this alliance have been often traced, and are now ſo generally known, that it were ſuperfluous to dwell upon them. It began upon a principle of mutual advantage, and has been cementing during a ſeries of more than 30 years, by the exchange of all ſorts of good offices; ſo that at this time or at leaſt very lately, it might be ſaid to have ripened into a ſincere and equal attachment. Much indeed were it to be wiſhed that all our alliances had been formed on the ſame principles, and that we had never taken advantage of our ſtrength to eſtabliſh a ſuperiority which might perhaps have been as well or as permanently acquired by more juſtifiable means. Our influence in the *Carnatic* is founded on the free will and conſent of the Nabob; from his confidence in our attachment and our power, he requeſted of his own accord that the Company might garriſon his forts and maintain troops at his expence, for the protection of the *Carnatic*. Such a confidence ought never to be abuſed: to have deſerved it, reflects honour upon our moderation; to abuſe it, would be to throw an indelible ſtain upon our character and memory.

I have often wondered that a connection of more than 30 years ſtanding ſhould have ſubſiſted, without any ſpecific treaty or agreement; for I do not remember that any was ever yet formed between the Company and the Nabob; poſſibly it may be owing to this circumſtance that their friendſhip has continued ſo long. Where expreſs ſtipulations are eſtabliſhed as the ground of an alliance, the parties are ſo much upon their guard, and ſo watchful of the conduct of each other, that jealouſy and diſtruſt too often aſſume the place of confidence and good will. Theſe inconveniences are more likely to be felt where the intercourſe is frequent and even conſtant, as that which has always exiſted between the Nabob and the Company. By maintaining a connection upon the mutual exchange of good offices, without expreſsly defining the views and wiſhes of either party, ſuch a latitude is given, as cannot fail of producing confidence and friendſhip. In theſe caſes miſunderſtandings when they happen, are removed by liberal explanations and arguments drawn from general queſtions, and not by the conſtruction of words and phraſes which may admit of various opinions, and be ſtrained occaſionally to the views and purpoſes of either party.

But although it be allowed that ſuch advantages have ariſen from the nature of our connection with the Nabob; yet in another view, it muſt be confeſſed, that the want of ſome preciſe line for the guidance of the Company's ſervants in their intercourſe with him hath been and muſt continue to be productive of much embarraſſment: for example, the Nabob has always been conſidered and treated by the Company as an independent

* It may perhaps appear extraordinary that the moſt important negociations that were ever yet ſet on foot in India, ſhould have been all entruſted in the hands of military officers: the negociation and treaty of 1766 with the Nizam, were conducted by General Caillaud; the negociation and treaty concluded at Poonah in 1777, were entruſted to Colonel Upton; the negociation of the propoſed treaty with the Rajah of Berar, upon the death of Mr. Elliott, the gentleman firſt employed, was tranſferred to General (then Colonel) Goddard; and the negociation of peace, now or lately on foot with the Marattas, was entruſted to the ſame officer. That military officers are poſſeſſed of as much zeal for the public ſervice as any other men, cannot be queſtioned; but they have no opportunities of acquiring the leaſt knowledge of the commercial or political intereſts of the Company, and the habits of their profeſſion give them too ſtrong a bias to the ſide of war. The Company upon the occaſion of General Caillaud's being employed to conclude the treaty with the Nizam in 1766, writes as follows, "We "muſt obſerve to you, that we think it very extraordinary, that the whole negociation with the Soubah ſhould have been conducted by a "military officer, unaccompanied by a civil ſervant: when Mr. Pybus's illneſs was known, another ſhould have been immediately appointed, "for it is highly diſpleaſing to us, and contrary to our orders, that a military officer ſhould be alone employed in negociations of our "commercial or political intereſt."

dent Prince; an union of intereſts and of meaſures has generally taken place between them, and at his requeſt, a certain force is continually kept up under the Company's authority for the defence of the *Carnatic*: it has not however yet been ſettled how far the Nabob in virtue of his independency, or the Company in the character of his friends and protectors, ſhould direct and ſuperintend the intereſts of the *Carnatic*. If this privilege belong ſolely to the Nabob, and he (as is natural to ſuppoſe) ſhould wiſh to exerciſe it, then the Company may without, and even againſt their conſent, be drawn into meaſures directly affecting their own intereſts and poſſeſſions; for it is not poſſible in any caſe to ſeparate their cauſe from that of the Nabob without totally giving up all concern in his affairs. On the other hand; if the Company in virtue of their character, as protectors of the Nabob's Government, claim the right of directing the intereſts of the *Carnatic*, then they infringe the acknowledged independency of the Nabob, and become in fact the rulers inſtead of the defenders of his country. It ſeems reaſonable indeed that the Company, who have taken upon themſelves the office of Protector, ſhould be allowed the lead in all political tranſactions that affect the *Carnatic*, and this the Nabob has hitherto generally admitted; but there are inſtances on record, where he has claimed the privilege of acting for himſelf, even in oppoſition to the advice and remonſtrances of the Company's Government, and it is upon theſe occaſions that the Company's ſervants will always find themſelves perplexed, until it be abſolutely determined how far they or the Nabob are to yield upon any differences in opinion.

There are other embarraſſments of a different nature attending the cloſe connection we have with the Nabob, which do not come ſo properly within my preſent purpoſe to mention; but it is certain, that all the inconveniences we ſuffer are amply compenſated by the advantages derived from an excluſive influence in the Nabob's country, ſufficient to eſtabliſh a decided ſuperiority, and to prevent all competitors, European or native, from hurting the commerce or diſturbing the poſſeſſions of the Company. It is unqueſtionably to this influence that we are indebted for a great part of our proſperity, for our ſucceſs againſt the French in *India* the laſt war, and for the deciſive ſtroke made againſt them ſo early in the preſent war, to which, as affairs have ſince turned out, we owe perhaps our preſent exiſtence in the Eaſt.

Under theſe circumſtances, if our gratitude alone be too weak a tie to bind us to the Nabob, a ſenſe of intereſt ſhould teach us the importance of ſo uſeful an attachment: and by ſhewing how much we have profited and may ſtill profit by it, inſtruct us on the other hand how different our ſituation would have been, and may ſtill be, if that attachment ſhould ever be diſſolved, or transferred to our rivals.

But it has been often urged, that the benefits reſulting from this connection are reciprocal, and that the Nabob having received the ſame advantage from our alliance and ſupport that we have derived from his friendſhip, is equally bound upon principles of gratitude and of intereſt to remain ſtedfaſt in his attachment to the Company. There can be no doubt that the Nabob owes the poſſeſſion and ſecurity of his Government to the Company; and he has never been wanting in acknowledgments for their favour and protection; though it be certain that the ſupport of the Company was originally given to him, *not upon his account, but their own:* and that having effectually anſwered their own purpoſes by eſtabliſhing him in his Government, the numerous gifts and favours he has ſince beſtowed on them ought to be conſidered rather as earneſts of his attachment, than returns for benefits received. Appendix. No. 325.

Such being the ſtate of our connection with the Nabob, it were extremely to be wiſhed, that nothing had been ever done by us which might tend to impreſs on his mind any unfavourable ideas of our juſtice, or the ſincerity of our attachment. There is reaſon however to believe, that the late tranſactions relative to *Tanjore*, have produced this effect in a remarkable degree; and as I conceive it to be properly connected with my preſent ſubject to touch upon thoſe meaſures, I ſhall do it with all due deference to the reſpectable opinions that have been already advanced, and more with a view to the juſtice and policy of our conduct, than to any perſonal regards whatſoever.

While the province of *Tanjore* was ſubject only to the claims of the Mogul, and to ſuch demands and pretenſions as were uſually advanced by the Nabobs of the *Carnatic*, the Company had properly no other concern in that Government than to maintain a friendly correſpondence with the perſon who might happen to be the Rajah; nor did they ever pretend the ſmalleſt right to interfere in its affairs until the year 1762, when their ſervants made a treaty between the Nabob and the Rajah, which gave riſe to all the ſubſequent meaſures relative to *Tanjore*.

This treaty, to which the Company became guarantees, was framed by their ſervants in the character of arbitrators: but the claims of theſe Princes upon each other were not voluntarily ſubmitted to their deciſion; and it would be difficult to conceive any other equitable ground upon which they could act as arbitrators *. A proper attention to this circumſtance is abſolutely neceſſary to form a right judgment of the treaty of 1762. It is indiſputable from the records of the Company, and avowed indeed by thoſe who made and have defended this treaty, that the Company's ſervants in adjuſting the pretenſions of the Nabob and the Rajah, decided entirely by *their own* ideas of juſtice, and obliged both parties to conform to their deciſions. An authority of this kind is without doubt neceſſary to an arbitrator; but it can be founded only on his being voluntarily choſen by both parties to adjuſt their differences; and their being mutually bound to each other, and to him, to abide by his award, whatever it may be. If this formality were obſerved in ſettling the treaty of 1762, the conduct of the Company's ſervants muſt be deemed unexceptionable in every part; but if it were wanting altogether, or there were any material defect in it, then their proceedings, under the maſk only of juſtice, became highly injurious to both parties, and might have been diſputed with as much propriety as an individual might diſpute any attempt to wreſt from him his undoubted property.

That the Nabob gave no ſuch previous conſent, as I have mentioned, to the appointment of the Company's ſervants as arbitrators of his differences with the Rajah, or any promiſe to be bound by their deciſions, is evident from his correſpondence with the Governor at that period. By this it appears, that the Company's ſervants were deſirous of interpoſing their mediation to adjuſt the claims of the Nabob and the Rajah. That both parties in conſequence ſtated their reſpective demands; that the Nabob's went much further than the Company's ſervants ſeemed inclined to allow; and that the Company's ſervants thereupon framed their objections, which were anſwered by the Nabob, in a manner that ſuffi-

* An indifferent perſon reading the accounts of this treaty, and particularly that publiſhed in a book called *Lord Pigot's Defence*, would ſuppoſe that Lord (then Mr.) Pigot, who was the prime mover in the treaty, was ſome great monarch, and that the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore were his vaſſals, whoſe differences he condeſcended to adjuſt in his own way; for in the book above mentioned, after ſpeaking with much encomium on Lord Pigot's deciſion upon the merits and claims of the reſpective parties, the writer goes on to obſerve: "*To reward* "*the fidelity of the one, and check the ambition of the other, Lord Pigot adopted the only effectual meaſure.* He guaranteed the kingdom of Tanjore to "Pertaub Sing and his deſcendants;" which is repeated alſo a ſecond time with peculiar emphaſis, page 40, and 41.

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ciently ſhewed his diſlike to their proceedings. Upon the whole, there appears not the leaſt room to doubt, that nothing but the decided influence and ſuperiority which the Company's ſervants had then lately acquired by the expulſion of the French from the country, and his fears of giving offence to them, could have prevailed with the Nabob to ſet his name to a treaty which he conſidered as depriving him of his moſt eſſential rights.*

With reſpect to the Rajah of *Tanjore*, ſo far were the Company's ſervants from conſulting his inclinations before hand, that when they had brought the Nabob's demands down to what *they* thought reaſonable, they drew out the treaty between him and the Rajah; got the Nabob firſt to ſign it, and then ſent it in this ſtate to *Tanjore* by their agent, with inſtructions to him, "*to* "*endeavour to prevail on the Rajah to accept the terms* "*propoſed* †." But what appears ſtill more extraordinary in this tranſaction is, that the Company's guarantee was affixed to the treaty *before* it was ſent to the Rajah for his acceptance, with this expreſſion, "*We do hereby* "*promiſe to guarantee the performance of the ſaid treaty,* "*being thereunto invited by both parties:*" from whence it ſeems reaſonable to conclude, that the ſame guarantee was likewiſe tendered to the Nabob for his acceptance, with the articles of the treaty; and that both of the parties, inſtead of *inviting* the Company's ſervants, were *invited*, or rather obliged by them, to accept of their proffered guarantee: yet it is upon this guarantee ſo obtained, that the Company have built their right to interfere in all the ſubſequent meaſures that have been purſued with reſpect to *Tanjore*; and finally, upon the conqueſt of that country made by the Nabob, with the aſſiſtance of their own ſervants, to take it into their hands and reſtore it to the Rajah.

The advocates for the treaty of 1762, have urged chiefly in its defence, that it was expedient in point of policy to keep *Arcot* and *Tanjore* in the hands of ſeparate Princes. Suppoſing it to be ſo, if the Princes of *Arcot* and *Tanjore* had claims upon each other, was it the part of juſtice for the Company's ſervants, becauſe they were ſtronger than either, to ſettle them in their own way, and with a view to the advantage of their maſters? Allowing the Nabob's claims upon the Rajah of *Tanjore* to have been in ſome points extravagant, and according to our notions of equity, unjuſt; upon what ground could the Company's ſervants pretend to regulate them by their own ideas of propriety? Admitting the Nabob to have been the dependant of a dependant of the King of *Debli*; ſtill with reſpect to the Company, he was ſovereign and independent, and their ſervants had no more right to adjuſt his pretenſions, than they had to adjuſt thoſe of the King of *Debli* himſelf‡. Does it ſeem probable that the Nabob, by his own free will, would have concluded ſuch a treaty as that of 1762, with the Rajah of *Tanjore*? If not, ſo far as the Company's ſervants acted on that occaſion againſt his voluntary conſent, ſo far they acted without authority; and by whatſoever name they may term the part they took in this treaty, whether it were that of friends, mediators, or guarantees, their conduct will always be liable to the imputation of an unjuſt interference.

The occurrences which intervened between the concluſion of the treaty of 1762, and the firſt expedition againſt *Tanjore* in 1771, are ſufficiently known. Much argument has been employed, both to prove and to arraign the juſtice of aiding the Nabob in that expedition; but as the meaſure itſelf proved nothing deciſive againſt the Rajah, and was cloſed by a new treaty between him and the Nabob, in which the Company's ſervants had no part, I ſhall only obſerve upon the ſubject, that from an attentive peruſal of this whole proceeding, and of the orders and opinions of the Company as they may be gathered from their correſpondence, it appears to me, that the war againſt the Rajah was fully juſtified by repeated provocations, and that the Court of Directors themſelves conſidered the treaty of 1762, as violated by his offenſive conduct, and their guarantee of courſe aboliſhed, ſome time before the expedition and treaty of 1771 took place. How elſe ſhall we account for their orders of 1769 and 1770, wherein they complain of the Rajah's withholding his aſſiſtance from the Company and the Nabob when they were acting in defence of the *Carnatic* againſt *Hyder Ally*, and after ſpeaking of former contributions made by the Rajahs of *Tanjore* in like caſes, enjoin their ſervants "to give the Nabob ſuch "ſupport in his pretenſions as may be effectual; and if "the Rajah refuſed to contribute a juſt proportion to "the expences of the war, then to purſue ſuch meaſures as the Nabob may think conſiſtent with the "juſtice and dignity of his Government?" In another letter they ſay, "the plain fact is, that the King of "*Tanjore*, who *is tributary to the Nabob, ought to have* "*furniſhed his quota towards carrying on the war, which* "*he has not done.*"

With regard to the ſecond expedition againſt *Tanjore* in 1773, which terminated by the capture of the place, it were to be wiſhed, that the Company's ſervants had been fully inſtructed by their conſtituents, before they were called upon to execute that meaſure; as it was, being left to their own diſcretion, and having the power of the Company in their hands, whether they uſed that diſcretion with wiſdom or not, their actions were to all intents and purpoſes as binding on the Company as if they had been performed by the expreſs authority of the Court of Directors. They were required by the Nabob to aid him as auxiliaries againſt the Rajah of *Tanjore*; in that character they made public engagements with the Nabob, and ſent their troops to aſſiſt him in reducing the fort of *Tanjore*, and placing that conqueſt in his hands. As the whole of their meaſures on this occaſion had the force of a public treaty, upon what claim of right do the Company by their own authority abrogate theſe proceedings in oppoſition to the will of the Nabob? Engaged by their ſervants as auxiliaries, how could they aſſume the character of principals? But as principals and equals even in this tranſaction, they could juſtly abrogate nothing without the Nabob's conſent. They go then ſtill higher: they act as the Nabob's ſuperiors, and not only take from him the country which their ſervants had conquered, and put into his hands, but even place the Nabob in a worſe ſituation, and the Rajah, at leaſt with reſpect to him, in a better than before the conqueſt was made.

As to the ground on which the Company built their claim of interference in this caſe, viz. the treaty of 1762, to which their ſervants had made them guarantees, I have already ſhewn upon what idea that treaty was concluded, and what ſtrong reaſons there were to believe, that one

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* The idea of the Nabob's being forced to ſign the treaty has been ridiculed; but if ſuch an influence were employed as he could not reſiſt without hazarding the affections or perhaps feeling the reſentment of thoſe who had the power to hurt him, it carries to my mind as much the idea of *force* as if he had been compelled by a ſtronger arm than his own to affix his name to the treaty.

† Vide inſtructions to Mr. Du Pré, dated 20th September 1762.

‡ There are ſeveral Rajahs or Zemindars in the Carnatic, over whom the Nabob exerciſes the ſame rights that he formerly claimed, and ſtill claims over the Rajah of Tanjore; yet the Company never pretended to examine or queſtion thoſe rights, and would now probably think it a great injuſtice, however they may have been acquired, to interfere with them in ſupport of thoſe whom the Nabob holds in dependance. This pretence aſſumed by the ſervants of the Company to adjuſt the claims of the Nabob, tempts me to put the following caſe: ſuppoſing the Nabob or any other Indian Prince were ſufficiently *powerful*, to inquire into and *adjuſt* the rights of the Company, either by their own fluctuating notions of equity, or even by the fixed and juſt ſtandard in uſe with more enlightened people, how many complaints ſhould we not make, and how many wars wage, in defence of our claims;—and is there the ſmalleſt difference between this caſe and that of which I am now ſpeaking?

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of the parties had been as it were compelled to enter into it; I have alſo, and I think, upon good reaſons, urged that the treaty of 1762 was conſidered by the Company themſelves as violated by the conduct of the Rajah of *Tanjore*, even before the commencement of the firſt expedition againſt him in 1771; but if the Company, after they had in effect declared thoſe engagements at an end; after their ſervants had made one expedition to *Tanjore*, which ended in a new treaty between the Nabob and the Rajah, wherein that of 1762 is not even mentioned; after a ſecond expedition had been undertaken, which ended in the capture of the place: I ſay, if the Company, after all theſe tranſactions, think proper to revive the guarantee of 1762, which was a diſcretional act of their ſervants, what reaſon can be given why the engagements with the Nabob of 1771, and thoſe of 1773, which were alſo diſcretional acts of their ſervants, ſhould be diſregarded and ſet aſide? And why are thoſe ſtipulations which were made by their ſervants in favour of the Rajah of *Tanjore*, who had no particular claim upon the Company's friendſhip, to be approved and revived in a manner the moſt diſtinguiſhing to him, and thoſe reiterated engagements which were made with the Nabob, who had ſo many claims upon their friendſhip, to be diſavowed, and abrogated in a manner the moſt diſgraceful to *him?*

But the guarantee of 1762, even allowing it to have been in force, could only entruſt to the Company the care of the ſtipulations included in the treaty ſo guaranteed. The operation of this guarantee therefore in its fulleſt extent, could not place the Rajah of *Tanjore* in any other ſituation than that in which it found him in 1762. In that ſituation, he was wholly independent of the Company, and the Nabob had ſtill ſome claims upon him, which were not given up by the treaty: how different becomes his ſituation now he is reſtored to his Government by the Company. The conditions of his reſtoration were, "that he ſhould admit a Company's garriſon in his fort; "that he ſhould aſſign revenues ſufficient to maintain "this garriſon: that no troops except thoſe of the Com- "pany ſhould be permitted to reſide within the city of "*Tanjore*, and except alſo a few native guards, which "were not to be exceeded or augmented by the Rajah "on any account or pretence whatſoever; and that he "ſhould make no treaty with foreign Powers without "their concurrence." This is in fact a ſituation of dependance, though diſtinguiſhed by the Company under the flattering names of friendſhip and alliance; and when we add, that the Company have ſince requeſted and obtained profitable grants of land in the Tanjore country, the whole tranſaction carries with it an appearance extremely unfavourable, and gives to the Nabob too much reaſon to complain that juſtice and friendſhip have been ſacrificed to the mere views of intereſt and policy.

With reſpect however to the policy of this meaſure, I ſhall never be induced to think it eligible in that view, to maintain ſo cloſe an alliance with two princes whoſe diſagreements never can be reconciled, and whoſe reſpective ſituations are ſuch as cannot fail of producing further diſputes in which we muſt neceſſarily take part. The Nabob ſuperior in power, and the moſt naturally our ally, poſſeſſes by much the greateſt portion of the *Carnatic*, and the Rajah of *Tanjore* is alſo by our alliance ſupported as a Power within that of the Nabob, his province being in the heart of the Nabob's poſſeſſions. In this ſituation, though dependant on the Company, he conſiders himſelf wholly independent of the Nabob: and from the tranſactions that have paſſed, the intereſts of the two princes are become totally oppoſite and incompatible with each other. If any diſpute happen between the Nabob and the Rajah, and the Nabob in revenge of a juſt offence ſhould think proper to attack the Rajah, which he may do with his own troops, independent of us, and without breaking any one engagement, then by our ſtipulations with the Rajah we are bound to act in his defence, and to conſider the Nabob as his enemy. If we aid the Nabob, as we ought in a juſt cauſe, then that part of our troops which is maintained for his ſupport, may be employed againſt that part which is entertained for the defence of the Rajah. On the other hand, ſhould the Rajah have any juſt cauſe of offence againſt the Nabob, it will be expected of us, as his friends and allies, to obtain redreſs: here again we may be involved, either with him or the Nabob. With reſpect to foreign Powers, our engagements to the Rajah become ſtill more hazardous. The French had lately, and the Dutch and Danes now have, ſettlements within his territories; to thoſe ſettlements the Rajah's ſervants or renters are perpetually flying for protection againſt his Government: and as our troops only are employed in the Tanjore country, the Rajah on theſe occaſions calls upon us to ſupport his authority. Once already have we been on the point of embroiling ourſelves with the Dutch: and very lately an inſult was offered upon the Daniſh ſettlement at *Tranquebar*, by ſome of our Sepoys employed in the collections under the authority of the Rajah's managers. With regard to the Indian States we are likewiſe in the ſame predicament from this alliance. If the Rajah's country be attacked by *Hyder Ally* or the Marattas, we muſt defend it, not only with the troops appointed for its protection, but *totis viribus*, otherwiſe it will inevitably be conquered. How then are we to act in this caſe? Our ſtrength chiefly conſiſts in the military eſtabliſhment kept up for the defence of the Nabob, and paid by him: but the Nabob has now no intereſt in the Rajah's country, nor can we imagine he will eaſily be induced to ſpend his money, and expoſe his own poſſeſſions in fighting the Rajah's battles; and indeed this is one of thoſe caſes in which it would be [illegible] what has paſſed, to deſire his aſſiſtance; much [illegible] uſe influence or compulſion for obtaining it. In a word, ſo far from thinking it politic to ſupport an independent intereſt within the *Carnatic*, oppoſite, and even inimical to that of the Nabob, it appears to me to be a ſyſtem productive of nothing but confuſion and danger; nor can we poſſibly maintain it long without making enemies of both the Princes we are bound to defend; without involving ourſelves in infinite troubles; and hazarding ſtill further than we have already done, the honour of our public engagements.

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Either the Rajah ſhould have been left in the ſituation in which we found him before the treaty of 1762, that is, before we had any public engagements in his behalf, or all the acts which the ſervants of the Company have deemed it neceſſary in various conjunctures to purſue, relative to *Tanjore*, ſhould have been confirmed. In this laſt event the Nabob would now have been in poſſeſſion of *Tanjore*, and the Company, beſides preſerving the faith of their engagements would have had only one inſtead of two intereſts to ſupport. It has been ſaid, that ſuch an increaſe of territory, might have made the Nabob too powerful, and placed him beyond the controul of the Company; but the idea in this caſe is fallacious. To have added any territory out of the *Carnatic* (that is in the *Belaghaut* or above the paſſes) to the dominions of the Nabob, would have no doubt been impolitic: but it is unqueſtionably more ſafe, as well as more advantageous, for the Company to have only one intereſt on this ſide the paſſes, let that intereſt be ever ſo powerful, than to have two diſtinct intereſts, both perpetually claſhing, and both upheld by our ſupport. If the Nabob had continued to poſſeſs *Tanjore*, would not the Company have maintained the ſame checks over him in that province that they now hold throughout the whole *Carnatic*, by having garriſons in all his forts? by having his perſon and family in their power? and laſtly, by having the little army which he keeps in his immediate pay commanded by their own officers? But what ſtill more effectually deſtroys the idea of the Nabob's becoming too powerful by the acceſſion of *Tanjore*, is, that when he actually poſſeſſed that country, and even had a large garriſon

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riſon of his own troops in the fort, he allowed himſelf to be deprived of it, and ſaw it given to his avowed enemy, in a manner the moſt humiliating and diſgraceful to himſelf, without even a ſemblance of oppoſition.

I have dwelt the longer upon the affairs of the Nabob ſeparately, and as they are connected with thoſe of *Tanjore*, becauſe as he is the oldeſt, and properly ſpeaking, the only natural ally of the Company, it is fit that his ſituation, his grievances, his embarraſſments, ſhould be perfectly known and underſtood. If it ſhall appear from a cool and candid examination of paſt meaſures, that he has been treated with a ſeverity ill ſuited to the long and faithful attachment he had confeſſedly borne to the Company: if it ſhall appear that we have in any inſtances uſed our power unjuſtly to exact compliances from him, which he might have otherwiſe thought it diſhonourable to grant: if it ſhall appear, that we have raiſed into our favour and alliance, a man whom he, and whom the Company have conſidered as a dependant on him, who was obnoxious to him, who had deſervedly on more occaſions than one drawn on himſelf the Company's diſpleaſure, and who never made any effort to deſerve their friendſhip*: if it ſhall appear that we have done this in a manner the moſt diſtinguiſhing to that man, the moſt humiliating and diſgraceful to the Nabob: and laſtly, if it ſhall appear that theſe acts have beeen committed at the expence of our public faith, pledged to the Nabob in repeated and poſitive engagements: I am at a loſs to conceive how we ſhall be able to atone for ſuch accumulated injuſtice. Certain it is, we ought to loſe no time in making every reparation in our power; and though we have as yet been ſlow in our attempts towards it, I hope we ſhall not confirm and add to the injuries we have committed, by neglecting any longer to redreſs them.

I propoſe now to return to the general ſubject of theſe ſheets, and to bring it to a concluſion, after making a few remarks upon the ſyſtem at preſent eſtabliſhed for the government of the Company's political affairs in *India*.

It has been obſerved in the courſe of my reflections, that ſome inconveniences have ariſen from the want of a free and equal communication of meaſures and ſentiments among the three principal Preſidencies of the Company, *Bengal*, *Madras*, and *Bombay*. This communication is ſo neceſſary in all tranſactions that relate to wars or engagements with the country Powers, that there is no poſſibility of preſerving any degree of union and conſiſtency of action without it. The clauſe in the late regulating Act of Parliament, which gave a controlling power to the Governor General and Council of *Fort William* in certain caſes, has been the chief foundation of this evil, not from any defect in the clauſe itſelf, but from its being ſtrained to purpoſes which the Legiſlature never could have intended it. The power therein conveyed was meant, as I have always underſtood, ſolely to eſtabliſh among the ſeveral Preſidencies an uniform plan of action with reſpect to their wars and treaties; for when the Preſidencies were in theſe reſpects independent of each other, it had ſometimes happened, that the Company's ſervants at one ſettlement were making war againſt a Power with whom their ſervants at another, were under engagements of peace and friendſhip. In order to remedy the abſurdity of this ſyſtem, the wiſdom of the Legiſlature judged it expedient to fix a controlling power in one of the Company's Governments, ſufficient to reſtrain the reſt from making wars or treaties without its concurrence, and conſequently to eſtabliſh that general uniformity of action ſo requiſite in affairs of this nature.

Such appear to have been the ground, extent, and meaning of the controlling power, but the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, have given it a much greater latitude. Inſtead of confining themſelves to a reſtraining power in two points, they have aſſumed and exerciſed upon different occaſions an active compelling power, extending to all the political tranſactions of the Company at the other Preſidencies. They have formerly promulgated among the Indian States, that the ſervants at the other Preſidencies are appointed to manage the Company's political affairs under "*their general controul* "*and directions*;" and they have in virtue of this aſſumed power interfered with the Governments of *Madras* and *Bombay*, in a manner the moſt hurtful to their conſequence that can be imagined, and as it were with the ſole degrading them in the eyes of the ſeveral Powers around view of them†.

The effects of this uſurpation are, I conceive, extremely injurious to the intereſts of the Company. The Governor General and Council of *Fort William* have annexed to it ſuch a degree of ſuperiority over the other Preſidencies, that they iſſue orders to them in the ſame ſtyle as the Court of Directors; nor will they condeſcend to aſk or to be guided by the opinions of the Company's ſervants at *Madras* or *Bombay*, in points even that relate ſolely to the intereſts of theſe Preſidencies, though they themſelves are not in a ſituation, even if they had experience and time ſufficient, to acquire a knowledge of them: the conſequence is, that with partial views only they form plans, and adopt meaſures that comprize the general intereſts of the Company; and when they come to be put in execution, it is found that they claſh with ſome intereſt or ſome engagement at another Preſidency, which had been overlooked. Thus the ſcheme of ſupporting *Ragonaut Row* in his pretenſions had a direct tendency to involve the *Carnatic* in a war, and interfered with an expreſs treaty made by the Government at *Madras* with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, yet the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* never aſked the advice or opinion of thoſe who were immediately charged with theſe intereſts and engagements; probably they knew not or had forgot that any ſuch exiſted. Again the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* formed in like manner a ſcheme of an offenſive and defenſive alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*, and authorized their agent to put it in execution; though one article of the propoſed alliance could not have been made without a direct breach of the ſame treaty with the Nizam, to which I have above alluded, nor of courſe without involving the Preſidency who executed the treaty, in a war againſt that Power.

I cannot help remarking on this occaſion, but with the greateſt deference and ſubmiſſion to that moſt reſpectable body which determined otherwiſe, that the ſituation appointed for the reſidence of the controlling power, has not been happily choſen; nor can I perceive a ſingle advantage that naturally intitles it to ſuch a pre-eminence, except it be one to poſſeſs more wealth and a larger territory than any other eſtabliſhment in *India*; this might

* When I obſerve the Rajah never made any effort to deſerve the Company's friendſhip, I ſpeak of the period of his independance; for ſince he was reſtored to his Government, I cannot conſider any conceſſions he may have made in that light: however even lately, when he was applied to for a grant of the diſtrict of Nagore, a ſhort time only after his reſtoration, he complied with a very ill grace, ſaying, that although he had done ſo much for the Company, and his country was ſo much impoveriſhed, ſtill he was *forced* to grant them large Jagueers (vide letter from him to the Governor, received 16th May 1778.) This Jagueer which he was *forced* to grant amounted to about £. 20,000 per annum, whereas the Nabob granted to the Company at one time as a proof of his friendſhip, a Jagueer of near £. 150,000 per annum.

† A ſtriking inſtance of this happened very lately: the Government at Madras endeavoured to obtain from Nizam Ally Cawn a relief from the great burthen of peiſcuſh, annually paid for the northern Circars. The Nizam at firſt ſhewed a ſtrong diſinclination to comply with the demand, and even expreſſed himſelf on the occaſion in terms of much reſentment; but the agent whom the Government of Madras employed at his Court, gave hopes that by perſiſting in the demand, the Nizam might be brought to a compliance. In the mean time the Governor General and Council of Bengal upon ſome imperfect information they had received of the proceeding, thought proper to interpoſe their authority; and without even waiting for any explanations from Madras, they addreſſed a letter directly to the Nizam, acquainting him in effect that the Government at Madras had acted improperly, and that he was not to regard any thing that had been done.

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be a conſideration ſufficient to determine a preference where the advantages were in more eſſential points equal to thoſe of any other place; but I am humbly of opinion, that the proper ſeat for a controlling power is that Preſidency which is moſt central with reſpect to the other Preſidencies, and moſt central in reſpect to the country Powers, with whom we have our chief intercourſe. *Fort Saint George* indiſputably claims theſe advantages over the other ſettlements. It is nearly equidiſtant from *Bengal*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen*. It has a more frequent, ſafe, and ſpeedy communication with *England*, and with the other Preſidencies, than any other ſettlement can have. It is the place to which the greateſt part of the India ſhips, outward bound, with military ſtores, recruits, &c. are ordered to touch before they proceed to the other parts of *India* and *China*; and it is the place to which all naval or land armaments ſent out by the king for the ſervice of *India* are directed, and from whence all their operations are planned and executed, forming by theſe means a much more reſpectable appearance in the eyes of the natives than *Bengal* itſelf. With regard to the country Powers, its ſituation is no leſs advantageous. The Company and the Nabob's poſſeſſions at *Fort Saint George* join to the territories of the Nizam, and of *Hyder Ally Cawn*: and the capitals of theſe two Powers are ſo near, that letters paſs to them from *Madras* in eight or ten days; to *Poonah*, the capital of the Marattas, letters can paſs directly by land in twenty days, or by the way of *Bombay* in almoſt the ſame time. I muſt not omit likewiſe, that military operations againſt either European or Indian Powers can no where be carried on with ſo much eaſe and expedition as at *Fort Saint George*, on account of its vicinity to the European ſettlements and to the territories of the principal Indian States*.

Bengal certainly does not poſſeſs any of the advantages I have mentioned in any degree equal to *Fort Saint George*. *Calcutta* is inconveniently ſituated for communication either with the other ſettlements or with *Europe*; and as to the country Powers I have mentioned, it is in a manner quite removed from the ſcene of their politics or military operations, and ſo diſtant from them, that I believe, until the Government of *Fort William* was inveſted with a controlling authority, and began in conſequence to aſſume a leading part in the general political intereſts of the Company, the Indian States paid very little regard to it; becauſe though it maintained a formidable force, that force was too remote to be of any immediate conſequence, either in promoting or checking their views.

The kingdom of *Bengal* is of ſuch wide extent, that the Government of it in all its branches, civil, military, political, and revenue, will be found a ſufficient taſk for any five, or even any ten men of the firſt abilities. To engage them in the concerns of other Preſidencies is to take off a portion of their time and attention from the objects committed to their chief care, and to employ it in directing intereſts at a diſtance, which are, and muſt be certainly more ſafe in the hands of thoſe who are immediately appointed to the charge of them, and whoſe ſole duty is to ſtudy them. But the controlling power lodged in the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, though it were confined in its exerciſe (which it is not) *to wars and treaties only*, would engage them in a ſcene much too extenſive for men who are entruſted with the government of ſo great a kingdom, becauſe they cannot uſe this power to advantage, without attending to the political concerns of the Company in every part of *India*, and watching the gradual changes which they undergo from a variety of occurrences, too trivial perhaps to be noticed, but by thoſe who are eye witneſſes of them, or thoſe who have ſufficient leiſure to mark them in a ſeries of voluminous correſpondence. Appendix. No. 326.

I ſhall now conclude the ſubject of theſe ſheets by obſerving, that as I have been induced by public conſiderations only, to preſent a faithful view of our political ſtate in *India*; and to recommend ſuch meaſures as are in my judgment beſt calculated to remedy the errors and defects of our late proceedings, ſo I ſhall think myſelf amply rewarded for the pains I have taken, if it be my good fortune to have propoſed any thing which may meet the approbation of thoſe whoſe opinions I reſpect, or contribute in any degree to reſtore peace and proſperity to the affairs of the Company.

APPENDIX, No. 326.

Extract of the general Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors; dated 3d April 1780.

Par. 10. WHEN we reflect upon all that has paſſed from the firſt treaty made with *Ragonaut Row* by the Preſidency of *Bombay* in 1774, to the preſent time, we are clearly of opinion, that no means ſhould have been left untried to bring about a peace upon terms of the moſt perfect moderation. If it ever were in General *Goddard*'s power to promote an accommodation upon the footing of the treaty of *Poorunder*, we think he ſhould have gladly embraced the opportunity; becauſe after the diſaſter which the Bombay troops met with, and the diſgraceful capitulation made in conſequence by Meſſrs. *Carnac* and *Egerton*, nothing could in our idea be more deſirable for the Company, both in point of honour and ſafety, than to obtain a releaſe from the ſevere terms of that capitulation, and a renewal of the treaty of *Poorunder*. We think too that ſuch conceſſions, or even leſs favourable ones, acquired in this manner, are infinitely preferable to any that can be obtained by force of arms. If the object of a war with the Marattas be the conqueſt of territory, we do not apprehend that the Company in the end will be any gainers, even by the moſt ſucceſsful expeditions that can be made; for beſides the vaſt expence of blood and treaſure which always attends diſtant military projects, there is too much reaſon to fear that ſuch remote acquiſitions can only be retained by the ſame mode in which they are won; and that the Company may in their defence be ſubject to a ſtate of perpetual warfare.

11. The only ſituation, we humbly conceive, in which the Company can carry on their affairs in ſecurity, is that of peace and friendſhip with all the country Powers, which never ſhould be diſturbed but when they are compelled to draw the ſword for the defence of their preſent poſſeſſions: to this their power is very equal: but the moment they paſs theſe bounds, and engage in the diſputes between the Indian States, or in any diſtant plans of conqueſt, their force, by being divided, is much too weak either for offenſive or defenſive meaſures; and in ſuch caſe their ſettlements and territories muſt inevitably become expoſed to the mercy of the firſt powerful invader. We do not conceive that your armies were ever meant for any other purpoſe than the defence and protection of your poſſeſſions; or that your reſources could ever be thought adequate to the ſupport of remote and offenſive wars: if any ſuch ideas prevail, they will be inſtantly

* When the Governor General and Council of Bengal determined in February 1778, to ſend troops to aſſiſt the military operations on the Bombay ſide, they ordered them to march acroſs the peninſula: I ſuppoſe chiefly, if not ſolely on account of the averſion which the Bengal Sepoys have to go on ſhip-board. This body of troops did not reach Surat till May 1779, that is fourteen months after they were put in orders to march. Beſides the riſk of paſſing through ſuch an immenſe tract of the Maratta dominions, the extra expence of ſending theſe troops by land, muſt have been at leaſt 20 or 25 lacks of rupees; whereas the whole armament might have been tranſported from Fort Saint George (where our Sepoys have not the ſame averſion to go on ſhip-board) in leſs then a month, and at the expence of about one lack, or one lack and a half of rupees.

Appendix, No. 328.

removed by comparing the preſent ſtate of the reſources in *Bengal* with their condition two years ago; and then reflecting, that excluſive of about 20 lacks of rupees, which were ſent to this Preſidency, and expended in the reduction of *Pondicherry* and *Mahé*, the remainder of the treaſure there accumulated, or a very conſiderable part of it, has gone to the ſupport of General *Goddard*'s detachment, conſiſting only of ſix battalions of Sepoys, one company of native artillery, and about a thouſand horſe.

12. We have thought it our duty to deliver our ſentiments freely upon the ſubject of your affairs on the other ſide of *India*; becauſe, being no further concerned in them than as acting in ſupport of the meaſures which have been adopted by the Preſidencies of *Fort William* and *Bombay*, the opinions we give are likely to be free from that partiality which men naturally feel in favour of their own meaſures; and we advance them with the more confidence on this occaſion, becauſe we find them perfectly conſonant to the general maxims which you have laid down for the government of your affairs.

13. We have adviſed your Honours from time to time of the diſpoſition and movements of *Hyder Ally Cawn*: this Chief, by means of our wars with the Marattas, is now grown to a formidable height of power; and his genius is ſo aſpiring, his reſources ſo various, and his authority throughout every part of his dominions ſo completely eſtabliſhed, that he has become an object of the firſt importance in the political ſyſtem of *India*. Before we were engaged in diſputes with the Marattas, that nation turned all its views to the reduction of *Hyder*'s power, and waged inceſſant war for that purpoſe during many years. *Hyder*, by his ſuperior and active genius, was able to withſtand their attacks, which though very powerful, were of no long continuance; and whenever the Marattas quitted his country he always found means to recover himſelf ſo far as to be prepared for their next invaſion. In this perpetual ſcene of warfare between the two firſt Powers of *India*, your affairs were every where carried on in perfect peace and ſecurity, your forces extremely reſpected, and your friendſhip courted by the parties at war, and by every other State in *India*. This then was preciſely the ſituation in which we think you ſhould and might eaſily have continued: nothing could poſſibly have altered it but the engagements entered into by the Preſidency of *Bombay* with *Ragonaut Row*, and the different attempts formed in conſequence to overturn the reigning Government at *Poonah*. The views of the Maratta State became by thoſe means inſtantly turned from *Hyder* to the Company. They withdrew all their forces from his country to defend themſelves againſt the attacks of *Ragonaut Row* and his allies. *Hyder* availed himſelf of this opportunity to recover the conqueſts that had been made from him by the Marattas, and to recompenſe himſelf by conqueſts upon them; and the Marattas at length ſeeing no proſpect of relief from their wars with the Engliſh, were forced to conclude a treaty with *Hyder*, which they made offenſive, that they might have the benefit of his aſſiſtance againſt us.

C. C. 1779. No. 168.

14. Such have been the effects produced by our diſputes with the Marattas; and if the country Powers were capable of taking all the advantages which a combination might give them againſt us, we ſhould ſeverely feel the weight of their united operations; but fortunately for the Company, their jealouſy of each other is too ſtrong to admit of any ſincere or permanent agreement; and we think even now, notwithſtanding the provocations which the Marattas have received by our meaſures in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, were we to grant them any reaſonable terms of accommodation, they would inſtantly turn their arms againſt *Hyder* and leave us once more to the enjoyment of that tranquillity which we experienced from their former conteſts with this Chief.

APPENDIX, No. 328.

Letter from the Governor General at *Fort William* to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors of the Honourable United *Eaſt India* Company, 2d December 1780.

Honourable Sirs,

IN the preſent alarming ſituation of your affairs which their diſtance, the long and momentous interval which will have paſſed before you can receive the knowledge of them, and the diſſentions which are ever attendant on public calamities, will be too apt to exaggerate, you will probably expect that I ſhould inform you of my particular ſentiments concerning them; and I am the more deſirous of conforming to this ſuppoſition, from a belief too ſtrongly founded, that the meaſures neceſſary to the preſervation of your poſſeſſions and intereſts in *India*, will be inevitably productive of one conſequence of which you ought to be early apprized, that you may be enabled to obviate it in the proviſions which I underſtand will fall regularly under your conſideration ſoon after the probable receipt of theſe diſpatches. I bear too high a reſpect for the characters to which I addreſs myſelf, to treat them with the managements of a preparatory and gradual introduction of an unpleaſing report; and as it is the only point of ſubſtantial information which I ſhall have to convey to you in this letter, I ſhall therefore make it the firſt ſubject of it.

The conſequence to which I allude is the neceſſity to which I foreſee that we ſhall be compelled of making a large reduction, and poſſibly a total ſuſpenſion, of your inveſtment for the enſuing year. I cannot pronounce what our ability may be beyond that period; this will depend on contingencies too variable and remote for preſent conjectures. In juſtification of the meaſure itſelf which I have predicted, I muſt remark that it will be leſs an act of the Board than, as I have before intimated, the reſult of an unavoidable neceſſity, in which no option will be left us, but either to ſacrifice the temporary profits of the Company, or to hazard for ever the exiſtence of all that they poſſeſs, for the ſake of retaining them. It will be impoſſible at the ſame time to provide for the vaſt expence which will be required for the ſubſiſtence and defence of both your other Preſidencies, and for an inveſtment, in addition to the increaſing exigencies of this Government, and all from its own unaſſiſted reſources.

We have been already reduced to the mortifying extremity of borrowing money at intereſt, by which we have raiſed the ſum of 64,44,601. 1. 6. This reſource cannot laſt: it muſt ceaſe at a certain period, and that perhaps not diſtant; but the exigency which called it forth will ſtill remain the ſame, and muſt be anſwered. We have no other fund from which we can defray it, with the preſent appropriation of our means; for excluſively of the foreign calls, our own internal expences have accumulated, and will yet increaſe, notwithſtanding all the care and economy that we may uſe to check them, as we muſt replace all the native troops which we have detached to the relief of the *Carnatic*, and as it is to be apprehended that our revenue may ſuffer by the large drafts which we ſhall be obliged to make of our current ſpecie.

I will confeſs that I am myſelf more alarmed at the novelty of the meaſure, than convinced of any real detriment of which it will prove to your intereſts, when I conſider, that your ſhips are detained in their outſet for months by the want of hands to navigate them, and liable without any exemption or diſtinction to the ſame hardſhips as the neceſſity of the public ſervice impoſes on common veſſels of trade; that they arrive too late to be diſpatched in the ſame ſeaſon; that equal delays often attend them in their return, which is accompliſhed with hazards ſo great, that at leaſt a part of their cargoes cannot fail, without great negligence of our national enemies, to fall into their hands; and in that ſenſe ſo much of your

inveſtment

inveſtment may be affirmed to be provided for their benefit, equally with your loſs. I can venture to aſſure you that every precaution will be taken by this Adminiſtration, with the advice of the Board of Trade, to prevent the inconveniences to which the buſineſs of your inveſtment may be liable in its renewal, from its having been diſcontinued. Reſpecting the expedients which may be recommended for ſupplying the deficiency of your inveſtment in the caſe of its ſtoppage beyond the next year, upon theſe I do not preſume to offer my opinion; they will not eſcape your penetration, and I know that they will be ſuggeſted by a judgment and experience in theſe points, ſuperior to my own.

I do not know whether your ſupracargoes at *Canton* will ſtand in any need of our aſſiſtance, I ſhould think not; but it is unneceſſary to add, after what I have herein premiſed, that it will be equally out of our power to afford it.

I wait in anxious expectation of an anſwer from the Government of *Berar* to my diſpatches which conveyed the treaty propoſed for its guarantee, and the ratification of the Adminiſtration of *Poonah*. This may arrive in the courſe of another week: I have every reaſon to believe it will be entirely conſonant to my own wiſhes. With the aid, or even neutrality of this Power, I have no doubt of being able to make the reſources of this Government equal to every ſervice which may be exacted from them, both for maintenance of the actual peace of theſe provinces, and the reſtoration of your affairs in the *Carnatic*, however deſperate they may now appear, if they continue under the conduct of your preſent Commander in Chief.

I cannot venture to pronounce what may be the determination of the Adminiſtration of *Poonah*: conſidered as a State, it has certainly every cauſe to dread the aggrandizement of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, its natural enemy: as a faction, though not wholly unintereſted in the event of his ſucceſs, it may be influenced by other cauſes; by the ties of confederacy; by its own weakneſs; by the jealouſy of *Ragonaut Row*; by the aſcendant of *Mahdajee Sindia*, and his ſeparate views, which are incompatible with peace; and perhaps by national reſentment—yet I think it probable that the example of the Government of *Berar* may contribute to turn the ſcale in our favour. But I have no grounds for ſuch an expectation in any recent act or appearance.

Maratta. Permit me to offer a brief reflection on the preſent ſtate of your preſent political affairs: I have been told that the Maratta war has been, I know not on what ground or ſuggeſtion, attributed to me: your honourable court is poſſeſſed of the fulleſt evidence of the contrary. The occaſion of the war was planned and executed without the knowledge or previous concurrence of this Government, which has had no other participation in it than in providing, by an extraordinary exertion, for the ſupport of the meaſures undertaken by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, if theſe ſucceeded; and for its preſervation if they failed: our detachment arrived ſeaſonably for the laſt of theſe objects, and for the redemption of the national honour, which had been without it irretrievably loſt.—I had indeed flattered myſelf that the war would have ſoon terminated in ſuch advantages as would have amply atoned for the paſt calamities which had attended it. Whatever conviction I may entertain of ſuch a concluſion, it is now reduced to an argument of unavailing ſpeculation, in which every perſon is at liberty to form his own opinion.

Another and more intereſting occaſion has now called for the exertion of this Government in the preſervation of that of *Fort Saint George*: this at leaſt will not be imputed to the Government of *Bengal*. If the extorted and palliated confeſſion of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* may be credited (and we have the evidence of the moſt public notoriety to confirm it) it was the ſole effect of a confederacy formed at his inſtigation, and dictated by his reſentment of the infringements made by the Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* on his rights, obtained by the treaty ſubſiſting between him and the Company, and his natural apprehenſion of hoſtilities intended by that Government againſt him. Whatever be the cauſe, ſuch have been the effects; and it is our duty to do all that may be in our power to avert them. This we have already done to a degree as great as the time and our means would admit: we exhauſted our treaſury: we have deprived ourſelves of the flower of our army for their relief: we have abandoned our own meaſures in the criſis of their ſucceſs: we have formed a powerful detachment which will be in a condition to march in a few days from this date; and have uſed means, which though new and untried were the moſt likely to prove of ſpeedy and of certain effect, to win allies to their cauſe, even of our preſent enemies. I hope it will not appear the aſſumption of an undue merit, to obſerve that, extenſive as the aids are which we have already afforded them, and at a ſeaſon in which the rules of your ſervice have hitherto interdicted the navigation of theſe ſeas in conſideration of the dangers attending it, they arrived in ſafety at *Fort Saint George* in leſs time than two months from the date of the calamity which furniſhed the occaſion for them, computed from the return of the army under Sir *Hector Munro* to the mount, on the 14th September, to the arrival of the laſt ſhip of the fleet, the *Duke of Kingſton*, at *Fort Saint George* on the 5th of November.

We ſhall continue to employ the ſame vigilant attention to your intereſts: and I have no fears for the event while I have the happineſs to poſſeſs my preſent means, with the ſame able and willing aſſiſtance which fortune has given me in my preſent aſſociate of this Government.

I moſt humbly beg leave to conclude this letter with a recommendation of Major *Popham* to your favour: the ſervices which he has rendered in the expulſion of the Marattas from the dominions of your ally the Rana of *Gohud*, and eſpecially in the capture of the important fortreſs of *Gwallier*, have given him a claim to my ſolicitation in his behalf; and you will permit me to obſerve, that in whatever mode you may be pleaſed to ſtamp your approbation of his ſervices, you cannot have a more deſerving ſubject for it, nor a ſeaſon in which the zeal of your ſervants will better entitle them, on every principle of policy, as well as juſtice, to ſuch rewards and encouragements. Major Popham.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
Fort William, faithful ſervant,
2d December 1780. *Warren Haſtings.*

Bengal Conſultations, the 25th September 1780.—At a Council; preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

READ the following letter from *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

Having this day received a packet to your addreſs from the Honourable Company, by the way of *Buſſora*, we take the opportunity of tranſmitting it by a country ſhip fortunately on the point of ſailing.

We have alſo forwarded to Admiral *Hughes* the intelligence therein contained, and earneſtly recommend to him to bring round his Majeſty's ſquadron to this coaſt as expeditiouſly as poſſible; as it might be attended with the utmoſt danger to the Company's poſſeſſions, ſhould ſuch a formidable French armament make its appearance, now that we are engaged in a war with the Marattas.

We have taken a copy of the diſpatches from the Honourable Company, which we ſhall tranſmit by another opportunity. The letter referred to by the Committee of Correſpondence in the firſt part of their letter has never come to our hands.

Bombay Caſtle, We are with reſpect, &c.
14th Auguſt 1780.

Appendix. Nos. 329 & 330.

APPENDIX, No. 329.

Extract of general Letter to *Bombay*, dated 12th April 1780.

21. HAVING taken into our particular and moſt ſerious conſideration the ſtate of the Company's military force at your ſettlement, we have reſolved to appoint an able officer to the command of the troops at *Bombay*.

22. And having the higheſt opinion of the zeal, experience, and military abilities of Colonel *Thomas Goddard*, we have thought fit to appoint Colonel *Goddard* Commander in Chief of the Company's forces at *Bombay*, and granted him a commiſſion of Brigadier General in our ſervice.

23. We have alſo requeſted his Majeſty to grant a commiſſion of Brigadier General, with local rank, to Colonel *Thomas Goddard*, which we doubt not will be granted accordingly.

27. It is our order, that Brigadier General *Goddard* have a conſtant ſeat as third in our ſaid Council and Select Committee. We likewiſe direct, that Mr. *Henry More* be the fourth member of our Select Committee at *Bombay*.

28. As a further mark of our approbation of the conduct of Brigadier General *Goddard*, we have directed that the pay and allowances received by him from *Bengal*, as Commander in Chief of the detachment ſent from that ſettlement, be continued to him and paid by our Governor General and Council, ſo long as thoſe troops ſhall remain under General *Goddard's* command on the weſtern ſide of *India*; he muſt alſo receive the pay and allowances of third of our Council and Select Committee at *Bombay*. But if our Governor General and Council ſhall recal the Bengal detachment, the pay and allowances received by General *Goddard* on that account muſt be diſcontinued, and ceaſe immediately upon the return of the ſaid detachment, as it will then be no longer under his authority or command; and after that period General *Goddard* muſt receive the pay and allowances of our Commander in Chief of our troops at *Bombay*.

APPENDIX, No. 330.

Secret Department, Tueſday. At a Council; preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

READ the following letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

Bombay, 17th Auguſt. Encloſed is duplicate of our letter, dated the 30th ultimo.

The Preſident ſoon after laid before us a plan for the operations of the enſuing campaign, which we take this firſt opportunity of tranſmitting to you, together with a copy of the letter we ſent to General *Goddard*, conveying our ſentiments of the plan, and the meaſures we propoſe purſuing on our part in conſequence.

The Preſident's minute and our letter containing a full ſtatement of the preſent ſituation of affairs, as relative to the Maratta war, as well as of the propoſed meaſures; it would be uſeleſs repetition to give them in detail here, and we therefore beg you will be referred to the papers in the packet.

We ſhall however explain ourſelves more fully to you on the ſubject of the excluſive appropriation you have deſired us to make of the receipts from the late acquiſitions, for the payment of the army under General *Goddard*.

If with our former reſources, we were under a neceſſity of requiring in addition a conſtant and ſtated ſubſidy from you, to ſupport the charges of this Preſidency, that neceſſity will not in any ſhape be leſſened, but very conſiderably augmented, by the late increaſe of our poſſeſſions; if the revenues are to be diverted to another channel, and ſo long as our receipts continue to fall ſhort of our expences, we ſhall not only ſtand in need of this ordinary ſupply from *Bengal*, but alſo of further aid, in proportion to any extraordinary and unprovided for demand which we may have to anſwer; or, to bring the matter exactly to a point, ſuppoſing an aggregate made of the expences of this Preſidency, and of the army under General *Goddard*, oppoſed to our receipts and revenues, the deficiency can be ſupplied from no other reſource but your Treaſury.

If it ſhould appear theſe receipts are unequal to the ſingle demands of this Preſidency, it can be no relief to your Government to leſſen General *Goddard's* demand upon you by increaſing ours, which is equally preſſing, but only varying the proportion of the reſpective ſupply to each. If you find both expences too heavy to ſupport, we have foreſeen that contingency, and pointed out a remedy, which will not be found in the meaſure you have propoſed to us; which, excluſive of the diſtreſs it will occaſion, is humiliating to this Government in the higheſt degree, when neither the army we are to pay, or the application of the money we are to furniſh, are under our controul.

We have already upon different emergencies, afforded to General *Goddard* conſiderable aids of money, not without involving ourſelves in great difficulties; and if our means are increaſed by the late acquiſitions, we ſhall moſt readily contribute more liberal aſſiſtance: but too much confidence muſt not be placed in the immediate receipts from that ſource, conſidering that the diſtricts from whence this revenue is expected were not taken into the Company's poſſeſſion till nearly the end of May laſt; and we have yet no knowledge but from country accounts, of what ſums they may afford, nor dependance upon making the collections, but from the protection that is given to the country. We requeſt theſe circumſtances may be attended to, when the eſtimate now ſent by the Board in conſequence of your letter of the 1ſt May, comes under conſideration.

To prevent the diſtreſs that would reſult from a deficiency in the ſupplies from you occaſioned by an overrated computation of the ſums to be produced by that reſource, we ſubjoin extracts of letters from the Chief of *Surat*, containing the laſt information on that ſubject.

"The Honourable Company's Tannahs are fixed in the 16th June.
"ſeveral Pergunnahs belonging to the Peiſhwa Govern-
"ment, as alſo in the different ceſſions to the Honourable
"Company from *Futty Sing Guicawar*; and every en-
"couragement given to the inhabitants to return to their
"villages, and reaſſume the cultivation; and from pre-
"ſent appearances, I flatter myſelf the Honourable
"Company will be able to recover a handſome revenue
"therefrom the next ſeaſon."

"Your Honour, &c. may reſt aſſured, that every Auguſt 2d.
"attention ſhall be uſed on my part, for procuring as
"large a revenue from the late acquiſitions as may lay
"in my power, but the whole will depend on the
"enemy's being prevented *from* entering the Per-
"gunnahs."

The importance and abſolute neceſſity of the expedition into the *Conkan* is very fully explained in the Governor's minute: it is, in ſhort, eſſential to the ſucceſs of the war; and the conqueſt of *Baſſein* would only be an addition to our burthens, unleſs the country is firſt ſecured, nor could the army be ſubſiſted otherwiſe. The preſent poſition of the army under General *Goddard* puts it out of his power to effect this in time, and we have therefore undertaken the execution of this ſervice, which we will venture to pronounce, is more calculated to produce a favourable criſis to the war, than any other which could at preſent be adopted. Our endeavours muſt be entirely defeated were we to throw our reſources out of our own hands; and we ſhall truſt, that when you are informed of the general tendency of our late meaſures to relieve you from your preſent intolerable burthens, and the vigorous exertion for which we are now preparing,

you

you will at leaſt provide for the payment of the Bengal troops, even if the lowneſs of your treaſury ſhould diſable you from aſſiſting us further; and we ſhall in the mean time appropriate the receipts from the new Pergunnahs to the general purpoſes of the war, and admit General *Goddard* to ſuch a participation as we can poſſibly afford.

If you ſhould judge it an expedient meaſure, upon the grounds of the Governor's minute, we requeſt you will negociate a loan in *Calcutta* to the amount of ten lacks of rupees, on the bonds of this Government, and ſend the amount in ſpecie to *Bombay*, for the purpoſes therein explained.

We hope that the line of conduct we have recommended to General *Goddard*, to be obſerved for the preſent towards *Futty Sing*, will meet with your approbation.

We acquainted you, in our letter of the 30th ultimo, with the conduct of the Nabob *Hyder Ally* to the Reſident at *Onore*; and it is proper we ſhould mention, that as the Nabob did not return any anſwer to the Preſident's propoſals of ſending a gentleman to him, we countermanded Mr. *Horſley*'s intended journey.

In our diſpatches of the 2d January, we tranſmitted the information we had received from General *Goddard* of the correſpondence carried on by the Dutch Chief at *Surat* with the Poonah Miniſters. The General has, in a ſubſequent letter which you will find in the papers now ſent, ſtrongly preſſed us to take public notice of the conduct of Mr. *Vande Graaf*, which we have deferred doing, till we receive your inſtructions, for which there will be ſufficient time before an opportunity will offer for *Batavia*, if you ſhould think it proper for us to make a repreſentation to the Dutch Governor General. Tranſlation to the intercepted letters are now encloſed, and the original of that from Mr. *Vande Graaf* is in our poſſeſſion, and ſealed with his official ſeal, as a Director at *Surat*.

We have directed Mr. *Henſhaw* to obtain the moſt authentic teſtimonials he can at *Goa*, of the ſeveral facts relative to the ſeizure of the Engliſh veſſel at *Mangulore*; which when received ſhall be tranſmitted to you.

Encloſed is a duplicate of our letter of the 14th inſtant; and the original packet from the Honourable Company therein mentioned, is now forwarded by the *Duke of Grafton*.

We are, with reſpect, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 17th Auguſt 1780. (Signed) *William Hornby*, &c. Select Committee.

Ordered, That the encloſures in the above letter be entered after the conſultation, and that the letter itſelf do lie for conſideration.

Preſident's Statement of the preſent Poſture of Affairs, and Propoſal of a Plan for the Operations of the enſuing Campaign.

1. The preſent ſeaſon which obliges both our troops and thoſe of the enemy to remain inactive, affords us an opportunity, uninterrupted by caſual intervening circumſtances, of reviewing the general poſture of our affairs as relative to the Maratta war, the advantage or difficulties of our preſent ſituation; and of conſidering how far the one may be improved, or the other relieved.

2. The war the nation is at preſent engaged in with *France* and *Spain*; the uncertain diſpoſition of the principal Powers in *India* who yet remain neuter in the conteſt between us and the Marattas; and the reduced ſtate of the Company's finances in *India*, while Government at home is calling on them for extraordinary ſupplies, in aid of the public neceſſities, ſufficiently evince the expediency of bringing this Maratta war to as early a concluſion as poſſible.

3. At preſent however there ſeems no likelihood of effecting this deſirable purpoſe by treaty, all attempts that have been made of this kind having hitherto failed. We need not be at a loſs for the reaſon why the very moderate terms demanded by the Governor General and Council laſt year, could not be accepted by *Nana* and by *Scindia*; and that reaſon ſtill ſubſiſts in its full force. The public faith engaged to *Ragoba* for his ſecurity, and the views of both *Nana* and *Scindia* in deſiring to obtain poſſeſſion of his perſon, form an obſtacle which in a ſeparate treaty with *Nana* ſeems inſurmountable, and with *Scindia*, is certainly of no ſmall difficulty. I do but touch on theſe ſubjects, for ſince the commencement of hoſtilities between General *Goddard* and *Mhadjee Scindia*, all preſent expectations of a peace by treaty with *Nana* and *Scindia*, jointly or ſeparately with either, has been at an end. The Governor General and Council have not even been pleaſed to inform us, whether they have empowered General *Goddard* to enter into further negociation ſince the termination of that which they authorized him in June laſt to commence with the Government at *Poonah*, and with *Futty Sing*, after the recommencement of hoſtilities, nor with their views in any future negociation for peace.

4. In the mean time their ſentiments with regard to the operations of war, and the direction of them to its final termination, we muſt conclude correſpond with ours; not indeed from any direct communication of theirs to us on this momentous ſubject, but from their approbation of my plan for the conduct of the war, delivered in this Committee laſt year *; according to which, the partition of *Guzerat* with *Futty Sing*, and the reduction of *Baſſein*, which with its diſtricts would connect our poſſeſſions in one continued line from hence to the *Myhie*, were to be the objects of the war, and the boundaries of our views in regard to the acquiſition of territory for this Preſidency.

* 30th March 1779.

5. All treaty for the preſent being at an end, and whenever recommenced, there being ſuch difficulties as to render the concluſion of a peace by this means very doubtful, I confeſs I have but little hope of it, unleſs by ſucceſs in vigorous meaſures directed to certain objects, and ſtrictly confined to them. What they are, as far as we are informed, and what they ought to be, according to our repeated reſolutions and opinions, is above expreſſed in a few words, and already in part accompliſhed. The reduction of *Baſſein*, and its dependent diſtricts, alone remains to complete our views; and when effected will bring us to that period, when, if the enemy refuſe to accept of a peace, they muſt continue the war with us on our own terms, as we ſhall then be in poſſeſſion of a revenue equal to all our expences, on a plan of mere defence, which the nature of the country will make eaſy to us; while our ſituation will render our force in the higheſt degree formidable to them during the war, and at all times reſpectable.

6. It is true however, that neither the revenue of all this territory, nor much more, will ſuffice both for the ſupport of General *Goddard*'s army, and of our own eſtabliſhment, which beſides we may fear will be growing more and more burthenſome, on account of the expectation our troops naturally entertain of being ſupported on the ſame footing with the Bengal army, which though given way to at firſt, only as a temporary indulgence, will ſoon be grounded on the plea of precedents; and when our officers have once formed their expences upon this (extravagant) plan, the inefficacy of oppoſing regulation to eſtabliſhing habit and cuſtom, will be felt here as it has been already experienced in other Governments.

7. By the advices laſt received from the Governor General and Council, we learn, "that their diſtreſs for "money is ſuch, that they ſhall be unable to make "adequate remittances for the ſupport of this Preſidency, "and the pay of the army under General *Goddard*."

This

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This diſtreſs may continue ſo long, or increaſe ſo far, as to overbalance by many degrees all the advantages derived from the aſſiſtance of the Bengal detachment. And the only ſecurity we can have againſt the evil, is in the diſpatch we uſe in putting our affairs into ſuch a poſture as to diſpenſe with this dangerous aid.

8. This we could never have done but by making ſuch an augmentation of our military force, as we have with this very view reſolved on, and which, if the events of the next campaign do not much diſappoint us, we may hope will enable us to ſend back the Bengal and Madras battalions as early as we can receive the neceſſary communications in reply to the letters already written to *Bengal* on this ſubject, and the ſeaſon will well permit; that is to ſay, by February or March next.

9. In a word then, peace, either formally or ſubſtantially, ſhould be the firſt object of our wiſhes. The ſecond, (and hardly of leſs importance to this Government than the firſt) to ſend back the troops of the other Preſidencies, which we have no preſent means nor future hope of being able to maintain, unleſs by ſupplies from *Bengal*, which we are plainly told are no longer to be depended on.

10. We have ourſelves ſcarce ever felt greater diſtreſs for money than at this time, and muſt ſtill expect to feel for ſome months; and I am well aware of the impediment we may meet from this cauſe, in the execution of any plan that can be propoſed; yet this is no reaſon with me againſt our entering on action, but indeed the contrary; for if we can by any means advance, we may ſtill as we proceed hope to find ſome relief to our neceſſities, which, while we remain inactive, muſt be ſtill increaſing on us till we are unable even to attempt a remedy. The expence of our preſent eſtabliſhment muſt be borne, whether our troops are kept in action or in idleneſs; and this expence alone is ſufficient to ſink us: the only difference therefore is, that by the former we have a proſpect of relieving our neceſſities; by the latter, none; for no reſource remains for us, but ſuch as we may find in our own efforts. Theſe I flatter myſelf will prove ſucceſsful; but if they do not, we ſhall have the conſolation of having made them, and ſhall be ſubject to no reproach for want of foreſight, or for inactivity or delay; and ſhall at leaſt put off the moment in which we are to give up all our hope to the laſt. We muſt therefore, in ſpite of all difficulties, reſolve to ſtruggle on towards the accompliſhment of the end we have in view, and determine to be ſtopped by nothing but abſolute impoſſibilities. I am not without hopes too, that the Governor General and Council will, notwithſtanding the lowneſs of their treaſury, fall on ſome expedient for aſſiſting us, when they are informed of the tendency of our meaſures to render all ſupplies from them for the future unneceſſary, and to relieve our employers from the intolerable burden the Bengal army on this ſide of *India* has proved to them.

11. Before I proceed to propoſe the ſentiments I mean to ſubmit to the Committee, relative to the operations of the enſuing campaign, it is neceſſary to take notice of ſome circumſtances of our connection with *Futty Sing*, to which the laſt letter from *Bengal* refers, as well as of all other particulars of our preſent ſituation which are to be taken into conſideration in order to form a juſt judgment with regard to our future meaſures.

12. The Governor General and Council have been pleaſed to inform us, that they ſhall conform to the caution given them by us, relative to the apparent diſproportion between our ſhare of the partition of *Guzerat* and *Futty Sing*'s, in their final ratification of the treaty with him. They likewiſe ſeem inclined to think that excluſive of the above-mentioned diſproportion, the exchange of territory agreed on with him muſt rather prove diſadvantageous to the Company, becauſe, as they ſay, "We gain for lands lying remote and rendered in a degree inacceſſible to the Marattas by the interpoſition "of two capital rivers, a diſtrict immediately on their "borders and open to their incurſions."

13. They have accordingly recommended three ſeveral ways of finally adjuſting the partition of the province; viz.

1ſt. Either to annul the exchange altogether, and both parties to poſſeſs their ſhare according to the former diviſion between the Peiſhwa and *Futty Sing*; for this I apprehend to be the meaning of the Governor General and Council, who ſeem to have miſunderſtood the ſituation of *Zinnore* and *Dubhoy*, and to have conſidered them as having both formerly belonged to *Futty Sing*, and to have ſuppoſed likewiſe that he had poſſeſſed no part of the province to the ſouthward of theſe places.

Or, 2dly. *Futty Sing* to make up the diſproportion by further ceſſion of land to the Company.

Or, 3dly. By paying an equivalent ſubſidy in ready money.

14. The Committee will recollect, that General *Goddard* in his reply to their letter of the 24th February, expreſſes his opinion poſitively, that the diviſion in point of revenue is already in our favour; and till we have an opportunity of informing ourſelves with certainty on this point, it will be highly impolitic to alarm *Futty Sing* with the appearance of inſtituting freſh claims: and, as the Governor General and Council have kept this matter open for future adjuſtment, I conceive that for the preſent this is ſufficient; and it will be adviſable to wait a more convenient ſeaſon than the preſent for the diſcuſſion.

15. With regard to the objection which the Governor General and Council have ſtated to the ſituation of our diviſion of the province, it ſeems to me totally without foundation. General *Goddard* has in the principal of the exchanges with *Futty Sing*, conformed ſtrictly to the plan which was originally concerted with him, and approved by the Governor General and Council. The ſouthern part of *Guzerat* will, after the reduction of *Baſſein* and its diſtricts, connect in one continued line with the reſt of our territory. The mountains which ſtretch northward from thence are a ſecurity to it from the ſouthward and eaſtward; and the *Myhie*, which forms our boundary to the northward, and the *Nerbuddah* and *Tappy* which interſect our portion of *Guzerat*, and are navigable higher than any other rivers of the province, give a clear advantage to this part of the country over that north of the *Myhie*, from which, if we were poſſeſſed of it, we ſhould be cut off by *Futty Sing*'s diviſion to the ſouthward, and during great part of the fair ſeaſon ſhould have but a tedious communication with it by ſea, on account of the north weſt winds which then prevail, and the difficulties of the navigation in the gulf of *Cambay*; while on the ſide of *Malva* and *Candeiſh*, it lies equally expoſed with the other, as well as to the depredations of the numerous bands of freebooters who are in poſſeſſion of the country to the N. W. By which and by the various oppreſſions it has ſuffered from its many maſters, within theſe laſt thirty years, it is totally changed from what it formerly has been; a melancholy inſtance of which may be ſeen in the preſent ſtate of the once flouriſhing city of *Ahmedabad*.

16. The Governor General and Council therefore having deſired that we would afford General *Goddard* the aid of our advice on this ſubject, and in a manner that ſeems to refer the deciſion on it to us, I would propoſe that we ſhould recommend to General *Goddard* to adhere by all means to the firſt intention of reſerving the ſouthern part of the province to ourſelves, and likewiſe for the preſent, wave entering on the more exact adjuſtment of the reſpective proportions of the Company, and of *Futty Sing* in the diviſion of it. The revenue we ſhall be in immediate receipt of, as we are now ſituated in that quarter, and the further views we have to proſecute on this ſide rendering it moſt prudent in my opinion to avoid a ſubject that may give cauſe of diſſatisfaction to

Futty Sing, to whom (if neceſſary) I think it might even be expedient to confirm any advantage he may have, according to the preſent partition, rather than to hazard a breach or even coolneſs with him, that would oblige us in any degree to withdraw our attention from the proſecution of the objects which ſo preſſingly demand it to the ſouthward.

17. I have the pleaſure to obſerve that General *Goddard*'s ſentiments with regard to the reduction of *Baſſein*, as the firſt operation of the enſuing campaign, entirely concur with ours, and he has deſired "to receive "from us the earlieſt communication of the plan we "would recommend for carrying it into execution, the "manner, time, and every thing elſe that may be "conducive to its early ſucceſs." He is even ſo anxious for undertaking this important enterprize, that he ſeems to wiſh to come down by ſea, as ſoon as ever the ſeaſon will permit of his embarking his troops from *Surat*, where he informs us he is providing every material neceſſary for conſtructing the works and carrying on the ſiege, which can eaſily be conveyed by water; but depending entirely on us for aſſiſtance of ſuch artillery, ſtores, and ammunition, as may be requiſite, and alſo for the neceſſary ſupplies of proviſions.

18. The General informs us likewiſe that *Scindia* and *Holkar* are certainly ſeparated, the former being gone to *Eugene*, and the latter to *Indore*; and that he has recommended to the Governor General and Council to aſſiſt in a plan of detaining them in the northern provinces, while we purſue our views here, by cauſing a powerful diverſion of their forces on the ſide of *Malwa*: and we muſt ſuppoſe, that it is to this purpoſe that the operations of the detachment under Captain *Popham*, in conjunction with the Rana of *Ghode*, are now directed, though we have heard nothing from the Governor General and Council on this ſubject, and know nothing of the proceedings of that detachment but by the intelligence of private correſpondents.

19. By the ſucceſs which has attended the detachment ordered by General *Goddard* againſt *Gunneſe Punt*, in driving him entirely out of *Guzerat*, and in taking poſſeſſion of the forts to the ſouthward of it, the General's quarters are now extended to the borders of the diſtricts dependent on *Baſſein*, and the revenue from our diviſion of *Guzerat* is ſecured for the next ſeaſon. *Scindia* and *Holkar* are the only enemies who can moleſt us from the northward; and even if their attention ſhould not be engaged on the ſide of *Bengal*, yet there is no reaſon to ſuppoſe that they will be able to aſſemble their troops and ſettle the terms on which they are to afford their aſſiſtance to *Nana*, ſo as to attempt any thing againſt us next ſeaſon earlier than they did the laſt; that is to ſay, before the end of February: and indeed *Scindia*'s operations during the laſt campaign ſeemed rather directed to cover his own country than to attack ours; and if that be ſtill his view, we ſhall have nothing to apprehend from him on the ſide of *Guzerat* while our troops are employed on this.

20. General *Goddard*, however, I dare ſay will be able to provide ſufficiently for the protection of that province when he comes this way, as in caſe of neceſſity a ſtrong reinforcement from the garriſon of *Surat* and *Broach* may take the field to join ſuch troops as the General may think proper to leave behind him to the northward.

21. In the mean time I conſider the poſition of General *Goddard*'s army, till the ſeaſon for action commences, as very advantageous, by ſecuring the Pergunnahs from which we are to expect ſo large a part of our reſources for the next year againſt the incurſions of the enemy from the ſouthward: this advantage will ſtill be maintained, and even extended, by his bringing down his army to the attack of *Baſſein* by land, as he will in fact by this means take in the whole country as he advances; he will too be in readineſs for undertaking the ſiege of *Baſſein* immediately on his arrival there; whereas if he comes down by ſea to *Bombay*, ſome time will be neceſſary to furniſh him with the neceſſary apparatus for the ſiege. And after the reduction of the place, his army will require to be fitted out afreſh for the field, in which we are under great diſadvantages from the nature of our preſent limits; and in the mean time the country between the hills and the ſea lying open to the enemy, they may do conſiderable damage to our northern Pergunnahs by incurſions from the *Concan*. Appendix No. 330.

22. At the time General *Goddard* propoſed coming down by ſea to the attack of *Baſſein*, he was unacquainted with the footing we had gained on the Continent, nor can he yet be informed of the purpoſes to which we may be able to apply this advantage in favour of his operations againſt *Baſſein*, and his march to the ſouthward; theſe I flatter myſelf are of the moſt deciſive kind, and will I think appear ſuch with ſo great a degree of evidence, as I proceed to explain the part I propoſe our troops ſhould take in the next campaign, that I do not doubt of the concurrence of the Committee.

23. By poſſeſſing ourſelves of *Callian* we have ſecured one of the moſt favourable openings into the *Conkan*, ſituated at eaſy and nearly equal diſtances from the principal paſſes leading to and from the *Decan*; it muſt be by poſſeſſing theſe, and by a reſpectable body of troops to cover the country, that we muſt endeavour to exclude the enemy from it, and render it uſeful to ourſelves. I would accordingly propoſe that five battalions ſhould be aſſembled at *Callian*, and all neceſſary preparation made for them to take the field as early as the ſeaſon will permit, it being a point of the laſt importance to have this body of troops in readineſs to protect the harveſt before the enemy can begin their operations: I do not pretend now to fix the preciſe time for their entering on action, which muſt depend on the ſeaſon and on many particulars of local knowledge, which can only be judged of on the ſpot; I therefore ſhould think it ſufficient for the preſent to appoint the officer we pitch on for this command, together with the commanding officer of artillery and the Commiſſary, who ſhould now be made acquainted with our views in forming this army, and be employed as may ſeem neceſſary in making the requiſite preparation in their ſeveral departments. Theſe views, according to my idea, are to ſecure to ourſelves the poſſeſſion of the country, and by that means a plentiful ſubſiſtence for our troops during the campaign, to guard the paſſes from the *Decan* into the *Conkan*, and otherwiſe cover the country till General *Goddard*'s arrival, and then to cover the ſiege of *Baſſein*.

24. By the appointment of the above-mentioned officers, and communicating our plan of operations thus early, I make no doubt of having every thing put in the neceſſary degree of forwardneſs in the ſeveral departments, without any unneceſſary increaſe of expence.—The officers we entruſt with this command will acquire, before the ſeaſon for action opens, a thorough knowledge of the country, in which the enemy have a vaſt advantage over us at preſent, and may prepare by many ſmall enterprizes and movements for the main ſervice on which he knows he is to be employed, and thus greatly facilitate its future ſucceſs.

25. The advantage we ſhall derive from the poſition of our troops and of General *Goddard*'s army, ſeems to me to be of the greateſt conſequence, it will ſecure to us the produce of an extenſive and plentiful tract of country, at a time when our diſtreſs for money will render ſuch a reſource doubly valuable; the enemy will be obliged to fight for an entrance into the *Conkan* if they preſume to attempt it, which I think they hardly will, as they will then be ſhut up between the two armies; we may conſider the country therefore as ours from the moment our troops take the field, if we are beforehand in this reſpect with the enemy.

26. With an army from hence in the field to prevent the enemy from entering the country on this ſide, it will not be very material whether General *Goddard* is a little ſooner or later in undertaking the ſiege of *Baſſein*. Our

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army in the *Conkan* will ſecure his unmoleſted march to the ſouthward, he will find a plentiful country to ſupply his army as he comes along, and we hope to meet with little oppoſition in the complete reduction of it with ſo reſpectable force both in numbers and ſituation.

27. The troops will better bear running in arrears while they are kept employed on actual ſervice and ſubſiſted from the country, than they will while they are idle in garriſon, and have no other dependance than their pay; in this reſpect therefore money will be leſs neceſſary to us, though we may feel the want of it in others; but the reputation of ſucceſs, and the near proſpect of bettering our finance, will of themſelves keep up a credit that may prove a reſource which we ſhall hardly obtain by any other means.

28. A further conſideration worthy of attention is this, that the difference of a month earlier in the field may make the difference of a whole year or more in point of revenue, or in the aids of ſubſiſtence to be expected from the country, for if the enemy are able to conſume and deſtroy the produce, it is certain that nothing can be had from it till a new crop comes in; and we may likewiſe reckon as our loſs, the detriment the future revenues muſt ſuffer by the depopulation of the villages.

29. The fall of *Baſſein*, our indiſputed poſſeſſion of the country and paſſes, and the actual ſtrength of the two armies, will certainly ſpread an alarm at *Foonah*, that may not improbably be expected to form a criſis, that may be improved to the great work of peace, but will certainly at leaſt ſerve to ſecure the tranquillity of our more diſtant poſſeſſions, as the enemy will hardly venture to ſend their forces from *Decan*, while they ſee ours aſſembled ſo near the capital.

30. In order to heighten to the utmoſt the impreſſion this ſituation may make on the enemy, and at the ſame time to keep alive the reliance *Ragoba* has ſtill had on us for aſſiſtance; it might perhaps be worth while to let him try his fortune in the ſouthern parts of the *Conkan*, between this and *Goa*, with ſuch forces as he could collect, and backed by a ſmall detachment of ours. He has yet ſome partizans in arms in the country. *Monackjee Funera* has ſent to me, offering aſſiſtance, and I know that there are now overtures making to *Ragoba* on this ſubject by the Rajah of *Callapore*, whoſe country gives an opening into the *Decan*, on the banks of the *Kiſtna*, not far from *Meritz*; *Ragoba* might then be able to form ſome eſtabliſhment for himſelf, in which, while the war continued, he would be eaſily ſupported by us, engage much of the enemy's attention, and render the work of peace more eaſy than it is at preſent. This, however, is rather thrown out as a hint, that may be purſued at its proper ſeaſon, than as a part of the preſent plan.

31. If inſtead of ſtepping forward in the war, we confine ourſelves merely to maintaining our garriſons in *Callian* and *Bellpore*, and waiting there General *Goddard*'s arrival from *Surat*, we muſt be ſatisfied to ſee the enemy poſſeſſed of the country, as ſoon as ever the ſeaſon will allow them to take the field, and our garriſons inſulted with impunity, and ſtraitened for every neceſſary of life. The enemy will ſupport themſelves by means of the reſources we have failed to avail ourſelves of, and may prepare for General *Goddard*'s march to the ſouthward, by laying waſte the whole country ſo completely, as not to leave a blade of graſs between him and *Callian*. By like means, in a much leſs diſtance, only 18 miles, *Mhadjee Scindia* effectually ſtopped General *Goddard*'s progreſs laſt ſeaſon; and in the preſent inſtance we have the more to apprehend from this mode of defence on the enemy's part, as it may go near to ſtarve us on our iſlands; and thus, beſides our own diſtreſs, diſappoint General *Goddard* in the dependance, he expreſsly ſays he has on us for proviſions, which it will be impoſſible for us to furniſh, unleſs by ſecuring the country, from whence it is produced.

32. If when the enemy is once come down into *Conkan*, theſe dangers appear ſo preſſing, as to induce us to ſend over our troops to act againſt them, we ſhall find, that for want of ſome little neceſſary preparation they will be landed in ſo crippled a ſtate that they will be unable to act, or but to little effect; much of the miſchief will be already done; and the enemy, who might eaſily have been keep out of the country, being once in it, will render it ſo difficult a matter to ſupply ourſelves, either with the neceſſary cattle for carriage and draft, or with proviſions, as will perhaps put it out of our power, but certainly render it very difficult to expel them; General *Goddard* indeed may ſtill come down by ſea, and though under manifeſt diſadvantages, he may reduce *Baſſein*, the acquiſition of which would burthen us with another chargeable garriſon, without enlarging our means of maintaining it; for General *Goddard*, if he come down by ſea, will have to fit out his army anew for taking the field; and if the enemy are in poſſeſſion of the country, will be as little able to effect it as we ſhall, for an increaſe of our numbers will only prove an increaſe of difficulty. Theſe conſiderations, I think, make it evident that the reduction of *Baſſein* will be performed with infinitely greater advantage if General *Goddard* come by land, than in the other mode of bringing down his army by ſea.

33. After ſtating thus at large the reaſons on which I found my recommendation of the above-mentioned meaſures, I ſhall not diſſemble the objections to which they ſeem moſt liable.

34. It may perhaps be thought that at a ſeaſon when we may probably expect to be attacked by an armament from *France*, we ought not to carry our views beyond our own defence till that danger is paſt. My anſwer to this objection is, that in the firſt place it is probable that our troops cannot take the field in the *Conkan* before the ſeaſon for an attack on this iſland by the French is paſt; and ſecondly, that this ſcene of action is propoſed to be confined ſo much to our own neighbourhood, that they will always be at hand to return to our aſſiſtance at a few hours warning. From the advices laſt received, we have no reaſon to think the probability of ſuch an attack at all increaſed; but even if it were far greater than any one I ſuppoſe can at preſent think it, I confeſs, no more probability ſeems ſufficient to juſtify us in remaining inactive. Under ſuch circumſtances as we are now in, we have it not in our choice to make peace either with the French or the Marattas, and therefore muſt remain ſubject to the riſk of a joint attack from them; for which very reaſon it ſeems neceſſary that we ſhould exert ourſelves with greater vigour, in order to eſtabliſh our ſuperiority over one, before the arrival of the other. I am by no means inſenſible to the danger we might be expoſed to from an attack by the French while we are engaged with the Marattas. But I think this danger better guarded againſt by puſhing hardily through the difficulties that preſs the moſt nearly on us, than by timid precautions, which provide againſt only one of our fears, and that the moſt remote.

35. An objection of far greater weight than that above-mentioned, in my opinion, is founded on our preſent want of money to carry on a plan of active ſervice into execution. The balance of caſh on the firſt of this month was only about 40,000 rupees; and from that time to the end of October, I ſee no probability of our receiving more than three, or at moſt three lacks and a half. Our ordinary expences for the ſame time cannot be eſtimated at leſs than one lack and a half per month, which, with one lack to be ſent from *Tellicherry*, one lack for the neceſſary preparation for our troops to take the field according to the above plan, and one more for their unavoidable expences, will bring our charges within the ſame time to nine lacks of rupees — We may flatter ourſelves with the hope of ſupplies from *Bengal*; but we cannot depend on them, and therefore muſt look for ſuch reſources as are to be had within ourſelves; and in my opinion there never was an occaſion which demanded our moſt ſtrenuous exertion more than the

preſent

preſent, for we are now ſo critically ſituated, that in the ſtate of our affairs for the enſuing year, and even the fortune of the war, will depend on the forwardneſs in which we may be for action at the very firſt opening of the ſeaſon. Whatever reſources therefore may preſent themſelves after October next, if in the mean time we are unable to find caſh for our neceſſary preparatory expences, they will come too late for our purpoſes; the enemy will be in poſſeſſion of the country before us; we ſhall be obliged to act againſt them under all the diſadvantages of an unfurniſhed army, and experience all the difficulties which their great ſuperiority in cavalry enables them to oppoſe to us; and if at laſt we drive them paſt the mountains, we ſhall have poſſeſſed ourſelves only of a depopulated and exhauſted country that will yield us neither revenue nor ſubſiſtence.

36. In circumſtances of ſuch preſſing neceſſity, and with objects of ſo great magnitude in view, I ſhould not doubt of the propriety of our reſolving on the moſt deſperate remedies, if none others were left. I flatter myſelf however that we have yet one reſource within our power, which will furniſh us with an immediate ſupply of ready money within the time above-mentioned. There is now in our warehouſe copper to the value of about ſeven or eight lacks, which I would propoſe ſhould be peremptorily ſold, to be paid for in ready money within three months, under a penalty of fifteen per cent. in default of payment at the ſtipulated terms. It would be neceſſary likewiſe, that it ſhould be ſold in large lots, not leſs than 1,000 maunds each, in order that the whole might be purchaſed by reſponſible men, who might be depended on for making good their engagements. I think too we ought to make this ſale without delay, as the arrival of ſhips that may now be expected, may reduce the price of our copper much below the price it may now fetch.

37. Notwithſtanding the preſent ſcarcity of money, it is generally believed that there are lodged in this place large ſums of gold and ſilver, which, ſince the troubles in the Maratta empire, ſome of the richeſt Bramins have depoſited here as a place of greater ſecurity than any other they could pitch on, on account of the nature of our Government, and the eſtabliſhed rights of private property among us. Theſe people are not indeed merchants, but copper being conſidered here as a ſort of precious metal, they would I believe exchange the money for it, if they ſaw proſpect of ſufficient advantage in it; we muſt expect therefore that it would ſell low, comparatively to the price we have lately ſold at, on the long credit uſually allowed at our ſales; yet I think we ſhall ſtill get at leaſt a ſaving price for the Company. And I am perſuaded every one who conſiders the ſtate of our affairs with any degree of knowledge or attention, muſt be ſatisfied that a preſent command of money for the purpoſes of the war, is of greater moment than any differenee of price in the ſale of our copper, which can never be put in competition with any one of the objects now in contemplation; excluding the enemy from the *Conkan*; ſecuring the immediate poſſeſſion of it to the Company, together with the ſubſiſtence of our armies and garriſons; completing our line of territory; bringing the war as near as poſſible to a termination, and relieving our eſtabliſhment from the expence of the Bengal army.

38. I entirely concur with the Governor General and Council, that as much as poſſible of our revenue, and the whole of that ariſing from the new acquired pergunnahs, ſhould be ſet apart for the purpoſes of the war.—Our aid however from this ſervice till after October, will be nothing. From that time till the end of December, I hope we may be able to procure about ſix lacks from *Surat* and *Broach*, which will juſt ſerve to ſupport our own indiſpenſable expences. After the commencement of the next year, I flatter myſelf our ſupplies from the northward will be conſiderable enough to render our ſituation ſomewhat eaſy. And ſuppoſing our buſineſs in the *Conkan* effected, and that we are relieved from the burthen of the Bengal and Madras battalions, I think we ſhall ſee the affairs of the Company on this ſide of *India* in a fair and proſperous train. Appendix No. 330.

39. As ready money will be abſolutely neceſſary for the payment of the troops of the other Preſidencies before they are ſent home, and the neceſſities of the Governor General and Council ſeem ſo preſſing as to oblige them to turn their views even to us for aſſiſtance, which I cannot think we ſhall be able to furniſh from any funds which we ſhall be in receipt of ſo ſoon as next month; and the whole property of this place being already in a manner inveſted in the Company's bonds, ſo that we cannot expect to be able to procure any further ſums at intereſt here; I think it would be expedient to requeſt of the Governor General and Council to negociate a loan in *Calcutta* to the amount of ten lacks of rupees on the bonds of this Government, and to ſend us round the amount in ſpecie; with which we ſhould, I think, find ourſelves ſufficiently in caſh to aſſiſt in diſcharging the arrears of the Bengal and Madras troops previous to their departure.

40. The extent and importance of this ſubject has led me into great length. I wiſh therefore, before I quit, to bring my opinion, together with the principal facts and arguments on which they are founded, within one general and comprehenſive view.

41. I think it abſolutely neceſſary to bring this Maratta war to as ſpeedy a concluſion as poſſible; at the ſame time I ſee little preſent hope of peace by means of treaty or negociation: I would wiſh therefore to ſee the war confined ſtrictly to what I conceive ought to be the objects of it, by the attainment of which we may either compel the enemy to peace, or reduce the war on our part to a mere plan of defence, for which the revenue we ſhall be in poſſeſſion of after the reduction of *Baſſein* and its dependant diſtricts, will amply ſuffice (if we are once relieved from the burden of the Bengal and Madras troops, to the expence of which, added to that of our own eſtabliſhments, much more than the revenue of all the territory we hope to acquire, would prove adequate). The reduction of *Baſſein* and its dependant diſtricts then I think ſhould be proceeded on, without ſuffering our attention to be diverted from this by any other object. But as the poſſeſſion of *Baſſein* alone without the country, will only be increaſing our charge at a time when we need every reſource to enable us to ſupport our exertions, I would have our operations ſo planned as to provide at once for the reduction of *Baſſein* and of the country which we muſt depend on for ſubſiſtence, and thus diſappoint the enemy in the only plan of defence in which they can hope for ſucceſs; for theſe purpoſes it ſeems indiſpenſably neceſſary that we ſhould take our meaſures ſo that our troops may be in the field ſome time before the enemy; and I accordingly propoſe to make ſuch appointments of officers, and ſuch a communication to them of our plan as ſeems neceſſary, in order to prepare for its execution. Senſible of the difficulties we have to ſtruggle with from the low ſtate of our finances, I think it neceſſary to take our meaſures in ſuch a manner as may moſt effectually tend to the relief of our neceſſities; but I do not think thoſe neceſſities, nor the difficulties ariſing from them, any ſufficient reaſon for inaction. If our want of money is now great, it is likely to become much greater, unleſs relieved by our own efforts. If theſe are now difficult to us, they will ſoon be impoſſible, and if they are ſo already, we are then already undone; yet even in this caſe we owe to ourſelves and to our conſtituents to bring this point to the proof, that nothing may remain unattempted that hereafter may be thought likely to have afforded a remedy. I am far however from thinking our affairs ſo deſperate, and have propoſed ſuch meaſures as to me ſeem likelieſt to put our affairs in a proſperous train, together with my reaſon for what I propoſe the Committee

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mittee will judge both of one and the other, and likewiſe conſider whether there is any other plan more ſuitable to all the circumſtances of our preſent ſituation. If the Committee concur with me, I think we cannot be too early in communicating our meaſure to General *Goddard* and to the Governor General and Council, who though "unable to make adequate remittances both for the ſup-"port of this Preſidency and the pay of the army under "the command of General *Goddard*," we may be confident will not neglect to provide for their own troops at leaſt, at a time when we are ſtraining every nerve to bring the war to ſuch a period as will relieve them not only from their preſent heavy charges on this ſide of *India*, but from all other in time to come.

1ſt Auguſt 1780. (Signed) *William Hornby.*

(A true copy.)
(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secry.

Copy of a Letter from General *Goddard*; dated at *Surat* the 6th Auguſt 1780, and received the 14th following.

Gentlemen,

I have the pleaſure to acknowledge your letter of the 3d inſtant. I am ſorry at the neceſſity which you have informed me has induced you to appropriate the two lacks of rupees ſent round from *Bengal* on the *Besborough*, to the payment of the arrears due to the detachment furniſhed by your Preſidency, becauſe it is a proof that your own wants are exceedingly preſſing, and diſappoint every expectation I might have formed of relief and aſſiſtance from you in diſcharging a part of the expences of the late campaign. I could not indeed build any thing on this hope, from the frequent deſcriptions you had given me of the low ſtate of your finances, nor did I think it the leſs incumbent on me to provide an adequate fund to the payment of the arrears due whenever it might be in my power, and for that purpoſe I meant to have taken the firſt opportunity of remitting a ſum of money to *Bombay*, which can always be done without any loſs, and generally with ſome advantage of exchange.

Reſpecting what you mention of Colonel *Hartley* and the paymaſter, being unable to inform you of any proviſion having been made for the payment of your troops by me, it is not at all ſurpriſing, as I was myſelf at that time unacquainted with the extent of the reſources it might afterwards be in my power to command, and of courſe could not ſpeak with any certainty either to the amount of the ſum itſelf, or to the time when it might be allowed me to furniſh it. Upon the march of your detachment, low as my finances were, I thought it neceſſary to make every poſſible exertion, and advanced what could be then ill afforded from the general ſtock, Rs 1,10,000. I at the ſame time told Colonel *Hartley* I ſhould take the firſt opportunity of remitting whatever ſum might be requiſite to clear off the arrears; which I meant to do when an application might be made ſtating their amount, and the improved ſtate of the treaſury put it in my power.

The Paymaſter, in his eſtimate given you, has generally ſaid it will require upwards of three lacks to pay off the arrears; of this ſum he has already received from you two lacks, and the Paymaſter of the Bengal detachment has by my orders diſcharged bills on his account to the amount of near Rs 1,40,000. This ſum exceeds Mr. *Lewis*'s ſtatement; but as he has never delivered in any accounts of his office from the firſt formation of Colonel *Hartley*'s detachment, I am at a loſs to know whether he confines his eſtimate to the arrears of the troops actually returned to the Preſidency, or extends to every expence of thoſe troops while in the field. I am therefore induced to beg you will be pleaſed to call upon Mr. *Lewis* for an account of the expenditure of ſuch ſums as he has already received, and direct him to tranſmit me the regular accounts of his diſburſements to the lateſt period poſſible, by which the balance due, if any, may be exactly aſcertained previous to my compliance with the application you ſay you have have left him to make to me for what further ſum may be wanting.

Although the Honourable Governor General and Council will moſt probably have themſelves tranſmitted you their ſentiments upon the exchange of territory in the late treaty with *Futty Sing*, as it may not have reached you I beg to tranſcribe extract of their letter to me on that ſubject.

"We have received from the Preſident and Select "Committee of *Bombay*, a copy of your correſpondence "with them to the 24th February.

"It appears by their laſt letter in this correſpondence, "that in the late treaty with *Futty Sing*, you have ceded "to him diſtricts which they eſtimate at the annual re-"venue of 27 lacks of rupees, but that in return there "was only yielded the Company the poſſeſſion of a country "eſtimated at 10,62,000 rupees, by which a difference of "16,37,100 Rs ariſes, which appears to be an entire loſs "to the Company: we are only able to account for this ex-"change, which has occaſioned ſuch a diminution of the "original value of our portion of the province of *Guzerat*, "by ſuppoſing that your knowledge of the character of "*Futty Sing* might ſuggeſt to you the expediency of hav-"ing ſome check over him, that the fort and diſtrict of "*Dubhoy* from its contiguity to *Brodera*, might appear "to you a deſirable poſſeſſion for the Company on this "account; but uninformed as we are of the other cir-"cumſtances on which the comparative advantage of the "diſtricts may depend, it ſeems to us that, excluſively of "the difference, the exchange made muſt rather prove "diſadvantageous to the Company: as we gain for lands "lying at a diſtance, and rendered in a degree inacceſſible "to the Marattas, by the interpoſition of capital rivers, "a diſtrict immediately bordering upon theirs, and at all "times open to their incurſions.

"This conſideration, we believe, did not occur to "you; but as it appears to us deſerving of your atten-"tion, we deſire that you will reconſider the part of the "treaty with *Futty Sing* to which it belongs, and avail "yourſelf of any advice reſpecting it, which you may "receive from the Preſident and Select Committee of "*Bombay*, whom we have requeſted to aſſiſt you with it.

"Such being our opinion of the exchange of the land "ſtipulated in the treaty, we think proper to direct,

"1ſt. That you either require the conſent of *Futty* "*Sing* to annul this exchange, and to give the poſſeſſion "of the diſtricts which formerly appertained to the "Peiſhwa on the north of the river *Myhie*, and which "were ceded to him by you, and to receive back the "diſtricts of *Zinnore* and *Dubhoy*, originally the Gui-"cawar ſhare on the ſouth of the *Tappey*, which were "ceded to him by you in like manner:

"Or, ſecondly, allowing the exchange to continue, to "aſſign and to deliver over to the Company poſſeſſion of "an additional portion of land, yielding a revenue equal "to the difference produced by that exchange, in the "manner preſcribed to you by the Preſident and Select "Committee of *Bombay*, in their letter to you of the "24th February:

"Or, thirdly, to enter into a ſpecial engagement for "a ſubſidy payable in ready money equal to that "amount

"The treaty has been tranſmitted to us by the Pre-"ſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* for our ratifi-"cation, and we ſhall return it to them in a few days, "properly confirmed; but guarding it with a reſer-"vation, providing a new and equitable ſettlement of "the province of *Guzerat*, according to the 5th article."

You will perceive by it the information on which they ground their objections to the preſent partition and alteration they have propoſed, contained in your letter of the 24th February, to which period only they had received

a copy

a copy of our correſpondence from you. I have therefore thought it neceſſary to ſend them an extract of my anſwer to you of the 7th March upon the ſame ſubject.

Since writing this letter, I have made every minute inquiry into the amount of the peiſhwa or revenue north of the *Myhie*, and have reaſon to be convinced, from the particular information I have received, and a compariſon of the ſeveral accounts I have been able to obtain, that the ſtatement you tranſmitted was greatly exaggerated, as indeed you acknowledged yourſelves you could not depend on its accuracy; that the corrections I offered in my former letter relative to the valuation of *Amedabad Pitlad*, and the article of *Muluchgary*, was juſt and well founded upon real and indiſputable facts, and that upon the whole, the exchange of lands was not only fair and equitable, but attended from concurring circumſtances with particular advantages to the Company. The ſuppoſed revenue of *Muluchgurry* is too variable and precarious to be a deſirable object of any Government, except one like that of the Marattas, which is founded upon violent meaſures and rapine. Even the ſmall ſum collected from that ſource, which I will venture to ſay, has not for the laſt ten years exceeded two lacks annually, requires a conſiderable force to collect it, and beyond that, as no means but compulſion, and the full exertion of that claim which the ſtrong may be ſaid to poſſeſs over the weak, could be uſed with any proſpect of advantage (the Rajahs and independent Zemindars not acknowledging any ſubjection) every increaſe of revenue from that quarter muſt depend upon, and will be in proportion to the numbers and ſucceſs of the troops employed to enforce it. A juſt and equitable diviſion of country between the Engliſh and *Futty Sing*, proportioned to the value of the diſtricts before poſſeſſed by the latter and the Poonah Government, being the avowed intention and expreſs object of the treaty, I have aſſured the Honourable Governor General and Council, that I ſhall cheerfully and zealouſly co-operate with you in every meaſure that may be found requiſite after a minute and cloſe inveſtigation to effect that end, towards which I have myſelf thought it improper and impolitic to take any immediate ſtep, and ſhall therefore be happy to receive your further ſentiments upon a ſubject of ſo great importance.

Reſpecting the opinion paſſed by the Honourable Governor General and Council, of the local advantages, excluſive of the conſiderations ſuſtained by the Company in the exchange of territory, I beg leave to tranſcribe for your peruſal the ſentiments I have expreſſed to them on that ſubject, and do not doubt, from the opportunity you poſſeſs of obſerving the ſtate of the country, and your knowledge of the juſt grounds upon which I have founded my remarks, but that the opinion I have given will meet with your concurrence.

" This meaſure was conformable to the plan propoſed " and recommended to me by the Preſident and Select " Committee of *Bombay*. And I muſt confeſs, for " many reaſons it then did and ſtill does appear to me " the moſt advantageous mode of partition that could " be adopted.

" If the lands to the northward of the *Myhie* are further removed from the main power of the Marattas " than thoſe we gain, and rendered difficult of acceſs by " the interpoſition of three capital rivers, they are alſo " ſeparated, and in a manner unconnected with the " Company's former poſſeſſions, and in caſe of an attack " the ſame obſtructions of river, together with the diſtance, would unite to prevent our being able to furniſh " the neceſſary aſſiſtance to their defence, except at an " increaſed expence, and at an extreme hazard and inconvenience, as all the country we do hold to the " ſouthward would in ſuch caſe be left entirely expoſed " to the inſults and inroads of the enemy; beſides, the " entrance into the northern diſtricts, is, at the ſeaſon " for military operations, always open to the Marattas by " the province of *Malwa*; and whenever they have " means to make an attack upon *Guzerat*, it has always " been by beginning their efforts to the northward." Appendix. No. 330.

The Governor General and Council having further informed me that they have ſignified to you their deſire of appropriating every exceſs of revenue which may immediately ariſe to the Company from the operations and ſucceſs of the army under my command, and excluſively to the ſupport of that expence, I take the liberty of requeſting that you will be pleaſed to give the neceſſary orders to your Chiefs at *Surat* and *Broach* for that effect. The low ſtate of my treaſury, and no other ſource of recruiting it now offering, but by drawing bills upon the Government of *Bengal* at a conſiderable loſs, and even that but temporary and precarious, I hope you will approve of the propoſals I beg leave to make, that inſtructions may be given to the gentlemen at both theſe ſtations, whenever the ſum collected may amount to one lack, to pay it into my hands.

Head Quarters, Camp near *Surat*, 6th Auguſt 1780. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

A true copy.
(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Sec'y.

Copy of a Letter from the Select Committee to General *Goddard.*

Sir,

The ſeaſon for action now approaching, the Preſident has laid before us a ſtatement of the preſent ſituation of affairs, relative to the Maratta war, and his ſentiments in reſpect to the operations of the enſuing campaign, with a general plan of meaſures moſt ſuitable to the circumſtances in which we now are.

We loſe no time in tranſmitting to you an abſtract of the Preſident's minute on thoſe points which are requiſite for your immediate information, and in adviſing you of the meaſures which appear to us moſt expedient to be purſued at this juncture.

The Preſident's ſtatement of our preſent difficulties is juſt in every particular, and we entirely concur with him in the neceſſity of the moſt vigorous exertions on our part for averting the further diſtreſs we ſhould be expoſed to by inactivity, and for bringing the Maratta war to as ſpeedy a concluſion as poſſible; nor can we indulge any hopes of effecting either of thoſe, or of improving our ſituation, but by the timely execution of the meaſures he has propoſed, and ſtrictly confining our attention and efforts to the objects already defined and explained to you as the boundaries of our views in regard to the acquiſition of territory for the Preſidency.

The plan of operations propoſed for the enſuing campaign appears calculated with every probability of ſucceſs to anſwer theſe important ends, and to be concerted with all poſſible attention to our preſent circumſtances and means of execution; and we have accordingly determined to ſend an army into the *Conkan* as early as the ſeaſon will poſſibly permit, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, to anticipate the enemy in ſecuring poſſeſſion of the country and paſſes into the *Decan*, whilſt the army under your command moves down to the ſiege of *Baſſein*, when our forces may be employed in covering the ſiege, or as occaſion may require. The advantages of this plan are ſo obvious, and ſo clearly explained in the Preſident's minute, that we ſhall not repeat them here; and ſhall only obſerve, that we ſee no other poſſible method of ſecuring ſubſiſtence for the army, for which you have acquainted us you ſhall entirely depend on us.

It will be eſſential to the complete execution of the plan for ſecuring the country before it is ravaged and deſtroyed by the enemy, that the Bengal army ſhould move down by land to the ſiege of *Baſſein*, and we think

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more eligible in every other reſpect than tranſporting it by ſea; not only by the ſaving of much time and expence; but as it will tend to diſtract and impreſs the enemy with an opinion of our ſtrength, excluſive of the argument that may be drawn in ſupport of our opinion from the averſion the Bengal Sepoys entertain for the ſea, the chance of accidents, and the diſguſts they may conceive to the ſervice, if embarked contrary to their intentions. What is urged on this head we doubt not will fully convince you, that the reduction of *Baſſein* will be performed with infinitely greater advantage, as well as other very important points provided for more effectually, if the army is moved down by land, rather than in the other mode of tranſporting it by ſea: and we truſt, that when you have attentively conſidered the reaſons on which our opinion is grounded, any further recommendation will be needleſs to induce you to adopt the meaſure of marching the army by land to the ſiege of *Baſſein*.

We cannot point out the exact time for your commencing the ſiege, as that will depend on the weather, but according to the uſual courſe of the ſeaſons, we imagine you will be able to put the army in motion the 1ſt of October. We however recommend to you to commence your march as ſoon as you ſhall judge it practicable, and the rains ſufficiently abated to permit the paſſage of the rivers; whilſt, as already mentioned, we ſhall exert our utmoſt endeavour to preſerve the country in a condition to afford the neceſſary ſupplies to the army during the march and the continuance of the campaign in this quarter.

We ſhall furniſh the artillery ſtores and ammunition requiſite for the ſiege agreeable to your deſire, and lodge them at *Danavie*, where they will be in readineſs for ſervice immediately on your arrival, and we ſhall provide veſſels for tranſporting them to the place where they are to be landed, and for keeping your communication open to ſea.

We underſtand there is now a large force in *Baſſein*, ſaid to conſiſt of 8 or 10,000 men; and as the enemy muſt for ſome time have expected our attack, we conclude they are not unprepared for the event. You will no doubt ſee the importance of making an effectual diſpoſition for the protection of *Guzerat* during your abſence to the ſouthward. So principal a part of your reſources depending on the receipt from the late acquiſitions, to enable you more ſufficiently to provide for their defence, we now ſend directions to the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* to afford you ſuch reinforcements from the garriſon as can be ſpared, if you ſhould judge ſuch aſſiſtance neceſſary, and make a requiſition to them on that head.

The Governor General and Council have in a late letter given their ſentiments on the exchange of territory made with *Futty Sing* according to the late treaty, and recommended other modes of partition which are particularized in the Governor's minute, as well as the objections that lay againſt thoſe modes; but circumſtanced as matters now are, we are perſuaded you will agree with us in opinion, that it will be more expedient for the preſent to avoid a ſubject that may give diſſatisfaction and raiſe doubt in *Futty Sing*, and to wave any further diſcuſſion of the matter till a more convenient ſeaſon.

Our diſtreſs for money is ſo very great, that we ſhall find the utmoſt difficulty in furniſhing the neceſſary ſum, even for the ſlender equipments of the body of forces to be ſent into the *Conkan*, a ſervice on which ſo much depends; and at a time when our own neceſſities preſs ſo hard upon us, our embarraſſment is doubly increaſed by the intimation we have received from the Governor General and Council, that their own diſtreſs will put it out of their power to make adequate remittances for the ſupport of this Preſidency, and the pay of the large army under your command; on which account they deſire that every acceſſion of revenue which may ariſe to the Company from the ſucceſs of that army, may be ſet aſide, and appropriated excluſively to that expence: we ſhall not, however, renounce our reliance on more effectual ſupport from *Bengal*, when the Governor General and Council have received our late repreſentations, and are informed of the levies made with your advice for the defence of our new poſſeſſions, for which it was neceſſary we ſhould make proviſion, as their defence muſt in the end devolve on us: but when they ſee the vigorous exertion we are making to bring the war to an advantageous criſis, we confidently hope they will ſtrain their extenſive reſources to ſecond our endeavours, or at leaſt that they will provide for the payment of the Bengal army, and make this excluſive appropriation unneceſſary as it is impoſſible. In the mean time, the revenue ariſing from the new acquiſitions ſhall be ſet apart for the general purpoſes of the war; and we ſhall be very ready to afford you, out of this or any other reſource, ſuch ſums as we can poſſibly ſpare from our own occaſions, to aſſiſt in defraying the charges of the forces under your command.

We have received your letter of the 8th ultimo.

The information you before gave us on the ſubject of Mr. *Vaande Graaf's* correſpondence with the Poonah Miniſter, has been already tranſmitted to the Governor General and Council, and will be followed by your letter above mentioned; when, if they ſhould judge it proper to take public notice of his conduct, we ſhall have ſufficient time to make a repreſentation to the Dutch Governor General before any opportunity will offer for *Batavia*.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 6th Auguſt 1780.

(Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c.
Select Committee.

A true copy.

(Signed) *Edwd Ravenſcroft*, Secr^y.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 23d November 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire.—(*Philip Francis*, Eſquire, indiſpoſed, Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on ſervice at the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*.)

Secret Department. Thurſday.

The following letter having been received from *Bombay* ſince the laſt meeting of the Board, it and its encloſures were circulated on the 20th inſtant, for the peruſal of the members of the Board.

Gentlemen,

We encloſe duplicate of our letters of the 14th and 17th ultimo, and of the ſeveral papers forwarded with thoſe letters. Bombay, 10th September.

General *Goddard* arrived here ſoon after to conſult with us on ſome points previous to the commencement of operations, which being adjuſted, he only waits for more favourable weather to embark again for *Surat*, in order to ſettle the neceſſary arrangements for the defence of the northern provinces during his abſence, and to march down the troops to be employed in the ſiege of *Baſſein*.

We tranſmit with the other papers, a copy of the letter he delivered after his arrival, and of our reply, which contain every thing material that has been determined; and by the latter you will obſerve the meaſures we have taken for aſſiſting General *Goddard* to defray the expences of the army.

We ſend by the *Nancy* ketch a box of army accounts, recommended to our care by General *Goddard*, and for which a receipt is encloſed.

Having lately received an extraordinary letter from the Governor General at *Goa*, we think it proper to tranſmit a copy thereof for your notice, as we ſhall hereafter of our reply.

We beg leave to notice to you that whatever advices you may have occaſion to forward to this Preſidency before the end of February, will be conveyed to

us

us with more expedition and ſafety by the way of *Anjengo* than by any other route.

Bombay Caſtle, We are with reſpect, &c.
11th September 1780.

Ordered, That the box of army accounts accompanying the above diſpatch be ſent to the Accountant General.

Ordered, That the enclofures in the above letter from *Bombay* be entered after the conſultation.

ENCLOSURES.

Copy Tranſlation of a Letter from the Captain General at *Goa* to the Governor and Council at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It being true and inconteſtable that the crown of *Portugal* for many lawful cauſes, ſince allowed as rights, made the conqueſt of the *Eaſt Indies*:

That the fortreſs of *Baſſein* and *Tannah*, with all the other forts, countries, and juriſdictions, from *Choul* up to *Dumaun*, and in poſſeſſion of the ſame crown and its State of *India* for the ſpace of two hundred years:

That notwithſtanding, that the Marattas forty years paſt, without juſt cauſe, invaded and by violence ſeized ſome forts and lands of the State, which they held in the northern province, detaining them by force of arms:

It is nevertheleſs indubitable that the crown of *Portugal* loſt not the ſovereignty and rights which it had and has in all the ſaid forts, lands, and countries relating thereto, notwithſtanding it is deprived of the poſſeſſion thereof agreeable to the true and inconteſtable law of rights. The ſovereignty is always preſerved whilſt the crown reſerves to itſelf the right of reverſion, and never diveſts itſelf of intentions of reannexing them, nor has it omitted to uſe every means poſſible to incorporate them again with its dominions. It waited only for a fortunate conjuncture, ſuch as now offered, when the interior diviſions and civil wars of the Marattas had divided the ſupreme authority into two parties, and the ſubaltern Powers into as many heads and chiefs as there are officers and governors of forts, and from this ſituation, the crown thought to have got poſſeſſion thereof through the channel of negociation.

The State has for years kept an emiſſary at *Poonah*, charged with the public buſineſs, and more eſpecially with the claim of reſtitution of the forts, villages, and other lands of its ancient juriſdiction; it was in part concluded on, and orders given for paſſing the Sunnuds for the delivery of ſundry lands.

In the reſtoration of the above forts and countries, the crown of *Portugal* has claim in a preference to all ſovereigns, eſpecially to that of the crown of *England*, founded on ſpecial right, for by the articles of peace and treaty of marriage of her Serene Highneſs *Donna Catharina*, Infanta of *Portugal*, with *Charles* the Second King of *England*, and from the declarations wherewith the delivery of the iſland of *Bombay* adjacent to the province of the north was made, having been given in dowry with ſaid *Donna Catharina*; it is expreſsly declared, that the crown of *Britain* at no time whatever ſhall impede the juriſdiction of the other iſlands of *Baſſein* and other countries, nor deprive the State of *India* of the commerce and liberty which they have in them, and that the Engliſh never ſhall claim in the Portugueze juriſdiction more than what was ceded to them by the ſaid marriage treaty, as fully appears from the conditions under which was delivered to them the ſaid iſland, inſerted in the act of poſſeſſion received from them under date 18th February 1665.

By this ſame ſolemn convention entered into by the two crowns, that of *Portugal* has a clear right to be aſſiſted by the Engliſh at any ſuch time as they deſigned to regain the province of the north; for in the ſaid treaty of peace the King of *England* obliges himſelf to ſuccour that of *Portugal* on all occaſions which require it, as is declared in the royal orders of the 9th April 1662, whereby we are ordered to deliver the iſland of *Bombay*, as follows:

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"By the other articles of this treaty you (Vice Roy of *India*) will be informed of the union we celebrate, and of the obligations that the King of *England* is under to aſſiſt us in all urgent occaſions that may ariſe and require it; if the ſituation you are in makes it neceſſary to avail of the Engliſh aſſiſtance, you will do it."

From whence may with evident certainty be inferred, that the Engliſh ought to ſuccour the State in the difficult enterprize of regaining the north, and that by no one title can they pretend to aſſume to themſelves the ſovereignty of theſe countries without breach of the laws of nature and of nations of the treaty of peace, and of the faith and ancient friendſhip which always ſubſiſted between the two crowns.

But the contrary has taken place, from the public and conſtant information received, that your Excellency and your noble Council have planned and undertaken an expedition, and have taken the field with a moſt numerous army, under the ſpecious pretext of aſſiſting *Ragoba*, and with him at the head, have blockaded and poſſeſſed themſelves of the fortreſs of *Parnel*, and propoſe extending their conqueſts to the forts of *Baſſein*, *Choul*, and other places of the ancient juriſdiction of *Damaun*, garriſoning the forts conquered with troops, and recovering the revenue and cuſtoms dependent thereon.

This intelligence is very afflicting to me, and I am convinced that your Excellency and the other gentlemen of your noble Council, when you met to reſolve thereon, were guided more by the Aſiatic intereſts of the Britiſh nation, than by regard to that public faith that ought to be obſerved in promiſes authorized by ſolemn treaties: and for the conſervation of the royal dominion, the crown of her moſt faithful Majeſty has in thoſe forts, lands, and diſtricts of the province of the north, I require of your Excellency, Honourable Governor, and the other gentlemen of your noble Council of *Bombay*, that you deſiſt from an undertaking ſo foreign to the intentions of his Britannic Majeſty, and ſo injurious to the good faith of the Engliſh nation, friend and ally of the crown of *Portugal*.

In caſe your Excellency and the other gentlemen of your noble Council do not comply with my demand, I hereby make a moſt formal proteſt, not only to preſerve to the crown of *Portugal* its ſovereignty in all the forts, diſtricts, and lands of the province of the north, which it has no intent to give up, nor to depart from its royal right in all the countries of the ſaid province, but to have and repoſſeſs them on a fit opportunity with all loſſes and damages ſuſtained.

I proteſt likewiſe againſt your Excellency, Honourable Governor, and the other gentlemen of your noble Council, as violaters of the public peace of the two nations, in a manner ſo inconſiſtent with, and ſo oppoſite to the defenſive alliance ſubſiſting between her moſt faithful Majeſty my miſtreſs and his Britannic Majeſty.

I likewiſe alſo proteſt for all the prejudice ſuſtained by the State of Portugueze *India*; and I beg you to reflect on the loſſes your Excellency and the other gentlemen of your noble Council are cauſing to ſaid State, and of which I ſhall quickly adviſe and inform her moſt faithful Majeſty: to the end that ſhe may indemnify herſelf for the ſame, as to her ſeems beſt, out of the great and important pledges that the crown and nation of *Great Britain* has in her kingdoms; far more conſiderable than the prejudices that your Excellency, and the other gentlemen of your noble Council, have created and intend to create, without reflecting on the danger to which you expoſe all thoſe intereſts which you derive from your alliance with *Portugal*.

Your Excellency, and the other gentlemen of your noble Council, ſhould reflect that on this conduct you

are

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are ſubjecting your bank in *Europe* to the riſk of loſing the many millions which it draws from *Portugal* for the ſupport of its public credit—That you are likewiſe ſubjecting your nation to the loſs of its trade in *Portugal* and *Algarve*, ſhould her moſt faithful Majeſty once determine to retaliate upon the Engliſh in *Europe*, the loſſes which reſult to her in *Aſia* from the preſent projected conqueſts.

Laſtly, I cannot diſpenſe with acquainting her moſt faithful Majeſty of what I have above obſerved from the full belief that the King and the whole Britiſh nation will deem your Excellency and the other gentlemen of your noble Council, reſponſible for every conſequence reſulting on this account.

God preſerve, &c. &c.

Goa, 17th July 1780. (Signed) *Dom Federico Guilherme de Souza.*

A true copy,
Edwd Ravenſcroft.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard* to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, dated 10th Auguſt 1780.

Gentlemen,

I had the pleaſure of addreſſing you the 4th inſtant, which has been diſpatched by the *Hart* and boat, and will I truſt reach you ſafe.

I have nothing new or material to communicate to you relative to the deſigns or ſituation of the Maratta leaders, further than the report of the great preparations making at *Poonah* by the Miniſter, and the repetition of the ſtory of laſt year, that he is to be aided with powerful foreign allies in the operation of next ſeaſon againſt us.

This expectation will, it is probable, prove as fallacious and ill-founded as the former, but there is reaſon to believe, from the ſilence he has obſerved, having hitherto made no overture or attempt towards an accommodation whatever, that he is meditating ſome effort of importance; and that he is buoyed up with hopes from ſome quarter not yet fully diſcovered by us, of retrieving the loſſes of the laſt by the ſuperiority he expects to obtain in the enſuing campaign.

I am from theſe conſiderations induced to be moſt earneſt in my wiſh, of ſeizing the firſt poſſible opportunity to commence the operations of the war by attacking *Baſſein*. The rainy ſeaſon is now approaching to a concluſion, at leaſt the violent and ſtormy months, which from obſtructing the navigations would have proved the greateſt obſtacle to that enterprize, are now paſt.

I cannot help being of opinion, that by a vigorous and unexpected effort we may anticipate the hoſtile preparations of our enemies, and have accompliſhed that ſervice before they are in a condition to act in any effectual manner againſt us in that or any other quarter. Your ſuperior information and knowledge of the ſituation of *Baſſein* will enable you to judge how ſoon any operations againſt the place will be practicable; but in this point of ſo great and real importance to the ſucceſs of the preſent conteſt, I muſt venture to offer it as my opinion, that conſiderations of the difficulties we may expect to encounter in the attempt ought to give way whenever circumſtances are ſuch as to preſent any reaſonable proſpect of ſucceſs.

Upon this principle I beg leave to conſult, and to requeſt you will communicate to me your ſentiments and inſtructions upon the following points.

As I am exceedingly deſirous, and think it eſſential to the conduct of the enſuing ſervice to have an opportunity of perſonally concerting with you the plan of its operations, previous to their commencement, I ſhall, whenever the ſeaſon permits, ſet out for *Bombay*, and this I hope will be during the preſent month, as the veſſels for the Surat ſtation are expected ſhortly to arrive.

The troops which can be ſupplied from this place without expoſing in any ſhape your poſſeſſions in this quarter, and which I would recommend as neceſſary to be employed againſt *Baſſein*, are the Madras European artillery and infantry, and battalion of Sepoys. The difficulty of the roads from the deep and rapid rivers, and the country being ſo much overflowed, will not for ſome time admit of marching any of the Bengal troops along the coaſt, but I propoſe tranſporting a ſtrong detachment of them by water, conſiſting of a force at leaſt equal to two battalions.

Theſe circumſtances I think it neceſſary thus early to ſubmit to your conſideration, that the requiſite veſſels may be ſent up for their tranſportation as ſoon as poſſible.

The force you can furniſh from *Bombay*, with the Madras detachment, and a numerous artillery, would I conceive amply ſuffice for the reduction of *Baſſein*; but I have reſolved upon the further reinforcement of the Bengal Sepoys, from an idea it is probable the principal ſcene of the war will be transferred to your neighbourhood, and that a reſpectable force will become requiſite in that quarter to ſecure the Gauts, and to carry on ſuch further operations againſt the enemy as circumſtances ſhall render practicable and eligible.

With reſpect to the neceſſary train of artillery and ordnance ſtores, I ſuppoſe it will be in your power to make every proper and ample proviſion of them at *Bombay*: I would however propoſe, if it meets with your approbation, to carry with me the four eighteen pounders employed at the ſiege of *Ahmedabad*, as I have had an opportunity of trying and proving their utility and excellence, and think they may be employed to great good purpoſe on the approaching ſervice. In order that nothing may be wanting for carrying into immediate and effectual execution the propoſed attack, I have alſo ordered to be prepared under my own inſpection many materials for the uſe of the Engineer's department at the ſiege, ſo that no obſtruction can ariſe to the inſtant commencement of operations, from any delay in putting them in readineſs. For the tranſportation of theſe and ſuch other ſtores as you may think requiſite to be conveyed from this place, the Chief of *Surat* will eaſily ſupply the neceſſary boats whenever you ſhall be pleaſed to give him your inſtructions for that purpoſe.

The next and moſt material point to be adjuſted, is the place for the troops from the northward to land, and as your knowledge of the ſituation of *Baſſein* and the country round it, puts it in your power to judge of the moſt eligible and convenient ſpot for that purpoſe, I ſhall be entirely guided in that particular by your advice and determination; it will ſave a good deal of time and prevent delays, which muſt neceſſarily ariſe by diſembarking at *Salſette*, and afterwards croſſing over to the continent, if the troops and ſtores from your Preſidency could effect a junction with me off *Terrapore*, in which caſe the whole might be landed immediately to the northward of *Baſſein* on the ſouthern ſhore of a river, which I underſtand empties itſelf into the ſea about ten or twelve miles from *Baſſein*. But of the propriety of this plan, the ſuperior informarion you have of the ſituation of the country will enable you to form the beſt judgment; and I beg to repeat that I ſhall act conformable to ſuch mode as you may chuſe to recommend.

I diſpatch this letter expreſs by Hircarrahs, whom I have promiſed to reward if they uſe expedition, and I hope to receive your anſwer in order that I may make the neceſſary arrangements previous to my departure.

Should I find it expedient to ſet out before your anſwer arrives, I ſhall take ſuch meaſures with Mr. *Boddam*, your Chief at *Surat*, and leave ſuch inſtructions with the officer in command of the troops, as may effectually prevent any impediment or delay to the immediate execution of your orders and intentions relative to this ſervice.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Surat, Auguſt 10th 1780. (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

Copy of a Letter from General *Goddard*, dated at *Bombay* the 24th Auguſt 1780.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to reply to your letter of the 6th Auguſt, encloſing abſtract of the Honourable Preſident's ſtatement of the preſent poſture of affairs, and cannot find words expreſſive of the ſatisfaction I have received from the clear and ample information it gives of their ſituation and proſpect, as well as the general propriety of the plan he has recommended for the operations of the enſuing campaign, which appears to me formed with a due regard to preſent circumſtances, and to provide for every future probable occurrence as far as the extent of human foreſight and wiſdom can poſſibly reach. I ſhall however venture to trouble you with a few remarks on this important ſubject, in which the very ample and minute detail entered into by the Preſident, will greatly relieve me from the neceſſity I might otherwiſe be under of commenting more at large on the meaſures proper to be adopted at this ſo critical a period, and on which the future good or bad fortune of our preſent conteſt with the Maratta State ſeems entirely to depend.

I beg leave to call your attention to the ſentiments contained in an addreſs I had the honour to deliver in to this Committee laſt November, which the event has ſince proved to have been juſtly founded, and of which the Honourable Preſident in his minute ſeems now ſo fully ſenſible.

The diſappointment I met with in my endeavours to negociate a peace, and the unreaſonable, I may add, inſolent demands made by the Poonah Miniſter, preſented obſtacles to its attainment, which I was convinced at that time were inſurmountable; and furniſhed me with arguments for urging the immediate proſecution of active and vigorous meaſures, as the only means by which we could ever hope to recover the Company's affairs on this ſide of *India* from the embarraſſment they were then under, or obtain terms of advantage or honour in any future accommodation.

To the objection of expence which the low ſtate of our finances would ill enable us to ſupport, and towards which you declared your inability of affording an adequate, or indeed any ſupply, I ventured to make uſe of the ſame reaſoning which the Preſident now urges in ſo clear and pointed a manner, and ſuggeſted the neceſſity of an immediate commencement of hoſtilities, to enable us to provide a fund for the future maintenance of our armies, which while they remained inactive, exceeded our abilities to ſupport; and being ſubſiſted at an expence little inferior to what they would require on active ſervice, could only tend to exhauſt the reſources we were poſſeſſed of, and deprive us even of the power of defence when the period ſhould arrive in which we might be called upon to ſtrain every nerve and ſinew of war againſt an elated and preſumptuous enemy.

You, gentlemen, were convinced by the propriety and force of the arguments; and I am happy that it is in my power at this day to congratulate you on the ſucceſs which I have been enabled, by your vigorous exertions and timely aſſiſtance, to obtain hitherto in the proſecution of the meaſures formerly reſolved upon in concert with you.

The Honourable Preſident has founded his plan for the operations of the enſuing campaign upon the baſis of that mutually agreed on laſt year, and which the Honourable Governor General and Council have been pleaſed to ſignify their approbation of, as beſt calculated to promote the intereſts of the Company, and produce that great and deſirable object to which their inclinations have been always ſo ſtrongly and manifeſtly directed, an advantageous and honourable peace.

The poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, which only remains to complete your views of territorial acquiſition, and the command of the paſſes leading to and from the *Decan*, which will be requiſite to give value and ſecurity to thoſe poſſeſſions, are from conſiderations of immediate benefit, as well as the future deciſive and favourable conſequences to be expected from them, the principal objects of our preſent purſuit and attainment. Appendix No. 330.

In a letter which I had the honour of addreſſing you from *Surat*, previous to the receipt of yours, encloſing the Preſident's minute, I propoſed the immediate embarkation of the troops from thence, in order to undertake the ſiege of *Baſſein*. My reaſon for this I gave you at the ſame time, which was founded upon the ſtriking advantage we ſhould derive by poſſeſſing ourſelves of that fortreſs previous to the poſſibility of any army's being aſſembled to oppoſe us, and the command that ſtrong hold would inevitably give us of the whole country below the ghauts. Nothing would then remain to be done but to ſecure the paſſes leading into the *Decan*; which ſervice, after leaving a ſufficient garriſon in *Baſſein*, we might have effected with our whole united force, or at leaſt ſuch conſiderable body as might have given us an aſſured ſuperiority over the numerous troops which the Miniſter will certainly collect to oppoſe us whenever our forces ſhall begin to be in motion.

The idea of anticipation, by the plan you have adopted of ſending Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* with the forces of your Preſidency to ſecure the ghauts, is now ſufficiently deſtroyed, becauſe a commencement of hoſtilities on our part will be a ſignal to the Maratta Government to aſſemble their forces from all quarters; and as they have, during the preſent inactive ſeaſon, diſcovered no inclination for peace, I muſt conceive, that ſenſible of our hoſtile deſigns, they are in a ready and prepared ſtate to reſiſt them; and it is not even improbable that if the alarm is given by any early movement of our troops, they will march ſo large an army into the *Conkan*, and with ſuch expedition as to demand the attention of our whole force; and retard at leaſt, if not entirely fruſtrate, the preſent accompliſhment of our views againſt *Baſſein*. The Honourable Preſident however has not fixed the preciſe time for entering upon action, which he ſays, muſt depend on the ſeaſon: and I would alſo propoſe, that your further determination on this point ſhould be made with a particular attention to the period when it will be practicable to move the troops from *Surat*, which you obſerve, according to the uſual courſe of the ſeaſon, cannot be before the 1ſt of October.

Upon the plan of operations you have adopted, I entirely concur with you in the expediency of marching the troops down by land; and as they are in a ſtate of complete preparation, I ſhall readily embrace the inſtant occaſion of the roads being in any degree paſſable to put them in motion.

In my laſt letter to you from *Surat*, I took occaſion to declare my opinion, that whenever we ſhould begin our operations againſt *Baſſein*, the principal efforts of the enemy, would be directed to that quarter, which would become the ſeat of war during the campaign. The vicinity of that place to the Maratta capital, and the imminent danger to which *Poonah* muſt be expoſed whenever we open ourſelves a paſſage to the *Decan*, by ſecuring the ſeveral commanding paſſes that lead towards it, confirms ſuch belief almoſt to a certainty.

I therefore muſt aſſure myſelf, although the terms in which you have deſcribed the ſervice intended for your troops do not expreſsly declare ſo, that you propoſe to leave me the entire direction of their military operations, in ſuch manner as I may find expedient to advance the general plan previouſly concerted with your Government.

The diviſion of force, with a powerful enemy in the field, which we have every reaſon to expect, is at all times attended with inconvenience, and ſeldom produces any adequate good conſequences to the manifeſt danger it threatens. Such diviſion may however be ſometimes proper, and even requiſite; but the officer who commands upon the ſpot, and has informed himſelf of the ſtrength, ſituation, and deſigns of the enemy, can be

Appendix. No. 330.

the only competent judge when it is to be attempted with ſucceſs. The idea of two armies acting ſeparately and independently of each other, while employed againſt one common enemy, in proſecution of the ſame general plan, and in the ſame tract of country, is too abſurd, and combats too much againſt every principle on which the ſyſtem of war is founded, to make it neceſſary I ſhould trouble you with further remarks on the ſubject.

The few obſervations I have made on this head are derived merely from conſiderations of military expediency, and theſe I deem at this time ſufficient, becauſe I cannot help being firmly perſuaded it is your intentions that the troops from your Preſidency, ſerving on the continent, ſhould act under my immediate orders and direction whenever the army under me ſhall arrive in the neighbourhood of *Baſſein*, or at ſuch place as the operations of the one may be materially affected by thoſe of the other.

I would not be thought, from what I have before advanced againſt the too early movement of your troops, to ſuggeſt the ſmalleſt objection againſt that part of the plan propoſed by Mr. *Hornby*, or the ſervice which it is intended they ſhould perform; on the contrary, I am convinced it will tend to facilitate and render more expeditious and unmoleſted the progreſs of the troops from the northward.

It will effectually diſtract the attention of the enemy: it offers the moſt reaſonable, the only poſſible means of preſerving the country from deſolation; and will, I truſt, help to ſecure that effectual ſupply of proviſions of which we ſhall ſtand ſo much in need.

The ſeaſon of the year would however obviate the danger of our feeling the ſame effects from the devaſtating hands of the Marattas, which we ſo ſeverely experienced in a diſtance only of 18 miles, laſt April, when the ſcorching winds and ſun ſo powerfully aſſiſted the efforts of *Madjee Scindia*, and burnt up every blade of graſs upon the ground; but even there, I beg leave to obſerve, that other conſiderations than the difficulties this occaſioned, operated effectually to ſtop my progreſs; and that had not political reaſons, which my letters written at that time to the Committee fully explained, detained me on the confines of the *Guzerat*, I ſhould have found it a much eaſier taſk to advance than to have continued ſo long as I did on the ſame barren deſolated ſpot.

I obſerve with real concern and diſappointment the diſtreſs for money which you ſo ſtrongly repreſent, becauſe my own cannot be inferior, and the Honourable Governor General and Council have depended upon the reſource of the new-required revenue for the greateſt part of my ſupply.

I have been compelled for ſome time paſt to draw bills upon them at a conſiderable loſs, which nothing but the moſt urgent and extreme neceſſity could juſtify, to provide for the mere ſubſiſtence of the troops; but even this reſource has proved inadequate, and the army is greatly in arrears: it is now no longer to be depended upon. I am firmly perſuaded of your readineſs to afford me every aſſiſtance in your power, and in that confidence, urged by the preſſing and immediate neceſſities of the ſervice, hope you will find it practicable to comply with my requeſt of appropriating the firſt payment of the revenues of the country dependent on *Surat*, which is paid in advance, to the ſole uſe of the army now under my command.

In a letter tranſmitted you from *Surat* ſome time ago, on the ſubject of the treaty made with *Futty Sing*, I delivered you my opinion fully, regarding the ſentiments expreſſed by the Governor General and Council on the exchange of territory made with him, and am happy to find it correſponds with thoſe contained in the Preſident's minute, and recommended by you. It is therefore unneceſſary to take up your time with further obſervations on that point at preſent.

You may rely upon my taking every effectual meaſure in my power, for protecting the province of *Guzerat* from the inſults and depredations of the enemy, during the abſence of any part of the troops to the ſouthward, which with the aid of reinforcements from your garriſons of *Surat* and *Broach*, will eaſily be accompliſhed, except *Scindia* ſhould himſelf return with a large army, in which caſe the force that can be ſpared for the defence of the province might be unequal to keep the field; but all apprehenſions from that quarter of *Scindia* (and from no other can there be any cauſe to fear) will, I truſt, be removed by the plan which the Government of *Bengal* may find it expedient to adopt to detain him in the province of *Malva*.

It remains now, that I ſay a few words reſpecting *Ragoba*. The Preſident in his minute has ſuggeſted a mode of employing him to the ſouthward, but which he adds, is rather thrown out as a hint that may be purſued at a proper ſeaſon, than as compoſing part of his preſent plan.

It may not however be improper juſt to take notice of it, in treating of the ſubject of *Ragoba*, as it tends to recommend the line of conduct it may be moſt expedient for us to follow regarding him. The two Chiefs mentioned by the Preſident, have been long partizans of *Ragoba*, and have been lately in arms againſt the Miniſter; it is true they defeated ſome troops that were ſent againſt them, but they obtained no deciſive or material advantages: if *Ragoba* was to join them, which however I am perſuaded he will not venture to do, their force would receive no augmentation, and the Miniſter would detach a more reſpectable army againſt them, the conſequence of which muſt end in their defeat, and irrecoverable ruin of *Ragoba*, who would either fall into the hands of the Miniſter, or, which is more probable, fly to *Hyder* for protection: the diſappointment *Ragoba* has met with from us, in not being decreed any participation of the revenues of the conquered country, has affected him a good deal; and if he was once to execute the deſign of leaving us, he would not be induced to return to his former aſylum. It ſeems now no longer a conteſt for empire with him; he has ſeen all the hopes he might once have entertained of being ſupported by powerful partizans in the empire, diſappointed, and all he can now have any wiſh for, muſt I ſhould think in a great meaſure be confined to ſubſiſtence, and ſafety to himſelf and family; while he confines his views to theſe preſents, even thoſe who were jealous of his pretenſions to power, may relent, and deſpair might alſo have the effect of making him rely upon their promiſes and profeſſions.

I am therefore induced to give it as my opinion, that *Ragoba* ſhould remain immediately under our own eyes, and that no partial or inferior attempts ſhould be made in his favour, which might end in diſappointment, and perhaps fix upon us the imputation of having relieved ourſelves from the weight of a tax we did not chuſe to pay, by reſigning him to deſtruction. The final opinion I have been led to form reſpecting *Ragoba*'s connection with us, is this, that though he can bring no material aid, or render any eſſential ſervice to us in the proſecution of the war, from the extreme contempt and hatred he is held in by all the principal leaders, that his preſence will be of infinite uſe in improving our ſucceſſes, when any future plan of negociation is entered upon, and the great work of peace through his means be more ſpeedily and effectually finiſhed, than if the Miniſter was entirely relieved from any apprehenſion on his account.

I ſhall conclude my remarks upon the preſent poſture of affairs, the clear and full inveſtigation of which ſubject in the Preſident's minute, leaves me ſo little room to enlarge, by venturing a few words on the obſervation he has made, concerning the want of information from the Honourable Governor General and Council, relative to their views in any future negociation for peace with the Poonah Government; and on this point I ſhall take

upon

upon me to ſpeak only from the circumſtances he has himſelf premiſed, and the concluſion which muſt indiſputably be deduced from them.

The Honourable Governor General and Council have all along conſidered the attainment of a permanent and honourable peace as the grand and primary object: their inſtructions to me in June laſt, which were imparted fully to this Government, pointed only to this end: ſince the failure of that negociation, they have repeatedly declared their ſtrong deſire of effecting a reaſonable accommodation; they have approved and authorized the plan concerted laſt year for proſecuting the war, which had then become neceſſary; and have concurred with you in the object to which its operations ſhould be directed.

Their views once accompliſhed, I conſider myſelf authorized, from the nature of their former inſtructions, which have never been revoked, and their repeated wiſh expreſſed for peace, to conclude ſuch terms of amity with the Maratta State, by the advice and concurrence of this Government, as the ſucceſſes of the war may entitle us to expect; as may be beſt ſuited to every concurrent circumſtance at the time when ſuch opportunity of accommodation offers itſelf, and calculated to promote the true intereſts of the Company in general, and the proſperity and ſucceſs of this Preſidency in particular.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
(Signed) *William Goddard.*

A true copy,
(Signed) *Edward J. Croft*, Secy.

Copy of a Letter to *General Goddard*; dated the 5th September, 1780.

To Brigadier General *Goddard.*

Sir,

We were very highly pleaſed to find by the letter you laid before us at our meeting on the 28th ultimo, that the general plan of operations propoſed for the enſuing campaign coincided ſo entirely with your ſentiments, and having already fully deſcribed the ſervice intended for the Bombay detachment under Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, it only now remains to explain the powers we have judged it expedient to give you over this detachment, for the proſecution of the general plan.

We are inclined to the opinion, that if it can ſtill continue to protect the country, at the ſame time that it covers the ſiege of *Baſſien*, it will be making the moſt advantageous uſe of it; but as the ſiege will be the grand object, and when once undertaken, our ſucceſs muſt be provided for to the utmoſt, we ſhall commit to you the entire direction from the time that you may arrive in the neighbourhood of *Baſſein* with the army under your command, and we ſhall accordingly direct Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* to pay ſtrict obedience to all ſuch orders as you may think proper to give him from that time.

We ſhall likewiſe continue your command over this detachment during the remainder of the campaign in the *Conkan* for the proſecution of the concerted plan, though we wiſh that ſo long as you may judge it adviſable to have a covering army, the Bombay detachment may be employed in that manner; and if you ſhould at any time think it neceſſary for them to join, we would ſtill wiſh to have our troops kept up in the ſame manner as when they were acting ſeparate, in order that they may be maintained in a condition to act ſeparately again, if it ſhall be hereafter found neceſſary. For the ſame reaſon, we ſhall be glad they may be as little as poſſible ſubdivided or ſcattered into ſmall detachments; and we muſt remark that the ſecuring the crop of grain in the country for which this detachment was principally formed, will depend on their being kept in a condition and ſtation to protect it. Appendix. No. 330.

We ſhall give orders to Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* to correſpond punctually with you as ſoon as you approach *Baſſein*, and we ſhall alſo direct him to continue to correſpond with us; we ſhall wiſh to receive the readieſt and moſt direct communication from all quarters of the ſtate of affairs. We cannot foreſee any circumſtance at preſent which can render it neceſſary for us to give any ſpecial directions to Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, while he may be acting ſeparately from you under your orders; but ſhould any ſuch occaſion occur, we ſhall give you the earlieſt notice.

The time for our troops taking the field will depend chiefly on the weather; but imagine it may be early in next month, about which time we ſuppoſe you will be able to put the forces in motion from the northward.

The battering cannon and heavy ſtores for the ſiege will be embarked in proper boats, and kept in readineſs in Salſette river, to join you as ſoon as you can poſſibly have occaſion for them.

As you propoſe bringing down the Europeans by ſea, and it will be a prudent meaſure to have them near the Preſidency at the opening of the ſeaſon, we now ſend up the *Revenge* and *Bombay* grab for the accommodation of yourſelf and ſuite to *Surat*, and to bring down the Europeans, with the neceſſary convenience and expedition, and they may be cantoned on *Salſette* till there may be occaſion for their ſervices.

Our ſituation in point of money has been fully explained to you; but in order to afford you every aſſiſtance in our power, we now ſend directions to the Chief and Council at *Surat* to make good to you the firſt collections from our pergunnahs under their management, for the ſole uſe of the army under your command; and to leſſen your expence of ready money we ſhall give you a credit on the Bombay treaſury for ſuch ſums, as you can diſcharge by aſſignment.

We hope ſoon to congratulate you on your arrival again in our neighbourhood; and are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient
Bombay Caſtle, humble ſervants,
5th September 1780. (Signed) *Willm Hornby*,
&c. Committee.

A true copy.
(Signed) *Edward J. Croft*, Secy.

The following letter from Brigadier General *Goddard* having been alſo received ſince the laſt meeting of the Board, it was circulated on the 20th inſtant for the peruſal of the members of the Board.

Gentlemen,

My laſt addreſs to you was dated ſo long ago as the 15th July; from which period to the time of my departure for *Bombay* in the middle of laſt month, nothing of any importance occurred to communicate to you. Brigadier General Goddard, 6th September

That you may be fully informed of every material tranſaction that has ſince happened, and clearly comprehend the preſent ſituation of affairs, together with the plan of operations propoſed for the enſuing campaign, I beg leave to tranſmit for your peruſal, copy of a letter, No. 1, I received from the Select Committee previous to my departure from *Surat*; and of the Preſident's minute, No. 2, which they ſent me encloſed; I alſo ſubmit to you my reply thereto, No. 3, delivered in to the Committee upon my arrival at *Bombay*. The contents of theſe papers, as they touch upon every point that appears of moment on the preſent occaſion, almoſt renders unneceſſary my further remarks, ſince you will from a peruſal of them be at once able to judge of the propoſed plan of operations, which is founded upon the principles of what I have already ventured to lay before you, both with reſpect to the object of the war itſelf, and the means by which it may be moſt eaſily and certainly attained.

To attempt to point out to you the advantages we muſt

Appendix No. 330.

must derive from profecuting the war upon the fyſtem now laid down, would be only a repetition of ſentiments frequently delivered to you; and indeed would be further ſuperfluous, as you have already ſignified your ſenſe of it in your concurrence with Mr. *Hornby*'s plan originally, and your approbation of the meaſures reſolved upon at the opening of the laſt campaign, of which thoſe at preſent entered into are intended as a completion; and cannot fail, with the effectual aid and ſupport of your Council and endeavours, to produce the end ſo much deſired, "a termination of our preſent conteſt by an ho- "nourable and advantageous treaty."

You will underſtand both from the expreſſions uſed in Mr. *Hornby*'s minute and the letters I have myſelf written you on the ſubject, that the plan adopted by the Committee is conformable to the ſentiments I had avowed to them relative to the general objects of the war, and is partial only with reſpect to the part they have aſſigned their own troops in the *Conkan* previous to my arrival before *Baſſein*, which meaſure was determined upon and in ſome degree entered into before I received any communication of their intentions.

Senſible of what ſerious importance it is to the public cauſe to preſerve a confidence and good underſtanding with this Government, I ſhall make that object my moſt earneſt and principal ſtudy, and I truſt the readineſs with which I have concurred in proſecution of their views for the public ſervice at this time, as well as the warmth and zeal with which I ſhall co-operate with them for the ſame good purpoſe hereafter, will obtain its reward in your future favour and approbation.

I ſhall, in purſuance of the plan fixed upon, take the earlieſt opportunity of putting the troops from *Surat* in motion, which I apprehend on account of the uncommon quantity of rains that have fallen this year and ſtill continue to fall, cannot poſſibly be before the 1ſt October. I hope, however, there will be no neceſſity of delay after that period, and as I propoſe returning to *Surat* in a few days; and the army is already prepared to take the field, no other impediment but the inclemency of the ſeaſon, and the conſequent difficulty of the march along the coaſt from the ſwelling of the numerous rivers that empty themſelves into the ſea from the hills that are adjacent, can poſſibly occur to protract my operations: I ſhall not fail to give you immediate notice of my movements, and of the diſpoſition of force I may find it neceſſary to make for the protection of the Company's territories in *Guzerat*.

The ſentiments of the Committee relative to the partition of territory made with *Futty Sing*, preciſely correſpond with thoſe I have already ventured to give you upon the ſame ſubject; and I flatter myſelf you will admit of their preſent juſtice and propriety.

I need not, I am convinced, call your attention to that part of the Committee's letter which relates to the ſupplies of money, ſetting forth their diſtreſs, and the impoſſibility of an excluſive appropriation of the revenues ariſing from the new-acquired pergunnahs to the payment of the army under my command, as its own importance will give it a claim to your immediate and particular notice. Their reſolution of ſetting them apart for the general purpoſes of the war, involves ſuch a variety of charges and ſo extenſive a field of expence, that excluſive of the precarioufneſs and at preſent inadequate extent of the revenue itſelf, leaves, I muſt confeſs, but little hopes of benefit or effectual aſſiſtance from it. Let me therefore repeat my earneſt ſolicitations that you will exert every endeavour to remedy the evils already felt, and prevent thoſe ſtill more ſevere which we muſt inevitably experience, unleſs you ſtrain every reſource at this time to adminiſter relief. I have ſo often troubled you with repreſentations on this ſubject, and you are yourſelves ſo well informed of the circumſcribed means poſſeſſed by this Government towards extricating themſelves and me from our preſent diſtreſs, that I feel at once the impropriety of enlarging further on it. I cannot help however anticipating the accompliſhment of that event predicted in the concluſion of Mr. *Hornby*'s minute, "when you ſhall be relieved from all future expence in ſupport of this Government," which I think the favourable train of their affairs at this juncture, ſeconded by vigorous and united efforts, cannot fail of producing before the termination of the enſuing campaign.

I come to that point which of all others appears to me the moſt intereſting, and demanding your particular attention and conſideration: I mean when the ſucceſsful operations of the war ſhall have brought us to that happy criſis ſo much to be deſired, and which we have beſides every reaſon to expect capable of being improved to the great work of peace.

Although the inſtructions I have received from you, and the ſentiments you have been pleaſed to communicate from time to time on this ſubject, leave me at no loſs regarding the objects you would look to in a treaty, or the meaſures I ought to purſue for their attainment; yet it does not appear that the gentlemen of this Government deem themſelves ſufficiently informed of your views to afford that full and unreſerved participation of ſentiments I could wiſh to receive from them whenever a negociation ſhall be ſet on foot. I have in a few words explained my idea of your intentions in reply to Mr. *Hornby*'s remarks, "of this Committee having received no communication of your views, in any future negociations for peace, ſince June 1779;" and I flatter myſelf that you will approve of what I have ſuggeſted on that occaſion. I repeat it, that I feel myſelf poſſeſſed of ſufficient grounds, from the inſtructions and information already received, to proſecute your views, in a treaty with the Maratta State, ſhould an opportunity offer of doing ſo previous to the arrival of any further directions from you for that purpoſe. But as a ſufficient time will certainly intervene, betwixt your receipt of the preſent diſpatches and the period of negociation to which I have alluded, to obtain a full communication of your ſentiments, I beg leave to expreſs my wiſh, that in order to prevent every poſſibility of inconvenience or delay from any miſconception of your inſtructions or intentions, you will pleaſe to tranſmit a clear and definite explanation of them for our mutual direction and guidance, as early as poſſible, that you may be informed of every particular circumſtance, and of the ſteps now taken or propoſed to be taken. I alſo encloſe you copy of a letter, wrote me by the Select Committee, No. 4, previous to my ſetting out for *Surat*; from which place I ſhall again addreſs you, and have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect, &c.

Bombay, (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*
September 6th 1780.

The accompaniments of the above letter being only copies of the papers received from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and entered on the proceedings of the 3d ultimo and this day, there is no occaſion to record them in this place.

Read another letter, as follows, from Brigadier General *Goddard*:

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you from *Bombay*, the 6th inſtant, encloſing copy of my correſpondence with the Select Committee; the opinion we had mutually formed of the preſent poſture of affairs; and the plan of operations propoſed to be followed for their improvement and ſucceſs the enſuing campaign. As this diſpatch was ſent round by the *Nancy*, Bengal armed veſſel, I make no doubt but it will reach you ſafe; and as it contained every particular and poſſible information, both with reſpect to the preſent ſtate of the war, and our intentions for its future proſecution, I find it unneceſſary, nothing material having ſince intervened, to trouble you farther at this time on the ſubject.

Brigadier General Goddard, 24th September

In

In purſuance of the plan determined upon at *Bombay*, the detachment of Madras Europeans, infantry, and artillery, embark this day; and as nothing prevents me but the ſeverity of the weather, and the conſequent height of the rivers and nullahs on the road, I flatter myſelf this obſtacle will now ſoon be removed, and that I ſhall have the happineſs ſhortly to acquaint you with the whole army's being in motion.

Permit me to congratulate you upon the ſignal ſucceſs of your arms under Captain *Popham*, and the honour they have acquired in the capture of the ſtrong fortreſs of *Gwalior*, which opens ſo favourable and promiſing a proſpect to the operations of the war in the northward.

I have within theſe few days been favoured with your letter, in triplicate, of the 15th May, on the ſubject of Mr. *Farmer*'s repreſentation, which has been attended to, and his claim admitted by the Government. I beg leave to acquaint you, that I have received no letter from your Government of a later date than the 17th May.

I have the honour to be,
With the greateſt reſpect, &c.

Camp near *Surat*, (Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*
September 24th 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 331.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* to the Honourable the Governor General and Council; dated 23d September 1780.

HAVING ſince then received ſome very intereſting intelligence from Mr. *Henſhaw* at *Goa*, we now encloſe copy of his letter, which we immediately communicated to General *Goddard*, and preſſed him to uſe all poſſible expedition in bringing down the army for the ſiege of *Baſſein*. And we ſhall likewiſe take every meaſure in our power to anticipate the Portugueze in their views of getting poſſeſſion of that important place.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. *Robert Henſhaw* to the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. &c. dated *Goa*, 9th September 1780.

Honourable Sir,

I ſend away this boat, expreſs, to acquaint you of ſome meaſures of this Government, in regard to their poſſeſſions (as they term them) north of *Bombay*. I yeſterday learnt of their having actually received orders from *Poonah*, to the Governor of *Baſſein*, for receiving a Portugueze garriſon therein, and hoiſting Portugueze colours. In conſequence, two of their frigates are getting ready, working night and day for this purpoſe, and upwards of five companies of Europeans, and near one thouſand Sepoys (irregulars) are now here at this village, ready to embark the moment the veſſels get over the bar. It is given out they are going to *Damaun*. Their hope is to be before hand with us; but I anxiouſly wiſh them diſappointed. I beg your Honour will return a Patamar boat to me, having none to forward any intelligence or packets from *Madras*. It is very long ſince I heard from *Stewart*.

I am with the higheſt eſteem and gratitude,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obliged
and grateful humble ſervant,

Goa, (Signed) *Robert Henſhaw.*
9th September 1780.

A true copy.
(Signed) *James Hartley*,
Dep^{y} Sec^{y}.

A true copy.
E. Hay, Act^{g} Sec^{y}.

APPENDIX, No. 332.

Appendix. Nos. 331 & 332.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard* to the Honourable the Governor General and Council; dated the 15th October 1780.

Gentlemen,

I HAVE the honour to encloſe you copy of an extract from the Honourable Company's commands, dated the 12th April laſt, which has been tranſmitted me by the Honourable Select Committee of *Bombay*.

The marks of diſtinction they have been pleaſed to confer upon me are in no reſpect more honourable and grateful than in the opportunity they give of continuing to merit your favour and approbation, by an implicit obedience to your commands, and the hope of conducting to a ſucceſsful termination, under your auſpices, the ſervice you have entruſted to my care and direction.

It is with pleaſure I can inform you, that every thing at preſent promiſes the moſt favourable iſſue to our firſt attempt upon *Baſſein:* the Madras Europeans are ſafe arrived at *Durwa Point* upon the iſland of *Salſette*, where the ſtores requiſite for the ſiege are all collected, with boats, &c. ready to tranſport them to the oppoſite ſhore, whenever the army under my command ſhall arrive; and as from the accounts brought me by my hircarrahs, of the condition of the roads, which from the unuſual heavy rains that have fallen this ſeaſon, have continued impaſſable longer than was expected, I have reaſon to hope it will now be in my power to overcome every remaining difficulty. I propoſe putting the army in motion the 16th inſtant, and ſhall march with all the expedition in my power to *Baſſein:* I ſhall write you immediately upon my arrival at that place; and ſhall not fail to addreſs you, ſhould any thing material happen on the road.

No change has taken place in the ſituation of affairs ſince I laſt had the honour of writing you; and from the reports that prevail here, of a large body of troops from *Bengal* having croſſed the *Jumna*, on their way to *Gohud*, I am encouraged confidently to hope that *Scindia* and *Holkar* will find themſelves too much employed in the defence of their northern poſſeſſions to have any leiſure to attend to what is tranſacting to the ſouthward.

I have provided as far as I could, conſiſtently with the plan of operations, and the grand objects to be purſued this campaign for the protection and ſecurity of the Company's territories in *Guzerat*, which from the preſent appearance of a favourable crop, and the extent and value of their collections, promiſe ſo large an acceſſion of revenue this ſeaſon, as to render the ſecurity of them a point of the moſt ſerious importance to our future ſucceſs; and unleſs *Scindia* and *Holkar* ſhould themſelves invade the country with a very large army, I am under no apprehenſion that it will be in the power of the enemy to make any impreſſion upon it.

To the detachment already ſtationed at *Ahmedabad*, and the two battalions left at *Zinnore*, which provide for the ſafety of the country north of the *Nerbuddah*, a body of troops, conſiſting of two Bombay battalions of Sepoys, will alſo be formed in the neighbourhood of *Surat*, to be in readineſs to move to repel any attack of the enemy from the ſouthward; and theſe it is intended ſhall be all directed to unite, ſhould the approach of any large army of the Marattas render it neceſſary.

The common object to which the ſervice of theſe ſeveral detachments is thus directed, requiring that their operations ſhould be under one general controul, in order that they may be ordered to act conjunctively, or ſeparately with each other as circumſtances ſhall render moſt expedient, I have thought it neceſſary to leave Major *Forbes*, an officer of experience and long ſervice, and of whoſe courage and military talents I have had repeated and recent proofs, in the command of the whole; and I flatter myſelf his conduct in it will be ſuch as to merit your approbation, and anſwer the good opinion I have been led to form of him.

Appendix. Nos. 333 & 334.

I ſhall addreſs you when any thing material occurs; and have the honour to be,

With the greateſt reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble ſervant,
(Signed) *Thos Goddard.*

Head Quarters, Camp near *Surat*, 15th October 1780.

(A true copy.)

E. Hay,
Act^g Sec^y.

APPENDIX, No. 333.

Extract of a Letter from Governor and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company, dated the 7th January 1781.

Par. 8. WE think it proper to ſend for your information an extract of a letter which we have received from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, under date the 23d September, accompanied by a letter to them from Mr. *Henſhaw*, their reſident at *Goa*; it goes therefore a number in this diſpatch; but we deem the report therein conveyed to us unworthy of our ſerious attention. We are generally inclined to believe, that although a connection may ſubſiſt between the Portugueze and the Marattas, its effect cannot be important: they have no rank among the Powers in *India*; they have no means of ſubſiſting their army in the field; and no ſuch advantages are likely to be yielded to them as can weigh againſt the ſtrong conſideration of the alliance which has long ſubſiſted between our nation and theirs. The claims which they prefer are claims of form, and perhaps would be preferred by any other nation having them, whether they were or were not juſtly founded.

9. With reſpect to the ſuppoſed intention of aſſerting and maintaining the claim on *Baſſein* by force, it ſeems to us nugatory; and it cannot be effectual, ſince we have received certain advices that Brigadier General *Goddard* with his army was before *Baſſein* on the 18th November laſt; and we are informed, that there was no force, excepting that in garriſon, to oppoſe his early capture of the place.

APPENDIX, No. 334.

Letter from *Bombay*, 11th January 1781, to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Gentlemen,

Par. 1. OUR laſt advices, dated the 25th July, were forwarded by the way of *Buſſora*, and we have the honour to addreſs you, in duplicate, by the ſame route, accompanied by tranſcript of our ſaid advices.

2. Since the above date, the following letters have come ſafely to hand.

Received the 14th Auguſt. Company's letter, and letter from the Committee of Correſpondence, both dated the 24th March 1780.

Received the 1ſt October. Letter from Chairman and Deputy Chairman, dated 9th July 1779.

Company's letter, and letter from the Committee of Correſpondence, dated 12th April 1780.

Letter from the Committee of Correſpondence, dated 29th April 1780.

3. The neceſſary communications were immediately made to the other Preſidencies, and to the Admiral, in conſequence of the advices contained in theſe ſeveral letters; and the diſmiſſions ordered in the Honourable Company's commands of the 12th April took place on receipt thereof.

4. Mr. *Draper* begs leave to return his humble and hearty acknowledgments for the very favourable orders reſpecting him; and to aſſure his Honourable Maſters, he will uſe his beſt endeavours, that his future conduct in the ſervice may prove equally acceptable to them, as that they have been pleaſed to notice.

5. In conſequence of Mr. *Carnac*'s diſmiſſion, and the death of Mr. *Moore*, Mr. *Stackhouſe* has become a member of this Committee, agreeable to the Honourable Company's orders, dated 10th April 1778.

6. We immediately ſignified to General *Goddard*, then with the army at *Surat*, your appointment of him to the chief command of the forces under this Preſidency, who has expreſſed himſelf exceedingly ſenſible of the honourable marks of diſtinction you have been pleaſed to confer upon him; and hopes to diſcharge the duties of that important ſtation with honour to himſelf and ſatisfaction to you. He has ſent advice of this appointment to the Governor General and Council, in order to receive their particular ſentiments regarding it; but has not as yet aſſumed the exerciſe of his command.

7. Our laſt advices left both our troops and thoſe of the enemy inactive: the ſeaſon of the year neceſſarily occaſioning an intermiſſion of hoſtilities, the Preſident made uſe of this opportunity to lay before us a review of the general poſture of affairs, as they related to the Maratta war. The advantages as well as difficulties of our ſituation, and a plan of meaſures for immediate proſecution, evincing, by the moſt accurate ſtatement of our ſituation, the neceſſity of bringing the Maratta war to as early a concluſion as poſſible.

8. By a well-founded concluſion from paſt events, and an attentive conſideration of the views and intereſts of the ſeveral leading men in the Poonah Government, we gave up all preſent expectation of effecting this deſirable purpoſe by treaty; nor were we empowered, or informed that General *Goddard* was empowered, to enter into any further negociation. We could not therefore entertain any hopes of peace, unleſs from ſucceſs in the moſt vigorous meaſures; which, preſſing as the difficulties were under which we laboured, ariſing eſpecially from the very low ſtate of our finances, we reſolved to adopt, and to purſue ſteadily the execution of the plan formed upon the grounds of your orders, and entered upon our diary under the 30th March 1779, according to which the reduction of *Baſſein* and its dependencies alone remained unaccompliſhed to complete our views in regard to the acquiſition of territory.

9. The principle of conduct recommended to us by the Preſident, and upon which we reſolved to proceed, was, in ſhort, by a vigorous purſuit of the war, ſtrictly confined to the objects already defined, either to compel the enemy to peace, or reduce the war on our part to a mere plan of defence, and thereby to put ourſelves in a condition as early as poſſible, to ſend back the troops of the other Preſidencies, for the expence of which no reſources within our moſt ſanguine hopes could prove in any degree adequate.

10. As the poſſeſſing *Baſſein* without the country would only be burthening ourſelves with an expenſive garriſon, and increaſing our charges without enlarging our reſources, the meaſures propoſed were ſo planned as to provide at once for the reduction of *Baſſein*, and the protection of the country, ſo far as our means would permit; as it was of the utmoſt importance to prevent, if poſſible, the enemy from conſuming or deſtroying the produce, which would not only diſappoint us of the revenue for a whole ſeaſon, but of all aids of ſubſiſtence expected from the country. By the poſſeſſion of *Callian* we had already ſecured footing, and a very favourable opening into the country, affording alſo a convenient ſtation for aſſembling our troops, and making early preparations for taking the field.

11. This ſervice could only be effected by troops from *Bombay*,

Bombay, the poſition of the Bengal army rendering it impoſſible to General *Goddard*. We therefore, after due communication with him, ſent a ſtrong detachment into the field under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*, as early as the ſeaſon would permit, whilſt the General undertook his march from *Surat*, which the ſeverity of the weather did not permit him to commence until the 16th of October; and even then, the army met with ſuch difficulties and obſtructions, from the extreme badneſs of the roads, and the numerous rivers, that they did not reach their ground before *Baſſein* until the 13th of November, where he was joined by reinforcements and ſtores from *Bombay*; and Colonel *Hartley*, according to his inſtructions, was from that time to act under the General's orders, and be employed in covering the ſiege, or otherwiſe, as might be found neceſſary.

12. The General repreſented, that finding the place very ſtrong, and defended by a numerous garriſon, under the command of *Viſſagee Punt*, he determined to carry on his operations with regularity and precaution.—On the 28th in the morning he had completed a battery of ſix guns, and ſix mortars, within 900 yards of the place, and under cover of the fire, carried on his approaches to the ſpot where he erected the grand battery of nine 24 pounders, which was opened the 9th ultimo in the morning, within 500 yards of the wall; beſides which a battery of 20 mortars of different ſizes was opened upon one of the flanks of the parapet: theſe were ſerved with ſuch effect, that on the 10th in the morning, a practicable breach being nearly completed, a meſſage was ſent from the fort, offering to ſurrender; and we have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that after ſome demur on the part of the enemy, which obliged the General to renew the fire from the batteries, the place ſurrendered the next day at diſcretion; the garriſon marched out and laid down their arms in front of the fort, being only allowed to carry away their own private effects. We beg leave to congratulate you moſt cordially on this important acquiſition, which has been ſo long the object of our wiſhes. And what adds greatly to the ſatisfaction we feel on the occaſion is, the very ſmall loſs ſuſtained in the ſiege; one officer only, Lieutenant Sir *John James Gordon*, having been wounded, who is ſince dead, and about 12 men killed and wounded, of whom four only were Europeans.

13. A conſiderable quantity of ammunition was found in the fort, and 220 pieces of cannon, and 10 braſs mortars; of which 19 pieces of braſs cannon, ſeveral of a very large calibre, 128 pieces of iron ordnance, and all the mortars, have been reported ſerviceable.

14. It is not material to give a detail by this conveyance of the operations of the detachment under Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley*; which, upon the whole, we doubt not facilitated the ſucceſs of the ſiege, which was carried on without interruption whilſt Colonel *Hartley* took up the attention of a large body of the enemy, ſent, we apprehend, to attempt the relief, with which he was ſucceſſively engaged for the three days preceding the fall of the place; immediately after which General *Goddard* moved to his ſupport; but two days before he joined, the enemy had retired to a conſiderable diſtance.

15. We ſignified to Lieutenant Colonel *Hartley* the mark of favour you intend him; and he aſſures us he ſhall ever conſider your approbation as the higheſt honour, and that whenever an opportunity offers, he ſhall not fail of ſhewing to the utmoſt his zeal for your ſervice.

16. After the reduction of *Baſſein*, the General repaired to *Bombay*, to conſult with us reſpecting his further operations; but by that time a very material change had taken place in our political ſituation.

17. The Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* had adviſed us, in a letter dated 28th July, received the 13th September, that *Hyder Ally* had invaded the *Carnatic* with a large army, and that they could only act upon the defenſive. They gave their opinion, that the war ſhould be carried into *Hyder*'s poſſeſſions on the coaſt of *Malabar*; and expreſſed hopes that we ſhould be in a ſituation to act with vigour againſt him, at leaſt when the Maratta war was at an end. We did not fail to give them a faithful account of our condition and inability to co-operate with them in any degree, until the Maratta war was brought to a concluſion, and had no further account of their proceedings until the arrival of the fleet on the 19th ultimo, when the Admiral delivered us a letter from the Select Committee, confirming reports we had before heard of a moſt dreadful diſaſter having befel a conſiderable part of their army under the command of Colonel *Baillie*. The account we now give of this unfortunate affair is in their own words. Appendix. No. 334.

18. With theſe alarming accounts we received a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 9th of October, adviſing that they had come to a determination to offer peace to the Marattas; and enclоſing copy of a treaty of which they had agreed for that purpoſe, to which they refer us in ſo many words for the knowledge of every particular; having therefore no further information to afford, we think it eſpecially neceſſary to tranſmit a copy of this paper, with which we received a peremptory order to ſuſpend all hoſtilities and military operations againſt the Marattas, immediately on receipt of a requiſition in writing to that effect, and a notification from the Peiſhwa that the like order had been given on his part to the officers commanding his armies: but in the mean time, and until the receipt of ſuch requiſition and notification, they earneſtly recommended to us a vigorous proſecution of the war, and ſending the like order to General *Goddard*. The copy of the propoſed treaty ſent to us has no date; but the letter accompanying it as above mentioned, is dated the 9th of October, and what we have now communicated contains the whole ſubſtance of the information given us by the Governor General and Council reſpecting this meaſure.

19. When *Hyder Ally*, by his invaſion of the *Carnatic*, had commenced open hoſtilities againſt the Company, a body of his troops alſo joined the Malabar Powers in the attack of *Tellicherry*: finding the defence of this ſettlement an inſupportable burthen, and the Maratta war requiring that every reſource of this Preſidency ſhould be confined to that object alone, we ſaw the expediency of abandoning *Tellicherry* altogether; but after the opinion given by the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, of the neceſſity of carrying the war into *Hyder*'s poſſeſſions on this coaſt, we did not think it proper without firſt conſulting them to give up a place which might be of much conſequence towards the ſucceſs of ſuch a meaſure whenever circumſtances may permit of its being carried into execution, and which might alſo have a material effect upon their preſent operations. We at the ſame time ſtated our inability to furniſh the neceſſary ſupplies of men, money, and ſtores, to ſuſtain a ſiege which promiſed to continue ſo long, as the army in the *Carnatic* continued to act on the defenſive; and ſubmitted to them, whether the fort of *Tellicherry* was of ſuch importance to the ſucceſs of the war as to be equal to the expence of maintaining it; in which caſe we deſired to know, whether they would take that charge upon their Government; for as we then acquainted them, we were not able to ſupport it, further than by ſending a temporary relief until their anſwer could be obtained.

20. The Select Committee, in their anſwer ſubſequent to the diſaſter of the 10th of September, recommended the evacuating of the place; and we had lodged previous orders at *Tellicherry* for the garriſon to act in this point according to the anſwer from *Fort Saint George*, which for that reaſon we deſired might be immediately communicated to the Reſident, that meaſures might be taken for withdrawing from the place under the countenance and protection of his Majeſty's ſquadron, which we expected would arrive there nearly at the ſame time with the anſwer from *Fort Saint George*.

21. The Admiral, when he arrived at *Tellicherry*, was poſſeſſed of the Governor General and Council's intentions of offering peace to the Marattas; and on being conſulted

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conſulted by the Reſident and factors reſpecting the meaſures for withdrawing the ſettlement, he gave it deciſively as his opinion, from the great difference which had ariſen in the ſtate of the Company's affairs, both as to war and policy, ſince the date of our inſtructions, the place ought not to be abandoned until further orders from *Bombay*; and to enable them to hold out until then, he offered ſupplies of ammunition, military ſtores, proviſions, men and money; and immediately diſpatched a letter to us, ſtrongly urging the neceſſity of maintaining the place at this time, and under the preſent circumſtances of the Company's affairs; and requeſting and deſiring we would take this matter under our moſt ſerious conſideration, and ſpeedily diſpatch ſuch a reinforcement of troops and other requiſites as might be fully ſufficient to drive the enemy from before the place; when, if we ſhould not think the ſettlement worth keeping, it might be evacuated, the Company's effects ſaved, and the honour of the national arms preſerved.

22. The Admiral accordingly landed a detachment of 100 marines, and ſuch ſtores as were judged adequate by the commandant to the defence of the place, until a reinforcement could be ſent from *Bombay*; and alſo left the ſhips *Ponsborne* and *Contractor*, to aſſiſt with the Company's cruizers ſtationed there in keeping the port open. We cannot omit mentioning the further proof the Admiral gave of his zeal for your ſervice, by offering to land a body of men from the fleet, to aſſiſt in ſtorming the enemy's works, but which Major *Cotgrave* thought proper to decline.

23. The Admiral, in his paſſage up the Malabar coaſt, has conſiderably weakened *Hyder Ally*'s marine force, by cutting out one ſhip from *Callicut* road; and at *Mangalore*, with the boats of the fleet, he deſtroyed two grab ſhips, a large ketch, and took another ketch of ten guns. He then proceeded to *Bombay* with the whole fleet, which now conſiſts of only five ſhips of the line, and one frigate; three ſhips being returned to *England*, one frigate ſent to *China*, and the *Nymph* ſloop to the *Cape*. The *Sartine* frigate was loſt at *Callicut*. The ſhips at *Bombay* are proceeding in their refitment with all poſſible expedition.

24. Such was the ſtate of affairs when after the reduction of *Baſſein* it became neceſſary to determine what further meaſures were to be purſued, and we requeſted the Admiral and the General to meet us in Committee for that purpoſe.

25. The Admiral declared it to be his opinion, that the ſafety and preſervation of the Company's ſettlements on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, and of the army under Sir *Eyre Coote*, depended on this Preſidency being able to make ſome vigorous effort againſt the poſſeſſions of *Hyder Ally* on this coaſt; and urged in ſtrong terms the neceſſity of a ſpeedy peace with the Marattas, to enable us to act with our whole force againſt *Hyder Ally*, who now threatens deſtruction to the *Carnatic*, and even to *Fort Saint George* itſelf, if aided by a body of French, which there appeared a great probability might be introduced into the country.

26. We allowed much weight to the ſentiments delivered by the Admiral, and that in the unhappy ſituation to which affairs at *Fort St. George* are reduced, a peace with the Marattas was moſt ardently to be wiſhed for, and which we ſhall labour moſt zealouſly and ſtrenuouſly to obtain; but until that event takes place it muſt be admitted as an abſolute impoſſibility, that we can make any effectual attack againſt the poſſeſſions of *Hyder Ally* on the Malabar coaſt, for were we to relax in our operations againſt the Marattas, or to weaken the army ſo far as to diſable it from acting with vigour againſt them, this Preſidency might ſoon be reduced to as bad a ſituation as *Fort St. George*; or the Marattas relieved from all apprehenſions from this quarter, might unite with *Hyder Ally* in the invaſion of the *Carnatic*, and complete the ruin of that Preſidency.

27. A purſuit of the Maratta war with all poſſible vigour as recommended by the Governor General and Council, promiſed with the moſt rational expectation to promote a ſpeedy accommodation, ſooner than any other plan of conduct; and indeed our own ſafety, as well as the general ſafety of the Company's poſſeſſions, made it neceſſary that we ſhould either find employment for the Marattas or bring them to terms. In theſe circumſtances therefore it would be in the higheſt degree imprudent and impolitic, by a diviſion of our forces to diſable ourſelves from purſuing the line of conduct ſo neceſſary for the public ſafety.

28. At the ſame time we were very earneſt in our wiſhes to preſerve *Tellicherry*, until at leaſt we can form a better judgment what probability there may be of the Marattas accepting the proffered terms, or of the war being otherwiſe brought to a concluſion; and on conſulting the General reſpecting the ſtate of the army, we found we could furniſh a very defenſive garriſon for *Tellicherry* without diſabling him from an active proſecution of the war againſt the Marattas; and we have therefore determined for the preſent to maintain it.

29. Immediately on the reduction of *Baſſein* and before the receipt of the letter from *Bengal* of the 9th of October, we had on the Preſident's propoſal recommended to the General, to acquaint the Poonah Miniſtry that if they were deſirous of peace on equitable and moderate terms he was ſtill ready to enter into treaty with them; at the ſame time ſupporting the offer with ſuch motions of the army as might ſeem moſt likely to enforce the acceptance of it; keeping ſtill in mind the main object of the campaign, the complete reduction of the *Conkan* or country below the Gauts, in which were ſeveral forts of difficult acceſs, the poſſeſſion of which would be of great importance to preſerve it in tranquillity: the General did not altogether coincide in the idea, but ſeemed to think that greater advantages might be derived from the fall of *Baſſein*, and although he did not abſolutely propoſe to penetrate into the *Decan*, he gave it as his opinion, that with all the force we could collect, the firſt military effort would be to ſecure the paſſes of the Gauts, there to take poſt, and either advance or continue to act on the defenſive, as may be found moſt expedient, carrying the terror of our arms as near to the enemy's capital as poſſible, without riſking too far the ſafety of the troops or endangering their return. This ſtep he thought moſt likely to produce a peace, and ſupported his propoſal by remarking the unprepared ſtate of the Poonah Government to reſiſt our arms, ariſing from the abſence of their two principal officers, *Scindia* and *Holkar*, who we do not find *have yet* moved to this ſide, as well as the improbability of their receiving aſſiſtance from any other Power hoſtile to the Company.

30. As we were equally ſolicitous to reduce the Maratta Government to terms, and the Governor General and Council left the conduct of the war to General *Goddard*, we have only in general terms recommended to him to purſue his operations with all poſſible vigour, and to the utmoſt extent he may find practicable with the force under his command.

31. While the neceſſary preparations are forwarding for the moſt vigorous operations, a detachment of the army is employed in the attack of *Arnaul*, a fort on the ſea coaſt to the northward of *Baſſein*; and the Admiral at our requeſt has ſent two of the king's ſhips to aſſiſt in this ſervice.

32. We have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that your poſſeſſions to the northward have remained in perfect tranquillity, and we expect to receive a conſiderable revenue therefrom this ſeaſon, which however will be far from equal to our neceſſities, now preſſing to a degree never before experienced, as we are obliged to appropriate a part for the expences of the Bengal army.

* 33. By a letter communicated to us by General *Goddard*, we learned with great ſatisfaction that the detachment under Captain *Popham* ſurprized and took the important fortreſs of *Guilier* on the 4th of Auguſt laſt, but

we are not able to give any farther advice of the operations of that detachment, or to what object they are directed.

William Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

Bombay Caſtle,
11th Jan. 1781.

APPENDIX, No. 335.

Encloſures in Sir *Edward Hughes*'s Packet to Lord *Hillſborough*, Secretary of State.

No. 9.

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in *India*.

Sir,

WE have the pleaſure to acquaint you with the ſafe arrival of Sir *Eyre Coote*, with a detachment of Europeans from *Bengal*. And we learn by private advice, that eight battalions of Sepoys are marching from thence to the Preſidency.

We encloſe you copy of a letter from our Reſident at *Ganjam*, which will inform you of the intelligence we have received reſpecting French cruizers.

We are likewiſe to inform you, that the Governor General and Council having thought proper, by the power veſted in them, to ſuſpend *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, *Charles Smith*, Eſquire, has ſucceeded to the government of the Company's affairs on this coaſt.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Chas Smith,
Eyre Coote,
Saml Johnſon,
Hector Munro,
Alex^r Davidſon.
Edwd Hughes.

Fort Saint George,
15th November 1780.

(Copy.)

No. 10.

Fort Saint George, 12th November 1780.

Dear Sir,

I muſt take a future opportunity of replying to ſuch parts of your letters of the 2d July, and 14th September, as may not be anſwered by what follows in this.

Before I left *Bengal*, your letters to the Governor General and Council, containing copies of the advices which you had received from *England*, of an armament being in readineſs to ſail from *France* to act againſt us in *India*, and informing them of your reſolution to leave this and proceed to the Malabar coaſt to counteract the enemy, as you expected they would firſt make an attempt in that quarter, either to diſtreſs our ſettlements there, or form a junction with *Hyder Ally Cawn*, had arrived. By the anſwers which were written to them, and which I hope have reached you in ſafety, you will be informed of the call that was made upon me to proceed hither in order to take upon me the command of the army at this Preſidency; a call, which you may ſuppoſe as the intereſts of the public were ſo eſſentially concerned, I embraced with that alacrity which my heart has ever dictated to me on ſuch occaſions. By the ſame diſpatches you are alſo informed of the reſolutions which the Supreme Council had come to, of making peace with the Marattas, a meaſure which in the preſent ſituation of our affairs was equally neceſſary and to be wiſhed for. I truſt therefore that the propoſals we have made towards bringing about an accommodation will be attended with ſucceſs. If you can be ſerviceable in this buſineſs I am confident you will.

I took my departure from *Bengal* on the 13th ultimo, and arrived here on the 5th inſtant. I have brought with me fifteen lacks of rupees for the ſervices of the war, two companies of European artillery with their complement of Laſcars, a battalion of Europeans conſiſting of 370, and about 40 gentlemen volunteers. I did flatter myſelf, that with this addition to the ſtrength of our army here, I ſhould have been in force ſufficient to have taken the field againſt *Hyder*; but ſo very ſhort have I found it of my expectations, and in ſo diſtracted and unprepared a ſtate, affairs in general, that however willing I feel myſelf to check him in his career of ſucceſs, it is now impoſſible: firſt, becauſe of the monſoon which has ſet in with very heavy rains, and obliged me for the preſent to order the troops into cantonments; and next, becauſe the fall of *Arcot*, the capital of the *Carnatic*, into the hands of *Hyder*, which happened two days before my arrival, has put him in poſſeſſion of not only a moſt formidable aſylum for his whole army, but a conſiderable quantity of very uſeful military ſtores, either for maintaining the footing he has already obtained, or for proſecuting his further views of conqueſt. By the beſt information I can obtain, his army does not conſiſt of leſs than a hundred thouſand black infantry; between two and three hundred of European infantry, under the command of a Mr. *Lally*; thirty thouſand horſe; a large train of artillery; not leſs than a hundred pieces of cannon of different calibres, and ſo well ſerved, as in the late ſiege of *Arcot*, to have frequently diſmounted the guns on our batteries. This is not a circumſtance collected from mere report, but communicated to me by the officers and others who are arrived from the garriſon of *Arcot*, under articles of capitulation. All theſe circumſtances conſidered, and added to the difficulties which we ſhould, after leaving this place, unavoidably experience on the ſcore of proviſions, I ſee no probability of having it ſpeedily in my power to act offenſively againſt *Hyder*, unleſs I ſhould have the happineſs to hear ſoon that peace is concluded with the Marattas, and that they have united their forces with General *Goddard*, and invaded his poſſeſſions on the other ſide of *India*.

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I encloſe you a copy of my letter to Brigadier General *Goddard*: you will perceive from it that he is under my orders; but you will obſerve alſo, that as I write without any certain intelligence, either of his ſituation, of the progreſs of his late expedition againſt *Baſſein*, or of the ſtate of our negociations with the Marattas, I am obliged to leave him in a great meaſure to his own diſcretion: I only point out to him that I now conſider the Maratta war as a very ſecondary buſineſs, and that he will direct his whole views towards diſtreſſing the poſſeſſions of *Hyder* on the Malabar ſide, as, until the detachment of eight battalions of Sepoys, which I have been adviſed from *Bengal*, are under orders of march for this place, under command of Colonel *Pearſe*, arrive, it is the only hope I have, by obliging *Hyder* to divide his force, of enabling me to act offenſively againſt him, and to drive him from the *Carnatic*.

After theſe obſervations, and convinced of the zeal with which Sir *Edward Hughes* is inſpired for the ſervice of his king, and for the honour and intereſts of the Britiſh nation, I know it is unneceſſary for me to expreſs even a wiſh of his concerting ſuch meaſures as his line of ſervice may enable him, and he may deem eligible, towards diſtreſſing *Hyder* on the ſea coaſt of *Malabar*, and of his co-operating with General *Goddard* in every inſtance that may be in his power, and whereby the grand object of their mutual exertion may be promoted.

I have, purpoſely to convey this diſpatch to you, ſent round the *Indus* ſchooner, Captain *Jones*, belonging to *Bengal*; and which, as I ſhall be extremely anxious to receive early intelligence of both your own and General *Goddard*'s plans, I hope you will return as ſpeedily as poſſible, as well as ſend me the earlieſt information to the ſame effect, in duplicate and triplicate, by the ſafeſt and moſt expeditious land conveyance.

I truſt that by our joint endeavours we may yet re-

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ſtore the intereſts of the nation in this quarter of the globe to their wonted flouriſhing ſtate, and that with honour and credit to ourſelves. With moſt ſincere wiſhes for all poſſible ſucceſs to crown your operations, I have the honour to be, with much eſteem and regard,

Dear Sir,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble ſervant,

Eyre Coote.

P. S. It had almoſt eſcaped me, that the Supreme Council having thought proper to ſuſpend Mr. *Whitehill*, the government in conſequence devolved upon Mr. *Charles Smith.*

(Copy.) *Edwd Hughes.*

His Excellency Sir *Edwd Hughes*, K. B.
&c. &c. &c.

No. 11.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*, or the officer commanding the Bengal detachment.

Sir,

I encloſe you a letter from the Governor General and Council, of which they communicated to me the contents, but ſent me no copy; I therefore opened it, that I might be enabled to ſend you an exact duplicate by land from hence, and which I ſhall ſend to-morrow.

I have alſo, to give theſe diſpatches every chance of reaching you with ſafety and expedition, ſent a duplicate by the veſſel which carries this, and which ſhe is to put on ſhore at *Nagore*, from whence I have written to the Reſident there, Mr. *Huddleſton*, to forward it to Mr. *Torleſſe* at *Anjengo*, and to whom I have likewiſe written to expedite it with all poſſible care to you.

The terms of the Governor General and Council's letter, placing your detachment under my orders, are in themſelves ſufficiently clear and deciſive to render all definition by me unneceſſary. I ſhall therefore, without further preamble, proceed to communicate to you in as conciſe a manner as poſſible, the ſtate in which things are in here, and what ſhare I could wiſh you to take, in order to aſſiſt in extricating them from the difficulties with which they are loaded.

I ſhall in the firſt place inform you, that I left *Calcutta* on the 13th of laſt month, and arrived ſafe here on board the *Kingſton* Indiaman, the 5th inſtant, having brought along with me a detachment from the Bengal army, conſiſting of two European companies of artillery with their complement of Laſcars, one battalion of European infantry amounting to 370, and 40 gentlemen volunteers. With ſuch an addition to the ſtrength of the army which I expected to find here, I had little doubt of being in force ſufficient to cope with *Hyder* in the field; but to my great concern the pleaſing view I had formed of entering immediately upon action, has, from a combination of untoward circumſtances, become altogether viſionary. Inſtead of eight or ten complete Sepoy battalions which I laid my account with meeting, I can hardly muſter from their remains enough of effective men to complete three. The cavalry, both Nabob's and Company's, when collected together, will not be a thouſand ſtrong. The complement of Europeans, which after leaving a very ſmall garriſon in this fort, I could carry into the field, would not exceed 1,400. No proviſions to be had any where in the country five miles beyond *Madras*, which has been ravaged, and is now infeſted by *Hyder*'s horſe in large bodies; and at this preſent time the inhabitants are living on the ſupplies which have lately come from *Bengal*.

Under theſe circumſtances you may imagine that it would be no eaſy matter to equip an army for either a long or active campaign, which could command no other reſources for ſubſiſtence than what it had immediately within itſelf. With ſuch powerful obſtacles as theſe to encounter, I confeſs my mind has received ſome ſmall relief from its diſappointments, by the neceſſity which the ſetting in of the monſoon has furniſhed me with, of throwing my little army into cantonments, which however I have formed contiguous to where it was encamped, that I might not give an unfavourable impreſſion, by appearing to quit the field. When the detachment of eight battalions of Sepoys under orders of march from *Bengal*, under the command of Colonel *Pearſe* joins, (which however it will not do in leſs than four months) I ſhall be competent to any thing: but ere that time, I conceive matters will be brought to a criſis one way or another, for *Hyder* has advanced with ſuch rapid ſucceſs, that I muſt not remain ſo long inactive.

Having made you acquainted with what immediately concerns myſelf, I ſhall now inform you of what belongs to *Hyder*.

He is in poſſeſſion of *Arcot*, the capital of the *Carnatic*, which he took two days before my arrival. The Pettah he took by ſtorm, and the citadel capitulated. His infantry are computed at a hundred thouſand, of which there are twenty thouſand in regular battalions, and well diſciplined; between two and three hundred Europeans under the command of a Mr. *Lally*, and 30,000 cavalry, together with a very formidable train of artillery, not leſs than 100 pieces of cannon, and which at the ſiege of *Arcot* were ſo well ſerved, as repeatedly to have diſmounted our guns on the batteries. By the capture of this town and garriſon he has got poſſeſſion of an aſylum for his whole army, and of a very large quantity of military ſtores, which will prove very uſeful, not only in maintaining what he has already acquired, but in aſſiſting his further views of conqueſt. Theſe are circumſtances which threaten us with the moſt ſerious conſequences.

I hope that ere this reaches you, you will have been informed of the reſolutions which the Governor General and Council had come to, of offering peace to the Marattas, and that the terms have been received and proved acceptable to the Court of *Poonah*; that matters are in a fair train of being amicably accommodated; and that I ſhall ſoon receive the agreeable tidings of their having united their forces with you to act againſt *Hyder*. However this may be, and as in the preſent ſituation of our affairs, I conſider it as a very ſecondary buſineſs; I muſt earneſtly deſire that you will of yourſelf endeavour by every poſſible means to diſtreſs *Hyder*'s poſſeſſions on your ſide *India*; and if there is any expedition which you are of opinion might, in concert with the Admiral, be ſucceſsfully undertaken againſt any of *Hyder*'s principal places, and would produce the effect of obliging him to ſend part of the large force he has here to the ſecurity of his own country, I depend on your military experience and activity for ſpeedily executing it, I ſhould then I think be able, even with the force I now have, to drive him from the *Carnatic*. I write to Sir *Edward Hughes* on this ſubject, who I am perſuaded will cheerfully cooperate with you in any meaſure that may promiſe ſucceſs to the general operations of the war. As I have no late accounts where you now are, nor any advices concerning either your own or the tranſactions of the Marattas in your expedition againſt *Baſſein*, I have it not in my power to point out to you any direct line for your plan of operations. I muſt therefore rely on your local knowledge of circumſtances and diſcernment, for purſuing ſuch a conduct as may ſerve to promote the great object I have above ſuggeſted.

As nothing can be more material to the mutual ſucceſs of our operations in the war than particular and frequent intelligence, I muſt beg you will be conſtant in your communications upon every occurrence which may be in any ſhape uſeful for me to know; and you may depend on my being punctual in my correſpondence from hence.

As the firſt ſtep which has occurred to me might be of ſervice to your operations, I have ſent orders to Major *Cotgrave*, in command of a detachment from the troops of this Preſidency formerly ſtationed at *Tellicherry*, and lately ordered to march from thence to *Anjengo* to obey

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any orders you may ſend him to join you if neceſſary; if not, his detachment would be of great ſervice here: I would therefore, if ſafe, adviſe his coming to *Pallamcotah* where he will receive further orders. I have the honour to be, with much eſteem and regard,

Sir,

Fort St. George, 12th Nov. 1780.

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

(Copy.) *Edward Hughes.*

APPENDIX, No. 336.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 9th October 1780.

THE Secretary lays before the Board drafts of letters to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* and to Brigadier General *Goddard*, grounded on the Reſolutions of the Board of the 27th ultimo.

To Bombay.

Gentlemen,

We have received the ſeveral letters which you have written to us under date the 29th May, 6th June, 30th July, and 14th Auguſt, with the accompaniments to each. We are alſo to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th Auguſt, which has reached us within theſe few days, and to which we propoſe to ſend a ſeparate reply in a very ſhort time.

At ſo great a diſtance as this is at which we are placed, from the ſcene of General *Goddard*'s operations, it is impoſſible for us to preſcribe any fixed plan of action for the army under his command: we have therefore left it to his judgment, guided and aſſiſted by your opinion and advice, to employ our troops after the reduction of *Baſſein*, which we ſuppoſe by this time accompliſhed, or nearly ſo, for your defence againſt the French, if neceſſary for the general benefit of the Company's intereſts and annoyance of the enemy. The line of conduct marked out by the Company's inſtructions, and to which you ſeem to adhere in your late letters, is the rule by which we deſire you to be guided; but we are happy to leave the plan of operations to your determination and to that of the commander of our troops, not doubting but that your judgment and information will determine on the beſt that can be purſued.

We are now, gentlemen, to inform you of a reſolution which we have paſſed, but which we deſire may be kept inviolably ſecret while it be in the power of our enemies to oppoſe and defeat the ſucceſs of its object. Without further preface then, we make known to you the determination which we have paſſed, to offer peace and friendſhip to the Maratttas. The encloſed copy of the treaty on which we have agreed for this purpoſe, will convey to you the knowledge of every particular; and we hereby require and command you, immediately to ſuſpend all hoſtilities and military operations againſt the Marattas on the receipt of a requiſition in writing to that effect, and notification from the Peiſhwa that the like order has been given on his part to the officers commanding his armies; but in the mean time and until your receipt of ſuch requiſition and notification, we earneſtly recommend to you a vigorous proſecution of the war as far as your troops may be engaged in it.

A ſimilar order has been ſent to Brigadier General *Goddard.*

We are, &c.

Fort William, the 9th October 1780.

To General Goddard.

Sir,

In our letter to you of this date already written we have replied to ſuch parts of your letters hitherto unacknowledged as appeared to us to require an anſwer. The purpoſe of this letter is diſtinct and particular; it is meant only to convey to your knowledge a reſolution which we have formed, and orders for your guidance grounded on it; and we direct that for ſome time to come the whole be kept inviolably ſecret, and not permitted to paſs beyond your own information. Appendix. Nos. 336&338.

We have reſolved to offer terms of peace and friendſhip to the Maratta State, and for your knowledge of ſuch part of the treaty as may affect the motions of your army we herewith ſend you an atteſted copy of the treaty which we have determined to propoſe.

And we hereby poſitively require and command you immediately to ſuſpend all hoſtilities and military operations againſt the Marattas, whenever you may receive a requiſition in writing to that effect, and a notification from the Peiſhwa that the like order has been given on his part to the officers commanding his armies; but in the mean time and until ſuch requiſition and notification be received by you, we direct that you proſecute the war with the utmoſt vigour, and act in all circumſtances as if the foregoing information had not been ſent.

We are, &c.

Fort William, 9th October 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 338.

Extract of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B. to the Earl of *Hillsborough*; dated *Bombay*, the 2d January 1781.

BY the *Ponsborne* I received letters from the Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, encloſing alſo a letter directed to me, dated the 2d October laſt, from the Governor General in Council of *Bengal*, in anſwer to mine to them of the 14th September laſt; a copy of which letter, No. 2. is herewith encloſed for your Lordſhip's information, as containing matter of much importance to the affairs of the Company in particular, and of the nation at large.

On the 24th November in the evening, in ſight of *Callicut* road, a port of *Hyder Ally*'s, I ſaw at an anchor there His Majeſty's ſhips *Exeter*, *Burford*, *Eagle*, and *Sartine*, the two laſt engaging two ſhips lying cloſe to the ſhore with *Hyder*'s colours flying on board them, but being ſtill anxious to proceed to the relief of *Tellicherry*, one of the Company's ſettlements on this coaſt, that had been beſieged nine months by the combined forces of the Nairs, aſſiſted by a detachment of *Hyder Ally*'s troops; and its garriſon, by the information I had received at *Anjengo*, reduced to great want of every article eſſential to its longer defence, I continued my courſe to that place with the *Burford* in company which joined off *Callicut*, and arrived in *Tellicherry* road on the 27th, where I found two of the Company's armed ſnows, and a tranſport ſhip which had brought ſome ſtores and ammunition to the garriſon; in the mean time the armed boats of the ſhips in *Callicut* road cut out and brought from thence one of *Hyder Ally*'s ſhips, and forced the other on ſhore; but in the courſe of their operations the *Sartine* being warped into ſhoal water to cannonade the ſhips, ſtruck on the rocks at low water, and filled ſo that ſhe was totally loſt, part of her ſails, topmaſts, booms, and ſome other ſtores, being all that could be ſaved out of her.

On the 28th I went on ſhore to *Tellicherry* at the requeſt of the Chief and Council at that place, to deliberate with them on what was beſt to be done in the then ſituation of that place; and prior to our meeting I received from them the letter of which No. 3 is a copy, and No. 4 a copy of my anſwer, by which your Lordſhip will obſerve that I ſtrongly urged the propriety of maintaining the place, and tendered them every aſſiſtance in my power for that purpoſe.

On the 28th and 29th the ſeveral ſhips of the ſquadron with the Company's ſhips *Ponsborne* and *Contractor*,

Appendix. No. 338.

tractor, merchant ſhips, joined me in *Tellichery* road, and on the 1ſt of December His Majeſty's ſhip *Coventry* joined me, laſt from *Bombay*; this ſhip I had ſent from *Madras* in February laſt with my public diſpatches, and a packet from that Preſidency to the Court of Directors, to be landed at *Suez* under the care of Mr. *Wooley*, who was charged with the conveyance of them over land; the *Coventry* did not get up the *Red Sea* quite as far as *Suez*, on account of contrary winds, but landed Mr. *Wooley* at *Coſſier*, a port not far diſtant from *Suez*, who proſecuted his journey to *Cairo*; and I hope the packets arrived ſafe in *England*.

By the *Coventry* I received a letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated the 13th November, of which No. 5 herewith enclоſed is a copy; by which your Lordſhip will obſerve that the Maratta war was ſtill uppermoſt in the minds of that Preſidency, notwithſtanding the known diſtreſs of the Company's affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, and of their own ſettlement of *Tellicherry*.

After much correſpondence with the gentlemen of *Tellicherry*, of which No. 6 is a copy of the reſolutions of a council of war held there; No. 7 a copy of a letter from me to them; and No. 8, their anſwer thereto; will enable your Lordſhip to form a judgment; they came to an unanimous reſolution, to maintain the place until further orders from *Bombay*, provided a reinforcement of an hundred marines with their officers, and a thouſand barrels of powder, were landed from the ſquadron, and the Company's ſhips *Pondborne* and *Contractor* left in the road to keep the poſt open for ſupplies of proviſions; and having landed the marines and powder accordingly, I ſailed from *Tellicherry* road towards *Bombay* on the 5th of December, with all the ſquadron, except the *Coventry* left as a convoy to the trade up the coaſt, taking with me the Company's two armed ſnows.

On the 8th of December being off *Mangalore*, the principal ſea-port of *Hyder Ally* on the Malabar coaſt, I ſaw two ſhips, a large ſnow, three ketches, and many ſmaller veſſels, at an anchor in the road, with *Hyder*'s colours flying on board; and ſtanding cloſe into the road found them veſſels of force and all armed for war; on which I anchored as cloſe to the enemy's ſhips as poſſible with ſafety, ordered the armed boats of the ſquadron to attack and deſtroy them, under the cover of the Company's two armed ſnows and the prize ſhip taken in *Callicut* Road, which were anchored in four fathoms water, and cloſe to the enemy's ſhips; this ſervice was conducted on the part of our boats with a ſpirit and activity that do much honour to the officers and men employed in them, and in two hours they took and burnt the two ſhips, one of 28 the other of 26 guns full of men for their defence; one ketch of 12 guns was blown up by the enemy at the inſtant our boats were boarding her; another ketch of 10 guns which cut her cables and endeavoured to get to ſea was taken; the third ketch with the ſmaller veſſels were driven on ſhore; and the ſnow only eſcaped into the harbour, having thrown every thing over board.

On this ſervice the ſquadron loſt Lieutenant *Gom* of the *Burford* and 10 men killed, Lieutenant *Sutton* of the *Superb*, Lieutenant *Maclellan* of the *Eagle*, and 51 men wounded: there were ſeveral of the enemy's ſhips and veſſels within the harbour, but ſo little depth of water on the bar at the entrance, that even the Company's ſnows could not go in without being lightened; and under the muzzles of the enemy's guns, with a garriſon of 4,000 men, who could wade to our boats when within the harbour, I did not think it practicable to deſtroy them by our boats alone without a very great loſs of men, and therefore early on the 9th I proceeded with the ſquadron for *Bombay*; and the ſame day was joined by the *Coventry* from *Tellicherry* road, which brought me letters from the Select Committee of *Fort St. George* and General Sir *Eyre Coote*, under dates the 12th and 15th November, of much importance to our affairs in this country, eſpecially the copy of Sir *Eyre*'s letter to Brigadier General *Goddard*; copies of which, Nos. 9, 10, and 11, I now have the honour to enclоſe with this for your Lordſhip's information, by which, amongſt other misfortunes, your Lordſhip will obſerve the loſs of the capital of the province of *Arcot*, and the almoſt ruined ſtate of the army on the Madras eſtabliſhment.

On the 20th December I arrived here with the ſquadron in this harbour, and the ſame day iſſued orders for preparing the ſhips for docking and refitting with all poſſible expedition; on the 23d I met the Select Committee at their deſire, and entered with them into deliberation on the preſent ſtate of the Company's affairs both on the Coromandel coaſt and on this ſide of *India*; the the reſult of which your Lordſhip will ſee in No. 12, of this packet, being a copy of the minutes of our conſultation; at the ſame time I received from the Preſident, a copy of the letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* to this Preſidency, with the copy of the treaty propoſed by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* to the Peiſhwa and the Maratta Adminiſtration; of which letter and treaty I have the honour to enclоſe copies, Nos. 13 and 14, for your Lordſhip's information.

On the 24th I received a letter deſiring the aſſiſtance of his Majeſty's ſhips *Worceſter* and *Coventry*, on an expedition againſt the Maratta town and fort of *Arnaul*, ſituated on a ſmall iſland at the entrance of a river of that name, which forms the northern boundary of *Baſſein*; a copy of which letter, No. 15, I have the honour to enclоſe with this; and I ordered the *Worceſter* and *Coventry* on that ſervice accordingly, on which they are now employed, co-operating with the Company's armed veſſels, and a part of General *Goddard*'s army, under Colonel *Parker*.

I have taken the liberty to trouble your Lordſhip with this minute detail of my tranſactions with His Majeſty's ſquadron under my command, as well as the moſt eſſential parts of my correſpondence with the ſeveral Preſidencies ſince my laſt addreſs to your Lordſhip, becauſe I think it neceſſary in the preſent ſituation of our affairs all over *India*, that your Lordſhip ſhould be furniſhed with every poſſible information.

The Marattas have as yet made no requiſition on their part to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, notwithſtanding the propoſed treaty has been received fourteen days ago at *Poonah*, their capital, diſtant only four days journey from *Bombay*; and until ſuch requiſition is made, this Preſidency is authorized by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, to proſecute the war againſt the Marattas; which they appear to me more diſpoſed to do, than to march the army under General *Goddard* into the dominions of *Hyder Ally*, to make the diverſion General Sir *Eyre Coote* thinks ſo neceſſary for the preſervation of the *Carnatic* againſt him, and which, indeed, they cannot do till a reconciliation with the Marattas takes place.

I beg leave to aſſure your Lordſhip that I will loſe no time in repairing and refitting His Majeſty's ſquadron under my command for ſervice and that the force entruſted under my direction ſhall be employed in the beſt manner I can for the defence of the Company's trade and ſettlements in this country; and I have the honour to enclоſe for your Lordſhip's farther information, Nos. 16 and 17 copies of the lateſt intelligence I have been able to procure from the *Mauritius*, by which your Lordſhip will judge of the naval and military force already accumulated at that place, and the expectations our enemies there have of ſtill greater additions to both.

No. 3.

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, Knight of the moſt honourable Order of the Bath, Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's ſhips in the *Eaſt Indies*.

Sir,

1ſt. We were honoured with your letter of the 26th inſtant; and you may depend on our exerting ourſelves

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in giving the ſquadron under your command every ſupply and aſſiſtance that our preſent ſituation will afford.

2d. The Honourable the Select Committee of *Bombay* were pleaſed to write us under the 23d September, that the war in which they are engaged with the Marattas requiring the utmoſt exertion of that Preſidency, and not permitting them to divert their reſources to any other object, they were not able to ſend us any further aſſiſtance after the diſpatch of the *Royal Charlotte*; and therefore unleſs the enemy ſhould withdraw from the attack, or the Government of *Madras* undertake to furniſh the neceſſary ſupplies of men and ſtores for our defence, they ſhould be under an abſolute neceſſity of abandoning this place.

3d. They further informed us, that they had then wrote fully to the Select Committee at *Madras* on the ſubject, and encloſed us a copy of their letter. Alſo, that the Select Committee at *Madras* had recommended to them that the Malabar Powers ſhould be excited to raiſe commotions, and revolt againſt *Hyder*'s Government: that it would be a good meaſure ſhould we find the ſettlement was to be maintained; otherwiſe it would be only needleſsly expoſing the Nairs to his reſentment; and that therefore we were to act in this point according to the anſwer from the Select Committee at *Madras*.

4th. In conſequente of the above orders from the Select Committee of *Bombay*, we addreſſed a letter to the Select Committee at *Madras*, under the 9th ultimo, giving them an account of the ſtate of the Malabar country from the time *Hyder Ally* conquered it till the preſent period, with our ſentiments of the practicability of exciting a revolt among the Nairs, and their inclinations to co-operate, ſhould ſuch a meaſure be adopted. A copy of our letters accompanies this for your obſervation.

We have yet received no anſwer to the above letter from the Select Committee at *Madras*; but by your ſquadron have received one under the 13th ultimo, to which we beg leave to refer you.

In compliance therefore with the orders of the Select Committee of *Bombay* to communicate to you the ſituation of our affairs, on your arrival we ſhall proceed to lay the ſame before you.

We are, Sir, to inform you, that although we are confined within the limits of the diſtricts of this ſettlement, and have been from the firſt commencement of hoſtilities on the part of the Nairs, ſubject to *Hyder*; and ſince, by *Hyder*'s troops under the command of an officer named *Sader Cawn*; that they have never yet been able to make any material impreſſion on our lines; and could the Preſidency of *Bombay* have afforded us, or could at this preſent period afford us, the ſupport of a battalion or two of Sepoys, with a proportion of Europeans, that we ſhould have been enabled to have acted offenſively againſt the enemy, and to have obliged them to retire. We have little doubt alſo, that had the ſtate of affairs on this coaſt admitted of ſuch ſupport, that it would have been productive of thoſe events ſo much wiſhed for by the Preſidency of *Madras*, as ſeveral of the Malabar Powers are at this period ripe for a revolt againſt *Hyder*'s Government, and only wait for the moment when they ſhall find us in a ſituation to ſupport them, or rather indeed to ſupport ourſelves, in the maintenance of this ſettlement.

You, Sir, from the papers now before you, will perceive that the two Preſidencies, however much they wiſh to maintain and ſupport this ſettlement, doubt the practicability of it, engaged as they both are in a war with the Marattas and *Hyder Ally*; and therefore direct, that if driven to the lamentable neceſſity (for ſuch indeed we muſt term it, all circumſtances conſidered) to abandon the place to the enemy.

Your known zeal, Sir, for the intereſt of the Company, from which the national is in no ways diſtinct, has led our ſuperiors to direct we ſhould conſult and adviſe with you in our preſent ſituation: and as your knowledge of the preſent deſigns and intentions, both of the Supreme Council at *Bengal* and the Preſidency of *Madras*, as to their operations and views in the proſecution of the preſent war with *Hyder Ally* and the Marattas, renders you a far better judge than we can be in what degree the intereſt and honour of the Company may be affected by abandoning this ſettlement at this period; we hope to be favoured with your advice and opinion on this important ſubject. Appendix, No. 338.

We think it incumbent on us to make known to you, that the *Eaſt India* Company have been in poſſeſſion of this ſettlement ſince the year 1708, and have now to the number of 30,000 inhabitants living under their protection; all of whom, as well as thoſe Malabar Powers who have afforded us ſupport in our preſent troubles, and who have proved themſelves ſtaunch in the intereſt of the Company, and have even rejected all overtures made them by *Hyder*, look up to the Company for protection, and whoſe ruin muſt be complete if ever this ſettlement falls under *Hyder*'s Government. Although it is our moſt earneſt deſire to put in execution the wiſhes of the Preſidency of *Bombay* in reſpect to this ſettlement, as far as we can judge of them, yet we ſhould feel the moſt ſenſible concern, if by any change in the preſent political ſyſtem of affairs, of which we are unacquainted, the defence and protection of this ſettlement might be conſidered of importance; which conſequently makes us ſo deſirous of obtaining your advice and opinion on the ſubject.

After this ſtatement of our ſituation, it is neceſſary to ſay ſomething as to the preſent ſtrength of the enemy now acting againſt us; that you, Sir, may be able to form a better judgment what meaſures are neceſſary to be taken, ſhould you adviſe and recommend the ſettlement being maintained until the further pleaſure of the different Preſidencies can be known, or until your ſquadrons return to *Madras*, ſhould it then be judged neceſſary to give it up. The troops under *Sader Cawn*, *Hyder Ally*'s officer, from the beſt information we can obtain, conſiſt now only of about 3,000 Sepoys, and about 30 pieces of cannon; the Nairs, Moplas, and Tivas with him, are ſuppoſed to be about 6,000 men; but we have occaſion to believe, that ſince your attack upon *Callicut*, and appearance here, that he has drawn off about 2,000 men. Major *Cotgrave*, who is in command of our troops, and who has had a long experience of the enemy's condition and ſtrength, is well convinced, that they muſt fly before us the moment we can act on the offenſive; and would conſider himſelf in an ample ſituation ſo to do, had he an addition to his preſent force of 1,000 Sepoys, or half the number of European troops. If therefore, Sir, you ſhould be of opinion that it is political and adviſable, engaged as the Company at preſent are in a war with *Hyder*, to oblige his troops to retire from before this place, you will now be able to judge what aſſiſtance it would be neceſſary to afford from His Majeſty's ſquadron now under your command. Major *Cotgrave* is of opinion the ſervice would be very ſoon effected, and attended with every favourable conſequence we could wiſh or expect from it. As to the ſupplies of ſtores, we ſhall be able to hold out for ſome months to come, after the receiving the powder you have on board the ſquadron; and in reſpect to the article of rice, as we hope to collect from the ſhips under your convoy between two and three thouſand bags, we ſhall in this particular alſo be able to ſupply our garriſon until ſome of the Bengal ſhips may appear.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble ſervants,

Tellicherry,
28th November 1780.

(Copy) *Edward Hughes.*
Ra Church,
Saml Stedman,
M. Firth.

Appendix. No. 338.

No. 4.

Gentlemen,

I have received your letter of the 28th of this month, in which after your promiſed aſſiſtance of a ſupply of every thing you can afford to His Majeſty's ſquadron under my command, you are pleaſed to inform me, that the Select Committee of *Bombay*, to which you are ſubordinate, had been pleaſed to write you under date the 23d September laſt, "that the war in which they "were engaged with the Marattas requiring the utmoſt "exertion of that Preſidency, and not permitting them "to divert their reſources to any other object, they "were not able to ſend any farther aſſiſtance after the "diſpatch of the ſhip *Royal Charlotte*, and therefore, "unleſs the enemy ſhould withdraw from the attack, or "the Government of *Madras* undertake to furniſh the "neceſſary ſupplies of men and ſtores for your defence, "they ſhould be under the abſolute neceſſity of abandon-"ing the place;" and in the third paragraph of your ſaid letter, you are pleaſed to inform me of your further inſtructions from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, under the ſame date, ſignifying that the Preſidency of *Madras* had recommended it as an eligible meaſure to excite the Malabar Powers to raiſe commotions and revolt againſt *Hyder*'s Government, if you found the ſettlement in a condition to be defended, otherwiſe it would be only unneceſſarily expoſing the Nairs to his reſentment; and that therefore you were to act in that point according to the anſwer from the Select Committee of *Madras*. In your fourth paragraph, you are pleaſed to inform me, that you had written to the Preſidency of *Madras*, giving them a ſtate of the Malabar country, from the time *Hyder Ally* conquered it to the preſent period, with your ſentiments of the practicability of exciting a revolt amongſt the Nairs, and their inclinations to co-operate with you; to which you have as yet received no anſwer: and you then proceed, in compliance as you ſay with the orders of the Select Committee of *Bombay*, to communicate to me the ſtate of your affairs on my arrival here, and to conſult and adviſe with me under that ſituation, as my knowledge of the deſigns and intentions of the Supreme Council of *Bengal* and the Preſidency of *Madras*, as to their operations and views in the proſecution of the preſent war with *Hyder Ally* and the Marattas, renders me a far better judge than you can be, in what degree the intereſt and honour of the Company may be affected by abandoning your ſettlement at this period, and that you hope to be favoured with my advice and opinion on the important occaſion. In the ſubſequent paragraphs, you have ſtated, with a due ſenſe of honour and humanity, the ſituation of 30,000 inhabitants living under the Company's protection in your ſettlement, all of whom, as well as thoſe Malabar Powers who have afforded you ſupport in your preſent troubles, and who have proved themſelves ſtaunch in the Company's intereſts, and have even rejected all overtures made to them by *Hyder Ally*, look up to the Company for protection, and whoſe ruin muſt be complete if ever your ſettlement falls into *Hyder*'s hands.

You then proceed to give me a ſtatement of the force of the enemy employed againſt you, and of the means which you think would be ſufficient to enable you to act, not only defenſively but offenſively againſt *Hyder Ally* and the Nairs.

Having deliberately conſidered every matter contained in your letter, as well as the inſtructions you have received from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, as the letter of the 13th of laſt month from the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, and alſo the ſtate and condition of the ſettlement and its inhabitants as you have repreſented it; and having alſo maturely weighed the great difference which has ariſen in the ſtate of the Company's affairs, both as to war and politics, ſince the date of your laſt inſtructions from *Bombay*, and the letter from *Fort Saint George*; I am clearly of opinion that you ought not to evacuate the ſettlement until you have farther orders from *Bombay*; and to enable you to hold out againſt the enemy until ſuch farther orders arrive, I will order you a ſupply of ſuch a proportion of ammunition, military ſtores, and proviſions, as can be ſpared from the ſquadron under my command, and immediately diſpatch letters to the Preſidencies of *Bombay* and *Fort Saint George*, to urge them to furniſh you with ample ſuccours; and if you ſtand in need of money for the immediate ſervice, I will direct a ſupply to be furniſhed you for your bills on the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

I am, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
Superb, in Tellicherry Road, humble ſervant,
the 29th November 1780. (Copy) *Edwd Hughes.*

Richard Church, Eſquire,
Chief and Council of *Tellicherry*.

No. 6.

At a Council of War held in *Tellicherry*, 28th November 1780; preſent, Major *John Cotgrave*, Captain *David Muirhead*, Captain *William Seward*, Acting Captain *Thomas Smith*, Lieutenant *Peter Campbell*.

Major *John Cotgrave*, commanding officer of the forces, lays before the Council a letter which he this day received from the Select Committee of *Madras*; wherein he is ordered to return to the coaſt of *Coromandel* with the Madras troops. He alſo acquaints the Council of an offer made this day by Sir *Edwd Hughes*, K. B. and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's ſhips in the *Eaſt Indies* viz. that for the preſervation of the Honourable Company's ſettlement of *Tellicherry* he will exert his utmoſt, and offers to land from eight hundred to one thouſand men from the ſquadron under his command, for the ſpace of two or three days, if Major *Cotgrave* thought, with their aſſiſtance, he could diſpoſſeſs the enemy of their poſts and drive them away.

The opinion of the Council is, that this ſervice could not be effected in ſo ſhort a time: and even was it poſſible to do it, the poſts could not be maintained, having ſo few troops in this garriſon, nor could the works be deſtroyed without a vaſt deal of labour and time.

The Admiral further ſaid, for the honour of the Britiſh nation, he thought it of the utmoſt importance to defend this ſettlement to the laſt extremity; and if the Major thought he could do it in one month, with the aſſiſtance of one hundred men from the ſquadron, he would land them, and immediately on his arrival at *Bombay* repreſent to the Board, and inſiſt on their ſending ſo ſtrong a reinforcement to put its ſafety beyond doubt. And the Admiral ſtill further added, from the alteration in the Company's affairs ſince the date of the letter from the Select Committee to Major *Cotgrave*, he was certain it would be more to the advantage of our honourable maſters, that Major *Cotgrave*, with the Madras troops under his command, ſhould remain and defend *Tellicherry* in preference to returning to the coaſt of *Coromandel*, agreeable to orders received.

The opinion of the Council is, that with the aſſiſtance of two hundred men (Europeans) ſeven hundred barrels of gunpowder, four hundred coolies (able bodied men) to work daily, a plenty of proviſion, and eight or ten twelve pounder guns, the ſettlement may be defended againſt the preſent enemy.

John Cotgrave,
D. Muirhead, Captn,
(Copy) *Wm Seward*, Captn,
Edwd Hughes. *T. Smith*, Act^g Captn,
P. Campbell, L^t.

No. 7.

Gentlemen,

I have received the pleaſure of your letter of yeſterday, and applaud your reſolution of maintaining your ſettlement, and am happy that it has been in my power to contribute ſuch aſſiſtance as you and Major *Cotgrave*

judge

judge will be adequate to your defence until a reinforcement from *Bombay* can arrive.

The detachment of marines conſiſting of one Captain, four Lieutenants, and one hundred and eight rank and file, will be landed this afternoon about 4 o'clock; and I beg leave to recommend both the officers and men to your particular attention and kindneſs.

There are 37,000 ſtar pagodas on board the *Superb*, the whole or any part of which you may have for the public ſervice for your bills drawn on your Preſidency; and you will be pleaſed to ſend a proper perſon on board the *Superb* to receive it.

With my letter of this date to Major *Cotgrave*, I have ſent a copy of my order to Captain *O'Farrel*, who commands the detachment of marines, with a requeſt that he would communicate it to you for your information.

So ſoon as my diſpatches for *Anjengo* and *Bombay* are ready, I will ſend them to you that you may diſpatch the Pattamar boat with them.

I am,

Superb, in Tellicherry Road, the 4th December 1780.
(Copy) *Edwd Hughes.*

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
Edwd Hughes.

Richd Church, Eſq.
Chief, and Factors of *Tellicherry*.

No. 8.

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, Knight of the moſt honourable Order of the Bath, Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the *Eaſt Indies*.

Sir,

We have been honoured with your letter of yeſterday's date, and one of this morning, encloſing copy of the orders you have given to the *Ponſborne* and *Contractor*.

It is with particular ſatisfaction we have received your approbation of our maintaining this ſettlement till further orders; and we hope with the aſſiſtance you have been pleaſed to afford us, to be able to preſerve it,

We are much obliged to you, Sir, for your offer of money, and in conſequence have received of *Arthur Cuthbert*, Eſq. the ſum of 22,000 ſtar pagodas, for which we have given him bills on the Preſidency.

Major *Cotgrave* has communicated to us copy of your order to Captain *O'Farrel*, and you may be aſſured that every attention and kindneſs in our power ſhall be ſhewn to the officers and men.

We have directed Captains *Willm Robinſon* and *Joſeph Alderſon*, of the *Drake* and *Eagle* cruizers, to obey your orders.

We wiſh you a ſpeedy paſſage to *Bombay*, and ſucceſs in your operations.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient, and moſt humble ſervants,

Tellicherry, 5th December 1780.
(Copy) *Edwd Hughes.*

Rd Church,
Sam' Stedman,
M. Firth.

No. 5.

Select Committee.

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, Knight of the moſt honourable Order of the Bath, Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the *Eaſt Indies*.

Sir,

The *Coventry* now proceeding to join the ſquadron, and Captain *Mitchell* having made an offer of his ſervices on the paſſage, we have requeſted him to do his utmoſt to take or deſtroy any veſſels he may meet with belonging to *Hyder Ally* or the Marattas, with both which Powers the Company are now at war, and to diſtreſs the common enemy by every means in his power; which we flatter ourſelves will meet with your approbation. Appendix. No. 339.

We have alſo recommended to him to touch at *Tellicherry*, and give the garriſon every ſupport and countenance in his power during his continuance there. We are quite ignorant of the ſtate of affairs there, and in a ſtate of anxiety, not having any accounts from thence later than the 10th of Auguſt, in conſequence of which we have already addreſſed you in duplicate, under the 23d September.

General *Goddard* is juſt arrived before *Baſſein*, and operations will ſoon be commenced againſt that place. We have a ſtrong body of forces near the foot of the Ghauts which we hope will prevent the enemy from venturing into the low country, or interrupting the ſiege of *Baſſein*.

We hope this will meet you on the coaſt of *Malabar*, and that we ſhall ſhortly have the pleaſure of ſeeing you at *Bombay*. In the mean time we remain, with the higheſt eſteem and reſpect,

Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 13th November 1780.
(Copy.) *Edwd Hughes.*

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

APPENDIX, No. 339.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 12th December 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *Daniel Draper*, *Nathaniel Stackhouſe*, Eſquires.

THE Preſident lays before us the following plan of meaſures he would propoſe to be now purſued in conſequence of the reduction of *Baſſein*; and the ſame being deliberately conſidered is entirely approved, and muſt be immediately tranſmitted to the General, with a ſtrong recommendation from us immediately to purſue the meaſures therein propoſed, which we flatter ourſelves will coincide with his ſentiments. President's plan of operations propoſed by him laid before the Committee.

The ſurrender of *Baſſein* makes it unneceſſary to ſend the large ſupply of gunpowder requeſted by General *Goddard* in his letter of the 10th, and which we could but ill afford to ſpare.

The Preſident's Plan of Operations he propoſes to be purſued in conſequence of the Reduction of *Baſſein*.

The reduction of *Baſſein* being now happily accompliſhed, I think it will be proper that the General ſhould be recommended immediately to acquaint the Poonah Miniſtry; that if they are convinced of the ſuperiority of our arms, and are deſirous of peace on equitable and moderate terms, he is ſtill ready to enter into treaty with them on this ſubject; at the ſame time ſupporting the offer with ſuch motions of his army as may ſeem moſt likely to enforce the acceptance of it, keeping ſtill in mind the main object of the campaign, the complete reduction of the *Conkan*. It is not improbable that *Nana* may accept the offer of a treaty with a view to gain time; this can only be known by the event, and need give him no advantage. We ought, I think, to be perſuaded of his ſincerity, and without delaying the buſineſs we have to accompliſh, encourage as much as poſſible the idea of the certain and inevitable concluſion of peace; for a perſuaſion of this ſort would prove one of the moſt powerful motives with all the Killedars in this country to make their terms, and would be an encouragement to the inhabitants to return, and would thus contribute to ſettle the country more ſpeedily and advantageouſly under our Government than it can otherways be done; ſo that whether *Nana* meant peace, or only

Appendix. No. 339.

only procraſtination, we ſhould draw our advantage from his accepting the offer of a treaty. The General ought, I think, to move his army immediately to the ſouth eaſt, without remaining at *Baſſein* now it is taken, becauſe great promptitude in his motions would tend to confound the enemy and improve the impreſſion made by the fall of *Baſſein*; he need not however be in too great a hurry, but ſhould, I think, ſhew himſelf before *Mowle*, *Byramgur*, *Shetgur*, and all the way along the foot of the Ghants to the ſouthward, where there are a line of forts juſt below the Ghauts, and of very great importance to the tranquillity of the country, ſummoning them to ſurrender, but not ſuffering himſelf to be detained by ſuch as are abſolutely inacceſſible, and ſeem determined on reſiſtance; but of the firſt that could be taken after ſlighting the ſummons, a ſevere example ſhould be made; as after the reduction of *Baſſein*, which may be conſidered as the capital, reſiſtance in the other places of leſs note ought not to be held juſtifiable, and if theſe little places are encouraged by an ill-timed lenity to hold out, we may probably find our conqueſt of *Baſſein* very unprofitable to us for a conſiderable time to come. While the General is advancing he will be ſuppoſed ſtill to have an expedition in view to *Poonah*, and ſo long as this idea laſts we ſhall have leiſure for effecting our real purpoſe of completing the reduction of this country, as the enemy will hardly defcend the Ghauts with their main army, but will probably reſerve it for what they will think a purpoſe of infinitely greater conſequence, the defence of the capital, and expect to meet us with advantages in the *Decan* far ſuperior to any they can hope for below the Ghauts.

Bombay, 12th December 1780. *William Hornby.*

Enclоſure in Sir *Edward Hughes's* Packet to Lord *Hillſborough*, Secretary of State.

No. 12.

Bombay Caſtle, 23d December 1780.—At a Select Committee; preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; Rear Admiral Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B. *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, Brigadier General *Thomas Goddard*, *Nathaniel Stackhouſe*, Eſquire.

The Admiral now meeting the Committee in conſequence of our deſire ſignified to him yeſterday by the Secretary, the ſtate of the Company's affairs, ſo far as they can be affected by our reſolutions, is taken under our moſt attentive conſideration, the ſeveral neceſſary Papers having been previouſly read.

The Admiral declares it to be his opinion, that the ſafety and preſervation of the Company's ſettlements on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, and the army under Sir *Eyre Coote*, depend on this Preſidency being able to make ſome vigorous effort againſt the poſſeſſions of *Hyder Ally* on this coaſt; and urges in ſtrong terms the neceſſity of a ſpeedy peace with the Marattas, to enable us to act with our whole force againſt *Hyder*, who now threatens deſtruction to the *Carnatic* and even *Fort Saint George* itſelf, if aided by a body of French which there now appears a great probability may be introduced into the country.

The Select Committee then proceeded, aſſiſted by the Admiral and the General, to conſider the ſeveral important matters before them, and the ſentiments delivered by the Admiral, in which they allow there is great weight; and having duly weighed every circumſtance, the following is the reſult of their deliberation, in which the Admiral and General concur.

That in the unhappy ſituation to which affairs at *Madras* are now reduced, a peace with the Marattas is moſt ardently to be wiſhed for, that we may have it in our power to make a vigorous attack againſt the poſſeſſions of *Hyder Ally* on this coaſt; but at the ſame time it muſt be admitted as an abſolute impoſſibility that we can make any effectual diverſion in their favour until the Maratta war is brought to ſome concluſion, as this Preſidency might ſoon be reduced to as bad a ſituation as *Madras*; or the Marattas united with *Hyder* might complete the ruin of that Preſidency were we ſo far to weaken our army as to diſable it from acting with vigour againſt them or to relieve them from further apprehenſions of the effects they have experienced of our force.

A purſuit of the Maratta war with all poſſible vigour, as recommended by the Honourable the Governor General and Council, promiſes to promote a ſpeedy accommodation ſooner than any other plan of conduct, till when it will not be in our power to act with vigour or effect againſt *Hyder*; and indeed our own ſafety as well as the general ſafety of the Company's poſſeſſions abſolutely requires that we ſhould either find employment in this quarter for the Marattas, or bring them to terms of accommodation.

In theſe circumſtances therefore it would be in the higheſt degree imprudent and impolitic, were we by any diviſion of our troops to diſable ourſelves from purſuing the line of conduct ſo neceſſary for the general ſafety.

Whilſt the neceſſity of our co-operating with the Preſidency of *Madras* againſt *Hyder* is ſo obvious and apparent, we can eaſily conceive how much it will add to their diſtreſs and diſappointment, if inſtead of giving our aſſiſtance, we abandoned the only place of ſtrength we poſſeſs in his dominions, the attack whereof at this time occupies a part of his force, which in that caſe might be added to the numbers of the enemy now in the field againſt them; we are therefore very earneſt in our wiſhes to maintain *Tellicherry*, at leaſt until we can form a better judgment what probability there is of the Marattas accepting the proffered terms, or of the war being otherwiſe brought to a concluſion. We are ſtrengthened in this diſpoſition not only by the reaſons which militate againſt withdrawing the ſettlement at this particular time, but alſo by the difficulties we can foreſee would ariſe even in the execution of an attempt to evacuate the place, which no doubt would be oppoſed by the auxiliary Nairs, as well as the numerous inhabitants, whoſe ſafety is involved with our continuance there; ſo that we think the garriſon could not be withdrawn with ſafety until rendered ſufficiently ſtrong firſt to diſlodge the enemy: this meaſure may be taken under conſideration on the return of the fleet, when we ſhall be better able to judge what probability there is of our wiſhes for peace being accompliſhed.

On conſulting with the General reſpecting the ſtate of the forces, we are of opinion we can furniſh a defenſive garriſon for *Tellicherry*, without diſabling him from an active proſecution of the war againſt the Marattas; and two battalions of Sepoys being judged fully ſufficient for that purpoſe, and to relieve the Madras Sepoys now there, which is abſolutely neceſſary, and likewiſe Captain *Seward's*, as recommended by the Reſident and factors; reſolved accordingly, that two complete battalions be ſent down by an early opportunity, which we ſhall take care to provide; and that Major *Cotgrave* with the Madras Sepoys be returned to *Anjengo*: on the arrival of the troops from *Bombay*, Captain *Seward's* battalion may be detained for a further time if judged neceſſary: we are inclined to think it may not be impracticable before the Madras detachment is returned to make an effort with ſucceſs, to diſlodge the enemy from their works.

If it ſhould be found neceſſary, in order to furniſh the force for *Tellicherry*, a part of the Sepoys may be drafted from the northward, the importance of defending our poſſeſſions there being leſſened by the probability of their being reſtored to the Marattas and the moſt conſiderable part of the revenues for this ſeaſon will ſoon be collected.

We can only in general recommend to General *Goddard* to purſue

purſue his operations againſt the Marattas with all poſſible vigour, and to the utmoſt extent he may find practicable with the force under his command, and we think nothing would tend more to the ſpeedy accompliſhment of a peace, than ſome deciſive advantage gained over the enemy in the field.

The firſt immediate object of his operations being the reduction of *Arnaul*, and the General repreſenting that His Majeſty's ſhips and ſeamen might be of great uſe in the undertaking, the Committee at his inſtance now make a requeſt to the Admiral to ſpare two ſhips for this ſervice. The Admiral on their requiſition readily agrees to ſpare the *Worceſter* and *Coventry*, upon its being repreſented to him, that the ſervice will not in all probability detain them more than ſeven or eight days, and that the diſtance is ſo ſmall they may be recalled in 24 hours, ſhould it be found neceſſary.

The neceſſary orders muſt be given to the commander of the Company's ſhips now on the Arnaul ſtation.

(Copy) *Edwd Hughes.*

APPENDIX, No 340.

Encloſure in Sir *Edward Hughes*'s Packet to Lord *Hilſborough*, Secretary of State,

N° 15.

Select Committee,

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, Knight of the Bath, Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's ſhips in the *Eaſt Indies*.

Sir,

IT being judged abſolutely neceſſary to proſecute the war againſt the Marattas with all poſſible vigour, in order to bring them to terms of accommodation; and the reduction of the fort of *Arnaul* being a material object in which the Commander in Chief has repreſented, that the aſſiſtance of His Majeſty's ſhips might be of eſſential ſervice; we were induced by this conſideration, and our experience of your zeal for the Company's intereſt, to requeſt, when we had the honour to meet you this morning, that you would ſpare two of His Majeſty's ſhips to co-operate with the Company's forces and veſſels in this undertaking, which in all probability will not detain them more than ſeven or eight days, and the diſtance is ſo ſmall, that they may be recalled within 24 hours ſhould you find it neceſſary.

Arnaul is a fort ſituated upon a ſmall iſland at the entrance of a river of that name, which forms the northern boundary of the iſland of *Baſſein*, from which place it is only diſtant about twelve miles. The poſſeſſion of that place is therefore highly neceſſary to ſecure *Baſſein* from interruption, whilſt the Company's troops may be employed in a more diſtant quarter; nor will it in that caſe be prudent to leave in the hands of the enemy a place of ſtrength immediately adjoining the Company's poſſeſſions, and without which the conqueſt of *Baſſein* is not complete.

We thank you for the readineſs with which you conſented to ſpare the *Worceſter* and *Coventry* for this ſervice, which we flatter ourſelves will with their aſſiſtance be effected without any material difficulty. We ſhall give inſtructions to Commodore *Neſbit*, now commanding the Company's ſhips on that ſtation, to communicate to the commanding officer of His Majeſty's ſhips every information in his power that may be uſeful in the execution of this ſervice, and to obey all ſuch orders as may be given him. We alſo beg leave to requeſt, that you will give inſtructions to the naval officers to co-operate with General *Goddard*, who on his part will exert every effort in his power in concert with them, to enſure ſucceſs to this enterprize. We have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect and eſteem,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle, 23d December 1780.

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

(Copy) *Edward Hughes.*

Appendix. Nos. 340 & 341.

APPENDIX, No. 341.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 11th February 1781;—preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, and *Nathaniel Stackhouſe*, Eſquire.

THE Preſident now lays before us an extract of a letter he wrote to the General under the 8th inſtant; and as we entirely concur with him in the propriety of what he has therein ſuggeſted; ordered, that it be entered after this conſultation, and another copy immediately tranſmitted to the General, leſt any accident ſhould have happened to the original.

Preſident. the Honourable William Hornby, Eſquire, letter from him to General Goddard approved.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident to General *Goddard*.

With reſpect to your going to *Poonah*, I do not know what effect it may have in bringing the Marattas to terms or of accepting the propoſals made to them by the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta*, through *Moodajee Bouncello*; but I think and recommend that you ſhould take Raja *Matchee*, as it may be very uſeful in many reſpects, both for lodging your proviſions, &c. and as a place to which you may return, ſhould it be found neceſſary; indeed I think it would be riſking too much the going with your army too far into the *Decan* in the preſent poſture of affairs with enemies on all ſides; for ſhould the French appear at this place, we have no force here to oppoſe them, ſhould any unforeſeen accident happen to your army, and the ſquadron have left this place; all which are matters of ſuch conſequence, that ſhould not be forgot by you, nor do I think the appearing at or before *Poonah* will be of any conſequence; as it is an open town, they will certainly abandon it, and fly to ſome of their ſtrong holds or forts; and I underſtand that all the merchants and people of conſequence with their property have been for ſome time removed.

8th February 1781.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors of the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Gentlemen,

1. We addreſſed you laſt in duplicate, under the 11th of January, *via Buſſorah*; and Mr. *Lateuch* has acquainted us, that he tranſmitted you another copy: we now ſend a further tranſcript.

2. We have now to adviſe, that the period limited by the Governor General and Council for the acceptance of the terms offered to the Poonah Durbar, expired the 9th of this month, without their having declared their acceptance of them; and conſequently they remain no longer in force. General *Goddard*, after the reduction of *Baſſein* and *Arnaul*, marched to the gauts, forced the enemy's poſt, and gained poſſeſſion of the paſs of *Bhore* Gaut; ſoon after a Maratta agent came into the camp, but without any powers or credentials from the Miniſter himſelf, and expreſſed in general terms the deſire of the Marattas for peace; and aſked what conditions we expected. In the firſt and every ſtage of this intercourſe (for it did not amount to a negociation) the Maratta profeſſed entire ignorance of the terms offered, by the Governor General and Council, through the medium

Appendix. No. 342.

of the Rajah of *Berar*; on which account, and to convince them of our pacific diſpoſition, we deſired the General to ſend a copy of the articles directly to the Miniſters; having no doubt at the ſame time, but that he was perfectly acquainted with the particulars. The General did accordingly tranſmit them, with a letter of the moſt friendly profeſſions, and received a reply containing a poſitive refuſal to accede to the offered terms; which he ſays were not approved by the Rajah of *Berar*, who had for that reaſon ſent them back to the Governor General and Council: and the Miniſter alſo ſays, that conditions for another Power muſt be included in whatever treaty may be made with the Marattas; by which we underſtood he meant *Hyder Ally*. It is to be obſerved, the Miniſter ſent to the General the firſt advice we received of the arrival of the French fleet on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, which muſt have reached the Maratta camp after the firſt overture had been made, and probably influenced him in his ſubſequent determination. As we have thus loſt all immediate proſpect of a peace with the Marattas; and every object we had propoſed to acquire in the courſe of the war being accompliſhed, we have taken meaſures, in concert with General *Goddard*, to confine our future operations to a mere plan of defence, and the ſecurity and preſervation of our preſent acquiſitions; to reduce as much as poſſible the enormous charges attending the army, and to yield what aſſiſtance we can to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*: the General will accordingly make a ſuitable diſpoſition to protect and cover our poſſeſſions, and for the defence of *Bombay*, in caſe of neceſſity; and we are preparing to ſend back all the *Fort Saint George* troops ſerving on this coaſt: by which our military charges will be greatly reduced, and the army under General *Coote* ſtrengthened with a very conſiderable reinforcement. The meaſure, which we have taken for the general ſafety of our poſſeſſions, makes it doubly neceſſary that you ſhould comply with our repeated requeſts for a ſupply of European recruits. We are concerned to be at the ſame time under a neceſſity of putting our former reſolution into execution, of withdrawing from *Tellicherry*, as fully explained in our laſt letter, which will be done as ſoon as ſhipping can be prepared for tranſporting the *Fort Saint George* troops, in which we have requeſted the aſſiſtance of the Admiral.

We have received advice from the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, and have ſeen other authentic accounts, of a French ſquadron which appeared off that place on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of January, conſiſting of

L'Orient,	74	Guns,	800 Men.
Brilliant,	64	—	700
Severé,	64	—	700
Bizaare,	64	—	700
Ajax,	64	—	700
Flamand,	50	—	700
Conſolante,	50	—	400
Subtile,	20	—	200
Expedition,	12	—	80

and commanded by Chevalier *D'Orves*. The commander of a country veſſel which was taken and ranſomed, and who was on board the French admiral, gives an account, that there did not appear to be any conſiderable number of military on board, and they have no tranſports. By a private letter from *Fort Saint George*, dated 1ſt of February, we find they proceeded to the ſouth, without making any attempt on the five Indiamen then in the road, with a number of veſſels laden with grain and proviſions; the deſtroying of which might have been eaſily accompliſhed, and would have been ſeverely felt. They arrived at *Pondicherry* the 29th of January; but it is ſuppoſed they have neither a ſtock of proviſions, nor can procure a ſupply ſufficient to enable them to continue long upon the coaſt of *Coromandel*.

It is ſaid the arrival of the French fleet has not prevented General *Coote* from purſuing his operations: the General has retaken *Carangoly*, and the enemy withdrawn the troops, with which for many weeks they have been beſieging *Vellore*, *Permacoil*, and *Wandewaſh*. *Hyder Ally* was alſo employed in moving his heavy cannon and ſtores from *Arcot*; but it ſeemed to be the general opinion, he will not withdraw his army before he has hazarded a battle.

The fleet under Admiral *Hughes* will ſail for the coaſt of *Coromandel* about the 20th of next month.

We are with great reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your moſt faithful ſervants,
Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

Bombay Caſtle,
31ſt March 1781.

APPENDIX, No. 342.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 15th February 1781.

RECEIVED the following letter from General *Goddard*.

Goddard General's letter from.

Gentlemen,

I beg leave to make you acquainted with a circumſtance that has occurred, which though of the moſt important nature, and on a ſubject at preſent the moſt intereſting to us of all others, I find it impoſſible to form any certain judgment of what may be the probable reſult, or how far it may be conſidered as favourable to our views. I ſhall however proceed without further preface to make you acquainted with the particulars.

Yeſterday, the 12th inſtant, a man arrived from the enemy's camp, ſent, as he previouſly intimated to me, from the Maratta Miniſter. His name is *Runſoor Senoy*; and I underſtand that he was many years ago employed by the Poonah Government to tranſact their affairs with the Preſidency of *Bombay* where he reſided a long time in the character of their Vackeel. Upon admitting him to a conference, I found that the letter he had brought was not from *Nana Purneſſe* himſelf, but from *Byroo Pundit*, a perſon who *Runſoor* informed me, and indeed I had heard myſelf from other authorities, was a good deal in the Miniſter's confidence. I expreſſed my ſurprize that he ſhould have neglected to provide himſelf with the credentials of his being really employed by *Nana*, and without which I told him it was improper for me to enter into any converſation with him. He made many apologies for the neglect, principally founded upon the doubts the Miniſter pretended to entertain of the friendly diſpoſition of the Engliſh towards him; and added ſuch ſtrong verbal aſſurances of the ſincere intentions of the latter, that though not convinced by his arguments, I thought it moſt expedient for the public good to acquieſce in his propoſal of being heard at this time, and give this proof of my readineſs to concur in any proper meaſures for terminating the difference now ſubſiſting, rather than by too nice a regard to ceremonious forms, throw any obſtacle in the way of a reconciliation that was ſo much the object of our deſire and intereſt.

The letter from *Byroo Punt* was in general terms acquainting me with the earneſt deſire of the Miniſter to conclude a peace: and his having diſpatched *Runſoor Senoy* to converſe with me upon certain points, to which if my anſwer proved favourable, he would immediately ſend an ambaſſador to me with full powers from the Sircar to conclude a treaty.

Runſoor began by declaring on the part of *Nana* his ſincere and friendly intentions towards the Engliſh, and his deſire of immediately entering into an alliance with them. He did not condeſcend upon any particular or ſpecific conditions for effecting this alliance, but affected to conſider it as a point that might be attained without any difficulty, if both parties were but ſincere in their deſire

deſire of accompliſhing it. On this head I thought it ſufficient on my part to make the ſame general aſſurances which the Miniſter had communicated to me through him, and he ſeemed to be perfectly ſatisfied with them.

The other point, and that on which he laid the greateſt ſtreſs, related to *Hyder Ally*; here he ſaid the Miniſter found himſelf a good deal embarraſſed; he had lately received letters from Sir *Eyre Coote* propoſing to him to conclude a peace with the Engliſh, and unite his forces with theirs againſt *Hyder*. He affirmed on this head, that however willing he was to conſider *Hyder Ally* an enemy to the Maratta State, which he had always proved himſelf, and at this time was in poſſeſſion of a country belonging to the Sircar, and yielding a revenue of ſixty lacks of rupees, it was impoſſible for the Miniſter to commence hoſtilities againſt him immediately, on account of engagements they had lately formed together; that he therefore propoſed to write to *Hyder*, acquainting him with the arrival of the Engliſh army at the top of the gauts; that he had thought it expedient to enter into an alliance of friendſhip with them, in which he intended that *Hyder* alſo ſhould be included; and the reſult of this plan, he added, would be, that as *Hyder*'s anſwer would furniſh him with a ſufficient pretext for breaking with him, the united arms of the Engliſh and Marattas ſhould take the field immediately after the rains, and march into his country. The reaſon he gave for delaying the operations to that period was, that before an anſwer could be received to the letter he now propoſed writing, the ſeaſon of action would be nearly over, and the rains at hand, which muſt render it impoſſible for an army to keep the field. He further added, that even admitting, that it was in every other reſpect convenient for him to break with *Hyder* and enter upon action immediately, the ſeaſon is already too far ſpent to enable us to make any conſiderable progreſs. *Runſoor* concluded this ſubject with declaring, that it was not the intention of *Nana* to defer the concluſion of the treaty betwixt the Engliſh and the Maratta State, which he wiſhed ſhould be executed immediately, and that what related to *Hyder* ſhould remain ſecret in a ſeparate private treaty; beſides which, if any doubts were entertained of the Sircar's ſincerity, he offered to deliver up to the Engliſh a man of the firſt conſequence as a hoſtage, in which caſe he alſo would expect the ſame.

Having maturely conſidered the important objects to which this propoſal relative to *Hyder* muſt lead, and the neceſſary attention it deſerved in the preſent ſtate of our affairs, I expreſſed in general terms my ſatisfaction with the ſentiments thus communicated to me by the Miniſter, and the mutual advantages which muſt accrue from the proſecution of the plan he had laid down. At the ſame time I thought it prudent to avoid entering more particularly into the ſubject, by pointing out any mode of attack, either with reſpect to time or place, or indeed by propoſing any conditions of mutual benefit as the baſis of our compact againſt *Hyder*. Theſe points I conceived could only be diſcuſſed with any propriety when a public Vackeel ſhould arrive; when it appeared that any reaſonable dependance could be placed upon the ſincerity of the Maratta Government, and when your ſentiments ſhould be tranſmitted to me on the important ſubjects now communicated, and your inſtructions founded on them be received for my future guidance. The man returned to the enemy's camp early this morning: and as the Miniſter is encamped beyond *Tilliagong*, the time neceſſary for going there and returning, together with that requiſite for the diſcuſſion and preparation of the important points to be afterwards adjuſted, will occaſion a delay of eight days, at the expiration of which he declared a public Vackeel would arrive in my camp.

The time thus limited will cauſe no inconvenience, or even delay in my operations, as I hope that interval will be uſefully employed in receiving the neceſſary ſupplies of proviſions from *Bellapore*, and give you leiſure to weigh fully the ſubjects on which I have ſolicited your ſentiments, and which I ſhall wait for with the greateſt impatience. Appendix. No. 342.

In the courſe of converſation with *Runſoor*, he gave me to underſtand, though it is a circumſtance by no means probable, that the propoſals from *Bengal* had never been received by *Nana*, but that *Moodajee Booſla*, through whom they were ſent, finding no ſatisfactory offer made relative to *Ragoba*, had returned them. Suppoſing this to have been actually the caſe, the copy of theſe propoſals will no doubt have been ſent them by *Moodajee*, and as it appears they do not mean to produce the original, there is reaſon to ſuſpect that either *Moodajee* muſt have been averſe to it, and deſignedly prevented the ſucceſs of the propoſed compact againſt *Hyder*, or that the Marattas themſelves have ſuppreſſed theſe propoſals, with a view of obtaining more favourable conditions in a preſent treaty with us; though this laſt ſuggeſtion is, I muſt confeſs, very unlikely and improbable.

Upon the whole, and indeed their own declarations confirm this opinion, the variety of channels through which application have been made to them, while it tends to perplex and confound, fills their minds with diſtruſt and diffidence of the powers veſted in any individual with whom they may treat, and an apprehenſion of the invalidity of the terms which may be concluded upon under ſuch circumſtances.

This ſubject leads me to mention another fact which *Runſoor* communicated to me, and affirmed to have been one very principal reaſon why the Miniſter had deferred for ſome days ſending him to me. I know the various artifices practiſed by theſe people, and therefore do not put much confidence in his aſſertion; but as Admiral Sir *Edward Hughes* is on the ſpot, who can ſatisfy you with reſpect to the truth of it, or otherwiſe, I ſhall only mention the circumſtance, and refer you to him for further information.' *Runſoor* told me that a Muſſulman, named *Bapoo Cout*, arrived in the Maratta camp, ſent, as he ſaid, from Admiral Sir *Edward Hughes*, with a verbal meſſage to the following effect: "that the Governments "of *Bengal* and *Bombay* had violated peace, and waged "an unjuſt war againſt the Maratta State; that he, (the "Admiral) was veſted with full powers, and deſirous of "putting an end to hoſtilities, by reſtoring to them what "had been taken, and therefore wiſhed to be ac- "quainted with their complaints." No anſwer was given by the Miniſter, but the man ordered to depart immediately.

I have fully weighed this circumſtance in my own mind, and if *Runſoor*'s information is true, am convinced that this man muſt have acted without authority; ſince Admiral Sir *Edward Hughes* would never have ſent a meſſage of any particular nature, to a Power with whom we were actually engaged in war, and propoſing to conclude a treaty upon the inſtructions received from the Governor General and Council, without firſt communicating his intentions to your Committee and to myſelf, who are intruſted with the management of this alliance, as an oppoſite conduct from the appearance it carries of diſunion and differing intereſts cannot but be productive of the greateſt inconvenience and detriment to the public ſervice.

I have wrote you ſeveral letters on the ſubject of ſupplies of proviſions for the army, to which I know it is unneceſſary further to call your attention. In a letter of this date I have enclоſed for your peruſal an addreſs from the Commiſſary General, and now beg leave to ſubmit to your conſideration another from Mr. *Horſely*, the Commiſſary of your detachment. The propriety of his requeſt, and the juſtneſs of the arguments which he uſed to enforce it, both with regard to what relates to himſelf, and the future proſecution of the ſervice, ſtrikes me in ſo forcible and particular a manner, that I find it unneceſſary to add any thing to what he has repreſented,

further

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further than to recommend it moſt earneſtly to you ſerious attention and conſideration.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp at *Bhore Gaut*,
February 13th, 1781.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 22d February 1781.

Goddard, Brigadier General, the manner in which he treated the Maratta agent, approved.

We can only expreſs our approbation of the manner in which the General appears to have treated the Maratta agent, but do not think it material to enter into any further diſcuſſion on the ſubject of the General's letter, till an agent arrives with proper credentials from the Miniſter himſelf, and there appears a greater certainty of a negociation taking place.

An extract of thoſe paſſages relative to the Admiral has been delivered to him, which we ſuppoſe he will of courſe explain.

Extract of *Bombay* Diary, the 7th March 1781.

Wedneſday 7th.

Received the following letter from General *Goddard*, with the encloſed paper.

Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

Having received early this morning the Miniſter's expected reply to my letter ſent him the 1ſt inſtant, I loſe no time in communicating it to you; and that you may be enabled to judge more fully of the real diſpoſition and intention of the Maratta Government, I have encloſed an exact tranſlation of his letter to me, together with a copy of mine, to which his is an anſwer.

This letter I can but conſider as an abſolute refuſal of the offers of the Government of *Bengal*, and proves beyond a doubt what I have all along had reaſon to ſuſpect, the exiſtence of an alliance and connection with *Hyder Ally*, which has for its principal object a mutual league againſt the Engliſh nation; and that *Hyder* is expreſsly alluded to in that part of the Miniſter's letter, when he ſays that if I am fervent in my deſire of friendſhip, it is requiſite that I make a treaty, which ſhall include the propoſals of ſuch perſons who are allied to and connected with the Sircar.

Having therefore no grounds to expect that the Miniſter will in the moſt diſtant degree be inclined to enter into our preſent views againſt *Hyder* by any further attempt to negociate on my part, and indeed thoroughly perſuaded that no terms could now in policy be propoſed to the Maratta Government, that had not the mutual proſecution of the war againſt *Hyder* for its expreſs and ſole object, the preſent expediency and neceſſity of which could alone juſtify any further ſacrifice on our ſide, I have determined to conſider the Miniſter's anſwer, as it is certainly intended by him, deciſive with reſpect to the preſent negociation, and to make no new propoſals or advances, which could only increaſe his confident preſumption, ſubject us to the mortification of a ſecond refuſal, and beſides promiſe no reaſonable proſpect of ſucceſs; ſince, if *Nana Furneſſe* was really deſirous of peace, he would have availed himſelf of the opening now given, and at leaſt have communicated in writing, or ſent a perſon to declare what the terms are on which he is ready to conclude a treaty, and in ſome reſpects have explained the nature of the propoſals he wiſhes ſhould be included for the benefit of the perſons who he ſays are allied to, and connected with the Councils of the Sircar.

I requeſt to be favoured with your particular ſentiments on this occaſion, and your opinion of the propriety or good policy of proſecuting any further plan of negociation under the diſcouraging circumſtances that now preſent themſelves; which unleſs ſome unforeſeen event occurs, I ſhall not myſelf think of attempting till I receive your anſwer to this letter.

I have under my conſideration your letter of the 12th ultimo, relative to the future operations of the war, in the conduct of which I ſhall be generally guided by the opinion you have therein expreſſed, and which concurs with the ſentiments formerly delivered to you by myſelf.

I ſhall however be glad to receive any further communication of your particular ideas on this important point; and have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters, *Condolah*,
5th March 1781.

Draft of a Letter from General *Goddard* to *Nana Furneſſe*, March 1ſt 1781.

Letter from General Goddard to Nana Furneiſe.

Notwithſtanding you are already fully acquainted with the friendly ſentiments of the Engliſh, and their earneſt deſire for peace with the Maratta State, which have been particularly communicated to you through the means of *Runſoor*; yet, in order to convince you ſtill more of the ſincerity of my intentions, and that you may not poſſibly urge in excuſe for neglecting the intereſts of the Sircar at this important and dangerous time, your ignorance of the favourable and very friendly diſpoſition of the Engliſh towards you, I now encloſe the propoſals of the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, for concluding a treaty of perpetual alliance with the Maratta State, original of which has been tranſmitted by them to you, through the mediation of *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*.

Should the original propoſals not have been received by you through *Moodajee*, I think it proper to declare to you in the name of the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, that I am inveſted with full powers in their name, and in behalf of the Honourable Company, to agree to the conditions propoſed in the paper I now ſend you, provided they are accepted of by you in the manner and within the time preſcribed by the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Bengal*.

You will perceive from the date of the propoſals, that the five months limited will expire in nine days from the date of this letter, that is on the 9th of March, correſponding to the 13th of Rubba ul Divil in the 1195 year of the Hegira.

I therefore think it neceſſary to declare to you, that if before that time you do not agree to the propoſals, I am not authorized to grant or to treat on thoſe terms afterwards, and they will therefore become then and for ever after void and of no effect.

If the propoſals now made meet with your concurrence, it is neceſſary that a perſon be ſent from you, fully authorized by the Sircar to negociate, as with no other can I in future hold correſpondence.—What more?

A true tranſlation.
Dalᵗᵉ Watherſton,
Perſian Tranſlator.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Nana Furneſſe* to General *Goddard*. Received 5th March 1781.

Letter from Nana Furneſſe to General Goddard.

Your agreeable letter having been received, I am made acquainted with the contents.

You have wrote, "that Mr. *Haſtings* and the Govern- "ment of *Calcutta* ſent a treaty to the Miniſter of the "Peiſhwa, through the mediation of *Moodajee Booſla*, "which perhaps may not have arrived, and on that ac- "count you have ſent a copy; from a peruſal of which "every particular will be made known." You alſo add, "that Mr. *Haſtings* and the Government of *Calcutta* "have inveſted you with full powers to conclude and "ſettle the buſineſs of theſe parts."

Before this, *Moodajee* wrote the Sircar; that *Imad ul Dowlah* and the Chiefs of *Calcutta* had ſent him a treaty, but as it did not meet with his approbation, it would

anſwer

anſwer no end to ſend it to the Sircar; and that therefore he had returned it to Mr. *Haſtings*.

At preſent the copy of that very treaty which you have ſent me, has been read from the beginning to the end by your friend, and it is certain that the contents therein written are not proper or fit for the approbation of the Sircar. If you are ſincere and fervent in your deſire of friendſhip, it is therefore incumbent upon you to make a treaty that ſhall include the propoſals of thoſe perſons who are allied to, and connected with the councils of the Sircar.

It is not my deſire that the violence of war ſhould continue to rage on both ſides, and the inhabitants be ruined. But betwixt the Government of the Peiſhwa *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Engliſh Company, a firm and conſtant intercourſe of friendſhip and alliance long ſubſiſted: on whoſe part this has been interrupted and deſtroyed, that friend well knows; there is no neceſſity for me to point it out. What more ſhall I write?

A true tranſlation.

D. Watherſton,
Perſian Tranſlator.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 24th March 1781.

By Pattamars received the two following letters from Brigadier General *Goddard*. The original of that of the 12th inſtant has never been received.

Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour of addreſſing you the 5th inſtant, informing you of the reſult of the overtures I had made to the Miniſter; ſince which nothing new or material has happened. Every doubt and uncertainty with reſpect to the Miniſter's real determination, being now removed by his poſitive refuſal to accede to the terms offered by the Honourable Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and an abſolute bar put to our hopes of effecting a peace with the Maratta State at this time, upon any conditions ſince thoſe already rejected have actually become void with the expiration of the period limited for their remaining in force, and were we even diſpoſed to make ſtill more liberal advances and conceſſions, there does not appear any reaſonable hope of ſucceſs to our endeavours; it becomes incumbent upon us in this ſituation to determine upon ſome plan of future operations that may remedy, by every poſſible means, the diſappointment given to the views of the Bengal Government, and provide as far as circumſtances will admit for the general intereſts of the Company's affairs, and the preſervation of their valuable ſettlements and acquiſitions in *India*. I ſhall therefore preſume to lay my ſentiments before you on theſe momentous points, that you may take them into your ſerious and full conſideration, and ſuch ſyſtem of conduct be immediately adopted, as ſhall appear beſt calculated to promote thoſe deſirable purpoſes.

Before the commencement of the preſent campaign, the expreſs objects of our military operations were declared to be the conqueſt of *Baſſein* and its dependencies, the expulſion of the enemy from the *Concan*, and beſides, providing for the defence of our new acquiſitions in *Guzerat*, the ultimate, and as it then appeared, every probable hopes of terms of honour and advantage to the Company. Upon this plan hoſtilities have been proſecuted, and every part of it has been hitherto attended with the wiſhed-for ſucceſs, except our expectations of attaining a peace, the cauſe of which diſappointment we unfortunately find to be ſo remote from any powers of remedy we may poſſeſs, as to have defied all our paſt, and to throw an invincible obſtacle in the way of any preſent, efforts to remove it. If under ſuch circumſtances it may be permitted to indulge any particular cauſe of ſatisfaction, I muſt confeſs I cannot on this occaſion avoid deriving a ſecret pleaſure from the conſcious reflection that no means have been left unattempted by us, either to produce the pacific diſpoſition in the Miniſter we ſo much wiſhed for, or, failing in that, to obtain a thorough knowledge of his real views and deſigns. Appendix. No. 342.

In this latter aim I think we have perfectly ſucceeded, and however much reaſon and good policy may condemn the idea, I cannot help being now confirmed in the belief that, encouraged by the ſucceſs of *Hyder*, or ſeduced by his promiſes, the Maratta Miniſter has determined to adhere to the engagements mutually formed, and ſteadily perſevere in the alliance, I am not perhaps far wrong, when I ſay, general confederacy of the Powers ſouth of the *Nerbuddah*, againſt the Engliſh; it is only therefore by a ſeaſonable and effectual check to the progreſs of *Hyder* that we can hope to bind the Maratta Miniſtry to peace. It may not be improper here to make ſome remarks upon the effects which an immediate proſecution of further vigorous meaſures might be expected to produce in their councils; eſpecially as from the poſſeſſion of the gauts, and the vicinity of their capital, it is evident that we could march and poſſeſs ourſelves of it in 6 or 7 days at furtheſt, but it is alſo well known that ſhould we determine upon this ſtep, they have reſolved to ſet fire to it themſelves, ſo that neither would the acquiſition of it be of any value to us, nor would it advance us one ſtep towards an accommodation with the Peiſhwa, which alone, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, would in any degree juſtify ourſelves penetrating into the *Decan*: and indeed were there not other weighty conſiderations at this time to demand our moſt ſerious attention, and did no other wars employ our arms in *India*, I am far from thinking that a plan of conqueſt on this ſide, beyond what has been already purſued, is for the intereſts of the Company; and conceive that the preſervation and ſecurity of the poſſeſſions we have acquired, would be an object far more beneficial in its conſequences than the glare of additional conqueſts, which, from their diſtance and relative ſituation, beſides involving an enormous and ruinous expence, would be too hazardous and difficult to maintain.

The ſyſtem of defence, which under ſuch circumſtances would be an object of choice, is now a meaſure of neceſſity; and if while proſecuting it, we can at the ſame time be ready to guard againſt any attempts of the French on this ſide, and be aſſiſting to the operations of Sir *Eyre Coote* againſt *Hyder* on the other coaſt, we ſhall accompliſh three objects the moſt beneficial to the Company's intereſts at this period, and provide, as far as lies in our power, for the general ſafety of their valuable poſſeſſions in *India*.

I ſhall firſt ſpeak to the latter point, viz. our affording relief to Sir *Eyre Coote*: and ſince the obſtinacy and enmity of the Maratta Miniſter will not admit of our doing it in the extent we could have wiſhed, we muſt make every effort to do it to the extent we poſſibly can, conſiſtent with the ſafety and exiſtence of this ſettlement: I therefore beg to propoſe, as the only ſtep left in our power, that the Madras detachment, ſerving in the army under my command, be ſent back to the ſervice of the coaſt of *Coromandel*; that it ſtop at *Tellicherry*, and, reinforced by the troops under Major *Cotgrave*, proceed to *Anjengo*, from whence Colonel *Brown*, the officer commanding the whole, will direct his march through the Travancore country, and in conjunction with the Rajah, make a powerful diverſion towards *Dindigal*, conformable to the plan already propoſed for the operations of Major *Cotgrave*'s detachment, by Sir *Eyre Coote*; or be ready to follow ſuch further inſtructions as the latter ſhall find it neceſſary to ſend to meet him at *Anjengo*.

This, gentlemen, is all that, in the preſent critical and dangerous ſtate of affairs, I am of opinion can be attempted in favour of Sir *Eyre Coote* conſiſtent with your own immediate ſafety: for, in order to effect this, it will be requiſite to ſpare at leaſt one battalion; or, if Captain *Seward* is withdrawn, two battalions from the troops of your Preſidency to relieve Major *Cotgrave*, and

Appendix. No. 342.

the remainder, in conjunction with the Bengal battalions, will not be more than ſufficient for the defence and protection of your own acquiſitions, the relinquiſhing of which at this time, unleſs for the eſſential and ſolid objects of advantage propoſed by the Honourable Governor General and Council, which we have eſſayed and found to be unattainable, would be moſt impolitic, and probably involve the ruin of all the Company's ſettlements on this coaſt.

I ſhall now make a few remarks reſpecting the future diſpoſition of the troops for the purpoſes of a plan of defence. It is very evident, that while we keep poſſeſſion of this gaut, the Miniſter will not venture to detach any conſiderable body diſtant from the capital: there is therefore no reaſon to be apprehenſive of our valuable acquiſitions in *Guzerat* being materially diſturbed; and I conſider the force already there under Major *Forbes*, joined by a body of *Futty Sing*'s troops in caſe of an attack, as fully adequate to their defence and preſervation. While we are in poſſeſſion of this gaut, it is alſo plain *Nana Furneeſe* will not ſend any conſiderable force into the *Concan*; at any rate he will not venture to detach any guns, and the bodies of cavalry that may moleſt the open country, will in all probability retire before the ſetting in of the rains.

I would therefore propoſe, as a plan the moſt expedient and adviſable, that two or more battalions of Sepoys, with a proportion of artillery, be ſtationed upon this gaut in a ſtrong fortified poſt; and the remainder of the army encamped during the rains in ſome part of the *Concan*, the moſt convenient for the purpoſe of moving with expedition to the ſupport of this gaut, or to aſſiſt in the defence of *Bombay*, as circumſtances may render expedient.

As it will be of the utmoſt importance to keep up a ſafe and regular communication from *Bombay* with this poſt; and its ſecurity will become an object of the firſt conſequence, in order effectually to check and overawe the Maratta Power, I would recommend that ſome place for encamping the army be fixed upon, as near to *Bhore gaut* as poſſible; and therefore, provided no objections exiſt in point of ſituation, or conveniency of ſupplies, which are at preſent to me unknown, I am of opinion that *Panwell*, or even *Chouk*, which is half way between *Panwell* and this place.

On this particular point it is not however ſo neceſſary to come to any immediate determination; and I have at preſent introduced it principally to give you a clear and preciſe idea of the general plan I beg leave to recommend to your conſideration, in order that you may come to ſome ſpeedy deciſion, and avail yourſelves of the preſence and aſſiſtance of Sir *Edward Hughes*, in deliberating upon a plan of ſo great importance to the intereſts of the nation in *India*, and particularly in executing that part of it which relates to the immediate tranſportation of the troops.

I beg leave to expreſs my earneſt wiſh to be favoured with an immediate anſwer to this letter, as indeed I have been conſiderably diſappointed in not receiving a reply to mine of the 5th inſtant, duplicate of which I have diſpatched by this opportunity, leſt ſome accident ſhould have befallen the original.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Condelah,
March 12th, 1781.

Goddard, General, letter from.

Gentlemen,

I was yeſterday favoured with your two letters of the 8th and 9th inſtant, the former enclosing a letter from the Secretary to the Honourable Governor General and Council to my addreſs; and thank you for the ſteps you have taken relative to the bills of exchange which came enclosed.

I moſt ſincerely felicitate you upon the favourable intelligence which you have communicated to me, of the ſtate of affairs on the coaſt, and have not any doubt but the moſt fortunate and deciſive ſucceſs will ſoon follow ſo auſpicious a beginning.

In reply to what you are pleaſed to obſerve in your letter of the 9th inſtant, relative to Colonel *Hartley*'s detachment, I did ſuppoſe the events that immediately followed the reduction of *Baſſein*, both reſpecting the ſituation of that detachment in particular, and the operations of the army in general, were ſo well known to you, that any particular explanation of them would never have been wanted from me. It is true, the Bombay detachment, at the period you mention, was placed, and has ever ſince continued, under my command; but the ſmalleſt reference to the peculiar circumſtances that firſt occaſioned my march to join it at *Vijrabhoy*, to the ſervice on which the troops were employed immediately after, to the object propoſed, of driving the Marattas out of the *Concan*, and to the expediency, nay even neceſſity of making no diviſion of force where the enemy had already ſhewn themſelves ſo dangerouſly powerful, will be ſufficient to convince you that no partial purpoſes of collection could poſſibly have been attended to by me, without the greateſt inconvenience and hazard to the public ſervice.

This explanation on my part will probably account fully for the neceſſary failure that may have happened to your expectations of ſupplies ſince the reduction of *Baſſein*; but as the ſeaſon for collection had commenced at leaſt two months before that period, the greateſt part of which no enemy whatever moleſted the country, I ſhould conceive the hopes you were led to form, during that time, of being relieved by the produce of the *Concan*, cannot poſſibly have met with the ſame diſappointment.

On the ſubject of further negociation with the Maratta Miniſter, and what relates to *Tellicherry*, as well as the general plan of meaſures to be purſued, I have already troubled you with my particular ſentiments, and wait to receive your opinion and determination on them.

In the mean time, as it will be abſolutely neceſſary in the event of maintaining a ſtrong poſt upon the top of the gaut, (a meaſure, the expediency of which cannot I think admit of a doubt) to leave for its more perfect ſecurity, ſome guns of a heavier metal than any at preſent with the army, I muſt requeſt of you to give immediate orders to be ſent to *Bellapore*, to be ready to accompany the firſt eſcort coming from thence, two 18 and alſo four 12 pounder pieces of ordnance, with their tumbrils, and a large proportion of ammunition, &c.

The danger of the road rendering my diſpatches to you very precarious, and liable to be intercepted, I have not encloſed you a formal return of the ſtate of the army, but tranſcribe you the following abſtract of its preſent actual ſtrength, excluſive of European officers.

Bombay artillery - -	57
Madras ditto - -	67
Bombay European infantry	170
Madras ditto - -	346
Bengal native artillery -	97
Bengal Sepoys - -	2542
Bombay ditto - -	1446
Madras ditto - -	527
Cavalry, about - -	700
	5952
Sick at *Baſſein*, *Callican* and Camp, about	754
Laſcars, Bildars, &c. ditto	2000

I ſhall conclude this letter with informing you of an action that happened at *Chouke* the 16th inſtant, with a body of Marattas under the command of *Purrjy's Ram Boa*, and the eſcort coming from *Panwell*, conſiſting of the 5th battalion of *Bengal* and the 1ſt of Bombay Sepoys, and the Candahar horſe.

The

The former to the amount of between 12 and 15 thouſand horſe and foot, made a moſt bold and daring aſſault upon the eſcort, a very ſhort time after coming to their ground early in the morning; but after repeated efforts, from which however they did not altogether deſiſt till about noon, were obliged to relinquiſh the attempt without making any impreſſion upon the detachment, though not without conſiderable loſs to themſelves both of men and horſes. The good conduct and military ſkill of Captain *Mackay*, who commanded, in the diſpoſition he made of his force, was equalled by the ſpirit and intrepidity of the officers under him, who exerted themſelves in a moſt extraordinary and gallant manner. I beg leave to expreſs my warmeſt ſenſe of their merits and ſervices on this occaſion, which I flatter myſelf will appear deſerving of your approbation.

One company of Sepoys belonging to the Bengal battalion, who had routed a party of horſe, and purſued them too eagerly and incautiouſly, were ſuddenly turned upon and attacked by them, and ſuſtained ſome loſs; I have not yet aſcertained the exact number of killed and wounded. In the night of the 16th Captain *Mackay* advanced a few miles, and having been joined by a reinforcement I ſent from *Campoly* the morning of the 17th, arrived ſafe in camp that evening with the whole of his convoy, which I have the pleaſure to tell you was a very large and conſiderable one. I have the honour to be with reſpect,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Camp at *Condelah*,
21ſt March 1781.

P. S. The above abſtract of the ſtate of the army under my command, includes only the troops preſent with me in the field, beſides which there are two Bengal battalions with Major *Forbes*, in *Guzerat*, their four grenadier companies excepted, which accompanied the army. Six Bengal with two Bombay Companies of Sepoys compoſe the garriſon at *Ahmadavad*, the whole amount of whoſe ſtrength may be computed at twelve hundred men. The ſtate of the two Bombay battalions which have joined Major *Forbes*, and of the reſt of your troops in *Guzerat* and at the Preſidency, as well as thoſe compoſing the garriſons of *Baſſein*, *Callian*, and *Bellapore*, you are ſufficiently acquainted with to form a certain eſtimate of their ſtrength; and it is not in my power to give you a more particular return of them at preſent than you are already poſſeſſed of.

T. G.

APPENDIX, No. 343.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 27th March 1781;—preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *Daniel Draper*, and *Nathaniel Stackhouſe*, Eſquires.

Goddard, Gen. the political plans ſuggeſted by him, the ſame as repeatedly recommended by us.

GENERAL *Goddard*'s definition of the objects of the war, and of our political views on this ſide of *India*, is exactly the ſame as has been repeatedly expreſſed by us in all our proceedings and plans of conduct, and by which we have been invariably guided in all our operations.

We entirely concur with the General, and indeed the propoſition came firſt from us, as appears by our minutes of the 9th, that a ſyſtem of defence is now a meaſure of neceſſity, and our own difficulty is in the choice of meaſures for purſuing that ſyſtem. Various objections occur againſt keeping ſo large a force at the head of the gauts during the monſoon; the danger and difficulty of affording them ſupplies, the vaſt expence of ſtores and ammunition, and the danger of leaving ſo large a part of our force in a ſituation where perhaps we could not command their ſervices, if there ſhould be a neceſſity for them at *Bombay*, or be able to give them aſſiſtance, if they ſhould be hard preſſed. After all, it does not appear that maintaining a poſt at the head of the gauts will anſwer the purpoſe of keeping the enemy out of the *Conkan*, for it is evident by the General's letters on the table, that notwithſtanding the preſent ſituation of the army, a very large body of the enemy is now in the country, by which a large convoy was expoſed to imminent danger. If the General could have adopted our propoſal of making himſelf maſter of *Razemabdy*, the poſſeſſion might have been maintained with a ſmall body of men, and it would have afforded ſecure lodgement for the troops and ſtores, without the expence attending the propoſed ſcheme of raiſing works and fortifying a poſt, building magazines, caſemates, &c.

Goddard, Gen. his plan for obtaining a poſt at the head of the gauts, not approved of.

The danger of it pointed out;

Upon the whole, we think that if at any time hereafter it may be judged expedient to poſſeſs ourſelves of the gauts, they may be again ſecured or taken poſſeſſion of with much leſs loſs, difficulty, and danger, than would attend maintaining a poſt there during the rainy ſeaſon: and it is therefore reſolved to recommend to the General to drop this idea, and to employ the army the remainder of the ſeaſon in protecting the *Conkan*, and if poſſible, to reduce *Paih*, or ſome other of the ſtrong holds, which might afford convenient and ſecure ſtations for part of the troops during the rains; and the ſecurity of which in our hands will protect and encourage the inhabitants in their cultivation the enſuing ſeaſon.

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and the likewiſe with a view of keeping the enemy out of the Conkan

His not having poſſeſſed himſelf of Razemabdy lamented.

To be recommended to him to give up the idea of maintaining a poſt on the gauts during the monſoons; but to employ the army in reducing ſome of the ſtrong holds.

As it will be impoſſible for the Maratta horſe to act in the *Conkan* during the rains, we apprehend there can be no danger; and it muſt be accordingly ſuggeſted to the General to canton the army in two or more diviſions, at the moſt convenient ſtations for covering the country, which we judge may be about *Panwell*, *Callian*, or *Viſrabbey*, from which places the troops may with eaſe be tranſported to *Bombay* in caſe of neceſſity; or form a junction againſt the opening of the ſeaſon, without danger from the enemy.

Goddard, Gen. recommendation with reſpect to the diſpoſition of the army in the rains.

Fort St. George, the detachment from thence ſerving on this coaſt to be returned.

We ſhall, agreeable to the General's propoſal, take immediate meaſures for returning the Madras detachment; and are glad to have it in our power to aſſiſt that Preſidency, though in the preſent reduced ſtate of our eſtabliſhment we wiſh circumſtances would permit of our detaining the Europeans. The General muſt in conſequence be deſired to give immediate orders for returning the Madras detachment to *Bombay*, in readineſs to embark.

Bombay, the troops ſerving with the army to be under orders into garriſon previous to the ſetting in of the monſoon.

We alſo propoſe, previous to the ſetting in of the monſoon, to withdraw the Bombay troops into garriſon, which will cauſe a further conſiderable reduction in the expences of the army; and we conceive the Bengal detachment will be fully ſufficient to ſecure the country, and ſtrong enough to reſiſt any attempts that can poſſibly be made by the enemy at that ſeaſon of the year.

Tellicherry, the reſolution for withdrawing this ſettlement finally determined on.

We muſt now, with whatever reluctance, put in execution our former reſolution of abandoning *Tellicherry*, which, as already full explained in our proceedings, it is abſolutely out of our power to maintain any longer, ſince we have no longer any hopes of bringing the Maratta war to a concluſion. When the Madras detachment arrives from the army, which, as the ſeaſon is late, the General muſt be deſired to expedite, we ſhall conſult with Colonel *Brown* about the plan to be obſerved in withdrawing the garriſon, and the expediency of landing his force, in order to make an effort to diſlodge the enemy, which we apprehend will be neceſſary before the place can be evacuated; and will alſo enable us to do it with leſs loſs of credit and riſk to the inhabitants.

Meaſures to be purſued for carrying this reſolution into execution. An effort to be made to diſlodge the enemy, previous to our evacuating the place.

Ordered that the Commander of the *Royal Admiral* be directed to get his ſhip in immediate readineſs for ſea, to aſſiſt in tranſporting the Madras detachment to *Tellicherry* and *Anjengo*.

Royal Admiral to be got ready for ſea immediately.

Read the letter from Admiral *Hughes*, entered under the 19th inſtant.

King's ſhips.

Reſolved,

Sir Edwd Hughes, reſolutions to be communicated to him; to be required to aſſiſt us with ſhips to carry our reſolutions into execution.

Reſolved, that our reſolutions of this day reſpecting the Madras detachment and the withdrawing of *Tellicherry* be communicated to the Admiral, and a requeſt made to him to order one or more of his Majeſty's ſhips to aſſiſt on theſe ſervices. Whatever ſhips he may think proper to order, may take on board the marines he left for the defence of *Tellicherry*.

Apology made for ſeamen borrowed from the fleet not being yet returned.

The ſeamen will be returned on the arrival of the *Revenge*, now daily expected, or if the Bombay grab ſhould not have ſent up her proportion, the ſhips the Admiral may ſend to *Tellicherry* may receive them there; and an apology muſt be made to the Admiral for their detention, which was neither foreſeen or ordered by us.

Adjourned.

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Sec^y.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 28th March 1781.

Signed the following letter to General *Goddard*, agreeable to the above minutes:

To Brigadier General *Goddard.*

Sir,

We have received a duplicate of your letter of the 12th inſtant, the original of which never came to hand, and the duplicate did not reach us till the 24th, at the ſame time with your letter of the 21ſt. We are ſorry to find our letters of the 8th and 9th met with equal delay in the paſſage.

Your definition of the objects of the war, and the extent of our views in point of acquiſition, entirely coincide with our opinion and the plan of meaſures originally formed for the proſecution of the war, and by which we have been invariably guided in all our proceedings and deliberations; nor have we a wiſh or view beyond the ſecurity and preſervation of our poſſeſſions in *Guzerat* and the *Concan*.

Upon this principle, and conſidering every other circumſtance neceſſary to be attended to, we are entirely of the opinion before expreſſed to you in our letter of the 9th inſtant, that our meaſures ſhould now be confined to a defenſive plan; and we have accordingly directed our deliberations ſolely to the choice of meaſures for purſuing a ſyſtem of defence.

Various and ſtrong objections occur againſt keeping ſo large a part of our force at the head of the gauts during the monſoon: the danger and difficulty of affording them ſupplies, the vaſt expence of ſtores and ammunition, and the imprudence of hazarding a body of troops in a ſituation where perhaps we might not be able to command their ſervices in caſe of neceſſity, or to give them aſſiſtance if they ſhould be hard preſſed; nor by a fair concluſion from paſt events can it be urged, that maintaining a poſt at the gauts will anſwer the purpoſe which alone could juſtify ſuch a meaſure, namely preventing the enemy from ſending a force into the *Conkan*; for it is evident, that notwithſtanding the preſent poſition of the army under your command, the enemy have by the other paſſes detached a very conſiderable body of horſe into the *Conkan*, and, as we underſtand, with guns, by which a large convoy was expoſed to imminent danger. The poſſeſſion of the fort of *Razemachy* would have removed ſome part of theſe objections, as it would not only have given us a firm footing on the gauts, but might have been maintained with a ſmall body of men, and would have afforded ſecure lodgement for the troops and ſtores without the heavy expences incident to the propoſed ſcheme of making a fortified poſt, with ſtore-houſes, magazines and lodgements, for a large garriſon, conſtructed with a ſufficient degree of ſtrength and ſolidity to reſiſt the attacks of the enemy, and the impreſſion of the weather during the monſoon.

Upon the whole, we are of opinion, that if at any time hereafter it may be judged expedient to gain poſſeſſion of the gauts, they may be ſecured or forced with much leſs difficulty and danger than would attend maintaining a poſt there during the rainy ſeaſon; and we muſt therefore recommend to you to drop that idea, and to employ the army during the remainder of the ſeaſon, in completing the reduction of the *Conkan*, and getting poſſeſſion of *Paeb*, or ſome other ſtrong holds, which would afford convenient and ſecure ſtations for part of the troops during the rains, and in our hands would protect and encourage the inhabitants in their cultivation for the enſuing ſeaſon.

As it will be impoſſible for the Maratta horſe to act in the *Conkan* during the rains, or for ſome time after, we apprehend there can be no danger in cantoning the army in two or more diviſions, at the moſt convenient ſtations for covering the country, which we judge may be about *Panwell*, *Callian*, or *Vizrabtroy*, from which places the troops may with eaſe be tranſported to *Bombay* in caſe of neceſſity, or form a junction at the opening of the ſeaſon, without danger from the enemy.

We acquieſce in your propoſal of ſending back the Madras detachment under the command of Colonel *Brown*, to be joined at *Tellicherry* by the party under Major *Cotgrave*, and are glad to have it in our power ſo far to aſſiſt that Preſidency: though in the preſent reduced ſtate of our eſtabliſhment, we wiſh circumſtances would permit of our detaining the Europeans.

We ſhall take immediate meaſures in concert with the Admiral to provide embarkation; and as the ſeaſon grows late we recommend to you to loſe no time in ordering the Madras detachment to *Bombay*, to be in readineſs for embarking: we alſo propoſe, previous to the ſetting in of the monſoon, to withdraw the Bombay troops into garriſon, in order to relieve ourſelves from the heavy expence of keeping them in the field, as we conceive the Bengal detachment will be ſufficiently ſtrong to reſiſt any attempts that can poſſibly be made by the enemy at that ſeaſon of the year.

Since we have no longer any hopes of coming to an accommodation with the Marattas, it is utterly beyond the reach of our reſources to maintain the ſettlement of *Tellicherry*, which we have accordingly reſolved to abandon; it will not therefore be neceſſary to make any arrangement for its defence, but we doubt not you will ſee the neceſſity; and we requeſt, that for the preſent this intention may be kept inviolably ſecret.

Mr. *Boddam* has acquainted us of his having received the bills in your favour for five lacks of rupees, and has lately remitted the ſum of R^s 1,80,000 for the ſervice of the army, which is depoſited in our treaſury till your directions can be received regarding it.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
28th March 1781.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 23d April 1781;—preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor; *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire, and *Nathaniel Stackhouſe*, Eſquire.

Received the following letter from Brigadier General *Goddard:*

Gentlemen,

I did myſelf the pleaſure of addreſſing you the 15th inſtant, and acquainted you with the ſafe arrival and junction of the eſcort under Colonel *Brown*.

Having previouſly ſent down to the gauts as many of the guns, tumbrils of ammunition, and baggage of every kind as I poſſibly could, conſiſtent with the ſecurity of the

poſt,

poſt, and the prevention of too full a diſcovery of our intentions; on the 17th in the afternoon I ordered the remaining bazars and baggage, together with ſuch artillery as I had found it neceſſary to detain, to proceed to *Campoley*, and I followed myſelf at day-break, with the rear diviſion of the army, which reached the encampment at the bottom of the gaut about nine o'clock, without having been annoyed by the enemy in the ſmalleſt degree, or ſuffering any loſs or inconvenience whatever.

This fortunate circumſtance I attribute to the ſucceſs of the precaution I had uſed to conceal as much as poſſible from the enemy our intentions to relinquiſh the poſt at *Condolah*, of which I am convinced, from the ſubſequent intelligence brought me by my hircarrahs, as well as from the certain proof their conduct furniſhed, they had not the ſmalleſt knowledge, till day-light diſcovered to them that we were gone. About eight o'clock a party of horſe made their appearance at the top of the gaut; a few foot only ſhewed themſelves; but none of them thought it prudent to advance or attempt to moleſt the march of our troops, who were at that time near the foot of the paſs.

I have been obliged to halt this day to refreſh the cattle after the exceſſive fatigue which they have lately undergone, and in particular during the day and night of the 17th; but I propoſe to march to-morrow, and hope to arrive at *Panwell* the 23d inſtant, as I fear, on account of the neceſſary attention to water ſufficient for the ſupply of the army, I ſhall be detained a day longer on the road than would otherwiſe be requiſite.

I ſhall however uſe every endeavour to reach *Panwell* the 22d, and therefore requeſt you will order the neceſſary boats to be ready at *Bellapore* for tranſporting the troops arrived from your Preſidency, as well as the Madras detachment, to *Bombay* with every poſſible expedition.

The enemy have not yet aſcended the gauts. *Holkar* with his force, unencumbered by any baggage, is at the bottom of the Ceſſere paſs; and *Purriſs Ram Bow* has ſent off all his bazars and baggage to the Columby paſs, about three coſs farther to the northward, and eight from this ground, where I learn he intends alſo following himſelf during this day.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Quarters,
Campoley,
19th April 1781.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 25th April 1781.

Gentlemen,

Ge- I had the pleaſure of addreſſing you the 22d inſtant from *Chouke*, and acquainted you with my intention of marching towards *Panwell* the following day. As I knew the road from *Chouke* to *Burwah*, more than half way to this place, lay through a country full of thick jungles, broken ground, and narrow defiles, where the enemy would poſſeſs every advantage they could wiſh, of concealing themſelves and annoying our troops, I thought it expedient to ſend off all the heavy ſtores, baggage, and every encumbrance, at two o'clock in the morning, under the care of a ſtrong eſcort, and remained myſelf with the main body till day-break. The ſucceſs fully anſwered my expectations: the baggage, &c. moved off undiſcovered by the enemy, who had not an opportunity during the march of attacking or giving them any diſturbance whatever.

A little after ſun riſe the enemy made their appearance, at firſt in ſmall parties, throwing rockets and diſcharging their muſketry upon our rear, from the numerous thickets and hollows that favoured their approach. Their numbers continued to increaſe; and ſoon after their whole force, which I am confident from the full view I had of them at different times yeſterday, the names of their leaders, and the repeated intelligence of my hircarrahs, could not be leſs than 50,000, of which there may be 6,000 infantry, ſhewed themſelves, lining the tops of the hills on right and left, and behind every bank or buſh where there was a poſſibility of concealing themſelves. Their horſe kept behind their guns, and generally at too great a diſtance for our artillery to reach them; though ſometimes conſiderable bodies came near enough to receive the fire of our guns, which were exceedingly well ſerved, and muſt have done very great execution.

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Their moſt ſerious and determined attack was made when we came near *Burwach*, with their whole force, horſe and foot; at which time the rear being very hardly preſſed, I took poſſeſſion of an eminence with the 6th battalion of Bengal and 13th of Bombay infantry, which effectually commanded the ſpot where the enemy had poſted themſelves, and drove them off, after they had ſuſtained very conſiderable loſs from the guns of theſe battalions.

The whole of the army reached *Burwach* about one o'clock; when finding the enemy ſhewed no inclination to advance, but on the contrary were retreating, ſeemingly tired of the warm reception they had met with, and deſpairing of ſucceſs in their attempts to make any impreſſion upon our line, I thought it moſt expedient, notwithſtanding the fatigue the troops had ſuſtained, as the whole of the baggage, &c. was ſecure in our front, to puſh on to *Panwell*; and accordingly having halted ſome time to refreſh the people, proſecuted my march, and arrived at *Panwell* about an hour before ſun ſet.

It is with the greateſt concern I have to acquaint you with the loſs of Colonel *Parker*, who commanded in the rear, where, exerting himſelf with that courage and military ardour that always diſtinguiſhed him on every occaſion of active ſervice, he received a mortal wound in the belly, of which he expired on the march a few hours after. Incloſed is a return of killed and wounded in the action of yeſterday; and I alſo take this opportunity of ſending you a particular liſt of our loſs upon the 21ſt inſtant.

The reinforcements upon your Preſidency will embark this day at noon; at which time alſo the reliefs for the garriſon of *Bellapore* and *Parſeek* will proceed. I ſhall alſo ſend off with all poſſible expedition the five companies belonging to Captain *Carpenter*'s battalion, to ſtrengthen the garriſon at *Callian*, with one company of the fourth battalion of Bombay Sepoys.

I expect to receive particular accounts by my hircarrahs of the ſituation of the enemy, and of their deſigns. By intelligence brought in early this morning, I learn that their main body is encamped at *Chouke*, and that they have a body of about 5,000 horſe poſted at *Burwach*. I ſhall do myſelf the pleaſure of communicating any further information as ſoon as it arrives; and have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Head Q^rs, *Panwell*,
April 24th, 1781.

To the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Gentlemen,

1. You receive herewith an addreſs, dated the 31ſt ultimo, containing a ſhort abſtract of the ſyſtem we had adopted for our conduct in the preſent ſituation of affairs.

2. We had made every neceſſary arrangement for putting in execution our reſolution of withdrawing from

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Tellicherry, and the time fixed for the departure of the fleet was arrived within two days; when on the 18th inſtant we received a letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 7th of January, (which might and ought to have reached us ſeven or eight weeks ſooner) wherein they acquainted us of their having ſent round five lacks of rupees for the ſervice of this Preſidency, on the *Duke of Portland*; and gave us authority to paſs drafts upon them for ſuch further ſum as we might ſtand in need of. We had alſo private intimation of their having provided a large quantity of rice for the ſervice of this Preſidency, of which we actually received a part by the veſſel that brought their letter.

3. Theſe reſources in view, we immediately determined, late as the ſeaſon was, to uſe our utmoſt exertion to preſerve *Tellicherry*; and made a requeſt to the Admiral, to poſtpone his departure for a few days, in order to give us time to collect troops, and the neceſſary ſupplies for the garriſon, to be ſent down in company with the fleet, without whoſe aſſiſtance we could not have executed our meaſures. The Admiral expreſſing great ſatisfaction in our reſolution, cheerfully complied with our requeſt, and by a vigorous diſpatch the *Royal Charlotte* and *Royal Admiral* were equipped for ſea. Troops brought from the foot of the gauts, and with ſtores and proviſions, embarked within ſeven days upon different veſſels, which with the fleet ſailed from this place the 27th of the month.

4. The *Royal Charlotte* has been detained a few days, to wait for rice, to complete a ſtock for the rains; that ſhip, as well as the *Royal Admiral*, will proceed from *Tellicherry* to *Fort St. George*, to aſſiſt in tranſporting Major *Cotgrave's* detachment to the coaſt of *Coromandel*, and will then purſue her voyage to *China*, whilſt the latter will return to *Bombay*, whence ſhe will be diſpatched to *England* early in the enſuing ſeaſon.

5. The *Prime* will ſhortly ſail for *England*, and carry our advices and proceedings at full length. We ſhall not now enter into a detail of the operations of the army, but ſhall only mention, that General *Goddard* has in purſuance of our advice, relinquiſhed poſſeſſion of the paſs of *Bhore Gaut*, where he had propoſed forming a fortified poſt; marched the army to *Panwell*, in order to lodge his ſtores and heavy baggage, and proceed in his future operations according to the ſyſtem of defence we had concerted with him in March: this being a country favourable for the mode of attack obſerved by the enemy, the army was extremely haraſſed by numerous bodies of horſe and foot, which had poured into the Conkan country, and preſſed upon our troops with a degree of boldneſs, which can only be imputed to their exultation at the appearance of a retreat; our troops in this ſituation behaved with their accuſtomed firmneſs and reſolution, and baffled every attack of the enemy to make an impreſſion either on the line or baggage, though our loſs from ſuch continual attack could not fail being conſiderable; and we find from our returns that during the two days taken up in the march, three officers and fifty-five men were killed, and fifteen officers and three hundred and ninety men wounded, though we derive ſome ſatisfaction that amongſt the privates killed and wounded, few or none were Europeans. We are very ſorry to add, that in the laſt day's march Colonel *Parker*, who commanded the rear guard, was mortally wounded, and died in a few hours.

6. Arrived at *Panwell* the 23d inſtant, when the General, immediately upon our requiſition, ſent over the troops we had appointed for the garriſon of *Tellicherry*, and will next proceed upon a plan for ſecuring the country from the ravages of the enemy in the beſt manner poſſible, until the lateneſs of the ſeaſon ſhall compel them to retire. For this purpoſe the army will immediately change its poſition, and move near *Callian*, a more central ſituation, and where it is propoſed to canton them during the rains; the Europeans and Bombay troops will be brought into this garriſon.

7. We very much wiſh we had any late authentic account to give you of the ſituation of affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, the hopes of which were the principal cauſe of our detaining the *Mercury* ſo long: we can only now acquaint you, that it is certain the French left the coaſt of *Coromandel* in February, without landing any aſſiſtance for *Hyder*, or doing any other material damage; and that they ſeemed much diſtreſſed for proviſions; the poſition of General *Coote's* army, and his burning all the boats at *Pondicherry*, preventing them getting any ſupplies from the ſhore. Country intelligence, collected by Mr. *Stewart* at *Goa*, mentions that *Hyder* had quitted the *Carnatic*.

8. We have the pleaſure to adviſe you of Colonel *Carnac's* having gained a very complete victory over *Mhadajee Scindia*; which is the more agreeable, as the Colonel had been obliged to retreat, and was haraſſed four days together by a very powerful army; after the fourth day's retreat the Colonel countermanded a detachment from his army in the night, with which he got in the rear of the enemy, and attacked their camp, which was forced and plundered, and two guns, four elephants, and a large booty fell into our hands. Several accounts concur that the enemies loſs amounted to eight thouſand men; and *Scindia* himſelf eſcaped with difficulty to *Serenga*, attended by only horſemen.

We have the honour to be with reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your faithful and obedient
humble ſervants,

Bombay Caſtle,
30th April 1781.

Willm Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

Extract of the Select Letter from *Bombay*, dated 27th May 1781.

We mentioned in our addreſs of the 11th of January, the attack of the fort of *Arnaul*, which was not reduced till the 18th of that month; General *Goddard* then moved with the remainder of the army, and joining the diviſion of Bengal troops and the Bombay detachment, late under the command of Colonel *Hartley*, which had remained in the ſame poſition at *Vizzaboy* ever ſince the 14th of December, put the whole in motion on the 27th of January. It had, as already adviſed, been ſettled, that in the interval which remained of the term limited by the Governor General and Council for the acceptance of their propoſals, the General ſhould purſue his operations with all poſſible vigour, and to the utmoſt extent he might find practicable, with the force under his command, in the hopes by this plan of conduct, or ſome deciſive advantage, to diſpoſe the Miniſter to an accommodation. The enemy, who, during the ſiege of *Arnaul*, and while the detachment kept their poſition at *Vizzaboy*, had committed great ravages in the country, immediately retired as the General advanced, and after ſlight oppoſition reaſcended the ghauts.

On the 8th February the Preſident took occaſion to lay before us an extract of a letter he had written to the General on the ſubject of the operations of the army, and as we entirely concurred in opinion with the Preſident, we alſo recommended the ſame to his conſideration. The ſubſtance of this letter was to recommend his poſſeſſing himſelf of *Razemachy*, a ſtrong fort at the head of the ghauts, and offering objections againſt his carrying the army to *Poonah*, or too far into the *Decan*. Diary, 2d and 7th February.

Our army advancing as the enemy retired, arrived at the foot of the ghauts on the 8th February, and the General finding the enemy had poſted a body of about 4,000 infantry, with ſeveral guns, to defend the paſs, and were conſtructing works for its defence, determined upon making the attack that very night before they could have

Diary, 12th February.

have time to collect a more numerous force, or to improve their works. The paſs of *Bhore Ghaut* was accordingly ſtormed that night by a ſtrong party, under the command of Colonel *Parker*, who, after forcing the different poſts, gained complete poſſeſſion of the paſs, and encamped on the ſummit of the ghauts on the ground formerly occupied by the late Captain *Stuart*.

From this poſt the General gave us his ſentiments with reſpect to the meaſures to be purſued the remainder of the campaign, in order, if poſſible, to bring the war to a concluſion: the Poonah Government had not then made any overture or propoſal for peace, and the Miniſter being in poſſeſſion of the terms on which he might, if he thought proper, put an immediate end to the war, the General thought any further advances on our part would rather encourage the enemy to perſiſt in hoſtility, and to increaſe in their demands and expectations of advantage: theſe being his ſentiments with reſpect to any advances to a negociation, he next explained his opinion of the moſt eligible plan for proſecuting the war; the firſt object he propoſed was to eſtabliſh a ſtrong poſt upon the ghauts, which he thought might be defended by one battalion of Sepoys againſt any force whatever, and that our poſſeſſion of this paſs which opened us a paſſage to the Maratta capital, might perhaps incline the enemy to think ſeriouſly of peace. The next point was to collect a magazine of ſtores and proviſions at the ghauts ſufficient for ſix weeks, ſhould it be deemed expedient to march forward to *Poonah*; with reſpect, however, to that meaſure, the General obſerved he did not then ſee any ſufficient or adequate reaſon to authorize it, but that at any rate he was under the neceſſity of remaining at the ghauts till he received a ſupply of proviſions.

We entirely coincided in the General's ideas, reſpecting the impolicy and inefficacy of making any further overtures towards an accommodation, as the Miniſter was in poſſeſſion of our terms, and little more than three weeks then remained of the period limited for their determination. We then hoped, the ſhort time they had for deliberation, the advantageous poſition of the army, and vigorous preparations for further meaſures might produce the wiſhed-for criſis, which we did not think could be accelerated by any further advances on our part.

Diary, 14th & 15th, 23d and 24th February.

We accordingly gave every aſſiſtance in our power for furniſhing the army with proviſions, that the General might have it in his power to proſecute his future operations in the manner that might be judged moſt expedient, upon further knowledge of the conduct the Miniſter might obſerve in conſequence of the poſition of the army and our preparations.

Then followed the General's intercourſe with a Maratta agent, mentioned in our addreſs of the 31ſt March, when, though every readineſs was ſhewn on our part to liſten to any reaſonable propoſals, we are ſorry to ſay, never advanced to any direct negociation: the General's account of the arrival, and of his reception of the agent, appears on the Diary under the 15th of February, and in the ſame letter is mentioned a circumſtance related to him by the agent, of the Admiral's interference, by ſending an agent to the Miniſters with a meſſage on the ſubject of the preſent war and the projected treaty.

Thoſe paſſages of the General's letter, relative to this affair, were communicated to the Admiral, who never explained himſelf to us in writing on this ſubject.

Under the 25th is entered another letter from the General, containing an account of his further proceedings with the Maratta agent; in which, as we obſerved, the Miniſter affected ignorance of the conditions propoſed by the Governor General and Council, though we were ſatisfied he was fully acquainted at leaſt with the ſubſtance of them: we thought it could have no bad effect, and would teſtify our earneſt deſire to promote a peace, were a copy of the Bengal propoſals to be ſent directly from the General to the Miniſter; we therefore ſuggeſted this meaſure to the General, which we thought would equally put to the teſt the ſincerity of the Miniſter's diſpoſition for peace.

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We underſtood that the four months limited by the Governor General and Council for the acceptance of their propoſals, was to expire the 9th of March, and therefore, to prevent the Miniſter taking any advantage to protract the concluſion of the treaty, we adviſed the General to accompany the copy of the propoſals with a declaration, that we ſhould conſider the four months to expire from that day, and not to commence from the delivery of the propoſals by him.

The General accordingly ſent a copy of the propoſals directly to the Miniſter, with a letter from himſelf, to which he received an anſwer, containing an abſolute refuſal of the offers made by the Bengal Government, as already noticed in our addreſs, dated the 31ſt of March.

The General's letter, and an exact tranſlation of the Miniſter's anſwer, are entered in our Diary under the 7th of March.

Diary, 7th March.

Having no grounds to expect the Miniſter would be induced to enter into our views againſt *Hyder*, by any further attempt to negociate, the General determined to conſider the Miniſter's anſwer as deciſive with reſpect to the negociation, and to make no more propoſals or overtures, which would only expoſe us to the mortification of a ſecond refuſal, without promiſing any reaſonable proſpect of ſucceſs, ſince, if the Miniſter had been really deſirous of peace, he certainly would have availed himſelf of the opening given him, and take ſome method to explain the propoſals, which, as he ſays in his anſwer, it is neceſſary ſhould be included for the benefit of the perſons allied to and connected with the councils of the Maratta Government.

Diary, 9th March.

The General however requeſted our opinion of the propriety or good policy of proſecuting any further plan of negociation, which we concurred with him, after the liberal advances made to the Miniſter, would be highly impolitic, and could not poſſibly anſwer any good end; and as the expiration of the limited period was then actually arrived, we propoſed waiting to hear the reſult thereof from the General, when if the Miniſter did not declare his acceptance of the offered terms, we ſhould finally determine what meaſure to purſue, which, as we then acquainted the General, we were of opinion muſt be confined to a defenſive plan.

Owing to a ſtoppage in the communication, we did not again hear from the General till the 24th of March, when an abſolute bar being put to hopes of peace, as the propoſals, beſides being rejected, had become void with the expiration of the term limited for their remaining in force, the General ſubmitted to us a plan of meaſures to be purſued in our then ſituation, which have already been briefly mentioned to you, and are explained at length in his letter entered under that date.

Letter 31ſt March.

General *Goddard*'s definition of the objects of the war, and of our political views on this ſide of *India*, is exactly the ſame as repeatedly expreſſed by us in all our proceedings and plans of conduct, and by which we have been invariably guided in all our operations.

We entirely concurred with him, and indeed the propoſition was our own, that a ſyſtem of defence was now become an act of neceſſity, and our only difficulty lay in the choice of meaſures for purſuing that ſyſtem. Various objections lay againſt keeping the large force now propoſed by the General at the head of the ghauts during the monſoon, ſuch as the danger and difficulty of affording them ſupplies, as had already been experienced in a high degree, the vaſt expence of ſtores and ammunition, and the imprudence of leaving ſo large a part of our force in a ſituation, when we could not command their ſervices if there ſhould be occaſion for them at *Bombay*, or be able to give them aſſiſtance if they ſhould be hard preſſed; and after all it did not appear, that maintaining a poſt at the head of the ghauts would anſwer

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swer the purpose, which alone could justify the measure, namely, preventing the enemy from entering the *Conkan*; for it was evident by the General's letters, that notwithstanding the position of the army, a very considerable body of the enemy had entered the country by other passes, of which there were several, by which a large convoy of provisions had been exposed to imminent danger, and considerable loss actually sustained. If the General could have adopted our proposal of making himself master of *Razemachy*, the possession of that fort might have been maintained with a small body of men, and it would have afforded secure lodgement for the troops and stores, without the expence attending the proposed scheme of raising works, fortifying a post, building magazines, casemates, &c. constructed with a sufficient degree of strength and solidity, to resist the attacks of the enemy, and the impression of the weather during the monsoon.

Diary, 24th March.

Upon the whole, we were of opinion, that if at any time hereafter it might be judged expedient to possess ourselves of the ghauts, they might again be forced or taken possession of with much less loss, difficulty, and danger, than would attend maintaining a post there during the rainy season; and we therefore recommended to the General to drop the idea, and to employ the army the remainder of the season in protecting the *Conkan*, and reducing the strong holds which still remained in the hands of the enemy.

Diary, 7th April.

The General in reply acquainted us, that although he entirely concurred with us in the superior expediency of the measures we had recommended, he was unable at that time, owing to a particular train of circumstances, to carry them into execution; for having under the 28th of March detached a very strong escort to *Panwell*, under the command of Colonel *Brown*, to bring a supply of provisions to the army, *Holkar* had descended the ghauts with the whole of his force, and by this addition of strength to the enemy then in the *Conkan*, had rendered the return of the escort, if not impracticable, at least too dangerous to be attempted without a reinforcement. Colonel *Brown* in the march to *Panwell* had been harassed by the enemy's troops, and lost a considerable number of bullocks; and in this emergency the General found himself obliged to request we would immediately order a detachment from the garrison of *Bombay* to join Colonel *Brown* and proceed with him to camp, after which the General proposed immediately to relinquish the post on the ghauts. He strongly urged to us to comply with his requisition, as he found it impracticable to march a detachment from camp to join the escort, or to relinquish the post until the return of Colonel *Brown* with the draft bullocks; and further mentioned that his stock of provisions would not last more than twelve days.

Diary, 10th April.

In this critical situation we immediately exerted every possible effort to extricate the army, and accordingly instantly formed the strongest detachment our garrison would afford, to reinforce Colonel *Brown*; with which we had the pleasure to learn he conducted the convoy of provisions to the army without any loss, notwithstanding the repeated and powerful efforts of the enemy, who attacked him every day, and in particular on the march of the second day, when he was attacked by the enemy's whole force, consisting of at least 20,000 men. The troops however suffered, eighteen being killed and eighty-eight wounded.

The General bestowed great commendations on the conduct and military skill of Colonel *Brown*, in preserving and protecting his convoy during so long and incessant an attack, and we likewise thought it just to express our approbation thereof.

At this period the letter arrived from *Bengal*, mentioned in our address of the 30th ultimo; in consequence of which we took the resolution then communicated to you, for maintaining *Tellicherry*, which you will find more fully explained in our proceedings under the 19th, where our letter to the Admiral on the subject is also entered, and his answer under the following day. In this place we must mention, that the Admiral on every occasion where his assistance could be of use, has manifested the utmost zeal and attention for the Company's service.

Upon the junction of Colonel *Brown* the General moved from the gauts with the stores and provisions collected there, and after sustaining severe and continual attacks on the march, as already advised in our abovementioned address, arrived at *Panwell* on the 23d ultimo. The General's letters, containing particular accounts of these actions, are entered on the Diary under the 23d and 25th, with the returns of the killed and wounded, amongst which we were sorry to find Colonel *Parker*, who commanded the rear guard, and was killed on the last day's march.

The army remained at *Panwell* till the 20th instant, employed in embarking the sick and wounded, stores and baggage, for *Bombay* and *Callian*, when they marched to the latter place under the conduct of Colonel *Brown*, the General having come over to *Bombay*. The army is to be cantoned at *Callian* during the rains, except the Madras Europeans and the troops of this establishment, which are to remain in garrison at *Bombay*.

Diary, 29th April.

We had intended to return the Madras detachment to the coast, as already mentioned, immediately on close of the campaign; but the General has given his opinion in strong terms, the necessity of their remaining on this side of *India*, in which we also entirely concur, until circumstances more favourable than the present shall admit of their return. As the service of the Madras Europeans appears indispensable in the shattered state of our battalions, and the expence upon their present footing of a detachment on foreign service is very heavy, we have it in contemplation to return the officers and incorporate the men on this establishment, at least till we are in a condition to return them, by which we shall receive a very material addition of effective strength, and the Company be relieved from a very burthensome expence which the funds for the army are totally unequal to sustain.

Diary, 18th April.

In our last letter from the Governor General and Council they express high approbation of the sentiments delivered in the President's minute of the 1st of August, on the plan of operations for the campaign then ensuing; but events having taken place since that period which could not be foreseen or provided for, the interests of the Company required that the operations of their troops should be directed against another enemy, and that their system of policy should of course be changed. That it was now become necessary that the whole force which could be collected and spared from the immediate defence of the several Presidencies, should be employed in curbing, and, if possible, oversetting the increased power of their ambitious enemy in the *Carnatic*, and they hoped that the orders which General *Goddard* had received from Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* would have been followed by the immediate direction of his arms towards the territories of *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

Letters from General *Coote* on this subject, both to General *Goddard* and to us, are entered on our Diary, under the 15th of April, and our answer under the 26th; but we think it totally needless to use any arguments to you to demonstrate so obvious an impossibility, as that we could divert the army from our own defence against the possessions of *Hyder Ally*, before the Maratta war is brought to a conclusion; should our wishes for peace be happily accomplished, we shall most zealously co-operate to the utmost of our ability against the common enemy, in which case likewise the aid of the Madras Europeans will be indispensable; but, as we observed to General *Coote*, it is not because we are desirous of peace, or that peace is necessary to our affairs, that will prove arguments

Diary, 23d December.

ments with the Marattas to conſent to an accommodation. Let the ſame arguments be applied to *Hyder Ally*, with whom a peace is equally neceſſary, and we believe the effect will be equal. We confeſs we know not what further can be undertaken on the plan of negociation. The Miniſter has declared in very intelligible terms, that *Hyder* muſt be included in whatever treaty may be made with the Poonah Government, and we have tranſmitted this declaration to the Governor General and Council, who alone are competent to treat upon that ground.

In the Preſident's minute of the 1ſt, and our letter to *Bengal* of the 17th of Auguſt, our diſtreſs for money is deſcribed with the utmoſt ſtrength and juſtice. The Governor General and Council have in reply acquainted us, that they wiſhed to leave in ſuſpenſe their ultimate reſolution on that part of our letter, wherein we communicated our obſervations on the deſire they had expreſſed that the receipts from the acquiſitions in *Guzerat* ſhould be appropriated excluſively to the payment of the army under General *Goddard*. They further obſerve, that their ability to continue ſupplies is not increaſed, but on the contrary leſſened, as they had been obliged to augment their own military ſtrength to ſupply the place of detachments; and that the proſecution of the war in the *Carnatic* depended ſolely on remittances from their treaſury.

Diary, 28th Auguſt. Beſides the aſſiſtance we have afforded to General *Goddard* from the collections made from the Surat Pergunnahs, we alſo gave him as a further relief, a credit on our treaſury for the diſcharge of ſuch of the army bills as did not require ready money, by which means our bond debt has been very conſiderably increaſed.

It is an inexpreſſible diſappointment to us, that out of the five lacks conſigned to us by the Governor General and Council on the *Duke of Portland*, three have been landed and detained at *Madras*, without even the ſmalleſt notice given to us on the part of that Government. We ſhall however endeavour to avail ourſelves of the permiſſion we have received to paſs drafts on *Bengal*, by which, and our other reſources, applied with the moſt frugal management, we muſt hope to keep affairs in a currency: but our difficulties are and will be very great.

We mentioned in our addreſs, by the *Hawke*, the conduct of the Governor at *Goa* reſpecting the capture of an Engliſh merchant veſſel at *Mangulore*, and the Governor General and Council have tranſmitted our repreſentation of the affair to the Admiral; his opinion on the ſubject is entered on the Diary, under the 25th of September. The ſentiments of the Governor General and Council will appear in their letter entered the 9th of July; but we do not find the Admiral has taken any further ſteps in the affair; and the Governor General and Council have lately deputed Mr. *Auriol*, their ſecretary, to *Goa*, to make overtures to the Portugueſe for a coalition againſt *Hyder Ally*, though we underſtand Mr. *Auriol* has been unable, through bad health, to proceed further than *Madras*.

25th May. We have, as you will obſerve by our laſt conſultations, judged it expedient to detain the *Ponsborne* till we ſhall come to ſome final determination reſpecting the Madras detachment.

We have no late intelligence of the ſtate of affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel*.

APPENDIX, No. 344.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 31ſt December 1779.

RECEIVED the following letter from *Surat*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We had the honour to addreſs you the 18th inſtant by an armed boat, and have ſince received your commands of the ſame date by the *Revenge*.

The Chief has acquainted us that he is in hopes of being able to procure about five lacks of rupees, in conſequence of a former order from your Honour, &c. and that one lack is already paid into the treaſury. Appendix. No. 344.

We therefore now ſend you by the *Revenge*, two lacks and a half of rupees in ſpecie, and your Honour, &c. may depend upon our attentive obſervance of your directions, relative to our continuing to ſend you down in ſpecie ſuch ſums as we can ſpare, or that the Chief may have taken up.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,

Surat, 28th December 1779.

R. H. Boddam,
Thomas Day.
Daniel Crokatt,
Daniel Seton.

At a Select Committee, Tueſday 11th January 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Preſident and Governor; *John Carnac*, Eſquire, *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire.

Read letters received this morning from Brigadier General *Goddard* and the Chief of *Surat*.

The preſent low ſtate of our finances, and the indiſpenſable occaſions we have for our own unavoidable expences, make it utterly impoſſible for us to engage to accept General *Goddard*'s drafts, or to give the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* authority for that purpoſe. It muſt be obſerved, that ſince the date of General *Goddard*'s letter, we have directed the Chief of *Surat* to advance him two lacks out of the expected loans at that place, which the Chief in his letter before us acquaints us he ſhould accordingly pay; and we truſt this ſum will prove a conſiderable relief to the exigencies of the army: but ſtill, to provide as far as we poſſibly can for their further demands, it is now alſo reſolved to empower the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* to make good to General *Goddard*, for the ſervice of the army, the amount they may recover from the new-acquired Pergunnahs, and this is the utmoſt we can poſſibly do to aſſiſt him.

General *Goddard* muſt be again reminded of the inability of our garriſons at *Surat* and *Broach* to protect and ſecure the Pergunnahs, which he has deſired them to take poſſeſſion of, and that we cannot ſpare a man from this garriſon. It appears to us he might add much to his reſources by enabling our ſettlements to ſecure the collections of ſuch extenſive diſtricts, and it will reſt with him to determine whether this can be effected without injury to the ſervice, by any diſpoſition of the forces under his command.

Adjourned.

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper.

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Sec^y.

Extract of a Letter from General *Goddard*.

Gentlemen,

I beg to acknowledge your letter of the 18th inſtant, mentioning the arrival of the ſhip *Elizabeth* with ſtores from *Madras*, upon the ſubject of which I have already wrote you.

I beg now to addreſs you in the moſt particular manner, on the ſubject of the money for the pay and ſubſiſtence of the troops. I ventured to aſſure you, when at *Bombay*, that with the ten lacks coming round from *Bengal*, and the money I ſhould myſelf be able to procure at this place for bills on the Honourable Governor General and Supreme Council, I hoped to prevent the inconvenience of a want of caſh, till the effectual ſupply which I was certain would be ſent by the Government of *Bengal*, when they received intelligence of the war in which they were involved, might arrive. Of the ten lacks above-mentioned, five only are come to hand; the

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remainder, in ſpecie, is ſhipped on the *Britannia*, and on the way; ſo that my expectations on that account have met with a temporary delay in their gratification: and with reſpect to the reſource I aſſured myſelf of finding in my credit with the merchants of *Surat*, I have been entirely diſappointed by the inſtructions tranſmitted by your Committee to the Chief, to borrow money upon account of the Company, which has put a total ſtop to my drafts. It was my belief for ſome time, that the expedient thus adopted by your Government was intended for the ſupport of the common cauſe; but I find you propoſe reſerving whatever money may be thus borrowed to be ſent to your treaſury at *Bombay*. I know, gentlemen, your own ſcarcity of caſh, but I beg leave alſo to repreſent the expediency and ſound policy of aſſiſting and relieving my wants all in your power: for theſe reaſons, let me propoſe that you will authorize your Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* to advance me any ſums which the neceſſity of the ſervice only ſhall compel me to draw for; that you will be pleaſed to direct the amount of the revenues collected from the new Pergunnahs to be appropriated to the expences of the preſent war, for which they will be a very timely ſupply, and paid to me; and that you will adopt ſuch other expedient for the convenience and benefit of the ſervice, and to relieve my preſent diſtreſs, as you may judge moſt eligible, either by permitting me to make drafts on your treaſury, which may be accepted by you as loans and depoſits, or otherwiſe as your own wiſdom and experience in theſe matters may ſuggeſt, &c.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Thomas Goddard.

Camp near *Surat*,
30th December 1779.

Extract of a Letter from *Surat*.

The ſum of two lacks ſhall be paid to General *Goddard* agreeable to your directions, and as faſt as the different perſons that have engaged for loans pay the ſame into the treaſury, it ſhall be tranſmitted to the Preſidency; but it will be the middle of next month before the whole is collected, as ſeveral of the merchants, on aſſenting to their loans, particularly ſpecified two periods for making good the ſame.

I am, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Rawſon Hart Boddam.

Surat,
7th January 1780.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

Our letter of the 27th ultimo, acquainting you of the effort we have made to aſſiſt you by directing the Chief of *Surat* to advance you two lacks of rupees for the ſervice of the army, which you were not apprized of at the date of your laſt letter; but with the moſt zealous and cordial inclination to relieve your wants, the low ſtate of our finances, and the indiſpenſable occaſions we have for every rupee we can raiſe from our ſtated reſources, for our own unavoidable expences, make it utterly impoſſible for us to engage to accept your drafts, or to give the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* unlimited authority for that purpoſe. The ſupply juſt mentioned, will, we truſt, prove a conſiderable relief to your exigencies; and in order to provide to the utmoſt extent of our power for your further demands, we ſhall now direct the Chiefs of *Surat* and *Broach* to pay to your order the amount of ſuch collections as they may make from the new Pergunnahs, if the neceſſity of the ſervice ſhould compel you to require ſuch ſupply, which we ſhould be very glad may not be the caſe; but this is the utmoſt we can do to aſſiſt you.

Our ſentiments reſpecting the expediency of protecting the Pergunnahs adjoining to *Surat* and *Broach* were made known to you in our laſt letter, with the inability of thoſe garriſons to ſuch an extenſive ſervice; and the Chief of *Surat* has ſince acquainted us, that the motion of the whole army to the northward has put it entirely out of his power to make detachments for ſecuring the Pergunnahs that were to fall under his charge, which made the firſt of the plan recommended to you. It appears to us you might add much to your reſources by enabling our ſettlements to ſecure the collections of ſuch extenſive diſtricts, and it will reſt with you to determine whether this can be effected without injury to the ſervice by any diſpoſition of the forces under your command.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
11th January 1780.

Bombay Select Conſultations, 28th January 1780.

To General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have received your letters of the 6th and 10th inſtant.

We have the pleaſure to acquaint you that the *Britannia* is arrived at *Bengal*, and now proceeds to *Surat* with a conſignment of eight lacks of rupees in ſpecie for the ſervice of the army under your command. This ample ſupply will, we doubt not, render it unneceſſary for you to paſs any drafts upon the ſettlements of *Surat* and *Broach*, in conſequence of the latitude lately given you, and which we therefore deſire you will not make, as our own exigencies for money are very preſſing.

The Governor General and Council alſo acquaint us, that they ſhall ſoon ſend you a further ſupply of two lacks by the *Besborough*.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
William Hornby,
&c. Committee.

Bombay Caſtle,
28th January 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 346.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 15th May 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Gentlemen,

3. THE ſettlement of *Guzerat* being effectually accompliſhed by the conqueſt of *Ahmedabad*, and the expulſion of all the garriſons belonging to the Maratta Miniſter, before ſtationed in the different Pergunnahs to collect the revenues of the province, I had full leiſure to attend to the buſineſs which next appeared of the greateſt importance; and accordingly, having left Major *Fullerton* with eight companies of Sepoys drafted from the ſeveral battalions, and two field pieces, in a ſtrong poſt within the city of *Ahmedabad*, formerly the reſidence of the Guicawar collector of *Futty Sing*'s ſhare of the revenues, in order to aſſiſt in the defence and ſettlement of the place; and further, to ſecure a uſeful and decided influence to the Engliſh in the northern part of the province, I marched myſelf with the remainder of the army to the river *Myhie*, which I croſſed on the 6th inſtant, having previouſly ſent off all my heavy ſtores, artillery, and unneceſſary baggage, to *Cambait*, to be ſent from thence to *Broach*.

10. I muſt here beg leave to obſerve, that of the reinforcements ordered to join me from *Madras*, five hundred Europeans only, under the command of Colonel *Brown* who commands the whole of the detachment, have arrived at *Surat*.

11. No part of the troops from *Tellicherry* are joined, owing to cauſes that appear to me moſt unaccountable, but which have been alleged, very unfortunately for the preſent

preſent juncture, to render the ſervice of ſo large a force totally uſeleſs to this campaign; for by the laſt advices they were detained merely to oppoſe the irruptions of the Nairs; a race of banditti who poſſeſs the hills adjoining to *Tellicherry*. Although Colonel *Braithwaite*, in the letters he formerly wrote me, aſcribed the detention of the Mahie detachment to his fears of *Hyder*'s hoſtile deſigns, which have ſince proved without foundation; but admitting that the Tellicherry troops were now permitted to ſet out, the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced that they could not poſſibly arrive in time to be employed upon any ſervice before the ſetting in of the rains.

12. I muſt beg leave here to repreſent the conſiderable increaſe of expence that will be requiſite to maintain all theſe additional troops who will look to be ſupported by me as their commander and immediate repreſentative of your Supreme Government. I ſhould expect and think it muſt be deemed ſtrictly conſiſtent with juſtice and propriety, that every acceſſion of revenue which may immediately ariſe to the Company from operations of this war, ſhould be ſet aſide and ſolely appropriated to aſſiſt in defraying the expences of it, and hope you will ſignify your ſentiments to the Select Committee of *Bombay* accordingly; but as the collection of theſe newly-acquired Pergunnahs likely to be the ſcene of future hoſtilities, muſt at preſent be very precarious and uncertain, let me entreat you will continue to ſend me ſuch ſupplies of money as will be abſolutely neceſſary to ſupport the large army I ſhall have with me, and prevent my having recourſe to the expedient of drawing bills on your Honourable Board, which I might perhaps be compelled to do at a very conſiderable loſs.

I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) *Thomas Goddard.*

APPENDIX, No. 347.

Bengal, Secret Conſultations, 1ſt May 1780.

AGREED that the following letter be written to *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have received your letter of the 31ſt January.

In order to enable us to make an early proviſion for any future ſupplies which you may require from us, we deſire that you will tranſmit to us as ſoon as poſſible an eſtimate of your probable receipts and diſburſements for the enſuing year, included between the 30th of April 1780 and the 1ſt of May 1781; with an account of the actual receipts and diſburſements of your Government for the preceding year, ending the 30th April 1780.

We further deſire to be furniſhed with a ſeparate eſtimate of the groſs revenue and charges of collection of the pergunnahs or diſtricts ceded to the Honourable Company by the treaties of *Poorunder*, and that lately concluded with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, alſo an account of your bonded debt, with the amount of intereſt due thereon up to the lateſt period.

We are, &c.

Fort William, the 1ſt May 1780.
Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 11th September 1780;— preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires; Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

Appendix. Nos. 347 & 348.

Read the following letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*:

Gentlemen,

We have the honour to encloſe a duplicate of our letter of the 6th ultimo, and have ſince received your letter of the 15th of May, to which we ſhall ſhortly reply more fully. In the mean time we muſt expreſs our very earneſt hope, that the meaſure we have adopted for relieving you from the heavy expence of the Bengal army will meet with your firm ſupport, and that you will exert your extenſive reſources to the utmoſt to ſend round the neceſſary ſupplies this ſeaſon to give full efficacy to our plan, and put an end to ſuch inſupportable drains from your treaſury in future.

We are, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 30th July 1780. (Signed) *W. Hornby*, &c. Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 348.

Bengal Public Conſultations, 3d October 1780.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*; dated 17th Auguſt 1780.

WE have received your letter of 1ſt May, and in conſequence thereof now forward the following accounts; moſt earneſtly requeſting that you will take the moſt effectual meaſures for ſending us ample and ſpeedy ſupplies, as we are now in the utmoſt diſtreſs for money to defray even our ordinary expences.

The accounts above-mentioned are;

N° 1. Eſtimate of the Honourable Company's probable receipts and diſburſements at this Preſidency, for the year 1780-1.

N° 2. Account of the receipt and diſburſements at this Preſidency and factories ſubordinate, for the year ending the 30th April laſt.

N° 3. Eſtimate of the groſs revenue ceded to the Honourable Company by the treaty of *Poorunder*.

N° 4. Account ceſſions made by the treaty concluded with *Futty Sing*, and of the conqueſts in conſequence of the war with the Marattas.

N° 5. Statement of the nett revenues at the Preſidency and factories ſubordinate.

N° 6. Account of the bonded debt at this Preſidency, made up with intereſt to the 30th April laſt.

We have the honour, &c.

Bombay Caſtle, 17th Auguſt 1780. (Signed) *Wm Hornby*, &c. Council.

Extract of APPENDIX to FORT WILLIAM Consultations the 3d October 1780.

D^r. { An ESTIMATE of the probable RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS of the Honourable Company, at their Presidency of BOMBAY, and the Settlements subordinate thereto, for the Year 1780—1. } C^r.

RECEIPTS.

AT THE PRESIDENCY.

The tobacco farm and rent		61,400 — —	
Arrack farm D°		41,000 — —	
Rent of villages and batta grounds		10,840 — —	
Duty on salt, estimated at		8,824 1 95	
Quit and ground rent, D°		7,718 2 18	
Batta grounds gained by stopping the breach, D°		2,550 2 91	
The codery, D°		3,598 1 96	
Pension		7,745 3 45	
Tax on the landed estates, D°		7,230 1 28	
		1,50,708 1 73	
Deduct the collector's charges, and the charges surveying the island		5,014 1 50	
		1,45,694 — 23	
Balance in the Treasury the 1st May last		6,72,953 1 75	
Due on account bills of exchange		77,547 3 50	
Due from the several purchasers at the public sales, the clearance of which is very uncertain		2,89,606 3 76	
The supposed amount of private sales in the different offices; vizt			
General stores	10,000 — —		
Military stores	10,000 — —		
Warehouse	60,000 — —		
Marine storekeeper	50,000 — —		
Hire of the docks, &c.	20,000 — —		
	1,50,000 — —		
The supposed amount of customs in the course of the year; vizt			
Bombay customs	2,00,000 — —		
Mahim D°	8,000 — —		
Bandorah D°	5,000 — —		
	2,13,000 — —		
Sale of Europe goods		6,00,000 — —	
The amount of certificates on the Court of Directors		1,00,000 — —	
			22,48,802 1 2

AT SURAT.

Revenues; viz.			
Castle, revenue amounted last year to		42,353 — 74	
Tanka D°		87,404 1 51	
Mowa, and Vagnagur Mandavee		985 — —	
Latry customs		48,246 — 47	
The ceded Pergunnahs		1,07,535 3 04	
			2,86,524 1 76

AT BROACH; vizt.

Pergunnah revenues, as per last year's Jemmabundy	4,79,654 — 20	
Corul Pergunnah	28,087 2 80	
Ahmode, &c. rawderres	1,205 1 01	
The mint	4,620 — 20	
Phorza duties	54,413 — 36	
Jambooser revenues	3,06,215 1 98	
Tribute	54,788 2 90	
		9,30,284 — 61

Annual revenues of the northern possessions, by virtue of the with Futty Sing, and the conquests in consequence of the war, which, by an account received from the Chief of Surat, amounts to the sum of rupees 24,51,700.; but, from the present unsettled state of the country, the collection thereof is very uncertain, for which reason no part of it can be reckoned upon as a probable receipt, and is not therefore included in this estimate.

The Chief of Surat has divided the Select Committee, that the Company's tannahs are fixed in all these districts, and that he hopes to make "a handsome collection" this year.

AT TANNAH; vizt.

For the nett amount revenues on Salsette, estimated as per last accounts	2,14,640 1 20
Carried over	36,80,251 — 81

DISBURSEMENTS.

AT THE PRESIDENCY.

Wanted to defray the expences of the several offices, taken from the latest accounts given in; vizt.

The military Paymaster's amount last year		11,39,976 2 53	
Add for 7 new battalions of Sepoys raising for the service of this establishment, the amount expences whereof are estimated at a lack of rupees each		7,00,000 — —	
		18,39,976 2 53	
The land Paymaster's amount last year		3,72,955 3 60	
Marine Paymaster's D°	3,46,329 2 19		
Add the following vessels on the stocks, viz.			
One ship & 2 snows	2,00,000 — —		
One luggage boat, One water boat	18,000 — —		
		5,64,329 2 19	
The military Storekeeper's amount last year		3,00,435 1 59	
General Storekeeper D°		1,50,261 1 51	
Paymaster of the new works D°		4,38,774 — 99	
Powder-house Committees D°		30,441 3 50	
Batta for 10 battalions, supposed to be on service this year, at 4,500 each per month, and for 8 months		3,60,000 — —	
			40,57,174 3 91
Account salary, as per last account		23,361 3 72	
Dewannee to the President and Council, the Commander in Chief, field officers, &c. &c.		1,50,312 3 24	
Stable charges		8,000 — —	
			1,81,674 2 96
To complete the stock of a China ship			2,75,000 — —
A cargo of cotton for one ship to Bengal			40,000 — —
For an investment of piece goods and arrangoes			2,00,000 — —
The annual supplies to the Malabar coast			4,00,000 — —
Contingencies			3,00,000 — —
			54,53,849 2 87

AT SURAT.

Disbursements in the several offices, estimated at the expences of last year; viz.			
Military Paymaster's	1,74,845 3 40		
Land D°	1,01,611 — 23		
Purser marine	72,580 3 66		
Storekeeper's	96,864 3 78		
		4,45,922 3 07	
Durbar charges amounted last year		11,554 2 —	
Account presents, factory, rent, charges on merchandize		23,326 3 04	
Contingencies		50,000 — —	
Account salary		3,312 — —	
			5,34,116 — 11

AT BROACH; viz.

Disbursements in the several offices, as above; viz.			
Military Paymaster's	2,52,327 3 02		
Land D°	1,22,705 1 19		
Storekeeper's	1,12,628 — 47		
Steward's	17,271 2 10		
		5,04,932 2 78	
Account salary		3,093 2 —	
Jambooser disbursements		41,981 3 08	
Contingencies		50,000 — —	
			6,00,607 3 86

AT TANNAH.

Disbursements in the several offices, as above; viz.			
General Paymaster's	3,77,321 — 09		
Storekeeper's	33,647 3 78		
Steward's	21,605 2 42		
		4,32,574 2 29	
Account salary		2,338 2 68	
Persovah disbursements	49,627 2 57		
Batta at the out-ports	28,358 2 —		
		77,986 — 57	
Contingencies		50,000 — —	
			5,62,899 1 54
Carried over			71,51,473 — 38

RECEIPTS continued.		
Brought over		36,80,251 — 81
AT CARANJAH.		
For the nett revenues collected at Caranjah, Hog, and Elephanta iſlands		52,410 1 62
AT FORT VICTORIA.		
For the revenues collected there, being the cuſtoms, rent of villages, and farm of the paſſage boats		8,216 2 38
AT TELLICHERRY.		
The revenues collected there before the troubles, amounted to about rupees 33,000; but we fear little or nothing has been collected ſince, and therefore cannot look upon any part thereof as a probable receipt.		
AT ANJENGO.		
The rent of Cotadilly farm		833 2 —
AT PERSIA.		
Buſhire reſidency receipts laſt year.		
Freight of pearl and treaſure — 700 — 36		
Account cuſtoms — 4,385 3 44		
	5,085 3 80	
To balance which our probable diſburſements exceed our probable receipts the enſuing year		38,34,492 — 85
Rupees		75,81,289 3 46

DISBURSEMENTS; viz.			
Brought over			71,51,473 — 38
AT CARANJAH.			
Account diſburſements, taken from laſt year's account			22,050 1 65
AT FORT VICTORIA.			
Amount diſburſements, taken as above			45,299 — 94
AT TELLICHERRY.			
Amount diſburſements, as above.			
Land Paymaſter's — 46,073 — 92			
Military D° — 1,77,405 2 99			
Storekeeper D° — 12,499 3 20			
Steward's D° — 9,509 3 53			
		2,45,488 2 64	
Purchaſe of ſtores under the warehouſe keeper		5,070 — 50	
Account ſalary		767 3 67	
Contingencies		50,000 — —	
			3,01,325 1 18
AT ANJENGO.			
Charges of the land pay office, about		24,000 — —	
Military D°		2,400 — —	
Contingencies D°		10,000 — —	
			36,400 — —
AT PERSIA; viz.			
Buſſorah Preſidency, the charges thereof eſtimated at about		8,000 — —	
Buſhire Preſidency.			
Charges of the ſettlement — 14,585 3 60			
Supplies under the head of acc[t] curt Bombay — 2,030 — 60			
Charges on merchandize — 124 1 48			
		16,740 1 68	
			24,740 1 68
Rupees			75,81,289 3 46

N. B. As the revenues from the late acquiſitions are not eſtimated in this account, ſo neither are the advances which may be made to General Goddard.

Bombay Caſtle, the 16th Auguſt 1780.

Errors excepted,

(Signed) *Jam. Anderſon,*

Sub Accountant.

D[r]. { ACCOUNT of the RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS of the Honourable Company, at their Preſidency of BOMBAY, and Settlements ſubordinate thereto, for the year ending the 30th April 1780. } C[r].

RECEIPTS.			
AT THE PRESIDENCY.			
On account goods ſold at different public ſales		7,32,261 1 75	
Received from the collector on accounts, rents, and revenues		1,80,062 3 95	
The bonded debt for the difference between the receipts and payments under this head		9,24,405 2 4	
Balmuccundaſs, &c. minters, the amount received of them, on account the coinage of copper into pice		36,823 2 59	
The amount received on account certificates on the Court of Directors, on account the privilege of the captain and officers belonging to the Europe ſhips		1,97,600 1 74	
Received from Cuſtom Maſter; viz.			
On account Bombay cuſtoms — 2,37,202 3 99			
D° Mahim and Bandorah D° — 17,943 2 28			
	2,55,146 2 27		
Received from Bengal, for remittances and bill of exchange		7,19,669 1 50	
The eſtate of Benjamin Jarvis, received for an advance made to him at Surat		1,000 — —	
Account tonnage collected in the year		1,679 — —	
Bombay Bank, received on that account		8,125 1 18	
The military ſtorekeeper, received from him, on account his ſales		26,077 3 58	
General ſtorekeeper, D°		12,429 1 50	
Marine Paymaſter, D° on account collections		25,336 1 27	
Warehouſekeeper, D° his ſales		1,87,516 3 18	
			32,18,134 2 55

DISBURSEMENTS.			
AT THE PRESIDENCY.			
The expences in the ſeveral offices; viz.			
In the department of the military Paymaſter		11,39,976 2 53	
Land D°		3,72,955 3 60	
Marine D°		3,16,329 2 19	
Military ſtorekeeper		3,00,435 1 59	
General D°		1,50,761 1 51	
New fortification paymaſter		4,38,774 — 99	
Powder-houſe Committee		30,441 3 50	
		27,79,174 3 91	
Stable charges.			
Paid the balance of laſt year — 4,000 — —			
the amount of this year — 8,000 — —			
		12,000 — —	
The Poonah Committee, paid the balance of their account		4,408 3 60	
Account current London payments under this head, being for paſſage money, &c. &c.		33,330 — —	
The amount paid for freight of Sandal wood, pepper, &c.		32,066 2 17	
Clothing the army under the command of General Goddard		19,292 1 75	
Remittance to Onore, per ſhip Reſolution, for the purchaſe of rice, but which could not arrive in time to be entered on the Reſident's diſburſements		62,940 3 73	
Sundry payments on account Poona reſidency		11,059 1 —	

RECEIPTS continued.

Brought over		32,18,134 2 55
AT SURAT.		
On account remittances from Bengal	14,19,268 2 19	
D° goods conditionally sold	1,64,552 2 38	
D° revenues under the Collector General	1,34,240 3 88	
D° D° D° of the revenues	63,030 2 89	
D° D° Phoorza and Latty	36,125 — —	
D° D° the Deroga ship	661 — —	
Borrowed at interest	3,68,341 — 59	
		21,86,160 — 33
AT BROACH.		
Revenues under the collector	3,28,291 — 14	
Deduct loans to the villages, to promote cultivation	1,54,680 — —	
	1,73,611 — 14	
Revenues from the Phoorza and mint	46,848 2 30	
Receipt on account sale of goods	75,876 1 84	
Borrowed at interest	1,20,000 — —	
Recoverances on account the expedition againſt the coolies	4,320 — —	
AT JAMBOOSEER; viz.		
Revenues under the collector	2,19,343 — —	
D° from the Phaerzah	30,189 1 49	
Recoverances on account of the expedition againſt the coolies	2,462 2 4	
	2,51,994 3 53	
		6,72,650 3 81
AT TANNAH.		
Revenues under the collector	68,648 2 —	
D° cuſtom maſter	24,966 2 —	
The warehouſekeeper, on account ſales	3,750 — —	
		1,39,570 3 89
AT VERSOVAH; viz.		
Collectors on account revenues	37,429 3 81	
Account cuſtoms	4,776 — 8	
	42,205 — 89	
AT CARANJAH.		
Received on account rents and revenues in the courſe of this year		33,226 1 58
AT FORT VICTORIA.		
The amount received in revenues and cuſtoms, &c. &c.		4,386 2 96
AT VINGORLA.		
The amount received in revenues	11,189 3 28	
Received on account of out-ſtanding debts of remittances to Onore	5,354 3 —	
		15,544 2 28
AT ONORE.		
The amount received on account ſale of cloth	8,657 — 34	
Taken by the Reſident out of our remittances from Bengal, per Beſborough	41,395 1 25	
		50,052 1 59
AT TELLICHERRY.		
The amount received on account revenue, cuſtoms, &c.	8,029 2 54	
D° ſales	7,959 1 40	
Taken by the Reſident out of our remittances from Bengal, per Beſborough	2,50,554 2 54	
Borrowed at intereſt	1,90,342 2 30	
Deduct paid	12,947 1 7	
	1,77,395 1 23	
		4,43,938 3 71
AT ANJENGO.		
No late accounts from the ſettlement have been received: the rent of Cotadilly muſt have been collected		833 2 —

Sundry payments on account Poonah expedition	91,464 1 40	
D° on account Mr. Farmer's hoſtage with Moodajee Scindia	25,130 — —	
D° on account Fort Saint George Preſidency		
D° on account Mr. Horſeley's proceeding to Bengal	13,996 2 16	
D° on account the office of police	6,953 3 30	
Purchaſe of arrack	12,927 2 —	
D° gannies	3,750 — —	
D° ghee	16,731 — 46	
D° houſe for the ſecretary	20,000 — —	
A payment to Dr Peters, on account Ragonaut Row	8,026 — —	
An advance to Bombay country	2,000 — —	
Account ſalary at the Preſidency	23,277 2 52	
Quanny to the Preſident and Council, &c.	1,49,287 2 58	
	1,72,565 1 10	
		33,32,657 3 58
AT SURAT.		
Diſburſements in the ſeveral offices; viz.		
Military Paymaſter	1,74,845 3 40	
Land Paymaſter	1,01,611 — 23	
Purſer Marine	72,580 3 66	
Storekeeper	96,884 3 78	
	4,45,922 3 7	
Payments from the Treaſury; viz.		
The contracts for piece goods	79,440 2 —	
Remittances to Cambay	21,000 — —	
Sundries, under the head of Account Preſents,		
Factory rent charges on merchandize, &c.	23,326 3 4	
Durbar charges	11,554 2 —	
Account ſalary	3,312 — —	
Advances to General Goddard	6,00,000 — —	
Payments to the Chief, on account ſervices ordered by the Select Committee	43,112 2 99	
		12,27,669 1 10
AT BAROCHE.		
Diſburſements in the ſeveral offices; viz.		
Military Paymaſter	2,52,327 3 2	
Land D°	1,22,705 1 19	
Storekeeper	1,12,628 — 47	
Steward	17,271 2 10	
	5,04,932 2 78	
Payments from the Treaſury; viz.		
On account purchaſe of cotton	36,369 — 41	
Account ſalary	3,693 2 —	
Payments to the Chief, on account ſervices ordered by the Select Committee	75,000 — —	
Advanced to General Goddard	1,30,000 — —	
Amount diſburſements at Jamboſeer	41,981 3 8	
		7,91,977 — 27
AT TANNAH.		
Diſburſements in the ſeveral offices; viz.		
The General Paymaſter	3,77,321 — 9	
Storekeeper	33,647 3 78	
Steward	21,605 2 42	
	4,32,574 2 20	
Account ſalary	2,338 2 68	
Verſovah diſburſements	49,627 2 57	
Proviſions to the out-poſts	28,358 2 —	
	77,986 — 57	
		5,12,899 1 54
AT CARANJAH.		
Amount diſburſements, as per Reſident's account for laſt year		22,050 1 65
AT FORT VICTORIA.		
Amount diſburſements, as per Reſident's account for laſt year		45,299 2 94
AT VINGORLA.		
Amount diſburſements, as per Reſident's account for laſt year		53,850 — 64
AT ONORE.		
Advances on account pepper		2,55,984 1 9

AT PERSIA.			
Buſhire, received on account cuſtoms		4,385 3 44	
D° freight of pearl and treaſure		700 — 36	
Exchange		500 — —	
		5,585 3 80	
		67,70,085 — 50	
By balance, ariſing from ſome part of the diſburſements for this year, made in the ſeveral offices, for which payments have not yet been made from the Treaſury		2,03,246 — 18	
Rupees			69,73,331 — 68

AT ONORE.			
Sundries under the heads of Account Salary, Charges on Merchandize, &c.		4,496 — 17	
Advances under the head of Account Current Bombay		3,027 2 95	
Amount diſburſements		18,782 — 99	
			2,82,290 1 [illegible]
AT TELLICHERRY.			
Diſburſements in the ſeveral offices; viz.			
Land Paymaſter		46,073 — 92	
Military D°		1,77,405 2 99	
Storekeeper		12,499 3 20	
		2,35,978 3 11	
Payments from the Treaſury; viz.			
Charges on account Callicut	6,500 — —		
For the purchaſe of rice, &c.	2,22,853 2 49		
On account the ſteward	9,509 3 53		
On account ſtores under the warehouſe-keeper and land Paymaſter	5,070 — 50		
Account ſalary	767 3 67		
Charges incurred by the attack made by the Prince of Cherika	44,236 1 32		
On account Fort St. George Preſidency 1,48,418 3 46			
Deduct received 41,839 — —			
	1,90,257 3 46		
		3,95,517 2 97	
			6,31,496 2 [illegible]
AT ANJENGO.			
The diſburſements of the Land Pay-office		24,000 — —	
Military D°		2,400 — —	
			26,400 — —
AT PERSIA.			
Buſſorah Preſidency. No late accounts received, but the expences there-fore eſtimated at rupees 2,500 per month		30,000 — —	
Buſhire D°, as per their books, ending 30th April laſt, viz.			
Sundry charges under the head of Account Current, Bombay, for ſupplies to cruizers, &c.	2,030 — 60		
Charges general, for the charges of the ſettlement, under ſundry heads	14,585 3 60		
Charges on merchandize	124 1 48		
		16,740 1 68	
			46,740 1 68
Rupees			69,73,331 — 68

Bombay, Auguſt 1780.

Errors excepted.
(Signed) *Jam. Anderſon*,
Sub Accountant.

ESTIMATE of the GROSS REVENUE of the COUNTRY CEDED to the Honourable Company by the Treaty of *Poorundur*.

A country ceded by the 5th article, but never put in our poſſeſſion		3,00,000 — —	
The Revenues on Salſette, taken from the lateſt accounts received from the Collector General; viz.			
Money Revenues	87,911 2 55		
White batta Mor[s] 5,480 P[s] 10 B[s] 4½, at R[s] 20 per M.	1,09,608 — 72		
Oarts	3,496 — —		
Gardens	408 — —		
Coolery	4,705 0 50		
Cuſtoms	26,231 3 11		
		2,32,360 2 88	
The Revenues on Caranjah, from the laſt accounts, &c.			
Farmers of villages	16,714 — —		
Renters of the ſalt batta grounds	13,161 — 97		
The fiſhery	2,595 — —		
Salt pans	1,970 — —		
Elephanta	730 1 60		
Hog Iſland	826 — —		
The tobacco farm	1,300 — —		
Fort Hill	71 — —		
Mourah arrack farm	53 — —		
The paſſage boats	1,820 — —		
Account cuſtoms	15,235 — 34		
		53,575 2 91	
			5,85,936 1 79
Rupees			5,85,936 1 79

Bombay Caſtle, 16th Auguſt 1780.

E. E.
(Signed) *Jam. Anderſon*, Sub Accountant.

Appendix. No. 348.

Ceſſions in conſequence of the Treaty with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, concluded by General *Goddard*.

The country ſouth of the *Tappy* being his ſhare of the *Autouezee*; viz.

Chouraſſee 17 villages, jaghire to Siccaram Bappoo		1,69,800 — —	
Ballifier		1,04,000 — —	
Muralee		56,000 — —	
Kamuge		88,500 — —	
Timbah		46,400 — —	
Cunode		46,400 — —	
Beara		14,000 — —	
Chokey at Bera		18,000 — —	
Tillaree		1,03,000 — —	
Nowſarree Cuſbah		14,700 — —	
Gundavee		89,000 — —	
Billamoria		8,000 — —	
Monvah		55,400 — —	
Weelu Anah		12,900 — —	
Anawil, alias Coſe Anawil		12,000 — —	
Huſſint Pore		18,900 — —	
Antapore and Rana Amba		22,500 — —	
Soongur		42,000 — —	
Mootah Cuſbah		9,800 — —	
Surat Choute		42,000 — —	
Zinnore		81,000 — —	
			10,52,900 — —

Conqueſts in conſequence of the War.

Pergunnahs ſouth of the *Tappy* taken from the Marattas, being the remainder of the country called the *Autorozee*, the collections of which are made by the Peiſhwa.

Parneya		27,000 — —	
Boodſeer		6,200 — —	
Bowarree		8,800 — —	
Bulſar		85,000 — —	
Parchole		1,07,000 — —	
Soopah		51,000 — —	
Sarbone		30,900 — —	
Ballare		30,000 — —	
Bamalee Cuſbah		7,900 — —	
Handſah, Chout on it		7,000 — —	
Durampore, D° D°		9,000 — —	
Surat, Chout on it		42,000 — —	
Chakees ſouth of the Tappy		83,000 — —	
		4,94,800 — —	

Pergunnahs between the *Tappy* and *Nerbuddah*.

Ulpar	3,16,000 — —		
Hamſood	85,000 — —		
Occlaſeer	78,000 — —		
Nandarree, Chout on it	65,000 — —		
		5,44,000 — —	

Pergunnahs between the *Nerbuddah* and *Mybie*.

Dubhay	2,00,000 — —		
Ahmud	1,25,000 — —		
Deſborah	35,000 — —		
		3,60,000 — —	
			13,98,800 — —
		Rupees	24,51,700 — —

Bombay Caſtle, 16th Auguſt 1780.

E. E.

(Signed) *Jam. Anderſon*, Sub Accountant.

Statement

Statement of the annual Revenues, as they now ſtand at the Preſidency of *Bombay* and Factories ſubordinate, eſtimated from laſt Year's Receipts.

Appendix. No. 348.

Bombay Preſidency.

Revenues under the Collector.			
The Tobacco Farm; its annual Rent			6,14,000 — —
The Arrack Farm; D°			41,000 — —
Malabar Hill; leaſed out at the annual Rent of			305 — —
Quit Rent.			
The annual Rent of Grounds let out to the Inhabitants for building of Houſes	8,107 2 88		
Deduct Charges of Collection	389 — 70		
		7,718	2 18
Penſion.			
This Revenue ariſes from a Sum of Money which the Inhabitants of the Iſland, who were poſſeſſed of landed Eſtates, agreed to give to the Company on their firſt taking Poſſeſſion thereof, in conſequence of their being continued in the free Enjoyment of their Eſtates without Moleſtation, and amounts per Annum to about	9,224 — 62		
Deduct Charges of Collection	414 — 33		
		8,810 — 29	
Tax on the landed Eſtates, being 10 per Cent. on all Orts and Grounds; its general Amount	8,383 2 47		
Deduct Charges of Collection	290 1 46		
		8,093	1 1
The Coolery.			
An annual Stipend collected from the Coolees for the Liberty of Fiſhing; its general Amount appears to be	4,417 1 13		
Deduct Charges of Collection	818 3 17		
		3,598	1 96
Batty Grounds gained by ſtopping the Breach.			
A Revenue ariſing from Grounds gained by erecting the Breach Wall	2,744 — —		
Deduct Charges of Collection	289 1 50		
		2,454	3 48
Salt.			
The general Amount of the Duty on this Article appears to be	11,840 2 40		
Deduct Charges of Collection	3,308 3 60		
		8,531	2 80
Rent of Old Woman's Iſland	853 1 76		
Deduct Charges of Collection	166 3 34		
		686	2 42
	1,42,598	2 14	1,42,598 2 14
Petty Tributes; the Amount annually is 1,643 3 48			
Deduct Charges of Collection 154 1 70			
	1,489	1 78	
Rent of Villages and Batta Grounds; the Annual Produce is 10,555 — —			
Deduct Charges of Collection 246 — —			
	10,309	— —	
	1,54,396	3 92	
Deduct general Charges incurred in the Collector's Office 2,076 2 —			
Surveyor's Allowance for 12 Months 2,920 — —			
	4,996	2 —	
	1,49,400	1 92	
Bombay Cuſtoms; the nett Amount for one Year, taken from the Cuſtom Maſter's Account	1,86,036	3 34	
Mahim and Bandorah Cuſtoms; the nett Amount as taken from the Cuſtom Maſter's Account	12,213	2 14	
Account Tonnage	1,679	— —	
Coinage Duty	534	— 20	
Duty filling Water at the Pier Head, for the Amount the Collection exceeds the Charges for one Year	314	1 60	
The Rope Walk, D°	565	3 54	
		3,50,744	— 74

Appendix. No. 348.

Surat Factory; Revenues thereat, viz.

Caſtle Revenues.

The nett Amount of Revenues collected from ſundry Villages granted the Honourable Company by the Mogul's Phirmaund, obtained from after our taking the Caſtle, Anno 1759			42,353 — 74
Tanka Revenues.			
The nett Amount collected for the Support of the Mogul's Fleet			81,715 2 22
The Honourable Company's Share of the Mint Revenue			5,688 3 29
			1,29,757 2 25

Surat Factory.

Mawai and Vagnagur Mandavie.			
The Honourable Company's Share of Cuſtoms collected there			985 — —
Sundry Duties collected at Surat, viz.			
Surat Cuſtoms		35,680 2 35	
Additional Duty on Malabar Pepper		88 — 80	
Account Tonnage		205 — —	
			35,973 3 15

The ceded Pergunnahs, being ſundry Diſtricts granted by *Futty Sing*.

Chickley Pergunnah, agreeable to the Jemmabundy	82,001 — —		
Collected at the Chokies	4,439 — —		
		86,440 — —	
Deduct Charges of Collection		9,445 — 13	
		76,984 3 87	
Batta Ghaung, agreeable to the Jummabundy	20,700 — —		
Collection at the Choukeys	76 2 5		
	20,776 2 5		
Deduct Charges of Collection	2,053 1 74		
		18,723 — 31	
Verion Cuſbah, agreeable to the Jemmabundy	11,417 1 33		
Collected at the Choukies	2,353 2 —		
	13,770 3 33		
Deduct Charges of Collection	1,943 — 47		
		11,827 2 86	
			1,07,535 3 4
			2,74,252 — —

Broach Factory, Revenues thereat, viz.

Pergunnah Revenue, 1779.		
The Amount of the Jemmabundy		4,84,814 — 67
Vajeefa, 1779.		
The Amount of the Rents of the Vajeefa Lands, and the Sums annually taken by the Guicawar Pundits, as Sooery from the ſeven Vajeefa Villages, when they had a Footing in the Pergunnah		9,550 1 37
Petty Branches of the Revenue, the Tax levied upon the Cotton Charcas, the Rent of a few ſmall Villages in the Lol Buza, and the Duty on Salt made at Carodra		5,333 — 54
Deſſey Duſtoor.		
The Sums due from Purtrabroy and Anundray Deſſoys, on Account Money borrowed from the late Nabob, and which are annually rated at		600 — —
		5,00,297 2 58
Deduct the Charges of Collections		20,643 2 38
		4,79,654 — 20

Appendix. No. 348.

Corul Pergunnah, 1779.			
Amount of the Jemmabundy - - -	31,267 2 —		
Deduct Charges of Collection and Gras to the Rajah of Rajahpeeptha - -	3,179 3 20		
		28,087 2 80	
Ahmoode, Corul, and Occleſeer Rawdarrays.			
The nett Amount of the Duties and Tolls collected there, in virtue of our being Proprietors of Broach - - -		1,805 1 1	
The Mint.			
Nett Amount of the Coinage Duty - - - -		4,620 — 26	
The Phoorza.			
Duties of every Denomination - - - - -		54,413 — 36	
The Tribute.			
Its nett Amount - - - - - - - - -		54,788 2 90	
		6,23,368 3 53	
Jamboofer Revenues, viz			
Pergunnah Revenues, 1779.			
Its nett Amount - - - - -	2,80,475 3 68		
The Phoorza.			
Duties of every Denomination - -	26,439 1 40		
		3,06,915 1 8	
			9,30,284 — 61
Anjengo Reſidency.			
The Rent of Coladitty Farm, which was a perpetual Grant from the King of Travencore and Princeſs of Attingah, 1731 - - - - -			833 2 —
Tellicherry Reſidency.			
Revenues collected on Durmapatam Iſland -	5,494 — 92		
Durmapatam Rents - - -	4,719 — 21		
	10,213 1 13		
Deduct Charges of Collection - -	434 2 —		
	9,778 3 13		
Rents and Revenues of Randoterrah, their nett Amount -		7,181 — 79	
Tellicherry and Mol.n Rents D° - - - - -		18,854 2 35	
Cuſtoms - - - - - - - -	10,255 — 74		
Deduct the annual Stipend allowed by the Prince of Collaſtra, in lieu of Cuſtoms - - - - - -	4,200 — —		
	6,055 — 74		
Deduct Charges of Collection -	585 — —		
		5,470 — 74	
			33,284 3 1
Fort Victoria Reſidency.			
Revenues thereat, viz.			
Account Cuſtoms - - - - - - - -		1,807 1 3	
Renters of Villages.			
For the nett Amount of their yearly Rent - - -		6,029 1 35	
Farmers of Paſſage Boats.			
The Amount of their annual Leaſe - - - -		380 — —	
			8,216 2 38

Appendix. No. 348.

Caranjah Reſidency,

For the Produce of the following Villages and Farms leaſed out for the Term of ſeven Years, from 1 May 1777; viz.

Farmers of Villages.			
For the Rent of ſundry Villages and Farms		16,714 — —	
Renters of Batta Grounds.			
Their annual Rent		13,161 — 97	
The Fiſhery.			
For one Year's Rent thereof		2,595 — —	
Salt Pans D°		1,070 — —	
Elephanta.			
The Amount, its annual Rent		730 1 60	
Hog Iſland D°		826 — —	
Caranjah Reſidency.			
The Tobacco Farm.			
The Amount, its annual Rent		1,300 — —	
Font Hill D°		71 — —	
Mourah Arrack Farm D°		53 — —	
		36,520 2 57	
Deduct Charges of Collection		1,165 1 29	
		35,355 1 28	
The Paſſage Boat.			
For one Year's Rent		1,820 — —	
		37,175 1 28	
Account Cuſtoms.			
The nett Amount for one Year		15,235 — 34	
			52,410 1 62
Tannah Factory. Revenues on Salſette, viz.			
Money Revenues		87,911 2 55	
White Batta Mor. 5,480 10 4½, at 20 Rup^{s} per Mo.		1,09,608 — 72	
Arts		3,496 — —	
Gardens		408 — —	
Coolery		4,705 — 50	
Cuſtoms		26,231 3 11	
		2,32,360 2 88	
Deduct Charges diſburſed on Account Tannah, Trombray, Maſale, Gorabunder, and Daruee Diſtricts	9,097 3 77		
D° on Account Malabar and Bandorah Diſtricts	3,220 — 35		
D° on Account Cuſtoms	5,402 1 56		
		17,720 1 68	
			2,14,640 1 20
			18,64,665 3 73
The Amount of the Ceſſions, in conſequence of the Treaty with Futty Sing Guicawar, as per ſeparate Account			24,51,700 — —
Total Amount of the Honourable Company's yearly Revenues at the Preſidency of Bombay, and Factories ſubordinate thereto, eſtimated from the laſt Year's Receipts, except the preceding Article			43,16,365 3 73

Bombay Caſtle,
16th Auguſt 1780.

E. E.
Signed *Jam. Anderſon,*
Sub-Accountant.

AMOUNT due on Bond to ſeveral Perſons; made up with Intereſt to the 30th April 1780.

Rupees	50,89,213 3 13

APPENDIX, No. 349.

Extract of a Letter from Brigadier General *Goddard*, to the Governor General and Council: dated Bombay, 6th September 1780; received 20th November.

I SHALL take the earlieſt opportunity of putting the troops from *Surat* in motion; which I apprehend, on account of the uncommon quantity of rain that has fallen this year, and ſtill continues to fall, cannot poſſibly be before the firſt of October.

Let me repeat my earneſt ſolicitations, that you will exert every endeavour to remedy the evils already felt, and prevent thoſe ſtill more ſevere, which we muſt inevitably experience unleſs you ſtrain every reſource at this time to adminiſter relief. I have ſo often troubled you with repreſentations on this ſubject, and you are yourſelves ſo well informed of the circumſcribed means poſſeſſed by this Government towards extricating themſelves and me from our preſent diſtreſs, that I feel at once the impropriety of enlarging further on it.

APPENDIX, No. 350.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, 6th March 1780.

THE Factors at *Tellicherry* muſt have permiſſion to land from the *Beſborough* two lacks and a half of rupees out of the five lacks expected from *Bengal* on that ſhip, having no other method of ſupplying them to the amount they require; and leſt the ſhip ſhould have paſſed their port, 50,000 rupees will be immediately ſent from hence on a veſſel which will be ordered for that purpoſe. The Reſident at *Onore* muſt alſo have permiſſion to land one lack of rupees from the *Beſborough*.

13th March 1780.

Extract of a Letter to Mr. *Richard Church*, Reſident, &c. Factors at *Tellicherry*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your letters of the 25th and 28th of January, and 2d, 9th, 11th, and 21ſt ultimo.

The *Eagle* arrived here the 7th inſtant, with Mr. *Petrie*.

We have, as before adviſed, given you authority to land two lacks and a half of rupees from the *Beſborough* out of the promiſed ſupply from *Bengal*; and though it muſt be attended with loſs to the Company, we can find no other mode of ſupplying you to ſo large an amount. But in caſe the *Beſborough* ſhould have paſſed *Tellicherry* before the receipt of this order, we now ſend you by the *Morning Star*, a ſupply of fifty thouſand rupees for your immediate expences, and ſhall furniſh you with the remainder of the ſum required in the moſt expeditious manner; which we ſhall be very glad to ſee appropriated to the purchaſe of pepper, inſtead of being expended in military charges.

We cannot give any orders about the works at *Tellicherry*, till we receive what Mr. *Dacer* has to offer further upon the method of putting them into a more compact ſtate of defence.

We encloſe a copy of our letter of this date to Major *Cotgrave*, and an invoice of the treaſure and ſtores on board the *Morning Star*, for your ſettlement, the whole amounting to - - - - - rupees.

After landing the conſignments of the *Morning Star*, you will return her to the Preſidency immediately.

We are

Your loving friends,

Bombay, 13th March 1780.

William Hornby, &c. Committee.

Bombay, Tueſday 4th April 1780.—At a Select Committee; preſent, the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, *Daniel Draper*, Eſquire. (Mr. *Carnac* indiſpoſed and abſent.)

Appendix Nos. 349 & 351

Read letters received from *Tellicherry* ſince our laſt meeting.

Tellicherry. The Reſident and factors to apply the money there to the payment of their troops, if there is no appearance of the troubles being ſoon accommodated.

As it will be utterly impoſſible for us to ſend any further ſupply of caſh to that ſettlement, and if the money there is expended in purchaſes of pepper, no means will remain for defraying the expences of its troops for the defence, which may be attended with the moſt alarming conſequences; directions muſt therefore be ſent to the Reſident and factors to pay the firſt attention to the means of their own ſafety, and that if they ſee no immediate proſpect of the troubles being accommodated, they muſt reſerve the whole of their preſent balance of caſh for the payment of their garriſon, as they muſt not expect to receive any further ſupply from us.

APPENDIX, No 351.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 18th April 1781.

Letter from Governor General and Council at *Fort William*; dated 7th January 1781.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

IN our letter of the 9th of October, which we have the pleaſure to forward to you in tranſcript, we acknowledge our receipt of the letter which you had written to us under date the 17th of Auguſt. We have ſince received thoſe of the 11th and 23d September.

We have read with attention your Preſident's minute tranſmitted to us with your letter of the 17th of Auguſt, and highly approve of the ſentiments therein delivered on a plan of operations for the enſuing campaign: it ſeems to us to be the beſt that could be adopted at the time when it was written; but ſince that period, events have taken place which could not have been foreſeen or provided for; the intereſts of the Company require, that the operations of their troops ſhould be directed againſt another enemy, and that their ſyſtem of policy ſhould of courſe be changed. It has now become neceſſary that the whole force which we are able to collect and to ſpare from the immediate defence of our Preſidencies, ſhould be employed in curbing, and if poſſible, overſetting the increaſed power of our ambitious enemy in the *Carnatic*; and we hope that the orders which General *Goddard* has received from Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, with whom it was left by us to ſend him ſuch as he ſhould deem expedient, will have been followed by the immediate direction of his arms towards the territories of *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

We wiſh at preſent to leave in ſuſpenſe an ultimate reſolution on that part of your letter wherein you communicate to us your obſervations on the deſire we had expreſſed, that the receipts from the acquiſitions in *Guzerat* ſhould be excluſively appropriated to the payment of General *Goddard*'s army. Our ability to continue ſupplies to it and to your Preſidency, is not increaſed ſince we made the requiſition; but on the contrary, conſiderably leſſened, for we have been obliged to augment our military ſtrength to ſupply the place of the detachments made from the force compoſing it; and the proſecution of the war in the *Carnatic* depends ſolely on remittances from our treaſury.

We have ſent to your Preſidency on the ſhip *Duke of Portland*, the ſum of five lacks of rupees, which we hope will prove to you a ſeaſonable ſupply, and we authorize you to draw on us for ſuch further ſums as you may want at a reaſonable rate of exchange; but the exchange of bills procured here payable at your Preſidency is ſo extravagantly high, and the riſk of conveyance of treaſure

Appendix. Nos. 352&355.

to the other ſide of *India* ſo great, that we cannot promiſe you ſupplies in any other manner.

We have peruſed the tranſlations which you have ſent us of the intercepted papers from the Dutch Chief at *Surat* and the Maratta Vackeels, but we deem them as unimportant as defective in proof; and would recommend that the complaint be permitted to reſt to a future day.

We are not of opinion that the information contained in Mr. *Henſhaw*'s letter enclоſed in yours to us of the 23d September, is of ſufficient importance to require our ſerious attention; ſo far otherwiſe are we inclined to believe that the Portugueze are diſpoſed to be hoſtile to the Company, that we have lately determined to make overtures to them for an union with us in diſtreſſing *Hyder Ally*, by ſending a body of forces into his country.

The inſults which have been offered to the Portugueze by this common enemy; the friendſhip and alliance which has long ſubſiſted between their nation and ours; and independently of this laſt conſideration, the intereſt which they have, in common with us, in curbing an increaſe of power in that ambitious Chief, have prevailed with us in making them the overtures above mentioned; and we have deputed on this ſervice Mr. *James Peter Auriol*; who has been inſtructed to adviſe you regularly of ſuch part of his proceedings as may be neceſſary for your information.

We have the honour to be.
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edward Wheler.

Fort William,
7th January 1781.

APPENDIX, No 352.

Extract of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hughes*, K.B. to the Earl of *Hilſborough*, dated *Tellicherry Road*, 15th May 1781.

ALTHOUGH His Majeſty's ſquadron under my command was in a perfect condition for ſea, and the ſeaſon at hand when bad weather might be expected on this coaſt; yet knowing the many good conſequences that would reſult to the public ſervice by effectually preventing the ſettlement of *Tellicherry* from falling into the enemy's hands, I readily complied with the requeſt of the Select Committee; and on the 28th of laſt month having embarked 40 European artillery men and 60 European infantry on board the ſhips of the ſquadron and 1160 Sepoys with 40 artillery Laſcars on four tranſports, I proceeded with the ſquadron and tranſports (as named in the margin) to ſea the ſame day, and arrived at this place the 7th of this month, and found it cloſely inveſted on all ſides by the enemy under the command of *Sadier Caun*, an officer of rank in *Hyder Ally*'s ſervice.

Superb, Exeter, Worceſter, Burford, Eagle, Coventry, Chaſer, Combuſtion fireſhip, Revenge, Royal Admiral, York, Freemaſon.

On the day after our arrival all the troops from *Bombay* on the ſquadron and tranſports were diſembarked, and the boats and men from the ſquadron have been conſtantly employed ſince in unlading and landing a very large quantity of proviſions, and all kinds of military ſtores, from the Company's ſhips *Royal Admiral* and *Royal Charlotte*, which laſt arrived here from *Bombay* on the 10th of this month with a farther reinforcement of 500 men for this garriſon: the ſervice of landing the ſtores and proviſions has been attended with much trouble and delay, as there is a very high ſurf on the ſhore at this ſeaſon of the year, and very few ſhore boats at this place.

The ſhips *Royal Admiral* and *Royal Charlotte* being now cleared of all the proviſions and ſtores intended for this place, and the detachment of Madras troops under Major *Cotgrave*, amounting to 1180 men, Europeans, and Sepoys, embarked on the above ſhips and three tranſports, I ſhall immediate proceed to ſea with His Majeſty's ſquadron and theſe ſhips, and make the beſt of my way to the Coromandel coaſt, together with ſuch others as have taken the benefit of convoy.

APPENDIX, No 355.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 26th October 1780;—preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident; *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, Eſquires.—(Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on ſervice.)

THE following minute from the Governor General having been circulated on the 16th inſtant it was returned with the minute from Mr. *Francis*, which is entered after it.

Governor General—Among the many important meaſures which have been objects of the deliberations of this Government, one moſt eſſentially neceſſary has eſcaped the attention of the Commander in Chief, as well as myſelf and members of the Board.

The numerous detachments from this Preſidency, now in the field, unleſs acting in concert, and connected in their operations by one uniform plan, may tend, inſtead of ſupporting, to counteract and even to defeat what is, and muſt continue to be for a long time to come, our principal object—the war againſt *Hyder Ally Cawn:* to this every other meaſure muſt be ſecondary and ſubſervient; for on the event of this may depend the ſalvation of the Britiſh dominion in *India*. In every ſituation of the army under General *Goddard* it may be employed to create a diverſion in favour of the operation of the Commander in Chief. It is impoſſible to lay down any determined ſyſtem, or even fixed principles, of proſecuting the operations of the war, as they muſt be guided by circumſtances. Peace may be concluded with the Marattas. Peace negatively, or peace with an offenſive alliance; or they may only agree for a truce, or the war may be continued, and in this event the ſtate and contingencies of it are liable to infinite poſſible variations.

His operations of courſe muſt be influenced in ſome degree by any reſult of theſe ſuppoſitions, and ought at the ſame time to be ſo conſtructed as to concide with the views of the Commander in Chief.

For this reaſon, I recommend that the Commander in Chief be empowered to iſſue ſuch orders to every detachment that has or may be made from the military eſtabliſhment of this Preſidency, as he ſhall judge expedient for the general ſervice of the war; and that orders of courſe be ſent to the reſpective detachments, to obey all orders which they ſhall receive from the Commander in Chief.

As there is yet time for the Commander in Chief to receive the authority which I have propoſed, before his final departure, I am anxious to ſolicit the Board for their immediate determination upon it.

(Signed) *W. Haſtings.*

Agreed. *Edward Wheler.*

Mr. Francis's minute.

Mr. *Francis*—I think it very neceſſary that Brigadier General *Goddard* ſhould be inſtructed to act in concert with the Commander in Chief, and to obey his orders. This was the point to which I alluded in my minute of the 9th inſtant. I agree to the whole of the motion, though I think that in effect it can only be applied to ſuch detachments as are now or may hereafter be ſent to either of the two coaſts.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

The Governor General's propoſition having been agreed to, the following letter was written to the Commander in Chief, and the letters which are entered after it were written to Brigadier General *Goddard*, and to Major *Camac*.

To the Commander in Chief.

Sir,

As the detachments now in the field from the forces under this Preſidency, unleſs acting in concert, and connected

nected in their operations by one uniform plan, may inſtead of ſupporting, tend greatly to counteract what is, and muſt continue for ſome time to come, to be our principal object, viz. the war againſt *Hyder Ally Khan*; we think it neceſſary to empower you to iſſue ſuch orders to every detachment that has been made from the military eſtabliſhment of this Preſidency as you may judge expedient for the general ſervice of the war.

Fort William, We are, &c.
16th October 1780.

To Brigadier General Goddard, &c.

Sir.

Having thought it proper to empower Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, the Commander in Chief, now embarking for the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, to iſſue ſuch orders to every detachment that has or may be made from the military eſtabliſhment of this Preſidency, as he ſhall judge expedient for the general ſervice of the war in which the Company's forces are engaged; we direct that you implicitly obey all ſuch orders as you may receive from him after your receipt of this letter.

Fort William, We are, &c.
the 16th October 1780.

The ſame to Major *Jacob Camac*, commanding the detachment of the Company's troops in *Ghode*.

APPENDIX, No 356.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 29th April 1781.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay* to Brigadier General *Goddard*, dated 29th April 1781.

IN the preſent ſtate of affairs, we agree with you that it will be a very proper meaſure, and of benefit to the public ſervice, to detain the Madras detachment till more favourable circumſtances will admit of their return, and we ſhall therefore in our next advices acquaint that Preſidency of the motives which have induced us to alter our former reſolution of ſending back theſe troops; which we hope with you will be attended with no inconvenience to them at this time.

As you are well acquainted with the preſent reduced ſtate of our European eſtabliſhment, it is unneceſſary to point out how deficient we are in our artillery and infantry corps. We wiſh therefore to be favoured with your ſentiments how far in your opinion it might be proper and practicable to incorporate with our troops the non-commiſſioned officers and private men of the Madras detachment, by which we ſhould have an addition of material ſtrength ſo neceſſary at this time, and not to be expected from *Europe*, beſides relieving the Company for ſome time of a conſiderable additional expence. If you coincide with us in this ſtep, the officers now ſerving with theſe men may be returned to the other coaſt on the veſſels which will ſhortly ſail thither.

Extract of *Bombay* Select Conſultations, the 26th May 1781;—preſent, the W° *Daniel Draper*, and *Nathaniel Stackhouſe*, Eſquires.

The commander of the *Ponſborne* having reported to the Board that he will be ready to ſail on the 28th of this month, Mr. *Draper* obſerves to the Committee, that it is material this ſhip ſhould remain here until we have come to a final determination reſpecting the Madras detachment in order to furniſh an opportunity for conveying round a proportion of the officers, ſhould it be reſolved upon to incorporate the private men; and that her detention here for a ſhort time is a matter of no importance to the Company, as ſhe will be diſpatched in very ſufficient time to proceed from *Madras* to *China*. Agreed therefore, for the above reaſons, that we propoſe to the Board, which will meet this morning, to refer the diſpatch of the *Ponſborne* to this Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 357.

Appendix. Nos. 356&357.

Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay* to the Honourable the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, dated 28th July 1781.

Honourable Gentlemen;

Par. 1. WE addreſſed you by this channel in duplicate, under the 31ſt of March and 30th of April, and now forward triplicates; we have ſince addreſſed you more at length under the 27th of May by the *Prime*.

2. The *Morning Star* being now diſpatched to the Gulph to convey to *India* any packets or intelligence of importance that may arrive at *Buſſorah* after the diſpatch of the *Mercury*, we take the opportunity of giving you brief advice of our ſituation.

3. The ſeaſon of the year neceſſarily prevents all military operations, and the troops are diſpoſed in quarters and cantonments at *Bombay* and *Calliaa*; neither has any further negociation been attempted either by us or the enemy ſince the propoſals offered by the Governor General and Council, and the advances made in conſequence by this Government and General *Goddard*, the reſult of which has been already communicated to you.

4. It is as yet too early for us to fix upon any preciſe plan, or to determine abſolutely upon further meaſures. The late occurrences, our ſituation and circumſtances, have been made known to the Governor General and Council, and we may expect their orders, founded upon full knowledge and information thereof. In the mean time it is our buſineſs in this ſeaſon of inaction to watch events with a careful eye, and to endeavour hereafter to make a judicious application of them to the Company's advantage.

5. You have been already adviſed in our letter dated the 31ſt of March, that on the failure of the negociation we judged it more expedient to reduce the war on our part to a mere ſyſtem of defence: this plan does not ſeem to be agreeable to the ſentiments of the Governor General and Council. They tell us in a late diſpatch, that the unwillingneſs of the Miniſter to accept the offer of a treaty, does not diſappoint, but on the contrary has rather pleaſed them, as it leaves them at liberty to ſecure to the Company the important poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, and the other advantages acquired at the time the propoſed treaty was written; and will warrant them in declaring their reſolution not to part with that valuable acquiſition, unleſs ſome great reverſe of fortune ſhould attend the operation of our arms. The ill ſucceſs which had attended their advances, diſcouraged them from looking to any favourable termination of the war, but the moſt vigorous and ſucceſsful proſecution of it; and under this impreſſion they intimate their wiſhes that our utmoſt aid might be afforded to General *Goddard*'s operations.

6. They impute to us a ſudden alteration of ſentiment, with reſpect to the mode of proſecuting the war againſt the Marattas. This is not an opportunity for entering into a particular defence and explanation of our meaſures. Our addreſs of the 11th of January, and proceedings tranſmitted by the *Prime*, will ſhew the grounds and principles upon which we acted when we communicated to General , in future, a purſuit of the war with all poſſible vigour, and to the utmoſt extent practicable with the force under his command; and that this recommendation was in exact conformity to our inſtructions from the Governor General and Council; in hopes by an active exertion, or by ſome deciſive ſucceſs in the interval limited for the acceptance of their propoſals, to diſpoſe the Maratta Government to an accommodation. Our ſubſequent plan of conduct was a neceſſary conſequence of the failure in theſe hopes, and of our ſituation and circumſtances at the time

which

Appendix, Nos. 358 & 360

which ſtand fully explained in our proceedings above referred to.

7. The Governor General and Council adviſe us under the 7th of May, that beſides the other cauſes which diſſuade them from making any further overtures of peace to the Adminiſtration of *Poonah*; another objection had recently occurred, in the connection they had lately formed in the Government of *Berar*, which they had every reaſonable hope would be attended with a very eſſential change in their political influence. The principal points of this engagement are ſubjoined, as communicated to us.

8. The firſt of the . . . . . inform . . . . . appoints . . . . . thouſand cavalry to overtake Colonel *Pearce*'s detachment, and to aſſiſt in war againſt *Hyder Naig*.

9. The ſecond ſtipulates, that the Berar army ſhall immediately leave the province of *Oriſſa*, and *Marine Day*. An expedition againſt *Gurrahmyndalla*, aided by a body of the Company's troops, in the reduction of it.

10. Third and laſt articles are preliminary to a ſtill nearer connection of the two Governments, and fix the means by which this may be effected.

11. Meſſrs. *Eyles Irwin*, and *John Richmond Smith*, arrived here from *Buſſorah* the 29th of May, and we received at the ſame time your commands of the 10th of January, which had overtaken them on the deſert. Mr. *Irwin* was furniſhed with one of your cruizers to *Madras*, from whence ſhe was to proceed to *Fort Marlborough*, with advice of the rupture with *Holland*, which we had before adviſed the Preſident and Council appeared to be inevitable. Meſſrs. *Benfield*, *Seton Stuart*, and *Conran*, arrived here the 7th inſtant, with duplicates of theſe diſpatches, and ſoon after proceeded to *Madras*. Mr. *Woolley* is not yet arrived from *Muſcat*.

12. We have given orders for diſpoſſeſſing the Dutch of their factories at *Broach* and *Surat*; we have had advice of the latter being effected; and have reaſon to believe a conſiderable property will be found belonging to the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company, which ſhall be ſecured for the benefit of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company.

13. General *Goddard* has taken upon him the chief command of the troops on this eſtabliſhment, and a ſhare in our adminiſtration, according to your appointment; ſtill reſerving the ſeparate powers he holds under the Governor General and Council. Mr. *John Halſey* has alſo been admitted a member of this Committee, in the room of Mr. *Stackhouſe*, who proceeded to *England* on the *Prime*.

14. We are ſorry we have it not in our power to ſend you intelligence reſpecting the ſtate of affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel*.

We have the honour to be,
with the higheſt reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient ſervants,
Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
Tho. Goddard.
Jno Halſey.

Bombay Caſtle,
28th July 1781.

APPENDIX, No. 358.

Letter from the Governor General and Council, to the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident, and Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

SINCE writing to you on the 7th inſtant, we have received your letter of the 30th March.

It concerns us to obſerve ſo ſudden an alteration in your ſentiments with reſpect to the proſecution of the war with the Maratta State. On the 15th of January laſt, you declared to us your concurrence in the opinion of General *Goddard*, that a purſuit of the war with all poſſible vigour, as recommended by us, promiſed with the moſt rational expectation to promote a ſpeedy accommodation, ſooner than any other plan of conduct. It does not appear that any diſaſter has befallen our arms; on the contrary, every ſucceſs has attended them. Our troops were in the neighbourhood of *Poonah*, and in ſuch force as well as character, as was likely to overcome all oppoſition, and to compel the enemy to terms; yet in this proſperous ſtate of the war, we are informed of your reſolution to reduce it on your part to mere defence, and to the ſecurity of the poſſeſſions obtained to your Government, by another mode of conducting it.

We have repeatedly declared, that we wiſh ſincerely for a peace with the Maratta State; it is our fixed object, and we ſhall deem the accompliſhment of it, on honourable terms, a moſt deſirable event. One mode of obtaining it has been tried; advances have been made, but theſe advances have not been ſucceſsful; a repetition of them would, in our opinion, have no other effect, than to fix an opinion of our weakneſs in the Maratta Government, arm them with ſpirits againſt us, and inſtead of ſhortening, prolong the duration of the war. We repeat our firm conviction, that nothing but a vigorous and ſucceſsful proſecution of it, will produce an honourable termination of it. Under this impreſſion, our inſtructions to General *Goddard* have been framed and continued, and under the ſame influence, we expreſs to you our wiſh, that your aid may be afforded to General *Goddard*'s operations.

We, on our receipt of your letter, gave immediate information to the Commander in Chief, according to your requeſt, of the determination which you have paſſed relative to the Madras detachment.

We are, &c. &c. &c.
(Signed)
The Honourable the Governor General
and Council

Fort William,
10th May, 1781.

A true Copy.
E. Hay, Acting Secretary.

APPENDIX, No. 360.

Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*; dated 7th January 1781.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. THE departure of Major *John Scott* to *Europe*, by expreſs appointment from the Governor General, as his private agent, affording us an opportunity of addreſſing you, we have the honour to avail ourſelves of it, in tranſmitting to you in triplicate our laſt advices from this department by the ſhips *Fox* and *Walpole*. Major *Scott* has taken his paſſage on a Portugueze ſhip, which being to ſtop in her way at *Fort Saint George*, we have recommended it to the Preſident and Select Committee at that place, to embrace the ſame occaſion of tranſmitting to you a relation of occurrences upon the coaſt to the lateſt period of Major *Scott*'s ſtay. We beg leave to recommend this gentleman to your favour; and that he may be reſtored to the Company's ſervice without prejudice to his rank, if he ſhould hereafter deſirous of returning to *Bengal*.

2. We ſend to you numbers in this diſpatch, copies of the letters which we have received from Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, ſince we had the honour of addreſſing you by the *Fox*. We are much concerned that the information contained in them, obliges us to ſay, that we ſtill continue in expectation of more favourable accounts of the ſtate of your affairs on the coaſt. The confidence which we place in the exertions of Lieutenant General

Dated 10 to 20 Nov.

General Sir *Eyre Coote*, in his experience in military affairs, and in his zeal for the public ſervice, will not permit us to deſpond of a proſperous change in it, while he continues at the head of your army; nor ſhall any aſſiſtance be wanting which we can render to give effect to his efforts. The military expences are indeed large, but we have promiſed to provide for them as long as we are able; and acting upon that promiſe, we have ordered that the ſum of CR$ 4,23,672. 10. 3. ſhould be remitted to *Fort Saint George* in ſpecie, by the ſhip *Duke of Portland*, now under ſailing orders. We have taken meaſures to continue to that Preſidency, ſupplies of grain and other articles of which they are in need: and ſhall in no inſtance relax in our declared reſolution to relieve their wants, as far as we may be able to ſupply them; but it is not in our power to afford that aid which the army is ſaid greatly to require, in an increaſe of its ſtrength in Europeans. The unfortunate diſaſter which befel the detachment from General *Munro*'s army near *Conjeveram*, in September laſt, was attended with an important diminution of it; and we are not able to ſpare from the defence of our own provinces more than have been already detached from them.

3. This conſideration, added to others which ariſe from the preſent ſtate of your affairs on the coaſt, and the neceſſity which we feel of giving every aid to your Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* that can poſſibly be obtained, without too diſproportionate a ſacrifice of the poſſeſſions of the Company, or of thoſe of the Nabob *Walaw Jaw*, have induced us to propoſe a treaty of alliance with the Dutch, whoſe poſſeſſions at, and adjacent to, *Cochin*, have lately been invaded by *Hyder Ally Khan*.

Conf. 4 Jan. The treaty itſelf appears on our proceedings of the 4th inſtant, which go a number in the packet, and has been formed with the advice and correction of Mr. *Roſs*, director and Governor of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company's ſettlements in *Bengal*.

4. It appears from an account which the Governor General informs us has been communicated to him by Mr. *Roſs*, that the force actually ſtationed at or near *Cochin*, will eaſily enable that Government to ſupply the proportion, both of European infantry and artillery, which are chiefly wanted, and of Malays ſpecified in the treaty; and theſe may be marched at a very ſhort notice and by a very near route, into the *Carnatic*, if the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, on which they depend, will accede to the proffered alliance. To engage their aſſent, which will in ſuch caſe involve both in great perſonal reſponſibility, as we underſtand that they have no regular powers to bind their Company in ſuch an act without the ſanction of the ſuperior Government of *Batavia*, we have offered to them much greater advantages than perhaps are ſuitable to the common intereſt which the Dutch Company have in the war, or than we ſhould be inclined to yield in an equal and formal negociation; but for this we have no time; the neceſſity of the Company require an inſtant relief, and the dependent ſtate of thoſe whom we ſolicit to be the immediate parties in the treaty, claims ſome additional conceſſions, both to indemnify them, and to win the concurrence of their ſuperiors.

5. Urged by theſe conſiderations, we have propoſed in the treaty the ceſſion of the country of *Tinivilly* to the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company. Its ſituation is ſuch, that it may, as we conceive, be ſeparated from the Government of the *Carnatic*, without either preſent embarraſſment or danger of future competition; and from its contiguity to the Dutch poſſeſſions in *Ceylon*, will prove a greater acquiſition to them than loſs to the Nabob.

6. The treaty has been ſuddenly prepared, without his knowledge, and of courſe without his conſent; and the latter is, we know, indiſpenſably neceſſary to that article of it in which the ceſſion of *Tinnively* is ſuggeſted, and which, on our part, we can only propoſe, but it is the only part which he is likely to have in the war, although the principal in it; and we have, in our opinion a right to claim at leaſt this ſmall return, both for the hazards which we incur and the exertions which we make for the ſupport of his cauſe; a return amounting only to the ſacrifice of a minute portion of his dominions, and that the moſt diſtant of them, for the ſalvation of the whole. Appendix No. 360.

7. A copy of the letter written by the Governor General to the Nabob on this occaſion, as well as of thoſe addreſſed to the Governors of *Colombo* and *Cochin*, and to the ſuperior Government of *Batavia*, appear on our proceedings of the 4th inſtant, to which we have already referred you for a tranſcript of the treaty itſelf. The latter has received our execution of it, and has been entruſted with our other diſpatches to *Fort St. George* to Mr. *James Deighton*, whom we have recommended to the Preſident and Select Committee to be employed to proceed with the treaty and letters, and ſuch other diſpatches as they may have occaſion to add to the Governments of *Colombo* and *Cochin*.

8. We think it proper to ſend for your information, an extract of a letter which we have received from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, under date the 23d September, accompanied by a letter to them from Mr. *Henſhaw*, their Reſident at *Goa*; it goes therefore a number in this diſpatch: but we deem the report therein conveyed to us, unworthy of our ſerious attention. We are generally inclined to believe that, although a connection may ſubſiſt between the Portugueſe and the Marattas, its effect cannot be important: they have no rank among the Powers in *India*; they have no means of ſubſiſting their army in the field, and no ſuch advantages are likely to be yielded to them as can weigh againſt the ſtrong conſideration of the alliance which has long ſubſiſted between our nation and theirs. The claims which they prefer are claims of form, and perhaps would be preferred by any other nation having them whether they were or were not juſtly founded.

9. With reſpect to the ſuppoſed intention of aſſerting and maintaining the claim on *Baſſein* by force, it ſeems to us nugatory, and it cannot be effectual, ſince we have received certain advices that Brigadier General *Goddard* with his army was before *Baſſein* on the 18th November laſt, and we are informed that there was no force excepting that in garriſon to oppoſe his early capture of the place.

10. The inſults which have repeatedly been offered to the Portugueſe by our common enemy *Hyder Ally*, the friendſhip and alliance which has long ſubſiſted between their nation and ours, and, independently of this laſt conſideration, the intereſt which they have in common with us, in curbing an increaſe of power in that ambitious chief, have induced us to make overtures to that Government for an union with us in diſtreſſing *Hyder Ally* by ſending a body of forces into his country; and we have availed ourſelves of the ſervices of Mr. *Auriol*, our ſecretary, who had before received our permiſſion to proceed to the weſt of *India* for the re-eſtabliſhment of his health by deputing him to *Goa* on this occaſion.

11. A copy of our inſtructions to Mr. *Auriol* goes a number in the packet. We confeſs that our expectations of ſucceſs, from the overtures made to the Viceroy of *Goa* are not very ſanguine; but there appeared to us a poſſibility of adding to the force engaged againſt *Hyder Ally* by the union of that Government with ours, and we were not willing to neglect even the remote chance of ſuch an advantage.

12. The perfidious conduct of thoſe of the French nation at *Pondicherry*, as repreſented in Sir *Eyre Coote*'s letter of the 19th November, ſuggeſting to us the neceſſity of taking immediate meaſures for preventing the example from having effect among thoſe reſident at *Chandernagore*, and within the provinces, we have given public notice to the higher claſs of Frenchmen, of our poſitive requiſition, that they all quit the provinces by ſea on or before the 31ſt inſtant, on pain of being made priſoners ſhould they be found in them after that period; and we

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have given orders for the immediate ſeizure of thoſe of the lower claſs. They had been all required in June laſt to leave the provinces by the 1ſt October; and our indulgence had permitted their remaining in them to this time, but the flagrant and hoſtile conduct of their countrymen at *Pondicherry* would not allow us to continue the favour ſhewn to them any longer.

13. We have the honour to ſend to you encloſed copies of the letters which we have received from Brigadier General *Goddard*, ſince we addreſſed you by the *Fox*. The information before quoted of his arrival at *Baſſein* will not be found in them, but it is ſufficiently authenticated by our receipt of a bill of exchange drawn by him and dated the 18th December.

14. Excepting the letter from *Bombay* before mentioned, and which is ſent a number in the packet, we have received no advices from that Preſidency of a later date than thoſe tranſmitted to you in our proceedings ſent by the ſhip *Fox*. We have remitted to them by the ſhip *Portland* treaſure to the amount of five lacks of rupees, and we have authorized them to draw bills on us for any further ſums at a reaſonable exchange.

15. The provincial Commander in Chief, in the perſuaſion that, to derive from the native infantry of our eſtabliſhment thoſe capital advantages which can only reſult from exact diſcipline, tempered with a ſtrict adminiſtration of the rights of the ſoldiery, it was poſitively neceſſary thoroughly to reform and new model the corps compoſing this part of our military force, preſented to us on the 26th ultimo, a ſeries of propoſitions beſt calculated, according to his judgment, for compaſſing ſo important and uſeful an end. Theſe propoſitions were accompanied with figured ſtatements, exhibiting as nearly as might be, the extraordinary expence which would be incurred by the new Sepoy eſtabliſhment, and the annual ſaving which would accrue from the general arrangements.

16. The letters which we have received from Brigadier General *Stibbert* on this ſubject, and copies of the ſtatements and propoſitions accompanying them, are ſent to you numbers in this diſpatch. After maturely conſidering the principles on which the plan ſubmitted to us was obviouſly founded, after meaſuring the extent of the advantages it promiſed to produce, and after ſatisfying ourſelves that it united economy and utility, we delayed not, in the conviction that the late military conſtitution of our native infantry was pregnant with defects, which, unleſs timely corrected, threatened the moſt ſerious and alarming conſequences, to paſs the whole of General *Stibbert's* propoſitions into reſolutions of our Council.

17. We will here delineate, as far as may be neceſſary, the general ground-work of this new ſuperſtructure, marking the leſs obvious motives of particular regulations, and diſtinguiſhing in a conciſe manner the advantages they poſſeſs over former inſtitutions and arrangements.

18. The apparent ſtrength of the battalions of the European regiments being at all times very inconſiderable (rarely exceeding 300 rank and file) and their poſitive and effective ſtrength being frequently below 200 men, the large eſtabliſhment of officers annexed to theſe corps appeared to be productive of an utterly irrequiſite expence, without yielding a ſingle advantage in a military point of view. Influenced by theſe reflections we made it our requeſt to General *Stibbert* to examine the expediency of doubling up the battalion of the regiments; and accordingly we have had the ſatisfaction of receiving his concurrence in a meaſure, that while it occaſions in our monthly expences a retrenchment of 37,186 ſonat rupees, furniſhes us with a conſiderable number of officers towards completing our native infantry on the new eſtabliſhment.

19. Although the Commander in Chief has, in the annexed propoſitions, inſerted a clauſe, expreſſing, that when the ſtrength of the European regiments ſhall exceed 752 rank and file, they ſhall revert to their former conſtitution (becauſe in that caſe the corps would be too unwieldy for the purpoſe of manœuvring with celerity and exactneſs) yet we muſt remark, that it is by no means probable that we ſhall be reduced during the continuance of the war in *Europe*, to the neceſſity of re-adopting this burthenſome ſyſtem on the military principle ſuggeſted, and that the period at which alone ſuch a neceſſity is likely to occur will be the beſt ſuited to its favourable and eaſy operation.

20. Having reſolved in conſequence of the approaching departure of a diviſion of our army towards *Madras*, to augment our military force, we iſſued orders for the raiſing of ſix new battalions; but the Commander in Chief having ſuggeſted to us the expediency of new modelling the native infantry, and of applying an immediate and effectual remedy to the abuſes which had crept into the corps compoſing this part of the army, to the great detriment of the ſervice; we thought proper to recal thoſe orders and to ſignify to him that we were prepared to receive his ſentiments at large upon this important and intereſting ſubject; when he accordingly preſented to us the annexed propoſitions, explaining them as far as was requiſite, in our conſultations of the 26th ultimo at which he was preſent.

21. As the advantages of the new Sepoy arrangements as far as relates to the purpoſes of manœuvring and diſciplining the corps, as well as to the effects which may be produced on the minds of the country Powers by ſuch an apparent increaſe of the number of battalions on our eſtabliſhment, are fully ſet forth in General *Stibbert's* letter to us of the 31ſt of October, we beg leave to refer you to the ſame for his arguments on theſe heads; which we are to obſerve had their due weight with us. We muſt alſo requeſt of you to ſeek in the ſame letter the reaſons adduced by him for aboliſhing the office of native commandant to the Sepoy regiments, in the propriety of which we entirely acquieſced, as well as in the expediency of the regulations, directing the native adjutants to be made from Jamautdars (inſtead of Subadars) with a view of preventing theſe officers from ſucceeding to the dangerous influence and authority of the commandants.

22. At the ſame time that, in order to the correcting of the abuſes which had crept into the army, and which were of a nature tending directly to the deſtruction of the corps compoſing it, it was become neceſſary to fix ſuch checks, and to eſtabliſh ſuch rigid rules, with regard to muſtering and paying the Sepoys, as ſhould put it totally out of the power of the commanding officers of regiments to derive any emoluments from their corps, and thereby engage their attention wholly to the diſciplining of them; it alſo became requiſite to annex ſuch rank and allowances to the command of theſe officers as ſuited its importance, and the length of their ſervice; for to have entirely excluded them from all perquiſites and emoluments whatſoever, without advancing their rank and ſalary, would, ſuppoſing it poſſible to have eſtabliſhed ſuch a regulation, have produced no other conſequence than that of rendering them to a man diſaffected to the ſervice; an evil that muſt have neceſſarily been followed by an univerſal relaxation of diſcipline, for which the moſt violent remedy would, under ſuch circumſtances, be ineffectual.

23. This danger however is avoided by granting, as we have done, advanced rank and allowances to the officers commanding regiments of Sepoys, who no doubt will ere long be reconciled to the reform, and being diſengaged from the purſuit of other objects, exert themſelves more than ever in training and diſciplining the corps committed to their charge.

24. You will be ſatisfied on examining the annexed papers, that notwithſtanding the great increaſe of field officers and captains, conſequent of the new arrangements, there will ſtill be an annual ſaving on the whole of near three lacks and an half of ſonat rupees, after allowing for

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the actual increaſe of force gained to the eſtabliſhment; but as the Commander in Chief is aware that excluſive of pay and batta there may be ſome other expences incurred by his regulations, of which he has not taken any notice, he does not reſt their propriety or utility on the head of ſaving. He will be ſatisfied if they ſhould not increaſe the diſburſements on the army account; and though, contrary to appearances as well as to his hope, they ſhould add in a ſmall meaſure to the military burthen, he aſſerts himſelf confident that the beneficial conſequences which will in due time reſult from them, will be abundantly more than adequate to the extraordinary expence they may occaſion.

25. It is unneceſſary for us to offer any remarks on the other parts of the annexed regulations; we conceive that they will ſpeak for themſelves; and we are particularly hopeful that the preſcribed forms for muſtering and paying the native troops will convince you, that it was our deſign (in theſe arrangements) to ſtrike at the root of every abuſe that could poſſibly affect either the good order and diſcipline of your forces, or the rights of the native ſoldiery.

26. We ſend you herewith a return of the European infantry and artillery on this eſtabliſhment. It will ſerve to place before you in a clear view, the alarming diſproportion of our ſtrength in Europeans to the number of native infantry; and at the ſame time the neceſſity of an early and ſtrong reinforcement of the former. We have before frequently ſuggeſted to you the neceſſity of preſerving this eſtabliſhment entire; it was particularly ſubmitted to your attention in one letter of the 13th October laſt, and we muſt now repeat to you our moſt earneſt requeſt that you will give the ſubject an early and particular conſideration. Your firſt eſtabliſhment of Europeans, even in time of peace, is not more than ſufficient to give reſpect to your military forces. In time of war it is greatly inferior to its wants; and when the exiſting numbers are below the eſtabliſhment, it is our duty to declare to you that your poſſeſſions are in danger of a ruin as ſudden as it may prove irretrievable. The eſſential ſtrength of this country, and the only ſtrength on which you can depend, is in the number of Europeans: you are not ſtrangers to this fact, and although there is no late proof from experience of the truth of the aſſertion, it cannot be inferred from this inſtance of our good fortune, that we may never experience the reverſe. Appendix, No. 360.

27. The ſum of forty-five lacks of rupees, to which the firſt loan on bonds bearing an intereſt of 8 per cent. per annum, was reſtricted by our reſolution of the 2d October laſt, having been completely ſubſcribed, we have determined to authorize the receipts of ſuch further ſums into the treaſury as might be tendered to it for like bonds.

28. The ſtate of our treaſury this day is as follows:

Ready money		8,17,446	11 9
Bills receivable		1,85,728	2 —
Mint general Treaſury		4,80,732	13 —
Unſorted treaſure		6,58,964	14 6
Current Rupees		21,42,872	9 3

Deduct the amount of appropriated ſums as follows:

Balance account depoſits			11,00,900	8 5
Ditto Accomptant General of the Mayor's Court			1,36,358	4 —
Amount of the old bonded debt in which the intereſt has ceaſed by public advertiſement	79,342	11 10		
Ditto, ditto, on account of the Church Wardens, bearing a running intereſt by order of the Court of Directors	98,200	— —		
Ditto of the new bonded debt	62,58,651	1 6		
Ditto 4 per cent. remittance loan	14,55,550	— —		
Ditto annuities 1780	94,720	— —		
		78,08,921	1 6	
			79,86,463	13 4
Rupees			92,23,722	9 9

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
7th January 1781.

Fort William the 4th January 1781.

At a Council; preſent, the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident, and *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire.—(Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on ſervice.)

Secret Dept. Thurſday.

The misfortunes which have attended the Company's arms in the *Carnatic*, in the war with *Hyder Ally*, and the diſadvantages which attend the proſecution of it, requiring that every aid ſhould be given to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, that can poſſibly be obtained without too diſproportionate a ſacrifice of the poſſeſſions either of the Nabob or the Company, the following draft of a treaty has therefore been formed, with the advice and correction of Mr. *Roſs*, the Director of *Chinſura*; the expediency of it having been ſuggeſted by the late hoſtilities which have been committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn* upon the Dutch dependencies at *Cochin*. The force

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force actually ſtationed at and near *Cochin*, as appears from an account communicated by Mr. *Roſs* to the Governor General, will very well enable that Government to ſupply the proportion both of European infantry and artillery which we chiefly want, and of Malays, ſpecified in the treaty; and theſe may be marched at a very ſhort notice and by a very near route into the *Carnatic*, if the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, on which they depend, will accede to the propoſed treaty. To engage their aſſent, which will in ſuch caſe involve both in great perſonal reſponſibility, as we underſtand that they have no regular powers to bind their Company in ſuch an act without the ſanction of the ſuperior Government of *Batavia*, we have proffered to them much greater advantages than perhaps are ſuitable to the common intereſt which the Dutch Company have in the war, or than we ſhould be inclined to yield in an equal and formal negociation; but for this we have no time; our neceſſities require an inſtant relief, and the dependant ſtate of thoſe whom we ſolicit to be the immediate parties in the treaty, claims ſome additional conceſſions, both to indemnify them and to win the concurrence of their ſuperiors. It is for this reaſon we have agreed to propoſe the ceſſion of the country of *Tinnevelly* to the Dutch. Its ſituation is ſuch, that it may, as we conceive, be ſeparated from the Government of the *Carnatic*, without either preſent embarraſſment, or danger of future competition; and from its contiguity to the Dutch poſſeſſions in *Ceylon*, will prove a greater acquiſition to them than loſs to the Nabob. His conſent indeed is eſſentially and indiſpenſably neceſſary to this article of the treaty, which on our part we can only propoſe; but it is the only part which he is likely to bear in the war, although the principal in it; and we have a right to claim at leaſt this ſmall return, both for the hazards which we incur, and the exertions which we make for the ſupport of his cauſe; that is, the ſacrifice of a minute portion, and that the moſt diſtant of his dominions, for the ſalvation of the whole.

For all the foregoing reaſons we have reſolved both on the ſubſtance of the treaty, as we have conſtituted it, and on its immediate execution on our part; and that it be tranſmitted with the letter entered on the proceedings of this day to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*. Other remarks upon the treaty itſelf we preſume will be unneceſſary, as we conceive their object and tendency will be obvious.

Propoſals for a Treaty of Alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch *Eaſt India* Companies and the Nabob *Walla Jah Bahâdr*.

Propoſed treaty with the Dutch and Nabob of Arcot.

Whereas the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn* has without any cauſe invaded the *Carnatic Payengaut*, and the poſſeſſions of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company which are ſituated therein, and attacked the ſettlements and forts of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company dependent on the Government of *Cochin* on the Malabar coaſt, wherefore it hath become the common intereſt of the Nabob *Walla Jah Bahâdr*, who is the ſovereign of the *Carnatic Payengaut*, and of the two companies aforeſaid, to unite in repelling and defeating the attempts and deſigns of the ſaid *Hyder Ally Cawn*; the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* with the advice and ſuggeſtion of the Director for the management of the affairs of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company in *Bengal*, do propoſe and offer the following conditions of a treaty to the Nabob *Walla Jah*, and to the proper agents and repreſentatives of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company aforeſaid, hereby declaring them to be from the time in which the ſaid conditions ſhall receive the ſeals and ſignatures of the other parties to this treaty, binding on the Governor General and Council, and on all the Governments and dependencies of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, in virtue of the ſeal of the Company, and the ſignatures of the Governor General and Council herein firſt prefixed; viz.

Article the firſt.

The Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin* ſhall engage to provide and aſſign for the quota of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company in the war with *Hyder Ally Cawn*, at or near *Cochin*, a diſciplined force conſiſting of not leſs than one thouſand European infantry, two hundred European artillery, and one thouſand Malays, with their complement of officers, not exceeding the rank of captains, it being underſtood and agreed that all the officers of a ſuperior rank ſhall either be furniſhed by the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, or appointed by commiſſions from them. Theſe forces ſhall be delivered over to the charge of ſuch officer or officers as ſhall be appointed by the Preſident and Council of *Fort St. George* to receive them, who ſhall for that purpoſe proceed to *Cochin* to receive charge and command of the ſame; and from that time the ſaid forces ſhall remain ſubject to the general authority and command of the Commander in Chief of the Engliſh forces, in like manner as the Engliſh forces in *India* are ſubject to his command, until the concluſion of the war, whether by the final conqueſt of the dominions of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, or by peace concluded with him, and their re-delivery in conſequence thereof to their original and proper Government: and their pay, according to the rates at which they are paid in the ſervice of the Dutch *Eaſt Iadia* Company, together with all expences of the field or garriſon, ſhall be at the charge of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, from the day on which they are transferred to the Engliſh command, until the day of their return and re-delivery at *Cochin*, or ſuch other place as ſhall be mutually appointed for that purpoſe.

Article the ſecond.

In conſideration of the aſſiſtance granted in the manner ſtipulated in the preceding article, beſides their pay and expence, which are to be defrayed by the Governor General and Council on the part of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, it is propoſed and recommended by the Governor General and Council to the Nabob *Walla Jah Bahâdr*, that he ſhall on his part grant and aſſign, by proper ſunnuds, to the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company, his right and property in the province or diſtrict of *Tinnevelly*, together with the excluſive right in the pearl fiſhery of all the coaſt lying to the ſouth of *Remiſerim*, to the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company; who ſhall be permitted to take poſſeſſion thereof from the day on which this treaty ſhall receive its final ratification, without any let or impediment on the part of his Aumils or officers of whatever denomination; and the ſaid province or diſtrict ſhall remain the property of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company for ever.

Article the third.

It ſhall be allowable to the Government of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company at *Cochin* to carry on any ſeparate operations againſt the common enemy with their own forces, and to make conqueſts of any lands or countries adjacent to *Cochin*, and to keep poſſeſſion of the ſame, without any claim of participation on the part of the Nabob *Walla Jah Bahâdr*, or of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company.

Article the fourth.

If a further aid of troops ſhall be required from the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company for the maintenance of the war, they ſhall engage to furniſh the ſame ſo ſoon as they can be obtained from the ſupreme Government at *Batavia*, on the ſame terms, and in the ſame manner, as are ſtipulated in the firſt article.

Article the fifth.

This treaty being firſt executed in the manner abovementioned by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, for and on behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, ſhall be next tendered to the Nabob *Walla Jah Bahâdr* for his acceptance and ratification, and having received the ſame it ſhall be forwarded to the Governments

ments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, that it may in like manner receive their aſſent and final ratification without any additional diminution or alteration whatſoever, to be made either by the Nabob *Walla Jah Bahâdr*, or by the Government of *Columbo* and *Cochin*.

Ordered, That the treaty above propoſed be copied fair, and that it be circulated by the ſecretary to the members of the Board for execution.

Agreed, That Mr. *James Dighton* be appointed agent on the part of the Governor General and Council on this occaſion, with the uſual allowances; that he be entruſted with the care of our diſpatches to *Fort Saint George*, and recommended to the Preſident and Select Committee to be employed by them to proceed with the treaty and letters written to *Columbo* and *Cochin*; together with ſuch other diſpatches as they may have occaſion to add to thoſe Governments.

The Governor General lays before the Board the draft of a letter which he has prepared to his Highneſs the Nabob of the *Carnatic*.

To the Nabob of the Carnatic.

To his Highneſs the Nabob *Walla Jah*, &c. &c. &c.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs,

The very critical ſituation in which the affairs of your Highneſs are at preſent involved, by the invaſion of the *Carnatic* by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, the diſgrace which the Britiſh arms have lately ſuſtained on the coaſt, and the conſequent neceſſity of every vigorous exertion on your part, not only to recover what has been loſt, but to preſerve what remains, are points too cloſely connected with your Highneſs's intereſt and proſperity to require many arguments to enforce them. From theſe circumſtances which alone I conceive to be of ſufficient weight, but which derive greater force from the obligations your Highneſs is under to the Company for the benefit of their protection and aſſiſtance upon repeated occaſions, I cannot but entertain hopes that your Highneſs will readily and cheerfully co-operate with us in any plan which may be propoſed for the common advantage, and for the more ſucceſsfully defeating the ambitious deſigns of *Hyder Ally Cawn*; eſpecially when you reflect how much has been already done by this Government, and in how ſhort a ſpace of time from the firſt intelligence of the late heavy diſtaſter which has befallen our arms on the coaſt, to redeem as far as it is in our power the national credit, and with it to retrieve the particular loſs which your Highneſs has ſuffered, and the great ſacrifice we have made in relinquiſhing the proſecution of the Maratta war, almoſt in the moment when we had reaſon to expect from the ſucceſſes which have attended it, that it would have ſpeedily terminated in an honourable and advantageous peace. Relying therefore upon the effect which I doubt not theſe conſiderations will produce on the mind of your Highneſs, I proceed to acquaint you, that in conſequence of the information which has long ſince been received of the hoſtilities and depredations committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn* on the territories belonging to the Dutch, at or adjacent to *Cochin*, and his late invaſion of the *Carnatic*, by which the ſafety of your poſſeſſions is endangered equally with thoſe of the Company, we have prepared the draft of a treaty of alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch *Eaſt India* Companies and yourſelf; and having firſt tendered it for approval to Mr. *Roſs*, Director and Governor of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company in *Bengal*, and obtained his concurrence, we have affixed our ſeals and ſignatures to it, declaring it to be binding on us; and have requeſted the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* to preſent it to your Highneſs for your aſſent and ratification, with an apology for having introduced your name into the treaty without the previous ſanction of your authority; but as this ſtep would have required too tedious a proceſs, and would have opened a channel of negociation and correſpondence, by which the ends propoſed by the treaty, which are immediate aſſiſtance, would have been defeated, your Highneſs will perceive the impoſſibility of an application of this ſort, which otherwiſe that proper reſpect and attention which is due to your Highneſs would moſt certainly have ſuggeſted. When the treaty has been approved of and ſigned by your Highneſs, it will be tranſmitted to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin* for their final ratification. Depending that your Highneſs, from your firm alliance with, and friendſhip for the *Eaſt India* Company, and from the confidence which you repoſe in them, will contribute cheerfully your aſſiſtance, in the manner and on the terms which have been ſtated in the treaty, I will conclude with wiſhing an increaſe of health and proſperity to your Highneſs.

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Agreed to the draft of the letter propoſed by the Governor General, and ordered that it be tranſlated.

Agreed, that the following letters be written to the Governors of *Columbo*, *Cochin*, and to the ſuperior Government of *Batavia*.

To the Governor of *Columbo*.

Honourable Sir,

Having long ſince received information of the hoſtilities and depredations committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn* on the Dutch territories at or adjacent to *Cochin*, and taking into our conſideration the circumſtance of his being at preſent in open war againſt them, together with the neceſſity of repelling his ambitious deſigns upon the *Carnatic*, which involve your State equally with thoſe of the Nabob *Wallajah* and the Engliſh Company, we have prepared the draft of a treaty of alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch Eaſt India Companies and the Nabob *Wallajah Bahader*, upon ſuch terms as we truſt will be accepted by you and the Governor of *Cochin*, having firſt tendered it to the peruſal of Mr. *Roſs*, Director and Governor of the Dutch Eaſt India Company at *Bengal*, and obtained his approval of it; and as the evident advantage to be derived to the Dutch Company from the ratification of the treaty on your parts muſt free you from every apprehenſion of reſponſibility to the ſuperior Government at *Batavia*, for having acceded to it without the previous ſanction of their authority, the obſtacle which might otherwiſe have been allowed weight will by this means be removed.

The ſame reaſon which prevented us from making an application direct to *Batavia*, will be ſufficient to evince the impoſſibility of its entering into a correſpondence with your Government and that of *Cochin* on the ſubject, ſince in both caſes the time which would be required for receiving an anſwer reſpecting the ratification of the treaty, would have defeated the ends of it, which are immediate aſſiſtance.

We have therefore for the greater diſpatch affixed our ſeals and ſignatures to the treaty, declaring it to be binding on us, and on all the dependencies of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, and have tranſmitted it to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, requeſting them to tender it to the Nabob for his aſſent; and as ſoon as the Nabob ſhall have made himſelf a ſubſcribing party to it, that it may be forwarded with all poſſible expedition to you, depending, that when the true intereſt of your nation is provided for ſo materially, you will not be the cauſe of a moment's delay in the execution of it.

We have the honour to be, &c.

(The ſame to the Governor of *Cochin*).

To the Superior Government at *Batavia*.

Honourable Sirs,

In conſequence of the information which we have long ſince received of the hoſtilities and depredations committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn* on the Dutch territories at or adjacent to *Cochin*, and his late invaſion of the *Carnatic*,

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by which the ſafety of your poſſeſſions in that part of the world is endangered equally with our own; and in conſideration of the neceſſity of a mutual co-operation to repel the deſigns of ſo ambitious an enemy, we have prepared the draft of a treaty of alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch Eaſt India Companies, and the Nabob *Wallajah Bahader*, having firſt tendered it for approval to Mr. *Roſs*, Director and Governor of the Dutch Eaſt India Company in *Bengal*, and obtained his concurrence in conſideration of the terms of it being ſo favourable to your Company; and we have now, to prevent delay, diſpatched it to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, with our ſeals and ſignatures affixed, together with a declaration, that it ſhall be binding on our parts; and we have further requeſted, as ſoon as the conſent of the Nabob *Wallajah* ſhall have been obtained to the treaty, that it may be forwarded with all poſſible expedition to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin* for their final ratification and concurrence. As the time which would be required for receiving an anſwer from you reſpecting the ratification of the treaty, would have defeated the ends of it, which are immediate aſſiſtance, the impoſſibility of a previous application for this purpoſe will, we truſt, be ſufficiently evident, and apologize for our having recourſe to the only method which could be effectual in ſo critical a conjuncture, that of forwarding it to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, who, we doubt not, will obtain your approbation for having ſubſcribed to a treaty, in which the manifeſt advantages to your State will free them from every ſhare of reſponſibility.

We have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

Fort William,
the 4th January 1781.

Ordered, that copies of the above letters of the propoſed treaty, and of the letter from the Governor General to the Nabob, be prepared for the peruſal of the Gentlemen at *Fort Saint George*, and that a letter be written to them as follows:

To the Honourable *Charles Smith*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c.
Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Having long ſince received information of the hoſtilities and depredations committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn* on the territories belonging to the Dutch at or adjacent to *Cochin*, and taking into conſideration the circumſtance of his being at preſent engaged in open war againſt them, together with the neceſſity of defeating his ambitious deſigns upon the *Carnatic*, and preſerving, as far as in us lies, the poſſeſſions of the Company and the Nabob, we have, with the advice and ſuggeſtion of Mr. *Roſs*, Director and Governor of the Dutch Eaſt India Company in *Bengal*, prepared the draft of a treaty of alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch Eaſt India Companies and the Nabob *Wallajah Bahader*, upon ſuch terms as we have every reaſon to hope will be accepted. But as the time which would be required for receiving an anſwer from the Superior Government of *Batavia*, reſpecting its ratification of, and final aſſent to the treaty, would entirely fruſtrate the ends of it, which are immediate aſſiſtance, we have reſolved to make our application direct to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, for which purpoſe we have affixed our ſeals and ſignatures to the treaty, declaring it to be binding on our parts; and we requeſt, that on the receipt of it you will uſe all poſſible expedition in diſpatching it to thoſe Governments, having firſt tendered it to the Nabob and obtained his aſſent to it. You will be pleaſed to accompany this tender with an apology to the Nabob from us, for having introduced his name into the treaty without the ſanction of his approbation; but as this ſtep would have been attended with too tedious a proceſs, and would have opened a channel for negociation and correſpondence, which would have impeded the inſtant execution of the meaſure propoſed, upon which in this critical moment ſo much depends, we truſt he will perceive the impoſſibility of our previous application to him, which otherwiſe a proper attention and reſpect to him would not have ſuffered us to omit.

In the event of a refuſal on the part of the Nabob, we deſire you will repreſent in the ſtrongeſt terms to him the nature of his ſituation, and the indiſpenſable obligation he is under of making common cauſe with the Company, leſs to ſecure their poſſeſſions than his own from the encroachments of the enemy—that his very exiſtence is now at ſtake—that he is more a principal in the war than ourſelves—that it is not by any means which can be furniſhed by him, or by any reſources or treaſure of his, that the *Carnatic* is to be ſaved and defended, but by the wealth of *Bengal*, and the blood of Britiſh ſubjects ſacrificed in its ſervice; that therefore we expect his aſſent to the treaty, and urge it as a juſt claim which we have upon him, in return for the protection which he has experienced at our hands.

We ſhall wait to hear the reſult of your application, not doubting that from motives of policy and neceſſity, as well as juſtice, he will accede to the terms which we have offered in his name.

We have appointed Mr. *James Dighton* to be the bearer of our diſpatches, and have intruſted to his care, a copy of the letter addreſſed by the Governor General to the Nabob ſeparately, together with copies of the letters to the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, for your inſpection; and we requeſt that he may be employed to proceed with the treaty and letters, together with ſuch other diſpatches as you may have occaſion to add, to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*.

We rely upon your zeal and activity in this buſineſs, and depend on receiving every neceſſary information as early as it is in your power.

We have the honour to be,

Fort William, &c. &c. &c.
4th January 1781. *Warren Haſtings*,
Edward Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 361.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 28th December 1780.

Inſtructions to *James Peter Auriol*, Eſq.

Sir,

HAVING given you permiſſion to proceed in the ſhip *Portland* to the other ſide of *India*, we are willing to avail ourſelves of the ſervices which you might render to this Government during your abſence from *Bengal*, and have accordingly deputed you to act as our public Miniſter at the Portugueſe ſettlement of *Goa* on the Malabar coaſt.

We encloſe a letter of credence to you for this purpoſe, and accordingly direct that you proceed to *Goa* with all convenient expedition. On your arrival there you will deliver the letter to the Viceroy which is herewith given to you in charge, and open the negociation with which you are intruſted.

The inſults which have repeatedly been offered to the Portugueze by our common enemy *Hyder Ally*; the friendſhip and alliance which has long ſubſiſted between their nation and ours; and independently of this laſt conſideration, the intereſt which they have in common with us in curbing an increaſe of power in that ambitious Chief; induce us to inſtruct you, as we do accordingly, to make overtures to the Portugueze Government for an union with us in diſtreſſing *Hyder Ally*, by ſending a body of forces into his country.

In addition to the motives which we have recited to you for the propoſed negociation, and which we direct you to uſe as the general ground of your arguments for giving it effect, we leave it to you to endeavour to engage

gage the compliance of the Portugueze Government, by ſuch further reaſons and inducements as may occur to you at the time; and we leave it to your management and diſcretion to obtain their aſſiſtance in the moſt effectual manner, independently of a junction of their troops with our army.

You will not omit to adviſe us regularly of your proceedings, and to make the ſame known to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, as well as that of *Bombay*, inaſmuch as may be neceſſary for their information.

We are, Sir,

Fort William, 28th December 1780. Your moſt obedient ſervants, (Signed) *Warren Haſtings*. Governor General.

A true copy.

Act^s Sec^y *E. Hay.*

APPENDIX, No. 362.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 3d October 1780.

THE Commander in Chief delivers in the following minute from Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Minute from Sir Eyre Coote.

The great loſs of troops upon the coaſt, of which we have daily confirmation, and the diſpirited ſituation to which thoſe remaining are reduced, will render the ſmall number now going by ſea very inadequate to the ſervice expected, unleſs ſupported by a detachment of Sepoys to march by land into the Circars; the defence of which muſt now be extremely weakened by the neceſſity there muſt have been of drawing the troops ſtationed for their defence towards the Preſidency: I therefore propoſe that 6 or 8 battalions of Sepoys with their guns, and one company of artillery, be ordered to be in readineſs to march through the Cuttack road towards *Madras*; and the order for their march to depend upon the hopes we have given us, that the Maratta army now lying there will either join us or return; as without this, or a peace concluded with the Marattas, I never can adviſe any detachment of troops marching from hence to the coaſt.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Agreed to the propoſition made by the Commander in Chief.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheler.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, dated 26th October 1780.

The Governor General—In conſultation the 3d October laſt, it was recommended by the Commander in Chief, and reſolved, that 6 or 8 battalions of Sepoys with their guns, and one company of artillery, be ordered to be in readineſs to march through the Cuttack road towards *Madras*; the order for their march being to depend on the hopes given us, that the Maratta army now lying there will either join us or return. To form a detachment of this ſtrength will require many preparatory arrangements, which can hardly be completed in leſs time than a month, or perhaps ſix weeks, from its firſt formation. The fair ſeaſon is now begun, and the anſwers from the Government of *Berar* to our late diſpatches muſt be expected much within the courſe of the enſuing month: if theſe are favourable, the detachment ought not to loſe an inſtant after their arrival in commencing its march. I myſelf have every reaſon to believe that their anſwer will be as favourable as we can wiſh: theſe reaſons I ſhall now communicate to the Board. In the mean time I move, that orders be immediately iſſued for forming the detachment, and that it do conſiſt of one company of artillery and ſix battalions of Sepoys with their guns. I take the liberty to recommend, that Lieutenant Colonel *Pearſe* be appointed to the command of this detachment, and Major *Edmondſtone* to be the ſecond in command. The firſt of theſe recommendations I can venture to aſſure the Board will be agreeable to the Commander in Chief, and that it was his intention to have offered it himſelf: the ſecond proceeds ſolely from my opinion of the qualifications of Major *Edmondſtone*, whom I know only as an officer, neither is he acquainted with my preſent wiſhes upon this ſubject. Appendix No. 362.

If the Board ſhall approve of thoſe propoſitions, I further beg leave to ſuggeſt the expediency of replacing the number which will be thus taken from our native infantry, by ſuch means as ſhall be judged the moſt effectual and leaſt burthenſome in their expence; that which has occurred to me, and which I ſubmit to the conſideration of the Board, is to augment all the battalions which remain, by an equal number of rank and file diſtributed amongſt them, to be hereafter drafted and formed into regular battalions of the eſtabliſhed ſtrength, when they ſhall be required for actual ſervice. This expedient, if the Board approves it, may be referred to the provincial Commander in Chief, and his opinion upon it deſired; or in place of it, any other which he may judge more ſuitable to the end propoſed.

The Governor General lays before the Board for their peruſal, a tranſlation of a letter from Maha Rajah *Mooda jee Booſla*, received on the 20th inſtant; and of a letter from *Dewangur Pundit*, the Maha Rajah's Dewan, to *Beneram Pundit*, referred to in it.

Mr. *Wheler*—I agree to the forming of the detachment now propoſed by the Governor General, (in conſequence of the reſolution of the 3d inſtant) in order that it may be in readineſs to act as we may judge proper, after receiving the advices that are expected from the Government of *Berar*. I accede to the wiſhes of the Commander in Chief in the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel *Pearſe* to the command of this detachment, and to the Governor General's recommendation of Major *Edmondſtone* to the ſecond in command. I alſo agree to refer to the provincial Commander in Chief the expedient propoſed by the Governor General, reſpecting the number of Sepoys which will be taken from the preſent ſtrength of our military eſtabliſhment by this meaſure.

Mr. *Francis*—Mr. *Wheler* has ſo exactly expreſſed what I meant to ſay, that I ſhall content myſelf with ſubſcribing to be ſame anſwer to the Governor General's motion.

Agreed, That orders be immediately iſſued for forming a detachment to proceed over land towards *Madras*: that the ſame do conſiſt of one company of artillery and ſix battalions of Sepoys with their guns; and that Brigadier General *Stibbert* be directed to carry this reſolution into execution.

Agreed, That Lieutenant Colonel *Pearſe* be appointed to the command of the detachment, and Major *Edmonſtone* to be ſecond in command of it.

The following Letter is written to Brigadier General *Stibbert*.

Sir,

Having thought it neceſſary to reſolve on detaching a conſiderable force towards *Madras*, and having this day determined that the ſame ſhall conſiſt of one company of European artillery and ſix battalions of Sepoys with their guns, we requeſt that you will immediately iſſue orders for carrying this reſolution into effect. The command of this detachment is given to Lieutenant Colonel *Pearſe*, and the poſt of ſecond in command of it to Major *Edmondſtone*.

Deeming it expedient that the numbers taken from the native infantry by this meaſure ſhould be replaced, and by means the moſt effectual and leaſt burthenſome in

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in their expence, it has occurred to us that ſuch purpoſe might be beſt effected in an augmentation of the battalions that remain, by an equal number of rank and file diſtributed amongſt them, to be hereafter drafted and formed into regular battalions of the eſtabliſhed ſtrength whenever they ſhall be required for actual ſervice. On this expedient we deſire your opinion, or in the place of it, that you will offer any other which you may judge more ſuitable to the end propoſed.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
26th October, 1780.

P. Francis.

Read the following letters from Brigadier General *Stibbert.*

Gentlemen,

I was yeſterday honoured with your letter of the 6th inſtant, informing me of your reſolution to detach towards *Madras* one company of European artillery and ſix battalions of Sepoys with their guns, &c. deſiring me to iſſue immediately the neceſſary orders for carrying this meaſure into effect.

Your inſtructions I beg you will be aſſured ſhall be obeyed with all poſſible diſpatch; but as you have omitted acquainting me where you would chooſe to have the detachment aſſembled, I find myſelf neceſſitated to retard my proceedings till you ſhall be pleaſed to ſatisfy me on this head.

In the mean time, I hold it my duty to ſtate to you the ſtrength of the forces at preſent ſtationed at *Fort William,* and the other parts of *Bengal,* from which the detachment ordered muſt neceſſarily be formed.

	European Artillery, Non-commiſſioned and Private.	European Infantry, Non-commiſſioned and Private.	Battalions of Sepoys.
Fort William, Barrackpore, and Chandernagore	232	341	6
Berhampore	99	688	4
Midnapore and Jellaſore	49	- - -	4
TOTAL, including the Sick	380	1,029	14

After deducting this force, one company of artillery and ſix battalions of Sepoys, there will only remain for the immediate protection of *Fort William* and the reſt of *Bengal* (excluſive of invalids and the Militia)

Artillery, Europeans - - - - 280
Infantry - - D° - - - - - 1,029
Battalions of Sepoys - - - - 8

which, conſidering that there is juſt now a large Maratta army aſſembled at *Cuttack,* and that we are at the height of war with two formidable European Powers, I conceive to be very inadequate to this purpoſe.

Should it be urged that the recruits ordered to be levied will ſupply the place of the troops deſigned to be detached, I muſt obſerve, that it will be impoſſible, let the care and attention of the officers be ever ſo unremitted, to diſcipline and train theſe recruits, ſo as to render them fit for actual ſervice in leſs (to ſpeak within bounds) than ſix or eight months; reſpecting the mode eligible to be purſued in raiſing and forming theſe levies, I ſhall do myſelf the honour of addreſſing the Board in a ſeparate letter.

On the other hand, there appears to me no leſs difficulty in the meaſure of ſtrengthening the force below by the recal of ſo conſiderable a part of the troops ſtationed in the Vizier's provinces, and beyond the *Jumna,* as one company of European artillery, the two regiments of cavalry, and ſix battalions of Sepoys, which I find to have been the propoſition of Sir *Eyre Coote:* for I ſubmit it to the Board whether it would be expedient or proper to reduce the army in that quarter ſo materially, at a time when all accounts agree in repreſenting that *Nudjiff Cawn* is making great preparations for taking the field, when the Seiks are in motion, and when it is confidently ſaid, that *Madajee Scindia* is ſetting on foot an expedition towards *Gualior* and the adjacent country. Such being the apparent ſituation of affairs, I muſt offer it as my opinion, that having a regard to the ſecurity of the upper provinces, and to the maintenance of our conſequence in that part of the country, we cannot withdraw from thence, at this critical period, a greater body of troops than will be ſufficient to aſſiſt in the defence of *Patna* and the *Bahar* province.

I cannot conclude this addreſs without declaring to the Board my apprehenſions that the appointment of the commandant of artillery to the command of the detachment ordered to be formed for marching toward *Madras,* being a thing unprecedented, will occaſion much diſcontent among the field officers of infantry, who from the uſage of the ſervice will be led to conſider it as an infringement of their rights, if not a reflection on their military talents.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Fort William, *G. Stibbert.*
29th October 1780.

P. S. I have been prevented from ſending my letter in till this day, by being obliged to wait for a return of the third regiment; and at laſt have been under the neceſſity of making uſe of one for July laſt. If the Board approve of it, the detachment may be aſſembled at *Manurgur,* near *Midnapore.*

G. Stibbert.

APPENDIX, No. 363.

From *Moodajee Booſla*; dated the 16th Zehiedja: received the 9th January 1781.

No. 1. YOUR agreeable letter, acquainting me that the ſincerity of my attachment and friendſhip, and of my advice and propoſals, was fully known to you, after you had underſtood, from the repreſentations of *Benei am Pundit* and the Engliſh tranſlations, the contents of my friendly letters; and that you had, in conſequence of your knowing the neceſſity of the times and circumſtances, ſettled all matters in the moſt prudent and adviſable manner with *Row Pundit Purdhaun* on this condition, that I ſhould become guarantee to the durability of the treaty on both ſides: that you had therefore ſent three copies of a treaty for my ratification: and after recounting the articles, you mention that I muſt firſt put my ſeal on them as guarantee, together with the ſeal and ſignature of my confidential miniſter, and then, having informed you and the Council of it, muſt ſend them to *Poonah:* that when the rulers and chiefs of that place ſhall in the ſame manner have put their ſeals and ſignatures to them, they are to keep one of the copies, and to ſend the other two to the Governor of *Bombay* and General *Goddard,* that every matter may be amicably ſettled, and the war entirely ſtopped. You further mention the particulars of *Hyder Ally Khan,* and his friendſhip and alliance with the French, the confirmed enemies of the Engliſh: that your ſole attention was taken up with preparing for repelling and puniſhing them in a proper manner: that this enmity to *Row Pundit Purdhaun* is of long and ancient ſtanding; and that if he increaſes his power and ſtrength in this manner, he will by degrees deſtroy their kingdom: that it is therefore moſt adviſable for them to ſtation a conſiderable force under a commander of experience and truſt with the Engliſh army, by which means the pride and preſumption of *Hyder* will be reduced, and whatever treaſure or

country may be taken from him ſhall be divided equally between both parties; that the ſuffering ſo conſiderable an enemy to acquire ſtrength, without any attempts to depreſs him, would moſt certainly give riſe to great loſſes and diſputes. This letter arrived in a lucky hour, and by removing my former anxiety and expectations, gave me inexpreſſible pleaſure, and added conſiderably friendſhip. The advances which you have made are highly commendable among perſons who have great and important objects in view, and are calculated to inſure the peace and ſatisfaction of the people, and put an end to the labours and diſtreſſes of the ſoldiers; and the taking the reſolution of ſending the treaty, is a complete proof of your friendſhip and ſincerity. From the firſt, down to the preſent time, the preſent hoſtilities and diſputes were not from your inclination or wiſh; but whatever was done originated from the Governor of *Bombay*; and in that caſe, there being no other remedy, you were compelled to exert yourſelf for the remedying it, and for the preſervation of your poſſeſſions and the defence of every thing dear. By the bleſſing of God, your good intentions are well known to the whole world. As before the arrival of the treaty I had received repeated intelligence by the ſucceſſive letters from that quarter of your intentions for peace on the part of the Company, and that the treaty would be ſent afterwards, my deſire was, that as ſoon as the treaty ſhould arrive, I ſhould ſend my miniſter, *Dawargur Pundit*, for the purpoſe of ſettling this matter, that every article might be determined agreeable to my wiſhes, and at nō future time any diſagreement about a ſingle letter might ariſe: but when I had peruſed the treaty, and had reflected on the ſeveral articles of it with the moſt attentive conſideration, I diſcovered ſome points which were contrary to the treaty of Colonel *Upton*, in ſo conſiderable a degree that the Poonah Miniſters will never give their aſſent to them; for if there are ſome few things in it which I cannot approve of, how can they ever be expected to conſent? and what I myſelf do not comprehend, how ſhould I explain to another? I have therefore delayed affixing my ſeal and ſignature to it, but have carefully kept it with me. To the variations of the times and the revolutions of the heavens it is entirely owing, that although you were ſincere and approved of peace and friendſhip on every condition, yet ſuch delays and obſtructions have ariſen in the matter, that the buſineſs of to-day has been put off till to-morrow, and what was approaching to a concluſion has been delayed to a future time; but where there is a ſtedfaſtneſs, faith, and ſincerity, there is no room for any prevarication, but that of the times and circumſtances, to raiſe ſuch obſtructions as it is impoſſible to prevent. Thus from the diſtance of the road three months have elapſed entirely in the coming and going of the Coſſids, otherwiſe the refuſal and aſſent of all the articles of the treaty on your part, through the mediation of this Government, would not have met with theſe delays, and every thing would have been ſettled in the beſt manner. As it does not ſeem to me adviſable that the war ſhould be ſuffered to extend on every ſide, and as my friendly heart has on all occaſions and in all ſituations wiſhed to perform the duties and obligations of friendſhip, I have therefore, in anſwer to every article of the treaty which you have ſent, wrote fully and explicitly in ſuch manner as was proper, and as my friendſhip, faith, and regard to treaties required, ſo that the intents of former treaties might not be fruſtrated, and that I might not ſeem partial to either ſide; theſe anſwers having been prepared in my preſence, are written on a detached paper, from which you will gain complete information: nothing in that is new or innovating, but all conformable to former agreements. In caſe of a peace, it is neceſſary for both parties to give up all places agreeable to ancient treaties, whether acquired before or in the preſent war. When you ſhall have done what is requiſite, the other ſide will likewiſe perform their part agreeable to their engagements. In anſwer to what you write reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*, *Futty Sing Guicawar*, and Ranna of *Gohud*, it is certainly incumbent on all perſons who have any regard for their word, their honour, or reputation, to exert themſelves in all caſes for the aſſiſtance of any one who takes refuge under the ſhadow of their protection, that it may be known to the whole world, that whoever throws himſelf on the protection of the Engliſh gentlemen, will through their aid attain the completion of his views: and that whatever diſtreſſed perſon they will take by the hand, they will place ſafely on the ſhore from the troubled ſea of war: this is without doubt the uſage of the world. But where the ſtandard of treaties and engagements has been erected, and a perſon has been pitched upon for guarantee, and entruſted with the equal balancing of intereſts, it then becomes incumbent on that guarantee to do nothing that is not conſiſtent with his faith and word, or that may ſeem partial to either party, but to remove all ſuſpicions and doubts, to keep firm to the truth, by ſaying and writing nothing but the truth, and by exerting himſelf in ſettling the arguments of both ſides: why therefore ſhould we make heſitation in the delivering up *Ragonaut Row* to the Poonah Miniſters, agreeable to former treaties, under pretence of his being the maſter where he chuſes to reſide; ſince it is much more adviſable to put an end to all diſputes, and ſince the Miniſters of *Poonah* will never fail in the ſmalleſt point of reſpect, attention, and careful treatment to one of their illuſtrious family. *Futty Sing Guicawar* is likewiſe a branch of the *Rauge*, and is beſides protected by you; his concerns will therefore certainly be attended to equally with thoſe of a brother; and as to the Ranna of *Gohud*, conformable to what you write, no ſpark of enmity againſt him will remain in their minds; why ſhould you therefore take any trouble in their affairs? Let it be written in the treaty, that on this condition it is binding, otherwiſe that it is void. Enter therefore on this matter with the greateſt ſincerity, and do not put any more refuſals in it, but prepare and ſend me a treaty agreeable to the encloſed ſeparate ſheets, in which there is a full diſcuſſion, and a plan for a treaty at the foot of each article; you will thus remove the reſponſibility from yourſelf to me: and if the Poonah Miniſters ſhould not then agree and aſſent to it, you will not be blamed. What is to happen will happen. The ſhort of it is this; that I have at all times and in all ſituations been reſolved to obſerve and attend to your wiſhes, even above thoſe of the Council and of the Chiefs ſtationed in the other Preſidencies. God is witneſs that I am in no inſtance partial or inclined to the other ſide. You will from the friendſhip and knowledge of events and circumſtances approve of what I have written.

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The treaty which you have ſent me, I have kept with the greateſt care and caution, and will ſoon return it, together with my anſwers to all your Kareetahs. Further particulars you will learn from the repreſentations of *Beneram Pundit*.

Poſtſcript.—As to what you have written from the exceſs of your friendſhip, that a conſiderable army has been ſent to *Madras* under the command of General *Coote*, and that it is neceſſary I ſhould write to *Shimdojee Bhoſila*, directing him to join 2 or 3000 horſe with the General, which would be a great addition of ſtrength; or ſhould it not be convenient to ſpare this force, that in ſuch caſe I ought to recal the army which is arrived at *Cuttack*; the fact is this: Of the ſtate of all matters, and of the full particulars of this quarter, not one article is unknown to you; and I myſelf have ſo often written them to you that they cannot be ſecret to you. Till peace ſhall have been ſettled, and the treaty finally ratified, I cannot adopt either of theſe propoſals; but when I ſhall have aſſembled there an army of 50,000 horſe, with all ſtores and neceſſaries, I may then ſend an army to join General *Coote*, or recal it altogether from thence. This matter will be more fully explained to you by *Beneram Pundit*

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Pundit. Be convinced, that in all circumſtances and ſituations I ſhall be your ſtedfaſt friend.

Till peace is finally ſettled, it is abſolutely neceſſary for me to act in the above manner.

The Anſwer to the Firſt Article.

" All the forts, towns, and places belonging to *Pundit Peiſhwah*, which may have been taken, or ſhall be taken by the Engliſh army, from the beginning of the war till the ratification of the treaty, ſhall be delivered over to the Peiſhwa, except the fort of *Ahmedabad*, and the ſhare of the country of *Guzerat*, which ſhall remain in the poſſeſſion of *Futty Sing Guicawar*; and the fort of *Gevalior*, which ſhall remain in the poſſeſſion of the Ranna of *Gohud*, and no one ſhall oppoſe it."

This requires ſome conſideration, and I requeſt you will reflect with juſtice on what I ſay: When a town and fort has been from time immemorial in the poſſeſſion of the family and chiefs of *Pundit Purdhaun*, and *Futty Sing* is one of the ancient dependants of the family of the Rauje, what connection can he have with the Engliſh gentlemen? The nature of his connection was this; that when General *Goddard* arrived in the province of *Guzerat* with a reſpectable army, *Futty Sing* with his whole family was in *Bedodah*; but having no power or ſtrength to oppoſe his enemies or defend his property, he being remedileſs, joined himſelf with General *Goddard*, and at this time has ſent ſeveral letters to *Poonah*; that having no reſource at that time, except the protection and aſſiſtance of the Engliſh, he had therefore united himſelf with them. Before this, reſpecting the reconciliation of the two brothers who had began diſputes and hoſtilities about the diviſion of their Talooks, I wrote in the articles of the memorandum, that as *Futty Sing* had taken part with you, it would be neceſſary for both ſides to exert themſelves for the reconciliation of the two brothers, when their Talooks might remain to both of them in ſecurity. You muſt therefore write reſpecting them in the treaty, that *Futty Sing* is a chief and dependant of the other party, and had joined you ſolely from the neceſſities of the times; that as peace and alliance has take place between the two parties, it is incumbent on friendſhip to forget all the paſt, and that the two brothers having been reconciled, muſt be made to remain peaceable and quiet as before on their ſhares of Jaghires, which will be greatly to your ſatisfaction, and to the completion of your wiſhes. The ſame muſt be written reſpecting the Raſſha of *Gohud*, who has always been a dependant and expectant on the Peiſhwah, and who has now, by the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh, got poſſeſſion of the fort of *Gevalior*, which is of ſuch ſtrength that the Miniſters of *Poonah* can never permit or ſuffer it to remain quietly in his hands: therefore, towards procuring peace it is neceſſary that both ſides, for the maintaining of former articles, reſtore all the places which they may have taken of whatever ſtrength they may be; and let it be mentioned, that on the ſubject of the Ranna no further miſunderſtandings ſhall remain, ſince the friends of one ſide are likewiſe the friends of the other party.

The Second Article.

" Towards the ſupport and ſtrengthening the peace and the intereſt of both ſides, that on future occaſion no diſputes or miſunderſtandings may ariſe, it is agreed, that in caſe the fort of *Baſſein* ſhall have been taken by the Engliſh army before the final ratification of the treaty, ſhould *Pundit Purdhaun* chooſe to exchange it for the Mahals which have been given up to the Company, and in their poſſeſſion, agreeable to the 3d and 7th articles of the treaty of *Poorunder*, conformable to the former treaty entered into by the Governor General and Council of *Bombay* with *Futty Sing Guicawar*; but ſhould *Pundit Purdhaun* not chooſe to exchange, we will then, agreeable to your firſt article of this treaty, deliver up the fort of *Baſſein* to *Pundit Purdhaun*; and the country delivered up to us by the treaty of *Poorunder* ſhall remain in our poſſeſſion."

The caſe is this; that I frequently have ſeen the treaty of Colonel *Upton*, and have often wrote the particulars of it, but never yet heard that the treaty of *Poorunder* was made conformable to a former treaty entered into by the Governor and Council of *Bombay* with *Futty Sing Guicawar*, that it ſhould now be mentioned. What has the treaty of *Futty Sing* to do with the treaty of the Peiſhwa? or, what connection can dirt have with a perſon of diſtinction? *Futty Sing* is one of the dependants and chiefs of the Rauje; if he chooſes to deliver over by writing to any one, the towns and forts belonging to the Rauje, how can it be agreed to? or what authority and voucher is that, that it will be aſſented to? Whatever the owner and poſſeſſor of the country gives in writing, that alone is binding.

In this caſe, therefore, it is neceſſary that all Mahals and places in the province of *Guzerat*, *Cokan*, and other parts which formerly belonged to *Pundit Purdhaun*, and which have been taken in the preſent war, ſhould all be delivered up; and beſides, if the fort of *Baſſein* ſhould be taken, that alſo muſt be reſtored to the people of *Pundit Purdhaun*. But do not inſiſt upon theſe points, which are difficult to be aſſented to; for theſe bring with them a breach of former treaties, and can never be agreed to. Abide entirely by the engagements of Colonel *Upton*, and reſtore every thing which has been taken in this war, or may be taken before the final ratification of the treaty; that the tree of friendſhip may bloſſom with the flowers of ſincerity, and that the thorn of enmity may be removed. It is not wiſe to add a little to a large treaſure.

Third Article.

After ſaying that *Ragonauth Row* ſhall be allowed for his expences during his life, according to the former agreement, you write " That what was ſettled in the former treaty reſpecting the place of his reſidence ſhall be void; that he ſhall reſide wherever he may chooſe, except in *Bombay* and *Surat*; that you will never aſſiſt him in any claim on the Maratta Government, unleſs all the Chiefs who ſign the treaty ſhould agree to it and deſire it."

The caſe is this: When he had been taken priſoner in the Bombay war, at that time no neglect or deficiency was found in the reſpect, attention, and good treatment of him. At preſent, that he comes under the protection of ſo great a Chief, what refuſal can they make to ſupply his neceſſary expences? But giving him power to reſide wherever he likes, which would be certainly attended with loſſes and damage to all quarters, can never be admitted of; and in what light can your letters on this ſubject be conſidered? At the time of making peace and treaties, the door of diſagreements is cloſed and not left open. How can the former treaty be rendered void? From his having this liberty great damage may be expected; for ſhould he ever under the protection of *Hyder Naig* join himſelf with a French army, it would be attended with great inconveniences to both ſides. The greateſt circumſpection is requiſite. Nothing more need to be mentioned reſpecting *Ragonauth Row*, except the delivering him up to the Poonah Miniſters, agreeable to the former treaty. The article relating to the aſſiſtance of him, in caſe all the Chiefs who may ſign the treaty ſhould deſire it, is likewiſe unneceſſary.

The Fourth Article.

" *Pundit Purdhaun*, and the other Maratta Chiefs, ſhall enter into an alliance with the Engliſh, and ſhall in conjunction with their army attack *Hyder Ally Khan*, both for the protection of their own country and for the conqueſt of his: they ſhall invade his country with the Engliſh army, and ſhall mutually join for his deſtruction. Whatever portion of country may be conquered from him ſhall be equally ſhared, in ſuch a manner that they ſhall take what borders on their country, and the Engliſh ſhall poſſeſs what lies near theirs and the Nabob *Wallanjaw*'s."

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The anſwer to this is as follows: when after the Bombay war *Ragonauth Row* had been taken priſoner, and had been delivered in charge to *Madajee Row Scindia*, who ſent him under care of a confidential ſervant of his to *Ugeen*, in the way to which place he found an opportunity, and eſcaping to *Surat*, was a ſecond time taken under the protection and aſſiſtance of the Engliſh. At that time my Miniſter *Dewargur Pundit*, who was at *Poonah*, was aſked by the Miniſters of the Peiſhwa his advice, that for many years *Hyder Naig* had not paid the ſmalleſt part of the peſhcuſh due to them, and had beſides poſſeſſed himſelf of ſome of their Mahals; that after the end of the Bombay war, there being ſome proſpect of tranquillity and peace, by *Raganouth Row*'s being brought to them, they had reſolved to ſend an army of great ſtrength againſt *Hyder Naig*, and to reduce his violence; but that when General *Goddard* had arrived at *Surat*, and *Ragonauth Row* had returned to him, and was preparing to renew the war at that time, how could they hope to be able to oppoſe two ſuch powerful enemies, and maintain themſelves againſt two ſuch violent attacks? The Pundit told them in anſwer, that they ſhould enter into a friendly correſpondence and connection with the one who was an Engliſh Chief, ſupreme over all the poſſeſſions of the Engliſh, and who was unequalled in his prudence, foreſight, faith, ſincerity, and obſervance of treaties, (namely, the Nabob *Amaud ul Dowlah*) and then engage in vigorous meaſures againſt the other (*Hyder Naig*) and either entirely deſtroy him, or take from him the money and Talooks which they want. The Miniſter agreeing to the advice, ſent letters and confidential perſons to General *Goddard* ſucceſſively, on the ſubject of peace and alliance; and at that time letters from the General were likewiſe received, full of expreſſions and promiſes of friendſhip, and ſaying that they ought to aſcribe *Ragonauth Row*'s being admitted to reſide with him, to no other reaſon but his (the General's) friendſhip for them, to prevent *Ragonauth*'s applying to any other quarter; that if they wiſhed it, he would come in perſon to meet them, and ſettle every thing in a perſonal conference. At that time certainly this matter would have been ſettled to mutual advantage, and many points of conſequence would have been properly adjuſted by perſonal agreements and conſultations. But of every thing which the General had written, not one came to paſs; for neither did he find leiſure to come himſelf to *Poonah*, nor did he enter into negociations with the confidential agents ſent to him, nor did he pay any attention to the letters of *Dewargur Pundit*: in ſhort, affairs at laſt ended in open war and hoſtilities, and it became neceſſary for them, having loſt ſo ſincere a friend, to unite themſelves with their old and eſtabliſhed enemy; and they, after mature conſideration, agreed to this deſperate remedy, and having entered into friendly connections with him, ſettled every matter agreeable to his plan and propoſals. As the opportunity which is once ſuffered to eſcape can never be recovered, it is a matter of great ſorrow, that now when peace might be made with the Engliſh, an army cannot be ſent into the poſſeſſions of *Hyder*, in company with the Engliſh, without being treacherous to him, and without being guilty of ſuch a breach of faith and engagements as to deter any other in future from truſting to or believing their moſt ſolemn promiſes: this however can never be admitted by the houſe of *Pundit Purdhaun*, nor will it ever be admitted. As the diſpoſition of *Hyder Naig* is bent on treachery and diſputes, there is no doubt but that in a ſhort time he will be guilty of ſome breach of treaty, ſuch as uniting himſelf with the French, or conceiving ſome hoſtile ſchemes, when immediately in conſequence of ſuch breach they may join in the deſtroying him: but till he takes off the maſk and diſcovers ſuch diſpoſition, they cannot think of any contrary to their engagements. Leave this therefore to time, and do not mention it in the treaty but wait to ſee when it may happen.

The Fifth Article.

"Should *Pundit Peiſhwa* not agree to form an alliance againſt *Hyder Naig*, nevertheleſs peace ſhall be made on this condition, that both ſides ſhall remain in poſſeſſion of what they have got, and a ceſſation of hoſtilities ſhall take place for one year from the date of this treaty, during which time peace may be ſettled in ſuch terms as to inſure its perpetual ſtability."

In anſwer to this; what I learn from it is, that at any rate peace and friendſhip is your wiſh; this is very proper and ſatisfactory; but a ceſſation of hoſtilities, without a final completion of peace, is not the cuſtom of this country. The practice of *Europe* is this, that two kings will ſit down on the ſame carpet, and will play at cheſs together, and their armies will remain peaceably together, while they receive continual accounts of each others intentions; and if they ſhould put an end to all hoſtilities, they agree to a ceſſation for a certain number of years, after which they renew their attacks and hoſtilities: but this is not the method in *Decan*, for whatever engagements are entered into there, are laſting and perpetual. You muſt therefore write this much, that if they will join their army with that of the Engliſh it is well, and if not it makes no difference; that you will with your ſingle force attack the enemy, but that at any rate you are deſirous of peace with the Poonah State.

The Sixth Article.

"As peace is made with *Pundit Purdhaun*, at the interceſſion of *Moodajee Bhoſilah*, it is neceſſary that he become guarantee to it: the treaty is therefore firſt ſent to him, that he may certify it under the moſt ſolemn oaths of his religion, with his own ſeal, and the ſignature of his confidential Miniſter; that he approves of the treaty, and agrees to be guarantee to it; that no breach ſhall ever happen in it; that as long as both ſides abide by it, he will be the friend of both; and whoever ſhall break it he will be his enemy, till he ſhall atone for ſuch breach."

The ſtate is this; that I am, without doubt, the firm friend of your quarter, and likewiſe am a well-wiſher of *Pundit Purdhaun*, in conformity to my attachment due to the family of the Rauje, and have taken upon me this trouble and exertion merely for the eaſe of the people, and from my regard to truth and ſincerity, and my knowledge of the rights and properties of every one. I likewiſe hoped, that upon the taking place of the peace and alliance, I ſhould attain the completion of my views, and ſhould, by the aſſiſtance of both parties, be relieved from the difficulties incurred by the expences of the new-raiſed Sepoys: I therefore agreed to become guarantee and ſecurity to both ſides, and whichever ſhould have failed in his part of the obligation, I ſhould firſt attempt to make him ſenſible of his fault, and if that failed, I ſhould then, to the utmoſt of my abilities, puniſh him for it, and not be reconciled to him till ſuch time as he returned to his duty. But what you have written in the treaty, that you have agreed to this peace to give me ſatisfaction, is by no means neceſſary. This only need be mentioned, that I am guarantee and ſecurity of this treaty to both parties, and that which ever ſide ſhall be guilty of any breach of it, I ſhall continue his enemy till he has made atonement for it, and has remedied ſuch breach of treaty.

The Seventh Article.

"Three copies of this treaty are ſent; after they ſhall arrive at *Poonah*, *Ballajee Row Purnaveeſe* and the other Chiefs having affixed their ſeals and ſignatures on them, ſhall keep one of them, and ſhall ſend the ſecond to the Governor of *Bombay*, and the third to General *Goddard*, that the war and hoſtilities may immediately ceaſe, and every matter be finally ſettled. Should this peace be finiſhed, and the treaty agreed to within five months from the date of it, it is well, otherwiſe it ſhall be altogether void."

Appendix. No. 363.

In anſwer to this, the diſtance from *Calcutta* to *Poonah* is 900 coſs; and beſides, the diſcuſſion and explanation, aſſent and denial of the important articles in the treaty, are in hand; why therefore ſhould the dates and times be circumſcribed? and why is this clauſe mentioned, that if it is concluded within ſuch particular time it is binding, otherwiſe that it will be void. I have kept the treaties by me with the greateſt caution, and have ſent off theſe letters to you. After the receipt of your explicit anſwers the treaties ſhall be ſent to that quarter. Set your mind at reſt. In ſhort, I have with the greateſt attention and care made myſelf thoroughly acquainted with all the articles, and have underſtood all the good and bad of them, and have written whatever was conſiſtent with my regard to the rights and obligations of both ſides. What might prevent the intereſts from preponderating might perpetuate the verdure of the garden of friendſhip, and keep off the blaſt of the nipping winds. This you muſt read and conſider with juſtice, and not think me in the ſmalleſt degree partial to the intereſts of *Pundit Purdhaun*, for a faithful guarantee muſt always have regard to his oaths and engagements, and in all caſes conſider the intereſts and advantages of both ſides: you will therefore, agreeable to theſe ſeparate ſheets, prepare and ſend a treaty without any addition or diminution, that my Miniſter, *Dewargur Pundit*, may be ſent to *Poonah*, and ſettle every point agreeable to your deſire, when, from the opportunity of the times and friendly connection between us, many and great advantages will be derived.

A true copy of the tranſlation.

E. Hay,
Act^{g} Sec^{y}.

From *Dewagur Pundit*.

I received your letter in a lucky hour, in which you write, that, &c. (the ſame recapitulation as the one in the Maha Rajah's letter.) The inſtant that I ſaw it, my heart felt an immediate and ſurpriſing ſatisfaction from the hopes and proſpect of a ſecure and peaceable future for the people; for by the ſpeedy end to all the cruelties and oppreſſions of the armies, the repoſe which the Chiefs would find from their former continual occupations, the attachment of many and great advantages to both ſides by the connection between them, the raiſing your reputation among all the other Chiefs of the Council and the Engliſh gentlemen, and even in the ſight of the powerful King of *England*; and the hopes of a perpetual and laſting friendſhip and connection between *Pundit Peiſhwa*, the Rajah my maſter, and the Engliſh gentlemen, by an equal balance of intereſts, I immediately conceived the deſire of departing inſtantly expreſs, that having opened the papers on the road, I might arrive in 10 days at *Poonah*, and deliver the treaty with my own hands, and ſettle the baſis of it with the Miniſters of *Poonah* in ſuch a ſolid manner, that on no occaſion any alteration or defect might ever happen: and after I ſhould have adjuſted thoſe important points agreeable to your intentions, I might get my diſmiſſion to go to *Calcutta*, where, being honoured with an interview with you, I might inform you of every thing which from a long time has been upon my mind reſpecting the true political meaſures.

But afterwards reflecting that it was not adviſable for me to be in ſuch haſte before I had fully underſtood all the contents of the papers, I opened them in the preſence of the Maha Rajah, when all the karetas, letters, copies, and treaties, were peruſed with the greateſt attention and care, firſt, they convinced us of your great truth and ſincerity, and that you never, from the beginning to this time, were inclined to the preſent diſputes and hoſtilities; and next, that you have not included in the articles of the treaty any of your wiſhes or inclinations; and, in ſhort, the garden of the treaty appeared to us in all its parts green and flouriſhing, but though the fruit of it was excellent, yet they appeared different from thoſe of Colonel *Upton*'s treaty (the particulars of which I have frequently written to you) and upon reading them, proved to be bitter and very different when compared to the former articles. How can any of the old and eſtabliſhed obligations be omitted, and new matters agreed to, when it is plain that they will produce loſſes and damages? Some points which you have mentioned under the plea of the faith and obſervance of treaties, are of ſuch a nature that the Poonah Miniſters can never aſſent to them: in all engagements and important tranſactions, in which the words But, and Although, and Beſides, and Whereas, and Why; and other ſuch words of doubt, are introduced, it gives an opening to diſputes and miſunderſtandings. A treaty is meant for the entire removal of all differences, not for increaſe of them. My departure to *Poonah* has therefore been delayed; and the Rajah my maſter likewiſe having put off the affixing his ſeal, ſaid, that although he was determined to ſign the treaty as guarantee agreeable to your letter, yet he could not ſuffer that after his ſeal ſhould have been affixed, it ſhould be rejected by the others; that he muſt therefore conſider maturely before he ſigns the treaty, that no one may afterwards make objections to any part of it; and if after having laboured to explain it to them, to ſatisfy them, and bring them over, they ſhould in any manner not comprehend it, or join in it, we may then make uſe of that as a ſufficient reaſon to act againſt them; but before we can be able to anſwer all their queſtions and doubts we muſt firſt comprehend them thoroughly ourſelves. Although theſe lines which you have written in your kharetas with the greateſt truth and ſincerity, that ſuch haſte was not your queſtion, but that from certain circumſtances you have, agreeeble to the advice of this quarter, diſpatched a treaty with all expedition, in which you have reſtored every thing taken in this war, and placed all matters on the ſame footing they were before the war, are very proper and friendly, and entirely conforming to the articles of Colonel *Upton*'s treaty, is conſiſtent with the preſent intereſts and future advantages, and will inſure the perpetuity and friendſhip, and render the guarantee of my maſter, the Maha Rajah, more ſecure; yet there is no remedy for the variations of the times, which always produce a hundred ſucceſſive events of the ſame kind, and in the ſettlement of all affairs cauſes ſo many, as to endanger the peace of the people and the ſecurity of the property and poſſeſſions of both ſides. Time does every thing which he chooſes, and there is not the ſmalleſt controul over him. But your prudence and wiſdom has undertaken this matter with a thorough knowledge of the influence of circumſtances. I entertain great hopes that you will at all future occaſions attend to every thing which your old and ſincere friends may write to you, from the ſincerity and friendſhip of their hearts, and without the ſmalleſt partiality to the other ſide, and by the bleſſing of God our alliance and intimacy will go on increaſing: but the great diſtance of 800 coſs from *Calcutta* to *Naigpore*, and from *Naigpore* to *Poonah*, which makes two months, and to *Poonah* three months, neceſſary for the going and returning of coſſids, cannot be remedied. What can I do? I am a man and have neither feathers nor wings. The ground is hard, and the heavens are far off: I am unluckily far removed from the Preſence: had I been near you, I ſhould before this have informed you of every particular relating to this buſineſs, and have adjuſted every thing to your ſatisfaction; the treaty would have been prepared in the beſt manner, and great and many advantages would have been derived from it, and I ſhould have acquired univerſal praiſe. Even at preſent I am exerting myſelf to the utmoſt of my power, in promiſing what is incumbent on my attachment, and am deſirous of ſpeedily bringing to a ſettlement whatever *Pundit Purdhaun* may propoſe conducive to a thorough reconciliation;

ciliation: I have therefore kept the treaty with the greateſt care and caution in my poſſeſſion, and having taken a copy of it, I have added to each article another which appeared to me proper and adviſable, and without any loſs or diſadvantage to the Engliſh, or any thing more in favour of the *Pundit Purdhaun*, than what was contained in the former treaties: this I have ſent to you, and hope that you will prepare and ſend a treaty conformable to that, without any Beſides, or If, or Why, or But, and Whereas, that as ſoon as it arrives I may depart from *Poonah*; and having united with me *Row Madajee Scindiah*, and having brought over the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowlah* to this buſineſs, I may ſettle and adjuſt all matters which are in this bad ſituation. As ſoon as I have received my diſmiſſion from thence I would ſet off for *Calcutta*, and repreſent to you every thing which for a long while I have had on my mind; and by this tranſaction erect to the view of all the world the ſtandard of the greatneſs and goodneſs of the Engliſh, and of my maſter, and extinguiſh the flames of war with the waters of friendſhip. The compaſſing all theſe advantages and happy proſpects depends entirely upon your will and conſent, and the power of bringing them to an iſſue is in your hands alone. Further particulars you will learn from my letter to *Beueram Pundit*.

Poſtſcript. The ſame as the one to the Rajah's letter.

A true copy of the tranſlation.

E. Hay,
*Act*ˢ *Sec*ʸ.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Maha Rajah *Moodajee Booſla* to *Beneram Pundit*; dated the 16th Zeheidga.

I have lately received eight arzies from you. The firſt two which arrived informed me that the Nabob had told you he reſolved to enter into a treaty with *Pundit Purdhaun* under my guarantee and ſecurity, but that the articles which you had propoſed did not meet with his aſſent; that *Dewan Dewargur Pundit* need not take the trouble of coming to *Calcutta*; and that you were not likely to come or go as you might chooſe. After this one or two or more letters arrived, acquainting me that the Nabob *Amaud ul-Dowlah* had held a council, at which he told you he was determined on peace. Three other letters I received with the treaty. As you had at firſt written that you was greatly affected by that converſation, and wiſhed to retire to *Benares*, I wrote in conſequence of that to *Hydrabad*, to *Poonah*, and to *Cuttack*: about ten days afterwards I received your letters, informing me that peace had been determined on, and all doubts removed; and I learnt the contents of the treaty from the Perſian copy of it. In the firſt place, what regards *Ragonauth Row* is written in an inſincere manner. Where friendſhip is wiſhed for, and is under diſcuſſion, no word admitting of doubt or inſincerity ought to be uſed, and every article ought to be written without the ſmalleſt obſcurity: I have therefore not thought it adviſable to ſend my Miniſter *Dewargur Pundit* to *Poonah* with the treaty. But if every article of the treaty had been plain and free from doubts, the Dewan would certainly have been ſent to *Poonah* to employ himſelf for the completion of peace. This could not however be done; and the length of time, which from the great diſtance of the way is requiſite for the arriving of letters and the receiving the anſwers, cannot be remedied. But God is witneſs of the friendſhip and affection which from my heart I entertain for the Nabob; yet there is now no remedy, except the execution of the plan which the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* and *Pundit Purdhaun* have ſettled. For theſe laſt fourteen months I have continually written every occurrence and tranſaction, without omitting the ſmalleſt circumſtance; and in the kharetah which I have now written to the Nabob, I have mentioned every thing which was incumbent on my friendſhip, and have alſo included all the particulars of the treaty. All other matters you will learn from the letters of *Dewan Dewagur Pundit*, who has written more fully to you. Appendix, No. 363.

A true copy of the tranſlation.

E. Hay, *Act*ˢ *Sec*ʸ.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Dewan Dewargur Pundit* to *Beneram Pundit*; dated the 16th Zeheidja; i. e. 13th December 1780.

I have received your ſucceſſive letters, dated the 17th, 19th, 22d, 24th, and 29th of Ramſaun, and the 1ſt, 7th, 21ſt, and 23d Shaival, and the 22d of Zekaida. Firſt two letters arrived to the following purport: that the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* had told you that he was deſirous of concluding a treaty of peace and alliance with the Chiefs of *Poonah*, under the guarantee of the Maha Rajah, but that he could not aſſent to the conditions propoſed by us: that he had forbid my coming to *Calcutta*, and had told you that you were at liberty either to ſtay or go; that you had accordingly for the departure prepared. After that another letter was received, in which you wrote, that the Nabob having held a council, told you that he was reſolved to make a peace; and having called you into the council, held a conſultation with you on all matters; and afterwards ſaid to you in private, that as the Maha Rajah had from his great friendſhip written to him letters containing all his private ſecrets, which were more ſacred to him than his own life, it was therefore incumbent on him to exert himſelf for the completion of peace, and that he had accordingly prepared a treaty with *Pundit Purdhaun*, under the guarantee of the Maha Rajah, which he was diſpatching, together with karetahs from himſelf. Three karetahs and letters accordingly arrived, and were fully underſtood; and we learnt from them that money had been ſent to *Rajah Chimnajee Bahadre*, with many other particulars. As we firſt received letters from you, acquainting us of the treaty and conditions not being approved of, and expreſſive of your deſire to go to *Benares*, conformably to them we wrote to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, to *Poonah*, &c. Ten days afterwards other letters were received: in them you wrote, that the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, from his great favour, ſhewed you much attention, and told you he was ſettling a peace with *Pundit Purdhaun*, under the guarantee of the Maha Rajah; that he would reſtore *Baſſein* and the *Guicawar*, and *Guzerat*, and the Talooks of *Kullian*; but that they muſt unite with him for an invaſion into the country of *Hyder Naig*, and for his reduction: all this we perfectly underſtood: and you beſides wrote, that in two or four days the treaty will be prepared and diſpatched. Accordingly four days after we received the treaty, with three letters; this treaty was written on one ſide of the paper in Engliſh, and on the other ſide in Perſian; and on one of theſe treaties there was a ſeal; the other two were copies without ſeals. After them arrived three more copies of the ſame treaty, and three karetahs, addreſſed to this quarter, to *Pundit Purdhaun*, and to *Scindia*. The contents of the treaty we learnt from the Perſian ſide of it, and were fully comprehended by us. The anſwers to every one of the articles have accordingly been written to the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*. When peace is really and ſincerely wiſhed for, it is proper to write every article without obſcurity: had this treaty been plain and without doubts in all its parts, I ſhould then have inſtantly ſet off for *Poonah*, where I ſhould have explained and ſatisfied them on every point. Firſt, the opportunity was ſuffered to eſcape, namely, when I went to *Poonah* and wrote myſelf to General *Goddard*, and received his anſwer; had at that time an interview taken place between the General and *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, all miſunderſtandings would have been cleared up, and by this time *Hyder Naig* would have been ſo entirely ruined, that neither his name nor any ſign of his having exiſted would have remained, and *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Nabob would have become one ſoul in two bodies.

Appendix. No. 63.

That opportunity was loſt, and as matters were referred to the deciſion of arms, *Pundit Purdhaun* readily conſenting to his own diſadvantage, intered into an alliance with *Hyder Naig*, on this agreement, that they ſhould carry ruin and deſolation into the country of the Engliſh. And the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* wrote to *Pundit Purdhaun*, and having with him ſettled a plan, brought us into this diſtreſs againſt our inclination and wiſhes. Had I not agreed to this I ſhould have been blamed for the misfortunes of the *Ranjee*; and I who am a well-wiſher and faithful ſervant of the *Ranjee*, ſhould have ſuffered every reproach and accuſation. As General *Goddard* had arrived at *Haſhungabad*, and Mr. *Weatherſtone* had come to *Naigpore*, and they had been ſupplied from this quarter with bullocks for their artillery, and all other duties of friendſhip had been performed, this was made uſe of as an argument for blaming and accuſing us; and *Pundit Purdkaun* openly affirmed to me, that we had a cloſe alliance and friendſhip with the Engliſh gentlemen: and at the ſame time Monſieur *Chevalier* the French Chief, having eſcaped from *Calcutta* had come to *Cuttack* in hopes of protection, and Mr. *Elliott* who was coming to this quarter, having arrived at *Cuttack*, requeſted him; notwithſtanding that in political affairs it is very blame-worthy to forſake a perſon who has claimed refuge with you, yet in conſequence of our friendſhip we delivered him up: and although the inhabitants of this country were diſpleaſed and blamed me, yet I conſidered ſolely my friendſhip, and by this I had become obnoxious and ſuſpected. Having no remedy I found it abſolutely neceſſary for me to aſſent to the plan, and in conſequence of that to raiſe 30,000 new horſemen. It is now 14 months that we have laboured under inexpreſſible diſtreſs, and been loaded with an expence of crores of rupees for the pay of theſe troops, but without endangering the friendſhip and alliance of the Engliſh gentlemen. I was deſirous to negociate a reconciliation at any rate between them and *Pundit Purdhaun*, in ſuch a manner as to enſure the perpetuity of the ancient alliance of this quarter with both ſides: during theſe 14 months I have therefore continually informed you of all matters, and have cheerfully ſubmitted to all difficulties and diſtreſſes. But when the firſt opportunity having been loſt, a treaty is at laſt received, even in that the concerns of *Ragonaut Row* are expreſſed in a doubtful and ambiguous manner; beſides which, in the affairs of *Gwalior Futty Sing Guicawar* and the Ranna of *Gohud*, there is great room for diſputes. The particulars of all theſe points were hinted at large in the Perſian letter, and are too long and tedious to be repeated here. There is a diſtance of 900 coſs between us, and a conſiderable time loſt in ſending letters and receiving the anſwers. From unlucky events and circumſtances I have been compelled to ſend an army under the command of *Rajah Chimnajee Babadre*; but how long am I to labour under the difficulties and diſtreſſes for the pay of the ſoldiers, which is immenſe? Though two or three lacks of rupees have been received, of what aſſiſtance can that be, or how does that relieve us from the weight of the arrears? We have entered into engagements with *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*; but that has not tended to the diminiſhing our difficulties, nor can they be removed till *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Engliſh gentlemen are reconciled. The Maha Rajah has accordingly exerted and employed his utmoſt abilities for this purpoſe and has written to you on the ſubject; but the event has not turned out as he wiſhed and hoped for; and now that the treaty is arrived, even in that there is great room for alterations. We are without reſource and remedy. God knows and is witneſs whether I am the friend or the enemy of the Engliſh; but the earth is hard, and the heavens are far removed. The Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* is prudent and foreſeeing, and all the difficulties of every meaſure are well known to him: at any rate he will not blame me; I am without the ſmalleſt reſource, and can ſee no remedy. Had the Engliſh army under General *Goddard* never arrived at *Heſhangabad*, what was then done would not have given umbrage to the Decan people, and we ſhould not have been compelled to ſend an army to *Cuttack*, and to ſubmit to ſuch a weight of expence, but we ſhould have been free and at liberty in all points, nor would any difficulty have come upon us. From a period of twenty years our friendſhip has been daily increaſing, but from the plan determined on by the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, which has occaſioned all theſe diſtreſſes, I am fallen into great embarraſſment. Had a peace been concluded between the Engliſh and *Pundit Purdhaun*, I was in hopes, that from the friendſhip of the Nabob, I might have requeſted ſome ſmall aſſiſtance, (on which ſubject I accordingly wrote before, and the Nabob has kindly granted us 3 lacks of rupees). I alſo hoped that *Pundit Purdhaun* would likewiſe have given ſome ſhare and that the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* would certainly have contributed his proportion, while we ourſelves would have repaid the reſt out of the country of *Hyder Naig*. But on the contrary this proſpect has not been realized, and the negociations are extended to an unforeſeen length: the will of God is ſuperior to every thing. As yet, what advantage has accrued to this quarter from the name which the Maha Rajah has adopted, from all the pains and exertions which I have taken during the laſt 14 months, and from the many letters I have written, in which I continually ſtyle myſelf the firm friend, the friend, the friend. Fourteen months are now elapſed ſince we raiſed 30,000 horſemen: if there were only paid 300 rupees, what a large ſum it would make; but the eſtabliſhed allowances of this country are 400 and 500 rupees for each horſeman, and ſome have even more than that; beſides which, there are large allowances to the Jematdars and other officers; conſider then well how great the expence of the whole muſt be. Having fully underſtood this matter you muſt explain it to the Nabob. For 14 months we have ſupported ourſelves, and how much longer muſt we wait in expectation? It is incumbent on me to do any thing that may promiſe relief from theſe diſtreſſes, and if I am negligent and dilatory in executing it, the whole State will be brought into danger, I have never been guilty of the ſmalleſt neglect, and yet I am without reaſon blamed and accuſed, and I have continually written all particulars; but the will of God is ſuperior to every thing. The Nabob muſt read with attention every ſyllable of the Perſian letter which I have written to him, and muſt write back his intentions. At this time it is not adviſable to ſend the army in cantonments, and ſtill more imprudent to recal it, as nothing but loſſes can be expected from acting contrary to the plan which was determined on: ſomething muſt therefore be done. Should the Nabob think me inexcuſable for writing in one manner, and acting in a different manner, diſtreſs for money is my excuſe, and for that I have no remedy: but if I was eſcaped from this whirlpool, and was able to keep myſelf alive, my ſole attention and endeavours would certainly be employed in cultivating the friendſhip of the Nabob, which I hope never to loſe; or ſhould the Nabob, forgetting this, give me the name of enemy, it is my misfortune, nor can I remedy it; but ſtill I will never give up my friendſhip for him. The expences of the army have rendered me without reſource. War and hoſtilities are going on in two or three different quarters; from one of theſe it is neceſſary to be free, and at the ſame time faith and truth are to be obſerved. All theſe particulars you muſt fully explain. Like the common ſtory of the villager, "If I mention "it, my mother dies; if I conceal it, my father will eat "an unclean dog;" both cauſes are difficult. In the ſame kind of dilemma, which I could not foreſee, am I fallen; and this the Nabob, who is unequalled in wiſdom and prudence, muſt reflect upon with juſtice. I write from the dictates of my friendſhip; and ſhould the Nabob conceive different ideas of what I wrote, I am remedileſs. Had the treaty been written without ambiguity there would have been no occaſion for all this: but it can never be conſented that *Ragonaut Row* ſhould remain in

full

full liberty to act as he pleaſes; for this reaſon, that *Madho Row Peiſhwa*, at the time of his death, putting the hand of his brother *Narain Row* into the hand of Maha Rajah *Ianorjee Bhoſila*, made them ſwear eternal friendſhip and that they would by all means in their power prevent the connection from being broken; and Maha Rajah *Ianojee Bhoſila* procured the releaſe of *Ragonaut Row*, who was at that time in confinement. The treacherous conduct which *Ragonaut* afterwards obſerved towards *Narrain Row*, who had a thouſand rights veſted in himſelf, is well known. After the murder of *Narrain Row* the Majah Rajah entered into new engagements, "that though he could not act in any hoſtile way againſt *Ragonaut Row*, yet he would never ſuffer him to be at liberty to act as he ſhould pleaſe." This therefore never can nor will be agreed to; and as it was not poſſible to be ſecurity for ſuch an article, the treaty has therefore not been ſent to *Poonah*, but has with letters been carefully kept here, and ſhall be diſpatched on the receipt of your anſwer. How can *Pundit Purdhaun* at this time act inimically againſt *Hyder Naig?* If he ſhould, no one in the whole world would ever again confide in him, but in the family of the Peiſhwa. There is no want of faith that they ſhould break their engagements with a perſon who ſolicited their friendſhip; beſides, at this time *Hyder Naig* has, in conſequence of his connection with the Peiſhwa, exerted all his abilities; they muſt wait till *Hyder* is guilty of ſome infringement of his engagements, which at preſent he faithfully obſerves. The opportunity of this attack, which I informed you of in the month of Cautick, upwards of 14 months ago, and which perhaps you recollect, or have letters reſpecting, was ſuffered to eſcape. If the plan had been executed agreeable to my information, by this time no mark of him would have remained; but at preſent, that to maintain their friendſhip he has exerted himſelf in this manner, how can they act with enmity againſt him? All this has proceeded from the war, and no advantage has been derived from it. The Chief of *Bombay* gave riſe to theſe hoſtilities and enmity, and has brought matters to this paſs; no fault laid in the Nabob. The Nabob was compelled to protect the honour and reputation of the Engliſh, and had he not attended to that, it would have given occaſion to unlucky events. All the preſent circumſtances are owing ſolely to his wiſh to maintain his honour. If all theſe miſunderſtandings can be removed through the mediation of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* or *Scindiah*, it makes no difference; I am certain that the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* will now not write me any letter for this reaſon, becauſe that Rajah *Chimnajee* is on the borders of *Bengal*, and perhaps ſome damages have been done by him, and which has given the Nabob ſome diſpleaſure. Let the Nabob think what he pleaſes, I am ſtill his ſincere friend; but misfortunes have no remedy.

In the Hand Writing of the Dewan.

God knows what diſtreſſes, and how great have been the expences of 25,000 men, which we have raiſed within theſe 14 months. I am now without remedy, and am in embarraſſment from two quarters; on one ſide there are treaties and engagements, and on the other a long and eſtabliſhed connection of friendſhip. I know not what to do; the Nabob is wiſe, and is well convinced of the variations and fickleneſs of times and circumſtances.

Poſtſcript, written in Perſian.

You write in your letters of the 22d and 30th of Ramzan, regarding "a negociation taking place for "peace; the conferences of the Council; and that after "much diſpleaſure the Governor had approved, and "came into a favourable diſpoſition to make a treaty to "abide by the engagements entered into by Colonel "*Upton*, to withdraw entirely from *Guzerat*, the depen-

"dencies of *Surat*, *Cokan*, and the other places which "have lately been taken poſſeſſion of, and until a treaty "can be effected to ſtop all operations." All this is extremely right and laudable, and tends to perpetual advantages. Appendix, No. 363.

The anſwer which you gave in the conference with the Council and to the Governor, was extremely proper; a hundred and a hundred praiſes. The wiſhes of my heart to eſtabliſh truth and ſincerity, and what tends to evince my deſire of promoting the welfare of the Engliſh, have been ſtrongly demonſtrated, and will continue to be ſo in your meaſures and obſervations, which were equally prudent and wiſe. True it is, that experience is the touchſtone which diſcovereth the value of a man. All is very proper, provided that the treaty from that quarter is concluded with candour and truth; and with regard to former treaties, and that the places which have been taken poſſeſſion be given up, great and ſmall; that favour be not ſhewn to *Ragonaut Row*, and that he be delivered up to the *Row Pundit Purdhaun*. I have the fulleſt confidence that the Governor, without further ſtickling or debate regarding any of theſe articles, will pay a regard to the future, and conſulting true wiſdom, will ſend a treaty concluded with a ſincere diſpoſition, ſo that I may have no doubts or difficulties in ſpeaking or writing to the *Pundit Purdhaun* and his Miniſters; that I may take a determinate part in enforcing their acquieſcence; and that I may diſpoſe the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* and *Scindia* with unanimity both in forms and in meaning to join in promoting theſe meaſures. But it is above all things neceſſary that letters ſhould be ſent to me addreſſed to the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, and alſo to *Sindiah*, the *Pundit Purdhaun*, and *Balajee Row Jenardain*; and it is highly requiſite that the ſatisfaction of *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, and the ſettling of his juſt pretenſions, ſhould be effected through the channel of this court; ſo that, with the aſſiſtance of the ſaid Nabob and *Sindiah*, I may take meaſures to lay a proper foundation for a treaty with *Pundit Purdhaun*. It muſt not depend entirely on the negociations of Mr. *John Hollond*; for if that gentleman is employed it will not be in our power here to make ſure of the aſſiſtance of the abovementioned Nabob: he will be drawn another way, and this will be the means of interrupting the whole buſineſs. As that gentleman will write in one ſtyle to *Calcutta*, and I in another, hence a difference will ariſe, which will occaſion doubts and ſuſpicions. It is particularly neceſſary to be careful to prevent this; for the Nabob is the firſt and moſt diſtinguiſhed of the Chiefs of the *Decan*, and he is in ſome meaſure ſatisfied with the Engliſh gentlemen on the reſtoration of *Mortezanagur*. It is therefore very adviſable that he ſhould be conciliated by civilities and profeſſions, and the ſettlement of his juſt pretenſions, and thereby brought over to co-operate in promoting the deſired objects. You write, that the Governor after expreſſing many doubts and objections about ſupplying the expences of the troops which are arrived at *Cuttack*, and after you had ſatisfied him, ſaid, "The gentlemen of the Council will not agree; for "my own part I approve of it. For the preſent I will "give thus much money; but the troops of this place "are going to *Madras*: let near 3,000 horſe of the "troops which are at *Cuttack* accompany them, ſo that "they may arrive in ſafety at the place of their deſtina-"tion; but let nothing be ſaid of the chout of *Bengal*, "for this would draw great diſcredit on me with the "Council and the Engliſh; and where advantages of "errores and lacks are in contemplation, it is improper "to look to ſuch inconſiderable objects. Some com-"penſation will be found for it." The caſe is this: in all the correſpondence which has paſſed during two years, not a word has ſlipped from my pen that has had the leaſt relation to avarice or ſelf-intereſt. But I am embarraſſed on account of the troops which are arrived at *Cuttack*, from my friendſhip to both ſides, namely, the *Pundit Purdhaun* and the Engliſh; they are prevented

 from

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from ravaging any of the Engliſh territories from a regard to the latter; and they are prevented from returning from a regard to the plan which has been laid down by the *Pundit Purdhaun*. I am perplexed therefore betwixt a regard to my friendſhip: I had no other motive in what I wrote. But two poſitive conditions are propoſed by the Governor before he will agree; the one is to relinquiſh the chout of *Bengal* out of friendſhip to the Engliſh; the ſecond is to ſend 3,000 horſe along with the officer who has been detached to *Madras*. The caſe is this: the exertions which were made by the late Rajah to obtain the chout, the labours he went through, and the valour he diſplayed, are as apparent as the ſun. In theſe wars, worlds were overturned, multitudes were trampled under the feet of horſes; the treaſures and goods of merchants, bankers, and inhabitants of that country, were plundered and deſtroyed, and two and twenty of the moſt diſtinguiſhed Chiefs of this country, together with many of their companions and friends, from the treachery of the Soubah of *Bengal*, fell in the ſervice of their maſter; till at length our hereditary right and property of the chout was fully eſtabliſhed and confirmed. Although from an union with the Engliſh the greateſt advantages can be obtained, yet how can we relinquiſh theſe rights and inheritances which commemorate the fame of our anceſtors, without forfeiting at the ſame time our dignity and rank as Princes? In the ſame manner as the Governor ſays diſcredit would be drawn upon him with the Council, ſo would this draw upon us the contempt of all our neighbours. What therefore is written regarding the relinquiſhment of the chout of *Bengal*, is no ways proper. It is adviſable that our name ſhould be preſerved in that Soubah; but except this, mention any other difficulties which occur, ſo that they may be obviated. In preſerving the name of our chout great advantages will be derived to the Engliſh; every one will be afraid to invade their country: this will be a great advantage. If troops were to be ſent along with the officer of the Engliſh, intelligence thereof would doubtleſs be carried to the Peiſhwa and *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*; and they will ſay with certainty, that *Booſhla* and the Engliſh have in their hearts been ſecretly united, and now it is diſcovered: he is in fact, therefore, one of the Engliſh, and we muſt concert meaſures and provide againſt him. All that has been written to *Poonah* and to the Nabob, regarding peace and the treaty which is coming from *Calcutta*, will be rendered ineffectual, and a war will be occaſioned with the Chiefs of the *Decan*: then at leaſt 50,000 horſe, beſides the neceſſary ſtores and ammunition, muſt be got ready before any thing can be done. By the bleſſing of God, whenever my letters arrive, as many troops as are wanted can be procured; but I am without money. As the courage and bravery of the family of *Booſhla* is well known, great revenues would be neceſſary. Although with the ſpirit and ability of the Engliſh, the aſſiſtance of crores and lacks is not ſo very great a matter, and men who accumulate treaſure, accumulate it for ſuch days as theſe; yet when ſo many objections are made to aſſiſt in paying the expences of the troops at *Cuttack*, how can I place my expectations in obtaining larger heaps? If ſo much ſpirit be ſhewn from that quarter, I am ready; and I know well that this will not be done by the Council. As the friendſhip of the Engliſh is at all events the firſt and moſt neceſſary conſideration, I will therefore exert myſelf in eſtabliſhing peace; for the power of making peace with all is the beſt object. To this all other meaſures are ſubſervient; and this will certainly be done by them (the Engliſh.) You write, "That after having laid the foundation of peace with the *Pundit Purdhaun*, it is requiſite that ſome troops ſhould be ſent along with Colonel *Goddard* againſt *Hyder Naig*, and take poſſeſſion of his country, when all theſe engagements and propoſals may be aſſented to." My reaſon is confounded in diſcuſſing this ſuggeſtion. At a time when *Hyder Naig* is in every reſpect in alliance with the Peiſhwa, and has aſſiſted with his ſoul and life to repel the Engliſh, ſo as to unite our troops with thoſe of the enemy, and endeavour to extirpate him, would not this fix the ſtamp of infamy upon us for ever? Would any Prince, for generations to come, ever after aſſiſt or unite with the Peiſhwa? Be yourſelf the judge; and whether ſuch a conduct would become a Prince or not? Why then do you mention it? Why do you write it? The caſe is as follows: at firſt there was the utmoſt enmity betwixt *Hyder Naig* and the *Pundit Purdhaun*, and there was the fulleſt intention of ſending troops into *Hyder Naig*'s country: and after the concluſion of the war with *Bombay*, and the capture of *Ragonaut Row*, it was firmly reſolved to ſend troops into that quarter, and a reliance was placed on the treaty which was entered into by the gentlemen of *Bombay* before the war; but when *Ragonaut Row* again went to them, and General *Goddard* was ready to commence hoſtilities, when no regard was paid to the friendly propoſals made by us and the *Pundit Purdhaun*, when they deſiſted from coming to *Poonah* agreeable to their promiſe, and a categorical anſwer was given to the deputies from *Poonah*, the Miniſters of *Poonah* then conſulted amongſt themſelves, and having adviſed with the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, they conſidered that as enemies were appearing on both ſides, and it would be difficult to cope with both, what was to be done? Peace muſt be made with one of them, and war muſt be carried on with the other. They wiſhed above all things in their hearts to make peace with the Engliſh gentlemen, and unite with them to puniſh *Hyder Naig*: but theſe gentlemen had plainly refuſed to enter into any terms of reconciliation; it was therefore adviſable to accommodate matters with *Hyder Naig*: Although he had long been an enemy, what elſe could be done? Having nothing elſe left for it, they were compelled to enter into an union with *Hyder*; but as the innate diſpoſition of that Prince is compoſed of ingratitude and infidelity, and he can never ceaſe to err, it is certain that he will violate the treaty and yield; a pretence that will render it adviſable for us, in conjunction with the Engliſh, to take vengeance, without incurring the imputation of a breach of treaties. We muſt therefore wait for an opportunity when he ſhall commit ſome fault, and doubtleſs he will commit one; but the time and opportunity are ſtill to come, and this is the way: after the treaty formed with ſincerity and candour arrives from your quarter, I will ſet out for *Poonah* to conclude theſe important matters, and will accompliſh every thing as wiſhed for. I will unite *Sindiah* with me, and I will ſatisfy the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*; and as the utmoſt diſguſt ſubſiſts in the hearts of the Miniſters and *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* againſt *Hyder*, yet for the ſake of appearances, as ſome pretence is neceſſary, we will conſult together; find out ſome accuſation againſt him. We muſt fix all our thoughts on this; but ſome little delay is neceſſary to effect all theſe objects. This you well underſtand, and be not impatient. Things which at firſt can eaſily and ſpeedily be accompliſhed, from the viciſſitude of affairs may afterwards be difficult. At preſent, the eſtabliſhment of peace between the Engliſh gentlemen, the *Pundit Purdhaun*, and the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, is highly expedient; and, as I formerly wrote, the loſs which each party has ſuſtained from keeping up their armies, may be indemnified from ſome operations carried on by them in conjunction. This is certainly true. In former times it might have been done immediately: if now, a delay of ſome days muſt take place, it does not ſignify: what comes ſlowly, comes well. The root and exiſtence of *Hyder Naig* will, in proceſs of time, be extirpated. To conclude: formerly a long correſpondence of this kind took place with Lord *Clive*, which aroſe from a cordial friendſhip on both ſides; after that no correſpondence was kept up, till knowing the diſtinguiſhed character of the preſent Governor, and finding that he was capable of comprehending all theſe objects, an intercourſe and confidential communication has been eſtabliſhed. God, who ſeeth the inſide of all hearts, is a witneſs whether it proceeded from intereſted-

neſs,

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neſs, or from the ſincereſt friendſhip. The event will infallibly evince, that it would be difficult to find throughout the whole extent of the *Decan*, and of *India*, a friend ſo truly attached as the Rajah my maſter.

Poſtſcript.—To the letter which you wrote to *Bowanny Pundit* to this effect, that if *Pundit Purdhaun* ſhould not be ſatisfied with the treaty on account of the news of *Hyder Naig*, it is proper that you ſhould cultivate the friendſhip of the Engliſh, becauſe many advantages may ariſe from it, and the Governor reckons you his firm friend. I hope that all theſe advantages agreeable to my inclinations will be brought about. This is the anſwer; that after the arrival of the true and undiſſembling treaty from *Calcutta* to this effect, to forſake *Raganaut Row*, and to deliver him to *Pundit Purdhaun*, and to reſtore all the places in the *Kokan*, and *Guzerat*, and the Talooks of *Hind*. I will go to *Poonah*, and will get a treaty on his (the Peiſhwa) part; and whatever is in my heart I will get eſtabliſhed in the treaty. But if the Peiſhwa does not agree to this equitable treaty, and peremptorily refuſes it, I will then write to you (agreeable to your letter) whatever is proper to be written. To keep an army, much money is requiſite; but I ſhall in no reſpect be neglectful in preſerving friendſhip with the Engliſh, and withdrawing from all others will adhere to them.

A true copy of the tranſlation.

E. Hay,
Acts Secy.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Rajah *Seina Behadar* to *Beneram Pundit*, dated the 23d Suffier; and a Duplicate to the ſame purport: received the 26th February.

Having committed many particulars verbally to *Biſſumber Pundit*, I diſpatched him to your quarter. All thoſe particulars you will have underſtood, as alſo the letters which have ſince been written to you. From the friendſhip of the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowla*, we are loaded with the reproaches of *Pundit Purdhaun* and *Nizam Ally Khan*; and out of regard to the friendſhip of the Nabob, no objection or oppoſition has been made to the march of Colonel *Pearſe*; but how will the event of this appear? The Maha Rajah formerly wrote to me that he was at a great diſtance, but that the Nabob was near me, and that whatever was proper I ſhould write to the Nabob and act agreeable to his orders. Accordingly, to this time I have acted in that manner; and it is therefore incumbent and neceſſary for the Nabob, in conſideration of his friendſhip, to think of and ſettle ſome plan for the relief of our diſtreſſes. You muſt now explain fully to the Nabob this letter, and ſatisfy him. Inform me of its ſucceſs. After the diſtreſſes of the army ſhall have been removed, and the foundation of our friendſhip ſtrengthened, great advantage will accrue. To this time, from an attention to my friendſhip, I have readily ſubmitted to theſe expences and reproaches which have been thrown upon us by *Pundit Purdhaun* and *Nizam Ally Khan*. The Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* is wiſe. It is neceſſary that he pay regard not to the money but to the friendſhip of the Maha Rajah, and that he performs what ought to be done. This friendſhip will be of great utility. I diſpatch this letter under charge of two Coſſids: return them with an anſwer ſpeedily.

In the Rajah's hand:—I have ſaid to *Biſſumber Sheo Behader* whatever was proper to be ſaid. He will have made every point known to you. Send him back hither ſoon, and return a ſpeedy anſwer.

A true copy of the tranſlation,

E. Hay,
Acts Secy.

From *Bowanny Pundit Appa* to the ſame; 23d Suffier.

Having committed ſeveral points of negociation to *Biſſumber Pundit*, I have diſpatched him to your quarter; and afterwards other letters were ſent; which you will have received, and underſtood the contents: you will now learn all particulars from the letter of the Rajah. From the friendſhip of the Nabob great expences and diſtreſſes have come upon us; and *Seremunt Row Pandit Purdhaun* and the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan* have reviled and reproached us; it is therefore incumbent upon the Nabob not to pay any attention to the money but to the friendſhip of the Maha Rajah. You are a well-wiſher to both ſides, and muſt explain this in a proper manner, and ſend a ſpeedy anſwer.

In the Pundit's hand:—Mr. *Anderſon* arrived, but no opportunity offered for an interview. He has ſent the letters which were with him, and which I underſtood. We have done what the Nabob requeſted, and the Nabob muſt now keep his eyes on the friendſhip to give us relief in the article of pay to the army; by ſo doing the Nabob would enſure great advantage to himſelf.

A true copy of the tranſlation,

E. Hay,
Acts Secy.

From Rajah *Ram Pundit* to the ſame; 23d Suffier.

I have before this written to you all particulars which you will have underſtood. *Biſſumber Pundit* having obtained permiſſion from the Preſence, ſent for me from *Cuttack*. When I arrived at the army by the advice of the *Pundit*, and agreeable to your former letters received at *Cuttack*, I explained every particular in a proper manner to *Appa Sabeb*, and repreſented them likewiſe to the Rajah. I alſo ſpoke, at *Biſſumber Pundit*'s deſire, reſpecting the march and ſtation of the army, and got it ſettled that Colonel *Pearſe* ſhould march without any moleſtation with his army, ſuch days journies as he may chooſe. Accordingly, all the requeſts of *Biſſumber* were agreed to, and the *Pundit* has been diſpatched to the Nabob and to you. Do you now execute whatever plan may bring things to an iſſue. I am the leaſt of the ſervants of the Sirkar. Out of the regard to the friendſhip of the Nabob, we for 10 months, to prevent the ſmalleſt injury being done, detained the army in *Cuttack*, and to the extent of our abilities to bear, brought into theſe diſtreſſes not only ourſelves but our relations, friends, and allies, and attempted to defray thoſe expences. *Biſſumber Pundit* is well acquainted with the ſentiments, views, and wiſhes of this quarter, and will have explained them to you. I have, to complete the point you have propoſed to me, ſpoken to the *Appa Sabeb*, and by procuring a free paſſage for the battalion have, with my eyes open, ſubmitted to a heavy reproach; and leaving only the propriety of this matter to you, I have executed it, as this was for the intereſt and advantage of both Governments: but how long is this friendſhip to be maintained through the intervention of others? The Nabob from his wiſdom and prudence having conquered the whole country, has for theſe 20 years ſent to Europe large ſums of money; and it is well known, that for theſe 20 years the Maha Rajah has never once ſent an army towards this country; and as he for 10 years did not think the friendſhip of the Nabob adviſable, the Nabob remained in peace, attending to the management of his country, and raiſing his glory. If I was to make an account of the chout, to how much would it not amount? But fear of God is neceſſary. For a whole year an army of 30,000 horſe has remained with their eyes towards that quarter, and continued within their own limits, and did not commit the ſmalleſt injury in the country of *Bengal*, to the damage of even a dry leaf. Much money will be received, but it is difficult for this ſeaſon, and the advantages of friendſhip to be attained. I am now releaſed from this, the blame of it belongs to the Nabob. I performed the ſame friendly offices at *Hoſhungabad*, and enabled them to go in ſafety to *Surat*; and in this place what could be my motive for delivering up the Frenchman to the Nabob? God is witneſs that it was to give plea-

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ſure to the Nabob. It is now univerſally known that I procured a paſſage for the battalions. Should the Nabob at this time alter his ſentiments, God will bear witneſs. This time is diſtreſſing; the ſoldiers pray that they may be led to battle and plunder, and daily and nightly make this requeſt. You will explain all theſe particulars to the Nabob in a proper manner, and having ſettled it, write me intelligence of it. The ſeaſon of opportunity is gone; this may be of great conſequence and advantage. If he is inclined to maintain and ſupport his greatneſs, let him remain firm in his friendſhip for the Nabob. Reflect on this maturely; as I am ſatisfied as to the pay of the army, I will do every thing which may be for the intereſts of the Nabob; having ſettled this, ſpeedily inform me of it.

A true copy of the tranſlation.

E. Hay,
Acts Secy.

From *Hurry Hurr Maha Deo*; 26th Suffier.

Your letters dated in Suffier, were received the laſt day of that month. According to your deſire I am going with *Munnijee Pundit* to the army: after my arrival there, I will repreſent all particulars to you. I have heard that *Biſſumber Pundit* being arrived at *Ballaſore*, is remaining there, in expectation of ſeeing Mr. *Anderſon*; before this he is doubtleſs arrived at *Calcutta*. Colonel *Pearſe* is arrived with his army at *Balaſore*, and *Buggerunt Row Nanna* has had an interview with him. At this time letters are received from *Rajah Seina Bahadre* and *Rajah Ram Pundit* to *Dewan Huderam* and *Munjoo Choudry*, to this purport: that between the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* and the Maha Rajah the firmeſt friendſhip exiſts; that Colonel *Pearſe* is going with an army to oppoſe *Hyder Naig*; that I muſt therefore come immediately to *Gunneſe Nagur Ghaut*, and prepare the ferry boats for the army to croſs as ſoon as they may arrive there; and that *Munjoo Choudry* and *Namdar Khawn* muſt accompany them to the limits of *Ganjam*: that I muſt quiet the inhabitants of the town, and prevent their conceiving any apprehenſions; that the battalions are going to *Madras* and will do no injury; and that I muſt give poſitive orders to the ſame effect to *Shawbeg Khan* and *Nabar Khan*, &c. who are on the other ſide of the river *Gunjoory*. Whatever further I may learn I will repreſent to you.

A true copy of the tranſlation.

E. Hay,
Acts Secy.

A ſecond Letter from *Rojah Ram Pundit* to *Beneram*.

Whatever I and *Biſſumber Pundit* together repreſented to the Rajah and *Appe Saheb*, will have been made known to you by the *Pundit*, who has been diſpatched from hence. Colonel *Pearſe* has had permiſſion to march, and ſtrict orders have been given to the Beuſſaries to furniſh him with proviſions; and having ſent an agent from us with him, he has been forwarded to the ſouthward from the neighbourhood of *Cuttack*. *Biſſumber Pundit* at the time of his departure petitioned from the Preſence, that they would not leave *Cuttack* till he ſhould addreſs an arzee to them after his arrival at *Calcutta*. The troops here complain greatly, that they came in the hopes of enriching themſelves in the country of *Bengal*, and that to this time they had neglected all thoſe hopes of acquiring money and goods; that they had now, for the ſake of friendſhip, given free paſſage to Colonel *Pearſe*; that they muſt now either give them intelligence where to get their money, or elſe ſuffer them to ſhew their courage and activity. How long are theſe diſcourſes to laſt? We are anxiouſly expecting letters from your quarter. We have performed the duties of friendſhip: To this time you and I have, in all caſes and ſeaſons, exerted ourſelves in repreſenting all matters, and pointing out the opportunities. The execution of every thing depends upon the Nabob: he will do whatever is right.

A true copy of the tranſlation.

E. Hay, Acts Secy.

From *Bowanny Pundit*, Moonſhy to *Moodajee Bhooſla*, to *Beneram Pundit*; dated 20th Mohervira, and received in *Calcutta* the 22d Suffier, 21ſt February.

Your letter dated the 6th Zeheidja arrived on the 9th Mohurrim, under charge of the Coffids of *Teek Chunder Meerdha*; together with Hindoſtanny letters, addreſſed to the Maha Rajah, my maſter, and the Dewan; and the receipt of it made me acquainted with all particulars, and gave me the greateſt ſatisfaction. You write, that at firſt you could not agree in any point of your converſations, till after the arrival of the letters from the Preſence, and from *Dada Saheb*; when on the contrary every thing was unanimouſly aſſented to, and the paper of advice and requeſts, and all the other points, were approved of, agreeable to what they had written: that upon theſe particulars being determined on, karetahs and letters from the Nabob, with a treaty under the ſeal and ſignature of the Council, written in Engliſh and Perſian, and with letters from you, were diſpatched by the way of *Benares*, and by that of *Cuttack*; and that the letters from hence were returned by the ſame conveyance: that as yet no anſwer had arrived to any one of them, which circumſtance had thrown you into the greateſt terror and apprehenſions, leſt theſe papers, containing ſecrets of ſuch importance, ſhould not have arrived ſafe at the Preſence, but ſhould have been loſt in the many dangers of the road: that you requeſt the receipt of them may be acknowledged as ſpeedily as poſſible, in order to reſtore tranquillity to your mind: that you have, agreeable to the contents of the letters from the Preſence and *Dada Saheb*, dated the 20th of Ramzan, repreſented to the Nabob the means of ſupporting the war on all four ſides, which requires the preſence of an Engliſh army in every quarter, and will be attended with a conſiderable expence; and that you inquired of him, in caſe he ſhould not adopt this plan, and ſhould not chooſe to incur too great an expence of money, in that caſe what advice and reſolution he would take, and what he would determine on for us? and if he does not act in that manner, what other plan he has adopted? That the Nabob is accordingly meditating on the above-mentioned points, and has begun to ſettle about the money, which will be entirely adjuſted after the arrival of the anſwers from hence: that the Nabob declares that he has given up the aſſiſting of *Ragonaut Row* ſolely out of friendſhip for the Maha Rajah, for that otherwiſe there are many chiefs and miniſters in *Decan* who are ambitious, and who would give money and treaſure for aſſiſtance: that at this time *Keeroo Butt*, a truſty ſervant of *Ragonaut Row*, is come for this very purpoſe, on the part of ſeveral perſons of credit and diſtinction, and promiſes money on condition of *Ragonaut*'s being placed on the throne; but that he pays no attention to ſuch promiſes, being reſolved to maintain the friendſhip of the Maha Rajah, and never to aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*; and that now he has ſent the treaty, he can never think of giving any aſſiſtance, and that he is anxious for the receipt of the anſwers from hence. That you ſaid in anſwer, that the Maha Rajah alſo was in every ſituation attentive to his friendſhip, and would, without doubt, act agreeable to what the Nabob had written: that it is adviſable to ſend an anſwer as ſpeedily as poſſible, becauſe, in ſhort, to this time every converſation and negociation has been founded on a deſire for friendſhip and alliance. But what is learnt from *Bowanny Pundit Buckſhy* being of a contrary nature, and *Rajah Chimnajee Baboo* having left his cantonments and encamped, and intending to enter the Engliſh dominions, Colonel *Pearſe*, an Engliſh Chief, has been ordered to march with 8 battalions by land; that they are waiting in expectation of the anſwers from hence. If theſe arrive ſoon it is well, if not, they will not remain long patient, but will march forwards and begin hoſtilities; and the valour and courage of the Engliſh, which is univerſally known and extolled, will give a bad iſſue to the matter; the receipt of the money will be prevented,

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and plunder and rapine muſt be expected in the room of it: that it is therefore moſt adviſable to remain on friendly terms with the Engliſh, and to enter into alliance and intimate connection with them, and at all events to effect a reconciliation between them and *Pundit Purdhaun*. That you have, agreeable to the former letters from hence, ſet on foot a negociation reſpecting the money, of which there are required ſeveral lacks; and that you will inform us of whatever may be determined after the arrival of the anſwers from hence. What you write conformably to the letters from hence, dated the 2d Zekaida, that although the favours which the Nabob ſhews to you increaſe daily, and although he has a ſincere affection for you, yet if it is the pleaſure of the Preſence that you ſhould remain, you muſt be informed of it, otherwiſe you will go to *Benares*. All theſe particulars are perfectly underſtood; and from the newſpaper of the royal Durbar, the manner and method of all the affairs at the Durbar, and the open and undiſguiſed proceedings in tranſacting all the concerns of the Sultanut and country were likewiſe fully learnt: and the paper, containing the preparations of the Engliſh in collecting troops at *Benares*, *Ellahabad*, *Fyzabad*, the neighbourhood of *Gwalior*, and in the *Carnatic*, was peruſed, and the full particulars of your letter, together with the abſtract and abridgment of ſeveral ſecret and important points were in a proper and complete manner explained to the Maha Rajah and his Miniſters, and the informing us of all occurrences and of the ſituation of affairs which you at this diſtance ſend continually and repeatedly: 'the explaining the concealed parts of all matters; the diſcovering the whole of our views and wiſhes; the foreſeeing the end of every thing at the very commencement of it; the holding faſt in your hand the chain of caution and circumſpection for the intereſts and advantage of your maſter; the being from your heart and ſoul employed in maintaining truth and faith, and in obſerving the duties of gratitude; your keeping up at the Durbar of the Engliſh a diſtinction and ſuperiority above all the reſt; have gained you the favour and affection of the Maha Rajah and his Miniſter; and the advantage to reſult from that, will, by the bleſſing of God, ſhortly appear to the utmoſt of your wiſhes. Knowing it to be incumbent on my friendſhip to give you the earlieſt intelligence of this lucky event, I have written it to you.

The karetahs and treaties which were ſent in duplicate by the way of *Benares*, are all ſafe arrived, and letters from you were received accompanying them, beſides a ſeparate letter conformable to what you wrote; but by the way of *Cuttack* no karetah or letter was received. In anſwer to theſe, karetahs and letters were diſpatched at two different times, under charge of the Coſſid which came from your quarter, accompanied by others from hence; firſt from *Ramleez* the 15th Zeheidja, and afterwards from *Noigpore* the 2d Mohurrem. Doubtleſs, they have arrived in ſucceſſive order, and have made you acquainted with all the contents. You need not be under any apprehenſion reſpecting the arrival of the letters of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, which you ſent back, as they were ſafely received at the ſame time as the letter for *Zuffer-ud-Dowlah*; but two papers of news written by *Kiſſen Row Billall* remain with you; thoſe likewiſe you will without doubt ſend. The letter which I wrote to you, under date the 6th Mohurrem, and diſpatched under charge of Coſſids belonging to the Sirkar, was written conformable to the orders of the Maha Rajah and the directions of the Dewan, and was free from all obſcurity and diſguiſe, was full of truth and ſincerity, and had not the ſmalleſt degree of doubt, excuſe, or diſſimulation; and at this time alſo, whatever I heard from the Maha Rajah my maſter, and from his Miniſter, I have written in the fulleſt manner: it is as follows; that what the Nabob has ſaid, namely, that notwithſtanding the Engliſh forces are ſtationed in all quarters, from *Benares* and *Ellahabad* as far as *Gwalior*, and from *Conkan* to the *Carnatic*, for the ſettlement of the war and diſputes from the four quarters, and for the recovery of their military reputation, and for ſupplying the expences required by theſe meaſures; and that notwithſtanding that many of the Chiefs and Miniſters are inclined towards *Ragonaut Row*, and promiſe to ſupply large ſums of money in caſe of his being reſtored to the throne; yet he has, ſolely with a view to pleaſe the Maha Rajah, ſent of himſelf a treaty, and has deſiſted from all aſſiſtance of *Ragonaut Row*; for that otherwiſe, to this time he had no inclination to enter into peace and alliance with them; that he is anxiouſly expecting the anſwer of the Maha Rajah. The caſe is this: that in the commencement of a war, the event of it, which muſt be either defeat or victory, is known only to God, who ſees the inward as well as outward. It is firſt neceſſary to quit the guard of one's own country before one can carry fire into the dominions of another; and while the other does not commit any breach of his engagements, to bind on without cauſe the girdle of enmity, and to act in oppoſition to all faith and treaties, is contrary to the opinion of all wiſe men, and is the height of infidelity. Beſides this, General *Goddard*'s being at *Hoſhungabad* was conſidered and pointed at through all parts of the *Decan*, as a proof of the friendſhip and alliance between theſe two countries: for this reaſon in the letters from hence it was adviſed and requeſted, conformable to our friendſhip and good wiſhes, that peace and reconciliation be effected, and in conſequence of that not being approved of, a karetah was ſent to you, containing the means of ſupporting this arduous war. In anſwer to this the Nabob wrote, that he had dropped that intention, and wiſhed for nothing but friendſhip. From this you muſt reflect, that if the letters from this quarter to that quarter had had any weight, out of thoſe two propoſals, one would certainly have met with his approbation. Enough of this. When after the Bombay defeat the Dewan went to *Poonah*, and *Hyder Naig* had no other kind of connection with *Pundit Peiſhwa*, except the ſending an army into his country, and General *Goddard* from himſelf had propoſed peace and friendſhip, and when his declining to aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*, and his promiſing to come to *Poonah*, was ſolely for the purpoſe of a reconciliation; and at that time although the Dewan in perſon exerted and employed the moſt powerful arguments for this purpoſe, yet they had no effect. Having no other reſource, the people of *Poonah* entered into an alliance with *Hyder Naig*: and whatever was to be done in conſequence has been done, and is ſtill doing. At that time, why did not the General act for the Maha Rajah's ſatisfaction? It is now become abſolutely neceſſary for us to approve the plan and ſcheme, and to raiſe an army and ſend it into *Oriſſa*, otherwiſe we ſhould never have had occaſion to raiſe an army and ſend it into *Oriſſa*, or to ſubmit to an expence of lacks and crores of rupees. All this has been the conſequence of General *Goddard*'s coming to *Hoſhungabad*, and our wiſh to maintain the friendſhip of the Engliſh. You muſt be juſt, and conſider well from what have proceeded the difficulties of this war and the preſent alarms. Afterwards, when the Dewan returned to *Naugpore*, the army which is arrived at *Cuttack* was put into cantonments ſolely for the friendſhip of the Engliſh gentlemen. Karetahs and letters were ſent from hence, containing many political and friendly ſentiments, and adviſing, that as peace was a thouſand times preferable to war, and as obſervance of treaties and engagements was the ſtandard of faith, peace ſhould be effected; or, that if this was not agreed to, then the proſecution of war on the four quarters, the ſtationing of Engliſh battalions on all ſides, and the providing money for the expences, muſt be thought of. When letters from hence to this purport were repeatedly received in that quarter, yet the Nabob, rejecting all the rights of friendſhip and affection, ſaid to you, that we were partial to *Pundit Purdhaun*, and wiſhed for his friendſhip and alliance; that he would decline our alliance; that it was of no uſe for you to remain with him, but that you might return home. Reflect what wiſh to give

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ſatisfaction to this quarter; was there any ſuch expreſſion it would have been right in him to have ſaid, that he had not the ſmalleſt intention of making peace with *Pundit Purdhaun*; that we are his friends, and are pointed at by all the people of *Dekan* on account of our friendſhip with him, who are not amicably inclined towards us, and wiſh to ſee no other intercourſe between us than that of diſputes; that we have therefore ſent an army into *Oriſſa*, and that it was neceſſary for us to unite ourſelves with him, by which means the army at *Cuttack* would become his; that as for the oppoſing his enemies, a large force was requiſite, it was therefore neceſſary for him to collect troops, and that for that purpoſe he would give us ſuch a ſum of money, and would pay us ſo much for the ſupport of the army of *Cuttack*. If he had ſpoken in this manner it would have ſet our minds at eaſe, and we ſhould, in hopes of aſſiſtance from him, have determined on plans and meaſures to be purſued: But he rejecting theſe words, which would have been conſiſtent with the advice required by the circumſtances, ſaid to you only this, that you might return home. At that time where was his wiſh to give us ſatisfaction, which he now writes has alone prompted him to make peace and to ſend the treaty? As in friendſhip and alliance ſuch a diſpute is not proper nor becoming, we have therefore aſſented and approved that he makes peace merely to pleaſe us, but only in caſe the treaty is made conformable to the former engagements. This will be an obligation conferred on his friends, and will reſtore tranquillity to the inhabitants, will extinguiſh the flames of war, and will eſtabliſh the reputation of our true friend the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*; but when we have aſſumed the name of *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, why ſhould we render it abortive, and of no effect, on account of theſe expreſſions about our ſatisfaction? What we do for him, we do for ourſelves; but only on condition that the treaty be plain and undiſguiſed, and conformable to former eſtabliſhed engagements. When the articles of it had been maturely conſidered, in the point of *Ragonaut Row*'s being at liberty to reſide wherever he may think proper, in that of the fort of *Ahmedabad*, and the ſhare of *Guzerat* being and maintained in the poſſeſſion of *Futty Sing Guicawar*, agreeable to your engagements; and in the like article ſecuring *Gwalior* to the Rana of *Gohud*, there appeared a variation from former treaties, and a neceſſity for an alteration, beſides the article engaging to attack and ruin *Hyder Naig* in concert; all which articles as we knew could never be aſſented to by the *Poonah* Miniſters: we therefore wrote in anſwer, whatever was right and was required by faith and obſervance of treaties, with the greateſt ſincerity and truth, and diſpatched the karetahs and letters to your quarter, where I have no doubt but they are ſafe arrived. If truth, and faith, and obſervance of treaties, and peace, and reconciliation, ſhould be their wiſh, they will then give their aſſent to every thing which has been written from their quarter, and will conſider it to have been dictated by friendſhip. Whatever they may have determined upon will be beſt. But I ſwear by the Almighty, and by my holy religion, that the Maha Rajah my maſter, and the Dewan, notwithſtanding that their plans and counſels above written have not availed or been approved of, have no other thoughts or views but the intereſts and advantages of the Engliſh gentlemen, and the glory of the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*; and how great, and of what a long ſtanding muſt their friendſhip be, which, notwithſtanding repeated denials and contradictions, has received no injury? This will by degrees be tried and plainly ſeen by the Nabob: at preſent many things veil it and keep it under darkneſs, as a cloud does the ſun; but at laſt the light of the ſun breaks forth by its own vigour. As the illuſtrious and noble family of *Bhooſlah* are famed for their obſervance of faith and ſincerity, and have been brought into the plan and meaſures of *Pundit Purdhaun*, they are therefore without remedy and reſource, and are wiſhing to extricate themſelves from their engagements with the Poonah Rulers. The Maha Rajah had for this purpoſe imagined and ſettled a ſcheme which he explained to me himſelf, and ordered me to write it to you in my letter of the 6th Moheuran, from which letter you will have thoroughly comprehended it. In this caſe, if the dependencies of the Engliſh have ſuffered from the army at *Cuttack*, or if from the dread of the Engliſh battalions the province of *Oriſſa* has received any damage, or even if any ſmall hoſtility has happened between them, it makes no difference, becauſe wherever the hearts are ſincerely unanimous, no outward appearance of miſunderſtanding can be of any effect; from that a plea may be procured for ſeparating ourſelves from the connection with *Pundit Purdhaun*, but it muſt not be looked upon as an act of enmity: this you muſt explain to the Nabob, and convince him that the ſole end propoſed from this meaſure, is to ſeparate ourſelves from *Pundit Peiſhwa*, and that after extricating ourſelves from our engagements to him, and from this diſtreſſing plan of his, every meaſure will be ſettled with the aſſiſtance and advice of the Engliſh gentlemen. But the means of ſupporting the expences of the pay to the army at *Cuttack*, and to the new troops, which this plan will require to be raiſed, depend altogether on the aſſiſtance of the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*; having ſettled this point in a binding manner, you muſt write us ſo.

The reaſon of the determining on this plan is as follows: when copies of the treaty had been ſent to the Poonah Miniſters after two months, when *Baſſein* had been loſt, and war had commenced in *Bore Ghaut* with the Engliſh, they ſent anſwers to this purport; that they could place no kind of dependance on the promiſes and engagements of the Engliſh, who had repeatedly entered into treaties and as often broke them; that we ought to examine what want of faith they had ever ſhewn that the Engliſh ſhould commence ſuch hoſtilities againſt them, and ſhould employ themſelves for the aſſiſtance of *Ragonaut Row*, and then ſay that any breach of treaty which happened was committed by the Chief of *Bombay*; but after the defeat of the Bombay army, from what ſide have the preſent hoſtilities and devaſtation ariſen? That the preſent treaty therefore can be no more relied on. That it is therefore neceſſary for the army at *Cuttack* to loſe no more time in uſeleſs delays, but to enter the Engliſh dependencies. The Maha Rajah therefore to extricate himſelf from theſe meaſures, has of himſelf imagined this plan, and has made me write it to you, that you might repreſent it in a proper manner.

Poſtſcript. While this important plan is under diſcuſſion, it is adviſable and neceſſary that you remain with the Nabob, who doubtleſs will willingly and with pleaſure retain you: why do you therefore mention any thing reſpecting your coming to *Benares*; you muſt exert yourſelf in the ſervice of your maſter, and in your attachment to the Nabob for the proſecuting the points now in conſideration, and the other important concerns; to the promoting the friendſhip between the Nabob and the Maha Rajah, that it may derive inwardly advantage from theſe ſeeming outward contradictions. To write more to you who are wiſe would be uſeleſs.

Poſtſcript.—This is the ſeaſon to fix ultimately the plan propoſed, that from the four quarters armies be ſent to the Engliſh dependencies, and war be commenced; and ſhould peace be thought adviſable, let it be by the intervention and knowledge of every one; namely, the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, *Pundit Peiſhwa*, and the Maha Rajah; and at this time, in conſequence of his connection with *Pundit Purdhaun*, *Hyder Ally Khan* has entered himſelf into this negociation, and, like the elephant at cheſs, has claimed this plan on the four ſides, that one of them without the other cannot act in this meaſure: but this connection and the conditions of the engagements between *Hyder Ally Khan* and *Pundit Peiſhwa*, were entered into without the knowledge of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, for which reaſon he has conceived diſpleaſure and enmity againſt *Hyder*; and *Hyder*, from the

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pride of having a large army and a conſiderable treaſure, of ſeeing his country in ſecurity, and of having effected a ſmall part of his ſcheme in an attack on ſome Engliſh battalions, conceived thoughts very far diſtant from his ſituation and rank, and ſent a Vackeel to the Preſence, to the Vizier *Nudjiff Cawn*, and repreſented, that as he had ſhewn ſuch courage and conduct in the war againſt the Engliſh, he hoped from the royal favour that he might receive as a reward the Sunnuds for the Soubahs of *Deckan*; and that if he obtained ſuch his deſire, he would lay at his Majeſty's feet every thing which his loyalty and obedience could require. Accordingly the Vackeel was admitted to his Majeſty's preſence, and to an interview with the Vizier; and a firmaun, containing the praiſes and virtues of *Hyder*, and promiſing him his requeſt, together with a turban from his Majeſty's head, and a khellaut from his wardrobe, were ſent to *Hyder*. We ſhall ſoon ſee what more his negociation there will effect. As this ſame news muſt have been contained in the papers ſent to your quarter, any more on this ſubject would be ſuperfluous. In ſhort, the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* being enraged at theſe tranſactions, is watching for an opportunity to revenge himſelf: it is therefore moſt adviſable for the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* to exert himſelf by all means to give ſatisfaction to the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, and not to refuſe ſending them preſents and gifts, but at any rate to gain, through Mr. *Hollond*, the friendſhip of ſo great a Chief, who is the ſupport of the throne, and is poſſeſſed of ſuch armies and reſources; and when this ſhall have been firmly ſettled, and this powerful Chief has been gained over, beſides the Maha Rajah and the Nabob *Zuffer-ud-Dowlah*, who are ſincerely attached to the Engliſh, and are likewiſe united with *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* both in ſchemes and counſels, and in the management of war and hoſtilities, what power or ability would then remain for the Chiefs and Rulers of *Poonah* to act hoſtilely againſt the Engliſh gentlemen, without the permiſſion of the Nabob and Maha Rajah? on the contrary, they would certainly be reconciled, and would act in every thing by the directions of the Nabob and Maha Rajah: and at that time treaties and engagements, ſuch as are wiſhed for, will be effected. The abſtract of this long letter is, that by prudent management and conduct the iron chain which is ſtrongly bound on the feet of the elephant will be removed, and what remains, which is only the chain from *Hyder*'s foot, muſt be ſeparated by the ſtrength of the ſword, and he muſt be deſtroyed by the combined force of the others, and his country ſhared according to agreement which will then be made; and being relieved from all dangers by the guarantee of the Nabob and the Maha Rajah, they will then remain in peace and ſecurity at home. You will therefore, in a proper manner, repreſent the above written particulars to the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*; but till this important point can be adjuſted and finally effected, you muſt write to us in an explicit manner from *Calcutta*; till that time the ſeeming preparations on both ſides to enter each other's dominions, ſome ſmall hoſtilities, and even a degree of plundering on both ſides, is to be recommended as adviſable, and as aveil over the plan. This muſt be conſidered as ſweet to the taſte, and muſt not be looked upon as bitter, as a bitter medicine is of the moſt ſervice to the body; you will therefore exert your utmoſt abilities to effect this plan, and will at any rate ſatisfy and convince the Nabob, that all what I have written are ſecrets entruſted to me by the Maha Rajah and his Miniſter, and I take God to witneſs that it is true. You muſt conſider this as a ſecret more precious than your own life, and muſt tear the letter, as it would be of the greateſt detriment ſhould any one elſe be acquainted with it. For the keeping of this ſecret you are bound by your moſt binding of all oaths, your duty to your maſter. I need write no more, the reſt depends on your management and conduct.

A true copy of the tranſlation.

E. Hay, Acts Secr.

Appendix. No. 363.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Dewan Dewagur Pundit* to *Beneram Pundit*. Dated the 20th Mohurren: received the 8th March.

Your letter has been received, and the contents underſtood. You write, that the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* has diſpatched a treaty full of oaths and engagements, with ſeparate karetahs addreſſed to *Row Pundit Purdhaun*, to *Nanah Purnaveſe*, to the Maha Rajah, to the Nabob *Zuffer-ud-Dowlah*, and to me; but that as yet no anſwer has been received to any one of them, which he is anxiouſly looking for. You further mention, that a karetah has been ſent from *Calcutta* to the Nabob *Nizam ul-Dowlah*, which, with other contents of your letter, is underſtood, and the treaty and karetahs have been carefully and attentively peruſed; and agreeably to what the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* wrote, we have kept with us the original treaties and karetahs, and have written the particulars and contents of them to *Pundit Purdhaun*. What was written reſpecting the oath to prevent any deviation from the treaty, that it ſhould be neither increaſed nor diminiſhed, has been fully comprehended. The caſe is this: that in the firſt place the chief article for *Pundit Purdhaun*, namely *Ragonaut Row*, is not written in a plain manner; neither are the articles reſpecting *Guealior*, *Guzerat*, the *Guicawar*, and the forts, and many other points which ought to have been rendered ſatisfactory, written with any plainneſs, otherwiſe I ſhould have gone in perſon and exerted myſelf to adjuſt every point. I have therefore not ſent the treaty, but have kept it carefully in my poſſeſſion. At the beginning the opportunity was ſuffered to eſcape; that is to ſay, the time when I was at *Poonah*, when I wrote letters to General *Goddard*, and anſwers were received, if at that time an interview had taken place between *Pundit Purdhaun* and General *Goddard*, all miſunderſtanding would have been cleared up and reconciled, and the Engliſh and *Pundit Purdhaun* would have become one mind and one ſoul, and would have ruined *Hyder Naig* and conquered his country: but this did not take place, and the General and *Scindia* prepared for war, and *Pundit Purdhaun* entered into alliance with *Hyder Naig*, and gave him a country of 80 lacks of rupees on the other ſide of the *Kiſhna*, with this view, that he might carry deſolation into the country belonging to the Engliſh. Engagements were entered into, agreeable to which the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* ſettled a plan, and having written to *Pundit Purdhaun*, forced me into theſe difficulties. Had I not agreed to the plan, it would have cauſed injuries to the Rauje, and great damage to me who am united with the Rauje: it being therefore neceſſary for me to aſſent to the plan propoſed, I was compelled to raiſe 30,000 men, and to ſend them under the command of Rajah *Chimnajee Saheb* towards *Bengal*. A year and a half have nearly elapſed, during which theſe troops have brought us under a load of expences, amounting to upwards of 1½ crore, and have remained all the time on our own confines without acting in any manner. My earneſt wiſh is, that at any rate peace and friendſhip may be effected between the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* and *Pundit Purdhaun*, and that our friendſhip to both parties may remain entire; with this view I have taken all theſe pains, and the Maha Rajah has adopted the name of *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, and has continually written, that he is the friend, the friend, the friend, and that he is determined to effect and compaſs his point: but Rajah *Chimnajee Saheb* is in great diſtreſs for the expences of his army. My wiſh was, that in caſe of peace taking place *Pundit Purdhaun* would contribute ſomething; that ſome part might be procured from the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, and another ſhare from the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, while we ſhould have ſubmitted to bear the remainder; by which means all our difficulties would have been removed. I had great dependance on this; but peace does not take place between the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* and *Pundit Purdhaun*. How long am I to wait in expectation? Great difficulty is

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come upon me from the plan which had been ſettled; and Rajah *Chimnajee Behader* from the ſame plan is fallen under great diſtreſs; ſo that we muſt do whatever appears likely to remove theſe difficulties. I am a ſincere friend, and never omit any duties towards him with whom I enter into friendſhip. From the want of reconciliation between the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* and *Pundit Purdhaun*, am I fallen into this dilemma. Be convinced that this is true. I have, to preſerve my friendſhip with the Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah*, been backward in the proſecution of the plan which had been ſettled: I have readily ſubmitted to whatever is come upon me, and ſolely from my deſire to effect a reconciliation between the Nabob and *Pundit Purdhaun*, have theſe difficulties ariſen; yet, notwithſtanding all this, he is not my friend: I am fallen into the dilemma of that plan, and have no remedy. The Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* is juſt, and will reflect on this with juſtice. How long muſt I repeat the ſame thing? What has happened muſt neceſſarily have happened from that plan, and we muſt ſubmit to it. The Maha Rajah is connected by treaties with *Pundit Purdhaun*, and the family of *Booſla* is known for their faith and obſervance of engagements; they never did nor will vary a hair's breath from any treaty: many Powers have attempted to injure them, but their government has remained firm and gains daily ſtrength, ſolely from their exalted faith and remarkable fidelity. The Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* is wiſe, and will be convinced, that to this time I have never been guilty of any neglect in the duties of my friendſhip, in which it is neceſſary to explain every thing ſincerely and plainly, and to avoid all appearance of diſtinction.

In the Dewan's own hand.

I am convinced and ſenſible of the great zeal and conduct which you have ſhewn in the Maha Rajah's ſervice, and in promoting the friendſhip and alliance of the Engliſh. I have accordingly before written to you in Perſian on that ſubject, and now the Moonſhy will inform you of every thing which the Maha Rajah ſaid reſpecting it. You will repreſent to the Nabob, that his poſſeſſions and thoſe of the Maha Rajah are one, and have no kind of diſtinctions; but there is a treaty and engagement which circumſcribes us, and from which it is neceſſary we ſhould be releaſed. This alone diſtreſſes us, for there is no other cauſe: there is already one crore of rupees due to the army, and it is daily increaſing. The cauſe of all theſe difficulties is the arrival of General *Goddard* at *Hoſhungabad*, and our performing the duties of friendſhip and hoſpitality to him, which it is unneceſſary to write or repreſent: by this we are become the mark for every one to point at, and by this affairs are brought into this ſtate. The Nabob *Amaud-ul-Dowlah* is wiſe, and is thoroughly convinced that we have never been forgetful or negligent. There is no remedy againſt the neceſſity of the times. In future no variation ſhall ever happen in our friendſhip, in which we are firm and ſtedfaſt.

A true copy of the tranſlation,

E. Hay.

Acts Secy.

APPENDIX, No. 364.

Letter from *Bengal*. Secret Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*; dated 27th April 1781.

Honourable Sirs,

1. WE had the honour of addreſſing you from this department by the *Fox* and *Walpole*, on the 29th November. We have ſince written to you under date the 7th and 13th January by Major *Scott*, and the 3d February in duplicate by the way of *Buſſorah*. Duplicates of the letters written by Major *Scott*, and a triplicate of that addreſſed to you over land, are tranſmitted with theſe diſpatches. We have alſo the honour of forwarding by the *Neptune*, the annual ſet of our Conſultations in this department for the year 1780, and a broken ſet of our proceedings from the 23d November to the 2d inſtant.

2. We were honoured on the 13th ultimo, with the receipt of letters from the Committee of Secrecy, under date the 9th July 1779, 12th, 29th April, and 17th May, 1780, by the packets of the *Nonſuch*, *Belmont*, and *Groſvenor*; the diſpatches of the latter ſhip being conveyed to us by the *Neptune*, in conſequence of the reſolution taken at *Fort Saint George* to detain the *Groſvenor* at that Preſidency, for the purpoſe of ſending her to *Europe* in the month of June. We received on the ſame day copies of the letters dated in July 1779 and April 1780, from *Bombay*; together with your diſpatches tranſmitted over land by *Richard Scott*, Eſquire, according to the liſt of packet. We have nothing to ſay in anſwer to the letters which we have the honour to acknowledge, and in addition to the information already ſent to you, but that the orders given to us have received, and always will receive, our punctual execution of them.

10. You were adviſed in our letter of the 7th of January, tranſmitted to you by Major *Scott*, of the motives which had induced us to propoſe a treaty of alliance with the Dutch, whoſe poſſeſſions at and adjacent to *Cochin* had lately been invaded by *Hyder Ally Khan*. The treaty was ſent to your Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, by Mr. *Dighton*, and it was left with them to obtain the Nabob *Walla Jaw*'s concurrence in it, as well as afterwards to tranſmit to *Cochin* and *Columbo* our diſpatches relative to it. A reference to their letter of the 16th of February, will make you acquainted with the reaſons which had operated with your Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, againſt promoting the ratification of it. The treaty itſelf was founded on the deſperate neceſſity of their affairs, and was one of the great and numerous exertions which we made for their relief. A more proſperous ſtate having ſince ſucceeded, the meaſure has been rendered unneceſſary, and we are well pleaſed therefore that they have thought proper to reject it. The great object of the treaty was a ſupply of European ſtrength. It was of ſo much importance, that we determined to avail ourſelves of other means alſo of obtaining it; and on the 22d of January, we wrote to your Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Marlborough*, to deſire that they would ſpare to us the European force at that Preſidency, conſiſting of 400 men. We conſidered them well able to do us this ſervice, as their remaining force conſiſting of Coffrees and Malays, is ſufficient for the defence of *Fort Marlborough* againſt the enemies of the country, and the ſmall force in Europeans unequal to its defence againſt an attack from an European enemy. Our letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Marlborough*, appears in the Conſultations noted in the margin.

Conſ. 2d April.

Treaty with the Dutch.

11. About the middle of the laſt month arrived in *Fort William*, *Syed Aſſam Cawn Behaudre*, Dewan of his Highneſs the Nabob *Walla Jaw*, accompanied by Mr. *Richard Joſeph Sulivan*; their arrival was reported to us by the Governor General on the 29th of that month, and a tranſlation of their credentials as Miniſters and Plenipotentiaries extraordinary from his Highneſs the Nabob *Walla Jaw* was laid before us, together with a paper of requiſitions prepared by the Dewan, who in the name of his maſter requeſted the Board's reply, expreſſing their reſolution on each article as expeditiouſly as poſſible; their object being of the utmoſt importance, not only to the future proſperity of his country, but alſo to the ſafety of the Engliſh poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic*, and to the relief of his numerous creditors, whoſe claims and neceſſities he repreſented as great and diſtreſſing.

Conſ. 22d Jan.

We

Conſ. 13 Mar. We had a few days before received from the Nabob's new conſolidated creditors, a propoſal for the ſatisfaction of the debt owing to them from his Highneſs, and your Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* had tranſmitted to us with it a copy of their minutes on a ſimilar propoſal made to them.

12. Senſible of the heavy load of difficulties under which the Nabob *Wallah Jaw* hath laboured for a conſiderable length of time, and anxious that a permanent plan ſhould be adopted for the future regulation of the affairs of the *Carnatic*, we readily acquieſced in the deſire of *Syed Aſſam Cawn*, that diſtinct replies ſhould be given by us to each of the ſeveral propoſitions of the Nabob; and we agreed, that the replies, if approved by the Dewan, ſhould ſerve for the baſis of an agreement between this Government and that of the *Carnatic*. As the agreement includes many particulars which cannot be made ſo clear in an abſtract of them as in the peruſal of the agreement itſelf, we have thought it neceſſary to tranſmit to you a copy of the requeſts of the Nabob *Wallah Jah*, and of our replies to them, which together form the agreement, numbers in this diſpatch. The agreement having been fairly engroſſed on two diſtinct papers, bearing the ſeal and ſignature of the Nabob *Wallah Jaw*, and the Dewan *Syed Aſſam Cawn Behauder* and Mr. *Richard Joſeph Sulivan*; attending at our Council on the 2d inſtant, it was ſealed and ſigned by them in our preſence, and by us in their preſence, and formally interchanged.

13. We ſhould have previouſly acquainted you, that we were fully ſatisfied with the ſufficiency of the powers with which *Syed Aſſam Cawn Behaudre* and Mr. *Richard Joſeph Sulivan* were inveſted on the part of the Nabob *Wallah Jaw*; and being anxious that ſpeedy and effectual remedies ſhould be applied to the diſordered ſtate of the affairs of the *Carnatic*, deemed it of eſſential moment that the entire ſanction of the controlling Government of *India* ſhould be given to the agreement; and the more eſpecially, as in the letters which have been received from the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* ſince the commencement of the late troubles in the *Carnatic*, they have repeatedly declared their total and abſolute inability to obtain from the *Carnatic* the ſmalleſt ſupply of money for the maintenance of the war, or the ſupport of their current expences.

14. In conſequence of the requeſt of the Nabob *Wallah Jaw*, the purport of which we duly weighed, being equally convinced of the neceſſity of the appointment of a perſon to reſide with the Nabob as the Repreſentative and Miniſter of this Government, for the maintenance of the agreement actually concluded between us; being alſo firmly of opinion, that without the reſources of the *Carnatic*, the war in which it is engaged cannot be ſupported but by uncertain and languid ſupplies from *Bengal*, and eventually involve both in one common ſtate of diſtreſs, if not utter ruin; and having alſo conſidered the recommendation made by his Highneſs the Nabob Conſ. 29 Mar. in favour of Mr. *Richard Joſeph Sulivan*, together with the reaſons which have been urged as his inducement to it, and deeming theſe as well as the objects of the appointment of too great importance to be ſacrificed to that punctilio which on a leſs urgent occaſion might diſſuade us from employing a ſervant of another Preſidency, although equally a ſervant of the ſame common maſters; we have appointed Mr. *Richard Joſeph Sulivan* the Repreſentative and Miniſter of this Government at the Court of the Nabob *Wallah Jaw*, for the purpoſe of maintaining the faith of this Government in the agreement concluded with the ſaid Nabob, and for the repreſentation of ſuch matters as may at any time require his interpoſition in that character and in our name, either with the Nabob, or with the Preſident and Council or Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*; and our credentials have been granted to him to this effect in the uſual form.

15. The letters which we have written to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, and to Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, appear on the proceedings noted in the margin, as well as that from the Governor General to the Nabob of the *Carnatic*. Appendix No. 364. Conſ. 2d April.

16. The line of conduct followed by the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* ſince we had the honour of addreſſing you laſt, will appear to you in the ſeveral letters which we have received from Mr. *John Hollond*, and recorded in our proceedings noted in the margin. It has hitherto been in general neutral, and ſo far we are happy to obſerve to you, that our endeavours to preſerve the peace with the Nizam, by promiſing to do him juſtice, have been attended with ſucceſs. It is alſo deſerving of remark, that of four great Powers combined againſt the Company, two only have been yet brought to act againſt them; and that of thoſe two, one is nearly defeated by the ſucceſsful operations of your forces under this Government. The Nizam, availing himſelf of the Company's preſent ſituation, has frequently urged Mr. *Hollond* for immediate payment of the arrears of the peſchuſh. As our laſt reply to Mr. *Hollond* on this and other ſubjects is material, we think it neceſſary to tranſmit it to you for your information, a number in this diſpatch. Nizam. Conſ. 15th and 22d January, 8th and 19th February, and 9th March.

17. Mr. *Hollond*'s ill ſtate of health not permitting his continuance at *Hydrabad*, he has requeſted our permiſſion to reſign his office, of our Reſident at the Nizam's Court: concerned as we are for the cauſe which obliged him to make this requeſt, it was yet of ſo forcible a nature, that we could not refuſe our aſſent to it. We have permitted him therefore to reſign the office which he held at the Court of his Highneſs the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and as an acknowledgment of the ſervices performed by him during his reſidence thereat, as well as a teſtimony of the high eſtimation in which we held his abilities and zeal for the ſervice of the Company, we have deſired his acceptance of a gratuity of ten thouſand rupees, and authorized him to continue drawing his allowances, and the charges of his eſtabliſhment, until his return to *Fort Saint George*. No one is yet appointed by us to fill the ſtation at *Hydrabad*, vacated by Mr. *Hollond*; but the Governor General has written to the Nizam, to be informed of his pleaſure concerning the nomination of another Miniſter to reſide at his Highneſs's Court.

18. We are well pleaſed to acquaint you, that the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* have thought proper to reſcind the act by which Mr. *Hollond* was ſuſpended from the ſervice of the Company on that eſtabliſhment, and admitted him to a ſeat in the Council. We had ſome weeks before the receipt of their letter, adviſing us of their reſolution, recommended it ſtrongly to them; but we have the pleaſure to obſerve, that the intended effect of our deſire was anticipated by their own regard to Mr. *Hollond*'s merits.

19. You were informed, in our letter of the 29th November, of the reſolution which we have taken, to detach over land towards *Madras*, a Company of European artillery, and a body of ſix battalions of native infantry, under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel *Pearſe*, to aid the operations of our troops on the coaſt. This detachment having been collected near *Naraingbur*, in *Midnapore*, marched from the place of rendezvous on the 21ſt January, and croſſed the *Soubenzeka* on the 9th February.

20. Although the low ſtate of the country through which its route lay, the long continuance of the rains, and the uncommon difficulties which, after the exertions made to furniſh our firſt aids to *Fort Saint George*, preſented themſelves in the equipment of this force, were ſufficient impediments to an earlier movement of it; we had beſides a political motive for not urging it ſooner in the deſire of waiting for replies from the Government of *Berar*, to the diſpatches which we had ſent thither in September, with our offers of peace to the Maratta

Appendix. No. 364.

State; left, by a precipitate march of the detachment into the borders of *Cuttac*, before time had been allowed to the commanding officer of the Berar troops which lay there; and in its deſtined paſſage, we might expoſe them to mutual hoſtilities, and defeat the ends of our negociation with that Government. But when the expected replies arrived, and contained a total rejection of our propoſals, founded, as we had every reaſon to believe, on an opinion that our affairs were reduced to ſo deſperate a ſtate as might render it too hazardous for them to take a decided part in our favour, and afforded them no hope of ſucceſs in the mediation which had been preſcribed to them; we then deemed it incumbent upon us, equally on the principle of maintaining the credit of our power, and on the ſubſtantial grounds on which the expedition had been originally planned, to order its inſtant commencement. Orders to this effect were accordingly and immediately iſſued: but that we might at the ſame time provide for the unmoleſted march of the detachment through the province of *Oriſſa*, and mark that attention which was due to the relation in which we had till that time ſtood with the Government of *Berar*, we choſe to depute a confidential perſon to Rajah *Chimnajee Booſla*, the Chief of the Berar army, who ſhould notify to him the order which we had given to Colonel *Pearſe*, to requeſt him, in our name, to cauſe ſuch of his troops as might yet be in the road through which the detachment was to paſs, to remove at ſuch a diſtance from it as might prevent individuals on either ſide from engaging in mutual broils; and if the Rajah ſhould be diſpoſed to take a more decided part in our favour, to ſolicit the aid of a body of cavalry, to accompany Colonel *Pearſe*, and to act under his command.—Mr. *David Anderſon* was appointed to this ſervice.

Conſ. 14th Jan.

21. The inſtructions which we gave to Colonel *Pearſe* were conſonant to thoſe given to Mr. *Anderſon*; and at the ſame time that they cautioned him in the ſtrongeſt manner to prevent, to the utmoſt of his power, any acts, or the permiſſion of any, on the part of his detachment or its followers, which could lead to hoſtilities with the Government of *Cuttac* or the Berar army, they directed him, in the event of his progreſs being obſtructed, to make his way againſt all oppoſition. The event has fully anſwered our expectations, as will be ſhewn in the ſequel.

22. Mr. *Anderſon* miſſing Rajah *Chimnajee Booſla*, who was engaged in a remote expedition, and the communication being ſtopped, was ordered to return at the ſolicitation of the Maratta Chief. He was a ſecond time deputed to him, and ſoon after returned, bringing with him Rajah *Ram Pundit*, the Naib of *Cuttac*; with whom an engagement was formally concluded in the name of his maſter Rajah *Chimnajee*; by which it was ſtipulated that a body of 2,000 effective horſe ſhould be detached from the army at *Cuttac*, and placed under the command of Colonel *Pearſe*; their pay to be iſſued by our Paymaſter, at the rate of one lack of rupees per month; and that a party of the Company's forces ſhould aſſiſt the Government of *Berar* in aſſerting its pretenſions to the diſtrict of *Gurra Mundela*, a ſmall territory lying on the banks of the *Nerbudda*, and under the actual poſſeſſion of the Peiſhwa. Major *William Popham*, a moſt deſerving officer in your ſervice, whom we have before had the pleaſure to diſtinguiſh to you for his ſpirited and gallant conduct in the capture of the fort of *Gwalior*, as well as on other occaſions of military duty, has been accordingly ordered on this ſervice with the regiment of native infantry, and the other troops which had been in *Gwalior*, to garriſon that fortreſs.

Conſ. 29th March.

23. It was at the ſame time reſolved, that a gratuity of 13 lacks of rupees, being the remainder of the ſum of 16 lacks of rupees, propoſed as a contribution for the relief of the forces in the province of *Cuttac*, in the event of the acquieſcence of the Government of *Berar* in the propoſals which were tranſmitted in October laſt to them, ſhould be granted and delivered to Rajah *Ram Pundit*, in the behalf of *Chimnajee*; for the relief of the army repreſented to be in the greateſt diſtreſs, and as an acknowledgment for the paſt and ſeaſonable inſtances afforded of the friendſhip of that Government. It was alſo reſolved, that a loan of ten lacks, requeſted for the ſame purpoſe, ſhould be granted to *Chimnajee*, on the part of the Government of *Berar*, on the ſecurity of Rajah *Ram Pundit* for payment.

24. As the detail of this negociation contains many particulars which are improper to be entered in the body of our conſultations, we have therefore judged it expedient to form a detached narrative of it, and to tranſmit it in a ſeparate copy to the Secret Committee of your honourable Court.

25. We ſhall briefly obſerve, that we have laboured, and we think with ſucceſs now decided, to detach the moſt powerful member of the Maratta State, and in its relation to *Bengal* the moſt capable of any in *India* to do it either ſervice or hurt, from the general confederacy which has been formed againſt us, and have converted it, oſtenſibly at leaſt, into a party to our cauſe. The event will ſhortly prove the truth of our concluſions.

26. During the courſe of this tranſaction, the detachment under the command of Colonel *Pearſe* proceeded by a quiet and unmoleſted progreſs to *Ganjam*, where it arrived on the 17th ultimo, accompanied to the borders of that diſtrict by a perſon of rank, deputed by the order of Rajah *Chimnajee*, and abundantly ſupplied with proviſions and every other aid and accommodation it required. Some of the plunderers of *Chimnajee*'s army made an incurſion on our frontier, which he ſeverely reſented, inſtantly cauſing the offenders to be ſeized and puniſhed in a public and exemplary manner. This is the only inſtance in which our provinces have ſuffered any real injury from the ſuſpicious ſituation of the Berar army during ſo long a time in our neighbourhood. It is now on its return to *Naypore*.

27. All apprehenſions of an invaſion from the Marattas being removed, we have given orders for the return of the 3d brigade, and of the regiments of Sepoys which were ſent from *Barrackpore* to join it, to their reſpective ſtations, excepting the artillery, which we have ordered down to the Preſidency.

28. In the interval between the time at which the detachment left *Midnapore*, and the day of its arrival at *Ganjam*, nothing ſufficiently material to be noticed happened reſpecting it, excepting a numerous and extraordinary deſertion, which originated in the firſt inſtance with the 20th battalion of Sepoys, formerly commanded by Captain *Peter Grant*: for the occaſion of this deſertion, and our proceedings in conſequence, we beg leave to refer you to our letter from the Public Department. With reſpect to the cauſes which have operated to the deſertion of thoſe men who did not belong formerly to Captain *Grant*'s battalion, we are at a loſs to account for it on any other principle than the contagion of example.

29. Soon after the arrival of Colonel *Pearſe*'s detachment at *Ganjam*, an infectious diſorder pervaded the camp, which obliged him to leave *Ganjam* and march to *Itchapore*. Our laſt letters from him are from *Culwall Delaub*, a place about five miles diſtant from *Itchapore*. The diſorder which we have mentioned prevailed generally, and has had very ſevere conſequences; but the means taken by Colonel *Pearſe* to put a ſtop to it for the preſent, having been in the latter reſpect nearly effectual, we hope ſoon to hear that the troops have generally recovered; and we are aſſured by Colonel *Pearſe*, that he will not ſuffer a moment's delay, which can be by any means avoided, in the further proſecution of his march.

30. Our concern on this occaſion is not confined to the effect of the diſaſter in the ſickneſs of a large body of men, or in the diminution which it has occaſioned of Colonel *Pearſe*'s force, though ſuch conſequences are felt by us in the moſt ſenſible manner; but the delay which is thereby neceſſarily and unavoidably occaſioned

in

in the march of the troops, is another ſerious evil which attends it, and cruelly oppoſes the wiſhes and expectations we had formed of their early arrival at *Fort Saint George.*

31. The diſorder to which we allude has not been confined to the country near *Ganjam*; it afterwards found its way to this place, and after chiefly affecting the native inhabitants, ſo as to occaſion a great mortality during a period of a fortnight, it is now greatly abated, and purſuing its courſe to the northward. The letters which we have received from Colonel *Pearſe*, from the time of his leaving the Midnapore diſtrict to that of his arrival at *Ganjam*, are according to the dates, and appear on the proceedings noted in the margin.

Conf. 12th, 15th, 19th, 26th Feb. 15th and 29th March.

32. When we had the honour of addreſſing you on the 13th of January we congratulated you on the important capture of the fortreſs of *Baſſein* on the 12th December, by your forces under the command of Brigadier General *Goddard*; and we tranſmitted to you a copy of the papers of intelligence which adviſed us of it. We had ſoon afterwards the pleaſure of receiving a letter from the General, in which he himſelf communicated to us the pleaſing news of this event. The particulars of the ſiege appear in a letter to the Commander in Chief, recorded on our proceedings of the 26th February. Every preparation had been previouſly concerted and made for a ſucceſsful attack, and a reſpectable force was left in the province of *Guzerat* to defend it againſt the enemy if they ſhould venture to invade it. After the ſucceſs at *Baſſein*, General *Goddard*'s operations were directed againſt the fort of *Arnall*, which ſurrendered at diſcretion to a detachment of his army on the 18th of January. The fort of *Arnall* is repreſented by General *Goddard* likely to be a very uſeful poſſeſſion to the Company, as completing the line of conqueſts from *Guzerat* to *Bombay*, and as being to be defended by a ſmall body of men againſt any force that can be brought to act againſt it. The whole army marched afterwards towards the gauts, at the foot of which the enemy had continued for ſome time. A letter which we have lately received from General *Goddard*, under date the 11th February, and which we have the honour to tranſmit to you with its enclоſure a number in the packet, acquaints us, that the enemy is entirely driven out of the *Conkan*; and that your army under his command were then in poſſeſſion of *Bhou Gaut*, beyond which the whole of the Maratta forces were encamped on the road to *Poonah*.

Conf. 22d Jan.

Conf. 26th Dec.

33. With a letter received by us from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, under date the 23d January, and recorded on our proceedings of the 23d of the following month, is tranſmitted to us copy of a letter received by the Nabob *Wallaw Jaw* from his Vackeel at *Poonah*; on which the gentlemen at *Fort Saint George* obſerve, that "they are happy to per-" ceive the Adminiſtration there are inclinable to pacific " terms." A ſuggeſtion of this nature raiſed our curioſity to a knowledge of the terms by which the peaceable intentions of the Poonah Government were to be proved to us; and as we ſincerely wiſhed for a peace with the Marattas, we were in hopes that the terms propoſed would have been ſuch as to admit of our according to them. You will judge then of our ſurpriſe when we found the following to be the conditions recommended: " that we ſhould deliver up to the Marattas the iſlands " of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, the fort of *Gualior*, the forts in " *Guzerat*, and all the countries which we had taken from " them in *Conkan*, &c. and ſurrender to their pleaſure " the perſon of *Ragonaut Row*."

34. Although we wiſh for peace with the Maratta State, we will not make peace on terms diſhonourable to ourſelves; we will not diſgrace the Engliſh name by ſubmitting to conditions which cannot be complied with without a ſacrifice of the honour and intereſt of the Company; yet ſuch are the conditions preſcribed in the propoſal to which we have alluded. On *Hyder*'s invaſion of the *Carnatic*, and on the unfortunate intelligence which we received of the defeat of a detachment of your troops near *Conjeveram*, you have been adviſed, that ſuch terms were agreed to be propoſed to the Maratta State, through the mediation of the Rajah of *Berar*, as appeared to us very reaſonable, and ſuch as might be honourably yielded to on both ſides; they were ſuch, therefore, as we thought would not be refuſed by the enemy. But the event has been otherwiſe: inſtead of finding them inclined to make peace, the diſtreſs which the Company's affairs have ſuffered in the *Carnatic*, and their belief of our conſequent inability to ſupport the war againſt them, has raiſed their preſumption, and induced them to inſiſt on terms for the concluſion of it, which the worſt ſtate of your affairs would not warrant us in yielding to. We are morally convinced, that nothing but a vigorous and ſucceſsful proſecution of the war will prevail on them to make a peace, or overcome their preſent diſinclination to it. Peace is our object, and we are determined to purſue the means which appear to us likely to give it an honourable effect, and we will readily accept it when we can.

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35. The ſeveral letters which we have received from Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*, whom we appointed to the command of a detachment employed on the weſtern ſide of the *Jumna*, appear in the proceedings noted in the margin.

Conf. 16th Jan. 8th and 19th Feb. 29th March, and 2d April.

36. The firſt operations of Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*'s detachment were directed againſt *Sippree*, the capital of a conſiderable territory extending from the Narwar paſs, which it commands, to *Niah Sirai*. He proceeded to *Seronge*, where he arrived on the 16th of February.—Here he unfortunately took poſt, and thereby afforded an opportunity to *Madajee Scindia*, who having aſſembled his forces, met him at this place to ſurround him, and cut off his ſupplies. In this ſituation, and with a proſpect of the greateſt diſtreſs for want of proviſions, Lieutenant Colonel *Camac* ſent repeated letters, preſſing Colonel *Morgan* who commanded the troops appointed for the defence of the Vizier's dominions, and Colonel *Muir*, to afford him inſtant and powerful aſſiſtance.

37. In conſequence of this deſire, and of other letters received by Colonel *Morgan* reſpecting Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*'s ſituation, he ordered three regiments of Sepoys, two regiments of cavalry, and a company of artillery, under the command of Colonel *Muir*, to march immediately to the relief of Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*'s detachment. We expect to hear daily of the junction of the two detachments, and as Colonel *Muir* being a ſenior officer to Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*, is in conſequence entitled to the command of the collected forces, we have ſent orders to Lieutenant Colonel *Camac* to deliver up the ſame to him, and to Colonel *Muir* to receive it. A copy of the inſtructions ſent to Colonel *Muir* for his guidance, is tranſmitted to you a number in the packet.

Conf. 22d Mar.

Conf. 2d April.

38. It appears by letters under date the 10th and 11th of March, received by the Governor General from Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*, that the want of proviſions had obliged him to retreat from *Seronge* into a country where the troops were plentifully ſupplied with proviſions; and we have great pleaſure in acquainting you, that in a ſucceſsful attack made upon *Scindia*'s camps, your troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*, have poſſeſſed themſelves of the enemy's guns, ſtores, and ammunition. There are 13 guns, 21 camels, 2 elephants, and the flag elephant with the enemy's grand ſtandard.

39. Lieutenant Colonel *Camac* having urgently and repeatedly repreſented the neceſſity of a body of cavalry to the operations of his detachment, and the nature of the ſervice on which he is employed appearing to us to require it, one of the regiments ſtationed at *Futtyghur* was ordered to join it.

Conf. 13th Ma

40. The conqueſt of the fortreſs of *Gwalior* having been

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been made for the expreſs benefit and behalf of the Rana of *Ghode*, and ſo eſpecially guaranteed to him by his treaty with the Company, that in the 8th article of it, it is made an exception to any ceſſions which may be hereafter made, whenever peace ſhall be concluded between the Company and the Maratta State, although the time in which it ſhould be put into his poſſeſſion is not preſcribed; the Rana having alſo repeatedly urged his claim to this acquiſition, and having been informed from authority, that the Rana having heard of Colonel *Camac*'s ſituation, when it was moſt diſtreſſed, had reſolved to march to his aſſiſtance in perſon, declaring his intention by this conduct to manifeſt his attachment and fidelity to the Company; we for theſe reaſons, and becauſe we thought it peculiarly neceſſary at a time in which we were endeavouring to form new alliances of the firſt conſequence to our intereſt, to remove every circumſtance that might tend to throw doubts on the Company's fidelity to their public treaties, have reſolved to deliver up *Gwalior* to the Rana; and accordingly ſent orders to Major *Popham* to that purpoſe.

Conſ. 2d April.

41. In conſequence of the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, Colonel *Morgan* was directed on the 12th of February to march with the 2d brigade to *Ackbarpoor*, diſtant a few coſs from *Culpee*, in order to ſtrike an awe into the Maratta Chiefs poſſeſſing the diſtrict lying between *Culpee* and *Narwar*, and by engaging them at home, prevent them from annoying the rear of Colonel *Camac*'s detachment; ſuch alſo being the ſituation of *Ackbarpoor*, as to enable Colonel *Morgan* to advance to *Itawah*, ſhould *Nudjiff Cawn* attempt any thing againſt the quiet of the *Daub*. Colonel *Morgan* was at the ſame time directed to hold his troops in readineſs to croſs the *Jumna*, whenever our farther orders ſhould require them to do ſo.

42. The ſtation to which Colonel *Morgan* had been thus directed to conduct the forces under his command, bringing him into the neighbourhood of *Culpee*, the preſent weak ſtate of the Maratta Government in that quarter affording alſo ſufficient grounds to us to hope that the war might be ſucceſsfully carried on there, in ſuch mode as might contribute to the relief of the heavy expences which have hitherto attended it, we thought it expedient on the 19th ultimo, to order the immediate detachment of a force from that command, of ſuch a ſtrength as the Commander in Chief ſhould judge adequate to the ſervice, to take poſſeſſion of the fort of *Culpee*; and a letter which we have lately received from Colonel *Morgan*, fixes us in the daily expectation of hearing that theſe orders have been carried into execution with ſucceſs. Our inſtructions to Colonel *Morgan* have alſo been to require the Chiefs of the diſtricts dependant on the Government of *Culpee*, to ſubmit themſelves and their dominions to the authority of the Company, and to pay to the Company the ſame tribute or revenue as has hitherto been drawn from them by the Maratta Government. We have left it to Colonel *Morgan*'s diſcretion to apply ſuch immediate and temporary meaſures as he ſhall judge neceſſary, for ſecuring the revenue eventually acquired in execution of this plan, and ſhall wait to receive his report thereof, before we tranſmit to him our final inſtructions upon the ſubject.

43. We think it proper to acquaint you, that in conſequence of the many repreſentations of a want of force to aid the collections from the countries in his Excellency's dominions aſſigned to the Company, the native Sibandy eſtabliſhment being unequal to this purpoſe; and in conſequence of orders, that all the ſcattered detachments of your troops near the frontier ſhould join their reſpective ſtations, we recommended it to the Vizier to re-eſtabliſh the corps lately commanded by Mr. *Osborne*; and as Captain *Clarke*, a deſerving officer in your ſervice, was in every reſpect qualified to fill the command, it was recommended to the Nabob to appoint him to it.

44. Some delays ariſing, which were likely to prevent Mr. *Auriol*, from commencing his negociations with the Portugueſe Government for ſome months, and the ſtate of his health being ſuch as to make it doubtful whether it would be adviſable for him to proceed to the Malabar coaſt or not, we have in a great meaſure left the proſecution of his commiſſion to his option. If the ſtate of his health ſhould oblige him to proceed to the other ſide of *India*, and he ſhould receive no orders from us in the mean time to deſiſt from the proſecution of the commiſſion, it is continued; but if his health ſhould be ſo far reſtored as to permit him to return, we have authorized his return.

45. Mr. *Crommelin*, a man in years, and of very reſpectable character, who formerly filled a high ſtation in the ſervice of the Company, is appointed to ſucceed to the office of our Miniſter at *Goa*, when it is relinquiſhed by Mr. *Auriol*.

46. Mr. *Francis Fowke* having been recalled from his Reſidency at *Benares*, and appointed agent for the proviſion of boats to the army after the expiration of the preſent contract, we have appointed Mr. *William Markham* to that Reſidency.

Conſ. 26th Jan.

47. We beg leave to refer you to Mr. *Middleton*'s letters, recorded on the conſultation noted in the margin, for a particular account of the ſituation of his Excellency the Vizier, and of the proviſion which he has been enabled to make for the Company's demand on him. His great diſtreſs would not permit him to make complete payment of the Company's claim on him for the laſt year, and that diſtreſs not only continuing but increaſing, we have been obliged to be content with the following ſettlement made with his Excellency for the preſent year:

In aſſignments	-	Rupees 98,95,345
Bonds	-	- 43,18,613
		142,13,958

We think it neceſſary only to obſerve to you further on this ſubject, that the amount of the aſſignments by Mr. *Middleton*'s calculation, exceeds the neceſſary claim upon the Company for the ſervices of the current year by above ſix lacks.

48. The Nabob Vizier having repeatedly and urgently repreſented to the Governor General the injuries which his authority and revenues have endured, from the abuſes of the agents acting under the commanding officers at the fixed ſtations, in the management of the camp Buzars, we thought it proper to publiſh to the army ſerving in his dominions, the general order which appears on our records of the 15th February, for the prevention of ſimilar cauſes of complaint in future: but as this regulation in redreſſing the injury done to the Nabob might deprive the commanding officers of a long eſtabliſhed, and under juſt reſtrictions, perhaps a juſt, perquiſite in the duties collected upon the proviſions and neceſſaries voluntarily brought into their camp, the Nabob has been requeſted to grant ſuch a gratuity, in lieu of the emoluments taken from the commanding officers, as he and our Collector Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton* may mutually agree upon as equitable, the ſame being previouſly ſubmitted to us for our approval.

49. It appearing from letters which his Excellency the Vizier has written to the Governor General, that the Nabob *Fyzulla Khan* has evaded the performance of his part of the treaty between the late Nabob *Shujah-ul-Dowla* and him, to which the Honourable Company were guarantee, and upon which he was lately ſummoned to furniſh the ſtipulated number of troops, which he is obliged to furniſh, as the conditions on which he holds the Jaghire granted to him, it has been recommended to the Nabob Vizier to ſend a deputation to him, accompanied by an agent from Mr. *Middleton*, in behalf of this Government as guarantees, and that in preſence of proper witneſſes they do unitedly, upon the following clauſe,

"That

" That he will conſider the Vizier's friends as his " friends, and all his enemies as his own; that with " whomſoever the Vizier ſhall declare war, *Fyzulla Khan* " ſhall join with his army two or three thouſand men, " to the utmoſt of his ability; and that if the Vizier " marches againſt any enemy in perſon, he ſhall then " bring his whole army to join him; and if he is unable " to join him, becauſe the number of 5,000 men, to " which his ſtanding army is limited, are too few; in ſuch " caſe he ſhall have leave to raiſe four thouſand more, " that he may then join him with a ſufficient force, and " theſe expences ſhall be defrayed,"

demand immediate delivery of 3,000 cavalry. If the Nabob *Fyzullah Khan* ſhall evade or refuſe compliance, the deputies are to deliver to him a formal proteſt againſt him for breach of treaty, and return, making their report to the Vizier, which Mr. *Middleton* is to tranſmit to us.

50. In the caſe of compliance of *Fyzullah Khan*, by the delivery of the horſe required, Mr. *Middleton* has been directed to eſtabliſh ſome mode of ſecuring a fund for the regular payment of them, that they may not from want of pay become troubleſome inſtead of uſeful, or the Company run the riſk of being involved by the neceſſity of making advances to them.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
27th of April, 1781.

APPENDIX, No. 365.

Letter from *Bengal* (Secret Department)

To the Honourable the Committee of Secrecy of the Honourable Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, dated 30th April, 1781.

Honourable Sirs,

1. IN our general letter to the Honourable Court of Directors, bearing date the 27th inſtant, we have acquainted them with our intention of tranſmitting to you in a ſeparate addreſs, an account or narrative of our proceedings, with reſpect to the Berar Government and the army of the Berar Rajah, ſtationed for a long time in the province of *Oriſſa*, which contained matter of too ſecret a nature to appear on the face of our records, and we have now the honour of communicating the ſame to you.

2. To render the ſubject of the narrative clear and intelligible, it will be neceſſary to revert to ſome circumſtances which happened a few months ago, and to unfold the diſpoſitions and views of ſome of the principal Powers of *Hindoſtan*.

3. In the month of September 1780, advices were received here from the Governor and Council of *Madras*, of the melancholy fate of Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, the retreat of the army under General *Munro*, and the deſperate ſtate of our affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel*: it was immediately reſolved that the moſt vigorous meaſures ſhould be taken to aſſiſt the Preſidency of *Madras* with men and money from *Bengal*. Accordingly, tranſports were fitted out with all expedition, and General Sir *Eyre Coote* was ſent round by ſea with a ſupply of 15 lacks of rupees, and a ſtrong detachment of European infantry and artillery, the flower of our army; and it was agreed, that a further reinforcement of five thouſand Sepoys ſhould be aſſembled at *Midnapore*, and ſent afterwards by land under the command of Colonel *Pearſe*.

At this important period we were engaged in a war with the Maratta Government at *Poonah*, which had laſted for ſome years; much expence had already been incurred, and notwithſtanding a conſtant train of ſucceſſes which had attended all the operations of our army under the command of General *Goddard*, we had ſtill no immediate proſpect of terminating the war. Appendix. No. 365.

It was at this time known that *Moodajee Bhooſla* the Rajah of the Maratta State of *Berar*, and *Nizam Ally Cawn* the Soubah of the *Decan*, had united in a plan of confederacy againſt the Engliſh with *Hyder Ally* the Nabob of *Myſore* and the Miniſters of the Peiſhwa's Government at *Poonah*. *Moodajee* was to invade *Bengal*, and the Nizam was to enter the Company's Circars of *Chicacole*, whilſt *Hyder Ally* was to paſs the ghauts and lay waſte the *Carnatic*. The Government of *Poonah*, preſſed in their own territories, could only contribute to this plan of offenſive war by grants of lands to its allies.

The Rajah of *Berar* had nevertheleſs on many occaſions given the moſt evincing proofs of his pacific diſpoſition towards the Engliſh, and had even given us early intimation of this confederacy, alleging, that he had been compelled to enter into it from a dread of the reſentment of his aſſociates; and aſſuring us, that whatever appearances he might be conſtrained to aſſume, he would not involve the Berar Government in a decided enmity with the Engliſh. In conformity to this plan of policy, *Moodajee* had ſent from 30 to 40,000 horſe, under the command of his ſecond ſon *Chimnajee Baboo*: they received their diſmiſſion on the day of the Duſſerah, on the 11th of Auguſt 1779. The plan of operations preſcribed to them by the confederates, was to march into *Behar*, which they might have reached in two months; but inſtead of following this plan they took a different road, and by ſtudied delays had only reached *Cuttack* in the month of May following, being about the time when the periodical rains uſually ſet in in that province, which of courſe ſerved them as a pretext for deferring the proſecution of their profeſſed deſign; and they were at this time ſtill laying at *Cuttack*.

The Nizam had committed no open hoſtilities againſt us, though there is every reaſon to ſuppoſe (and he has even himſelf avowed it) that he was the projector of the confederacy, and had ſecretly ſupplied the other Powers with money to carry on their operations againſt us.

The advices from *Madras* proved but too fully the activity and ſpirit with which *Hyder* had begun to perform his part in this alarming confederacy.

Such was the poſture in which we ſtood with reſpect to the Powers of this country. Our advices regarding our European enemies were uncertain; it was however firmly believed, that an expedition would be attempted by the French, in the courſe of the ſeaſon, againſt ſome of the Company's ſettlements in *India*, though it was impoſſible to ſee whether it would fall on *Bengal*, *Madras*, or *Bombay*, though the latter was moſt probable.

Under theſe circumſtances it became expedient to contract as much as poſſible the ſphere of our military operations, ſo that without endangering the ſafety of our own poſſeſſions in *Bengal*, we might be able to act with more force and efficacy in our endeavours to recover the *Carnatic*, and to revenge the injury which the Engliſh had ſuſtained from *Hyder Ally Cawn*. The Government at *Poonah* had long borne an inveterate and avowed enmity againſt *Hyder*, and though temporary policy had now united them in one cauſe, yet his great and unexpected ſucceſſes might naturally revive their former jealouſy, and alarm the Miniſters of *Poonah* with apprehenſions for the future ſafety of their own territories: the opportunity therefore ſeemed favourable for propoſing to them terms of reconciliation from this Government, and as *Moodajee Booſla* had always profeſſed the ſtrongeſt deſire of effecting a pacification betwixt us and the Maratta States, it was thought neceſſary to engage him as a mediator in the intended negociation. With theſe views a treaty was drawn out by us, and ſent to *Naugpore*, and *Moodajee* was deſired to get it executed by the Peiſhwa and his Miniſters, and to ſign it himſelf as the guarantee for the punctual obſervance of it on both ſides. Vide Conſ. 2d Oct. 1780.

Whilſt

Appendix. No. 365.

Whilſt this negociation was in ſuſpenſe, it was agreed to poſtpone the march of the detachment deſtined by land for *Madras*, becauſe its route lay through the territories of *Moodajee Booſla*, and it muſt neceſſarily paſs by that part of his army which was laying at *Cuttack*, under the command of *Chimnajee*; circumſtances which, without having obtained the previous concurrence of *Moodajee*, might, in the unſettled ſtate of our connection with that prince, not only expoſe the detachment to difficulties and oppoſition in its march, but lead it into operations very different from the intention of its equipment, and draw on us the decided enmity of *Moodajee*, whoſe power when exerted againſt us would prove an important acquiſition to the ſtrength of *Hyder* and the Miniſters of *Poonah*. The great exertions which had already been made by this Government, required alſo ſome time before the neceſſary arrangements could be made for fitting out a new detachment, which was to perform ſo long a march, and be employed in ſervice of ſo much importance.

Vide Appendix No. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

On the 9th January 1781, anſwers were at length received from the Rajah of *Berar* and his miniſters, which contained however ſo many objections to the propoſed treaty, that little room was left to hope for an immediate accommodation with the Government of *Poonah*; and beſides the points which came into diſcuſſion, from their immediate connection with the treaty, theſe letters contained a variety of claims and propoſitions aſſerted by *Moodajee* on his own account, which though they were not wholly new, were recapitulated in a ſtyle that impreſſed us with doubts regarding the ſincerity of *Moodajee*'s former profeſſions and aſſurances.

The ſeaſon for action was now far advanced, Colonel *Pearſe*'s detachment was almoſt ready, and the ſtate of our affairs on the coaſt would not admit of longer delay. It was evident alſo, from the anſwers which had been received from *Moodajee*, that he conceived that our affairs were reduced to a ſtate more deſperate than they really were. To remove therefore this impreſſion, as well as to afford the moſt ſpeedy aſſiſtance to the Preſidency of *Madras*, it was reſolved, that the detachment ſhould immediately proceed and make its way through the province of *Oriſſa* againſt all oppoſition. To reconcile *Moodajee* however to this meaſure by every mark of attention in our power, and to prevent, if poſſible, a rupture from the meeting of the two armies, it was agreed to depute a gentleman from this Government to *Chimnajee Baboo* at *Cuttack*. Mr. *Anderſon* was ſelected for this ſervice, and the following inſtructions were given to him:

Secret Department.

To Mr. *David Anderſon*.

Sir,

We hereby appoint you our ſpecial miniſter to Rajah *Chimnajee Bhooſla*, the commander of the army of the Government of *Berar* now in the province of *Cuttack*; and we direct you to proceed thither with all poſſible expedition for the following purpoſes.

Firſt, you will produce to the Rajah your credentials, and deliver to him and to the Dewan *Bowanny Punt Appa*, the introductory letters which you will receive from the Governor General.

Secondly, you will notify to them in form, that orders have been given to Lieutenant Colonel *Pearſe*, the commander of the army lately formed at *Midnapore*, to march into the *Carnatic* by the way of *Cuttack*, its only practicable route; apprizing them that this information is given them in conſideration of the ancient friendſhip which has ſubſiſted between our forces in the *Carnatic* and the Government of *Naugpore*, and for the prevention of any cauſe which might eventually diſturb it. For this reaſon we have inſtructed you to requeſt them in our name to cauſe ſuch of their troops as may yet be in the road through which our army muſt paſs, to remove at ſuch a diſtance from it as may prevent the individuals on either ſide, and particularly the followers of the camps, whoſe licentiouſneſs is the moſt difficult to be reſtrained, from engaging in mutual broils which might imperceptibly lead to ſerious and alarming conſequences, affecting the union of the two States; and to acquaint them that the ſtricteſt orders have from the ſame motives been iſſued to the commander of the Engliſh army, who is a man of underſtanding and prudence, to obſerve all the duties of friendſhip with the Rajah and his people, and to avoid whatever may tend to create a miſunderſtanding with either. That the force has been ſome time ſince aſſembled and ready to march; but letters having been before ſent to *Naugpore*, containing the ſubſtance of a treaty propoſed for the guarantee of Rajah *Mhoodajee Bhooſla*, and the acceptance and ratification of the miniſters of the Peiſhwa, with other ſubjects tending to draw the two Governments of *Berar* and *Bengal* into a cloſer and firmer connection of friendſhip and intereſt, the march of the army was therefore withheld till an anſwer ſhould be received from *Naugpore*: that an anſwer has been received, but not concluſive, many points remaining for adjuſtment which may be the work of time: that we are aſſured of the inflexible determination of the Rajah to maintain the ancient friendſhip of the Bhoſila family with this Government, and to unite with it in one common cauſe, whenever the terms and objects of it can be ſettled to our mutual ſatisfaction; but that we cannot ſuffer the neceſſary plans and meaſures of Government to remain ſuſpended in the expectation of this concluſion, nor our armies to loſe the ſeaſon of action, while thoſe of our enemies are employing it againſt us; and that having acquitted ourſelves of the obligation impoſed upon us by our ſenſe of the relation ſubſiſting between the two Governments, the reſt remains with them, and they muſt be anſwerable for the conſequences if they do not conform to our example. You will be careful to make them underſtand that the orders to Colonel *Pearſe* are poſitive to proſecute his march, and make his way againſt all oppoſition.

Thirdly, if you find the Rajah and his Dewan diſpoſed to take a more decided part in our favour, of which indeed we have no expectation, we deſire that you will ſolicit the aid of 2,000 effective and choſen horſe, or any leſs number which they may be willing to contribute, to accompany Colonel *Pearſe*, and to act under his command, and receive their pay from the Company through their Pay Maſter; the mode and rate of which we empower you to ſettle by written ſtipulation.

Fourthly, we expect that this application will draw from them other demands; but theſe we direct you to tranſmit to us, and wait our anſwers to them, not judging it either neceſſary or expedient to give you more poſitive orders upon other points.

It is our order that you correſpond with Lieutenant Colonel *Pearſe*, tranſmitting to him ſpeedy and regular information of all matters proper for his knowledge.

Fort William, the 14th January, 1781. We are, &c.

Mr. *Anderſon* having received theſe inſtructions, proceeded on his journey towards *Cuttack*; on his arrival at *Ballaſore*, he found that *Chimnajee* had marched with his army againſt the fort of *Dhekanall*, which is ſituated amongſt the hills, and that it would be impoſſible at that time to penetrate through the paſſes which were in the poſſeſſion of the mountaineers. Mr. *Anderſon* communicated this difficulty to the Governor General in the following letters.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire.

Honourable Sir,

I arrived here this morning. The Maratta army is I find engaged in the ſiege of *Dhekanall*, which lays amongſt the hills, a conſiderable diſtance to the weſtward of the Cuttack road. The communication is I am told almoſt entirely ſtopped, as there is a thick jungle of near 17 coſs in length betwixt the road and *Dhekanall*, which is ſo much

infeſted

infeſted by the people of the rebellious Rajah's, that ſome days ago a conſiderable body of horſe which attempted to penetrate to the army with ſome ſupplies from *Cuttack*, were obliged to return.

I foreſee therefore a great difficulty in reaching *Chimnajee*'s camp in time to carry on any negociation, before the arrival of Colonel *Pearſe*'s detachment; and what will I fear conſiderably augment it, is the abſence of the Phouſdar of this place, for whom I brought a letter from *Beneram Pundit*. I have delivered the letter to his Naib, but having no previous notice, he ſeems undetermined how to act until he ſhall receive directions from the Subahdar at *Cuttack*. This would require a delay of 4 or 5 days, but you may be aſſured I ſhall endeavour to find means of proceeding ſooner.

Whilſt I regret extremely this delay, it is with ſome pleaſure that I remark that the ſame circumſtance which is the cauſe of it, renders the object of my deputation leſs important than it would have been, had the army of the Marattas been unemployed and on the high road to *Cuttack*.

If I can get the Naib Phouſdar's permiſſion, and a few of his ſervants for my protection, (which I find from experience is abſolutely neceſſary) I ſhall ſet out to-morrow for *Cuttack*, and there wait until I can hear from *Chimnajee*, or until I can get an eſcort to conduct me through the hills.

I have the honour to be,
With much reſpect, &c.
Ballaſore, Honourable Sir,
22d January 1781. Your, &c.

Honourable Sir,

I had the honour to write you yeſterday. I have now determined to ſet out for *Cuttack* to-morrow morning at all events. The Naib Phouſdar has promiſed to ſend two or three of his Sepoys along with me, which will I hope prevent any delay from my being ſtopped by the Chowkeydars on the road. *Biſſumber Pundit* is I find with Rajah *Ram Pundit* at *Cuttack*. I ſhall conſult with him about my future operations, and if the road to *Chimnajee*'s camp is impracticable, I ſhall wait at *Cuttack* until I ſhall receive your orders, or until I can find means to convey a letter and receive an anſwer from *Chimnajee*. I do not underſtand that there are many troops in this part of the country, they are moſtly gone with *Chimnajee* into the *Dhekanall* country. The few that are left are I believe under the command of Rajah *Ram Pundit*, who is a man of high rank, and much reſpected among the Marattas. I think it is probable that the chief object of my deputation may be anſwered by an interview with him. I mean the declaration which you have enjoined me to make with reſpect to the march of Colonel *Pearſe*. But if you ſhould think it at all events neceſſary that I ſhould find means of waiting on *Chimnajee*, to purſue the remaining objects of my commiſſion, viz. to perſuade him to take an active part and join us, or to enter into ſome engagement to remain paſſive, it will be neceſſary to ſend me more particular inſtructions, becauſe theſe propoſitions will, as you have obſerved, lead to demands on his part that I ſhall be unable to anſwer, until I can write to the Board and receive their orders, which (hemmed in as *Chimnajee* is at preſent by the rebellious Rajahs) would be very difficult, and if effected, would be attended with ſo much delay as to render my negociations with the Marattas, either regarding a junction or remaining paſſive, of no uſe with reſpect to Colonel *Pearſe*'s detachment. I beg leave to ſubmit theſe circumſtances to your conſideration, and to requeſt your orders; which as far as I can judge at preſent, may reach me before it will be in my power to leave *Cuttack*.

I have the honour to be,
With the utmoſt reſpect,
Ballaſore, Honourable Sir,
23d January 1781. Your faithful, &c.

The Governor General laid theſe letters before the Board, and as there appeared ſo little probability of Mr. *Anderſon*'s being able to effect an interview with *Chimnajee*, and that gentleman's preſence was wanted at the Preſidency for the duties of a very important ſtation, to which we had lately appointed him, we agreed to direct him to return to the Preſidency, and to leave the ſubject of his commiſſion with Rajah *Ram Pundit*, the Naib of *Cuttack*. The following letter was accordingly written to him by the Secretary. Appendix, No. 365.

Mr. *David Anderſon*.

Sir,

I am directed to convey to you the orders of the Honourable Governor General and Council, that you immediately return to the Preſidency, delivering the ſubject of your commiſſion to Rajah *Ram Pundit*, the Naib of *Cuttack*, to be by him communicated to *Chimnajee Baboo*.

I am Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
(Signed) *E. Hay*,
Fort William, Act^g Sec^y.
Council Chamber,
the 29th January 1781.

Mr. *Anderſon* in the mean time proceeded on to *Cuttack*, and during his ſtay there wrote the following letters to the Board.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council, *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

On my arrival here three days ago, I was informed that Rajah *Chimnajee* was encamped with his whole army amongſt the hills, about 24 coſs from this place; that the mountaineers were in general up in arms againſt the Maratta Government; that they had for ſome time entirely cut off the communication betwixt this place and the Rajah's camp, but that it was then again in ſome meaſure opened by the reduction of the Rajah of *Dheekanall*, who had been one of the principal and moſt active leaders in the rebellion. I immediately diſpatched letters to Rajah *Chimnajee*, and his Dewan *Bowanny Pundit*, informing them of my deputation from you, and of my arrival here, and requeſting to know if it would be agreeable to them that I ſhould wait on them in camp. It is with concern I am obliged to acquaint you that the Hircarrahs who carried the letters have now returned, and inform me that it is utterly impoſſible to paſs through the hills; even conſiderable bodies of horſe who have attempted to join the main army being obliged to return. This information is confirmed by the voice of all thoſe with whom I have had an opportunity of converſing.

As there has been no intercourſe whatever betwixt this place and the camp for ſome days, it is impoſſible to ſay where the army is at preſent. All the inhabitants here conclude from a variety of circumſtances that it is in motion. But different opinions and reports prevail regarding its deſtination; ſome allege that it was *Chimnajee*'s intention to march againſt the Rajah of *Sumbelpore*, who had refuſed to ſubmit to the heavy exactions impoſed by the Maratta Government; whilſt others conjecture that he is now actually on his march towards the weſtern paſſes of *Bengal*. Though this is merely conjecture, yet the well-known diſtreſſes and importunities of *Chimnajee*'s army, and the impoſſibility of finding any further reſources in this exhauſted country, give it an appearance of probability that will not allow me wholly to reject it.

I think it neceſſary to inform you that there are few or no troops at preſent in this part of the country.

I am this evening to have a conference with *Manoojee*, the Dewan of Rajah *Chimnajee*'s Duſtun, and *Hurdy Ram*, the Dewan of *Cuttack*, which will probably deter-

Appendix. No. 365.

mine me regarding the meaſures which are now left for me to purſue.

Cuttack, 31ſt January, 1781. I am, &c.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had yeſterday evening the honour to receive your Secretary's letter of the 29th ultimo.

Rajah *Ram Pundit* being at preſent with *Chimnajee Baboo*, and it appearing the intention of your order that I ſhould communicate the ſubject of my commiſſion to the perſons who for the time being might be conſidered as the repreſentative of the Maratta Government at *Cuttack*, I this morning waited on *Manoojee Pundit* and *Hurdy Ram*, the former of whom as Phurnoveſe, poſſeſſes great weight in the councils of the Berar State, and the latter as Dewan of *Cuttack* holds the executive authority of this Soubah in the abſence of Rajah *Ram Pundit*. I had at a former interview opened to them the intention of my deputation, and I this morning entered on the ſubject more fully, explaining it to them nearly in the words of my inſtructions. During the courſe of our converſation, *Manoojee* and *Hurdy Ram* at firſt expreſſed ſome apprehenſions from the reſentment which the Peiſhwa and his miniſters would entertain at their maſter's ſuffering Colonel *Pearſe*'s detachment to paſs. They enlarged much on the ſteady attachment ſhewn by *Moodajee* to the Engliſh, even whilſt all the other nations were at enmity with us; and obſerved that he had ſent his ſon to command the troops, who, notwithſtanding the preſſing inſtances of the Peiſhwa and his miniſters, had thus long avoided an invaſion of our territories, and had even now, under pretence of reducing ſome petty Rajahs, removed his army to a conſiderable diſtance, on purpoſe that our troops might the more eaſily paſs. This was a proof of friendſhip which had not occurred to them at our firſt interview; I was pleaſed however to find it adduced, and readily admitted it; I purſued the favourable diſpoſition which it diſcovered, and I have the pleaſure to inform you, that *Manoojee* and *Hurdy Ram* promiſed that orders ſhould be ſent to all the Tanadars and officers on the road, not only to avoid doing any thing which might be productive of diſputes, but to aſſiſt as far as poſſible in ſupplying the detachment with proviſions in their route. The performance of this promiſe muſt however, I am ſenſible, depend on the intentions of the Maratta Government, and the orders which may be received from *Chimnajee*. At the requeſt of *Manoojee* and *Hurdy Ram*, I delivered to them the letters of introduction which I received from the Governor General for *Chimnajee*, and ſome diſpatches which I had brought from *Beneram Pundit* to his brother, and they promiſed that they would immediately forward them to camp under a ſtrong eſcort, together with a letter from themſelves to Rajah *Chimnajee*, informing him of the ſubject of my commiſſion.

I learned from *Manoojee* and *Hurdy Ram*, that *Chimnajee*, with almoſt the whole of his army, was at a place called *Khoud*, on the boundaries of the Cunjer country, about 35 coſs from hence. It lays, as I am informed, nearly N. W. from *Cuttack*, and no inference can be drawn regarding *Chimnajee*'s intentions from the ſuppoſed ſituation of the army, as it is ſaid to be almoſt equally convenient for marching to any of the places for which report variouſly deſtines it, to *Jumbelpore*, to *Great Naugpore*, or to the weſtern frontiers of *Bengal*.

In obedience to your orders of the 29th ultimo, I ſhall ſet out to-morrow on my return to *Bengal*.

5th February 1781. I am, &c.

Mr. *Anderſon* afterwards left *Cuttack* and ſet out on his return to the Preſidency: on his arrival at *Ballapore* he overtook *Biſſumber Pundit*, a Vackeel whom *Chimnajee Baboo* had ſent through the hills under a ſtrong eſcort with diſpatches to the Governor General. Mr. *Anderſon* agreed to travel in company with *Biſſumber Pundit* to *Calcutta*; but before he left *Balaſore*, he heard that *Chimnajee* with all his army was come down into the open country, which was confirmed by a letter which he received from *Chimnajee*'s miniſter, *Bhowanny Pundit*; expreſſing a great deſire to ſee him, and requeſting him to return from *Balaſore* to *Chimnajee*'s camp, which was then in the neighbourhood of *Jaagepore*: but as the order of the Board, of the 29th January, was poſitive, and Mr. *Anderſon* knew not on what grounds it was iſſued, he thought he could not take upon himſelf to deviate from it; he excuſed himſelf therefore to *Bowanny Pundit* in the beſt manner he could, and having written all the circumſtances to the Governor General, he proceeded by ſlow journies towards *Calcutta*, expecting to receive on the road further orders for his conduct. The Governor General accordingly did write to him three letters, directing him to comply with *Bowanny Pundit*'s deſire; but as they were ſent by one road, and Mr. *Anderſon* proceeded by another, they did not reach him till after his arrival at *Calcutta*.

In the mean time Colonel *Pearſe*'s detachment entered the Maratta territories, and *Chimnajee Baboo*, whoſe army was now within a few miles of the road, not only ſuffered him to paſs without oppoſition, but directed one of his principal officers to attend the Colonel, and ſupply the detachment with whatever they might want. The Colonel's letter afforded daily teſtimony of the care with which the officer executed his inſtructions, and the detachment during the whole of the march through *Oriſſa* had the moſt plentiful ſupplies of grain and every kind of proviſions.

Repeated diſpatches were about this time received from *Chimnajee* and his miniſters (vide Appendix, No. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) profeſſing their friendly diſpoſition towards the Engliſh, and declaring their reſolution to afford Colonel *Pearſe* every aſſiſtance during his march through *Oriſſa*; but all of them complaining at the ſame time of the hardſhips which their friendſhip for the Engliſh had brought upon them, and the difficulty which they found in pacifying their troops, who complained of their want of pay, and loudly called out to be led to plunder. A letter was likewiſe about this time received from *Bowanny Pundit*, the Moonſhee of Rajah *Moodajee Bhooſla*, addreſſed to *Beneram Pundit*, the Berar Vackeel at *Calcutta*, which throws ſome light on the views and policy of the Court of *Berar*. Vide Appendix No. 10.

The meſſage which *Biſſumber Pundit* conveyed from Rajah *Chimnagee Baboo* contained ſeveral propoſitions of great importance, and as the Rajah had expreſſed ſome chagrin at not ſeeing Mr. *Anderſon* on his firſt deputation, we agreed to ſend that gentleman back to him. The Governor General alſo ſent *Biſſumber Pundit* back at the ſame time with anſwers to the Rajah's propoſitions. As it became neceſſary to inform Mr. *Anderſon* of the propoſitions conveyed by *Biſſumber Pundit*, and to direct him to ſound the diſpoſitions of the Rajah and his miniſters, regarding ſeveral objects of a ſecret nature, it was thought adviſable to iſſue his inſtructions from the Governor General only, without minuting the particulars of them on the uſual records of the Council. The following is a copy of the letter which being agreed on by the Board was written to him:

N. B. The Committee have upon due conſideration thought it proper to leave out the letter of inſtructions to Mr. *Anderſon*.

Letter from the Governor General.

Dear Sir, *Barraſſet*, 1ſt March 1781.

I now ſend you my private inſtructions; they are ſuch as could not properly or prudently be given in public orders, and expoſed as of courſe theſe would be to our official records. Mr. *Wheler* approves them, and authorizes me to declare his approbation of them. They appear rather longer

longer than the matter of mere converſation needs to be; but I ſhould have made them ſtill longer had they been addreſſed to a perſon leſs informed, or leſs capable of drawing the probable concluſions from known or ſuppoſed facts, than you are; for I think much will depend on the temper and inclinations of the young Rajah, and therefore I have been ſo particular in ſtating the points which are moſt likely to influence his mind, and even to preſcribe the manner in which you may moſt ſucceſsfully urge them.

I recommend to you to take minutes of every converſation with him; they will be uſeful not only for reference, but by connecting the ſentiments of the Rajah expreſſed at different times, they will afford you a better clue to his real views and intentions.

Reſpecting the connection of the Government of *Berar* with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, I would rather refer you to *Biſſumber Pundit*, who can give you the fulleſt information concerning it. I will only ſay in a few words, that I conſider them as natural enemies, although they are on terms of outward friendſhip. I can perceive that *Moodajee* (or rather his Dewan, whoſe dictates the Rajah implicitly follows in all political meaſures) ſtands in ſome awe of *Nizam Ally*, and I have ſometimes intimated the poſſibility of our being driven to the neceſſity of courting his alliance in the manner in which I have hitherto ſought that of the Governor of *Berar*, if the latter ſhould continue to procraſtinate. He was the projector of the preſent confederacy, and is ſaid to be at this time detached from it by the report of *Hyder*'s having obtained a grant from the king of his dominions: the report is certainly true.

Do not fail to make my acknowledgments to *Chimnajee*, for the liberal manner in which he has acted to Colonel *Pearſe*, of which the Colonel writes his daily teſtimony. He has a claim to a grateful return, and on that footing I would yield him advantages which ſhould be withheld from him for ever, if he employed the means of hoſtility or menace to obtain them.

Rajah Ram Pundit has been very uſeful to us by his influence and counſels: let him know that I know it, and am ſenſible of it. If you ſhall judge it neceſſary to enſure either his or *Bowanny Pundit*'s friendſhip by gifts of money, or to make ſimilar preſents to others, you have my authority to draw on me for any ſums, and to diſtribute them according to your diſcretion.

If any thing that I have ſaid ſhould require further explanation, and ſuch as can only be conveyed effectually by converſation, as I ſhall of courſe return to town for a day, in a day or two hence, let me know, and I will go earlier to ſee you.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Your's affectionately.

Mr. *Anderſon* having expreſſed ſome doubts regarding the intention of ſome parts of the preceding inſtructions, the Governor General thought it neceſſary to explain them more fully in the following letter.

Dear Sir, *Baraſet*, 2d March 1781.

To remove every ambiguity in the conſtruction of the paragraph concerning which you have expreſſed your doubts, I deſire you will read it with the following correction:

" You may engage to ſupply them with twelve lacks " of rupees. This is the ſum which I formerly promiſed " my intereſt with this Government to grant them in the " event of the Rajah's (that is, *Moodajee*'s) compliance " with the requiſition made to him in October laſt."

This requiſition was, that he ſhould execute the treaty which was propoſed to him, and order his troops at *Cuttack* either to return or to join us. The requiſition has not been complied with. I now offer the ſame ſum to *Chimna Baboo*, with the condition only that he will return, or ſolemnly promiſe not to employ the forces under his command againſt us. I limit the condition to no time, but to the forces which are actually under the command of *Chimna Baboo*. Theſe muſt never be employed againſt us. Appendix. No. 365.

Here I think it neceſſary to diſtinguiſh between the motive of this bounty, or the condition *for* which it is granted, and the condition *on* which it is granted; and I deſire that you will mark the diſtinction in all your diſcourſes upon the ſubject. It is this, I conſider the Government of *Berar* as a ſufferer by the many inſtances which it has given of its attachment to our's, and therefore entitled to ſome retribution from us. To the world, the appearance of its forces ſo near to our borders, and their profeſſed deſtination againſt our provinces, will be conſtrued an hoſtility. To me who know the compulſion under which this meaſure was undertaken, and the pretexts which have been uſed to elude the purpoſe for which it was profeſſedly formed, to whom both its profeſſed deſtination and the intended evaſion of it were early notified, and the latter verified by the ſlow progreſs of the army, its inactivity, its diſtreſſes, and above all, by its forbearance with an Engliſh army paſſing in their route, and through their own territory; it is an evidence of the pacific diſpoſition of the Government of *Berar*, and its attachment to ours, equal even to the hoſpitality ſhewn by it to General *Goddard*'s detachment We cannot repay the expence which they have incurred by ſo long an employment of ſo large a body of cavalry in inaction, and in a remote and deſtitute country; but I deem it incumbent upon our Government to relieve its preſent wants, and to afford it the means of a retreat. It is a debt of honour, juſtice, and even policy, for I doubt whether the Rajah could return with them, unleſs he could either diſcharge a part of their arrears, or lead them to plunder. It is therefore as a compenſation for loſſes ſuſtained on our account, as an acknowledgment and return for paſt kindneſs, not the purchaſe of future forbearance, that we conſent to grant them the aid which you are inſtructed to tender to them. At the ſame time we have thought it proper to give it with the obvious precaution, that it be not employed to our own hurt, nor the right forfeited on which it was granted by future hoſtilities.

You muſt not exceed the ſum of two lacks in private diſtributions; even that you will doubtleſs conſider an exceſs, unleſs ſome very ſubſtantial benefit can be purchaſed by it.

I am, Dear Sir,
Your's affectionately.

P. S. I am not yet ſatisfied with the preceding explanations; complete as they may appear, they want their direct and poſitive application, which I now add.—If *Chimnajee* in his acceptance of the ſum proffered to him ſhall inſiſt on any reſervation of the right to employ his forces againſt us in the next ſeaſon, or at any period before their return to *Naugpore*, you muſt declare to him, that his claim to this ſupply will become forfeit by ſuch a reſervation, and that it will put it out of our power to grant it; in a word, that *we will not grant it.*

With theſe inſtructions Mr. *Anderſon* proceeded to the Maratta camp, where he held ſeveral long conferences with the Rajah and his miniſters. The ſubject of theſe conferences will beſt appear from the following papers which were ſent by Mr. *Anderſon* to the Governor General. They were originally intended by that gentleman to have been conſidered only as private information, previous to his finding leiſure to deliver in a regular report of his proceedings to the Board; but as theſe papers were written almoſt at the moment in which the ſeveral conferences related in them actually paſſed, they will afford the beſt inſight into the views of the parties, and probably be more acceptable than a relation more leiſurely and methodically digeſted.

Honourable Sir, Camp 13th March, 1781.

On my arrival yeſterday evening, I was received in camp with every mark of attention and reſpect. I was introduced

Appendix. No. 365.

introduced to the Rajah, and all his principal officers aſſembled. I delivered to him and his Dewan *Bowanny Pundit* the letters which I received from you. I took occaſion at this interview to inform the Rajah that you had ſent him ſome preſents of ſilks, which together with all my own baggage had been left at *Beercool*, the coolies who carried them having run away terrified at the reports of the depredations committed by a body of Maratta horſe, which had entered the province of *Jellaſore*. The Rajah aſſured me that theſe outrages on our territories were committed in oppoſition to his orders, and that the moment he had heard of them, he had ſent to recall the plundering party, and to puniſh the perſons who compoſed it. I deemed it neceſſary to obtain this aſſurance before I entered on the ſubject of my commiſſion.

This morning I again waited on the Rajah by appointment, and had a very long conference with him, or rather with the Dewan *Bowanny Pundit* in his preſence. Having produced my credentials, I explained the profeſſed object of my former and of my preſent deputation. Our converſation afterwards turned on the propoſitions which had been made to you through *Biſſumber Pundit*. I was called on for the anſwers, as *Biſſumber Pundit* had referred them to me, and had affected an ignorance of your ſentiments, even on thoſe points which you have replied to in the cleareſt terms. The Dewan in diſcuſſing the preliminary article of theſe propoſitions, endeavoured to involve under it the nature of our ſituation with reſpect to the Peiſhwa, and it was with ſome difficulty that I could confine the queſtion to the point of view in which you had conſidered it, and which at the time of ſtating it was certainly the point of view in which it was intended you ſhould conſider it, being an appeal from the Rajah to your juſtice. I went through all the arguments which you have ſo fully laid down in my inſtructions; and as the Dewan ſeemed inclined to combat every one of them, the converſation was carried on to a great length. The Dewan at laſt in ſome meaſure concurred in the propriety of the advice which you had given to the Rajah, but he reſted every thing on your compliance with his expectations reſpecting the firſt article of the propoſitions, namely, the expence of the troops. I then proceeded to inform the Rajah of the offer which you had empowered me to make him, of the motives which induced you to grant him that ſupply, and of the promiſe which you had directed me to exact from him. The Rajah, his Dewan, *Rajah Ram Pundit*, one or two of the miniſters who were preſent, and even *Biſſumber Pundit*, affected much ſurpriſe at the ſmallneſs of the ſum: they obſerved, that near two crores of rupees had been expended on account of their attachment to the Engliſh; they expatiated on their preſent diſtreſſes, and remarked that the ſum which you had tendered was ſcarcely adequate to diſcharge the arrears of a ſingle Jemaautder, and inſinuated the conſequences to which they might be driven by hunger, diſappointment, and deſpair. I acknowledged in the fulleſt degree the ſenſe you entertained of their attachment, and admitted the reality of their diſtreſſes: I requeſted, however, that they would conſider alſo the ſituation of our Government; that we were engaged in wars with ſeveral powerful States; that although we had indeed latterly been ſucceſsful, yet that theſe ſucceſſes had been obtained at a vaſt expence of treaſure, and that much more might ſtill be neceſſary; that as theſe troops had not come thus far at our requeſt, nor ever been employed in our ſervice, it was not to be expected that we could defray the whole of their expence; all that could be looked for was, that we ſhould aſſiſt in relieving them from their preſent diſtreſſes, of which their attachment to our Government had partly been the occaſion; and this I aſſured them you had attended to in as full a degree as our own ſituation could poſſibly admit: in ſhort, much argument paſſed on the ſubject, and as the Dewan ſeemed to reject the offer with a kind of ſlight, which I deemed inconſiſtent with the connection which has ſubſiſted betwixt the two Governments of *Berar* and *Bengal*, I thought it my duty to turn to the Rajah and aſk, whether this was a poſitive and final anſwer, or whether it would be agreeable to him before he gave me my diſmiſſion, to take ſome days to weigh all that I had ſaid in his own mind, and then give me an anſwer?

I proceeded to communicate your anſwers regarding the remaining three propoſitions. I was permitted to go through thoſe which relate to *Ragonaut Row*, and the paſſage of the troops through *Goyah*, without being interrupted or receiving a reply. When I came to the laſt article, and when I queſtioned whether the Rajah was authorized to treat upon it, the Dewan informed me that he was; and on my telling him, that I ſhould in that caſe hear and tranſmit to you whatever he had to ſay, he replied, that too much delay had taken place on that ſubject already: he ran through the whole ſtory of the manner in which the chout had been acquired; ſaid that the exaction of it had been ſuſpended on account of the troubles which had happened in the Berar State, but that the right ſtill remained, and that the troops who had acquired it were ſtill the ſame. I ſatisfied myſelf with replying, that the troops of *Aliverdy Cawn* and thoſe of the Engliſh were different; and we ſoon afterwards imperceptibly paſſed from this article without my having an opportunity of fully ſounding their diſpoſition in the manner which you have enjoined. The article of the expences ſeemed to engroſs the whole of their thoughts. They ſaid they were willing to engage hereafter in any of our views, particularly to unite with us againſt *Hyder Ally*, if he had actually ſolicited ſunnuds for the *Deckan*; but the arrears of their troops muſt firſt be paid, without which it was impoſſible for them to do any thing: that it was with the utmoſt difficulty they could now prevent them from mutinying, by buoying up their hopes with promiſes of relief from *Bengal*; and that if a mutiny ſhould happen, it might prove very fatal to the Rajah and them all; that their diſtreſſes and apprehenſions were now ſuch, that if I went away without fulfilling the expectations of the troops, the Rajah muſt go alſo, from neceſſity, and throw himſelf upon you for relief at *Calcutta*. On the whole, you will not imagine that I had much reaſon to be ſatisfied with the expectations ſhewn by the Dewan in this day's converſation: I am not, however, entirely diſcouraged, as I aſcribe it chiefly to the idea with which *Biſſumber Pundit* has impreſſed them, of my being poſſeſſed with full powers to ſettle any ſum which I may think fit, and it is natural for them to try every method of raiſing it as high as poſſible. I am endeavouring to remove this idea, and I would fain hope, that when this is effected, the Dewan will change his opinion regarding the offer which you have made to the Rajah. You will obſerve from the manner in which this converſation has been carried on, that I have little to expect from an attention to the particular diſpoſition of the young Rajah: he ſhewed a kind of complacent indifference during the whole time, and it was in vain that I endeavoured to engage him in the diſcuſſion by frequent appeals to him in points where the Dewans and I differed. I am again to viſit him to-morrow evening to deliver your preſents, which I underſtand are arrived at *Balaſore*: I ſhall then confine our converſation to ſubjects of leſs importance, and endeavour to obtain a more thorough inſight into his temper and character, and to acquire his good-will and favourable opinion. I ſhall be in no haſte to leave his camp whilſt there remains the ſmalleſt hope of my ſtay being productive of any good. *Rajah Ram Pundit*, who has frequently viſited me ſince my arrival, has particularly implored me to repreſent to you their diſtreſſes, and entreat you to prevent them by a more conſiderable ſupply. It is in vain that I have repeated to him, and indeed to all the reſt who have ſpoken to me, that you have fixed a ſum, and that I was certain that you would on no account exceed it. Under the preſent appearances I have thought it would be to no purpoſe and premature to try

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the mode which you have authorized of private diſtributions. Notwithſtanding the length of this letter, I have been obliged to omit many things which I could wiſh to have mentioned. I muſt make an apology for the haſty and inaccurate manner in which I have written, and requeſt that you will conſider it as a private letter addreſſed to yourſelf only. I am, &c.

Poſtſcript, 14th in the morning.

Biſſumber Pundit has juſt now been with me with a meſſage from the Rajah. He has ſhewn me your letter to him, to evince that I have a diſcretional power to increaſe the ſum tendered as I may think fit. I have explained to him, that although you have referred the Rajah to me, yet you have communicated to me your utmoſt intentions, and I muſt abide by them. He deſired, in the Rajah's name, to know whether he ſhould march forwards to day, and whether he ſhould give me my diſmiſſion? I have told him that I wiſhed him to weigh well the views which I have ſuggeſted yeſterday, and to act accordingly; that it is not my deſire to leave him ſo ſoon; that on the contrary it is my wiſh to ſtay ſome time with him, that I may obtain a knowledge of all his ſentiments and wiſhes, ſo that on my return I may be enabled to explain them to you; but that on both of the above points it muſt reſt with him to determine; that I could not give him any expectations whatever of a larger ſum. I do not imagine he will give me my diſmiſſion, though poſſibly he may make a ſhow of marching. I am to viſit *Bowanny Pundit* this morning.

On a further conſideration of my inſtructions, ſome doubts ariſe in my mind, which as they may ſtill have their application, I beg leave to ſtate in ſhort queſtions.

1ſt. Shall the Rajah's promiſe to return, or not employ his troops againſt us, be in *writing*, or will a verbal promiſe be enough?

2d. Shall it either in writing or verbally be required to be *on oath?*

3d. Shall the word *never* be poſitively expreſſed, or will it be enough if the general tenor of the Rajah's diſcourſe ſhews no inclination *ever* to employ his troops againſt us; and in his formal promiſe will the word *not* inſtead of *never* be in ſuch caſe ſufficient?

If you think any of theſe points of conſequence, I beg you will be pleaſed to ſend me anſwers to them, as they are not particularly expreſſed in my inſtructions; and I wiſh to adhere cloſely to your inclinations in every thing.

Minutes of ſeveral Conferences on the 14th and 15th March.

14th. I received ſeveral curſory viſits in the courſe of the day from *Biſſumber Pundit* and *Rajah Ram Pundit*; but as little paſſed excepting expreſſions of the apprehenſions which they entertained of the conſequences which would accrue to both parties, from our not being able to come to an agreement on the preſent occaſion, I forbear to minute at full length the particulars of our converſation.

In the evening I went with them to pay a viſit to the Dewan. The converſation was begun by his aſking me if I had conſidered the particulars of yeſterday's conference, and what advice I had to offer? I replied that my advice, in conformity to that of the Governor, was for them to accept of the ſum, which in regard to their attachment had been proffered for the relief of their preſent diſtreſſes; and either reſolve to join us when circumſtances would admit, in carrying on the war againſt *Hyder*, or in proſecuting the object which I had pointed out to them, of acquiring the Rauje of the Maratta State for the Bhooſla family. The Dewan replied, that ſupplies were neceſſary. To this I anſwered, that when they ſhould reſolve to join in the former object, the terms of our union would neceſſarily be ſettled; but that if they ſhould embrace the latter propoſal, the object would be more for their benefit than for our's, and that I imagined it could be effected without their incurring much expence; that our troops alone had already reduced the Government of *Poonah* to the greateſt extremity, but that when joined with theirs, or ſupported with the ſanction of their name, they could not fail of ſucceſs; that the Rauje was now vacant, inſomuch that even the name of it was ſcarcely preſerved: that (as they themſelves muſt be ſenſible) it was their known hereditary right; that there was probably no Power would be inclined, and none I was certain would be capable to oppoſe their pretenſions; and that on the whole therefore I thought the acquiſition would be eaſy and infallible. The Dewan replied, that their engaging in this object was a matter which muſt depend on the councils at *Naugpore*; that this therefore would require ſome delay, and that in the mean time what were they to do to relieve the diſtreſſes of their troops which had come thus far, and which had for ſixteen months depended on their expectations from our Government. I replied, that for this purpoſe the ſum was now tendered them. He anſwered that the ſum tendered was ſcarcely a mouthful; that the Rajah had remarked to him, that the Governor had ſtyled him in his letters yeazaz-az-jiam, dearer than life; was this a proof of it? Was this all that he would do for one that was ſo dear to him? It would appear that he regarded money as more dear. I informed him, that I had not had an opportunity of knowing the ſubject of all the conferences which had paſſed betwixt the Governor and *Beneram Pundit* and *Biſſumber Pundit*, or of all the letters which had been written to and from *Naugpore*; but that I never had underſtood that any more than what now proffered had ever been required or promiſed: that I had ſeen one letter from *Dewagur Pundit*, which, though it mentioned high expectations in caſe of a junction againſt *Hyder Ally*, yet it implied no higher expectations for the relief of the troops ſent to *Cuttack*. I aſked him, if any higher promiſe had ever been made? He acknowledged, that no expreſs promiſe had ever been made of a larger ſum, but that the Governor had always promiſed his friendſhip, and in promiſing *that* had given them reaſon to expect a ſupply adequate to their neceſſity. *Rajah Ram Pundit* obſerved, that the letter to which I alluded from *Dewagur Pundit*, related to a particular occaſion, when the ſupply wanted was only for one or two months.—I think it here neceſſary to remark, that *Rajah Ram Pundit* yeſterday obſerved, at the conference held in preſence of the Rajah, that the ſum now tendered was only equal to what was in agitation at the end of the rains, when the treaty was firſt offered to the Poonah Government, and that eight months expences had ſince been incurred. I then replied, that the ſubſequent delay could not be aſcribed to us but to their own Government, which had returned the treaty with propoſitions which could not eaſily be acceded to.—To return to the conference of to-day: The Dewan aſked, what mighty matter it would have been if the Governor, conſidering their hereditary claims on *Bengal*, and from a regard to his friendſhip to *Chimnajee*, as well as to prevent the conſequences which may ariſe to our own territories, from their diſtreſs and deſpair, had made each of the Zemindars contribute to raiſe a ſum to relieve *Chimnajee*, and enable him to return to *Naugpore?* He laid ſo much ſtreſs upon this method of raiſing a ſupply, that I thought it neceſſary to inform him, that money paid by a contribution by our Zemindars, or money paid from our own treaſury, was to us much the ſame thing; or if there was any difference, the latter was preferable.

Biſſumber Pundit having declared to them, that he knew not the extent of the Governor's intentions, that he had only told him he would aſſiſt them with a ſupply in proportion to his abilities, and that he had deputed me with full powers for this purpoſe, I thought it neceſſary to repeat to them again and again, that the intention of my deputation was chiefly to afford a public teſtimony of the acknowledgments of our Government for the friendſhip

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ſhip ſhewn by *Chimnajee* in regard to Colonel *Pearſe*'s detachment; that the Governor had, however, for my information, communicated to me the anſwers which he had delivered to *Biſſumber Pundit* to the propoſitions conveyed to him from the Rajah, and had inſtructed me, in conformity to his anſwer regarding the expences, to engage to ſupply the particular ſum which he expreſſed; that it was not in my power to deviate from it; that however, if they choſe, I ſhould certainly write to the Governor, and communicate to him all that had paſſed; but that I could give them no hopes that this would be productive of a larger ſupply. They did not require me to write, but left it to me to do as I pleaſed. We afterwards mutually regretted the interruption which from preſent appearances was likely to take place in the friendſhip which had ſubſiſted betwixt the Engliſh and Berar Government, and which, if preſerved, we agreed might have tended to the mutual benefit of both States. This is almoſt word for word all that paſſed at this interview. I ſtudiouſly avoided argument, becauſe I had obſerved a captiouſneſs in the Dewan which notwithſtanding frequent profeſſions of friendſhip gave our yeſterday's conference more the appearance of diſpute than I thought conſiſtent with calm and friendly diſcuſſion. Nothing however of this nature paſſed at this interview; every thing was ſaid in a cool and deliberate tone, and due attention was paid by each to whatever was ſaid by the other. I afterwards went and paid a viſit to the Rajah, and delivered to him the Governor's preſents, which he accepted with much ſeeming complacency. Nothing paſſed at this interview relating to buſineſs. I endeavoured to engage the Rajah in ordinary topics of converſation; but either owing to a natural ſhyneſs of diſpoſition, or to the diffidence of a young man unaccuſtomed to converſe with ſtrangers, or perhaps to the reſtraint impoſed upon him by his miniſters, he ſhewed little inclination to enter into any diſcourſe. His anſwers were always ſhort, and his queſtions very few; but his ſilence ſhewed no want of affability. *Biſſumber Pundit* came to me afterwards, and informed me, that *Rajah Ram Pundit* would ſhortly come to me with a meſſage from the Rajah, to aſk me whether he ſhould march on to-morrow? The effect of his march we both agreed would be the letting looſe all thoſe plundering parties who had hitherto with ſo much difficulty been reſtrained; and *Biſſumber Pundit* acknowledged that when a fire was once kindled, it was not eaſy afterwards to extinguiſh it. *Biſſumber Pundit* ſaid, that the Rajah's expectations were about fifty lacks; he has ſince talked of thirty or twenty-five. About ten at night *Biſſumber Pundit* came again, and informed me that *Rajah Ram Pundit* was coming to aſk me about the march of the troops: I deſired he would tell *Rajah Ram Pundit* before-hand, that I had no right to object to the Rajah's marching to any part of his territories; but the manner in which this march was propoſed immediately after our conferences, would to all the world carry the appearance of a threat, as it really was; and that as I was inſtructed to offer a ſupply, from motives of gratitude and not from motives of fear, I ſhould not if the Rajah marched, think myſelf authorized to repeat the offer which I had made to him: that I had now done every thing in a public capacity that lay in my power to prevent a rupture; but that there was indeed one thing of a private nature which I could take upon myſelf to do, and that was to make preſents to the amount of a lack, or one and a half, or thereabouts, to *Bowanny Pundit*, *Rajah Ram Pundit*, or any of the Rajah's miniſters, and this he might mention to *Rajah Ram Pundit*.

The ſame night, about half paſt eleven, *Biſſumber* and *Rajah Ram Pundit* came to me: *Rajah Ram Pundit* ſaid, that *Biſſumber Pundit* had mentioned to him all that I had told him: he obſerved, that in ſettling farms of pergunnahs, or buſineſs of ſuch a nature, preſents to the mutſuddies employed were uſual and proper; but that this was a matter in which the lives and happineſs of thouſands were eventually concerned, and that in ſuch a negociation ſuch preſents could have no place. I excuſed myſelf to him; I reminded him that the idea had been ſuggeſted by himſelf the evening before, when he had inſinuated to me, that if my object was to obtain any thing for myſelf, the houſe of *Booſla* could eaſily give it: I repeated to him what I had ſaid to *Biſſumber Pundit* about the march of the troops, and the impoſſibility of my continuing after it the Governor's offer. He then drew ſo ſtrong a picture of the diſtreſſes that the Engliſh would thus entail on their provinces, that, conſidering it as a kind of menace, I begged he would deſiſt from ſuch diſcourſe; that it was perhaps improper for me to anſwer it, as I was ſent only on the idea of their pacific diſpoſition; but that I would once for all repeat to them that fear for our own territories had no part in the Governor's intention in ſending me; that our troops were in poſſeſſion of all the Gauts, and that we had a body in the field which the whole of the Maratta army could not face; that all that could happen to us (independent of the loſs of diſtant political views) would be the ſpreading terror amongſt the inhabitants of *Midnapore*, *Jellaſore*, and perhaps part of *Burdwan*. *Rajah Ram Pundit* then told me, that as I could not be brought to alter my offer, a thought had occurred to him, which was, for the army to go on to *Ramchundernapore*, and for him and *Biſſumber Pundit* and me to go to the Governor at *Calcutta*, to ſee and prevail on him to give a larger ſupply, but that I muſt promiſe to uſe my endeavours in perſuading the Governor; and that we ſhould in the mean time leave Mr. *Redfearn* with the Rajah.

I objected to leave Mr. *Redfearn* after I ſhould go myſelf; but I ſaid, that I would ſend Mr. *Redfearn* with them, and ſtay with the Rajah myſelf; that their going however would, I was certain, be to no purpoſe, if the army moved any nearer our provinces after what had paſſed, as the Governor would not afterwards confer on the ſubject: that as to my perſuading the Governor, *Biſſumber Pundit* could tell him, that the Governor did every thing from himſelf; that his reaſon and judgment were much ſuperior to mine; that it was my duty to regulate mine by his, and not to attempt to influence his; that I could not even promiſe to adviſe; that I wiſhed to preſerve peace, and had a regard for the Rajah, but all that I could engage was to repreſent all that I had ſeen and heard; and concluded with telling him that I could give him no further aſſurances or expectations of better ſucceſs with you.

It was agreed by *Rajah Ram Pundit* and *Biſſumber Pundit* to repreſent what had paſſed to the Rajah.

15th. Early in the morning *Biſſumber Pundit* came to me, and told me that the Rajah had approved of *Rajah Ram Pundit*'s going with *Biſſumber Pundit*, Mr. *Redfearn*, and me to the Governor, and that the Rajah had deſired him to apologize to me for any want of affability which he might have ſhewn yeſterday; that I muſt make allowance for his feelings as a ſoldier, hurt at being ſtopped on his march from what I had ſaid in the morning. *Rajah Ram Pundit* ſaid, that he was hurt at ſomething that paſſed betwixt him and ſome of his Jemautdars.

Received the following letter from the Governor General:

Fort William, 11th March 1781.

Sir

A letter is received from Major *Mc Pherſon*, which reports, that on the 7th inſtant a large party of Marattas croſſed the *Soubenrekah* and came ſo near to Fort *Knox*, that the officer ſtationed there fired upon them; and that they moved off, as he ſuppoſed, in ſearch of plunder. He adds, that *Dumdarva* with a conſiderable force was expected in the ſame quarter on that evening, or the next morning.

I deſire that you will remonſtrate with *Chimnajee Baboo* on the impropriety of this conduct, and require his inſtant orders for the retreat of his troops from our neighbourhood,

neighbourhood, declaring that we ſhall conſider their paſſing our frontier line, and even their continuance near it, as a decided hoſtility, ſince neither can be attributed to any other deſign. It is alſo my order that you forbear to make the tender to *Chimnajee Baboo*, directed in my inſtructions; or if you have made it, that you formally retract it, until he ſhall have recalled all his forces, of every denomination, to a man, to the ſouthward of *Ballaſore*.

Mr. *Wheler* authorizes me to notify his concurrence in theſe orders, which you will therefore regard as equivalent to thoſe of the Board delivered in the cuſtomary form.

I am, Sir.

Your moſt obedient ſervant.

P. S. A letter ſince received from Mr. *Pearſe*, confirms the intelligence of Major *Mc Pherſon*; I herewith ſend you a copy of it, by which you will ſee the conſequences which this indiſcreet act, if it hath not received the authority of the Rajah, is likely to produce.

I viſited afterwards the Rajah, and communicated to him the purport of the Governor's letter, he deſired me to aſſure the Governor that he had already iſſued the orders which the Governor required. I ſhall minute the particulars of this interview hereafter; ſuffice it for the preſent to ſay, that the Rajah diſmiſſed me, pleaſed with the marks of attention which he ſhewed to me, and with the good inclinations which he diſcovered towards our Government.

Honourable Sir,

As I have not leiſure to ſend you a regular detail of my proceedings in the form of an addreſs, I have taken the liberty to ſend you incloſed a copy of the minutes which I have taken, agreeable to your direction, of every thing that has paſſed ſince my laſt letter. They are incorrect, but will perhaps communicate to you a more clear idea of the ſtate of opinions here than I could poſſibly convey to you in a ſtudied and regular addreſs.

It is now ſettled that *Rajah Ram Pundit*, *Biſſumber Pundit*, and I and Mr. *Redfearn*, are immediately to proceed to *Calcutta*; and that in the mean time the army is not to move from this place. I am ſenſible that *Rajah Ram Pundit*'s viſit, and the repreſentation which he will make to you of the diſtreſſes of his army, will put your feelings as an individual to a ſevere trial: but conſidered in a political light, *Rajah Ram Pundit*'s propoſal of viſiting you ſeemed ſo much to our advantage, that I could not poſſibly object to it. It will transfer the appearance of a ſubmiſſive diſpoſition from us to them. It will prevent an immediate rupture if there was any danger of it; and will ſo long protract negociation, that you will have the power to dictate terms, without regard to any other conſiderations but thoſe of preſent compaſſion or gratitude, and a view to future advantages from an alliance between the two States. This army will then depend almoſt entirely on your mercy, for the ſeaſon will be too far ſpent for them afterwards to be able to do any miſchief: a conſideration which I doubt not muſt have its weight with you, though I have conſtantly and invariably in all my conferences maintained the contrary. It is probable, I think, that *Rajah Ram Pundit* will be inſtructed to converſe with you on the more important views which I have ſuggeſted, of a junction againſt *Hyder*, or the acquiſition of the Rauje. Their faith towards the Peiſhwa, or their connection with *Hyder*, has ſcarcely been mentioned, and I have no doubt but ſomething of importance would be ſtruck out betwixt you and *Rajah Ram Pundit*, if the preſent emergency could be got over.

I am thoroughly convinced that nothing but diſtreſs will ever induce the Rajah or his miniſters to break with the Engliſh. Whatever has paſſed of a different tendency ſince my arrival here, has proceeded from the miſtaken notion that it might work on me to augment the ſupply that I had proffered. The young Rajah, who received me to-day without reſtraint, has deſired me to implore you to take him and his army under your protection, to conſider them as much your own as General *Goddard*'s detachment; to enable them to return to *Naugpore*, and to command their ſervices afterwards as you may think fit. We ſhall travel by daily journies to *Naraingbur*, and from thence I have deſired Mr. *Pearce* to relay bearers to *Oolbareah*. I have written to my correſpondent at *Calcutta* to ſend down a ſufficient number of boats and budgerows to *Oolbareah*, ſo that there will be no occaſion for you to take any trouble about our journey; but I beg leave to ſuggeſt to you the propriety of ſending down ſome gentlemen of your family to meet *Rajah Ram Pundit*: this will be a mark of reſpect to which his rank, and ſtill more his attachment to the Engliſh entitles him; and it will be only a return for a ſimilar mark of reſpect which was ſhewn to me. Appendix. No. 365.

Maratta Camp. near *Ballaſore*, 15th March 1781.

I have the honour to be, With the moſt unfeigned reſpect, Honourable Sir, Your, &c. &c.

P. S. I expect to be at *Oolbareah* in five days.

The Rajah has expreſſed ſo much anxiety for my ſpeedy return to you, that I have been obliged to receive my diſmiſſion without finding the opportunity I wiſhed for, of ſpeaking to him in private. It would have given much ſuſpicion, if I had deſired that his miniſters and *Biſſumber Pundit* ſhould withdraw, and he has always been ſurrounded by them.

On receiving the two firſt of theſe letters, the Governor General wrote the following anſwer to Mr. *Anderſon*:

David Anderſon, Eſq.

Sir, *Fort William*, 18th March 1781.

I have received your letters of the 10th and 11th.

Inform the Rajah that the offer which you have been authorized to make him, was purely gratuitous, not intended for negociation, but acceptance; and decline any further diſcourſe upon it as improper.

The Rajah's promiſe to return, or not to employ his troops againſt us, may be expreſſed either in writing or verbally; but the requiſition muſt be verbal, and not in writing.

It is indifferent whether the word "*not*," be uſed, or "*never*."

I am perfectly ſatisfied with the care which the Rajah has taken to repreſs the licentious ſpirit of his people, and to publiſh his diſapprobation of the late inſtance of it, of which I deſire you will give him an aſſurance.

I am, with eſteem, Sir, Your moſt affectionate friend.

Whilſt Mr. *Anderſon* was at *Ballaſore*, letters were received from *Dewagur Pundit*, the miniſter of *Meodajee Bhoſla*, repeating the circumſtances of the embarraſſments under which his connection with the *Engliſh* had drawn him, and ſtrongly urging the neceſſity of our ſupplying the troops under *Chimnajee* with money.

Mr. *Anderſon* on his return delivered to the Governor General the following letter: Vide Appendix.

Honourable Sir,

In the minutes which I had the honour to ſend you from *Ballaſore*, I had only leiſure to mention in a few words my laſt interviews with *Rajah Chimnajee*; I ſhall now beg leave to mention it more circumſtantially. The Rajah early in the morning ſent me a meſſage, that he wiſhed Mr. *Redfearn* and I would come and dine in his tent before our departure. We accordingly went, and found the Rajah ſitting with little ceremony amongſt a few of his officers. He received us with a frank and cheerful air; all that cold reſerve, that effected indifference, which I had remarked at our former meetings was now changed into an open and animated behaviour

We

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We talked of indifferent ſubjects, ſuch as the cuſtoms of *Europe* and *Aſia*, with much good humour; and his officers, who had at our former interviews preſerved a formal and reſpectful ſilence, now mixed in our converſation with eaſy familiarity. At length our diſcourſe turned on my departure for *Calcutta:* the Rajah then changed his mien; his diſtreſſes ruſhed full into his mind, and he deſcribed them with a degree of energy that excited compaſſion; then taking hold of my hand, he in a tone of ſupplication begged, that as I had been an eye-witneſs of his diſtreſſes, I would repreſent them to you in their real colours; that I would put you in mind that they were drawn upon him by his deſire of preſerving a friendſhip with the Engliſh; and that I would, in his name, implore you to take himſelf and his army under your protection; to conſider them as much your own as Colonel *Goddard*'s army; to make as great exertions for their relief, and to enable them only to return to *Naugpore*, and afterwards command them as you pleaſe. He inſiſted more than once on my promiſing to repreſent all thoſe matters in the ſtrongeſt manner, and earneſtly entreated me to become his advocate with you. I could only repeat to him, that I ſhould faithfully report every thing to you.

When the ſervants informed us that the dinner which the Rajah had ordered to be prepared for Mr. *Redfearn* and me was ready, we retired to a ſeparate tent: the Rajah however ſoon afterwards followed, and ſtanding at a diſtance, preſſed us to eat, in a manner that ſhewed the ſtrongeſt deſire of pleaſing. I mention this circumſtance, though apparently trivial, becauſe it was a kind of condeſcenſion which to me marked the diſpoſition of the Rajah's mind more ſtrongly than the moſt exaggerated profeſſions.

We afterwards returned to the Rajah's tent, and paſſed more than an hour with him, before he would conſent to give us our diſmiſſion. *Bowanny Pundit* in the mean time joined us, but he took little part in the converſation, being chiefly employed in dictating to the Monſhee anſwers to the letters which I had brought from you.

Before we received our diſmiſſion, the Rajah inſiſted on our accepting of a horſe, a turban, and a few pieces of cloth; and then having repeated his requeſt that I would join *Rajah Ram Pundit*, and intercede in his behalf with you, he took leave of us with a degree of warmth and emotion that ſhewed both how much he was deſirous of repreſenting his conduct in a favourable light, and how much he conſidered his future welfare as dependant on your determination.

I have the honour to be
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient humble ſervant.

Fort William,
26th March 1781.

Rajah Ram Pundit arrived at *Calcutta* the 25th March, and the next day waited on the Governor General.

During the firſt two viſits *Rajah Ram Pundit* drew a ſtrong picture of the diſtreſſes of *Chimnajee*'s army; and to prove how incumbent it was on us to relieve them, he expatiated on the friendſhip which had been ſhewn by the Berar Government towards the Engliſh. He enumerated a variety of inſtances—their conduct towards General *Goddard*'s detachment at *Hoſhungabad*—their delivering up Monſieur *Chevalier*, who had taken refuge in their country—their forbearing to invade our territories, notwithſtanding the remonſtrances of all their allies; and laſtly, the aſſiſtance which they had offered to Colonel *Pearſe* on his march through *Oriſſa*. He diſcuſſed with great ability the intereſts of the Maratta States, and ſhewed that he was very ſenſible how much it would be for the mutual advantage of the Engliſh and *Moodajee Bhoſla* to unite cordially in a cloſe alliance. Still however his obſervations were general, and he ſeemed to avoid any clear or particular propoſitions; it was agreed therefore, for the purpoſe of bringing the negociation to a ſpeedy concluſion, the following propoſitions ſhould be ſtated in writing, and communicated to *Rajah Ram Pundit* by Mr. *Anderſon*.

"That as a return for the proofs of attachment ſhewn by the Berar Government to the Engliſh, and to relieve the troops from the diſtreſſes which they at preſent ſuffered, and which were in ſome meaſure occaſioned by their amicable inclinations towards this Government, we would give them twelve lacks to complete the ſum which we had formerly promiſed to them.

"That we deſired to know what was afterwards neceſſary to be done to effect the deſired union of the two States. Would *Chimnajee* reſolve immediately to ſend 3000, or even 1500 of his beſt horſe to join Colonel *Pearſe*, and act with him againſt *Hyder?* Would he return with the reſt of his army to *Naugpore?* and would he promiſe to intereſt himſelf with his father to engage in alliance with us, and to ſend a perſon from *Naugpore* to ſettle finally the terms of a treaty? That the following might be the grounds of the plan: that we ſhould engage to aſſiſt them with a part of our troops in taking poſſeſſion of the forts of *Burhanpore* and *Aſſur*, and the country of *Khandeiſh*, which had been lately aſſigned by the Peiſhwa as an annexation to the jagheer already poſſeſſed by *Madajee Scindia*: that if it ſhould be adviſable to purſue further conqueſts, we would aſſiſt on a plan of participation; and that they on their parts ſhould engage to unite with us in effecting the total extirpation of *Hyder Ally Cawn*: but that if ſuch a plan could not be ſettled, we deſired to know clearly what they would do on their part to merit any further aſſiſtance from us."

The next day *Rajah Ram Pundit* returned an anſwer to the following purport. "The demands of *Chimnajee*'s army amount to two crores of rupees; in part thereof fifty lacks have already been paid; let the Engliſh pay fifty lacks more, the troops will then have received one half of their pay, with which it will be in *Chimnajee*'s power in ſome meaſure to ſatisfy them; and in this caſe he will ſend 3000 men along with Colonel *Pearſe*, and will march the reſt to *Naugpore*. If it is deſired that a more cloſe connection ſhould take place, let a truſty perſon be ſent from hence to *Naugpore*, and a treaty may there be concerted and ſettled for the eſtabliſhment of a permanent alliance betwixt the Engliſh and the Marattas, and the extirpation of *Hyder Naig*; or let Mr. *Anderſon* be ſent immediately with fifty lacks to *Chimnajee* to ſatisfy the troops, and bring *Bowanny Pundit* to meet the Governor at the *Subenreka*, or in either of the Engliſh camps at *Dantoon* or *Narainpur*, to ſettle with him a treaty containing the terms of an alliance. If this is approved, the ſum of 50 lacks muſt be ſent immediately, becauſe it will not be in *Chimnajee*'s power to leave the troops until he has ſatisfied them. If the Governor will give ſome aſſurances that theſe propoſitions will be ſhortly taken into conſideration, *Rajah Ram Pundit* will accept of the twelve lacks, tendered for the preſent as a part of the fifty, and will cauſe the army immediately to march to a greater diſtance from *Bengal*. But unleſs ſome aſſurances of the kind are given, he muſt decline receiving the twelve lacks; will repay the ſum of three lacks which was formerly ſent to *Chimnajee*, and deſires to receive his diſmiſſion immediately."

Theſe propoſitions ſeemed ſo highly unreaſonable, that the Governor General immediately ſent Mr. *Anderſon* to *Rajah Ram Pundit* with a meſſage; the ſubſtance of which was as follows: "that he would ſend the twelve lacks if *Rajah Ram Pundit* would accept of that ſum in the name of *Chimnajee*: that no more would be given: that the Rajah, on the acceptance of this ſum, muſt return to *Naugpore*, and not ſtay any longer at *Cuttack:* that if he would ſend 2000 horſe with Colonel *Pearſe*, their charge ſhould be defrayed by us: that the Governor General muſt decline a meeting with the Rajah, unleſs the grounds on which they are to meet are previouſly ſettled, as he cannot poſſibly think of meeting to treat

about money: that Rajah *Ram Pundit* may ſtay here if he pleaſes; but that he need not ſtay in expectation of more money, as that ſubject muſt now be dropped."

This meſſage being accordingly communicated to Rajah *Ram Pundit*, he deſired Mr. *Anderſon* would return to the Governor General with the following anſwer: "He conſents to ſend 2000 horſe with Colonel *Pearſe*, who may receive the pay which ſhall be agreed on: he accepts the ſupply now offered as a return of kindneſs; but to prevent a mutiny of the troops, requeſts that a loan of a further ſum of 25 lacks may be given, ſo that he may be enabled to quiet them. It does not ſignify, although a delay of 12 or 15 days ſhould take place in procuring the loan; if it is only agreed to by the Governor, he will immediately ſend off the 12 lacks, and cauſe the troops to remove towards *Naugpore:* he propoſes that the loan ſhould be obtained either in his name, or in that of *Syna Behader (Chimnajee)* from merchants, and that the Company ſhould be ſecurity. It may afterwards be repaid by means of conqueſts of countries on a plan which may be ſettled. It is requeſted from neceſſity, becauſe *Syna Behader* has no means of ſatisfying his troops: he deſires that this may be accepted as an apology for his repeating with ſo much importunity the ſubject of money: he begs that the Governor General will take *Syna Behader* under his protection, and relieve him in his preſent diſtreſs. If this loan is not acceded to, Rajah *Ram Pundit* wiſhes to be diſmiſſed as ſoon as the Governor General pleaſes; and in that caſe nothing can be ſettled, as the ſum tendered cannot be accepted, and a mutiny muſt be the conſequence amongſt the troops in *Oriſſa.*"

The above propoſitions being laid before the Board, the following reſolution was paſſed: "It is neceſſary to bring this negociation to a concluſion. We cannot comply with either of the propoſitions made by Rajah *Ram Pundit*; we cannot advance the money required; we cannot give our ſecurity to the loan, becauſe we know it to be inpracticable at the rate of intereſt allowed by our bonds, and to allow a higher rate will deſtroy our own credit; beſides, that ſuch a ſecurity will be conſtrued, and will be in effect, a payment. If the Government of *Naugpore* is willing to concur with our views for its aggrandiſement, and a connection of intereſts in the manner which has been held out to it, we are ready to aſſiſt them with our forces. We will endeavour to give them the poſſeſſion of *Burhanpore* and of *Aſſur*, which will yield a revenue of 80 lacks; and of *Gurrah Mundela*, of which the amount is unknown, but valuable. If the Government of *Naugpore* looks only to the acquiſition of ready money, we have it not to give, nor will their friendſhip be an object to us on ſuch a footing. Let this be underſtood to be our final anſwer."

Rajah *Ram Pundit* on being informed of the above reſolution, returned a new ſet of propoſitions, the ſubject of which was as follows:

"That the ſum formerly tendered to the Government of *Naugpore* was 16 lacks, and that only three have yet been paid: that he will accept of the remaining 13 lacks, which he will diſpatch to *Syna Behader* for the relief of his army; that he will cauſe the army to march immediately to *Dhekanaul* on the way to *Gurrah Mundelah*; that he himſelf will ſtay here for ſome time longer on this Government's giving him aſſurances that they will afterwards aſſiſt him in procuring a loan of 10 or 15 lacks, to be repaid in two years from the money to be acquired from the conqueſt of *Gurrah Mundelah*, and for which he, as Naib of *Cuttack*, will be ſecurity. That he will for the preſent engage to ſend 2,000 horſe to join Colonel *Pearſe*, and to aſſiſt in the war againſt *Hyder Ally*; and that *Dewagur Pundit* will afterwards come from *Naugpore*, and ſettle more fully the terms of an alliance betwixt the two States."

Theſe propoſitions were declared to be final. The point on which our negociations hinged, was now reduced to an object which appeared of little magnitude when compared with the vaſt importance of turning the ſcale of the Powers of *Hindoſtan*, by detaching the Berar Government from the confederacy formed againſt us, and engaging it on our ſide. When the propoſitions therefore were laid before the Board, it was immediately reſolved to accede to them. Accordingly the ſum of 13 lacks was advanced to Rajah *Ram Pundit*; and on the 2d of April he attended us in council, and laid before us the following articles of agreement, which he deſired to be conſidered as preliminary to a definitive treaty betwixt the Engliſh and Berar Governments. Appendix. No. 365.

Account of the monthly Expence of the Troops to be ſent along with Colonel *Pearſe.*

2000 ſuars on horſe, at 50,000 rupees per month, for each 1000, making altogether one lack of rupees per month. Dated 8th Rebbe-ul-Sanee, in the 22d year of the reign.

The ſaid allowance ſhall commence from the time of the troops leaving *Cuttack*, and when they ſhall have finiſhed the ſervice, and (having received their diſmiſſion from the commander of the Engliſh troops) they ſhall return to their own country, their pay ſhall be continued according to the number of *munzels*, or days journies which there may be from the place of their diſmiſſion to the city of *Cuttack.*

Whereas a friendſhip is firmly eſtabliſhed betwixt Maha Rajah *Moodajee Bhoſla*, and the Engliſh; the following articles are accordingly ſettled by *Syna Behader*, through Rajah *Ram Pundit.*

1ſt. That Rajah *Syna Behader* ſhall ſend 2,000 good and effective horſe along with Colonel *Pearſe*, to aſſiſt the Engliſh in the war againſt *Hyder Naig*; that the officer commanding them ſhall act under the orders of the ſaid Colonel or the officer who ſhall command the Bengal troops in the *Carnatic*; and that they ſhall receive from the officer who ſhall command the Bengal troops in the *Carnatic*, an allowance for their ſupport, at the rate which hath been ſettled in a ſeparate paper by the Governor General and Council and Rajah *Ram Pundit*, month by month, in the ſame proportion as the Engliſh troops ſhall receive their pay.

2d. That the army of Rajah *Syna Behader* will immediately leave *Oriſſa*, and march on an expedition againſt *Gurrah Mundela.* Let the Governor General and Council of the Engliſh, from a regard to the friendſhip which ſubſiſts betwixt the family of *Bhooſla* and the Engliſh, gave orders that an Engliſh officer, with a body of the troops now ſtationed in *Hindoſtan*, may march from that quarter to aſſiſt the Rajah in the above-mentioned expedition, and having reduced *Gurrah Mundelah*, eſtabliſh immediately the Rajah's garriſons there.

3d. That in order that the friendſhip betwixt the family of Maha Rajah *Moodajee Bhooſla* and the Engliſh may daily be ſtrengthened and augmented, let the Governor General and Council for the preſent ſend a truſty perſon to *Naugpore*, and hereafter the Dewan *Dewagur Pundit* will come from that place, and have an interview with the Governor General, when with their mutual advice and approbation, the deſires and demands of both parties will be adjuſted and ſettled.

4th. That if it ſhould happen from particular circumſtances that an interview, betwixt *Dewagur Pundit* and the Governor General cannot take place, in that caſe the deſires and demands of both parties may be ſettled at *Naugpore* by the intervention of a truſty perſon, and the bonds of friendſhip ſhall be ſo firmly eſtabliſhed betwixt the family of *Bhooſla* and the Engliſh, that no infraction or injury can ever by any means happen to them.

Theſe papers being ſigned by us and Rajah *Ram Pundit*, with the teſtimony of *Beneram Pundit*, the Vackeel of *Moodajee Bhooſla*, copies of them were mutually interchanged. An order has ſince been iſſued by us to the ſub-treaſurer to advance ſuch ſums, on account of the intended loan of ten lacks, as the ſtate of our treaſury will admit; and Rajah *Ram Pundit* has delivered to us an engagement to the following purport:

"Whereas

Appendix, No. 365.

"Whereas the Governor General and Council of the Engliſh have promiſed, that in order to aſſiſt in ſupplying the expences of the troops of Maha Rajah *Moodajee Bhooſla*, which are arrived with Rajah *Syna Behauder* in *Oriſſa*, they will procure the ſum of ten lacks of ſicca rupees from merchants of the province of *Bengal*, and deliver it as a loan through the hands of *Beneram Pundit*; and accordingly an order has been delivered to the ſaid *Pundit* for the ſaid ſum on the Engliſh treaſurer: in conſideration thereof, it is ſtipulated and written on behalf of the aforeſaid Rajah *Syna Behauder* by Rajah *Ram Pundit*, that he will diſcharge the ſaid ſum within the term of two years, and will pay intereſt at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum, to be calculated from the dates of the ſeveral payments, which will be aſcertained from the receipts of *Beneram Pundit*: in caſe the ſaid loan and intereſt ſhould not be punctually repaid by Maha Rajah *Moodajee Bhooſla* and Rajah *Syna Behauder*, Rajah *Ram Pundit*, who is Naib of the province of *Oriſſa*, engages on his own part that he will pay, in the term above limited, the ſaid ſum with intereſt, at the rate above-mentioned, either from his own private fortune, or from the revenues of the province of *Oriſſa*.

Written the 6th April 1781, or 11th of Rebbee-ul-Sanee 1170 of the Hegyra."

Rajah *Ram Pundit* has ſince taken his leave, and is gone to *Chimnajee*'s camp, to make the neceſſary arrangements for the march of the 2,000 horſe, which are to join Colonel *Pearſe*.

We have thus fully given a narrative of this negociation, becauſe we think the iſſue of it may be productive of an important change in the political ſtate of *Hindoſtan*. We ſhall now beg leave to cloſe it with a few obſervations. By acceding to Rajah *Ram Pundit*'s propoſitions, we have effectually detached one of the moſt powerful States from the general confederacy againſt us, into which it had apparently entered; we ſhall by this meaſure add ſtrength to ourſelves in proportion as we diminiſh that of the confederacy. The ſeparation of the Berar Government will doubtleſs excite diſtruſt amongſt the remaining Powers, and probably the example will be followed. The Nizam who has not yet entered into open hoſtilities againſt us, and the Miniſters of *Poonah*, who already tremble for their own exiſtence, ſeeing the confederacy begin to diſſolve, will naturally be deſirous of ſecuring themſelves by an early peace. The mere fame of an alliance betwixt the Engliſh and the Government of *Berar*, will have a great effect. We ſhall no longer be conſidered as ſinking under the united weight of every State in *Hindoſtan*, the ſcale of power is evidently turned in our favour, and this is of more importance than could be well imagined in *Europe*, where the policy of nations is regulated by principles the very reverſe of thoſe which prevail in *Aſia*. There, in conteſts betwixt nations, the weaker is held up by the ſupport of its neighbours, who know how much their own ſafety depends on the preſervation of a proper balance. But in *Aſia*, the deſire of partaking of the ſpoils of a falling nation, and the dread of incurring the reſentment of the ſtronger party are the immediate motives of policy, and every State wiſhes to aſſociate itſelf with that Power which has a decided ſuperiority.

It is true, the alliance which is held out in Rajah *Ram Pundit*'s propoſitions, apparently relates to objects of a very limited nature. But it is not to be doubted, that when once the Marattas of *Naugpore* are fairly involved with us in the proſecution of theſe objects, it will not long reſt with them to ſet bounds to our connection. The aſſiſtance which is to be given to us in the war with *Hyder*, is as full a declaration of hoſtility againſt that Prince as if they had ſent their whole army. And their employing our forces to aſſiſt them in recovering *Gurrah Mundelah* from a tributary of the Peiſhwa, will probably lead to a complete junction of their ſtrength and ours againſt the Government of *Poonah*, or reduce the latter to the neceſſity of becoming a party with them and us.

We will now conſider what would have been the alternative if we had refuſed to accede to propoſitions which were evidently ſo deſirable. Whatever might have been the real inclination of *Chimnajee*, or the dictates of his father *Moodajee Bhooſlah*, his unpaid troops had long been kept quiet only by the hopes which were held out to them of acquiring wealth from the plunder of *Bengal*; and if no ſupply had been granted to them, it is probable that extreme diſtreſs would have compelled them to ſeek for ſupport by an invaſion of our frontiers. It would be little conſolation to us to know that their own deſtruction would be the certain effect of ſuch a meaſure: we know that before they could have been totally deſtroyed, or even expelled, much miſchief would have been done in the provinces of *Burdwan* and *Midnapore* by their depredations, and ſtill more by the alarm which they would have excited amongſt the inhabitants; the revenues and inveſtments muſt have been put to a ſtop from the deſertion of the ryots and manufacturers: the immediate loſs would have conſiderably exceeded the ſum now requeſted, and the fatal conſequences of ſuch an irruption would have been felt throughout theſe provinces, and particularly in the manufactures, for many ſucceeding years. We can mention on the beſt information, that the deſertion of the manufacturers for only three days from the Aſſring of *Radnagur* alone, would have occaſioned a loſs of four lacks of rupees as the ſilk worms muſt have been wholly deſtroyed, and their loſs could not have been recovered for many years. If the troops of *Chimnajee* had been driven to this extremity, a war muſt inevitably have enſued with the Government of *Berar*, more dangerous to our poſſeſſions in *Bengal* than any in which we have ever been engaged ſince our acquiſition of the *Dewanny*.

Nor are the advantages to be derived from the preſent agreement merely ſpeculative or negative: the great and almoſt the only defect of the detachment ſent under the command of Colonel *Pearſe* to the relief of the *Carnatic*, is the want of a body of cavalry: the preſent offer of 2,000 of *Chimnajee*'s horſe will amply ſupply this defect; they will be fully ſufficient to prevent the detachment from being haraſſed on the march, or ſuffering from want of proviſions; and though little can be expected in the field of battle from the diſcipline of Maratta horſe, yet as much may be expected from them as from the horſe that will be oppoſed to them by *Hyder Ally*: the junction of this body will prove therefore of real and immediate ſervice.

We are aware that men who are inclined to object will not fail to employ the moſt ſpecious arguments to draw cenſure on this negociation: they will avail themſelves of maxims which have already obtained the popular opinion; they will without heſitation aſcribe our conduct in ſupplying *Chimnajee* with money to weakneſs or want of foreſight; and they will declaim that the hiſtory of all ages, from the remoteſt period down to the preſent century, ſhews, that to purchaſe the forbearance of invading enemies ſerves only to tempt them to return with increaſed numbers. It is in vain to attempt to anſwer every objection which ingenuity may deviſe: we muſt rely on your candour to impute our conduct to more honourable and judicious motives. It cannot eſcape your attention, that the negociation for money began at a time when we could have little to apprehend, though much to hope from the Government of *Naugpore*; that it was held out as an inducement to obtain their aſſiſtance in effecting an accommodation with the Government of *Poonah*, and that the profeſſed object of it was a retribution for the heavy expence which they had incurred from their deſire of preſerving peace with the Engliſh. When their anſwers from *Naugpore* affected a higher ſtyle, and indicated a change of diſpoſition, Mr. *Anderſon* was ſent to *Cuttack* without any authority, to treat on money; Colonel *Pearſe* was ordered to proceed through *Oriſſa* in defiance of all oppoſition; and an army was aſſembled under the command of Colonel *Ironſide* for the defence of our frontiers of *Burdwan* and *Midnapore*. During all this time the

negociation

negociation for money was dropped, nor was it renewed until Colonel *Pearſe* had paſſed without oppoſition cloſe to the *Maratta* army, and until new proofs were given us of an amicable diſpoſition; the Governor General's letter of the 2d March to Mr. *Anderſon*, will fully explain to you, that though we thought it in prudence neceſſary to ſtipulate the return of *Chimnajee*'s army as a condition on granting the ſupply, yet the motives or the conditions for which we were willing to grant it, were different; and the Governor General's letters of the 11th and 18th March will ſhew, that when motives of gratitude ceaſed, and hoſtilities were expected, we inſtantly directed Mr. *Anderſon* to retract our offer, and to decline any further diſcourſe on the ſubject of money. At length the affecting manner in which the Rajah opened his diſtreſſes to Mr. *Anderſon* at his laſt interview, and threw himſelf on our mercy for relief, induced us to reſume the ſubject with Rajah *Ram Pundit*.

Theſe circumſtances have not eſcaped the attention of the Marattas themſelves, and we are ſatisfied that they, in whoſe opinion the public is perhaps moſt intereſted, have not miſtaken the motives of our conduct. Nor need we apprehend that the ſupply which they have received will ever tempt them to return to theſe provinces; they beſt know the extreme diſtreſſes which they have ſuffered, the heavy expences which they have incurred, and the miſery which they have entailed by this expedition on their province of *Oriſſa*; and it is not to be ſuppoſed that they will ever again attempt to fit out an army of 30,000 horſe, at an unavoidable expence of more than a crore of rupees, to march a thouſand miles through a hilly country, in the expectation of acquiring a ſupply of 12 lacks of rupees. On the whole, whatever the deſigning or uninformed part of the world may ſay, we flatter ourſelves that you, in whoſe approbation we are moſt particularly intereſted, having all theſe circumſtances fully before you, will be pleaſed not only to approve of the motives which have influenced us in this negociation, but alſo of the favourable iſſue to which we have happily brought it.

It remains only for us to obſerve, that letters have lately been received from *Chimnajee*, confirming every thing that has been ſettled by Rajah *Ram Pundit*; and we have the pleaſure to think that he has now engaged ſincerely and cordially on our ſide.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
your moſt faithful
humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William,
the 30th April 1781.

APPENDIX, No. 366.

Inſtructions from the Governor General and Council to Colonel *Grainger Muir*, the 21ſt of April 1781.

Sir,

AS you have been ordered by Colonel *Morgan* to proceed from the ſtation at *Futtyghur* with a detachment of the Company's troops, conſiſting of two regiments of cavalry, three of Sepoys, and a company of Artillery, to the aſſiſtance of Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*, on application made by the latter for that purpoſe; we have ſuppoſed, that before this period the forces under your command muſt have joined thoſe heretofore commanded by Lieutenant Colonel *Camac*; and under ſuch ſuppoſition, we directed you on the 2d inſtant to take the command of that detachment, at the ſame time ordering Lieutenant Colonel *Camac* to deliver it up to you.

As the collected force of infantry and cavalry of the two detachments when joined muſt greatly exceed the ſervice remaining to employ them, and the artillery certainly ſo beyond all proportion, we direct that you diſmiſs ſuch part of your force in infantry and artillery as the actual or probable exigency may not require you to retain, and order their return to the *Doaab*. We direct alſo, that you diſmiſs the 2d regiment of cavalry, retaining the 3d. Appendix No. 366.

We direct that you make it your object to obtain poſſeſſion of *Oogein* and its dependencies, and for this purpoſe we order you to proceed thither, demanding the aſſiſtance of ſuch a body of the Rana's troops, as you may think requiſite, and the Rana's preſence with them.

If the Rana ſhould refuſe or evade compliance with the requiſition made of him, you are to deliver to him in writing a proteſt againſt his conduct, declaring him guilty of an infraction of his treaty with this Government; of which a copy is incloſed.

In the courſe of your march you will take ſuch advantage of the enemy as opportunities may offer to you: but for the ſake of ſuch advantage you muſt not be diverted from the object which we have preſcribed, but keep invariably in proſpect until you have accompliſhed it.

All inſtructions to you are intended to be general, and rather to mark the objects which we wiſh to attain by the operations of the troops under your command, than to fix the means of their accompliſhment. Theſe means we leave to your own judgment and to the exigency of circumſtances, of which we cannot be aware or adviſed in ſufficient time to inſtruct you particularly on them; and we have ſo great reliance on your activity and experience, that we cannot ſuffer ourſelves to heſitate in leaving this power in your hands; convinced that you never will adopt a meaſure without a full conſideration of its probable conſequences, nor abate from the proſecution of it when once undertaken, unleſs compelled by urgent and evident neceſſity.

We think it neceſſary to recommend to you in the ſtrongeſt manner to keep your force entire, making no detachments from it but ſuch as are abſolutely neceſſary and unavoidable; and in order to give effect to this inſtruction, and to remove the neceſſity of your eſtabliſhing garriſons for the places which may either ſurrender to our arms or require our protection, we direct and empower you to aſſign them to the charge or abſolute poſſeſſion of ſuch of the neighbouring Zemindars as are beſt qualified to receive them, either by natural right or by ſituation, added to that of ſervice and approved attachment; excepting only ſuch as lie contiguous to the dominions of the Rana of *Gohud*, and appertain to him in virtue of the treaty.

With theſe explanations we give you a full diſcretion for diſpoſal of all conquered places and territories in your route, hoping that you may be able to make ſuch ſtipulations with the proprietors, as may obtain either a preſent aid in money for the relief of the expence of the expedition, or a future and permanent income in the way of tribute.

We are,
Sir, &c. &c.
(Signed) Governor General and Council.

Fort William,
21ſt April 1781.

Examined: a true copy.
E. Hay,
Acts Sec.

Extract of *Bombay* Diary, the 12th May 1781.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Camac* to Mr. *Malet*, dated near *Holaries*, the 29th March 1781.

In reſpect to my operations, I had penetrated into *Malva* as far as the town of *Seronge*, when being diſappointed in the aſſiſtance I had reaſon to expect from the Nabob of *Bhopaul* and the neighbouring Rajahs; being unable for want of cavalry to prevent the deſolation of the country, and *Scindiah*'s army with a train of artillery, field and battering, arriving at the ſame time, I found my ſtock of proviſions ſoon exhauſted, and having taken the opinions of my principal officers, determined on a retreat. The enemy had cannonaded us for ſeven days, thereby

Appendix. No. 367.

thereby attempting to draw us from the town which was our only resource for provisions. It was on the 7th, at midnight, that we moved off, and with so much secrecy that the enemy did not come up with us till near day-break. They then attacked us from all quarters, but were as often repulsed. They pursued their attack on the second day, and on the third I reached a town called *Mohautpore*, which I forced to supply me, and then marched out, and in vain attempted to bring on an engagement. We halted there several days to refresh our people, and relieve our wounded, of which we had a great number. The orderly retreat that was made before so able a General as *Scindiah*, and so numerous an army, does the highest credit to the troops; they behaved like heroes. On arriving at this place, finding that the enemy encamped within three cos's, and kept their baggage seven cos's in the rear, I determined to beat up their quarters on the night of the 24th. We accordingly succeeded to admiration; surprized and routed their first camp where *Scindiah* was, pursued them to their second, drove them three cos's further, and across the *Sind*, where we overtook their artillery, and by nine o'clock were masters of ten pieces of cannon, all their tumbrills; two elephants, and the greatest part of their stores and ammunition, and baggage. We took the guns yoked, otherwise we could not have brought them off. The enemy are in the utmost disorder, and I trust that this success will have the best influence on our concerns in every part, but particularly on your side of the continent.

I am, &c.

A true copy. *J. Camac.*

C. W. Malet.

APPENDIX, No. 367.

Additional Secret Letter from *Bengal*, 15th May 1781.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

Secret Depart.

THE dispatch of the two ships *Neptune* and *Bellmont*, by which we have had the honour to address you under date the 27th ultimo, having been unavoidably delayed on account of bad weather, we do not think it proper to lose the opportunity which presents itself to us on this occasion, of transmitting to you such further advices as we deem necessary for your information.

It appears in a letter from Brigadier General *Goddard* to the President and Select Committee of *Bombay*, under date the 9th of February, that having taken possession of *Bore-Ghaut*, as we had the honour to acquaint you in our last letter, it was his intention to establish a strong post at the head of it, and to continue there until he had collected such a magazine of stores and provisions as would enable him to prosecute his further operations in such manner as might be judged most expedient. By a letter which we have ourselves received lately from Brigadier General *Goddard*, we find that he was at the same place on the 6th of March, and one bill of exchange which he has lately drawn is dated from it on the 8th ultimo.

During the continuance of the army at the head of the Ghauts, an indirect intimation appears to have been sent to General *Goddard* from the Minister, of his desire to conclude a peace. The messenger was a man named *Runsoor Naigue*, and brought a letter to the General from one *Byroo Pundit*, a Brahmin, said to be much in the confidence of *Nana Furnese*. The purport of this letter, the particulars of the General's conference with the bearer of it, the event of the negociation, and the subsequent advances unsuccessfully made by the General to the Minister for a termination of the war on the conditions stated in our proposals of the 2d of October, appearing in his address to us of the 6th March, which we deem of importance, we have the honour to transmit it and its accompaniments to you a number in the packet.

The unwillingness of the Minister to accept the offer of our treaty does not disappoint us; we are rather pleased with it, since it leaves us at liberty to secure to the Company the important possession of *Bassein*; and the advantages acquired by your troops in the west of *India* since the time at which our treaty was written, will warrant us in declaring our resolution not to part with this valuable acquisition, unless indeed some great reverse of fortune (which God forbid) should attend the operations of your arms, and oblige us to submit to the loss of it. Respecting other conditions on which we might be willing to accede to a peace, the ill success with which our advances have been hitherto attended, and the presumption which they seem to have given birth to in the arrogant conduct of the Minister, discourage us in looking to any favourable termination of the war, but as we have advised you in our last address, by the most vigorous and successful prosecution of it.

We have received within these five days a letter from the President and Select Committee of *Bombay*, under date the 30th March; in which they inform us that "they have judged it the most advisable conduct to reduce the war on their part to a mere system of defence, and to confine their military operations to the security and preservation of their own possessions." Our answer to this letter is transmitted to you a number in the packet, and we trust that it will have the good effect which we intend by it, in altering a plan of conduct in your Select Committee of *Bombay*, as opposite to their late opinions as we deem it hostile to the obtainment of the object which we both profess to aim at, an honourable and advantageous peace.

In the same letter from *Bombay*, we are advised of their resolution to send back all the Fort Saint George troops serving on the Malabar coast, and their hopes of landing them at *Anjengo* in the course of the last month. The measure of sending back the Madras detachment conforms strictly to the instructions sent by us to Brigadier General *Goddard*, so long ago as the 20th April 1780; but we apprehend that it may have an unfavourable influence on our affairs at this time, which may be considered at their crisis, by impressing the minds of the public with an opinion that some necessity, or a consciousness of our inability to prosecute the great advantages which we have acquired, has compelled us to stop at the instant of their completion. Yet in other respects we have no reason to be dissatisfied with it, since the troops of this Presidency and that of *Bombay* are sufficient for the prosecution of the war, and the defence of our possessions on the Malabar coast; and the services of the Madras detachment in the *Carnatic*, may be of great use and importance to the success of the war in which you are engaged with *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

A letter which we have received from Rear Admiral Sir *Edward Hughes*, under date the 23d February, informs us of his success on the 9th December last, in destroying two ships mounting 26 and 28 nine pounder guns, and 4 ketches mounting each 12 six and four pounder guns, belonging to *Hyder Ally*, in Mangalore road. It being impracticable to remove the ships and vessels taken, as they were grounded, orders were given for them to be burnt.

We have received information which we deem authentic, that the Portugueze Government at *Goa* have entered into a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with *Hyder Ally*. The substance of the treaty appears in a letter from Mr. *Auriol*, whom we had appointed our Minister to the Court of *Goa*, but who fortunately had not proceeded on his commission when he received advice of their alliance with our enemies; and a copy of this letter we think it necessary to transmit to you a number in the packet.

We have the pleasure to acquaint you, that a garrison

of your troops is in poſſeſſion of Kalpy fort, which they entered without oppoſition. The Maratta Chief who held the Kalpy diſtrict under the Maratta Government having ſhewn an unwilling neſs to comply with the requiſition made to him to pay to the Company the ſame tribute that he was uſed to pay to the Marattas, and an inclination to delay coming to an accommodation until the preſent year is ended, and all the collections made, with a view of appropriating them to his own uſe, we have inſtructed Colonel *Morgan* to oblige him to pay into the Company's treaſury the ſum due to his former maſter for this whole year, which is nearly paſſed. We have approved of a meaſure recommended to us by Colonel *Morgan*, that the whole diſtricts of *Kalpy* and *Humeerpoor* ſhould be taken into the Company's hands entirely, and an Aumil placed over them; and we have directed him to receive the propoſals of *Allmaſs Ally Cawn*, a man of property, and Aumil of a large tract of country in his Excellency the Vizier's dominions, for the rentage of theſe diſtricts from the Company: we are in hopes that they will yield a conſiderable revenue.

A large body of Maratta horſe and foot, to the number of 2,000, having appeared in the town of *Kalpy* ſince our poſſeſſion of it, and attempted to plunder and diſturb the people reſiding there, a detachment of ſix companies of grenadiers, with two guns and a tumbril, was ſent to diſperſe them, and the Marattas were inſtantly defeated, with loſs on their part, but with none on ours.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edward Wheler.

Fort William,
the 15th May 1781.

Letter from *J. P. Auriol* to the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Members of the Supreme Council, *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Underſtanding that the Portugueze Government at *Goa* had lately entered into a treaty of alliance offenſive and defenſive with the Nabob *Hyder Ally*, I thought it my duty to aſcertain the nature and conditions of ſuch compact, before I ventured to expoſe the honour of the commiſſion with which I am entruſted to the riſk of any ſlight or indignity, in having the proffered honour of a connection with the Company rejected by the Captain General at *Goa*; on that ground I have therefore made it my buſineſs ſince my arrival here to inquire into the particulars of it.

That a treaty has been concluded, is a fact eſtabliſhed and confirmed by various authorities; but for the purport of it I am indebted chiefly to Mr. *Lloyd*, a perſon who lately held a confidential ſtation in the ſervice of *Hyder Ally*. He aſſured me that he was preſent at all the conferences between *Hyder* and the Portugueze Miniſter which produced it; and from the ready and unprevaricated account he gave me of it, in a long converſation which I held with him upon the ſubject, I have no reaſon to doubt any part of his information.

Mr. *Lloyd* acquainted me that Colonel *Aſſa*, an officer in the Portugueze ſervice, arrived at *Hyder Ally*'s camp about the beginning of Auguſt laſt, attended by 50 Sepoys, a few horſemen, and a numerous ſuite of attendants, among whom were a band of muſicians; that he came publicly deputed from the Captain General at *Goa*, to negociate a treaty in the name of his ſovereign with *Hyder Ally*, and delivered him a valuable preſent on the occaſion, conſiſting of a broad ſword hilted with gold, and very richly ornamented with diamonds and rubies, and a kind of cane ſet and adorned in the ſame manner, beſides various other articles; that he was treated with great reſpect and attention during his ſtay in *Hyder*'s camp, and that a treaty was concluded between them to the following effect:

"That the friends and enemies of each party were to be reciprocally ſo conſidered by the other party. Appendix. No. 367.

"That the Portugueze were to ſupply *Hyder Ally* with a body of troops, conſiſting of 500 thrings, whether natives of *Europe* or *Goa*, to be commanded by European officers; and 50 European artiſts of different callings, to ſerve him in his arſenal, his engineer corps, and artillery, he paying them according to rates ſtipulated:

"That all vacancies in this ſupply ſhould be replaced, and the numbers kept conſtantly complete by occaſional recruits from *Goa*:

"That *Hyder Ally* was likewiſe to be ſupplied by the Portugueze, from time to time, with any quantity of arms or military ſtores which he ſhould have occaſion for, by purchaſe:

"That the Portugueze in return ſhould enjoy all their eſtabliſhments on the Malabar coaſt in profound peace; that their trade ſhould be preſerved to them unmoleſted by *Hyder Ally*'s dependants, their privileges maintained in full force, and a right granted them to ſettle any new factories on his coaſts, if they ſhould require it."

The above are the conditions actually agreed upon in the treaty: it was further demanded by *Hyder Ally*, that the Portugueze naval armament ſhould join his fleet at *Mangalore* on his requiſition, and thence proceed in conjunction with it to co-operate in any hoſtilities which he might undertake in ſupport of the French, on the arrival of their forces in *India*; and that the Portugueze ſhould further aſſiſt him in his military operations with a body of Sepoys, in caſe he thought fit to call on them for that purpoſe, he paying their expences: but theſe two articles Colonel *Aſſa* not having power to aſſent to, were omitted, and the treaty ſigned, on his promiſe that a reference of them ſhould be made to the King of *Portugal*.

It appears that the treaty was not finally ſettled and concluded until eight or ten days after the unfortunate defeat of Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment in September; and I learn that Colonel *Aſſa*, upon taking his leave ſhortly after to return to *Goa*, was complimented with preſents in jewels, &c. to the value of about 60,000 rupees for himſelf, and ſomething more conſiderable for the Captain General at *Goa*.

The troops furniſhed by the Portugueze in virtue of the above treaty are to be on the ſame eſtabliſhment and regulations as thoſe now commanded by Monſieur *Pigmorin*, a Frenchman, conſiſting of 150 cavalry and about 100 infantry. Theſe corps, with their proper complement of officers, were appointed by a ſpecial agreement made between Monſieur *Law*, the late Governor of *Pondicherry*, and *Hyder Ally*, to aſſiſt the latter in all his wars, though they were to be conſidered as French troops, and recruited occaſionally from *Pondicherry*.

Mr. *Lloyd* informs me, that he ſaw a letter which *Hyder Ally* received about twelve days before he left *Arcot* from the Captain General of *Goa*, notifying the march of the troops which he was engaged to ſupply, and he believes them to be now actually on the road towards the place of rendezvous.

As theſe circumſtances would infallibly fruſtrate the end of my negociations, I ſhall not hazard the credit of Government by proceeding in them until I am honoured with further orders from you in reply to my preſent letter.

I am, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
(Signed) *J. P. Auriol*.

Fort Saint George,
20th March 1781.

Examined *T. P.*

A true copy.

E. Hay, Act. Sec.

Appendix No. 368.

APPENDIX, No. 368.

Extract of Letter from *Bengal* (Secret Department).

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for the Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England*, trading to the *East Indies*; dated 3d February 1781.

Honourable Sirs,

WE avail ourſelves of an opportunity of addreſſing you by the way of *Buſſorah*, and of communicating to you the principal facts of moment which have occurred ſince we had the honour of writing to you by the *Ceres*. The channel of conveyance makes it neceſſary that theſe facts ſhould be related with all poſſible brevity and conciſeneſs.—

Reſolve to detach over land towards *Madras* ſix battalions of Sepoys with their guns, and one company of artillery, the command given to Lieutenant Colonel *Pearce*; one company of Golandaaze and a troop of horſe, added afterwards to the ſtrength of this detachment.

Treaty with Dutch, prepared with the advice of Mr. *Roſs*, the Director at *Chinſurah*, and propoſed to the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, for alliances againſt *Hyder Ally*; object in this alliance a ſupply of 1,000 infantry European, 200 European artillery, and 1,000 Malays, with their complement of officers.

Diſpatch the *Portland* to *Madras* and *Bombay*; remit by her to *Madras* ſicca rupees 3,65,235. 1. 6. and to *Bombay* current rupees 5,31,159. 11. 4.; have alſo authorized the latter to draw on us for ſuch further ſums as they may want.

Our ſupplies of treaſure and grain to *Madras* much impeded by a French cruizer at the mouth of the river that has taken many ſmall veſſels along the coaſt. Unable to repel it by our own means (for although we have ſhips, we cannot man them) we have ſent to the Admiral to detach a ſhip for this purpoſe.

Total amount of remittances to *Fort Saint George*, by ſpecie and bills ſince the 22d of September, current rupees 19,59,762. 12. 4. D° D° remittances of grain to D° ſince the 22d of September, maunds 227,465, rupees 7,58,924. 10.—Continue the ſupply of grain to *Fort Saint George* to an unlimited quantity.

Letters received from the Rajah of *Berar* containing ſuch exceptions to the treaty with the Marattas reſolved on in September laſt, as amount to a rejection of the terms; reſolve to confide in our own ſtrength, and on the expectation of ſuccours from Europe, and order Colonel *Pearſe*'s detachment to march direct to *Madras*.

The Maratta army quiet at *Cuttac*; has lately left that place, and marched to the weſtward to reduce ſome refractory Zemindars—Colonel *Pearſe*'s unmoleſted paſſage —thus certain motions of the *Berar* army probably made with this intention.

Informed by Mr. *Hollond*, that the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* has taken to himſelf the Guntoor Circar, inſtead of leaving it to the poſſeſſion of his brother: the meaſure does not affect us, and we will not interfere.

The expences of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay*, and theſe augmented, added to our own; ſuch an expence, and the loſs of ſpecie to theſe provinces, are our only diſtreſs: we hope to obviate them by an increaſe of revenue and official economy,—The means taken to keep the war at a diſtance from our own borders is likely to prove effectual for this ſeaſon, which is all we want; we ſhall be prepared the next, by the completion of our new eſtabliſhment, and by ſuch a diſpoſition of it as ſhall be equal to repel any attempts, however multiplied, of an enemy: upon the whole, notwithſtanding the dreadful calamity which has befallen your intereſts in the *Carnatic*, and which has contributed to drain us of our reſources, both of ſtrength and money to retrieve it, we have the beſt grounds to hope of being able to overcome all our difficulties and dangers, and even to convert them into the inſtruments of your future proſperity; at leaſt, if the event ſhould not prove anſwerable to theſe expectations, you ſhall have no cauſe to reproach your Adminiſtration of the want of ſuch exertions as were moſt likely to fulfil them.

We reſolved on the 29th, that the drafts under Captain *Popham*'s command ſhould be relieved by four regular battalions, put under the command of Major *Camac*. This reſolution continued and ſtrengthened by an order that the four battalions of drafts ſhould be appointed to the eſtabliſhment, and make part of Major *Camac*'s detachment.—Major *Camac* ſince appointed a Lieutenant Colonel.

New arrangement paſſed with reſpect to the corps of cavalry—the horſes made the property of the Company.

The Vizier's great diſtreſs would not permit him to make complete payment of the Company's demand on him for the laſt year; and that diſtreſs continuing, we have been obliged to be content with the following ſettlement with him for the preſent year.

In aſſignments	- -	98,95,345
Bonds	- -	43,18,613
		1,42,13,958

The amount of the aſſignments exceeds the neceſſary claims upon the Company for the ſervices of the current year by above ſix lacks—Mr. *Purling* recalled from *Lucknow*; and Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, collector of the Vizier's aſſignments to the Company, and agent for managing his Excellency's pecuniary engagements with them.

Required from the Rajah of *Benares* the ſame ſubſidy for the enſuing year that he paid in the laſt; one lack paid immediately, the remaining four lacks not paid until the 18th October.

The aſſiſtance of a body of cavalry required from him to be returned at the concluſion of the war.—Mr. *Francis Fowke* recalled from *Benares*, and appointed agent for the proviſion of boats to the army, after the expiration of the preſent contract.—Mr. *Markham* appointed Reſident at *Benares*.—Reſolved to take up money on loan on the following ſcheme:

One loan for 45 lacks of rupees, to be paid on or before the 30th November, for bonds bearing an intereſt at 8 per cent.

Second loan in favour of the Company's ſervants for 20 lacks; to be ſubſcribed for on or before the 28th of February, for bonds bearing an intereſt of 4 per cent. from the day of ſubſcription. The intereſt, together with 20 per cent. of the principal, to be paid by drafts on you, out of the ſum annually drawn upon you by us, ſo often as ſuch drafts are permitted, or that channel of remittance remains open, at the exchange of two ſhillings per current rupee. Should we be forbidden to draw upon you, it is at the option of the ſubſcribers to receive payment of the remaining part of their principal, with the intereſt which ſhall accrue from the laſt payment, at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum; or to let it remain at that rate of intereſt, and receive notes for the ſame, according to the firſt mode above-mentioned.

Third loan in favour of the Company's ſervants and other European inhabitants, of 20 lacks; to be ſubſcribed on or before the 28th February 1781, in exchange for annuities, payable by bills on you, out of the ſum uſually drawn on you by us: the particulars have been already tranſmitted to you in duplicate. The annuities are redeemable on or before the 1ſt of January 1783, if the plan ſhould not meet with your approbation.

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The State of our Treaſuries this day is as follows:

Ready money	30,599	5	—
Bills receivable	2,59,331	7	—
Mint	2,59,724	1	9
Unſorted treaſure	5,59,464	6	3
Total	11,09,119	4	—

Deduct appropriated Sums, *viz.*

Balance account depoſits	9,41,611	3	5
Accountant General Mayor's Court	1,36,358	4	—
Amount of the old bond debt on which the intereſt has ceaſed by public advertiſement	79,342	11	10
D° of D°, on account of the Churchwardens, bearing a running intereſt by order of the Court of Directors	98,200	—	—
D° of the new bond debt	71,14,351	1	6
D° four per cent. remittance loan	17,18,550	—	—
D° annuities 1780	94,720	—	—
Total	1,01,83,133	4	9

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings,
Edw. Wheler.

Fort William,
3d February 1781.

Mr. *John Hollond*, Reſident at the Court of his Highneſs *Nizam-ul-Mulck.*

Sir,

We have received the letter which you have written to us under date the 15th ultimo, and the Governor General has laid before us thoſe which you have addreſſed to him on the 5th, 26th, 29th, and 31ſt ultimo.

The line and meaſures which you inform us the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* has thought proper to adopt reſpecting the Sircar of *Guntoor*, do not appear to us to require any new orders to you or repreſentation to him: it is to us a point of mere indifference, whether the Sircar of *Guntoor* be in his Highneſs's poſſeſſion, or in that of his brother. It was not guaranteed by the Company to the latter, but yielded at the inſtance of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, who had granted it as a jaghier to him. If the Nabob now thinks proper to reſume his own gift, we ſee no cauſe to warrant us in interfering, particularly when ſuch interference might involve us in differences with him, which at this time eſpecially we wiſh to avoid; and as we think his poſſeſſion of the Sircar an event more likely to prove of ſervice than prejudice to our affairs, by embarraſſing his Highneſs with *Hyder Ally Cawn*, ſuppoſing it to be true, as he aſſerts, that the latter has formed deſigns on the northern Circars, from which it is not probable that an exemption will be made in favour of that of *Guntoor*; yet we do not mean, by the part which we have determined to purſue on this occaſion, either to invalidate the claim of the Company to the reverſion of the Circar of *Guntoor*, agreeable to the treaty of 1768, on the death of *Baſſalet Jung*, or the right which they derive to it from the ſame authority, when he breaks the conditions under which this reſervation was originally made by the treaty in favour of *Baſſalet Jung*.

With reſpect to the future payment of the arrears of the peſhcuſh, we give you full authority to aſſure his Highneſs that they ſhall be completely diſcharged at the termination of the war, and that the current demands on this account be regularly diſcharged from that fund: that at preſent, and during the continuance of the war, our reſources are all engaged in the proſecution of it, and that we cannot employ them on other ſervice. We authorize you alſo to inform his Highneſs, that be the preſent loſs ſuſtained by him from our inability to diſcharge the ſums due to him from the Company, what it may, it is imputable to himſelf only, for that he is the cauſe of the war, being the avowed author of the confederacy which occaſioned it; and that without taking upon us to condemn the motives of his conduct, or even to declare that it might not be juſtified by that of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*. We affirm, that at the moment when we complained of their injuſtice towards him, when he inſtigated the other States of *India* to combine againſt the Company, he well knew the controlling powers veſted in this Government over all the other Preſidencies, and that we were able to do him juſtice; yet he made not any application to us for that purpoſe.

His Highneſs ſeems to be miſinformed of the preſent relation which ſubſiſts between this Government and *Ragonaut Row*; and we are induced to believe ſo from a part of your letter to us of the 15th ultimo, wherein you recite a converſation that had paſſed, in which he expreſſed his readineſs to join us againſt *Hyder* on certain conditions; the firſt of which is ſaid to be, that the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row* ſhould be for ever abandoned. If by the word "ſupport" be meant the ſupport of his claims at *Poonah*, we authorize you to declare to his highneſs that *Ragoba* is not ſupported by us in it in any manner whatſoever, and that at this moment we are not connected with him, though we ſhould think it diſhonourable to deliver him into the hands of his enemies.

We are well pleaſed with the attention which you have ſhewn us in the conſtant and particular advices which you have tranſmitted to us of your tranſactions at the Nabob's court, and of his Highneſs's deſigns, and we depend on a continuance of the ſame communications to us in future.

We are, &c. &c.
(Signed) Governor General and Council.

Fort William.
22d January 1781.

A true copy. *E. Hay*, Act. Secy.

Appendix. Nos. 369 & 370.

APPENDIX, No. 369.

Extracts from a Copy of a Letter from the President and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors, dated 17th February 1781.

WE did ourselves the honour of addressing you by your ship the *Duke of Kingston*, that sailed from hence the 15th of last month, and there in the fullest manner stated to you the general situation of military and political affairs, as immediately or relatively connected with this Presidency. Duplicates of that dispatch now waits upon you by Colonel *James Capper*, who takes his passage on a Portuguese ship.

2. Alarmed as you will naturally have been at the very gloomy prospect which there presented itself: the being enabled in so short a space of time to acquaint you of a favourable turn in your affairs on this coast, cannot but afford us the most solid and real satisfaction. The invariable language which hath been held to you by this Committee will have convinced your Honours, that in our opinion nothing but a peace with the Marattas could possibly extricate us from our difficulties, or your other settlements of *Bengal* or *Bombay*, from the accumulating load of expence, and consequently debt, which it was unavoidable to incur. This opinion was daily increased from the effects we could perceive of universal dissatisfaction in the country Powers. Happily indeed the many resources which have been found in your own possessions have hitherto empowered the arms of the Company to penetrate into the most formidable parts of the peninsula; but these resources are in no respect adequate to the continuance of such great and such distant operations. The stepping beyond the bounds of political moderation, and of your own and the territories of your allies, is fraught with effects of the most pernicious tendency. Extension of dominion hath been uniformly one of the objects you have commanded us to refrain from: the reason is clear; that which you have already is as much as you ever can be able to turn to advantage; more would but load you with encumbrances, and render your possessions defenceless and open to the invasions of every restless neighbour.

The Maratta war, though it originated perhaps in the one idea of merely affording support to the cause of *Ragonaut Row*, when that support could be supposed to be but very inconsiderable, has yet in its consequences involved a variety of mischiefs and embarrassments of an alarming nature to your present and your future influence. In deliberating on this subject, it is probable your controlling Government of *Bengal* have left unexplained no matter which it would be proper for you to be acquainted with; we shall therefore avoid entering in a more diffusive manner into the subject, especially as we understand the dispatches which now wait upon you from *Bengal*, are full and particular, from its commencement by the Presidency of *Bombay* to the present hour. Accompanying, however, you will receive copies of two letters that were received from *Poonah* about the middle of last month. The first is from the Peishwa *Mhadoo Row* to our President, and the latter is to the Nabob from his Vackeel, who resides at the Peishwa's court. From both these letters you will perceive that the disposition of the Poonah Administration is far from being so hostile as it naturally might be supposed. We have transmitted copies of these letters to the Governor General and Council; and have recommended to the Nabob, in the strongest terms, the exerting the utmost of his influence towards the terminating the present troubles, by a permanent and honourable peace. The negociations of the Nabob, at the express desire of the Governor General, are now going on for the accomplishment of this wished for end; and he gives us the strongest reason to hope he shall be successful in his mediation. To the like purport as the above letters, Sir *Eyre Coote* has been written to by the chief minister, *Nanna Furnaveese*; but as in the hurry of taking the field he forgot to furnish us with a translate of what he had received, we can only in general terms inform you, that the minister expressed himself to General *Coote* as desirous of putting an end to the war, provided the advantages were not all to be expected on our side.

9. In our former advices we explained to your Honours our reasons for apprehending the Soubah's intentions to be entirely hostile to the Company: his public declarations were expressive of abundance of ill-humour, and he hesitated not to avow himself to the Governor General the adviser of the confederacy between *Hyder Ally* and the Marattas. However willing the Soubah might have been to have availed himself of the embarrassed situation of our affairs, he yet hath fortunately refrained from any hostile attempt. His complaints indeed have of late assumed a milder tone, and we have reason to believe, from our intelligence from the *Decan*, that nothing dangerous to our repose may be immediately expected from that quarter.

APPENDIX, No. 370.

Major *Scott*'s Examination before the Court of Directors, 26th February 1782.

Q. FROM whom did you receive copy of the revenue letter of the 5th May 1781, from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* to the Court of Directors, with the other papers relating to the revenues of *Bengal*?

A. They were sent me by Mr. *Hastings* the Governor General under the care of Mr. *Grady*, from whom I received them.

Q. When did you receive those papers?

A. I think on the 19th instant; Mr. *Grady* was particularly directed to deliver them into my hands.

Q. What directions did you receive from the Governor General respecting the above letter and papers?

A. They were sent for my information, and I supposed that the Court of Directors would have received the revenue letter by the same ship. These papers were put on board the *Neptune*, on which ship Mr. *Grady* had taken his passage; but she being unable to proceed he embarked on board the *Bellmont*; wrote to the Governor General to know what he should do with the papers, but receiving no answer, he brought them with him on the *Bellmont*.

Q. Were the papers sealed up and directed to you?

A. Yes; in a box sealed up, directed to the particular care of Mr. *Grady*.

Q. Are the papers produced the original ones delivered in by him?

A. They are not the original ones, but appear by the endorsement to be copies of them.

Q. Did you receive any other papers relating to the Company's affairs from Mr. *Grady*?

A. Yes, ſeveral other papers relating to the Company's affairs. Appendix. No. 372.

Q. When you tendered thoſe papers which are delivered in, what reaſon had you for withholding the others?

A. I underſtood that the revenue letter and papers had not been received by the Company; but if there are any other papers in my poſſeſſion, being copies of the proceedings of the Governor General and Council, the originals of which have not been received by the Company, I will with great pleaſure, and I think it my duty ſo to do, lay them before the Honourable the Court of Directors. It is from ſome accident which I cannot account for, that papers of ſuch conſequence have not been received, becauſe I am ſure it was Mr. *Haſtings*'s intention to have tranſmitted them.

Q. How came you to know that the originals of thoſe papers which were delivered in were not received by the Company?

A. I heard ſo at this houſe, and that the revenue packet had not been received. I had aſked that queſtion before I had received any letter myſelf.

Q. By what means can you aſcertain that the papers which you have delivered in, and thoſe others which you received from the Governor General by Mr. *Grady*, are true copies from the Company's records?

A. I firmly believe them to be ſo, becauſe they are endorſed by the Governor General himſelf, and becauſe he refers me to them very particularly in his private letters.

Q. Can you recollect the purport of the other papers in your poſſeſſion which came by Mr. *Grady*, and which you have not delivered in?

A. I cannot recollect them all, but will mention as far as I am able. Copies of many of them were in my poſſeſſion before, which Mr. *Haſtings* had forgot.

The propoſed treaty with the Dutch—The debates relative to Sir *Elijah Impey*'s appointment—New regulations for the Courts of Juſtice, dated I think the 15th of April 1781—Regulations of the Cuſtoms—Mr. *Anderſon*'s negociation with *Chimnajee Booſla*, including the Governor General's inſtructions to that gentleman—Letter from *Dewangur Pundit*, miniſter of the Rajah of *Berar*, to the Governor General, received at *Calcutta* the 10th May 1781—Copy of the correſpondence with *Fort Saint George*, from Auguſt 1780 to February 1781.—I believe theſe are all the public papers; if there are any others I will ſend them in. I had forgot to mention the copy of Mr. *Haſtings*'s minute and Mr. *Wheler*'s on the appointment of Mr. *Markham* to the Reſidency of *Benares*.

Q. Were thoſe papers tranſmitted by the Governor General for your private information?

A. They were.

Q. Have you directions from the Governor General to communicate thoſe papers or their contents to any other perſon or perſons?

A. Mr. *Haſtings* has deſired me to ſhew a private letter to his particular friends, but the other papers are left to my diſcretion. Theſe papers are often referred to in that private letter, and I ſhould have ſhewn them to thoſe particular friends who deſired to read them.

Q. Are any of thoſe friends in the direction of the *Eaſt India* Company's affairs?

A. They are not—many of them are proprietors.

Q. How long have you reſided in *India*, at what ſettlements, and in what ſtations?

A. I was appointed a Cadet by the Court of Directors 16 years and a half ago—Arrived at *Bombay* in Auguſt 1766—Served ſeven months on that coaſt, and went with permiſſion to *Bengal*, where I came in a Cadet in June 1767—I ſerved in the army till the 7th January 1781, and then reſigned the Honourable Company's ſervice.

Q. When did you leave *Bengal*?

A. I left *Calcutta* the 9th January 1781, and the pilot left the ſhip the 17th.

APPENDIX, No. 371.

Letter from the Governor General to the Chairman of the Court of Directors; dated 6th January 1781.

Sir,

HAVING thought proper to appoint an agent at home for the purpoſe of attending to my political intereſts, and managing all my public concerns, I take this opportunity of acquainting you that I have ſelected Major *Scott* for this ſervice, and have furniſhed him with ſuitable inſtructions; and as this gentleman is poſſeſſed of every neceſſary information relative to the ſtate of this Government, he will be ready to communicate with you on all matters wherein you may think it proper to aſk his opinion.

It is material to me to make one obſervation, that in my inſtructions to Major *Scott* I have particularly provided, that I will ſuffer no perſon whatever to perform any act in my name that ſhall be conſtrued to imply a reſignation of my authority; proteſting againſt the exerciſe of ſo dangerous a power, from its having been aſſumed upon a former occaſion without being warranted by my conſent, or by any previous inſtructions that could bear the moſt diſtant tendency to ſuch a meaſure.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble ſervant,

Fort William, January 6th 1781. *Warren Haſtings.*

APPENDIX, No. 372.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Dewargur Pundit*, Miniſter to *Moodajee Booſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, to Mr. *Haſtings*. Dated 5th April; received 10th May, 1781.

After the uſual compliments,

PRIOR to this, in the fulneſs of friendſhip and reſpect, which God, the Creator of heaven and earth, knew

Appendix. No 372.

knew to be ſincere; I wrote four letters concerning the affairs of this province, ſtating the buſineſs in agitation in all its points of view; and ſetting forth the meaſures to be taken, and the conſequences attending your reſolution for peace or war: that if in order to reſtore your reputation, which had ſuffered from the incapacity of the Bombay Commanders, you were determined upon war, there were ſuch and ſuch meaſures neceſſary to be taken to carry it on with ſucceſs. that if you ſpoke the language of peace, and wiſhed that the garden of the State ſhould preſerve its beauty unviolated by the thorns of war and confuſion, you ſhould ſend propoſals for a treaty, fully and particularly drawn out, reſpecting every article, in ſuch and ſuch form, and to ſuch and ſuch purport; that the thorns of diſcontent might be removed, and a foundation laid for our mutual agreements to laſt for ever; that the country might flouriſh in tranquillity, the inhabitants be at eaſe, and the General and ſoldiers free from the fatigues of inceſſant toil. I conclude that theſe letters haae been reſpectively received, and that you muſt be acquainted with their contents; and moſt undoubtedly your extenſive capacity and univerſal knowledge have enabled you to comprehend the ſecret meaning of every hint and ſuggeſtion contained in the lines which I wrote regarding the negociation of a treaty; and will have conſidered every matter, both in its beginning and its conſequences. But as, contrary to former cuſtom, when a mutual correſpondence every month reſpecting buſineſs ſubſiſted between us, your anſwer in the preſent inſtance, although the welfare of the State depended upon it, has been delayed; my heart, which is captivated in the ties of affection and good-will towards you, is involuntarily ſtruck with ſurpriſe, and filled with uneaſineſs. The Rajah himſelf often calling to mind the excellence of your diſpoſition and underſtanding, aſks, what can be the reaſon, that in three months no letter has been received from *Calcutta?* —What reaſon can I aſſign?—I replied, that as the letters from here were all written in the cauſe of peace, through the favour of the Almighty, their contents were engraved in your heart, ſince you of yourſelf, had ſent the drafts of a treaty. But as the daring ambition of *Hyder Naig* has filled *Arcot* with war and confuſion, that you, being unable to bear his daring inſolence, were taken up with the neceſſary preparation of ſending troops to chaſtiſe him, occaſioned this delay; but that it was no matter, as your anſwer would certainly arrive in a few days. To ſpeak to the point at once; the greatneſs of the wealth, and the numerous armies of the State; the ſtrength and power of the *Purdhan Pundit*, and his Generals; the multitude of forts and ſtrong holds in their poſſeſſion; and the ſtrength, valour, and proweſs, which they have diſplayed for theſe fifty years paſt in the wars carried on in the *Decan* and *Hindoſtan*, are written on the leaves of the world; and are too well known to need a repetition. There are few places in *Decan* or *Hindoſtan* which have not felt the hoofs of the Maratta horſes. Their armies ſpread like the ocean, and are in all places. But praiſes, a thouſand praiſes, to the excellency of your meaſures, your exertions in war, and your regard to honour and glory; that amidſt the diſcord which ſhakes the world, you ſtand like a rock on your ground unmoved; and in proportion as the troubles increaſe beyond the power of remedy, your ſtrength and proweſs riſe ſuperior a hundredfold; who only, from the circumſtance of a Frenchman's having been admitted to the preſence of the Regency of *Poonah*, obſerved the ſcent of enmity and ſeparation, and inſtantly conceived the remedy, ſent a force under the command of Colonel *Leſlie* againſt this place, and diſpatched Mr. *Elliott* to negociate the affair; and when that gentleman died on the expedition, *Beneram Pundit* was furniſhed with proper diſpatches and inſtructions from hence; General *Goddard* was written to, that at firſt he ſhould try every means, and uſe his utmoſt endeavours for peace; but in caſe of this failing, he was to proceed to hoſtilities. After the defeat of the Bombay detachment, General *Goddard* marched to *Surat*, ſeized upon *Guzzerat*, and gave aſſiſtance to *Futty Sing Guicawar*; letters were ſent to the Government of *Poonah*, and to me for a ratification of the treaty, as laid down by Colonel *Upton*, which by the unfortunate chances of things were not attended to; and by the advice and ſuggeſtion of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, a plan was laid out to effect the buſineſs by war. Forces were ſent into every quarter. The valour and activity ſhewn by your troops, when in the field, need not be repeated. The intrepidity and ſkill diſplayed by General *Goddard* for ſix months, in his attack upon *Scindia*, are beyond a doubt equal to the labours of *Ruſtum* and *Eſfendyar*; as none before had ever been victorious over Chiefs ſo mighty and powerful as *Scindia* and *Holkar*. In like manner, in the provinces of *Madras* and *Arcot*, &c although the Engliſh troops are but few, and thoſe diſperſed in many places; and although *Hyder Naig* had a numerous army, and well provided with ſtores, yet their valour and reſolution has not been damped, particularly ſince the arrival of General *Coote* at *Madras*. Theſe are the effects of your exertions, by which your forces have gained additional ſtrength. The whole are now aſſembled, and are in the field againſt *Hyder*; perhaps, by this time there has been a deciſive engagement; as *Hyder* is in alliance with the French, and a large force is on the way by ſea to aſſiſt him, the Engliſh have ſent out a fleet properly equipped to intercept it. In the Zellah of *Kandeiſh*, dependent on the province of *Berrampore*, the Engliſh are engaged in a bloody war with *Holkar*. In the province of *Malva*, near *Oögeyn*, the conteſt is wonderful; *Scindia*, at the head of thirty thouſand horſe, attended by all the Rajahs and Zemindars of that country, making in all near fifty thouſand horſe, have ſurrounded the Engliſh troops which had marched from *Bopaul* and *Nawa* at *Seronge*. The Engliſh, though their number is ſmall, are prepared to fight them. General *Goddard*, in three days and nights, in defiance of the forces of *Ram Chunder Gunnis*, who attempted to oppoſe his progreſs, has taken the fort of *Baſſein*, which is the firſt amongſt the forts for ſtrength; and after ſettling that ſtrong fort, and taking ſome other places, he is now in the field againſt *Hurry Pundit* and *Holkar*, who have an army of fifty thouſand tried horſe and native Generals, and many large cannon at the ghaut, and has taken poſt in places of difficult acceſs, and great natural ſtrength. The Government and Chiefs of *Poonah* have thrown aſide their affection to their families, and are reſolved to devote their town to the flames. They only wait till they hear of General *Goddard*'s marching from his ſtation at the ghaut, and then that which is to be will take place. Although the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* has not yet joined the Poonah army, yet he has collected his forces, and made the neceſſary preparations. In ſhort, your good ſenſe, valour, and victorious fortune in every part, againſt all oppoſition, has lighted up ſo aſtoniſhing a flame of war, that for 50 or 100 years back no Power has been ſo univerſally ſucceſsful againſt every General, and every Power oppoſed to them. The Rajah is continually ſinging the praiſes of theſe exertions; and I, whoſe heart and ſoul are intereſted in your welfare, wiſh earneſtly and ſincerely for the honour of an interview with you, and that, without waiting for the permiſſion of the Miniſter of the *Pundit Purdhaun*, I may ſee with my own eyes the form of that greatneſs, which is the ſource of all this bravery, conduct, grandeur, ſtate, wiſdom, and knowledge of mankind; that I may explain to you my ideas, and the plan which I have for a long time revolved in my mind for the benefit of the State, and hear from your own mouth the obſervations which you ſhall think proper to make; that I may be able to ſettle the terms of ſuch a treaty between the Engliſh and the Peiſhwa, as may be for the benefit of both; that the thorns of diſcontent, which are in the breaſt of the Engliſh nation againſt *Hyder Naig* and the French, by conſultation with each other, may be removed with eaſe. Your name and reputation is great

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in the world, and in the preſence of the Royal Majeſty of *England:* but what can I do? I have been ſix months confined by illneſs, and at preſent I am ſo tortured with pains in my left leg and arms, that I can ſcarce ſit down or riſe up: I receive no benefit from the medicines I take. As you have with you gentlemen completely ſkilled in phyſic, if any ſuch gentleman with proper medicines and oils can come, it will be regarded by me as the greateſt favour and kindneſs; it will be giving a renewal of life to this well-wiſher, who is equal to manifold ſervices; and when I ſhall be reſtored to health, and ſhall preſent myſelf before you, what ſhall then be done it is ſuperfluous to write. Whatever ſhall come within the compaſs of actual obſervation and experience is truth itſelf. But till the completion of my wiſhes, which depend upon my recovery, be pleaſed to aſſent to what I write in the fulneſs of friendſhip and regard; and believe that what I ſay is only from motives of truth and friendſhip, a foreſight of conſequences, and a knowledge of the affairs; and it is this, that as full revenge has been taken for the diſgrace of the Bombay detachment, and the Engliſh name is a hundred times greater than before, and the dread and reſpect of the Engliſh ſo eſtabliſhed over all, that if any one ſhall hereafter be at enmity with them, the ſame conſequences will be expected to follow; it is therefore not conſonant to wiſdom, to ſuffer the flames of war to lay waſte and ſpread the earth with deſolation. For what you have gained by your power, fortune, and the favour of God, to this hour be thankful, that ſo ſmall a force has been able to prevail againſt ſuch numerous hoſts in every part; and you ſhould by all means open the door to peace and friendſhip, and uſe your utmoſt power to root out the French and *Hyder Naig*. If you ſhould ſay, I myſelf have formed a treaty, which if they will not accept, what am I to do? The anſwer is this: the articles inſerted in your propoſals reſpecting *Ragonaut Row*, the fort of *Gwalior*, and *Futty Sing Guicawar*, contained obvious grounds for objection; and the affairs of the State and the greatneſs of the *Pundit Purdhaun*, by his acceding to the above three articles, would have been injured; therefore ſuch anſwers were returned as were judged neceſſary and proper: and further, at the time the propoſed treaty arrived here, the Engliſh forces were employed in ſubduing the country of *Cokan*, and General *Goddard* was likewiſe exerting himſelf with the greateſt activity in the ſiege of the fort of *Baſſein*, and the flames of contention were every day gaining new ſtrength; wherefore, amidſt this conflagration of war, where was there room for deliberation?—And how could propoſals for peace and friendſhip be approved of at ſuch a time? They rather would be looked upon as the language of deceit. If a man was to ſeize another by the head, and attempt to take his turban from him, and a ſtruggle enſued, and at ſuch a time any one was to propoſe to the latter a reconciliation, how would he receive ſuch a propoſal? He would firſt effect his own deliverance, and then liſten to terms of accommodation. Your proffered treaties arrived in the midſt of the ferment of war and paſſion, and therefore remained in ſuſpenſe; nor had any anſwers arrived to what had been ſent from hence. What is paſt is paſt. At this time in which I am writing, the ſcale of ſtrength between the forces of both parties hangs equal. No time can be better than the preſent for the work of peace; you ſhould look upon this as propitious, and not let it ſlip, ſince the wiſe never let opportunity paſs, for it is impoſſible to be recalled: therefore you ſhould begin a negociation through the mediation of the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah*, who is one of the moſt principal Chiefs of the *Decan*. He will repreſent here whatever you ſhall think proper to write to him, without diminution or exaggeration; and in return, by the ſame channel, whatever is to be written, will be written; and let the Nabob *Mobarez-ul-Mulk* be applied to in reſpect of this negociation, who is the firm pillar of the fortune and greatneſs of the Aſofean race, and to whom you have heretofore written; ſo that the Rajah, the Nabob *Mobarez ul-Mulk*, and the Nabob *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* may join in a mediation, and obtain from *Pundit Purdhaun* ſuch a treaty as may prevent any diſputes in future, and a plan laid for extirpating the power of *Hyder* and the French. Appendix No. 373.

The above advice is juſt, and according to good ſenſe; you will certainly ſee the propriety of it, and ſoon ſhew your approbation publicly; and you will believe what I have written to be the dictates of my friendſhip and good wiſhes; but if not, the matter will be carried to ſuch a length, that it will be impoſſible to bring it again in the ſame train. For how long will General *Goddard* remain at the ghauts? As it will not be proper for him to retreat, he will deſcend from the ghaut upon *Poonah*. The Maratta Chiefs with their own hands will ſet fire to the town, level all their houſes with the duſt, and ſprinkling their arms and feet with the aſhes of their habitations, and devoting their families and poſſeſſions to deſtruction, will perform acts beyond the power of imagination, which their opponents will never be able to get the better of. *Nizam-ul-Dowlah* alſo will not ſit an idle ſpectator of the ſame. *Hyder*, with ſo large a force, and the aſſiſtance of the French, will not remain inactive: and *Scindiah*, who is a renowned and warlike Chief, and who has a force of near 50,000 horſe, with Rajahs and Zemindars, and who has of old rendered ſervices to the imperial throne, will exert himſelf while able to move hand or foot. God knows what they may be able to perform, or what game the deceitful heavens may play: you ſhould therefore look on what has already been brought to paſs as fortunate, and begin the work of peace. What I have written is merely from a regard to the friendſhip which you have at all times diſplayed towards me. In the letters with which you formerly honoured me, you wrote, that "On your comfort and "ſatisfaction depend the comfort and ſatisfaction of "mankind, and the peace and happineſs of the people; "let not therefore ſorrow for your deceaſed wife prey "upon your heart."

From the emotions of my heart therefore, and the impulſe of friendſhip, which attracts me towards you, I have been induced to write ſo fully. I have not omitted a ſingle point in this letter that could contribute to ſet matters in the fulleſt light, either in weighing the preſent circumſtances, or looking forward to future conſequences. I have the ſtrongeſt hopes that you will examine the whole by yourſelf, word by word, and approve of all that I have ſaid. And after the foundation of peace is thus laid, and I am relieved a little from my diſorder, I will certainly do myſelf the honour of having one time an interview with you.

APPENDIX, No. 373.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*; dated the 9th January 1781.

Par. 19. FROM the invariable tenor of our advices to your Honours, you will perceive a ſtrong, and we are ſorry to believe a juſt opinion of the ruinous conſequences which would ſooner or later fall upon the Company, from the war which your ſervants at the other Preſidencies had unneceſſarily entered into with the Maratta State. Vide Letter 3d April 1780, by

Bordering upon each other's dominions, and heated by jealouſy and a deſire of plunder, *Hyder* and the Marattas never could have remained upon amicable terms. Every year, unleſs when we ſtepped in to ſuſpend their operations, the country of the one or the other was the theatre of war. Their ſucceſs was various; but the effect to the Engliſh intereſt was the ſame, they reciprocally waſted their ſtrength, and found a ſufficiency of employment at home to hinder their diſturbing the tranquillity of their neighbours.

20. Whilſt theſe two Governments, the moſt powerful

Appendix. No. 374 & 375.

in *Hindoſtan*, were thus weakening themſelves by an inveterate war, which from the known diſpoſition of the parties, was never likely to have an end, your ſettlements were at peace, and your proſperity was making the quickeſt advances to its fulleſt ſtate. Unhappily for your intereſts, the flame of diſſention at length broke forth at *Bombay*. The ſeeds of war which were then ſown in ſupport of the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row*, and which were afterwards nouriſhed in the moſt unbounded manner by the Government of *Bengal*, gave a reſpite to theſe rival Powers. They ſoon began to ſlacken in their oppoſition: the pretenſions of each became every day more moderate. At length they combined againſt us, and from being enemies cemented the ſtrongeſt ties of mutual aſſiſtance and ſupport, againſt a conſequence which they had every reaſon to conſider as too formidable and interfering for the repoſe of *India*.

92. In this manner did we communicate our ſentiments to the Governor General and Council on the ſubject of the Guntoor Circar. Your Honours will determine whether they accord with the deciſion they have been pleaſed to paſs in their letter of the 10th October 1780, "That we preſumed to hold the Circar of Guntoor at all events, in defiance of a requiſition from the Governor General and Council peremptorily made to return it. That we had refuſed to withdraw our troops, and remove our agents and collectors from it, knowing as we did that they had formerly pledged the faith of the Company to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* for both thoſe points, thereby degrading the authority, weakening the energy, and preventing the efficacy of the power of their Government."

93. Involved as your affairs are in every quarter of *Hindoſtan*, the accuſation of wantonly adding to the flame, carries in its conſequences a degree of criminality which every Government ſatisfied with the rectitude of its actions, is warranted to clear itſelf of, and even to retort upon thoſe who are primarily and principally concerned.

94. We have already ſaid, and we again repeat it, the Maratta war is the ſole cauſe of all the miſchiefs which hitherto have been felt, or hereafter may befal the intereſts of *England* in *India*. The viſionary purſuit of that ſcheme hath plunged you into the moſt complicated public calamity. The country Powers tired of the yoke, rejoice at the ruinous meaſures, which to the expenditure of all your treaſure in *Bengal*, and of all that hath been borrowed, hath been offenſively carried on againſt the combined Maratta empire. Nor ſhall we heſitate in declaring it our opinion, that unleſs a peace is ſpeedily concluded with that Power, the hard earned ſupremacy of your ſituation will ſink under a blow the moſt ſevere that it hath ever yet received.

APPENDIX, No. 374.

Minute of Sir *Eyre Coote*: 12th January 1781.

AT the ſame time I put my ſignature to the General Letter of the 9th of January 1781, I muſt in candour and conformity to thoſe opinions which I have both held and expreſſed, except againſt one part of it, and which aſcribes all our preſent miſfortunes to the Maratta war.

That that meaſure may firſt have given birth to the idea of a general combination of the Powers of *Hindoſtan* againſt us, I will not endeavour to diſprove; but that to it alone we owe the formidable incurſion of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, I cannot admit. Firſt, becauſe long after we had commenced hoſtilities againſt the Marattas, *Hyder* himſelf continued to make conqueſts upon them, and which our operations no doubt facilitated. It was his favourite object, and which I am confident he would never have quitted, or ſought for an union with the Marattas againſt us, had not our negociations with *Bazalet Jung* about the Guntoor Circar, on which he had alſo views, and the mode in which they were carried on, awakened his jealouſy, and very naturally made him apprehend, that our ultimate intentions were to poſſeſs ourſelves of ſome part of his country. Whilſt it anſwered his purpoſe to make peace with the Marattas, in order that his attention or ſtrength might in no ſhape be diverted from providing effectually for the ſecurity of his own territories, it was entirely ſuitable to the Marattas in their then ſituation, as it enabled them to direct their whole force againſt the operations of our army under Brigadier General *Goddard*. We alarmed his fears for the ſafety of his own country, croſſed his views upon the Guntoor Circar, which he was deſirous of obtaining in farm from *Bazalet Jung*. That an able agent might not be wanting to foment theſe offences, we deliberately gave umbrage to the Nabob *Nizam*; firſt, by ſeeking and actually ſubſcribing to a treaty of friendſhip with his brother and ſubject *Bazalet Jung*, without aſking his conſent or approbation; and next, by demanding of him a remiſſion of the peſhcuſh, or tribute, which for theſe eleven years and upwards we have paid him, as in treaty bound, on account of the northern Circars. To prevent any bad conſequences ariſing from the delay in the payment of the peſhcuſh, which was owing in the firſt place to a temporary inability created by the heavy current expences which were unavoidably incurred by the ſiege of *Pondicherry*; and in the next place, perhaps by miſmanagement, I was induced, when I ſtopped here in my way to *Bengal*, to recommend the miſſion of Mr. *Hollond*, as Ambaſſador to the *Nizam*'s Court, to aſſure him that the peſhcuſh ſhould be paid, and to explain to him the cauſe of its detention.

The *Nizam* has in his letters to this Government, and in his converſations with Mr. *Hollond*, who communicated them to the Governor General and Council, avowed his diſpleaſure on account of our behaviour with regard to the peſhcuſh and the Guntoor treaty, and has without ſcruple acknowledged his having for theſe reaſons encouraged and connived at a combination of the Powers againſt us.

With all theſe circumſtances before me, and which the records both here and in *Bengal* bear teſtimony, and further knowing it as a thing certain, that at the very time the treaty was carrying on with *Bazalet Jung*, *Hyder* would have entered into an offenſive and defenſive alliance with us, I would do an injury to myſelf, and a ſtill greater one to our ſuperiors, who are to paſs their judgment on men and meaſures, by the documents handed them from their reſpective Governments in *India*, did I tacitly ſubſcribe to that part of the general letter to the Court of Directors, which I have hereby excepted againſt, and not alſo elucidate the other cauſes, beſides the Maratta war, which have aſſiſted to haſten our preſent diſtreſſes.

I requeſt that this may go a number in the packet now under diſpatch.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

A true Copy. *R. J. Sulivan.*

APPENDIX, No. 375.

Extract of *Bombay* Diary, the 15th April 1781.

Extract of Letter from General Sir *Eyre Coote* to Brigadier General *Goddard*; dated Camp, *New Town*, 1ſt March 1781.

WHEN I wrote you in the terms I did, the moſt expreſſive I could dictate, of the diſtreſſed ſituation of affairs here, wherein I enumerated the various difficulties I had to combat againſt, the ſmalneſs of my force, and the impoſſibility of attacking the enemy in the ſtrong holds he was poſſeſſed of unleſs a diverſion was created in his country, to oblige him to divide the very formidable force he had in the *Carnatic*; I ſay, when I ſtated theſe circumſtances, and added to them my firm opinion, that nothing but our united efforts ſpeedily exerted could poſſibly

poſſibly retrieve the misfortunes which had fallen upon our intereſts on this coaſt, and the conſequent ruin which threatened the whole of the Engliſh poſſeſſions in *India*, I did not mean to enhance any credit which might ariſe from my honeſt exertions in the cauſe of my country, and my employers, but that you might be the better convinced of the real neceſſity there was for ſeeking for an accommodation with the Marattas on any terms, rather than that by proſecuting a deſtructive war, delay ſhould have happened in purſuing ſuch meaſures as promiſed the accompliſhment of the grand national object, giving an effectual check to the increaſing power and influence of *Hyder Ally Cawn*. I will not argue how far my orders as Commander in Chief ought to have weighed with you on the occaſion; but I muſt ſay, when, together with them, I ſtated the imminent danger which I conceived to impend the Britiſh intereſts in *India*, and under the expreſs authority delegated to me over the Bengal troops under your command, pointed out the mode whereby that danger might be averted; I experienced a very heavy diſappointment in your not having at leaſt aimed at the ceſſation of hoſtilities with the Marattas, for which the reſolutions of the Governor General and Council, as well as the ſpirit of the propoſed treaty itſelf, gave a clear latitude, with the authority you poſſeſs over the Bengal troops independent of the Bombay Adminiſtration, and furniſhed with a juſt account of the ſituation of affairs of the moſt ſerious importance, and which ſtood in need of ſuch ſpeedy ſupport. I am confident, that had you made it, as it deſerved, the firſt object in your deliberations with the Bombay Council, that they would have ſeen the propriety of countenancing it; and that had they and you in conſequence been ſolicitous about it in our communication with the Miniſters at *Poonah*, I have every reaſon to think, from the ſituation which the affairs of the Maratta State were then in, might eaſily have been effected. I will not be certain that no endeavours have been exerted to that end, but as you make no mention of any thing to that effect in your letters, I am juſtified in drawing the concluſion I have done; and in adding, that I conceive my powers as Commander in Chief in *India* have not been treated with that attention to which in a time of warfare they are entitled to, and more particularly at a juncture and on an occaſion like the preſent, which called for their exerciſe and interpoſition. I wiſh nevertheleſs to reſt the judgment to be formed of my conduct, and the conduct of the other parties, who have had either an executive or deliberative ſhare in the management of public affairs, upon our own evident neceſſities, which it muſt be confeſſed were too alarming to juſtify any meaſures that could delay the much wanted cure of all our diſtreſſes, a Maratta peace. Although I ever conſidered the policy of warring againſt the Maratta State a moſt ruinous one to the intereſts both of the Company and the Engliſh nation; ſtill on the eve of your late ſucceſs, if we had no other Power to combat againſt, I might have ſubſcribed to the plan you adviſed me, as laid down for the operations of your campaign, as the moſt likely to procure us honourable terms of accommodation; but engaged as we are in a ſcene of contention, I may ſay with every power of any conſideration in *India*, all ſteps, the event of which could not be clearly aſcertained as an unfailing remedy, muſt be exceptionable. By proſecuting the war our difficulties muſt be increaſed, and the proſpect of obtaining peace become daily more diſtant. Our reſources, anticipated by the current demands of our military eſtabliſhment, in which they are unequal, and burthened with a heavy debt, cannot long ſupport the preſent ſyſtem. I muſt therefore impoſe it upon you as a duty you owe your king, your country, and your employers, to leave no means which may depend upon you, untried, to effect a peace with the Marattas, and which may enable you ſpeedily to carry into execution my orders for entering and creating a powerful diverſion in *Hyder Ally*'s country on the Malabar ſide.

P. S. I think it neceſſary to inform you I have received information, that *Hyder Ally Cawn* is uſing every means in his power to defeat our views of peace with the Marattas, and has even carried his intrigue ſo far as to authorize *Ragonaut Row* to employ his credit in the expenditure of whatever ſums he may find neceſſary to that end. Appendix. No. 376. A.

Extract of *Bombay* Diary, the 15th April 1781.

Letter from Sir *Eyre Coote* to the Preſident and Seleſt Committee of *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

By letters which I have received from Brigadier General *Goddard*, I have had the pleaſure to be informed of the ſurrender of the important fortreſs of *Baſſein* to our arms on the 11th December; on which event permit me to congratulate you.

Although I have not been honoured with any reply to my letter November, theſe letters alſo ſufficiently inform me of your having been made acquainted with my earneſt deſire of the troops under Brigadier General *Goddard*'s command, being employed againſt the poſſeſſions of *Hyder Ally*, of my reaſons for expreſſing that deſire; and in order that he might do ſo to the beſt advantage, of my anxious wiſh to ſee an accommodation take place between the Marattas. By the ſame letters it alſo appears, that you were in poſſeſſion of the terms of the treaty offered to them by the Supreme Council, and of their deliberations thereon, conſequently you were poſſeſſed of every material and authority neceſſary to aſſiſt and ſanctify your councils, which it gives me concern to find ſhould have terminated in a reſolution to proſecute hoſtilities againſt the Marattas.

What are the grounds upon which this reſolution was taken, and its neceſſity evinced, it is impoſſible I ſhould know without having ſeen your proceedings; of this however I am certain, that if to enable us to direct our whole force againſt *Hyder Ally* it was neceſſary to make peace with the Marattas, even upon their own terms, it would have been according to what I am fully convinced ought not to be put in competition with the riſk which is now run by proſecuting the war, and would in the preſent ſituation of affairs, which is truly a deſperate one, been a much better policy, and in the end, have terminated more to the advantage of the Company and the nation, than that which has been adopted, and which nothing but a ſucceſſion of the moſt fortuitous circumſtances can poſſibly bring to a happy concluſion. The deliberations of the Governor General and Council on the ſubject of peace with the Marattas, gave a latitude for a ceſſation of hoſtilities, but I cannot gather from the letters I have received from Brigadier General *Goddard*, that any endeavours have been exerted to that end, which certainly, circumſtanced as we are, was an object at leaſt to have been purſued, if we had failed in the accompliſhment of it.

For your further information, I encloſe you a copy of my letter to General *Goddard*, and leſt the original may miſcarry, as all land conveyances are now become very precarious, I beg you will tranſmit him a copy of it.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Eyre Coote.

Camp, *Newtown*,
2d March 1781.

APPENDIX, No. 376. A.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Seleſt Committee at *Bombay*, to General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B. dated 26th April 1781.

IN our letter of the 15th of February, by the *Indus*, we fully explained our motives for recommending to

Appendix. No. 376. B.

General *Goddard* a vigorous proſecution of the war againſt the Marattas; which we thought the moſt probable and rational method of bringing them to terms, neither had we in that caſe any room for deliberation, our line of conduct being diſtinctly marked out by the Governor General and Council, who after acquainting us, that they had offered terms to the Maratta Government, direct us on receipt of a certain requiſition and notification from the Peiſhwa, immediately to ſuſpend all hoſtilities and military operations; but in the mean time, and until the receipt of ſuch requiſition or notification, they earneſtly recommended a vigorous proſecution of the war, ſo far as our troops were engaged in it, and acquainted us that a ſimilar order had been ſent to General *Goddard*.

We are convinced of the neceſſity, and ſincerely deſirous of bringing the Maratta war to a concluſion; but it is not becauſe we are deſirous of peace, or that peace is neceſſary to our affairs, that will prove arguments with the enemy for conſenting to an accommodation; and until that happens it would be as impracticable and as unſafe for us to employ the army againſt the poſſeſſions of *Hyder Ally*, as it would be for you to make a diverſion in our favour againſt the Marattas: in this ſituation we have done the utmoſt in our power for the common cauſe. We have reduced the war on our part as nearly as poſſible to a mere ſyſtem of defence, and determined to ſend back all the Madras troops ſerving on this coaſt, in order to make the army under your command more reſpectable and formidable, and thereby to diſtreſs *Hyder* to the utmoſt degree that lay within our power.

It is not to be doubted but that the Marattas and *Hyder* are bound by mutual engagements, which we may conclude they will abide by ſo long as they may find it for their intereſt or ſafety. Proviſion muſt therefore be made to reſiſt the attempts of both theſe Powers until one or other can be detached from their engagements, or be effectually depreſſed; and it now appears to us that we can only expect this criſis from the event of your operations againſt *Hyder*, which we have ſanguine hopes will be attended with the moſt deciſive ſucceſs, and that *Hyder* himſelf will be inclined to peace now he finds himſelf diſappointed in his hopes of aſſiſtance from the French. We then might hope to bring the Marattas to terms, which it has appeared the offers from *Bengal* have not been able to effect; though, as we have already mentioned in our letter, dated the 6th March, General *Goddard*, in conſequence of our recommendation, ſent a copy of the articles directly from himſelf to the Miniſter, who had affected ignorance of their contents.

We have encloſed a copy of the anſwer the General received from the Miniſter, wherein he evidently alludes to, and acknowledges engagements with *Hyder Ally*, and in direct terms refuſes to accede to the offers.

We have advices, which we believe very authentic, of *Hyder* having ſuſtained a very material loſs by the blowing up of his magazine and powder works at *Bednare*, on the 2d or 3d of laſt month.

No. 376. B.

The Requeſts of the Nabob *Wallah Jah* from the Governor General.

1. Let a treaty be firmly eſtabliſhed between us, which may laſt for ever and be ſubject to no deviation.

2. I am hereditary Prince of the *Carnatic*, and of Balla Ghauts under *Peanghaut*, and am independent of every one, and I have entire right and authority over my country, my children, my family, my ſervants, and ſubjects, and have power in the political and domeſtic adminiſtration of my country. This ought to be altogether dependant on me, and let not my friends interfere in it.

3. As the Company and Engliſh nation are the protectors of my honour and government, they will act in thoſe points only where the advancement of my intereſts is concerned.

4. Ten battalions of well-diſciplined troops are ſtationed by me with the Company, and are paid by me; let them take nothing from me, except the pay of them, and let all the contingent expences, the batta for their marches, and the repairs of the forts, be by my conſent; and let the accounts of every three months be punctually delivered to me within the ſixth month: when peace ſhall be reſtored, I will diſcharge the amount regularly, and let the Governor and Council of *Madras* give me a full receipt, and in time of peace, let them aſſiſt me with thoſe ten battalions, that I may ſettle the country ſubject to me, and derive ſome advantage from the expence.

5. Many Polygars, notwithſtanding that they have met with the greateſt favour from me in time of peace, have, from their ambitious and rebellious views, joined my enemy *Hyder Ally*, and began open war; I can therefore never place any reliance upon them or look upon them as deſerving of favour. In this caſe, my ſubjects are to be kept in awe by the puniſhment of theſe people; for which aſſiſtance is neceſſary.

6. After peace and alliance is made between us and the Engliſh Company, the enemies, the ſecurity, and the dangers of both will be the ſame; that is to ſay, whoever of us ſuffers an injury it will be felt by both of us. I therefore wiſh that the Engliſh in *India*, or the King of *Great Britain*, would make a treaty of peace with the King of *France*, and let the peace and ſecurity of the *Carnatic*, and the rights of my Government, without the connection of any one, and my power to appoint a ſucceſſor in the *Carnatic*, be ſettled in a ſolid manner, and included in the treaty.

7. In the garriſons of my forts, Commandants and Paymaſters are ſent, who at the advice of their Dabpaſh's, with a view to profit, lend money to the Ryots at an exorbitant intereſt, and afterwards are preſſing for the money, and interfere in the Government, and aſſiſt one another, by which great injury is done to my ſubjects and to myſelf: let it be poſitively ordered, that without my permiſſion no one lend money to my ſubjects, and that for what is paſt as well as future the intereſt on all loans be 12 per cent. per annum, and that if any perſon ſhould act contrary to this, and ſhould diſtreſs the Ryots, I ſhall complain againſt him, and requeſt his removal: and the Governor and Council of *Madras* will remove him from his office, and appoint another perſon in his room.

8. My conſtant wiſh has been to diſcharge the money due to the troops ſtationed by the Company, and I have always exerted myſelf for this purpoſe; from the commencement of my connection I have paid very conſiderable ſums on this account, and on the day that *Hyder* invaded the *Carnatic* I owed the Governor and Council of *Madras* leſs than one lack of pagodas, which I was in hopes of diſcharging by receiving bills from the bankers in the country; when in the mean while the attack of our enemy began, and inſtead of paying the balance in money to the Company, provided in my country a greater amount than that in rice and bullocks and ſheep for the army, beſides the ſtores in my forts, of which there is a large ſupply in *Trichinopoly*, and a leſs quantity in *Velore*, &c. and what was in thoſe forts which our enemy has taken is in his poſſeſſion; had not my bad deſtiny produced many obſtacles, there is no doubt but at this time I ſhould not have been indebted one ſingle pagoda to the Company. Of ſeveral Talooks of the *Carnatic*, which are ſtill ſecure from our enemy, the collections are included in the accounts of the Company, but ſome Talooks are aſſigned to my creditors, and ſome I have received the Paiſhgall in advance; for whatever is collected from thoſe Mahls, let it be expended for the Company; but for the ſatisfaction of my creditors, my friends muſt be juſt; as ſoon as the enemy ſhall have left my country, let the collections of thoſe

Talooks be given to my creditors in order to pay off their principals agreeable to my engagements with them.

9. For ſeveral reaſons, and from the invaſion of my enemy, which are not unknown to my friends, I am greatly diſtreſſed, and my ſubjects are not in a ſtate to ſuffer me to have any hopes from them. With my exertions and endeavours alone, it is difficult to adjuſt my concerns; it is neceſſary that my friends ſhould be juſt and favourable to me, and ſhould aſſiſt me in this manner, by giving into my hands, after the defeat of our enemy, the Talook of *Herpah* and *Zurghaut*, and ſeveral Mahls in *Ballaghaut*, belonging to *Carnatic Peanghaut*, which are in my country, and are my right; and I will maintain in my ſervice 5,000 well-diſciplined horſe for the collection of it.

10. The Talooks of *Tanjore*, which are my right, I, at a conſiderable expence, conformably to the rules and practice of *Hindoſtan*, took poſſeſſion of; in this my friends aſſiſted me, for which I returned them thanks; ſince that they have, at the ſole inſtigation of ſelf-intereſted people, taken it from me by force, which has brought great damage to me, my ſubjects, and creditors: to this time ſuch is the ſituation. Numbers of my creditors are Engliſhmen, which is not unknown to you, as I have repeatedly written to you. From that time my right has been given up to a Ryot of mine, but no advantage has accrued from it to the Company's concerns; but on the contrary, he has connected himſelf ſtrictly with *Hyder Ally* and the Marattas, and has refuſed to ſupply money and ſtores, but keeps all his money in *Negapatam*, a Dutch ſettlement. If my friends would act juſtly, and give the Talook to me, great advantage would be derived to the Company's and my affairs, and the views of our enemies would be counteracted: otherwiſe let the whole collections of *Tanjore* be appropriated to the payment of the Carnatic army, my public and private debts, and the expulſion of our enemy. *Tanjore* is a Talook of the *Carnatic*, and let a ſhare of it be aſſigned to my creditors, that they may be quieted and pacified in ſome degree till my friends in *England* ſhall have done me juſtice, and let the Governor General and Council, conformably to their juſtice and greatneſs, write about this matter, which is my right.

The Governor General and Council have the adminiſtration of the affairs of *India*; if the inquiry into this matter depends on the gentlemen in *Europe*, it is for the general advantage that they ſhould write about it. I am the friend of the Company: the great weight of debts, the mortgaging my jewels, and the ſale of them, have brought on me a diſgrace and diſtreſs which the Company never meant to come upon their old friend.

11. Beſides the expences of the Company, the pay of my troops, the native bankers, my creditors, the Hindoo and Muſſulmen ſecurities, I am indebted about 70 lacks of pagodas to European creditors, both old and new; and people living under the protection of the Company; reflect on the payment of ſuch large ſums. I am plunged into a ſea of diſtreſs. Except from the aſſiſtance of my friends, I can ſee no releaſe from this heavy load, that having eſcaped from ſuch anxiety might apply myſelf to the cultivation of the country and the protection of the Ryots. I therefore beg your advice and ſentiments on this point, which I requeſt you to give in ſuch a manner as no injury may ariſe to my concerns and reputation, no detriment to my creditors, and no loſs to the Company.

A true copy,
E. Hay,
Acts Secr.

Replies from the Honourable the Governor General and Council to the Requeſts of the Nabob *Wallah Jah*.

1 A temporary treaty ſhall be made, ſubject to the reviſion and approbation of the Company, and it is hoped this may ſerve as the baſis of another treaty, to be concluded under the orders and inſtructions of the Company, and even with the ſanction of the Engliſh Parliament, which may endure for ever, and rendered ſo binding, that it ſhall not be in the power of any individual to break it, or to depart from it. Appendix. No. 376. E.

2. The right and authority which the Nabob poſſeſſes over his country, his children, his family, his ſervants, and ſubjects, in all the political and domeſtic adminiſtration of his country, we will maintain and ſupport.

3. Certainly.

4. Both the pay of theſe troops and their batta and contingent expences, and even the repairs of the forts, if any repairs are neceſſary, ought undoubtedly to be charged to the Nabob's account, becauſe theſe are expences incurred for his own immediate ſervice; and in the time of war muſt depend upon the Commander in Chief of the forces, under the cuſtomary regulations, and reſtrictions. The remainder of this article is very proper; but it ſeems ſtrange to us that a claim ſhould be made of this kind, or any doubts implied concerning it.

5. The Nabob is the maſter of his own country, and the diſtributer of juſtice to his own ſubjects. This is ſo clear that it appears as if ſomething more was meant than is expreſſed in the propoſition.

6. In whatever treaty ſhall be concluded between the Nabob and the Company, it will of courſe be ſtipulated, that the friends or enemies of either party ſhould be held as equally the friends or enemies of the other, and their intereſt, their ſafety, and their danger the ſame. Such has been the implied condition of the alliance hitherto ſubſiſting between the Nabob and the Company, although unſupported by any written engagements. Reſpecting the latter claim of this article, we are informed by *Aſſam Cawn*, the Nabob's Dewan, that the Nabob poſſeſſes letters from the Company, the King's Miniſter, and the King himſelf, on the ſubject of his will; and he has produced copies of thoſe from the King and from the Company, which all expreſs a clear acknowledgment of the Nabob's right to appoint a ſucceſſor to the Government of the *Carnatic*. It is therefore unneceſſary, and would be unbecoming in this Government to make any proviſion, even in a temporary treaty for ſuch event, which we hope is far diſtant. Such acknowledgments are equivalent to treaties, and of the higheſt poſſible authority; and muſt be binding on all the ſervants of the Company, and on all the King's ſubjects.

7. We are greatly afflicted that any occaſion ſhould have been afforded for ſuch complaints as are ſtated in this article; they are no leſs repugnant to juſtice, than injurious to the Engliſh reputation. We are willing to engage on the part of the Engliſh Company, and of all their dependants, that no one under their authority ſhall be permitted to lend money to any of the Nabob's ſubjects for the time to come: that it ſhall be prohibited in public orders. And it is equitable, that if any perſon ſhall act contrary to this prohibition, or ſhall oppreſs the Ryots, the Nabob ſhall have a right to require his removal: and that the Governor and Council of *Madras* ſhall be bound in ſuch requiſition to remove him, and to bring him to a public trial, that he may ſuffer ſuch ſentence as ſhall be due to the degree of the offence, if it ſhall be eſtabliſhed againſt him. But as we conceive that it will be often difficult in caſes of this nature to obtain ſuch evidence of the facts as the ſtrict forms of our military laws require, and muſt in every caſe render the Nabob popularly obnoxious, by ſtanding forth as he neceſſarily muſt, in the character of a proſecutor, againſt the ſervants of the Company, to whom he ought never to be known but by acts of benevolence; and as the appointment to military commands in his country is intended for his ſole benefit and the ſupport of his Government and intereſts; we proceed yet further to declare, that the Nabob has a juſt claim to object to the appointment of any

Appendix. No. 376. B.

any perſon of whom he ſhall diſapprove, to any command in his country, or to the continuance of any perſon in ſuch command, againſt whom he ſhall have cauſe of ſufficient validity for his own conviction to object; and that in every ſuch caſe the Governor and Council ought to conform to his opinions: but the invariable application of this rule can only be admitted in a time of peace. In a ſtate of actual war it might be productive of dangerous conſequences, and the principle on which it is conſtructed muſt be therefore in ſuch a ſeaſon left to the equity of the Governor and Council, and the diſcretion of the Commander in Chief of the forces.

8. This is juſt. Let the Nabob conſent and engage to aſſign all the revenues of his country during the war, without any exception, to the Company, for the actual ſupport of the war. Let the collections and their aſſignments be made by his own Aumils, in conjunction with perſons appointed by the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, and inveſted with an authority from him to receive from the Aumils all the money which ſhall be collected, and to intercept and ſeize all ſums of money which the Aumils or others ſhall attempt to ſecrete from the diſtricts under their juriſdiction, that the whole may be applied and excluſively appropriated to the ſervice of the war, excepting ſuch ſums as the Nabob ſhall require to be paid immediately to himſelf for his and the neceſſary diſburſements of his country: that he will remove and puniſh ſuch of his Aumils as ſhall attempt to elude this regulation; and that the perſons as above mentioned appointed to receive the revenues, as the pledge of their integrity ſhall be required to ſwear that they will be true to the truſt repoſed in them, and that they will neither receive nor permit to be taken, either directly or indirectly, any portion of the revenues but ſuch as they ſhall bring to a public account. That of ſuch Talooks as have been aſſigned to the Nabob's creditors, the nett ſums of the collections ſhall be received into the Company's treaſury for the ſervice of the war, as above provided, but carried to the credit of the collective head of the Nabob's creditors, to whom they have been aſſigned, to be hereafter diſtributed amongſt them according to their reſpective claims. By this arrangement the reſources of the Carnatic will be applied, as they ought to be, to its immediate defence and preſervation, and the Nabob's faith and the rights of the creditors will be ſecured: and this is agreeable to the requeſt which the creditors themſelves have formerly made.

9. The recovery of the *Carnatic* from the hands of the enemy muſt be our firſt object; that of its dependencies will be ſecond: but it will reſt upon our ability. It cannot be made a fixed article of a treaty, the purpoſe for which the propoſed annexations of *Curkapah* and *Zeer Ghaut Gutti*, and the ſeveral mahals in *Balaghaut*, which belong to *Carnatic Payen-ghaut*, is profeſſed to be intended, is equally neceſſary for the ſervice of the Nabob and of the Company: and the future ſecurity of their common intereſts; and therefore muſt be equally the deſire of both.

10. This Government has no authority to inquire into the reciprocal claims of the Nabob and the Rajah of *Tanjore*; theſe are before a higher and a competent tribunal. We can only require that as the Zemindary of *Tanjore* is a member of the ſoubah or province of *Carnatic*, its reſources ſhall in like manner be primarily, and at this time of common danger, be excluſively applied to the maintenance of the forces employed in the defence and preſervation of the whole: that the revenues be taken in aſſignment and put under a commiſſion, ſimilar to that propoſed for the reſt of the *Carnatic*, and received and applied in the ſame manner, and for the ſame purpoſes. This requiſition has been partly made, and ſhall be repeated in the above terms to the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*; but it will reſt with them to conform to it, or by rejecting it to take the reſponſibility of it upon themſelves.

11. Our advice is this, that a new adjuſtment be made of all the Nabob's debts; contracted with Britiſh ſubjects, without any diſtinction of old debts; of thoſe of a more recent kind, called his conſolidated debts; or of others newly contracted, but not yet brought to any public account or adjuſtment: that the intereſt upon the whole and each debt ſhall be allowed and added to the original debt, to the 25th November 1781, and thenceforward ſhall ceaſe: that from ſuch debts as have been transferred from the original proprietors, by purchaſe or otherwiſe, a deduction ſhall be made of 25 per cent. from the whole amount: and the remainder be the ſum for which the Nabob ſhall be finally debited: that the adjuſtment being made in this manner, the ſum adjuſted to be reſpectively due to each creditor, ſhall be brought to his ſeparate credit: that Company's bonds, with the uſual intereſt, ſhall be granted to each who ſhall be entitled to a ſhare in the ſums received on account of the aſſigned revenues in the proportion of his reſpective debt: and in like manner to the creditors for advances made on the ſecurity of the public revenue for the ſums brought to their account; and that it ſhall be left to the Nabob, with the concurrence of the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, and the ſanction of the Governor General and Council, to appropriate ſuch a portion of the revenues after the concluſion of the war, or any period of it, which ſhall admit of ſuch an application of them, as an aſſignment for the annual payment of the debt, until the whole ſhall be diſcharged: that this plan is recommended, both to the Nabob, the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George* and the creditors, and will be ſubmitted to the Company in the firſt advices to them from the Preſidency.

If an agreement ſhall take place according to the above-mentioned plan, it will be neceſſary, both for the purpoſe of rendering it effectual, and for preventing the like diſtreſſes from falling on the Nabob and Individuals in future, that the Nabob ſhall ſolemnly engage that he will never hereafter borrow money from the Company's ſervants, or any other Britiſh ſubjects; that the moſt public notice ſhall be given, that no loans to the Nabob, or bonds accepted upon ſuch loans, ſhall be valid, or the loans recoverable by any influence or interference of the Company or its repreſentatives: and the Governor General and Council will engage on their part, for themſelves, the Company, and their repreſentatives, that no authority of the Company, or of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, ſhall be employed for the recovery of any debts ſo contracted.

A true Copy.
E. Hay,
Acts Sec^y.

APPENDIX, No. 377.

APPENDIX,

ESTIMATE of the Probable RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS

Dr.

To Receipts, which are expected to take place in the following Departments, within the 30th April 1780 and the 1st May 1781.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil.

Draughts on Europe for Lord Clive's Jaghire			2,58,631	2	—			
Certificates to the Commanders and Officers of the freighted Ships, 10 Ships, at £.8,000 each			7,68,000	—	—			
						10,26,631	2	—
Calcutta Customs, as in 1778-9						3,25,763	15	3
Mint Duties, as in 1778-9						71,956	10	6
Collections in the Postmaster General's Department, as in 1778-9						55,087	—	3
Collections of Chandernagore						18,560	—	—
Rajah Cheyte Sing's Tribute for one Year						25,77,224	5	3
							40,75,223	1 3

Military.

Army Subsidy from the Nabob Asoph-ul-Dowlah - C. S^a R^s	31,20,000	—	—					
Batta 11 per Cent.	3,43,200	—	—					
				34,63,200	—	—		
Amount of the estimated Expences of the Detachments from the different Brigades serving in his Dominions				32,78,241	4	1		
						67,41,441	4	1
Rajah Cheyte Sing's Subsidy for defraying the extra Expences of the War - - - B^a S^a R^s	5,00,000	—	—					
Batta at 9. 1. o½ per Cent.	45,325	8	4					
						5,45,325	8	4
Sales of Military Stores, as in 1778-9						6,574	7	—
Amount to be received from Mr. Robert Stewart, for the Sale of the Powder Works						24,000	—	—
							73,17,341	3 5

Marine.

Amount Sales of Marine Stores, as in 1778-9							30,947	13 6
								1,14,23,512 2 2

REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

Receipts of Revenue expected from the following Divisions, as in 1778-9.

Khalsah				1,66,283	14	10		
Provincial Council of Revenue of Burdwan				43,02,257	9	14		
Provincial Council of Revenue of Dacca				29,90,495	12	1		
Provincial Council of Revenue of Dinagepore				24,09,053	4	19		
Provincial Council of Revenue of Moorshedabad				35,72,376	5	7	1	
Provincial Council of Revenue of Patna				34,27,340	5	15		
Calcutta Committee of Revenue				38,21,460	8	2	3	
Collector of Boglepore				3,14,623	11	18	3	
Collector of Chittagong				5,98,651	6	11		
Collector of Futteh Sing				88,875	—	—		
Collector of Jungleterry				49,293	11	1	3	
Collector of Midnapore and Jellafore				4,19,927	9	15		
Collector of Rajemehal				1,08,366	14	9		
Collector of Ramgur				79,823	3	16	3	
Collector of Rungpore				6,79,243	10	5		
Collector of Silburris				2,04,524	15	3	3	
Collector of Silhet				1,73,762	6	2	1	
Collector of Sircar Saran				5,95,519	15	16	3	
						2,40,01,880	5	8 1
Batta 16 per Cent.						38,40,300	13	13 1
							2,78,42,181	3 1

GOVERNMENT CUSTOMS.

Collector of Government Customs at Calcutta				6,61,732	4	5		
Collector of Government Customs at Chittagong				2,717	12	16	3	
Collector of Government Customs at Dacca				1,65,859	14	12	2	
Collector of Government Customs at Houghley				45,677	6	8		
Collector of Government Customs at Moorshedabad				1,39,035	9	8		
Collector of Government Customs at Patna				1,98,661	5	—		
						12,13,684	4	10 1
Batta 16 per Cent.						1,94,189	7	15 1
							14,07,873	12 3
								2,92,50054 15 4

Carried forward - - - - 4,06,73,567 1 6

No. 377.

of the Bengal Government, within the 30th April 1780 and the 1st May 1781.

Cr.

By Disbursements, which are expected to take place as the following Departments, within the 30th April 1780 and 1st May 1781.

GENERAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil.

Sundry Charges disbursed by the Buxey in in 1778-9			8,32,214	15	—
Account Salary		D°	7,28,634	11	1
Charges Durbar		D°	2,34,968	—	2
Secret Services		D°	17,220	—	—
Mint		D°	74,934	14	—
Custom House		D°	61,085	8	—
Post Office		D°	1,61,356	4	11
Resident at the Vizier's Court		D°	57,063	4	10
Buxey Khaneh Charges at Chittagong		D°	4,636	4	1
Proportion of the Surgeon General's Contract for Hospital Expences, chargeable to the Civil Department			81,415	—	—
Commissary for the Effects taken from the French, as in 1778-9			1,06,523	13	4
Collector of Chandernagore		D°	4,619	12	11
Civil Buildings		D°	23,677	8	8
				23,88,350	1 —

Supreme Court of Judicature.

Salaries to the Judges and Officers of the Court, and other contingent Charges, as in 1778-9			4,83,122	10	6
Charges Law Suits		D°	67,983	7	6
Estimated Amount of what may be required to complete the New Jail			50,000	—	—
				6,01,106	2 —
					29,89,456 3 —

Military.

Paymasters to the Army, as estimated by the Commissary General.

Troops stationed within the Provinces, and at Khorah	1,12,83,280	3	5		
Troops serving in the Vizier's Dominions	32,78,241	4	1		
			1,45,61,521	7	6
General Goddard's Detachment	36,27,518	4	9		
Captain Popham's D°	11,73,743	12	2		
Deduct Disbursements on Account of the Detachment from Bombay, serving with General Goddard	48,01,262	—	11		
	3,09,570	1	11		
			44,91,691	15	—
				1,90,53,213	6 6
Military Storekeeper's Disbursements, as in 1778-9				8,87,728	13 —
Agent Victualler of the Garrison		D°		2,08,479	15 3

Disbursements on Account of the Fortifications and Military Buildings, as in 1778-9.

New Fort	9,14,812	2	6		
Budge Budge	1,28,385	5	3		
Mannicolly Fort	22,173	8	—		
Chunar	1,443	—	—		
Hospital	7,303	12	8		
Burhampore Cantonments	45,260	9	10		
Dinapore Cantonments	1,18,296	15	1		
Monghyr Fort	14,415	—	3		
			12,52,090	5	7
Engineer's Stores purchased	68,908,12	3			
Deduct, Amount of Stores sold	21,308	12	—		
			47,600	—	3
				12,99,690	5 10
					2,14,49,112 8 7

Marine.

At the Presidency.

Marine Contractor	per Mensem		28,721	10	8
Yacht D°	D°		1,674	—	—
Amazon Snow	D°		2,991	5	1
Caranjah Schooner's Abstract	D°		145	12	9
Nancy Ketch, estimated at	D°		3,000	—	—
Contingencies D°	D°		5,000	—	—
			40,632	12	6
	per Annum			4,87,593	6 —
Naval Storekeeper's Charges, as in 1778-9				8,992	7 3
				4,96,585	13 3

At Chittagong.

Captain Forde's Contract				33,000	— —
					5,29,585 13 3
					2,49,68,154 8 10
Carried forward					2,49,68,154 8 10

Dr

To Receipts - - - - - - - - - Brought forward			4,06,73,567 1 6
COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT.			
Receipts expected, as per their Eſtimate, of the probable Receipts and Diſburſements of their Department, within the 30th April 1780 and the 1ſt May 1781.			
Import Sales - - - - - - - - - - - -		13,00,000 — —	
Ophium - - - - - - - - - - - -		10,00,000 — —	
Salt - - - - - - - - - - - -		3,87,040 9 3	
		26,87,940 9 3	
			4,33,61,507 10 9
To Exceſs of Diſburſements - - - - - - - - -			27,28,778 4 9
Current Rupees - -			4,60,90,285 15 6

Fort William,
Accountant General's Office,
the 1ſt March 1780.

Cr.

By Diſburſements. Brought forward 2,49,68,134 8 10

REVENUE DEPARTMENT.

Charges of the following Diviſions, as in 1778-9.

Khalſa	4,00,623 15 —		
Provincial Council of Revenue of Burdwan	7,15,674 5 —		
Provincial Council of Revenue of Dacca	3,85,005 2 7 3		
Provincial Council of Revenue of Dinagepore	2,35,206 4 18 3		
Provincial Council of Revenue of Moorſhedabad	10,15,077 12 5		
Provincial Council of Revenue of Patna	3,57,604 14 10		
Calcutta Committee of Revenue	6,65,712 9 4 1		
Collector of Boglepore	82,219 11 3 1		
Collector of Chittagong	89,690 8 15 1		
Collector of Futteh Sing	23,481 10 13		
Collector of Jungleterry	11,651 3 —		
Collector of Midnapore	50,368 1 18		
Collector of Rajemehal	25,511 8 15		
Collector of Ramgur	39,803 12 5		
Collector of Rungpore	1,10,690 — 7		
Collector of Silhurris	13,650 — —		
Collector of Silhet	28,260 10 3		
Collector of Sircar Sarun	47,413 12 5		
		42,97,645 14 8	
Batta 16 per Cent.		6,87,623 5 10	
			49,85,269 3 11

GOVERNMENT CUSTOMS.

Charges of the following, as in 1778-9.

Board of Cuſtoms	15,632 6 —		
Collector of Government Cuſtoms at Calcutta	73,386 1 10		
Collector of Government Cuſtoms at Chittagong	1,092 — —		
Collector of Government Cuſtoms at Dacca	18,588 8 —		
Collector of Government Cuſtoms at Houghly	16,817 13 8		
Collector of Government Cuſtoms at Moorſhedabad	28,868 1 19		
Collector of Government Cuſtoms at Patna	31,207 15 —		
		1,85,592 13 17	
Batta 16 per Cent.		29,694 13 14 3	
			2,15,287 11 7

DURBAR DEPARTMENT, at Moorſhedabad.

Stipends and Allowances, as in 1778-9	24,60,568 2 17 1		
Sundry Charges D°	65,001 9 2 2		
		25,25,569 11 19 3	
Batta 16 per Cent.		4,04,091 2 11 1	
			29,29,660 14 7
Lord Clive's Jaghire for one Year			2,58,631 2 —
Commiſſion on the Revenues			1,16,892 5 6
			85,05,741 5 7

Extraordinary Diſburſements, as in 1778-9.

Profit and Loſs		49,143 15 2 2	
Salt Advances and Charges		9,579 12 12	
Salt Petre Advances and Charges		5,3,817 13 10	
Opium Advances and Charges		7,61,851 8 12 1	
Chowkey Bundy		33,227 14 6 1	
Elephants at Selket		7,128 13 1	
Tuckavy		28,414 — 9	
		9,45,163 13 13	
Batta 16 per Cent.		1,51,226 3 9 1	
			10,96,390 1 1
			96,02,131 6 8
			3,45,70,283 15 6

By Extraordinary Diſburſements.

COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT.

Amount to be advanced to the Board of Trade in 1780-1			1,00,00,000 — —
Supplies to other Preſidencies			
Bombay			15,00,000 — —
St. Helena			20,000 — —
			15,20,000 — —
			1,15,20,000 — —
			Current Rupees 4,60,90,285 15 6

Errors excepted.

Wm Larkin, Accountant General.

AT a Court of Directors of The United *East*

William Mills, Junior, Esquire,

ESTIMATE of Probable RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS of

Dr

To Receipts,					
Resources.					
GENERAL DEPARTMENT.					
Civil.					
Calcutta Customs		4,15,000 — —			
Mint Duties		25,000 — —			
Postage		61,000 — —			
Rajah Cheyt Sing's tribute		25,77,000 — —			
			30,78,000 — —		
Military.					
Army subsidy from the Nabob Aloph-ul-Dowlah	34,63,000 — —				
Amount to be received from him, for the pay, &c. of troops employed for the defence of his dominions, not guaranteed by treaty	37,75,000 — —				
		72,38,000 — —			
Rajah Cheyt Sing's subsidy		5,45,000 — —			
			77,83,000 — —		
				1,08,61,000 — —	
REVENUE DEPARTMENT.					
Land Revenues			2,42,52,000 — —		
Government Customs			11,32,000 — —		
		Sa Rs	2,53,84,000 — —		
		Batta 16 per Cent.	40,61,440 — —		
				2,94,45,440 — —	
					4,03,06,440 — —
Extraordinary Receipts.					
GENERAL DEPARTMENT.					
Civil.					
Collections of Chandernagore		19,000 — —			
Drafts on Europe		10,00,000 — —			
			10,19,000 — —		
Military.					
Sales of military stores		42,000 — —			
To be received for the sale of the powder works		24,000 — —			
			66,000 — —		
Marine.					
Sales of naval stores			19,000 — —		
				11,04,000 — —	
REVENUE DEPARTMENT.					
Opium sales			11,48,000 — —		
Salt			9,68,000 — —		
		Sa Rs	21,16,000 — —		
		Batta 16 per Cent.	3,38,560 — —		
				24,54,560 — —	
COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT.					
Import sales				14,28,000 — —	
					49,86,560 — —
					4,52,93,000 — —
				Current Rupees	4,52,93,000 — —

Fort William,
Accountant General's Office, the 13th January 1781.

India Company, held the 20th March 1782;

delivered in a Paper, intituled,

the BENGAL GOVERNMENT, between the 30th April 1781 and the 1ſt May 1782, *viz.*

				C.
By Diſburſements.				
Charges.				
GENERAL DEPARTMENT.				
Civil.				
Civil Charges	25,19,000 — —			
Supreme Court	4,89,000 — —			
Law Suits	1,43,000 — —			
	6,32,000 — —			
		31,51,000 — —		
Military.				
Pay, &c. for the troops, as eſtimated by the Military Paymaſter General, troops within the provinces, and at Cawnpore	98,00,000 — —			
D° maintained for the defence of the Nabob's dominions, not guaranteed by treaty	87,75,000 — —			
D° with General Goddard	24,42,000 — —			
D° with Major Camac	19,47,000 — —			
D° with Colonel Pearſe	10,76,000 — —			
D° with General Coote	7,20,000 — —			
	2,06,60,000 — —			
Military Storekeepers Diſburſements, as in 1779-80	7,91,000 — —			
Agent Victualler of the garriſon	1,30,000 — —			
Military buildings, &c.				
At the Preſidency 4,20,000 — —				
Dinapore and Burrampore 1,11,000 — —				
	5,31,000 — —			
		2,21,12,000 — —		
Marine.				
Preſidency	4,41,000 — —			
Chittagong	41,000 — —			
		4,82,000 — —		
			2,57,43,000 — —	
REVENUE DEPARTMENT.				
Charges of collecting the Land Revenues		42,76,000 — —		
—— —— the Government Cuſtoms		2,04,000 — —		
Commiſſion on the Revenues		93,000 — —		
Lord Clive's Jaghire		2,23,000 — —		
D° of the Durbar Department at Moorſhedabad		21,29,000 — —		
Sa Rs		69,25,000 — —		
Batta 16 per Cent.		11,88,000 — —		
			80,33,000 — —	
Extraordinary Diſburſements.				3,37,78,000 — —
GENERAL DEPARTMENT.				
Civil.				
Collector of Chandernagore		11,000 — —		
Commiſſary of the effects taken from the French		76,000 — —		
Intereſt on money borrowed		7,00,000 — —		
			7,87,000 — —	
REVENUE DEPARTMENT.				
Profit and Loſs		5,000 — —		
Salt Petre advances		18,000 — —		
Opium		7,90,000 — —		
Chunkey Bundy		3,000 — —		
Elephants		2,000 — —		
Sa Rs		8,18,000 — —		
Batta 16 per Cent.		1,30,880 — —		
			9,48,880 — —	
Supplies to the other Preſidencies.				
Bombay		15,00,000 — —		
Bencoolen		2,00,000 — —		
St. Helena		30,000 — —		
Madras requires 84 lacks, but the utmoſt that can be afforded from theſe funds is		67,21,120 — —		
			84,51,120 — —	
COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT.				
Import ſales, which they will probably withhold			14,28,000 — —	
				1,15,15,000 — —
				4,52,93,000 — —
				Current Rupees - 4,52,93,000 — —

Errors excepted.

(Signed) *Wm Larkins*, Accountant General.

Appendix. Nos. 378 & 379.

APPENDIX, No. 378.

BY a Statement laid before the Board by the Governor General, the 5th July 1779, it appeared that the expences of General *Goddard*'s detachment from May 1778 to April 1779, amounted to - - - - - - - - - - - - Cur^t R^s 28,02,509 15 10

The letter from the Governor General and Council, in their Public Department, dated 14th January 1780, ſtates the amount of bills drawn by General *Goddard* ſince his arrival at *Surat*,* to be - Sicca Rupees 32,49,090. 7. 1. - - - - - - - or CR^s 37,68,944 — —

*25 February 1779.

And ſpecie ſupplied him, *viz.*

By bills - - - - - - - - - - - -	5,00,000	
By the *Britannia* - - - - - - - - -	8,00,000	
And by the *Beſborough* - - - - - - - - -	2,00,000	
		15,00,000 — —

Beſides 5 lacks loſt on the *Stafford*.

By letter from the Select Committee of *Bombay* to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 31ſt December 1779, par. 35 and 76, it appears that General *Goddard* had been furniſhed by that Preſidency with - - - - - - - - - - - - 6,00,000 — —

See *Bombay* Sel. Conſ. 21ſt Septr 1779 - - Folio 440
26th Dec^r - - - - - - - 723

In the Eſtimate of *Bengal* reſources and diſburſements for the year 1780-81, the expence of General *Goddard*'s detachment is eſtimated at - - - - - - - - 36,27,518

Deduct Diſburſements on account of the Bombay detachment ſerving under General *Goddard* - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3,09,570

33,17,948 — —

C^t R^s - 119,89,401 15 10

See Appendix 377. Expence of Captain *Popham*'s detachment for 1780-81, eſtimated at - - - 11,73,743 — —

N. B. The expences of other detachments may be viewed in the Eſtimates for 1781-2, in Appendix 377.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Governor General and Council at *Fort William*, in their Public Department, 5th July 1779.

Governor General—The amount of the expences of the detachment under General *Goddard*, from the 30th April 1778 to the 1ſt of May laſt, is current rupees, 28,02,509. 15. 10. as I am informed by the following account from the Military Paymaſter General.

Honourable Sir,

In compliance with your orders, I ſend you annexed, an account of the monthly expences of the *Bombay* detachment, from the 1ſt of May 1778, to the 30th of April 1779.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) *Wm Pawſon.*

Calcutta, 5th July 1779. M^y P^y Mr Genl.

May 1778 - - - -	1,38,904	1	2
June D° - - - - -	3,17,587	15	1
July D° - - - - -	2,42,738	—	1
Auguſt D° - - - -	2,19,003	—	5
September D° - - -	2,13,761	1	11
October D° - - - -	2,33,589	6	6
November D° - - -	2,15,241	14	4
December D° - - -	2,31,745	—	9
January 1779 - - -	2,72,857	—	8
February D° - - -	2,35,684	13	4
March D° - - - -	2,46,662	3	9
April D° - - - - -	2,34,735	5	10
Current Rupees -	28,02,509	15	10

Extract of Letter from the Governor General and Council at *Fort William*, in their Public Department, to the Court of Directors; dated 14th January 1780.

Par. 44. The drafts made upon us by General *Goddard* ſince his arrival at *Surat*, have amounted to Sicca Rupees 32,49,090. 7. 1. beſides which, we have ſupplied him by bills 5 lacks, in ſpecie by the *Britannia* 8 lacks, and by the *Beſborough* 2 lacks.

45. The great diſadvantage ſuffered by the Company in the low rate of exchange obtained by General *Goddard* for his bills, ſome of which were drawn at 93, and none higher than 95 *Surat* rupees, for 100 *Calcutta* Siccas, induced us to put a ſtop to his power of drawing, and to adopt the remittance of bullion, as a preſent mode of ſupply, which may enable us to bring back the exchange ſomewhat nearer to its original ſtandard.

46. The united demands upon us from *Bombay*, General *Goddard*, and the different offices here, for the neceſſary charges of our own eſtabliſhments, added to the total loſs of 5 lacks in the *Stafford*, have ſo far dried up our immediate reſources, that we have been obliged to refuſe any further compliance with the application of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* for caſh, and to excuſe ourſelves from ſending the balance, being 5 lacks, which remained to complete the ſupply of 15 lacks, promiſed to them in March laſt.

APPENDIX, No. 379.

Extract of Circular Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to *Bengal*, *Fort Saint George*, and *Bombay*; dated the 24th March 1780.

YOU have been informed by our Secret Committee of the deſigns of the enemy to attempt the capture of our ſettlements. You will be vigilant to guard againſt ſurprize, and communicate theſe particulars to the Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's ſhips in *India*, and to every other Preſident and Council, ſo ſoon as poſſible. The French expect to be joined by the Marattas or *Hyder Ally*, at or near *Callicut*, who are ſaid to be impatient for their arrival. *Bombay* is probably their object. We moſt earneſtly deſire that peace may be ſpeedily concluded with the Marattas, on the terms of excluding the French from that ſide of *India*; and that our friendſhip

and

and connection with *Hyder Ally* may be ſtrengthened as much and as ſpeedily as poſſible, on the ſame terms.

We are
Your loving friends,
(Signed) *Wm James,*
Wm Devaynes,
Lau. Sulivan,
John Harriſon,
Henry Savage,
John Manſhip,
J. Purling.

Circular Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to the following Preſidencies; *Bengal, Fort Saint George, Bombay*, and *China.*

Encloſed we tranſmit for your particular information copy of His Majeſty's order in Council, dated the 17th of April inſtant, declaring that the ſubjects of the United Provinces are henceforward to be conſidered upon the ſame footing with thoſe of other neutral States, not privileged by treaty; and ſuſpending proviſionally, and till further order, all the particular ſtipulations reſpecting the freedom of navigation and commerce, in time of war, of the ſubjects of the States General, contained in the ſeveral treaties now ſubſiſting between His Majeſty and the Republic.

But although the ſituation of the affairs of this country is rendered thus critical reſpecting the States General; and although that Republic, by their failure in the execution of their part in the ſeveral treaties with *Great Britain*, have juſtly forfeited, and by his Majeſty's proclamation are declared to have forfeited, all particular rights and privileges which they were entitled to under the ſaid treaties; yet, His Majeſty ſtill conſiders them as in a ſtate of amity with *Great Britain*, only reduced by their own conduct to the ſituation of a neutral State, not privileged by treaty.

Upon this ground we caution you to avoid becoming aggreſſors in any act of hoſtility againſt the ſubjects of the Republic in *India*, and direct, that your conduct be ſuch only as ſhall tend to the preſervation of that good underſtanding which ſtill ſubſiſts between the two countries.

But at the ſame time that we recommend to you the moſt ſcrupulous attention to avoid any offence or act of aggreſſion whatever againſt the ſubjects or poſſeſſions of the Republic, you will moſt vigilantly guard againſt any conſequences which may eventually ariſe from the meaſures which His Majeſty has been under the neceſſity of adopting. We do not mean, however, that you ſhall take any other ſteps, in conſequence of this ſuggeſtion, but ſuch as ſhall be warranted by that line of prudence and caution which the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions and property ſhall fully juſtify, and of which the States General ſhall have no well-grounded reaſon of complaint.

We are,
Your loving friends,
(Signed) *Wm Devaynes,*
Lau. Sulivan,
George Cuming,
John Harriſon,
Ben. Booth.

London,
29th April 1781.

APPENDIX, No. 380.

Extract of general Letter to *Bengal*, dated 2d February 1781.

Par. 35. OUR Select Committee at *Bombay* have tranſmitted us a copy of the treaty which General *Goddard* has concluded with *Futty Sing*. By a letter from our ſaid Committee, dated the 16th of March 1780, we were led to hope for a favourable and ſpeedy concluſion to a negociation which had then been opened with *Madjee Scindia*; and although the event has proved otherwiſe, yet as *Scindia* has ſince experienced the ſuperiority of our arms, we think it probable that he may again be induced to offer or accept reaſonable terms. If not, we have little doubt of his being ſoon compelled thereto by the force employed on that ſervice, under ſo active and able an officer as General *Goddard*. Appendix. No. 380.

36. In the before mentioned letter, we find our Select Committee of *Bombay* had repreſented to General *Goddard* the importance of obtaining poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, and offered it as their opinion, that no other object could claim a preference to the General's attention, or bring the campaign to a more honourable and advantageous concluſion; they alſo flattered themſelves, that General *Goddard* having been reinforced with troops from *Madras*, would be able to protect effectually our poſſeſſions in *Guzerat*, and to undertake the ſiege of *Baſſein*; and if this plan of operations has been purſued, we hope it has been attended with the deſired ſucceſs.

37. It ſeems to be the opinion of our ſaid Committee (provided no efforts would be made by the French to retrieve their affairs in *India*) that the views of the Company, after eſtabliſhing ourſelves at *Baſſein* and ſecuring our ſhare of the *Guzerat* country, ſhould be merely defenſive.

38. No material objection to this plan occurs to us at preſent, provided due care be taken that our European enemies are prevented from regaining their influence, and precluded from ſettling in the Maratta dominions. It would however be ſtill more eligible if proviſion could be made for reimburſing the heavy charges incurred by the war; but if this be found impracticable, we think a relaxation in the demand for indemnification, would be more prudent than further prolongation of the war on that account.

39. We obſerve that when you firſt reſolved to ſend military aſſiſtance to *Bombay*, you underſtood the plan of operation to be confined merely to the objects of ſecurity to the Engliſh poſſeſſions in *India*, and to the excluſion of the natural enemies of the Britiſh Government, from any influence or connection with the Marattas, *and you made it an expreſs condition of your concurrence, that our ſervants at* Bombay *ſhould withdraw their forces ſo ſoon as the end required and defined ſhould be accompliſhed.*

40. Theſe ſentiments are conſonant to our own ideas, agreeable to the general tenor of our repeated orders and inſtructions, and conſiſtent with the intereſt of the Company. And although the want of ſucceſs in the *Bombay* expedition might render it neceſſary to carry your views further * than were firſt intended, and the honour of the Company, which had been deeply wounded by the diſgraceful convention of *Worgaum*, called for the ſtrongeſt exertions, as well to reſtore and preſerve the reputation of our arms, as to reduce the enemy to the neceſſity of liſtening to reaſonable terms of accommodation; yet, as we truſt theſe ends have been anſwered, and as the French are alſo expelled from *India*, we enjoin you to convince the Marattas, and all the native Powers around you, that our troops ſhall not be employed againſt our neighbours, unleſs they become the aggreſſors; and that we utterly diſavow all ideas of diſturbing the public tranquillity for the ſake of conqueſt.

41. Hoping therefore that our arms have continued ſucceſsful, that the acquired countries in the *Guzerat* province are properly ſecured, and that *Baſſein* is in our poſſeſſion, the reſtoration of peace becomes an object of our moſt earneſt deſire; and it will give us inexpreſſible ſatisfaction to find it eſtabliſhed upon a footing ſo advantageous to the Company. 42. The

* Powers to conclude a treaty with *Futty Sing* were not given to General *Goddard* till December 1779, which was nearly 11 months after the convention of *Worgaum*.

Appendix. No. 381.

42. The open and avowed predilection of the Court of *Poonah* in favour of French agents, was the only ground upon which we countenanced hoſtilities againſt the Marattas. Upon the removal of European influence we repeat our moſt anxious ſolicitude to have a ſpeedy termination put to the war; and as conqueſt is by no means our object, we deſire no other benefit from the late ſucceſs of our arms, than a full compliance with the ſtipulations of the treaty of *Poorunder*, and the ceſſion of *Baſſein*, as a neceſſary appendage to *Salſette*.

43. In order therefore to manifeſt to the ruling Powers of *Poonah* the ſincerity of our diſpoſition to be at peace upon honourable terms, we ſhall have no objection, on the above conditions, to reſtore the *Guzerat* countries, provided the ſafety and honour of *Futty Sing* be effectually ſecured, unleſs better terms have been or can be ſoon and eaſily obtained.

44. But if, contrary to our expectations, unfortunate circumſtances ſhall have rendered it impoſſible to make peace with the Marattas on the above conditions; and if ſupporting the war ſhall be found impracticable, without reducing our inveſtments, and depriving us of thoſe aids which *Bengal* has uſually furniſhed to our *China* trade; in ſuch caſe a ſpeedy accommodation with the Marattas will be neceſſary upon the beſt terms poſſible, taking care that the faith and honour of the Company be in all reſpects inviolably preſerved, and that effectual proviſion be made for the ſecurity of our poſſeſſions.

45. Our Select Committee entertained hopes that their views in point of territory might be eſtabliſhed in a few months; they therefore propoſed ſtating their ſentiments on the ſubject to you, and alſo reſpecting the great importance of reducing the charges of the war to more moderate bounds than could be expected whilſt the troops of other Preſidencies are ſerving with thoſe of *Bombay*; and to theſe important objects you will not fail to pay early attention. Indeed we aſſure ourſelves that the reduction of expence will appear to you ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that every ſtep will be taken which ſhall have a tendency to bring it within the moſt moderate bounds.

46. You will have been informed, that the forts of *Perſick* and *Bellapore* have been ſurprized by detachments from *Bombay*; that a conſiderable quantity of grain had been thereby obtained, of which they were in great want; and that a ſource of future ſupply is opened, which in the preſent ſtate of affairs appears of the utmoſt conſequence.

47. It is with pleaſure we remark, that although our ſervants at *Bombay* ſeem in ſome degree hurt by the independent powers granted by you to General *Goddard*, the moſt perfect harmony has nevertheleſs ſubſiſted between the General and our Select Committee at *Bombay*; and from this circumſtance, and their manifeſt diſpoſition to concur heartily in future operations, we venture to draw the moſt favourable concluſion.

48. It is impoſſible at this diſtance, and without more recent information before us, to be more particular reſpecting the ſituation of our affairs on the weſtern ſide of *India*. We truſt every thing in your power has been done to render the iſſue of the war adequate to the vaſt expence incurred; the ſafety of our poſſeſſions has we hope been effected, and there ſeems no doubt of the reputation of our arms having been fully reſtored, by the ſpirited, judicious, and very gallant conduct of General *Goddard*, and the army under his command.

APPENDIX, No. 381.

Bengal, Political, } Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William*, in *Bengal*; dated 11th April 1781.

Par. 1. IN our letter of the 2d February laſt, we gave you our ſentiments and inſtructions on the poſture of affairs on the weſtern ſide of *India*, ſo far as we were able from the advices then before us. Since that period, we have received a letter from our Select Committee at *Bombay*, dated the 25th of July 1780, and are thereby informed, that though the laſt campaign had not produced deciſive advantages, the ſuperiority of our arms had been evinced in the moſt honourable and ſtriking manner; and it will afford us infinite ſatisfaction, if the conſequences have a tendency to haſten the concluſion of a ſafe and honourable peace.

2. It is with concern we acquaint you, that by an intercepted extract of a gazette from the *Iſle of France*, information is received of *Hyder Ally* having in July laſt croſſed the Gauts, through the paſs of *Changama*, entered the *Carnatic* with a large army, defeated a detachment under the command of Colonels *Baillie* and *Fletcher*, and gained other advantages. The action is ſaid to have happened the 10th of September.

3. We have no official information from *Fort Saint George* later than the 3d of April: by advices of that date we are acquainted, that the Nizam had, in the ſtrongeſt terms, recommended to *Bazalet Jung*, to give the Guntoor circar at rent to *Hyder Ally*; that *Hyder* had actually invaded *Bazalet Jung*'s country, in order to force a compliance, and threatened entire conqueſt, if *Bazalet Jung* ſhould heſitate to renounce his engagements with the Engliſh; that *Bazalet Jung* (obliged to ſubmit to neceſſity) had deſired the march of our troops to be ſtopped, and poſſeſſion of the country to be reſtored to him: that our Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* had readily agreed to the former, but declined complying with the latter propoſition. It alſo appears that a ſpecial meſſenger had been ſent by the Select Committee to *Hyder*'s Court; but that *Hyder* was not deſirous of their friendſhip, nor did he treat Mr. *George Gray*, their meſſenger on that occaſion, with reſpect or civility.

4. From the above particulars, we conclude it poſſible that *Hyder* may have entered the *Carnatic*, and commenced hoſtilities with a view to diſtreſs *Mahomed Ally Khan*, who had been put in poſſeſſion of the Guntoor circar, and to compel him to relinquiſh ſuch poſſeſſion.

5. In our laſt advices we expreſſed our expectation that your conciliatory letter to *Hyder*, of the 17th of February 1780, would be productive of ſalutary effects; we would ſtill entertain the hope of your having been able to ſettle matters amicably with him; and in ſuch caſe direct that you renew the aſſurances given of our deſire to be on terms of cordial friendſhip; but under preſent circumſtances we can preſcribe no poſitive rules for your conduct in this reſpect.

6. If *Hyder* has really invaded the *Carnatic*, though the French accounts before us are probably much exaggerated, ſuch an event muſt nevertheleſs have produced great and immediate diſtreſs; and in ſuch caſe it will require your inſtant and powerful exertion to recover affairs from diſorder in that quarter. We have no doubt of your zeal and ability, and rely with confidence upon your beſt endeavours being immediately exerted for that purpoſe.

7. We alſo aſſure ourſelves, that harmony and unanimity in this inſtance will guide your councils, and give vigour and diſpatch to your proceedings; we particularly enjoin it; and the more confidently expect it, becauſe it does not appear to us that you have differed in ſentiment concerning thoſe tranſactions on the coaſt, which we fear have been the immediate cauſe of troubles in the *Carnatic*.

8. We have no doubt but *Hyder Ally* is in cloſe connection with the French: his conduct reſpecting *Mahie*, and on other occaſions, affords the cleareſt proof of his attachment to that nation. The French ſeem to have no other probable means of regaining conſequence and advantage in *India*, but by means of *Hyder*; nor can

we

we be of opinion that *Hyder* would venture to attack our poſſeſſions, unleſs aſſured of ſpeedy and powerful ſupport from *France*. One object unites the French with *Hyder*: if the Engliſh are depreſſed on the coaſt, the French gain their purpoſe, and *Hyder* becomes irreſiſtible in the *Carnatic*; all the country Powers, from *Cape Comorin* to the *Kiſtnah*, muſt fall a prey to his ambition; even the *Decan* would be at his mercy; the northern circars be loſt to the Company; and our troops, without the means of ſubſiſtence, might be compelled to take ſhelter within the walls of *Fort Saint George*.

9. It would be very deſirable, but perhaps not practicable, to detach *Hyder* from the Marattas, if a league offenſive and defenſive has really been formed between them; but we apprehend it would be leſs difficult to prevail upon the Marattas to quit their connection with *Hyder*: the alliance, on their part, is unnatural, except againſt the Engliſh, with whom their cauſe of quarrel is temporary. If *Hyder*'s force be now troubleſome, it may ſoon become dangerous; and if he has invaded the country with ſucceſs, we fear there will be no bounds to his ambition, nor ſafety but in his reduction.

10. If you ſhould find this to be the caſe, and a ſeparate peace with the Marattas can be made, which on any terms is preferable to the alternative of maintaining a war againſt the combined force of *Hyder* and his dependants united with the Marattas, you may then be at liberty to draw down General *Goddard*'s army from the northward, and, by well-judged and vigorous exertions, make ſuch impreſſions upon *Hyder*'s territories, as may reduce him to reaſon, and compel him to quit the *Carnatic*, in order to provide for the defence of his own capital, and thus pave the way to an equitable and permanent peace.

11. Theſe are our preſent ideas, if war with *Hyder* ſhall be found utterly unavoidable: but not knowing what events may have happened, we muſt leave it to your diſcretion on the ſpot, to determine how far they are to be adopted, as conſiſtent with ſound policy, and practicable in the execution; and we muſt alſo add, that a ſafe and immediate peace, both with *Hyder* and the Marattas, is to be your primary object.

12. In order, to the utmoſt of our power, to afford ſpeedy aſſiſtance to our ſettlement of *Fort Saint George*, we have applied to His Majeſty for a preſent reinforcement of troops and ſhips of war; and we have the ſatisfaction to acquaint you that his Majeſty has been graciouſly pleaſed to grant us an immediate reinforcement of 1,000 Britiſh troops for that purpoſe, which we expect to ſail for *India* by the middle of next month. Meaſures will alſo be taken to furniſh ſuch additional ſtrength, both naval and military, as the exigency of affairs will permit.

13. We have reſolved, in conſideration of the critical ſituation of the Company's affairs on the coaſt, to take off the ſuſpenſion of Brigadier General *James Stuart*, and to avail ourſelves, in the preſent criſis of the ſervices of ſo able and experienced an officer, by reſtoring him to his rank in the Company's ſervice at *Fort Saint George*, next below General *Munro*.

14. In regard to the political affairs of your own Preſidency, we are extremely ſorry to find that the Vizier's country has ſuffered ſo much from drought and other circumſtances, as to render it difficult to draw from thence the reſources which your neceſſities require.

15. We truſt Mr. *Briſtow*, who concluded the treaty with *Auſuph-ul-Dowlah* in June 1775, would arrive in *Bengal* ſoon after the date of your laſt conſultations; and as, in conſequence of our orders, he would alſo proceed immediately to the Vizier's Court, we entertain the moſt favourable expectations of his being able to conciliate the mind of the Vizier, and to aſſiſt him effectually in arranging and reſtoring his finances to a more flouriſhing condition.

16. We notice the repugnance with which you agree to enforce a requiſition for more than the amount of the ſtipulated ſubſidy; and we can eaſily conceive, that in all ſuch caſes, if the Nabob comply, it muſt be from a principle of fear, and with great reluctance. And for theſe reaſons, added to our former obſervations on the ſubject, we particularly renew our injunction, that every effort be uſed to reſtore and eſtabliſh peace with all your neighbours, on terms of the moſt perfect moderation, in order to be able to abridge your own inſupportable charges, and to relieve your friends and allies from additional expences incurred on account of the war; and alſo, that you may be able to exert your whole force againſt the national enemies, if the continuance of European troubles ſhall render it neceſſary. Appendix No. 382.

We are,

London, 11th April 1780. Your affectionate friends,

(Signed) *W. Devaynes*, *L. Sulivan*, *Jn° Woodhouſe*, *Jn° Michie*, *Wm James*, *John Roberts*, *Fran' Baring*, *Ja' Moffatt*, *Tho' Cheap*, *L. Darell, Jun.*, *J. Stables*, *Jn° Townſon*, *W. G. Freeman*, *John Harriſon*, *Cha' Boddam*.

Extract of circular Letter to the Governor General and Council at *Bengal*, to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, and to the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*; dated the 11th April 1781.

By the Court's letter of this date, you will be informed of the line of conduct to be obſerved reſpecting *Hyder Ally Khan*, if matters cannot be finally adjuſted without proceeding to extremities. We therefore enjoin you to loſe no time in preparing for the attack of *Mangalore*, and from that ſide of *India*, for the reduction of *Hyder*'s capital in the Myſore country, as the ſureſt means of forcing him to accept terms of accommodation ſafe and honourable for the Company.

And as we truſt matters with the Marattas will be ſettled, and peace reſtored between them and the Company immediately upon the receipt of the Court's preſent orders, if not done before, we conclude that the troops under General *Goddard* will be totally at liberty to act againſt *Hyder*; and, with ſuch other force as may be brought to co-operate, be ſufficient for every ſervice that ſhall be found neceſſary.

APPENDIX, No. 382.

Extract of general Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*; dated the 31ſt May 1781.

Par. 1. OUR laſt letters were dated the 11th of April, by which you are adviſed of the information then before us, reſpecting the irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, and our ſentiments on that alarming event.

2. By the *Trial* ſchooner we received, the 16th ultimo, ſeveral packets from our Governor General and Council, and from the late Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, confirming the accounts before received of the invaſion of the *Carnatic* by the troops of *Hyder Ally Khan*, with letters dated as follows, viz.

Public letter from *Bengal*, dated 26th Auguſt 1780.
Secret letter, 13th October, D° public D° 17th D° D°
Letter from the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, dated 15th October 1780. D° D° 29th November D°.

3. The immediate cauſe of this unfortunate war; the unprepared ſtate of the Government of *Fort Saint George* to reſiſt or repel the invader; the ſevere loſs ſuſtained by the defeat and deſtruction of Colonel *Baillie*'s detach-

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Appendix. No. 382.

ment; the retreat of the army under General *Munro*, and the future ſucceſs of the enemy, are events which have occaſioned univerſal conſternation and aſtoniſhment; and we now inform you, that a Select Committee of Secrecy is appointed by Parliament to inquire into the cauſes of the preſent war that ſubſiſts in the *Carnatic*, and into the preſent ſtate of our poſſeſſions in thoſe parts; alſo to make their obſervations thereon, and to report the ſame to the Honourable the Houſe of Commons.

4. At the earneſt requeſt of the Company, in the preſent alarming criſis, his Majeſty has been moſt graciouſly pleaſed to order that one thouſand regular troops, and two hundred recruits for the 73d regiment, ſhall embark on the ſhips now under diſpatch for *India*. The particulars of their embarkation, and other neceſſary circumſtances, will be communicated to you by *James Moffatt* and *Lionel Darell*, Eſquires, who are now at *Portſmouth* to ſuperintend and regulate the ſaid embarkation.

5. Reſpecting further ſuccours to be ſent to our ſettlements, and ſuch information and advice as require temporary ſecrecy, you will be addreſſed by *Laurence Sulivan*, Eſquire, our Chairman, and Sir *William James*, Baronet, our Deputy Chairman, who have been appointed a Committee of Secrecy, with like powers to thoſe veſted in the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, as adviſed in the Court's letter of the 11th of January 1781, and all orders and inſtructions given by our ſaid Chairman and Deputy Chairman relative to naval or military operations, muſt be obeyed in the ſame manner as though they were ſigned by thirteen or more of the Court of Directors.

6. We much approve and applaud the attention paid by our Governor General and Council to the Company's affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel:* the inſtant relief propoſed by the Governor General; his requiſition to Sir *Eyre Coote* to proceed and take upon himſelf the command of the army on the coaſt; the terms and manner in which the requiſition was made; the General's ready acceptance of a ſervice, big with difficulty and danger; and the concurrence of the other members of Council in the wiſe and active meaſures propoſed on that moſt important occaſion, do them much honour. From their future exertions, and the hearty co-operation of our other ſettlements, we hope the ſcene in the *Carnatic* has been, or ſoon will be, reverſed.

Extract of general Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*; dated 31ſt May 1781.

Par. 7. A few days ſince, we received a letter from our Select Committee of *Bombay*, dated the 11th of January 1781, by which we are informed of the reduction of *Baſſein*, with very little loſs, by the army under the command of General *Goddard*. The conduct of our ſaid Committee appears to have been judicious, and the behaviour of the troops highly ſatisfactory. In regard to the General, we have already given our ſentiments reſpecting the meritorious ſervices of that good and gallant officer, and we are exceedingly happy in the preſent opportunity of repeating thoſe ſentiments, and in teſtifying, as we now do, that we have the greateſt dependance upon his zeal and ability if warlike operations be ſtill unavoidable; and that he will contribute to the utmoſt of his power towards removing every obſtacle to a juſt, ſpeedy, and honourable peace.

8. As the fall of *Baſſein* was an event expected by our Governor General and Council, and by our Select Committee of *Bombay*, we hope, according to their own ideas, and agreeable to the tenor of our inſtructions of the 2d of February, that upon giving up other diſtricts lately obtained to the Marattas, *Baſſein* may have been preſerved to the Company; but we are nevertheleſs clearly of opinion, that if peace could not be re-eſtabliſhed with the Marattas without giving up *Baſſein*, and if their aſſiſtance in repelling the incurſions of *Hyder Ally* could be obtained by the ſacrifice of that fortreſs, in ſuch caſe *Baſſein* ſhould be forthwith reſtored. And indeed the ſtate of affairs at *Fort Saint George* by the laſt advices, is ſo very different from what we had reaſon to expect when we wrote the before-mentioned letter, that if peace be purchaſed by the reſtitution of *Baſſein*, and of other conqueſts made from the Marattas, *Salſette* and *Caranja* excepted, we are convinced that the abſolute neceſſity of the meaſure muſt have been evident, before it would be adopted, and in ſuch caſe it will have our approbation.

9. Our advices from *Ganjam* ſtate the apprehenſions which naturally aroſe upon the arrival of an army in that quarter from the Rajah of *Berar*. We have noticed the ſentiments and proceedings of our Governor General and Council reſpecting the deſigns of *Moodajee Booſla*, and particularly the examination of his Vackeel before the Board at *Calcutta*; and we hope it will prove, that the Rajah has not entertained unfavourable deſigns againſt the Company, but that it is his real deſire and intention to act the part of a mediator between the Company and the Marattas.

10. We remark with peculiar ſatisfaction, that our Governor General and Council intend to obtain a proper proviſion for the ſupport of *Ragoba* during his life. We earneſtly hope this point will have been duly attended to and properly ſecured, in caſe pacific arrangements may have taken place before the receipt of theſe our inſtructions.

11. For the moſt obvious reaſons we forbear at preſent to enter upon the further conſideration of the occurrences of your Preſidency in detail; we expect before the diſpatch of the October fleet to be in poſſeſſion of more recent advices, and ſhall not fail to give ſuch orders and inſtructions as ſhall then be neceſſary. In the mean time, we have the moſt perfect reliance upon your wiſdom, zeal, and watchful attention, to promote the welfare of the Company, and to guard againſt and render abortive all deſigns formed by the enemies of *Britain* to the prejudice of our intereſt in *India*.

Extracts of circular Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Governor General and Council at *Bengal*, and to the Preſidents and Select Committees of *Bombay* and *Fort Saint George*; dated 31ſt May 1781.

The Powers delegated to the late Chairman and Deputy Chairman, as adviſed in the Court's letter of the 5th July 1780, having been renewed and veſted in us, we addreſs you as a Committee of Secrecy accordingly.

By the *Trial* ſchooner we have received packets from our Governor General and Council, and from the late Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, adviſing us of the invaſion of the *Carnatic* by *Hyder Ally*. The immediate cauſe of the war; the unprepared ſtate of the late Government of *Fort Saint George* to reſiſt or repel the invader; the ſevere loſs ſuſtained by the defeat and deſtruction of Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment; the retreat of the army under General *Munro*; and the future ſucceſs of the enemy, are events which have occaſioned univerſal conſternation and aſtoniſhment.

As we write in cypher, we enter into no detail by this diſpatch. We however inform you, that a parliamentary inquiry into the cauſe or cauſes of the late misfortunes on the coaſt has taken place at the requiſition of Adminiſtration.

We exceedingly approve and applaud the ready attention paid by our Governor General and Council to the Company's affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel*. The inſtant relief afforded, and wiſe meaſures adopted at that moſt alarming criſis, do them much honour. From their future exertions, and the co-operation of our other ſettlements, we hope the ſcene in the *Carnatic* will ſoon be reverſed.

The principal deſign of this letter is to inform you what

what succours may be expected from hence, in addition to those already sent to *India*.

You will always remember, that our first and grand object is peace with the country Powers of *India*, upon safe and honourable terms. Our Governor General and Council must take the lead in all negociations, and direct or authorize the plan of operation for all our settlements; and all their instructions and requisitions must be obeyed.

We rely upon your hearty co-operation in giving effect to every measure adopted for restoring the public tranquillity, and for re-establishing the Company's affairs on a solid foundation, and shall write you more at large by the first sea conveyance.

We are

London, 31st May 1781. Your loving friends,

L. Sulivan,
Wm James.

APPENDIX, No. 383.

Letters from the Court of Directors.

Our President and Select Committee at *Bombay*.

1. YOUR secret advices of the 31st December and 16th March were received over-land in cypher. Transcripts were also received by the *Hawke*; and likewise your letter of the 30th April 1780, which arrived here the 21st instant.

2. For your further information, we transmit you a copy of that part of our letter to our Governor General and Council, which relates to the war carrying on against the Marattas; you will consider this letter in the same point of view as though the subject matter had been specially addressed to *Bombay*; and co-operate so far as depends upon you, in every measure that shall have a tendency to facilitate the restoration of peace, which you will find strongly inculcated in our letter to *Bengal*.

London, 2d February 1781. We are Your loving friends,

W. Devaynes,
Lau. Sulivan,
Jno Woodhouse,
Wm James,
Jno Michie,
Ben. Booth,
Thos Cheap,
L. Darell,
W. G. Freeman,
John Harrison,
George Cuming,
Richd Becher,
Evan. Baring,
J. Farling,
John Roberts,
Hen^y Savage,
Chas Beddam,
Jno Moffatt,
J. Stables,
H. Fletcher.

Our President and Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Par. 1. By the enclosed copy of our letter of this date, to our Governor General and Council at *Bengal*, you will be informed of the very alarming intelligence received by an intercepted packet from the *Isle of France*, respecting the invasion of the *Carnatic* by *Hyder Ally Khan*: to that letter we have stated our ideas on the posture of affairs on the coast, and on the general line of policy, which we apprehend it may be necessary to adopt, for curbing the ambition of *Hyder*, and restoring and securing peace to the *Carnatic*.

2. It is impossible for us in the present conjuncture to give decisive orders upon a subject of so great importance, of which we have no official information; the Appendix general outline given is upon the known attachment of *Hyder* to the French, and upon a supposition also, that he has actually commenced hostilities by invading our possessions, or those of our old and faithful ally the Nabob of *Arcot*. 380, 383.

3. You will observe by the general tendency of our instructions to *Bengal*, that our grand object is peace; and as our Governor General and Council must of course take the lead if negociation be necessary, so must they also direct the plan of joint operation for all our Presidencies, if war shall be unavoidable; and it is our order, that all their requisitions be, to the utmost of your ability, implicitly obeyed.

4. We have no doubt of your ready concurrence in such measures as the Governor General and Council shall deem necessary for the public welfare, and we rely upon your hearty co-operation with our other Presidencies, in giving effect to every plan formed, or to be formed, for restoring the public tranquillity, and for establishing a permanent peace with the country Powers in *India*.

5. You will learn, from our letter to *Bengal*, the steps taken for affording speedy assistance to our settlement at *Fort Saint George*.

6. We have resolved, in consideration of the critical situation of the Company's affairs on the coast, to take off the suspension of Brigadier General *James Stuart*, and to avail ourselves in the present crisis of the services of so able and experienced an officer, by restoring him to his rank in the Company's service at *Fort Saint George*, next below General *Munro*.

London, 11th April, 1781. We are Your loving friends,

Jno Moffatt,
Thos Cheap,
L. Darell,
J. Stables,
Jno Townson,
W. G. Freeman,
Jno Harrison,
Wm Devaynes,
L. Sulivan,
Jno Woodhouse,
Jno Michie,
Evan^s Baring,
Wm James,
John Roberts,
Chas Beddam.

Our President and Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Par. 1. By a short letter of the 11th of April, you were informed of the intelligence received by an intercepted packet, concerning the invasion of the *Carnatic* by *Hyder Ally Khan*.

2. Our said letter was accompanied by copy of our letter of like date, to our Governor General and Council, at *Fort William*, containing our sentiments relative to the general line of policy proper to be observed according to the information then before us, and directing your hearty co-operation with our Governor General and Council, in giving effect to every plan formed, or to be formed, for restoring the public tranquillity, and for establishing a permanent peace with the country Powers in *India*.

3. Since that period we have received by the *Trial* schooner, a very full and circumstantial account of all the disasters which have happened on the coast of *Coromandel*.

4. We have also received your letter, dated 11th January 1781, which brings us the agreeable and important advice of *Bassein* having been conquered, and of other proceedings on that side of *India*.

5. Being uncertain what may be the particular posture of affairs when the present dispatches shall reach *India*, we have again adopted the mode observed by the

Appendix. Nos. 384 & 385.

Court in April last, and herewith transmit you an extract of our present letter to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William*, on political affairs, which you will consider as addressed to yourselves, in all cases which require your co-operation with our said Governor General and Council.

6. We have no doubt of your zeal and activity in contributing to the restoration of a speedy, safe, and honourable peace, and shall only direct, that all instructions given, and requisitions made by our Governor General and Council, for the accomplishment of this desirable purpose, be duly observed and carried into execution.

7. *Laurence Sulivan*, Esquire, our Chairman, and Sir *William James*, Baronet, our Deputy Chairman, will address you on subjects which require temporary secrecy; and all orders and instructions given by them, concerning naval and military operations, must be implicitly obeyed.

London, the 31st May 1781.

We are,
Your loving friends,
(Signed) *L. Sulivan*,
Wm James,
Jm Woodhouse,
Henry Savage,
W. G. Freeman,
John Smith,
George Tatem,
Ben. Booth,
Joseph Sparkes,
Thô Cheap,
John Harrison,
John Hunter,
J. Stables,
George Guming,
W. Mills, Jun.
Fran. Baring.

APPENDIX, No. 384.

Letter from Court of Directors to *Ragoba*, dated 19th June 1781.

To *Mhu Rajah Ragonaut Row*.

Illustrious Sir,

YOUR letter addressed to the East India Company, which appears to have been wrote so long ago as the 24th day of November 1778, was delivered to us, the Court of Directors of the said Company, upon the 7th day of February 1781, by *Hermunt Rum* and *Monoher Parsee*; and the contents have been duly understood and considered.

In several letters to our principal servants in *India*, we have manifested the warmest attachment to your person, and attention to your interest; and it is with pleasure we embrace the present opportunity of assuring you, that our regard for your welfare can suffer no diminution.

As all circumstances respecting your situation are well known to our Governor General and Council, and as they are invested with full powers to adjust differences, and finally to conclude such treaties as shall be deemed proper with the Princes of *Indostan*, it is unnecessary for us to enter upon the several particulars contained in your letter; but we shall transmit a copy thereof to our said Governor General and Council by the first opportunity, for their information.

As the flames of war have been re-kindled and spread wide since the time of writing your letter, and as events, during a state of warfare, cannot be foreseen; we are not able, at this distance of time and place, to say how far it may be in the power of our Governor General and Council to gratify your expectations; but we have the particular satisfaction to find, by the last advices to us, that they express the strongest desire of obtaining a proper provision for you, and we earnestly hope it will in all respects be suitable to your dignity.

In testimony of the sincerity of our professions, we hereunto affix our Great Seal in the city of *London*, this nineteenth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-one.

APPENDIX, No. 385.

Extract of a Letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, and to the Presidents and Select Committees at *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay*; dated the 11th December 1781.

ADVICES from *Bombay* and *Bussorah* give us reason to hope, that the wise and spirited measures adopted by our Governor General and Council, and the speedy succour sent, have produced the most favourable effects on the coast of *Coromandel*, which entitles them to our repeated and warmest approbation. The success of General *Goddard* against *Bassein* is also an event which adds much to the honour of that invaluable officer, and of the troops under his command; we shall be exceedingly happy if the result has been peace with the Marattas.

A safe and speedy peace with all Indian Powers is our primary object: this must never be forgotten. No step must be taken, but such as have a direct tendency to accomplish this desirable object.

France continues vigorous preparations for *India*. Be well on your guard. The welfare of your country, and perhaps the existence of the Company, depends upon your vigilance, ability, activity, and prudence.

END OF THE SIXTH REPORT.

COPIES

COPIES of Two NARRATIVES from The GOVERNOR GENERAL to EDWARD WHELER, Esquire; relative to the AFFAIR at BENARES; and a Copy of a Letter from Bengal, in the Secret Department.

COPY of a Narrative from the Governor General to *Edward Wheler*, Esquire, relative to the Affair at *Benares*; dated the 18th August 1781.

The Honourable *Edward Wheler*, Esquire, &c. &c. &c.
Fort William.

Sir,

I ARRIVED at *Benares* on the 14th instant.—My transactions with the Rajah being of a most important nature to the present and future interests of the Company, I have determined to inform you of them without delay, in the order in which they have occurred.

The first step which I judged it necessary to take, as the ground on which my future proceedings with the Rajah were to be conducted, was to recapitulate in writing the several instances of his conduct, which for some time past have repeatedly drawn upon him the severe reprehensions of the Board; and to demand a clear and satisfactory explanation.—This paper I sent to the Rajah by the hands of Mr. *Markham*, who was directed to require an immediate answer.

In the evening his answer arrived. The following are copies of both.

"To Rajah *Cheyt Sing*,

"It is about sixteen months since *Lalah Sudamund*, "your Buxey and confidential servant, came to *Calcutta*, "charged with an express commission and authority to "make excuses for your past conduct, and to give me "assurances, confirmed by oath, of your future submis- "sion to my advice, and the orders of my Government. "As a test of your sincerity, I required your immediate "and unreserved acquiescence in the demand, which at "the same time was made to you, in the name of the "Governor General and Council, of the subsidy of five "lacks of rupees for the expences of the war.

"With this demand you ostensibly complied, in your "answer to my letter; and the Buxey promised me ver- "bally in your name, and on terms so strong as amounted "to the fullest assurance, that there should be no delay "in the payment. Relying on this agreement and pro- "mise, I gave orders to Mr. *Fowke*, who was then Re- "sident at this place, to receive the money, and remit it "to Colonel *Camac* for the pay of the army, which had "been ordered to march towards the province of *Malwa*; "and I made no other provision for it, such was my "confidence in your faith; but you deceived me; and, "after having made the first payment of a few rupees, "either consulting the temper of the times, or conform- "ing to a premeditated design, you by shifts and pre- "tents withheld the ten under, until the army, for whose "use it was intended, was reduced to the last state of "distress. Many hundreds deserted; and, had an enemy "at that time appeared against them, their total de- "struction had been inevitable.

"In all this time daily applications were made to you "by the Residency, and I wrote repeated letters to you; "but you paid no regard to either.

"Besides this, I required, in the name of the Go- "vernor General and Council, by letters, and ordered "Mr. *Fowke* to repeat the requisition in person, that you "should furnish a body of horse to assist and act with "the armies of the Company; and when Mr. *Markham* "succeeded Mr. *Fowke*, I gave him orders to repeat the "demand; which he did accordingly, with frequent "and almost daily importunity, limiting the number to "1,500, and afterwards to 1,000. To this demand "you returned evasive answers; nor to this hour have "you contributed a single horseman.

"I pass over other instances of your conduct, in which, "through the means of your secret agents, you have en- "deavoured to excite disorders in the Government on "which you depend; and your neglect of the duty "which you owe to it, and to the subjects of this Ze- "mindary, by suffering the daily perpetration of rob- "beries and murders, even in the streets of the city of "*Benares* itself, to the great and public scandal of the "English name, and in violation of one of the conditions "on which you receive the confirmation of this Zemin- "dary. But, as the two foregoing instances amount to "a direct charge of disaffection and infidelity to the Go- "vernment on which you depend, and happened at a "time in which it was your duty most especially to have "exerted yourself in the support of its interests, I have "therefore judged it proper to state them to you thus "fully in writing, and to require your answer to them. "And this I expect immediately."

ANSWER.

"I received your letter delivered to me by Mr. *Mark-* "*ham*, and I have understood every particular of its con- "tents. Sir, after the arrival of *Sheik Ally Nuchy*, I ob- "served all the orders which you sent me; and I re- "ceived the letter which the deceased Sheik brought "me, informing me that every suspicion was now com- "pletely removed from your mind, and that I must con- "sider you as formerly attentive to me. But I have not "experienced from you the same generosities as formerly. "I sent you repeatedly letters, representing to your con- "sideration my unhappy circumstances; but you never "honoured me with any reply. For this reason I sent "my Buxey *Sudamund* to your presence, enjoining him "to represent to you the firmness of my obedience and "attachment; to lay before you the particulars of my "situation; and to learn the disposition of your mind "towards me. He arrived accordingly in your presence, "and represented every thing in a proper manner. I "have never deviated in the smallest degree from these "professions; and the benefactions and civilities with "which you have honoured me, have given me the "greatest satisfaction; and I have considered you as "the source from which I derive the fulfilment of all "my wishes and desires. It is my firm hope that I may "be always favoured with your directions. In this manner "I complied, with the utmost readiness, with the order "you sent me for the payment of five lacks of rupees on "account of the war:—I sent first one lack of rupees, "with an answer to your letter; afterwards, having paid "to Mr. *Fowke*, the sum of one lack and seventy thou- "sand rupees, I sent a letter requesting a further allow- "ance of time to enable me to make some preparations. "To this I received no reply,—it being no time to delay. "Notwithstanding this, I was not a moment inattentive "to this concern, and as soon as my Buxey arrived, I "paid immediately the remaining part of the sum. The "remitting of this to the army did not depend upon "me; if any delay happened on this head I could not "help it. By besides the payment of the money, the re- "mittance

"mittance of it also to the army had rested with me, a "delay of this kind should not have happened. I have "enclosed in this letter a paper respecting the particular "sums which have been advanced, with their dates.

"With respect to the horse, you desired me, in your "letter, to inform you of what number I could afford to "station with you. I sent you a particular account of "all that were in my service, amounting to one thousand "three hundred horse, of which several were stationed "at distant places; but I received no answer to this. "Mr. *Markham* delivered me an order to prepare a "thousand horse. In compliance with your wishes I "collected five hundred horse, and a substitute for the "remainder, five hundred Burkundazes, of which I sent "you information; and I told Mr. *Markham* that they "were ready to go to whatever place they should be sent. "No answer, however, came from you on this head, and "I remained astonished at the cause of it. Repeatedly "I asked Mr. *Markham* about an answer to my letter "about the horse; but he told me, that he did not "know the reason of no answer having been sent. I re-"mained astonished.—With respect to the Sepoys, I re-"ceived first an order to station two of my companies, "which I did. I was then desired to give a tunkhaw for "the payment of the Sepoys, and likewise to pay the "Captain; which has been done every month.

"Excepting *Alaulah Beg*, who remains with you, and "his attendants, none of my people, either dependents "or servants, or others in any shape connected with me, "have ever gone to *Calcutta*. My enemies, with a "view to my ruin, have made false representations to "you. Now that, happily for me, you have yourself ar-"rived at this place, you will be able to ascertain all the "circumstances relative to the horse, to my people going "to *Calcutta*, and the dates of the receipts of the parti-"cular sums above-mentioned; you will then know whe-"ther I have amused you with a false representation, or "made a just report to you.

"I have given my Aumils most particular injunctions, "and have taken a penalty bond from them, that they "shall keep no thieves in their districts. What power "have they to act otherwise? But if ever a robbery or "murder is committed in the country, I have been care-"ful to impale or otherwise punish the culprit. If a "person having committed a delinquency should escape "to some other place, so as to elude all discovery, in that "case I am helpless; but to the utmost of my power I "endeavour to fulfil your orders. I have never swerved "in the smallest degree from my duty to you. It re-"mains for you to decide on all these matters. I am in "every case your slave. What was just I have repre-"sented to you. May your prosperity increase!

"Account of Five Lacks of Rupees advanced for the "Expence of the War.

"1st Shabaun	- -	100,000
"29th Ramzaun	- -	170,000
"7th Showal	- -	130,000
"18th Showal	- -	100,000
		500,000"

This answer you will perceive to be not only unsatisfactory in substance, but offensive in style, and less a vindication of himself than a recrimination upon me. It expresses no concern for the causes of complaint contained in my letter, or desire to atone for them, nor the smallest intention to pursue a different line of conduct. An answer couched nearly in terms of defiance, to requisitions of so serious a nature, I could not but consider as a strong indication of that spirit of independency which the Rajah has for some years past assumed, and of which indeed I had early observed other manifest symptoms, both before, and from the instant of my arrival here.

Under these alarming appearances of the Rajah's conduct and disposition, I conceived myself indispensably obliged to form some immediate and decisive plan for obviating their consequence, and for the preservation of the Company's rights and interests in this Zemindary. To have left him in the full exercise of powers, which he had notoriously abused, and which it was to be apprehended he would employ to the most dangerous purposes, was totally inconsistent with the maxims of justice and prudence. To divest him entirely of the Zemindary, though justifiable on the grounds stated above, would be attended with an appearance of severity, and might have furnished grounds for constructions unfavourable to the credit of our Government, and to my own reputation, from the natural influence which every act of rigour, exercised in the persons of men who stand in elevated stations, is apt to impress on the minds of those who are too remote from the scene of action to judge, by any evidence but of the direct facts themselves, of their motives or propriety.

Thus circumstanced, and attentive to these opposite considerations, I had drawn the following plan for my future proceedings.

I first directed the Resident to repair to the Rajah, who resided at his house, situated on this side of the river, at the distance of about two miles, and gave him the following instructions:

"*Benares*, 15th August 1781, 10 at night.

"To Mr. *William Markham*, Resident at *Benares*.

"Sir,

"It is my order, that you proceed early to-morrow "morning to the house of Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, with your "usual guard, and put him in arrest. You will require "his immediate submission, informing him, that you "act under orders given you by me; and in case of re-"fusal, you will wait the arrival of two companies of "Sepoys belonging to Major *Popham*'s detachments who "are directed to follow and assist you in the execution of "this service. Having secured the Rajah, you will keep "him in your custody until further orders.

"I am,

"Sir,

"Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) "*Warren Hastings*."

On the next morning Mr. *Markham* went, according to his foregoing instructions, and was followed by two companies of grenadier Sepoys belonging to Major *Popham*'s detachment. The Rajah quietly submitted to the arrest; and Mr. *Markham* returned to me with the following letter from the Rajah, leaving him under the charge of Lieutenants *Stalker*, *Scott*, and *Symes*. For the particulars which passed at this interview, I refer you to the following report, which Mr. *Markham* delivered to me on his return.

Letter from the Rajah.

"At this time Mr. *William Markham* being come to "me, has informed me that your Highness's orders are, "that I should remain under a guard. My protector, "I before represented to you, on board your pinnace, "that I was the servant of the Honourable Sirkar, and "was ready from my heart and soul. Whatever may be "your pleasure, do it with your own hands. I am "your slave; what occasion can there be for this "guard?"

"*Benares*, 16th August 1781.

"To the Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Esquire, Go-"vernor General, &c. &c. &c.

"Honourable Sir,

"I this morning, in obedience to your orders of last "night, proceeded with a few of my orderlies, accom-"panied

" panied by Lieutenant *Stalker*, to *Shewwallah Gaut*, " the preſent reſidence of Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, and ac- " quainted him, it was your pleaſure he ſhould conſider " himſelf in arreſt; that he ſhould order his people to " behave in a quiet and orderly manner, for that any " attempt to reſcue him would be attended with his " own deſtruction. The Rajah ſubmitted quietly to " the arreſt; and aſſured me, that whatever were your " orders, he was ready implicitly to obey: he hoped " that you would allow him a ſubſiſtence; but as for " his Zemindary, his forts, and treaſure, he was ready " to lay them at your feet, and his life, if required. He " expreſſed himſelf much hurt at the ignominy, which " he affirmed muſt be the conſequence of his confine- " ment, and intreated me to return to you with the " foregoing ſubmiſſion, hoping that you would make " allowances for his youth and inexperience, and, in " conſideration of his father's name, releaſe him from " his confinement as ſoon as he ſhould prove the ſin- " cerity of his offers, and himſelf deſerving of your com- " paſſion and forgiveneſs.

" Near a quarter of an hour after this converſation, " Lieutenant *Scott* arrived with the two grenadier com- " panies of Major *Popham*'s regiment, to whoſe and " Lieutenant *Stalker*'s care I left the Rajah, having given " them the following inſtructions:—That they ſhould " diſarm every ſervant of the Rajah's—that they ſhould " allow him any ſuch eight or ten Kiſſmutgars, for the " attendance of his perſon, as he ſhould approve of;— " that theſe men ſhould be ſhewn to the Sepoys, leſt " any deceit ſhould be practiſed; but that they might " indulge him in any requeſt conſiſtent with the ſecurity " of his perſon.

" I am now returned to acquaint you with my pro- " ceedings, and to receive any further inſtructions, if " you think it neceſſary.

" I have the honour to be,
" Honourable Sir,
" Your moſt obedient
" humble ſervant,
" *William Markham.*"

As the Rajah in the above letter had deſired that Mr. *Markham* might be ſent back to him, I was preparing inſtructions for that purpoſe, when I received another letter from the Rajah, of which the following is a tranſlation:

Letter from the Rajah.

" I am the ſervant of the Sirkar, and am ready from " my heart and ſoul in the performance of your orders. " —My honour was beſtowed on me by your Highneſs; " it depends on you alone to take away, or not take " away, the country out of my hands. In caſe my " honour is not left me, how ſhall I be equal to the " buſineſs of the Sirkar? Whoever, with his hands in " a ſupplicating poſture, is ready with his life and pro- " perty, what neceſſity can there be for him to be dealt " with in this way?"

From the apparent deſpondency in which theſe letters were written, I thought it neceſſary to give the Rajah ſome encouragement; and accordingly wrote him the following anſwer:

Letter to the Rajah.

" I have received your two arzies by the hand of Mr. " *Markham*, and underſtand their contents.—That gen- " tleman will wait upon you in the afternoon, and ex- " plain all particulars to you.—Set your mind at reſt, " and do not conceive any terror or apprehenſion."

To this I received the following reply:

Letter from the Rajah.

" Your gracious letter has been received, and has " made me acquainted with your commands. You " order that Mr. *William Markham* will come to me; " that I muſt not ſuffer any apprehenſion to diſtreſs " me, but remain at eaſe in my mind.—My protector, " wherever you ſpread your ſhadow over my head, I " am entirely free from concern and apprehenſion; " and whatever you, who are my maſter, ſhall as ſuch " determine, will be right."

At this time I had prepared Mr. *Markham*'s ſecond inſtructions; but before he could ſet out with them, intelligence came that large bodies of armed men had croſſed the river from *Ramnagur*, and had proceeded to the Rajah's houſe. What follows is a ſcene of ſuch horror, that it is with the greateſt reluctance I ſubmit to the painful duty of relating it: The guard placed over the Rajah conſiſted of the two companies of grenadier Sepoys, as above-mentioned, from Major *Popham*'s detachment, and commanded by the Officers already named, who were ſtationed in an incloſed ſquare, which ſurrounded the apartment where the Rajah was. The Reſident's guard had returned with him. It now appeared that theſe troops had taken no ammunition with them: Major *Popham* ſent another company of Sepoys, under an Officer, with ammunition, to reinforce and ſupport the firſt party. When the latter arrived at the Rajah's houſe, they found it ſurrounded, and all the avenues blockaded by a multitude of armed men, who oppoſed their paſſage. The minds of this tumultuous aſſembly becoming ſoon inflamed, ſome of them began to fire upon the Sepoys within the ſquare; and immediately, as if this had been the concerted ſignal, the whole multitude ruſhed in, and made an inſtantaneous and fierce attack upon the Sepoys, who, wanting their accuſtomed means of defence, were capable of making but a feeble reſiſtance, and fell an eaſy ſacrifice to the ſuperior numbers of the aſſailants, who cut almoſt every man of this unfortunate party to pieces. The Officers, it is ſuppoſed, were the firſt victims to their fury; but not until they had, by aſtoniſhing efforts of bravery, and undiſmayed amidſt the imminent danger which ſurrounded them, involved a much ſuperior number of their enemies in their fate. In this general report of them all accounts concur, though varying in circumſtances: I yield to my own feelings in beſtowing this juſt, but unavailing tribute, to theſe unhappy gentlemen. In the midſt of this confuſion, the Rajah found means to eſcape through a wicket which opened to the river; and the banks being exceedingly ſteep in that place, he let himſelf down by turbans tied together, into a boat which was waiting for him, and conveyed him to the oppoſite ſhore: thoſe who had effected his eſcape, followed him acroſs the river, in the ſame tumultuous manner in which they had aſſembled, leaving the party of our Sepoys which had laſt arrived, in the poſſeſſion of the houſe.

On the firſt intelligence of this commotion, I had directed Major *Popham* to repair immediately to his camp, which was about two miles from the Reſident's, and at the ſame diſtance from the Rajah's houſe; and to march inſtantly with the remainder of his detachment to the ſupport of the party. This order was executed with all poſſible expedition; but Major *Popham* arrived too late, and had the mortification to be a ſpectator of the effects of a maſſacre which he could neither prevent nor revenge —He returned to me immediately, and made the following report:

Report of Major *Popham.*

" Conſequent to an order for the detachment under " my command to proceed to the ſupport of the grena- " dier companies under Lieutenant *Stalker*, I carried it " with as much expedition as poſſible to *Adjet Sing*'s " palace, which I found to be entirely evacuated by the " Rajah's people, who were already landed on the op- " poſite ſide of the river.

" Of the two companies commanded by Lieutenant

" *Stalker* very few remained alive, and the majority of " theſe appeared to be ſeverely wounded. The bo- " dies of Lieutenants *Stalker*, *Scott*, and *Simes*, were ly- " ing within a ſmall diſtance of each other, ſhockingly " mangled, and without any ſigns of life.

" It may be neceſſary to obſerve, that Lieutenant " *Burrell* was diſpatched with one company of Sepoys " upon the firſt rumour of the Rajah's coercive inten- " tions, but the fate of the companies which preced- " him was decided prior to his being able to enter the " palace. There were, however, ſome of the Rajah's " people whom he effectually cleared it of. In his at- " tack he met with ſome loſs.

" My utmoſt endeavours have hitherto proved inſuf- " ficient to procure an exact detail of the killed and " wounded in this unfortunate tranſaction.

" I thought it neceſſary to leave a company with a " ſubaltern in the palace.

" *Benares*, " *William Popham*,
" 16th Auguſt 1781. " Major."

I cannot learn with certainty what is become of the Rajah, but the prevailing report is, that he fled from *Rumnagur*, his uſual reſidence on the other ſide of the river, in the middle of the night, and proceeded with his Zenana and effects to *Lutteefgur*, a ſtrong fort of his, ſituated about ten miles from *Chunar*. He was accompanied by *Sujan Sing* his brother, and *Mungar Sing* a relation and ſon by adoption of Rajah *Bulwant Sing*. He has alſo had the precaution to take with him *Rana Golabhooer* the widow of Rajah *Bulwant Sing* his father, her ſon-in-law *Durbijey Sing*, and his two ſons her grandſons.

In them he poſſeſſes every member of his family who can have any plea to diſpute with him the right of inheritance from his father Rajah *Bulwant Sing*, if that were ever a queſtion. His right to the Zemindary being derived excluſively from Sunnuds which his father never poſſeſſed, but which were firſt granted to *Cheyt Sing* by the late Vizier *Sujah ul Dowla*, through the influence of our Government, in the year 1773, and ſince repeated by ſimilar grants from our Government, when the ſovereignty was ceded to the Company by the preſent Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowla*.

I have made choice of *Baboo Oojaun Sing*, who held the office of Dewan during ſeveral years of the life of Rajah *Bulwant Sing*, for a conſiderable period ſince the acceſſion of the preſent Rajah, to adminiſter the revenues and government of this country, in the quality of Naib, until it can be determined to whom the Zemindary may legally belong, and who may be in a capacity to receive it.

To this effect I have cauſed a proclamation to be made through the city of *Benares*, and have notified it by circular perwannas to all the Zemindars and Aumils of the Zemindary.

To enforce the execution of theſe acts, to maintain tranquillity and order in the country, and protect the inhabitants, I have ordered one battalion of Sepoys from *Chunargur*, the remainder of Major *Popham*'s detachment from *Mirzapoor*, and a regiment of Sepoys from *Dinapoor*, to march immediately to *Benares*.

The detail of theſe proceedings ſhall be tranſmitted to you in a ſubſequent letter. I do not expect they will detain me here much beyond the time I had preſcribed to myſelf, which was about ſeven or eight days.

I have the honour to be,
With the greateſt eſteem,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Benares,
17th Auguſt 1781.

P. S. The delay occaſioned in copying this letter, from its great length, has afforded me an opportunity of contradicting the latter part of it; and I have now the ſatisfaction to add, that *Ranny Colabkooer*, together with her ſon-in-law *Durbejey Sing*, and his two ſons, are ſafe at *Benares*.

I have this morning received a viſit from *Durbejey Sing*, and his eldeſt ſon *Mejep Narain*.

(Signed) *W. H.*

Benares,
the 18th Auguſt, 1781.

A true Copy,
J. P. Auriol,
Sec^r.

COPY of the Second Narrative from the Governor General to *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire, relative to the Affair at *Benares*, dated 29th September 1781.

To *Edward Wheler*, Eſquire.

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour to inform you in various and ſucceſſive letters of my tranſactions, and of the occurrences which have befallen me ſince my departure from *Calcutta*, and eſpecially ſince my arrival at this place on the 14th of laſt month. It is my intention to employ the firſt hours of my leiſure in drawing up a detailed narrative of the latter for your information; in the mean time I ſhall continue to adviſe you, from time to time, of ſuch circumſtances of moment as occur in the courſe of daily buſineſs, both for your information, and for the means of obtaining your ſentiments upon them for my aſſiſtance and guidance. I deem it a misfortune, that not one of your letters, written with the knowledge of the late troubles, have reached me, and I much fear that many of mine may have miſcarried; for which reaſon, I ſhall cauſe to be tranſcribed copies of all written ſince the 16th of laſt month, and ſhall tranſmit them to you.

Leſt my letters, adviſing you of our late ſucceſſes, ſhould have been intercepted, I think it proper to repeat, in this the ſubſtance of them.

The arrival of the detachment from *Caunpore*, under Major *Crabb*, of the 10th inſtant, and of Major *Roberts* on the 13th, enabled Major *Popham* to take the field with a conſiderable force.

It was publicly expected that his firſt attempt would be made upon *Ramnagour*; but ſuch information having been given of the ſtate of the two fortreſſes of *Lutteefpoor* and *Patula*, as ſeemed to promiſe the certain and immediate reduction of thoſe places; he accordingly formed his army into two detachments, one commanded by Major *Crabb*, conſiſting of the firſt battalion of the ſixth regiment, the ſeventh regiment, the batalion of the Nabob's body guard, commanded by Lieutenant *Polhill*, with 6 ſix pounders, and one 5½ inch howitzer; and the other under his own command, conſiſting of the nineteenth, thirtieth, and twenty-fifth regiments, two companies of European infantry, the corps of rangers, and about thirty artillery, with 6 ſix pounders, two 8¼ inch howitzers, and an 8 inch mortar. The firſt detachment marched on the night of the 15th, by a large circuit, through almoſt impracticable ways: but the ſpirit of the Officers and men ſurmounted every difficulty. In places where the guns could not be drawn by bullocks, the Sepoys lifted them up the rocks; and at length, on the morning of the 20th, they arrived at the heights lying behind and above the fort of *Lutteefpoor*, at a place called *Lora*, which commands a paſs deſcending to *Lutteefpoor*, and reputed inacceſſible againſt oppoſition, but from above. The profound ſecrecy with which this expedition was undertaken, and to which the ſecurity of the enemy, in a region ſo unfrequented, not a little contributed, prevented any oppoſition to our troops in the different parts of their route. Their firſt movement only, but neither their ſtrength nor deſtination was known till their very near approach,

At *Lora* they met a body of 2,000 of the enemy, which

which they defeated and diſperſed with little loſs on our ſide, but on theirs of 200 men killed on the ſpot.—The next morning they took poſſeſſion of the paſs, and of the fort of *Lutteefpoor*, which they found evacuated.

In the mean time Major *Popham* marched with his part of the forces on the morning of the 16th to *Patecta*, a place of conſideration in itſelf, being a fortified ſtone houſe within a very high rampart, and a ditch of great depth, and the town which is of great extent ſurrounded by intrenchments.—Theſe being all obſcured from obſervation by trees and thick buſhes, he judged it not adviſable to attempt an immediate aſſault upon the place, which fortunately proved the cauſe of a concurrent ſucceſs in both enterprizes, almoſt in the ſame inſtant of time; for in the morning of the 20th he ſtormed and took *Patecta*, at the ſame time defeated and diſperſing two bodies of the enemy that made an attempt on his camp. And on the ſame day, and on the ſame hour, Major *Crabb* fought and gained the battle of *Lora*, which was the immediate and eventual cauſe of the capture of *Lutteefpoor*.

The news of theſe combined ſucceſſes alarmed the Rajah to ſuch a degree, that he inſtantly fled by a diſtant route over the hills from *Lutteefpoor*, which till that time had been his capital reſidence, regaining the road of *Bidjeygur*, the only direct way to it being through the paſs above-mentioned.

The conſternation of his followers was ſo great, and its contagion ſo rapid, that in a few hours the fort or palace of *Ramnagur*, and the fortreſs of *Suttuſgur*, were wholly abandoned and evacuated.

Major *Balfour* marched on the 22d, and took poſſeſſion of *Ramnagur*.

On the morning of the 25th I parted from the Nabob, who ſet out on that afternoon on his return to his capital. It is but juſtice to the Nabob to declare, that on the firſt intelligence of theſe troubles, notwithſtanding my repeated and preſſing injunctions to return to *Lucnow*, he proſecuted his march to *Benares*, with only a few companies of Sepoys and 100 horſe at that time attending him, and has in every other inſtance given the ſtrongeſt proofs of his fidelity and attachment. In the evening I departed from *Chunar*, and on the next morning arrived at *Ramnagur*. My ſtay there being unneceſſary, and it having been repreſented to me that my preſence at *Benares* would be a means of quieting the minds of its inhabitants, I accordingly returned hither yeſterday morning, and had the happineſs to find the city reſtored to a ſtate of perfect order and tranquillity.

I have iſſued proclamations offering pardon to all who ſhall quietly return to their obedience, excepting the perſons of *Cheyt Sing* and his brother *Sujan Sing*, whom their late rebellious conduct and their rancour manifeſted to our nation, in the deliberate murder of many of our ſoldiers, and even unarmed paſſengers who had the misfortune to fall into their hands, have precluded from every title to lenity.

The perſons ſtanding next in the line of inheritance of the Zemindary, were *Ranny Goolaub Kaower* the widow of Rajah *Balwunt Sing*, their daughter married to *Bauboo Durbijey Sing*, and *Bauboo Meyipnarain* their grandſon by the two latter. By the concurrence of the two firſt parties, and in conſequence of a written acknowledgment made by the Ranny of the right of her grandſon *Mayipnarain*, I have nominated him to the ſucceſſion of the Rauge, and have appointed the morning of to-morrow for his inveſtiture.

I have forborne any particular comments in this place, reſerving them, where they will be more properly introduced, for my more detailed narrative. Yet I cannot ſuppreſs, without a violence to my own feelings, the teſtimony which is due eſpecially from me to the unexampled zeal and public ſpirit of all our Officers, and the wonderful activity with which their qualities were diſplayed on the late occaſion. I have already acknowledged the early exertions which were made by Colonel *Blair* during my former ſhort and calamitous reſidence at *Benares*. Of Major *Popham* I cannot ſay ſufficient to expreſs my ſenſe of his ſervices. Though my letters were every where intercepted, Colonel *Morgan*, with a deciſion and ſolicitude that reflect equal credit upon his character, detached Major *Crabb*, with his party, to my aſſiſtance. On the firſt and inſtant rumour of my ſituation, Colonel Sir *John Cumming*, with the like alacrity, obeyed the order of his march to *Cawnpore*; as did Colonel *Ahmuty* in the immediate diſpatch of Major *Crawford*, and the troop of cavalry. The ſame ſpirit animated every Officer of every corps, and infuſed itſelf into the men under their command, with an effect ſo far exceeding the common occurrences of human affairs, that in the complete ſpace of one month, this great and valuable province, which had been unexpectedly and wholly loſt, was in ſubſtance wholly recovered to the Britiſh empire.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Benares, 29th September 1781.

A true Copy,
J. P. Auriol,
Secretary.

16th October 1781.

(Copy.)

LETTER from *Bengal*, in the Secret Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

1. WE avail ourſelves of the departure of His Majeſty's ſloop the *Nymph*, for the coaſt, to addreſs you this letter; and we have requeſted Sir *Edward Hughes* to forward it by the firſt proper conveyance.

2. In a ſhort time we propoſe to diſpatch the *Swallow* packet direct for *England*: by her we ſhall have the honour of communicating to you the fulleſt information regarding your affairs. We hope we are not too ſanguine in expecting to tranſmit to you then very ſatisfactory advices, and ſuch as may effectually relieve you from the anxiety neceſſarily created by the accounts which you muſt have lately received from this country.

3. On the 29th of laſt month Mr. *Macpherſon* arrived at the Preſidency, and next day took his ſeat at the Board.

4. Your Governor General has been for ſome time back in the upper provinces; his preſence was neceſſary there to effect meaſures, which ſhall be explained to you at large by the firſt ſafe opportunity, and which we doubt not will meet with your fulleſt approbation.

5. It is with pleaſure we inform you, that the dangers to which he was expoſed at *Benares*, on the 16th of Auguſt, have been happily counteracted; and that your intereſts in that province are now ſecured upon a ſolid and permanent footing.

6. For the particulars of the commotions at *Benares*, we beg to refer you to the narrative of the Governor General, which comes down to the 18th of Auguſt, and which we encloſe for your peruſal, though it was only drawn up haſtily by him, for the immediate ſatisfaction of the Board. We have had advices from him as late as the firſt of this month, when all was quiet at *Benares*; the new Rajah, the grandſon of *Bulwan Sing*, having been inveſted in his office; while *Cheit Sing*, in juſt return for his cruelty and rebellion, was at ſome diſtance from *Beechy Ghur*, helpleſs and unattended.

7. By the laſt advices from the Governor General, we have the ſincere ſatisfaction to underſtand, that *Madajee*

dajee Scindia had made offers for a ſeparate treaty and peace, which were accepted by the Governor General, who accordingly wiſhed to have a meeting with that chief; an event which, if it takes place, will probably lead to an immediate and general peace with all the Maratta Governments.

8. At all events, we wiſh you to reſt aſſured, that we are determined, without loſs of time, to accompliſh this neceſſary and moſt important object; nor can any one be more ſolicitous to effect it than the Governor General. Meaſures have been already adopted, which open the way to this event, and which place your intentions and directions in the faireſt and moſt honourable light to all the Powers of *India*. That harmony now reigns in your councils upon this ſide of *India*, which muſt be no leſs ſatisfactory to you, than ſerviceable to the operations of your Government, either in negociation or war.

9. Your preſent Adminiſtration of *Fort Saint George* enters fully into the views, and co-operates heartily with the wiſhes, of this Government; and we beg you to be aſſured, that if there is a power of legal or actual compulſion in our hands, no ſeparate or ambitious views of the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſhall be permitted to fruſtrate our determination to conclude a peace with the Marattas.

10. The relinquiſhment, if not formal ceſſion, of all the territories wreſted during the preſent war from the Marrattas, is not to be put in competition with the impending fate of the *Carnatic*, and the boundleſs expence of maintaining ſuch conqueſts.

11. The termination of the Maratta war muſt be the commencement of ſuch an attack upon *Hyder Ally*'s poſſeſſions along the Malabar coaſt, as muſt ſoon recal that bold invader from the *Carnatic*; enable us to conclude a general peace with the native Powers; and turn our arms with efficacy againſt our European enemies.

12. Unfortunate as thoſe miſmanagements have been, which left the *Carnatic* a prey to attack, and puſhed our arms upon the ſide of *Bombay* beyond the wiſhes of this Government, an experience may be gained from our diſaſters, which the prudence and ability of your leading ſervants, ſupported by your own well-weighed and decided authority, may yet turn to the perfect ſecurity of the intereſts of *Great Britain* in *India*.—If the conteſts in which we are engaged with the country Powers have not been ſucceſsful, they have opened to us a perfect knowledge of the dominions, policy, faculties, force, and views of thoſe reſpective Powers.

13. If we have not benefitted as uſual by our ſuperior diſcipline, we have aſcertained the cauſes, and have learned the remedy which we ought to apply.

14. If our expences abroad have been immenſe, the peace of theſe provinces has been ſecured, and the economy neceſſary in future is preſſed upon us by neceſſity.

15. If there has been an error in the extent of our ambition, the limits of it are now preſcribed—peace, moderation, juſtice, and the ſtricteſt attention to cultivate the returns of commerce, ought to follow; and ſhall, we truſt, be the conſequences of the military career that has been run by *Britain* in *India*.

16. But let it not be forgot, that amidſt all the miſmanagement of your different ſervants in *India*, and even in our preſent ſituation, two of the moſt important effects have been produced.

17. Our European competitors have been decidedly and we truſt irretrievably counteracted, and ſuch an impreſſion of our power has been made upon the country States, that if we act with them but upon the common principles of juſtice, they will not readily connect themſelves with our enemies, nor venture, unprovoked, to diſturb us in future.

18. As for our own parts, as your ſervants, we moſt ſolemnly pledge ourſelves to you and to our country, that to the utmoſt of our ability we ſhall endeavour to manage your affairs upon the principles of maintaining your faith inviolate to your allies and dependents; of defending effectually the dominions we poſſeſs, unambitious of extending them; of cultivating a general ſyſtem of confidence with the country Princes; and of retrenching every poſſible expence, and cheriſhing that induſtry in manufacture and cultivation which conſtitute the chief value of remote dominions to any State.

19. Theſe we conſider to be your own objects, and ſuch are the great lines of conduct which from the general ſpirit of your orders you have ever wiſhed your ruling ſervants to purſue.

20. But, Gentlemen, much depends upon your hearty concurrence and ſupport, unmixed with the influence of any prejudice, to enable your ſervants here to execute thoſe deſirable and great public purpoſes—And if ever there was a criſis, when the affairs of theſe diſtant dominions, blended as they are with the general proſperity of our country, calls upon the duty, ſpeaks to the affection, and appeals to the honour of thoſe who hold ſuch great truſts from the public, this is the criſis: we ſay no more upon this ſubject than that we feel its emergency, and that it is not only with the zeal of good ſervants, but with the grateful ſenſibility of good citizens, that we wiſh to diſcharge our duty.

21. Your Governor General has convinced us, that his utmoſt ambition is to unite with us moſt cordially in carrying on the public ſervice; it is from his experience, great knowledge, zeal, and ability, acting in harmony with our beſt endeavours, that we hope not only to reſtore your affairs to proſperity, but to eſtabliſh that proſperity upon a permanent and regular arrangement.

22. Our firſt care ſhall be to draw out with him a regular ſyſtem, *upon which we may perfectly agree*, to conduct your affairs in their two great branches of politics and commerce; a work which has never yet been formally adopted by your Adminiſtration, and afterwards ſubmitted to your approbation from the united voice of this Government; a work which is abſolutely as neceſſary in the guidance of great and various political affairs, as a plan of order is eſſential in the arrangement of the common tranſactions of life.

23. It has been for the want of ſuch a work or ſyſtem, that oppoſite intereſts have been purſued in your different Preſidencies, and that meaſures change with the adminiſtration of different men.

24. We ſhall be able to ſend you by the ſhips of this ſeaſon, an inveſtment to the amount of upwards of one crore of rupees; we are reſolved at every hazard of diſburſement to ſupply regularly this great ſource of the Company's ſupport. Sooner than it ſhould not be ſupplied, we would cheerfully forego our own allowances; and after giving ſuch an example to your ſervants, retrench every poſſible advantage they could ſpare. With the advances for the inveſtment, the productive induſtry of theſe provinces would ceaſe; without induſtry, cultivation would ſtop; which would ſpeedily end in the ruin and depopulation of the country. Our object in dwelling ſo forcibly upon ſo obvious a concern of your intereſt is, that it may ſtand in an equally ſtrong light, not only to your conſideration, but to that of the State at large, in every poſſible change of the public management.

25. Fortunately for the other Preſidencies, cultivation was never in higher perfection or more productive than it is at preſent in this country; there is likewiſe a proſpect of great increaſe, with more eaſe to the natives, from the preſent mode of collecting the revenue. In every new arrangement the ſatisfaction and ſecurity of the natives muſt be firſt conſidered; it is upon their happineſs a wiſe government will ever endeavour to eſtabliſh its proſperity. And whatever line the iſſue of war may leave as the boundary of our territories over all *India*, upon the eſtabliſhment of general peace, policy, if not juſtice, directs that our chief frontiers ſhould be occupied by allies, who have an intereſt in ſtanding between

us and the incurſions of enemies. and who ſhould be taught to feel that their arms were neceſſary only againſt thoſe enemies, and not againſt our ambition.

26. You will be pleaſed to obſerve, Gentlemen, that in this letter, expoſed to the various accidents of conveyance in time of war, we have given you only our general ideas; wiſhing to have a full communication of your ſentiments in return. We avoid entering into the particular detail of your affairs till the return of the Governor General and we diſpatch one of your packets. You muſt have more recent, and, we hope, more favourable intelligence from the coaſt, and even from *Bombay*, than any we can convey relating to thoſe Preſidencies. We truſt much to the good and able management of my Lord *Macartney*, and the gallant activity of Sir *Eyre Coote*; and we hope the repreſentations that have been ſent to the Government of *Bombay*, will recall them from their viſionary views of raiſing new armies, and embracing a more extenſive ſyſtem of war.

27. But whatever may be the ſucceſs of our arms upon thoſe coaſts, we are unalterably bent upon one ſyſtem of conduct, to yield what we can with ſecurity and honour to obtain peace, and to turn every poſſible ſucceſs to confirm it after it is adopted; we ſhall then be enabled to diſcharge gradually thoſe debts which war, when it is even ſucceſsful, muſt create, but which with its duration muſt accumulate very rapidly amidſt any ill ſucceſs.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble ſervants,
Edwd Wheler,
John M'Pherſon.

Fort William,
October 16th, 1781.

P. S. Since writing the above, and juſt as we were ſealing it, we have received information, though not officially, of the ſucceſs of your arms under General Sir *Eyre Coote*, againſt the main army of *Hyder Ally*, on the plains of *Arcot*, on the 27th of laſt month. We have every reaſon to believe the information true; and, in the fulneſs of our joy at ſuch an event, we cannot cloſe this diſpatch without indulging in the moſt liberal congratulations with our country on the repeated and moſt diſtinguiſhed national ſervices of Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*.

The importance of the ſervice which he has thus rendered to *Great Britain*, can only be equalled by the gallantry with which, amidſt the ſtorms of the monſoon, and in a very bad ſtate of health, he flew from the tranquillity of his official duty here, in October laſt; and both by his example as a ſoldier, and able conduct as a General, began what we hope he has now completed, the relief of the *Carnatic*. A member of this Board had an opportunity, in his way hither, to witneſs perſonally the many uncommon difficulties againſt which Sir *Eyre Coote* had to ſtruggle to effect this great and brilliant ſervice; and he has no heſitation in ſaying, that he is perſuaded no Officer but one of General Sir *Eyre Coote*'s attention to the native troops, and wonderful perſeverance, under ill health and every military diſtreſs, could have conducted himſelf ſo patiently and completely to the overthrow of the enemy.

My Lord *Macartney*'s aſſiduity, zeal, and exertion were equally conſpicuous, in collecting and forwarding ſupplies for the army.

We have, without the loſs of a moment, tranſmitted this news to the Governor General, and veſted him with full powers to turn it to the public advantage, in finiſhing a peace with the Marrattas, and completing the relief of the *Carnatic*, by directing the Preſidency of *Bombay* and General *Goddard* to raiſe enemies to *Hyder* in his own dominions. From *Benares* to *Bombay* letters may paſs in 28 or 30 days.

E. W.
J. M'P.

The End of the EIGHTH VOLUME.

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